[Senate Hearing 116-508, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1790
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
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PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
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APRIL 3; MAY 1 AND 8, 2019
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-155 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, JACK REED, Rhode Island
Chairman JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
TOM COTTON, Arkansas MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
JONI ERNST, Iowa ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RICK SCOTT, Florida DOUG JONES, Alabama
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
__________
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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April 3, 2019
Page
Missile Defense Policies......................................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 1
Statement of Senator Martin Heinrich............................. 2
Witness Statements
Rood, Hon. John C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy........ 2
O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United 7
States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command.
Greaves, Lieutenant General Samuel A., USAF, Director, Missile 13
Defense Agency.
Dickinson, Lieutenant General James H., USA, Commander, United 30
States Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces
Strategic Command and Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense.
Questions for the Record......................................... 64
May 1, 2019
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy...................................... 73
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 73
Statement of Senator Martin Heinrich............................. 74
Witness Statements
Lord, Hon. Ellen M., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 75
and Sustainment.
Trachtenberg, Hon. David J., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 83
for Policy.
Ray, General Timothy M. Ray, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global 90
Strike Command and Commander, Air Force Strategic-Air, United
States Strategic Command.
Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr. USN, Director Strategic 101
Systems
Programs.
Questions for the Record......................................... 125
(iii)
May 8, 2019
Page
Department of Energy's Atomic Defense Activities and Programs.... 139
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Deb Fischer................................. 139
Witness Statements
Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E., Administrator, National Nuclear 140
Security
Administration.
White, Hon. Anne Marie, Assistant Secretary of Energy for 150
Environmental Management.
Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for 157
Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration.
Questions for the Record......................................... 176
(iv)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 3, 2019
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Fischer, Rounds,
Sullivan, Hawley, Heinrich, King, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order. The
Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to review the
Administration's budget request for missile defense programs
for the next fiscal year and to discuss the associated policies
with our witnesses.
Testifying before us today we have the Honorable John Rood,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Terrence J.
O'Shaughnessy, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command and North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); Lieutenant General
Sam Greaves, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and
Lieutenant General James Dickinson, who commands the Army Space
and Missile Defense Command, as well as the Army Forces
Strategic Command and the Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Missile Defense.
Last year we bid farewell to General O'Shaughnessy's
predecessor, General Robinson, and I understand, General
Greaves, that you will be following her into retirement. I want
to thank you for your decades of service to this country that
you have sacrificed so much for, you and your family. We wish
you well. It has been a pleasure to work with you, sir.
I would like to thank the entire panel for being here
today. We look forward to hearing from you.
First I would recognize our Ranking Member for any comments
he would like to make.
Senator Heinrich?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
First I want to thank Senator Fischer for holding this
hearing, and let me also thank today's witnesses for
testifying. We very much appreciate the time that they took to
prepare for today's hearing and for the work that they do every
day for our country.
Now that we have the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR),
it's important that we take this opportunity to review the
fiscal year 2020 budget request to ensure that it's consistent
with the MDR and that it provides sufficient resources so that
our missile defense systems perform reliably and effectively.
We also need to continue to improve our sensor and
discrimination capabilities so that we have a better picture of
the ever-evolving threats, including hypersonic missiles.
We need to continue to conduct smart simulation and testing
before we commit to buying new technologies.
While we continue to improve our Homeland defense systems,
we should not take our eyes off the ball when it comes to
protecting our deployed troops and reassuring our allies and
partners. The demand for our combatant commanders for Aegis
ships, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot
batteries remains high. We need to consider how we can best
allocate these systems and effectively train the warfighters
who operate them, and to provide the protection that is needed
in today's demanding environment.
But what was most notable about the Missile Defense Review
is what it didn't do, since it failed to recommend any new
creative solutions for addressing the expensive shock doctrine
that we currently face. Simply put, the cost curve is not in
our favor.
The targets are extremely cheap, and our interceptors are
extremely expensive, which means we need to more aggressively
pursue new technologies and emphasize left-of-launch
approaches.
The Missile Defense Review also avoided proposing any
actions to defend against hypersonic missiles despite
repeatedly acknowledging the threat. So I look forward to
hearing about how we can, as a nation, move with a sense of
urgency to best address that threat.
Again, thank you for coming today, and I look forward to
this dialogue.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
We now turn to our witnesses for their opening statements.
I would remind you that your full statements will be made part
of the record.
Secretary Rood, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
POLICY
Secretary Rood. Senator Fischer, Madam Chairman, Senator
Heinrich, other Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on the Department's
missile defense policy, posture, and budget.
The Missile Defense Review, or MDR, articulates a
comprehensive approach to address the missile threat through
strength and deterrence and active missile defense systems. It
is based on a recognition that the threat environment is more
dangerous and calls for a concerted U.S. effort to improve the
existing capabilities for both Homeland and regional missile
defense.
The fiscal year 2020 budget requests $12 billion for
missile defense, which includes $9.4 billion for the Missile
Defense Agency, as well as other funding for the Army and Air
Force. These funds support improving the current system and
moving towards innovative concepts and advanced technologies.
Now, today more than 20 states possess offensive missiles.
Potential adversaries are developing sophisticated ballistic
and cruise missile systems with increased speed, range,
accuracy, and lethality.
Over the past decade, for example, North Korea and Iran
have accelerated efforts to develop and field missiles capable
of threatening United States strategic interests. While North
Korea has not tested a nuclear-capable missile in over a year,
it possesses a range of systems, including road-mobile
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), solid-propellant
medium-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.
Iran continues to improve its missile capabilities and
develop space launch vehicles which provide knowledge to
develop an intercontinental-range ballistic missile. Iran
already possesses the largest stockpile of regional missiles in
the Middle East and is now enhancing their precision.
We see the re-emergence of long-term competition with
Russia and China. Both of those countries are expanding and
modernizing a wide range of offensive missile capabilities. For
example, they are fielding increasingly diverse missile systems
and integrating those missiles into their coercive threats and
military plans.
Russia is developing the hypersonic glide vehicle, which
maneuvers outside traditional trajectories and typically
maneuvers in the atmosphere, and China is also developing
advanced technologies, such as maneuverable reentry vehicles,
as well as hypersonic glide vehicles.
As highlighted in the Missile Defense Review, a
comprehensive approach is needed to address today's complex
threats. Our focus is on a layered defense, with adaptable
systems to meet the changing environment.
Within the MDR framework, the key roles for missile defense
include: one, protecting the U.S. Homeland, our forces abroad,
our allies and partners; two, diminishing the benefits of
adversary coercive threats and attacks; three, assuring allies
and partners we will stand by our security commitments; four,
assuring our freedom of action to conduct military operations;
and lastly, hedging against future unanticipated threats.
Let me now turn to the missile defense capabilities,
posture, and budget that flow from our policy in the MDR to
counter these threats. Regarding our first priority, to protect
the U.S. Homeland, the United States is protected by the
ground-based missile defense system. The budget requests $1.8
billion for this system, which includes a number of
improvements such as: 20 additional ground-based interceptors,
bringing the total to 64; continuing development of the
redesigned kill vehicle (RKV); and continuing to build a new
missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska.
The budget also requests funding to field new
discrimination radars in Alaska and Hawaii, and extend
operations for use of the sea-based X-band radar.
The MDR also recognizes the need for improving our
capability to detect and defend against increasingly stealthy
cruise missile threats. This includes a phased effort to
enhance our ability to warn and defend against air-breathing
threats and cue our air and missile defense systems against
these threats. Funds for Homeland cruise missile defense in the
2020 budget request include $301 million for the wide-area
surveillance system.
To address the regional missile threat, our efforts are
focused on integrated air and missile defense to defend our
forces, allies, and partners against missile threats from any
source. General Greaves will talk about a number of the
programs where we have requested funding and the budget request
for them.
In addition to improving our legacy systems, the MDR calls
for pursuing a range of technologies and examining advanced
concepts and breakthrough technologies. We are requesting
funding for: additional space-based sensors; integrating space-
based kill assessment; operating and sustaining the space
tracking and surveillance system; developing defenses against
hypersonic missiles, including near-term sensor and command and
control upgrades; testing an SM-3 Block IIA capability against
an ICBM-class target; kinetic boost phase intercept using a
tactical air platform; and technology maturation initiatives,
including a neutral beam technology demonstration program and
continuing High-Energy Laser development and scaling, as well
as a study of space-based interceptors.
The MDR stresses the importance of working with allies and
partners and encouraging them to invest in their own air and
missile defense capabilities. The United States, for example,
is committed to completing the deployment of European Phased
Adaptive Approach. Phases 1 and 2 are complete and included:
stationing ships in Rota, Spain; positioning a TPY-2 radar in
Turkey; and deploying the first operational Aegis Ashore system
in Romania. Deployment of Phase 3, in Poland, for an Aegis
Ashore system is underway.
In the Middle East we are working with our Gulf partners.
We are also working and supporting Israel's programs. In the
Indo-Pacific region, Japan is perhaps the best example, where
we have developed the SM-3 Block IIA together with that
country.
So in conclusion, let me just say that our missile defense
investments and priorities focus on the concepts and advanced
technologies to ensure the continuing effectiveness of missile
defenses against capabilities of potential adversaries. By
doing so, we will strengthen our ability to protect the
Homeland, enhance deterrence, stabilize crises, better control
escalation, protect and assure our allies, and hedge against
future threats.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rood follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary John Rood
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department's
missile defense policy, posture, and budget.
The MDR articulates a comprehensive approach to address the missile
threat through strengthened deterrence and active missile defense
systems. It is based on a recognition that the threat environment is
more dangerous and calls for a concerted U.S. effort to improve
existing capabilities for both Homeland and regional missile defense.
The fiscal year 2020 budget requests $12.0 billion for missile
defense that includes: $9.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency;
$2.5 billion for the Army; and $100 million for the Air Force. These
funds support improving the current system and moving towards
innovative concepts and advanced technologies.
threat
Today, more than 20 States possess offensive missiles. Potential
adversaries are developing sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile
systems with increased speed, range, accuracy, and lethality.
Over the past decade, North Korea and Iran have accelerated efforts
to develop and field missiles capable of threatening United States
strategic interests. While North Korea has not tested nuclear-capable
missiles in over a year, it possesses a range of systems including
road-mobile intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, solid-propellant
medium-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.
Iran continues to improve its missile capabilities and develop
space launch vehicles which provide knowledge to develop an
intercontinental-range ballistic missile. Iran already possesses the
largest stockpile of regional missile systems in the Middle East. It is
now enhancing their precision while developing cruise missiles and
anti-ship ballistic missiles.
We also see the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by
revisionist powers in Russia and China. Russia and China are expanding
and modernizing a wide range of offensive missile capabilities. For
example, they are fielding increasingly diverse missile systems, and
integrating missiles into their coercive threats and military plans.
These plans support antiaccess/area denial, or A2/AD strategies, which
seek to deny the United States the ability to move forces freely to
limit or negate our ability to respond in a regional conflict or
crisis.
Russia is also developing the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which
maneuvers outside of traditional trajectories and typically maneuvers
in the atmosphere, (unlike traditional missiles on a predictable
ballistic trajectory), and China is also developing advanced
technologies, such as maneuverable reentry vehicles in addition to
HGVs.
missile defense roles, policy, and strategy
As highlighted in the MDR, a comprehensive approach is needed to
address today's complex threats. Our focus is on a layered defense,
with adaptable systems to meet the changing environment, enhanced
ballistic and cruise missile defense integration for more robust
capability, and pursuit of space-based capabilities and boost-phase
intercept capabilities.
Within the MDR framework, the key roles for missile defense
include:
Protecting the U.S. Homeland, our forces abroad, and
allies and partners;
Diminishing the benefits of adversary coercive threats
and attacks;
Assuring allies and partners we will stand by our
security commitments;
Preserving our freedom of action to conduct military
operations; and
Hedging against future, unanticipated missile threats.
u.s. missile defense priorities, programs, budget, and capabilities
U.S. Homeland Defense
Let me now turn to the missile defense capabilities, posture, and
budget that flow from our policy in the MDR, to counter the threats
I've highlighted. Regarding our first priority, to protect the U.S.
Homeland, today, the United States is protected by the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. The budget requests $1.8 billion for
this system, which includes a number of improvements such as:
Adding 20 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska,
bringing the total to 64;
Continuing development of a Redesigned Kill Vehicle for
improved reliability; and
Continuing to build a new missile field at Fort Greely,
Alaska.
The budget also requests funding to field new discrimination radars
in Alaska and Hawaii, and extend operations for the sea-based X-band
radar.
The MDR also recognizes the need for improving our capability to
detect and defend against increasingly stealthy cruise missile threats.
In response, we are bolstering our Homeland three defenses against such
threats. This includes a phased effort to enhance our ability to warn
and defend against air-breathing threats and cue our air and missile
defense systems against these threats. Funds for Homeland cruise
missile defense in the fiscal year 2020 budget request include $301
million for the Wide-Area Surveillance system.
Regional Defense
To address the regional missile threat, our efforts focus on
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) to defend U.S. forces abroad,
allies, and partners against missile threats from any source. We are
strengthening our regional missile defense posture by funding several
programs. For instance, we are enhancing the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense system by procuring Standard Missile (SM-3), Block IB and Block
IIA missiles and integrating the SPY-6 radar. The Department will also
procure additional Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
interceptors, Patriot interceptors, and the Army Indirect Fire
Protection Capability (IFPC) command and control system.
Preparing for Emerging Offensive Missile Threats and Uncertainties
In addition to improving our legacy systems, the 2019 MDR calls for
pursuing a range of technologies and examining advanced concepts and
breakthrough technologies. We are requesting funding for:
Additional space-based sensors;
Integrating Space-based Kill Assessment into the
Ballistic Missile Defense System;
Operating and sustaining the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System;
Developing defenses against hypersonic missiles,
including near-term sensor and command and control upgrades;
Testing a SM-3 Block IIA capability against an ICBM-class
target to develop the capability to add a layer to our defense system;
Kinetic boost phase intercept using a tactical air
platform;
Technology maturation initiatives include initiating a
Neutral Particle Beam technology demonstration program and continuing
High-Energy Laser development and scaling; and
A study of a space-based interceptors.
working with allies and partners
The MDR stresses the importance of working with allies and partners
and encouraging them to invest in their own air and missile defense
capabilities that are interoperable with U.S. capabilities.
Interoperable Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems can
take advantage of cost-sharing and help distribute the burden of common
defense. The budget requests funding for the Joint Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO), some of which supports
conducting evaluations and demonstrations of IAMD with regional allies
and partners throughout the United States Indo-Pacific Command, United
States European Command, and United States Central Command areas.
The United States also is committed to completing the deployment of
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the United States
contribution to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ballistic
missile defense in Europe. EPAA has three phases intended to address
the threat to NATO and Europe originating from Iran. Phases 1 and 2 are
complete and included: the stationing of four multi-mission Aegis BMD-
capable ships in Rota, Spain; positioning of a forward-based AN/TPY-2
radar in Turkey; and deploying the first operational Aegis Ashore
system in Romania. Deployment of Phase 3, an Aegis Ashore system in
Poland, is underway.
In the Middle East we are working with our Gulf partners who are
acquiring United States missile defense systems and we continue to
support Israel's efforts through the DOD-Israeli Ministry of Defense
Memorandum of Understanding that began in fiscal year 2019, requesting
$500 million for the Iron Dome, Arrow Weapon System and David's Sling
programs.
In the Indo-Pacific region, Japan is an example of mutually
beneficial burden sharing, codeveloping with the United States, the SM-
3 Block IIA. Japan also hosts two U.S. AN/TPY-2 X-Band radars that are
fully interoperable in a manner that supports both Japanese and United
States regional missile defense operations. Japan also continues to
make significant investments in its own missile defense capabilities,
highlighted by its decision to acquire two Aegis Ashore systems.
conclusion
Our missile defense investments and priorities focus on concepts
and advanced technologies to ensure the continuing effectiveness of
missile defenses against capabilities of potential adversaries. By
doing so, we will strengthen our ability to protect the Homeland;
enhance deterrence, stabilize crises, and better control escalation;
protect and assure allies and partners; and hedge against future
threats. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward
to your questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General O'Shaughnessy, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking
Member Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
I am truly honored to appear today as the Commander of the
United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American
Aerospace Defense Command.
As a warfighter responsible for defending the Homeland from
attack, I am truly grateful for the steady support we receive
from Under Secretary Rood, General Greaves, and General
Dickinson, and I appreciate the opportunity to appear with each
of these great partners today. I also thank you, ma'am, for
recognizing Sam Greaves' upcoming retirement and the great work
that he's done for us.
USNORTHCOM is responsible for the ballistic missile defense
of the United States, while NORAD has responsibility for cruise
missile defense over the United States and Canada. In an era of
rapidly evolving technology and renewed great power
competition, the importance of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's mission
to deter, detect, and defeat threats to the Homeland cannot be
overstated.
Our adversaries have engaged in deliberate, focused efforts
over a number of years to exploit our perceived gaps and erode
many of the advantages previously afforded by our geography and
technological superiority. As a result, it is clear that our
Homeland is not a sanctuary.
Revisionist powers Russia and China have given every
indication that their own security strategies are based on
holding the United States at risk with both conventional and
nuclear weapons, and they have signaled that we must anticipate
attacks against our civilian and defense infrastructure in the
event of conflict.
Russia has modernized its aviation and submarine fleets and
fielded long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar
detection. Russia and China continue developing and testing
hypersonic glide vehicles, and both have also established a
noticeably stronger foothold in the Arctic along the northern
approaches to the United States and Canada, well within the
striking distance of both nations.
Meanwhile, North Korea's stockpile of nuclear weapons and
ICBMs remain an immediate concern.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD's mission to deter our adversaries is
dependent on our ability to detect and defeat potential threats
to the Homeland, and I am grateful to the Subcommittee for your
strong support of USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities along those
lines of effort. Improving our ability to see and defeat
missile threats to the Homeland is among my top priorities.
Congressional support for fielding active electronically
scanned array (AESA) radars for our aerospace control and
warfighters and improving the capability and capacity of our
missile defense sensors and interceptors clearly demonstrates
our shared sense of urgency and resolve. In that same spirit, I
ask for your continued support as we improve our defenses
against new and emerging missile technologies.
We must take prudent steps now to ensure our next
generation defense capabilities to include a space-based
sensing layer are not late to need. That effort cannot start
too soon given that our adversaries are already developing and
testing advanced weapons specifically intended to avoid
detection in order to hold targets in the Homeland at constant
risk.
With these challenges firmly in mind, I sincerely
appreciate the much-needed predictability and stability that
came from an on-time budget in fiscal year 2019. I am also
grateful for the subcommittee's ongoing efforts to ensure that
we avoid the devastating impacts that a return to sequestration
would bring to the Department of Defense (DOD) in fiscal year
2020.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD work every day with our partners to
keep our citizens safe while confronting challenges emanating
from multiple approaches and in all domains. I especially want
to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the amazing
men and women in the National Guard who are great partners and
critical to our ability to perform our missions.
The threat to the Homeland from both ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles are significant and increasingly complex, but
the airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and
civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are deeply committed to
defending our nation, and I am honored to represent them today.
We have the watch.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to appear today as the
Commander of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--two complementary but
distinct commands.
USNORTHCOM is the Geographic Combatant Command laser-focused on
defending our Homeland from an increasingly assertive set of
competitors who are committed to holding the United States at risk in
multiple domains.
NORAD is the bi-national United States-Canadian command that
deters, detects, and, if necessary, defeats air threats to the United
States and Canada while also providing aerospace warning and maritime
warning. The six decades of NORAD's unmatched experience and shared
history are proving more vital than ever as we face the most complex
security environment in generations. This unique and longstanding
command serves as both a formidable deterrent to our adversaries and a
clear symbol of the unbreakable bond between the United States and
Canada.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority:
defending the Homeland from attack. Revisionist powers Russia and China
have changed global strategic dynamics by fielding advanced long-range
weapons systems and engaging in increasingly aggressive efforts to
expand their global presence and influence, including in the approaches
to the United States and Canada. Our competitors currently hold our
citizens and national interests at risk, and we must anticipate attacks
against our defense and civilian infrastructure in the event of a
conflict. As a result, it is clear that the Homeland is not a
sanctuary.
For that reason, improving our ability to detect and defeat cruise
missile attacks is among my highest priorities. Russia has made its
strategic intentions clear by investing heavily in long-range, low
radar cross section cruise missiles that can be fired from aircraft or
submarines against targets well inside the borders of the United States
and Canada. To safeguard our citizens and critical infrastructure, and
to preserve our ability to rapidly project power abroad, it will be
necessary to take deliberate and focused measures to improve our cruise
missile defenses.
These shifting global military and political dynamics will be with
us for the foreseeable future. Our competitors have fielded weapons
systems and employed new methods in a concerted effort to exploit
perceived vulnerabilities and erode our strategic advantage. The
successful defense of our Homeland today relies more than ever on
constant vigilance by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, tightly coupled with a
reinvigorated emphasis on close integration with our fellow combatant
commands, the intelligence community, and our allies and partners.
Collectively, these dynamics reinforce the importance of nuclear
deterrence to our national security, given that nuclear deterrence
backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy across the globe.
Should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always ready to
defeat any threat to our nations.
The threats facing our nation are not hypothetical; our
competitors' reach is now global, and they are conspicuously
undermining international norms and standards of behavior while
possessing the capability to strike targets in North America with both
nuclear and advanced non-nuclear weapons launched from well beyond our
territory. In light of this reality, the Homeland defense mission is
more essential than ever, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD must be energized,
proactive, and determined to actively shape our strategic environment.
Together with our Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and
international partners, we have taken active measures to ensure the
Homeland defense enterprise is globally integrated, well-exercised, and
positioned to take quick, decisive action to protect our interests and
preserve the ability to project all of the elements of our national
power. Should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always ready
to defeat any threat to our nations.
threat
Russia:
Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a
century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to
threaten the Homeland below the nuclear threshold. Russia continues to
hone and flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation
of advanced air- and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly
greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing
them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.
Since 2015, Russia has employed its new air- and sea-launched
cruise missiles against anti-regime targets in Syria, providing real-
world training for Russian crews and demonstrating its growing
precision-strike capabilities to the West. In a parallel effort, Russia
has implemented a modernization program for its heavy bombers that will
ensure their ability to perform nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and
strike missions in the coming decades.
Russian heavy bombers such as the Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK
continue to conduct regular air patrols in the international airspace
along the coastlines of other countries to underscore Russia's
capabilities. Russian bomber crews are demonstrating increasing
proficiency in their flight activities, developing a new generation of
air crews capable of employing this highly visible implement of Russian
deterrence and messaging in peacetime, crisis, and war.
Patrols by Russian military aircraft off the coasts of the United
States and Canada have grown increasingly complex in recent years.
NORAD fighter aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aviation
missions inside the United States and Canadian Air Defense
Identification Zones, and there is no indication that Russian
leadership intends to reduce the number of these missions in the near
future.
In addition to its highly capable cruise missiles that enable its
anti-ship and land-attack missions, Russia has introduced the
Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarine, which is armed with
advanced land-attack cruise missiles and is much quieter and more
lethal than previous generations of Russian attack submarines. Russia's
growing non-nuclear capabilities provide Moscow a range of options to
dissuade an adversary from escalating and to terminate a conflict on
terms favorable to Moscow, increasing the potential for miscalculation
or opportunistic actions.
Russia has demonstrated a willingness to conduct disruptive
cyberattacks and cyber-enabled influence operations against its
competitors, as it demonstrated during the 2016 election cycle in the
United States. In a crisis or conflict, we would expect Russia to
conduct cyber operations against critical infrastructure in an attempt
to compel de-escalation.
In the Arctic, Moscow is planning to deploy surface vessels armed
with the modular KALIBR-NK cruise missile system that will offer highly
precise land-attack capabilities and introduce a new cruise missile
threat from our northern approaches. Separately, Moscow continues to
bolster its military defenses in the Arctic with the deployment of a K-
300P Bastion coastal defense cruise missile system on the New Siberian
Islands, significantly increasing Russia's ability to defend and
control a large stretch of the Northern Sea Route.
Finally, Russia is developing multiple weapon systems specifically
designed to circumvent United States missile defenses and hold our
Homeland at risk. This includes the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM)-delivered AVANGARD hypersonic glide vehicle, which was
highlighted in a speech by Vladimir Putin in March 2018 and is expected
to become operational in the next few years, complicating our missile
warning mission.
China:
China is pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program
that includes a rapid expansion of its strategic nuclear capabilities
while working to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and
increase their ability to ensure a credible second-strike capability.
Over the last decade, China has supplemented its modest silo-based ICBM
force with dozens of road-mobile ICBMs capable of delivering multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles that could significantly
increase the number of survivable warheads available for a retaliatory
strike. During that same timeframe, China operationalized its first
class of ballistic missile submarines, adding a second leg to its
strategic deterrent. China maintains its longstanding no-first-use
nuclear policy, but its growing nuclear, conventional, and cyber
capabilities are significant.
China's military strategy and ongoing People's Liberation Army
(PLA) reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric
mentality, as evidenced by emerging doctrinal references to strategies
that would move potential conflicts away from Chinese territory,
suggesting that PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role
for their military.
On the economic front, China plans to invest heavily in
infrastructure projects in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative in a major
effort to develop stronger economic ties with other countries and shape
their interests to align with China's, simultaneously seeking to deter
confrontation or international criticism of China's approach to
sensitive issues.
In the cyber domain, Chinese leaders view computer network
operations as a low-cost deterrent that demonstrates capabilities and
resolve to an adversary and allows them to manage the escalation of a
conflict by targeting critical military and civilian infrastructure.
Ongoing military reforms are aimed at accelerating the incorporation of
information systems that enable forces and commanders to carry out
missions and tasks more effectively.
Advanced Threat Technologies:
Defending the United States and Canada against long-range weapons
systems capable of striking targets in the Homeland is a major focus of
both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Russian aircraft and submarines are now
armed with long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar
detection, while both Russia and China are developing and testing
maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. In the cyber domain, our
adversaries continue their non-stop efforts to penetrate defense and
civilian networks. Collectively, these advanced technologies could be
capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear weapons,
potentially affecting national decision making and limiting response
options in both peacetime and crisis.
North Korea:
After decades of research and development activity marked more by
failure than success, North Korea's ICBM program turned the corner in
2017 when North Korea successfully flight-tested multiple ICBMs capable
of ranging the continental United States and detonated a thermonuclear
device, increasing the destructive yield of its weapons by a factor of
ten. Following these successes, Kim Jong-un declared the completion of
his nuclear ICBM research and development program, implying the
production and deployment of these systems would soon follow.
Kim Jong-un developed these strategic weapons to deter the United
States from overthrowing his regime, and he almost certainly has plans
to use them against our Homeland should a conflict erupt on the
Peninsula. Meanwhile, North Korea's cyber capabilities continue to
grow, as does the country's willingness to employ them during
peacetime, as North Korea demonstrated by its cyber attacks on Sony
Pictures in 2014.
Iran:
Iran is not yet able to strike the United States with strategic
weapons, and its leaders have declared a unilateral 2000 kilometer
range restriction that limits its missile force to threatening only
regional targets in the Near East. Iran's SIMORGH space launch vehicle
has yet to successfully place a satellite in orbit, but its most recent
launch in January 2019 demonstrated continued progress on long-range
missile technologies. Although we have no information to indicate that
Iran intends to test and deploy an ICBM, the SIMORGH would be capable
of ICBM ranges if configured for that purpose, and progress on the
vehicle could enable Iran to field an ICBM in as a little as a few
years if its leaders chose to pursue that objective.
However, Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the
region and has expended significant resources on its space launch and
civil nuclear capabilities that could enable it to develop a nuclear-
armed ICBM relatively quickly if its leaders chose to do so. In the
meantime, Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks abroad via covert
operations, terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber capabilities. Iran
considers disruptive and destructive cyberspace operations as a valid
instrument of statecraft and a means of imposing costs on its
adversaries, even during peacetime.
defending the homeland
Homeland defense is USNORTHCOM's essential mission and the number
one priority of the DOD per the 2018 National Defense Strategy. In
light of the complex and significant threats to our Homeland,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD take assertive, proactive measures each day to
shape our strategic environment, deter aggression, and ensure that we
are always ready to defeat any adversary should deterrence fail. As the
Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I view everything the commands do
through the lens of Homeland defense, and I am committed to ensuring
that each of our missions help to deter adversaries, preserve decision
space, and maintain the ability for our national leaders to project
power and exert influence in the best interest of our nations.
In pursuit of their own perceived national and ideological
interests, our competitors have developed advanced capabilities and
demonstrated their intent to hold our Homeland at risk in multiple
domains and along numerous avenues of approach to North America. In
light of that reality, we simply do not have the luxury of waiting for
others to act before we formulate a response. Instead, USNORTHCOM and
NORAD work constantly to shape our theater while making it obvious to
potential adversaries that they will face overlapping dilemmas and
extraordinary costs should they choose to challenge us. This active and
continuous enterprise requires strong relationships and close
coordination with our fellow combatant commands, the military Services,
the U.S. Federal interagency community, and our international allies
and partners.
The diverse threats arrayed against the United States and Canada
challenge our defenses in a number of domains and along multiple
avenues of approach. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD work
around the clock to monitor those approaches and are ready to respond
at a moment's notice should our adversaries chose to challenge our
defenses.
Ballistic Missile Defense:
USNORTHCOM continues to prioritize our mission to defend the United
States against potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
attacks from North Korea and Iran, should Iran develop that capability.
I remain cautiously optimistic that North Korea can be convinced that
it is in their best interest to abandon its nuclear weapons and ICBM
programs. In the meantime, I continue to emphasize the necessity of
fielding improved discriminating radars, a more survivable sensor
network, and improving the reliability and lethality of our interceptor
fleet in order to remain well ahead of North Korea or Iran's capability
to strike the defended area.
I am confident in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
System to defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea
or Iran, if Iran develops an ICBM, but that confidence is contingent on
our continued pursuit of system-wide enhancements to outpace our
adversaries' rapid technological advancements.
The success of the Ballistic Missile Defense mission is also
dependent on strong cooperation between USNORTHCOM as the supported
warfighting command and the technical experts of the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA). The MDA Director, Lieutenant General Sam Greaves, is an
outstanding partner, and I am grateful to him and the entire MDA team
for their dedicated support of this enormously complex, no-fail
mission. I fully support MDA's plans to field the Long-Range
Discrimination Radar, Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar,
along with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle and a selectable 2- or 3-stage
interceptor booster. Additionally, I believe we must pursue space-based
sensors to detect and track advanced threats from Russia and China.
Each of these improvements to our sensor network and interceptor fleet
will help to ensure our ability to defend the United States against an
ICBM attack now and into the foreseeable future.
To counter the rapid evolution of our adversaries' missile
technologies, we will require advanced defensive technologies such as
space-based sensors and directed-energy missile defeat technology in
the near future. A space-based sensor network, in particular, will
provide far greater coverage, survivability, and persistence--all of
which are necessary to maintaining confidence in our ability to deter,
detect, and defeat missile threats to the Homeland.
At present, the DOD is striking an effective balance between
ensuring our ability to defend against current and near-term threats
while simultaneously investing in the research and development of
advanced technologies capable of defeating future threats. This vision
for meeting anticipated requirements is strongly articulated in the
recently published Missile Defense Review, and I fully support the plan
for defending the Homeland.
Arctic Northern Approaches:
It has become clear that defense of the Homeland depends on our
ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in the Arctic and
passing through the Arctic. Russia's fielding of advanced, long-range
cruise missiles capable of flying through the northern approaches and
striking targets in the United States and Canada has emerged as the
dominant military threat in the Arctic, while diminished sea ice and
the potential for competition over resources present overlapping
challenges in this strategically significant region. Meanwhile, China
has declared that it is not content to remain a mere observer in the
Arctic and has taken action to normalize its naval and commercial
presence in the region in order to increase its access to lucrative
resources and shipping routes.
I view the Arctic as the front line in the defense of the United
States and Canada, and as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities and
the Combatant Commander responsible for defending the approaches to the
Homeland, I constantly assess the changing environmental and strategic
conditions throughout the region--across borders and operational
boundaries--in an ongoing, active, and collaborative effort to mitigate
the risks associated with increased civilian and military presence in
the northern approaches to North America.
The effort to rapidly adapt to the evolving strategic landscape and
associated challenges in the Arctic includes a deliberate and ongoing
effort to fully assess our collective missions and associated
requirements in the region. As one key example of those ongoing
assessments, in 2018, USNORTHCOM planners conducted a Homeland Defense
Mission Analysis for the Arctic Region. This comprehensive, classified
assessment of our capability to operate in the far north revalidated a
number of known capability gaps in the region and provided an updated
overview of current and future requirements.
As confirmed by our Mission Analysis, civil and military operations
in the Arctic are impeded by limited communications capability, harsh
environmental conditions, and vast distances between population
centers. Improving communications and domain awareness in the region
are among my top priorities for the region, and the DOD and the
military Services have demonstrated their support of those requirements
through investment in programs such as the Multi User Objective System
(MUOS)--a satellite-based communications network that significantly
expands the ability of United States and Canadian assets to operate in
the far north.
To detect and track potential airborne threats, to include Russian
long-range bombers and cruise missiles, USNORTHCOM and NORAD both rely
on radar systems such as the North Warning System (NWS), a network of
aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada. In August 2018,
NORAD, working in close coordination with USNORTHCOM, the Canadian
NORAD Region, and the U.S. Navy's Naval Air Warfare Center, conducted
an operational assessment of the NWS against representative targets,
and the data collected from the test will inform the design for the air
domain defense of the United States and Canada for years to come.
Air Domain:
Variants of the advanced cruise missiles that could fly through our
northern approaches also present a threat along our coasts. Russian
Severodvinsk-class submarines are capable of firing low radar cross
section cruise missiles against critical targets along our coasts. This
emerging threat requires advanced capabilities to ensure surveillance,
detection, identification, targeting, and destruction to protect the
Homeland and key strategic targets in the United States and Canada.
The Homeland Defense Design will be a phased approach to employ
advanced detection and tracking technologies to defeat a cruise missile
attack against the Homeland. However, the rapidity of our competitors'
development of advanced cruise missile technology demands a continued,
aggressive, and focused commitment to ensure our ability to defeat a
cruise missile attack.
conclusion
Today and every day, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
standing watch over our Homeland. These dedicated professionals work
around the clock surveilling our skies, monitoring our oceans, and
ensuring that we are always ready to counter a staggering range of
threats to our Homeland, ranging from intercontinental ballistic
missiles and long-range bombers to lethal opioids and cyberattacks. The
strategic and technological innovation that will be required to defend
our nation in the coming years depends entirely on the quality and
experience of our people.
Today and always, our people are our strength, and I am proud to
lead the outstanding airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and civilians
of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While the threats facing our nation can be
daunting, I have absolute confidence in our ability to meet any
challenge and defeat any adversary because of the dedicated
professionals I am honored to lead. We Have the Watch.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
General Greaves, welcome.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF,
DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
Lieutenant General Greaves. Chairman Fischer, Ranking
Member Heinrich, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee,
good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to testify on
the Missile Defense Agency's budget request for fiscal year
2020.
Madam Chairman, thank you for those very kind comments at
the beginning of the hearing. It has been my distinct pleasure
and true honor to serve within our United States Air Force
these past 37 years.
As for the budget request, I am pleased to report that we
have nearly completed execution of the missile defense
enhancements funding we received in the fiscal year 2018 budget
amendment that provided funding to enhance the Department's
missile defeat and defense capabilities.
Once again, I would like to express my appreciation to this
body for its support in this process. In fiscal year 2020 we
will continue to leverage this funding to meet our nation's
critical missile defense needs.
I would also like to thank the thousands of men and women
across government and industry who work tirelessly every day in
support of our nation's ballistic missile defense mission.
Without question, they are the source of our strength and one
of the reasons the armed forces of the United States remain
unparalleled in the world.
Our budget request of $9.4 billion supports the President's
commitment to sustain, expand, and improve performance and
reliability of the nation's missile defense systems, and
reflects what was broadly articulated in the 2019 missile
defense review.
This funding request will continue development, rigorous
testing and fielding of reliable, increasingly capable advanced
defenses for the protection of the United States, our deployed
forces, and our allies and partners against current and
projected missile threats.
As part of our intensive engineering efforts, this past
year the agency began development of a high-fidelity, all-
digital, integrated ballistic missile defense system simulation
capability to support both developmental and operational
ballistic missile defense system assessments. This effort
integrates the best high-fidelity, all-digital models from each
of our ballistic missile defense system elements using an
integrated framework which is progressing towards the Missile
Defense Agency's first use in calendar year 2021 on the ground-
based midcourse defense program.
Program plans include the continued construction of 22
missile silos at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and the procurement of
an additional 20 ground-based interceptors for Homeland defense
upon completion of the redesigned kill vehicle development
program. The emplacement of the new interceptors will bring the
total number of operational ground-based interceptors to 64.
Initial plans were to begin fielding those ground-based
interceptors with redesigned kill vehicles in 2023. However,
during the redesigned kill vehicle design phase, I assessed
that we were unable to meet the critical entrance criteria for
the critical design review, resulting in a projected delay in
the program of up to 2 years.
Sensors. We continue to make investments in sensors to
improve Homeland missile defense. The Department conducted the
Sensors Analysis of Alternatives to assess the most cost-
effective options for enhanced sensor capability to increase
ground-based interceptor effectiveness, and highlighted the
operational value of placing additional discrimination radars
in the Pacific region.
With the addition of the long-range discriminating radar in
Alaska, the Homeland defense radar in Hawaii, and the future
Pacific radar, we will have in place a diverse sensor
architecture in the Pacific to provide an improved and
persistent midcourse tracking discrimination capability against
future threats.
The combination of high-speed maneuverability and
relatively low altitude of some of the emerging advanced
threats makes them challenging threats for missile defense
systems. A space sensor layer is needed since we cannot
populate the Earth and the oceans with terrestrial radars to
meet this need. The birth to death tracking that space sensors
can provide when integrated with terrestrial sensors will make
it possible to maintain custody of missile threats from launch
through intercept regardless of location.
On the advanced threat, we must also prepare for future
security challenges. Developing advanced missile defense
technologies to address emerging threats will remain a top
priority. The projected missile threats include new ballistic
missile systems, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic
missile capabilities that are now being actively tested by
other nations.
With this budget, we will fund software modifications to
the current ballistic missile defense system and further define
the architecture for future hypersonic defense demonstrations.
The agency is taking significant steps in understanding the
cybersecurity posture of the ballistic missile defense system
and the ability to defend against emerging cyber threats.
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the
Subcommittee, in closing, our fiscal year 2020 budget funds
comprehensive missile defense development efforts, including
several critical capabilities required by the warfighter. We
will continue to increase the reliability, as well as the
capability and capacity of fielded Homeland and regional
defense systems and make measured investments in advanced
technology to counter the adversarial threat.
Thank you once again, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Greaves follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Samuel A. Greaves
Good morning, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich,
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this
opportunity to testify before you today on the Missile Defense Agency's
budget request for fiscal year 2020.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget request of $9.431 billion
for fiscal year 2020 will continue the development, rigorous testing
and fielding of reliable, increasingly capable, and state-of-the-art
defenses for the United States, our deployed forces, and the forces and
territories of our allies and partners against current and projected
missile threats. The Agency's priorities for missile defense
development and fielding will remain as follows: 1) continue to focus
on increasing system reliability and sustainment to build warfighter
confidence; 2) increase engagement capability and capacity; and 3)
address the advanced threat. We will continue to collaborate closely
with the Warfighter and support the current and future needs of the
combatant commanders and the Services. Specifically, we will work
closer with them on the development, testing, deployment, and
integration of interceptors, sensors, and the command and control,
battle management and communications (C2BMC) system into a multi-domain
system for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
First, I am pleased to report that we have nearly completed
execution of the emergency appropriations requested in the fiscal year
2018 Budget Amendment that provided funding to enhance the Nation's
missile defense and defeat capabilities. I once again want to express
my appreciation to the Congress for its support in this process.
Additionally, we have made great progress since 2002 improving
missile defense performance, affordability, and reliability. The 2019
Missile Defense Review (MDR) underscores the evolving missile threat we
face and that missile defense must remain a high priority investment in
our National Defense Strategy. Indeed, the missile defense mission is
expanding to include non-ballistic threats. Aligned with current
national security and defense strategies, the MDR strengthens our
posture as we continue to make progress in the development and fielding
of a BMDS to defend the Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies
and partners, and it supports the critical need to pursue new concepts
and technologies to address tomorrow's threat. The MDR also underscores
our continued pursuit of cooperative relations with allies and partners
to field interoperable and effective regional missile defenses.
The current BMDS can defeat the current ballistic missile
capabilities of our adversaries, but we require additional capacity and
advanced capabilities to stay ahead of the evolving threat. The
projected missile threat is complex and volatile, and it includes new
ballistic missile systems, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic
missile capabilities, which are now being actively tested by other
nations. It is critical we continue to develop innovative and
breakthrough technologies to outpace rogue state offensive missile
capabilities against the U.S. Homeland.
Evolving regional offensive missile systems can threaten U.S.
forces abroad, allies, and international partners, and so we also must
continue to modernize U.S. regional missile defenses. We have several
new technology efforts to improve discrimination capabilities and
deliver space sensors to improve the ability of the system to conduct
kill assessment following engagements. MDA also is continuing efforts
to develop scalable, efficient, and compact high-energy lasers for
potential use against threat missiles in the boost phase of flight.
In light of these realities in the current security environment,
MDA understands the importance of innovating, developing, and
delivering new missile defense capabilities quickly, accelerating where
possible missile defense acquisition timelines while adhering to sound
acquisition principles. U.S. missile defenses must be responsive to
existing and new threats and leverage new approaches to the Homeland
and regional defensive missions by delivering capabilities faster,
learning from failures to make rapid adjustments, and swiftly adapting
our systems once they are fielded.
Madam Chairman, I would like to recognize the personnel at MDA as
being among the most skilled and dedicated in the Nation. Additionally,
the Nation's preeminent Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (FFRDCs) and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) are
integral partners providing technical depth, innovation, engineering
excellence, and core competencies that are critical to providing
capability and capacity to the warfighter in an expedited manner.
Working together with our partners in the Services, allies, and
industry, this highly capable workforce makes it possible to develop
and deliver the effective and reliable defenses we need to counter the
proliferating missile threat.
missile threat
Nearly all of our adversaries are devising various means to
complicate missile defense operations. Missile defense countermeasures
continue to be developed and fielded. Increasingly threat missiles are
displaying maneuver capabilities such as maneuvering reentry vehicles
(MaRV). Future supersonic and hypersonic powered cruise missiles may be
launched from aircraft or by large rocket boosters that have
traditionally been associated with ballistic missiles. Hypersonic glide
vehicles are being developed as a new type of ballistic missile
payload. The combination of high speed, maneuverability, and relatively
low altitude makes them challenging targets for missile defense
systems.
In 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted over 40 launches of missile
systems of all ranges; this included two new intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles (ICBM). As configured, the Hwasong-14 ICBM can reach
North America, and the Hwasong-15 ICBM can reach the Continental United
States. Pyongyang flew two Hwasong-12 Intermediate-Range Ballistic
Missiles (IRBMs) over Japan in 2017, placing the territory and
population of our allies at potential risk from falling missile debris.
The second of these tests demonstrated a capability to reach over 3,700
kilometers, which can range beyond Guam. North Korea twice flight-
tested a solid-propellant Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), which
is capable of reaching Japan. This advancement is significant because
solid-propellant missiles can be prepared for launch more rapidly than
liquid-propellant systems, which challenges U.S. pre-launch counter
missile operations. North Korea remains capable today of conducting
additional missile launches and further strategic-weapon testing.
Iran has ambitious ballistic missile and space launch development
programs and continues to attempt to increase the lethality of its
ballistic missile force. Iran is fielding increased numbers of theater
ballistic missiles and improving its existing inventory with MaRVs,
submunition payloads, and multiple seekers that enable anti-ship
missions. Iran's ballistic missiles are capable of striking targets
throughout the region, ranging as far as southeastern Europe. Within
the Middle East, Iran has conducted missile strikes on targets in Iraq
and Syria. It continues to proliferate ballistic missiles to states and
non-state groups, such as the Huthi rebels in Yemen. Iran's ongoing
missile tests demonstrate its desire to increase the accuracy and
effectiveness of its capabilities. Continued investments in its space
launch vehicle program also have been notable. Iran's July 2017 launch
of a Simorgh space launch vehicle demonstrated technologies that are
virtually identical and interchangeable with those used in ballistic
missiles, in particular ICBMs.
increasing system reliability through testing, warfighter
collaboration, and cybersecurity
MDA continues to enhance the reliability and functionality of
current missile defense systems, especially the performance of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs)
and Aegis BMD Weapon System/Standard Missile (SM)-3, build the
confidence of Warfighters in the BMDS, and reduce the number of
interceptors needed to defeat in-flight ballistic missile threats.
System Reliability
MDA executes a continuous program to improve system reliability and
manage service life of BMDS components. For example, we have
implemented a series of upgrades to increase the overall reliability of
Homeland missile defenses. Recent improvements to the GMD ground system
architecture replaced a number of obsolete components and the original
Command and Launch Equipment with a GMD Maintenance Manager, increased
system redundancy, and enhanced cyber resiliency. The GMD program also
has advanced GBI stockpile reliability. In prior years, two GBIs were
removed from the fleet, inspected and tested to gain understanding of
how GBIs age in the silos. Another GBI will be similarly tested this
year. This testing will enable service life extension for the GBI
fleet. MDA also pursues reliability improvements through our
development activities. We measure availability and reliability data in
the field and target improvements in the GBIs and GMD ground system
development programs. A key delivery this year was the Ground System
7A.0.1 software, which eliminated cyber vulnerabilities and also
improved redundancy for the Warfighter. Key future reliability
improvements include delivering interceptors with Redesigned Kill
Vehicles (RKVs) and upgrading the GMD Communications Network and launch
support equipment.
We also continue to improve the system and missile reliability of
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). For example, improvements to the
Aegis Weapon System with the Aegis Baseline (BL) 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1)
upgrade enhances reliability and improves cybersecurity. We conducted
several successful ground and flight tests in fiscal year 2018 of Aegis
BL 9.C2.0 to demonstrate these enhancements.
We continue to improve the system reliability of the seven Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries that have been delivered
to the Army's inventory, including those deployed to Guam and United
States Forces Korea. Improvements to THAAD include software upgrades
for the batteries and the Army's THAAD Institutional Training Base to
improve cybersecurity and system performance against current and
emerging threats. We conducted FTX-35 and numerous ground tests
demonstrating improved reliability in the interoperability between and
THAAD and the Patriot weapon systems.
Missile Defense Testing
MDA continues to execute a robust and aggressive test program that
conducts meaningful missile defense testing. These tests demonstrate
BMDS capabilities and provide confidence to combatant commanders in the
capabilities being delivered. We remain committed to ``fly before you
buy'' through collaboration with
independent testers within the Department--the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Developmental Test & Evaluation; Combatant Commands; the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense; Service
Operational Test Agencies (OTA); and the Joint Interoperability Test
Command--to develop the Agency's strategic test program
as documented in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). The IMTP
provides a flight-, ground-, and cyber-test program, to include the
rigorous modeling and simulation (M&S), systems engineering and
validation, and verification and analysis necessary to demonstrate and
deliver proven integrated capabilities against the evolving threat.
Tests comprised of multiple shooters, sensors, and command and control
assets, weapon system improved functionality, and evolving targets
drive the increasing complexity of our test program. We are using more
threat-representative targets, longer-range targets, and simultaneous
target launches in our test events. In addition, we are increasing our
cybersecurity and international testing to execute a robust, cost-
effective test program.
Our system ground tests are the primary source for system
performance data, and they test our capability across a wide range of
threats and environments that flight tests cannot replicate affordably.
MDA and the BMDS OTA Team are making significant progress accrediting
the ground test M&S to support developmental and operational
assessments. The BMDS OTA Team, which provides an independent
operational assessment of the BMDS, relies heavily on the MDA ground
test program to independently assess MDA's operational capability.
Ground tests allow analysts to characterize BMDS performance under
varying conditions, with unconstrained red and blue force limitations,
and without the safety, fiscal, and hardware availability limitations
of flight-testing. Additionally, with Warfighters on console, they are
able to use ground tests to refine Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
All ground test data are used to inform DOT&E BMDS capability
assessments.
In addition to 17 element-level ground tests, we conducted six
developmental and operational system-level ground tests from April 2018
to present. There are four additional system-level ground tests
scheduled for fiscal year 2019 and 10 more planned for fiscal year
2020. Since April 2018, we also conducted or participated in more than
25 multi-event exercises and wargames, which are critical to the
reliability and performance assessments of the Combatant Commands and
the intensive engineering efforts across the Agency.
In fiscal year 2018, the Agency began development of a high-
fidelity, all-digital, integrated BMDS simulation to support both
developmental and operational BMDS assessments. This effort integrates
the best high-fidelity, all-digital models from each BMDS element using
an integrating framework that manages time and the distribution of
stimulus and is progressing towards MDA's first use in Calendar Year
(CY) 2021.
Beginning in fiscal year 2019, we are undertaking an across-the-
board re-architecture of the M&S used in ground tests to address
current limitations. With incremental deliveries scheduled over the
next 5 years, this effort will improve every aspect of ground test M&S,
including accuracy, efficiency, capacity, and credibility. By
streamlining the interfaces between models, we will improve the speed
with which we can integrate the BMDS and reduce the likelihood of
integration errors.
Flight testing provides data for M&S and demonstrates the end-to-
end performance functions of the operational system that ground testing
cannot address. One of the key attributes of each flight test is
combining the system under test with the Warfighters who plan to
operate the system in wartime under operationally realistic conditions.
We also work closely with our allies to demonstrate the integration and
interoperability of BMD capabilities prior to fielding. From April 2018
to present we have executed nine flight tests. For the remainder of
fiscal year 2019, we will conduct 10 additional flight tests. Recently,
on March 25, 2019, we successfully executed the first salvo test using
the GMD weapon system. We will conduct 14 flight tests in fiscal year
2020, to include additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
and Patriot integration tests in support of the USFK JEON; a Ground-
based Midcourse Defense (GM) Booster Vehicle Test (BVT) flight test of
the 2-/3-stage selectable GBI; and the first Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA
test against an ICBM-class target. The Agency is also conducting
detailed planning to execute the second operational test of Regional/
Theater Increment 5 air and missile defense system capabilities; it
will be the largest air and missile defense live-fire test in history.
Cybersecurity
MDA remains vigilant of the growing cyber threat and we continue to
work aggressively to ensure the Nation's missile defenses are hardened,
resilient, and able to operate in a highly contested cyber threat
environment. We are strengthening the cyber defensive posture of
missile defense capabilities by ensuring the cybersecurity
infrastructure has the latest upgrades. MDA remains focused on
supporting the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign through implementation of the
DOD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan--Four Lines of Effort
for: Strong Authentication, Hardening of Systems, Reducing the DOD
Attack Surface, and Alignment to Cybersecurity Service Providers (CSSP)
across all networks and, where applicable, BMDS weapon systems.
MDA defends its networks against the advanced persistent cyber
threat through its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). This team
provides 24/7 network monitoring and defense of over 24 thousand
network devices and continues to expand its breadth of coverage. This
has increased the number of recorded cyber events from 3.3 billion to
11 billion per month, leading to actionable defensive measures by
three-fold in the past year alone. MDA has continuously supported DOD
cyberspace efforts by providing timely MDA cyber situational awareness.
To ensure MDA cyber defense posture and activities are synchronized
with U.S. Cyber Command priorities, MDA has supported as many as eight
named operations at a time through active network defense measures and
daily input to the Joint Force Headquarters, Department of Defense
Information Cyber Tasking Order. Lastly, MDA collaborated with U.S.
Cyber Command, National Security Agency, as well as open source
partners to gather and analyze more than 3.4 million threat indicators
over the past year in order to characterize and identify cyber threats
to MDA capabilities. MDA also has partnered with the Intelligence
Community to identify threat indicators against BMDS elements and is
taking action to mitigate known threats to the BMDS.
MDA has engaged with our defense industrial base (DIB) corporate
partners to ensure cybersecurity is prioritized, addressed and enforced
at all levels of MDA's highly complex supply chain. We continue to make
strides in this arena, where our technology is largely generated and
where our controlled unclassified information (CUI) resides. The
government has contractual relationships with only the prime contractor
and has limited knowledge and visibility with the remainder of the
supply chain. Our first order of business is to have prime contractors
minimize the flow down of information requiring protection. Realizing
this is not an absolute solution, we have recently initiated
collaborative efforts with industry on two pilot efforts to illuminate
where CUI resides within the entire contract supply chain.
Not only are we focused on external threats to our enterprise, but
MDA acknowledges the reality of the insider threat as one of the more
pervasive threats to be addressed, and we have established and
implemented an aggressive Agency Insider Threat Program. This allows us
to monitor both internal and external data movement to ensure all
unclassified and classified data is handled in accordance with
applicable guidance and is also afforded the highest level of
protection. We are continually evaluating our attack data and updating
the MDA Emergency Response Team procedures. Abnormalities or violations
are quickly identified and thoroughly investigated by both MDA and DOD
Insider Threat and Counter Intelligence.
This year MDA engaged in significant improvements in cyber
resiliency, increasing the programs' ability to prevent, mitigate, and
recover from cyber effects on mission capabilities. We extended defense
coverage to the BMDS OPIR (Overhead Persistent InfraRed) Architecture
(BOA) system and implemented additional C2BMC tools to create a diverse
layered defense capability. MDA also upgraded cyber defense for sensors
by adding monitoring tools. GMD is actively updating its monitoring
tools, improving its cyber defensive capabilities, and training its
cyber incident responders to address modern, sophisticated cyber
threats. Extensive cyber testing involving C2BMC, sensors, and GMD was
conducted in platform-level and system-of-systems integrated cyber
tests pursuant to new platform and increment releases. C2BMC performed
in 25 cyber related test events. MDA developed the cybersecurity test
strategy, test plans, and coordination with external stakeholders such
as DOT&E, National Security Agency (NSA) (Platform Resiliency & Mission
Assurance division), Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate (a
directorate of Army Research Lab), Army Threat Systems Management
Office, and NSA's Cyber Protection Team, providing Red and Blue Team
test experts. The increased cyber situational awareness, training, and
improved cyber defense performance were demonstrated through
significantly improved cyber test results. Cybersecurity requires team
synergy balance capability with security requirements, Warfighters
considering potential cyber effects with maintenance outages, and
increased diligence of daily technicians and those responsible for
cybersecurity programs. We will support the Combatant Commands in
Persistent Cyber Operations testing in 2019, adding real-time daily
test, fix, and cyclic test improvements to the BMDS cyber posture.
MDA is actively integrating cybersecurity and cyber resiliency
requirements early into the acquisition life cycle to increase security
and reduce overall cost. For example, we are upgrading C2BMC and the
GMD ground systems software and hardware to enable enhanced
cybersecurity protection capabilities. To better support our combatant
commanders, in 2018 we successfully executed seven operational
Adversarial Assessments and Cybersecurity Vulnerability & Penetration
Assessment on BMDS systems culminating in an Adversarial Assessment
during Ground Test Distributed-07b United States European Command /
United States Central Command. This is a significant step in
understanding the cybersecurity posture of the BMDS and the ability to
defend against emerging cyber threats.
The MDA office of the Chief Information Officer executes several
testing efforts across MDA systems on an annual basis. This
cybersecurity testing includes all BMD elements, development labs, and
test systems. In 2018, cyber testing included 26 cybersecurity controls
validation tests, six vulnerability assessments, 46 software assurance
code reviews, and 308 cybersecurity risk assessments. MDA also executes
BMDS element- and system-level tests that support fielding of new
capability to be included in the Operations Capacity Baseline. Per
Section 1647 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA, MDA executes operational
weapon system cyber-testing and develops risk mitigation strategies for
the congressional report scheduled to be delivered first quarter fiscal
year 2020.
Our partnership with DOT&E to implement a rigorous Test and
Assessment Program is focused on ensuring cybersecurity compliance,
resiliency, and protection and has supported our comprehensive
cybersecurity efforts since 2010. In 2018, the Agency took critical
steps to improve the BMDS cybersecurity posture. We implemented a
proactive approach to MDA Cybersecurity Test and Assessment to support
development of assessment requirements, detailed test designs, and
executable schedules. To further harden the BMDS, we approved the MDA
Standing Ground Rules to support Combatant Command Persistent Cyber
Operations. Moreover, we executed seven operational Adversarial
Assessments on the BMDS Weapon Systems, to include THAAD, the Army
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model-2 (AN/TPY-2)
radar, and C2BMC, in addition to six Cybersecurity Vulnerability &
Penetration Assessments. In fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020, we
will continue to plan cyber assessments on additional assets in the
Homeland defense architecture and an operational assessment of the EPAA
Phase 3 architecture, to include Aegis Ashore-Poland. MDA is committed
to implementing cybersecurity in all phases of development,
integration, deployment and sustainment of the BMDS.
In fiscal year 2018, MDA took a proactive approach to cybersecurity
by modifying contracts, including system level specifications that
include cyber resiliency requirements. The contract modifications
address compliance, security engineering, design, development,
assessments, testing, physical security and program security. The key
to executing this strategy is the understanding of the linkage that
cybersecurity has with system engineering and the acquisition
processes. Incorporating cybersecurity into the systems engineering
directorate aligns cybersecurity functions to the following other
functions: software, modeling and simulation, future concepts,
requirements, and system integration. This alignment ensures
cybersecurity is embedded early and often in the systems engineering
and development life cycles.
I am confident in our cybersecurity posture and our plans for
additional cybersecurity improvements. Our innovative teams continue to
refine processes and procedures in this fast-paced, ever-changing and
unforgiving cyber environment. We intend to improve our cyber
resiliency capabilities through increased cyber sensors, enhanced
centralized visibility, and increased cyber vigilance, all while
preserving warfighter confidence in a critical national defense asset.
Left-Through-Right-of-Launch
During the past year, MDA has been working with other elements of
the Department on a comprehensive effort to create a more robust
missile defeat strategy.. This integration will enable the United
States to identify and exploit opportunities to detect, disrupt, and
destroy threat missiles. Collaboration between the Intelligence
Community, Combatant Commands, State Department, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and MDA has
resulted in the Department developing a ballistic missile left-through-
right-of-launch (LTRI) framework that will enhance sharing of data,
technologies and capabilities across warfighter, policy, intelligence,
and acquisition organizations. It includes discovery and development of
new technologies to facilitate integration, improved data-sharing
between systems, alignment of programs, and creation of a multi-year
test campaign to integrate future capabilities and close gaps. The LTRI
framework, governed by an Integration Senior Strategy Group (ISSG) with
representatives from more than 20 organizations, provides a forum for
development of comprehensive strategies to defeat any ballistic missile
threat to the Homeland, regardless of origin.
increasing engagement capability and capacity
This budget request maintains operational missile defense
capabilities for existing operational Homeland and regional defense
forces and will continue to increase interceptor inventory capacity and
use existing technologies to improve sensors, battle management, fire
control, and kill vehicle capabilities to address evolving threats.
Homeland Defense
MDA remains committed to operating, sustaining, and expanding the
Nation's Homeland missile defenses and requests $1.83 billion in fiscal
year 2020 for the GMD program. The Agency will continue to demonstrate
improved performance through flight- and ground-testing of Homeland
defenses, integrate additional capabilities by development of a suite
of Advanced Discrimination Radars (ADR) that maximize the engagement
space of regional and Homeland missile defense, to include the Long
Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-
H), and Pacific Radar. These additional ADR sensors, coupled with the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle development and enhanced C2BMC will expand the
GBI engagement capabilities while simultaneously improving
effectiveness. We will continue improving our sensors, C2BMC, GMD
ground systems hardware/software upgrades, GMD Fire Control (GFC), and
kill vehicle software to improve discrimination capabilities and
overall system performance. We also will continue to improve confidence
in our reliability through increased testing and analysis.
Over the life of the BMDS, the intercept flight tests of the
Nation's Homeland defenses have increased in complexity with the
employment of realistic test scenarios and the use of operational
weapons, sensors and fielded software. With the March 25 successful
intercept of an advanced ICBM-class target with countermeasures (FTG-
11), the Department executed the first test involving a salvo
engagement, involving two GBIs launched from the missile field at
Vandenberg Air Force Based in California. All system elements
functioned as designed. The ICBM-representative target was launched
from the Reagan Test Site on the Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands in
the Broad Ocean Area in the Pacific over 4,000 miles away. Following
detection by Air Force Space Based Infrared System satellites, early
tracking information was passed through C2BMC to precision
discrimination sensors deployed on Wake Island (AN/TPY-2 radar) and in
the Pacific Ocean (Sea-Based X-band radar). Northern Command operators
then authorized and launched the two GBIs. Once they were separated
from the GBI boosters and in position, the exo-atmospheric kill
vehicles successfully engaged the target complex, resulting in an
intercept of the lethal warhead, with the trailing GBI observing the
intercept flash and debris scene then intercepting the next most lethal
object.
FTG-11 provided the data necessary to assess the performance of the
GMD system, the evaluation of which will occur over the coming weeks
and months. An Aegis BMD (ABMD) ship in the ABMD 5.1 (Aegis Baseline
9.C2) configuration participated in this test by tracking the ICBM
target and executing a simulated SM-3 Block IIA engagement of the
target as risk reduction for the planned fiscal year 2020 SM-3 Block
IIA test against an ICBM target. In that test we will determine if this
advanced capability could be an additional layer of defense in support
of the GMD system. During the test Spacebased Kill Assessment
satellites provided data required to assess successful intercepts. We
also collected real-time data from F-35 aircraft/sensors participating
in the test to assess quality of track data for integration into the
BMDS architecture.
Increasing GBI Capacity: MDA currently has 44 operational GBIs and,
in accordance with the fiscal year 2018 Missile Defeat and Defense
Enhancement initiative, plans to expand the fielded GBI fleet to 64 in
response to the rapidly advancing North Korean threat. MDA is
developing the capability to provide the Warfighter the option of using
all three GBI booster stages or not igniting the third stage, which
would provide performance similar to a 2-stage boost vehicle. This 2-
stage booster capability will provide additional Homeland defense
battle-space capability by enabling shorter engagement times without
the expense of a separate development program. This capability is
planned to be tested in a non-intercept flight test, after which it
will be integrated into all boost vehicle configurations.
Redesigned Kill Vehicle: As a follow-on to the existing GBI
program, MDA initiated the fielding of an additional 20 GBIs, tipped
with the RKV upon completion of the development program, at Fort
Greely, Alaska (FGA). The RKV will address the evolving threat, enhance
kill vehicle reliability, improve in-flight communications to better
utilize off-board sensor data, and heighten combatant commanders'
situational awareness via hit/kill assessment messages. Initial plans
were to field GBIs with RKVs as early as 2023 within an acquisition
strategy that is disciplined, gated, and milestone-driven. Using this
strategy and with inputs from key stakeholders, I assessed the RKV
program did not meet the entrance criteria for the Critical Design
Review, resulting in a projected delay in the program of up to 2 years.
Re-planned RKV test efforts include Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
Flight Test GM-Boost Vehicle Test-02 (GM BVT-02), a non-intercept
mission in support of 2- or 3-Stage selectable boost vehicle software
that will provide additional engagement battlespace to the warfighter
using a GBI launched from VAFB, California in fiscal year 2020 and
Flight Test GM-Controlled Test Vehicle-03+ (GM CTV-03+), a non-
intercept mission to collect RKV flight environment data in fiscal year
2022. The first intercept flight test utilizing the RKV is planned for
fiscal year 2023, and a second intercept flight test in fiscal year
2024.
The effort to reach 64 deployed GBIs requires MDA to develop and
produce the RKV, construct a new missile field (Missile Field 4) at
Fort Greely, install 20 silos, and deliver an additional 20 GBIs tipped
with RKVs. In addition, MDA will initiate a plan to ensure that no less
than 64 GBIs are available to the Warfighter at all times. To
accomplish this, MDA will add two silos to Missile Field 1 at FGA and
purchase six additional boosters.
Ground System Upgrades: MDA continues to develop and field
capability upgrades and technology modernization of key ground support
and fire control system components. These include upgrades to the GMD
Launch Support System, Communications Network, and the In-Flight
Interceptor Communication System Data Terminals. Additional upgrades
include improvements to the GFC-Warfighter interface, 2-/3-stage
selectable GBI battle management, discrimination improvements,
enhancements to the kill vehicle Target Object Map, and On-Demand
Communications for the RKV. Ground system modernization will continue
to mitigate obsolescence issues, improve cyber resilience, increase GFC
capacity for emerging threat complexity and raid size, reduce life-
cycle cost, increase system reliability and operational availability,
and simplify the insertion of future technologies.
Defense Sensors: We are investing in radars and developing advanced
electro-optical sensors to achieve a diverse sensor architecture to
provide highly accurate midcourse tracking, discrimination and battle
damage assessment for Homeland missile defense. We request $194.3
million to sustain the Cobra Dane radar, the Upgraded Early Warning
Radars (UEWR), and the AN/TPY-2 radar. The Services and Combatant
Commands, with logistical support from MDA, operate a fleet of five AN/
TPY-2 (Forward Based Mode) radars in Japan, Israel, Turkey, and United
States Central Command in support of Homeland and regional defense.
We request $283.5 million to continue radar development, to include
advanced discrimination algorithms for the AN/TPY-2 and Sea-Based X-
band (SBX) radars to counter evolving threats. The improvements will
develop and field integrated capabilities to improve the BMDS ability
to identify lethal and non-lethal objects. In fiscal year 2019, MDA
will complete transition to production development activities for next-
generation Gallium Nitride (GaN) Transmit/Receive Integrated
Multichannel Modules to support the AN/TPY-2 obsolescence and sparing
strategy and set the condition for enhanced performance in the future.
MDA requests $105.5 million for BMD Sensors testing activities for
planning, analysis, and execution of BMDS flight test events, including
pre- and post-test efforts, such as Digital and Hardware-in-the-Loop
Pre-Mission Tests and Post-Flight Reconstruction.
MDA requests $128.2 million for the SBX radar. The SBX is an
advanced mobile radar that provides precision midcourse tracking and
discrimination capabilities. The SBX participates in flight tests to
demonstrate discrimination and debris mitigation improvements. Our
budget request includes funds to continue extended operations for
defense of the Homeland in the United States Indo-Pacific Command and
United States Northern Command areas of responsibility.
We request $136.4 million to continue development of the LRDR. The
LRDR will provide persistent long-range midcourse discrimination,
precision tracking and hit assessment to support the GMD capability
against long-range missile threats from the Pacific theater. LRDR's
improved discrimination capability in the Pacific architecture
increases the defensive capacity of the Homeland defense interceptor
inventory by enabling conservation of GBIs. LRDR includes threat
discrimination improvements to enhance BMDS effectiveness against the
evolving threat. LRDR also supports other mission areas, including
Space Situational Awareness. Initial fielding/deployment of the LRDR is
planned for calendar year 2020. We are on-schedule for the Technical
Capability Declaration in late 2021, leading to Warfighter Operational
Acceptance in 2022.
The Department conducted a Sensors Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
to assess the most cost-effective options for enhanced sensor
capability to increase GBI effectiveness against future complex
threats. The Sensors AOA report highlighted the operational value of
placing additional discrimination radars in the Pacific region. Based
on the report's finding, MDA completed site surveys for the HDR-H in
fiscal year 2017. In fiscal year 2018 we conducted source selection
activities for the HDR-H and, last December, awarded this radar as the
first delivery order on a fixed-price indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity (IDIQ) contract. MDA is requesting $274.7 million in fiscal
year 2020 for the HDR-H.
The Pacific Radar will leverage a forward position to maximize BMDS
discrimination areas for both Homeland and regional missile defense.
MDA plans to competitively award the Pacific Radar as the second
delivery order on the IDIQ contract. MDA is requesting $6.7 million in
fiscal year 2020 for the Pacific Radar. Coupled with LRDR, both radars
will close coverage gaps in the Pacific architecture, provide
persistent long-range acquisition, midcourse discrimination, precision
tracking, and hit assessment to support Homeland defense against long-
range missile threats.
Space provides the critical vantage point necessary to address
rapidly advancing threats across multiple regions of interest and the
only vantage point for global persistence to address Warfighter
requirements. A space-based sensor layer consisting of two separate
constellations, one for tracking and discriminating ballistic missiles
and one for tracking dim ballistic targets and hypersonic missiles,
would enable the United States to use interceptor inventory more
efficiently and effectively to counter a broad array of threats.
Integrated space and terrestrial sensors for tracking, discriminating,
cueing and targeting ballistic missile threats can improve missile
defense architecture performance and robustness.
We are requesting $27.6 million for the Spacebased Kill Assessment
(SKA) program. Using fast frame, infrared sensors, SKA will deliver a
kill assessment capability for GMD defense of the Homeland as part of
an integrated post-intercept assessment solution requested in the
fiscal year 2014 NDAA. As MDA's pathfinder program to host military
payloads on commercial/other satellites, SKA, which
received the DOD's 2018 David Packard Award for Acquisition Excellence,
proved that commercial/other hosting can deploy assets on orbit quickly
and at an appreciable cost savings. To increase the Department's
overall experience with commercial hosting, MDA collected and shared
its SKA lessons learned with several organizations, including the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and U.S. Air Force.
SKA sensors are participating in a variety of MDA flight tests and
engineering missions to better understand the full capabilities of the
SKA network. For example, SKA participated and performed well in FTI-
03, an Aegis BMD test, and FTG-11, the GMD salvo test. In fiscal year
2020 we will focus on steps necessary to add the SKA system to the
operational BMDS.
Also, we request $35.9 million in fiscal year 2020 for continued
operation of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and the
Missile Defense Space Center (MDSC). STSS satellites, launched in 2009,
have exceeded their life expectancy and proven to be a good investment.
These satellites operate in low Earth orbit and continue to collect
valuable test data. The STSS program and MDSC support concept
development activities for space sensor architecture studies and
analyses to address advanced threats.
MDA is working with the Space Development Agency (SDA), DARPA, and
the U.S. Air Force to conduct prototype concept design activities for a
space-based missile tracking sensor system known as Hypersonic and
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). HBTSS is one of several
proposed missions within the DOD's Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (P-LEO)
space architecture led by SDA. As part of an integrated multi-tier OPIR
enterprise architecture, HBTSS would detect and track additional and
emerging threats using persistent infrared sensors. MDA and the SDA are
partnering with DARPA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to ensure our
Nation's ability to detect and track evolving threats. MDA will
coordinate and leverage DARPA's Blackjack program for advances in the
areas of production-line satellite buses and spacecraft autonomy
approaches in parallel with the HBTSS risk-reduction efforts. MDA is
partnering with AFSPC on integrated missile warning and missile defense
requirements definition and will explore opportunities to partner with
the Air Force on ground services, integration, launch, and operations.
MDA is using STSS as a testbed for HBTSS, and MDA will continue to
leverage the Enterprise Capabilities developed collaboratively within
other Department and federal agencies. MDA will work with SDA to ensure
that HBTSS is compatible with a potential P-LEO data and communications
transport layer.
Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications: We
request $564.2 million in fiscal year 2020 for C2BMC. C2BMC provides
persistent acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination, and fire-
control quality data to Aegis BMD, GMD, Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD), Patriot, and coalition partners to support Homeland
and regional missile defense. We continue to support Warfighter command
and control and battle management needs across the globe by providing
the Combatant Commander with the BMD planner, situational awareness
tools, and battle management capability to support global BMD
situational awareness, coalition operations, weapons release authority
for Homeland defense, and control and tasking of the forward-based AN/
TPY-2 radars, LRDR radar, and the HDR-H radar. C2BMC operators and
maintainers deploy forward in some of the world's hottest threat spots
and continue to provide around-the-clock support to the local
commanders.
In fiscal year 2020, we will continue development of C2BMC Spiral
8.2-5, which provides system-level discrimination data, BMDS Overhead
Persistent InfraRed (OPIR) Architecture (BOA) 7.0 to provide advance
threat warning capability with space sensors and threat
characterization solutions and support command and control integration
of the LRDR into the BMDS by 2021. These efforts support a robust
Homeland defense capability and integration of HDR-H into the BMDS by
2023. Spiral 8.2-5 also will include initial integration and testing of
the new Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System.
C2BMC will continue development of Spiral 8.2-7 to meet the BMDS
Increment 7 requirements, including command and control of the HDR-H
radar, SKA sensor operationalization and prototyping for robust Post
Intercept Assessment supporting Homeland defense, expansion of C2BMC
space tracking capability, and additional system-level discrimination
data integration and integrated threat characterization.
In 2018, we successfully fielded C2BMC Spiral 8.2-1 and BOA 5.1 to
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and C2BMC Spiral
8.2-3 to United States European Command and United States Central
Command along with the BOA 6.1 to Northern, Indo-Pacific, European and
Central Commands. For the USFK JEON, we fielded a C2BMC Spiral 8.2-1
User Node providing improved BMD situational awareness and
communications for USFK.
We continue supporting incremental improvements to the BMDS to keep
pace with emerging threats worldwide by investing in the development,
integration, and testing of advanced algorithms to improve track and
discrimination capabilities and enhance the use of space-based sensor
data from sources such as the Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS),
using the BMDS OPIR Architecture. C2BMC will continue to update
hardware/software to increase cybersecurity. The Air Force and MDA also
will execute the MDR's direction to deliver a joint report to
Department stakeholders within 6 months of the release of the MDR on
how to integrate the F-35, including its sensor suite, into the BMDS
for Homeland and regional defense.
Regional Defenses
There are hundreds of theater-range ballistic missiles deployed
worldwide. Our fiscal year 2020 budget request continues to resource
and build integrated regional missile defenses that are interoperable
with systems deployed by international partners to protect deployed
forces, allies and international partners against Short-Range Ballistic
Missiles (SRBMs), MRBMs, and IRBMs.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Aegis BMD continues to be a key component of the Nation's regional
defense for our deployed forces, allies, partners and friends, and
directly supports and expands our Homeland defenses with long-range
surveillance and tracking capability. The fiscal year 2020 budget
request of $897.3 million supports continued advancement of the Aegis
BMD system to counter growing and more complex threats, including
improvements in system reliability and missile reliability as well as
increases in Aegis BMD engagement capacity and lethality.
We continued to expand Aegis BMD capability and capacity through
new construction deliveries and upgrades on 10 Aegis ships: Three new
construction DDG-51 Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGs)
with Aegis Baseline (BL) 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1) were commissioned into
service in fiscal year 2018 as well as six Aegis BMD 3.6 ship upgrades
to Aegis BMD 4.1, two non-BMD-capable ship upgrades to Aegis BL 9.C2.0
(BMD 5.1) through the Aegis modernization program and two Aegis BL
9.C1.0 (BMD 5.0CU) ships to Aegis BL 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1). These additions
and upgrades bring, among other things, Engage-on-Remote capability,
SM-3 Block IIA, cyber improvements, and enhanced reliability to the
Aegis fleet.
MDA's ability to keep Aegis BL 9 ships and Aegis Ashore in
relatively the same configuration and under configuration control
through in-service upgrades aligns training and Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for the U.S. Navy and ensures the highest level of BMD
capability is resident and consistent across the in-service and
deploying fleet. We are strongly committed to further enhancing
capability of the Aegis BMD system and continue to improve the Aegis
Weapon System in alignment with Navy programs. In coordination with the
U.S. Navy, we currently have 38 BMD-capable ships, which will rise to
41 by the end of fiscal year 2019. Per direction in the MDR, the Navy
and MDA will develop a plan to convert all Aegis destroyers to be fully
missile defense capable within 10 years.
In 2018, we successfully conducted a number of ground and flight
tests of Aegis BL 9.2.0 (with BMD 5.1 integrated), which introduces
significant new capabilities in U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in support
of Department of Defense priorities to increase lethality and validate
the EPAA Phase 3 architecture. Aegis BL 9.2.0 (BMD 5.1) was a joint
MDA-U.S. Navy development effort. For the MDA, Aegis BL 9.2.0 (BMD 5.1)
delivered Significant Object Reporting to the BMDS, BMD reliability
enhancements, and Engage-on-Remote capability with the SM-3 Block IIA
missile, significantly expanding Aegis BMD's defended area. In
September 2018, Aegis BL 9.2.0 (BMD 5.1) achieved U.S. Navy
certification and we have commenced fielding this capability on in-
service Aegis destroyers (affordable software updates to current Aegis
BL 9.1 DDGs), modernized Aegis DDGs, new construction DDGs, and Aegis
Ashore Romania and, upon activation, Aegis Ashore-Poland.
MDA conducted an international live fire event in support of
Japan's modernization efforts, Japan Flight Test Aegis Weapon System
(JFTM)-5, that successfully verified the performance of the Aegis J6
(with BMD 5.0CU equivalent capability) weapon system functionality,
guiding a SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) to a lethal intercept of a
SRBM target. This test completed the certification of the J6 combat
systems baseline and was an important milestone for Japan's use of the
SM-3 Block IB TU missile. MDA also completed an important Sensor
Integration Study with The Netherlands that will inform their future
BMD efforts, conducted Pacific Dragon 2018 with the Japanese and South
Korean navies, and continued cooperation in the United States-European
Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum.
We also conducted Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM)-45, which
successfully verified the performance of the Aegis BL 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1)
weapon system and SM-3 Block IIA functionality, guiding a SM-3 Block
IIA missile intercept of a MRBM target. This flight test also provided
objective quality evidence to finalize a detailed Failure Review Board
of missile anomalies experienced earlier in 2018 during FTM-29.
Automated BMD kill assessment was also successfully evaluated after
intercept.
Finally, we successfully conducted Flight Test Integrated (FTI)-03,
an operational test demonstrating the Aegis Weapon System Engage-on-
Remote capability to track and lethally intercept an IRBM target with
an Aegis Ashore-launched SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a European
Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 3 link architecture. In this case, Aegis
Ashore calculated fire control solutions using remote AN/TPY-2 radar
data, and then transmitted guidance messages to the interceptor, which
then accomplished a lethal intercept of the lethal object. The
engagement leveraged a ground-, air-, and space-based sensor/command
and control architecture linked by the BMDS C2BMC suite.
In fiscal year 2020, we will continue our commitment to develop,
test, and deliver global naval capability to the Warfighter and support
defense of U.S. deployed forces and European NATO allies through
delivery of EPAA Phase 3 missile defenses. The MDA requests a total of
$822.8 million in procurement for Aegis BMD. As part of the overall
Aegis BMD procurement request, MDA is requesting $459.8 million to
procure 30 Aegis SM-3 Block IB missiles and $238.00 million to procure
seven SM-3 Block IIAs, along with associated hardware and support
costs. By the end of fiscal year 2020, we plan to have 238 SM-3 Block
IBs and 11 SM-3 Block IIAs in inventory. Also part of the request, we
are continuing to explore the opportunity to enter into a five-year SM-
3 Block IB Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract for fiscal year 2020--
fiscal year 2024. MDA will continue to deliver both SM-3 Block IBs and
SM-3 Block IIAs for deployment on land at the Aegis Ashore site in
Romania and at sea on multi-mission Aegis ships with BMD capability.
The procurement budget also requests $125.0 million for Aegis BMD
weapon systems equipment to support program of record requirements.
In fiscal year 2020, as part of our overall Aegis BMD request, we
are requesting $198.1 million for the SM-3 Block IIA program. This
includes final efforts to transition from development into production,
continued integration of the SM-3 Block IIA into the BMDS, along with
certification and deployment activities to deliver SM-3 Block IIA
rounds to the U.S. Navy and in support of EPAA Phase 3.
We remain committed to the Aegis BMD development required to
deliver the new construction DDG-51 Flight III Arleigh Burke-class
destroyer with Aegis BL 10 (with BMD 6.0 integrated) and SPY-6 Air and
Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). We will continue to align with the U.S.
Navy to develop and deliver a comprehensive Integrated Air and Missile
Defense capability against advanced threats in the Arleigh Burke-class
Flight III Destroyers for a 2024 Initial Operational Capability. Aegis
BMD 6.0 exploits AN/SPY-6 radar improvements to enhance Aegis combat
effectiveness, to include advanced discrimination, significantly
improved raid defense, and expanded engagement battlespace. This will
provide advanced organic capability at longer ranges to Flight III DDGs
as well as enable BMDS utilization of AN/SPY-6 data for remote
engagements while also supplementing deployed assets with simultaneous
multi-mission capabilities. AN/SPY-6 will enable U.S. Navy ships to
have a greater standoff range from threat environments, providing
greatly improved operational flexibility. Aegis BL 10 Weapon System
will integrate BMD capability with the advanced AN/SPY-6 for remote
engagements and increased raid capacity with simultaneous multi-mission
capabilities.
We continue joint U.S. Navy and MDA development of Aegis BL 5.4
(with BMD 4.1.2 integration), which merges Aegis BL 5.3 and Aegis BMD
BL 4.1 into a single computer program with multi-mission capability and
updated Identification Friend or Foe processing, a significant tactical
advancement for individual U.S. Navy ships. We are actively working
with the U.S. Navy to certify and initiate fielding of this capability
in fiscal year 2020. MDA also continues collaboration efforts with the
U.S. Navy on AN/SPY-1 radar antenna improvements that, when coupled
with Aegis BL 5.4, will increase AN/SPY-1 radar detection range and
sensitivity, improving discrimination, performance, and stand-off
distance from threat environments.
In fiscal year 2020, we will also incorporate new BMD threats in
Aegis BMD 5.1 that are inherent in the SM-3 Block IIA Build 8 missile
software. We will also improve raid performance in Aegis BMD 5.1
through Force Level Engagement and Sensor Coordination--Raid. In fiscal
year 2020, we will expand our capability and capacity through execution
of 19 Aegis BMD weapon system installations: one Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis
BMD 4.1 upgrade (enabling a follow-on upgrade to Aegis BL 5.4); three
non-BMD capable ship upgrades to Aegis BL 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1); eight Aegis
BL 9.B/C2 (BMD 5.1) Software Upgrade Installs; two Aegis BL 9.C2 (BMD
5.1) Backfit Installs; five Aegis BL 5.4 (BMD 4.1) Installs.
Sea Based Terminal: A sea-based terminal capability is critical to
defending high value units at sea as well as protecting air and sea
ports of debarkation during mobilization. Adding an additional layer to
Aegis BMD, we are using an incremental development approach integrated
within the Aegis BL 9 architecture to develop and deliver a Sea Based
Terminal (SBT) capability. By expanding the capability of the SM-6
missile and associated Aegis weapon system changes, we are delivering
capability to maritime forces to protect against anti-ship ballistic
missiles and provide a layered defense for forces ashore.
SBT Increment 1 was fielded in 2018 after completing the final
testing in 2017. SBT Increment 1 built upon an existing weapon system
performance and leveraged the Navy's SM-6 Block I design to deliver an
operationally effective capability. In 2019, we continue to explore
opportunities to expand this capability to in-service Aegis Weapon
Systems.
SBT Increment 2, which further improves our endo-atmospheric
defensive capabilities, was certified in September 2018. The
introduction of SM-6 Block IA with modifications, which expands
capability against SRBM threats, provides larger operating areas with
higher performance against threats expected in the 2020 timeframe and
will undergo testing in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020. The
flight test program supporting the SBT Increment 2 program consists of
three flight tests. The first test, FTM-31, is planned for late fiscal
year 2019. FTM-31, a Development Test with Commander, Operational Test
& Evaluation Force participation, consists of two independent events,
both of which support the SM-6 Dual II missile Engineering Change
Proposal production cut-in approval and subsequent delivery to the
fleet. FTM-31 Event 1 will demonstrate an Aegis BL 9.C2 engagement of a
MRBM target with an SM-6 Dual II (BMD initialized) missile. FTM-31
Event 2 will demonstrate an SM-6 Dual II engagement of an Anti-Air
Warfare target. The second and third tests, FTM-32 and FTM-33, are
planned for fiscal year 2020.
SBT Increment 3 is critical to meet emerging and more complex
threats. SBT Increment 3 will expand on the current capabilities of the
Aegis Weapon System and leverage SM-6 engineering efforts achieved to
date. This engineering effort will provide increased engagement
capability against advanced threats by building on capability provided
by prior SBT Increments. SBT Increment 3 System Requirements Review was
completed in December 2018 and in fiscal year 2019 will define a
preliminary design to support delivery of full capability in fiscal
year 2024.
Aegis Ashore-Poland: We continue to support the EPAA as a major
U.S. contribution to NATO's BMD capability, providing coverage and
protection of NATO's European territory, populations, and forces
against the increasing threat of ballistic missile proliferation in the
Middle East. Currently, there is an operational Aegis Ashore site
located in Romania and another under construction in Poland. NATO BMD
architecture also includes the United States contributions of a
forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey, four BMD-capable Aegis
destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, SM-3 interceptors, and a command-
and-control node at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
In fiscal year 2020, we will continue our commitment to develop,
test, and deliver global naval capability to the Warfighter and support
defense of our deployed forces and European NATO allies through
supporting the operational readiness of EPAA Phase 2 and efforts to
deliver Phase 3 to improve defensive coverage against medium- and
intermediate-range threats, which includes delivery of the Aegis Ashore
site in Poland. Aegis Ashore site construction in Poland began in
fiscal year 2016. That site will be equipped with the upgraded Aegis BL
9 weapon system with BMD 5.1 and a capability to launch SM-3 Block IIAs
in support of EPAA Phase 3 Technical Capability Declaration (TCD). The
Aegis Weapon System upgrades are further enhanced by spiral upgrades to
C2BMC and AN/TPY-2 sensors, enabling Engage-on-Remote capability and
extended defensive coverage for NATO Europe.
Delays due to an unsatisfactory construction progress at the Aegis
Ashore site in Poland delayed the EPAA Phase 3 TCD, and Navy Acceptance
and Operational Acceptance into CY 2020. Several factors contributed to
these delays including underestimation of project complexity, slow
mobilization, and challenges with trade staffing. While there is risk
associated with unsatisfactory construction progress at the Aegis
Ashore-Poland site, quality of accepted work is good and the Poland
project continues to track to delivery of EPAA Phase 3 Technical
Capability Declaration and Navy and EUCOM acceptance in CY2020. MDA and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) continue to use all available
tools to assist efforts toward completion of the construction. In an
effort to maintain post-construction schedule, the MDA,/USACE/Industry
team initiated the first of three industrial work packages in support
of Aegis Weapon System (AWS) Installation and Check-Out (INCO) in March
2019 on a not to interfere basis with ongoing construction. These work
packages, combined with construction contractor efforts lay the
groundwork to commence INCO in completed individual spaces vice waiting
for the completion of all joint occupancy requirements. This approach
will reduce construction delay impacts and assist with maintaining the
site's TCD date. MDA, USACE, and Department of Defense leadership
remain engaged with the construction contractor at high levels to
ensure proper emphasis is placed on project importance and execution.
Company leadership continues to express their commitment to the
project. The company's performance has improved with steady progress on
the ground observed. The company's actions to prioritize preparations
for weapon system installation and improve trade labor placement will
aid greatly to keep the overall project on track for delivery in
calendar year 2020.
The site in Romania is on schedule to be upgraded this summer. This
upgrade provides increased coverage capability for the defense of
Europe and partially mitigates the delay at the AA Poland site.
MDA fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $25.65 million in
Defense Wide Procurement and $38.4 million in Research, Development,
Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funds to address the multiple actions
required to field Aegis Ashore in Poland and continued operations of
other Aegis Ashore sites. Given the construction delays and the
requirement to be on-site for at least another year, MDA's fiscal year
2020 budget request includes funding to complete combat system
adaptation, integration, installation, and testing to ensure delivery
of EPAA Phase 3 capability to the Warfighter. MDA and the Navy also
will execute the MDR's direction to evaluate the viability of
operationalizing the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC)
at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii and develop an
emergency activation plan that would enable the SECDEF to
operationalize AAMDTC within 30 days of the Secretary's decision to do
so.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a globally-
transportable, ground-based missile defense system that is highly
effective against short-, medium-, and limited intermediate-range
ballistic missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in the
terminal phase of flight. THAAD provides unique, cost-effective, and
rapidly deployable capability to the combatant commanders to deepen,
extend, and complement BMDS Homeland and regional defenses. THAAD has
successfully intercepted threat representative ballistic missile
targets in all 15 of its intercept attempts. In 2018, MDA completed
fielding of the 7th THAAD Battery to the U.S. Army while continuing to
provide maintenance and sustainment support and deliver interceptors to
the inventories of both the United States and United Arab Emirates
(UAE).
MDA requested $99.8 million of Operations and Maintenance funding
to support the maintenance and upkeep of all BMDS-unique items of the
fielded U.S. THAAD batteries and for all THAAD training devices. In
fiscal year 2020, MDA will provide support to seven THAAD batteries,
including the two forward batteries stationed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility and is prepared to support
the U.S. Army in any future deployments around the world.
MDA requested $425.9 million to continue procurement of THAAD
equipment, including 37 THAAD interceptors in fiscal year 2020. By the
end of fiscal year 2020, MDA will deliver 85 additional THAAD
interceptors to the U.S. Army, for a total of 351 interceptors
delivered. Synchronized with the deliveries for U.S. inventory, MDA is
on track to complete delivery of THAAD interceptors to the UAE in
fiscal year 2020 as planned.
On November 26, 2018, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) signed
Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for THAAD, with a program value
of $13.4 billion. MDA will deliver seven batteries, 360 interceptors,
and associated support services to the KSA. The U.S. Government expects
to award the contract for the first phase of the KSA THAAD effort in
fiscal year 2019, which will include acquisition of long-lead items and
obsolescence efforts.
MDA requested $302.8 million in fiscal year 2020 for THAAD
development efforts. We will continue development of multiple,
independent THAAD software upgrades to address the evolving threat,
improve the Warfighter's defense planning capabilities, and provide
improved interoperability with other BMDS elements. THAAD fiscal year
2020 development and integration efforts include activities in support
of the USFK JEON. The U.S. Army deployed THAAD in March 2017 to
USINDOPACOM in support of the United States-Republic of Korea (ROK)
Alliance. The USFK JEON requested improved integration of existing
ballistic missile defense assets in theater. In fiscal year 2020, MDA
will support Army fielding of Electronic Protection / Objective Debris
Mitigation enhancements and the THAAD Remoted Launcher capability,
which allows the THAAD system to use flexible communication paths to
the THAAD launchers to increase defended areas. In coordination with
the Army's Program Executive Office for Missile & Space, efforts will
continue to complete the development and demonstration of the Patriot
Launch on Remote (THAAD) capability in fiscal year 2020. Integration of
the Patriot Advanced Capability--3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3
MSE) interceptor capability into the THAAD system will continue to be
delivered in fiscal year 2021. In coordination with Army and the Joint
Staff, MDA will execute the MDR's direction to prepare a report that
provides a current assessment of the required numbers of THAAD
batteries to support needed worldwide THAAD deployments, including
potential deployment timelines, and basing and deployment options.
Testing continues to reinforce the confidence of U.S. and FMS
customers in the THAAD system's performance and interoperability with
other air and ballistic missile defense systems. THAAD successfully
executed Flight Test Other (FTX)-35 at White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico on April 6, 2018, using THAAD Software Build 3.0, which
demonstrated interoperability between THAAD and Patriot by exchanging
Link-16 messages over tactical data links while tracking a Close Range
Ballistic Missile target. This effort also met the NDAA requirement for
annual BMDS integration testing with Patriot. MDA requested $25.1
million for Terminal Defense Testing in fiscal year 2020. This includes
THAAD support of Army's Lower Tier Project Office demonstration of
Patriot Launch on Remote (THAAD) in two events as well as demonstration
of THAAD's capability to intercept an IRBM in the next operational
flight test, Flight Test Operational (FTO)-03.
MDA and the Military Departments continue to coordinate with OSD on
the path forward for transfer of missile defense programs as directed
in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA. A draft Report to Congress has been
updated based on feedback from the Services and is in OSD staffing.
addressing the advanced threat
We must make investments in advanced technology today to prepare
for tomorrow's threats by improving system performance and
effectiveness. This budget request will continue the development and
technology risk reduction of breakthrough technologies for integration
into the BMDS, including discrimination improvements, Multi-Object Kill
Vehicle technology, hypersonic defense technology, and high-powered
lasers that have potential use against threat missiles in the boost
phase of flight. Scalable, efficient, and compact high-energy lasers
could change future missile defense architectures. MDA is developing
technology to improve reliability, enhance discrimination, and expand
battle space in order to address gaps in the BMDS and dramatically
drive down the cost of defending the Homeland.
MDA requested $303.5 million for Technology Maturation Initiatives
to conduct ground and airborne demonstrations of advanced sensor
systems and refine directed energy technologies for missile defense.
The Agency is maturing the technologies to increase power and testing
sensors.
We are operating aircraft outfitted with passive sensors to better
understand threat tracking and how an airborne layer could augment the
existing sensor network. In 2020, we will add tracking lasers to these
aircraft to increase precision and range and determine how these
compact lasers could further influence sensor design. In addition, we
are developing advanced sensors and testing them from ground sites to
improve discrimination accuracy and validate performance against
targets of opportunity. What we learn from these ground and airborne
tests could influence future space-based sensor systems.
We continue to advance the state of the art for scaling electric
laser powers and pursue competing technologies to reduce development
risk. Distributed gain, diode pumped alkali laser, and fiber combining
laser technology have the potential to meet missile defense
requirements. In 2020, we will concentrate on laser maturation and
power scaling development at the national laboratories and work with
industry and the Services to investigate other promising laser
technologies. Based on the results of these and other tests, we will
work closely with the Department to determine the best way to integrate
directed energy and laser sensing into the missile defense system.
We are exploring technology for a Neutral Particle Beam system to
engage threat systems. The neutral particle beam offers new kill
options for the BMDS and adds another layer of protection for the
Homeland. We are building upon technologies developed in the 1990's and
have defined a logical building block approach that will culminate in
an on-orbit demonstrator. We are exploring advancements in neutral
particle beam component technology to improve the cost-benefit and
size, weight and power for an operational system by incrementally
building a demonstrator system in a lab environment and executing sound
systems engineering practices early in the program. Per the MDR, MDA
will study a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase
defense and provide a report to the Under Secretary of Defense (USD)
for Research & Engineering (R&E) and the USD for Policy (P) within 6
months of the release of the MDR.
MDA requests $13.6 million for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle effort
to establish the technology foundation for killing multiple lethal
objects from a single interceptor. The more kill vehicles we can put on
an interceptor, the greater the raid capacity of our Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system. MOKV has the potential to significantly
enhance Homeland defense capabilities against the threat at a lower
cost per engagement. MDA competitively awarded contracts to three major
prime contractors in 2017 to reduce the technical risk for MOKV product
development. The MOKV Technology Risk Reduction effort will culminate
with component demonstrations specific to the three industry concepts.
We request $157.5 million in fiscal year 2020 for the Hypersonic
Defense effort to execute the systems engineering process, identify and
mature full kill chain technology, provide analysis and assessment of
target of opportunity events, and execute near term space sensor
technology and multi-domain command and control capability upgrades to
address defense from hypersonic threats. This effort will execute the
Defense Science Board's and the MDR's recommendations to develop and
deliver a set of material solutions to address and defeat hypersonic
threats informed by a set of near-term technology demonstrations. An
integrated set of enhancements will provide incremental capability
measured by progress and knowledge points in the following areas:
establishment of systems engineering needs and requirements to identify
alternative material solutions; execution of a series of sensor
technology demonstrations; modification of existing BMDS sensors and
the C2BMC element for hypersonic threats; and definition of weapon
concepts and investments in key technologies to enable a broad set of
solutions, including kinetic and non-kinetic means. Per the MDR, MDA
and Northern Command will prepare a plan to accelerate efforts to
enhance missile defense tracking and discrimination sensors, to include
addressing advanced missile defense threats. Also, MDA will provide a
plan that will leverage work taking place at DARPA and the Air Force
identifying resources, retesting, and personnel requirements necessary
for defense against hypersonic threats to USD (R&E) and USD (P) within
6 months of the release of the MDR.
MDA requests $20.7 million for the Advanced Research Program to
continue capitalizing on the creativity and innovation of the Nation's
small business community and academia to enhance the BMDS. Advanced
Research conducts innovative research and development with small
businesses, universities, and international partners to create and
advance missile defense capabilities against current and future
threats. We are fostering innovative research between U.S. and foreign
universities of allied nations through international cooperative
technology development projects.
We request $14.2 million for the Advanced Concepts & Performance
Assessment effort, which centralizes advanced technology concept
modeling, simulation, and performance analysis. The program delivers
independent assessments of government, university, and industry
technology concepts that, along with systems engineering requirements,
support acquisition strategy decisions and define our technology focus
areas. The request will fund independent government assessments of
industry sensor, directed energy, and interceptor technology concepts
and mature related tracking, discrimination, and sensor fusion
algorithms. Assessment activities also include development of
Hypersonic Defense, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
Initiatives, and left-through-right-of-launch integration key
technology areas. The concept definition and assessment methodology
enables us to verify contractor technology solutions and evaluate
promising concepts in future missile defense systems architectures.
international cooperation
The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes funding for regional
missile defense capabilities to protect deployed U.S. forces, reassure
allies and partners, and build stronger regional security
architectures. MDA is actively engaged with over 20 countries and
international organizations and is expanding work with our
international partners through joint analyses, cooperative research and
development projects, co-production activities, deployment of BMD
assets, and facilitating the acquisition of missile defense
capabilities, including FMS.
MDA continues to encourage allied and partner investments in their
own missile defense capabilities to create more effective regional
security architectures that complement U.S. regional missile defense
capabilities. The United States and Australia are conducting joint
modeling and simulation activities looking at combined regional IAMD
architectures. MDA is providing support to the United Kingdom as it
conducts an analysis of requirements and potential radar options to
fulfill a commitment to field a BMD radar to enhance the coverage and
effectiveness of the NATO BMD system. We are engaged in multiple
missile defense architecture analysis studies with our foreign partners
to help them make missile defense acquisition decisions that also
support interoperability with the United States. MDA also supports
foreign military sales of the THAAD system, highlighted by the FMS case
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for seven THAAD batteries. We continue
to execute the UAE FMS case and deliver interceptors for the UAE's two
THAAD batteries, both of which have been delivered and have achieved
Initial Operational Capability.
MDA is actively engaged with several nations across the globe to
provide program information and cost data that may inform future
decisions to procure missile defense capabilities, including Aegis BMD,
THAAD, and BMD-capable sensors. We continue to discuss the 2016
regional Ballistic Missile Early Warning System architecture study
results with the Gulf Cooperation Council nations. MDA also is
assisting Japan in their pursuit of an FMS case for two Aegis Ashore
installations.
MDA's work with the Israeli Missile Defense Organization is a
testament to the strong missile defense partnership we maintain with
Israel. MDA's fiscal year 2020 request remains consistent with the
funding Memorandum of Understanding that the United States and Israel
signed in 2016, which would provide $500 million for this effort. This
budget continues MDA's longstanding support of United States-Israeli
Cooperative BMD Programs, to include the co-development and co-
production of the David's Sling Weapon System and Upper Tier
Interceptor and improvements to the Arrow Weapon System. The Department
continues to support co-production efforts for the Iron Dome program to
provide critical defense against short-range rockets and artillery. In
fiscal year 2020, our budget will also support several flight tests
across the Israeli portfolio. These continued joint efforts provide
Israel with a three-tiered defense to defend from ballistic missiles,
rockets, and cruise missiles and ensure Israel maintains its
qualitative military edge against its advisories.
We continue to make progress with our Japanese counterparts on the
SM-3 Block IIA, our largest co-development effort, which supports
extended deterrence and establishes an important regional defense
capability. We are committed to delivering the SM-3 Block IIA to meet
global threat requirements and support Phase 3 of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach. Our fiscal year 2020 budget request also supports
Allied participation in tests, exercises, and wargames, such as
Formidable Shield-2019 (FS-19). FS-19 is a multinational exercise that
will build upon the FS-17 exercise, which included the first
operational SM-3 intercept in the Atlantic.
conclusion
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, in closing, our
fiscal year 2020 budget funds comprehensive missile defense development
efforts, including several critical capabilities required by the
Warfighter. We will continue to increase the reliability as well as the
capability and capacity of fielded Homeland and regional missile
defense systems and make measured investments in advanced technology to
counter the adversary missile threat.
I also would like to broadly recognize the government/industry
missile defense team and, more specifically, recognize the brave men
and women who serve in our Armed Forces at home and abroad and who
operate the BMDS. Our Nation is fortunate to have such a capable
fighting force.
I appreciate your continued support for MDA and missile defense,
and I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
General Dickinson.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND
/ ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT
COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE
Lieutenant General Dickinson. Chairman Fischer, Ranking
Member Heinrich, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I'm
honored to testify before you today. Thank you for supporting
our servicemembers, civilians, and their families, and your
continued support to the U.S. Army, U.S. Strategic Command, and
the Joint Missile Defense community.
As air and missile threats continue to evolve, your support
enables the nation's air and missile defense forces to
accomplish their critical worldwide missions. I will briefly
summarize those missions in the context of three roles in which
I serve, along with some selected achievements over the past
year.
First, I serve as the Commander of the United States Army
Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), Army Forces Strategic
Command (ARSTRAT), which provides trained and ready space and
missile defense forces to support the warfighter and the
nation. With two warfighting brigades, as well as science and
technology capability development centers, we provide low-
density, high-demand capabilities for today's fight and develop
future space and missile defense concepts and capabilities for
tomorrow.
Last week, SMDC/ARSTRAT's 100th missile defense brigade,
comprised of Army National Guard soldiers from Colorado,
California, and Alaska, supported the FTG-11 ground-based
midcourse defense test. These flight tests allow our soldiers
to demonstrate their readiness and lethality to protect the
Homeland in the event of an ICBM attack.
Additionally, over the past year soldiers have supported
numerous regional air and missile defense tests, including the
maneuver fires integrated experiment, and a successful
interoperability demonstration between THAAD and Patriot.
SMDC/ARSTRAT is also developing directed energy for air and
missile defense. In 2018, soldiers at the Joint Warfighting
Assessment engaged in defeating targets with a 10-kilowatt
laser mounted on a Stryker combat vehicle. With soldiers'
input, the Army is developing tactics, techniques, procedures,
and concepts of operations for soon-to-be fielded high-energy
laser systems.
In my second role I serve as the Army's Air and Missile
Defense Enterprise Integrator, coordinating across the Army air
and missile defense community to balance priorities, inform
resourcing decisions, and pursue innovative approaches that
enhance our strategic flexibility. Our team recently published
Army Air and Missile Defense 2028. This document is aligned
with national DOD Army strategic guidance to include the
missile defense review. It synchronizes the Army's AMD [air
missile defense] capabilities, capacity, training, and our ally
and partner initiatives to ensure our forces are flexible,
agile, and integrated, capable of executing multi-domain
operations and defending the Homeland, joint and coalition
forces, and critical assets.
As one of the Army's top six modernization priorities, Army
air and missile defense is achieving accelerated delivery of
capabilities and capacity. The Army selected and has begun
production of the first of four battalions of interim mobile
short-range air defense, or IM-SHORAD.
Additionally, per the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019, Iron Dome was selected as the interim
cruise missile defense capability for indirect-fire protection
capability, or IFPC, and will serve to deliver cruise missile
defense protection by the end of next year.
In the past year, the Army expanded air and missile defense
capacity by activating an additional air defense artillery
brigade in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), activated a
SHORAD battalion in Europe, and resourced force structure for
future IM-SHORAD battalions.
Finally, I serve as the Commander of the Joint Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, or JFCC IMD,
which supports U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) by
integrating and synchronizing global missile defense
operations. JFCC IMD also advocates for missile defense
capabilities and provides global missile defense training.
In 2018, JFCC IMD, our team spearheaded the biennial Nimble
Titan campaign, an exercise that brings together
representatives from over 24 allies and partners, and 4
international organizations to explore solutions for
collaborative missile defense. Nimble Titan builds confidence
in shared missile defense and enables collaboration,
interoperability, and cost-sharing with our allies and
partners. The campaign serves as a linchpin by building trust
and increasing integration to maximize our collective
capability and capacity.
So in summary, there is no one silver bullet or single
capability to counter the rapidly changing and complex
operational environment. We must continue to develop more cost-
effective capabilities that position us on the right side of
the cost curve. We must invest in solutions to counter threats
through all phases of flight, in any weather, and in a denied,
degraded, or contested environment, and finally, all that we do
depends on our greatest strength, which is our people. Our
remarkable servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and their
families provide global support to the Army, joint warfighter,
and the Homeland every day as they deploy, develop, and operate
our nation's air and missile defense systems.
So thank you for your continued support for these dedicated
professionals, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Dickinson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General James H. Dickinson
introduction
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of
our servicemembers, civilians, and families and your continued support
of the Army, the U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of Defense, and
the missile defense community. Thank you also for the opportunity to
testify before this Subcommittee. I am honored to highlight the
important missile defense capabilities and ongoing enhancements that
enable the defense of our Nation, forward stationed and deployed
forces, allies, and partners.
As I have done for the past 2 years, today I bring both an Army and
a joint perspective on effective missile defense capabilities. Within
the Army and joint communities, my responsibilities encompass several
mission areas.
As the commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
and Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT), I have Title 10
responsibilities to organize, train, and equip Army space and global
ballistic missile defense forces. I serve as the Army's force
modernization proponent for space, global ballistic missile defense,
and high altitude forces and capabilities. Further, I am the Army
Service Component Commander to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In
this role, I am responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating,
and providing Army space and missile defense forces and capabilities in
support of USSTRATCOM missions.
I also serve as the Army's Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Enterprise
Integrator. In this role, I synchronize the balanced execution of the
Army's AMD posture across the functions of force planning and sourcing
requirements, combat and materiel development, AMD acquisition, and
lifecycle management. I coordinate with the AMD community of interest
to balance priorities, inform resourcing decisions, and pursue
innovative approaches in order to enhance our strategic flexibility.
Finally, as the Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am
responsible for coordinating global missile defense planning,
conducting missile defense operations support, recommending allocation
of missile defense assets, and advocating for missile defense
capabilities on behalf of the combatant commanders.
My major tasks within these roles can be summarized as providing
forces and capabilities for current operations; preparing forces and
capabilities for the future fight; and, research and development of
Army technologies that will provide future advancements in air and
missile defense capabilities. To achieve this, the organizations I
command align their activities to these priorities:
Protect our Homeland
Provide combat-ready forces and capabilities
Plan and conduct synchronized global operations
Prepare or adopt leap-ahead concepts and technologies
Preserve and account for the Nation's critical resources
Promote and foster a positive command climate
In line with my previous appearances, my intent today is to
highlight the dedicated people who serve in the diverse and
geographically dispersed organizations under my command, to briefly
outline the strategic environment, and to emphasize USASMDC/ARSTRAT's
missile defense force provider responsibilities with respect to the
Army and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs). I would also like
to outline JFCC IMD's role as a warfighter advocate supporting
USSTRATCOM's coordinating authority for global missile defense
planning, and finally, I will summarize key Army AMD developments in
the context of a comprehensive approach to addressing the evolving air
and missile threat.
the workforce--our foundation
USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC IMD cannot carry out our wide-ranging
national security missions without the dedication of our greatest
asset--our people. One of my most important messages to you today is
that your continued support is critical to our ability to develop and
retain a highly qualified and mission-ready workforce. The Department
of the Army needs predictable, stable funding to execute today's
missions and to posture for the future. The October 1 impact and will
ensure we continue to provide trained and ready servicemembers enacted
Fiscal Year 2019 Department of Defense (DOD) budget and the fiscal year
2018 emergency budget reprogramming for Homeland and regional missile
defense is making a significant and civilians to operate and pursue
advancements in space and missile defense capabilities for our Nation.
The supplementary resources will continue our momentum to provide
additional interceptors, modernize essential infrastructure, and
enhance discrimination and characterization capabilities. After more
than 2 years in command, I have seen countless examples of how our
strength lies in the command's agile, adaptive space and missile
defense workforce, a team of more than 3,000 highly trained and skilled
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians who stand vigilant
24/7/365, protecting the joint warfighter and defending the Homeland.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soldiers, Civilians, and Contractors Working
Together Across 11 Time Zones in 23 Locations to
Protect Our Nation, Allies, and Deployed Forces
------------------------------------------------------------------------
the increasingly complex threat environment
Current global trends indicate ballistic and cruise missiles are
becoming more capable, due in part to the proliferation of advanced
technologies, resulting in systems with global reach, increasing speed,
and greater accuracy. Additionally, many foreign ballistic and cruise
missile systems are progressively incorporating advanced
countermeasures including maneuverable reentry vehicles, multiple
independent reentry vehicles, and electromagnetic jamming, all intended
to defeat our missile defense capabilities. Moreover, numbers of
ballistic and cruise missile platforms are increasing. Many of these
systems are mobile, which increases the difficulty in detecting,
tracking, and targeting these weapons.
Numerous countries are developing ground-, sea-, and air-launched
land-attack cruise missiles using a variety of unconventional and
inexpensive launch platforms. Today, nearly 30 countries possess
ballistic missile capability and some are actively pursuing hypersonic
weapons. There are over 35 different variants of ballistic missiles in
service across the globe today and new intermediate-range and
intercontinental ballistic missiles (IRBM and ICBM) are under
development. Adversaries have demonstrated rapid advances in range and
overall missile performance. To meet the demands resulting from the
shift to great power competition, we continue to pursue increased
capability through modernization and development as well as increased
capacity within the missile defense area. Russia and China have
achieved parity with the United States in many cases, and overmatch in
others.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) have advanced technologically and
proliferated exponentially over the past decade. As technology has
progressed, both reconnaissance and attack capabilities have matured to
the point where UASs represent a significant threat to Army combat
operations from both state and non-state actors. The extensive range of
UAS platforms in terms of size, velocity, range, altitude, flexibility,
and capability make this a very challenging mission area for AMD
systems. As such, we appreciate that Congress authorized the Department
to take actions to mitigate the threat posed by UAS to facilities and
assets related to the Department's missile defense mission.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
`` . . . U.S. Homeland missile defense must both
outpace rogue state offensive missile capabilities
and hedge against possible future threat
developments.''
--2019 Missile Defense Review
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the future, our missile defense systems will encounter more
complex electronic and cyber attacks, as well as directed energy
threats that could significantly degrade U.S. missile defense
operations. We expect cyber and electronic attacks will be increasingly
relied upon in potential adversaries' anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
strategies. Our ability to successfully counter these continuously
advancing threats will rely heavily on our increased use of space and
space-enabled capabilities. Space sensors, in greater numbers and
sensor modalities, would expand our capability and capacity to track,
discriminate, and successfully engage ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic
threats.
The strategic missile defense environment is becoming more
challenging as adversary air and missile threats continue to
proliferate in number and advance in complexity. Our evolution of
capabilities requires a holistic approach that effectively integrates
alternative approaches and technologies to defeat air and missile
threats. A comprehensive approach, including attack operations and
active and passive defenses, increases lethality and enables more
efficient and effective missile defense capabilities. In addition,
implementing technological advances in a time of fiscal constraints
requires more cost effective methods to integrate our current and
future capabilities. We continue to prioritize integrated AMD resources
to optimize our support of the warfighter and to partner with the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Combatant Commands, and the Services in
pursuit of fiscally responsible methods to address evolving threats.
strategic positioning to counter the threat
To counter the threat and meet the objectives of the 2018 National
Defense and Army Strategies, USSTRATCOM and the U.S. Army continue to
provide and enhance Homeland and regional missile defenses. We continue
to work with our allies and partners in Europe, the Indo-Pacific
region, and the Middle East to increase integration and
interoperability of missile defense systems and operations.
Integrated missile defense planning, force management, and
operations emphasize global coordination with regional execution so
that for any threat, we match the best interceptor with the best
sensors. A layered and holistic approach that integrates offense and
defense will move the U.S. toward a more robust and flexible crisis
response capability.
The 2017 basing of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
battery in the Republic of Korea bolstered our regional defense
capabilities to improve protection of U.S. and allied forces, and
critical infrastructure on the peninsula. Additionally during 2017, MDA
completed the emplacement of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors
(GBIs) at Fort Greely, Alaska, to provide more capacity to defend the
Nation against an ICBM attack from North Korea, or a future ICBM
capable Iran.
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`` . . . ``I am confident in the ability of the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the
United States from ICBMs fired from North Korea or
Iran...''
--USNORTHCOM SASC
Posture Statement, February 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2018 National Defense Strategy prioritizes a strong commitment
to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, and the
Middle East. In conjunction with our allies and partners, the
Department of Defense maintains forward-committed Patriot; THAAD; and
counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) forces to enhance our AMD
posture, sending a deterrence message to potential adversaries and
assurance to our friends. Through forward positioned AMD commands and
air defense brigade headquarters, we continue to work with regional
partners and allies to increase information and data sharing and we are
developing a more robust global AMD force posture that leverages
partner nations' growing capabilities and capacity. Eventually, this
will reduce the strain on our forces while enabling more timely
modernization of our AMD assets.
The Army AMD enterprise, consisting of agencies and organizations
that develop, maintain, sustain, train, and employ AMD capabilities,
developed Army Air and Missile Defense 2028. This document, is based on
the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the
Missile Defense Review, the Army Operating Concept, the changing
operational and threat environments, and the rapid pace of our
technological advancement. This new path forward for Army AMD, released
last month, focuses on the 2018-2028 timeframe, aligns with current
Department and Army doctrine, and addresses our ability to balance
current operational requirements while shaping the force and
modernization efforts to counter future challenges. AMD serves as a
critical enabler of the Army's ability to penetrate and dis-integrate
enemy A2/AD systems and exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to
achieve strategic objectives. In summary, the Army Modernization
Strategy enables us to deliver advanced AMD capabilities to our
warfighters on a substantially decreased timeline. The Air and Missile
Defense Cross-Functional Team (CFT) is key to rapidly developing
requirements and ensuring these future capabilities transition quickly
from concept, to prototyping, to fielding. Army AMD continues its focus
on program development of Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD),
Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS), Indirect Fire
Protection Capability (IFPC), Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense
(IAMD), directed energy, and advanced energetics.
providing and enhancing missile defense capabilities
USASMDC/ARSTRAT's first major task is carrying out its Title 10
responsibilities, which include being a force provider of missile
defense capabilities. This command is manned by multi-component
soldiers, civilians, and contractors, who contribute to operations,
planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army forces and
capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM's missile defense mission. Other
commands around the world, including all GCCs, also leverage the
capabilities we provide.
Our operational function in today's fight is to provide trained and
ready missile defense forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the
warfighter. For example, USASMDC/ARSTRAT soldiers serving in the
Homeland and in remote and austere forward-deployed locations operate
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and the Army Navy/
Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control, Model 2, Forward-Based
Mode (AN/TPY-2 FBM) radars. Highlights of the capabilities provided to
current operations and readiness by our missile defense professionals
include:
Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense: Soldiers from the
100th Missile Defense Brigade, headquartered in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
Greely, Alaska, are ready to defend our Nation from an ICBM attack. In
support of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Army National Guard and
Active component soldiers operate the GMD Fire Control Systems located
at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska, the Missile Defense Element in
Colorado, and a detachment that oversees operations at Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California. These soldiers, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM,
also oversee maintenance of GMD interceptors and ground system
components. At the Fort Greely Missile Defense Complex, the 49th
Missile Defense Battalion military police secure the interceptors and
command and control facilities from physical threats. Given their
strategic mission in this remote location, the harsh environment and
20-hours per day of winter darkness, we must continuously review and
enhance the Fort Greely Garrison services and support to these
soldiers, civilians, contractors, and their families. With the
continued support of Congress, we have already realized substantial
quality of life improvements for these remotely stationed personnel and
their families.
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`` . . . the United States has a robust and credible
layered missile defense system.''
--USSTRATCOM SASC
Posture Statement, February 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Support to GMD System Test and Development: Soldiers from the 100th
Missile Defense Brigade and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion
participate in GMD test activities and work with MDA developers on
future improvements to the GMD system. MDA's testing regime, conducted
through a series of ground-based and operational flight tests, and
rigorously verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations,
emphasizes operational realism during test design and execution. This
realism enables soldiers of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade to
sustain and improve their proficiency and validate operational
employment of the system. A current example is the recent FTG-11 test.
The event enabled brigade and battalion soldiers to demonstrate their
tactics, techniques, and procedures in support of an operational flight
test. This test validates their readiness by performing their
operational tasks while building warfighter confidence that the system
will perform as designed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Our missile defense forces here, are vital to our
national defense and the world should know that
they're ready.''
--VPOTUS Elmendorf Air Force Base,
Alaska, 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Support to Regional Capabilities: The 100th Missile Defense Brigade
also provides GCCs with trained and certified AN/TPY-2 FBM missile
defense batteries. These batteries are currently located at five
strategic locations around the globe where they contribute to the early
warning, cueing, tracking, and discrimination of threats to our allies
and partners. These forward-based radars also represent a tangible
contribution to both Homeland and regional defense. Soldiers manning
these radars, deployed to remote and austere locations across the
globe, demonstrate daily our Nation's commitment to defend deployed
forces, allies, and partners from ballistic missile attacks.
Space Support to Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Space-enabled
capabilities are essential for missile defense operations, providing
and enabling communications; positioning, navigation, and timing;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and early warning. We
routinely coordinate and collaborate with USSTRATCOM's National Space
Defense Center to ensure that space assets are poised to support
missile defense.
In support of the joint force commander, USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues
to provide ballistic missile early warning within the United States
European Command (USEUCOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM),
and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) theaters of
operations. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Station
(JTAGS) detachments, which support the Joint Force Space Component
Command, are operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT space cadre and qualified
soldiers who monitor launch activity and other infrared events. They
provide essential information to members of the AMD and operational
communities. Our JTAGS detachments are forward deployed around the
globe, providing continuous, dedicated, assured missile warning to
USSTRATCOM and GCCs in support of deployed and forward-based forces. In
Europe, the relocation of the JTAGS detachment from Stuttgart, Germany,
to Sigonella Naval Air Station, Italy, is scheduled for completion
later this year. This will increase operational missile warning
capability.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``The exploitation of space provides a missile
defense posture that is more effective, resilient and
adaptable to known and unanticipated threats.''
--2019 Missile Defense Review
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USASMDC/ARSTRAT's second major task is to develop future missile
defense forces and mature current capabilities. A major component of
this function is providing relevant and updated training for our global
missile defense systems. During the past fiscal year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
trained approximately 200 soldiers to execute the missile defense
mission of the Homeland.
USASMDC/ARSTRAT, as a recognized Army Center for Analysis, conducts
studies to determine how to best meet the Army's assigned missile
defense responsibilities. Our analyses validates established procedures
and supports emerging processes. The Army uses these result to document
its missile defense needs and pursue joint and Army validation of its
requirements. With insights from these studies, we develop and
operationalize the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
requirements to address evolving threats and potential vulnerabilities
to the GMD and AN/TPY-2 FBM missile defense systems. This disciplined
approach ensures limited resources are applied to achieve maximum
operational utility.
USASMDC/ARSTRAT's third major task is to provide critical
technologies to address future needs that will enhance warfighter
effectiveness. Our technology development function is primarily focused
on the space and high altitude domains. Additionally, although MDA is
the principal materiel developer for missile defense capabilities,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues to support the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) efforts to move conventional prompt strike technology
demonstration activities to acquisition Programs of Record within the
U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. USASMDC/ARSTRAT has been
heavily involved in establishing the U.S. Army Hypersonic Project
Office (AHPO) and is supporting the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy
hypersonic programs with flight test and component procurement support.
The AHPO is currently providing senior Army leadership with program
plans, schedules, and funding requests to support a rapid near term
capability. In addition, the AHPO is supporting MDA's concept
development for defense against hypersonic threats. These technical
capabilities are at the forefront of developing holistic, cost-
effective approaches to address the broadening missile defense
challenge.
Following are brief summaries of a few of our research and
development efforts, as well as an overview of the capabilities of an
essential Army testing range.
High Energy Laser Technology Development and Demonstration: The
Army's high energy laser (HEL) science and technology effort aims to
develop ruggedized laser system components and subsystems, integrate
them onto an Army vehicle, conduct demonstrations to characterize
performance, and transition the technology to a Program Executive
Office. A solid-state laser weapon system has the potential to be a
low-cost and effective complement to kinetic capabilities in countering
rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM); UAS; and other threats. The
effort builds upon earlier pathfinder demonstrations of a 10-kilowatt
(kW) laser system by continuing to develop, integrate, and mature the
technology at higher laser power outputs. The 50-kW class Robust
Electric Laser Initiative fiber laser has been integrated into the High
Energy Laser Mobile Test Truck (HELMTT) for a 50-kW laser demonstration
against RAM and UAS threats. The HELMTT deployed to the High Energy
Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) at White Sands Missile Range, New
Mexico, last fall for initial system checkout. During that limited
demonstration, the HELMTT system showed that a high energy laser
system, mounted on an Army tactical vehicle, could engage and destroy
RAM targets. It will return to the HELSTF later this spring to conduct
data collection to ensure we are on the right track with our HEL
development efforts. This demonstration will be a key knowledge point
for the next major phase of high energy laser technology development,
the High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD). The HEL
TVD supports the Army's Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment
2--Intercept (IFPC Inc 2-I) program. It is on schedule to conduct a C-
RAM 100-kW demonstration in late 2022 to validate system performance
against IFPC Inc 2-I requirements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
`` . . . we are no more than a few years of having .
. . directed energy weapons of military utility . . .
''
--Dr. Michael Griffin, Center for Strategic and
International Studies Interview, December 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the past year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT also started work on the
Multi-Mission High Energy Laser (MMHEL) as an Army Technology
Maturation Initiative (TMI). The TMI will integrate a 50-kW laser
system on a Stryker combat vehicle and culminate in an operational
demonstration that informs M-SHORAD requirements. Supporting this
effort is the Mobile Experimental High Energy Laser (MEHEL), a 10-kW
laser on a Stryker. Over the past several years, MEHEL has participated
in four Maneuver Fires Integration Experiments at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,
and a Joint Warfighting Assessment in Germany. During the 2018 Joint
Warfighting Assessment, soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment
successfully operated the MEHEL during limited live-fire exercises.
MEHEL is helping warfighters develop tactics, techniques, and
procedures, as well as concepts of operations for future high energy
laser weapons.
Low-Cost Target Development: The Army has completed the initial
effort to develop a suite of threat representative, short-range
ballistic missile targets for lower-tier missile defense testing at a
substantially reduced cost. Over the past few years, we completed three
detailed target designs and successfully demonstrated all three of the
configurations, which leverage excess solid rocket motors. The initial
launch of Zombie targets was the Pathfinder Zombie Demonstration flight
in December 2016, followed by
Sabre Zombie targets in June and November 2017 for Patriot
intercept tests. These missions were critical operational tests of the
Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor.
Development of a two-stage Zombie ballistic missile target known as
Black Dagger was completed last year, culminating with a successful
risk reduction launch in June 2018. The Black Dagger target is meant to
represent a broader range of short-range ballistic missile threats by
achieving longer range, higher altitude, and increased velocity. The
Zombie suite of targets has multiple missions planned in support of
MDA, Patriot, and Army IAMD over the next several years. The goal
remains to provide more cost effective ballistic missile targets.
Accomplishing this goal, will result in an overall reduced cost to the
DOD's test execution mission.
Missile Defense Testing Range: USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Ronald
Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site (RTS) at the U.S. Army
Garrison--Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. RTS
provides critical testing support to both offensive and defensive
missile testing requirements for programs such as GMD and U.S. Air
Force strategic ballistic missile systems. RTS retains preeminent
ballistic missile testing capabilities used in validating the Nation's
ability to sustain a strong, credible ballistic missile deterrent as a
key element of national security and the security of U.S. allies and
partners.
RTS continues to support the developmental and operational testing
of both Homeland and regional missile defense systems. Two Standard
Missile-3 tests were successfully supported with MDA in 2018 (FTM-29 in
January 2018 and FTO-03 E1 in December 2018). Planning and preparation
for support to the Army Patriot system, the MDA Ground-Based
Interceptor, and THAAD systems continued throughout 2018 for future
test events.
RTS also supports offensive ballistic missile testing for the Air
Force Global Strike Command. During 2018, RTS supported four Minuteman
III test (Glory Trips) launches to successfully validate and verify the
effectiveness, readiness, and accuracy of the weapon system. Hypersonic
system testing has become a significant element of test planning at RTS
during 2018. Because of the geographic remoteness and available complex
sensor suite, RTS has seen a significant upswing in hypersonic systems
test planning. There are currently five active hypersonic test programs
in various stages of planning at RTS.
In concert with its testing mission, RTS conducts continuous deep
space surveillance and space object identification operations to
increase national capabilities and reduce expenditures for both mission
sets. The U.S. Air Force continues testing of its most advanced
surveillance system--Space Fence. In a few years, this improved
surveillance capability will enable proactive space situational
awareness while complementing existing systems at the RTS.
army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
Army Air and Missile Defense 2028 meets the directives of the
National Defense Strategy and the Army vision and enables Multi-Domain
Operations (MDO). To achieve the AMD force of 2028, we must continue to
modernize and develop AMD capabilities, build sufficient AMD capacity
for MDO, and ensure AMD forces are trained and ready. MDO requires that
our capabilities and associated command and control systems have robust
interoperability, to include with joint and allied forces, and be
highly resilient. Accomplishing these essential tasks will allow us to
provide deterrence via forward stationing and enable a more robust,
comprehensive defense by coordinating and integrating with our partners
and allies. AMD is one of six Army modernization priorities in which
recent Army investments have significantly increased. The Army AMD CFT
is the Army's modernization lead for these capabilities and works
closely with the other Services, the Joint Staff, and MDA toward joint
IAMD capabilities. The Program Executive Office for Missiles and Space
is the Army's materiel developer for these capabilities and works
closely with the AMD CFT. A summary of the Army's AMD strategic
direction and major programs follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMD is a Critical Enabler of the Army's Ability to
Conduct Multi-
Domain Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Readiness is the Army's top
priority. The operational demand to meet the requirements of joint
warfighters continues to stress the Army AMD force, impacting current
and future readiness, as well as modernization initiatives. With a
significant portion of the AMD force decisively committed, the Army
continues to take action to mitigate this stress on the force and
restore strategic flexibility. Within the last five years, the Army
implemented a Sustainable Readiness Model, established an AMD test
detachment, and fielded the Dismounted Patriot Information Coordination
Central (DPICC). Last year, the Army completed fielding of five DPICCs
to USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM providing these combatant
commanders greater flexibility and a smaller deployable footprint to
meet mission requirements.
Mission Command: Closely linked to AMD readiness is the ability to
provide low density/high demand AMD mission command elements. The
mission command elements are pivotal to laying the foundation and
creating an environment that supports the integration of Army AMD
forces into joint command and control (C2) architectures. Over the past
year, the Army has activated an additional Active component Air Defense
Artillery brigade headquarters in USINDOPACOM and is rotating a
National Guard Air Defense Artillery brigade headquarters to USEUCOM,
and is elevating the command of the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense
Command in USEUCOM to a general officer.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System: THAAD, a key
component of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) architecture,
is designed for area defense of deployed and allied forces, population
centers, and critical infrastructure against short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. THAAD is a mobile and globally
transportable, low density/high demand asset. THAAD has a unique endo-
and exo-atmospheric intercept capability using proven hit-to-kill
technology. There are currently seven operational THAAD batteries.
THAAD batteries are deployed to Guam and the Republic of Korea in
response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. The United
States Forces Korea (USFK) Joint Emergent Operational Needs Statement
(JEONS) requirement brings a remote launch capability in fiscal year
2019 and a THAAD Missile Segment Enhancement Integration capability in
fiscal year 2021. As directed in the 2019 Missile Defense Review, the
Army, in conjunction with OSD and MDA, is currently reviewing and
validating the THAAD requirements in order to support current operation
plans.
Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment
Enhancement (MSE): The Army Patriot force remains the cornerstone of
AMD protection for our deployed forces, friends, and allies. The
Patriot force is 40 percent forward stationed/forward deployed as GCCs'
increasing AMD requirements drive the operational tempo and stress on
the Patriot force. The PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE interceptors employ hit-to-
kill capability against ballistic missiles. PAC-3 MSE fills the
engagement gap between the THAAD and the PAC-3 missiles while also
defeating advanced threats earlier, at greater range, with increased
lethality. The PAC-3 MSE is in full-rate production and is the latest
generation hit-to-kill PAC-3 interceptor in the Patriot force to meet
global capability requirements. Over the next year, ongoing efforts
will increase annual PAC-3 MSE production capability by approximately
30 percent to address increased U.S. requirements and demand from our
international partners.
Patriot must continually modernize through software and hardware
upgrades to avoid obsolescence and to take advantage of the extended
battlespace performance afforded by the PAC-3 MSE interceptor. This
modernization effort provides combat identification enhancements,
addresses upper tier debris mitigation, improves performance of the
PAC-3 MSE interceptor, and enables Army and joint interoperability
improvements. The Post Deployment Build (PDB)-8 Conditional Materiel
Release hardware and software was approved in November 2018. An agile
build, PDB-8.0.6, was created in support of the USFK JEONS to expand
Patriot and THAAD interoperability. The JEONS requirement brings the
launch-on-remote capability, which expands Patriot's battlespace by
enabling it to utilize the AN/TPY-2 radar battlespace by the Patriot
system. This capability will be pure fleeted across Patriot in PDB-8.1
in fiscal year 2022. For adversary overmatch, the Army is continuously
improving Patriot capability against the near-term evolving threat
while we move toward the Army IAMD Battle Control System (IBCS)
architecture including a new Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor
(LTAMDS) and the IFPC Inc 2-1.
Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS): LTAMDS will
provide sensing capabilities in the lower tier portion of the ballistic
missile defense battlespace and allow the full kinematic capabilities
of the PAC-3 MSE missile. Additionally, LTAMDS will serve as a sensor
node on the IBCS network, address capability gaps, modernize
technology, reduce operations and sustainment cost, mitigate
obsolescence, increase battlespace, and enhance reliability and
maintainability.
To ensure a fair-and-open competition, an LTAMDS Sense-Off
demonstration will be conducted in 2019. The upcoming Sense-Off
competition provides industry the opportunity to demonstrate potential
LTAMDS solutions. The Army will leverage Sense-Off results, along with
concurrent modeling and simulation efforts, to evaluate current
industry capabilities and determine future growth potential. Following
the Sense-Off and proposal evaluations, the Army will award a contract
later this year to a single vendor for the delivery of six prototypes.
The rapid prototyping effort goal is the delivery of four sensors to
one battalion in 2022.
Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 - Intercept (IFPC
Inc 2): As the end of the operational lifecycle approaches for short-
range AMD capabilities such as Avenger, the Army is developing new
capabilities to defeat air, cruise missile (CM), and RAM threats. The
primary IFPC-Inc 2 mission is to provide a robust protection capability
against these threats to supported forces within fixed and semi-fixed
locations. To address a gap in defenses against potential Russian and
Chinese CM threats, the Army recently reported to Congress its intent
to rapidly field an interim capability utilizing the Israeli Iron Dome
system no later than fiscal year 2020. Concurrently, the Army plans to
execute a decision on enduring IFPC capability by the end of fiscal
year 2019. Two batteries of the enduring IFPC-Inc 2 capability will be
deployed no later than the conclusion of fiscal year 2023.
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS): Technological advances
and the proliferation of commercial and tactical UAS in both
reconnaissance and attack capabilities have matured to the point where
they represent a significant threat to Army operations from both state
and non-state actors. The extensive range of platforms in terms of
size, velocity, range, altitude, flexibility, and capability make this
a very challenging mission area for AMD systems. C-UAS efforts are
critical to defeat the rapid proliferation of small, commercially
available UAS technology on the battlefield. In response to a
warfighter Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS), the Army
has deployed over 500 C-UAS systems (man-portable, expeditionary, and
mobile) and continues to adapt to changes in theater UAS threats. The
modification of counterfire target acquisition radars, equipped with
multi-mission air surveillance target acquisition capabilities,
improves the warfighter's ability to detect and defeat these low, slow,
and small UAS threats. Efforts continue to close the risk gap to
protect our maneuver forces with short range defense capabilities.
Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance (ALPS): In support of a
JUONS, the ALPS passive sensor is currently being fielded to
USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM. The Army demonstrated the ability
to integrate ALPS into the Army IBCS in 2018. Once fully integrated
into Army IBCS, the ALPS passive sensor will provide continuous, 360-
degree, long-range surveillance against fixed and rotary wing aircraft,
UAS, and CM threats.
Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD): M-SHORAD will provide
a dedicated maneuverable and survivable AMD capability for maneuvering
forces against fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and UAS threats. The Army
delivered two Avenger battalion equipment sets to USEUCOM in support of
the European Deterrence Initiative. The equipment was accompanied by
personnel and infrastructure allowing the establishment of an Active
component Avenger battalion. Additionally, the Army is rotating an Army
National Guard Avenger battery to Europe to provide protection of
maneuver forces. While the current Avenger and Stinger systems provide
limited capabilities today, we must develop and field more advanced
systems to outpace the threat. In fiscal year 2018, the Army began the
development and fabrication of initial M-SHORAD systems that integrate
existing Army capabilities into a Stryker combat vehicle. Rapid
prototype development and integration activities continue and fielding
of four M-SHORAD battalions is scheduled for fiscal years 2021 through
2023. In addition, the Army continues to mature high energy lasers and
electronic warfare to increase M-SHORAD capabilities in support of the
maneuver force. M-SHORAD will begin to integrate a laser with an
initial capability in fiscal year 2024. By fiscal year 2028, M-SHORAD
battalions will field a mix of directed energy and missile-based
systems.
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): Army IAMD
integrates current and future AMD sensors and weapons into a common
integrated fire control capability. The Army's common integrated and
networked AMD C2 capability, IBCS, will allow the warfighter to fully
integrate joint and multinational AMD capabilities across all echelons.
IBCS allows rapid convergence of sensors, shooters, and C2 components
on an integrated fire control network. Once fully fielded, IBCS will
provide a game-changing capability, allowing AMD forces to be tailored
and scaled appropriately to meet the given threat. The flexible number
and mix of capabilities can be task organized into a formation with an
inherent, integrated C2 system. The IBCS open architecture will enable
rapid integration of legacy and developmental sensors and shooters,
providing capabilities to defeat emerging threats in multi-domain
operations. The program continues to execute on plan in accordance with
the 2018 Congressional report.
The program will field common missile command nodes for Army AMD
forces to defend against manned aircraft and UAS, air-to-ground
missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, CM, and RAM attacks. The IBCS
will operate with air surveillance and fire control capabilities across
the Army, and with joint and multinational AMD capabilities across all
echelons. It will enhance the lethality of the AMD force, dismantling
the current system-centric control paradigm, which will dramatically
increase capability and also facilitate open industry competition in
support of the AMD community. Additional efforts are currently underway
to explore the feasibility and potential benefits of integrating Army's
IBCS and MDA's BMD System Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications (C2BMC), to include THAAD fire control center, to fully
support Army IAMD interoperability with the BMDS.
joint functional component command for integrated missile defense (jfcc
imd)--integrating and synchronizing missile defense
JFCC IMD is USSTRATCOM's missile defense integrating element,
formed to execute its Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned missile
defense mission and enable the headquarters to focus on integration and
advocacy. Headquartered at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado
Springs, Colorado, JFCC IMD is manned by a cohesive team of Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marine Corps, civilian, and contractor personnel.
As the Secretary of Defense and various combatant commanders have
previously testified, warfighters remain confident in our ability to
protect the Nation against missile attacks. However, as the global
missile threat continues to evolve, we must invest in holistic
approaches to defeat adversary missiles before launch or during all
phases of flight (boost, midcourse, and terminal phases). Additionally,
we must continue to invest in capabilities that limit or mitigate the
effects of an attack which penetrates our defenses. JFCC IMD's
principal mission is to coordinate with, and operationally support, the
joint warfighters at the GCCs, and advocate for their requirements with
the materiel developers at MDA and the Services. On behalf of the GCCs
and USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD champions warfighter priorities and capability
needs, including continued development of a robust sensor network,
integrated discrimination capabilities, redundant and resilient C2
networks with enhanced cybersecurity defenses, and improved
interceptors for both Homeland and regional missile defenses.
Through JFCC IMD, we work across DOD and alongside key allies and
partners to improve integration of existing capabilities, maximizing
efficiency and effectiveness in global missile defense missions. The
essential force multiplier is integration--a critically important
mission enabler that JFCC IMD directly supports. As a functional
component command of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD executes support to
designated UCP responsibilities along four lines of effort:
Synchronizing global missile defense planning, global
force management, and missile defense security cooperation activities.
Conducting global missile defense operations support, to
include asset management, alternate execution authority, federated
intelligence support, and network monitoring and protection.
Executing above element, joint, and combined global
missile defense training and education, exercises, and experimentation.
Advocating for and recommending acceptance of global
missile defense capabilities, conducting analysis and assessments of
current and future capabilities, and supporting ground & flight tests.
To accomplish these efforts, we maintain close collaborative
relationships with the GCCs, MDA, the Services, OSD, the Joint Staff,
and our allies and partners. We continually seek to enhance our
deployed forces' capabilities while gaining operational experience and
confidence in our collective ability to defend the Nation, deployed
forces, partners, and allies. Some of our key efforts to enhance
missile defense planning and capabilities for both the Homeland and
regional architectures follow:
Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In
response to the evolving strategic environment, we continue to bolster
Homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. In development of
the global missile defense mission, we are supporting the advancement
of the new capabilities such as Aegis Ashore in Poland; the Standard
Missile-3 Block IIA under co-development with Japan; Long Range
Discrimination Radar at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska; 20 additional
GBIs in a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska; Homeland Defense
Radar-Hawaii; Pacific Radar; Spacebased Kill Assessment; and various
other new capabilities such as neutral particle beam, high energy
laser, and other directed energy technologies. Given the many
challenges associated with implementation of these architectures, JFCC
IMD, in support of USSTRATCOM's coordinating role for global missile
defense, collaborates with the GCCs to assess and address cross-
regional gaps in the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and
operations.
Multi-Regional Missile Defense Asset Management: JFCC IMD, in
coordination with USSTRATCOM and the GCCs, manages the availability of
missile defense assets to balance operational readiness posture,
coordinates the scheduling of missile defense system maintenance
activities, and supports MDA and Service test requirements. The asset
management process allows us to continually assess our readiness to
defend against missile attacks and to recommend adjustments to optimize
the overall missile defense architecture.
Cybersecurity of the Ballistic Missile Defense System: JFCC IMD, in
coordination with USSTRATCOM and MDA, conducts the Cybersecurity
Service Provider mission for the BMDS to ensure cyber defenses and
operations are planned and executed across the globe. JFCC IMD works
with key stakeholders to enhance the cyber defense posture of our
missile defense operational architecture against malicious activity. We
are collaborating with our mission partners to incorporate realistic
cybersecurity testing in support of the Warfighter Capability
Acceptance process. JFCC IMD also works closely with the Joint Staff,
combatant commanders, and MDA to educate, train, and exercise
cybersecurity protocols to ensure the highest levels of readiness.
Global Planning and Assessment: As regional and global missile
threats continue to increase in number and complexity, JFCC IMD works
with the missile defense community to refine processes that synchronize
transregional global missile defense planning and operations. Codified
in periodic revisions to the Global Missile Defense Concept of
Operations, these processes ensure unity of effort and mitigate
potential seams and gaps across geographic areas of responsibility.
Consistent with the Department's transition to planning based on
adversary problem sets, JFCC IMD has continued to refine our process
for adversary-centric missile defense plans assessments, and completed
further objective analysis of missile defense risks across multiple GCC
plans. This assessment methodology identifies systemic risk, informs
recommendations for shortfall mitigation, and increases effectiveness
in future missile defense planning efforts. This analysis informs our
biennial Global Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment which
shapes recommendations for global force management and future
capability advocacy. Looking forward, we will focus our efforts with
the warfighter community to continue establishing approaches and
processes necessary to enable increased integration and a more holistic
approach to missile defense.
Global Force Management: USSTRATCOM, as the designated Joint
Functional Manager for missile defense, relies upon JFCC IMD to
evaluate and recommend to the Joint Staff sourcing of missile defense
requirements based on assessed risk. Due to the low density/high demand
nature of missile defense assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct
and significant impact on other combatant commanders' campaign and
contingency plans. We continue to refine our approach to prioritize
steady-state global missile defense requirements. This Global
Prioritized Defended Asset List categorizes the GCCs' critical assets
based on global risk. It informs our recommendations in the Global
Force Management process, enabling senior leaders to make informed
decisions on allocation of low density missile defense forces.
Allied and Partner Missile Defense Integration: Given that we will
never have enough active defense capacity, integrating our allies and
partners into a common and mutually supportive architecture is a
critical warfighter priority. In support of those efforts, our Global
Missile Defense Concept of Operations includes an International
Engagement Framework which provides a common approach to identify
potential partners, a model to identify a level of maturation, and an
assessment mechanism. This approach has formed the analytical basis for
the Department's Reports to Congress on Allied Integration for the past
2 years. Another venue aimed at promoting increased cooperation is the
Nimble Titan campaign, a biennial series of multinational missile
defense experiments. Nimble Titan brings together policy and military
subject matter experts from allies and partner nations to explore
collaborative missile defense, synchronize policy and military
initiatives, and identify potential future concepts. Today, ministries
of foreign affairs and defense representatives from 24 nations, the
North Atlanta Treaty Organization (NATO), three additional
multinational organizations, as well as DOD, OSD, Joint Staff,
Combatant Commands, and MDA convene quarterly to exchange views and
insights, collectively exploring policy and operational concepts. The
Nimble Titan 18 campaign highlighted the importance of common threat
perception, differences in triggers for offensive action, challenges of
intelligence and information sharing in a multinational coalition, and
experimentation with global, regional, and national defense designs
with layered defense. The campaign explored regional verses national
defense designs to combat overmatch of threats, where nations with
missile defense assets provided coverage for regional partners without
assets. Additionally, increased intelligence sharing led to a
multinational coalition to prevent missile proliferation and decreased
risk of escalation.
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``By working together with allies and partners we
amass the greatest possible strength for the long-
term advancement of our interest . . . ''
--2019 National Defense Strategy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ongoing Nimble Titan 20 campaign incorporates recent guidance
from worldwide senior leaders and lessons learned from past campaigns
to experiment with the future use of space sensors for missile defense,
the use of deterrence, and defense against and use of non-kinetic
effects to include cyber, as part of IAMD. Nimble Titan continues to be
a gateway for the U.S. to establish crucial relationships with allies
and partners. It also informs the missile defense policies of the
participating nations and international organizations. Events like
Nimble Titan foster greater confidence in combined missile defenses and
provide a means to advance U.S. efforts in collaboration, integration,
interoperability, and burden sharing with our allies and partners.
JFCC IMD, in coordination with Combatant Commands and selected
allies and partner militaries, is developing a multilateral
information-sharing and modeling and simulation construct to enable
collaborative planning and provide a better assessment of allied and
partner nations' missile defense systems and capabilities. It also
participates in regular multilateral tabletop exercises and events to
help partner nations identify and close capability gaps. Additionally,
we have successfully integrated allies directly into the JFCC IMD staff
through the Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) program. Our first FLO, a
German Air Force officer, has been an integral player in Nimble Titan,
NATO BMD training, and allied and partner modeling and simulation
efforts. We are seeking to add additional FLOs to increase our
understanding of allied missile defense policies, capabilities, and
planning in order to optimize missile defense planning and force
allocation.
Joint Missile Defense Training and Education: In coordination with
USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Services, we
continue to develop comprehensive and innovative training programs to
close gaps between Service, joint, and regional missile defense
training and education. JFCC IMD's Joint Ballistic Missile Defense
Training and Education Center, was designated last year by OSD as a
Center of Excellence. It now offers 16 mission-oriented resident and
mobile training team courses, and online courses to include
orientation, asset management, C2BMC situational awareness, and general
officer/flag officer seminar training. Over the past year, JFCC IMD
instructors executed 240 courses, training over 3,500 students
worldwide. Additionally, in keeping with Joint Vision 2020, JFCC IMD
provided training courses to our allies and partners through military-
to-military and Foreign Military Sales training venues. In 2018, this
included training to the Japan Self Defense Force Joint Staff, the
Republic of Korea Armed Forces, and the Peninsula Shield attendees at
the Fires Center of Excellence Top Gun course.
Warfighter Capability Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan:
As missile defense architectures mature, warfighters require a
credible, comprehensive assessment of new capabilities to inform
operational acceptance into the global BMDS. The warfighter relies on a
robust and operationally relevant test campaign to confidently field
and integrate new capabilities into their existing IAMD architectures.
In April 2018, Warfighter Capability Acceptance was completed for
the entire fleet of operational GBIs, thus enhancing Homeland defense
capabilities for USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM. Warfighter Capability
Acceptance is scheduled to be completed in 2019 for improvements made
to Robust IRBM Defense for USEUCOM and USCENTCOM.
Last year's test campaign included several significant tests. In
April 2018, the Department demonstrated interoperability between the
THAAD and Patriot weapons systems. Additionally in September 2018,
international cooperation was demonstrated when Japanese Maritime Self
Defense Force and MDA completed an Aegis BMD intercept flight test, in
cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Hawaii. Finally, in
December 2018, the Department conducted an Aegis Weapon System Engage-
On-Remote intercept of an IRBM-class target with an SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor demonstrating the effectiveness of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach Phase III architecture.
This year, JFCC IMD supported the FTG-11 test which demonstrated
several firsts, including the first salvo (two GBIs) engagement;
operational flight test of the GMD system; first use of the space
segment of the Space-based Kill Assessment in a GMD flight test; and
first Aegis SM-3 Block IIA simulated engagement of an ICBM class
target. The Navy and MDA will demonstrate fleet defense using a salvo
of two SM-6 missiles. Additionally this year, new capabilities that
will be demonstrated in flight test are THAAD remote launcher
capability and Patriot launch on remote engagement using THAAD.
Missile Defense Review (MDR): The recently released MDR reinforces
our commitment to defending the United States, our deployed forces and
allies from adversary missile launches. The review lays out a strategy
to prioritize a comprehensive approach to countering the increasingly
capable and diverse missile threat. It acknowledges the limitations of
relying solely on defending against missiles inflight and seeks to
improve our integration of offensive and defensive actions. Combining
offensive capabilities with a credible missile defense capability sends
a strong message of deterrence to our adversaries. We are pursuing new
concepts and capabilities to ensure effectiveness against current and
future threats. But, as we address future threats, we must account for
the AMD assets required to defend the Homeland while simultaneously
improving our regional capabilities. The MDR assigned a number of
follow-on reviews to ensure the missile defense enterprise
appropriately addresses requirements development, trans-regional
integration, and pre-launch attack operations. The JFCC IMD team is
fully engaged in these efforts and I am confident they will effectively
inform meaningful reforms.
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``The MDR looks at, and beyond, the contemporary
threat environment to consider emerging missile
challenges and their implications for U.S. missile
defense roles and requirements.''
--2019 Missile Defense Review
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our Nation's global
missile defense architecture and explores future capabilities to
maintain operational advantage against current and future threats.
Competitive edge is maintained through integrated planning and
operational support, deliberate investments in our capability
developments by MDA and the Services, investments in our warfighters
through education and training, expansion of collaboration with our
allies and partners, and the speed of innovation and fielding to get
capability in the hands of our warfighters.
conclusion
Chairman Fischer and Ranking Member Heinrich, as a member of the
joint missile defense community, the Army continues to pursue
enhancements to the Nation's IAMD systems, from the tactical to the
strategic levels of warfare. As outlined here, USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC
IMD perform a broad set of critical national security missions. These
missions include providing professional warfighters and capabilities to
support current operations, ensuring they are prepared for tomorrow's
fight, and developing new technologies required to maintain a
technological advantage against our adversaries. Our trained and ready
soldiers, operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York,
California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain on
point to defend the Homeland against an ICBM attack. As a force
provider to the GCCs, our soldiers provide essential regional sensor
capabilities, ballistic missile early warning, and satellite
communications. Our regional forces continue to leverage allied
collaboration and planning efforts in developing integrated and
interoperable defenses against the various threat sets. USSTRATCOM,
through the JFCC IMD, continues to integrate BMDS capabilities to
counter global missile threats and to protect our Nation, deployed
forces, allies, and partners.
While operational, doctrinal, and materiel developments are
essential, our most important assets are the thousands of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and contractors who deploy and
operate our IAMD systems. As recognized by Department leadership, the
strength behind our outstanding workforce is their families. Their
contributions and sacrifices are foundational to the dedication and
performance of our workforce--the role and support of our families
empowers mission accomplishment.
I appreciate having the opportunity to address missile defense
matters and look forward to addressing your questions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
Secretary Rood, the deployment of space-based sensors is
generally looked upon as a necessary next step for missile
defense, especially as threats from maneuvering hypersonic
weapons increase. Last year, funding to pursue such a network
was not included in the budget. It was placed on MDA's unfunded
priorities list. But Congress provided funding to begin moving
forward.
Now, in this year's budget request, the project is again on
the unfunded priorities list. Can you help me understand what
the Department's approach is here? We have heard a lot of
testimony about how important this capability is, but it
doesn't seem to ever be included in the budget documents.
What's going on?
Secretary Rood. Senator, as you point out, the growth in
hypersonic threats that we face is one of our concerns. So in
the approach that the Department has taken for this year as
compared to last year, one of the things that we've had is that
Under Secretary Mike Griffin, former National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) director, who also spent a great
deal of his career working in missile defense, has put forward
a concept that the Department is embracing for a proliferated
low Earth orbit (LEO) constellation of satellites. That
proliferated, or P-LEO constellation, has funding requested
from the Department that the committee will review, of course,
to begin the work both to architect that proliferated LEO
concept, which leverages work that the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has done, initially with
studies of the architecture, the sensor, a space transport
layer to communicate that data, and then a ground-based system
as well for command and control. That work would be done by the
Space Development Agency (SDA).
Senator Fischer. Is it $20 million that's in the budget for
the SDA to study that low orbit architecture?
Secretary Rood. The SDA budget request is for just under
$150 million for that purpose. That will include $20 million,
as you point out, for the P-LEO sensor technology, but it will
also include funding requested for the transport layer at $15
million, the ground warning integration for $30 million, as
well as the launch and space situational awareness portion of
that at $10 million, and for the staff and studies just under
$45 million. That's in addition to a space-based discrimination
study for the Space Development Agency, which has applications
both for ballistic missile defense and other activities.
Senator Fischer. General Greaves, can you discuss the
project on the Missile Defense Agency's unfunded priorities
list? Would you say it's premature to move forward at this
point, or is this for work that needs to be done regardless of
the outcome of this study?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Madam Chairman, thank you for
the question. It is absolutely essential that we continue to
move forward, and this work would be needed to be done now or
done later. It involves essentially initiating work for long
lead procurement of such things as the sensors themselves, the
focal plane arrays that will be needed to do the missile
defense mission from low Earth orbit, things such as cryogenic
coolers, and things such as solar arrays, which take a long
time to be developed.
So what Secretary Rood has mentioned is a proliferated
architecture where Dr. Griffin's organization and the Space
Development Agency will be presenting and preparing the
infrastructure required to host whatever mission set is plugged
into that low Earth orbit architecture, such as missile
defense. It could be positioning navigation and timing. It
could be some other mission.
But our enemy is time. This Nation is extremely capable of
doing just about anything it puts its mind to. The threat is
moving faster and faster, and the reason I include it as my top
priority in the unfunded list is that I believe that as time is
the enemy, let's not waste it, and if additional funding is
provided, that's where it would go.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General O'Shaughnessy, can you talk about why a space-based
sensor network is necessary in terms of threat?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the
opportunity.
First off, obviously with our adversaries, continuing to
make more complex weapons systems that we have to be able to
respond to. An example is hypersonics, where our current
sensing capability just doesn't have the ability to watch a
hypersonic from birth, from the time it launches, all the way
to the time that it would impact. The space-based sensing layer
gives us the ability to see it from the time that it launches,
and because of the unique fashion in which the trajectory is,
where it starts out very high but then it will come down low,
it will not be seen by our current sensors. The space-based
sensing capability now gives us the ability to track it from
birth all the way to ultimately when we defeat it.
So to me, that is of the highest urgency that we gain that
capability as soon as possible, because our adversaries are
actively developing these weapons as we speak.
Senator Fischer. Agree. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. I'm going to stay on the same subject
because I think I'm in a very similar position to the Chair on
this issue. It just seems like this is the thing that we should
be doing now. I'm deeply concerned that SDA doesn't even exist
yet, and we can't continue to push this off down the timeline.
So I guess I want to ask you, Under Secretary Rood, isn't
this an urgent need that we ought to be focused on now?
Secretary Rood. Senator, I would agree that this is a high-
priority need. The hypersonic testing that we see being
conducted by countries like Russia and China is a noteworthy
concern. The Space Development Agency, which reports to Under
Secretary Mike Griffin, has just begun its work with a director
and a small staff being named, and they have started the
construction of the agency. As you know, it's part of a focus
for a Space Force and a renewed focus that the Department would
have on that broad mission area.
So I quite agree that it's an important priority. The early
parts of this program are leveraging work that DARPA has done
in order to ramp that up over time, and that's listed in the
Department's plans coming out through the coming years.
Senator Heinrich. I have great respect for Dr. Griffin. I
just think this needs to land someplace that is ready to move
now, as opposed to in the future.
One of the things that I'm concerned about that's related
to this is that MDA's budget includes $34 million to revive
work done in the 1990s on neutral particle beam technology for
a potential space-based directed energy interceptor, and I
think all of you know that I'm about as big a booster of
directed energy technology as you're going to find in
Washington, but it seems to me that it's important to have the
sensors in place to discriminate these paths before we start
talking about a new interceptor; and, from a budget point of
view, that we might want to move up the space-based layer and
consider doing something like this that is brand new down the
road.
General Greaves, what was the reason back in the 1990s that
that program was stopped? What's the reason for reviving it
today? Are we doing this in the right order?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator Heinrich, just a short
summary. It was stopped because the Cold War ended,
essentially. A lot of work was done back then to prove out the
basic technology. Most of the components except for two of the
major actions within that system are at high technology
readiness levels, within being proven in the lab.
The reason why we looked at it is akin to the comment that
was made earlier about what are we doing new that's different
that can reduce the cost of missile defense and move us down
the cost curve. So we looked at something that was radically
different that had a significant amount of work done that we
can prove in a lab and then move to space if the Nation decides
that's what we need to deploy. But do it in the lab, prove the
technology, then move to space.
As far as the order in which things are done, I firmly
believe that with the work that's been going on with the space
sensor layer with the Missile Defense Agency, with the United
States Air Force, and with DARPA since 2015, there's a lot of
work that's been done with industry already to lay the
groundwork for the deployment of these sensors. The major
change this year has been the movement from the medium Earth
orbit deployment of an architecture to a low Earth orbit
deployment of an architecture.
So we will continue to use the funding that we received
last year. If we receive additional funding this year, it will
go into the very same sensor technology and development
activities. I think that we'll be ready in time to match up
with the infrastructure that the Space Development Agency is
producing; i.e., the communications transport layer, as well as
the satellite process.
Senator Heinrich. I'm going to run short on time here.
Given the votes coming up, I'm just going to yield back and
we'll see where we go from here.
Senator Fischer. Senator Hawley?
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I thank the gentlemen for being here. Thank you, as always,
for your exemplary service.
I want to start, actually, by going back to something that
you said, Secretary Rood, about the positioning of the--is it
the TPY-2?--in Turkey. We just heard, before the full
committee, from the new United States European Command (EUCOM)
commander that we are strongly considering and indeed may pull
back F-35s from Turkey if they move forward with their
procurement.
Are we worried about the TPY-2 being placed in Turkey given
its current pursuit?
Secretary Rood. Not at present, although depending on where
our relationship with Turkey should go, of course, it would be
one of the things that we would watch. We do still enjoy
generally good relations with Turkey. There are some areas,
particularly in interest in the S-400 Russian air defense
system, that concern us, and that's what you were referring to,
that there may be some results. But as far as Turkey hosting
the deployment of that radar, we've been pleased. It's been a
positive experience for us.
That's not the only facility, of course, that the United
States military maintains in Turkey. We have other both Air
Force and Army facilities there.
Senator Hawley. Right. A number of you have mentioned, both
in your written testimony and here, the development by both
China and Russia of hypersonic weapons of intercontinental
range. So say something more--we'll start with you, Secretary
Rood--if you could, about what we are doing to defend the
continental United States and Hawaii, the Homeland, from these
hypersonics, and are we in a position where we're likely going
to need to rely on nuclear deterrence in order to successfully
defend ourselves? What are the options that are on the table?
Secretary Rood. We do plan to rely on both nuclear and
conventional deterrence to deal with the hypersonic threat, in
addition to other things that we use those capabilities for.
However, our basic approach--and others on the panel can add if
I leave something off--would be first we want to have the
capability to detect and track those launches of hypersonics.
So that's where this proliferated low Earth orbit concept with
lower-cost sensors we hope can begin as early as 3 years from
now to place into orbit would provide the means, along with a
space transport communications layer and the ability to control
those things on the ground--first to track it, to have enhanced
command and control, and then some of the money that has been
requested this year is to continue to work on architecture to
affect the hypersonic vehicle during its flight.
Senator Hawley. Can you just say a word on nuclear
deterrence, about the importance of low yield tactical nuclear
weapons to an effective contemporary deterrent, and given the
context now of the return of peer or near-peer competition?
Secretary Rood. Yes. What we see in both Russia and China
is a substantial improvement and increases in their nuclear
forces; in Russia's case, a very large growth of so-called
tactical nuclear weapons. One of the things we see in Russia's
doctrine, which we see them exercise as well, is escalate to
deescalate, and we get concerned that some of the Russian
writings and their practices lead us to conclude they think
they have an advantage, that if they escalate and perhaps use
tactical nuclear weapons earlier, that the United States does
not have a comparable capability that is survivable and
responsive. Therefore we have requested money for both a low-
yield modification to an existing warhead for a submarine-
launched ballistic missile and a submarine-launched cruise
missile. A submarine-launched cruise missile is further behind
and we're just doing the AOA, or analysis of alternatives, at
this stage, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator King?
Senator King. I'm going to ask a series of dumb questions,
which people have told me I'm well equipped to do.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. The first one is give me a speed comparison
between a ballistic missile and a hypersonic missile.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Let's see. Hypersonic missiles
go Mach 5 or above, and Intercontinental-range Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) are at, depending on altitude, Mach 10, 12,
13, something like 22,000 miles an hour.
Senator King. So a ballistic missile is much faster, but a
hypersonic missile doesn't go up and down, it goes straight; is
that correct?
Lieutenant General Greaves. The hypersonic missile follows
a profile that's boosting and then reduces altitude into a
longer glide phase, and then a shorter terminal phase.
Senator King. What's the range of a hypersonic missile?
Could a hypersonic missile go from North Korea to the
continental United States?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, depending on the booster
that's attached to it. It could range ICBM or intermediate
range nuclear missile or----
Senator King. Does a hypersonic missile create a more
difficult or a different targeting scenario for our missile
defense?
Lieutenant General Greaves. It's a different, and with the
current sensor network that we have, a more difficult problem,
and that's why the space sensor layer is so significant, so
that we can capture it from the time it launches to the time we
intercept it, birth to death.
Senator King. Is North Korea doing any work on hypersonics,
or is that just China and Russia?
Lieutenant General Greaves. I would need to discuss that in
a classified forum. But the concern is potential, if not
likely, proliferation.
Senator King. Can hypersonic missiles have nuclear
warheads?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes.
Senator King. So this presents a really new challenge, and
you say that the necessary step is additional sensors?
Lieutenant General Greaves. That is the first step, sir, to
ensure we have custody----
Senator King. Did I understand from the Chair's question
that those sensors, that that new sensor layer is on the
unfunded priorities, not on the front burner?
Lieutenant General Greaves. It is on both. It is initiated
in the Space Development Agency's budget to develop the
architecture to support that sensor layer. But as my if not top
concern, near top concern, it's my number-one priority in the
Missile Defense Agency's unfunded list that was requested by
the Congress.
Senator King. It seems to me that's a very, very high
priority given the speed with which hypersonics are being
developed by our adversaries.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, I would agree, and I made
a comment earlier that in my mind the enemy is time, not the
ability to develop effective defenses against hypersonic
threats.
Senator King. General Greaves, could you describe the
recent test? Is that something that you can describe here in an
open setting?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. The reference is to
the acronym FTG-11, flight test ground-based midcourse defense
11, which, together with the U.S. Northern Command and General
Dickinson's team, we executed back on last Monday. It was the
most complex, comprehensive, and operationally challenging test
ever executed by the Missile Defense Agency.
Senator King. It was a success, was it not?
Lieutenant General Greaves. It was. We are doing about 9
months' worth of data review because we collected lots of data,
but the initial look says it was a complete success.
Senator King. Define complete success. Did the bullet hit
the bullet?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. The object of the
test was to launch an ICBM, an intercontinental ballistic
missile representative target, and we did that from the
Marshall Islands out at Kwajalein, to ensure to achieve the
speeds you asked about earlier, and the profile of a realistic
threat. But this test was different because we launched within
a very short period of time two ground-based interceptors,
operationally released by the combatant commander using their
operational processes, which is very important, and the lead
interceptor intercepted the ICBM representative threat.
But what's most important is that it created a debris
field, and this test has been 10 years or more in the making,
and the importance of that is the trailing interceptor was able
to discern the debris from the next most lethal object that I
can talk about in a classified forum, and also intercept that
object.
What that means is enemy operations that seek to confuse
our missile defense system by launching junk or debris would
not be successful. That's why it was a success.
Senator King. Congratulations. That's an amazing
achievement. So please convey the heartfelt congratulations
from this committee.
One other quick question. Do we know if the North Koreans
are developing a submarine-launched missile capacity?
Secretary Rood. Yes, Senator, they are.
Senator King. So that changes this calculation again. If
they're launching their missiles from North Korea, that's one
thing. If they're launching them from the Bering Strait or
somewhere in the North Pacific, that's a different problem.
Secretary Rood. It changes the defense equation in terms of
where the origin could be and what are other anti-submarine
capabilities in a potential conflict, how they would be
utilized, and it also changes the geometry depending on how the
North Koreans could choose to deploy that.
Senator King. And the time.
Secretary Rood. Yes, depending on where they launch from.
Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. We have had a vote called. We don't know
for sure what the schedule is going to be for votes in the next
few hours, but we'll try and do a tag team here until we're
sure what's happening.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I really want to reiterate what my colleague from Maine
said in a bunch of his questions. But first of all, gentlemen,
congratulations. The way I've been describing this--General
Greaves, correct me if I'm wrong. I think Senator King's
questions were actually quite good; basic, but good.
So is this a bullet? How fast is this bullet going? I'm
talking about the successful test.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Twenty-two thousand miles an
hour.
Senator Sullivan. So it's one bullet hitting another
bullet; correct?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. At 22,000 miles an hour in space?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, and then the first successful hit
created a fragment----
Lieutenant General Greaves. Debris field.
Senator Sullivan.--and the second missile then tracked the
biggest fragment, adjusted at 22,000 miles an hour, and hit the
fragment?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. That's unbelievable.
Lieutenant General Greaves. I would say it hit the next
most lethal object, because the architecture----
Senator Sullivan. Is that the next biggest object?
Lieutenant General Greaves. The next object that most
closely resembles a threat vehicle.
Senator Sullivan. First of all, congratulations.
Second, you might remember in the last couple of National
Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) I had rather comprehensive
missile defense bills that got incorporated, very bipartisan,
by the way, but the Congress encourages you to test at least
once a year. We want you to continue that, and, in part, here's
the reason.
Had that test failed, the New York Times, certainly The Los
Angeles Times--for whatever reason, they are real big skeptics
of missile defense--it would have been front page news, how
horrible and weak the system is. I don't even know if I read
any news articles on this remarkable test. So if any media, if
you're listening--I don't know if we have any media here, but
why don't you write an article on this? Because had it failed,
it would have been front page news. We all know that, and yet
you do something that is unbelievable and you get no press.
So, thank you. We're noticing, and it's remarkable.
My colleague from Maine is always asking the questions that
I want to ask, so here it is. What message does this send to
our adversaries, Kim Jong-un, Putin, the Chinese, anyone else
who wants to mess with us? Can they do this?
[No response.]
Senator Sullivan. Well, you don't have to answer that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. But what message does it send?
General O'Shaughnessy?
General O'Shaughnessy. Part of our deterrence is based on a
credible capability to deny an enemy the ability to achieve its
objective. So this test clearly shows that they would not be
able to achieve their objective, which leads to our ability to
deter so we could prevent a conflict from ever happening
because they know they can't reach their objectives. As the
operator of the ballistic missile defense system, this gives me
great confidence because we actually use our operators, the
actual folks who are doing it, to include your team from
Greeley, as we launched this through the operational construct.
It really gives us that high sense of confidence that we can
use it to deter our adversaries.
Senator Sullivan. Secretary Rood, what do you think in
terms of the message this sends, whether you're Kim Jong-un or
Putin or whomever?
Secretary Rood. I think it sends a very strong message
about the credibility of our capability and reinforces
deterrence. Missile defenses are part of contemporary
deterrence, both offenses and defenses. If you're Kim Jong-un
or another adversary, you have to think about first the
probability that your attack would be successful; and then
secondly, even if we successfully defended against an attack,
an attempt to incinerate an American city, the story wouldn't
end there. We still maintain our offensive capabilities.
Senator Sullivan. I think it's a great point. My point--and
again, you guys are the experts, and you've done a great job,
remarkable. But I think it's the message of if you do want to
go out in a flame of glory, Kim Jong-un or the Ayatollahs in
Iran, (a) it won't work if we have this capability; (b) we will
flatten your country after you try, so it's double deterrence.
I think that that's important.
Let me ask one quick question here. I think you're kind of
seeing what you might call in the military a foot stomper on
the issue of space-based sensors. The last two NDAAs, again in
a very bipartisan way, led by bills that my team and I and a
lot of you wrote, but to deploy a space-based sensor, there's a
strong interest in doing that here. I think you're seeing it.
We would be a little bit, I think, disappointed if somehow,
with the development of the new Space Development Agency, if
that kind of got lost in the shuffle there.
General Greaves, I'm going to ask you a question. Of
course, I'm going to ask for your professional military advice
on this one. But where do you think the best place for space-
based sensors to be put and deployed the most rapidly would be,
in the Missile Defense Agency or in the new Space Development
Agency?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, I will say that----
Senator Sullivan. I know it kind of puts you a little bit
on the spot.
Lieutenant General Greaves. It really doesn't because the
Space Development Agency, as it was stood up, was given special
authorities that are very similar or almost exactly what the
Missile Defense Agency has, except for the milestone decision
authority. I think that's still within the----
Senator Sullivan. So MDA or the new Space Development
Agency, most rapid deployment for space-based sensors?
Lieutenant General Greaves. If it's executed per the plan
that was laid out, the Space Development Agency is best suited
to provide the capability, and the example is the----
Senator Sullivan. Is that a big if?
Lieutenant General Greaves. If it's executed. My concern is
the big if, because if it's done the way we did the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), the space tracking
surveillance satellite program, where the Space and Missile
System Center contracted and delivered that capability to the
Missile Defense Agency, where the Missile Defense Agency held
the requirements and we continue to lead operation of that
capability, that can work.
If it's all co-located in one organization that has
responsibility for developing space capability, that's probably
the most efficient place to be. But it's got to have, it must
have, the responsibility, authority, and accountability that I
have in my position today. If that is not executed, if the
Space Development Agency does not have milestone decision
authority, which is critical for acquisition programs, then
that is not the most efficient place for it to be.
Senator Sullivan. You're seeing a lot of us want to get
that deployed quickly.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. [presiding] Senator Jones?
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today and for your service.
This is really just for anybody that might want to chime in
here. I'm wondering if we've already made plans or plan to make
any changes to our missile defense structure as a result of the
President's announcement that we're going to be withdrawing
from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. What
changes are there, if there are going to be any, or if you've
already made them or whatever? Are we covering those with the
budget that's there?
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rood. Senator, in the budget for missile defense,
there isn't a change necessary as a result of the President's
decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty. Of course, that will
take effect in August of this year. The change that you will
see going forward is the treaty, of course, prohibited the
United States from the pursuit of intermediate range missiles,
and we will begin to explore, and there's funding requested
from the Congress to explore concepts and to look at what the
options are that would be available to the United States for
offensive missile capability.
But from the defensive perspective, to withdraw from the
treaty would not affect the budget request for defenses.
Senator Jones. All right. Anybody else? Is that covered?
All right. So, General Dickinson, coming from Alabama and
the Huntsville area, the Space Force is an intriguing part.
We've been part of a Space Force in some way or another for a
long, long time. I'm wondering how the proposed Space Force
will impact your command, and how do you believe creating a
Space Force is going to enhance our national security?
Lieutenant General Dickinson. Well, thank you for that
question. So, in terms of Army space, we've got some great
capabilities within the Army space portfolio, if you will, that
as we go along in support of the legislative proposal that is
now here on the Hill that I think will fit nicely with that
proposal.
Our work right now in terms of supporting the ground
maneuver forces that reside within the Army, in terms of the
future of that, I think we will still see our ability to do
that. But as the Space Force, the opportunity to be able to
organize, man, and equip as an enterprise for space, as a space
warfighting domain is all included within that proposal, and I
think I support that.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
General Greaves, let me also congratulate everyone on the
success of the salvo intercept test. My only simple question of
this is what are the next steps on that, and are they
adequately funded in this budget?
Lieutenant General Greaves. The next step, sir, the number-
one priority in the agency is to continue ensuring that we
maintain and sustain the deployed fleet so that General
O'Shaughnessy retains his high confidence in the system. That's
the number-one priority.
The next step is to continue on with the reliable kill
vehicle program. I mentioned earlier that it's part of a
disciplined acquisition strategy. We had very strict entrance
criteria into what's called a critical design review. The
design did not meet it, so I assessed that and made the
decision that we would not enter into it.
What we're working now is to get back to the critical
design review. But the top priority is to deliver that more
reliable kill vehicle along the plan that we have submitted in
the budget.
Senator Jones. So the budget is okay on that? You're
satisfied that it's adequately funded in this budget?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
Senator Jones. Great. All right.
That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much for being here, gentlemen.
Senator Heinrich. In that case, I'll fill up a little time
here and follow up on what Senator Jones was just chatting
about.
General Greaves, the redesigned kill vehicle has a
projected delay of 2 years, and I understand there's a process
in place to review the challenges in the RKV program and to
ensure that we develop and provide the warfighter with a more
reliable kill vehicle. In your statement you described the test
events that will involve the RKV, and I just want to confirm
that given the delay time there, the 2-year delay, that these
tests will still occur before you procure RKVs so that you
fulfill the `fly before you buy' requirement.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, the answer is, in
general, yes. As part of the disciplined acquisition approach,
we have not deleted or modified any of those test requirements.
The only caveat I'll state is that we may approach the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as granted in the language for a
waiver of some sort if we believe that we can and are able to
and are credible enough to pursue that waiver. But the
scheduled delay was planned. It encompasses the activity we
need to complete a disciplined acquisition approach, which I
firmly believe we should continue on.
Senator Fischer. [presiding] Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Secretary Rood, in last year's hearing we discussed some of
the unanswered policy questions related to boost phase missile
defense. It was my understanding at the time that these issues
were being considered by the Missile Defense Review, but the
MDR did not go into any great detail other than to state that
boost phase capabilities could enhance our missile defense
efforts.
Can you discuss what the Department is pursuing with
respect to boost phase capabilities and whether there are
unanswered policy questions that really need to be resolved
before any capabilities can be deployed?
Secretary Rood. Yes. First, boost phase defenses are very
attractive to us because the missile is at its slowest point,
and potentially the debris could even fall back on the
launching state's territory. That's also the area where we
don't have substantial capability of any note in our arsenal as
part of a layered defense, which is another reason it's
attractive to us, to get at the missile as early as it is
launched.
With respect to the policy barriers, there aren't any
policy barriers at this stage. As the Missile Defense Review
notes, we are giving all the framework and guidance that the
developers need in order to go pursue those capabilities.
One of the noteworthy areas that we speak to in the Missile
Defense Review is the incorporation of our tactical air fifth-
generation platforms as first sensors, and later potentially
carriers, for interceptors to attack offensive missiles in
their boost phase. We're also looking at other potential
capabilities in directed energy for that purpose. But it's
mostly a capability limitation. At this stage the policy gives
encouragement to pursue the boost phase defenses.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Greaves, when we spoke yesterday it was an
unclassified setting, and you explained the low orbit sensors.
We've had a lot of talk about that. I know my colleagues went
to vote, but I think it would be good for the record if you
could give us an explanation of really what that all entails,
what we went through yesterday. I think it would be helpful to
have that in the record, what we're talking about here.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Let
me begin with the activity that I was involved with 3 years
ago, 3-\1/2\ years ago now, when I was the commander at the
Space and Missile Systems Center. Vice Admiral Sering was in my
position, and General Hyten was transitioning between Air Force
Space Command and USSTRATCOM. We saw the need for a shared
responsibility, shared capability between what the U.S. Air
Force was providing with the Space-based Infrared System in
geo-synchronous orbit 22,000 miles out in space, and the
ability to execute such missions at lower orbit levels, such as
the hypersonic defense mission.
So we, working with industry, explored architectures, which
resulted in a government reference architecture, essentially,
based at medium Earth orbit, about 10,000 miles out, but with
fewer spacecraft to do the hypersonic defense mission and look
for new, low signal level propulsion capability as the threat
is developing.
So that's where we started, and we were making significant
progress in that area. What has changed within the last year--
and the last year has been a year of transition within the
Department--is that Dr. Griffin is now approaching space
capability from a Department-wide perspective. So what has
changed is that with industry's progress in actually developing
the capabilities to proliferate multiple small satellites in
low Earth orbit, very significant potential to deploy a low
Earth orbit architecture that can do multiple missions, one of
which is missile defense.
So the vision from Dr. Griffin is to deploy that
architecture, multi-hundred satellites, very small, together
with a communications transport layer to move the information
around among satellites and to the ground and to the
warfighters where it needs to be, and to have mission areas
plug in as required. We do not need 200 satellites to do the
missile defense mission. We need a smaller number. Positioning,
navigation, and timing may need a smaller number. But together
we would ride on these spacecraft buses, as we call them, take
advantage of a communications transport layer architecture, and
execute the mission at lower cost.
The difference also between what our original government
reference architecture was and what Dr. Griffin is proposing
has to do with resiliency, the ability while under attack to
gracefully degrade your capability and not have it shut off
immediately. The way I try to explain it is if you've got six
big targets up at medium Earth orbit, that's a lot easier to go
against and have a bigger effect upon than a few hundred down
at a lower orbit that we have shown through analysis and study
that can gracefully degrade and still maintain capability.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Let me just follow up, and I apologize. You understand, for
some odd reason, the Chairman and I aren't in charge of the
schedule around here.
Senator Fischer. We should be.
Senator King. We should be, yes. It would work much more
efficiently. But let me follow up.
I was asking questions about could the capability of the
North Koreans in a submarine--if a missile is launched from
somewhere in the mid-Pacific between Hawaii and California,
would you still have time, if it were a ballistic missile, to
target and hit it as successfully as you did the one coming
from Kwajalein?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, yes. That would be an
intermediate-range to short-range attack, for which our current
systems--the THAAD system is an example, and if they're in the
right position to defend a certain area, or the SM-3s that are
carried on Navy ships as part of the Aegis weapon system, they
would be positioned, and we've demonstrated the ability to
counter those threats. The latest demonstration was last year
with THAAD against an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
(IRBM).
Senator King. So that deals with the shorter range.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes.
Senator King. With the submarine launch, if that's the
choice.
Secretary Rood, talk to me about directed energy. One of
the problems with missile defense is that the missiles that
we're shooting are quite expensive. Where are we with directed
energy? How far away are we? What might the role be--for
example, could it be ship-borne into the boost phase? Give me a
tutorial on where we are in directed energy.
Secretary Rood. Senator, I can begin, and then General
Greaves and General Dickinson may have something to add to that
as well.
But the short answer would be we are requesting funding to
continue directed energy work that the Missile Defense Agency
would lead. The main reason that that work for ballistic
missile defense has been centered at higher altitudes, both for
high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or potentially
space-based applications, is it's difficult to propagate lasers
in the atmosphere. There's a lot of water, clouds, other
things, and so by going up above the cloud layer or at a higher
altitude or in space, that is a simpler----
Senator King. Then you have the problem of weight and a
sufficient electric charge.
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir. This is the engineer's challenge,
yes. If you optimize in one area, other parts of the trade
space, you do encounter that. But it is easier to propagate the
beam across that area, and the energy that is output and beam
quality on the target is the key, really energy on the target.
General Greaves could teach a Ph.D. dissertation course, so
perhaps I should defer to him on it.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, the main constraints
or challenges have to do with power on the target, as well as
beam control to ensure you can stabilize it, as well as
pointing the laser in the right direction. So those are the
major challenges we're working on right now.
The scaling effort is one that has the most priority. The
original lasers that flew on the airborne laser, for example,
they were chemical based, so they were huge and took up lots of
room. Right now we're working with three industry partners, the
National Labs, looking at electric lasers; fiber-combined
lasers is one of the technologies. The other technology is--
forgive me for the acronym here, but diode-pumped alkali
lasers. We've seen significant progress with both of those, and
we're shooting to essentially move up from about 30 or 40
kilowatts. For us in the missile defense area, 1 megawatt is
high power. We need that to go against a----
Senator King. If you had 1 megawatt at the source, what's
the delivered power to the target?
Lieutenant General Greaves. We need 1 megawatt at the
target.
Senator King. So what I'm looking for is what's the
differential? How much--in the electric business I used to be
in, we talked about line losses. What's the differential
between where it leaves and where it hits?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, it depends on the altitude
from which the weapon is fired. We're looking at above 55,000
to 60,000 feet to get out of the atmosphere to allow maximum
power on target, energy on target. I missed the second part of
your question.
Senator King. Well, in order to put a megawatt on the
target, how much power do you have to have leaving the source?
A megawatt-and-a-half, or 2, or 1 and----
Lieutenant General Greaves. I may have misspoken. We need a
megawatt capability at distance with line loss to affect the
target. I'm sorry about that.
Senator King. Okay.
Secretary Rood. I know less about this than General
Greaves. I think the answer, Senator, is it's highly dependent
on several variables, the beam quality from its emission at 1
megawatt, and your ability to control that and change its optic
over time. In other words, it's not like electricity
transmission. It's a constant depending on what your sensor is
telling you about how this very dynamic environment with water
and air is moving, and you sense that, you change, like with a
contact lens changing its prescription over time, what you are
putting out. So it's a highly complex set of variables to say
it depends on many of the qualities of the system, how much
line loss, essentially, you have.
Is that accurate, General?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes. What I'll say, sir, is
while we were working on this successful mission within the
last 3 weeks, we've been doing some testing out of White Sands
against representative objects out there, but at much, much
shorter distances, and very successful in penetrating threat
representative articles----
Senator King. Can I be assured that this is a major area of
research and development and effort? It seems to me this is an
enormously potentially important development.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, within the Missile Defense
Agency it absolutely is, and that's why we continue to have
three activities going on in that area and request funding for
it.
Senator King. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. Senator, if I could add on to
that, that's a major priority within the U.S. Army. We've had
some success, a lot of success recently with integrating a 10-
kilowatt laser into a Stryker combat vehicle where it is
totally self-contained within that vehicle that will be able to
maneuver with ground maneuver forces. While 10 kilowatts (KW)
may not sound like a lot, what we've done over the past few
years is grow it from a 2 kilowatts to a 5 kilowatts, and our
road map is to put a 50 kilowatts onto a Stryker combat vehicle
within the next 4 or 5 years and be able to provide that to the
ground maneuver commander.
What we envision using that for is we've already
demonstrated successfully against an unmanned aircraft system,
and we've actually had soldiers actually operate the system
when it was a 2KW/5KW/10KW as recently as this year, and we
envision that in the future. So that's allowed us to have
warfighters using the technology at a very early stage so that
we can start developing our techniques and procedures that we
will use in combat.
We're on a path to get a 100 kilowatts high-energy laser as
part of our IFPC increment 2, our indirect fire protection
capability in the Army, which will be responsible for fixed and
semi-fixed defense, and we envision that. It's going to be
designed for not only unmanned aerial system (UAS) but also
counter-rocket artillery and mortar, and we've already
demonstrated some success with a 50 kilowatts against
artilleries out in White Sands missile range.
Senator King. I foresee a hand-held UAS anti-weapon staffed
entirely by duck hunters from Arkansas.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
You know, one of the things that all of you have been
mentioning is that time is the enemy here because of the
advancements of--whether it's North Korea or some of our other
adversaries or potential adversaries. As an Alaska senator, I
certainly take pride in the fact that we are the cornerstone of
our nation's missile defense with the Fort Greeley field and
the long-range discrimination radar and the radar sites out in
the Aleutian Island chain, and we're making progress on all of
these, as you know, gentlemen.
One area, though, where it looks like we're not making
progress--General Greaves, can you talk about the potential 2-
year delay of the redesigned kill vehicle, and is that a best-
case or worst-case scenario? Can you talk in public about what
the problem is?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, I'll start with the
last question. We cannot discuss the details of the problem.
What I'll say in general is that if this same issue had
occurred when we were developing the original extra-atmospheric
kill vehicle, the current fleet, a decision could have been
made to move ahead and deliver the capability, whatever we had,
the best capability that we can deliver.
The major difference here is that from the outset this
acquisition strategy was destined or intended to deliver a more
reliable vehicle that followed a disciplined acquisition
process to include robust design, robust testing, and a system
which was more maintainable----
Senator Sullivan. But does that make the acquisition
process slower, almost by definition?
Lieutenant General Greaves. No, it does not, sir, because
of the unique acquisition authorities that both the Congress
and the Department have provided to the Missile Defense Agency.
The issue with acquisition is the inability for rapid decision-
making within DOD 5000. That's the simplest way I can put it.
But with the authorities in this position that I occupy to be
the milestone decision authority, which has major approval
authority before we make major decisions, before we get to
production, as the program manager, as the head of the agency,
the decision authority lies right here.
It's what I personally use to decide that if we had done
something other than that, we would not be credible to the
acquisition strategy that we signed up to.
Senator Sullivan. So let me--can you answer the first part
of my question? Is that a best-case or worst-case scenario? Two
years is a lot of time.
Lieutenant General Greaves. It is.
Senator Sullivan. Especially given that time is the enemy.
Lieutenant General Greaves. We are testing components as we
speak, and that time may be adjusted over the next few months.
Senator Sullivan. Which way do you think it's going to be
adjusted?
Lieutenant General Greaves. More likely shortened, but it
could go the other way. When we developed the plan for up to 2
years, we took a best guess, almost worst case----
Senator Sullivan. Is there something we can do as a
Congress to help you with shortening that time line?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Negative, sir. Continue to
support what we're doing, ensure we----
Senator Sullivan. Is it a contractor issue? Is it a company
issue?
Lieutenant General Greaves. It's a technical issue, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me ask Secretary Rood, you and
I were all at the big rollout of the Missile Defense Review at
the Pentagon. I think it was important, an important symbol
that not just you and the Secretary of Defense and the Vice
President but the President of the United States was there. I
think that also sent a message to our adversaries and our
friends that this is a serious issue for the country.
In your view, what are the top three most critical elements
of the 2019 Missile Defense Review? A number of us--and you
know that you and I had a lot of discussions about this--were
pressing you guys to get this nice piece of work out as soon as
possible so it could impact the NDAA. Well, here we are. We're
already starting to draft up the NDAA. What are the key
elements that you think you need our help on? Again, one of the
positive things that's going on with regard to missile defense
right now in the last few years is that it's generally a
bipartisan endeavor in the Congress, particularly in this
committee.
So, top three things, and what do you need from us, and is
there anything missing? Now that you've written it and put your
heart and soul into it, and the President rolled it out, are
there things that you think, oh, shoot, we should have gotten
that in there, and let's try and get it in the NDAA?
Secretary Rood. Well, on the first question, in terms of
the key elements of the Missile Defense Review, I think for the
purposes of the NDAA one of the things that you see contained
in the Missile Defense Review is the support for the legacy
systems. That is to say, as those things that are existing
programs. Sustainment costs more, upgrades need to be made to
them, and then additional units that we've procured. So the
Missile Defense Review essentially says let's continue to
support what are installed bases or those things that are
currently planned and keep them robust and vital.
Senator Sullivan. So like the things in Alaska the
President highlighted in his remarks.
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir. So that would be one part of it.
But at the same time, then, the Missile Defense Review speaks
to developing new technologies and looking for new
breakthroughs and things that will take us to the next level,
if you will, of effectiveness of missile defense, things like
space-based sensors, starting to look at spacefbased
interceptors, directed energy, whether that's lasers, neutral
particle beam, or other activities like that. Trying to do this
in a more innovative way, leveraging DARPA's work for this
proliferated low Earth orbit series of sensors and the means to
communicate with them.
So, one, the Congress continuing to support the planned
sustainment and upgrades and additional production of the
current legacy systems, if you will; support for these new
technology efforts; and there's a certain art between always,
when you're moving to the next generation of technology, how
robustly do you fund that, because, as you know, those efforts
start smaller but then grow in funding.
Then the third area, which may sound very fundamental but
has had a huge impact on us, the Congress last year did
terrific work in the defense area to both finish an
authorization bill and an appropriations bill before the end of
the fiscal year, and I've seen the impact that that has had on
our ability, the purchasing power. Essentially, that gives us
more, the stability and the ability to focus on things other
than continually managing change orders and change activities
to keep going. So the terrific work that you did last year, if
it were possible again--and they were strong bills, the
authorization and appropriations bills that showed bipartisan
support for what we are doing. If you can re-create that, it's
hard to understate how important and how much that has
benefitted the Department overall.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Gentlemen, earlier we had a discussion on the recent
missile defense test, and I would like to ask you, General
O'Shaughnessy, if you have anything to add about USNORTHCOM's
involvement in that test.
General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, ma'am. As we discussed
about the sense of confidence that that test gives us as the
operators cannot be overstated. For us to actually participate
in the test from the aspect of the same way that we would do it
in an actual launch, so not in a test environment, not using a
different system but using the very systems that we would use,
with the very people that we would use to man those systems, in
a manner that is representative of a real-world event, really
gives us the confidence in the system, confidence in our
ability to give our senior leadership a sense of confidence
that we can execute this mission. We had a discussion with
Senator Sullivan about our ability to have that credible
deterrence and be able to say with authority that we do have
the confidence to be able to defend this Nation. I'm thankful
to General Greaves for giving us that opportunity.
If you actually look at the myriad of different things that
were tied to this test to take full advantage of the cost of
putting this together is not insignificant, but to take full
advantage of that, from the operational side, from the test
side, from some of the future capabilities that we tied into
the test as well, I think it was masterful the way that General
Greaves put that together.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. Congratulations again.
Also, sir, I understand that what you can say is limited in
this unclassified environment, but can you briefly describe
your level of concern about your ability to defend the Homeland
from cruise missile threats that we're facing?
General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you for highlighting that. We
talked a lot about ballistic missiles today, and hypersonics,
but the one in the middle, the cruise missile threat, is
equally as potent, and we certainly have adversaries that have
invested significantly in that cruise missile threat; for
example, certainly Russia and China. As we look to defend the
Homeland, that is one of our significant concerns. As you
mentioned, for much of this we'd have to go to a classified
environment. We've had the opportunity to have some of that
discussion.
But I do have concerns that we have to continue to invest
in our ability to defend against the cruise missile threat as
well, to be able to stay ahead of our adversaries. So as we do
go forward, I was happy to see, for example, the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review became the Missile Defense Review.
That's a very subtle but very important change within that,
that the focus is not just on ballistic missiles but also on
the cruise missiles.
So as we look to go forward, I look forward to the
committee's continued support to invest in and allow us to be
able to pursue advanced capabilities to defend against what our
enemy is doing to hold us at risk with advanced cruise missiles
that have low radar cross sections (RCS's), very difficult to
track and very difficult to defeat, and so we have to stay
ahead of that threat.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. I apologize for going back to ploughed
ground here, but I do want to return to the space sensor layer
issue because I'm just having a hard time with the timeline.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it's my understanding that the
Space Development Agency doesn't have budget authority yet,
doesn't have funding yet, and will need a reprogramming request
approved by Congress before they can really get off the ground.
So at this point it exists in name only, which is why I'm
having a hard time understanding why we just don't move forward
with this space development layer under MDA and re-sort out the
relationships a year down the road once we know how SDA is
working and how it's organized and that it's ready to hit the
ground running.
Maybe Secretary Rood?
Secretary Rood. Well, the Space Development Agency, as you
say, is just being stood up in terms of the director being
named and the initial staff and the charter, and its
authorities have been granted. We are at the beginning phase of
the creation of that entity. The intent is, as General Greaves
said, that it be modeled for rapid acquisition and centralized
authority after the Missile Defense Agency's authorities but
with a focus on space. So the initial requests to the Congress,
as you point out, sir, relates to reprogramming; and then, of
course, the funding for the next fiscal year, for fiscal year
2020, to fund those projects, and it's just part of a broader
activity that would affect more than the missile defense
mission.
The intent is, because of our contested warfighting
environment in space, that we have a more rapid acquisition,
sir.
Senator Heinrich. I think I get the underlying architecture
and the need for an entity that can move rapidly and nimbly.
I'm more worried about losing this, what could be a real
bottleneck for us on hypersonics to the right of the timeline.
Secretary Rood. Well, certainly this is one of the
considerations that the Department leadership--as the Secretary
was evaluating what work to provide to the Missile Defense
Agency and what the Space Development Agency was given, there
was some consideration, but the belief being that with Under
Secretary Griffin's oversight, and he oversees the Missile
Defense Agency as well, sir, that the Space Development Agency,
with a focus on a narrow set of items initially that would
grow, could provide the fastest possible route to get those
things into orbit.
I agree with you that it is a priority that this continue
and be done with purpose.
Senator Heinrich. General Greaves, in the fiscal year 2018
annual report, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,
DOT&E, again recommended the MDA should develop independently
accredited modeling and simulation to evaluate Ground-Based
Missile Defense (GMD) effectiveness. Can you explain what needs
to be done, if more needs to be done in that area, and whether
or not additional resources are needed to meet DOT&E's
recommendation?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Thank you, Senator. We worked
with General Behler's organization in DOT&E to develop a plan
that we are executing now to eventually, not in the too-far
term, deliver accredited models. So that work is going very
well. I think if you ask DOT&E, they will tell you the same
thing.
While additional resources, if provided, would help to
speed that up, I believe that----
Senator Heinrich. You feel good about the fundamentals.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Absolutely. The commitment is
there. We made it a centerpiece of the organization while I've
been there, and it was seriously started before he departed.
The Missile Defense Agency has always had models and
simulations that we used, but the realization that we really
can't grade our own homework, if you get right down to it, that
that's not credible, that we needed an agency that's appointed
and certified and recognized as being able to grade our
homework, to go do that.
So the effort has been getting the two cultures, the people
to work together to realize that it's for the better good.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your attendance today.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
missile defense policy
1. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, Lieutenant General Dickinson, the fiscal
year 2020 Budget Request for the Department of Defense includes nearly
$50 million to pursue the development of non-kinetic and kinetic
options for space-based missile defense interception. In 2016, former
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Adm. James Syring told the House
Armed Services Committee the following: ``I have serious concerns about
the technical feasibility of interceptors in space, and I have serious
concerns about the long-term affordability of a program like that.'' Do
you agree with Adm. Syring? Please provide an unclassified explanation
why or why not.
Secretary Rood. It makes sense to leverage existing fielded
capabilities to their fullest extent, and we are doing so. At the same
time, we must invest in new capabilities to keep pace with, and stay
ahead of, the advanced threat in defense of the United States, our
allies and partners. For fiscal year 2020, the DOD budget requests
funding to continue improving existing sensor programs as well as to
proceed with a number of other efforts that begin to move us in a new
direction to support a holistic, cost-effective approach to space-based
sensors. For missile defense, these include: a proliferated Low-Earth
Orbit (pLEO) sensor technology effort; developmental work for a space
sensor technology demonstration for hypersonic tracking; and an
architectural assessment for a missile defense space-based
discrimination layer.
General O'Shaughnessy. Due to the complexity and evolution of
missile threats, I believe we need missile defense technology that is
lethal, reliable, and resilient to defend the Homeland now, and to keep
pace with the threats into the future. As part of our integrated,
layered approach to missile defense, I support the Department of
Defense's efforts to evaluate the potential effectiveness and cost of
space-based interceptor technology to help inform the best way forward
for required missile defense capabilities.
Lieutenant General Greaves. As of today, I do not agree or disagree
with VADM Syring (Ret). Previous concerns about space-based missile
defense were based on the best information available at the time. Many
factors affect affordability and technical feasibility. The 2019
Missile Defense Review tasked MDA to study development and fielding of
a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense.
This report is scheduled to be completed by July 2019, and will
identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other requirements for a
space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense. The affordability
of space-based missile defenses must be a driver from the start of the
design process. Affordability begins by picking the right mission space
for space-based missile defense and then completely understanding the
capabilities and limitations of an architecture designed to that
mission space--to include the susceptibility of space-defense concepts
to responsive adversary tactics. The proposed funding will be used to
better understand the drivers of feasibility and costs in today's
environment so that the leadership can make informed decisions.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. Given the potential technical
advancements since the referenced statement, I support the Department's
efforts to examine the benefits, feasibility and affordability of a
range of technologies for the Warfighter to defeat the advanced threat.
This includes a healthy re-examination with industry of past efforts as
technologies mature and in the case of space, the evolution of
commercial space offers economies of scale previously unavailable.
2. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, if Russia
or China were to move to put missile defense interceptors in space, how
would you advise the Secretary of Defense to respond? Please provide an
unclassified explanation.
Secretary Rood. Russia and China have substantial missile defense
programs. In Russia's case, that nation maintains a significant missile
defense system that is deployed near Moscow. Though I cannot say what
specific position the United States would take regarding a particular
future hypothetical system, I can say that the actions the United
States is taking to improve space-based missile defense sensor systems
and to explore space-based interceptor concepts are fully consistent
with our obligations under relevant international law, including the
United Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty.
General O'Shaughnessy. As the USNORTHCOM Commander, I am focused
primarily on defending the Homeland against adversaries' offensive
weapon systems targeting the United States. I would defer to the
Missile Defense Agency Director to address this with the Department.
Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and
deliver capability to the warfighter.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue and outside
my purview, I respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy).
3. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, what
historical evidence is available to demonstrate that space-based
missile defense has been affordable and effective for the United
States? Please provide an unclassified explanation.
Secretary Rood. Conceptual benefits of engaging missile threats
from space, particularly for boost phase defense, have long been
recognized, as well as the critical technical and operational issues
that would have to be resolved on the way to a militarily useful and
affordable capability. Space-based missile defense concepts have been
studied sporadically going back to Project Defender in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. The Brilliant Pebbles program--which ran from Concept
Definition with Industry in 1990 to its termination in 1993--was the
last attempt to develop a capability. Given the significant advantages
of space-based missile defenses, the 2019 Missile Defense Review
requested the Missile Defense Agency study development and fielding of
a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense.
This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of
2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other
requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
General O'Shaughnessy. I currently rely on space-based capabilities
to provide information regarding missile detection, warning, and
preliminary impact, which are critical for execution of our Homeland
defense mission. As part of an ongoing layered approach for missile
defense in the future, I look forward to the results of Department of
Defense's evaluation of the concepts and technology for space-based
defenses and defer to Under Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General
Greaves for any further details regarding potential effectiveness and
affordability for space-based missile defense.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Conceptual benefits of engaging missile
threats from space, particularly for boost phase defense, have long
been recognized, as well as the critical technical and operational
issues that would have to be resolved on the way to a militarily useful
and affordable capability. The objective is to provide defense in depth
and to deprive the adversary of unchallenged access to midcourse with
complex countermeasures. Space-based missile defenses are a logical
supplement to the existing midcourse tier of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System. Given the significant advantages of space-based missile
defenses, the 2019 Missile Defense Review tasked MDA to study
development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept layer
capable of boost-phase defense. This report is scheduled to be
completed by July 2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule,
cost, and other requirements for a space-based defensive layer for
boost-phase defense.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for the MDR
directed study on this effort, I respectfully defer to MDA. However, we
have leveraged the Nation's significant space sensor investment in the
conduct of the missile defense mission. I am confident that this
historical information will be used in any cost and operational
effectiveness study.
4. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the
Missile Defense Review (MDR) proposed a six-month feasibility study
``of the concepts and technology for space-based defenses.'' What is
the expected completion date for that study? A date range would also be
acceptable.
Secretary Rood. We plan to complete this study between July and the
end of 2019.
General O'Shaughnessy. I look forward to the Department of
Defense's evaluation of the concepts and technology for space-based
defenses, and I will continue to communicate our operational
requirements that support our Homeland defense mission. I defer to
Under Secretary Rood regarding the timeline for expected completion of
the study.
Lieutenant General Greaves. The Missile Defense Agency will
complete this study and publish its findings by July, 17, 2019.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for this study, I
respectfully defer to MDA.
5. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, depending
on the results of the MDR's six-month feasibility study, is it possible
that the Missile Defense Agency may request supplemental funding in
fiscal year 2020 to continue development of space-based interceptors?
Secretary Rood. Upon the completion of the study, the Missile
Defense Agency and the Department will determine the next steps for
space-based interceptors. If additional funding is required, we would
not anticipate that request until the President's Budget request for
fiscal year 2021.
General O'Shaughnessy. As the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander, I
rely on the Services and the Missile Defense Agency to program and
acquire the necessary capabilities for our warfighter missions. I defer
to Under Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Greaves regarding any
potential future funding requests, pending the results of the
feasibility study.
Lieutenant General Greaves. Upon the completion of the study, MDA
and the Department will determine the next steps for space-based
interceptors. If additional funding is required, we would not
anticipate that request until President's Budget 2021.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is an MDA funding issue, I
respectfully defer to MDA.
6. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, how would
a United States ballistic missile defense capability against Russia or
China affect our ability to maintain a stable strategic nuclear balance
with those countries?
Secretary Rood. The United States ground-based midcourse defense
system deployed in Alaska and California is not designed to negate, nor
is it capable of negating, the strategic nuclear arsenal of Russia or
China. Rather, the United States relies primarily on its strategic
nuclear forces to deter a Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear attack.
Even with planned growth in United States missile defense capabilities
over the Future Years Defense Program, the U.S. will continue to rely
primarily on strategic nuclear forces to maintain strategic stability.
General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense
system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential
Iranian ballistic missile threats. It was not designed or intended to
defend against Russian or Chinese ballistic missile threats. I defer to
Under Secretary Rood on any potential changes relating to current U.S.
BMD policy.
Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and
deliver capability to the warfighter.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue, I
respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). However, we
believe United States missile defenses do not undermine Russia or
China's large and sophisticated strategic nuclear deterrent.
7. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the MDA
has said repeatedly that there is no military requirement for an ``East
Coast'' Ground-Based, Mid-Course Defense (GMD) site. MDA has also
previously stated that the estimated $3-$4 billion cost to construct a
third GMD interceptor site in the eastern United States would be better
spent on improving ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) sensor and
discrimination capabilities. Do you agree with previous MDA
assessments?
Secretary Rood. The United States is currently defended from
intercontinental missile threats by 44 ground-based missile defense
interceptors--with 40 interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska and 4
interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The Department
is currently in the process of deploying an additional 20 ground-based
interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska by 2025, providing Homeland defense
against the foreseeable projected threats. As part of continued efforts
to evaluate optimized U.S. defensive capabilities, Congress required,
and DOD explored, the development of additional missile defense
Interceptor Sites in the continental United States (CIS). The
Department continues to explore additional capabilities to address the
advancing threat and provide operational flexibility which will be
considered when making a final CIS decision. However, at this time
there is no operational requirement for a third CIS.
General O'Shaughnessy. There is some increased operational
capability with an East Coast site, particularly in that it would
provide increased capacity as well as dispersal of interceptors. But
while that is important, my top operational priorities for resources
remain focused on developing our persistent, discriminating sensor
architecture, as well as improving interceptor reliability and
lethality, which may prove more dynamic and responsive to future
threats. We continue to be vigilant for future threats to the Homeland
and are postured to readdress the assessment of the ``East Coast'' GMD
site if needed.
Lieutenant General Greaves. The MDA assessment remains unchanged.
The current Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) sites at Fort Greely, Alaska
and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California provide the capability
necessary to protect the United States Homeland against the current and
projected Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat from North
Korea, as well as a future Iranian ICBM threat, should it emerge.
Twenty additional interceptors are planned for the GBI site in Alaska.
An additional GBI site located within the United States would add
battlespace and interceptor capacity, but would come with materiel
development and sustainment costs. The Department has determined that
investment in discrimination and sensor capabilities will yield more
cost-effective near-term improvements to United States Homeland missile
defense for threats from Iran and, hence, implementation of a
continental United States interceptor site is not currently programmed.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. Yes, I strongly believe that the
limited ballistic missile defense resources should continue to be
prioritized to improving the sensor architecture and increasing
interceptor reliability.
8. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the
Missile Defense Review proposes to bring the SM-3 IIA interceptor into
the national missile defense architecture, beginning with a test of the
interceptor against an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class
target in 2020. Combined with the GMD system, the United States by 2030
could have several hundred interceptors available for national missile
defense. How do you predict Russia and China would respond to such a
capability?
Secretary Rood. Pursuant to the Missile Defense Review (MDR) and
pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
2018, the Department plans to conduct a test of the SM-3 IIA
interceptor against an intercontinental-ballistic missile (ICBM) target
in 2020. Regarding Russia's and China's reactions, it is important to
recognize both nations are pursuing national and regional missile
defense programs of their own. For example, Russia has a missile
defense system ringing Moscow with 68 nuclear-tipped interceptors.
Also, in the event that the SM-3 IIA test is successful and we decide
to field an underlay to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system, we would be doing so to address the long-range missile
capabilities of North Korea, and potentially Iran. An SM-3 IIA underlay
for Homeland defense would be insufficient to counter the large
quantity and sophistication of Russian and Chinese ICBMs and other long
range nuclear missiles, and therefore would not negate their strategic
forces.
General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the intelligence community
regarding a predicted response from Russia and China if the SM-3 IIA
interceptor is integrated with the GMD system architecture in the
future.
Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and
deliver capability to the warfighter.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue, I
respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).
9. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the MDR
asserts that U.S. missile defense capabilities ``may also help dissuade
missile proliferation among potential adversaries by reducing the
political and military value of their missiles.'' How do you reconcile
this assertion with North Korea's recent aggressive development of
ballistic missiles of different ranges?
Secretary Rood. The United States relies on a broad range of
strategies to deter and dissuade potential adversaries. Against missile
attacks, we take a comprehensive approach consisting of deterrence,
active defenses, passive defenses, and offensive capabilities. Missile
defense is one element of our broader deterrence strategy to persuade a
potential adversary that the benefits of developing, deploying and
using missiles will not be achieved. Should dissuasion and deterrence
fail, it's essential that we have the ability to protect the nation,
our forces, and allies and partners from missile attack.
General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to Under Secretary Rood and the
intelligence community regarding the effects of United States missile
defense policy and capabilities on North Korea's aggressive development
of ballistic missiles.
Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and
deliver capability to the warfighter.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue, I
respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).
10. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, as
Congress and the Administration negotiate on defense funding for fiscal
year 2020, do you think that it makes sense to fully leverage the
sensors the United States currently has fielded for missile defense
detection, discrimination and tracking before funding new programs?
Secretary Rood. It makes sense to leverage existing fielded
capabilities to their fullest extent, and we are doing so. At the same
time, we must invest in new capabilities to keep pace with, and stay
ahead of, the advanced threat in defense of the United States, our
allies and partners. For fiscal year 2020, the DOD budget requests
funding to continue improving existing sensor programs as well as to
proceed with a number of other efforts that begin to move us in a new
direction to support a holistic, cost-effective approach to space-based
sensors. For missile defense, these include: a proliferated Low-Earth
Orbit (pLEO) sensor technology effort; developmental work for a space
sensor technology demonstration for hypersonic tracking; and an
architectural assessment for a missile defense space-based
discrimination layer.
General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Northern Command fully leverages
currently fielded missile defense sensors in support of our ballistic
missile defense mission. However, these sensors do not provide the
complete persistent discrimination capability required. Additional
sensors, such as the Long Range Discrimination Radar, Homeland Defense
Radar--Hawaii, and the Pacific Radar will improve persistent tracking
and discrimination coverage of threat missiles for entirety of flight,
which will enhance our ability to defend the Homeland.
Lieutenant General Greaves. I agree that it always makes sense to
apply currently fielded systems to the fullest extent to meet ongoing
and emerging missions. To do this, we must combine keen awareness of
the changing threat, a thorough understanding of the capabilities and
limitations of the current systems, and detailed planning for any
potential upgrades or refinements to keep pace with our adversaries.
The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program has done this with improved
discrimination made to the Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX), the Army Navy
Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2) radars,
and the Army Navy Shipboard Radar Surveillance and Control Series 1 as
well as threat catalog enhancements to the Upgraded Early Warning
Radars. Where existing sensors didn't provide enough coverage or
project capabilities to stay ahead of the advanced threat in defense of
the Homeland, the Department made the case for the Long Range
Discriminating Radar, the Hawaiian Homeland Defense Radar and the
Pacific radar. The threat assessment was clear and we responded. With
programs like the BMDS Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Architecture
(BOA) and Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications and
related fusion systems, the Missile Defense Agency and its partner
agencies employed an enterprise approach to data sharing. Because of
this, the BMDS has made dramatic improvements in ground processing to
extract everything possible from existing sensors such as the Space
Based Infrared System, AN/TPY-2s and outside data sources to enable us
to track advanced threats in real time--and we are tracking these
threats today. But we can only use this capability where sensors are
actually observing the threat, and there are huge portions of the globe
where the BMDS has limited-to-no sensor coverage. We need to fill those
gaps. With emerging hypersonic and maneuvering threats as well as
advanced ballistic threats, we are reaching the limits of our existing
sensors to adequately defend the United States when these new
capabilities become operational, as these maneuvering threats could
evade detection and tracking by many of our current generation sensors.
This is why I have advocated for a detection and tracking space layer
to give us persistent coverage and adequate sensitivity to view and
defend against this next generation of threats. A detection and
tracking space layer will be integrated into our existing architecture
that, by design, processes all available OPIR sensor data.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for the NDAA
directed BMD Sensor AOA Study, I respectfully defer to MDA.
11. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy,
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, are you
using all available sensors, including those not originally designed
for missile defense?
Secretary Rood. I concur with Lieutenant General Greave's statement
that: ``The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) leverages all
appropriate sensors to support Homeland and regional missile defense.
Not all sensors possess the characteristics and attributes to be useful
for missile defense applications. The Department continues to explore
the utility for sensors currently outside of the BMDS to support
missile defense, and weighs the integration and testing cost with the
assessed benefits to the BMDS. DOD has undertaken steps over the last
decade to incorporate data sharing across multiple domains to improve
the capabilities of the BMDS to detect and track ballistic threats,
including significant investment in extending the service life of Cobra
Dane, the integration and exploitation of Overhead Persistent InfraRed
(OPIR) sensor data, the initial mobile sensor integration and
developmental demonstrations of airborne sensor tracking, as well as,
use of the F-35 sensor suite.''
General O'Shaughnessy. Per the Missile Defense Review, we are
actively working with the Missile Defense Agency to examine how
additional discriminating radar sites in the Pacific and other
potential sensors could add to our capability. I defer any specific
questions to Lieutenant General Greaves.
Lieutenant General Greaves. The BMDS leverages all appropriate
sensors to support Homeland and regional missile defense. Not all
sensors possess the characteristics and attributes to be useful for
missile defense applications. The Department continues to explore the
utility for sensors currently outside of the BMDS to support missile
defense, and weighs the integration and testing cost with the assessed
benefits to the BMDS. DOD has undertaken steps over the last decade to
incorporate data sharing across multiple domains to improve the
capabilities of the BMDS to detect and track ballistic threats,
including significant investment in extending the service life of Cobra
Dane, the integration and exploitation of OPIR sensor data, the initial
mobile sensor integration and developmental demonstrations of airborne
sensor tracking, as well as, use of the F-35 sensor suite.
Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for the NDAA
directed BMD Sensor AOA study, I respectfully defer to MDA.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
transfer of missile defense agency projects to space development agency
12. Senator Manchin. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Greaves,
the MDA was created and granted powers to prioritize correctly and
rapidly acquire much needed systems and capabilities in the missile
defense mission area. A significant amount of work in missile defense
revolves around space-based detection, tracking and kill assessment
capabilities. Already, the transfer of responsibility for the Space
Sensor Layer research and development to the Space Development Agency
(SDA) has apparently led to an unfunded priority designation for this
much needed capability in fiscal year 2020. What are the plans and
timelines, if any, to transition other space based capabilities such as
the Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA) and the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System to the SDA so as to not cause disruptions or slowed
development for these critical programs?
Secretary Rood. The Space Development Agency, as established, was
given special authorities that are very similar to what the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) has. This allows SDA to anticipate and respond to
some of the Department's most significant challenges in space on short
timelines. The SDA is uniquely postured to rapidly develop and deploy
advanced capabilities such as the Space Sensor Layer. It will rapidly
develop and deploy next-generation space capabilities including
rethinking how we do rapid experimentation, prototyping, and innovating
for space. For many on-going programs, such as MDA's Space Based Kill
Assessment (SKA) and Space Tracking and Surveillance Systems (STSS),
the Department has concluded that it is preferable for them to remain
with their parent Services or Agencies, rather than transferring them
to the SDA. Regardless of which organization has the lead for these
critical programs, the SDA, MDA, and the Services will continue to work
closely together to ensue capability integration.
Lieutenant General Greaves. The Space Development Agency was
recently established March 2019 and per the fiscal year 2020
President's Budget focusing on developing the department's proliferated
LEO architecture, primarily the transport layer. MDA expects transition
discussions at some point in the future.
norther defense radars
13. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you have now testified
twice over the critical task of defending northern and arctic
approaches to North America and the United States. Your testimony has
also cited the aging Cold War era array of radars that make up the
Northern Warning System (NWS). I am concerned that there is nothing in
this year's budget specifically addressing the modernization or
recapitalization of this critical capability with estimates currently
in the billions required for these tasks. Have recent tests conducted
with the NWS reassured your confidence in the ability of this network
of radars to defend against ballistic and cruise missile threats or
should we be prioritizing investment in this system to ensure safety of
the Homeland?
General O'Shaughnessy. Defense of our Homeland is my absolute top
priority. The results of the North Warning System (NWS) assessment
indicated that the NWS does not currently provide the indications and
warning, detection, tracking, and identification required to defend
against current and emergent aerospace threats. To get after this
requirement, the Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of
Alternatives (NAS AOA), led by the Air Force, is an ongoing,
comprehensive analysis of the capabilities and architecture required to
ensure our ability to detect, identify, and track advanced airborne
threats in the northern approaches to the Homeland. Thanks to
Congressional support, that critical effort was supported with two-year
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) dollars in
fiscal year 2019, and fully funds the NAS AOA contract through fiscal
year 2020. The fiscal year 2020 President's Budget also includes
Science and Technology funding to research the potential for employing
over-the-horizon radars in the Arctic. In the meantime, we are working
closely with the Air Force to augment and extend the capability of the
NWS while continuing our high-priority efforts to identify and field a
replacement capability as soon as possible.
thaad and patriot systems
14. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy and Lieutenant General
Greaves, I see the budget contains procurement for Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors and system upgrades as well
as THAAD and Patriot integration capabilities and tests. But I do not
see any additional THAAD battery procurements. Currently the United
States operates only seven THAAD batteries. Both of you have testified
that a THAAD--Patriot combination can be very effective in defeating
terminal Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, cruise missiles and other difficult
to track and target threats. What is the plan for procurement of these
systems to ensure we have comprehensive coverage of critical U.S.
assets from emerging threats?
General O'Shaughnessy. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) program has a demonstrated capability against Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles and we have a request into the Missile Defense
Agency to explore THAAD's utility for our Homeland defense mission. I
defer to the Missile Defense Agency and the Services regarding any
potential future plans for additional THAAD batteries and Patriot
systems.
Lieutenant General Greaves. The Army, Joint Staff, OSD and MDA are
conducting a study on THAAD Batteries and Interceptor quantities in
response to the Missile Defense Review (MDR). The integrated
capabilities of THAAD and Patriot are informing this study which is due
out this summer. Specifically the study will provide a current
assessment of the required number of THAAD Batteries to support needed
worldwide THAAD deployments, including potential deployment timelines,
and basing and deployment options. The study results will be considered
during the development of the President's Budget for 2021. THAAD and
Patriot could provide contributions to defend against Hypersonic Glide
Vehicles. However, MDA, Joint Staff, Army and OSD are assessing BMDS
architecture of Interceptors, Sensors, and Command and Control to
counter emerging threats including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles and
influence acquisition decisions for the future of the BMDS.
hypersonic defense systems
15. Senator Manchin. General Greaves, I noticed in the MDA budget a
decrease over the Future Years Development Plan (FYDP) in research and
development funding for Hypersonic Defense (PE 0604181C). This is
concerning as the hypersonic weapon threat is one of the greatest
threats we're facing right now. Is this decline in funding due to
meeting objectives and requiring less money or is it due to
reprioritization to other missile defense objectives?
Lieutenant General Greaves. Defending against the hypersonic threat
remains a high priority for MDA. The FYDP funding profile declines as
these objectives are met, not because of reprioritization of funds to
other efforts. The President's Budget 2020 Hypersonic Defense program
of record represents a near-term body of work, prior to completion of
the Department's Defense against Hypersonic Threats Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA). This work includes modification of existing or use
of in-development ground-based sensors (AN/TPY-2 radar, Long Range
Discrimination Radar, the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii, and Pacific
Radar) and the C2BMC system to track and report the threat. MDA will
consider the AOA recommendations to counter the threat in long term,
such as potential Hypersonic Defense future architectures including
weapon solutions, in the fiscal year 2021 MDA budget deliberations.
Upon completion of the AOA, MDA will address recommendations to counter
the threat in subsequent budget deliberations. Based on the preliminary
findings in the AOA, acceleration of a Hypersonic Defense capability
was included in MDA's fiscal year 2020 Report to Congress on Unfunded
Priorities. The report included $719 million in fiscal year 2020 to
begin the following:
Development of Glide Phase Engagement Capability (Over-
the-Horizon) with 2 concepts for competitive environment
Leverage and upgrade additional C2BMC and ground sensor
capabilities
Participate in partner flight tests to provide additional
data sources for integrated capability demonstrations
Develop land based terminal defense capability
Invest in additional component and integrated
technologies across the kill chain for future architecture spirals.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 2019
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Cramer, Hawley, King, Heinrich, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
The Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on U.S.
nuclear weapons policy, programs, and strategy in review of the
administration's budget request for fiscal year 2020.
Testifying before the Subcommittee today are: Ellen Lord,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment;
David Trachtenberg, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy; General Timothy Ray, the Commander of Air Force Global
Strike Command; and Admiral Johnny Wolfe, the Director of the
Navy's Strategic Systems Programs.
Thank you for appearing before us today. I also want to
express my particular appreciation for this Department's
emphasis on the importance of nuclear deterrence.
Secretary Lord, your prepared testimony unequivocally
describes nuclear deterrence as, ``the Department of Defense's
highest priority,'' echoing similar comments from a number of
other senior leaders, such as General Dunford. As you all know,
a lack of senior leader attention has been a challenge for the
nuclear enterprise in the past, and I am pleased to see this
Department is properly prioritizing this issue.
Similarly, I think there is bipartisan recognition in
Congress that if foreign nuclear threats continue to grow and
our platforms reach the end of their serviceable lives,
modernization is necessary to ensure our deterrent remains
credible. We look forward to hearing from each of you about
your efforts in this regard, and your assessment of how any
delay or disruption would impact our ability to met deterrence
requirements.
Your full statements will be made part of the record. But,
first, I would like to recognize the Ranking Member for any
comments he would like to make.
Senator Heinrich.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
Senator Heinrich. Thank you. Let me thank Chairwoman
Fischer for holding today's hearing.
I also want to thank our witnesses for taking the time to
testify today. We very much appreciate your service to our
country and to the job that each of you perform.
Every national security action we take is underpinned by
our deterrent. So, it's important we continue its
modernization. Some have claimed it's too expensive. But, even
in its peak years, the Congressional Budget Office has said
that its cost, relative to the Department of Defense (DOD)
budget, will only be 6 percent. I have often said that 6 cents
on the dollar to protect us from World War III or an
existential threat is money well invested.
There is a lot to cover in today's hearing, besides
modernization. I'm concerned about pulling out of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with nothing to
show for it. It seems to me that we have given Putin everything
he wanted since he broached this topic with the Administration
officials 15 years ago. In turn, we have left our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in a bind.
I am concerned about the upcoming expiration of the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). If we let this treaty
expire, it'll be the first time since 1972 that we have not had
some form of arms control treaty in place for strategic
stability. The Senate ratified New START, with the condition of
modernizing the triad, which President Obama certified in
February of 2011, and which continues to this day. Arms control
and modernization should go hand in hand. I take this
relationship very seriously.
I am encouraged that the President has recently announced
that he wants to include China in an arms control discussion,
and to add nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a future arms
control agreement. But, he should renew New START first, and
that should be our priority.
Let me close on this issue of pit production. I continue to
question the validity of producing 80 pits per year by 2030
under the split production option proposed by the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA) found that none of the options analyzed
by the NNSA can be expected to provide 80 pits per year by
2030, and none of the options was demonstrably better than the
others. I'd like to note, however, that, when the NNSA analyzed
a split production at the Savannah River site, it was for 80
pits a year by 2030, at an added cost of some $14 billion to
the taxpayer. I am very leery, to say the least, of the split
option, given that an independent report said it will not even
achieve by 2030, and it will cost even more than the additional
$14 billion to be requested by Congress.
Madam Secretary, you certified to this Committee on May
10th, 2018, that the recommended alternative is, ``likely to
meet pit production timelines and requirements responsive to
military requirements,'' and it is also, ``cost-effective and
has reasonable near-term and lifecycle costs that are minimized
to the extent practicable compared to other alternatives.'' I
would like to ask that, in light of this report, that you
report back to the Committee on reevaluation of your
certification.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Lord. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated ``An
effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons
infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt
flexibility to shifting requirement.'' This is the Department
of Defense's (DOD) highest priority mission and reestablishing
a resilient plutonium pit production capability to support this
mission is a top priority for the DOD and National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). After several decades with
almost no pit production, we are now faced with aging warheads
that are nearing their end-of-life. In order to meet the
challenges of the current and evolving security environment,
DOD requires a steady-state ability to produce plutonium pits
to: enhance warhead safety and security; meet future DOD and
NNSA requirements; replace older existing plutonium pits
deliberately and methodically; and enable the ability to
respond to changes in deterrence requirements arising from the
reemergence of great power competition.
In an assessment of multiple options, we found NNSA's two-
site plutonium pit production approach most suitable because it
meets NWC-endorsed and statutory requirements; provides
resiliency through its use of multiple production facilities;
and offers future potential to increase pit production above
the minimal 80 ppy. This approach comes with some schedule and
cost risks that can be managed given appropriate authority and
requested funding. I am committed to working collaboratively
with NNSA and Congress to ensure the pit production strategy is
executed successfully.
Senator Heinrich. Again, thank you today for coming, and I
look forward to hearing all of your testimony.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
As I visited with the panel before we started the hearing,
we do have four votes beginning at 3 o'clock, and so I have
asked them to submit their statements for the record. I also
suggested to them, during the questioning, if they feel there
is a part of their prepared statements that they would like to
include it at that point during the questioning, they were free
to do so at that time.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN M. LORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
Secretary Lord. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
I am pleased to join Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy David Trachtenberg, General Timothy Ray, and Vice
Admiral Johnny Wolfe to discuss what three successive
Secretaries of Defense have called the Department of Defense's
highest priority mission: ensuring that the United States has a
safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent--now and
in the future.
I am here representing the entire Acquisition and
Sustainment team of over 100,000 dedicated military, civilian,
and contractor professionals who execute our mission every day.
As Under Secretary, I am responsible for leading the
Department's efforts to both sustain and modernize the nation's
nuclear weapon delivery systems and related nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3) systems.
I would like to frame my remarks and our discussion around
two key points:
1. LAlthough still militarily effective today, the U.S.
nuclear deterrent remains dependent on rapidly aging nuclear
delivery and NC3 systems that were built during the Cold War;
and
2. LAfter 25 years of primarily drawing down and life
extending these systems, repeated decisions to defer
recapitalization of our nuclear forces have caught up to us.
While sustainment efforts have allowed us to defer nuclear
modernization investments for many years, delay is no longer an
option. Nearly all of the systems that comprise the current
nuclear deterrent are well beyond their original service lives,
and can no longer be cost effectively life extended.
Now, we must concurrently acquire and field modem systems
in each leg of the strategic nuclear triad. The choice is
stark: either we invest in modernizing our nuclear forces, or
we unilaterally eliminate them due to obsolescence.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for DOD's nuclear
forces is consistent with this urgency. In total, the budget
request includes $24.9 billion for nuclear forces, or 3.5
percent of DOD's budget. This includes $8.4 billion for
recapitalization and $16.5 billion for operations and
sustainment.
Because nuclear deterrence is DOD's number one priority
mission, nuclear modernization programs are our highest
investment priorities. As these programs mature in the coming
decade, the funding they require will increase. The total
projected cost of sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces
will peak at approximately 6.4 percent of the DOD budget in the
late-2020s.
The cost of this effort is significant but manageable. From
a historical perspective, it is far less expensive in relative
terms than previous nuclear recapitalization programs carried
out during the Cold War.
Any large collection of complex and integrated programs
faces risks, and our nuclear recapitalization and sustainment
efforts are no different. The dedicated professionals in DOD
and our partners at the Department of Energy are actively
managing these programs to reduce risk, accelerate schedules,
and seek efficiencies wherever possible.
We recognize that this is a 20-year nuclear modernization
journey we are embarked upon--but perhaps the biggest driver of
risk is that we started that journey 15 years too late.
I want to thank this Subcommittee for its longstanding,
bipartisan support to our nuclear deterrent mission and the men
and women in uniform who are its backbone. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lord follows:]
prepared statement by secretary ellen m. lord
Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs, and Strategy and the
fiscal year 2020 Budget Request. I am pleased to join Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg, General Timothy
Ray, and Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe to discuss the Department of
Defense's (DOD) highest priority: ensuring that the United States has a
safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent now and in the
future.
role of acquisition and sustainment in dod's nuclear enterprise
I am here today representing the entire DOD Acquisition and
Sustainment (A&S) team of thousands of dedicated military, civilian,
and contractor professionals who execute the A&S mission every day. As
Under Secretary, I am responsible for leadingthe Department's efforts
to both sustain and modernize the nation's nuclear weapon delivery
systems and related nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
systems.
To enable these efforts, I chair the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
and the Defense Acquisition Board, co-chair the Council on Oversight of
the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System
(CONLC3S), and have been designated DOD's NC3 Enterprise Capability
Portfolio Manager. I also serve as the Defense Acquisition Executive
and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for all of the major nuclear
modernization acquisition programs. In addition, A&S has three
Assistant Secretaries focused on Acquisition, Sustainment, and Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. These and other roles and
responsibilities of the Under Secretary for A&S put our organization at
the center of a complex and integrated set of programs that must be
executed successfully to ensure the long-term credibility of our
nuclear deterrent.
2018 nuclear posture review and today's nuclear threat environment
For more than 70 years, U.S. nuclear forces have deterred our
adversaries, assured our allies, and helped prevent competition among
the Great Powers from escalating into large-scale conflict. For much of
that history, this mission has been underpinned by the strategic
nuclear triad consisting of ground-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable
bombers. For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations alike
have recognized the critical importance of the nuclear triad for
keeping the peace.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed the need to
maintain the triad and other longstanding, bipartisan views on U.S.
nuclear posture and took a clear-eyed look at the nuclear threat
environment we face today and are likely to face in the future. The
2018 NPR recognized that, while the U.S. has spent the decades since
the end of the Cold War both reducing the size of the United States
nuclear stockpile and the role of nuclear weapons in our defense
strategy, Russia and China have gone--and continue to go--in the other
direction. Our potential adversaries are actively increasing the role
of nuclear weapons in their strategies and increasing the size and
sophistication of their nuclear forces.
For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly announced
last year that Russia is actively developing and testing entirely new
nuclear capabilities such as a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise
missile and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed transoceanic underwater
vehicle. Russia also is modernizing and expanding its arsenal of
approximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, including nuclear
torpedoes, nuclear air and missile defense interceptors, nuclear depth
charges, nuclear landmines, and nuclear artillery shells--more than a
dozen types. Russia's public statements and nuclear threats, its
deployment of systems in direct violation of the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, its well-documented and well-rehearsed military
doctrine to use nuclear weapons to ``de-escalate'' a conventional
conflict, and its military resourcing decisions make clear that Russian
leaders have not followed the United States' post-Cold War lead with
respect to nuclear weapons.
China also continues to expand and diversify its nuclear forces.
China is modernizing its full array of nuclear missile forces, is
deploying sea-based weapons, and has announced their intent to form a
nuclear triad by developing a nuclear-capable, next-generation bomber.
North Korea's nuclear capabilities also threaten our Homeland and our
allies and add to an already complex strategic picture.
As outlined in the NPR and National Defense Strategy, we must now
face the reality of growing nuclear threats coupled with the
reemergence of Great Power competition as a driving force in world
affairs. After 25 years of primarily drawing down and sustaining the
nuclear forces we built during the Cold War, repeated decisions to
defer recapitalization of our nuclear forces have caught up to us. Now,
we must concurrently acquire and field modern systems in each leg of
the strategic nuclear triad--and in our non-strategic nuclear forces--
while also sustaining our aging legacy systems until modernized systems
are available. We must also reinvigorate our science, technology, and
innovation base to ensure that the investments we are making in our
forces lead to the greater flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency
called for by the NPR.
Although still militarily effective today, the U.S. nuclear
deterrent remains dependent on nuclear delivery and NC3 systems that
were mostly fielded in the 1980s or earlier. Through the Services, DOD
is sustaining these legacy nuclear forces until they can be replaced by
modern systems. While these sustainment efforts have allowed us to
defer investments for many years, we have reached a point where delay
is no longer an option. Nearly all of the systems that comprise the
current force are well beyond their originally designed service lives
and will reach the end of their sustainability in the 2025 to 2035
timeframe. The United States must make a choice: either we continue to
invest in modernizing and replacing these systems or we accept the loss
of our ability to deter the most severe threats to our nation and our
allies and partners.
summary of fiscal year 2020 budget request for nuclear forces
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for DOD nuclear forces is
consistent with this urgency and is designed to address the risks we
face across our nuclear enterprise. It funds the sustainment of our
legacy forces and provides the necessary funding to continue
modernizing them. In total, the fiscal year 2020 budget request
includes $24.9 billion for nuclear forces, or 3.5 percent of DOD's
budget. This includes $8.4 billion for recapitalization and
modernization and $16.5 billion for operations and sustainment.
Because nuclear deterrence is DOD's number one priority mission,
nuclear modernization programs are our highest investment priorities.
As these programs mature in the coming decade, the funding they require
will increase--the cost to recapitalize strategic delivery systems and
NC3 is expected to peak at approximately 3.7 percent of the annual DOD
budget in 2029 before decreasing again. When added to the relatively
flat sustainment expenses, the total projected cost of sustaining and
modernizing our nuclear forces will peak at approximately 6.4 percent
of the DOD budget in the late-2020s. DOD is mindful of the sustained
financial commitment ahead of us and gratefully recognizes the ongoing
support Congress and the American people provide for this most
important mission.
The cost of this effort is significant but manageable. As seen in
the figure below, from a historical perspective, it is less expensive
in relative terms than previous nuclear recapitalization programs.
Comparatively, previous rounds of nuclear modernization during the Cold
War cost the nation 10.6 percent of DOD's annual budget in the 1980s,
and 17.1 percent in the 1960s. Measured against the catastrophic
consequences of a major conflict or nuclear war, the cost of nuclear
modernization is one we can afford to bear. As former Secretary of
Defense Mattis said, ``America can afford survival.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
nuclear forces modernization and sustainment of legacy systems
Ballistic Missile Submarine Force
The sea-based leg of our nuclear triad consists of 14 Ohio-class
SSBNs armed with Trident II (D5) SLBMs. Originally designed for a 30-
year service life, our Ohio-class submarines have already undergone a
service life extension to prolong their lifespan to 42 years. The Navy
will continue to operate and sustain the fleet out to 2040, but further
service life extensions of the Ohio-class are not possible. In addition
to hull fatigue and nuclear reactor life limitations, in the coming
decades advances in our adversaries' anti-submarine warfare
capabilities require us to develop and field a modern submarine fleet.
To maintain the effectiveness of the submarine force, the Navy is
developing the Columbia-class SSBN--a next-generation strategic
deterrent platform expected to serve until 2084. Columbia will take
advantage of new technologies, such as a life-of-ship reactor core.
Without the need to ever refuel, these ships will need less time in
overhaul and therefore enable the Navy to meet the same deterrence
requirements while reducing the fleet size from 14 to 12. This alone
will lead to many billions of dollars in acquisition and operating cost
savings. Additional improvements will ensure that Columbia remains
survivable in future threat environments, while design flexibility will
allow for future upgrades. The Columbia program is currently in the
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, and advanced
procurement began in fiscal year 2018. Production of the lead ship of
the class is expected to begin in the first quarter of fiscal year
2021. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Columbia totals $2.2
billion.
The Navy is extending the life of the Trident II (D5) Strategic
Weapons System (SWS) to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and
to serve as the initial SLBM for the Columbia-class SSBN. This is being
accomplished through an update to all SWS subsystems: launcher,
navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Two major
components of this effort are the D5 Life Extension (D5LE) missile and
Shipboard System Integration (SSI) Program. The Navy deployed 24 life-
extended (D5LE) missiles in fiscal year 2018 and remains on track to
complete deployment by fiscal year 2024. The SSI program refreshes
shipboard electronics hardware and upgrades software to enable extended
service life, efficient and affordable maintenance and continues to
provide the highest level of nuclear weapons safety. The Navy completed
16 installations in fiscal year 2018--7 more are scheduled to be
completed this year.
ICBM Force
For the ground-based leg of the triad, the Air Force is
concurrently sustaining 400 deployed Minuteman III (MM III) ICBMs and
developing their replacements, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
(GBSD) weapon system. The MM III has been in service since 1970 and has
been life extended several times. When it is finally retired, after
2030, it will be the longest serving ICBM in history. For sixty years,
MM III will have played a central role in our nuclear triad by
providing a highly responsive capability that complicates adversary
attack planning and decision making. However, U.S. Strategic Command
has noted that as it reaches its end of life, MM III will face a more
challenging threat environment that will make it increasingly difficult
for the missile system to effectively hold targets at risk. MM III will
also contend with attrition issues due to required testing and the
aging and obsolescence of key missile components.
GBSD addresses the problems of MM III aging, attrition, and
declining capability. The GBSD program is a comprehensive effort to
replace the missile system, weapon system command and control, and
ground systems--as well as convert, modernize, or replace aging MM III
infrastructure. Beginning with its initial deployment in 2028, GBSD
will provide improved capability versus the legacy MM III, and ensure
the ICBM force remains safe, secure, effective, and reliable out to
2075.
The GBSD program is currently in the Technology Maturation and Risk
Reduction (TMRR) phase, with two prime contractors competing over the
next year to address risk and develop the most cost-effective solution
to meeting military requirements. The fiscal year fiscal year 2020
budget request includes $678 million of RDT&E and MILCON funding for
the continued development of the GBSD weapon system. By the end of
fiscal year 2020, the program plans to complete its TMRR Preliminary
Design Review, conduct a Milestone B review, and award the contract for
the EMD phase of the program.
Bomber Force
The airborne leg of the triad is currently comprised of B-52H
bombers capable of delivering nuclear-armed air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs) and B-2A bombers capable of delivering nuclear gravity
bombs. To sustain this most visible and flexible leg of the triad and
maintain its effectiveness in a threat environment characterized by
continuously improving adversary air defenses, the Air Force is
carrying out multiple modernization programs to extend the service
lives and improve the capabilities of these aircraft. For instance, the
B-52 fleet is scheduled to receive new engines as part of the B-52
Commercial Engine Replacement program--this will be the first engine
replacement for the B-52 since its introduction in 1962. B-52Hs will
also receive an upgraded radar through the Radar Modernization Program
and an improved communications and mission management system known as
Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT). CONECT will provide
an integrated communication and mission management system with a
machine-to-machine interface for weapons targeting and will enable
greater weapons carriage flexibility.
Similarly, the B-2A fleet will receive upgrades to multiple
systems, including the Defensive Management System (to ensure its
ability to operate in highly contested environments) and its Stores
Management Operational Flight Program software (to enable the aircraft
to use advanced digital weapon interfaces and allow carriage of the
B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb).
To supplement--and eventually replace--the legacy bomber force, DOD
is developing a modern, long-range, penetrating bomber. The B-21 Raider
will give the Air Force a highly-survivable conventional and nuclear-
capable bomber that ensures the ability to penetrate advanced air
defense systems in an anti-access/area denial environment well into the
future. The Air Force plans to acquire a minimum of 100 B-21s, with the
first expected to enter service in the mid-2020s. B-21 is currently in
the EMD phase and is transitioning to the development of the first test
aircraft. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $3 billion for
the program.
DOD is also sustaining the nuclear-armed AGM-86B ALCM, first
introduced in the early 1980s, until it can be replaced by the Long
Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon in the early 2030s. Developed to allow the
B-52H to execute its deterrent missions while remaining safely outside
the range of adversary air defenses, the ALCM has already undergone
multiple service life extensions to keep it operational well beyond its
original 10-year design life. As it ages, ALCM will face continuously
improving adversary air defenses, as well as challenges to weapon
system sustainment caused by out-of-production parts and limited
supplies.
LRSO will be a modern, nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile
capable of penetrating advanced integrated air defenses. Once deployed,
LRSO will be carried by both the B-52H and upcoming B-21 bombers. LRSO
will be the first simultaneous development of a missile and nuclear
warhead in more than 30 years. The LRSO program is currently underway,
with two contractors currently performing work under TMRR contracts.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $713 million in RDT&E
funding to continue development of the missile and fund initial
aircraft integration efforts.
Dual-Capable Aircraft
In addition to the three legs of the strategic nuclear triad, the
U.S. maintains a force of dual-capable tactical aircraft (DCA), capable
of delivering nuclear-gravity bombs. This ``non-strategic'' nuclear
capability enhances deterrence and assurance by providing an ability to
forward-deploy U.S. nuclear forces around the globe and demonstrate to
allies and adversaries alike that U.S. nuclear forces are prepared to
defend U.S. interests and those of our allies and partners. Today, DCA
missions are fulfilled by U.S. F-15E aircraft, as well as aircraft
provided by several NATO allies, capable of carrying B61-3/4 nuclear
gravity bombs.
To replace the F-15E in the DCA role, the U.S. is developing DCA
capability for the F-35A--which several of our NATO allies will also
fly for the Alliance's nuclear deterrence mission. Fifth-generation F-
35 DCA will ensure U.S. and NATO allies retain the ability to penetrate
advanced air defenses long into the future. The fiscal year 2020 budget
request includes $71.3 million for the F-35A DCA program, with the
program planning to complete software development, separation flight
testing, and mission system flight testing during the fiscal year.
Similarly, the B61-3/4s carried by our DCA are being modernized to
the B61-12, which is scheduled to replace several B61 variants
currently in service. The B61-12 Life Extension Program is a joint
effort between DOD and the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In this program, DOD is
responsible for development of a guidance-capable tailkit assembly
(TKA), aircraft integration, and all-up round integration, while NNSA
is responsible for the bomb assembly. Production of the B61-12 TKA is
underway and Milestone C was achieved in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2019. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $108.3 million
for the program.
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
The NPR directed DOD to pursue a modern, nuclear-armed, sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM) to supplement the triad and DCA. The
SLCM will provide a regional, non-strategic nuclear capability and will
help address both Russia's arms control violations and the major
imbalance between Russian and United States non-strategic nuclear
capabilities. This program will leverage existing technologies wherever
possible to ensure cost effectiveness and will require close
coordination with NNSA. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $5
million to support an analysis of alternatives for the SLCM.
NC3
Underpinning our entire nuclear deterrent is a complex and
resilient NC3 system that must always connect the President to our
nuclear forces--even under the most stressful circumstances. The NC3
portfolio comprises a complex architecture of more than 200 systems
that allow detection of threats, support decision making, and enable
force direction.
Our NC3 system is reliable and effective in supporting today's
nuclear deterrence requirements, but it is largely based on 20th
Century technologies developed during the Cold War. Modernization is
essential to meet modern threats, especially in cyberspace. As DOD's
NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager, I work closely with General Hyten, in
his capacity as the NC3 Enterprise Lead, to sustain the systems we have
while working to develop and field new capabilities across the domains
of space, air, and land.
Space-based communications systems play--and will continue to
play--a vital role in our NC3 architecture. As with other operating
environments, space is increasingly contested and potentially a
warfighting domain. Satellite systems operating in the extremely high
frequency range, with their ability to communicate through severe
nuclear radiation environments, are essential to ensuring resilient
communications. The existing Military Strategic and Tactical Relay
(Milstar) satellite constellation is long past its planned life. To
replace and enhance Milstar capability, there are currently four
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites in orbit with two
additional satellites set to launch by 2020. The fiscal year 2020
budget request includes $149 million in total funding for AEHF. DOD is
developing a number of airborne and land-based satellite terminals to
take advantage of this new AEHF constellation. For instance, the Family
of Beyond Line of Sight Terminals (FAB-T) program is developing force
element and command post terminals to provide the resilient
communications necessary to link senior national leaders together with
each other and with our nuclear forces. The fiscal year 2020 budget
request includes $198 million in RDT&E for FAB-T.
In the air domain, the NC3 system currently relies on E-4B and E-6B
aircraft to act as alternate command posts and communications relays to
help direct our nuclear forces. These aircraft date to the 1970s and
1980s and also require recapitalization. An analysis of alternatives is
underway to replace these systems in the early-2030s with newer, more
capable, and more sustainable platforms. Additionally, DOD is
developing a common Very Low Frequency (VLF) receiver that, when
fielded, will replace aging communications systems on our B-52H and B-
2A bomber fleets that are challenged by a vanishing vendor base.
Finally, in the land domain, the Air Force's Global Aircrew
Strategic Network Terminal (Global ASNT) is being developed to
modernize our survivable communications links between the President and
certain elements of the nuclear enterprise such as Wing Command Posts,
bomber and tanker Mobile Support Teams, and more. Global ASNT will
replace the Single-Channel, Anti-Jam, Man-Portable (SCAMP) system,
which is based on 1980's technology. The fiscal year 2020 budget
request includes $123 million for Global ASNT Increment 2.
nuclear weapons council and alignment with nnsa
As statutory chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), the Under
Secretary for A&S has responsibility for not only sustaining and
modernizing DOD's nuclear forces but also ensuring those activities are
synchronized with their associated nuclear warhead development programs
managed by NNSA. The NWC is a joint DOD and DOE/NNSA governance body
established to facilitate alignment and coordination--and establish
priorities--as the two Departments fulfill their shared responsibility
for providing the nation's nuclear deterrent. The NWC continually seeks
to guide and balance the many programs needed to maintain our existing
nuclear weapons stockpile while also modernizing it. We also review,
coordinate, and help set requirements that drive capability and
capacity decisions at NNSA, which is particularly important as NNSA
recapitalizes its nuclear weapons production infrastructure--much of
which dates to the 1950s and 1960s or earlier.
Regarding capability and capacity, the 2018 NPR re-confirmed, and
the NWC supports, NNSA's efforts to establish a responsive enterprise
capable of designing and producing the nuclear weapons DOD needs to
deter conflict and assure allies. This includes rebuilding NNSA's
strategic materials production and processing capabilities for
plutonium, uranium, lithium, and tritium--as well as key capabilities
for the design and manufacture of strategic radiation hardened
microelectronics. While all these materials and capabilities are
important to sustaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, pit
production is a lynchpin. Funding to support implementing the pit
production capability needed to meet DOD's requirements lowers risks
associated with the aging of plutonium in existing pits and provides
the ability to respond to potential challenges, caused by renewed
strategic competition, in a timely fashion.
A responsive enterprise also includes ensuring NNSA has a world-
class workforce capable of responding to the dynamic and uncertain
nuclear future we face. With the reemergence of Great Power competition
and increasing nuclear threats, it is important to ensure NNSA's
workforce and infrastructure are prepared to provide a credible,
flexible, and modern deterrent that can adapt to change and emerging
requirements in a timely manner. As the Secretary of Defense's preface
to the NPR stated:
``Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons complex of laboratories
and plants is also long past due; it is vital we ensure the
capability to design, produce, assess, and maintain these
weapons for as long as they are required. Due to consistent
underfunding, significant and sustained investments will be
required over the coming decade to ensure that National Nuclear
Security Administration will be able to deliver the nuclear
weapons at the needed rate to support the nuclear deterrent
into the 2030s and beyond.''
The NWC regularly convenes to synchronize efforts between DOD and
NNSA on the vision, strategy, and execution of nuclear programs.
Similar to the challenges faced by aging nuclear delivery systems in
DOD, the nuclear weapons produced and sustained by NNSA continue to
age--with many well-beyond their originally expected service lives. DOD
and the NWC support NNSA's nuclear weapon life extension programs
(LEP), Stockpile Stewardship Program, and Stockpile Responsiveness
Program. Collectively, these programs enable sustainment of the current
nuclear weapons stockpile, improved understanding of aging effects in
the stockpile, and prepare NNSA's enterprise for the future. For
example, NNSA's Stockpile Responsiveness Program is an important means
to develop and retain the next generation of world-class scientists and
engineers that NNSA needs. It also allows NNSA to explore and mature
technologies for potential insertion into future LEPs, exercise
critical design and production skills, and develop options for
responding to emerging threats.
npr implementation and nuclear enterprise review follow-up
NPR Implementation
The 2018 NPR confirmed the findings of previous NPRs that the
diverse capabilities of the nuclear triad provide the flexibility and
resilience needed for deterrence in the most cost-effective manner. To
turn the NPR's policy direction into action, A&S has been leading and
supporting a variety of implementation activities.
For instance, the NWC took quick action to respond to the NPR's
tasking to develop and field a low-yield, submarine-launched ballistic
missile, completing necessary reviews and authorizations to enable NNSA
to build a first production unit of the W76-2 warhead just 12 months
after the NPR was released. The NWC has also reviewed requirements
related to the nuclear-armed SLCM directed by the NPR, and NWC
stakeholders are engaging to support the analysis of alternatives
related to that weapon.
More long-term, the NWC has published a fiscal year 2019-2044
Strategic Plan, which will help guide efforts to align programs related
to nuclear delivery platforms, warheads, and infrastructure. More
broadly, A&S continues to assess and mitigate risks across the defense
industrial base that may impact our nuclear sustainment and
modernization efforts--including with respect to large solid rocket
motors, radiation hardened microelectronics, and aeroshells.
Nuclear Enterprise Review Follow-up
The 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER) identified a series of
problems across the DOD nuclear enterprise and made hundreds of
recommendations to correct them. As then-Secretary of Defense Hagel
stated upon conclusion of the NER in a November 14, 2014, Message to
the Force on Our Nuclear Enterprise:
``Our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in assuring U.S.
national security, and it is DOD's highest priority mission. No
other capability we have is more important . . . For too long,
we have overlooked career paths, compensation, infrastructure,
and small unit leadership that are mission-critical in the
nuclear force. That is changing. It will continue to change.''
DOD continues to carry this torch and continues to take action to
ensure our nuclear enterprise stays healthy. For instance, the Nuclear
Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG), created in 2014 to ensure
effective follow-up on the NER's recommendations, recently met and
reviewed progress across the enterprise.
As we institutionalize the NDERG for the long-term, A&S is leading
the NDERG in a transition from a mission that largely looks back to
address and close recommendations from the 2014 NER to instead also
look forward to identify and address problems early. While the NDERG
has closed many of the recommendations from the 2014 NER, some of the
remaining recommendations are enduring, which will require DOD to track
their associated metrics indefinitely. The NDERG and its stakeholders
are also in the process of developing leading indicators and data
analysis tools to ensure risks, issues, and opportunities across the
nuclear enterprise are understood and effectively communicated to
senior leaders.
conclusion
History has made clear that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is the
foundation of U.S. national security and fundamental to international
stability. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for DOD's modernization
and sustainment programs reflect that importance. Any large collection
of complex and integrated programs faces risks, and our nuclear
recapitalization and sustainment efforts are no different. The
dedicated professionals in A&S, the Services, and NNSA are actively
managing these programs to reduce risk, accelerate schedules, and seek
efficiencies wherever possible. We recognize that this is a 20-year
nuclear modernization journey we are embarked upon--but perhaps the
biggest driver of risk is that we started that journey 15 years too
late. Delay is no longer an option. I encourage Congress to provide the
full amount of the budget request for nuclear programs in both DOD and
NNSA.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Secretary Trachtenberg. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the President's Fiscal Year
2020 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces.
For decades, the United States has led the world in efforts
to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, as described in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review, Russia and China have
chosen a different path and have increased the role of nuclear
weapons in their strategies and actively increased the size and
sophistication of their nuclear forces.
For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent
is necessary to prevent competition from escalating to large-
scale conflict.
THE NUCLEAR THREAT
Russia
Russia continues to prioritize modernizing its nuclear
forces, including every leg of its strategic triad. According
to the Russian Defense Minister, 90 percent of the country's
strategic nuclear forces will be upgraded by 2020.
In March 2018, only a month after the United States and
Russia reached New START limits on strategic systems, Vladimir
Putin announced that Russia is developing even more new nuclear
weapons capabilities. Moreover, Russia is modernizing and
expanding an active stockpile of approximately 2,000
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed on ships,
bombers, tactical aircraft, and with ground forces.
China
China continues its expansive military modernization,
including deploying advanced sea-based weapons, developing a
new generation of road-mobile missiles, improving its silo-
based weapons, testing hypersonic glide vehicles, and
developing a nuclear-capable, next-generation bomber.
North Korea
North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a potential threat
to our allies and Homeland.
Although we remain hopeful that negotiations may produce a
pathway to peace and denuclearization, we must also remain
vigilant and maintain a strong deterrence posture.
POLICY
In light of these threats, the Department's 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review prioritizes maintaining a safe, secure,
survivable and effective nuclear deterrent as the ultimate
foundation of our nation's security. To remain credible, our
aging nuclear forces must be modernized--delay is not an
option.
The 2018 NPR reaffirmed the conclusions of previous
Republican and Democratic administrations that the diverse,
complementary capabilities of the nuclear triad ensure no
adversary believes it can employ nuclear weapons for any
reason, under any circumstances.
Unfortunately, each leg of the triad is now operating far
beyond its originally-planned service life. If not
recapitalized, these forces will age into obsolescence.
The Department's request to recapitalize or modernize the
nuclear enterprise is about 1.2 percent of the total DOD budget
request. In addition, the budget request to sustain and operate
nuclear forces is about 2.3 percent, for a total of about 3.5
percent of the DOD budget.
DECLARATORY POLICY
Our nuclear declaratory policy remains consistent with
longstanding precepts that ``the United States would employ
nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances . . . ''
The United States has a long-standing policy of
constructive ambiguity regarding nuclear employment that has
deterred potential adversaries since the advent of the nuclear
age. Establishing a policy of ``no-first-use'' of nuclear
weapons would undermine U.S. extended deterrence and damage the
health of our alliances because it would call into question the
assurance that the United States would come to the defense of
allies in extreme circumstances. ``No-first-use'' could
embolden adversaries to test what they might perceive as a
weakened U.S. resolve to defend our allies and vital interests
with every means at our disposal. It could undermine U.S.
nonproliferation objectives if allies and partners felt the
need to develop or possess their own nuclear weapons to deter
potential adversaries.
ARMS CONTROL
With respect to arms control, as a consequence of Russia's
clear violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty, and consistent with the Sense of Congress expressed in
the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the
United States suspended its obligations under the Treaty. We.
also gave notice of our intent to withdraw from it. Let me be
clear: It is Russia that has abandoned the Treaty as a result
of its violation, and our Allies fully support these United
States actions in response.
Consequently, the United States is moving forward with
developing conventionally-armed, ground-launched, intermediate-
range missile capabilities. What sort of system we ultimately
develop will be driven by our assessment of military
requirements and in consultation with Congress and with our
allies and partners.
More generally, the United States is committed to arms
control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner
security, are verifiable and enforceable, and include partners
that comply responsibly with their obligations. Accordingly, we
must take account of the prevailing international security
environment, which is more complex and challenging than nearly
a decade ago when the New START Treaty was signed.
New technologies, the development by Russia of new
strategic weapons systems (several of which would be
unconstrained by New START), Russia's significant advantage in
non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the expansion by China of
its own nuclear capabilities present new challenges for arms
control.
CONCLUSION
Chairman Fischer, let me conclude by stating that nuclear
deterrence is the bedrock of U.S. national security. Our
nuclear deterrent underwrites all U.S. military operations and
diplomacy across the globe--it is the backstop and foundation
of our national defense. A strong nuclear deterrent also
contributes to U.S. nonproliferation goals by eliminating the
incentive for allies to have their own nuclear weapons.
I thank the Committee for its previous support and urge
continued support for the important nuclear programs and
funding contained in the President's fiscal year 2020 budget
request.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Under Secretary Trachtenberg
follows:]
prepared statement by under secretary david j. trachtenberg
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request for nuclear forces and
our nuclear posture.
Today, the United States faces an extraordinarily complex and
dangerous global security environment, in which the central challenge
to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term
strategic competition with China and Russia, which seek to overturn the
long-standing rules-based international order and change territorial
borders.
This is acknowledged in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which
also notes that rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are
destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear weapons or
sponsorship of terrorism.
While we are hopeful for a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, North Korea continues to pose a threat to the United States
Homeland, as well as our allies, and Iran seeks to establish itself as
the dominant regional power in the Middle East, restrict our access,
support proxies, and sow violence throughout the region.
For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce
the role and number of nuclear weapons. Successive treaties enabled
reductions in accountable strategic U.S. nuclear warheads, first to
6,000, and ultimately to 1,550. Thousands of shorter-range nuclear
weapons not covered by any treaty were almost entirely eliminated from
the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Overall, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile
has drawn down by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high.
Unfortunately, Russia and China have chosen a different path and
have increased the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and
actively increased the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces.
For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent helps
ensure the United States competes from a position of strength and can
deter nuclear attack and prevent large-scale conventional warfare
between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future.
the nuclear threat
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects DOD's strategic
priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and effective nuclear
deterrent. The NPR examined the challenges posed by Russia, China,
North Korea and Iran in order to recommend a nuclear force posture
adequate to deter aggression by these and other countries.
Russia
Russia continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to
upgrade its nuclear forces and pursue advanced weapons specifically
designed to counter U.S. military capabilities. Russia's nuclear
modernization program covers every leg of its strategic triad and
includes advanced modern road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), new submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and long-range strategic bombers. According to Russia's TASS
News Agency, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced on
February 21, 2017 that 90 percent of the country's strategic nuclear
forces will be armed with modern weaponry by 2020.
In March 2018, only a month after the United States and Russia
reached the limits on strategic systems established under the New START
Treaty, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia is developing
even more new nuclear weapons capabilities, which include: 1) an
intercontinental-range, nuclear armed hypersonic glide vehicle; 2) a
maneuverable, nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile; 3) a long-
range, nuclear-powered cruise missile; 4) a nuclear-powered, nuclear-
armed underwater unmanned vehicle; and 5) a new heavy intercontinental
range ballistic missile, called the SARMAT. President Putin, during
this same speech, also announced that Russia developed new laser
weapons systems ``that have been supplied to the troops since last
year.''
This past February (2019), President Putin declared that Russia had
successfully tested nuclear-propulsion engines that would allow the
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and underwater drones to travel for
unlimited distances and evade traditional defenses. Some of these
weapons would not be subject to the New START Treaty's central limits
and verification regime as they exist today.
On top of all of this, Russia is modernizing and expanding an
active stockpile of approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons--
often referred to as tactical nuclear weapons--that can be deployed on
ships, bombers, and tactical aircraft, and with ground forces. None of
these are limited by any arms control treaty. In contrast, the United
States forward deploys to Europe small number of just one type of
nonstrategic nuclear weapon--the B61 nuclear gravity bomb--which is
delivered by a dual-capable tactical aircraft. Both the B61 and its
delivery aircraft are being modernized, but not increased in number.
Russia's military doctrine emphasizes the coercive nature and
military value of nuclear weapons. During its military operation
against Crimea, Russia raised the alert level of its nuclear forces and
issued veiled nuclear threats to ensure the West did not intervene.
Russia has repeatedly brandished its nuclear sword towards our NATO
Allies in recent years. In July 2017, Russian President Putin signed a
new naval doctrine that stated, ``under conditions of escalation of a
military conflict, demonstration of readiness and determination to use
force, including the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, is an
effective deterrent factor.'' More recently, in his annual state-of-
the-nation address on February 20, 2019, Putin said that, if Washington
deployed intermediate-range missiles in Europe, Moscow would target the
countries hosting the United States weapons.
China
China continues its expansive military modernization and is focused
on establishing regional dominance and expanding its ability to coerce
U.S. allies and partners. Consistent with a military strategy that
stresses ``optimization of its nuclear force structure,'' China is
modernizing and rapidly expanding its already considerable nuclear
forces, with little to no transparency regarding the scope and scale of
its nuclear modernization program. China is the only P-5 country that
has not announced publicly the size of its nuclear arsenal, and has
rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to engage in a meaningful bilateral
dialogue on nuclear posture and risk reduction issues.
China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles, with
warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids. In particular, China has
developed a new road-mobile strategic ICBM and its most advanced
ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM).
China has also announced development of a new nuclear-capable
strategic bomber, indicating China's intent to develop a nuclear triad
and has deployed a nuclear-capable precision guided DF-26 intermediate-
range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets.
China also tested a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2014.
China's nuclear forces include a mix of strategic-range systems
capable of striking the Homeland as well as theater-range forces
capable of threatening allies, United States bases, and forces in the
region. As China's capabilities both diversify and improve, there is
risk China may perceive that these weapons provide it with coercive
options in a crisis or conflict. China's modernization is troubling,
and the lack of transparency combined with growing Chinese
assertiveness in the region is one of the most serious risks to
regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.
North Korea
North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a potential threat to our
allies and the United States Homeland and add to an already complex
strategic picture. North Korea has conducted six increasingly
sophisticated nuclear tests and three ICBM flight tests that
demonstrate its ability to strike the United States Homeland. Although
we remain hopeful that negotiations may produce a pathway to peace and
denuclearization, we must also remain vigilant and maintain a strong
deterrence posture.
policy
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects the Department of
Defense's strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and
effective nuclear deterrent. Nuclear forces are the ultimate foundation
of our nation's security. Our deterrent forces must be modernized to
remain credible--delay is not an option.
The highest U.S. nuclear policy and strategy priority are to deter
potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale against the
United States or its allies and partners. However, deterring nuclear
attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons. Given the diverse
threats and profound uncertainties of the current and future threat
environment, U.S. nuclear forces play the following critical roles in
U.S. national security strategy:
Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack;
Assurance of allies and partners;
Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and
Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.
Effective U.S. deterrence of nuclear attack and non-nuclear
strategic attack requires ensuring that potential adversaries do not
miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use, either
regionally or against the United States itself. They must understand
that the costs far outweigh any perceived benefits from non-nuclear
aggression or limited nuclear escalation.
Declaratory Policy
U.S. nuclear declaratory policy is consistent with longstanding
precepts that ``the United States would employ nuclear weapons only in
extreme circumstance to defend the vital interests of the United
States, allies and partners.'' The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
clarifies that the ``extreme circumstances'' that may lead the United
States to consider nuclear use, include, but are not limited to:
significant non-nuclear strategic attacks on U.S., allied, or partner
civilian population or infrastructure; and significant non-nuclear
strategic attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and
control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities. This
clarification is intended to reduce the possibility of adversary
miscalculation.
The 2018 NPR further states: ``The United States will not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that
are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations.''
No-First Use
The United States has a long-standing policy of constructive
ambiguity regarding U.S. nuclear employment that has deterred potential
adversaries from nuclear coercion or aggression since the advent of the
nuclear age. A policy of ``no-first-use'' would undermine U.S. extended
deterrence and damage the health of our alliances because it would call
into question the assurance that the United States would come to the
defense of allies in extreme circumstances. ``No-first-use'' would
likely embolden adversaries to test what they might perceive as
weakened U.S. resolve to defend our allies and vital interests with
every means at our disposal. Finally, a no-first use policy could
undermine U.S. nonproliferation objectives if allies and partners felt
the need to develop or possess their own nuclear weapons to deter
potential adversaries.
posture
The policies set forth in the 2018 NPR reaffirmed the conclusions
of previous Republican and Democratic administrations that the diverse
capabilities of the nuclear triad provide the flexibility and
resilience needed for deterrence in the most cost-effective manner.
Each triad leg is essential, complementary, and critical to ensuring no
adversary believes it can successfully employ nuclear weapons for any
reason, under any circumstances.
Unfortunately, each leg of the triad is now operating far beyond
its originally-planned service life. Over the past 25 years, the United
States made only modest investments in basic nuclear sustainment, life-
extension, and operations. Most of the nation's nuclear delivery
systems, built in the 1980s and prior, will reach their end-of-service
life in the 2025-2035 timeframe and cannot be sustained further. If not
recapitalized, these forces will age into obsolescence. Our choice is
not between replacing our Cold War systems or keeping them, but between
replacing them or losing them altogether. Similarly, the DOE/NNSA
infrastructure has long been underfunded and overdue for the upgrades
necessary to create a modern, efficient nuclear complex to meet the
nation's national security missions. DOD relies on the continued
investment in recapitalization of DOE/NNSA's laboratories, production
and test facilities.
Consequently, we must not delay the recapitalization of the triad
and our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system
initiated by the previous Administration. The fiscal year 2020 Budget
Request funds all critical Department of Defense (DOD) modernization
requirements, helping to ensure that modern replacements will be
available before the Nation's legacy systems reach the end of their
extended service lives. The fiscal year 2020 Budget Request for nuclear
forces is $24.9 billion or roughly 3.5 percent of the DOD budget. This
includes $8.4 billion for recapitalization programs (including the B-
21, ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD) ICBM, the long-range
standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, and the Columbia-class nuclear
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)) and $16.5 billion to sustain and
operate our nuclear forces.
DOD's fiscal year 2020 request to recapitalize the nuclear
enterprise is about 1.2 percent of the total DOD budget request. Over
the long term, nuclear force modernization will cost approximately $320
billion over 23 years. Recent estimates, such as those from the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review, project that the total cost to sustain and
modernize U.S. nuclear forces will account for about 6.4 percent of the
Defense budget at its highest level of funding in 2029, returning to
about 3 percent for sustainment upon completion of modernization. The
January 2019 Congressional Budget Office report supports DOD's
estimates concluding that the estimated cost of nuclear forces ``is
projected to rise from about 5 percent in 2019 to about 7 percent in
2028.''
Finally, in support of modernizing these strategic systems, the
bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission concluded in its 2018
Providing for the Common Defense report that ``Given the criticality of
effective U.S. nuclear deterrence to the assurance of allies, and, most
importantly, the safety of the American people, there is no doubt that
these programs are both necessary and affordable.''
Supplemental Capabilities
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the United States
must supplement its existing stockpile with two modest capabilities to
ensure Russia, China, and others do not perceive a gap in our regional
deterrence posture. This is intended to discourage adversaries from
limited nuclear attacks--strengthening deterrence and helping prevent
conflict in the first place. By modifying a small number of existing
SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option and restoring a modern
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the force, the U.S. will have
credible response options to nuclear attacks of any magnitude. The low-
yield SLBM warhead and nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)
are measured responses to close troubling gaps in regional deterrence
that have emerged in recent years. In addition, redeploying a SLCM
addresses the enormous disparity in nonstrategic nuclear forces,
without attempting to match Russia system for system. Both systems
complement existing capabilities in the triad by providing assured,
tailored options in the face of increasingly advanced air and missile
defenses. In addition, the unique attributes of a nuclear SLCM may
incentivize Russia to accept constraints on its nonstrategic nuclear
capabilities.
Moreover, the supplemental capabilities do not require nuclear
testing or developing new nuclear weapons. They do not violate any arms
control treaties or other international obligations, and they do not
lower the threshold for nuclear use. They are intended to raise
Russia's threshold (or likelihood) for employing nuclear weapons by
convincing Russia that it would gain no advantage in using low-yield
nuclear weapons.
nato, japan and republic of korea engagements
The United States continues to extend nuclear deterrence
commitments to assure allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
Based on our long-shared common values and interests, this commitment
helps address allied concerns with regional threats, such as Russia's
nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities and aggressive rhetoric; China's
assertiveness; and North Korea's nuclear and non-nuclear threats.
The United States exhibits its commitment to extended deterrence in
two ways: first, it maintains the capabilities necessary to deter and,
if necessary, to respond decisively across the spectrum of potential
nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios that could affect our allies and
partners; and second it sustains regular allied dialogues to facilitate
understanding of each other's threat perceptions and to determine how
best to demonstrate our collective capabilities and resolve.
Within NATO, we continue to participate in the Nuclear Planning
Group and the High-Level Group, which our Assistant Secretary for
Strategy, Plans and Capabilities chairs. As NATO Allies reiterated in
Brussels last July, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain
a nuclear alliance. The Alliance's deterrence posture continues to
depend upon both U.S. strategic nuclear forces and forward deployed
nuclear gravity bombs with U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft.
In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States maintains formal
extended deterrence dialogues with Japan--the United States-Japan
Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD)--and with the Republic of Korea
(ROK) (e.g. United States ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC)).
Through regular bilateral meetings, allied site-visits to locations of
U.S. strategic capabilities, and table-top exercises, both the EDD and
DSC have helped us to develop a common Alliance understanding of
deterrence principles, and to test application of those principles to
scenarios we may face in the Indo-Pacific region. These dialogues
contribute to alliance cohesion and effectiveness and help affirm to
our allies that they should not doubt our extended deterrence
commitments or our ability and willingness to fulfill them.
intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty developments
On February 2, 2019, after years of Russian cheating on its
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty obligations, and after
exhausting every reasonable diplomatic, economic, and military effort
to persuade Russia to comply with its treaty obligations, the United
States suspended its obligations under the INF Treaty and gave notice
of the U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty. As NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg asserted, ``Russia is in material breach of
the INF Treaty and must use the next six months to return to full and
verifiable compliance or bear sole responsibility for its demise.''
Allies fully support the U.S. decision to suspend its obligations under
INF and the U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty.
To be clear, what prompted the U.S. suspension was not a technical
violation or an interpretive difference, but Russia's development,
testing, and fielding of a ground-launched cruise missile system
specifically banned by the INF Treaty. For those concerned that our
suspension will cause Russia to develop these systems further, I can
only say Russia's legal obligations under the INF Treaty proved no
barrier to its pursuit and fielding of a banned system in the first
place. To assert that Russia is reacting to our suspension is to ignore
the reality of Russia's conduct under the INF Treaty.
As the President stated in February 2019, the United States is
moving forward with developing ground-launched missile capabilities.
This is a direct consequence of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty.
Now that our Treaty obligations are suspended, we are beginning work
that if pursued to completion would be inconsistent with the Treaty.
The United States is developing systems that are conventional in
nature, and this work is designed to be reversible should Russia return
to compliance by verifiably destroying its INF Treaty-violating
missiles, launchers, and associated equipment. This development will
include flight tests, although we do not anticipate progressing to this
stage before the United States' withdrawal from the Treaty takes effect
on August 2. What sort of system we ultimately develop will be driven
by our assessment of military requirements and in consultation with
Congress and with our allies and partners.
the new start treaty
As stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is
committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and
partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners
that comply responsibly with their obligations. As both the 2018 NPR
and the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit Communique noted, we must take
account of the prevailing international security environment. In the
arms control context, this means Russia and, increasingly, China.
While we assess Russia to be in compliance with the central limits
of New START, the history of Russia's arms control behavior is
sobering. I will not recount here Russia's many violations of its
treaty obligations and other political commitments. It is instructive,
however, that, only a month after the United States and Russia reached
the central limits on strategic nuclear systems prescribed by the New
START Treaty, President Putin--with great fanfare--announced Russia was
developing new long-range nuclear delivery systems, some of which would
not be limited by the New START Treaty. This is troubling given that
Russia is also modernizing its growing and increasingly capable arsenal
of shorter-range, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are also not
covered by New START. Members of this Committee will remember that
Russia's nonstrategic arsenal was of great concern when the New START
Treaty was ratified, and it remains a concern today.
That said, the Department supports pursuing a prudent arms control
agenda, which could include extending the New START Treaty, provided
the outcomes improve the security of the United States and our allies
and partners, and effectively help manage strategic competition among
states.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that nuclear deterrence is
the bedrock of U.S. national security. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must
dissuade any adversary from mistakenly believing it can benefit from
using nuclear weapons--even in a limited way--against the United States
or its allies and partners.
Our nuclear deterrent underwrites all U.S. military operations and
diplomacy across the globe--it is the backstop and foundation of our
national defense. A strong nuclear deterrent also contributes to U.S.
nonproliferation goals by eliminating the incentive for allies to have
their own nuclear weapons.
In an increasingly complex and threatening security environment, we
must make the investments needed to address the on-going atrophying of
our nuclear capabilities and ensure we have the capabilities, now and
in the future, to deter and defend against attacks on our Homeland,
U.S. forces deployed abroad, and allies and partners.
I urge the Committee to support the important nuclear programs and
funding contained in the President's fiscal year 2020 Budget Request.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT GENERAL TIMOTHY M. RAY, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND AND COMMANDER, AIR FORCE STRATEGIC-
AIR, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND"
General Ray. Good morning Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking
Member Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee;
thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to
represent the men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command.
After three years in Europe as the Commander of Third Air
Force and the Deputy Commander of United States European
Command, I had a front row seat in the great power competition
unfolding around us in Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa,
and the Middle East.
It became abundantly clear we must bring about a
significant transition in our capabilities and our thinking as
we turn our attention from seventeen years of conflict in the
Middle East and counterterrorism operations to potential
conflict with global competitors, with significantly more
capable technology and growing strategic capabilities. Air
Force Global Strike Command has a central role in delivering
what the nation needs most: a safe, secure, reliable,
effective, and affordable long range. Precision strike force--
both nuclear and conventional.
Safety, security, reliability and the American Public's
trust in the nuclear force is non-negotiable and must remain
the bedrock of how we operate. What must change is the manner
in which we train, prepare, sustain, and modernize. The Air
Force nuclear arsenal can no longer be a collection of
expensive programs; it must be grounded in relevant operational
concepts of operations, affordable acquisition programs,
improved and affordable sustainment, and robust training
underwritten by effective nuclear command and control.
Transitions are difficult, but we have a unique opportunity
to partner with Congress, the combatant commanders, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to press forward with
affordable, cost effective, and innovative solutions to ensure
our intercontinental ballistic missile and bomber forces are
ready for the challenges of the 21st Century.
Part of presenting the long-range precision strike force
our nations needs is fostering the right culture and climate
for the best of America's sons and daughters. As we modernize,
we are putting equal attention on developing the right leaders
and cultivating dignity, respect, diversity, and inclusion.
We are working to retain talent and harness the innovative
mindset all airmen share.
Lastly, I want to thank you for on-time 2019 funding; I
cannot articulate enough how critical on-time funding is to
restoring readiness; predictable, reliable, and flexible
budgets, with the right authorities to drive competition are
elemental to our future success.
Chairwoman Fischer and distinguished Subcommittee Members,
I want to thank you for your dedication to our great nation and
the opportunity to appear before the committee, I am looking
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Timothy M. Ray follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Timothy M. Ray
introduction
For the last three years in Europe as the Commander, Third Air
Force and the Deputy Commander, United States European Command, I had a
front row seat in the great power competition unfolding in Europe, the
Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East. It is abundantly
clear we must bring about a significant transition in our capabilities
and our thinking as we turn our attention from seventeen years of
conflict in the Middle East and counterterrorism operations to
potential conflict with global competitors with more capable technology
and growing strategic capabilities. Air Force Global Strike Command
(AFGSC) has a central role in delivering what the nation needs most: a
safe, secure, reliable, effective, and affordable long-range precision
strike force--nuclear and conventional. This is a dialogue of blending
what must and must not change. Safety, security, reliability and the
American Public's trust in the nuclear force is nonnegotiable and must
remain the bedrock of how we operate. What must change is the manner in
which we train, prepare, sustain, and modernize. The Air Force nuclear
arsenal can no longer be a collection of expensive programs; it must be
grounded in relevant operational concepts of operations, affordable
acquisition programs, improved and affordable sustainment, and robust
training underwritten by effective nuclear command and control.
Transitions are the most difficult undertakings, but we have a
unique opportunity to partner with Congress, the combatant commanders,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to press forward with
affordable, cost effective, and innovative solutions to ensure our
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and bomber forces are ready
for the challenges of the 21st Century.
Thank you for the on-time 2019 funding; predictable, reliable, and
flexible budgets, coupled with the right authorities to drive
competition are elemental to our future success.
context
I am personally committed to the Secretary of the Air Force and
Chief of Staff of the Air Force and their three lines of effort: the
Air Force We Need, building a more lethal force, and fielding
tomorrow's Air Force faster and smarter. AFGSC is the warfighting
command responsible for simultaneously executing two legs of the
nuclear triad, overseeing the nation's Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications (NC3) capabilities and accomplishing long-range
precision strike missions across the globe. Previous commanders
testified from the perspective of a traditional Organize, Train, and
Equip (OT&E) major command. Today, the AFGSC Commander is the Air
Component Commander to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
which is a very different role. This provides a different perspective
into how AFGSC forces are employed to fight. From this seat, it is
possible to make decisions based on war-time operational impact rather
than simply providing the forces. As modernization and sustainment
programs progress, there will be ongoing analysis that leads us to
risk-informed and balanced decisions throughout all phases of the
acquisition process. An iterative, informed, and agile process is a key
enabler for ensuring our deterrent and warfighting capabilities--legacy
as well as follow-on--are firmly focused on meeting the anticipated
challenges of the decades ahead. The pace of developing emerging
technologies has changed drastically. Chasing the most exquisite
technical solutions is too expensive and takes too much time. The
pursuit should be the right strategies, ``good enough'' technology on-
time, stable requirements, and owning the tech-baseline to support
future development.
There have already been success stories as a result of these
practices. For example, the Air Force selected the UH-1N replacement
helicopter for $1.7 billion less than the service cost estimate. The
decision to compete this contract was absolutely the right call and the
competition it drove between the bidders resulted in lower prices for
the Air Force. In terms of operations and sustainment, the Air Force
will own the data rights and maintenance, which makes this option much
more affordable in the long-term. We are particularly pleased with the
unprecedented results digital based modeling and engineering has
yielded in one of our most critical programs, Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent (GBSD). This process is reducing risk at a faster rate and
the certainty gained in the risk reduction will have a positive impact
on the bottom line further down the road.
Affordability is imperative to maintain relevancy and the command
is committed to seeking innovative ways to bring the cost of
modernization down. There is potential for billions of dollars in
savings in modernization and sustainment programs, but the Air Force
must be deliberate when developing the requirements and making
subsequent investment decisions. Building this trust with the nation's
leaders is critical to fostering productive teamwork. Make no mistake,
the nation's nuclear weapon systems and legacy bombers are old and are
no longer aging gracefully. The burden of cost to sustain and maintain
our legacy systems will continue to increase, and there is no long-term
affordable solution that does not include replacing those systems and
components affected by age-out and technological obsolescence. The
command's promise is to deliver those replacements as efficiently and
affordably as possible.
air force global strike command priorities
Componency to USSTRATCOM
In 2018, my predecessor updated this committee on the
reorganization effort aligning AFGSC as the single, full-time air
component to USSTRATCOM and streamlined the lines of authority for our
bomber and ICBM forces. The commander of AFGSC is now the commander of
Air Forces Strategic--Air (AFSTRAT-Air) and the Joint Forces Air
Component Commander (JFACC) as designated by the Commander of
USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM).
Under the previous construct, responsibilities for the air, space,
and naval strategic missions were spread across several lines of
authority. Now, the Joint-Global Strike Operations Center (J-GSOC)
handles the day-to-day responsibilities of the strategic nuclear
mission for USSTRATCOM's air component. The J-GSOC consists of the
Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and Joint Nuclear Operations Center
(JNOC). The JAOC handles the conventional portion of the command's
mission while the JNOC focuses on the nuclear portion. The National
Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) is also aligned under the J-GSOC.
When combined with AFGSC's existing responsibility for the E-4B
aircraft, AFSTRAT, through USSTRATCOM, is better postured to present
the NAOC mission to support the President and Secretary of Defense. The
Standoff Munitions Application Center (SMAC) provides expertise in
planning and targeting of Air Force standoff weapons. The Cruise
Missile Support Activity Atlantic (CMSALANT) and Pacific (CMSAPAC),
aligned under the Navy's Fleet Forces day-to-day, support the J-GSOC
during complex, joint targeting operations required by any combatant
commander.
As CDRUSSTRATCOM's designated JFACC in addition to the Commander,
AFSTRAT-Air, this dual-hatted position provides the ability to monitor,
control, and direct all the air assets assigned or attached to
USSTRATCOM anywhere in the world. These include the Air Force bomber,
tanker, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and ICBM forces
as well as the USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and Take Charge
and Move Out (TACAMO) missions. The JFACC also supplies a common
operating picture to CDRUSSTRATCOM that provides status and locations
of all air assets. The success of this restructuring has been proven
during global exercises for two years now, and this is a much better
operations-focused construct than the previous organization.
This is relevant because the authorities granted to these positions
enable an assessment of how best to accomplish the warfighting and OT&E
missions through risk-informed and balanced decision making. As the
warfighter, executing as the Air Component Commander, it has revealed
things that have been invalid for a long time and provided the
opportunity to put operating concepts in place that enhance lethality
and improve relevancy. How we prioritize sustainment and modernization,
Forward Locate Aircraft Generate (FLAG) operations, and requirements
validation on command and control parameters are all examples of how
this position is able to optimize and prioritize. There is an
opportunity to make deliberate, risk-informed decisions to bring costs
down based on operational impact.
Security
Security is one of the most fundamental competencies the nation
demands of the military. The right questions about security need to be
asked and innovative teams should determine how best to secure our
installations and assets. This is more than Security Forces Defenders
at the gate; this is preparing for threats from unmanned aerial
systems, cyber, and other potential threats across multiple domains.
The United States no longer enjoys the sanctuary it used to and the
warfighting domains continue to expand, challenging the nation's
collective understanding and application of warfare, ideas of national
defense, and theories of victory. In 2017, the Secretary of the Air
Force directed AFGSC to lead a Security Forces Review Team to provide
Headquarters Air Force actionable items to improve the health and
lethality of our Defender corps. While these action items are refined
and addressed, progress is being made to shape the future of Security
Forces as an elite, integrated team prepared to face the threats they
encounter in and around our installations and missile fields.
The Ground Combat Training Squadron on Camp Guernsey (Frontier
Defender) was realigned under the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB,
Wyoming, on 1 June 2018. The regional training center operates on a
Wyoming Air National Guard camp, where joint cooperation enables the
training of our elite Defenders charged with protecting our nation's
nuclear arsenal. The 60-member staff provides the only training in the
Air Force for Defenders assigned to nuclear security operations.
Additionally, Frontier Defender continues to refine and execute the
first-ever Security Forces weapons school, the 62-day Security Forces
Weapons and Tactics Course. The objective of the course is to train
Defenders skilled in resource analysis and the application of force
protection concepts, through the lens of USAF Weapons School graduates,
to ultimately provide proactive protection of our nuclear assets.
AFGSC is also collaborating with the United States Air Force
Academy's Research Department. The intent is to pioneer integration of
existing communications equipment employed by AFGSC's Defenders in the
missile fields with commercial drone capabilities. The ability to see
and sense potential threats using small, unmanned aerial vehicles and
provide that information quickly and securely to ground forces will
substantially increase our capability to defend the nation's nuclear
assets and installations. Over the past year, AFGSC has made
significant strides in an emerging security initiative to counter-
unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) detected near important resources.
Fielded capabilities include handheld and portable systems. Fixed-site
and mobile vehicle-borne systems are currently being installed. These
new capabilities will provide a necessary added layer of security to
ensure continued weapons systems safety and operability. Additionally,
the command has initiated blue-unmanned aircraft systems (B-UAS), a
friendly forces pilot program, across all installations, and once
training and testing are complete, B-UAS capabilities will enhance
battlespace awareness to assist in meeting these emerging threats.
These efforts with our partners will continue to ensure the robust
integration of both existing and developing technologies to provide
cost effective and robust battle space awareness to AFGSC defense
forces. This is the beginning of an evolving journey. C-UAS is a
rapidly developing technology and as a service, there will be an
evolution to utilize the capability and defend against the threat.
These are a few examples of how AFGSC is taking Security Forces
training and operations in a more relevant, realistic direction.
Weapons Generation Facilities
Today's Weapon Storage Areas (WSA) are not simply storage
facilities; they support rapid generation of nuclear aircraft and
routine maintenance operations for the ground-based and air legs of the
nuclear triad. Two ICBM wings are planned to receive modernized
facilities for these missions, renamed Weapons Generation Facilities
(WGFs). Additionally, bomber WGFs will be needed to accommodate mission
growth and improve current capacity, and with the right number, will
provide national leadership more strategic decision space.
Affordability is the entering argument for the Air Force's way forward
concerning WGFs. This year, AFGSC organized a cross-functional team to
re-examine the design plans to identify more affordable options. The
team identified options that allow for recapitalization of existing
facilities where possible. For locations that do not have existing
facilities capable of undergoing recapitalization, the design
characteristics have been scaled back for more affordable construction.
A more detailed update will be available after a final decision is made
on the plan for bomber WGFs.
Infrastructure
One of the chronic challenges is the impact that degraded and
unpredictable infrastructure funding is having on mission, Airmen, and
families. Bases are power projection platforms and must be viewed as
part of a ``3-D weapon system.'' They are essential elements, and this
is particularly true for the three ICBM bases and the five bomber
bases, as they stand as deterrent 24/7/365, ready to conduct global
strike missions directly from these locations. For years, the Air Force
has been forced to make deliberate decisions to take risk in
infrastructure funding, in order to apply scarce dollars toward higher
readiness and modernization priorities. The cumulative effect has been
a steady erosion of facilities and core infrastructure, and significant
growth in costs to address exponentially-growing repair and replacement
backlogs. There is a growing risk in facilities and infrastructure
reliability, higher overall costs due to accelerated deterioration, and
increasing potential for unexpected catastrophic, mission-impacting
failure. Innovative Airmen have, and will continue to, focus limited
resources on ``mission critical, worst first'' facilities and
infrastructure while accepting risk in the recapitalization of
facilities with less-direct mission impact such as community and base
support. There is without question a correlation between facility
condition and quality of life, as well as quality of work. Without
consistent, reliable, and flexible funding, degrading infrastructure
will continue to increase risk of mission interruption or degradation
and affect quality of life of Airmen and families. Providing a
predictable, stable budget with enough resources to address degrading
infrastructure will not only enhance lethality, but will go far in
providing Airmen the working and living environments they deserve and
increasing overall readiness.
nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
As the NC3 lead for the Air Force, AFGSC supports CDRUSSTRATCOM
priorities of sustaining current NC3 systems and replacing the legacy
systems with next generation NC3 technology to ensure secure, reliable
nuclear command and control capabilities to the President and
warfighters.
Sustaining current NC3 systems includes developing maintenance
performance indicators to track the reliability of communications
systems and predicting future maintenance actions and spare parts
needs. Unfortunately, there are components that suffer from diminishing
manufacturing sources and material shortages across the NC3 enterprise.
For example, the decades-old Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT) on the B-
52, a system that receives Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) over very
low frequency, fell into that category. As a result of this analysis
and planning, a vendor was identified that could manufacture the band-
pass filters required to repair the MRT receivers. Today, there are
enough band-pass filters in stock to sustain the aging system until
replacement.
Continuing its sixth decade as the backbone of the nation's bomber
fleet, the B-52 is funded in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget
for installation of a Very Low Frequency (VLF) receiver which leverages
the technology currently being installed on the B-2 fleet. This VLF
terminal will provide a NC3 receive-only capability. To further
modernize VLF capability across multiple platforms, we are moving
forward with development of a Common VLF Receiver (CVR) capable of
utilizing emerging waveforms for improved EAM reception. We envision
employing this receiver on airborne and ground weapons systems.
Additionally, the Air Force continues to develop the Family of Advanced
Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) Force Element Terminal (FET) which will
be integrated onto the B-52 providing access to the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) satellite network. AEHF will also be integrated
into the ICBM's Launch Control Centers (LCC), further enhancing the
redundancy that exists for NC3 in the ICBM force. We are also assessing
options to leverage other programs' investments in this communication
technology to enable more rapid fielding across bombers and supporting
reconnaissance and tanker aircraft.
Other command and control modernization programs include the Global
Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (GASNT) Increment 1 program, which
will bring nuclear tasked command posts, mobile support teams, and
munitions squadrons the capability to operate on the AEHF satellite
network at extended data rates. The GASNT Increment 1 program is
currently undergoing operational testing and is expected to reach a
Milestone C production decision in the summer of 2019. The GASNT
Increment 2 program will provide advanced aircrew alerting, Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) Line of Sight (LOS) and advanced High Frequency (HF)
capabilities. Additionally, the Service continues efforts to upgrade
the Strategic Automated Command Control System (SACCS) to improve
reliability of this primary EAM distribution system.
Fully funded in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget,
communications upgrades to the E-4B NAOC will ensure a reliable,
airborne NC3 platform for senior leaders. The Low Frequency Transmit
System (LFTS) replaces the existing dual trailing wire antenna while
reducing aircraft weight by almost a ton. The Survivable Super High
Frequency (SHF) system provides reliable and sustainable voice/data
capability in scintillated and jammed operational environments.
Tactical UHF radios will be upgraded to Mobile User Objective System
(MUOS) capability to meet CJCS requirements. Finally, the FAB-T Command
Post Terminal (CPT) is being installed on the E-4B fleet and will
enable Presidential National Voice Conferencing (PNVC) to replace
legacy MILSTAR capability and provide connectivity to the AEHF
satellite network.
As the E-4B is modernized, the nation must look ahead to replacing
the aging aircraft within the National Military Command System. The
joint-Service NAOC, Executive Airlift (EA), ABNCP, and TACAMO (NEAT)
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is underway and is scheduled to report
to OSD in September 2019. The AOA will evaluate whether mission
realignments can improve the operational value of the airborne layer
and examine potential synergies in acquiring a common platform.
The next generation of NC3 that will be in place thirty years from
now is currently in development. Simply replacing the old with the new
is not the right strategy; as sustainment and modernization efforts
progress, retaining the modularity and data rights to incorporate new
technology and ensure compatibility with new weapon systems is a
necessity. AFGSC stands ready to support USSTRATCOM and the initiatives
to deliver NC3 capability on operational and threat-relevant timelines.
sustainment
Twentieth Air Force
Twentieth Air Force (20 AF), one of two Numbered Air Forces in
AFGSC, is responsible for the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM, UH-1N
helicopter forces, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and
Storage Complex at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, the Flight Test
Squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and the ground
combat training squadron at Camp Guernsey, Wyoming. The 450 dispersed
and hardened Launch Facilities (LFs), are controlled, maintained,
defended, and supported by AFGSC Airmen every single day, providing the
bulk of our day-to-day nuclear alert force, and doing so with precision
and professionalism. The ICBM forces presented to USSTRATCOM are
deployed in place, and preserve strategic stability by providing the
nation a credible and responsive nuclear option in a contested
environment and presenting adversaries a nearly insurmountable obstacle
of numbers should they consider a disarming attack on the United
States. AFGSC's ICBM forces are New START compliant.
Minuteman III
AFGSC is committed to the sustainment of MMIII ICBM and its NC3
systems and support equipment. It is critical the weapon system remains
viable until it is replaced by the GBSD. To sustain the existing fleet
of large missile maintenance vehicles, the $136.2 million Transporter
Erector Program (TERP) and the $321.8 million Payload Transporter
Replacement (PTR) remain a priority. PTR production is expected to
begin production in fiscal year 2019.
The ICBM LCCs will be equipped with modernized communications
systems to improve reliability and replace aging and technologically
obsolete systems. The LCC block upgrade, expected to begin full
deployment in 2020, is a $94M modification effort that replaces
multiple LCC components to include modern data storage, a weapon system
console printer and oxygen regeneration unit. A significant security
upgrade to the remote visual assessment capability at our LF will
increase situational awareness and security. This $69.5 million program
is expected to begin deployment in fiscal year 2020.
In fiscal year 2018, AFGSC conducted three MMIII flight tests and
two simulated electronic launch tests. In fiscal year 2019, we are
scheduled to conduct four operational MMIII flight tests and two
simulated electronic launch tests that will demonstrate the operational
credibility of the ground-based component of the nuclear triad and the
Air Force's commitment to sustaining that capability.
In an effort to improve the nuclear capability of our ICBM force,
the ICBM Programmed Depot Maintenance program began in fiscal year
2016. The program places operational LFs and LCCs on an 8-year depot-
level maintenance cycle. It greatly increases the effectiveness and
lethality of our ICBMs by ensuring their sustainment is done in an
engineering-based, systematic way. Successful prototyping of the
program was accomplished in fiscal year 2016 and from fiscal year 2016
to fiscal year 2018, 100 LFs and 15 LCCs went through the first
maintenance cycle. There are 55 LFs and 6 LCCs planned in fiscal year
2019. This program is key to ensure MMIII viability through the
transition to GBSD.
UH-1N
AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's Vietnam-era fleet of
63 UH-1N helicopters. The majority of these aircraft support several
critical missions: security of our ICBM fields, transport missions in
the National Capitol Region and USINDOPACOM, and critical Continuity of
Operations missions. Additionally, UH-1Ns support Air Force survival
training with rescue operations. Further, they participate in the
Defense Support of Civil Authorities program and are frequently called
upon to conduct search and rescue activities for missing or injured
civilians.
AFGSC has developed a comprehensive sustainment plan for the UH-1N
while transitioning to the replacement aircraft. The UH-1N will
continue to operate in AFGSC through the mid-fiscal year 2020s and
within the USAF until the mid-fiscal year 2030s. AFGSC is responsible
for the life-cycle of all UH-1Ns in the USAF and some modernization
will be necessary for the aircraft to remain effective; currently, all
future modifications will be completed in the early fiscal year 2020s.
These modifications are only occurring on UH-1Ns flying the longest to
ensure mission effectiveness while remaining fiscally responsible. The
sustainment of the UH-1N will ensure effectiveness until platform
retirement.
Eighth Air Force
Eighth Air Force (8 AF) is responsible for the B-52H Stratofortress
(B-52) bomber, the B-2A Spirit (B-2) bomber, the B-1B Lancer (B-1)
bomber, and the E-4B NAOC, the cornerstone of survivability of the
National Military Command System, providing critical continuity and
communication capability for our national leaders. Bombers provide
decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve through generation,
dispersal, and deployment. AFGSC's bombers are New START compliant.
The overall size of the bomber force is driven by the significant
contribution to conventional campaigns, now more of a concern in this
era of great power competition. Since 1991, the Air Force has conducted
continuous combat operations with 46 percent fewer aircraft than we had
in 1991. During this period, the demand for bombers increased resulting
in a growing toll on Airmen and readiness of the aircraft and
equipment. AFGSC bombers have supported operations through continuous
rotations in United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), United States
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), United States Africa Command
(USAFRICOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM), and United
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs).
Additionally, AFGSC provides bomber forces to support USSOUTHCOM's
Joint-Interagency Task Force-South, USEUCOM, and USAFRICOM through the
Joint Staff's Global Force Management process and Bomber Task Force
ordered deployments and missions. These opportunities enhance our
support to our allies and display our resolve to potential adversaries.
The core of AFGSC assurance and deterrence is our unwavering commitment
to USSTRATCOM and our nuclear mission. AFGSC must balance global force
posturing with our nuclear mission, while not jeopardizing readiness
and fleet health. Unfortunately, the effects of this extremely high
operational tempo are reverberating through the bomber fleet and
specific examples are outlined below.
B-1 Update
The B-1 is a highly versatile, conventional-only, multi-mission
weapon system that carries the largest payload of both guided and
unguided weapons, of all the bombers in the U.S. inventory. Since 1991
it has provided rapid support for combatant commanders around the
globe. Multiple wartime employments, high operations tempo, and harsh
environment exposure have proven the aircraft's combat effectiveness,
but have significantly degraded aircraft availability.
The B-1 was built as a low-level penetrator and is engineered for
flight profiles different than the more stressing close air support/
strike profiles flown in support of USCENTCOM. Seventeen years of
steady deployments in these more stressing flight profiles has resulted
in the need for increased structural inspections and repairs. To that
end, a dedicated, programmed depot-level repair line is planned to
stand up at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex beginning in fiscal
year 2020 in order to assure our high standard of aviation safety.
Furthermore, using Delta Airlines as a benchmark, AFGSC's Condition
Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) initiative is now underway in the B-1
maintenance community. This predictive approach to identifying aircraft
subsystem degradation will optimize scheduled down time for the B-1 in
order to concurrently make deferred repairs and change near end-of-life
components, avoiding unscheduled breaks and ultimately resulting in
improved aircraft availability. When fully implemented, CBM+ will
increase mission effectiveness, aircraft availability, optimize spare
parts forecasting in the supply chain, and minimize unscheduled
downtime for maintenance. In combination, the additional investment in
the B-1 structure and implementation of CBM+ sustainment processes will
ensure the Air Force achieves the service life goal for the B-1.
The B-1 will remain a viable platform through modernization
programs and upgrades to carry it through to retirement. Avionics and
weapon upgrades are critical; the Integrated Battle Station, funded to
$56 million in fiscal year 2020-24, includes an upgraded Central
Integrated Test System, Fully Integrated Data Link, Vertical Situation
Display, and flight simulator upgrades. These are essential
capabilities to provide aircrew with a more flexible, integrated
cockpit. This fleet wide modification will reach full operational
capability in fiscal year 2020. Upgrades to Radio Cryptographic
Equipment, Identification Friend or Foe, Link-16, and Bomb Rack
Modifications along with the Fully Integrated Advanced Targeting Pod
capability will ensure the B-1 remains completely assimilated with
Joint Combat Forces.
The stand-off weapons currently employed by the B-1 include the
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), and now, the B-1 is the
only Air Force delivery platform for the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
(LRASM). This precision strike capability has guaranteed a critical
role for the B-1 in assuring our allies and deterring potential
adversaries now and into the future.
B-2 Update
For nearly 25 years, B-2s have provided the nation with the only
stealth bomber capable of penetrating air defenses anywhere in the
world. The B-2 holds targets at risk with
a variety of nuclear and conventional weapons and has provided
deterrence against our enemies and stability for our allies. The B-2's
conventional accomplishments are numerous and incontrovertible; the
bomber provided precision attacks during the Kosovo and Iraq Wars,
strikes on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and on forces in
Libya.
B-2 modernization efforts are addressing a nuclear command and
control need by bringing a survivable very low frequency communication
capability to the aircraft. Additionally, with the proliferation of
anti-access/area denial threats, we must ensure the B-2's ability to
penetrate enemy defenses with the Defensive Management System
Modernization (DMS-M) program. The command stands behind DMS-M as a
must-pay bill for continued lethality and the program is fully funded
in fiscal year 2020. Additionally, the B-2 is being upgraded to carry
the JASSM-ER and the B61-12 nuclear gravity weapon. These upgrades are
currently programmed for $145 million in Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation and $46 million in procurement. These are critical to
ensuring the bomber leg of the nuclear triad remains a viable and
relevant warfighting capability.
Small fleet dynamics continue to challenge our sustainment efforts
primarily due to vanishing vendors and the diminishing supply chain.
There is an ongoing effort to maintain the proper balance of fleet
modernization and sustainment while maintaining combat readiness.
Lessons learned from the difficulty of sustaining and modernizing the
B-2's small fleet, and an ever-decreasing technological advantage, are
critical drivers for B-21 requirements.
B-52 Update
The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
airpower. It is able to deliver the widest variety of nuclear and
conventional weapons, and boasts the best aircraft availability and
mission capable rates of all three bomber platforms.
The B-52 will remain a key element of our bomber force until the
2050s, and therefore, it is paramount that we continue to invest
resources into this aircraft. The modernization and sustainment of the
B-52 should not be based on how long it has been in service, but
rather, based on how long it will be in service. AFGSC is looking at B-
52 modernization holistically, to optimize, prioritize, and deliver
affordable, on-time modernization to sustain this aircraft.
Modernization programs will be prioritized and integrated in an effort
to make deliberate decisions on timing for concurrent programs.
Integration of the existing programs with smart and efficient
development and test schedules is critical to deliver affordable,
lethal combat capability. Current modernization programs include the B-
52 Radar Modernization Program, funded $1.03 billion in fiscal year
2020-24, and entered execution in the pre-Milestone B phase.
Furthermore, B-52 training simulators require integration of various
programs such as Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT),
internal weapons bay upgrade, data link capabilities, air refueling,
and information technology refresh. Supporting the revitalization of
these critical training tools will create high fidelity training
environments in-line with Air Force priorities, such as Pilot Training
Next, and directly increase the readiness of B-52 crews in support of
nuclear and conventional missions.
Additionally, the 1960-era TF-33 engines currently on the B-52 are
frequently operating with parts salvaged from aircraft no longer in the
inventory. What the aircraft maintainers accomplish on a daily basis to
keep these jets flying is nothing short of miraculous. The supply of
these parts, no longer made by industry, will be exhausted and leave
the engines unsustainable by 2030. The Air Force is now funding
efforts, $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2020-24, to integrate and deploy
replacement B-52 engines, saving fuel and extending the aircraft's
range while improving reliability and sustainment.
Other initiatives include the Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade, which
increases B-52 smart weapons capacity by 67 percent and adds JASSM and
JASSM-ER capability. Also, there are currently 52 B-52s converted to
the new CONECT configuration. This modification moves the B-52 into the
digital age for the first time, providing an on-board local area
network, allowing the aircrew to share a common battlespace picture.
This modification is installed on every aircraft going through regular
program depot maintenance cycle. The B-52 CONECT targeting upgrades and
inclusion of Digital Aided Close Air Support brings a robust capability
to long-range firepower available today to combatant commanders.
Communications remain the cornerstone of our long-range strike
capability. The ability to launch bombers and re-task and retarget them
while en route to the battlespace is a powerful force multiplier.
Additionally, the addition of Link-16, a critical communications node,
will enhance the operational picture integrating the aircraft with the
warfighter.
Air-Launched Cruise Missile
The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground,
winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. Fielded in the
1980s, the ALCM is over 30 years old, well beyond its 10-year life
expectancy, and is undergoing multiple Service Life Extension Programs
(SLEP). While the ALCM remains effective today, it is rapidly becoming
technologically obsolete. As our ALCMs are aging-out, our adversaries
are developing new cruise missiles and fielding more capable defense
systems. It is imperative that the ALCM is replaced due to its aging
subsystems, the shrinking stockpile of operational missiles, and
advances in enemy defense. The Air Force will invest $360 million in
fiscal year 2020-24 to continue existing SLEPs and testing efforts that
include critical telemetry, encryption, and flight termination
components until the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile reaches
operational capability in 2030.
B61
The B61 family of gravity nuclear weapons supports the airborne leg
of the triad and is the primary weapon supporting our NATO allies under
extended deterrence. The B61 is currently undergoing a LEP that results
in a smaller stockpile, reduced special nuclear material in the
inventory, modernized safety and security features, and reduced
lifecycle costs by consolidating four weapon versions into one version,
the B61-12. The B61-12 includes the addition of a digital weapons
interface and a guided tail kit assembly. AFGSC is the lead command for
the $157 million in fiscal year 2020-24 B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly
program, a DOD-developed system providing reduced maintenance, reduced
cost, and increased sustainability. The B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly
program is in Production and Deployment Phase and is synchronized with
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) efforts. The Tail Kit
Assembly design and production processes are on schedule and within
budget to meet the planned fiscal year 2020 first production unit date,
and support the lead time required for the inclusion of the Department
of Energy (DoE) warhead service-life extension completion date of March
2020. This joint DOD and DoE endeavor allows for continued attainment
of our strategic requirements and regional commitments.
modernization
B-21 Raider
The B-21 Raider will fulfill two critical roles: provide a day-to-
day conventional and nuclear bomber that will eventually replace the
conventional B-1 and dual-capable B-2. This is highlighted because the
cost of nuclear modernization often includes this program in the
narrative. Technology gaps between the United States and potential
adversaries are closing. The B-21 Raider will support the nuclear triad
by providing an advanced and flexible deterrent capability and the
ability to penetrate modern and future air defenses. Further, the B-21
will provide flexibility across a wide range of joint military
operations using long-range capabilities, large and mixed payloads, and
survivability. From the outset, the B-21 has been designed to have an
open architecture, which enables it to more rapidly and affordably
integrate new technology and respond to future threats. The program is
a national security imperative that will extend American air dominance
and lethality against next generation capabilities and advanced air
defense environments.
The B-21 is fully funded for $3 billion in the fiscal year 2020
budget submission, and initial capability is projected for the mid-
2020s. Extensive campaign and mission level analysis will determine the
minimum number of B-21s required to meet combatant commander needs in
the face of closing technology gaps and increasing threat capabilities.
Current bomber bases are best suited for B-21 operations,
maintenance, security, and training requirements. The Air Force is
conducting the strategic basing process, which includes analysis to
determine construction and facility renovations necessary to support
the new mission. Additionally, base operating support and off-base
community support are well-established at current bomber bases.
Throughout this process, the primary focus is to provide safe, secure,
and lethal bomber operations in a cost-efficient manner.
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
To ensure continued lethality and affordability of the most
responsive leg of the triad, GBSD has successfully moved forward
through the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) contract
awarded on 21 August 2017. Following this competitive and cost-reducing
TMRR phase, the source selection process will identify a single
provider with material development efforts anticipated to begin in the
2020 timeframe. As continued program analysis has revealed, GBSD
represents the most-effective strategy to mitigate capability
shortfalls while restoring warfighting effectiveness and replacing
critically-aged infrastructure. GBSD is fully funded at $10.8 billion
in fiscal year 2020-24. A focus on developing a competitive edge is
evident in the leveraging of Model Based System Engineering (MBSE)
during TMRR where there is an estimated potential to save several
billion dollars of acquisition and lifecycle costs. This is possible
due to MBSE's ability to decrease design cycle timelines and ensure
design modifications and their subsequent impacts are fully realized
without the need for traditional prototypes or extensive paperwork
reviews.
Furthermore, the modular design focus, a key acquisition tenet, is
expected to reduce the need for specialized or comprehensive system
overhauls throughout the 50-year operational lifecycle. The value
proposition of this program is unprecedented--the Air Force will save
money on maintenance, operations, and in personnel; physical access and
modularity of the designs makes GBSD simpler and more affordable to
sustain than any of its predecessors. The security requirements will
change dramatically: there will be fewer convoys on the roads, fewer
open launcher configurations, fewer defenders needed to guard the site
during maintenance, and it brings new capability to the most responsive
leg of the triad affordably.
Additionally, there is collaboration with NNSA and the W78 warhead
replacement program, the W87-1. As of this calendar year, that program
is in development. The replacement warhead will use the MK21 aeroshell
and will deploy on GBSD after fiscal year 2030.
Long Range Stand-Off Missile
The LRSO will be a reliable, long-range, and survivable weapon
system and is an essential element of the nuclear triad. It will be
flexible and compatible with B-52 and B-21 platforms. The Air Force
dedicated $2.4 billion in fiscal year 2020-24 for the LRSO to replace
the aging ALCM we have relied upon for 36 years. The ALCM will not be a
viable option for employment beyond 2030. The vast majority of targets
covered by the bomber leg of the triad require the employment of stand-
off weapons. Without LRSO on B-21s and B-52s, our ability to hold
adversaries at risk is reduced, the risk to our aircraft and aircrew is
increased, and the execution of the wartime mission is degraded. Stand-
off weapons reduce over-flight concerns and provide the most visible
and responsive extended deterrent to our allies and partners,
supporting the well-established United States counter-proliferation
policy. Furthermore, the bombers that will deliver the LRSO are the
Nation's only recallable asset, giving U.S. leaders the maximum amount
of flexibility at the most critical moments.
The LRSO missile will ensure the bomber force continues to hold
high-value targets at risk in an evolving threat environment, including
targets deep within an advanced integrated air defense system.
Additionally, the current acquisition strategy ensures close
synchronization with NNSA to fully integrate the W80-4 nuclear warhead
with LRSO. This weapon will retain nuclear penetrating cruise missile
capabilities through 2060. To meet operational, testing, and logistics
requirements, the Air Force plans to acquire approximately 1,000 LRSO
cruise missile bodies. This quantity will provide spares and supply
sufficient non-nuclear missile bodies throughout ongoing flight and
ground testing. The number of nuclear-armed LRSO cruise missiles (i.e.,
mated to a nuclear warhead) is planned to be equivalent to the current
ALCM nuclear force.
UH-1N Replacement
In order to continue supporting critical national missions and
fully comply with DOD and USSTRATCOM requirements, the Air Force has
committed $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2020-24 toward replacing the UH-
1N fleet, as the legacy platform falls short of missile field
operational needs, notably speed, range, endurance, payload, and
survivability. In September 2018, the Air Force selected Boeing's MH-
139 as the replacement solution for the aging UH-1N fleet through a
full and open competition, significantly advancing the capabilities
over the legacy aircraft and saving the Air Force $1.7 billion based on
the service cost estimate. The timely fielding of this platform will
enable the Air Force to meet nuclear security requirements and fully
support Presidential Continuity of Government missions in the national
capital region. The first aircraft is already on the production line
and is scheduled for delivery in November 2019. Initial Operating
Capability at the first Global Strike base is anticipated in fiscal
year 2022.
conclusion
I look forward to updating the committee on our progress and
building trust through our common goal: to protect the United States
with a safe, secure, reliable, effective, and affordable long-range
precision strike force. We remain focused on climate and culture to get
us there, particularly in the areas of excellence, teams, and people.
The Air Force requires authentic leaders who excel at two things:
connecting with Airmen and connecting Airmen to the Air Force family.
Leaders at every level must cultivate a culture and climate of respect,
encourage personal and professional growth, and advocate for Airmen to
ask for help if they need it. Our work demands excellence, not
perfection, and Airmen at every level are valued team members working
together to accomplish the mission. Authentic leaders encourage
innovation, bold ideas, and better ways of going about our business.
Revitalizing our squadrons and allowing commanders the space to lead
boldly, to develop inclusive, diverse, and well-rounded teams of
integrators will produce measurable results and create a better climate
for the Airmen who will take our place. It will take teamwork to win
tomorrow's fight and we are stronger together. We are on a good path
moving forward, but there is a lot of work to be done.
AFGSC is committed to affordable modernization and sustainment of
our nuclear triad and conventional forces. During this period of
transition, it is imperative that we continue to seek out innovative
solutions to bring the cost of modernization down. Our Air Force
remains the most powerful in the world thanks to the help from Congress
and the vision and courage of those who have gone before us, but we
cannot be static in a world where the dynamics of power are shifting. I
am encouraged by our progress and appreciate the opportunity to update
this committee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN,
DIRECTOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of
Defense's budget request for nuclear forces. I am honored to be
here today. I would like to thank this Subcommittee for its
continued support of the Navy's deterrence mission, and I
respectfully request my written statement be submitted for the
record.
Nuclear deterrence is the number one priority mission of
the Department of Defense. The nation's nuclear triad of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and
ballistic missile submarines is the bedrock of our ability to
deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, achieve U.S.
objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an
uncertain future. Most critically, the Navy continues to focus
not only on the modernization of the nuclear deterrent, but
also its role as trusted steward of the safety and security of
these weapons.
The Navy Strategic Systems Program--or SSP--fiscal year
2020 budget that I manage supports the continued sustainment of
the deterrent as well as the modernization efforts directed in
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Additionally, although not
part of the strategic nuclear portfolio, the SSP budget request
supports the hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike progam--an
effort leveraging SSP's unique and critical non-nuclear skill
set that the workforce has refined for 60 years.
The men and women of SSP and their predecessors have
provided unwavering and single mission focused support to the
sea-based leg of the triad for over six decades. SSP is now
facing a bow wave of critical development activities. The
organization must be prepared not only to sustain today's
deterrent, but to modernize it so that it remains a credible
and effective strategic weapon system into the future.
Today, SSP continues to extend the life of the Trident II
(D5) strategic weapon system to match the Ohio-class submarine
service life and to serve as the initial weapon system on the
Columbia-class submarine. This is being accomplished through an
update to all subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control,
guidance, missile, and reentry as well as our flight test
support infrastructure. All of our life extension efforts
remain on track. Additionally, we will continue to recapitalize
our Strategic Weapons Facilities to continue to support and
sustain SSBN operations.
These collective efforts will ensure an effective and
credible sea-based strategic deterrent on both the Ohio-class
and Columbia-class until the 2040s. In accordance with the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review, SSP will ``begin studies in 2020 to
define a cost-effective, credible, and effective submarine-
launched ballistic missile that we can deploy throughout the
service life of the Columbia SSBN.''
In addition to our modernization efforts, our budget
request supports the direction of the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review. Specifically, our budget request continues to fund the
modification of a small number of warheads to provide a low-
yield option. This near-term capability is being accomplished
through our strong partnership with the Department of Energy.
This effort will not increase the overall number of deployed
ballistic warheads. It will, in fact, bolster our deterrence
posture.
As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to
represent the men and women of SSP, comprising approximately
1,700 sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast guardsmen, 1,200
civilians, and over 2,000 contractor personnel. It is my most
critical goal to ensure that they are poised to execute the
mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor,
both today and tomorrow, as they have since our program's
inception in 1955. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on behalf of the men and women who make nuclear
deterrence their life's work. I look forward to your questions.
Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
introduction
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss
the sea-based leg of the triad. It is an honor to testify before you
this morning representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
The Nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped
with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) is essential to our
ability to deter major warfare with adversaries and assure our allies.
Each leg provides unique attributes and, together, provides critical
diversity and flexibility. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
reaffirmed that foreign nuclear threats are growing and Great Power
competition has returned and, thus, reinforced the need to recapitalize
each component of the triad. The nuclear triad is the bedrock of our
ability to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, achieve
U.S. objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an uncertain
future; it is the Department of Defense's number one priority mission.
The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the triad with our
Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II (D5) strategic weapon system (SWS)
they carry. SSBNs are responsible for a significant majority of the
Nation's operationally deployed nuclear warheads. The Chief of Naval
Operations has made clear the priority the Navy places on the
sustainment and modernization of the undersea leg of the triad,
directing the Navy to ``be ready to deploy USS Columbia (SSBN 826) as
quickly as possible--beating the current schedule--in order to preserve
our ability to defeat the threat.'' Delay is not an option.
SSP's fundamental mission is to design, develop, produce, sustain,
and ensure the safety and security of the Trident II (D5) SWS,
comprising the SLBM, reentry systems, and shipboard systems. We strive
to maintain a culture of excellence, underpinned by self-assessment, to
achieve the highest standards of performance and integrity for
personnel supporting the strategic deterrent mission. We focus
unremittingly on our tremendous responsibility for the custody and
accountability of our Nation's nuclear assets. The men and women of SSP
and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of
our sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines, sailors, and
coast guardsmen who stand watch, safeguarding the weapons with which we
are entrusted by this Nation.
Our fiscal year 2020 budget request provides the required funding
to support the program of record for the Trident II (D5) SWS. To
sustain this capability and usher in a new era of development efforts,
I am focusing on my top priorities: nuclear weapons safety and
security; the Trident II (D5) Life Extension Program; NPR-directed
activities; the Columbia-class Program; the Industrial Base,
infrastructure, and capabilities; support to the United Kingdom's
continuous at-sea deterrent; and the workforce that enables this
mission every day.
The men and women of SSP and their predecessors have provided
unwavering and single mission-focused support to develop, sustain, and
secure the sea-based leg of the triad for over six decades. SSP now
faces a bow wave of critical modernization activities, and our
workforce is evolving from years of sustainment efforts to large-scale
development, as most recently evidenced by the 2018 NPR implementation
and our expanding mission into conventional hypersonic capabilities.
The organization must be prepared not only to sustain today's
deterrent, but to modernize it so that it remains a credible, effective
SWS that can support our ballistic missile submarines and our strategic
deterrent mission through the life of the Columbia-class SSBN.
As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to serve as the
program manager, technical authority, safety and security lead,
regulatory lead, and Polaris Sales Agreement Project Officer for the
Navy's nuclear weapons program. Most importantly, I am honored to
represent the men and women of SSP, comprising approximately 1,700
sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast guardsmen, 1,200 civilians, and over
2,000 contractor personnel. It is my most critical goal to ensure they
are poised to execute the mission with the same level of success,
passion, and rigor both today and tomorrow as they have since our
program's inception in 1955.
safety and security
The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and
security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Navy leadership
delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and technical
authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons. At its most basic level, this
priority is the physical security of one of our nation's most valuable
assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters at Arms provide an effective and
integrated elite security force at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities
and Waterfront Restricted Areas in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor,
Washington. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units have been
commissioned at both facilities to protect our submarines. Together,
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our
security program, while headquarters staff ensures that nuclear
weapons-capable activities comply with safety and security standards.
The Navy maintains a culture of self-assessment in order to ensure
safety and security. This is accomplished through biennial assessments,
periodic technical evaluations, formal inspections, and continuous on-
site monitoring and reporting at the Strategic Weapons Facilities. We
strive to maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the highest
standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting the
strategic deterrent mission and continue to focus on the custody and
accountability of the assets entrusted to the Navy. SSP's number one
priority is to maintain a safe and secure strategic deterrent for the
Navy.
d5 life extension program
The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on the Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarines for nearly three decades and is planned to
be deployed more than 50 years. This is well beyond its original design
life of 25 years and more than double the historical service life of
any previous sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, SSP is
extending the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class
submarine service life and to serve as the initial SWS for the
Columbia-class SSBN. Our life extension efforts will ensure an
effective and credible SWS on both the Ohio-class and Columbia-class
SSBNs until the 2040s. This is being accomplished through an update to
all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire
control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Our initial life extension of
missile and guidance flight hardware components is designed to meet the
same form, fit, and function of the original system, maintain the
deployed system as one homogeneous population, control costs, and
sustain the demonstrated performance of the system.
The Navy's D5 life extension program is executing on schedule to
continue to meet deterrence requirements. In fiscal year 2018, the Navy
deployed 24 life-extended D5 missiles (D5LE) to the fleet and remains
on track to complete deployment by fiscal year 2024. In June 2018, we
successfully conducted the first D5LE flight test of four missiles to
support the Commander Evaluation Test (CET) program. The CET program
obtains and monitors reliability, accuracy, and performance data of the
D5LE missile population in an operational environment, and is one
method used to monitor the long-term effectiveness of this nuclear
deterrent weapon system.
Another major initiative to ensure the continued sustainment of our
SWS is the SSP Shipboard Systems Integration (SSI) Program, which
manages obsolescence and modernizes SWS shipboard systems through the
use of open architecture design and commercial off-the-shelf hardware
and software. The SSI Program refreshes shipboard electronics hardware
and upgrades software, which will extend service life, enable more
efficient and affordable future maintenance of the SWS, and ensure we
continue to provide the highest level of nuclear weapons safety and
security for our deployed SSBNs while meeting U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) requirements. Our organization performed over 90 fleet and
shore-based incremental installations over the last three years.
Sixteen installations were completed in 2018, and two began this year
with an additional five planned for completion. Three shipboard
modernization increments are currently in development for future
installation.
The Navy also works in partnership with the Department of Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish our
reentry systems. The Trident II (D5) is capable of carrying two types
of warheads, the W76 and the W88, which are both undergoing
refurbishment. Deliveries of life-extended W76 warheads, known as the
W76-1, to the Navy are nearly 100 percent complete and are on track to
finish by the end of fiscal year 2019. The W76-1 program has been a
tremendous effort that informs much of our understanding of
refurbishment programs, and I laud our NNSA partners for their support
of the Navy's deterrent. The W88 major alteration program also remains
on track to support a first production unit in fiscal year 2020 with
production scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2024. These
combined efforts to refurbish the Navy's reentry systems ensure that
the Navy can meet USSTRATCOM requirements for decades to come.
nuclear posture review activities
The Navy is also beginning an approach to maintain a credible and
effective SWS beyond 2040. For example, we are leveraging the work
being done today to extend the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS as well
as investigating opportunities to innovate, such as through the
application of model-based engineering. As directed in the Nuclear
Posture Review, the Navy will begin ``studies in 2020 to define a cost-
effective, credible, and effective SLBM that we can deploy throughout
the service life of the Columbia SSBN.'' These threat-informed studies
will underpin decisions made to sustain the Trident II (D5) SLBM and to
maintain an adaptable and flexible sea-based deterrent for the Nation.
SSP has a history of more than 60 years of developing, producing, and
supporting SWSs to support the undersea leg of the triad. We are
optimizing our SWS by applying lessons learned from six generations of
missiles and will continue to do so until the 2080s.
As we face increasingly agile, advanced, and persistent cyber
threats to our nuclear enterprise, SSP must be constantly vigilant of
our adversaries' means and methods of obtaining critical technology and
information about the Navy's SWS. In order to protect our technical
advantage from significant harm today and into the future, we are
laying the groundwork with our industry partners to revolutionize our
business practices. Securing program information within the industrial
base and adjusting procurement approaches will ensure long-term
stability of our design, development, and sustainment efforts. The
ability to drive concerted progress within the nuclear enterprise is
critical to the security and survivability of our current and future
SWS and the platform on which it is deployed to defend the Nation.
In accordance with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review's recommendation
to pursue supplemental capabilities, SSP is fielding of a small number
of low-yield SLBMs and is participating in a nuclear-armed sea-launched
cruise missile (SLCM) study. The near-term low-yield SLBM and long-term
SLCM efforts are intended to address deterrence gaps and assure allies.
Our budget request supports executing a low-yield SLBM option,
configured to leverage the W76-1 life-extension efforts. The low-yield
program, known as the W76-2, is on track to meet warfighter
requirements. The W76-2 modification will not increase the number of
deployed ballistic missile warheads and leverages the people,
processes, and schedule from the W76-1 program to ensure a cost-
effective and executable approach. The W76-2 weapon system will enhance
deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence
that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the
United States and its allies.
In the mid-term, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review directed the Navy
to investigate the feasibility of fielding the nuclear explosive
package from the Air Force's W78 warhead replacement into a Navy
reentry body. This ongoing effort will inform Nuclear Weapons Council
decisions regarding SLBM warhead modernization needs.
sws and the columbia-class program
The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Columbia-
class Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines. The
continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
missile submarines. Accordingly, the Navy is taking the necessary steps
to ensure the Columbia SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested
on time with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Columbia SSBN will enter service with the
life-extended Trident II (D5) SLBM, which is resident today on Ohio-
class submarines. Maintaining a common SWS during the transition
between existing and successor submarine platforms allows the Navy to
leverage a mature material and knowledge enterprise, thus reducing
programmatic costs and risks. Life-extended missiles will be shared
with both the Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines into the 2040s.
A critical component of the Columbia-class Program is the
development of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) with the United
Kingdom. Today, the United States Navy shares the Trident II (D5) SWS
with the UK aboard its Vanguard-class of ballistic missile submarines.
Similar to the United States Navy, the UK is recapitalizing its four
aging Vanguard-class SSBN submarines with the Dreadnought-class SSBN.
The CMC will support the life-extended Trident II (D5) SWS to be
deployed on the Columbia and the UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs. Our
partnership also supports production of these two new classes of SSBNs
in both United States and UK build yards. Collaborative efforts also
include construction of missile tubes to support building the U.S.
prototype Quad-pack module and the SWS Ashore integration test site at
Cape Canaveral, Florida.
To manage and mitigate technical risk associated with the delivery
of the first submarines to both the United States and UK programs, SSP
is leading the development of the SWS Ashore integration test site.
This is a joint effort between the Navy and the state of Florida,
investing in the redevelopment of a 1950s Polaris Missile site to
conduct integration testing and verification for Columbia and UK
Dreadnought programs. We reached a programmatic milestone in 2017 when
Test Bay One, which will be used to test the Missile Service Unit first
article, achieved Initial Operational Capability. Last year, we
successfully installed the first Columbia missile tube into Test Bay
Two and, in the beginning of 2020, we are scheduled to achieve the
Initial Operational Capability for verifying and validating the SWS
support systems for the Columbia and UK Dreadnought programs.
To mitigate the risk in the restart of launcher system production,
SSP developed a surface launch test facility at the Naval Air Warfare
Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California. This facility will
prove that the launcher industrial base can replicate the performance
of the Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launcher system. Thirteen evaluation
and four qualification tests were conducted in 2018, and one
qualification test was conducted in January 2019. Eleven remaining
tests are planned for 2019. To date, Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launch
performance has been demonstrated.
The Ohio-class SSBNs begin decommissioning in the late 2020s and
the Columbia-class must be ready to start patrols in fiscal year 2031
to maintain a minimum operational force of 10 SSBNs. The Navy has
already extended the Ohio-class service life from 30 years to 42 years,
and there is no engineering margin left for further life extension.
Recapitalizing our SSBNs is a significant investment that only happens
every other generation, making it critically important that we do it
right. Any delay has the potential to impact not only our ability to
meet operational requirements, but also the United Kingdom's strategic
deterrent requirements.
industrial base, infrastructure, and capabilities
Ensuring robust defense and aerospace industrial base
capabilities--such as shipyard support, radiation-hardened electronics,
and solid rocket motors--remains an important priority. SSP places
particular emphasis on the solid rocket motor industry and its sub-tier
suppliers. Although the Navy maintains a continuous production
capability of solid rocket motors, the demand from both National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force has
precipitously declined. This decline results in higher costs for the
Navy and puts an entire specialized industry at risk. Future Air Force
modernization will provide some much needed relief beginning in the
mid-2020s; however, our Nation cannot afford to lose this capability.
While the efforts of our industry partners and others create short-term
cost relief, the long-term support of the solid rocket motor industry,
including its sub-tier supplier base, and maintenance of critical
skills remains an issue that must be addressed. For example, we are
concerned with ensured access to and affordability of certain critical
solid rocket motor constituents, such as ammonium perchlorate. We will
continue to work with our industry partners, the Department of Defense,
senior NASA leadership, Air Force, and Congress to do everything we can
to ensure this vital national security industry asset is preserved.
As the Navy executes the total overhaul and replacement of the SSBN
and SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, which will be in service until 2084,
NNSA's infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the
evolving needs of the Nation. Of most importance, an effective,
resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability and
capacity can address age-related risks, support planned refurbishments,
as well as prepare for future uncertainty. Additionally, tritium,
lithium, and uranium, among other strategic materials, are vital to
ensuring the Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent
requirements.
support to the united kingdom
The United States and UK have maintained a longstanding shared
commitment to nuclear deterrence, one that dates to the signing of the
Mutual Defense Agreement in 1958 and with the Polaris Sales Agreement
(PSA) in 1963. This year, the UK celebrates 50 years of its continuous-
at-sea-deterrent--a momentous achievement that the U.S. has proudly
supported. Today, the Navy's support encompasses not only the CMC and
SSBN programs but also 100 percent of the shipboard systems, missile,
and reentry portions--the Strategic Weapon System--of the UK's nuclear
deterrent. As the Director of SSP, I serve as the delegated United
States Project Officer of the PSA and am solely responsible for
fulfilling lifecycle support to the UK's program. As SSP shapes the
future SWS, we must continue to consider the UK's connection to our
decisions and our responsibility to our most important ally. SSP
remains steadfastly committed to the UK's continuous-at-sea deterrent
and to the mutually beneficial relationship we have both maintained and
celebrated for 60 years.
conclusion
History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and
execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950s was truly
a result of a cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and
inspirational leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts,
our dedicated predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners
alike--responded to the national need with gusto and drove this program
with a vision. Today's SSP and its industry partners will continue this
vision by attracting, nurturing, and retaining the next generation
workforce that will enable a capable, credible strategic deterrent for
our Nation for the next 60 years.
SSP ensures a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent and
focuses on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets
entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based
strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security
requirement. Our Nation's sea-based deterrent has been a critical
component of our national security since the 1950s and must continue to
assure our allies and partners and deter potential adversaries well
into the future. I am privileged to represent this unique organization
as we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. I thank the
committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg
of the triad and the vital role it plays in our national security.
Senator Fischer. With that, I will begin our first round of
questioning.
Secretary Lord, after the last two administrations, we've
consistently heard testimony that nuclear modernization
programs such as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
have no margin for error. Can you talk about how fragile the
situation is and the impact that funding cuts or additional
delays would have on our ability to meet deterrence
requirements?
Secretary Lord. Absolutely. Thank you, Chairman.
We are living now with Cold War technology, and we have put
off modernizing the triad for multiple decades. So, now we have
no margin. We need to move forward. So, any cut in funding
would essentially have us unilaterally stand down, in terms of
our capability to have a credible nuclear deterrent.
Senator Fischer. When you say we have no room for any delay
in meeting these modernization requirements, could you speak to
us, in this setting, on the importance of our keeping up with
that in regard to what our adversaries, specifically Russia and
China, are doing, and why that is so important for us to know,
why it's important for the people of this country to know?
Secretary Lord. Absolutely. Russia, in particular, has
developed many capabilities, whether they be unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs) or different types of warheads, over
recent years. Our systems will be timing out, in terms of their
capability, between 2020 and 2040. We must modernize what we
have so that we can replace our systems, one for one. GBSD, for
instance, there is no margin to do another Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) on Minuteman III, because not only
would it be more expensive than developing GBSD, but you would
not have the resiliency in the capability, because you would
not have the modern equipment, you would not have the actual
capabilities from a functional-range point of view, warhead
capability. So, we need to, by 2028, start replacing.
Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
General Ray, if you have anything to add to that. Some have
argued that reducing the number of deployed Minuteman
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to 300 or 200
missiles would be a way to extend the life of the current
system and allow the delay for its replacement. Can you talk
about why this isn't accurate?
General Ray. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. Three
dimensions to that:
The first, of course, 400 to 450 weapons deployed is a very
high threshold for our enemies to derail us. It would consume
up to two-thirds of an enemy arsenal to disarm us.
The second piece of that is the near-term challenge, as
Secretary Lord talked about, is the timing. Last night, we had
the successful launch of a Minuteman III. That testing program
will consume the boosters and the propulsion system rocket
engines much faster if we continue on this pace. We don't have
a program to replace that.
But, when I consider the affordability formula, it features
some things, such as modularity. It features a competitive
environment with a good tech baseline that we own. It features
a good tech base of engineers and individuals.
When I think about foregoing the GBSD, we forego a value
proposition that gives us the modularity that lets Admiral
Wolfe and I work together on improvements in a more affordable
fashion. It also helps us in the competitive environment, since
we would own the tech baseline for GBSD. But, moreover, we
forego a value proposition of reducing our convoys by upwards
of two-thirds and the number of times that we would penetrate
the sites by two-thirds. So, when we think about what the
digital engineering is helping us learn, and help drive the
sustainment dollars down by billions, what we give up is
probably even more than just the pricetag of a new program.
Senator Fischer. You know, you talk about affordability.
General Rand, your predecessor, he testified that the GBSD
would save around a billion dollars compared to performing
another life extension program. General Hyten, in his annual
posture statement, said that the further life extension of
Minuteman III ICBM is not cost-effective, nor will it provide a
weapon system capable of adapting to advancing technology.
Can you talk a little bit more about the savings that are
associated with the GBSD in greater detail, and some of the
other benefits that it's going to provide?
General Ray. Ma'am, I think the big help to us right now--
and we've talked with your staff--is the digital engineering
that is operating at an unprecedented level of this acquisition
program. Secretary Roper has already declared this is the best
acquisition program he has. The risk that we're reducing by the
numerous design cycles--a typical design effort would take one,
maybe two, manual efforts. We're on our ninth design cycle on
this side of the milestone. So, the insights about how to
manage requirements, the ability to create a competitive
environment of areas that will give us a good return on
investment for areas that we value, and then the insights on
how to sustain, are tremendous to us, in terms of the ability
to work with the Navy on new components and the ability to do
things smartly in the design, right up front, that the two
primes are telling us that it's a much more competitive
environment and much more affordable approach.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Under Secretary Lord, as you know, we are
modernizing three weapons platforms, a new cruise missile, and
multiple warhead systems, all concurrently. What contingency
plans do you have if any one of these programs slips?
Secretary Lord. We are the point where, for decades, we
have put off modernizing these programs. Right now, we have no
choice but to move forward, and move forward in lockstep with
NNSA. So, we are focused on GBSD, particularly, and looking at
plutonium pit production, making sure we have 30 by 2026, that
we have 80 per year by 2030. So, we do not have any margin, at
this point, because, for decades, we have delayed.
Senator Heinrich. I don't disagree, and certainly, I'm
fully committed to working with you to ensure that Los Alamos
can get to 30 by 2026, safely and expeditiously. However, from
a broader good-government perspective, I'm going to remain
determined to hold both yourself and others accountable for the
decision to split plutonium production and to build, really, an
entirely new plutonium pit production complex. The independent
IDA study found that none of the plutonium pit options were
demonstrably better than any of the others. So, I have to ask,
how did the Nuclear Weapons Council select an option that is
literally twice the cost of other options and will force
appropriators to find an additional 14 billion-plus dollars?
Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council looked at the
data we had. Since we do not yet have a conceptual design, we
do not have firm cost data. If we get funding for the
conceptual design in the 2020 budget, we will have it by the
end of 2020. We will then be able to understand the cost
implications. The IDA study that was done said there was no
significant difference in the cost between the two
alternatives. The multiple alternatives.
Senator Heinrich. So, the need for redundancy has never
been in the nuclear complex, or at least articulated, and was
nowhere in the Nuclear Posture Review, was nowhere in the
analysis of alternatives, or even the engineering analysis
conducted by the Pentagon and the NNSA. So, when did the
Nuclear Weapons Council decide that redundancy was a factor,
even ``the'' factor, for splitting pit production?
Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council focused on the
Nuclear Posture Review, which states, ``An effective,
responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is
essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting
requirements.'' So, what we looked at was a resilient
capability. It wasn't particularly redundant. What we found the
best option to be was to, first, produce the 30 pits----
Senator Heinrich. What does that mean, ``resilient''? How
do you define that?
Secretary Lord. It means we have the ability to have
multiple options to meet our requirements. So, we will start at
Los Alamos with the trained workforce we have there. We have to
add about 1,000 jobs a year at Los Alamos, given everything we
have in front of us. We then will look at South Carolina, where
we have a facility that can be upgraded, and a large workforce
in a community that's very, very interested in moving forward.
So, what we are doing is, we are standing up, first, Los
Alamos, then we will move to Savannah River, and move on from
there with two different options to mitigate any type of
catastrophes we might have in one or the other, and also be
able to tap into the workforces of each of the communities.
Senator Heinrich. How do you square your certification that
this split production option is on track to get us where we
need to be, when the independent study comes to such a starkly
different conclusion?
Secretary Lord. The independent study said that there was
no path without risk involved, and that there was no
significant differences in all the risks. So, we're waiting for
the full study to be done at the end of June, and then, every
day we don't move forward with the conceptual design and on to
the follow-on details, we will slip. So, we think this is the
best path forward right now, but we need to get down to work,
and continue with it.
Senator Heinrich. General Ray, your bomber roadmap states
that we'll field 175 bombers, about 100 B-21s, and 75 B-52s,
when all is said done, out in the 2030s. This has concerned
some people, but it seems to me, as long as we're producing B-
21s, we have the flexibility, 5 or 20 years from now, to change
that number, up or down. Do you believe this number is set in
stone, or is it more flexible than that?
General Ray. It is more flexible. The bomber roadmap that
we have right now is the product of a programmatically-driven
solution. The analysis that we're looking at for inside of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and inside the Air
Force has revealed it will be at the forefront of anything that
happens. The Air Force we need has shown a growth in bomber
squadrons. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA) study and the MITRE study show a growth in that, and so,
my role here now in Global Strike Command is to set the
foundation for smart and good growth.
The decision point to look closely at the B-21 production
rate is in about the 2024 timeframe. So, we've got a very good
program, very good program managers there, and we all agree
that, once we get to that point, we have some options. But, in
the meantime, there are some sustainment options we're going to
look at to make the bomber roadmap that we have more
affordable. I'm convinced we're underinvested in the
countermaritime dimension of long-range strike. We're
underinvested in hypersonics and, potentially, counterspace.
So, my job is to set the foundation for the Chief and the
Secretary to have some more innovative options, here, in the
next 2 or 3 years, to expand beyond the minimum of 100 B-21s
and 75 B-52s.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Ray, first of all, I really appreciate that the
Secretary of the Air Force's strategic decision to choose the
Ellsworth Air Force Base as the first B-21 base is moving
forward. Since the Air Force has requested funding in fiscal
year 2020 for two weapons-generation facilities--and these
would be at Warren and Malmstrom, if I'm correct--when would we
expect to see funding requested for these weapons-generation
facilities at all of the bomb wings, including Ellsworth Air
Force Base, to support the B-21? Assuming fiscal year 2021
beginning or otherwise?
General Ray. Sir, the process we're following now, of
course, with the main operating base (MOB) declaration and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process that we
started that you and I talked about is one piece of it. The
Secretary insisted that we rethink, and we reported back to
Congress recently that we needed to reevaluate our WGF game
plan. We are proud to say that there is a good plan for the
ICBM WGFs, and that remains on track. The Secretary has given
us a homework assignment. We've gone back and looked at that
very closely, broadened our team to collaborate on some more
insightful and appropriate approaches to this. She's not
blessed our roadmap just yet, and so, I'd like to be able to
come back to you and to the committee with a more informed
long-term game plan that would--just like Senator Heinrich's
question, that would accompany the right bomber roadmap and
give you better insights.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Ray. In August 2019, AFGSC briefed the Acting
Secretary of the Air Force and received approval on the way
ahead for bomber WGFs, subject to budgetary decisions within
the Air Force, Department of Defense, and the Office of
Management and Budget. The Air Force remains on track to submit
the Barksdale WGF as part of the fiscal year 2022 budget
submission. B-21 WGF construction will be timed to coincide
with projected B-21 acquisition and fielding timelines;
location and funding decisions are not yet final.
Senator Rounds. Timeframe for that report?
General Ray. Sir, I think the decision from the Secretary
should be in the next couple of months, and then our ability to
refine that, I'd like to come back to you by the end of the
fiscal year, if that's possible.
Senator Rounds. So, it would still be available to maintain
on-track planned developments for fiscal year 2021
appropriations.
General Ray. Sir, if I could come back to you with that
assessment, I can give you a better sense of when that would
be.
Senator Rounds. My point being, at this point, there is not
an anticipated delay in the construction processes, because all
of these new facilities need to be in place before the B-21 can
actually be facilitated, correct?
General Ray. Sir, not every facility has to be there, and
that's part of the Site Activation Task Force (SATAF) planning
that's beginning now, and part of the NEPA process. But, the
sequencing of these things has been perturbated with the
supplemental request for the emergency relief in our military
construction (MILCON) game plan. So, we need to come back and
then lay out the roadmap for the timing of how we're going to
do all these steps. I think we should include all the bomber
bases to give us clarity. The closest challenge that we have
right now is for the Barksdale facility, based on the B-52 in
the current nuclear mission, and then to add on, where we can,
for the additional B-21s.
Senator Rounds. Okay.
For Secretary Lord and General Ray, both. Have you found
that the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
acquisition and operational management has improved since
Secretary Mattis designated U.S. Strategic Command as the
enterprise lead and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment as acquisition lead and primary
policymaker for OSD?
Secretary Lord. I would like to address that. Yes, I
believe it has. In fact, we just very recently completed an NC3
Enterprise Review with General Hyten, myself, General Selva,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), and we are
reviewing all the key programs, looking at fragility, making
sure we're addressing key items. Again, we need to modernize
and sustain at the same time. We're, again, dealing with Cold
War technology that needs to be upgraded. What is particularly
key, in my role in acquisition and sustainment (A&S), is that I
have your support for the 14 billets in the 2020 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that I need in order to help
staff and move this forward.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Ray?
General Ray. Sir, it's emphatically helped us as a team,
greater coordination at all levels and echelons of influence
and stewardship. The additional pieces, we're adding some more
operationally relevant approaches to how we're doing business
so that you can manage the risk. I have great coordination with
OSD, the Joint Staff, and certainly with General Hyten. I
believe that's going to be very helpful. I've asked for an
independent review to come in and relook at the NC3 center that
is in my command. When it stood up, it was stood up without the
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) role and the oversight from
OSD. I believe, with some minor modifications, we can be even
more effective.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
I'd just--very quickly--and I'm not even sure who to
address this to, so I'll offer it and then ask whoever feels
comfortable with a response. Would it be fair to say that both
our near-peer competitors, China and Russia, have both
significant advantages today, in terms of the upgrades to their
NC3 development and upgrades that basically push us to make
certain that we are getting ours done just to be in a
competitive and at least in a near-peer position over the next
couple of years?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Senator Rounds, if I could, just
generally, I would say, without getting into specific
capabilities of Russia or China, I would note that both of
those countries have very aggressive modernization programs
underway, and have had them underway for quite some time. One
of the basic premises contained within the National Defense
Strategy is that we are at risk of losing our competitive
advantages to potential adversaries; hence, the need--and I
would echo the comments of my colleagues here, also--with
respect to the importance of maintaining our NC3 architecture
and infrastructure.
From my perspective, sir, the nuclear command, control,
communications enterprise is the glue that holds our nuclear
deterrent together. Hence, it is critically important to ensure
the robustness and reliability of that, going forward.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Lord, in your testimony, you used the word
``credibility.'' Do you feel that, if we slip on our schedule--
for example, with Columbia or otherwise in all of the elements
that we're trying to modernize at one time, that that
diminishes credibility, which, in turn, diminishes deterrence?
Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
Senator King. That strikes me as one of the great dangers
here. As you do your planning and your charts, are there gaps?
Are there places where--for example, this is hypothetical, but
Columbia doesn't come on until a certain period? And Ohio,
we're starting to be retired. Are there gaps in our----
Secretary Lord. Absolutely. There's a one-for-one with Ohio
and Columbia, and that's why, for instance, Columbia is one of
the major defense acquisition programs that I milestoned
decision authority for, and I review that very, very closely.
In fact, on Friday morning, I have a quarterly review on it,
and I look very closely at what we have for capacity in our
shipyards to build it.
Senator King. Am I understanding there's been some issues
about the tubes?
Secretary Lord. We have a common missile chamber, actually,
with the UK [United Kingdom], and the first ones being
fabricated are for the Dreadnought, the United Kingdom sub.
They're up in Quonset Point, Rhode Island, right now. There
were some cracks on them. It's a technically challenging weld.
There were issues with the nondestructive tests that were being
done. We identified it. We've gotten to the root-cause analysis
and, I think, irreversible corrective action. We're working
very closely with a key contractor----
Senator King. Is that going to cause the schedule to slip?
Secretary Lord. We think it is contained. I will find out,
again, on Friday. But, right now, there shouldn't be. I'll
defer to Admiral Wolfe.
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am--yes, sir, if I could answer
that.
So, right now, based on, as Secretary Lord said, knowing
what we know about the welds, getting to the root cause, we
still have margin in the program. We have 11 months margin. If
you look at how the Navy has responded to this, both the Navy
and General Dynamics Electric Boat, we've staffed up, we've
realized several things. One is, it's the fragility of the
industrial base, which we've talked about already. So, making
sure that we are getting that industrial base not only where it
needs to be, but to get it to status quo and sustain it. That's
why we've stood up, in the Navy, a separate program executive
office just for Columbia, because this is the Navy's number-one
acquisition program. So, we're taking all the steps to make
sure we've got the proper oversight to keep this on track.
Secretary Lord. If I may, just one more point on that.
This is so very, very important to us that, frankly, after
the last Columbia review, I had the week before Christmas, I
had Phebe Novakovic, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of General
Dynamics (GD), come in on the Friday afternoon before Christmas
to sit down and talk about how the supply chain was being
managed and what we have for staffing. So, working very, very
tightly with Hondo Geurts, in the Navy, on that one.
Senator King. Well, deterrence is the heart of our
defensive posture, and credibility is the heart of deterrence.
So, that's obviously of great concern.
Mr. Trachtenberg, do we need to match every new Russian
nuclear-armed delivery vehicle?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Absolutely not, Senator King, and
it's certainly not our intent to match what Russia is doing,
weapon for weapon. Our basic concern is that we have seen,
through the development of Russian military doctrine, some of
the exercises they have conducted, and our concern is that the
Russians may believe that they have some kind of exploitable
advantage through the development of capabilities that they
have developed. Through our Nuclear Posture Review and the
programs that we have asked for support for to develop, we hope
that we can certainly convince the Russians not to miscalculate
and believe that anything they are doing would offer them an
advantage that could be exploitable or where they could
miscalculate, and competition could lead to conflict. But, no,
the short answer to your question is no.
Senator King. But, clearly, again, getting back to
deterrence, we need to be sure that they don't feel that they
have a weapon that can penetrate our defenses or will otherwise
go unresponded.
Let me ask one more question. This is sort of an odd
question, but you'll have to excuse it. I'm spending a lot of
my time these days in the cyber arena. One of the big issues in
cyber is attribution. Where is the attack coming from? Is there
a potential for attribution issues in this area, particularly
where you're talking about an underwater, unmanned vehicle,
knowing where it is going? We need to know who to respond to
and what the response will be. Am I just making something up,
here, or is this an issue?
Secretary Trachtenberg. No, sir. I would not say you're
making anything up, here, Senator. I think you're absolutely
right to focus on cyber as an element in the deterrence
equation. What we have seen, certainly over the past decade or
so, is the development of cyber as a domain where we need to
pay particular attention to what is happening and what our
adversaries are doing. Attribution is certainly one element
when it comes to our overall deterrent and the credibility of
that deterrent and how we might respond. Cyber is a piece of
that.
So, you're absolutely correct to flag that. That is one of
the additional technologies and capabilities that we need to
look at, and are looking at, as a Department.
Senator King. Well, a big part of our upgrade is command
and control. I'm out of time, but that's as important as
anything else we're talking about here, I think.
Secretary Trachtenberg. Absolutely.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Madam Chair.
This was not something I was going to ask about, but just
to, maybe, follow up on that line of thought. How important is
space to that, then? Because we're going to have a decision to
make, here, on Space Force and what happens next. Maybe whoever
wants to talk about that could add to that. But, Secretary, it
seemed like the appropriate time to ask.
Secretary Lord. Perhaps I'll make a comment and then pass
it down through.
When you talk about nuclear command and control, space is
an incredibly important portion of that to make sure we have
secure and resilient communications, and our space layer is
critical for that. The cybersecurity of that is another piece.
That's why we're working so hard to make sure that we have
hardened systems, and why so many of these systems need to be
upgraded, because they're just not capable of being hardened
today.
But, I'll hand over.
Secretary Trachtenberg. Yeah, just briefly, Senator Cramer.
I would agree with that completely. Space is critically
important. Almost everything that we do nowadays relies, to
some degree, on space and space systems. Key aspects of our NC3
architecture--for example, missile warning or command and
control--are space-based. So, we very much need to be focused
on the survivability, the resilience, and the capability of
those space-based elements for the deterrence mission, as well
as for others, as well.
Senator Cramer. General Ray?
General Ray. Senator, I think one of the other dimensions
is to go beyond just simply the importance when we think about
where we are. One of the new roles I have under Strategic
Command, is as the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC).
So, one of the jobs I do is to coordinate the air and space
dimension. With space leaving STRATCOM, I now have to be the
space coordinating authority. So, I will tell you, the
indications and warning dimension, to get to Senator King's
point about attribution, is foundational to everything we're
doing. But, what it's allowed us to do in this last exercise is
to actually map kinetic and nonkinetic threats from a space,
cyber, and physical domain against our nuclear command and
control and indications warnings. So, we have a better roadmap
now, at the very classified level, about what to contend with,
and it'll help us with the recipe of how to deal with those
coming.
Senator Cramer. That's probably as important in a submarine
as it is anyplace, huh?
Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I would tell you,
cybersecurity has to be at the forefront of everything that we
do, moving forward. Some people would say, ``Well, you're on a
submarine, you're kind of out, right? You don't need to worry
about that.'' We all need to worry about it. So, it doesn't
matter what you're doing, and everything that we're doing in
the Navy, whether it be NC3, whether it be what we're doing in
the Trident, cybersecurity is a part of everything that we're
putting in place, moving forward.
Senator Cramer. I'm going to resist the temptation to just
go on, on the whole Space Force idea, and get, maybe, General
Ray, from you, a broader elaboration on the importance of the
entire triad. Because, as we're having this discussion of
modernization, there are those in office who think that three
legs is at least one too many, if not two too many. Maybe if
you can just describe, strategically, why they're all relevant,
if you believe they are, that that would be helpful.
General Ray. Yes, sir. My perspective comes from being the
Deputy Commander in European Command, the head of a combatant
command on a daily basis in support of General Scaparotti. I've
learned to look at our triad in the context of a modernized
Chinese triad, a modernized triad-plus on the part of the
Russians, and clearly in the minds of our allies. Any change in
that has to make a collectively more safer plan. So, our triad
is foundational. It has to be where we go. As we've said, we
have to modernize it. Any change in that has to be done to
where we do change the rest of the dynamic, and do our allies
believe that the world is a safer place? I think there's no
solution right now I can imagine that would say to back off the
triad. You heard Secretary Mattis, one of the brightest
military minds, said, ``I questioned it, and I cannot solve the
deterrent reducing from the triad.''
Secretary Trachtenberg. If I could----
Senator Cramer. Please.
Secretary Trachtenberg. May I, Senator?
Senator Cramer. Please.
Secretary Trachtenberg. Just briefly, to pick up on what
General Ray said. I think, in terms of the triad, I tend to
look at the capabilities the triad brings for deterrence as
complementary rather than redundant, because I do believe each
of the legs brings unique characteristics that are useful in a
deterrence perspective. I think that is why every
administration has reiterated the importance of maintaining all
three legs of the triad. We can discuss the numbers for each,
but, in terms of the critical and unique capabilities each
brings, whether it is reliable command and control, resilience,
survivability of the sea-based leg, adaptability and
flexibility of the air-breathing leg, the bombers, the
geographic dispersion of ICBMs, each brings a unique component
to the overall deterrence equation, which complicates the--any
attack calculations that a potential adversary might have. I
think that is sort of the inherent value of the triad.
Senator Cramer. Oh, I appreciate it. That was a great
summary. I'm glad you took the time to say it, because I was
even intrigued by Senator Heinrich's question about resiliency
versus redundancy. I think I just heard how the two are the
same--the two parts of the same umbrella, if you will, and so,
I appreciate that. Thank you.
Yield back.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
The vote has been called, but we're going to continue with
the hearing. We're moving pretty well through questions. I
would urge Members to stay, or go vote and come back, because
we'll have time for more questions.
Secretary Trachtenberg--oh, Senator Manchin, if you're
ready, would you like to ask questions right now?
[Laughter.]
Senator Fischer. I'll let do your first round. That's
putting you on the spot. Walk in the door.
Senator Manchin. This will be to Secretary Lord. You and
the other witnesses' testimony highlights the multiple
modernization programs that we're undergoing right now. We have
the ground-based strategic deterrent, the long-range standoff
weapon, the B-61, and -12, and B-21. The list goes on and on.
So, I'm concerned about the testimony, such as Secretary
Trachtenberg's written testimony that highlights the rapid
growth of China's nuclear forces in the face of all the
corporate espionage we know they're conducting. So, my question
would be--and I'm sorry if it's already been asked about--but,
what steps are you taking to ensure that our nuclear
modernization efforts remains with us and aren't stolen by the
Chinese or Russians or from our subcontractors? The biggest
problem we've seen to be as it goes down the food chain,
procurement? It seems to be wide open for the taking.
Secretary Lord. Senator, this is really on point, because,
if there's any area that has received enhanced focus over the
last 18 months more than any other, it's cybersecurity. So, in
my responsibility for the defense industrial base, I've looked
at the problem and have seen that we have a fundamental issue,
that we have National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) cybersecurity standards that are very hard to interpret
if you're a contractor, in terms of how you actually
instantiate those. So, what we're doing right now is, by the
end of this year, we will have a national cybersecurity
standard, just like we have International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) standards for quality.
Senator Manchin. Well, who's maintaining the visibility on
those contracts to ensure that nuclear projects aren't being
exposed the same way the Navy's undersea programs were last
year?
Secretary Lord. We are, as I have responsibility for a
number of the larger programs, like GBSD and so forth, so it's
a milestone decision authority. So, as we go through the
reviews, we look at what our supply base is doing, how they are
secure, both in their software development, especially, but in
terms of physical security, as well. We work very closely with
intel, with DSS----
Senator Manchin. Do you believe the primes should be held
responsible----
Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
Senator Manchin.--and held accountable----
Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
Therein lies the problem. Typically, primes are pretty
good. Maybe the next level down. But, they lose sight, and what
we did, just about 3 months ago, was, we introduced new
cybersecurity clauses that are going in all the contracts,
moving forward. So, it is absolutely clear----
Senator Manchin. How does that change the whole business
model--I'm so sorry, because our time will be running--how does
it change the business model, when there's a sub, three rungs
down the chain, who doesn't want to, basically, give you
pertinent information or have someone else have access to that
information? I mean, I just couldn't believe what's going on
and how vulnerable we have been over the years. There's no
wonder why China has accelerated the way they did, the access
they've had to the system.
Secretary Lord. I don't disagree with you. It all starts
with standards that you can measure to, that have metrics, so
we know what right looks like, in terms of cybersecurity. Then
it turns into educating the workforce. So, we're standing up
courses at our Defense Acquisition University. So, it comes to
really making sure our acquisition workforce has the skillsets
they need, and that we communicate that to our industrial base,
and that we have actual metrics that say, ``This is what''----
Senator Manchin. If there's not financial penalties to the
prime, this'll never work.
Secretary Lord. You're absolutely correct. In fact, we go
right back to source-selection criteria. If it----
Senator Manchin. I'm sure, any primes out there, you're not
really happy with this line of questioning. But, it is the way
it's evolved over the years. It's got to change.
Secretary Lord. We have never clearly said what is
acceptable, what is unacceptable. So, we'll start at contract
award. But, it's a critical issue, and we're having ongoing
discussions. We meet quarterly with the three largest
industrial associations.
Senator Manchin. If I may--and I'm sure anybody else--if
you can keep us informed. If we can look and see what you all
have been able to do----
Secretary Lord. Absolutely, I would very much like to--we
can come and give you a briefing----
Secretary Lord. My office will continue to engage with you
on this issue and keep you informed.
Senator Manchin. Love to. I've spoke to primes and
everything, and I've spoke to the subs all the way down the
food chain, and there is nothing that's, basically, linking
them together. Sometimes the primes don't even know who the
subs are far enough down the food chain.
Secretary Lord. Well, this is exactly what we've gotten at,
and exactly what's going to change.
Senator Manchin. Well, I appreciate it--I appreciate all of
y'all here. But, we just want to help you. Our job is to help
you.
Secretary Lord. Thank you.
Senator Manchin. We want to work together.
Thank you very much.
I'm so sorry. We're all running to vote.
Senator Heinrich [presiding]. Well, Senator Manchin, it's
just you and I now, so you don't have to apologize. You can
even sneak one more in, if you want, before you go.
[Laughter.]
Senator Heinrich. He couldn't pass that up. So, you do one
more, and then I've got a whole pile here.
Senator Manchin. The other one I would have is the
relationship between the Missile Defense Agency and the Space
Development Agency, to ensure that all aspect of nuclear
deterrent missions are being executed under a united line of
effort. If you have something along those----
Secretary Lord. Well, we are just now standing up the Space
Development Agency, and what programs are within what entity
are just being adjudicated now.
Senator Manchin. General Ray, I think that you highlighted
the much-needed improvements in our satellite systems from
advanced extremely high frequency satellites in orbit and
production of that. How's that coming along?
General Ray. Sir, we're making good progress with the
terminals and the elements. We visited the team at Raytheon
recently, and all that progress is where we'd like it. We were
behind, and we had to restructure the program. So, I'm pleased
with it, going forward, and the key will be to keep on the
primes to execute as we've laid it out.
Senator Manchin. Secretary Trachtenberg, your written
testimony included a couple of mentions of Iran as a nation
trying to tip the balance of power. Would you want to expand on
that?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes, sir. You're correct, we were
very much concerned, in terms of looking at Iran and seeing
where Iran is going. Iran continues to be the prime supporter
of terrorism. Iran continues to develop ballistic missile
capabilities. So, we're watching that very carefully.
We face a variety of threats today, not just from Russia
and China, as large competitors, but also there are still
threats that we need to deal with from North Korea and also,
potentially, Iran, as well. So, we are looking at them.
Senator Manchin. Are we selling missiles to Saudis?
Are we providing access to missiles to the Saudis?
Secretary Trachtenberg. I'm not sure what missile tech--are
you talking about actual missiles?
Senator Manchin. Uh-huh.
Secretary Trachtenberg. If I could, I will get back to you
on that. I'd like to take that one for the record.
Senator Manchin. Yeah. I would, too.
Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Senator Manchin.
No surprise I want to return for a moment to pit production
again. Under Secretary Lord, my understanding is that we're
probably a few years away from a Critical Decision 2 (CD2)
estimated independent cost analysis of what the real, sort of,
concrete and steel costs are going to look like at the Savannah
River site. Probably out in 2021-2022. So, how do you certify
now that we're on track, when we don't really know even what
those costs are going to look like yet?
Secretary Lord. We work very, very closely with NNSA under
the framework of the Nuclear Weapons Council. What we have from
them is the engineering analysis, moving forward. As they move
into conceptual design, we will begin to get clear track as to
the actual dollars. But, the estimates we have right now, they
certify they believe in, and we back them up, and we believe
this is the best path forward from the alternatives we've seen
so far.
Senator Heinrich. One of the reasons why I'm dubious is
because we've done the big-box thing before. We had the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project (CMRR)
plan, and that sort of collapsed, in and of its own weight, and
everyone moved to a modular plan, which seemed to have a great
deal of traction. Now we're back to the big-box plan.
I'm going to switch gears here. General Ray, I know the
Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland coordinates nuclear
certification of all systems involved with nuclear weapons. How
concerned are you about the current staff levels there?
General Ray. Sir, I'm concerned about that staff level and
what it's going to take to deliver, when it comes to that, into
the right sustainment game plan team, the right team to go from
design to execution, managing that talent base. I'm worried
about that. The NC3 enterprise, in terms of the expertise. So,
broadly, we're in competition for a great deal of high-tech
talent. So, as we look across the entire spectrum, it's
something that we, as a team, have to continue to drive a
competitive environment----
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
General Ray.--and then to do very good planning that let's
us forecast what we need. I think the digital engineering
that's in front of us gives us the chance to bring in a lot of
young talent, which is what we're really in the need of doing
to make sure that--as Secretary Lord talked about, this is Cold
War stuff. We may have a lot of older engineers in the game,
and we need to bring in more and more of the young folks in the
Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) program----
Senator Heinrich. You have the incentives to be able to
make that happen?
General Ray. Sir, that manpower plays in a different pool,
but I certainly would be willing to follow up with some more
insights later, after collaborating with the team.
Secretary Lord. May I comment on that?
Senator Manchin. Under Secretary?
Secretary Lord. One of the things we are very much
challenged by is getting the talent we need at the right time.
One of the ideas we've had, particularly on the acquisition
side to get individuals with the technical credibility to run
these acquisition programs, is, we are floating the idea of
having sort of an Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) for
acquisition professionals, where, for every year of college we
would pay for, we would get 2 years service back. So, we would
have 8 years of very technically qualified people to help run
these programs.
Senator Fischer [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
We're just going to keep going.
Secretary Trachtenberg, from a policy point of view, can
you discuss the importance of NATO remaining a nuclear
alliance, and how close allies with independent nuclear
deterrent capabilities and who are committed to NATO complement
U.S. decisionmaking and deterrence posture?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Well, certainly, Chairman Fischer.
Absolutely. It is critically important. NATO is a nuclear
alliance. The NATO statements that have been made reaffirm that
NATO is a nuclear alliance. We have very good relationships, of
course, certainly with the UK and France, that are both nuclear
partners--or nuclear states, I should say. Maintaining alliance
unity, when it comes to the importance of sustaining a robust
nuclear deterrent that is in the benefit, not just of the
United States, but in the benefit of the alliance as a whole,
is critically important. We engage in discussions at various
levels with our NATO allies repeatedly. We have found a good
sense of unity and an understanding among our allies, in terms
of U.S. policy and the need for modernization and the need for
our alliance to remain a nuclear-capable one.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, in the course of the Nuclear Posture Review,
did the Department gather allied feedback on the idea of
adopting a no-first-use policy? What was that?
Secretary Trachtenberg. We discussed a variety of issues in
the course of developing the Nuclear Posture Review with
allies. The no-first-use issue, of course, is one that has come
up repeatedly, in terms of discussions and debates over whether
or not it makes sense, from an alliance perspective, to go down
that path. From our perspective--and I believe it is shared by
our allies, as well, that we have spoken with--a no-first-use-
of-nuclear-weapons policy would be counterproductive to
deterrence. It could actually undermine deterrence. It could
undermine the assurance value that our nuclear deterrent brings
to our allies. It could also, by lowering allied confidence
that the United States, in essence, has their backs and would
be prepared to defend our allied security, at any level of
conflict--could push at least some of our allies to consider
the acquisition of nuclear weapons, themselves.
So, I would argue, from the standpoint of a no-first-use
policy, I see that, generally, as a negative, from a variety of
levels, including the nonproliferation aspect of U.S. policy. I
happen to believe that our current policy and our current
extended deterrence, the so-called nuclear umbrella of security
that we provide to others, is perhaps one of the best and most
successful nonproliferation policies that the United States has
implemented.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Secretary Lord, we keep hearing arguments that DOD can't
afford everything it wants, it must set priorities, and that we
should cut spending on nuclear forces to prioritize other
things, like space or cyber. The implication here is that the
Department is only requesting funds for nuclear modernization
as a result of failing to prioritize. But, as I noted in my
opening statement, I believe the opposite is true. Can you
elaborate on the Department's priority level for nuclear
deterrence?
Secretary Lord. Three Secretaries of Defense have called
nuclear deterrence the DOD's number-one priority. It's very
clear. Our National Defense Strategy calls it out. The Nuclear
Posture Review goes into much detail about how we deliver on
that, and, as we've been talking about, we really are dealing
with Cold War technology right now. We have weapons that are
decades over what was supposed to be their useful life, and we
are out of time. We need to continue on the path we're on, or
we are going to fall behind and not have the nuclear deterrence
that we enjoy today.
Senator Fischer. Secretary Trachtenberg, would you like to
add anything?
Secretary Trachtenberg. I would, Senator. The only thing I
would add is that, when you look at what our nuclear deterrent
buys for us, I would argue that it is a relatively inexpensive
investment, because that is the ultimate guarantor of our
security. In terms of the amount of fiscal resources we invest
in the modernization program, it is a relatively small fraction
overall of the DOD budget, approximately 3-and-a-half percent.
At the peak of the planned modernization program, that
percentage may rise to about--somewhere between 6 or 7 percent
of DOD spending, still much less, in percentage terms, than
what we spent during the modernization cycles of the 1960s and
the 1980s. So, from the standpoint of what nuclear deterrence
gets us, I would have to argue that I think it's actually a
bargain.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, critics argue that the Department plans to
develop an intermediate-range system in response to Russia's
violation of the INF Treaty will serve no purpose unless a
foreign nation agrees to host them. Therefore, the program
shouldn't proceed without such an agreement. Of course, this
view does overlook the fact that a mobile system could be
deployed in response to future provocation, and potential
adversaries would have to contend with this fact. Could you
speak to this issue and why the Department believes
intermediate-range systems are a critical part of our response
to Russia's dismantling of an arms control treaty?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Of course, Senator. I appreciate
your characterization of Russia's dismantling of an arms
control treaty, because, obviously, as a consequence of
Russia's clear violation of that treaty, and also, I might add,
consistent with the Sense of Congress expressed in the fiscal
year 2019 NDAA, the United States suspended its obligations
under the treaty, and we also gave notice of our intent to
withdraw from it. It is, in fact, Russia, I would argue, that
has abandoned the treaty as a result of its violation, and our
allies, as I mentioned previously, support the actions we have
taken in response.
Yes, we are moving forward, as a result, with developing
conventionally-armed ground-launched intermediate-range missile
capabilities. What sort of system we ultimately develop will be
driven by our assessment of military requirements and, of
course, in consultation with the Congress and with our allies
and partners. So, it remains to be seen where we will go, but I
will say--and Senator Heinrich mentioned, at the start--made a
comment--I think he expressed some concerns that we had----
Senator Fischer. I'm sure when he returns, he'll be
visiting with you about it.
Mr. Trachtenberg.--absolutely--that we had gotten out of
the INF treaty with nothing to show for it. The point I would
make there, Senator, is, we have nothing today, because, for
30-some years, we have been in strict compliance with the terms
of the INF treaty that prohibited the kinds of capabilities
that, if the treaty terminates in August of this year, we will
then be free to develop and proceed with.
Senator Fischer. Right, and it is a bilateral treaty. It
does not take into account what other countries, such as China,
may be developing. I think it ties our hands with regard to
other nations when they are able to move freely about, and I
agree with you on the Russians, and in regard to the INF, as
well.
Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes.
Senator Fischer. So, thank you.
I see we have been joined by Senator Hawley. A lot of back-
and-forth here. So, if you are ready for questions, just coming
in, please go ahead, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Okay. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
General Ray, I appreciated the phone call that you and I
had a few weeks ago about the stationing plans for the B-21.
Obviously, we're very excited about that in my home State. My
staff had the chance to visit Whiteman again last week. We are
delighted about the future, here.
As we've discussed the need to modernize all three legs of
the nuclear triad, I think this may be a good opportunity to
talk about why the bomber leg is so important. I wonder,
General Ray, if you could talk to us a little bit about the
rationale behind maintaining, and indeed updating, burnishing
this particular leg of the triad and its significance for our
defense.
General Ray. Yes, sir. The comment has been made by
Secretary Trachtenberg about the extended deterrence dimension
of a bomber leg. The very visible and flexible element is just
one piece. So, when our allies look at the extended deterrence
and the counterproliferation dimension, they probably, more
than likely, look at the bomber first, the ability to escalate
and send the signal with a generation of the bomber force, the
flexibility of the bomber force both for penetrating and for a
standoff capability. When I consider the would-be adversaries'
defensive systems and the complexity of that, the clear need to
go after those challenges with penetrating and standoff to
assure no sanctuary of anything that could harm the United
States is one of the other particular dimensions to it. But, I
think when you just step back and consider all three legs, the
interrelated dimensions of this, when we think about
modernizing an old fleet to a new fleet, the inherent risk on
all three legs, I watch every single step of the way for the
old fleet to the new fleet and knowing how will I close any of
the gaps, the bomber is my most flexible and visible piece.
Secretary Trachtenberg. May I add a comment, Senator just
briefly?
Senator Hawley. Yes, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Trachtenberg. The bomber leg of the triad is the only
leg of the triad that is essentially recallable. Because of the
speed, its relative slowness compared to a ballistic missile,
it gives decisionmakers additional time and space to try to
negotiate or reduce, in a crisis, the opportunity for
miscalculation or any unintended or potential escalation. So,
the bomber plays a unique role in the triad, for those reasons,
as well.
Senator Hawley. Yeah, thank you for that. That's very
significant. Thank you for pointing that out.
Let me also invite you to touch on why it's important to
have different platforms that are able to fulfill this
dimension. You know, it's probably hard to find two aircraft
that are more different, for instance, than the B-2 or the B-
52. So, speak to that, if you would, General, and, Mr.
Secretary, if you want to, or anyone else.
General Ray. Yes, sir. I fielded a question earlier in this
hearing about the size of the bomber roadmap. First of all, the
size of the conventional bomber fleet is the sizing mechanism
for how many bombers we have. The analysis we have tells us
where a conventional campaign begins to falter without bombers.
I can't go into that here, but all the studies are now showing
a broader number of bombers are required, beyond a minimum of
100 B-21s and 76 B-52s. We just pulled one out of the boneyard
to get it refurbished. So, when I think about the standoff, the
stand-in, and the complementary capabilities, and the need to
grow beyond these two platforms to keep our options open as
much as we can in the short term, to provide the leadership the
chance to make informed programmatic decisions, here, in the
future, the roadmap tells us, in about the 2024 timeframe,
we'll be able to make an insightful acquisition-ramp decision
for the B-21. Meanwhile, we've got a lot of work to do with
sustainment for the B-1, the B-52, and the B-52. All three of
the current bombers.
Senator Hawley. Mr. Secretary, would you like to add to
that?
Secretary Trachtenberg. I certainly concur with what
General Ray has said. Agree wholeheartedly.
Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much.
My time is nearly expired, so I'll yield back. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Since we are in votes and we've had two
rounds of questions, I think, Senator Hawley, if you are
satisfied with your questioning time----
Senator Hawley. I might just ask one thing, since you're
offering Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. I never should open it up to you.
I know better.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hawley. Never give a lawyer a chance at just one
other question.
You may already have testified on this, so forgive me if
you have. Feel free to be extremely brief. But, I think it's so
important as we think about the debate about nuclear
modernization and about low-yield tactical nuclear weapons,
which I'm sure you've discussed, but it never hurts to get it
on the record again. There has been robust debate in this body,
as you know, and in the other chamber, about a no-first-use
policy, about whether we should even have low-yield tactical
weapons; now that we have them, whether we should deploy them.
If you could, just speak to, from a strategic perspective and a
defense perspective, the importance of this class of weapons,
from a defensive perspective, and why we need them, why we need
to deploy them, and what role they play in our overall defense
scheme.
Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Trachtenberg. If I could, briefly, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Yes, please.
Secretary Trachtenberg. I think that is a great question.
The only thing I would say is that deterrence really is in the
eye of the deteree, so to speak. What we want to do, and the
reason why we have chosen to go forward on the path that we
have chosen, with the low-yield ballistic missile, is because
we have looked at what the Russians have been doing, in
particular, and it is a cause of great concern, in terms of, I
mentioned earlier, their doctrine, their military exercises,
the possibility that they may miscalculate and believe that
they could use a weapon----
Senator Hawley. You mean their ``escalate to de-escalate''
doctrine.
Secretary Trachtenberg. Absolutely, sir. Absolutely. So,
what we are trying to do is, we are trying to foreclose any
miscalculation on the part of any adversary, broadly speaking,
that they may believe they have some kind of an advantage that
is exploitable, that they could challenge us to take the next
step that we wouldn't want them to take because they believe
they've got a capability that allows them to do something where
our response would be to either acquiesce or to escalate to a
higher level of violence, which is something we clearly do not
want to do. So, we're doing that, not to lower our threshold
for nuclear use, but to raise the threshold in the minds of an
adversary, or potential adversary, when it comes to nuclear
use.
General Ray. Sir, my last 3 years in Europe in the
competitive environment with the Russians, it's very clear in
my mind they will look for the line, and they'll go right up to
it, and they'll operate inside of that gray zone. Secretary
Trachtenberg's right, you have to eliminate the gray zone and
create a gray zone for them so they do not miscalculate and
they do not intimidate us in front of our allies.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
With that, I would like to thank the panel members for
their testimony today. I'll remind you that your opening
statements will be included in the record. So, if you have more
to add to those, feel free to do so.
With that, I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
icbm replacement
1. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, some have suggested we extend
the life of the current Minuteman III system instead of the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) system to replace it. What are your
views on this?
Secretary Lord. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the
critical importance of an effective ICBM force in deterring strategic
threats to the Nation. In order to maintain that capability into the
future, we must continue our efforts to replace the aging Minuteman III
(MM III) system with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).
MM III, first deployed in the 1970s, is well beyond its original
design life, will experience significant component attrition
challenges, and faces emerging critical capability gaps. As described
in the 2014 GBSD Analysis of Alternatives, a MM III life extension
would address only some of these issues and, thus, would result in
retaining a system that is less cost effective over its lifecycle and
fails to address capability gaps in the deterrent.
2. Senator Heinrich. General Ray, do you believe the existing
intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet can undergo
another life extension program?
General Ray. (AFGSC) Extending the Minuteman system service life
comes with greater cost, complexity, and does not address shortfalls.
The current ICBM, Minuteman III, is faced with four different
challenges: asset attrition, component/subsystem ageout, supportability
challenges, and capability shortfalls. These aspects all drive a
significant investment across the entire system through the mid-2030s
to ensure continued ICBM viability. Analysis concluded a replacement
strategy is more cost effective than life extension. A system
replacement strategy provides opportunity to realize efficiencies
during both the acquisition and long-term sustainment. We have miss the
opportunity by at least four years to implement a sustainment/life
extension program. ement a sustainment/life extension program.
3. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, we currently have an extremely
effective and reliable missile guidance system. What are you doing to
ensure the data and design can be used by the contractors who are
competing for the ICBM replacement program or GBSD?
Admiral Wolfe. Since 2012, the Air Force and Navy Strategic Systems
Programs have formally collaborated in technical areas, including
strategic guidance systems. Over the last several years, we have
conducted commonality assessments and identified components from the
Navy's Mk6 Guidance Life Extension program that could be used for the
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program. The Navy has also shared with
the Air Force data on current guidance sensors and potential future
sensor technologies, has provided sensors for the Air Force's test and
evaluation needs, and has shared experiences on ground testing
capabilities. Formal collaboration including sharing relevant design
and guidance system data will continue under the auspices of a 2018
Memorandum of Understanding among the Navy Strategic Systems Programs,
Air Force GBSD program, and the Missile Defense Agency.
long range stand off weapon
4. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, we have multiple life
extensions underway all at the same time. Why do you believe it is
important that we also build the Long Range Stand-Off Weapon?
Secretary Lord. Maintaining a long-range, nuclear-armed, air-
launched cruise missile (ALCM) capability ensures that the United
States retains the ability to hold targets at risk globally, even in
areas protected by advanced integrated air defense systems. ALCMs add
significant flexibility to the range of capabilities available to
USSTRATCOM, allowing planners to provide the President with credible
response and signaling options in the event of a crisis.
The current AGM-86B ALCM will be nearly 40 years past its planned
service life when scheduled to be replaced by the Long Range Standoff
(LRSO) weapon, and is already facing increased threats from advanced
air defenses that it was never designed to address. Additionally, as it
ages, ALCM will face continual sustainment challenges from components
that are no longer in production and limited sources for replacement
parts.
Additionally, as one of the less complex and least expensive
aspects of the Administration's modernization plan, we believe LRSO can
provide an important hedging capability for the deterrent as we
transition from the legacy force to a modernized Triad.
5. Senator Heinrich. General Ray, how does the Long Range Standoff
Weapon match up against the Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities of our
adversaries?
General Ray. (AFGSC) The LRSO is being developed to be a survivable
replacement for the aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in the
future threat environment. Its design will feature advanced
capabilities to allow it to penetrate current and future enemy advanced
integrated air defenses, to include the A2/AD environment.
new start treaty
6. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Trachtenberg, the Pentagon has
frequently touted the benefits of New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START), particularly emphasizing the visibility and insight we gain
into Russia's strategic nuclear forces. There have been rumors that the
Trump Administration is considering either not extending the treaty or
potentially even withdrawing from it altogether. If New START expires
in February 2021 with nothing to replace it and there are no
constraints on Russia's nuclear forces, would that increase or decrease
the threat Russia poses to the United States?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Much has changed in the near-decade since
the New START Treaty was signed in 2010, including the expansion of
Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. A decision regarding
extension of the New START Treaty has not yet been made, but will be
balanced against changes in the strategic environment and broader
concerns regarding Russia's non-compliance with other arms control and
nonproliferation commitments. Any extension decision must weigh a
variety of factors to ensure the national security of the United States
and that of our allies and partners is maintained and strengthened. I
defer to the Intelligence Community to provide a more detailed
assessment of whether the threat from Russian nuclear forces would
increase or decrease were the New START Treaty to expire without
extension.
7. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Trachtenberg, if we lose the New
START data exchanges and onsite inspection rights, would the Pentagon
and the intelligence community have to spend more on national technical
means of verification to make up for this loss? If so, roughly how
much?
Secretary Trachtenberg. The end of the New START Treaty's
verification regime would end one source of information regarding
Russia's strategic forces; however, there are other sources such as
national technical means. The resulting cost impacts of an increased
reliance on national technical or other means would be best addressed
by the Intelligence Community.
8. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Trachtenberg, the President has
indicated he would like to broaden arms control to Russia and China. Do
you believe it is wise to first extend the New START to give breathing
room for these more ambitious negotiations?
Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked for options from
his national security team to broaden arms control to Russia and China,
and we are working to support that process. Whether or not to extend
the New START Treaty is part of that discussion, but the Administration
has not made any decision yet.
weapons storage areas for b-21
9. Senator Heinrich. General Ray, as you know, the Air Force is
evaluating constructing weapons storage areas for bases where the B-21
beds down--these are costly endeavors, not only from the special
security requirements in the facility but also from the extra security
forces that may be required to man them over the life of the facility.
What is the status of your thinking on this?
General Ray. (AFGSC) Over the last year Air Force Global Strike
Command led a cross-functional team of subject matter experts to create
a Weapons Generation Facility design balancing operational utility,
resilience, and affordability. We feel we have a solution optimizing
all three factors and are in the process of socializing our plan with
Air Force leadership. Once the design is approved, we will move forward
with funding a time-sequenced plan for constructing these facilities
aligned with operational needs across the MAJCOM to include B-21
fielding. The force structure impacts of WGF design are absolutely a
decision factor, and they are a significant part of the larger B-21
fielding plan.
solid rocket motor base
10. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the Department of Defense's
September 2018 defense industrial base report highlighted the decline
in U.S. suppliers of solid rocket motors. This is an important factor
in the GBSD program. Are you working with the Air Force to address this
issue through the GBSD program, and what is your plan?
Secretary Lord. The Department continually monitors the health and
resiliency of the solid rocket motor industrial base across all defense
programs that use solid rocket motors, including GBSD. My office works
with all programs to ensure that they understand and consider
industrial base risks when making acquisitions decisions. The GBSD
program has released the Request for Proposal for Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase of the program. As such, the program
has entered source selection, and any discussions related to GBSD are
limited at this time.
missile tubes
11. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, the Columbia-class submarine,
which is intended to replace the current Ohio fleet, encountered
welding defects in the build of the missile tubes for the submarine.
Building missile tubes is something we have not done for 30 years. How
serious do you take this, what are the impacts, and what are you doing
to correct it?
Admiral Wolfe. The Navy continues to closely oversee General
Dynamic Electric Boat's (GDEB) efforts to define, scope, and mitigate
any potential impact to the schedule of all missile tube efforts as
ensuring the industrial base is ready to support Columbia is a primary
risk mitigation effort. These actions follow the identification of
welding issues on subcontracted missile tubes delivered for the
Columbia and Dreadnought programs. The Navy and GDEB team have bounded
the scope of the problem and correction actions are ongoing to recover
from the identified issues. Initial inspections are complete and the
Navy and industry partners are leveraging multiple resources across the
industrial base to conduct necessary repairs and assessments. The
current recovery plan is holding schedule margin for the Common Missile
Compartment Super Module at 11 months ahead of the construction need
date for Columbia.
12. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, are you at all worried about
the industrial base's ability to produce missile tubes in quantities
necessary for the Columbia program?
Admiral Wolfe. The vendor base remains one of the top risks for the
Columbia program, including the missile tube portion. General Dynamic
Electric Boat's (GDEB) and the Navy continue to proactively work with
missile tube vendors to execute their scope of work. GDEB and the
missile tube vendors also continue to execute the recovery plan from
previous vendor quality issues associated with early missile tube
production. The current recovery plan is holding schedule margin for
the Common Missile Compartment (CMC) Super Module at 11 months ahead of
the construction need date for Columbia.
submarine launched cruise missile
13. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review recommended investigating a submarine launched cruise missile.
We dropped it in 2010 due to maintenance and cost reasons. It seems to
me the biggest cost will be the costs over the life of the weapon of
certifying personnel and facilities to store, handle, maintain, and
operate them on an attack submarine not built for it. Can you describe
some of the issues you see as the biggest cost drivers in the program?
Admiral Wolfe. The nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missile
(TLAM-N) was retired primarily as a result of what was perceived to be
a more benign security situation at that time. The recommendations in
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflect an assessment of the current
threats posed by revisionist powers Russia and China. While the United
States for decades steadily reduced the role and size of its nuclear
forces, Russia and China moved in the opposite direction and have
increased the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and have
modernized their nuclear capabilities. The Navy is assessing the full
impact of reconstituting the capability for sea-launched cruise missile
with a nuclear warhead, including costs drivers such as personnel and
facilities.
institute for defense analyses independent assessment of nnsa's
plutonium strategy (march 2019)
14. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) selected and you certified on May 14, 2018, a
two-site option to produce plutonium pits where the NNSA would produce
30 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by 2026 and
repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at the
Savannah River Site to produce an additional 50 pits per year by 2030.
Two sites were selected even though NNSA's engineering analysis
determined the lifecycle cost of splitting production was double that
of maintaining the work at LANL. What, in your view, were the specific
advantages of splitting production between two sites that justify the
estimated additional lifecycle cost of about $14 billion?
Secretary Lord. After several decades with almost no pit
production, restoring the nation's capability to produce plutonium pits
at a sustained rate is fundamental to the reliability, sustainability
and credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which is the number one
priority defense mission of the DOD. Therefore, a near-term focus on
achieving steady-state production of 30 ppy by 2026 at LANL is
essential, while simultaneously building a capability to produce at
least 50 ppy at SRS to support longer-term requirements, is a necessary
element of the overall strategy. This approach is consistent with the
DOD requirement for steady-state production of pits that allows for the
ability to enhance warhead safety and security and meet future DOD and
NNSA requirements. The two-site strategy improves the resiliency,
flexibility, and redundancy in our Nuclear Security Enterprise by not
relying on a single production site.
15. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the Institute for Defense
Analysis recently completed an Independent Assessment of the Plutonium
Strategy of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
independent assessment concluded that all of the options NNSA
considered in the Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) are extremely
challenging. Each is potentially achievable given sufficient time,
resources and management focus, though not on the schedules or budgets
forecasted. None of the alternatives is demonstrably superior. In light
of IDA's conclusions, what is your assessment of the report with
respect to the ability of any of the options considered by the NNSA to
produce 80 pits per year by 2030?
Secretary Lord. The IDA assessment identified that the two-site
strategy could potentially achieve 80 pits per year given sufficient
time, resources, and management focus. The IDA report recognized that
because of the challenging timeline to meet pit production
requirements, any option presents risks to producing no fewer than 80
pits per year by 2030. With DOD's support, NNSA continues to pursue the
two-pronged approach to pit production, and is actively working to
mitigate the risks. The two-site approach is best for DOD in our
assessment.
16. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, your testimony specifically
cites NNSA's efforts to establish a responsive enterprise, with
production of plutonium pits as a lynchpin. However, I continue to
question NNSA's emphasis on a so-called resilient infrastructure as the
basis to justify splitting pit production between two sites, at twice
the lifecycle cost. NNSA's studies never considered resilience as a
criterion in either the Analysis of Alternatives or the Engineering
Assessment, and it appeared only after the Nuclear Posture Review was
released. The IDA recently completed an Independent Assessment of the
Plutonium Strategy of the National Nuclear Security Administration. In
light of IDA's assessment that none of the four options evaluated in
the EA is demonstrably superior, and given the very much higher
lifecycle cost, in your view is resilience a valid sole basis for
NNSA's strategy?
Secretary Lord. Resilience is a Department of Defense (DOD) value.
Despite the higher lifecycle cost, repurposing the former Mixed Oxide
Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) while maximizing pit production at Los
Alamos to the extent practicable is the best alternative to reduce
overall risk to the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This approach makes the
Nuclear Security Enterprise more resilient to external threats or
hazards, shutdowns, or other incidents; leverages an existing structure
in the appropriate hazard category; and minimizes impacts to the
mission essential work at Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 at Los Alamos.
Additionally, the Institute for Defense Analyses report concluded
that accounting for the additional costs of key LANL personnel for
LANL-only one-site approaches would narrow the gap between the
lifecycle costs estimates. These costs were not previously assessed. As
reported in NNSA's Engineering Assessment, one-site approaches could
also result in higher total project costs and later Critical Decision-4
(Approve Start of Operations or Project Completion) dates as compared
to the endorsed two-site approach.
17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the second of the main
findings of IDA's report is, ``[n]o available option can be expected to
provide 80 pits per year by 2030. DOD should evaluate how best to
respond to this requirement shortfall.'' If you concur with IDA's
findings, please provide the Armed Services Committee the timeline for
the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop a formal response to the
requirement shortfall. If you disagree with IDA's finding, please
provide a full explanation of the basis for your dissent.
Secretary Lord. Reestablishing a plutonium pit production
capability is a top priority for DOD and NNSA. Over the past two
decades, several pit production strategies were initiated and then
halted. Because of these aborted efforts, we are now out of time and
must commit to--and stick with--the two-site strategy approved by the
NWC last year. The risks are known, but can be managed, given
appropriate authority and requested funding.
18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, under section 3120(e) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Chairman
of the Nuclear Weapons Council is required to re-certify annually on
April 1 that NNSA is on track to meet the military requirement to
produce 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. In light of IDA's
assessment, will you be able to make the certification for 2019?
Secretary Lord. Yes, a certification of the plutonium pit
production plan was submitted to the Secretary of Defense and
congressional defense committees on April 30, 2019.
strategic rad-hard microelectronics
19. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, has the Nuclear Weapons
Council been briefed on NNSA's plans to sustain the unique capabilities
of Sandia's aging Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications
(MESA) Complex to produce strategic rad-hard microelectronics beyond
2025?
Secretary Lord. Yes, NNSA briefed the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
Standing and Safety Committee in March 2018 on its strategy for the
MESA Complex at Sandia National Laboratories. Since then, there is
continuing dialogue and reporting from NNSA to the NWC as part of
Nuclear Posture Review Implementation tasks. NNSA has committed to
maintain MESA as a design agency and trusted supplier of strategic
radiation-hardened electronics through 2040 and has developed a
strategy, informed by the Sandia Extended Life Program report, to
deliver on this commitment.
20. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, do you agree that the upgrade
of MESA should be a priority for NNSA?
Secretary Lord. Yes, the MESA Complex is currently the only U.S.
foundry with the capability to deliver custom strategically radiation-
hardened (SRH) microelectronic components required to sustain the
Nation's nuclear stockpile. Both the sea-based and land-based legs of
the strategic triad depend on the survivability of the reentry systems.
The survivability of reentry systems requires strategic radiation-
hardened electronic devices in core circuitry in order to meet very
high radiation requirements. The MESA Complex is a DOD Defense
Microelectronic Activity (DMEA) accredited Category 1A Trusted Facility
for trusted design, foundry, and test services for both unclassified
and classified integrated circuits and other devices for the Nation's
national security needs.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
future arms control agreements with russia and china
21. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, senior Administration
officials recently told reporters that President Trump had directed his
Administration to seek a new arms control agreement with Russia and
China. One official told CNN that the agreement should include ``all
the weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.'' The officials
criticized the 2010 New START for only limiting United States and
Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons. What does the
Administration have in mind with this arms control outreach project?
Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked his national
security team for possible options on more comprehensive agreements
with Russia and China, and we are in the midst of developing such
options. However, we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our
potential negotiating strategies publicly.
22. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, what is the
Administration's strategy for achieving more comprehensive arms control
deals with Russia and China?
Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked his national
security team for possible options on more comprehensive agreements
with Russia and China, and we are in the midst of developing such
options. However, we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our
potential negotiating strategies publicly.
23. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, how long does the
Administration expect it will take to negotiate such comprehensive
deals?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Negotiating a new agreement that
encompasses a broader range of weapons than just strategic systems and
includes an effective verification regime will likely take time. Since
no specific proposal has been made, it is impossible to predict how
long such a negotiation would take.
24. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, what does the
Administration want China to do on arms control?
Secretary Trachtenberg. The President wants serious arms control
that delivers real security to the American people and our allies and
partners. To achieve this, he believes Russia and China must be brought
to the table. The President has charged his national security team to
think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries
and the weapons systems involved. If China is the great power its
leaders claim it to be, it should increase transparency into Chinese
nuclear forces and limit China's growing nuclear weapons ambitions in
order to help manage strategic competition among States. Beyond this,
we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our potential negotiating
strategies publicly.
25. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, what is the
Administration willing to put on the table in talks with Russia and
China on more comprehensive agreements?
Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked his national
security team for possible options on more comprehensive agreements
with Russia and China, and we are in the midst of developing such
options. However, we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our
potential negotiating strategies publicly.
26. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, wouldn't extending New
START by 5 years buy additional time to develop U.S. negotiating
positions, address issues of mutual concern that impact strategic
stability, and avoid new risks from an unconstrained and less
transparent United States-Russian nuclear relationship?
Secretary Trachtenberg. We are not trying to buy time. We are
attempting to address the core impediments to restoring trust with
Russia and reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear
arms control initiatives. We must consider a multitude of factors
before making any decision on whether or not to extend the New START
Treaty--for example, Russia's record of compliance with arms control
agreements, its overall malign behavior on other matters such as
Ukraine and election interference, and the fact that its nuclear
arsenal is growing in areas not currently constrained under the New
START Treaty.
27. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, in 2012, then commander
of U.S. Strategic Command General Robert Kehler stated: ``I do not
believe that China has hundreds or thousands more nuclear weapons than
what the intelligence community has been saying, [ . . . ] that the
Chinese arsenal is in the range of several hundred'' nuclear
warheads.'' Do you agree with this assessment? If not, why not?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Over the next decade, China is likely to
double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing
the most rapid expansion and diversification of is nuclear arsenal in
its history. It is improving its ground and submarine-based nuclear
capability and is pursuing a viable nuclear ``triad'' with the
development of a nuclear capable strategic bomber. In addition, it is
working to field nuclear, theater-range precision-strike systems
capable of reaching U.S. territory and United States forces and bases
in the region as well as those of our allies and partners. China's
nuclear deterrent cannot currently be verified as to numbers and
quality of its weapons. It refuses to offer transparency into its force
and refuses to participate in any serious talks that would lead to any
meaningful transparency. The scope and scale of China's nuclear
modernization program, combined with China's lack of transparency,
raise questions regarding its future intent. This not only increases
the threat of possible nuclear coercion and conflict for the United
States, and its allies and partners, but risks miscalculation and
misperception.
new start
28. Senator Warren. General Ray, the Department has frequently
touted the benefits of New START, particularly emphasizing the
visibility and insight we gain into Russia's strategic nuclear forces.
There have been rumors that the Trump Administration is considering not
extending the treaty or potentially even withdrawing from it
altogether. If New START expires in February 2021 with nothing to
replace it and there are no constraints on Russia's nuclear forces,
would that increase or decrease the threat Russia poses to the United
States?
General Ray. (A10) Much has changed in the near-decade since the
New START Treaty was signed in 2010, including the expansion of Russian
and Chinese nuclear capabilities. For example, Russia is modernizing
and expanding an active existing stockpile of approximately 2,000
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed on ships, submarines,
aircraft, with ground forces, and on air and missile defense
interceptors. None of these weapons are limited by any arms control
treaty including the New START Treaty. A decision regarding extension
of the New START Treaty has not yet been made, but will be balanced
against changes in the strategic environment and broader concerns
regarding Russia's non-compliance with other arms control and
nonproliferation commitments. Any extension decision must weigh a
variety of factors to ensure the national security of the United States
and that of our allies and partners is maintained and strengthened. I
defer to the Intelligence Community to provide a more detailed
assessment of whether the threat from Russian nuclear forces would
increase or decrease were the New START Treaty to expire without
extension.
29. Senator Warren. General Ray, if we have less visibility into
Russia's nuclear capabilities, force structure, and modernization
plans, which would be the case without New START, what impact would
that have on U.S. military planning and spending? What countermeasures
would we need to consider and what would be the cost?
General Ray. The visibility into Russia's capabilities that the New
START Treaty provides is an important, but not exclusive, source of
information that feeds into the Department of Defense's force
requirements analysis. The Department of Defense will continue to make
the necessary investments in its nuclear and conventional delivery
systems to ensure a flexible and continuing deterrent capability in the
face of evolving security challenges and technological developments.
The President's Budget provides for the sustainment and operations of
existing nuclear and conventional forces in defense of the United
States.
30. Senator Warren. General Ray, if we lose the New START data
exchanges and onsite inspection rights, would the Pentagon and the
intelligence community have to spend more on national technical means
of verification to make up for this loss? Is there a formal or informal
cost estimate to this effect?
General Ray. The end of the New START Treaty's verification regime
would end one source of information regarding Russia's strategic
forces; however, there are other sources such as national technical
means. The resulting cost impacts of an increased reliance on national
technical or other means would be best addressed by the Intelligence
Community.
31. Senator Warren. General Ray, is there any way to replace the
``boots on the ground'' inspections provided by New START if the treaty
did not exist?
General Ray. (A10) On-site inspections are just one important tool
to build trust and verify compliance with current international
agreements. Regardless of the state of arms control agreements, the
United States continues to maintain robust intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities provide insights inside another
country's military capabilities. The loss of the New START treaty and
its on-site inspections will force the United States to rely more on
alternate means of assessing Russian capabilities.
32. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, is the Administration's
position that Russia must agree to limits on its tactical nuclear
weapons or that China must limit its nuclear forces in some way as a
condition for extending New START?
Secretary Trachtenberg. The President wants serious arms control
that delivers real security to the American people and our allies and
partners. To achieve this, he believes Russia and China must be brought
to the table. Therefore, the President has charged his national
security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms
of the countries and the weapons systems involved. Whether or not to
extend the New START Treaty is part of that discussion, but the
Administration has not made any decision yet.
33. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, some Administration
officials have raised concerns about new strategic-range weapons that
Russia is developing. My understanding is that New START envisioned the
possible development of new kinds of strategic offensive arms during
the period of implementation of the treaty. Article II of the treaty
states: ``When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive
arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question
of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.'' Has the Administration formally raised
Russia's development of these new weapons for discussion in the
Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty's implementing body?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes.
34. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, given the concerns you
have expressed about some of the new nuclear weapons systems being
developed by Russia, have you been a part of discussions with Russian
counterparts about those weapons? Are you aware of whether any of your
colleagues in the Department of State are having such discussions?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Most recently, in April 2019, a United
States interagency delegation, including representatives of the Defense
Department, met with Russian counterparts in a session of the New START
Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to discuss ongoing New
START Treaty implementation issues. The BCC usually convenes twice a
year. At the April BCC, representatives from the Department of State
and the Department of Defense engaged Russia on these systems, and we
continue to do so.
35. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, General Hyten told the
Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year that he's worried
about the threat these new weapons might pose a decade from now. Do you
agree?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes.
36. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, wouldn't extending New
START for another 5 years buy us additional time to discuss and address
our concerns about the new weapons with Russia while retaining
verifiable limits on Russia's current deployed strategic weapons?
Secretary Trachtenberg. We are not trying to buy time. We are
attempting to address the core impediments to restoring trust with
Russia and reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear
arms control initiatives. We must consider a multitude of factors
before making any decision on whether or not to extend the New START
Treaty--for example, Russia's record of compliance with arms control
agreements, its overall malign behavior on other matters such as
Ukraine and election interference, and the fact that its nuclear
arsenal is growing in areas not currently constrained under the New
START Treaty.
intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty
37. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, when I asked General
Scaparrotti at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on March 5,
2019 whether the Trump Administration has a plan to prevent Russia from
building more and new types of ground-launched intermediate-range
missiles in the absence of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty, he said, ``I don't know that we have a plan today. I know we're
working on what we think that plan might be.'' Why did the President
withdraw from the treaty without having first developed such a plan?
Secretary Trachtenberg. An arms control treaty that one side abides
by while the other openly and brazenly violates it does not make us
safer. Since 2013, the United States engaged Russia more than 30 times
to try to resolve Russia's material breach and preserve the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Russia, however,
continued to violate the INF Treaty, and has taken no steps to return
to full and verifiable compliance. Due to our scrupulous INF Treaty
compliance before our obligations were suspended, we do not have any
new systems to deploy in the immediate future. Now that we have
suspended our obligations under the INF Treaty, we are free to pursue
work that would otherwise be prohibited by the INF Treaty. Currently,
we have no plans to conduct flight tests of any noncompliant systems
prior the United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty in August.
38. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, at the Munich Security
conference in mid-February, Polish foreign minister Jacek Czaputowicz
stated the following: ``We are not very much in favor--we are
definitely even against--deployment of [INF Treaty prohibited] missiles
on our soil. But we will work out the solution with our allies in NATO
because it must be united response to Russian threat in that case . . .
If we do it maybe [host new missiles] it will be a decision of all the
alliance.'' Do you agree that any decision to base U.S. ground-launched
intermediate-range missiles should only be considered if it is
supported by ``all of the alliance''?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Due to our scrupulous Treaty compliance
before our Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty obligations
were suspended, it will be some time before we are ready to hold
discussions about potential basing options. We have kept our Allies
fully apprised of these developments and we continue to work together
within NATO to deny Russia any military advantage from its material
breach of the INF Treaty. The systems we are developing are
conventional, not nuclear, and we are committed to discussing in
advance with our Allies any potential basing options on Allied
territory in the future.
39. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, has the Department
begun conversations with any alliance members about hosting INF-range
missiles on their territory?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Due to our scrupulous Treaty compliance
before our Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty obligations
were suspended, it will be some time before we are ready to hold
discussions about potential basing options. We have kept our Allies
fully apprised of these developments and we continue to work together
within NATO to deny Russia any military advantage from its material
breach of the INF Treaty. The systems we are developing are
conventional, not nuclear, and we are committed to discussing in
advance with our Allies any potential basing options on Allied
territory in the future.
supplemental sea-based low-yield nuclear capabilities
40. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) recommends adding a third and fourth low-yield
warhead option to the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the form of a low-yield
SLBM warhead and sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). The United States
already possesses low-yield warheads, including nuclear gravity bombs
stationed in Europe in support of NATO, as part of the air-leg of the
triad and plans to invest over $150 billion in then-year dollars in the
coming decades to ensure these warheads can penetrate the most advanced
air defenses. If current and planned air-launched options cannot deter
or respond to Russian limited nuclear use, why are taxpayers being
asked to spend scores of billions of dollars on these systems?
Secretary Trachtenberg. We will continue to rely on current and
planned air-launched options to deter Russian limited nuclear use and
to assure allies of our security commitments. In light of the
continuing modernization of Russian air defenses, as well as specific
developments in Russia's forces and doctrine that create a credible
threat that Russia would use a small number of low-yield nuclear
weapons to deter a United States military response to aggression, a
low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) provides the
United States a near-term, flexible, limited nuclear response option
that complements existing and future air-launched options. Deployed
quickly in small numbers, the low-yield SLBM provides a tailored
solution to this problem and, based on its attributes, corrects any
misperceptions that Russia and others may have that the United States
lacks credible options to deter the use of nuclear weapons in a
regional conflict. Re-deployment of SLCM-Nuclear (N) is a response to
broader, equally serious developments in the balance of nonstrategic
nuclear forces (which favors Russia by a huge margin), the operational
environment, and regional security dynamics. It provides leaders with a
hedge for the current U.S. sea-based deterrent and a flexible and
responsive limited use capability that further strengthens the extended
deterrence and allied assurance framework in both Europe and East Asia.
Proceeding with the acquisition of SLCM-N will provide negotiating
leverage to capture Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future
agreement.
41. Senator Warren. General Ray, are there any targets on the
planet that can't be held at risk by the B-2 or in the future the B-21?
General Ray. (A10) The specific capabilities of the B-2 and B-21
are classified. The unique combination of range, precision, payload,
and ability to penetrate and operate in anti-access/area denial
environments allows the B-2 to identify, locate, target, and destroy
the highest value enemy targets. The B-21 is an Air Force acquisition
recapitalization priority which will provide critical operational
capability and flexibility across a wide range of military objectives,
providing both conventional and nuclear capabilities, in fulfillment of
national objectives. The B-21 will be highly survivable with the
ability to penetrate modern air defenses to accomplish national
security objectives despite an anti-access/area denial environment and
attack targets.
42. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, the fiscal year 2020 budget
request for the nuclear SLCM includes $5 million to begin an Analysis
of Alternatives of the capability. To your knowledge, did the Navy
support President George H.W. Bush's decision to remove the TLAM-N from
deployment in the early 1990s?
Admiral Wolfe. To my knowledge, the Navy supported the 1991
decision to remove the TLAM-N from deployment. The Navy similarly
supports development of a nuclear SLCM in response to the changed
security environment, as noted in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
43. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, did the Navy support President
Obama's decision to retire the missile and warhead in 2010, and if so,
why?
Admiral Wolfe. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review noted that the
security environment of the time had changed dramatically since the end
of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war had become remote, and the
nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) served a
redundant purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile based on the
anticipation that the security environment would continue to improve.
However, as the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review highlights, the security
environment has actually moved in the opposite direction with
adversaries, particularly Russia and China, who have increased the
prominence of nuclear weapons in their national strategies. This is
demonstrated by Russia's large and increasingly capable non-strategic
nuclear weapons arsenal and China's improving forces. A new sea-
launched cruise missile capability is needed to provide a flexible,
sea-based, non-strategic nuclear capability to improve U.S.
capabilities to deter limited nuclear use and to assure our allies that
we will meet our extended deterrence commitments.
44. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, if a decision is made to re-
nuclearize the Navy's attack submarine fleet with a SLCM, can you tell
me what doing so would entail?
Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will
provide that to Congress when complete.
45. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, in addition to the cost to
acquire the missile and warhead, would there be additional
certification, security, storage, and operational costs for re-
nuclearizing the Navy's attack submarine fleet with a SLCM?
Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will
provide that to Congress when complete.
46. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, could arming attack submarines
with nuclear SLCMs mean that each submarine could carry fewer
conventional Tomahawks?
Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will
provide that to Congress when complete.
47. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, how might arming attack
submarines with nuclear SLCMs impact conventional deterrence?
Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will
provide that to Congress when complete.
u.s. nuclear weapons spending
48. Senator Warren. Secretary Lord, in January 2019 the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost of the Trump
administration's plans to sustain and replace the U.S. nuclear arsenal
between fiscal years 2019 and 2028 at $494 billion in then-year
dollars. This is an increase of $94 billion, or about 23 percent, above
the CBO's 2017 estimate as of the end of the Obama administration. By
2028 nuclear weapons would consume about seven percent of total
national defense spending. Do you agree with CBO's estimate?
Secretary Lord. Generally, the basis for CBO's estimate is
consistent with DOD's projections, although CBO's cost growth
projections were more pessimistic than our own. However, it is
important to clarify that very little of CBO's projected increase was
attributed to increased program cost. Most of the growth cited by CBO
involved factors such as economic inflation and natural increases that
come with greater program maturity.
Nuclear modernization remains the Department's highest defense and
investment priority. DOD expects this effort to cost approximately 3.7
percent of the defense budget across the 23-year modernization period.
These costs represent a significantly smaller percentage than past
efforts, which required 10.6 percent of the defense budget in the early
1980s and 17 percent of the defense budget in the early 1960s.
A large-scale nuclear attack poses an existential threat to the
United States. U.S. nuclear forces are the indispensable means of
deterring this threat. The modernization program is necessary and
prudent given the nature and evolution of the threat. Accordingly, we
believe the current modernization plan remains affordable.
ground based strategic deterrent
49. Senator Warren. General Ray, in 2016 the Department set the
cost at the GBSD program's Milestone A decision at $85 billion in then-
year dollars, but called for a more up to date estimate by March 2018.
An estimate by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office
put the $85 billion figure at the lower end and a scale that reached as
high as $150 billion. Both estimates were far higher than the Air
Force's initial estimate. My understanding is that CAPE is working on a
new cost estimate for GBSD that will be completed in June 2019. Has the
Air Force produced an updated cost estimate for the GBSD program? If
so, what is it? If not, when can we expect an updated estimate from the
Air Force?
General Ray. (AQ) Total acquisition cost for GBSD is estimated at
$85 billion, per the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) updated in June 2019. The program is fully funded
to the low end range of the Milestone A independent cost estimate as
reflected in the Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget request.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Then-Year $B Jun 19 ICE Aug 16 ICE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDT&E $27.1 $22.66
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procurement $56.5 $61.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILCO$1.5 $0.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acquisition Total $85.1 $84.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ops & Sustainment $157.5 $177.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lif$242.6e Cost $262.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
50. Senator Warren. General Ray, according to the 2018 NPR, the
life of the Minuteman III ``cannot be extended further.'' However,
neither RAND in a 2014 report nor the Air Force's 2014 Analysis of
Alternatives determined that another life extension is infeasible.
Moreover, at a March 28, 2019 House Armed Services Committee hearing,
Lieutenant General Richard Clark, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration said: ``We have several of
the [Minuteman III] components that are becoming obsolete. The
propulsion system, the guidance system, even the ability to provide the
solid rocket motor fuel, we only have one more opportunity to do that
for these weapons.'' If there is ``one more opportunity'' to extend the
life of the Minuteman III, why did the NPR claim that the life of the
Minuteman III ``cannot be extended further?''
General Ray. (AFGSC) There are several studies highlighting
Minuteman III supportability challenges, component aging and asset
attrition, diminishing manufacturing sources, vanishing vendors, and
obsolescence. The Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the fact that
``component aging and inventory attrition are rapidly driving it to the
end of its sustainability,'' from a system perspective. The simple fact
is, Minuteman III system is beyond a modernization approach. There are
numerous components within Minuteman III system that cannot be
supported through life extension efforts. There are insufficient
quantities of items to support guidance, propulsion system rocket
engine, missile inter-stage/raceway components, and flight controls,
just to name a few. The NPR conclusion recognizes these facts combined
with current/future adversary threats and existing platform shortfalls.
51. Senator Warren. General Ray, in 2017 the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) projected that $17.5 billion could be saved over the next
30 years by delaying development of a new ICBM by 20 years and instead
extending the life of the Minuteman III by buying new engines and new
guidance systems for the missiles. Crucially, however, this approach
would save $37 billion through fiscal year 2036 when the vast majority
of nuclear recapitalization spending is scheduled to take place. Do
CBO's estimates comport with the Air Force's estimate of the cost to
sustain the Minuteman III relative to GBSD over this more confined time
period?
General Ray. (AFGSC) The Air Force does not concur with the CBO
estimate of costs to sustain Minuteman III relative to GBSD. As part of
the 2014 Analysis of Alternatives, the Air Force reviewed a Minuteman
III tech refresh option. This analysis, and subsequent program
analysis, has shown that GBSD represents the most effective strategy to
mitigate capability shortfalls while restoring warfighter effectiveness
and replacing critically aged infrastructure. Specifically, the Air
Force has determined that GBSD would provide lower total life cycle
through 2075 costs than a Minuteman III tech refresh and replacement
strategy. Minuteman III is 44 years old and will be more than 60 years
old when finally completely replaced by GBSD in the 2030s. In order to
counter the systemic age-out and attrition of the Minuteman III system,
the Air Force cannot delay development of GBSD but must begin delivery
of the weapon system by 2028. A program office analysis has indicated
that a 4 year slip to the GBSD Full Operational Capability date would
result in an estimated $22 billion in additional costs. The Department
of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council has validated the need
for a modern ICBM system. GBSD provides a more capable ICBM within the
cost estimate for maintaining the existing Minuteman III capability.
Additionally, GBSD is safer and more secure to operate than the current
system, reducing the number of required convoys and open launcher
configurations by two-thirds. The design of GBSD will provide the
United States with a system that is more readily adaptable to evolving
threats while significantly reducing the total cost of ownership for
the ICBM.
52. Senator Warren. General Ray, the Department continues to use
Minuteman II rocket motors for military space launches, which suggests
the Department has high confidence in the boosters. Which begs the
question: If older Minuteman II motors are still functioning reliably,
could the newer Minuteman III boosters reliably last longer than
currently planned?
General Ray. (AFGSC) No; the Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP)
enables the Department of Defense to repurpose Minuteman motors, which
have been removed, from operational inventory due to age-out concerns
or arms control reductions. Since the inception of the RSLP program,
nearly 1200 Minuteman first, second, and third stage motors have been
transferred from the ICBM fleet. Of these, 225 have been refurbished
and launched, 107 were static tested to validate the RSLP refurbishment
process, 381 were deemed unsuitable for launch and destroyed, and 50
motors have been assessed as unsuitable and await demil. The remaining
437 motors, considered the least suitable, await assessment for use.
Reuse of these motors is only possible through the completion of an
extensive refurbishment effort, by which RSLP conducts an inspection
using a priority checklist to ensure the best motors are selected. This
process certifies each motor for one year of use, after which the
motors must undergo recertification. The high failure rate and limited
certification time makes this refurbishment process unsuitable for
sustaining the ICBM force.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
53. Senator Manchin. Secretary Trachtenberg, are we providing
missiles to Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Trachtenberg. Under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program, the United States is currently executing FMS cases involving
the following ``missile'' systems: Air-to-Surface includes the Hydra-
70, High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), Hellfire and Standoff
Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER); Surface-to-Air
includes the HAWK; Anti-Ship includes the Harpoon; Air-to-Air includes
the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM); and Missile
Defense includes the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD).
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2019
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Subcommittee Members present: Senators Fischer, Rounds,
Sullivan, Hawley, Heinrich, King, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER
Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
Good afternoon. I would like to welcome everyone to the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee's fourth open hearing of the
116th Congress and our final hearing before the committee
markup for its 2020 National Defense Authorization Act.
We meet today to receive testimony on the Department of
Energy's atomic defense activities and programs.
Appearing before the Subcommittee, we have the Honorable
Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA); the Honorable Anne Marie White,
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management; and
Admiral James Caldwell, Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors
at NNSA.
Thank you all for your service and for being with us today.
We look forward to hearing from each you. Your full statements
will be made part of the record.
We are in the middle of votes right now. The ranking
Member, Senator Heinrich, is waiting to take the second vote
before he returns here to the hearing room. But at this time,
we will hear your opening statements. Administrator, if you
would like to begin.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Chairman Fischer and Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present
the President's fiscal year 2020 budget for the Department of
Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration. It is an honor to
appear before you today proudly representing the extraordinary
team at NNSA, a team that is indispensable for our U.S.
national security.
I am also delighted to share this hearing with my
colleagues,
Admiral Frank Caldwell, my Deputy Administrator for Naval
Reactors, and Assistant Secretary Anne White.
Since I last testified before this committee, NNSA has been
diligently executing our three enduring missions: one, ensuring
the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons
stockpile; two, reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism around the world; and three, providing
nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft
carriers and submarines.
The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA is
an investment in these missions, our infrastructure, and our
people. My priorities with this crucial funding are to
revitalize the U.S. defense plutonium capabilities and other
essential infrastructure, to keep our stockpile life extension
programs on schedule and on budget, and to recruit our
workforce of the future. My focus is on setting the conditions
today for a resilient and responsive nuclear security
enterprise for the next 50 years and beyond.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided a realistic
view of our world, with an evolving and uncertain political
environment. The Nuclear Posture Review states that there is no
margin for further delay in recapitalizing the nuclear security
enterprise, an enterprise comprised of 8 laboratories, plants,
and sites and a dedicated workforce of almost 44,000 employees.
NNSA's $16.5 billion budget request is a necessary
investment when you consider the stakes. Russia and China are
pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities. North Korea's
intentions remain unclear, and we face the most complex and
demanding global security environment since the end of the Cold
War. Accordingly, our fiscal year 2020 budget request
represents the largest increase for our nonproliferation,
counter-proliferation, and counterterrorism programs in the
last 5 years.
During my nomination hearing last year, I stated that my
highest priority was plutonium pit manufacturing, and that has
not changed. For the next several decades, NNSA will rely on a
combination of newly manufactured pits and the judicious use of
existing pits to modernize the existing nuclear weapons
stockpile. A modest pit manufacturing capability is necessary
to ensure the safety and security of refurbished warheads while
maintaining high confidence in stockpile effectiveness.
Consistent with the NPR, the NNSA is committed to producing no
fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030 to meet military
requirements.
Last May, the Nuclear Weapons Council endorsed NNSA's path
forward to recapitalize a production capability that was
shuttered in the early 1990s. Our two-site approach calls for
pit production at both Los Alamos National Laboratory in New
Mexico and the Savannah River site in South Carolina. Following
this strategy, our fiscal year 2020 budget calls for nearly a
$500 million investment in plutonium pit manufacturing
capabilities at Los Alamos, which will remain the Nation's
plutonium center of excellence for research and development.
Thanks to the strong support of Congress, we have stated
construction on the main buildings of the uranium processing
facility at Y-12 National Security Complex. I am proud to
report that this vital undertaking has been on budget and on
schedule for the last 6 years.
Indeed, all of NNSA's enduring missions are underpinned by
the state-of-the-art scientific capabilities. As these
capabilities become more important during this time of renewed
great power competition, NNSA is working to stay ahead of the
technology curve.
A future gap in high performance computing is being
addressed through a joint effort between NNSA and the
Department of Energy's Office of Science. Our contribution to
that effort will be undertaken at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and we will deliver an exoscale computing
platform to the enterprise in 2023.
From the earliest days of the Manhattan Project, the
dedicated men and women of the nuclear security enterprise have
answered our Nation's call. What our team has continued to
accomplish is remarkable. We completed the W76-1 life extension
program under budget and ahead of schedule. We have held 33
countries plus Taiwan to become free of highly enriched
uranium. We routinely deploy nuclear security experts to major
public events like the Super Bowl that keep the public safe
from radiological threats, and we are lending unparalleled
expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program to
ensure sea-based deterrence capabilities for decades to come.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that regardless of the
investments we make to modernize our enterprise, the United
States must continue its investment in our world-class
workforce as requested by the fiscal year 2020 budget. NNSA is
requesting that the current 1,690 full time equivalent (FTE)
and 600 excepted service personnel caps be eliminated in order
to gain flexibility in hiring authorities and to better align
our personnel resources to mission priorities. With an aging
workforce, NNSA has launched an integrated effort to recruit
the next generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians
so that we can continue to answer the Nation's call and meet
tomorrow's challenges. No other government agency can
accomplish these unique missions on behalf of our American
people, and I could not be prouder to represent NNSA today.
Thank you for your continued strong support, the reliable,
flexible, and timely budget that you provided NNSA for the
current fiscal year, and for the opportunity to testify before
you today. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Administrator Gordon-Hagerty
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Secretary Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA appreciates the
Committee's strong support for our nuclear security mission and for the
workforce and organizations that are responsible for executing it every
day.
NNSA's enduring missions are to protect our Nation by maintaining a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global
nuclear threats, and providing the United States (U.S.) Navy's
submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear
propulsion. NNSA has numerous strategic partners that enable,
contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, yet no other government or
civilian organization can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of
the American people.
The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of our national
security and global stability for more than 70 years, and its
credibility serves as the ultimate insurance policy against a nuclear
attack. While the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has been
an aspiration for generations, we must recognize the reality that
foreign nuclear threats are growing. It is imperative that we modernize
the U.S. nuclear deterrent and enterprise; our credibility assures our
friends and allies and deters those who wish us harm.
Thanks to continued strong support from this Administration and
Congress, NNSA is transforming the nuclear security enterprise to be
more responsive and resilient. The following highlights: (1) NNSA's
accomplishments in calendar year 2018; (2) the budget request for NNSA;
(3) Weapons Activities Appropriation; (4) Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation Appropriation; (5) Naval Reactors Appropriation; and
(6) NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses Appropriation.
nnsa's accomplishments in calendar year 2018
Plutonium Pit Production: The highest NNSA infrastructure priority
is re-establishing a plutonium pit production and fabrication
capability to meet the Department of Defense's (DOD) military
requirements. Our national requirement, supported by numerous studies
and analyses, requires no fewer than 80 war-reserve pits per year by
2030. Last May, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed NNSA's
recommended alternative calling for plutonium pit production at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS).
This two-site approach bolsters the nuclear security enterprise's
responsiveness and resiliency.
NNSA's Life Extension Programs (LEPs), Modifications, and
Alteration: In December 2018, NNSA completed the final weapon
refurbishment for the W76-1 LEP, extending the warhead's service life
from 20 years to 60 years. The W80-4 LEP, W87-1 Modification, and the
W76-2 Modification continue to remain on budget and schedule. We also
continue to make progress on the B61-12 LEP and the W88 Alteration 370.
That said, we are currently working through recently identified
challenges that will impact delivery schedules and we are assessing
options with DOD to mitigate delays.
Infrastructure Investments: NNSA commenced construction of the main
buildings of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National
Security Complex (Y-12). UPF remains on budget and on schedule for
delivery by the end of 2025 for no more than $6.5 billion. NNSA also
broke ground on the new Albuquerque Complex, which will house 1,200
employees when complete.
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Working with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China, and Nigeria, NNSA was instrumental
in the conversion of a Nigerian research reactor from HEU to low-
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This marks NNSA's 74th research reactor or
isotope production facility conversion, which was followed by
repatriation of the HEU fuel to China, making Nigeria the 33rd country
plus Taiwan to become HEU free.
Nuclear Material Removal: NNSA removed or confirmed disposition of
more than 280 kilograms of HEU from four countries, enough material for
more than 11 nuclear weapons.
Counterterrorism: NNSA's technical experts were deployed to
numerous widely attended public events such as the Super Bowl and the
Boston Marathon to provide radiation detection, identification, and
technical advice, helping to protect the public from acts of nuclear
and radiological terrorism. This level of support requires NNSA's
response assets to maintain full operational readiness at all times.
Naval Nuclear Propulsion: NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors continued
its record of safe and reliable nuclear propulsion and nuclear fleet
support, while contributing expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-
class program. This next generation nuclear-powered submarine will
ensure required sea-based deterrence capabilities for decades to come.
Supercomputing: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
unveiled the Sierra supercomputer, ranked the second-fastest in the
world according to the Top 500 list.
For more than 70 years, from the early days of the Manhattan
Project to the height of the Cold War, the dedicated men and women of
the nuclear security enterprise have overcome every obstacle in their
way, all while accomplishing a complex and enduring national security
mission. With Congress' continued support, NNSA will similarly overcome
the nuclear security threats that face us today and into the future.
nnsa's fiscal year 2020 budget request
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (2018 NPR) calls for the United
States to have modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear capabilities
that are safe and secure until such a time as nuclear weapons can
prudently be eliminated from the world. All previous NPRs highlighted
the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure, yet the
United States has fallen behind in sustaining a modern infrastructure
that is resilient and has the capacity to respond to unforeseen
threats. Additionally, the 2018 NPR reiterates the United States'
commitment to effective nonproliferation and arms control measures,
both of which are equally important as having a credible deterrent.
For the Nation to retain a credible deterrent and prevent, counter,
and respond to global nuclear security threats, NNSA will require
significant and sustained investments in its nuclear security mission.
In pursuit of these goals, the President's fiscal year 2020 budget
request for NNSA is $16.5 billion. This is an increase of $1.3 billion,
or 8.3 percent, over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Amounts do not reflect the transfer of funds from Naval
Reactors to the Office of Nuclear Energy for maintenance and operation
of the Advanced Test Reactor in fiscal year 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
weapons activities appropriation
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for the Weapons Activities
account is $12.4 billion, an increase of $1.3 billion, or 12 percent,
over fiscal year 2019 request levels. The programs funded in this
account support the Nation's current and future defense posture and the
associated nationwide infrastructure of science, technology,
engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities.
The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their
intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United
States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while
potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons
and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities.
Maintaining the Stockpile
In fiscal year 2019, the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
Program supported certifying to the President for the 23rd consecutive
year that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and
reliable without the need for nuclear explosive testing. This
remarkable scientific achievement is made possible through the work
accomplished by NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and
technicians, and through investments in state-of-the-art diagnostic
tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern facilities.
For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2020 budget
request is $5.4 billion, an increase of $768 million, or 16.5 percent,
over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. Included within this request
is funding to support the LEPs, modifications, and a major alteration.
These modernization efforts are aligned with the needs outlined in the
2018 NPR and approved by the NWC.
W76-1 LEP: The W76-1 LEP, which directly supports the sea-based leg
of the nuclear triad, completed its production run in December 2018.
Close-out activities in fiscal year 2020 include archiving production
tooling and program records, and completing component overbuilds to
support hardware provisioning for the life of the warhead system.
W76-2 Modification Program: The W76-2 is currently on schedule and
on budget. The First Production Unit (FPU) was completed in February
2019. By providing the U.S. an assured ability to respond in kind to a
low-yield nuclear attack, the W76-2 discourages an adversary from
pursuing such an attack and therefore strengthens deterrence. Having
credible response options to a nuclear attack of any magnitude ensures
no adversary mistakenly believes the U.S. would be deterred from
responding to a low-level nuclear attack for fear of escalation.
B61-12 LEP: The B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the
B61 gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of the weapon.
Currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, this LEP has
demonstrated system performance in over 60 integrated ground and flight
tests, including eight joint flight test drops. NNSA has notified your
committee of a technical issue with the B61-12 that we estimate will
delay the FPU. We are aggressively working to minimize the delay and
are working with DOD to coordinate any possible impacts.
W88 Alteration 370: This program, which also supports the sea-based
leg of the nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4, Production
Engineering. NNSA is aggressively managing the FPU for this program,
which was scheduled for December 2019. The same technical issue
impacting the B61-12 LEP will impact the W88 Alteration 370. The length
of the delay to FPU is still being assessed and a number of mitigation
plans are being executed at this time, in coordination with DOD, to
minimize the FPU delay.
W80-4 LEP: In February 2019, the NWC approved the W80-4 LEP to
transition into Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The fiscal year
2020 request for $899 million will allow the W80-4 LEP to remain on
track to achieve FPU completion in fiscal year 2025 in support of the
Air Force's Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile.
W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 program will replace the
aging W78 warhead, with planned first production in 2030 to support
fielding on the U.S. Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
(GBSD) missile system. In September 2018, the NWC authorized restart of
Phase 6.2, Program Feasibility Study, activities on the W78 replacement
warhead and renamed it the W87-1. The W87-1 Modification Program will
improve the warhead's safety and security, addressing design, material
obsolescence, performance, and survivability considerations.
Within DSW, the fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $636
million for Stockpile Systems, an increase of $36 million, or 6.1
percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This program sustains
the stockpile in accordance with the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan by
producing and replacing limited-life components such as neutron
generators and gas transfer systems; conducting maintenance,
surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon reliability; detecting
and anticipating potential weapon issues; and compiling and analyzing
information during the annual assessment process.
The DSW request also includes $1.1 billion for Stockpile Services,
an increase of $76 million, or 7.2 percent, above the fiscal year 2019
enacted level, to support the modernization of capabilities to improve
efficiency of manufacturing operations to meet future requirements.
This request supports all DSW operations by funding programmatic and
infrastructure management, and maintaining the core competencies and
technologies essential for reliable and operable stewardship
capabilities.
The fiscal year 2020 budget for Strategic Materials is necessary to
maintain NNSA's ability to produce nuclear and other strategic
materials associated with its weapons programs, as well as refurbish
and manufacture components made from these materials. This includes
uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium.
Strategic Materials Sustainment: The request of $257 million, an
increase of $41 million, or 18.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2019
enacted level, will develop and implement strategies to maintain the
technical base for strategic materials in support of NNSA's nuclear
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval nuclear propulsion activities at
NNSA's eight sites.
Uranium Program: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $909
million for the Uranium Program is comprised of Uranium Sustainment
($94 million), Process Technology Development ($70 million), and the
UPF project ($745 million). \2\ Uranium Sustainment supports the
program to maintain existing enriched uranium capabilities through
enhanced equipment maintenance while preparing to phase out mission
dependency on Building 9212, a Manhattan Project-era production
facility at Y-12. The funding request will enable NNSA to sustain
uranium manufacturing capabilities while accelerating planning and
execution of the Building 9212 exit strategy to reduce risks associated
with transitioning enriched uranium capabilities to the UPF. Process
Technology Development supports key capability transitions out of
Building 9212, including chip processing, purified metal production,
and recovery of low equity material, into enduring nuclear facilities.
Funding for UPF will support peak construction activities in fiscal
year 2020 and fiscal year 2021. UPF will provide uranium casting,
special oxide production, and salvage and accountability capabilities
for the enterprise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Process Technology Development is funded under the Advanced
Manufacturing Development program, and the UPF project is funded under
Infrastructure and Operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plutonium Sustainment: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $712
million, an increase of $351 million, or 97.2 percent, above the fiscal
year 2019 enacted level, supports continued progress to meet pit
production requirements. The requested funding would support efforts to
begin the long-term plan to develop a capability to produce no fewer
than 80 war-reserve pits per year by 2030, as directed in the 2018 NPR.
The time to move forward is now. Repurposing the Mixed Oxide (MOX)
Fuel Fabrication Facility and producing plutonium pits at SRS and LANL
is the preferred path to achieve the critical DOD requirement of 80
pits per year by 2030. Even though this approach will require NNSA to
fund activities at two sites, any interruption or delay to pit
production in the future due to the lack of resiliency will have huge
cost increases across the entire nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is
investing in the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility. The
agency is executing conceptual design activities for the repurposed MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility and moving forward with National
Environmental Policy Act activities.
NNSA is also investing at LANL to provide all the tools necessary
for the enterprise to successfully support an enduring plutonium pit
production mission to produce 30 pits per year by 2026. NNSA
anticipates $3 billion in total funding over the next five years to
enable this, and LANL is actively installing pit production equipment
and has begun hiring to meet future work scope. As the Nation's
plutonium center of excellence for research and development, LANL plays
a critical role in early design efforts for pit production.
In addition, NNSA's budget request includes funding for the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project at LANL, which
supports our plan to cease operations in buildings dating back to the
Manhattan Project, in the height of the Cold War, and transition to
modern facilities.
Tritium Program: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $269
million, a decrease of $21 million, or 7.3 percent, below the fiscal
year 2019 enacted level, will provide the tritium necessary for
national security requirements. Tritium must be replenished regularly
because it radioactively decays at 5.5 percent per year. Tritium
availability is dependent on both the production of new tritium and the
recovery and recycling of tritium from returned warhead components.
Mission requirements necessitate that tritium production double by the
mid-2020s. NNSA's tritium strategy focuses on increasing tritium
production in Tennessee Valley Authority reactors and modernizing
infrastructure at SRS to support the tritium supply chain.
Lithium Program: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $29
million, a decrease of $335,000, or 1.1 percent below the fiscal year
2019 enacted level, supports a lithium bridging strategy to maintain
the production of lithium. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes
$32 million for the Lithium Processing Facility (LPF), which will
replace 1940s infrastructure at Y-12 and house lithium processing
capabilities by 2030. NNSA completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
for the LPF and is preparing for Critical Decision 1, establishing the
preferred alternative design and estimated budget.
Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE): The fiscal year 2020 budget
request of $140 million, an increase of $90 million, or 180 percent
above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level, will continue efforts to make
available, when needed, the necessary supplies of enriched uranium for
a variety of national security needs. The DUE program schedule is
driven by the nearest-term defense need--unobligated low enriched
uranium for tritium production. Other Departmental needs for enriched
uranium (e.g., research reactors, naval fuel) are supported by this
effort as well.
For Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), the fiscal
year 2020 budget request is $2.3 billion, an increase of $264 million,
or 13.1 percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted levels.
Increases to the Science Program ($587 million) provide additional
funding to support subcritical experiments for pit reuse and advanced
diagnostics for subcritical hydrodynamic integrated weapons experiments
that produce data for stockpile certifications.
The Engineering Program ($234 million) sustains NNSA's capability
for creating and maturing advanced toolsets and technologies to improve
weapon surety and support annual stockpile assessments.
In fiscal year 2020, the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and
High Yield Program ($481 million) will continue to maintain essential
experimental capabilities and expertise in high energy density
stockpile science. These efforts continue to provide data to reduce
uncertainty in calculations of nuclear weapons performance and improve
the predictive capability of science and engineering models in high-
pressure, high-energy, high-density regimes.
The fiscal year 2020 request includes $840 million for the Advanced
Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, which continues NNSA's close
collaboration with DOE's Office of Science to implement the Exascale
Computing Initiative. The ASC Program supports stockpile stewardship by
developing and delivering predictive simulation capabilities for
nuclear weapons systems in addition to deploying increasingly more
powerful supercomputers at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratories.
The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program provides safe, secure
movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon
components to meet projected DOE, DOD, and other customer requirements.
The Office of Secure Transportation has an elite security workforce
that performs sensitive and demanding work; our agents are among the
most highly trained and dedicated national security personnel operating
within the United States. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $317
million, of which $80 million continues our efforts to modernize and
replace the existing fleet of transporters with the Mobile Guardian
Transporter (MGT). The MGT will be used for the containment and
transport of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and/or special
nuclear materials.
Improving Safety, Operations, and Infrastructure
An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons
infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to
shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence
to both allies and potential adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons
capabilities and can help to deter, assure, hedge against adverse
developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms competition.
More than half of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old, and
roughly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. It will take
sustained, significant resources to modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
Thanks to the support of the Administration and Congress, NNSA is
making progress in repairing, replacing, and modernizing NNSA's
facilities and stabilizing deferred maintenance; yet much more remains
to be done. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Infrastructure and
Operations is $3.2 billion, an increase of $121 million, or 3.9 percent
above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. It includes $1.1 billion for
line item construction and over $580 million for minor construction and
equipment recapitalization needs. Delivering these projects on budget
and schedule is contingent upon stable and predictable funding
profiles, and support for the President's budget request.
Many of NNSA's excess process-contaminated facilities will
ultimately be transferred to DOE's Office of Environmental Management
(EM) for disposition. For example, EM commenced efforts to remove
Building 280 Pool Type Reactor and ancillary facilities at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. NNSA identified five (including Building
280) of the top ten highest risk excess facilities at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory.
In the interim, NNSA is focusing on reducing risks where possible.
NNSA has made critical investments to stabilize high-risk process-
contaminated facilities until ultimate disposition, including at Y-12's
Alpha 5 and Beta 4 facilities. In fiscal year 2020, NNSA is using the
authority Congress provided in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) to pursue disposition of several high-risk
process-contaminated excess facilities with a project cost of less than
$50 million. NNSA also remains committed to reducing the risk of non-
process contaminated facilities by dispositioning facilities where
possible. For example, NNSA completed the Pantex Drummond Office
Building (formerly known as the Administrative Support Complex) at the
Pantex Plant outside of Amarillo, Texas in 2018. This building provides
1,000 employees with modern, energy efficient workspace. As a result,
NNSA is now disposing of dilapidated, 1950s-era buildings and
eliminating approximately $20 million in deferred maintenance. In
fiscal year 2020, NNSA plans to fund the disposition of 24 additional
facilities totaling 75,000 gross square feet.
Defense Nuclear Security's fiscal year 2020 budget request is $778
million, an increase of $88 million, or 12.7 percent, over the fiscal
year 2019 enacted amount. To execute its enterprise security program,
DNS provides funding to the sites for: protective forces; physical
security systems; information security and technical security;
personnel security; nuclear material control and accountability; and
security program operations and planning. While NNSA faces challenges
replacing and refreshing aging physical security infrastructure, we are
making key investments in recapitalizing this infrastructure through
the Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP). SIRP
projects address aging high-priority security systems and related
security infrastructure and equipment needs at all NNSA sites. NNSA
will continue to execute ongoing line-item security projects as well,
including the effort to reduce the Y-12 Protected Area and use security
resources more efficiently. In addition, NNSA will sustain counter
unmanned aircraft systems implementation and operation at sites
possessing Category 0/I quantities of special nuclear material.
Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every element of
NNSA's missions. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $309 million,
an increase of $88 million, or 40 percent over the fiscal year 2019
request. This increase will continue cybersecurity enhancements,
bolster cybersecurity capabilities, and support the continuation of IT
modernization efforts. NNSA is making steady progress in enhancing and
upgrading the components of the Enterprise Secure Computing environment
to ensure that nuclear security enterprise missions can be completed
without disruption. As NNSA mission requirements expand in scope, the
IT and cyber programs require modernization, expansion, and innovation
in a commensurate fashion. Cybersecurity is a defense and deterrence
mechanism and a powerful tool. In the current threat environment, NNSA
cannot afford to neglect its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as
frontline assets that protect the information, systems, and networks
NNSA depends on to execute our mission.
defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account is $2 billion, an increase of $63 million, or
3.3 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 request. Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation account activities address the entire nuclear threat
spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to nuclear and
radiological incidents around the world. The fiscal year 2020 budget
request funds two program mission areas under this account: the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Program and the Nuclear Counterterrorism
and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program.
Nonproliferation Efforts
The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation works to: remove or
eliminate vulnerable nuclear material; improve global nuclear security
through multilateral and bilateral technical exchanges and training
workshops; help prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radioactive materials; secure domestic and international civilian
buildings containing high-priority radioactive material; provide
technical reviews of U.S. export license applications; conduct export
control training sessions for U.S. enforcement agencies and
international partners; strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect and
deter nuclear proliferation; advance U.S. capabilities to monitor arms
control treaties and detect foreign nuclear programs; and maintain
organizational readiness to respond to and mitigate radiological or
nuclear incidents worldwide.
The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program provides an
integrated approach to addressing the risk posed by nuclear materials.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $334 million, an increase of $40
million, or 13.5, percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. The
request supports the conversion or shut-down of research reactors and
isotope production facilities that use HEU and the acceleration of
developing new, non HEU-based molybdenum-99 production technologies in
the United States. Additionally, the request for M3 supports the
removal and disposal of weapons-usable nuclear material, with priority
on expediting the removal of surplus plutonium from the State of South
Carolina and continuing the transition to the dilute and dispose
strategy for surplus plutonium disposition.
The Global Material Security program works with partner nations to
increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials
and improve the ability to deter, detect, and investigate illicit
trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year 2020 budget request of
$342 million, a decrease of $65 million, or 15.9 percent, below the
fiscal year 2019 enacted level and includes efforts to secure the most
at-risk radioactive material in U.S. high-threat urban areas by the end
of fiscal year 2020.
The Nonproliferation and Arms Control program develops and
implements programs to: strengthen international nuclear safeguards;
control the proliferation of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment,
technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with
nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; and address
enduring and emerging proliferation challenges requiring the
development of innovative policies and approaches. The fiscal year 2020
budget request for this program is $137 million, an increase of $6
million, or 5.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This
increase serves to advance and complete development of the new Export
Compliance Assistance Program to deploy export control training across
DOE and NNSA facilities, implement new 10 CFR Part 810 civil penalty
authority pursuant to the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, and establish and
maintain a nonproliferation enrichment testing and training platform in
cooperation with the IAEA and select foreign partners.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development
program supports innovative unilateral and multilateral technical
capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear
weapons programs, illicit diversion of special nuclear material, and
nuclear detonations worldwide. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for
this program is $495 million, a decrease of $80 million, or 13.9
percent, below the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This decrease is due
to shifting the HEU Reactor Conversion program to M3, as it is no
longer in the research and development phase.
Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
DNN projects. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $299 million, an
increase of $79 million, or 35.9 percent, above the fiscal year 2019
enacted level. Last year, NNSA terminated activities for the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility project to pursue the dilute and dispose option to
fulfill the U.S. commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium.
The $220 million for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility will be used to
continue termination activities. The request also includes $79 million
for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition project, which supports the
dilute and dispose strategy.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR)
The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or
radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the
unique technical expertise found in NNSA's nuclear security enterprise.
Highly trained personnel with specialized technical equipment maintain
readiness to support lead federal agencies to find and render safe
potential nuclear and radiological threat devices, to effectively
manage the consequences of nuclear or radiological emergencies, and to
support enhanced security operations for National Security Special
Events (NSSE).
NNSA's Aerial Measuring System (AMS) provides airborne remote
sensing in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident or incident
within the continental United States, as well as in support of
regularly scheduled NSSE. The AMS fleet consists of three Beechcraft
B200 fixed-wing aircraft with an average age of 33 years and two Bell
412 helicopters with an average age of 24 years. The age of the current
aircraft leads to unscheduled downtime resulting in reduced mission
availability. A 2017 AOA on the AMS aircraft determined that
recapitalization of the aging aircraft fleet is necessary to continue
to provide Federal, State, and local officials with rapid radiological
information following an accident or incident. In fiscal year 2019, the
fixed-wing aircraft will be replaced, and the rotary-wing aircraft will
be replaced in fiscal year 2020. The fiscal year 2020 budget request
for AMS recapitalization is $35.5 million.
NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), supports render safe teams at FBI field offices in 11 major
American cities that are specially trained and equipped to identify and
mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device (i.e,
``stabilization''). CTCP will conduct stabilization training and
operations and begin transitioning to the Capability Forward
initiative, under which lifesaving responses to a nuclear threat device
will be accelerated. Under this initiative, NNSA will provide
additional training, equipment, and technical support to the current 11
stabilization cities--eventually growing to 14 U.S. cities by fiscal
year 2022--to allow FBI teams to execute render safe operations more
rapidly. CTCP will also improve and expand NNSA training facilities to
accommodate the increased training requirements associated with
regional render safe capabilities.
The Nation's nuclear incident response teams require the ability to
communicate classified technical assessments in deployed, and often
austere, environments using highly secure means. Information
requirements encompass both nuclear device design information and
intelligence assessments. The equipment used by NNSA's nuclear incident
response teams is aging, resulting in increasing maintenance costs and
heightened risks to the emergency response mission. This budget
includes funding for recapitalization of incident response equipment
consistent with lifecycle planning to maintain operational readiness.
The budget also includes funding for state-of-the-art, secure,
deployable communications systems that are interoperable with FBI and
DOD mission partners that will help provide decision makers with real-
time technical recommendations to mitigate nuclear terrorist threats.
CTCP maintains an operational nuclear forensics capability in three
distinct areas: (1) pre-detonation device disassembly and examination;
(2) post-detonation assessment; and (3) analysis and characterization
of nuclear materials. The program maintains readiness to deploy device
disposition and device assessment teams, conduct laboratory operations
in support of analysis of bulk actinide forensics, and deploy subject
matter expertise and operational capabilities in support of ground
sample collections that support attribution of a nuclear detonation.
The Emergency Operations program's fiscal year 2020 budget request
includes $35.5 million under NCTIR to support NNSA's Office of
Emergency Operations. This funding will support NNSA's all-hazard
emergency response capabilities that positively impact the Department's
emergency management continuity and devolution programs, enhance the
ability of the Department to respond to, and recover from, catastrophic
emergencies or other man-made hazards or natural disasters.
naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of submarines and
aircraft carriers is critical to the security of the United States and
its allies as well as the security of global sea lanes. The Office of
Naval Reactors remains at the forefront of technological developments
in naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new technologies and
improvements in naval reactor performance. This preeminence provides
the U.S. Navy with a commanding edge in naval warfighting capabilities.
The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2020 budget request is $1.65
billion, a decrease of $140 million or approximately 8 percent, below
the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This request reflects reductions to
planned funding levels following additional funding enacted in fiscal
year 2018 for the S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul and Spent Fuel
Handling Recapitalization Project. In addition to supporting today's
operational fleet, the requested funding is the foundation for Naval
Reactors to deliver tomorrow's fleet and recruit and retain a highly-
skilled workforce. One of Naval Reactors' three national priority
projects, continuing design and development of the reactor plant for
the Columbia-class submarine, featuring a life-of-ship core and
electric drive, will replace the current Ohio-class fleet and provide
required deterrence capabilities for decades. The project to refuel a
research and training reactor in New York will enable 20 more years of
research, development, and training for fleet operators. Funding will
also be used to support construction of a new spent fuel handling
facility in Idaho that will facilitate long term, reliable processing
and packaging of spent nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers and
submarines.
Naval Reactors has requested funding in fiscal year 2020 to support
these projects and fund necessary reactor technology development,
equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical
infrastructure and facilities. By employing a small but high-performing
technical base, the teams at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring
Site in New York; and the spent nuclear fuel facilities in Idaho can
perform the research and development, analysis, engineering, and
testing needed to support today's fleet at sea and develop future
nuclear-powered warships. These laboratories also perform the technical
evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess emergent
issues and deliver timely responses to provide nuclear safety and
maximize operational flexibility.
nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Federal Salaries and
Expenses is $435 million, an increase of $25 million, or 6.0 percent,
over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. The 2018 NPR highlighted the
need to properly support civilian personnel who protect the United
States against nuclear threats. Effective deterrence would be
impossible without the vital contributions our personnel make to the
United States' nuclear capabilities and deterrence. NNSA's workforce is
critical to the success of the Nation's nuclear security enterprise.
NNSA must have a sufficient workforce, with the right capabilities, to
ensure we can modernize the nuclear deterrent, recapitalize an aging
infrastructure, and continue to meet the requirements of our
nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs. To effectively
accomplish our mission deliverables, NNSA's workforce must be aligned
to meet the mission needs of today and those in future.
NNSA's expanding and challenging national security missions require
it to recruit, train, and retain a highly skilled and dedicated federal
employee and Management and Operating (M&O) contract workforce. A
skilled federal workforce is required to execute appropriate program
and project oversight as the nuclear security enterprise is busier than
it has been since the end of the Cold War. However, funding alone is
not the only thing needed. NNSA must continue to provide its highly-
talented men and women with the tools necessary to support their work,
including providing the necessary human resource authorities to
attract, recruit, and retain its world-class workforce. To validate the
size of the federal workforce needed to execute our mission, NNSA
engaged in a multiyear effort to critically analyze its manpower
requirements. Within the past year, the Office of Personnel Management
and NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation both
independently determined the need to significantly increase federal
staffing levels.
The number of additional staff recommended in both studies would
exceed the statutory cap on NNSA's full-time equivalent employees. In
March 2019, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) endorsed both
OPM and CEPE's staffing analyses' conclusions and recommended that
Congress work with NNSA on the statutory staffing cap to ensure it is
consistent with our federal human capital requirements to meet the
evolving needs of the mission. These studies, and GAO's recommendations
in particular, support NNSA's request to eliminate the current 1,690
FTE and 600 Excepted Service personnel caps to achieve greater
flexibility in hiring authorities. Eliminating both of these caps and
matching our Federal Salaries and Expenses budget request would allow
the NNSA to align personnel resources to mission priorities. This is
more pressing now because the OPM staffing study was conducted before
new requirements from the 2018 NPR and multi-site plutonium pit
production approach were endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council in May
2018.
Management and Performance
Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $2 billion in
projects, a significant portion of NNSA's total project portfolio,
under budget. We are committed to encouraging competition and
increasing the universe of qualified contractors by streamlining major
acquisition processes. NNSA will continue to focus on delivering
timely, best-value acquisition solutions for all programs and projects,
by using a tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that
are appropriate for the special missions and risks at each site. NNSA's
Office of Acquisition and Project Management continues to: lead
improvements in contract and project management practices; provide
clear lines of authority and accountability for program and project
managers; improve cost and schedule performance; and ensure that
Federal Project Directors and Contracting Officers possess the
appropriate skill mix and professional certifications to manage NNSA's
work.
Conclusion
NNSA's diverse missions are critical to the national security of
the United States: maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and
effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and
providing naval nuclear propulsion to the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft
carriers and submarines. NNSA is mindful of its obligation to improve
acquisition, safety, and security practices continually, and to use in
a responsible manner, the resources entrusted to it by Congress and the
American people. By investing in our nuclear security enterprise and
continuing our efforts to modernize our scientific, technical, and
engineering capabilities and infrastructure, NNSA will continue to
deliver on its nuclear security mission.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Secretary White, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE MARIE WHITE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
Secretary White. Chairman Fischer and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $6.5 billion
demonstrates the Administration's commitment to tackling the
environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production that helped
end World War II and the Cold War.
Madam Chair, since the Office of Environmental Management's
(EM's) inception, our dedicated workforce has cleaned and
closed sites, dramatically reducing the EM footprint from 107
sites to just 16. Progress continues at every site.
Last month, I was in New Mexico with Ranking Member
Heinrich to mark the 20th anniversary of the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP), our key facility for final disposition of
transuranic waste across the EM complex. I saw firsthand
progress on a number of vital infrastructure projects at WIPP,
including upgrades to electrical, fire suppression, and
compressed air systems. WIPP not only has an amazing history to
celebrate but a very bright future ahead.
Over the course of the last year, workers in South Carolina
at the Savannah River site (SRS) consolidated more than 400,000
cubic yards of coal ash and ash contaminated soil. They got it
done safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 million
and earning them the Project Management Institute Award for
project excellence.
For the first time in the history of the Savannah River
site, EM is processing two salt waste streams at the site. With
help from the parallel processing systems, now more than 10
million gallons of salt waste have been processed since salt
decontamination operations began at SRS.
At Oak Ridge, we took another significant step towards
large-scale cleanup at the Y-12 site.
During my confirmation hearings, I committed to enhance
safety through risk mitigation and cleanup and to address
overall taxpayer liability. That is precisely what I have
focused on during my first year on the job. We are getting a
clear picture of EM liabilities for the first time. We are
increasing accountability to Congress and to the American
people through stronger project management and oversight. That
includes addressing issues long raised by the Government
Accountability Office.
There are opportunities with the potential to get cleanup
projects done and off the books safely, sooner, and at a
reasonable cost. The Department is evaluating these
opportunities, including new technologies, treatment options,
and disposal capabilities in a comprehensive way. Following on
recommendations from wide-ranging and nonpartisan outside
groups, the Department is evaluating its interpretation of the
statutory term ``high level radioactive waste.''
EM is also taking steps to get the best value out of every
cleanup dollar that Congress provides. That includes
identifying impactful regulatory reforms and improving
procurements through a new end-state contracting model.
As EM is put on a sustainable path forward, the budget
request provides the resources to build upon recent successes
and bring a renewed sense of urgency to the program. The
request provides the resources to make progress on cleanup
activities across the complex, including addressing radioactive
tank waste at the Savannah River site and driving the direct
feed low activity waste approach to initiate Hanford tank waste
treatment.
At Los Alamos, funding is included to initiate two
transuranic waste processing lines, complete characterization
of the high explosive plume in Canyon de Valle and implement
the full interim measure for the chromium plume.
In the interest of time, I will stop there and just note
that more details about the work we have planned are provided
in my written testimony.
EM's historical successes have been achieved through the
dedication of leaders on both sides of the aisle with a
uniformity of purpose to drive the cleanup mission towards
completion. I want to work with Congress to clean up these
sites so that our host communities can envision a vibrant
future with diverse and enduring economic opportunities.
I appreciate this opportunity and the Subcommittee's
support of the EM mission.
[The prepared statement of Secretary White follows:]
Prepared Statement by Anne Marie White
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to represent the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental
Management (EM). I would like to provide you with an overview of the EM
program, key accomplishments during the past year, and planned
accomplishments through the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget request
of $6.5 billion, which includes $5.5 billion in Defense Environmental
Cleanup funding.
The request demonstrates the Administration's continued commitment
to the vital mission of EM to address the environmental legacy of
nuclear weapons production that helped end World War II and the Cold
War.
This legacy is one that includes challenges like the safe
disposition of radioactive wastes; the management of spent nuclear fuel
and special nuclear material; the cleanup of contaminated soil and
groundwater; and the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of
thousands of excess facilities.
Madam Chair, this year marks the 30th anniversary of the EM
program. Since its inception, our dedicated workforce has worked
effectively to reduce the footprint of the cleanup program from 107
sites comprising a total of 3,100 square miles to just 16 sites, with
an active cleanup footprint of less than 300 square miles.
While it does not always make headline news, we are sustaining
progress at each of our EM sites, and we have realized a set of key
accomplishments over the past year.
Last month I was out in New Mexico with Ranking Member Heinrich to
mark the 20th Anniversary of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP),
our key facility for final disposition of transuranic waste across the
EM complex.
I had the opportunity to see firsthand progress on a number of
vital infrastructure projects at WIPP, which include upgrades to
electrical, fire suppression, and compressed air systems.
From there I headed to Los Alamos where I received an update on the
early success of the chromium plume interim measure.
Over the past year, EM took another significant step towards large-
scale cleanup at the Y-12 site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, by removing
over 3 tons of mercury from equipment and completing all of the site
preparation required for construction of the new Mercury Treatment
Facility. This vital infrastructure will help EM fulfill a commitment
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of
Tennessee to reduce the levels of mercury leaving the Y-12 facility.
Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000 cubic
yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the Savannah River Site.
They completed it safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9
million.
For the first time in the history of the Savannah River Site (SRS),
EM is processing two salt waste streams at the site. With help from the
parallel processing streams, now more than 10 million gallons of salt
waste have been processed since salt-decontamination operations began
at SRS. The waste is being processed through two salt-decontamination
operations: an integrated interim salt processing operation called the
Actinide Removal Process and the Modular Caustic Side Solvent
Extraction Unit, and a newly implemented process called Tank Closure
Cesium Removal.
Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000 cubic
yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the SRS. They completed
it safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 million.
At Hanford, EM continued hot cell cleanup and workers began
installing equipment to excavate highly contaminated soil under the 324
Building. This facility operated from 1966 to 1996 and supported
research involving radioactive materials.
From my time in industry, I understand where cleanup work gets
done. It is out in the field. Our men and women on the ground are doing
a great job and making progress--but we must do more.
Despite this great work and the important federal investment year
after year, EM faces significant challenges. Cleanup progress is being
significantly outpaced by environmental liabilities.
Even with significant budgets, EM is swimming upstream as we gear
up to tackle some of our remaining toughest challenges. Simply throwing
more taxpayer dollars into EM will not address these challenges.
This Administration, and the Secretary of Energy's senior
leadership team are taking action to ensure the sustainability of the
EM program and address issues long-raised by the Government
Accountability Office.
Since the inception of the EM program, our knowledge and technology
have matured significantly. We need to employ a sustainable completion-
centric cleanup approach, using the latest knowledge in waste
composition, risks, and attainable end states. We need to pursue
cleanup in a manner that properly incentivizes performance, strengthens
oversight, and delivers results.
EM is committed to working in a collaborative manner with Congress
and others toward a future that will not simply enable the cleanup
program to continue--but will propel the mission forward and drive it
toward completion and closure. The Subcommittee will see EM focus on
strengthening program management, oversight, and accountability to
ensure value for the American taxpayer.
That starts with abandoning vague notions of our challenges and
truly getting to the bottom of what we are dealing with using accurate
up-to-date information.
Work must be prioritized based on real risks and sound science,
rather than perceived risks or soundbites.
There are some real potential improvements for how EM treats and
disposes of waste safely, quickly, and cost-effectively. The Department
has a responsibility to carefully evaluate these options, including new
technologies, treatment options, and disposal capabilities that did not
exist when cleanup plans were first developed.
To that end, EM is looking 10 years out at what the barriers are
and how they could be mitigated for faster completion. We are
developing site options analyses to identify opportunities to complete
cleanup work through more efficient, innovative, or novel approaches
over the next decade. This includes considering the range of
possibilities in terms of what could be achieved at sites across the
complex if we are willing to reassess our assumptions, consider new
approaches and disposal options, and just think outside the box.
EM will soon complete site options assessments and we look forward
to engaging with Congress as well as stakeholders and regulators
throughout the cleanup community on the best ways to move forward.
As announced in a Federal Register notice in October 2018, the
Department is evaluating its interpretation of the statutory term high-
level radioactive waste. In the notice, the Department sought public
comment on an interpretation that would classify high-level radioactive
waste based on its actual radiological content and associated risks
rather than solely on the source of the waste. If implemented, this
would bring the U.S. more in line with the rest of the world, and be
consistent with many reports and recommendations from wide-ranging and
non-partisan outside groups. It is important to note this is the first
step in a process that must comply with existing programmatic and
regulatory requirements and law. The Department's consideration of a
new interpretation does not alter or abrogate the Department's
responsibilities or policies under existing regulatory requirements or
agreements.
EM is also taking steps to get the best value out of every cleanup
dollar that Congress provides.
Consistent with the Deputy Secretary's initiative on regulatory
reform, I have directed staff and the field to look at opportunities
for change.
Based on my experience in the field, this will lead to an enhanced
safety culture because many of the reforms are common sense approaches
that can streamline our work.
EM is focused on driving down the operating and maintenance costs
for its facilities, which represent a significant portion of EM's
annual budget that could otherwise be used for actual cleanup work.
As project lifecycle schedules drag out, aging facilities'
components and equipment are stretching resources. We can either invest
money towards cleanup or we can maintain aging facilities and build new
facilities, but we cannot do it all.
One of the most transformative initiatives is in the area of
contracting. EM has billions of dollars in procurements coming up at
some of our largest sites over the next few years, representing a
significant opportunity to improve our procurement processes, contract
management, and oversight performance.
In February, the Department released Final Requests for Proposals
for the first two contracts that are representative of this new ``end-
state contract'' model. Proposals from offerors are currently being
evaluated for award later this summer.
End-state contracting is not a contract type but an approach to
creating meaningful and visible progress through defined end-states,
even at sites with completion dates far into the future. This is
intended to create and motivate a culture of completion.
Madam Chair, this new approach to procurement; the discussions we
are having on the regulatory front; the ongoing options analyses; and
the funding proposed in the fiscal year 2020 budget request, will yield
impactful results.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for EM is $6.5 billion, which
includes $5.5 billion for defense environmental cleanup activities;
$247 million; for non-defense environmental cleanup activities; and
$715 million for Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning
Fund cleanup activities.
As EM is put on a sustainable path forward, the fiscal year 2020
budget request provides the resources to build upon recent successes,
bring a renewed sense of urgency to the program, and enable meaningful,
measurable progress to projects and sites throughout the cleanup
complex.
From day one, the Secretary of Energy has made the environmental
cleanup mission a key priority for the Department of Energy.
EM's 2020 budget request provides the resources to make progress on
cleanup activities across the complex, including increasing efforts to
address radioactive tank waste at the Savannah River Site through
start-up of the Salt Waste Processing Facility and continued
construction activities for Saltstone Disposal Units.
At Hanford's Office of River Protection, the budget drives the
focus on the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste approach to initiate tank
waste treatment by December 2023.
Resources are also provided for Hanford's Richland Operations
Office for work on River Corridor decontamination and decommissioning
activities including remediation of the highly contaminated 300-296
waste site under the 324 Building.
At Oak Ridge, the request advances construction on the Outfall 200
Mercury Treatment Facility, continues deactivation and demolition of
remaining facilities at the East Tennessee Technology Park, and
continues preparation of Building 2026 to support processing the
remaining U-233 material at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
The budget includes funding to initiate two transuranic waste
processing lines, complete characterization of the high explosives
plume in Canon de Valle, and implement the full interim measure for the
chromium plume at Los Alamos in New Mexico.
At SPRU in New York, EM would be able to complete verification of
cleanup, site restoration, and closeout activities.
Together, these investments for environmental management will
enable EM to make significant progress in fulfilling its cleanup
responsibilities.
EM's greatest successes have historically been achieved through the
hard work and dedication of leaders on both sides of the aisle who are
determined to get big things done. I want to express my desire to work
with the Congress towards a future that propels the EM mission forward
and drives cleanup toward safe completion, sooner, and in a cost-
conscious manner.
budget authority and planned accomplishments for selected sites
Office of River Protection, Washington
(Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$1,573,000 $1,392,460
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
Initiate cold commissioning of the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant to support Low Activity Waste Facility hot
commissioning and production operations by December 31, 2023.
Design and construct tank farm facility upgrades (i.e.
222-S Laboratory, 242-A Evaporator and the Effluent Treatment Facility)
for staging waste in 2021 for Waste Treatment Plant operations.
Incorporate lessons learned from Savannah River cesium
processing to facilitate fabrication, testing and delivery of the Tank-
Side Cesium Removal System to pretreat waste for the LAW Facility.
Perform tank integrity activities to ensure adequate
double shell tank space is available for Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
(DFLAW) operations and AX retrievals.
Complete retrieval of single shell tank AX-102 by 2021 in
support of the corresponding Consent Decree milestone.
Advance a production-scale offsite disposition path for
tank waste. utilizing the regulatory pathways created by Test Bed
Initiative
Hanford Tank Closure End-State Contract scheduled for
award in Q4 2019 incentivizes risk-based cleanup that reduces financial
liability.
Richland Operations Office, Washington
(Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$954,097 $718,098
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
Reduce risk and facility costs by supporting construction
activities for future relocation of Cesium & Strontium capsules to dry
storage by the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) due date of August 2025.
Shrink the extent of radiological and chemical
contamination in groundwater at Hanford through treatment of 2.2
billion gallons.
Complete 324 Building structural modifications, removal
of the hot cell floor, and readiness review activities for start of
soil removal for remediation of the 300-296 waste site below the
building.
Hanford Central Plateau Cleanup End-State Contract
scheduled for award in Q4 2019 incentivizes risk-based cleanup that
reduces financial liability.
Savannah River Site, South Carolina
(Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1,551,014 $1,642,509
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
Complete removal of material-at-risk from Building 235-F
which addresses remaining activities in accordance with Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board Implementation Plan to reduce residual
Plutonium 238.
Liquid Waste/Salt Waste Processing:
Supports Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) start of
radioactive operations necessary to meet State commitments and advance
completion of cleanup mission
Enables waste removal preparation activities required
to support SWPF planned operations rate greater than current rate for
salt waste processing, allowing tank closure to proceed at a more rapid
pace.
Continues construction of Saltstone Disposal Unit 7 and
initiate construction of Saltstone Disposal Units 8/9 and design of
Saltstone Disposal Units 10-12 to support SWPF planned rates.
Funding to initiate the Savannah River National
Laboratory's Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative facility (AMC)
Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho
(Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$443,200 $347,654
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
Complete exhumations at Accelerated Retrieval Project
area in support of meeting regulatory milestone to retrieve, process
and dispose of targeted buried waste by 2023.
Initiate hot operations of Integrated Waste Treatment
Unit, pending successful demonstrations of the phase 2 simulant run
number 3 and phase 3 performance run, to begin treating liquid sodium-
bearing waste leading to closure of the final 3 liquid waste tanks.
Complete processing and packaging of legacy transuranic
waste so that it is ready for certification and shipment.
Idaho Cleanup Project End-State Contract scheduled for
award in Q2 2020 incentivizes risk based cleanup that reduces financial
liability.
Oak Ridge Site, Tennessee
(Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$646,281 $428,875
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
Complete demolition of 90 percent of East Tennessee
Technology Park facilities and continue environmental remediation work.
Complete processing contact-handled and remote-handled
legacy transuranic debris waste inventory.
Complete construction of transuranic sludge processing
test area.
Complete preparation of Building 2026 for processing
remaining U-233 material.
Complete second of four years of construction of the
Mercury Treatment Facility.
Complete preliminary design and early site preparation of
On-Site Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act Disposal Facility.
Oak Ridge Reservation Cleanup Contract End-State Contract
scheduled for award in Q3 2020 incentivizes risk based cleanup that
reduces financial liability.
Carlsbad Field Office, New Mexico
(Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$403,487 $398,334
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
At Waste Isolation Pilot Plan (WIPP):
Support receipt of up to 10 shipments of transuranic
waste per week.
Continue construction progress on Safety Significant
Confinement Ventilation System (15-D-411) and on Utility Shaft
(formerly Exhaust Shaft) (15-D-412).
Complete two infrastructure recapitalizations (public
address system and electrical substations).
Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$220,000 $195,462
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
Commence operations in two (of three planned) TRU
processing lines to treat waste for shipment to WIPP.
Reduce risk by completing 850 shipments of TRU waste to
WIPP.
Complete characterization of RDX (high explosives) plume
beneath Canon de Valle and continue activities to determine final
remedy.
Prevent migration of Chromium plume offsite by
implementing a hydraulic barrier.
Continue investigation and cleanup activities required to
meet Consent Order milestones.
Continue groundwater and surface water sampling to remain
compliant with the Consent Order and Individual Permit.
Nevada National Security Site, Nevada
(Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$60,136 $60,737
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
Complete closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97 Yucca
Flat/Climax Mine.
Complete 3 percent for a total of 66 percent towards the
closure of CAUs 101/102 Central and Western Pahute Mesa.
Initiate and complete 18 percent towards the installation
of 4 post-closure monitoring network wells for CAUs 97 Yucca Flat/
Climax Mine and 99 Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain.
Conduct annual post-closure monitoring and maintenance of
197 closed-in-place contaminated soil and industrial-type sites.
Conduct annual post-closure sampling, monitoring and
maintenance at 16 well locations associated with 76 closed-in-place
contaminated groundwater sites.
Operate DOE-owned waste disposal facility with the
capability to receive between 1.2 to 1.5 million cubic feet of low-
level and mixed low-level waste in support of cleanup activities across
the DOE complex.
Maintain Nevada's Agreements in Principal and grants and
provide funds for the Low-Level waste fee agreement.
Nevada Environmental Program Multiple Award Small
Business End State Contract scheduled for award in Q2 2020 incentivizes
risk based cleanup that reduces financial liability.
Senator Heinrich [presiding]. Admiral?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL, JR., USN, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Caldwell. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify here today.
I also thank the subcommittee for consistently supporting
Naval Reactors, enabling my team to provide the Navy with
propulsion plants that give our nuclear-powered warships the
incredible advantage of unmatched reliability, speed, and
endurance to carry our national security missions around the
world.
Our National Security Strategy and National Defense
Strategy recognize the increasingly complex global security
environment marked by the reemergence of great power
competition, and these also recognize the erosion of our
competitive advantage. The Chief of Naval Operations has made
it clear that the Navy must become more agile, must compete in
ways that are sustainable, and must be prepared to control the
high end of maritime conflict.
Our nuclear Navy is essential in achieving these
objectives. Today, nearly 45 percent of our Navy's major
combatants are nuclear-powered, including 11 aircraft carriers
and 69 submarines. In 2018, Naval Reactors supported the
operations of the nuclear fleet, including 22 submarine
deployments, 36 strategic deterrent patrols, and 5 aircraft
carrier deployments.
Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal year 2020 is
$1.65 billion, a reduction of $140 million from last year's
request, or 7.8 percent from the fiscal year 2019 request. Our
budget fully supports three national priority projects.
The first project supports the Navy's number one
acquisition priority by developing the new propulsion plant for
the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine which will
feature a life-of-ship reactor core. That core is made possible
by the reactor technologies developed over many decades.
Because of your support, the Navy began procuring long lead
propulsion plant equipment for the lead ship this fiscal year
as planned, and we will begin manufacturing the Columbia-class
reactor core later this year.
The second project is refueling and overhauling a research
and training reactor in New York. There is a dual benefit to
this effort; first, facilitating the reactor development for
the Columbia-class and, second, providing 20 years of training
for nuclear operators.
The third project consists of the naval spent fuel handling
facility in Idaho which will enable long-term, reliable
processing and packaging of spent naval nuclear fuel from Navy
nuclear propulsion plants.
This year's budget also invests in three key areas: first,
developing advanced reactor technology for future classes of
nuclear-powered warships; recapitalizing vital laboratory
facilities and infrastructure; and also remediating efforts to
reduce environmental liabilities of legacy facilities.
I want to assure the Subcommittee that our planning efforts
are done with rigor. Investments we make today in research and
development not only advance Navy warfighting capabilities but
also result in cost savings and improve capability for the
fleet far into the future.
I understand the difficult budget environment in which
Congress must craft legislation, and I respectfully urge your
support of our fiscal year 2020 budget request. Thank you for
this committee's longstanding support. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today and present the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget
Request for Naval Reactors. Your strong support for the work we do
ensures our nuclear Navy has the power and propulsion to carry out
missions around the world.
This past year marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program under the leadership of Admiral Hyman
Rickover. In 1955, just seven years after the creation of our program,
the first nuclear-powered warship, USS Nautilus (SSN 571) reported
``Underway on nuclear power''. Since Nautilus, follow-on classes of
ever more capable nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers have
ensured our warfighting edge over potential adversaries. Reactor core
lives have increased from just under two years to over 40 years. Our
ballistic missile submarines have provided the most survivable leg of
our nuclear triad for nearly six decades and are essential to our
ability to deter major warfare and assure our allies. Our fast attack
submarines operate virtually undetected, safeguard vital commercial
sea-lanes, and stand ready to protect American interests. Our aircraft
carriers--4.5 acres of sovereign territory--provide our Nation
unparalleled mobility and the sustained ability to project combat
power, deter conflict, and protect our interests.
Today's security environment is dynamic and challenging, best
characterized as a return to great power competition. In the maritime
domain, nuclear propulsion enables the Navy to conduct missions vital
to national security by providing unmatched mobility, flexibility,
responsiveness, and endurance. These key attributes ensure our nuclear
fleet can meet the demands of forward presence and crisis response
world-wide. Today, nearly 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants are
nuclear-powered (11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines,
50 attack submarines, and four guided missile submarines).
Last year, with Naval Reactors support, the Navy deployed 22
submarines and conducted 36 strategic deterrent patrols. At any given
time, there were at least 47 submarines deployed or ready to deploy
within days. Our carriers, USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), USS Theodore
Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), USS Harry S. Truman
(CVN 75), and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) deployed during 2018. This
past December, USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) successfully concluded a
historic, two-part deployment as part of the implementation of the
Dynamic Force Employment plan, demonstrating our Navy's ability to be
more agile and operationally unpredictable to potential adversaries.
In submarine shipbuilding, the Navy recently saw the keel laid for
the attack submarines Pre-Commissioning Units (PCU) Montana (SSN 794)
and Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795), and the commissioning of USS Colorado
(SSN 788), USS Indiana (SSN 789), and USS South Dakota (SSN 790). This
totals 17 Virginia-class submarines.
In aircraft carrier shipbuilding, USS Gerald R. Ford completed her
initial at sea operations and began her Post-Shakedown Availability in
July. Construction of the John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) is nearing
completion, and she is scheduled to be christened later this year. The
third carrier of the Ford-class, Enterprise (CVN 80), began
construction activities this past year and will proceed as part of a
two-carrier buy of CVN 80 and CVN 81, which is anticipated to generate
substantial savings for the Navy. As these aircraft carriers join the
fleet, they will bring unmatched capabilities to our Navy. The
propulsion plant for the Ford-class represents the first newly designed
aircraft carrier propulsion plant in 40 years. These ships not only
match the high speed of our Nimitz-class aircraft carriers but provide
25 percent more energy and three times the electrical generating
capacity. Additionally, the propulsion plant design reduces maintenance
by 30 percent and manpower by 50 percent. These advances in propulsion
plant design are a direct result of the dedicated and sustained effort
by Naval Reactors and its field activities, our Department of Energy
(DOE) laboratories, nuclear industrial base suppliers, the Navy design
team, and the nuclear shipbuilders.
This committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the
nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our
continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program. Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal
year 2020 is $1.65 billion, a reduction of $140.2 million, or 7.8
percent, from our fiscal year 2019 request. The budget request fully
supports the requirements for our three major projects--Columbia-class
propulsion plant development, the refueling overhaul of a research and
training reactor in New York, and the construction of the Naval Spent
Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho. The budget request also ensures Naval
Reactors can support the operational nuclear fleet, continue research
and development efforts for the next generation of nuclear powered
warships, and make progress on both the recapitalization of our
laboratory facilities and the environmental remediation of our legacy
responsibilities.
major projects
Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine is the Navy's number
one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is on track to support the
start of ship construction in fiscal year 2021 and is committed to
delivering the life-of-ship reactor core and the electric drive
propulsion system necessary for the Columbia-class program. Fiscal year
2020 funding of $75.5 million will continue supporting procurement of
the lead ship propulsion plant components. The Navy began procuring
long-lead material for the propulsion plant this year, and also will
begin manufacturing the life-of-ship reactor core.
S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $155 million to
support the refueling overhaul of one of the New York land-based
prototypes, which will enable an additional 20 years of Naval Reactors'
commitment to research, development, and training. As part of this
refueling project, we will insert recently manufactured Columbia-class
type fuel modules in the prototype reactor as part of testing and
demonstrating the manufacturability necessary for production and
delivery of the Columbia-class reactor core. The prototype refueling
overhaul is scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2021, with a return to
training operations shortly thereafter.
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $238 million to
continue construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility, which
broke ground in 2017. Full support from Congress has enabled us to keep
this project on track. The cost and schedule baselines were approved in
September of 2018. Design and site preparation for this facility
continues, and it is on track to receive spent nuclear fuel from
aircraft carriers in fiscal year 2024 and be fully operational by
fiscal year 2025.
technical base funding
In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors
maintains a high-performing technical base to: 1) execute nuclear
reactor technology research and development that supports today's fleet
and ensures our Navy maintains its technological advantage over
adversaries and, 2) provide the necessary equipment, construction,
maintenance, and modernization of critical infrastructure and
facilities. The funding required for this base also supports the lean
federal workforce that provides the oversight necessary to carry out
this important technical work safely and efficiently. These activities
are vital to our ability to provide 24-7 support to the nuclear-powered
Navy.
Research and Development
By employing an effective technical base, the teams of talented and
dedicated people at Program sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory
in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site
in greater Albany, the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho, and our
Washington, DC headquarters--can perform the research and development,
analysis, engineering, and testing needed to support today's fleet at
sea and develop more capable nuclear-powered warships for tomorrow's
fleet. Advanced nuclear technologies such as those employed in the
Columbia reactor require extensive development and prototyping,
spanning a decade or more to mature the technology to a point where it
is ready to incorporate in a ship design. Technology development will
receive increased emphasis in the coming years as we complete our major
projects and increase our focus on the development of tomorrow's fleet.
Our labs perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval
Reactors to thoroughly assess approximately 4,000 emergent issues
annually and deliver timely responses that ensure nuclear safety and
maximize operational flexibility. Our research and development efforts
must continue so that we can provide the Navy more capable propulsion
plants in the future. The performance of our reactors is key to
maintaining advantages over our potential adversaries. The
technological advances that go in our propulsion plants today are a
direct result of research and development investments that began
decades ago. Continued investment now is vital to the generations of
scientists and engineers who will design the propulsion plants of the
future.
Facilities and Infrastructure
Our laboratory facilities and infrastructure are critical in
carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. The budget request supports
recapitalizing our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and
infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the Program since
its inception 70 years ago. Without this recapitalization we will be
unable to effectively support nuclear fleet operations and advanced
research and development efforts at the level required by this complex
technology. Our budget request this year also reflects the increase in
our efforts in decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older
facilities that have been in existence since the start of the Program
in the early 1950s. We have approximately $8 billion in environmental
liabilities requiring D&D efforts--about one-third of these facilities
are no longer in use. We are increasing our emphasis on retirement of
theses liabilities in an environmentally responsible and cost-effective
manner to support best use of our funding.
I want to assure the committee that the planning efforts we execute
in budgeting for current and future projects are done with extreme
rigor. We conduct comprehensive reviews of our budget to ensure we are
making the right investments and tradeoffs. Our budget profile is
consistent with projections in earlier Future Years Nuclear Security
Plan submissions. Investments we make today in research and development
efforts not only advance capabilities, but will also result in cost
savings far into the future. We provide unmatched value to our Nation's
defense and have a history of cost-effectively meeting our obligations.
I understand the difficult budget environment in which Congress must
craft legislation, and I respectfully urge your support for aligning
allocations with the Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Admiral.
I am going to go ahead and jump into my opening statement.
We apologize for the back and forth, but that is what happens
when we have a series of votes around here. So Members will be
coming and going, and hopefully by the time I am done with my
opening statement, the chair will be back as well.
I want to thank Chairwoman Fischer for holding today's
hearing.
I certainly want to thank all of our witnesses for taking
the time to testify. We very much appreciate your service to
our country and the job that you perform.
There are a number of issues I want to raise today at this
hearing. First and foremost is the issue of plutonium and the
recent report by the Institute for Defense Analysis, or IDA,
which essentially invalidated all NNSA conclusions from last
year's engineering assessment.
In that report, IDA stated that it was not feasible to
construct and operate any facility by 2030 to produce 80 pits
per year at the cost range you found in the engineering
assessment. This is quite serious because we legislated last
year based on that previous assessment.
More importantly, the issue is not with construction costs
although we know from the IDA that these numbers are
drastically underestimated. What I will be looking for is the
lifecycle cost. The real cost drivers are staffing and
facilities and getting them fully operational and capable of
producing our war reserve pits. I will be looking closely at
this issue, and according to the Office of Enterprise
Assessments (EA), we know the lifecycle costs will exceed the
cost of other options considered by at least $14 billion, which
I would point out is double the estimate for the alternative.
On the critical issue of rebuilding our warheads, I am
pleased with the cooperation with the Department of Defense
(DOD). But I am concerned that we may be recreating a similar
problem to what we had in the early 2000s of balancing
workload, design, and engineering between the two weapons
laboratories. Livermore, over the next 10 to 15 years, will be
tasked with two major systems, the W80-4 cruise missile warhead
and the W87-1 warhead, while Los Alamos will be exiting the
B61-12 program. This is a serious issue, given we had just
staffed up for the B61 program.
Finally, Ms. White, welcome to our Subcommittee. It was
great to see you in New Mexico recently. It goes without saying
that you are responsible for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,
and as you know, we have waste backed up at every major
Department of Energy (DOE) site because of the fire and drum
explosion several years ago at the WIPP site, as well as the
lack of adequate ventilation at WIPP to conduct operations. I
want you to elaborate on what is being done to bring back that
capacity in a safe and effective manner. I know you touched on
that in your opening statement.
More importantly, when it does become operational, I am
concerned, as my State has been for the past 30 years, that we
continue to adhere to the grand bargain between the State of
New Mexico and the Federal Government on what kind of waste can
be disposed in this unique, one-of-a-kind facility. Until
recent events, WIPP's success, in contrast with Yucca Mountain,
for example, was our ability to reach a consensus between the
State and Federal Government, and that consensus was enacted
into law in 1992 with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Land
Withdrawal Act under Energy Committee jurisdiction. The last
thing we want is an upset Governor who retains Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, or RCRA, authority over this
facility, an upset delegation, and an upset Senate committee
over trying to dispose of waste that is not explicitly defined
in the Land Withdrawal Act. So I will be asking you some
questions concerning waste reclassification and attempts to
dispose of waste not explicitly defined in the WIPP Land
Withdrawal Act.
Again, thank you for coming today, and I very much look
forward to hearing all of your testimony and to questions.
Senator Fischer [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
We will begin our first round of questions.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, as you discuss in your opening
statement, this year's budget request of $16.48 billion for
NNSA--this is $1.3 billion over last year's enacted level,
which some suggest is a dramatic increase.
However, last year's budget projected a $16 billion top
line for NNSA in fiscal year 2020, a 3 percent difference from
the level of funding requested in this budget. Instead of being
a massive or an unexpected surge in spending, NNSA's budget is
following the anticipated path. The modernization programs that
have been planned for a very long time are finally getting
started and they are off the ground, and the cost will increase
as activities progress and programs become more mature.
That being said, can you talk about the importance of
funding this budget at the requested level and what impact cuts
would have on your ability to build a responsive nuclear
infrastructure, as well as your ability to meet the deterrence
requirements set out by U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Chairman Fischer, thanks for
the question.
There are a number of opportunities that are critical to
our request in the fiscal year 2020 budget. You have alluded to
several of them. But we have three major priorities in NNSA at
the present time. One is to continue our infrastructure
modernization. For those that are unfamiliar, more than 50
percent of our facilities are 40 years old or older, 30 percent
of which were built in the Manhattan Project days. To maintain
an infrastructure like that and ask our 44,000 men and women in
our workforce to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent and
provide assistance and support to nonproliferation, counter-
proliferation, counterterrorism programs to me is just
unacceptable. So we are on a trajectory to modernize our long
past modernization of our infrastructure, and many of the
requirements that we have and resources for which we are
requesting will continue us on that path.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, for example, the
uranium processing facility that will recover all of the work
that has been--or most of the work that has been done in what
is known as 92-12 at Y-12, a facility that was built during the
Manhattan Project, long past its prime--we will be completing
that program as long as we are receiving the funding request
that we have asked for, which is $745 million this year, to
continue the construction on the main processing facility. We
will complete that facility by the end of 2025. But as long as
we are on this trajectory and the path forward for those major
construction activities, that is just one of so many others.
Another one is the Los Alamos National Laboratory and our
PF-4, a facility that is 40 years old. But we maintain that as
our singular location to do pit work, actinide chemistry, and
basically the basic research and surveillance on our U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile.
I could explain many more facilities, but that is just one
of our highest priorities.
The second, of course, is our workforce. In the next 5
years, more than 40 percent of our workforce will be
retirement-eligible. We need to change the mindset of what we
are doing with the challenges we have to obtaining clearances
for new employees, for a number of other issues that we have at
our eight labs, plants, and sites, our seven field offices and
our headquarters. It is urgent that we find a way to be able to
hire the existing workforce changes that we need, the increases
that we need in our workforce, as well as the workforce of the
future. So we have a number of different priorities that we are
undergoing right now, but that is just to maintain the existing
nuclear weapons stockpile.
Senator Fischer. I think that one of the main points here
is we are no longer just studying modernization. We are no
longer trying to define modernization. Now we are working on
it. We are moving forward. Would you agree with that?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Fischer. We are on schedule.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, we are.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Also, this year's budget requested a significant increase
for subcritical experiments. Can you talk about the importance
of these activities, specifically how they will enable our
continued certification of the stockpile without returning to
testing and support the W80-4 and the W87-1 life extension
programs?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. For the last 25 years,
since we stopped underground explosive testing in 1992, a
voluntary moratorium on underground explosive testing, the
Department of Energy and NNSA undertook a science-based
stockpile stewardship program, and in light of not being able
to conduct underground explosive testing, we need to certify
the stockpile on an annual basis. I am happy to say for the
last 25 years, our three laboratory directors and the STRATCOM
Commander have sent letters to the President from the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of Energy certifying the stockpile
is safe, secure, and reliable.
But in order to do so, we need state-of-the-art scientific
capabilities, of which one is Enhanced Capability for
Subcritical Experiments (ECSE), which is a planned activity
that we are going to plan on conducting at Nevada national
security sites. Those are subcritical experiments that we
currently undertake, but that will be a new suite of
capabilities that we are looking forward to employing in the
future.
In addition to that, we have high performance computing, as
I mentioned, exoscale at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, which we will be able to operate that platform
beginning in 2023. There are a number of different, very highly
important scientific and engineering capabilities that we have
spread out throughout our entire complex that inform us on the
health of the stockpile.
Senator Fischer. Without these experiments, would it be
possible to certify the Life Extension Programs (LEPs)?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It would be highly doubtful
that we would be able to do so with the confidence that we have
currently.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA's
engineering analysis back in May of 2018 provided a lifecycle
cost estimate for each of our nation's plutonium options. Are
you familiar with those numbers, and do you have that slide
with you today?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I do. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich. I have got it here.
I want to direct your attention to alternative 1, the
Savannah big box alternative, and then also to alternative 2C
which I will call the Los Alamos PF4 plus modules alternative.
For this committee and for Congress, can you state what the
estimated lifecycle cost is for alternative 1, the Savannah?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. The number that we had when
we completed the Environmental Assessment was $27.8 billion.
Senator Heinrich. So can you state what the estimates were
for the other options?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. Alternative 2
alpha, $18.8 billion; alternative 2 bravo, $14.3 billion; and
alternative 2 Charlie, $14.8 billion.
Senator Heinrich. Exactly.
The independent Institute for Defense Analysis has said
that no one option the NNSA considered is valid for actually
being able to produce 80 pits by 2030. So if no one option is
fundamentally better than the others, why build an entire new
weapons complex with an additional price tag of $14 billion in
lifecycle costs?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Heinrich, we
recognize that pit production activities at two locations is
going to result in higher lifecycle costs. Recognizing the
numbers that I gave you, our lifecycle costs are over a 50-plus
year period, not an annual basis, if you will, so total
lifecycle costs.
Additionally, this is fundamentally to ensure the
resiliency of our nuclear weapons stockpile. At present, as a
reminder, we have not had a plutonium pit production capability
since the early 1990s when we shuttered the Rocky Flats plant
in Colorado. The last time we produced war reserve pits was in
2011 at Los Alamos. Therefore, we have a challenge ahead of us
if we want to just maintain the current nuclear weapons
stockpile and that of the 87-1, which is the 78 replacement,
which is what is driving our numbers to have the not fewer than
80 pits per year, as directed by the requirements laid out by
STRATCOM and as approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I certainly agree with the goal of
80 pits per year, but I am trying to understand why nowhere
else in the entire complex do we have this requirement. We have
one uranium facility. We have one tritium facility. We have one
plutonium facility. The IDA study said that basically none of
the options were any better than the other. I just think it is
very hard to justify an additional $14 billion in taxpayer
money.
I want to jump to another budgetary issue, and that is you
should have in front of you the estimated out-year costs for
plutonium from your budget data. I am curious in particular, if
you look at the line on Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
pit production from fiscal year 2020 and then across to fiscal
year 2024--and this is during the ramp to get to the point
where we are ramping up to achieve the 30 pits per year by
2026. So we have fiscal year 2020 at $21.2 million. Fiscal year
2021 is $231.3. Fiscal year 2022 is at $244, then $284 in 2023.
Then it drops to $75 million in fiscal year 2024. I am trying
to make sense of that 75 number given that it is in the midst
of that ramp.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, first of all, I am
happy to say that our requirements are to place more than $3
billion over the next several years into Los Alamos for its pit
production capability. It is going to be a challenge at best to
get to our 10 pits per year by 2024, our 20 by 2025, and the 30
and then 30 in perpetuity in 2026. Those numbers come from our
Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNCP).
I am happy to say also that since we submitted the fiscal
year 2020 budget, we have put more fidelity into these numbers,
and we would be able to brief you on these. But let me assure
you that those numbers are only going to increase, and we are
working very closely with Los Alamos that is providing us with
additional fidelity into what their requirements will be. So
rest assured, we are looking to do everything we can to ensure
operability at PF4 and throughout the NNSA enterprise.
Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
My time is up, so I am going to wait for the second round.
I have got some questions, Secretary White, for you regarding
WIPP, but we will get to it in the second round. Thanks.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to take my time and work my way through a primer
with you, if we could. I think one of the challenges we have in
gaining support for moving forward with the necessary
improvements in the entire program is to have a lot more people
understand exactly what we are talking about. So far, we are
talking about pits. We are talking about specifics that within
the industry itself are well known but not outside of the
industry. Let us talk about this for just a little bit so that
people understand the need for the additional production and
what it entails.
Can we start talking with just exactly what a pit is, and
as much as we can in an unclassified session, what is involved
in making it, and what it is used for? So this is going to be a
primer.
This is really important that we gather support because
when we start talking about making changes within the nuclear
production capabilities of our country, it is necessary that
folks back home start to understand that there is a real need
and that just because we have capabilities that have been here
for years, it does not mean that we do not need additional
capabilities for the operation of our nuclear capabilities. I
would defer to any of you who want to work your way through
this with us.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you. If I may start.
First of all, plutonium is used in the primary of a nuclear
weapon or a bomb, and it is the material, if you will, the
ingredient that provides the necessary explosive power, plus
additional materials, whether they are highly enriched uranium
and the secondary and other materials that we need, critical
materials that make up a nuclear warhead or a bomb.
Senator Rounds. How about for the Navy itself with regard
to the nuclear fuel needs for the carriers and our submarines?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. So that is uranium, and it is
highly enriched uranium that we use. It is also part of the
material that we process through our defense enterprise.
Senator Rounds. Is it done at the same locations as these
pits are produced?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It is actually done at Y-12
and at other locations throughout the United States where they
actually make the fuel rods.
Senator Rounds. So when we talk about the pits themselves,
we are not talking even about the amount of production needed
for the fuel. We are talking about our need for our weapon
systems.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. For our entire enterprise.
You are exactly right, and this is just to maintain our
existing nuclear weapons stockpile. We are the only nuclear
nation that is not currently designing or fielding new nuclear
weapons. Every other nuclear weapon state is. What we are doing
is extending the life of our existing nuclear weapons
stockpile. If I might, the oldest nuclear weapon system that we
have in our stockpile right now is the B-61 that was fielded in
the early 1960s.
Senator Rounds. I understand that right now that we are
upgrading or we intend to upgrade through what? About the year
2020. We are beginning sometime in the year 2020 through what?
2023 for the B61-12 to be available. Is that about right?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Correct. That should be
beyond 2025. We have an issue right now with the life extension
program on the B61, and we are addressing that right now.
Senator Rounds. So when you do that, can you simply use the
nuclear material that was in the earlier weapons to be redone,
or do you need to use one of these new pits?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. In the case of the W78, which
is what we are replacing now with something called the W87-1,
which is currently existing in the stockpile, we will need to
modernize our pit for that. That is precisely what we are
trying to deal with right now----
Senator Rounds. Now, if I understand it, the W78 is not for
the B61.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. No. The B61--we are going to
continue to use that and many elements of it. But what we are
doing is increasing the safety and security of the actual
nuclear weapon itself, and we are introducing new robust
systems and additional surety features that we can talk about
in a classified space, if you would like.
Senator Rounds. Okay. When we talk about a pit itself, how
big is a pit? How much material is it? Are they standard?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. In unclassified terms, it is
several kilograms or more.
Senator Rounds. Do we use multiple pits per weapon system?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. No. There is a single pit in
the primary for a nuclear weapon system, and there is a
secondary. It depends what the configuration is and what the
nuclear weapon----
Senator Rounds. If you were to talk to the public on this
and you were to say this is the reason why we need to produce
more pits, a lot of folks are going to say, well, we have
already got plenty in stock. We have got lots of weapons out
there. What is the need for the increase in production of pits?
I think that is a really important thing to discuss.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It is based on military
requirements and what the military requirements and target sets
are. So we take our direction from STRATCOM, the Strategic
Command, about what their requirements are, what our nuclear
weapons stockpile requirements are based on direction from the
President.
Senator Rounds. So what you are actually saying, though, is
that it is not even just to replace those that are there. It is
because when we modernize, we are actually looking at different
types of weapon systems that we need in order to be a deterrent
force into the future. We are not just talking 2 years from
now. We are talking 25, 30, 40 years from now.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Exactly. We are talking more
likely 50 and beyond. That is exactly what we are doing. In
fact, you raise a good point, Senator. One of the issues about
plutonium right now is plutonium aging, and it is a challenge
that we have and that is, in fact, why we are doing some of the
studies that we are undertaking and some of the modernizations
that we are undertaking. In fact, that is why we are doing the
78 replacement for the 87-1, which is exactly why we need the
new plutonium pit production capability, something again that
we have not had since the early 1990s.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Jones?
Senator Jones. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today.
I want to go back, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, to something
you mentioned earlier today, and that is about staffing levels.
Let us get to some nuts and bolts.
Forty percent of your staff is going to be retirement-
eligible in 4 or 5 years. But as I understand it, a couple of
studies have already said it is understaffed now. Your
responsibilities are increasing and if the Administration and
Congress want you to do your job, we got to provide you the
tools.
So can we talk a little bit about staffing? What are the
challenges that you are facing in recruiting? What can we do to
help? Are there specific things that are stopping you from
bringing new people on for this really important role that you
have got here?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. We have a number of staffing
challenges currently and ahead of us. One of the things that we
have requested is if Congress would consider lifting the cap on
our FTEs, for our full-time equivalents, for our federal
workforce, which is at 1,690 at the present time. We are
bumping up close to that right now, and that is just to staff
our headquarters and our field offices. Most of those personnel
are at our field offices.
However, we have taken a look at what we need to do about
these staffing challenges, and what we are doing is sort of
what I consider disruptive technology. What we have done is we
have come together with all of our labs, plants, and sites, our
field offices, and our headquarters, and instead of doing
basically 16 different stovepipe staffing plans, if you will,
we are coming together and we are getting together with all the
labs, plants, and sites hiring authorities and our field
offices and our headquarters. We have had a hiring day, which
we undertook in January of this year, where we had 1,700
applicants. Just to give you some idea--for those of you in the
federal workforce, you will understand--we actually offered 53
jobs at that time. So that is unheard of that the federal
workforce could actually offer those kinds of jobs.
That said, we are working very closely with organizations
and with some of our labs, plants, and sites such as Los
Alamos. Los Alamos has just undertaken an agreement with
Northern New Mexico College to start a technician program for
radiological technicians so that they can bring in a new
pipeline of radiological technicians to do work in plutonium
operations and working with radioactive materials.
We are finding different ways of trying to resource, if you
will, or source the next generation, the best and brightest,
and those are scientists. Those are engineers. Those are
technicians. Those are people that put hands on weapons. Those
people that put hands in glove boxes, as well as the primary
and secondary designers. We are trying to find different ways
of finding that pipeline, if you will.
We have a number of very interesting programs now where we
support universities and colleges around the United States
where we can actually grow our workforce through those
endeavors. But we really need to break that paradigm.
I am also happy to say that we have also established things
called national security or nuclear security enterprise days.
We have conducted on-site employment opportunities at Georgia
Tech, at University of California at Merced, and Texas A&M so
far this year. We will be going to the State of Ohio and we
will be going to the State of North Dakota in the next several
months or so, probably in the fall time to see what we can do
to encourage a pipeline of new students throughout our United
States that might want to come to work at our great eight labs,
plants, and sites, field offices, and our headquarters.
So we are really trying to break that paradigm because it
is crucial now. Los Alamos is looking to hire 1,000 people this
year. Sandia is looking to hire 1,000 people this year.
Livermore is looking to hire 500 people. We are talking about
really thousands of people in our workforce not only in the
next 5 years but now in order to handle the increasing workload
that is on us right now.
Senator Jones. All right. Well, great. I wish I had asked a
question that you were passionate about.
[Laughter.]
Senator Jones. Well, let me just ask this. I want you very
succinctly if you can--we are hearing talk from different
sectors about that it may be too expensive to modernize all
three prongs of the nuclear triad. I do not agree with that.
But I would like for you to just right here on the record,
maybe in less time than you talked about the staffing, tell us
how they work together and why it is important that we
modernize all of the nuclear triad.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, I would certainly defer
to the Department of Defense since they are the ones that
employ the nuclear triad. But it is imperative to have a
credible deterrent in the United States, that we have every
capability possible in order to show that we have a robust
deterrent and play into the global threats that we see now and
on the horizon. It certainly would make sense to maintain the
triad as it is.
Senator Jones. All three work together as a part of that
deterrent.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. All three work together. That
is exactly right.
Senator Jones. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hawley?
Senator Hawley, Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to all of the witnesses for being here.
Administrator, if I could just start with you. It is nice
to see you again the other day, and thank you for being here.
Thank you for your service.
Can I come back to Senator Heinrich's question? What is the
answer to his question about the alternative facilities here
for pit production? If in fact there is no advantage one over
the other, then why build the new facility at Savannah River?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator, always nice to see
you too again. Thank you.
First of all, we believe that it is necessary to have
resiliency throughout the enterprise. Now, admittedly, I would
like to see a resilient enterprise that has redundant
capabilities throughout our entire complex, but that would just
break the budget and that is just untenable.
However, we have decided that our highest priority is for
pit manufacturing and production. It is our impression that
putting all of our capabilities at a single site while we are
maintaining plutonium pit production capabilities, which is
what we are trying to do at Los Alamos and get them to 30 pits
per year by 2026, we do not believe that it is appropriate to
put all of our requirements in a single location and that
redundancy is critical to maintaining our nuclear enterprise
now and in the future.
Again, as I had mentioned in the outset of my discussion,
plutonium facility 4 at Los Alamos is over 40 years old. These
numbers that Senator Heinrich had referred to do not include
the lifecycle costs for either modernizing that facility or
replacing that facility.
So we have got challenges ahead of us no matter where we
look in the enterprise. We had an opportunity to repurpose a
facility at South Carolina, and we think that is the best way
to go for a resilient and a functioning enterprise for the next
50 to 75 years.
Senator Hawley, The redundancy piece is really important to
you. Is that right? Can you just explain why it is so critical?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Because putting our
capabilities in a single location, if there is a major activity
or a major incident at a single location, our entire nuclear
weapons enterprise is down for any kind of pit production
capability or monitoring, even our surveillance. So if we lose
our single location, then we do not have an enterprise that is
resilient and we may be unable to or it will put in jeopardy
the capability to surveil our current nuclear weapons.
Senator Hawley, So what I hear you saying is when you think
about the different options here, the various alternatives,
they are not all the same in the sense that--it is not merely
about the amount of production you can get cumulatively out of
these facilities. It is also about resiliency and redundancy,
and these are important factors that weigh heavily in the
decision-making process. Is that fair? Am I understanding you
correctly?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. They are critical.
Senator Hawley, Now, back to reaching the 2026 pit
production goal, you said a little bit earlier that it is going
to be a stretch--I think that was the word you used--to reach
that goal. Can you say a little bit more there and what sort of
mitigation strategies we are going to employ if we do not, in
fact, hit that goal?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. We are working
incredibly closely with our colleagues at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and, for that matter, all of our colleagues around
the enterprise pulling together a team to find out where we can
minimize risks, maximize opportunities and working in parallel
on several strategic plans. Los Alamos is required to put
together a plutonium pit plan for us. They are undertaking that
right now. We have seen the draft, and we are working on that
plan with them to get us to that 30 pits per year. So we are
working, doing everything we possibly can to give Los Alamos
the tools necessary to be successful to get us to those
requirements of the 30 pits per year by 2026.
Senator Hawley, Very good.
In the time I have remaining, let me just shift gears
briefly and, Admiral, ask you. I noticed that the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) is estimating that over the next 10 years,
about 6 percent of defense spending is going to go toward
modernizing the triad and managing the various life extension
programs, which is quite a bit of money and focused on a pretty
narrow sector of our national defense. I just want to ask you
about the effective management of some of these programs.
I understand the Naval Reactors is moving out of the
development phase and into production for the Columbia-class.
Has your experience with developing this reactor informed your
approach to program management and avoiding delays that are
inherent to fielding new technologies like this one?
Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.
I would say that my experience to date with the Columbia
program has absolutely informed the way ahead. What I have
realized is that we are trying to build a larger Navy and
recapitalize an important national asset on a shipbuilding
industry that did not build submarines through the 1990s and
really into the start of the 2000s. That shipbuilding industry
and the supporting vendor base has some fragility in it, and it
requires that we manage it very carefully if we are going to be
successful. We have learned that it takes a tremendous amount
of oversight, in fact, in some cases intrusive oversight.
It takes a close partnership with our partners in the
vendor base to understand what their capacity is, to make sure
that we are in dialogue with them, and to be very sensitive to
increases in production or changes in the way that we tackle
production. For example, many times a vendor will make a change
in production to accommodate maybe affordability or maybe to
make it easier to manufacture. If you are not careful, you can
induce errors.
This close relationship, partnership is critical, and
oversight is essential if we are going to get this right. That
comes from the Navy and it also comes from our prime
contractors that have to be really involved with their
subcontractors if we are going to get this right.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
This really is not addressed to you three, although you are
part of this enterprise. I think those of us that are engaged
in this issue have to do a better job of communicating to the
public the importance of the modernization. I met with a group
of Maine people yesterday who basically asked why we are
spending all this money. Is it another nuclear arms race? By
the way, 6 percent of the budget is $42 billion a year. This is
not insignificant. You could do a lot of Head Start slots for
$42 billion a year. I mean, there are a lot of other important
priorities.
So this is just a comment that I think the Defense
Department and the strategic people have to really communicate
with the public about this because this is a major commitment.
You know, I had this discussion yesterday, as I said, with a
group of people that were very skeptical, and I said we have
got to have a--you used the right word--credible deterrent.
That is the whole rationale for the modernization. But I think
the case has to be made. What is the incremental value that we
are getting for that $42 billion over and above what we have
now? I hope you will take that back. As I say, that is not
really a question, but I think it is very important as we go
into this next year and this budget cycle.
Admiral Caldwell, you are now developing and have developed
a nuclear propulsion capability that has a longer life. Have
you ever done a calculation of what that saves us over the long
haul, in other words, not having to refuel, having a longer
life on a submarine, for example? It strikes me that is a sort
of hidden savings that I think is important to quantify.
Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. We have done some of those
calculations. Well, first off, we always try to build on
technology to improve what we are delivering to the fleet. Over
the life of the program, we have been able to deliver reactor
cores that are life-of-the-ship cores. In fact, every submarine
we are building today has a life-of-the-ship core, and the
carriers have a 25-year core and they get refueled once in
life. The ability to have a core in the Columbia submarine that
lasts over 40 years will allow us to do the mission with 12
submarines versus the 14 today.
Senator King. That is a huge savings right there.
Admiral Caldwell. That is a huge saving, and we think that
is about $40 billion over the total ownership of the program.
Now, there are cost savings in other ways too, sir. For
example, if you look at the Ford aircraft carrier, we designed
that reactor plant with 25 percent more energy in the core,
three times the electrical generation capacity. We were able to
take out roughly 30 percent of the required maintenance in the
propulsion plant, and we were able thereby to reduce the
manning in the propulsion plant by about 50 percent. So if you
take that figure and you add that up over 11 carriers or a 12-
carrier force is what the Navy wants and you do that for the
lifetime, that is real money. If you take all those kind of
cost saving measures that are in the Ford, it is about $80
million per year per carrier. So that is real money.
We are focused on not only delivering quality but seeing
can we manufacture these things cheaper, easier, and can we do
it so that it is affordable from a total ownership cost.
Senator King. Thank you. That is important. I think there
are other areas as well. We could talk about the Truman, but
that is another topic.
Secretary White, this is an issue I keep raising in Energy
and Natural Resources and here: waste. You all have developed
waste disposal techniques and technologies. Can you please help
us on the civilian side? Because this is the unanswered
question with regard to nuclear power. We had a bill in Energy
and Natural Resources to promote nuclear power. It is fossil
free. It has a lot of positives. But we still have not answered
the waste question that has been pending now for about 70
years. Your thoughts.
Secretary White. So Yucca Mountain is not within my
purview. But I would have to vehemently agree with you that in
order to sort of support the viability of commercial nuclear
power, the waste question needs to get solved. We also have to
be able to decommission these facilities effectively both in
terms of safety and costs.
Senator King. What we have now are effectively 100 or so
high-level nuclear waste sites scattered all over the country.
We have one in Maine.
What I hope you can do is share some of your expertise and
poke the Department because this is a question that is really
impeding our national policy I think.
Secretary White. I agree with you totally. I will
definitely take that back to the Department.
Senator King. Thank you. Yes, pass it back to my friend,
Governor Perry. He will know who it is coming from when I say
Governor Perry.
Secretary White. Absolutely.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
Admiral Caldwell, for some time now, your three major
priorities have been the Columbia-class reactor, the S8G land-
based reactor, and spent fuel handling project in Idaho. Can
you talk about what you see as the next key challenges or
objectives for the Naval Reactors?
Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am, I can.
As you know, the last several years, we have been focused
on these three high priority, national priority tasks. As the
budget for those winds down, I would put the future funding
requirements into sort of three broad categories.
First is to support the operating fleet. That is number one
in Naval Reactors in our day-to-day business. That is important
because when you operate a nuclear fleet, you have to make sure
that you provide the technical support and the backing for all
the sailors that operate these great ships and make sure our
Navy can go out there and do the things that we need to do.
We have a number of aging platforms. We have extended the
life of the Trident submarine out past 40 years. That was never
intended that way. If you go back and look at the aircraft
carriers, we never intended to operate them necessarily for 50
years, but we are. The same is going to be true for our 688 or
our Los Angeles class submarines. In fact, we are going to
refuel five to seven of those, and it will take some of those
out past 40 years of operations. So being able to support that
current fleet is vitally important. That is number one.
Number two is building the technologies for the future
fleet. The Navy is examining the future capabilities that we
need, and they are talking about more energy in the core, life-
of-the-ship cores, stealth, acoustics, and improved capability.
So I need to invest in technologies that are going to be the
game changers in terms of affordability, capacity, capability
for the U.S. Navy. So that is number two.
Number three are my facilities. I have a number of
facilities, just as the Administrator said, that are aging,
that go back 60 years or longer. I need to recapitalize those
facilities and I also need to decontaminate and decommission a
large number of those facilities. So you will see in my budget
submission and in the future FYNCPs a budget request to support
taking a bigger chunk out of that Deactivation and
Decommissioning (D&D), as well as recapitalizing very important
facilities at our labs that allow us to do this important work
that supports the fleet.
So those are the three big areas, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, as we have discussed, some are
criticizing this budget as being insufficiently committed to
nonproliferation programs. This argument is being made despite
the fact that the fiscal year 2020 request and the associated
out-year funding projections would increase top line spending
on nonproliferation above the levels projected in last year's
budget even though it eliminates spending for the mixed oxide
(MOX) program. Can you explain that to us in greater detail?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I can. In fact, thank
you.
This is the largest increase that has been requested in the
last 5 years for our nonproliferation, our counter-
proliferation, and counterterrorism programs. As you rightly
state----
Senator Fischer. Sometimes we focus on the other side of
your programs, and I think this is really important.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It is incredibly important.
Thank you.
We are doing a number of things with this budget in what we
are looking to do in the out-years, one of which is something
that is very important, which is the cesium blood irradiators.
Oftentimes we are replacing cesium blood irradiators that are
large sources with non-radioactive sources. They are x-ray
machines, and we are doing this around the United States, and
hopefully we will be able to do this around the world as well.
By the end of 2027, we will have completed the removal of the
cesium irradiators from the United States, which could be an
opportunity for terrorists to take the materials and make them
radiological dispersal devices or otherwise known as dirty
bombs. At the end of 2027, we anticipate completing that
program throughout the United States. So you do see a natural
decrease in those budgets.
There are a number of different programs that we have that
come to fruition. So oftentimes some might state that we are
drawing down on our nonproliferation programs. There could be
nothing further than the truth. We believe very strongly in
nonproliferation goals, counterterrorism, and counter-
proliferation as well. We are working very closely with the
interagency to put new programs in place around the United
States to support the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
initiatives for counterterrorism, and we are working very
closely and we have just gotten approval from the White House
to do so. So you see that also in our engagement strategy and
approach and request for the 2020 budget.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Assistant Secretary White, first off, I
just want to thank you for joining me in Carlsbad last month to
celebrate 20 years of operation at that one-of-a-kind facility.
One of the concerns--and we talked about this a little bit
there in Carlsbad, but one of the concerns I continue to hear
about are the ongoing problems with air quality underground.
Are there some things that we can do now to improve air quality
until the new ventilation system is up and fully operational in
a couple years? For example, have we considered switching all
of those diesel-powered underground equipment over to electric-
powered equipment like they have in some of the other mining
facilities?
Secretary White. So, yes, we have been looking at switching
over to electric. But in the meantime, though, there are
immediate things we have been doing such as kind of simple
operational things like ensuring vehicles are turned off if
they are not being used.
Other things. We have worked very closely with the miners
themselves to say, hey, what do you think about how we can get
more air flow. We have changed some things like operating right
in the middle of the drifts rather than over at the side, some
really kind of simple operational things like that, applying
some local ventilation to get some air movement in spaces where
there is some dead air. So we are making improvements
constantly. We are also really trying to see if there are ways
we can accelerate the schedule on the new ventilation system.
So we are very concerned about it, and like I say, we are
working very closely with the miners themselves on this.
Senator Heinrich. I appreciate that. I want to encourage
you on both fronts. Obviously, the miners themselves have the
direct day-to-day experience, and it is not an easy job and we
want them to be working in the safest environment possible.
I want to ask you in addition, does the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant accept non-defense transuranic waste?
Secretary White. It does not.
Senator Heinrich. Would it require a change in the enabling
statute to accept non-defense waste?
Secretary White. That is a legal question. I would imagine
the answer is yes.
Senator Heinrich. That is my read.
I do understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is developing a rule for greater than class C waste, but
under the 1986 Low Level Waste Policy Act, the Department is
charged with disposing of it. If this new NRC rule does become
final, what would the Department need to do to implement this
legislation?
Secretary White. So what we have done to date is there was
a requirement that we submit to Congress our report on our
environmental impact statement, the options within that. That
was submitted to Congress in 2017. The rule that asked us to do
this report also said then we would await congressional action.
So we are awaiting that action.
The other pieces and parts that need to happen are NRC
would need to decide first in the case of Waste Control
Specialists (WCS), if that were a selected facility. They would
need to decide if Texas can be the regulator or if NRC would be
the regulator and the licenser. Then also there would need to
be a regulatory basis and new regulations and requirements
would need to be developed. So we are a ways down the road
before we will have a disposal option for greater than class C.
Senator Heinrich. So my understanding is that DOE under the
Atomic Energy Act has the authority to reclassify nuclear waste
as long as it removes the highly radioactive component and it
can be safely disposed of at a low level waste level and that
last October, you made such a proposal public. Do you know how
that proposal, if it were to move forward, would potentially
impact WIPP?
Secretary White. So right now, where we are in the process
is we put out a Federal Register notice. We gathered a large
number of comments, I think 5,500. We are doing our due
diligence and looking very carefully through those comments,
seeing what they have to say to make a very deliberate decision
on this issue.
In terms of implementation, we have not done the necessary
studies to determine what specific waste streams would go to
which specific disposal routes. But should the Department make
that decision, we would like for the whole process, both the
States where the waste resides now and the receiving States to
be a very transparent process, and simply following our
existing rules around the National Environmental Policy Act,
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) is not going to be enough. So we want to
go the extra mile because this is very important to our nation.
Senator Heinrich. I would certainly agree with you there.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Senator King?
Senator King. First, you used the term ``dead air.'' I
think of dead air is what happens when a reporter asks me a
question I do not want to answer. It is dead air.
[Laughter.]
Secretary White. For me, it is when a Senator asks me one.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. Good for you.
This is more a comment than a question, but it goes to the
costs that we were talking about.
One of the anomalies of the federal budgetary process--one
of the many--is that we have no capital budget. Everything is
operations even though we are buying 40-year assets. No other
entity on earth I think would not separate that expenditure
from paying a park ranger, and yet that is what we do. It
distorts the way the budget works particularly when we are
making major capital investments, as we will be over the next
whatever the term is for this particular modernization. But it
goes for building buildings and everything else. I mean, I just
make that comment that it really is I think one of the
unacceptable ways that we budget. Hopefully, that is something
that we can try to address because to pay for a 40-year asset
in cash essentially over the construction period is not a good
budget. It is not budgeting or accounting. It is not an
accurate representation of the actual cost over the life of the
project. So I just offer that. I could not resist under this
circumstance.
Thank you.
Senator Fischer. Senator Heinrich, anything else?
Senator Heinrich. I will save my questions for the
questions for the record.
Senator Fischer. I would like to thank the panel for being
here today. We appreciate all of your information that you
provide us. I would ask that you be available for questions,
written questions, and get those back to us as soon as
possible.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
work balance between los alamos and livermore labs
1. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Livermore will
be leading the work on the W80-4 cruise missile warhead and the W87-1
Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) warhead. Meanwhile, Los
Alamos is finishing work on the B61-12. In the future, how will you
balance work for Los Alamos for design and engineering given Livermore
has the bulk of the work for the next 10-15 years?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. The national laboratories have
managed varying life extension program (LEP) workloads in the past and
maintained their modernization skills. This is now reinforced by
initiatives like the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and the important
peer review work done across the nuclear security enterprise. There is
still a significant amount of LEP work to be conducted at Los Alamos
National Laboratory, as well as future LEP requirements and other
initiatives such as the recapitalization of a pit production
capability. Additionally, design and engineering capabilities continue
to be utilized at both labs as these activities are required for the
day-to-day maintenance and minor alterations and modifications needed
to keep the stockpile in a ready-for-deployment status.
nnsa strategic vision 2018
2. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, this week the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) released the Strategic
Vision 2018, which is in response to the findings of the Augustine--
Mies Congressional Commission on the Governance of the Nuclear
Enterprise. Chapter one of the report presents a clear and
implementable vision for the organization--one that changes its
culture. How do you intend to implement and track this Strategic Vision
document to promote the change in culture of a mission driven
organization?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. In association with the release of
the Strategic Vision, NNSA also released the Governance and Management
Framework and the Strategic Integrated Roadmap. The Governance and
Management Framework shows how the agency will deliver its mission in a
resilient, agile, and responsive manner. The Strategic Integrated
Roadmap illustrates the path to achieving goals now through the next 25
years. Collectively, the three documents set the stage for realizing
the cultural changes necessary to ensure that NNSA continues to
demonstrate excellence and is responsive to the nation's nuclear
security and strategic defense needs now and into the future.
Issuing these documents alone does not transform NNSA. Doing so
requires leadership, training, dedication, and ongoing communication.
NNSA will work together as one team by drawing upon common values
across the nuclear security enterprise, building enduring and trusted
relationships, promoting transparency, fostering a passion for and
awareness of mission, and demonstrating a commitment to success at all
levels. NNSA is poised to continue making essential contributions to
U.S. and global security now and into the future.
surplus plutonium dilute and dispose--los alamos national laboratory
3. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, my understanding
is that to perform the dilute and dispose operations for surplus
plutonium in later years you intend to ship plutonium from Pantex to
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to turn it into oxide power.
Then, you will ship it to the Savannah River Site to be packed; and
then, ship it again back to Carlsbad, New Mexico to be disposed of at
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Is this truly the optimal strategy and
have you considered alternatives that could reduce the number of
required shipments?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has previously and will continue
to evaluate opportunities to improve the efficiency of the dilute and
dispose process, including optimizing transportation requirements.
4. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, looking at your
planned plutonium funding for fiscal years 2020 through 2024, I note
there are increased operations for Los Alamos' plutonium facility to
dilute and dispose of the 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium that was
to go to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) facility, while at the same time we are
increasing operations for pit production in PF-4. Can all of these
tasks be done effectively in the plutonium facility? How is this work
being coordinated?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
is aware of the need to maintain dilute and dispose (D&D) activities
and has incorporated D&D plans into the overall site strategy for
plutonium that is currently under development. LANL is developing an
integrated schedule for all Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 activities to
balance resources among all the programs that PF-4 supports.
5. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, is it true you
are going to have to add another entrance into the plutonium facility
to accommodate both dilute and dispose and pit production?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is working with Los Alamos
National Laboratory to evaluate the investments needed to support
increased operations at Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 to meet pit
production requirements and other missions. With an increased
operational tempo, there will be a need to accommodate additional staff
in PF-4. Updated staffing analyses will inform the basis for personnel-
related infrastructure such as offices, parking, training, and entry
control capabilities.
nnsa's plutonium strategy and the institute for defense analysis's
assessment for the department of defense
6. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to
your recommended alternative for plutonium pit production announced in
May 2018, I continue to have serious concern over the substantially
higher estimated lifecycle cost of establishing a second site to
produce 50 pits year by 2030 compared to enhancing the current
capabilities at Los Alamos. What is the status and timeline to complete
the conceptual design to repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication
Facility for pit production and to approve the selected alternative and
updated cost range, including lifecycle cost, to support CD-1?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. To achieve DOD's requirement of not
less than 80 pits per year by 2030, NNSA's recommended alternative
repurposes the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah
River Site in South Carolina to produce plutonium pits while also
producing pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico.
Though we expect the lifecycle cost of a two-site approach to be higher
than that of a one-site approach, the recent Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA) study noted that this gap in costs would be reduced when
accounting for the cost to maintain the aging Plutonium Facility (PF)-4
and the cost of additional LANL personnel. Additionally, the proposed
two-site approach supports the need for resiliency, flexibility, and
redundancy across the nuclear security enterprise for the critical
plutonium pit production mission by not relying on a single production
site.
NNSA is currently executing conceptual design activities for the
proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) to
produce 50 pits per year, with a goal of achieving Critical Decision-1
(CD-1) by September 30, 2020. An independent cost estimate for
refurbishment of the proposed SRPPF will be performed prior to CD-1.
7. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, when completed,
will you provide the Armed Services Committees notification of the
approval of the selected alternative and the updated cost range?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, when Critical Decision-1 is
approved, NNSA will notify the Committees of the approval of the
selected alternative and the updated cost range.
8. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, it is clear that
the key milestone in NNSA's plutonium strategy is achieving 30 pits per
year at Los Alamos. However, the Institute for Defense Analysis's
recent independent assessment for the Department of Defense (DOD)
presents a rather sobering and pessimistic view of the overall
plutonium strategy. The key findings include: none of the four options
NNSA considered to reach 80 pits was demonstrably better; each is
achievable but not on the schedule or budget currently forecast; and
none of the options can provide the 80 pits per year DOD requires by
2030. What is your assessment of the report with respect to the ability
of any of the four options considered by the NNSA to produce 80 pits
per year by 2030?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA realizes that production of not
less than 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030 is an ambitious goal, but we
remain committed to meeting the requirement laid out in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) study
based its conclusion that NNSA cannot reach the 80 ppy milestone in
2030 with any of the proposed options on the history of recent large
construction projects within DOE. On that comparative basis, IDA could
find no example of a project on the same scale as pit manufacturing
being completed in the time frame we need. It is also worth noting that
IDA could not find an example of repurposing an existing facility as a
comparison; their assessment was based only on large construction
projects that involved new construction. These past projects do not
reflect the fact that DOE has incorporated lessons learned from life
extension programs and capital construction projects as well as
improved program management processes to facilitate execution of
projects on schedule and within budget.
plutonium stored at the nevada national security site
9. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, my understanding
is Secretary Perry has assured the Nevada delegation the NNSA will
begin removing the half-ton of Savannah River plutonium from Nevada by
2021. In addition, Secretary Perry has indicated the second half-ton of
plutonium will not be shipped from South Carolina to Nevada. Can you
tell us in open session where this plutonium is headed?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. No, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA), the Department of Energy is charged with safeguarding national
security information related to the shipment of special nuclear
material. As the material removed from the Savannah River Site will be
used for national security missions, details of the campaign are
classified, in accordance with the AEA.
molybdenum 99 from low enriched uranium
10. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the American
Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012 directed NNSA to implement a
technology-neutral program, in cooperation with non-Federal entities,
to produce molybdenum-99 without using highly enriched uranium (HEU).
The NNSA should take a lot of credit for working with industry to
develop a domestic supply of the medical isotope, Mo-99, using only
low-enriched uranium. In February, NNSA completed its evaluation of
applications submitted in response to a funding opportunity for the
production of Mo-99 without the use of HEU. What is the status of the
negotiations with the four U.S. companies selected for new cooperative
agreement awards to produce Mo-99?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Currently, NNSA is reviewing the
proposed budgets for the four potential vendors to include a review of
pricing and cost reasonableness; total budget cost; and an assessment
of costs proposed, to ensure costs are allowable under Federal
Acquisition Regulation. Concurrently, NNSA is preparing contract
documents in anticipation of four awards.
11. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how soon do you
anticipate domestic production of Mo-99 will begin?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NorthStar began domestic production
of Mo-99 in November 2018.
12. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, are we on track
to eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium for radioisotope
production in the United States and overseas?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, we are on track to eliminate the
use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for radioisotope production. The
first domestic producer in the United States in 30 years, NorthStar,
began production in November 2018 with non-HEU technology. Three of
four major global suppliers now produce with low-enriched uranium
(LEU). The fourth, Belgium's Institute of Radioelements, plans to
convert to 100 percent LEU by June 2022.
domestic uranium enrichment
13. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, since the
closure of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 2013, the United
States has lacked the capability to enrich uranium using a domestic
technology. The Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA requires unobligated
enriched uranium to meet stockpile requirements, fuel reactors that
produce tritium, and power the nuclear Navy. In rough terms, about how
many years will the existing inventory of enriched uranium, including
HEU, provide NNSA to extend the need date for unobligated low enriched
uranium for tritium production and other purposes?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA's nearest-term need for
unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) is to fuel tritium production
reactors. NNSA is currently executing a campaign to down-blend highly
enriched uranium materials from the existing uranium inventory, which
will provide enough unobligated LEU for tritium production through
2041.
14. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, based on the
present projection, in approximately what year does NNSA currently
expect it will need to reestablish a domestic uranium enrichment
capability?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA's ongoing down-blending campaign
will provide low-enriched uranium (LEU) for tritium production through
2041. NNSA is currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives to
examine all options for meeting the enriched uranium mission need. Any
option pursued will need to be in place in time to provide LEU by 2041.
15. Senator Heinrich. Aministrator Gordon-Hagerty, DOE/NNSA
requires enriched uranium, but not necessarily unobligated enriched
uranium, to fuel research and medical isotope reactors as part of its
nonproliferation mission. Am I correct that Urenco USA's plant, the
nation's only operating commercial uranium enrichment facility, is a
possible near-term option to meet DOE's need for enriched uranium fuel,
including HALEU, for these nonproliferation activities?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA's nonproliferation requirements
for high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) have been incorporated into
its ongoing Domestic Uranium Enrichment Analysis of Alternatives, which
includes Urenco USA as a potential option.
albuquerque complex project
16. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, last July NNSA
broke ground on a new state-of-the-art office facility for its federal
workforce in Albuquerque. I was pleased to join you at the event. The
$175 million Albuquerque Complex Project will provide modern, safe and
reliable workspace for the 1,200 employees who support the nation's
vital national security mission. The building will also meet a
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design gold standard. What is
the status of the project and the expected date NNSA staff will begin
to occupy the new office building?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Construction of the NNSA Albuquerque
Complex Project is well underway and remains on schedule and on budget.
The project continues to make progress toward meeting LEED objectives
and is on track to achieve Gold level certification. NNSA staff are
scheduled to begin occupying the building in 2021.
lanl cleanup
17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary White, I have worked with Senator
Udall to increase funding this year for cleanup work at LANL to $220
million, consistent with the achievable scope of work. With respect to
the future scope of work for environmental cleanup at Los Alamos, N3B
has developed a 5-year cost baseline at the level of $220 million per
year, $25 million above your fiscal year 2020 request. Clearly, there
is sufficient environmental remediation work throughout LANL to
accelerate cleanup work above the $195 million baseline request. Do you
have any doubt that the Office of Environmental Management (EM) can
effectively execute a scope of work at $220 million for fiscal years
2020 through 2024?
Secretary White. The 2016 Consent Order establishes an effective
structure for accomplishing and prioritizing work through risk-based
cleanup campaigns with achievable milestones and targets. The Consent
Order has an annual planning process to update Appendix A (Solid Waste
Management Unit/Area of Concern List), Appendix B (Milestones and
Targets), and Appendix C (Campaigns), as appropriate. The fiscal year
2020 Budget will support the continued retrieval and disposition of
legacy transuranic waste at Technical Area-54 and the deactivation and
decommissioning of excess facilities at Technical Area-21. Moreover,
the fiscal year 2020 budget will support the final remedy and site
completion at remaining Solid Waste Management Units that are co-
located in the footprint of the structures and will also facilitate
progress on the ongoing Chromium Interim Measures and Characterization
campaign and Royal Demolition Explosives Characterization campaign.
air quality in wipp
18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary White, thank you for joining me
last month at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant to celebrate 20 years of
operation at that important facility. One concern I've been hearing
about is the ongoing problems with the air quality in the underground.
Are there addition steps we can take now to improve the air quality
until the new ventilation system is operational in late 2022? In the
interim, to improve fire safety and reduce emissions in the
underground, does your fiscal year 2020 budget request include funding
to replace diesel with electric- or hybrid-powered equipment, such as
bolters, haulers, graders, Load/Haul/Dumps, forklifts, etc.?
Secretary White. The Carlsbad Field Office is aggressively taking a
number of approaches at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to
address air quality in the underground. In collaboration with our
workforce, we have identified and implemented a number of changes to
our processes and procedures in the underground including shutting off
vehicles if stopped for more than a few minutes, keeping running
vehicles in the middle of drifts where air flows are higher, and
routing exhaust to unoccupied spaces (this is done with bolters that
sit stationary while installing bolts). Also, we are installing
supplemental localized ventilation in low flow areas, such as dead legs
to keep the airflow moving.
Plans are underway to upgrade the entire underground fleet with low
and no emission vehicles. WIPP has already ordered its first electric
powered vehicle and is working to have it in service this summer.
columbia life of core fuel
19. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, what is the status of the
life of core fuel you are producing for the Columbia-class submarine
and do you expect any issues when moving it into production for the
fleet?
Admiral Caldwell. Naval Reactors is supporting construction of the
first Columbia-class submarine by developing a reactor plant with a
life-of-ship core that will be in service for more than 40 years.
In support of this effort, the types of core materials that will be
used in the Columbia-class reactor core were also used in the
Technology Demonstration Core being delivered this summer to refuel the
Naval Reactors' land-based prototype at our facility in New York. We
have completed manufacturing of the alternate core material to refuel
this prototype. This effort proved the ability to manufacture alternate
core material on a production scale and identified means to improve
manufacturability and performance of the Columbia-class core.
Earlier this year, Naval Reactors placed the reactor plant long-
lead procurement contract with Navy funding (Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy), including the reactor core, to support the
shipyard's build plan. The contract was placed on time, following
design efforts that began in 2010, and we expect to remain on schedule
and on budget in support of Columbia-class construction beginning in
fiscal year 2021 with delivery in fiscal year 2028.
low enriched uranium fuel
20. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, some have advocated using
Low Enriched Uranium fuel similar to the French for their submarines.
What are the issues, here in open session, from a technical and cost
perspective?
Admiral Caldwell. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has a
history of using highly enriched uranium in naval cores. This
technology has enabled the program to develop reactor cores that are
capable of lasting the entire life of a submarine. The effect of this
capability can be seen in the ability to replace 14 Ohio-class
submarines with 12 Columbia-class submarines by forgoing a mid-life
reactor refueling. This results in substantial savings over the life of
the class in terms of acquisition, maintenance, and operational costs.
Today, nearly 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants are nuclear
powered, including 11 aircraft carriers and 69 submarines. The U.S Navy
mission has a global reach with a high operating tempo and energy
requirements. The French operate far fewer nuclear-powered ships. Their
nuclear fleet is less than one-seventh the size of the U.S. nuclear-
powered fleet. The French nuclear-powered ships are typically refueled
every seven to ten years. Transitioning the U.S. Fleet to low-enriched
uranium (LEU) fuel would result similarly in approximately two to three
refuelings over the life of a ship, deviating from our current life-of-
ship submarine core designs. Based on fleet size, the costs would be
significantly greater for the U.S. Navy to maintain an LEU fleet.
Furthermore, an LEU fuel system would not provide any military
benefit to the performance of U.S. naval reactors. LEU fuel would
fundamentally decrease the available energy in a naval reactor at a
time that energy demands are expected to increase and would negatively
affect reactor endurance, reactor size, ship costs, ship availability,
force structure, and maintenance infrastructure.
idaho spent fuel project
21. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, what is the cost and
completion status of the spent fuel pond facility at the Idaho National
Laboratory? Are there any issues you are worried about?
Admiral Caldwell. The Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
will design and construct a new facility, the Naval Spent Fuel Handling
Facility, to incorporate the capabilities for naval spent nuclear fuel
handling that currently exist in the Expended Core Facility (ECF) and
its supporting facilities. Additionally, a major portion of this new
facility is required to support additional capability, which does not
exist in the ECF, to handle full-length aircraft carrier naval spent
nuclear fuel received in M-290 shipping containers.
I approved the Performance Baseline and Start of Construction
(Critical Decision-2/3) in September 2018. The project has an estimated
total project cost of approximately $1.687 billion with completion in
fiscal year 2025, of which, $40 million was included to account for
potential increases in market-based conditions, such as unanticipated
increases in labor costs and domestic steel prices. Naval Reactors
continues to closely monitor and evaluate the volatility in labor costs
and material prices as well as other issues typical for a construction
project of this size in Idaho (e.g., winter related impacts).
The project is completing site preparation, has begun the mass
geotechnical excavation, and will begin permanent construction
activities this fiscal year.
spent fuel examination facility at the idaho national laboratory
22. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, my understanding is the
spent fuel facility you are building at the Idaho National Laboratory
will not have a capability to examine the fuel. What are you doing
about this and how much might it cost?
Admiral Caldwell. The capability to examine naval spent nuclear
fuel from refueled or defueled warships is vital to Naval Reactors'
mission of delivering reliable and effective nuclear propulsion plants.
It enables resolution of emergent fleet issues, confirmation of
continued safe and reliable operation in the fleet, design and
manufacture of longer-life and higher-powered cores, and demonstration
of performance of new fuel technologies. This capability is currently
provided by the Expended Core Facility (ECF) located at the Naval
Reactors Facility in Idaho. ECF is more than 60 years old and requires
recapitalization.
Naval Reactors is taking a phased approach to recapitalizing the
capabilities of the ECF that supports all Naval Reactors Program
requirements, keeping recapitalization projects to a manageable scope
and size, and considering affordability. The first step will be
recapitalizing spent fuel handling operations to the new Naval Spent
Fuel Handling Facility (NSFHF), which will be completed by the Spent
Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project in fiscal year 2025. Although
some types of spent fuel examinations will be able to be accomplished
in the NSFHF water pools, other types of spent fuel examinations must
be performed in a dry environment (i.e., hot cells).
The Naval Examination Acquisition Project will recapitalize the
spent fuel examination capabilities currently provided by the ECF hot
cells. The project was initiated with Critical Decision-0, Mission Need
Statement, in January 2018, and is planned to begin preliminary design
in fiscal year 2023. The project is targeted to complete as early as
the mid-2030s with a cost between $500 million and $1.3 billion.
electric drive
23. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, my understanding is you are
building an electric drive propulsion system for the Columbia-class
submarine and the contractor has had issues building it. What is the
status of this project?
Admiral Caldwell. In 2017, the vendor manufacturing the prototype
Main Propulsion Motor for the electric drive system identified a
manufacturing issue related to the procurement of improperly insulated
material for the prototype motor stator. The vendor did not properly
relay requirements to sub-tier vendors. This required remanufacturing a
major portion of the prototype motor. The remanufactured prototype
motor has since been delivered to the motor assembly facility where the
vendor is completing final assembly and component testing. The vendor
is under a firm fixed price contract and therefore is absorbing the
costs associated with these actions.
In order to de-risk the lead ship motor assembly manufacturing
process, the vendor built a full-scale mock-up motor at its motor
assembly facility to prove out the final assembly process and special
tooling. Additionally, we installed an alternate motor at the test
facility and have started system level integration testing to ensure
the prototype system (controllers and drives) perform and communicate
as expected. By implementing these mitigation actions, we have been
able to preserve the required nine-month margin for the required in-
yard date for construction of the ship. As such, delivery of the
production motor to the shipyard for construction of the lead ship will
remain on schedule to support construction beginning in fiscal year
2021.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
``low-yield'' nuclear weapons
24. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, my understanding
is that the First Production Unit of the W76-2 was completed in
February 2019, and that the NNSA is currently on a path toward
completing the W76-2 Initial Operational Capability warhead quantity
and delivering the units to the Navy by the end of Fiscal Year 2019.
According to your written testimony for the May 8, 2019, Strategic
Forces Subcommittee hearing, the W76-2 ``provid[es] the U.S. an assured
ability to respond in kind to a low-yield nuclear attack [and]
discourages an adversary from pursuing such an attack and therefore
strengthens deterrence.'' If funding for further work on the W76-2 were
canceled in fiscal year 2020, would the United States have no other
viable capabilities to deter a low-yield nuclear attack?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Cancelling NNSA funding for the W76-2
in fiscal year 2020 would not prevent NNSA from completing 100 percent
of the production required for the W76-2 warheads, as all production is
scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2019. Fiscal year 2020 funding for
the W76-2 is exclusively allocated to the administrative tasks
associated with completing the program. The Department of Energy defers
to the lead agency, the Department of Defense, on further details
related to military capabilities and calculus.
saudi civilian nuclear cooperation agreement
25. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, do you or any
other NNSA official have current or prior involvement in Trump
Administration efforts to negotiate a civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954? If yes,
please explain the nature of that involvement.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, pursuant to Section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Department of Energy
provides technical support to the Department of State in the
negotiation of all peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. The Office
of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation within NNSA provides this function
for the Secretary of Energy. NNSA has provided such technical support
to the negotiations since 2012, when the previous Administration
commenced with such negotiations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
environmental liability contract management
26. Senator Manchin. Secretary White, federal accounting standards
require agencies responsible for cleaning up any contaminated site to
estimate their financial responsibility for doing so. As of fiscal year
2018, the Office of Environmental Management's liability was recorded
as $377 billion. This number is worrisome as the liability growth has
outpaced cleaning spending from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2018,
in large part due to contract and project management problems. During
fiscal year 2018 alone, the Department managed 14,455 contracts and
subcontracts valued at more than $25 billion and $375 million
respectively. The DOE Inspector General has identified numerous issues
to include lagging schedules, fraud, waste, and abuse specifically
linked to weaknesses in project management and oversight. What actions
are you and the Department taking to address the issues cited by the
Inspector General to improve management practices and oversight to
ultimately improve efficiency and reduce costs?
Secretary White. EM has several initiatives in place to improve
oversight and respond to the Inspector General's concerns. For example,
EM is transitioning to an end state contracting (ESC) model on all
major contracts. These contracts will focus on objective ``end states''
that reflect EM's goals of accelerated closure, lower financial
liability, and lower risk. They are cost-plus-incentive fee indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity contracts with task orders that have
shorter durations, more discrete scopes of work, and more accurate cost
and schedule targets. EM is also aligning Performance Evaluation
Measurement Plans for existing cost-plus-award-fee contracts with EM
goals and ESC principles, and using a fee advisory determination board
led by EM headquarters to share best practices and verify consistency
in determination of award fees across the EM complex.
EM is committed to effectively resolving the issues and challenges
identified by the Inspector General and to uphold the Department's
commitment to cleanup.
environmental liability and technology development
27. Senator Manchin. Secretary White, according to the Government
Accountability Office, Department of Energy staff and management are
aware of the increasing federal liability associated with defense
nuclear waste cleanup. DOE staff noted that the change in liability
over the past 8 years is a multifaceted problem due to the complex
cleanup work and also the range of technologies that are available for
remediation. The National Academy of Sciences produced a report this
year that recommends that DOE change how it manages science and
technology development in order to speed up remediation efforts and
reduce cost. In the early 2000s, the environmental technology budget
for the Department was around $200 million, but now is only around $25
million. Do you believe the current budget for technology development
is sufficient to meet the challenges that have been raised by the
National Academy of Sciences and Department employees?
Secretary White. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) has
been very successful with its cleanup program to date, reducing the
number of sites to be addressed from 107 to 16. The Technology
Development program works with the sites, National Laboratories, and
site contractors to address the remaining challenges. As the cleanup
program has matured, the focus of technology development has shifted to
solve site-specific technology issues. Although the EM Headquarter
technology development budget has been reduced to $25 million, the
sites are also investing in technology development. For example, Oak
Ridge funds $3 million for mercury research related to a site-specific
contamination issue, and the Office of River Protection has requested
$10 million in the fiscal year 2020 Budget to fund a test bed
initiative for demonstrating grouting and disposal of low-level waste.
EM has developed a number of tools for clean-up since the organization
was established in 1989. We are also looking at technologies and
innovative approaches from other industries, such as the mining and oil
industries, where we can adapt an existing technology or approach to
address DOE's challenges.
y-12 facility upgrades and impact
28. Senator Manchin. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, on April 6 of
this year you gave testimony to the House Energy and Water Development
Subcommittee that pieces of the roof were falling in at the old Lithium
Processing facility locate at Y-12 to highlight the need for repairs
and modernization. This followed a chemical spill on April 4 reported
at the facility. Although both incidents are considered minor and did
not affect the overall safety of the operations there, they raise
concerns of the condition and long-term sustainability of operations
under current conditions. As a part of your budget there are funds
going to continuing projects to build new Uranium and Lithium
processing facilities. Given the recent issues and your understanding
of the state of facilities and operations at Y-12, are the current
timelines for construction and upgrade of weapons going to meet the
timeline goals of the Uranium Processing facility completion in 2025
and warhead upgrades by 2030?
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is committed to constructing the
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) for no more than $6.5 billion by the
end of 2025. UPF has been on budget and on schedule for six consecutive
years. The UPF nuclear facilities were baselined in March 2018 and
construction is underway. UPF supports NNSA's enduring uranium mission
and its commitment to modernize its infrastructure.
NNSA management practices ensure that we follow integrated
schedules to align our strategic materials work with our warhead
modernization activities. The W87-1 Modification Program, which has a
scheduled First Production Unit date of fiscal year 2030, remains on
budget and on schedule. As part of NNSA's overall strategy, NNSA
continues to maintain existing facilities until such a time when
operations can move into the new facilities.
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