[Senate Hearing 116-508, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                 S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                                   ON

                                S. 1790

     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND 
   FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE 
   MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER 
                                PURPOSES
                               __________

                                 PART 7

                            STRATEGIC FORCES
                               __________

                       APRIL 3; MAY 1 AND 8, 2019
                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
         
         
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]         


                 Available via http://www.govinfo.gov/

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
46-155 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024  


                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, 		JACK REED, Rhode Island
             Chairman			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
TOM COTTON, Arkansas			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		TIM KAINE, Virginia
JONI ERNST, Iowa			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona			TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
RICK SCOTT, Florida			DOUG JONES, Alabama
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                
                                     
                                     
                                     
   		   John Bonsell, Staff Director
		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
             
                               __________

                    Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman		MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TOM COTTON, Arkansas			ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		DOUG JONES, Alabama
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                
                                     

                                  (ii)


                          C O N T E N T S

                               __________

                             April 3, 2019

                                                                   Page

Missile Defense Policies.........................................     1

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................     1

Statement of Senator Martin Heinrich.............................     2

                           Witness Statements

Rood, Hon. John C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy........     2

O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United           7
  States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense 
  Command.

Greaves, Lieutenant General Samuel A., USAF, Director, Missile       13
  Defense Agency.

Dickinson, Lieutenant General James H., USA, Commander, United       30
  States Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces 
  Strategic Command and Joint Functional Component Command for 
  Integrated Missile Defense.

Questions for the Record.........................................    64

                              May 1, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy......................................    73

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................    73

Statement of Senator Martin Heinrich.............................    74

                           Witness Statements

Lord, Hon. Ellen M., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition      75
  and Sustainment.

Trachtenberg, Hon. David J., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense       83
  for Policy.

Ray, General Timothy M. Ray, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global       90
  Strike Command and Commander, Air Force Strategic-Air, United 
  States Strategic Command.

Wolfe, Vice Admiral Johnny R., Jr. USN, Director Strategic          101
  Systems
  Programs.

Questions for the Record.........................................   125

                                 (iii)


                              May 8, 2019

                                                                   Page

Department of Energy's Atomic Defense Activities and Programs....   139

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator Deb Fischer.................................   139

                           Witness Statements

Gordon-Hagerty, Hon. Lisa E., Administrator, National Nuclear       140
  Security
  Administration.

White, Hon. Anne Marie, Assistant Secretary of Energy for           150
  Environmental Management.

Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for      157
  Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration.

Questions for the Record.........................................   176

                                  (iv)


 
           
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, APRIL 3, 2019

                  United States Senate,    
                  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                        MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in 
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb 
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Fischer, Rounds, 
Sullivan, Hawley, Heinrich, King, and Jones.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

    Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order. The 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to review the 
Administration's budget request for missile defense programs 
for the next fiscal year and to discuss the associated policies 
with our witnesses.
    Testifying before us today we have the Honorable John Rood, 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Terrence J. 
O'Shaughnessy, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command and North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); Lieutenant General 
Sam Greaves, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and 
Lieutenant General James Dickinson, who commands the Army Space 
and Missile Defense Command, as well as the Army Forces 
Strategic Command and the Joint Functional Component Command 
for Integrated Missile Defense.
    Last year we bid farewell to General O'Shaughnessy's 
predecessor, General Robinson, and I understand, General 
Greaves, that you will be following her into retirement. I want 
to thank you for your decades of service to this country that 
you have sacrificed so much for, you and your family. We wish 
you well. It has been a pleasure to work with you, sir.
    I would like to thank the entire panel for being here 
today. We look forward to hearing from you.
    First I would recognize our Ranking Member for any comments 
he would like to make.
    Senator Heinrich?

              STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

    Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
    First I want to thank Senator Fischer for holding this 
hearing, and let me also thank today's witnesses for 
testifying. We very much appreciate the time that they took to 
prepare for today's hearing and for the work that they do every 
day for our country.
    Now that we have the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR), 
it's important that we take this opportunity to review the 
fiscal year 2020 budget request to ensure that it's consistent 
with the MDR and that it provides sufficient resources so that 
our missile defense systems perform reliably and effectively.
    We also need to continue to improve our sensor and 
discrimination capabilities so that we have a better picture of 
the ever-evolving threats, including hypersonic missiles.
    We need to continue to conduct smart simulation and testing 
before we commit to buying new technologies.
    While we continue to improve our Homeland defense systems, 
we should not take our eyes off the ball when it comes to 
protecting our deployed troops and reassuring our allies and 
partners. The demand for our combatant commanders for Aegis 
ships, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot 
batteries remains high. We need to consider how we can best 
allocate these systems and effectively train the warfighters 
who operate them, and to provide the protection that is needed 
in today's demanding environment.
    But what was most notable about the Missile Defense Review 
is what it didn't do, since it failed to recommend any new 
creative solutions for addressing the expensive shock doctrine 
that we currently face. Simply put, the cost curve is not in 
our favor.
    The targets are extremely cheap, and our interceptors are 
extremely expensive, which means we need to more aggressively 
pursue new technologies and emphasize left-of-launch 
approaches.
    The Missile Defense Review also avoided proposing any 
actions to defend against hypersonic missiles despite 
repeatedly acknowledging the threat. So I look forward to 
hearing about how we can, as a nation, move with a sense of 
urgency to best address that threat.
    Again, thank you for coming today, and I look forward to 
this dialogue.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    We now turn to our witnesses for their opening statements. 
I would remind you that your full statements will be made part 
of the record.
    Secretary Rood, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
                             POLICY

    Secretary Rood. Senator Fischer, Madam Chairman, Senator 
Heinrich, other Members of the Committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today on the Department's 
missile defense policy, posture, and budget.
    The Missile Defense Review, or MDR, articulates a 
comprehensive approach to address the missile threat through 
strength and deterrence and active missile defense systems. It 
is based on a recognition that the threat environment is more 
dangerous and calls for a concerted U.S. effort to improve the 
existing capabilities for both Homeland and regional missile 
defense.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget requests $12 billion for 
missile defense, which includes $9.4 billion for the Missile 
Defense Agency, as well as other funding for the Army and Air 
Force. These funds support improving the current system and 
moving towards innovative concepts and advanced technologies.
    Now, today more than 20 states possess offensive missiles. 
Potential adversaries are developing sophisticated ballistic 
and cruise missile systems with increased speed, range, 
accuracy, and lethality.
    Over the past decade, for example, North Korea and Iran 
have accelerated efforts to develop and field missiles capable 
of threatening United States strategic interests. While North 
Korea has not tested a nuclear-capable missile in over a year, 
it possesses a range of systems, including road-mobile 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), solid-propellant 
medium-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles.
    Iran continues to improve its missile capabilities and 
develop space launch vehicles which provide knowledge to 
develop an intercontinental-range ballistic missile. Iran 
already possesses the largest stockpile of regional missiles in 
the Middle East and is now enhancing their precision.
    We see the re-emergence of long-term competition with 
Russia and China. Both of those countries are expanding and 
modernizing a wide range of offensive missile capabilities. For 
example, they are fielding increasingly diverse missile systems 
and integrating those missiles into their coercive threats and 
military plans.
    Russia is developing the hypersonic glide vehicle, which 
maneuvers outside traditional trajectories and typically 
maneuvers in the atmosphere, and China is also developing 
advanced technologies, such as maneuverable reentry vehicles, 
as well as hypersonic glide vehicles.
    As highlighted in the Missile Defense Review, a 
comprehensive approach is needed to address today's complex 
threats. Our focus is on a layered defense, with adaptable 
systems to meet the changing environment.
    Within the MDR framework, the key roles for missile defense 
include: one, protecting the U.S. Homeland, our forces abroad, 
our allies and partners; two, diminishing the benefits of 
adversary coercive threats and attacks; three, assuring allies 
and partners we will stand by our security commitments; four, 
assuring our freedom of action to conduct military operations; 
and lastly, hedging against future unanticipated threats.
    Let me now turn to the missile defense capabilities, 
posture, and budget that flow from our policy in the MDR to 
counter these threats. Regarding our first priority, to protect 
the U.S. Homeland, the United States is protected by the 
ground-based missile defense system. The budget requests $1.8 
billion for this system, which includes a number of 
improvements such as: 20 additional ground-based interceptors, 
bringing the total to 64; continuing development of the 
redesigned kill vehicle (RKV); and continuing to build a new 
missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska.
    The budget also requests funding to field new 
discrimination radars in Alaska and Hawaii, and extend 
operations for use of the sea-based X-band radar.
    The MDR also recognizes the need for improving our 
capability to detect and defend against increasingly stealthy 
cruise missile threats. This includes a phased effort to 
enhance our ability to warn and defend against air-breathing 
threats and cue our air and missile defense systems against 
these threats. Funds for Homeland cruise missile defense in the 
2020 budget request include $301 million for the wide-area 
surveillance system.
    To address the regional missile threat, our efforts are 
focused on integrated air and missile defense to defend our 
forces, allies, and partners against missile threats from any 
source. General Greaves will talk about a number of the 
programs where we have requested funding and the budget request 
for them.
    In addition to improving our legacy systems, the MDR calls 
for pursuing a range of technologies and examining advanced 
concepts and breakthrough technologies. We are requesting 
funding for: additional space-based sensors; integrating space-
based kill assessment; operating and sustaining the space 
tracking and surveillance system; developing defenses against 
hypersonic missiles, including near-term sensor and command and 
control upgrades; testing an SM-3 Block IIA capability against 
an ICBM-class target; kinetic boost phase intercept using a 
tactical air platform; and technology maturation initiatives, 
including a neutral beam technology demonstration program and 
continuing High-Energy Laser development and scaling, as well 
as a study of space-based interceptors.
    The MDR stresses the importance of working with allies and 
partners and encouraging them to invest in their own air and 
missile defense capabilities. The United States, for example, 
is committed to completing the deployment of European Phased 
Adaptive Approach. Phases 1 and 2 are complete and included: 
stationing ships in Rota, Spain; positioning a TPY-2 radar in 
Turkey; and deploying the first operational Aegis Ashore system 
in Romania. Deployment of Phase 3, in Poland, for an Aegis 
Ashore system is underway.
    In the Middle East we are working with our Gulf partners. 
We are also working and supporting Israel's programs. In the 
Indo-Pacific region, Japan is perhaps the best example, where 
we have developed the SM-3 Block IIA together with that 
country.
    So in conclusion, let me just say that our missile defense 
investments and priorities focus on the concepts and advanced 
technologies to ensure the continuing effectiveness of missile 
defenses against capabilities of potential adversaries. By 
doing so, we will strengthen our ability to protect the 
Homeland, enhance deterrence, stabilize crises, better control 
escalation, protect and assure our allies, and hedge against 
future threats.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rood follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Secretary John Rood
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department's 
missile defense policy, posture, and budget.
    The MDR articulates a comprehensive approach to address the missile 
threat through strengthened deterrence and active missile defense 
systems. It is based on a recognition that the threat environment is 
more dangerous and calls for a concerted U.S. effort to improve 
existing capabilities for both Homeland and regional missile defense.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget requests $12.0 billion for missile 
defense that includes: $9.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency; 
$2.5 billion for the Army; and $100 million for the Air Force. These 
funds support improving the current system and moving towards 
innovative concepts and advanced technologies.
                                 threat
    Today, more than 20 States possess offensive missiles. Potential 
adversaries are developing sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile 
systems with increased speed, range, accuracy, and lethality.
    Over the past decade, North Korea and Iran have accelerated efforts 
to develop and field missiles capable of threatening United States 
strategic interests. While North Korea has not tested nuclear-capable 
missiles in over a year, it possesses a range of systems including 
road-mobile intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, solid-propellant 
medium-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles.
    Iran continues to improve its missile capabilities and develop 
space launch vehicles which provide knowledge to develop an 
intercontinental-range ballistic missile. Iran already possesses the 
largest stockpile of regional missile systems in the Middle East. It is 
now enhancing their precision while developing cruise missiles and 
anti-ship ballistic missiles.
    We also see the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by 
revisionist powers in Russia and China. Russia and China are expanding 
and modernizing a wide range of offensive missile capabilities. For 
example, they are fielding increasingly diverse missile systems, and 
integrating missiles into their coercive threats and military plans. 
These plans support antiaccess/area denial, or A2/AD strategies, which 
seek to deny the United States the ability to move forces freely to 
limit or negate our ability to respond in a regional conflict or 
crisis.
    Russia is also developing the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which 
maneuvers outside of traditional trajectories and typically maneuvers 
in the atmosphere, (unlike traditional missiles on a predictable 
ballistic trajectory), and China is also developing advanced 
technologies, such as maneuverable reentry vehicles in addition to 
HGVs.
              missile defense roles, policy, and strategy
    As highlighted in the MDR, a comprehensive approach is needed to 
address today's complex threats. Our focus is on a layered defense, 
with adaptable systems to meet the changing environment, enhanced 
ballistic and cruise missile defense integration for more robust 
capability, and pursuit of space-based capabilities and boost-phase 
intercept capabilities.
    Within the MDR framework, the key roles for missile defense 
include:

      Protecting the U.S. Homeland, our forces abroad, and 
allies and partners;
      Diminishing the benefits of adversary coercive threats 
and attacks;
      Assuring allies and partners we will stand by our 
security commitments;
      Preserving our freedom of action to conduct military 
operations; and
      Hedging against future, unanticipated missile threats.

  u.s. missile defense priorities, programs, budget, and capabilities
U.S. Homeland Defense
    Let me now turn to the missile defense capabilities, posture, and 
budget that flow from our policy in the MDR, to counter the threats 
I've highlighted. Regarding our first priority, to protect the U.S. 
Homeland, today, the United States is protected by the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. The budget requests $1.8 billion for 
this system, which includes a number of improvements such as:

      Adding 20 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska, 
bringing the total to 64;
      Continuing development of a Redesigned Kill Vehicle for 
improved reliability; and
      Continuing to build a new missile field at Fort Greely, 
Alaska.

    The budget also requests funding to field new discrimination radars 
in Alaska and Hawaii, and extend operations for the sea-based X-band 
radar.
    The MDR also recognizes the need for improving our capability to 
detect and defend against increasingly stealthy cruise missile threats. 
In response, we are bolstering our Homeland three defenses against such 
threats. This includes a phased effort to enhance our ability to warn 
and defend against air-breathing threats and cue our air and missile 
defense systems against these threats. Funds for Homeland cruise 
missile defense in the fiscal year 2020 budget request include $301 
million for the Wide-Area Surveillance system.
Regional Defense
    To address the regional missile threat, our efforts focus on 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) to defend U.S. forces abroad, 
allies, and partners against missile threats from any source. We are 
strengthening our regional missile defense posture by funding several 
programs. For instance, we are enhancing the Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense system by procuring Standard Missile (SM-3), Block IB and Block 
IIA missiles and integrating the SPY-6 radar. The Department will also 
procure additional Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
interceptors, Patriot interceptors, and the Army Indirect Fire 
Protection Capability (IFPC) command and control system.
Preparing for Emerging Offensive Missile Threats and Uncertainties
    In addition to improving our legacy systems, the 2019 MDR calls for 
pursuing a range of technologies and examining advanced concepts and 
breakthrough technologies. We are requesting funding for:

      Additional space-based sensors;
      Integrating Space-based Kill Assessment into the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System;
      Operating and sustaining the Space Tracking and 
Surveillance System;
      Developing defenses against hypersonic missiles, 
including near-term sensor and command and control upgrades;
      Testing a SM-3 Block IIA capability against an ICBM-class 
target to develop the capability to add a layer to our defense system;
      Kinetic boost phase intercept using a tactical air 
platform;
      Technology maturation initiatives include initiating a 
Neutral Particle Beam technology demonstration program and continuing 
High-Energy Laser development and scaling; and
      A study of a space-based interceptors.
                    working with allies and partners
    The MDR stresses the importance of working with allies and partners 
and encouraging them to invest in their own air and missile defense 
capabilities that are interoperable with U.S. capabilities. 
Interoperable Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems can 
take advantage of cost-sharing and help distribute the burden of common 
defense. The budget requests funding for the Joint Integrated Air and 
Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO), some of which supports 
conducting evaluations and demonstrations of IAMD with regional allies 
and partners throughout the United States Indo-Pacific Command, United 
States European Command, and United States Central Command areas.
    The United States also is committed to completing the deployment of 
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the United States 
contribution to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ballistic 
missile defense in Europe. EPAA has three phases intended to address 
the threat to NATO and Europe originating from Iran. Phases 1 and 2 are 
complete and included: the stationing of four multi-mission Aegis BMD-
capable ships in Rota, Spain; positioning of a forward-based AN/TPY-2 
radar in Turkey; and deploying the first operational Aegis Ashore 
system in Romania. Deployment of Phase 3, an Aegis Ashore system in 
Poland, is underway.
    In the Middle East we are working with our Gulf partners who are 
acquiring United States missile defense systems and we continue to 
support Israel's efforts through the DOD-Israeli Ministry of Defense 
Memorandum of Understanding that began in fiscal year 2019, requesting 
$500 million for the Iron Dome, Arrow Weapon System and David's Sling 
programs.
    In the Indo-Pacific region, Japan is an example of mutually 
beneficial burden sharing, codeveloping with the United States, the SM-
3 Block IIA. Japan also hosts two U.S. AN/TPY-2 X-Band radars that are 
fully interoperable in a manner that supports both Japanese and United 
States regional missile defense operations. Japan also continues to 
make significant investments in its own missile defense capabilities, 
highlighted by its decision to acquire two Aegis Ashore systems.
                               conclusion
    Our missile defense investments and priorities focus on concepts 
and advanced technologies to ensure the continuing effectiveness of 
missile defenses against capabilities of potential adversaries. By 
doing so, we will strengthen our ability to protect the Homeland; 
enhance deterrence, stabilize crises, and better control escalation; 
protect and assure allies and partners; and hedge against future 
threats. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward 
to your questions.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    General O'Shaughnessy, please.

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF, 
 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN 
                   AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking 
Member Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 
I am truly honored to appear today as the Commander of the 
United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American 
Aerospace Defense Command.
    As a warfighter responsible for defending the Homeland from 
attack, I am truly grateful for the steady support we receive 
from Under Secretary Rood, General Greaves, and General 
Dickinson, and I appreciate the opportunity to appear with each 
of these great partners today. I also thank you, ma'am, for 
recognizing Sam Greaves' upcoming retirement and the great work 
that he's done for us.
    USNORTHCOM is responsible for the ballistic missile defense 
of the United States, while NORAD has responsibility for cruise 
missile defense over the United States and Canada. In an era of 
rapidly evolving technology and renewed great power 
competition, the importance of USNORTHCOM and NORAD's mission 
to deter, detect, and defeat threats to the Homeland cannot be 
overstated.
    Our adversaries have engaged in deliberate, focused efforts 
over a number of years to exploit our perceived gaps and erode 
many of the advantages previously afforded by our geography and 
technological superiority. As a result, it is clear that our 
Homeland is not a sanctuary.
    Revisionist powers Russia and China have given every 
indication that their own security strategies are based on 
holding the United States at risk with both conventional and 
nuclear weapons, and they have signaled that we must anticipate 
attacks against our civilian and defense infrastructure in the 
event of conflict.
    Russia has modernized its aviation and submarine fleets and 
fielded long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar 
detection. Russia and China continue developing and testing 
hypersonic glide vehicles, and both have also established a 
noticeably stronger foothold in the Arctic along the northern 
approaches to the United States and Canada, well within the 
striking distance of both nations.
    Meanwhile, North Korea's stockpile of nuclear weapons and 
ICBMs remain an immediate concern.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD's mission to deter our adversaries is 
dependent on our ability to detect and defeat potential threats 
to the Homeland, and I am grateful to the Subcommittee for your 
strong support of USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities along those 
lines of effort. Improving our ability to see and defeat 
missile threats to the Homeland is among my top priorities. 
Congressional support for fielding active electronically 
scanned array (AESA) radars for our aerospace control and 
warfighters and improving the capability and capacity of our 
missile defense sensors and interceptors clearly demonstrates 
our shared sense of urgency and resolve. In that same spirit, I 
ask for your continued support as we improve our defenses 
against new and emerging missile technologies.
    We must take prudent steps now to ensure our next 
generation defense capabilities to include a space-based 
sensing layer are not late to need. That effort cannot start 
too soon given that our adversaries are already developing and 
testing advanced weapons specifically intended to avoid 
detection in order to hold targets in the Homeland at constant 
risk.
    With these challenges firmly in mind, I sincerely 
appreciate the much-needed predictability and stability that 
came from an on-time budget in fiscal year 2019. I am also 
grateful for the subcommittee's ongoing efforts to ensure that 
we avoid the devastating impacts that a return to sequestration 
would bring to the Department of Defense (DOD) in fiscal year 
2020.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD work every day with our partners to 
keep our citizens safe while confronting challenges emanating 
from multiple approaches and in all domains. I especially want 
to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the amazing 
men and women in the National Guard who are great partners and 
critical to our ability to perform our missions.
    The threat to the Homeland from both ballistic missiles and 
cruise missiles are significant and increasingly complex, but 
the airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and 
civilians of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are deeply committed to 
defending our nation, and I am honored to represent them today. 
We have the watch.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy follows:]

        Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to appear today as the 
Commander of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)--two complementary but 
distinct commands.
    USNORTHCOM is the Geographic Combatant Command laser-focused on 
defending our Homeland from an increasingly assertive set of 
competitors who are committed to holding the United States at risk in 
multiple domains.
    NORAD is the bi-national United States-Canadian command that 
deters, detects, and, if necessary, defeats air threats to the United 
States and Canada while also providing aerospace warning and maritime 
warning. The six decades of NORAD's unmatched experience and shared 
history are proving more vital than ever as we face the most complex 
security environment in generations. This unique and longstanding 
command serves as both a formidable deterrent to our adversaries and a 
clear symbol of the unbreakable bond between the United States and 
Canada.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority: 
defending the Homeland from attack. Revisionist powers Russia and China 
have changed global strategic dynamics by fielding advanced long-range 
weapons systems and engaging in increasingly aggressive efforts to 
expand their global presence and influence, including in the approaches 
to the United States and Canada. Our competitors currently hold our 
citizens and national interests at risk, and we must anticipate attacks 
against our defense and civilian infrastructure in the event of a 
conflict. As a result, it is clear that the Homeland is not a 
sanctuary.
    For that reason, improving our ability to detect and defeat cruise 
missile attacks is among my highest priorities. Russia has made its 
strategic intentions clear by investing heavily in long-range, low 
radar cross section cruise missiles that can be fired from aircraft or 
submarines against targets well inside the borders of the United States 
and Canada. To safeguard our citizens and critical infrastructure, and 
to preserve our ability to rapidly project power abroad, it will be 
necessary to take deliberate and focused measures to improve our cruise 
missile defenses.
    These shifting global military and political dynamics will be with 
us for the foreseeable future. Our competitors have fielded weapons 
systems and employed new methods in a concerted effort to exploit 
perceived vulnerabilities and erode our strategic advantage. The 
successful defense of our Homeland today relies more than ever on 
constant vigilance by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, tightly coupled with a 
reinvigorated emphasis on close integration with our fellow combatant 
commands, the intelligence community, and our allies and partners. 
Collectively, these dynamics reinforce the importance of nuclear 
deterrence to our national security, given that nuclear deterrence 
backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy across the globe. 
Should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always ready to 
defeat any threat to our nations.
    The threats facing our nation are not hypothetical; our 
competitors' reach is now global, and they are conspicuously 
undermining international norms and standards of behavior while 
possessing the capability to strike targets in North America with both 
nuclear and advanced non-nuclear weapons launched from well beyond our 
territory. In light of this reality, the Homeland defense mission is 
more essential than ever, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD must be energized, 
proactive, and determined to actively shape our strategic environment. 
Together with our Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and 
international partners, we have taken active measures to ensure the 
Homeland defense enterprise is globally integrated, well-exercised, and 
positioned to take quick, decisive action to protect our interests and 
preserve the ability to project all of the elements of our national 
power. Should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always ready 
to defeat any threat to our nations.
                                 threat
Russia:
    Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a 
century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to 
threaten the Homeland below the nuclear threshold. Russia continues to 
hone and flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation 
of advanced air- and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly 
greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing 
them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.
    Since 2015, Russia has employed its new air- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles against anti-regime targets in Syria, providing real-
world training for Russian crews and demonstrating its growing 
precision-strike capabilities to the West. In a parallel effort, Russia 
has implemented a modernization program for its heavy bombers that will 
ensure their ability to perform nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and 
strike missions in the coming decades.
    Russian heavy bombers such as the Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK 
continue to conduct regular air patrols in the international airspace 
along the coastlines of other countries to underscore Russia's 
capabilities. Russian bomber crews are demonstrating increasing 
proficiency in their flight activities, developing a new generation of 
air crews capable of employing this highly visible implement of Russian 
deterrence and messaging in peacetime, crisis, and war.
    Patrols by Russian military aircraft off the coasts of the United 
States and Canada have grown increasingly complex in recent years. 
NORAD fighter aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aviation 
missions inside the United States and Canadian Air Defense 
Identification Zones, and there is no indication that Russian 
leadership intends to reduce the number of these missions in the near 
future.
    In addition to its highly capable cruise missiles that enable its 
anti-ship and land-attack missions, Russia has introduced the 
Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarine, which is armed with 
advanced land-attack cruise missiles and is much quieter and more 
lethal than previous generations of Russian attack submarines. Russia's 
growing non-nuclear capabilities provide Moscow a range of options to 
dissuade an adversary from escalating and to terminate a conflict on 
terms favorable to Moscow, increasing the potential for miscalculation 
or opportunistic actions.
    Russia has demonstrated a willingness to conduct disruptive 
cyberattacks and cyber-enabled influence operations against its 
competitors, as it demonstrated during the 2016 election cycle in the 
United States. In a crisis or conflict, we would expect Russia to 
conduct cyber operations against critical infrastructure in an attempt 
to compel de-escalation.
    In the Arctic, Moscow is planning to deploy surface vessels armed 
with the modular KALIBR-NK cruise missile system that will offer highly 
precise land-attack capabilities and introduce a new cruise missile 
threat from our northern approaches. Separately, Moscow continues to 
bolster its military defenses in the Arctic with the deployment of a K-
300P Bastion coastal defense cruise missile system on the New Siberian 
Islands, significantly increasing Russia's ability to defend and 
control a large stretch of the Northern Sea Route.
    Finally, Russia is developing multiple weapon systems specifically 
designed to circumvent United States missile defenses and hold our 
Homeland at risk. This includes the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM)-delivered AVANGARD hypersonic glide vehicle, which was 
highlighted in a speech by Vladimir Putin in March 2018 and is expected 
to become operational in the next few years, complicating our missile 
warning mission.
China:
    China is pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program 
that includes a rapid expansion of its strategic nuclear capabilities 
while working to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and 
increase their ability to ensure a credible second-strike capability. 
Over the last decade, China has supplemented its modest silo-based ICBM 
force with dozens of road-mobile ICBMs capable of delivering multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles that could significantly 
increase the number of survivable warheads available for a retaliatory 
strike. During that same timeframe, China operationalized its first 
class of ballistic missile submarines, adding a second leg to its 
strategic deterrent. China maintains its longstanding no-first-use 
nuclear policy, but its growing nuclear, conventional, and cyber 
capabilities are significant.
    China's military strategy and ongoing People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric 
mentality, as evidenced by emerging doctrinal references to strategies 
that would move potential conflicts away from Chinese territory, 
suggesting that PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role 
for their military.
    On the economic front, China plans to invest heavily in 
infrastructure projects in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative in a major 
effort to develop stronger economic ties with other countries and shape 
their interests to align with China's, simultaneously seeking to deter 
confrontation or international criticism of China's approach to 
sensitive issues.
    In the cyber domain, Chinese leaders view computer network 
operations as a low-cost deterrent that demonstrates capabilities and 
resolve to an adversary and allows them to manage the escalation of a 
conflict by targeting critical military and civilian infrastructure. 
Ongoing military reforms are aimed at accelerating the incorporation of 
information systems that enable forces and commanders to carry out 
missions and tasks more effectively.
Advanced Threat Technologies:
    Defending the United States and Canada against long-range weapons 
systems capable of striking targets in the Homeland is a major focus of 
both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Russian aircraft and submarines are now 
armed with long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar 
detection, while both Russia and China are developing and testing 
maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. In the cyber domain, our 
adversaries continue their non-stop efforts to penetrate defense and 
civilian networks. Collectively, these advanced technologies could be 
capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear weapons, 
potentially affecting national decision making and limiting response 
options in both peacetime and crisis.
North Korea:
    After decades of research and development activity marked more by 
failure than success, North Korea's ICBM program turned the corner in 
2017 when North Korea successfully flight-tested multiple ICBMs capable 
of ranging the continental United States and detonated a thermonuclear 
device, increasing the destructive yield of its weapons by a factor of 
ten. Following these successes, Kim Jong-un declared the completion of 
his nuclear ICBM research and development program, implying the 
production and deployment of these systems would soon follow.
    Kim Jong-un developed these strategic weapons to deter the United 
States from overthrowing his regime, and he almost certainly has plans 
to use them against our Homeland should a conflict erupt on the 
Peninsula. Meanwhile, North Korea's cyber capabilities continue to 
grow, as does the country's willingness to employ them during 
peacetime, as North Korea demonstrated by its cyber attacks on Sony 
Pictures in 2014.
Iran:
    Iran is not yet able to strike the United States with strategic 
weapons, and its leaders have declared a unilateral 2000 kilometer 
range restriction that limits its missile force to threatening only 
regional targets in the Near East. Iran's SIMORGH space launch vehicle 
has yet to successfully place a satellite in orbit, but its most recent 
launch in January 2019 demonstrated continued progress on long-range 
missile technologies. Although we have no information to indicate that 
Iran intends to test and deploy an ICBM, the SIMORGH would be capable 
of ICBM ranges if configured for that purpose, and progress on the 
vehicle could enable Iran to field an ICBM in as a little as a few 
years if its leaders chose to pursue that objective.
    However, Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the 
region and has expended significant resources on its space launch and 
civil nuclear capabilities that could enable it to develop a nuclear-
armed ICBM relatively quickly if its leaders chose to do so. In the 
meantime, Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks abroad via covert 
operations, terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber capabilities. Iran 
considers disruptive and destructive cyberspace operations as a valid 
instrument of statecraft and a means of imposing costs on its 
adversaries, even during peacetime.
                         defending the homeland
    Homeland defense is USNORTHCOM's essential mission and the number 
one priority of the DOD per the 2018 National Defense Strategy. In 
light of the complex and significant threats to our Homeland, 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD take assertive, proactive measures each day to 
shape our strategic environment, deter aggression, and ensure that we 
are always ready to defeat any adversary should deterrence fail. As the 
Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I view everything the commands do 
through the lens of Homeland defense, and I am committed to ensuring 
that each of our missions help to deter adversaries, preserve decision 
space, and maintain the ability for our national leaders to project 
power and exert influence in the best interest of our nations.
    In pursuit of their own perceived national and ideological 
interests, our competitors have developed advanced capabilities and 
demonstrated their intent to hold our Homeland at risk in multiple 
domains and along numerous avenues of approach to North America. In 
light of that reality, we simply do not have the luxury of waiting for 
others to act before we formulate a response. Instead, USNORTHCOM and 
NORAD work constantly to shape our theater while making it obvious to 
potential adversaries that they will face overlapping dilemmas and 
extraordinary costs should they choose to challenge us. This active and 
continuous enterprise requires strong relationships and close 
coordination with our fellow combatant commands, the military Services, 
the U.S. Federal interagency community, and our international allies 
and partners.
    The diverse threats arrayed against the United States and Canada 
challenge our defenses in a number of domains and along multiple 
avenues of approach. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD work 
around the clock to monitor those approaches and are ready to respond 
at a moment's notice should our adversaries chose to challenge our 
defenses.
Ballistic Missile Defense:
    USNORTHCOM continues to prioritize our mission to defend the United 
States against potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
attacks from North Korea and Iran, should Iran develop that capability. 
I remain cautiously optimistic that North Korea can be convinced that 
it is in their best interest to abandon its nuclear weapons and ICBM 
programs. In the meantime, I continue to emphasize the necessity of 
fielding improved discriminating radars, a more survivable sensor 
network, and improving the reliability and lethality of our interceptor 
fleet in order to remain well ahead of North Korea or Iran's capability 
to strike the defended area.
    I am confident in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
System to defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea 
or Iran, if Iran develops an ICBM, but that confidence is contingent on 
our continued pursuit of system-wide enhancements to outpace our 
adversaries' rapid technological advancements.
    The success of the Ballistic Missile Defense mission is also 
dependent on strong cooperation between USNORTHCOM as the supported 
warfighting command and the technical experts of the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA). The MDA Director, Lieutenant General Sam Greaves, is an 
outstanding partner, and I am grateful to him and the entire MDA team 
for their dedicated support of this enormously complex, no-fail 
mission. I fully support MDA's plans to field the Long-Range 
Discrimination Radar, Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, 
along with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle and a selectable 2- or 3-stage 
interceptor booster. Additionally, I believe we must pursue space-based 
sensors to detect and track advanced threats from Russia and China. 
Each of these improvements to our sensor network and interceptor fleet 
will help to ensure our ability to defend the United States against an 
ICBM attack now and into the foreseeable future.
    To counter the rapid evolution of our adversaries' missile 
technologies, we will require advanced defensive technologies such as 
space-based sensors and directed-energy missile defeat technology in 
the near future. A space-based sensor network, in particular, will 
provide far greater coverage, survivability, and persistence--all of 
which are necessary to maintaining confidence in our ability to deter, 
detect, and defeat missile threats to the Homeland.
    At present, the DOD is striking an effective balance between 
ensuring our ability to defend against current and near-term threats 
while simultaneously investing in the research and development of 
advanced technologies capable of defeating future threats. This vision 
for meeting anticipated requirements is strongly articulated in the 
recently published Missile Defense Review, and I fully support the plan 
for defending the Homeland.
Arctic Northern Approaches:
    It has become clear that defense of the Homeland depends on our 
ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in the Arctic and 
passing through the Arctic. Russia's fielding of advanced, long-range 
cruise missiles capable of flying through the northern approaches and 
striking targets in the United States and Canada has emerged as the 
dominant military threat in the Arctic, while diminished sea ice and 
the potential for competition over resources present overlapping 
challenges in this strategically significant region. Meanwhile, China 
has declared that it is not content to remain a mere observer in the 
Arctic and has taken action to normalize its naval and commercial 
presence in the region in order to increase its access to lucrative 
resources and shipping routes.
    I view the Arctic as the front line in the defense of the United 
States and Canada, and as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities and 
the Combatant Commander responsible for defending the approaches to the 
Homeland, I constantly assess the changing environmental and strategic 
conditions throughout the region--across borders and operational 
boundaries--in an ongoing, active, and collaborative effort to mitigate 
the risks associated with increased civilian and military presence in 
the northern approaches to North America.
    The effort to rapidly adapt to the evolving strategic landscape and 
associated challenges in the Arctic includes a deliberate and ongoing 
effort to fully assess our collective missions and associated 
requirements in the region. As one key example of those ongoing 
assessments, in 2018, USNORTHCOM planners conducted a Homeland Defense 
Mission Analysis for the Arctic Region. This comprehensive, classified 
assessment of our capability to operate in the far north revalidated a 
number of known capability gaps in the region and provided an updated 
overview of current and future requirements.
    As confirmed by our Mission Analysis, civil and military operations 
in the Arctic are impeded by limited communications capability, harsh 
environmental conditions, and vast distances between population 
centers. Improving communications and domain awareness in the region 
are among my top priorities for the region, and the DOD and the 
military Services have demonstrated their support of those requirements 
through investment in programs such as the Multi User Objective System 
(MUOS)--a satellite-based communications network that significantly 
expands the ability of United States and Canadian assets to operate in 
the far north.
    To detect and track potential airborne threats, to include Russian 
long-range bombers and cruise missiles, USNORTHCOM and NORAD both rely 
on radar systems such as the North Warning System (NWS), a network of 
aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada. In August 2018, 
NORAD, working in close coordination with USNORTHCOM, the Canadian 
NORAD Region, and the U.S. Navy's Naval Air Warfare Center, conducted 
an operational assessment of the NWS against representative targets, 
and the data collected from the test will inform the design for the air 
domain defense of the United States and Canada for years to come.
Air Domain:
    Variants of the advanced cruise missiles that could fly through our 
northern approaches also present a threat along our coasts. Russian 
Severodvinsk-class submarines are capable of firing low radar cross 
section cruise missiles against critical targets along our coasts. This 
emerging threat requires advanced capabilities to ensure surveillance, 
detection, identification, targeting, and destruction to protect the 
Homeland and key strategic targets in the United States and Canada.
    The Homeland Defense Design will be a phased approach to employ 
advanced detection and tracking technologies to defeat a cruise missile 
attack against the Homeland. However, the rapidity of our competitors' 
development of advanced cruise missile technology demands a continued, 
aggressive, and focused commitment to ensure our ability to defeat a 
cruise missile attack.
                               conclusion
    Today and every day, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are 
standing watch over our Homeland. These dedicated professionals work 
around the clock surveilling our skies, monitoring our oceans, and 
ensuring that we are always ready to counter a staggering range of 
threats to our Homeland, ranging from intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and long-range bombers to lethal opioids and cyberattacks. The 
strategic and technological innovation that will be required to defend 
our nation in the coming years depends entirely on the quality and 
experience of our people.
    Today and always, our people are our strength, and I am proud to 
lead the outstanding airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and civilians 
of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While the threats facing our nation can be 
daunting, I have absolute confidence in our ability to meet any 
challenge and defeat any adversary because of the dedicated 
professionals I am honored to lead. We Have the Watch.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
    General Greaves, welcome.

   STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF, 
                DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

    Lieutenant General Greaves. Chairman Fischer, Ranking 
Member Heinrich, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, 
good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to testify on 
the Missile Defense Agency's budget request for fiscal year 
2020.
    Madam Chairman, thank you for those very kind comments at 
the beginning of the hearing. It has been my distinct pleasure 
and true honor to serve within our United States Air Force 
these past 37 years.
    As for the budget request, I am pleased to report that we 
have nearly completed execution of the missile defense 
enhancements funding we received in the fiscal year 2018 budget 
amendment that provided funding to enhance the Department's 
missile defeat and defense capabilities.
    Once again, I would like to express my appreciation to this 
body for its support in this process. In fiscal year 2020 we 
will continue to leverage this funding to meet our nation's 
critical missile defense needs.
    I would also like to thank the thousands of men and women 
across government and industry who work tirelessly every day in 
support of our nation's ballistic missile defense mission. 
Without question, they are the source of our strength and one 
of the reasons the armed forces of the United States remain 
unparalleled in the world.
    Our budget request of $9.4 billion supports the President's 
commitment to sustain, expand, and improve performance and 
reliability of the nation's missile defense systems, and 
reflects what was broadly articulated in the 2019 missile 
defense review.
    This funding request will continue development, rigorous 
testing and fielding of reliable, increasingly capable advanced 
defenses for the protection of the United States, our deployed 
forces, and our allies and partners against current and 
projected missile threats.
    As part of our intensive engineering efforts, this past 
year the agency began development of a high-fidelity, all-
digital, integrated ballistic missile defense system simulation 
capability to support both developmental and operational 
ballistic missile defense system assessments. This effort 
integrates the best high-fidelity, all-digital models from each 
of our ballistic missile defense system elements using an 
integrated framework which is progressing towards the Missile 
Defense Agency's first use in calendar year 2021 on the ground-
based midcourse defense program.
    Program plans include the continued construction of 22 
missile silos at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and the procurement of 
an additional 20 ground-based interceptors for Homeland defense 
upon completion of the redesigned kill vehicle development 
program. The emplacement of the new interceptors will bring the 
total number of operational ground-based interceptors to 64.
    Initial plans were to begin fielding those ground-based 
interceptors with redesigned kill vehicles in 2023. However, 
during the redesigned kill vehicle design phase, I assessed 
that we were unable to meet the critical entrance criteria for 
the critical design review, resulting in a projected delay in 
the program of up to 2 years.
    Sensors. We continue to make investments in sensors to 
improve Homeland missile defense. The Department conducted the 
Sensors Analysis of Alternatives to assess the most cost-
effective options for enhanced sensor capability to increase 
ground-based interceptor effectiveness, and highlighted the 
operational value of placing additional discrimination radars 
in the Pacific region.
    With the addition of the long-range discriminating radar in 
Alaska, the Homeland defense radar in Hawaii, and the future 
Pacific radar, we will have in place a diverse sensor 
architecture in the Pacific to provide an improved and 
persistent midcourse tracking discrimination capability against 
future threats.
    The combination of high-speed maneuverability and 
relatively low altitude of some of the emerging advanced 
threats makes them challenging threats for missile defense 
systems. A space sensor layer is needed since we cannot 
populate the Earth and the oceans with terrestrial radars to 
meet this need. The birth to death tracking that space sensors 
can provide when integrated with terrestrial sensors will make 
it possible to maintain custody of missile threats from launch 
through intercept regardless of location.
    On the advanced threat, we must also prepare for future 
security challenges. Developing advanced missile defense 
technologies to address emerging threats will remain a top 
priority. The projected missile threats include new ballistic 
missile systems, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic 
missile capabilities that are now being actively tested by 
other nations.
    With this budget, we will fund software modifications to 
the current ballistic missile defense system and further define 
the architecture for future hypersonic defense demonstrations.
    The agency is taking significant steps in understanding the 
cybersecurity posture of the ballistic missile defense system 
and the ability to defend against emerging cyber threats.
    Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, in closing, our fiscal year 2020 budget funds 
comprehensive missile defense development efforts, including 
several critical capabilities required by the warfighter. We 
will continue to increase the reliability, as well as the 
capability and capacity of fielded Homeland and regional 
defense systems and make measured investments in advanced 
technology to counter the adversarial threat.
    Thank you once again, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Greaves follows:]

       Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General Samuel A. Greaves
    Good morning, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this 
opportunity to testify before you today on the Missile Defense Agency's 
budget request for fiscal year 2020.
    The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget request of $9.431 billion 
for fiscal year 2020 will continue the development, rigorous testing 
and fielding of reliable, increasingly capable, and state-of-the-art 
defenses for the United States, our deployed forces, and the forces and 
territories of our allies and partners against current and projected 
missile threats. The Agency's priorities for missile defense 
development and fielding will remain as follows: 1) continue to focus 
on increasing system reliability and sustainment to build warfighter 
confidence; 2) increase engagement capability and capacity; and 3) 
address the advanced threat. We will continue to collaborate closely 
with the Warfighter and support the current and future needs of the 
combatant commanders and the Services. Specifically, we will work 
closer with them on the development, testing, deployment, and 
integration of interceptors, sensors, and the command and control, 
battle management and communications (C2BMC) system into a multi-domain 
system for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
    First, I am pleased to report that we have nearly completed 
execution of the emergency appropriations requested in the fiscal year 
2018 Budget Amendment that provided funding to enhance the Nation's 
missile defense and defeat capabilities. I once again want to express 
my appreciation to the Congress for its support in this process.
    Additionally, we have made great progress since 2002 improving 
missile defense performance, affordability, and reliability. The 2019 
Missile Defense Review (MDR) underscores the evolving missile threat we 
face and that missile defense must remain a high priority investment in 
our National Defense Strategy. Indeed, the missile defense mission is 
expanding to include non-ballistic threats. Aligned with current 
national security and defense strategies, the MDR strengthens our 
posture as we continue to make progress in the development and fielding 
of a BMDS to defend the Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies 
and partners, and it supports the critical need to pursue new concepts 
and technologies to address tomorrow's threat. The MDR also underscores 
our continued pursuit of cooperative relations with allies and partners 
to field interoperable and effective regional missile defenses.
    The current BMDS can defeat the current ballistic missile 
capabilities of our adversaries, but we require additional capacity and 
advanced capabilities to stay ahead of the evolving threat. The 
projected missile threat is complex and volatile, and it includes new 
ballistic missile systems, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic 
missile capabilities, which are now being actively tested by other 
nations. It is critical we continue to develop innovative and 
breakthrough technologies to outpace rogue state offensive missile 
capabilities against the U.S. Homeland.
    Evolving regional offensive missile systems can threaten U.S. 
forces abroad, allies, and international partners, and so we also must 
continue to modernize U.S. regional missile defenses. We have several 
new technology efforts to improve discrimination capabilities and 
deliver space sensors to improve the ability of the system to conduct 
kill assessment following engagements. MDA also is continuing efforts 
to develop scalable, efficient, and compact high-energy lasers for 
potential use against threat missiles in the boost phase of flight.
    In light of these realities in the current security environment, 
MDA understands the importance of innovating, developing, and 
delivering new missile defense capabilities quickly, accelerating where 
possible missile defense acquisition timelines while adhering to sound 
acquisition principles. U.S. missile defenses must be responsive to 
existing and new threats and leverage new approaches to the Homeland 
and regional defensive missions by delivering capabilities faster, 
learning from failures to make rapid adjustments, and swiftly adapting 
our systems once they are fielded.
    Madam Chairman, I would like to recognize the personnel at MDA as 
being among the most skilled and dedicated in the Nation. Additionally, 
the Nation's preeminent Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers (FFRDCs) and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) are 
integral partners providing technical depth, innovation, engineering 
excellence, and core competencies that are critical to providing 
capability and capacity to the warfighter in an expedited manner. 
Working together with our partners in the Services, allies, and 
industry, this highly capable workforce makes it possible to develop 
and deliver the effective and reliable defenses we need to counter the 
proliferating missile threat.
                             missile threat
    Nearly all of our adversaries are devising various means to 
complicate missile defense operations. Missile defense countermeasures 
continue to be developed and fielded. Increasingly threat missiles are 
displaying maneuver capabilities such as maneuvering reentry vehicles 
(MaRV). Future supersonic and hypersonic powered cruise missiles may be 
launched from aircraft or by large rocket boosters that have 
traditionally been associated with ballistic missiles. Hypersonic glide 
vehicles are being developed as a new type of ballistic missile 
payload. The combination of high speed, maneuverability, and relatively 
low altitude makes them challenging targets for missile defense 
systems.
    In 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted over 40 launches of missile 
systems of all ranges; this included two new intercontinental-range 
ballistic missiles (ICBM). As configured, the Hwasong-14 ICBM can reach 
North America, and the Hwasong-15 ICBM can reach the Continental United 
States. Pyongyang flew two Hwasong-12 Intermediate-Range Ballistic 
Missiles (IRBMs) over Japan in 2017, placing the territory and 
population of our allies at potential risk from falling missile debris. 
The second of these tests demonstrated a capability to reach over 3,700 
kilometers, which can range beyond Guam. North Korea twice flight-
tested a solid-propellant Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), which 
is capable of reaching Japan. This advancement is significant because 
solid-propellant missiles can be prepared for launch more rapidly than 
liquid-propellant systems, which challenges U.S. pre-launch counter 
missile operations. North Korea remains capable today of conducting 
additional missile launches and further strategic-weapon testing.
    Iran has ambitious ballistic missile and space launch development 
programs and continues to attempt to increase the lethality of its 
ballistic missile force. Iran is fielding increased numbers of theater 
ballistic missiles and improving its existing inventory with MaRVs, 
submunition payloads, and multiple seekers that enable anti-ship 
missions. Iran's ballistic missiles are capable of striking targets 
throughout the region, ranging as far as southeastern Europe. Within 
the Middle East, Iran has conducted missile strikes on targets in Iraq 
and Syria. It continues to proliferate ballistic missiles to states and 
non-state groups, such as the Huthi rebels in Yemen. Iran's ongoing 
missile tests demonstrate its desire to increase the accuracy and 
effectiveness of its capabilities. Continued investments in its space 
launch vehicle program also have been notable. Iran's July 2017 launch 
of a Simorgh space launch vehicle demonstrated technologies that are 
virtually identical and interchangeable with those used in ballistic 
missiles, in particular ICBMs.
       increasing system reliability through testing, warfighter 
                    collaboration, and cybersecurity
    MDA continues to enhance the reliability and functionality of 
current missile defense systems, especially the performance of the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) 
and Aegis BMD Weapon System/Standard Missile (SM)-3, build the 
confidence of Warfighters in the BMDS, and reduce the number of 
interceptors needed to defeat in-flight ballistic missile threats.
System Reliability
    MDA executes a continuous program to improve system reliability and 
manage service life of BMDS components. For example, we have 
implemented a series of upgrades to increase the overall reliability of 
Homeland missile defenses. Recent improvements to the GMD ground system 
architecture replaced a number of obsolete components and the original 
Command and Launch Equipment with a GMD Maintenance Manager, increased 
system redundancy, and enhanced cyber resiliency. The GMD program also 
has advanced GBI stockpile reliability. In prior years, two GBIs were 
removed from the fleet, inspected and tested to gain understanding of 
how GBIs age in the silos. Another GBI will be similarly tested this 
year. This testing will enable service life extension for the GBI 
fleet. MDA also pursues reliability improvements through our 
development activities. We measure availability and reliability data in 
the field and target improvements in the GBIs and GMD ground system 
development programs. A key delivery this year was the Ground System 
7A.0.1 software, which eliminated cyber vulnerabilities and also 
improved redundancy for the Warfighter. Key future reliability 
improvements include delivering interceptors with Redesigned Kill 
Vehicles (RKVs) and upgrading the GMD Communications Network and launch 
support equipment.
    We also continue to improve the system and missile reliability of 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). For example, improvements to the 
Aegis Weapon System with the Aegis Baseline (BL) 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1) 
upgrade enhances reliability and improves cybersecurity. We conducted 
several successful ground and flight tests in fiscal year 2018 of Aegis 
BL 9.C2.0 to demonstrate these enhancements.
    We continue to improve the system reliability of the seven Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries that have been delivered 
to the Army's inventory, including those deployed to Guam and United 
States Forces Korea. Improvements to THAAD include software upgrades 
for the batteries and the Army's THAAD Institutional Training Base to 
improve cybersecurity and system performance against current and 
emerging threats. We conducted FTX-35 and numerous ground tests 
demonstrating improved reliability in the interoperability between and 
THAAD and the Patriot weapon systems.
Missile Defense Testing
    MDA continues to execute a robust and aggressive test program that 
conducts meaningful missile defense testing. These tests demonstrate 
BMDS capabilities and provide confidence to combatant commanders in the 
capabilities being delivered. We remain committed to ``fly before you 
buy'' through collaboration with
independent testers within the Department--the Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Developmental Test & Evaluation; Combatant Commands; the Joint 
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense; Service 
Operational Test Agencies (OTA); and the Joint Interoperability Test 
Command--to develop the Agency's strategic test program
as documented in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). The IMTP 
provides a flight-, ground-, and cyber-test program, to include the 
rigorous modeling and simulation (M&S), systems engineering and 
validation, and verification and analysis necessary to demonstrate and 
deliver proven integrated capabilities against the evolving threat. 
Tests comprised of multiple shooters, sensors, and command and control 
assets, weapon system improved functionality, and evolving targets 
drive the increasing complexity of our test program. We are using more 
threat-representative targets, longer-range targets, and simultaneous 
target launches in our test events. In addition, we are increasing our 
cybersecurity and international testing to execute a robust, cost-
effective test program.
    Our system ground tests are the primary source for system 
performance data, and they test our capability across a wide range of 
threats and environments that flight tests cannot replicate affordably. 
MDA and the BMDS OTA Team are making significant progress accrediting 
the ground test M&S to support developmental and operational 
assessments. The BMDS OTA Team, which provides an independent 
operational assessment of the BMDS, relies heavily on the MDA ground 
test program to independently assess MDA's operational capability. 
Ground tests allow analysts to characterize BMDS performance under 
varying conditions, with unconstrained red and blue force limitations, 
and without the safety, fiscal, and hardware availability limitations 
of flight-testing. Additionally, with Warfighters on console, they are 
able to use ground tests to refine Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 
All ground test data are used to inform DOT&E BMDS capability 
assessments.
    In addition to 17 element-level ground tests, we conducted six 
developmental and operational system-level ground tests from April 2018 
to present. There are four additional system-level ground tests 
scheduled for fiscal year 2019 and 10 more planned for fiscal year 
2020. Since April 2018, we also conducted or participated in more than 
25 multi-event exercises and wargames, which are critical to the 
reliability and performance assessments of the Combatant Commands and 
the intensive engineering efforts across the Agency.
    In fiscal year 2018, the Agency began development of a high-
fidelity, all-digital, integrated BMDS simulation to support both 
developmental and operational BMDS assessments. This effort integrates 
the best high-fidelity, all-digital models from each BMDS element using 
an integrating framework that manages time and the distribution of 
stimulus and is progressing towards MDA's first use in Calendar Year 
(CY) 2021.
    Beginning in fiscal year 2019, we are undertaking an across-the-
board re-architecture of the M&S used in ground tests to address 
current limitations. With incremental deliveries scheduled over the 
next 5 years, this effort will improve every aspect of ground test M&S, 
including accuracy, efficiency, capacity, and credibility. By 
streamlining the interfaces between models, we will improve the speed 
with which we can integrate the BMDS and reduce the likelihood of 
integration errors.
    Flight testing provides data for M&S and demonstrates the end-to-
end performance functions of the operational system that ground testing 
cannot address. One of the key attributes of each flight test is 
combining the system under test with the Warfighters who plan to 
operate the system in wartime under operationally realistic conditions. 
We also work closely with our allies to demonstrate the integration and 
interoperability of BMD capabilities prior to fielding. From April 2018 
to present we have executed nine flight tests. For the remainder of 
fiscal year 2019, we will conduct 10 additional flight tests. Recently, 
on March 25, 2019, we successfully executed the first salvo test using 
the GMD weapon system. We will conduct 14 flight tests in fiscal year 
2020, to include additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
and Patriot integration tests in support of the USFK JEON; a Ground-
based Midcourse Defense (GM) Booster Vehicle Test (BVT) flight test of 
the 2-/3-stage selectable GBI; and the first Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IIA 
test against an ICBM-class target. The Agency is also conducting 
detailed planning to execute the second operational test of Regional/
Theater Increment 5 air and missile defense system capabilities; it 
will be the largest air and missile defense live-fire test in history.
Cybersecurity
    MDA remains vigilant of the growing cyber threat and we continue to 
work aggressively to ensure the Nation's missile defenses are hardened, 
resilient, and able to operate in a highly contested cyber threat 
environment. We are strengthening the cyber defensive posture of 
missile defense capabilities by ensuring the cybersecurity 
infrastructure has the latest upgrades. MDA remains focused on 
supporting the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign through implementation of the 
DOD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan--Four Lines of Effort 
for: Strong Authentication, Hardening of Systems, Reducing the DOD 
Attack Surface, and Alignment to Cybersecurity Service Providers (CSSP) 
across all networks and, where applicable, BMDS weapon systems.
    MDA defends its networks against the advanced persistent cyber 
threat through its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). This team 
provides 24/7 network monitoring and defense of over 24 thousand 
network devices and continues to expand its breadth of coverage. This 
has increased the number of recorded cyber events from 3.3 billion to 
11 billion per month, leading to actionable defensive measures by 
three-fold in the past year alone. MDA has continuously supported DOD 
cyberspace efforts by providing timely MDA cyber situational awareness. 
To ensure MDA cyber defense posture and activities are synchronized 
with U.S. Cyber Command priorities, MDA has supported as many as eight 
named operations at a time through active network defense measures and 
daily input to the Joint Force Headquarters, Department of Defense 
Information Cyber Tasking Order. Lastly, MDA collaborated with U.S. 
Cyber Command, National Security Agency, as well as open source 
partners to gather and analyze more than 3.4 million threat indicators 
over the past year in order to characterize and identify cyber threats 
to MDA capabilities. MDA also has partnered with the Intelligence 
Community to identify threat indicators against BMDS elements and is 
taking action to mitigate known threats to the BMDS.
    MDA has engaged with our defense industrial base (DIB) corporate 
partners to ensure cybersecurity is prioritized, addressed and enforced 
at all levels of MDA's highly complex supply chain. We continue to make 
strides in this arena, where our technology is largely generated and 
where our controlled unclassified information (CUI) resides. The 
government has contractual relationships with only the prime contractor 
and has limited knowledge and visibility with the remainder of the 
supply chain. Our first order of business is to have prime contractors 
minimize the flow down of information requiring protection. Realizing 
this is not an absolute solution, we have recently initiated 
collaborative efforts with industry on two pilot efforts to illuminate 
where CUI resides within the entire contract supply chain.
    Not only are we focused on external threats to our enterprise, but 
MDA acknowledges the reality of the insider threat as one of the more 
pervasive threats to be addressed, and we have established and 
implemented an aggressive Agency Insider Threat Program. This allows us 
to monitor both internal and external data movement to ensure all 
unclassified and classified data is handled in accordance with 
applicable guidance and is also afforded the highest level of 
protection. We are continually evaluating our attack data and updating 
the MDA Emergency Response Team procedures. Abnormalities or violations 
are quickly identified and thoroughly investigated by both MDA and DOD 
Insider Threat and Counter Intelligence.
    This year MDA engaged in significant improvements in cyber 
resiliency, increasing the programs' ability to prevent, mitigate, and 
recover from cyber effects on mission capabilities. We extended defense 
coverage to the BMDS OPIR (Overhead Persistent InfraRed) Architecture 
(BOA) system and implemented additional C2BMC tools to create a diverse 
layered defense capability. MDA also upgraded cyber defense for sensors 
by adding monitoring tools. GMD is actively updating its monitoring 
tools, improving its cyber defensive capabilities, and training its 
cyber incident responders to address modern, sophisticated cyber 
threats. Extensive cyber testing involving C2BMC, sensors, and GMD was 
conducted in platform-level and system-of-systems integrated cyber 
tests pursuant to new platform and increment releases. C2BMC performed 
in 25 cyber related test events. MDA developed the cybersecurity test 
strategy, test plans, and coordination with external stakeholders such 
as DOT&E, National Security Agency (NSA) (Platform Resiliency & Mission 
Assurance division), Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate (a 
directorate of Army Research Lab), Army Threat Systems Management 
Office, and NSA's Cyber Protection Team, providing Red and Blue Team 
test experts. The increased cyber situational awareness, training, and 
improved cyber defense performance were demonstrated through 
significantly improved cyber test results. Cybersecurity requires team 
synergy balance capability with security requirements, Warfighters 
considering potential cyber effects with maintenance outages, and 
increased diligence of daily technicians and those responsible for 
cybersecurity programs. We will support the Combatant Commands in 
Persistent Cyber Operations testing in 2019, adding real-time daily 
test, fix, and cyclic test improvements to the BMDS cyber posture.
    MDA is actively integrating cybersecurity and cyber resiliency 
requirements early into the acquisition life cycle to increase security 
and reduce overall cost. For example, we are upgrading C2BMC and the 
GMD ground systems software and hardware to enable enhanced 
cybersecurity protection capabilities. To better support our combatant 
commanders, in 2018 we successfully executed seven operational 
Adversarial Assessments and Cybersecurity Vulnerability & Penetration 
Assessment on BMDS systems culminating in an Adversarial Assessment 
during Ground Test Distributed-07b United States European Command / 
United States Central Command. This is a significant step in 
understanding the cybersecurity posture of the BMDS and the ability to 
defend against emerging cyber threats.
    The MDA office of the Chief Information Officer executes several 
testing efforts across MDA systems on an annual basis. This 
cybersecurity testing includes all BMD elements, development labs, and 
test systems. In 2018, cyber testing included 26 cybersecurity controls 
validation tests, six vulnerability assessments, 46 software assurance 
code reviews, and 308 cybersecurity risk assessments. MDA also executes 
BMDS element- and system-level tests that support fielding of new 
capability to be included in the Operations Capacity Baseline. Per 
Section 1647 of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA, MDA executes operational 
weapon system cyber-testing and develops risk mitigation strategies for 
the congressional report scheduled to be delivered first quarter fiscal 
year 2020.
    Our partnership with DOT&E to implement a rigorous Test and 
Assessment Program is focused on ensuring cybersecurity compliance, 
resiliency, and protection and has supported our comprehensive 
cybersecurity efforts since 2010. In 2018, the Agency took critical 
steps to improve the BMDS cybersecurity posture. We implemented a 
proactive approach to MDA Cybersecurity Test and Assessment to support 
development of assessment requirements, detailed test designs, and 
executable schedules. To further harden the BMDS, we approved the MDA 
Standing Ground Rules to support Combatant Command Persistent Cyber 
Operations. Moreover, we executed seven operational Adversarial 
Assessments on the BMDS Weapon Systems, to include THAAD, the Army 
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model-2 (AN/TPY-2) 
radar, and C2BMC, in addition to six Cybersecurity Vulnerability & 
Penetration Assessments. In fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020, we 
will continue to plan cyber assessments on additional assets in the 
Homeland defense architecture and an operational assessment of the EPAA 
Phase 3 architecture, to include Aegis Ashore-Poland. MDA is committed 
to implementing cybersecurity in all phases of development, 
integration, deployment and sustainment of the BMDS.
    In fiscal year 2018, MDA took a proactive approach to cybersecurity 
by modifying contracts, including system level specifications that 
include cyber resiliency requirements. The contract modifications 
address compliance, security engineering, design, development, 
assessments, testing, physical security and program security. The key 
to executing this strategy is the understanding of the linkage that 
cybersecurity has with system engineering and the acquisition 
processes. Incorporating cybersecurity into the systems engineering 
directorate aligns cybersecurity functions to the following other 
functions: software, modeling and simulation, future concepts, 
requirements, and system integration. This alignment ensures 
cybersecurity is embedded early and often in the systems engineering 
and development life cycles.
    I am confident in our cybersecurity posture and our plans for 
additional cybersecurity improvements. Our innovative teams continue to 
refine processes and procedures in this fast-paced, ever-changing and 
unforgiving cyber environment. We intend to improve our cyber 
resiliency capabilities through increased cyber sensors, enhanced 
centralized visibility, and increased cyber vigilance, all while 
preserving warfighter confidence in a critical national defense asset.
Left-Through-Right-of-Launch
    During the past year, MDA has been working with other elements of 
the Department on a comprehensive effort to create a more robust 
missile defeat strategy.. This integration will enable the United 
States to identify and exploit opportunities to detect, disrupt, and 
destroy threat missiles. Collaboration between the Intelligence 
Community, Combatant Commands, State Department, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and MDA has 
resulted in the Department developing a ballistic missile left-through-
right-of-launch (LTRI) framework that will enhance sharing of data, 
technologies and capabilities across warfighter, policy, intelligence, 
and acquisition organizations. It includes discovery and development of 
new technologies to facilitate integration, improved data-sharing 
between systems, alignment of programs, and creation of a multi-year 
test campaign to integrate future capabilities and close gaps. The LTRI 
framework, governed by an Integration Senior Strategy Group (ISSG) with 
representatives from more than 20 organizations, provides a forum for 
development of comprehensive strategies to defeat any ballistic missile 
threat to the Homeland, regardless of origin.
             increasing engagement capability and capacity
    This budget request maintains operational missile defense 
capabilities for existing operational Homeland and regional defense 
forces and will continue to increase interceptor inventory capacity and 
use existing technologies to improve sensors, battle management, fire 
control, and kill vehicle capabilities to address evolving threats.
  Homeland Defense
    MDA remains committed to operating, sustaining, and expanding the 
Nation's Homeland missile defenses and requests $1.83 billion in fiscal 
year 2020 for the GMD program. The Agency will continue to demonstrate 
improved performance through flight- and ground-testing of Homeland 
defenses, integrate additional capabilities by development of a suite 
of Advanced Discrimination Radars (ADR) that maximize the engagement 
space of regional and Homeland missile defense, to include the Long 
Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii (HDR-
H), and Pacific Radar. These additional ADR sensors, coupled with the 
Redesigned Kill Vehicle development and enhanced C2BMC will expand the 
GBI engagement capabilities while simultaneously improving 
effectiveness. We will continue improving our sensors, C2BMC, GMD 
ground systems hardware/software upgrades, GMD Fire Control (GFC), and 
kill vehicle software to improve discrimination capabilities and 
overall system performance. We also will continue to improve confidence 
in our reliability through increased testing and analysis.
    Over the life of the BMDS, the intercept flight tests of the 
Nation's Homeland defenses have increased in complexity with the 
employment of realistic test scenarios and the use of operational 
weapons, sensors and fielded software. With the March 25 successful 
intercept of an advanced ICBM-class target with countermeasures (FTG-
11), the Department executed the first test involving a salvo 
engagement, involving two GBIs launched from the missile field at 
Vandenberg Air Force Based in California. All system elements 
functioned as designed. The ICBM-representative target was launched 
from the Reagan Test Site on the Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands in 
the Broad Ocean Area in the Pacific over 4,000 miles away. Following 
detection by Air Force Space Based Infrared System satellites, early 
tracking information was passed through C2BMC to precision 
discrimination sensors deployed on Wake Island (AN/TPY-2 radar) and in 
the Pacific Ocean (Sea-Based X-band radar). Northern Command operators 
then authorized and launched the two GBIs. Once they were separated 
from the GBI boosters and in position, the exo-atmospheric kill 
vehicles successfully engaged the target complex, resulting in an 
intercept of the lethal warhead, with the trailing GBI observing the 
intercept flash and debris scene then intercepting the next most lethal 
object.
    FTG-11 provided the data necessary to assess the performance of the 
GMD system, the evaluation of which will occur over the coming weeks 
and months. An Aegis BMD (ABMD) ship in the ABMD 5.1 (Aegis Baseline 
9.C2) configuration participated in this test by tracking the ICBM 
target and executing a simulated SM-3 Block IIA engagement of the 
target as risk reduction for the planned fiscal year 2020 SM-3 Block 
IIA test against an ICBM target. In that test we will determine if this 
advanced capability could be an additional layer of defense in support 
of the GMD system. During the test Spacebased Kill Assessment 
satellites provided data required to assess successful intercepts. We 
also collected real-time data from F-35 aircraft/sensors participating 
in the test to assess quality of track data for integration into the 
BMDS architecture.
    Increasing GBI Capacity: MDA currently has 44 operational GBIs and, 
in accordance with the fiscal year 2018 Missile Defeat and Defense 
Enhancement initiative, plans to expand the fielded GBI fleet to 64 in 
response to the rapidly advancing North Korean threat. MDA is 
developing the capability to provide the Warfighter the option of using 
all three GBI booster stages or not igniting the third stage, which 
would provide performance similar to a 2-stage boost vehicle. This 2-
stage booster capability will provide additional Homeland defense 
battle-space capability by enabling shorter engagement times without 
the expense of a separate development program. This capability is 
planned to be tested in a non-intercept flight test, after which it 
will be integrated into all boost vehicle configurations.
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle: As a follow-on to the existing GBI 
program, MDA initiated the fielding of an additional 20 GBIs, tipped 
with the RKV upon completion of the development program, at Fort 
Greely, Alaska (FGA). The RKV will address the evolving threat, enhance 
kill vehicle reliability, improve in-flight communications to better 
utilize off-board sensor data, and heighten combatant commanders' 
situational awareness via hit/kill assessment messages. Initial plans 
were to field GBIs with RKVs as early as 2023 within an acquisition 
strategy that is disciplined, gated, and milestone-driven. Using this 
strategy and with inputs from key stakeholders, I assessed the RKV 
program did not meet the entrance criteria for the Critical Design 
Review, resulting in a projected delay in the program of up to 2 years. 
Re-planned RKV test efforts include Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
Flight Test GM-Boost Vehicle Test-02 (GM BVT-02), a non-intercept 
mission in support of 2- or 3-Stage selectable boost vehicle software 
that will provide additional engagement battlespace to the warfighter 
using a GBI launched from VAFB, California in fiscal year 2020 and 
Flight Test GM-Controlled Test Vehicle-03+ (GM CTV-03+), a non-
intercept mission to collect RKV flight environment data in fiscal year 
2022. The first intercept flight test utilizing the RKV is planned for 
fiscal year 2023, and a second intercept flight test in fiscal year 
2024.
    The effort to reach 64 deployed GBIs requires MDA to develop and 
produce the RKV, construct a new missile field (Missile Field 4) at 
Fort Greely, install 20 silos, and deliver an additional 20 GBIs tipped 
with RKVs. In addition, MDA will initiate a plan to ensure that no less 
than 64 GBIs are available to the Warfighter at all times. To 
accomplish this, MDA will add two silos to Missile Field 1 at FGA and 
purchase six additional boosters.
    Ground System Upgrades: MDA continues to develop and field 
capability upgrades and technology modernization of key ground support 
and fire control system components. These include upgrades to the GMD 
Launch Support System, Communications Network, and the In-Flight 
Interceptor Communication System Data Terminals. Additional upgrades 
include improvements to the GFC-Warfighter interface, 2-/3-stage 
selectable GBI battle management, discrimination improvements, 
enhancements to the kill vehicle Target Object Map, and On-Demand 
Communications for the RKV. Ground system modernization will continue 
to mitigate obsolescence issues, improve cyber resilience, increase GFC 
capacity for emerging threat complexity and raid size, reduce life-
cycle cost, increase system reliability and operational availability, 
and simplify the insertion of future technologies.
    Defense Sensors: We are investing in radars and developing advanced 
electro-optical sensors to achieve a diverse sensor architecture to 
provide highly accurate midcourse tracking, discrimination and battle 
damage assessment for Homeland missile defense. We request $194.3 
million to sustain the Cobra Dane radar, the Upgraded Early Warning 
Radars (UEWR), and the AN/TPY-2 radar. The Services and Combatant 
Commands, with logistical support from MDA, operate a fleet of five AN/
TPY-2 (Forward Based Mode) radars in Japan, Israel, Turkey, and United 
States Central Command in support of Homeland and regional defense.
    We request $283.5 million to continue radar development, to include 
advanced discrimination algorithms for the AN/TPY-2 and Sea-Based X-
band (SBX) radars to counter evolving threats. The improvements will 
develop and field integrated capabilities to improve the BMDS ability 
to identify lethal and non-lethal objects. In fiscal year 2019, MDA 
will complete transition to production development activities for next-
generation Gallium Nitride (GaN) Transmit/Receive Integrated 
Multichannel Modules to support the AN/TPY-2 obsolescence and sparing 
strategy and set the condition for enhanced performance in the future. 
MDA requests $105.5 million for BMD Sensors testing activities for 
planning, analysis, and execution of BMDS flight test events, including 
pre- and post-test efforts, such as Digital and Hardware-in-the-Loop 
Pre-Mission Tests and Post-Flight Reconstruction.
    MDA requests $128.2 million for the SBX radar. The SBX is an 
advanced mobile radar that provides precision midcourse tracking and 
discrimination capabilities. The SBX participates in flight tests to 
demonstrate discrimination and debris mitigation improvements. Our 
budget request includes funds to continue extended operations for 
defense of the Homeland in the United States Indo-Pacific Command and 
United States Northern Command areas of responsibility.
    We request $136.4 million to continue development of the LRDR. The 
LRDR will provide persistent long-range midcourse discrimination, 
precision tracking and hit assessment to support the GMD capability 
against long-range missile threats from the Pacific theater. LRDR's 
improved discrimination capability in the Pacific architecture 
increases the defensive capacity of the Homeland defense interceptor 
inventory by enabling conservation of GBIs. LRDR includes threat 
discrimination improvements to enhance BMDS effectiveness against the 
evolving threat. LRDR also supports other mission areas, including 
Space Situational Awareness. Initial fielding/deployment of the LRDR is 
planned for calendar year 2020. We are on-schedule for the Technical 
Capability Declaration in late 2021, leading to Warfighter Operational 
Acceptance in 2022.
    The Department conducted a Sensors Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) 
to assess the most cost-effective options for enhanced sensor 
capability to increase GBI effectiveness against future complex 
threats. The Sensors AOA report highlighted the operational value of 
placing additional discrimination radars in the Pacific region. Based 
on the report's finding, MDA completed site surveys for the HDR-H in 
fiscal year 2017. In fiscal year 2018 we conducted source selection 
activities for the HDR-H and, last December, awarded this radar as the 
first delivery order on a fixed-price indefinite delivery/indefinite 
quantity (IDIQ) contract. MDA is requesting $274.7 million in fiscal 
year 2020 for the HDR-H.
    The Pacific Radar will leverage a forward position to maximize BMDS 
discrimination areas for both Homeland and regional missile defense. 
MDA plans to competitively award the Pacific Radar as the second 
delivery order on the IDIQ contract. MDA is requesting $6.7 million in 
fiscal year 2020 for the Pacific Radar. Coupled with LRDR, both radars 
will close coverage gaps in the Pacific architecture, provide 
persistent long-range acquisition, midcourse discrimination, precision 
tracking, and hit assessment to support Homeland defense against long-
range missile threats.
    Space provides the critical vantage point necessary to address 
rapidly advancing threats across multiple regions of interest and the 
only vantage point for global persistence to address Warfighter 
requirements. A space-based sensor layer consisting of two separate 
constellations, one for tracking and discriminating ballistic missiles 
and one for tracking dim ballistic targets and hypersonic missiles, 
would enable the United States to use interceptor inventory more 
efficiently and effectively to counter a broad array of threats. 
Integrated space and terrestrial sensors for tracking, discriminating, 
cueing and targeting ballistic missile threats can improve missile 
defense architecture performance and robustness.
    We are requesting $27.6 million for the Spacebased Kill Assessment 
(SKA) program. Using fast frame, infrared sensors, SKA will deliver a 
kill assessment capability for GMD defense of the Homeland as part of 
an integrated post-intercept assessment solution requested in the 
fiscal year 2014 NDAA. As MDA's pathfinder program to host military 
payloads on commercial/other satellites, SKA, which
received the DOD's 2018 David Packard Award for Acquisition Excellence, 
proved that commercial/other hosting can deploy assets on orbit quickly 
and at an appreciable cost savings. To increase the Department's 
overall experience with commercial hosting, MDA collected and shared 
its SKA lessons learned with several organizations, including the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and U.S. Air Force. 
SKA sensors are participating in a variety of MDA flight tests and 
engineering missions to better understand the full capabilities of the 
SKA network. For example, SKA participated and performed well in FTI-
03, an Aegis BMD test, and FTG-11, the GMD salvo test. In fiscal year 
2020 we will focus on steps necessary to add the SKA system to the 
operational BMDS.
    Also, we request $35.9 million in fiscal year 2020 for continued 
operation of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and the 
Missile Defense Space Center (MDSC). STSS satellites, launched in 2009, 
have exceeded their life expectancy and proven to be a good investment. 
These satellites operate in low Earth orbit and continue to collect 
valuable test data. The STSS program and MDSC support concept 
development activities for space sensor architecture studies and 
analyses to address advanced threats.
    MDA is working with the Space Development Agency (SDA), DARPA, and 
the U.S. Air Force to conduct prototype concept design activities for a 
space-based missile tracking sensor system known as Hypersonic and 
Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). HBTSS is one of several 
proposed missions within the DOD's Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (P-LEO) 
space architecture led by SDA. As part of an integrated multi-tier OPIR 
enterprise architecture, HBTSS would detect and track additional and 
emerging threats using persistent infrared sensors. MDA and the SDA are 
partnering with DARPA and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to ensure our 
Nation's ability to detect and track evolving threats. MDA will 
coordinate and leverage DARPA's Blackjack program for advances in the 
areas of production-line satellite buses and spacecraft autonomy 
approaches in parallel with the HBTSS risk-reduction efforts. MDA is 
partnering with AFSPC on integrated missile warning and missile defense 
requirements definition and will explore opportunities to partner with 
the Air Force on ground services, integration, launch, and operations. 
MDA is using STSS as a testbed for HBTSS, and MDA will continue to 
leverage the Enterprise Capabilities developed collaboratively within 
other Department and federal agencies. MDA will work with SDA to ensure 
that HBTSS is compatible with a potential P-LEO data and communications 
transport layer.
    Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications: We 
request $564.2 million in fiscal year 2020 for C2BMC. C2BMC provides 
persistent acquisition, tracking, cueing, discrimination, and fire-
control quality data to Aegis BMD, GMD, Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD), Patriot, and coalition partners to support Homeland 
and regional missile defense. We continue to support Warfighter command 
and control and battle management needs across the globe by providing 
the Combatant Commander with the BMD planner, situational awareness 
tools, and battle management capability to support global BMD 
situational awareness, coalition operations, weapons release authority 
for Homeland defense, and control and tasking of the forward-based AN/
TPY-2 radars, LRDR radar, and the HDR-H radar. C2BMC operators and 
maintainers deploy forward in some of the world's hottest threat spots 
and continue to provide around-the-clock support to the local 
commanders.
    In fiscal year 2020, we will continue development of C2BMC Spiral 
8.2-5, which provides system-level discrimination data, BMDS Overhead 
Persistent InfraRed (OPIR) Architecture (BOA) 7.0 to provide advance 
threat warning capability with space sensors and threat 
characterization solutions and support command and control integration 
of the LRDR into the BMDS by 2021. These efforts support a robust 
Homeland defense capability and integration of HDR-H into the BMDS by 
2023. Spiral 8.2-5 also will include initial integration and testing of 
the new Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System. 
C2BMC will continue development of Spiral 8.2-7 to meet the BMDS 
Increment 7 requirements, including command and control of the HDR-H 
radar, SKA sensor operationalization and prototyping for robust Post 
Intercept Assessment supporting Homeland defense, expansion of C2BMC 
space tracking capability, and additional system-level discrimination 
data integration and integrated threat characterization.
    In 2018, we successfully fielded C2BMC Spiral 8.2-1 and BOA 5.1 to 
U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and C2BMC Spiral 
8.2-3 to United States European Command and United States Central 
Command along with the BOA 6.1 to Northern, Indo-Pacific, European and 
Central Commands. For the USFK JEON, we fielded a C2BMC Spiral 8.2-1 
User Node providing improved BMD situational awareness and 
communications for USFK.
    We continue supporting incremental improvements to the BMDS to keep 
pace with emerging threats worldwide by investing in the development, 
integration, and testing of advanced algorithms to improve track and 
discrimination capabilities and enhance the use of space-based sensor 
data from sources such as the Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS), 
using the BMDS OPIR Architecture. C2BMC will continue to update 
hardware/software to increase cybersecurity. The Air Force and MDA also 
will execute the MDR's direction to deliver a joint report to 
Department stakeholders within 6 months of the release of the MDR on 
how to integrate the F-35, including its sensor suite, into the BMDS 
for Homeland and regional defense.
  Regional Defenses
    There are hundreds of theater-range ballistic missiles deployed 
worldwide. Our fiscal year 2020 budget request continues to resource 
and build integrated regional missile defenses that are interoperable 
with systems deployed by international partners to protect deployed 
forces, allies and international partners against Short-Range Ballistic 
Missiles (SRBMs), MRBMs, and IRBMs.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
    Aegis BMD continues to be a key component of the Nation's regional 
defense for our deployed forces, allies, partners and friends, and 
directly supports and expands our Homeland defenses with long-range 
surveillance and tracking capability. The fiscal year 2020 budget 
request of $897.3 million supports continued advancement of the Aegis 
BMD system to counter growing and more complex threats, including 
improvements in system reliability and missile reliability as well as 
increases in Aegis BMD engagement capacity and lethality.
    We continued to expand Aegis BMD capability and capacity through 
new construction deliveries and upgrades on 10 Aegis ships: Three new 
construction DDG-51 Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGs) 
with Aegis Baseline (BL) 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1) were commissioned into 
service in fiscal year 2018 as well as six Aegis BMD 3.6 ship upgrades 
to Aegis BMD 4.1, two non-BMD-capable ship upgrades to Aegis BL 9.C2.0 
(BMD 5.1) through the Aegis modernization program and two Aegis BL 
9.C1.0 (BMD 5.0CU) ships to Aegis BL 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1). These additions 
and upgrades bring, among other things, Engage-on-Remote capability, 
SM-3 Block IIA, cyber improvements, and enhanced reliability to the 
Aegis fleet.
    MDA's ability to keep Aegis BL 9 ships and Aegis Ashore in 
relatively the same configuration and under configuration control 
through in-service upgrades aligns training and Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures for the U.S. Navy and ensures the highest level of BMD 
capability is resident and consistent across the in-service and 
deploying fleet. We are strongly committed to further enhancing 
capability of the Aegis BMD system and continue to improve the Aegis 
Weapon System in alignment with Navy programs. In coordination with the 
U.S. Navy, we currently have 38 BMD-capable ships, which will rise to 
41 by the end of fiscal year 2019. Per direction in the MDR, the Navy 
and MDA will develop a plan to convert all Aegis destroyers to be fully 
missile defense capable within 10 years.
    In 2018, we successfully conducted a number of ground and flight 
tests of Aegis BL 9.2.0 (with BMD 5.1 integrated), which introduces 
significant new capabilities in U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers in support 
of Department of Defense priorities to increase lethality and validate 
the EPAA Phase 3 architecture. Aegis BL 9.2.0 (BMD 5.1) was a joint 
MDA-U.S. Navy development effort. For the MDA, Aegis BL 9.2.0 (BMD 5.1) 
delivered Significant Object Reporting to the BMDS, BMD reliability 
enhancements, and Engage-on-Remote capability with the SM-3 Block IIA 
missile, significantly expanding Aegis BMD's defended area. In 
September 2018, Aegis BL 9.2.0 (BMD 5.1) achieved U.S. Navy 
certification and we have commenced fielding this capability on in-
service Aegis destroyers (affordable software updates to current Aegis 
BL 9.1 DDGs), modernized Aegis DDGs, new construction DDGs, and Aegis 
Ashore Romania and, upon activation, Aegis Ashore-Poland.
    MDA conducted an international live fire event in support of 
Japan's modernization efforts, Japan Flight Test Aegis Weapon System 
(JFTM)-5, that successfully verified the performance of the Aegis J6 
(with BMD 5.0CU equivalent capability) weapon system functionality, 
guiding a SM-3 Block IB Threat Upgrade (TU) to a lethal intercept of a 
SRBM target. This test completed the certification of the J6 combat 
systems baseline and was an important milestone for Japan's use of the 
SM-3 Block IB TU missile. MDA also completed an important Sensor 
Integration Study with The Netherlands that will inform their future 
BMD efforts, conducted Pacific Dragon 2018 with the Japanese and South 
Korean navies, and continued cooperation in the United States-European 
Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum.
    We also conducted Flight Test Aegis Weapon System (FTM)-45, which 
successfully verified the performance of the Aegis BL 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1) 
weapon system and SM-3 Block IIA functionality, guiding a SM-3 Block 
IIA missile intercept of a MRBM target. This flight test also provided 
objective quality evidence to finalize a detailed Failure Review Board 
of missile anomalies experienced earlier in 2018 during FTM-29. 
Automated BMD kill assessment was also successfully evaluated after 
intercept.
    Finally, we successfully conducted Flight Test Integrated (FTI)-03, 
an operational test demonstrating the Aegis Weapon System Engage-on-
Remote capability to track and lethally intercept an IRBM target with 
an Aegis Ashore-launched SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a European 
Phased Adaptive Approach Phase 3 link architecture. In this case, Aegis 
Ashore calculated fire control solutions using remote AN/TPY-2 radar 
data, and then transmitted guidance messages to the interceptor, which 
then accomplished a lethal intercept of the lethal object. The 
engagement leveraged a ground-, air-, and space-based sensor/command 
and control architecture linked by the BMDS C2BMC suite.
    In fiscal year 2020, we will continue our commitment to develop, 
test, and deliver global naval capability to the Warfighter and support 
defense of U.S. deployed forces and European NATO allies through 
delivery of EPAA Phase 3 missile defenses. The MDA requests a total of 
$822.8 million in procurement for Aegis BMD. As part of the overall 
Aegis BMD procurement request, MDA is requesting $459.8 million to 
procure 30 Aegis SM-3 Block IB missiles and $238.00 million to procure 
seven SM-3 Block IIAs, along with associated hardware and support 
costs. By the end of fiscal year 2020, we plan to have 238 SM-3 Block 
IBs and 11 SM-3 Block IIAs in inventory. Also part of the request, we 
are continuing to explore the opportunity to enter into a five-year SM-
3 Block IB Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract for fiscal year 2020--
fiscal year 2024. MDA will continue to deliver both SM-3 Block IBs and 
SM-3 Block IIAs for deployment on land at the Aegis Ashore site in 
Romania and at sea on multi-mission Aegis ships with BMD capability. 
The procurement budget also requests $125.0 million for Aegis BMD 
weapon systems equipment to support program of record requirements.
    In fiscal year 2020, as part of our overall Aegis BMD request, we 
are requesting $198.1 million for the SM-3 Block IIA program. This 
includes final efforts to transition from development into production, 
continued integration of the SM-3 Block IIA into the BMDS, along with 
certification and deployment activities to deliver SM-3 Block IIA 
rounds to the U.S. Navy and in support of EPAA Phase 3.
    We remain committed to the Aegis BMD development required to 
deliver the new construction DDG-51 Flight III Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer with Aegis BL 10 (with BMD 6.0 integrated) and SPY-6 Air and 
Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). We will continue to align with the U.S. 
Navy to develop and deliver a comprehensive Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense capability against advanced threats in the Arleigh Burke-class 
Flight III Destroyers for a 2024 Initial Operational Capability. Aegis 
BMD 6.0 exploits AN/SPY-6 radar improvements to enhance Aegis combat 
effectiveness, to include advanced discrimination, significantly 
improved raid defense, and expanded engagement battlespace. This will 
provide advanced organic capability at longer ranges to Flight III DDGs 
as well as enable BMDS utilization of AN/SPY-6 data for remote 
engagements while also supplementing deployed assets with simultaneous 
multi-mission capabilities. AN/SPY-6 will enable U.S. Navy ships to 
have a greater standoff range from threat environments, providing 
greatly improved operational flexibility. Aegis BL 10 Weapon System 
will integrate BMD capability with the advanced AN/SPY-6 for remote 
engagements and increased raid capacity with simultaneous multi-mission 
capabilities.
    We continue joint U.S. Navy and MDA development of Aegis BL 5.4 
(with BMD 4.1.2 integration), which merges Aegis BL 5.3 and Aegis BMD 
BL 4.1 into a single computer program with multi-mission capability and 
updated Identification Friend or Foe processing, a significant tactical 
advancement for individual U.S. Navy ships. We are actively working 
with the U.S. Navy to certify and initiate fielding of this capability 
in fiscal year 2020. MDA also continues collaboration efforts with the 
U.S. Navy on AN/SPY-1 radar antenna improvements that, when coupled 
with Aegis BL 5.4, will increase AN/SPY-1 radar detection range and 
sensitivity, improving discrimination, performance, and stand-off 
distance from threat environments.
    In fiscal year 2020, we will also incorporate new BMD threats in 
Aegis BMD 5.1 that are inherent in the SM-3 Block IIA Build 8 missile 
software. We will also improve raid performance in Aegis BMD 5.1 
through Force Level Engagement and Sensor Coordination--Raid. In fiscal 
year 2020, we will expand our capability and capacity through execution 
of 19 Aegis BMD weapon system installations: one Aegis BMD 3.6 to Aegis 
BMD 4.1 upgrade (enabling a follow-on upgrade to Aegis BL 5.4); three 
non-BMD capable ship upgrades to Aegis BL 9.C2.0 (BMD 5.1); eight Aegis 
BL 9.B/C2 (BMD 5.1) Software Upgrade Installs; two Aegis BL 9.C2 (BMD 
5.1) Backfit Installs; five Aegis BL 5.4 (BMD 4.1) Installs.
    Sea Based Terminal: A sea-based terminal capability is critical to 
defending high value units at sea as well as protecting air and sea 
ports of debarkation during mobilization. Adding an additional layer to 
Aegis BMD, we are using an incremental development approach integrated 
within the Aegis BL 9 architecture to develop and deliver a Sea Based 
Terminal (SBT) capability. By expanding the capability of the SM-6 
missile and associated Aegis weapon system changes, we are delivering 
capability to maritime forces to protect against anti-ship ballistic 
missiles and provide a layered defense for forces ashore.
    SBT Increment 1 was fielded in 2018 after completing the final 
testing in 2017. SBT Increment 1 built upon an existing weapon system 
performance and leveraged the Navy's SM-6 Block I design to deliver an 
operationally effective capability. In 2019, we continue to explore 
opportunities to expand this capability to in-service Aegis Weapon 
Systems.
    SBT Increment 2, which further improves our endo-atmospheric 
defensive capabilities, was certified in September 2018. The 
introduction of SM-6 Block IA with modifications, which expands 
capability against SRBM threats, provides larger operating areas with 
higher performance against threats expected in the 2020 timeframe and 
will undergo testing in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020. The 
flight test program supporting the SBT Increment 2 program consists of 
three flight tests. The first test, FTM-31, is planned for late fiscal 
year 2019. FTM-31, a Development Test with Commander, Operational Test 
& Evaluation Force participation, consists of two independent events, 
both of which support the SM-6 Dual II missile Engineering Change 
Proposal production cut-in approval and subsequent delivery to the 
fleet. FTM-31 Event 1 will demonstrate an Aegis BL 9.C2 engagement of a 
MRBM target with an SM-6 Dual II (BMD initialized) missile. FTM-31 
Event 2 will demonstrate an SM-6 Dual II engagement of an Anti-Air 
Warfare target. The second and third tests, FTM-32 and FTM-33, are 
planned for fiscal year 2020.
    SBT Increment 3 is critical to meet emerging and more complex 
threats. SBT Increment 3 will expand on the current capabilities of the 
Aegis Weapon System and leverage SM-6 engineering efforts achieved to 
date. This engineering effort will provide increased engagement 
capability against advanced threats by building on capability provided 
by prior SBT Increments. SBT Increment 3 System Requirements Review was 
completed in December 2018 and in fiscal year 2019 will define a 
preliminary design to support delivery of full capability in fiscal 
year 2024.
    Aegis Ashore-Poland: We continue to support the EPAA as a major 
U.S. contribution to NATO's BMD capability, providing coverage and 
protection of NATO's European territory, populations, and forces 
against the increasing threat of ballistic missile proliferation in the 
Middle East. Currently, there is an operational Aegis Ashore site 
located in Romania and another under construction in Poland. NATO BMD 
architecture also includes the United States contributions of a 
forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey, four BMD-capable Aegis 
destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain, SM-3 interceptors, and a command-
and-control node at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
    In fiscal year 2020, we will continue our commitment to develop, 
test, and deliver global naval capability to the Warfighter and support 
defense of our deployed forces and European NATO allies through 
supporting the operational readiness of EPAA Phase 2 and efforts to 
deliver Phase 3 to improve defensive coverage against medium- and 
intermediate-range threats, which includes delivery of the Aegis Ashore 
site in Poland. Aegis Ashore site construction in Poland began in 
fiscal year 2016. That site will be equipped with the upgraded Aegis BL 
9 weapon system with BMD 5.1 and a capability to launch SM-3 Block IIAs 
in support of EPAA Phase 3 Technical Capability Declaration (TCD). The 
Aegis Weapon System upgrades are further enhanced by spiral upgrades to 
C2BMC and AN/TPY-2 sensors, enabling Engage-on-Remote capability and 
extended defensive coverage for NATO Europe.
    Delays due to an unsatisfactory construction progress at the Aegis 
Ashore site in Poland delayed the EPAA Phase 3 TCD, and Navy Acceptance 
and Operational Acceptance into CY 2020. Several factors contributed to 
these delays including underestimation of project complexity, slow 
mobilization, and challenges with trade staffing. While there is risk 
associated with unsatisfactory construction progress at the Aegis 
Ashore-Poland site, quality of accepted work is good and the Poland 
project continues to track to delivery of EPAA Phase 3 Technical 
Capability Declaration and Navy and EUCOM acceptance in CY2020. MDA and 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) continue to use all available 
tools to assist efforts toward completion of the construction. In an 
effort to maintain post-construction schedule, the MDA,/USACE/Industry 
team initiated the first of three industrial work packages in support 
of Aegis Weapon System (AWS) Installation and Check-Out (INCO) in March 
2019 on a not to interfere basis with ongoing construction. These work 
packages, combined with construction contractor efforts lay the 
groundwork to commence INCO in completed individual spaces vice waiting 
for the completion of all joint occupancy requirements. This approach 
will reduce construction delay impacts and assist with maintaining the 
site's TCD date. MDA, USACE, and Department of Defense leadership 
remain engaged with the construction contractor at high levels to 
ensure proper emphasis is placed on project importance and execution. 
Company leadership continues to express their commitment to the 
project. The company's performance has improved with steady progress on 
the ground observed. The company's actions to prioritize preparations 
for weapon system installation and improve trade labor placement will 
aid greatly to keep the overall project on track for delivery in 
calendar year 2020.
    The site in Romania is on schedule to be upgraded this summer. This 
upgrade provides increased coverage capability for the defense of 
Europe and partially mitigates the delay at the AA Poland site.
    MDA fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $25.65 million in 
Defense Wide Procurement and $38.4 million in Research, Development, 
Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funds to address the multiple actions 
required to field Aegis Ashore in Poland and continued operations of 
other Aegis Ashore sites. Given the construction delays and the 
requirement to be on-site for at least another year, MDA's fiscal year 
2020 budget request includes funding to complete combat system 
adaptation, integration, installation, and testing to ensure delivery 
of EPAA Phase 3 capability to the Warfighter. MDA and the Navy also 
will execute the MDR's direction to evaluate the viability of 
operationalizing the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC) 
at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii and develop an 
emergency activation plan that would enable the SECDEF to 
operationalize AAMDTC within 30 days of the Secretary's decision to do 
so.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a globally-
transportable, ground-based missile defense system that is highly 
effective against short-, medium-, and limited intermediate-range 
ballistic missile threats inside and outside the atmosphere in the 
terminal phase of flight. THAAD provides unique, cost-effective, and 
rapidly deployable capability to the combatant commanders to deepen, 
extend, and complement BMDS Homeland and regional defenses. THAAD has 
successfully intercepted threat representative ballistic missile 
targets in all 15 of its intercept attempts. In 2018, MDA completed 
fielding of the 7th THAAD Battery to the U.S. Army while continuing to 
provide maintenance and sustainment support and deliver interceptors to 
the inventories of both the United States and United Arab Emirates 
(UAE).
    MDA requested $99.8 million of Operations and Maintenance funding 
to support the maintenance and upkeep of all BMDS-unique items of the 
fielded U.S. THAAD batteries and for all THAAD training devices. In 
fiscal year 2020, MDA will provide support to seven THAAD batteries, 
including the two forward batteries stationed in the U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility and is prepared to support 
the U.S. Army in any future deployments around the world.
    MDA requested $425.9 million to continue procurement of THAAD 
equipment, including 37 THAAD interceptors in fiscal year 2020. By the 
end of fiscal year 2020, MDA will deliver 85 additional THAAD 
interceptors to the U.S. Army, for a total of 351 interceptors 
delivered. Synchronized with the deliveries for U.S. inventory, MDA is 
on track to complete delivery of THAAD interceptors to the UAE in 
fiscal year 2020 as planned.
    On November 26, 2018, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) signed 
Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for THAAD, with a program value 
of $13.4 billion. MDA will deliver seven batteries, 360 interceptors, 
and associated support services to the KSA. The U.S. Government expects 
to award the contract for the first phase of the KSA THAAD effort in 
fiscal year 2019, which will include acquisition of long-lead items and 
obsolescence efforts.
    MDA requested $302.8 million in fiscal year 2020 for THAAD 
development efforts. We will continue development of multiple, 
independent THAAD software upgrades to address the evolving threat, 
improve the Warfighter's defense planning capabilities, and provide 
improved interoperability with other BMDS elements. THAAD fiscal year 
2020 development and integration efforts include activities in support 
of the USFK JEON. The U.S. Army deployed THAAD in March 2017 to 
USINDOPACOM in support of the United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) 
Alliance. The USFK JEON requested improved integration of existing 
ballistic missile defense assets in theater. In fiscal year 2020, MDA 
will support Army fielding of Electronic Protection / Objective Debris 
Mitigation enhancements and the THAAD Remoted Launcher capability, 
which allows the THAAD system to use flexible communication paths to 
the THAAD launchers to increase defended areas. In coordination with 
the Army's Program Executive Office for Missile & Space, efforts will 
continue to complete the development and demonstration of the Patriot 
Launch on Remote (THAAD) capability in fiscal year 2020. Integration of 
the Patriot Advanced Capability--3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 
MSE) interceptor capability into the THAAD system will continue to be 
delivered in fiscal year 2021. In coordination with Army and the Joint 
Staff, MDA will execute the MDR's direction to prepare a report that 
provides a current assessment of the required numbers of THAAD 
batteries to support needed worldwide THAAD deployments, including 
potential deployment timelines, and basing and deployment options.
    Testing continues to reinforce the confidence of U.S. and FMS 
customers in the THAAD system's performance and interoperability with 
other air and ballistic missile defense systems. THAAD successfully 
executed Flight Test Other (FTX)-35 at White Sands Missile Range, New 
Mexico on April 6, 2018, using THAAD Software Build 3.0, which 
demonstrated interoperability between THAAD and Patriot by exchanging 
Link-16 messages over tactical data links while tracking a Close Range 
Ballistic Missile target. This effort also met the NDAA requirement for 
annual BMDS integration testing with Patriot. MDA requested $25.1 
million for Terminal Defense Testing in fiscal year 2020. This includes 
THAAD support of Army's Lower Tier Project Office demonstration of 
Patriot Launch on Remote (THAAD) in two events as well as demonstration 
of THAAD's capability to intercept an IRBM in the next operational 
flight test, Flight Test Operational (FTO)-03.
    MDA and the Military Departments continue to coordinate with OSD on 
the path forward for transfer of missile defense programs as directed 
in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA. A draft Report to Congress has been 
updated based on feedback from the Services and is in OSD staffing.
                     addressing the advanced threat
    We must make investments in advanced technology today to prepare 
for tomorrow's threats by improving system performance and 
effectiveness. This budget request will continue the development and 
technology risk reduction of breakthrough technologies for integration 
into the BMDS, including discrimination improvements, Multi-Object Kill 
Vehicle technology, hypersonic defense technology, and high-powered 
lasers that have potential use against threat missiles in the boost 
phase of flight. Scalable, efficient, and compact high-energy lasers 
could change future missile defense architectures. MDA is developing 
technology to improve reliability, enhance discrimination, and expand 
battle space in order to address gaps in the BMDS and dramatically 
drive down the cost of defending the Homeland.
    MDA requested $303.5 million for Technology Maturation Initiatives 
to conduct ground and airborne demonstrations of advanced sensor 
systems and refine directed energy technologies for missile defense. 
The Agency is maturing the technologies to increase power and testing 
sensors.
    We are operating aircraft outfitted with passive sensors to better 
understand threat tracking and how an airborne layer could augment the 
existing sensor network. In 2020, we will add tracking lasers to these 
aircraft to increase precision and range and determine how these 
compact lasers could further influence sensor design. In addition, we 
are developing advanced sensors and testing them from ground sites to 
improve discrimination accuracy and validate performance against 
targets of opportunity. What we learn from these ground and airborne 
tests could influence future space-based sensor systems.
    We continue to advance the state of the art for scaling electric 
laser powers and pursue competing technologies to reduce development 
risk. Distributed gain, diode pumped alkali laser, and fiber combining 
laser technology have the potential to meet missile defense 
requirements. In 2020, we will concentrate on laser maturation and 
power scaling development at the national laboratories and work with 
industry and the Services to investigate other promising laser 
technologies. Based on the results of these and other tests, we will 
work closely with the Department to determine the best way to integrate 
directed energy and laser sensing into the missile defense system.
    We are exploring technology for a Neutral Particle Beam system to 
engage threat systems. The neutral particle beam offers new kill 
options for the BMDS and adds another layer of protection for the 
Homeland. We are building upon technologies developed in the 1990's and 
have defined a logical building block approach that will culminate in 
an on-orbit demonstrator. We are exploring advancements in neutral 
particle beam component technology to improve the cost-benefit and 
size, weight and power for an operational system by incrementally 
building a demonstrator system in a lab environment and executing sound 
systems engineering practices early in the program. Per the MDR, MDA 
will study a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase 
defense and provide a report to the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) 
for Research & Engineering (R&E) and the USD for Policy (P) within 6 
months of the release of the MDR.
    MDA requests $13.6 million for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle effort 
to establish the technology foundation for killing multiple lethal 
objects from a single interceptor. The more kill vehicles we can put on 
an interceptor, the greater the raid capacity of our Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense system. MOKV has the potential to significantly 
enhance Homeland defense capabilities against the threat at a lower 
cost per engagement. MDA competitively awarded contracts to three major 
prime contractors in 2017 to reduce the technical risk for MOKV product 
development. The MOKV Technology Risk Reduction effort will culminate 
with component demonstrations specific to the three industry concepts.
    We request $157.5 million in fiscal year 2020 for the Hypersonic 
Defense effort to execute the systems engineering process, identify and 
mature full kill chain technology, provide analysis and assessment of 
target of opportunity events, and execute near term space sensor 
technology and multi-domain command and control capability upgrades to 
address defense from hypersonic threats. This effort will execute the 
Defense Science Board's and the MDR's recommendations to develop and 
deliver a set of material solutions to address and defeat hypersonic 
threats informed by a set of near-term technology demonstrations. An 
integrated set of enhancements will provide incremental capability 
measured by progress and knowledge points in the following areas: 
establishment of systems engineering needs and requirements to identify 
alternative material solutions; execution of a series of sensor 
technology demonstrations; modification of existing BMDS sensors and 
the C2BMC element for hypersonic threats; and definition of weapon 
concepts and investments in key technologies to enable a broad set of 
solutions, including kinetic and non-kinetic means. Per the MDR, MDA 
and Northern Command will prepare a plan to accelerate efforts to 
enhance missile defense tracking and discrimination sensors, to include 
addressing advanced missile defense threats. Also, MDA will provide a 
plan that will leverage work taking place at DARPA and the Air Force 
identifying resources, retesting, and personnel requirements necessary 
for defense against hypersonic threats to USD (R&E) and USD (P) within 
6 months of the release of the MDR.
    MDA requests $20.7 million for the Advanced Research Program to 
continue capitalizing on the creativity and innovation of the Nation's 
small business community and academia to enhance the BMDS. Advanced 
Research conducts innovative research and development with small 
businesses, universities, and international partners to create and 
advance missile defense capabilities against current and future 
threats. We are fostering innovative research between U.S. and foreign 
universities of allied nations through international cooperative 
technology development projects.
    We request $14.2 million for the Advanced Concepts & Performance 
Assessment effort, which centralizes advanced technology concept 
modeling, simulation, and performance analysis. The program delivers 
independent assessments of government, university, and industry 
technology concepts that, along with systems engineering requirements, 
support acquisition strategy decisions and define our technology focus 
areas. The request will fund independent government assessments of 
industry sensor, directed energy, and interceptor technology concepts 
and mature related tracking, discrimination, and sensor fusion 
algorithms. Assessment activities also include development of 
Hypersonic Defense, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
Initiatives, and left-through-right-of-launch integration key 
technology areas. The concept definition and assessment methodology 
enables us to verify contractor technology solutions and evaluate 
promising concepts in future missile defense systems architectures.
                       international cooperation
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes funding for regional 
missile defense capabilities to protect deployed U.S. forces, reassure 
allies and partners, and build stronger regional security 
architectures. MDA is actively engaged with over 20 countries and 
international organizations and is expanding work with our 
international partners through joint analyses, cooperative research and 
development projects, co-production activities, deployment of BMD 
assets, and facilitating the acquisition of missile defense 
capabilities, including FMS.
    MDA continues to encourage allied and partner investments in their 
own missile defense capabilities to create more effective regional 
security architectures that complement U.S. regional missile defense 
capabilities. The United States and Australia are conducting joint 
modeling and simulation activities looking at combined regional IAMD 
architectures. MDA is providing support to the United Kingdom as it 
conducts an analysis of requirements and potential radar options to 
fulfill a commitment to field a BMD radar to enhance the coverage and 
effectiveness of the NATO BMD system. We are engaged in multiple 
missile defense architecture analysis studies with our foreign partners 
to help them make missile defense acquisition decisions that also 
support interoperability with the United States. MDA also supports 
foreign military sales of the THAAD system, highlighted by the FMS case 
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for seven THAAD batteries. We continue 
to execute the UAE FMS case and deliver interceptors for the UAE's two 
THAAD batteries, both of which have been delivered and have achieved 
Initial Operational Capability.
    MDA is actively engaged with several nations across the globe to 
provide program information and cost data that may inform future 
decisions to procure missile defense capabilities, including Aegis BMD, 
THAAD, and BMD-capable sensors. We continue to discuss the 2016 
regional Ballistic Missile Early Warning System architecture study 
results with the Gulf Cooperation Council nations. MDA also is 
assisting Japan in their pursuit of an FMS case for two Aegis Ashore 
installations.
    MDA's work with the Israeli Missile Defense Organization is a 
testament to the strong missile defense partnership we maintain with 
Israel. MDA's fiscal year 2020 request remains consistent with the 
funding Memorandum of Understanding that the United States and Israel 
signed in 2016, which would provide $500 million for this effort. This 
budget continues MDA's longstanding support of United States-Israeli 
Cooperative BMD Programs, to include the co-development and co-
production of the David's Sling Weapon System and Upper Tier 
Interceptor and improvements to the Arrow Weapon System. The Department 
continues to support co-production efforts for the Iron Dome program to 
provide critical defense against short-range rockets and artillery. In 
fiscal year 2020, our budget will also support several flight tests 
across the Israeli portfolio. These continued joint efforts provide 
Israel with a three-tiered defense to defend from ballistic missiles, 
rockets, and cruise missiles and ensure Israel maintains its 
qualitative military edge against its advisories.
    We continue to make progress with our Japanese counterparts on the 
SM-3 Block IIA, our largest co-development effort, which supports 
extended deterrence and establishes an important regional defense 
capability. We are committed to delivering the SM-3 Block IIA to meet 
global threat requirements and support Phase 3 of the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach. Our fiscal year 2020 budget request also supports 
Allied participation in tests, exercises, and wargames, such as 
Formidable Shield-2019 (FS-19). FS-19 is a multinational exercise that 
will build upon the FS-17 exercise, which included the first 
operational SM-3 intercept in the Atlantic.
                               conclusion
    Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, in closing, our 
fiscal year 2020 budget funds comprehensive missile defense development 
efforts, including several critical capabilities required by the 
Warfighter. We will continue to increase the reliability as well as the 
capability and capacity of fielded Homeland and regional missile 
defense systems and make measured investments in advanced technology to 
counter the adversary missile threat.
    I also would like to broadly recognize the government/industry 
missile defense team and, more specifically, recognize the brave men 
and women who serve in our Armed Forces at home and abroad and who 
operate the BMDS. Our Nation is fortunate to have such a capable 
fighting force.
    I appreciate your continued support for MDA and missile defense, 
and I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
    General Dickinson.

   STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, 
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND 
/ ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT 
             COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

    Lieutenant General Dickinson. Chairman Fischer, Ranking 
Member Heinrich, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I'm 
honored to testify before you today. Thank you for supporting 
our servicemembers, civilians, and their families, and your 
continued support to the U.S. Army, U.S. Strategic Command, and 
the Joint Missile Defense community.
    As air and missile threats continue to evolve, your support 
enables the nation's air and missile defense forces to 
accomplish their critical worldwide missions. I will briefly 
summarize those missions in the context of three roles in which 
I serve, along with some selected achievements over the past 
year.
    First, I serve as the Commander of the United States Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), Army Forces Strategic 
Command (ARSTRAT), which provides trained and ready space and 
missile defense forces to support the warfighter and the 
nation. With two warfighting brigades, as well as science and 
technology capability development centers, we provide low-
density, high-demand capabilities for today's fight and develop 
future space and missile defense concepts and capabilities for 
tomorrow.
    Last week, SMDC/ARSTRAT's 100th missile defense brigade, 
comprised of Army National Guard soldiers from Colorado, 
California, and Alaska, supported the FTG-11 ground-based 
midcourse defense test. These flight tests allow our soldiers 
to demonstrate their readiness and lethality to protect the 
Homeland in the event of an ICBM attack.
    Additionally, over the past year soldiers have supported 
numerous regional air and missile defense tests, including the 
maneuver fires integrated experiment, and a successful 
interoperability demonstration between THAAD and Patriot.
    SMDC/ARSTRAT is also developing directed energy for air and 
missile defense. In 2018, soldiers at the Joint Warfighting 
Assessment engaged in defeating targets with a 10-kilowatt 
laser mounted on a Stryker combat vehicle. With soldiers' 
input, the Army is developing tactics, techniques, procedures, 
and concepts of operations for soon-to-be fielded high-energy 
laser systems.
    In my second role I serve as the Army's Air and Missile 
Defense Enterprise Integrator, coordinating across the Army air 
and missile defense community to balance priorities, inform 
resourcing decisions, and pursue innovative approaches that 
enhance our strategic flexibility. Our team recently published 
Army Air and Missile Defense 2028. This document is aligned 
with national DOD Army strategic guidance to include the 
missile defense review. It synchronizes the Army's AMD [air 
missile defense] capabilities, capacity, training, and our ally 
and partner initiatives to ensure our forces are flexible, 
agile, and integrated, capable of executing multi-domain 
operations and defending the Homeland, joint and coalition 
forces, and critical assets.
    As one of the Army's top six modernization priorities, Army 
air and missile defense is achieving accelerated delivery of 
capabilities and capacity. The Army selected and has begun 
production of the first of four battalions of interim mobile 
short-range air defense, or IM-SHORAD.
    Additionally, per the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019, Iron Dome was selected as the interim 
cruise missile defense capability for indirect-fire protection 
capability, or IFPC, and will serve to deliver cruise missile 
defense protection by the end of next year.
    In the past year, the Army expanded air and missile defense 
capacity by activating an additional air defense artillery 
brigade in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), activated a 
SHORAD battalion in Europe, and resourced force structure for 
future IM-SHORAD battalions.
    Finally, I serve as the Commander of the Joint Functional 
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, or JFCC IMD, 
which supports U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) by 
integrating and synchronizing global missile defense 
operations. JFCC IMD also advocates for missile defense 
capabilities and provides global missile defense training.
    In 2018, JFCC IMD, our team spearheaded the biennial Nimble 
Titan campaign, an exercise that brings together 
representatives from over 24 allies and partners, and 4 
international organizations to explore solutions for 
collaborative missile defense. Nimble Titan builds confidence 
in shared missile defense and enables collaboration, 
interoperability, and cost-sharing with our allies and 
partners. The campaign serves as a linchpin by building trust 
and increasing integration to maximize our collective 
capability and capacity.
    So in summary, there is no one silver bullet or single 
capability to counter the rapidly changing and complex 
operational environment. We must continue to develop more cost-
effective capabilities that position us on the right side of 
the cost curve. We must invest in solutions to counter threats 
through all phases of flight, in any weather, and in a denied, 
degraded, or contested environment, and finally, all that we do 
depends on our greatest strength, which is our people. Our 
remarkable servicemembers, civilians, contractors, and their 
families provide global support to the Army, joint warfighter, 
and the Homeland every day as they deploy, develop, and operate 
our nation's air and missile defense systems.
    So thank you for your continued support for these dedicated 
professionals, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Dickinson follows:]

      Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General James H. Dickinson
                              introduction
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of 
our servicemembers, civilians, and families and your continued support 
of the Army, the U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of Defense, and 
the missile defense community. Thank you also for the opportunity to 
testify before this Subcommittee. I am honored to highlight the 
important missile defense capabilities and ongoing enhancements that 
enable the defense of our Nation, forward stationed and deployed 
forces, allies, and partners.
    As I have done for the past 2 years, today I bring both an Army and 
a joint perspective on effective missile defense capabilities. Within 
the Army and joint communities, my responsibilities encompass several 
mission areas.
    As the commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command 
and Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT), I have Title 10 
responsibilities to organize, train, and equip Army space and global 
ballistic missile defense forces. I serve as the Army's force 
modernization proponent for space, global ballistic missile defense, 
and high altitude forces and capabilities. Further, I am the Army 
Service Component Commander to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). In 
this role, I am responsible for planning, integrating, coordinating, 
and providing Army space and missile defense forces and capabilities in 
support of USSTRATCOM missions.
    I also serve as the Army's Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Enterprise 
Integrator. In this role, I synchronize the balanced execution of the 
Army's AMD posture across the functions of force planning and sourcing 
requirements, combat and materiel development, AMD acquisition, and 
lifecycle management. I coordinate with the AMD community of interest 
to balance priorities, inform resourcing decisions, and pursue 
innovative approaches in order to enhance our strategic flexibility.
    Finally, as the Commander of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional 
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am 
responsible for coordinating global missile defense planning, 
conducting missile defense operations support, recommending allocation 
of missile defense assets, and advocating for missile defense 
capabilities on behalf of the combatant commanders.
    My major tasks within these roles can be summarized as providing 
forces and capabilities for current operations; preparing forces and 
capabilities for the future fight; and, research and development of 
Army technologies that will provide future advancements in air and 
missile defense capabilities. To achieve this, the organizations I 
command align their activities to these priorities:

      Protect our Homeland
      Provide combat-ready forces and capabilities
      Plan and conduct synchronized global operations
      Prepare or adopt leap-ahead concepts and technologies
      Preserve and account for the Nation's critical resources
      Promote and foster a positive command climate

    In line with my previous appearances, my intent today is to 
highlight the dedicated people who serve in the diverse and 
geographically dispersed organizations under my command, to briefly 
outline the strategic environment, and to emphasize USASMDC/ARSTRAT's 
missile defense force provider responsibilities with respect to the 
Army and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs). I would also like 
to outline JFCC IMD's role as a warfighter advocate supporting 
USSTRATCOM's coordinating authority for global missile defense 
planning, and finally, I will summarize key Army AMD developments in 
the context of a comprehensive approach to addressing the evolving air 
and missile threat.
                     the workforce--our foundation
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC IMD cannot carry out our wide-ranging 
national security missions without the dedication of our greatest 
asset--our people. One of my most important messages to you today is 
that your continued support is critical to our ability to develop and 
retain a highly qualified and mission-ready workforce. The Department 
of the Army needs predictable, stable funding to execute today's 
missions and to posture for the future. The October 1 impact and will 
ensure we continue to provide trained and ready servicemembers enacted 
Fiscal Year 2019 Department of Defense (DOD) budget and the fiscal year 
2018 emergency budget reprogramming for Homeland and regional missile 
defense is making a significant and civilians to operate and pursue 
advancements in space and missile defense capabilities for our Nation. 
The supplementary resources will continue our momentum to provide 
additional interceptors, modernize essential infrastructure, and 
enhance discrimination and characterization capabilities. After more 
than 2 years in command, I have seen countless examples of how our 
strength lies in the command's agile, adaptive space and missile 
defense workforce, a team of more than 3,000 highly trained and skilled 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians who stand vigilant 
24/7/365, protecting the joint warfighter and defending the Homeland.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Soldiers, Civilians, and Contractors Working
 Together Across 11 Time Zones in 23 Locations to
 Protect Our Nation, Allies, and Deployed Forces
------------------------------------------------------------------------

              the increasingly complex threat environment
    Current global trends indicate ballistic and cruise missiles are 
becoming more capable, due in part to the proliferation of advanced 
technologies, resulting in systems with global reach, increasing speed, 
and greater accuracy. Additionally, many foreign ballistic and cruise 
missile systems are progressively incorporating advanced 
countermeasures including maneuverable reentry vehicles, multiple 
independent reentry vehicles, and electromagnetic jamming, all intended 
to defeat our missile defense capabilities. Moreover, numbers of 
ballistic and cruise missile platforms are increasing. Many of these 
systems are mobile, which increases the difficulty in detecting, 
tracking, and targeting these weapons.
    Numerous countries are developing ground-, sea-, and air-launched 
land-attack cruise missiles using a variety of unconventional and 
inexpensive launch platforms. Today, nearly 30 countries possess 
ballistic missile capability and some are actively pursuing hypersonic 
weapons. There are over 35 different variants of ballistic missiles in 
service across the globe today and new intermediate-range and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (IRBM and ICBM) are under 
development. Adversaries have demonstrated rapid advances in range and 
overall missile performance. To meet the demands resulting from the 
shift to great power competition, we continue to pursue increased 
capability through modernization and development as well as increased 
capacity within the missile defense area. Russia and China have 
achieved parity with the United States in many cases, and overmatch in 
others.
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) have advanced technologically and 
proliferated exponentially over the past decade. As technology has 
progressed, both reconnaissance and attack capabilities have matured to 
the point where UASs represent a significant threat to Army combat 
operations from both state and non-state actors. The extensive range of 
UAS platforms in terms of size, velocity, range, altitude, flexibility, 
and capability make this a very challenging mission area for AMD 
systems. As such, we appreciate that Congress authorized the Department 
to take actions to mitigate the threat posed by UAS to facilities and 
assets related to the Department's missile defense mission.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  `` . . . U.S. Homeland missile defense must both
 outpace rogue state offensive missile capabilities
 and hedge against possible future threat
 developments.''
          --2019 Missile Defense Review
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the future, our missile defense systems will encounter more 
complex electronic and cyber attacks, as well as directed energy 
threats that could significantly degrade U.S. missile defense 
operations. We expect cyber and electronic attacks will be increasingly 
relied upon in potential adversaries' anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) 
strategies. Our ability to successfully counter these continuously 
advancing threats will rely heavily on our increased use of space and 
space-enabled capabilities. Space sensors, in greater numbers and 
sensor modalities, would expand our capability and capacity to track, 
discriminate, and successfully engage ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic 
threats.
    The strategic missile defense environment is becoming more 
challenging as adversary air and missile threats continue to 
proliferate in number and advance in complexity. Our evolution of 
capabilities requires a holistic approach that effectively integrates 
alternative approaches and technologies to defeat air and missile 
threats. A comprehensive approach, including attack operations and 
active and passive defenses, increases lethality and enables more 
efficient and effective missile defense capabilities. In addition, 
implementing technological advances in a time of fiscal constraints 
requires more cost effective methods to integrate our current and 
future capabilities. We continue to prioritize integrated AMD resources 
to optimize our support of the warfighter and to partner with the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Combatant Commands, and the Services in 
pursuit of fiscally responsible methods to address evolving threats.
              strategic positioning to counter the threat
    To counter the threat and meet the objectives of the 2018 National 
Defense and Army Strategies, USSTRATCOM and the U.S. Army continue to 
provide and enhance Homeland and regional missile defenses. We continue 
to work with our allies and partners in Europe, the Indo-Pacific 
region, and the Middle East to increase integration and 
interoperability of missile defense systems and operations.
    Integrated missile defense planning, force management, and 
operations emphasize global coordination with regional execution so 
that for any threat, we match the best interceptor with the best 
sensors. A layered and holistic approach that integrates offense and 
defense will move the U.S. toward a more robust and flexible crisis 
response capability.
    The 2017 basing of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
battery in the Republic of Korea bolstered our regional defense 
capabilities to improve protection of U.S. and allied forces, and 
critical infrastructure on the peninsula. Additionally during 2017, MDA 
completed the emplacement of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors 
(GBIs) at Fort Greely, Alaska, to provide more capacity to defend the 
Nation against an ICBM attack from North Korea, or a future ICBM 
capable Iran.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  `` . . . ``I am confident in the ability of the
 Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the
 United States from ICBMs fired from North Korea or
 Iran...''
    --USNORTHCOM SASC
      Posture Statement, February 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2018 National Defense Strategy prioritizes a strong commitment 
to security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, and the 
Middle East. In conjunction with our allies and partners, the 
Department of Defense maintains forward-committed Patriot; THAAD; and 
counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) forces to enhance our AMD 
posture, sending a deterrence message to potential adversaries and 
assurance to our friends. Through forward positioned AMD commands and 
air defense brigade headquarters, we continue to work with regional 
partners and allies to increase information and data sharing and we are 
developing a more robust global AMD force posture that leverages 
partner nations' growing capabilities and capacity. Eventually, this 
will reduce the strain on our forces while enabling more timely 
modernization of our AMD assets.
    The Army AMD enterprise, consisting of agencies and organizations 
that develop, maintain, sustain, train, and employ AMD capabilities, 
developed Army Air and Missile Defense 2028. This document, is based on 
the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the 
Missile Defense Review, the Army Operating Concept, the changing 
operational and threat environments, and the rapid pace of our 
technological advancement. This new path forward for Army AMD, released 
last month, focuses on the 2018-2028 timeframe, aligns with current 
Department and Army doctrine, and addresses our ability to balance 
current operational requirements while shaping the force and 
modernization efforts to counter future challenges. AMD serves as a 
critical enabler of the Army's ability to penetrate and dis-integrate 
enemy A2/AD systems and exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to 
achieve strategic objectives. In summary, the Army Modernization 
Strategy enables us to deliver advanced AMD capabilities to our 
warfighters on a substantially decreased timeline. The Air and Missile 
Defense Cross-Functional Team (CFT) is key to rapidly developing 
requirements and ensuring these future capabilities transition quickly 
from concept, to prototyping, to fielding. Army AMD continues its focus 
on program development of Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD), 
Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS), Indirect Fire 
Protection Capability (IFPC), Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
(IAMD), directed energy, and advanced energetics.
          providing and enhancing missile defense capabilities
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT's first major task is carrying out its Title 10 
responsibilities, which include being a force provider of missile 
defense capabilities. This command is manned by multi-component 
soldiers, civilians, and contractors, who contribute to operations, 
planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army forces and 
capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM's missile defense mission. Other 
commands around the world, including all GCCs, also leverage the 
capabilities we provide.
    Our operational function in today's fight is to provide trained and 
ready missile defense forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the 
warfighter. For example, USASMDC/ARSTRAT soldiers serving in the 
Homeland and in remote and austere forward-deployed locations operate 
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and the Army Navy/
Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control, Model 2, Forward-Based 
Mode (AN/TPY-2 FBM) radars. Highlights of the capabilities provided to 
current operations and readiness by our missile defense professionals 
include:
    Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense: Soldiers from the 
100th Missile Defense Brigade, headquartered in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado, and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort 
Greely, Alaska, are ready to defend our Nation from an ICBM attack. In 
support of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Army National Guard and 
Active component soldiers operate the GMD Fire Control Systems located 
at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska, the Missile Defense Element in 
Colorado, and a detachment that oversees operations at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, California. These soldiers, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM, 
also oversee maintenance of GMD interceptors and ground system 
components. At the Fort Greely Missile Defense Complex, the 49th 
Missile Defense Battalion military police secure the interceptors and 
command and control facilities from physical threats. Given their 
strategic mission in this remote location, the harsh environment and 
20-hours per day of winter darkness, we must continuously review and 
enhance the Fort Greely Garrison services and support to these 
soldiers, civilians, contractors, and their families. With the 
continued support of Congress, we have already realized substantial 
quality of life improvements for these remotely stationed personnel and 
their families.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  `` . . . the United States has a robust and credible
 layered missile defense system.''
    --USSTRATCOM SASC
      Posture Statement, February 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Support to GMD System Test and Development: Soldiers from the 100th 
Missile Defense Brigade and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion 
participate in GMD test activities and work with MDA developers on 
future improvements to the GMD system. MDA's testing regime, conducted 
through a series of ground-based and operational flight tests, and 
rigorously verified, validated, and accredited models and simulations, 
emphasizes operational realism during test design and execution. This 
realism enables soldiers of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade to 
sustain and improve their proficiency and validate operational 
employment of the system. A current example is the recent FTG-11 test. 
The event enabled brigade and battalion soldiers to demonstrate their 
tactics, techniques, and procedures in support of an operational flight 
test. This test validates their readiness by performing their 
operational tasks while building warfighter confidence that the system 
will perform as designed.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  ``Our missile defense forces here, are vital to our
 national defense and the world should know that
 they're ready.''
   --VPOTUS Elmendorf Air Force Base,
     Alaska, 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Support to Regional Capabilities: The 100th Missile Defense Brigade 
also provides GCCs with trained and certified AN/TPY-2 FBM missile 
defense batteries. These batteries are currently located at five 
strategic locations around the globe where they contribute to the early 
warning, cueing, tracking, and discrimination of threats to our allies 
and partners. These forward-based radars also represent a tangible 
contribution to both Homeland and regional defense. Soldiers manning 
these radars, deployed to remote and austere locations across the 
globe, demonstrate daily our Nation's commitment to defend deployed 
forces, allies, and partners from ballistic missile attacks.
    Space Support to Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Space-enabled 
capabilities are essential for missile defense operations, providing 
and enabling communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and early warning. We 
routinely coordinate and collaborate with USSTRATCOM's National Space 
Defense Center to ensure that space assets are poised to support 
missile defense.
    In support of the joint force commander, USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues 
to provide ballistic missile early warning within the United States 
European Command (USEUCOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), 
and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) theaters of 
operations. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Station 
(JTAGS) detachments, which support the Joint Force Space Component 
Command, are operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT space cadre and qualified 
soldiers who monitor launch activity and other infrared events. They 
provide essential information to members of the AMD and operational 
communities. Our JTAGS detachments are forward deployed around the 
globe, providing continuous, dedicated, assured missile warning to 
USSTRATCOM and GCCs in support of deployed and forward-based forces. In 
Europe, the relocation of the JTAGS detachment from Stuttgart, Germany, 
to Sigonella Naval Air Station, Italy, is scheduled for completion 
later this year. This will increase operational missile warning 
capability.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  ``The exploitation of space provides a missile
 defense posture that is more effective, resilient and
 adaptable to known and unanticipated threats.''
          --2019 Missile Defense Review
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    USASMDC/ARSTRAT's second major task is to develop future missile 
defense forces and mature current capabilities. A major component of 
this function is providing relevant and updated training for our global 
missile defense systems. During the past fiscal year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT 
trained approximately 200 soldiers to execute the missile defense 
mission of the Homeland.
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT, as a recognized Army Center for Analysis, conducts 
studies to determine how to best meet the Army's assigned missile 
defense responsibilities. Our analyses validates established procedures 
and supports emerging processes. The Army uses these result to document 
its missile defense needs and pursue joint and Army validation of its 
requirements. With insights from these studies, we develop and 
operationalize the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy 
requirements to address evolving threats and potential vulnerabilities 
to the GMD and AN/TPY-2 FBM missile defense systems. This disciplined 
approach ensures limited resources are applied to achieve maximum 
operational utility.
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT's third major task is to provide critical 
technologies to address future needs that will enhance warfighter 
effectiveness. Our technology development function is primarily focused 
on the space and high altitude domains. Additionally, although MDA is 
the principal materiel developer for missile defense capabilities, 
USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues to support the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) efforts to move conventional prompt strike technology 
demonstration activities to acquisition Programs of Record within the 
U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force. USASMDC/ARSTRAT has been 
heavily involved in establishing the U.S. Army Hypersonic Project 
Office (AHPO) and is supporting the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy 
hypersonic programs with flight test and component procurement support. 
The AHPO is currently providing senior Army leadership with program 
plans, schedules, and funding requests to support a rapid near term 
capability. In addition, the AHPO is supporting MDA's concept 
development for defense against hypersonic threats. These technical 
capabilities are at the forefront of developing holistic, cost-
effective approaches to address the broadening missile defense 
challenge.
    Following are brief summaries of a few of our research and 
development efforts, as well as an overview of the capabilities of an 
essential Army testing range.
    High Energy Laser Technology Development and Demonstration: The 
Army's high energy laser (HEL) science and technology effort aims to 
develop ruggedized laser system components and subsystems, integrate 
them onto an Army vehicle, conduct demonstrations to characterize 
performance, and transition the technology to a Program Executive 
Office. A solid-state laser weapon system has the potential to be a 
low-cost and effective complement to kinetic capabilities in countering 
rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM); UAS; and other threats. The 
effort builds upon earlier pathfinder demonstrations of a 10-kilowatt 
(kW) laser system by continuing to develop, integrate, and mature the 
technology at higher laser power outputs. The 50-kW class Robust 
Electric Laser Initiative fiber laser has been integrated into the High 
Energy Laser Mobile Test Truck (HELMTT) for a 50-kW laser demonstration 
against RAM and UAS threats. The HELMTT deployed to the High Energy 
Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) at White Sands Missile Range, New 
Mexico, last fall for initial system checkout. During that limited 
demonstration, the HELMTT system showed that a high energy laser 
system, mounted on an Army tactical vehicle, could engage and destroy 
RAM targets. It will return to the HELSTF later this spring to conduct 
data collection to ensure we are on the right track with our HEL 
development efforts. This demonstration will be a key knowledge point 
for the next major phase of high energy laser technology development, 
the High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD). The HEL 
TVD supports the Army's Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 
2--Intercept (IFPC Inc 2-I) program. It is on schedule to conduct a C-
RAM 100-kW demonstration in late 2022 to validate system performance 
against IFPC Inc 2-I requirements.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  `` . . . we are no more than a few years of having .
 . . directed energy weapons of military utility . . .
 ''
    --Dr. Michael Griffin, Center for Strategic and
      International Studies Interview, December 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the past year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT also started work on the 
Multi-Mission High Energy Laser (MMHEL) as an Army Technology 
Maturation Initiative (TMI). The TMI will integrate a 50-kW laser 
system on a Stryker combat vehicle and culminate in an operational 
demonstration that informs M-SHORAD requirements. Supporting this 
effort is the Mobile Experimental High Energy Laser (MEHEL), a 10-kW 
laser on a Stryker. Over the past several years, MEHEL has participated 
in four Maneuver Fires Integration Experiments at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 
and a Joint Warfighting Assessment in Germany. During the 2018 Joint 
Warfighting Assessment, soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment 
successfully operated the MEHEL during limited live-fire exercises. 
MEHEL is helping warfighters develop tactics, techniques, and 
procedures, as well as concepts of operations for future high energy 
laser weapons.
    Low-Cost Target Development: The Army has completed the initial 
effort to develop a suite of threat representative, short-range 
ballistic missile targets for lower-tier missile defense testing at a 
substantially reduced cost. Over the past few years, we completed three 
detailed target designs and successfully demonstrated all three of the 
configurations, which leverage excess solid rocket motors. The initial 
launch of Zombie targets was the Pathfinder Zombie Demonstration flight 
in December 2016, followed by
    Sabre Zombie targets in June and November 2017 for Patriot 
intercept tests. These missions were critical operational tests of the 
Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor. 
Development of a two-stage Zombie ballistic missile target known as 
Black Dagger was completed last year, culminating with a successful 
risk reduction launch in June 2018. The Black Dagger target is meant to 
represent a broader range of short-range ballistic missile threats by 
achieving longer range, higher altitude, and increased velocity. The 
Zombie suite of targets has multiple missions planned in support of 
MDA, Patriot, and Army IAMD over the next several years. The goal 
remains to provide more cost effective ballistic missile targets. 
Accomplishing this goal, will result in an overall reduced cost to the 
DOD's test execution mission.
    Missile Defense Testing Range: USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Ronald 
Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site (RTS) at the U.S. Army 
Garrison--Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. RTS 
provides critical testing support to both offensive and defensive 
missile testing requirements for programs such as GMD and U.S. Air 
Force strategic ballistic missile systems. RTS retains preeminent 
ballistic missile testing capabilities used in validating the Nation's 
ability to sustain a strong, credible ballistic missile deterrent as a 
key element of national security and the security of U.S. allies and 
partners.
    RTS continues to support the developmental and operational testing 
of both Homeland and regional missile defense systems. Two Standard 
Missile-3 tests were successfully supported with MDA in 2018 (FTM-29 in 
January 2018 and FTO-03 E1 in December 2018). Planning and preparation 
for support to the Army Patriot system, the MDA Ground-Based 
Interceptor, and THAAD systems continued throughout 2018 for future 
test events.
    RTS also supports offensive ballistic missile testing for the Air 
Force Global Strike Command. During 2018, RTS supported four Minuteman 
III test (Glory Trips) launches to successfully validate and verify the 
effectiveness, readiness, and accuracy of the weapon system. Hypersonic 
system testing has become a significant element of test planning at RTS 
during 2018. Because of the geographic remoteness and available complex 
sensor suite, RTS has seen a significant upswing in hypersonic systems 
test planning. There are currently five active hypersonic test programs 
in various stages of planning at RTS.
    In concert with its testing mission, RTS conducts continuous deep 
space surveillance and space object identification operations to 
increase national capabilities and reduce expenditures for both mission 
sets. The U.S. Air Force continues testing of its most advanced 
surveillance system--Space Fence. In a few years, this improved 
surveillance capability will enable proactive space situational 
awareness while complementing existing systems at the RTS.
    army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
    Army Air and Missile Defense 2028 meets the directives of the 
National Defense Strategy and the Army vision and enables Multi-Domain 
Operations (MDO). To achieve the AMD force of 2028, we must continue to 
modernize and develop AMD capabilities, build sufficient AMD capacity 
for MDO, and ensure AMD forces are trained and ready. MDO requires that 
our capabilities and associated command and control systems have robust 
interoperability, to include with joint and allied forces, and be 
highly resilient. Accomplishing these essential tasks will allow us to 
provide deterrence via forward stationing and enable a more robust, 
comprehensive defense by coordinating and integrating with our partners 
and allies. AMD is one of six Army modernization priorities in which 
recent Army investments have significantly increased. The Army AMD CFT 
is the Army's modernization lead for these capabilities and works 
closely with the other Services, the Joint Staff, and MDA toward joint 
IAMD capabilities. The Program Executive Office for Missiles and Space 
is the Army's materiel developer for these capabilities and works 
closely with the AMD CFT. A summary of the Army's AMD strategic 
direction and major programs follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  AMD is a Critical Enabler of the Army's Ability to
 Conduct Multi-
  Domain Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Air and Missile Defense Readiness: Readiness is the Army's top 
priority. The operational demand to meet the requirements of joint 
warfighters continues to stress the Army AMD force, impacting current 
and future readiness, as well as modernization initiatives. With a 
significant portion of the AMD force decisively committed, the Army 
continues to take action to mitigate this stress on the force and 
restore strategic flexibility. Within the last five years, the Army 
implemented a Sustainable Readiness Model, established an AMD test 
detachment, and fielded the Dismounted Patriot Information Coordination 
Central (DPICC). Last year, the Army completed fielding of five DPICCs 
to USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM providing these combatant 
commanders greater flexibility and a smaller deployable footprint to 
meet mission requirements.
    Mission Command: Closely linked to AMD readiness is the ability to 
provide low density/high demand AMD mission command elements. The 
mission command elements are pivotal to laying the foundation and 
creating an environment that supports the integration of Army AMD 
forces into joint command and control (C2) architectures. Over the past 
year, the Army has activated an additional Active component Air Defense 
Artillery brigade headquarters in USINDOPACOM and is rotating a 
National Guard Air Defense Artillery brigade headquarters to USEUCOM, 
and is elevating the command of the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense 
Command in USEUCOM to a general officer.
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System: THAAD, a key 
component of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) architecture, 
is designed for area defense of deployed and allied forces, population 
centers, and critical infrastructure against short-, medium-, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. THAAD is a mobile and globally 
transportable, low density/high demand asset. THAAD has a unique endo- 
and exo-atmospheric intercept capability using proven hit-to-kill 
technology. There are currently seven operational THAAD batteries. 
THAAD batteries are deployed to Guam and the Republic of Korea in 
response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. The United 
States Forces Korea (USFK) Joint Emergent Operational Needs Statement 
(JEONS) requirement brings a remote launch capability in fiscal year 
2019 and a THAAD Missile Segment Enhancement Integration capability in 
fiscal year 2021. As directed in the 2019 Missile Defense Review, the 
Army, in conjunction with OSD and MDA, is currently reviewing and 
validating the THAAD requirements in order to support current operation 
plans.
    Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment 
Enhancement (MSE): The Army Patriot force remains the cornerstone of 
AMD protection for our deployed forces, friends, and allies. The 
Patriot force is 40 percent forward stationed/forward deployed as GCCs' 
increasing AMD requirements drive the operational tempo and stress on 
the Patriot force. The PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE interceptors employ hit-to-
kill capability against ballistic missiles. PAC-3 MSE fills the 
engagement gap between the THAAD and the PAC-3 missiles while also 
defeating advanced threats earlier, at greater range, with increased 
lethality. The PAC-3 MSE is in full-rate production and is the latest 
generation hit-to-kill PAC-3 interceptor in the Patriot force to meet 
global capability requirements. Over the next year, ongoing efforts 
will increase annual PAC-3 MSE production capability by approximately 
30 percent to address increased U.S. requirements and demand from our 
international partners.
    Patriot must continually modernize through software and hardware 
upgrades to avoid obsolescence and to take advantage of the extended 
battlespace performance afforded by the PAC-3 MSE interceptor. This 
modernization effort provides combat identification enhancements, 
addresses upper tier debris mitigation, improves performance of the 
PAC-3 MSE interceptor, and enables Army and joint interoperability 
improvements. The Post Deployment Build (PDB)-8 Conditional Materiel 
Release hardware and software was approved in November 2018. An agile 
build, PDB-8.0.6, was created in support of the USFK JEONS to expand 
Patriot and THAAD interoperability. The JEONS requirement brings the 
launch-on-remote capability, which expands Patriot's battlespace by 
enabling it to utilize the AN/TPY-2 radar battlespace by the Patriot 
system. This capability will be pure fleeted across Patriot in PDB-8.1 
in fiscal year 2022. For adversary overmatch, the Army is continuously 
improving Patriot capability against the near-term evolving threat 
while we move toward the Army IAMD Battle Control System (IBCS) 
architecture including a new Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor 
(LTAMDS) and the IFPC Inc 2-1.
    Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS): LTAMDS will 
provide sensing capabilities in the lower tier portion of the ballistic 
missile defense battlespace and allow the full kinematic capabilities 
of the PAC-3 MSE missile. Additionally, LTAMDS will serve as a sensor 
node on the IBCS network, address capability gaps, modernize 
technology, reduce operations and sustainment cost, mitigate 
obsolescence, increase battlespace, and enhance reliability and 
maintainability.
    To ensure a fair-and-open competition, an LTAMDS Sense-Off 
demonstration will be conducted in 2019. The upcoming Sense-Off 
competition provides industry the opportunity to demonstrate potential 
LTAMDS solutions. The Army will leverage Sense-Off results, along with 
concurrent modeling and simulation efforts, to evaluate current 
industry capabilities and determine future growth potential. Following 
the Sense-Off and proposal evaluations, the Army will award a contract 
later this year to a single vendor for the delivery of six prototypes. 
The rapid prototyping effort goal is the delivery of four sensors to 
one battalion in 2022.
    Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 - Intercept (IFPC 
Inc 2): As the end of the operational lifecycle approaches for short-
range AMD capabilities such as Avenger, the Army is developing new 
capabilities to defeat air, cruise missile (CM), and RAM threats. The 
primary IFPC-Inc 2 mission is to provide a robust protection capability 
against these threats to supported forces within fixed and semi-fixed 
locations. To address a gap in defenses against potential Russian and 
Chinese CM threats, the Army recently reported to Congress its intent 
to rapidly field an interim capability utilizing the Israeli Iron Dome 
system no later than fiscal year 2020. Concurrently, the Army plans to 
execute a decision on enduring IFPC capability by the end of fiscal 
year 2019. Two batteries of the enduring IFPC-Inc 2 capability will be 
deployed no later than the conclusion of fiscal year 2023.
    Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS): Technological advances 
and the proliferation of commercial and tactical UAS in both 
reconnaissance and attack capabilities have matured to the point where 
they represent a significant threat to Army operations from both state 
and non-state actors. The extensive range of platforms in terms of 
size, velocity, range, altitude, flexibility, and capability make this 
a very challenging mission area for AMD systems. C-UAS efforts are 
critical to defeat the rapid proliferation of small, commercially 
available UAS technology on the battlefield. In response to a 
warfighter Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS), the Army 
has deployed over 500 C-UAS systems (man-portable, expeditionary, and 
mobile) and continues to adapt to changes in theater UAS threats. The 
modification of counterfire target acquisition radars, equipped with 
multi-mission air surveillance target acquisition capabilities, 
improves the warfighter's ability to detect and defeat these low, slow, 
and small UAS threats. Efforts continue to close the risk gap to 
protect our maneuver forces with short range defense capabilities.
    Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance (ALPS): In support of a 
JUONS, the ALPS passive sensor is currently being fielded to 
USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM. The Army demonstrated the ability 
to integrate ALPS into the Army IBCS in 2018. Once fully integrated 
into Army IBCS, the ALPS passive sensor will provide continuous, 360-
degree, long-range surveillance against fixed and rotary wing aircraft, 
UAS, and CM threats.
    Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD): M-SHORAD will provide 
a dedicated maneuverable and survivable AMD capability for maneuvering 
forces against fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and UAS threats. The Army 
delivered two Avenger battalion equipment sets to USEUCOM in support of 
the European Deterrence Initiative. The equipment was accompanied by 
personnel and infrastructure allowing the establishment of an Active 
component Avenger battalion. Additionally, the Army is rotating an Army 
National Guard Avenger battery to Europe to provide protection of 
maneuver forces. While the current Avenger and Stinger systems provide 
limited capabilities today, we must develop and field more advanced 
systems to outpace the threat. In fiscal year 2018, the Army began the 
development and fabrication of initial M-SHORAD systems that integrate 
existing Army capabilities into a Stryker combat vehicle. Rapid 
prototype development and integration activities continue and fielding 
of four M-SHORAD battalions is scheduled for fiscal years 2021 through 
2023. In addition, the Army continues to mature high energy lasers and 
electronic warfare to increase M-SHORAD capabilities in support of the 
maneuver force. M-SHORAD will begin to integrate a laser with an 
initial capability in fiscal year 2024. By fiscal year 2028, M-SHORAD 
battalions will field a mix of directed energy and missile-based 
systems.
    Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): Army IAMD 
integrates current and future AMD sensors and weapons into a common 
integrated fire control capability. The Army's common integrated and 
networked AMD C2 capability, IBCS, will allow the warfighter to fully 
integrate joint and multinational AMD capabilities across all echelons. 
IBCS allows rapid convergence of sensors, shooters, and C2 components 
on an integrated fire control network. Once fully fielded, IBCS will 
provide a game-changing capability, allowing AMD forces to be tailored 
and scaled appropriately to meet the given threat. The flexible number 
and mix of capabilities can be task organized into a formation with an 
inherent, integrated C2 system. The IBCS open architecture will enable 
rapid integration of legacy and developmental sensors and shooters, 
providing capabilities to defeat emerging threats in multi-domain 
operations. The program continues to execute on plan in accordance with 
the 2018 Congressional report.
    The program will field common missile command nodes for Army AMD 
forces to defend against manned aircraft and UAS, air-to-ground 
missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, CM, and RAM attacks. The IBCS 
will operate with air surveillance and fire control capabilities across 
the Army, and with joint and multinational AMD capabilities across all 
echelons. It will enhance the lethality of the AMD force, dismantling 
the current system-centric control paradigm, which will dramatically 
increase capability and also facilitate open industry competition in 
support of the AMD community. Additional efforts are currently underway 
to explore the feasibility and potential benefits of integrating Army's 
IBCS and MDA's BMD System Command, Control, Battle Management, and 
Communications (C2BMC), to include THAAD fire control center, to fully 
support Army IAMD interoperability with the BMDS.
joint functional component command for integrated missile defense (jfcc 
          imd)--integrating and synchronizing missile defense
    JFCC IMD is USSTRATCOM's missile defense integrating element, 
formed to execute its Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned missile 
defense mission and enable the headquarters to focus on integration and 
advocacy. Headquartered at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado 
Springs, Colorado, JFCC IMD is manned by a cohesive team of Army, Navy, 
Air Force, Marine Corps, civilian, and contractor personnel.
    As the Secretary of Defense and various combatant commanders have 
previously testified, warfighters remain confident in our ability to 
protect the Nation against missile attacks. However, as the global 
missile threat continues to evolve, we must invest in holistic 
approaches to defeat adversary missiles before launch or during all 
phases of flight (boost, midcourse, and terminal phases). Additionally, 
we must continue to invest in capabilities that limit or mitigate the 
effects of an attack which penetrates our defenses. JFCC IMD's 
principal mission is to coordinate with, and operationally support, the 
joint warfighters at the GCCs, and advocate for their requirements with 
the materiel developers at MDA and the Services. On behalf of the GCCs 
and USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD champions warfighter priorities and capability 
needs, including continued development of a robust sensor network, 
integrated discrimination capabilities, redundant and resilient C2 
networks with enhanced cybersecurity defenses, and improved 
interceptors for both Homeland and regional missile defenses.
    Through JFCC IMD, we work across DOD and alongside key allies and 
partners to improve integration of existing capabilities, maximizing 
efficiency and effectiveness in global missile defense missions. The 
essential force multiplier is integration--a critically important 
mission enabler that JFCC IMD directly supports. As a functional 
component command of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD executes support to 
designated UCP responsibilities along four lines of effort:

      Synchronizing global missile defense planning, global 
force management, and missile defense security cooperation activities.
      Conducting global missile defense operations support, to 
include asset management, alternate execution authority, federated 
intelligence support, and network monitoring and protection.
      Executing above element, joint, and combined global 
missile defense training and education, exercises, and experimentation.
      Advocating for and recommending acceptance of global 
missile defense capabilities, conducting analysis and assessments of 
current and future capabilities, and supporting ground & flight tests.

    To accomplish these efforts, we maintain close collaborative 
relationships with the GCCs, MDA, the Services, OSD, the Joint Staff, 
and our allies and partners. We continually seek to enhance our 
deployed forces' capabilities while gaining operational experience and 
confidence in our collective ability to defend the Nation, deployed 
forces, partners, and allies. Some of our key efforts to enhance 
missile defense planning and capabilities for both the Homeland and 
regional architectures follow:
    Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In 
response to the evolving strategic environment, we continue to bolster 
Homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. In development of 
the global missile defense mission, we are supporting the advancement 
of the new capabilities such as Aegis Ashore in Poland; the Standard 
Missile-3 Block IIA under co-development with Japan; Long Range 
Discrimination Radar at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska; 20 additional 
GBIs in a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska; Homeland Defense 
Radar-Hawaii; Pacific Radar; Spacebased Kill Assessment; and various 
other new capabilities such as neutral particle beam, high energy 
laser, and other directed energy technologies. Given the many 
challenges associated with implementation of these architectures, JFCC 
IMD, in support of USSTRATCOM's coordinating role for global missile 
defense, collaborates with the GCCs to assess and address cross-
regional gaps in the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and 
operations.
    Multi-Regional Missile Defense Asset Management: JFCC IMD, in 
coordination with USSTRATCOM and the GCCs, manages the availability of 
missile defense assets to balance operational readiness posture, 
coordinates the scheduling of missile defense system maintenance 
activities, and supports MDA and Service test requirements. The asset 
management process allows us to continually assess our readiness to 
defend against missile attacks and to recommend adjustments to optimize 
the overall missile defense architecture.
    Cybersecurity of the Ballistic Missile Defense System: JFCC IMD, in 
coordination with USSTRATCOM and MDA, conducts the Cybersecurity 
Service Provider mission for the BMDS to ensure cyber defenses and 
operations are planned and executed across the globe. JFCC IMD works 
with key stakeholders to enhance the cyber defense posture of our 
missile defense operational architecture against malicious activity. We 
are collaborating with our mission partners to incorporate realistic 
cybersecurity testing in support of the Warfighter Capability 
Acceptance process. JFCC IMD also works closely with the Joint Staff, 
combatant commanders, and MDA to educate, train, and exercise 
cybersecurity protocols to ensure the highest levels of readiness.
    Global Planning and Assessment: As regional and global missile 
threats continue to increase in number and complexity, JFCC IMD works 
with the missile defense community to refine processes that synchronize 
transregional global missile defense planning and operations. Codified 
in periodic revisions to the Global Missile Defense Concept of 
Operations, these processes ensure unity of effort and mitigate 
potential seams and gaps across geographic areas of responsibility. 
Consistent with the Department's transition to planning based on 
adversary problem sets, JFCC IMD has continued to refine our process 
for adversary-centric missile defense plans assessments, and completed 
further objective analysis of missile defense risks across multiple GCC 
plans. This assessment methodology identifies systemic risk, informs 
recommendations for shortfall mitigation, and increases effectiveness 
in future missile defense planning efforts. This analysis informs our 
biennial Global Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment which 
shapes recommendations for global force management and future 
capability advocacy. Looking forward, we will focus our efforts with 
the warfighter community to continue establishing approaches and 
processes necessary to enable increased integration and a more holistic 
approach to missile defense.
    Global Force Management: USSTRATCOM, as the designated Joint 
Functional Manager for missile defense, relies upon JFCC IMD to 
evaluate and recommend to the Joint Staff sourcing of missile defense 
requirements based on assessed risk. Due to the low density/high demand 
nature of missile defense assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct 
and significant impact on other combatant commanders' campaign and 
contingency plans. We continue to refine our approach to prioritize 
steady-state global missile defense requirements. This Global 
Prioritized Defended Asset List categorizes the GCCs' critical assets 
based on global risk. It informs our recommendations in the Global 
Force Management process, enabling senior leaders to make informed 
decisions on allocation of low density missile defense forces.
    Allied and Partner Missile Defense Integration: Given that we will 
never have enough active defense capacity, integrating our allies and 
partners into a common and mutually supportive architecture is a 
critical warfighter priority. In support of those efforts, our Global 
Missile Defense Concept of Operations includes an International 
Engagement Framework which provides a common approach to identify 
potential partners, a model to identify a level of maturation, and an 
assessment mechanism. This approach has formed the analytical basis for 
the Department's Reports to Congress on Allied Integration for the past 
2 years. Another venue aimed at promoting increased cooperation is the 
Nimble Titan campaign, a biennial series of multinational missile 
defense experiments. Nimble Titan brings together policy and military 
subject matter experts from allies and partner nations to explore 
collaborative missile defense, synchronize policy and military 
initiatives, and identify potential future concepts. Today, ministries 
of foreign affairs and defense representatives from 24 nations, the 
North Atlanta Treaty Organization (NATO), three additional 
multinational organizations, as well as DOD, OSD, Joint Staff, 
Combatant Commands, and MDA convene quarterly to exchange views and 
insights, collectively exploring policy and operational concepts. The 
Nimble Titan 18 campaign highlighted the importance of common threat 
perception, differences in triggers for offensive action, challenges of 
intelligence and information sharing in a multinational coalition, and 
experimentation with global, regional, and national defense designs 
with layered defense. The campaign explored regional verses national 
defense designs to combat overmatch of threats, where nations with 
missile defense assets provided coverage for regional partners without 
assets. Additionally, increased intelligence sharing led to a 
multinational coalition to prevent missile proliferation and decreased 
risk of escalation.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  ``By working together with allies and partners we
 amass the greatest possible strength for the long-
 term advancement of our interest . . . ''
              --2019 National Defense Strategy
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ongoing Nimble Titan 20 campaign incorporates recent guidance 
from worldwide senior leaders and lessons learned from past campaigns 
to experiment with the future use of space sensors for missile defense, 
the use of deterrence, and defense against and use of non-kinetic 
effects to include cyber, as part of IAMD. Nimble Titan continues to be 
a gateway for the U.S. to establish crucial relationships with allies 
and partners. It also informs the missile defense policies of the 
participating nations and international organizations. Events like 
Nimble Titan foster greater confidence in combined missile defenses and 
provide a means to advance U.S. efforts in collaboration, integration, 
interoperability, and burden sharing with our allies and partners.
    JFCC IMD, in coordination with Combatant Commands and selected 
allies and partner militaries, is developing a multilateral 
information-sharing and modeling and simulation construct to enable 
collaborative planning and provide a better assessment of allied and 
partner nations' missile defense systems and capabilities. It also 
participates in regular multilateral tabletop exercises and events to 
help partner nations identify and close capability gaps. Additionally, 
we have successfully integrated allies directly into the JFCC IMD staff 
through the Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) program. Our first FLO, a 
German Air Force officer, has been an integral player in Nimble Titan, 
NATO BMD training, and allied and partner modeling and simulation 
efforts. We are seeking to add additional FLOs to increase our 
understanding of allied missile defense policies, capabilities, and 
planning in order to optimize missile defense planning and force 
allocation.
    Joint Missile Defense Training and Education: In coordination with 
USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Services, we 
continue to develop comprehensive and innovative training programs to 
close gaps between Service, joint, and regional missile defense 
training and education. JFCC IMD's Joint Ballistic Missile Defense 
Training and Education Center, was designated last year by OSD as a 
Center of Excellence. It now offers 16 mission-oriented resident and 
mobile training team courses, and online courses to include 
orientation, asset management, C2BMC situational awareness, and general 
officer/flag officer seminar training. Over the past year, JFCC IMD 
instructors executed 240 courses, training over 3,500 students 
worldwide. Additionally, in keeping with Joint Vision 2020, JFCC IMD 
provided training courses to our allies and partners through military-
to-military and Foreign Military Sales training venues. In 2018, this 
included training to the Japan Self Defense Force Joint Staff, the 
Republic of Korea Armed Forces, and the Peninsula Shield attendees at 
the Fires Center of Excellence Top Gun course.
    Warfighter Capability Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan: 
As missile defense architectures mature, warfighters require a 
credible, comprehensive assessment of new capabilities to inform 
operational acceptance into the global BMDS. The warfighter relies on a 
robust and operationally relevant test campaign to confidently field 
and integrate new capabilities into their existing IAMD architectures.
    In April 2018, Warfighter Capability Acceptance was completed for 
the entire fleet of operational GBIs, thus enhancing Homeland defense 
capabilities for USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM. Warfighter Capability 
Acceptance is scheduled to be completed in 2019 for improvements made 
to Robust IRBM Defense for USEUCOM and USCENTCOM.
    Last year's test campaign included several significant tests. In 
April 2018, the Department demonstrated interoperability between the 
THAAD and Patriot weapons systems. Additionally in September 2018, 
international cooperation was demonstrated when Japanese Maritime Self 
Defense Force and MDA completed an Aegis BMD intercept flight test, in 
cooperation with the U.S. Navy, off the coast of Hawaii. Finally, in 
December 2018, the Department conducted an Aegis Weapon System Engage-
On-Remote intercept of an IRBM-class target with an SM-3 Block IIA 
interceptor demonstrating the effectiveness of the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach Phase III architecture.
    This year, JFCC IMD supported the FTG-11 test which demonstrated 
several firsts, including the first salvo (two GBIs) engagement; 
operational flight test of the GMD system; first use of the space 
segment of the Space-based Kill Assessment in a GMD flight test; and 
first Aegis SM-3 Block IIA simulated engagement of an ICBM class 
target. The Navy and MDA will demonstrate fleet defense using a salvo 
of two SM-6 missiles. Additionally this year, new capabilities that 
will be demonstrated in flight test are THAAD remote launcher 
capability and Patriot launch on remote engagement using THAAD.
    Missile Defense Review (MDR): The recently released MDR reinforces 
our commitment to defending the United States, our deployed forces and 
allies from adversary missile launches. The review lays out a strategy 
to prioritize a comprehensive approach to countering the increasingly 
capable and diverse missile threat. It acknowledges the limitations of 
relying solely on defending against missiles inflight and seeks to 
improve our integration of offensive and defensive actions. Combining 
offensive capabilities with a credible missile defense capability sends 
a strong message of deterrence to our adversaries. We are pursuing new 
concepts and capabilities to ensure effectiveness against current and 
future threats. But, as we address future threats, we must account for 
the AMD assets required to defend the Homeland while simultaneously 
improving our regional capabilities. The MDR assigned a number of 
follow-on reviews to ensure the missile defense enterprise 
appropriately addresses requirements development, trans-regional 
integration, and pre-launch attack operations. The JFCC IMD team is 
fully engaged in these efforts and I am confident they will effectively 
inform meaningful reforms.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  ``The MDR looks at, and beyond, the contemporary
 threat environment to consider emerging missile
 challenges and their implications for U.S. missile
 defense roles and requirements.''
                --2019 Missile Defense Review
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In summary, JFCC IMD continues to expand our Nation's global 
missile defense architecture and explores future capabilities to 
maintain operational advantage against current and future threats. 
Competitive edge is maintained through integrated planning and 
operational support, deliberate investments in our capability 
developments by MDA and the Services, investments in our warfighters 
through education and training, expansion of collaboration with our 
allies and partners, and the speed of innovation and fielding to get 
capability in the hands of our warfighters.
                               conclusion
    Chairman Fischer and Ranking Member Heinrich, as a member of the 
joint missile defense community, the Army continues to pursue 
enhancements to the Nation's IAMD systems, from the tactical to the 
strategic levels of warfare. As outlined here, USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC 
IMD perform a broad set of critical national security missions. These 
missions include providing professional warfighters and capabilities to 
support current operations, ensuring they are prepared for tomorrow's 
fight, and developing new technologies required to maintain a 
technological advantage against our adversaries. Our trained and ready 
soldiers, operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska, New York, 
California, and from remote, globally deployed locations, remain on 
point to defend the Homeland against an ICBM attack. As a force 
provider to the GCCs, our soldiers provide essential regional sensor 
capabilities, ballistic missile early warning, and satellite 
communications. Our regional forces continue to leverage allied 
collaboration and planning efforts in developing integrated and 
interoperable defenses against the various threat sets. USSTRATCOM, 
through the JFCC IMD, continues to integrate BMDS capabilities to 
counter global missile threats and to protect our Nation, deployed 
forces, allies, and partners.
    While operational, doctrinal, and materiel developments are 
essential, our most important assets are the thousands of soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and contractors who deploy and 
operate our IAMD systems. As recognized by Department leadership, the 
strength behind our outstanding workforce is their families. Their 
contributions and sacrifices are foundational to the dedication and 
performance of our workforce--the role and support of our families 
empowers mission accomplishment.
    I appreciate having the opportunity to address missile defense 
matters and look forward to addressing your questions.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
    Secretary Rood, the deployment of space-based sensors is 
generally looked upon as a necessary next step for missile 
defense, especially as threats from maneuvering hypersonic 
weapons increase. Last year, funding to pursue such a network 
was not included in the budget. It was placed on MDA's unfunded 
priorities list. But Congress provided funding to begin moving 
forward.
    Now, in this year's budget request, the project is again on 
the unfunded priorities list. Can you help me understand what 
the Department's approach is here? We have heard a lot of 
testimony about how important this capability is, but it 
doesn't seem to ever be included in the budget documents. 
What's going on?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, as you point out, the growth in 
hypersonic threats that we face is one of our concerns. So in 
the approach that the Department has taken for this year as 
compared to last year, one of the things that we've had is that 
Under Secretary Mike Griffin, former National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) director, who also spent a great 
deal of his career working in missile defense, has put forward 
a concept that the Department is embracing for a proliferated 
low Earth orbit (LEO) constellation of satellites. That 
proliferated, or P-LEO constellation, has funding requested 
from the Department that the committee will review, of course, 
to begin the work both to architect that proliferated LEO 
concept, which leverages work that the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has done, initially with 
studies of the architecture, the sensor, a space transport 
layer to communicate that data, and then a ground-based system 
as well for command and control. That work would be done by the 
Space Development Agency (SDA).
    Senator Fischer. Is it $20 million that's in the budget for 
the SDA to study that low orbit architecture?
    Secretary Rood. The SDA budget request is for just under 
$150 million for that purpose. That will include $20 million, 
as you point out, for the P-LEO sensor technology, but it will 
also include funding requested for the transport layer at $15 
million, the ground warning integration for $30 million, as 
well as the launch and space situational awareness portion of 
that at $10 million, and for the staff and studies just under 
$45 million. That's in addition to a space-based discrimination 
study for the Space Development Agency, which has applications 
both for ballistic missile defense and other activities.
    Senator Fischer. General Greaves, can you discuss the 
project on the Missile Defense Agency's unfunded priorities 
list? Would you say it's premature to move forward at this 
point, or is this for work that needs to be done regardless of 
the outcome of this study?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Madam Chairman, thank you for 
the question. It is absolutely essential that we continue to 
move forward, and this work would be needed to be done now or 
done later. It involves essentially initiating work for long 
lead procurement of such things as the sensors themselves, the 
focal plane arrays that will be needed to do the missile 
defense mission from low Earth orbit, things such as cryogenic 
coolers, and things such as solar arrays, which take a long 
time to be developed.
    So what Secretary Rood has mentioned is a proliferated 
architecture where Dr. Griffin's organization and the Space 
Development Agency will be presenting and preparing the 
infrastructure required to host whatever mission set is plugged 
into that low Earth orbit architecture, such as missile 
defense. It could be positioning navigation and timing. It 
could be some other mission.
    But our enemy is time. This Nation is extremely capable of 
doing just about anything it puts its mind to. The threat is 
moving faster and faster, and the reason I include it as my top 
priority in the unfunded list is that I believe that as time is 
the enemy, let's not waste it, and if additional funding is 
provided, that's where it would go.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    General O'Shaughnessy, can you talk about why a space-based 
sensor network is necessary in terms of threat?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the 
opportunity.
    First off, obviously with our adversaries, continuing to 
make more complex weapons systems that we have to be able to 
respond to. An example is hypersonics, where our current 
sensing capability just doesn't have the ability to watch a 
hypersonic from birth, from the time it launches, all the way 
to the time that it would impact. The space-based sensing layer 
gives us the ability to see it from the time that it launches, 
and because of the unique fashion in which the trajectory is, 
where it starts out very high but then it will come down low, 
it will not be seen by our current sensors. The space-based 
sensing capability now gives us the ability to track it from 
birth all the way to ultimately when we defeat it.
    So to me, that is of the highest urgency that we gain that 
capability as soon as possible, because our adversaries are 
actively developing these weapons as we speak.
    Senator Fischer. Agree. Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. I'm going to stay on the same subject 
because I think I'm in a very similar position to the Chair on 
this issue. It just seems like this is the thing that we should 
be doing now. I'm deeply concerned that SDA doesn't even exist 
yet, and we can't continue to push this off down the timeline.
    So I guess I want to ask you, Under Secretary Rood, isn't 
this an urgent need that we ought to be focused on now?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, I would agree that this is a high-
priority need. The hypersonic testing that we see being 
conducted by countries like Russia and China is a noteworthy 
concern. The Space Development Agency, which reports to Under 
Secretary Mike Griffin, has just begun its work with a director 
and a small staff being named, and they have started the 
construction of the agency. As you know, it's part of a focus 
for a Space Force and a renewed focus that the Department would 
have on that broad mission area.
    So I quite agree that it's an important priority. The early 
parts of this program are leveraging work that DARPA has done 
in order to ramp that up over time, and that's listed in the 
Department's plans coming out through the coming years.
    Senator Heinrich. I have great respect for Dr. Griffin. I 
just think this needs to land someplace that is ready to move 
now, as opposed to in the future.
    One of the things that I'm concerned about that's related 
to this is that MDA's budget includes $34 million to revive 
work done in the 1990s on neutral particle beam technology for 
a potential space-based directed energy interceptor, and I 
think all of you know that I'm about as big a booster of 
directed energy technology as you're going to find in 
Washington, but it seems to me that it's important to have the 
sensors in place to discriminate these paths before we start 
talking about a new interceptor; and, from a budget point of 
view, that we might want to move up the space-based layer and 
consider doing something like this that is brand new down the 
road.
    General Greaves, what was the reason back in the 1990s that 
that program was stopped? What's the reason for reviving it 
today? Are we doing this in the right order?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator Heinrich, just a short 
summary. It was stopped because the Cold War ended, 
essentially. A lot of work was done back then to prove out the 
basic technology. Most of the components except for two of the 
major actions within that system are at high technology 
readiness levels, within being proven in the lab.
    The reason why we looked at it is akin to the comment that 
was made earlier about what are we doing new that's different 
that can reduce the cost of missile defense and move us down 
the cost curve. So we looked at something that was radically 
different that had a significant amount of work done that we 
can prove in a lab and then move to space if the Nation decides 
that's what we need to deploy. But do it in the lab, prove the 
technology, then move to space.
    As far as the order in which things are done, I firmly 
believe that with the work that's been going on with the space 
sensor layer with the Missile Defense Agency, with the United 
States Air Force, and with DARPA since 2015, there's a lot of 
work that's been done with industry already to lay the 
groundwork for the deployment of these sensors. The major 
change this year has been the movement from the medium Earth 
orbit deployment of an architecture to a low Earth orbit 
deployment of an architecture.
    So we will continue to use the funding that we received 
last year. If we receive additional funding this year, it will 
go into the very same sensor technology and development 
activities. I think that we'll be ready in time to match up 
with the infrastructure that the Space Development Agency is 
producing; i.e., the communications transport layer, as well as 
the satellite process.
    Senator Heinrich. I'm going to run short on time here. 
Given the votes coming up, I'm just going to yield back and 
we'll see where we go from here.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I thank the gentlemen for being here. Thank you, as always, 
for your exemplary service.
    I want to start, actually, by going back to something that 
you said, Secretary Rood, about the positioning of the--is it 
the TPY-2?--in Turkey. We just heard, before the full 
committee, from the new United States European Command (EUCOM) 
commander that we are strongly considering and indeed may pull 
back F-35s from Turkey if they move forward with their 
procurement.
    Are we worried about the TPY-2 being placed in Turkey given 
its current pursuit?
    Secretary Rood. Not at present, although depending on where 
our relationship with Turkey should go, of course, it would be 
one of the things that we would watch. We do still enjoy 
generally good relations with Turkey. There are some areas, 
particularly in interest in the S-400 Russian air defense 
system, that concern us, and that's what you were referring to, 
that there may be some results. But as far as Turkey hosting 
the deployment of that radar, we've been pleased. It's been a 
positive experience for us.
    That's not the only facility, of course, that the United 
States military maintains in Turkey. We have other both Air 
Force and Army facilities there.
    Senator Hawley. Right. A number of you have mentioned, both 
in your written testimony and here, the development by both 
China and Russia of hypersonic weapons of intercontinental 
range. So say something more--we'll start with you, Secretary 
Rood--if you could, about what we are doing to defend the 
continental United States and Hawaii, the Homeland, from these 
hypersonics, and are we in a position where we're likely going 
to need to rely on nuclear deterrence in order to successfully 
defend ourselves? What are the options that are on the table?
    Secretary Rood. We do plan to rely on both nuclear and 
conventional deterrence to deal with the hypersonic threat, in 
addition to other things that we use those capabilities for. 
However, our basic approach--and others on the panel can add if 
I leave something off--would be first we want to have the 
capability to detect and track those launches of hypersonics. 
So that's where this proliferated low Earth orbit concept with 
lower-cost sensors we hope can begin as early as 3 years from 
now to place into orbit would provide the means, along with a 
space transport communications layer and the ability to control 
those things on the ground--first to track it, to have enhanced 
command and control, and then some of the money that has been 
requested this year is to continue to work on architecture to 
affect the hypersonic vehicle during its flight.
    Senator Hawley. Can you just say a word on nuclear 
deterrence, about the importance of low yield tactical nuclear 
weapons to an effective contemporary deterrent, and given the 
context now of the return of peer or near-peer competition?
    Secretary Rood. Yes. What we see in both Russia and China 
is a substantial improvement and increases in their nuclear 
forces; in Russia's case, a very large growth of so-called 
tactical nuclear weapons. One of the things we see in Russia's 
doctrine, which we see them exercise as well, is escalate to 
deescalate, and we get concerned that some of the Russian 
writings and their practices lead us to conclude they think 
they have an advantage, that if they escalate and perhaps use 
tactical nuclear weapons earlier, that the United States does 
not have a comparable capability that is survivable and 
responsive. Therefore we have requested money for both a low-
yield modification to an existing warhead for a submarine-
launched ballistic missile and a submarine-launched cruise 
missile. A submarine-launched cruise missile is further behind 
and we're just doing the AOA, or analysis of alternatives, at 
this stage, Senator.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator King?
    Senator King. I'm going to ask a series of dumb questions, 
which people have told me I'm well equipped to do.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. The first one is give me a speed comparison 
between a ballistic missile and a hypersonic missile.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Let's see. Hypersonic missiles 
go Mach 5 or above, and Intercontinental-range Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs) are at, depending on altitude, Mach 10, 12, 
13, something like 22,000 miles an hour.
    Senator King. So a ballistic missile is much faster, but a 
hypersonic missile doesn't go up and down, it goes straight; is 
that correct?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The hypersonic missile follows 
a profile that's boosting and then reduces altitude into a 
longer glide phase, and then a shorter terminal phase.
    Senator King. What's the range of a hypersonic missile? 
Could a hypersonic missile go from North Korea to the 
continental United States?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, depending on the booster 
that's attached to it. It could range ICBM or intermediate 
range nuclear missile or----
    Senator King. Does a hypersonic missile create a more 
difficult or a different targeting scenario for our missile 
defense?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. It's a different, and with the 
current sensor network that we have, a more difficult problem, 
and that's why the space sensor layer is so significant, so 
that we can capture it from the time it launches to the time we 
intercept it, birth to death.
    Senator King. Is North Korea doing any work on hypersonics, 
or is that just China and Russia?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. I would need to discuss that in 
a classified forum. But the concern is potential, if not 
likely, proliferation.
    Senator King. Can hypersonic missiles have nuclear 
warheads?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes.
    Senator King. So this presents a really new challenge, and 
you say that the necessary step is additional sensors?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. That is the first step, sir, to 
ensure we have custody----
    Senator King. Did I understand from the Chair's question 
that those sensors, that that new sensor layer is on the 
unfunded priorities, not on the front burner?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. It is on both. It is initiated 
in the Space Development Agency's budget to develop the 
architecture to support that sensor layer. But as my if not top 
concern, near top concern, it's my number-one priority in the 
Missile Defense Agency's unfunded list that was requested by 
the Congress.
    Senator King. It seems to me that's a very, very high 
priority given the speed with which hypersonics are being 
developed by our adversaries.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, I would agree, and I made 
a comment earlier that in my mind the enemy is time, not the 
ability to develop effective defenses against hypersonic 
threats.
    Senator King. General Greaves, could you describe the 
recent test? Is that something that you can describe here in an 
open setting?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. The reference is to 
the acronym FTG-11, flight test ground-based midcourse defense 
11, which, together with the U.S. Northern Command and General 
Dickinson's team, we executed back on last Monday. It was the 
most complex, comprehensive, and operationally challenging test 
ever executed by the Missile Defense Agency.
    Senator King. It was a success, was it not?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. It was. We are doing about 9 
months' worth of data review because we collected lots of data, 
but the initial look says it was a complete success.
    Senator King. Define complete success. Did the bullet hit 
the bullet?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir. The object of the 
test was to launch an ICBM, an intercontinental ballistic 
missile representative target, and we did that from the 
Marshall Islands out at Kwajalein, to ensure to achieve the 
speeds you asked about earlier, and the profile of a realistic 
threat. But this test was different because we launched within 
a very short period of time two ground-based interceptors, 
operationally released by the combatant commander using their 
operational processes, which is very important, and the lead 
interceptor intercepted the ICBM representative threat.
    But what's most important is that it created a debris 
field, and this test has been 10 years or more in the making, 
and the importance of that is the trailing interceptor was able 
to discern the debris from the next most lethal object that I 
can talk about in a classified forum, and also intercept that 
object.
    What that means is enemy operations that seek to confuse 
our missile defense system by launching junk or debris would 
not be successful. That's why it was a success.
    Senator King. Congratulations. That's an amazing 
achievement. So please convey the heartfelt congratulations 
from this committee.
    One other quick question. Do we know if the North Koreans 
are developing a submarine-launched missile capacity?
    Secretary Rood. Yes, Senator, they are.
    Senator King. So that changes this calculation again. If 
they're launching their missiles from North Korea, that's one 
thing. If they're launching them from the Bering Strait or 
somewhere in the North Pacific, that's a different problem.
    Secretary Rood. It changes the defense equation in terms of 
where the origin could be and what are other anti-submarine 
capabilities in a potential conflict, how they would be 
utilized, and it also changes the geometry depending on how the 
North Koreans could choose to deploy that.
    Senator King. And the time.
    Secretary Rood. Yes, depending on where they launch from. 
Yes, sir.
    Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. We have had a vote called. We don't know 
for sure what the schedule is going to be for votes in the next 
few hours, but we'll try and do a tag team here until we're 
sure what's happening.
    Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I really want to reiterate what my colleague from Maine 
said in a bunch of his questions. But first of all, gentlemen, 
congratulations. The way I've been describing this--General 
Greaves, correct me if I'm wrong. I think Senator King's 
questions were actually quite good; basic, but good.
    So is this a bullet? How fast is this bullet going? I'm 
talking about the successful test.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Twenty-two thousand miles an 
hour.
    Senator Sullivan. So it's one bullet hitting another 
bullet; correct?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. At 22,000 miles an hour in space?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Okay, and then the first successful hit 
created a fragment----
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Debris field.
    Senator Sullivan.--and the second missile then tracked the 
biggest fragment, adjusted at 22,000 miles an hour, and hit the 
fragment?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. That's unbelievable.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. I would say it hit the next 
most lethal object, because the architecture----
    Senator Sullivan. Is that the next biggest object?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The next object that most 
closely resembles a threat vehicle.
    Senator Sullivan. First of all, congratulations.
    Second, you might remember in the last couple of National 
Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) I had rather comprehensive 
missile defense bills that got incorporated, very bipartisan, 
by the way, but the Congress encourages you to test at least 
once a year. We want you to continue that, and, in part, here's 
the reason.
    Had that test failed, the New York Times, certainly The Los 
Angeles Times--for whatever reason, they are real big skeptics 
of missile defense--it would have been front page news, how 
horrible and weak the system is. I don't even know if I read 
any news articles on this remarkable test. So if any media, if 
you're listening--I don't know if we have any media here, but 
why don't you write an article on this? Because had it failed, 
it would have been front page news. We all know that, and yet 
you do something that is unbelievable and you get no press.
    So, thank you. We're noticing, and it's remarkable.
    My colleague from Maine is always asking the questions that 
I want to ask, so here it is. What message does this send to 
our adversaries, Kim Jong-un, Putin, the Chinese, anyone else 
who wants to mess with us? Can they do this?
    [No response.]
    Senator Sullivan. Well, you don't have to answer that.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Sullivan. But what message does it send?
    General O'Shaughnessy?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Part of our deterrence is based on a 
credible capability to deny an enemy the ability to achieve its 
objective. So this test clearly shows that they would not be 
able to achieve their objective, which leads to our ability to 
deter so we could prevent a conflict from ever happening 
because they know they can't reach their objectives. As the 
operator of the ballistic missile defense system, this gives me 
great confidence because we actually use our operators, the 
actual folks who are doing it, to include your team from 
Greeley, as we launched this through the operational construct. 
It really gives us that high sense of confidence that we can 
use it to deter our adversaries.
    Senator Sullivan. Secretary Rood, what do you think in 
terms of the message this sends, whether you're Kim Jong-un or 
Putin or whomever?
    Secretary Rood. I think it sends a very strong message 
about the credibility of our capability and reinforces 
deterrence. Missile defenses are part of contemporary 
deterrence, both offenses and defenses. If you're Kim Jong-un 
or another adversary, you have to think about first the 
probability that your attack would be successful; and then 
secondly, even if we successfully defended against an attack, 
an attempt to incinerate an American city, the story wouldn't 
end there. We still maintain our offensive capabilities.
    Senator Sullivan. I think it's a great point. My point--and 
again, you guys are the experts, and you've done a great job, 
remarkable. But I think it's the message of if you do want to 
go out in a flame of glory, Kim Jong-un or the Ayatollahs in 
Iran, (a) it won't work if we have this capability; (b) we will 
flatten your country after you try, so it's double deterrence. 
I think that that's important.
    Let me ask one quick question here. I think you're kind of 
seeing what you might call in the military a foot stomper on 
the issue of space-based sensors. The last two NDAAs, again in 
a very bipartisan way, led by bills that my team and I and a 
lot of you wrote, but to deploy a space-based sensor, there's a 
strong interest in doing that here. I think you're seeing it. 
We would be a little bit, I think, disappointed if somehow, 
with the development of the new Space Development Agency, if 
that kind of got lost in the shuffle there.
    General Greaves, I'm going to ask you a question. Of 
course, I'm going to ask for your professional military advice 
on this one. But where do you think the best place for space-
based sensors to be put and deployed the most rapidly would be, 
in the Missile Defense Agency or in the new Space Development 
Agency?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, I will say that----
    Senator Sullivan. I know it kind of puts you a little bit 
on the spot.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. It really doesn't because the 
Space Development Agency, as it was stood up, was given special 
authorities that are very similar or almost exactly what the 
Missile Defense Agency has, except for the milestone decision 
authority. I think that's still within the----
    Senator Sullivan. So MDA or the new Space Development 
Agency, most rapid deployment for space-based sensors?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. If it's executed per the plan 
that was laid out, the Space Development Agency is best suited 
to provide the capability, and the example is the----
    Senator Sullivan. Is that a big if?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. If it's executed. My concern is 
the big if, because if it's done the way we did the Space 
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), the space tracking 
surveillance satellite program, where the Space and Missile 
System Center contracted and delivered that capability to the 
Missile Defense Agency, where the Missile Defense Agency held 
the requirements and we continue to lead operation of that 
capability, that can work.
    If it's all co-located in one organization that has 
responsibility for developing space capability, that's probably 
the most efficient place to be. But it's got to have, it must 
have, the responsibility, authority, and accountability that I 
have in my position today. If that is not executed, if the 
Space Development Agency does not have milestone decision 
authority, which is critical for acquisition programs, then 
that is not the most efficient place for it to be.
    Senator Sullivan. You're seeing a lot of us want to get 
that deployed quickly.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
    Senator Heinrich. [presiding] Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today and for your service.
    This is really just for anybody that might want to chime in 
here. I'm wondering if we've already made plans or plan to make 
any changes to our missile defense structure as a result of the 
President's announcement that we're going to be withdrawing 
from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. What 
changes are there, if there are going to be any, or if you've 
already made them or whatever? Are we covering those with the 
budget that's there?
    Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Rood. Senator, in the budget for missile defense, 
there isn't a change necessary as a result of the President's 
decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty. Of course, that will 
take effect in August of this year. The change that you will 
see going forward is the treaty, of course, prohibited the 
United States from the pursuit of intermediate range missiles, 
and we will begin to explore, and there's funding requested 
from the Congress to explore concepts and to look at what the 
options are that would be available to the United States for 
offensive missile capability.
    But from the defensive perspective, to withdraw from the 
treaty would not affect the budget request for defenses.
    Senator Jones. All right. Anybody else? Is that covered?
    All right. So, General Dickinson, coming from Alabama and 
the Huntsville area, the Space Force is an intriguing part. 
We've been part of a Space Force in some way or another for a 
long, long time. I'm wondering how the proposed Space Force 
will impact your command, and how do you believe creating a 
Space Force is going to enhance our national security?
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. Well, thank you for that 
question. So, in terms of Army space, we've got some great 
capabilities within the Army space portfolio, if you will, that 
as we go along in support of the legislative proposal that is 
now here on the Hill that I think will fit nicely with that 
proposal.
    Our work right now in terms of supporting the ground 
maneuver forces that reside within the Army, in terms of the 
future of that, I think we will still see our ability to do 
that. But as the Space Force, the opportunity to be able to 
organize, man, and equip as an enterprise for space, as a space 
warfighting domain is all included within that proposal, and I 
think I support that.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
    General Greaves, let me also congratulate everyone on the 
success of the salvo intercept test. My only simple question of 
this is what are the next steps on that, and are they 
adequately funded in this budget?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The next step, sir, the number-
one priority in the agency is to continue ensuring that we 
maintain and sustain the deployed fleet so that General 
O'Shaughnessy retains his high confidence in the system. That's 
the number-one priority.
    The next step is to continue on with the reliable kill 
vehicle program. I mentioned earlier that it's part of a 
disciplined acquisition strategy. We had very strict entrance 
criteria into what's called a critical design review. The 
design did not meet it, so I assessed that and made the 
decision that we would not enter into it.
    What we're working now is to get back to the critical 
design review. But the top priority is to deliver that more 
reliable kill vehicle along the plan that we have submitted in 
the budget.
    Senator Jones. So the budget is okay on that? You're 
satisfied that it's adequately funded in this budget?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes, sir.
    Senator Jones. Great. All right.
    That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you so much for being here, gentlemen.
    Senator Heinrich. In that case, I'll fill up a little time 
here and follow up on what Senator Jones was just chatting 
about.
    General Greaves, the redesigned kill vehicle has a 
projected delay of 2 years, and I understand there's a process 
in place to review the challenges in the RKV program and to 
ensure that we develop and provide the warfighter with a more 
reliable kill vehicle. In your statement you described the test 
events that will involve the RKV, and I just want to confirm 
that given the delay time there, the 2-year delay, that these 
tests will still occur before you procure RKVs so that you 
fulfill the `fly before you buy' requirement.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, the answer is, in 
general, yes. As part of the disciplined acquisition approach, 
we have not deleted or modified any of those test requirements. 
The only caveat I'll state is that we may approach the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as granted in the language for a 
waiver of some sort if we believe that we can and are able to 
and are credible enough to pursue that waiver. But the 
scheduled delay was planned. It encompasses the activity we 
need to complete a disciplined acquisition approach, which I 
firmly believe we should continue on.
    Senator Fischer. [presiding] Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Secretary Rood, in last year's hearing we discussed some of 
the unanswered policy questions related to boost phase missile 
defense. It was my understanding at the time that these issues 
were being considered by the Missile Defense Review, but the 
MDR did not go into any great detail other than to state that 
boost phase capabilities could enhance our missile defense 
efforts.
    Can you discuss what the Department is pursuing with 
respect to boost phase capabilities and whether there are 
unanswered policy questions that really need to be resolved 
before any capabilities can be deployed?
    Secretary Rood. Yes. First, boost phase defenses are very 
attractive to us because the missile is at its slowest point, 
and potentially the debris could even fall back on the 
launching state's territory. That's also the area where we 
don't have substantial capability of any note in our arsenal as 
part of a layered defense, which is another reason it's 
attractive to us, to get at the missile as early as it is 
launched.
    With respect to the policy barriers, there aren't any 
policy barriers at this stage. As the Missile Defense Review 
notes, we are giving all the framework and guidance that the 
developers need in order to go pursue those capabilities.
    One of the noteworthy areas that we speak to in the Missile 
Defense Review is the incorporation of our tactical air fifth-
generation platforms as first sensors, and later potentially 
carriers, for interceptors to attack offensive missiles in 
their boost phase. We're also looking at other potential 
capabilities in directed energy for that purpose. But it's 
mostly a capability limitation. At this stage the policy gives 
encouragement to pursue the boost phase defenses.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    General Greaves, when we spoke yesterday it was an 
unclassified setting, and you explained the low orbit sensors. 
We've had a lot of talk about that. I know my colleagues went 
to vote, but I think it would be good for the record if you 
could give us an explanation of really what that all entails, 
what we went through yesterday. I think it would be helpful to 
have that in the record, what we're talking about here.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Let 
me begin with the activity that I was involved with 3 years 
ago, 3-\1/2\ years ago now, when I was the commander at the 
Space and Missile Systems Center. Vice Admiral Sering was in my 
position, and General Hyten was transitioning between Air Force 
Space Command and USSTRATCOM. We saw the need for a shared 
responsibility, shared capability between what the U.S. Air 
Force was providing with the Space-based Infrared System in 
geo-synchronous orbit 22,000 miles out in space, and the 
ability to execute such missions at lower orbit levels, such as 
the hypersonic defense mission.
    So we, working with industry, explored architectures, which 
resulted in a government reference architecture, essentially, 
based at medium Earth orbit, about 10,000 miles out, but with 
fewer spacecraft to do the hypersonic defense mission and look 
for new, low signal level propulsion capability as the threat 
is developing.
    So that's where we started, and we were making significant 
progress in that area. What has changed within the last year--
and the last year has been a year of transition within the 
Department--is that Dr. Griffin is now approaching space 
capability from a Department-wide perspective. So what has 
changed is that with industry's progress in actually developing 
the capabilities to proliferate multiple small satellites in 
low Earth orbit, very significant potential to deploy a low 
Earth orbit architecture that can do multiple missions, one of 
which is missile defense.
    So the vision from Dr. Griffin is to deploy that 
architecture, multi-hundred satellites, very small, together 
with a communications transport layer to move the information 
around among satellites and to the ground and to the 
warfighters where it needs to be, and to have mission areas 
plug in as required. We do not need 200 satellites to do the 
missile defense mission. We need a smaller number. Positioning, 
navigation, and timing may need a smaller number. But together 
we would ride on these spacecraft buses, as we call them, take 
advantage of a communications transport layer architecture, and 
execute the mission at lower cost.
    The difference also between what our original government 
reference architecture was and what Dr. Griffin is proposing 
has to do with resiliency, the ability while under attack to 
gracefully degrade your capability and not have it shut off 
immediately. The way I try to explain it is if you've got six 
big targets up at medium Earth orbit, that's a lot easier to go 
against and have a bigger effect upon than a few hundred down 
at a lower orbit that we have shown through analysis and study 
that can gracefully degrade and still maintain capability.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
    Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Let me just follow up, and I apologize. You understand, for 
some odd reason, the Chairman and I aren't in charge of the 
schedule around here.
    Senator Fischer. We should be.
    Senator King. We should be, yes. It would work much more 
efficiently. But let me follow up.
    I was asking questions about could the capability of the 
North Koreans in a submarine--if a missile is launched from 
somewhere in the mid-Pacific between Hawaii and California, 
would you still have time, if it were a ballistic missile, to 
target and hit it as successfully as you did the one coming 
from Kwajalein?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, yes. That would be an 
intermediate-range to short-range attack, for which our current 
systems--the THAAD system is an example, and if they're in the 
right position to defend a certain area, or the SM-3s that are 
carried on Navy ships as part of the Aegis weapon system, they 
would be positioned, and we've demonstrated the ability to 
counter those threats. The latest demonstration was last year 
with THAAD against an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
(IRBM).
    Senator King. So that deals with the shorter range.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes.
    Senator King. With the submarine launch, if that's the 
choice.
    Secretary Rood, talk to me about directed energy. One of 
the problems with missile defense is that the missiles that 
we're shooting are quite expensive. Where are we with directed 
energy? How far away are we? What might the role be--for 
example, could it be ship-borne into the boost phase? Give me a 
tutorial on where we are in directed energy.
    Secretary Rood. Senator, I can begin, and then General 
Greaves and General Dickinson may have something to add to that 
as well.
    But the short answer would be we are requesting funding to 
continue directed energy work that the Missile Defense Agency 
would lead. The main reason that that work for ballistic 
missile defense has been centered at higher altitudes, both for 
high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or potentially 
space-based applications, is it's difficult to propagate lasers 
in the atmosphere. There's a lot of water, clouds, other 
things, and so by going up above the cloud layer or at a higher 
altitude or in space, that is a simpler----
    Senator King. Then you have the problem of weight and a 
sufficient electric charge.
    Secretary Rood. Yes, sir. This is the engineer's challenge, 
yes. If you optimize in one area, other parts of the trade 
space, you do encounter that. But it is easier to propagate the 
beam across that area, and the energy that is output and beam 
quality on the target is the key, really energy on the target. 
General Greaves could teach a Ph.D. dissertation course, so 
perhaps I should defer to him on it.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, the main constraints 
or challenges have to do with power on the target, as well as 
beam control to ensure you can stabilize it, as well as 
pointing the laser in the right direction. So those are the 
major challenges we're working on right now.
    The scaling effort is one that has the most priority. The 
original lasers that flew on the airborne laser, for example, 
they were chemical based, so they were huge and took up lots of 
room. Right now we're working with three industry partners, the 
National Labs, looking at electric lasers; fiber-combined 
lasers is one of the technologies. The other technology is--
forgive me for the acronym here, but diode-pumped alkali 
lasers. We've seen significant progress with both of those, and 
we're shooting to essentially move up from about 30 or 40 
kilowatts. For us in the missile defense area, 1 megawatt is 
high power. We need that to go against a----
    Senator King. If you had 1 megawatt at the source, what's 
the delivered power to the target?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. We need 1 megawatt at the 
target.
    Senator King. So what I'm looking for is what's the 
differential? How much--in the electric business I used to be 
in, we talked about line losses. What's the differential 
between where it leaves and where it hits?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, it depends on the altitude 
from which the weapon is fired. We're looking at above 55,000 
to 60,000 feet to get out of the atmosphere to allow maximum 
power on target, energy on target. I missed the second part of 
your question.
    Senator King. Well, in order to put a megawatt on the 
target, how much power do you have to have leaving the source? 
A megawatt-and-a-half, or 2, or 1 and----
    Lieutenant General Greaves. I may have misspoken. We need a 
megawatt capability at distance with line loss to affect the 
target. I'm sorry about that.
    Senator King. Okay.
    Secretary Rood. I know less about this than General 
Greaves. I think the answer, Senator, is it's highly dependent 
on several variables, the beam quality from its emission at 1 
megawatt, and your ability to control that and change its optic 
over time. In other words, it's not like electricity 
transmission. It's a constant depending on what your sensor is 
telling you about how this very dynamic environment with water 
and air is moving, and you sense that, you change, like with a 
contact lens changing its prescription over time, what you are 
putting out. So it's a highly complex set of variables to say 
it depends on many of the qualities of the system, how much 
line loss, essentially, you have.
    Is that accurate, General?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Yes. What I'll say, sir, is 
while we were working on this successful mission within the 
last 3 weeks, we've been doing some testing out of White Sands 
against representative objects out there, but at much, much 
shorter distances, and very successful in penetrating threat 
representative articles----
    Senator King. Can I be assured that this is a major area of 
research and development and effort? It seems to me this is an 
enormously potentially important development.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Sir, within the Missile Defense 
Agency it absolutely is, and that's why we continue to have 
three activities going on in that area and request funding for 
it.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. Senator, if I could add on to 
that, that's a major priority within the U.S. Army. We've had 
some success, a lot of success recently with integrating a 10-
kilowatt laser into a Stryker combat vehicle where it is 
totally self-contained within that vehicle that will be able to 
maneuver with ground maneuver forces. While 10 kilowatts (KW) 
may not sound like a lot, what we've done over the past few 
years is grow it from a 2 kilowatts to a 5 kilowatts, and our 
road map is to put a 50 kilowatts onto a Stryker combat vehicle 
within the next 4 or 5 years and be able to provide that to the 
ground maneuver commander.
    What we envision using that for is we've already 
demonstrated successfully against an unmanned aircraft system, 
and we've actually had soldiers actually operate the system 
when it was a 2KW/5KW/10KW as recently as this year, and we 
envision that in the future. So that's allowed us to have 
warfighters using the technology at a very early stage so that 
we can start developing our techniques and procedures that we 
will use in combat.
    We're on a path to get a 100 kilowatts high-energy laser as 
part of our IFPC increment 2, our indirect fire protection 
capability in the Army, which will be responsible for fixed and 
semi-fixed defense, and we envision that. It's going to be 
designed for not only unmanned aerial system (UAS) but also 
counter-rocket artillery and mortar, and we've already 
demonstrated some success with a 50 kilowatts against 
artilleries out in White Sands missile range.
    Senator King. I foresee a hand-held UAS anti-weapon staffed 
entirely by duck hunters from Arkansas.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    You know, one of the things that all of you have been 
mentioning is that time is the enemy here because of the 
advancements of--whether it's North Korea or some of our other 
adversaries or potential adversaries. As an Alaska senator, I 
certainly take pride in the fact that we are the cornerstone of 
our nation's missile defense with the Fort Greeley field and 
the long-range discrimination radar and the radar sites out in 
the Aleutian Island chain, and we're making progress on all of 
these, as you know, gentlemen.
    One area, though, where it looks like we're not making 
progress--General Greaves, can you talk about the potential 2-
year delay of the redesigned kill vehicle, and is that a best-
case or worst-case scenario? Can you talk in public about what 
the problem is?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Senator, I'll start with the 
last question. We cannot discuss the details of the problem. 
What I'll say in general is that if this same issue had 
occurred when we were developing the original extra-atmospheric 
kill vehicle, the current fleet, a decision could have been 
made to move ahead and deliver the capability, whatever we had, 
the best capability that we can deliver.
    The major difference here is that from the outset this 
acquisition strategy was destined or intended to deliver a more 
reliable vehicle that followed a disciplined acquisition 
process to include robust design, robust testing, and a system 
which was more maintainable----
    Senator Sullivan. But does that make the acquisition 
process slower, almost by definition?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. No, it does not, sir, because 
of the unique acquisition authorities that both the Congress 
and the Department have provided to the Missile Defense Agency. 
The issue with acquisition is the inability for rapid decision-
making within DOD 5000. That's the simplest way I can put it. 
But with the authorities in this position that I occupy to be 
the milestone decision authority, which has major approval 
authority before we make major decisions, before we get to 
production, as the program manager, as the head of the agency, 
the decision authority lies right here.
    It's what I personally use to decide that if we had done 
something other than that, we would not be credible to the 
acquisition strategy that we signed up to.
    Senator Sullivan. So let me--can you answer the first part 
of my question? Is that a best-case or worst-case scenario? Two 
years is a lot of time.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. It is.
    Senator Sullivan. Especially given that time is the enemy.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. We are testing components as we 
speak, and that time may be adjusted over the next few months.
    Senator Sullivan. Which way do you think it's going to be 
adjusted?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. More likely shortened, but it 
could go the other way. When we developed the plan for up to 2 
years, we took a best guess, almost worst case----
    Senator Sullivan. Is there something we can do as a 
Congress to help you with shortening that time line?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Negative, sir. Continue to 
support what we're doing, ensure we----
    Senator Sullivan. Is it a contractor issue? Is it a company 
issue?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. It's a technical issue, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Okay. Let me ask Secretary Rood, you and 
I were all at the big rollout of the Missile Defense Review at 
the Pentagon. I think it was important, an important symbol 
that not just you and the Secretary of Defense and the Vice 
President but the President of the United States was there. I 
think that also sent a message to our adversaries and our 
friends that this is a serious issue for the country.
    In your view, what are the top three most critical elements 
of the 2019 Missile Defense Review? A number of us--and you 
know that you and I had a lot of discussions about this--were 
pressing you guys to get this nice piece of work out as soon as 
possible so it could impact the NDAA. Well, here we are. We're 
already starting to draft up the NDAA. What are the key 
elements that you think you need our help on? Again, one of the 
positive things that's going on with regard to missile defense 
right now in the last few years is that it's generally a 
bipartisan endeavor in the Congress, particularly in this 
committee.
    So, top three things, and what do you need from us, and is 
there anything missing? Now that you've written it and put your 
heart and soul into it, and the President rolled it out, are 
there things that you think, oh, shoot, we should have gotten 
that in there, and let's try and get it in the NDAA?
    Secretary Rood. Well, on the first question, in terms of 
the key elements of the Missile Defense Review, I think for the 
purposes of the NDAA one of the things that you see contained 
in the Missile Defense Review is the support for the legacy 
systems. That is to say, as those things that are existing 
programs. Sustainment costs more, upgrades need to be made to 
them, and then additional units that we've procured. So the 
Missile Defense Review essentially says let's continue to 
support what are installed bases or those things that are 
currently planned and keep them robust and vital.
    Senator Sullivan. So like the things in Alaska the 
President highlighted in his remarks.
    Secretary Rood. Yes, sir. So that would be one part of it. 
But at the same time, then, the Missile Defense Review speaks 
to developing new technologies and looking for new 
breakthroughs and things that will take us to the next level, 
if you will, of effectiveness of missile defense, things like 
space-based sensors, starting to look at spacefbased 
interceptors, directed energy, whether that's lasers, neutral 
particle beam, or other activities like that. Trying to do this 
in a more innovative way, leveraging DARPA's work for this 
proliferated low Earth orbit series of sensors and the means to 
communicate with them.
    So, one, the Congress continuing to support the planned 
sustainment and upgrades and additional production of the 
current legacy systems, if you will; support for these new 
technology efforts; and there's a certain art between always, 
when you're moving to the next generation of technology, how 
robustly do you fund that, because, as you know, those efforts 
start smaller but then grow in funding.
    Then the third area, which may sound very fundamental but 
has had a huge impact on us, the Congress last year did 
terrific work in the defense area to both finish an 
authorization bill and an appropriations bill before the end of 
the fiscal year, and I've seen the impact that that has had on 
our ability, the purchasing power. Essentially, that gives us 
more, the stability and the ability to focus on things other 
than continually managing change orders and change activities 
to keep going. So the terrific work that you did last year, if 
it were possible again--and they were strong bills, the 
authorization and appropriations bills that showed bipartisan 
support for what we are doing. If you can re-create that, it's 
hard to understate how important and how much that has 
benefitted the Department overall.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Gentlemen, earlier we had a discussion on the recent 
missile defense test, and I would like to ask you, General 
O'Shaughnessy, if you have anything to add about USNORTHCOM's 
involvement in that test.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you, ma'am. As we discussed 
about the sense of confidence that that test gives us as the 
operators cannot be overstated. For us to actually participate 
in the test from the aspect of the same way that we would do it 
in an actual launch, so not in a test environment, not using a 
different system but using the very systems that we would use, 
with the very people that we would use to man those systems, in 
a manner that is representative of a real-world event, really 
gives us the confidence in the system, confidence in our 
ability to give our senior leadership a sense of confidence 
that we can execute this mission. We had a discussion with 
Senator Sullivan about our ability to have that credible 
deterrence and be able to say with authority that we do have 
the confidence to be able to defend this Nation. I'm thankful 
to General Greaves for giving us that opportunity.
    If you actually look at the myriad of different things that 
were tied to this test to take full advantage of the cost of 
putting this together is not insignificant, but to take full 
advantage of that, from the operational side, from the test 
side, from some of the future capabilities that we tied into 
the test as well, I think it was masterful the way that General 
Greaves put that together.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. Congratulations again.
    Also, sir, I understand that what you can say is limited in 
this unclassified environment, but can you briefly describe 
your level of concern about your ability to defend the Homeland 
from cruise missile threats that we're facing?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you for highlighting that. We 
talked a lot about ballistic missiles today, and hypersonics, 
but the one in the middle, the cruise missile threat, is 
equally as potent, and we certainly have adversaries that have 
invested significantly in that cruise missile threat; for 
example, certainly Russia and China. As we look to defend the 
Homeland, that is one of our significant concerns. As you 
mentioned, for much of this we'd have to go to a classified 
environment. We've had the opportunity to have some of that 
discussion.
    But I do have concerns that we have to continue to invest 
in our ability to defend against the cruise missile threat as 
well, to be able to stay ahead of our adversaries. So as we do 
go forward, I was happy to see, for example, the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review became the Missile Defense Review. 
That's a very subtle but very important change within that, 
that the focus is not just on ballistic missiles but also on 
the cruise missiles.
    So as we look to go forward, I look forward to the 
committee's continued support to invest in and allow us to be 
able to pursue advanced capabilities to defend against what our 
enemy is doing to hold us at risk with advanced cruise missiles 
that have low radar cross sections (RCS's), very difficult to 
track and very difficult to defeat, and so we have to stay 
ahead of that threat.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. I apologize for going back to ploughed 
ground here, but I do want to return to the space sensor layer 
issue because I'm just having a hard time with the timeline. 
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it's my understanding that the 
Space Development Agency doesn't have budget authority yet, 
doesn't have funding yet, and will need a reprogramming request 
approved by Congress before they can really get off the ground.
    So at this point it exists in name only, which is why I'm 
having a hard time understanding why we just don't move forward 
with this space development layer under MDA and re-sort out the 
relationships a year down the road once we know how SDA is 
working and how it's organized and that it's ready to hit the 
ground running.
    Maybe Secretary Rood?
    Secretary Rood. Well, the Space Development Agency, as you 
say, is just being stood up in terms of the director being 
named and the initial staff and the charter, and its 
authorities have been granted. We are at the beginning phase of 
the creation of that entity. The intent is, as General Greaves 
said, that it be modeled for rapid acquisition and centralized 
authority after the Missile Defense Agency's authorities but 
with a focus on space. So the initial requests to the Congress, 
as you point out, sir, relates to reprogramming; and then, of 
course, the funding for the next fiscal year, for fiscal year 
2020, to fund those projects, and it's just part of a broader 
activity that would affect more than the missile defense 
mission.
    The intent is, because of our contested warfighting 
environment in space, that we have a more rapid acquisition, 
sir.
    Senator Heinrich. I think I get the underlying architecture 
and the need for an entity that can move rapidly and nimbly. 
I'm more worried about losing this, what could be a real 
bottleneck for us on hypersonics to the right of the timeline.
    Secretary Rood. Well, certainly this is one of the 
considerations that the Department leadership--as the Secretary 
was evaluating what work to provide to the Missile Defense 
Agency and what the Space Development Agency was given, there 
was some consideration, but the belief being that with Under 
Secretary Griffin's oversight, and he oversees the Missile 
Defense Agency as well, sir, that the Space Development Agency, 
with a focus on a narrow set of items initially that would 
grow, could provide the fastest possible route to get those 
things into orbit.
    I agree with you that it is a priority that this continue 
and be done with purpose.
    Senator Heinrich. General Greaves, in the fiscal year 2018 
annual report, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 
DOT&E, again recommended the MDA should develop independently 
accredited modeling and simulation to evaluate Ground-Based 
Missile Defense (GMD) effectiveness. Can you explain what needs 
to be done, if more needs to be done in that area, and whether 
or not additional resources are needed to meet DOT&E's 
recommendation?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Thank you, Senator. We worked 
with General Behler's organization in DOT&E to develop a plan 
that we are executing now to eventually, not in the too-far 
term, deliver accredited models. So that work is going very 
well. I think if you ask DOT&E, they will tell you the same 
thing.
    While additional resources, if provided, would help to 
speed that up, I believe that----
    Senator Heinrich. You feel good about the fundamentals.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Absolutely. The commitment is 
there. We made it a centerpiece of the organization while I've 
been there, and it was seriously started before he departed. 
The Missile Defense Agency has always had models and 
simulations that we used, but the realization that we really 
can't grade our own homework, if you get right down to it, that 
that's not credible, that we needed an agency that's appointed 
and certified and recognized as being able to grade our 
homework, to go do that.
    So the effort has been getting the two cultures, the people 
to work together to realize that it's for the better good.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for your attendance today.
    With that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                         missile defense policy
    1. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, Lieutenant General Dickinson, the fiscal 
year 2020 Budget Request for the Department of Defense includes nearly 
$50 million to pursue the development of non-kinetic and kinetic 
options for space-based missile defense interception. In 2016, former 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Adm. James Syring told the House 
Armed Services Committee the following: ``I have serious concerns about 
the technical feasibility of interceptors in space, and I have serious 
concerns about the long-term affordability of a program like that.'' Do 
you agree with Adm. Syring? Please provide an unclassified explanation 
why or why not.
    Secretary Rood. It makes sense to leverage existing fielded 
capabilities to their fullest extent, and we are doing so. At the same 
time, we must invest in new capabilities to keep pace with, and stay 
ahead of, the advanced threat in defense of the United States, our 
allies and partners. For fiscal year 2020, the DOD budget requests 
funding to continue improving existing sensor programs as well as to 
proceed with a number of other efforts that begin to move us in a new 
direction to support a holistic, cost-effective approach to space-based 
sensors. For missile defense, these include: a proliferated Low-Earth 
Orbit (pLEO) sensor technology effort; developmental work for a space 
sensor technology demonstration for hypersonic tracking; and an 
architectural assessment for a missile defense space-based 
discrimination layer.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Due to the complexity and evolution of 
missile threats, I believe we need missile defense technology that is 
lethal, reliable, and resilient to defend the Homeland now, and to keep 
pace with the threats into the future. As part of our integrated, 
layered approach to missile defense, I support the Department of 
Defense's efforts to evaluate the potential effectiveness and cost of 
space-based interceptor technology to help inform the best way forward 
for required missile defense capabilities.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. As of today, I do not agree or disagree 
with VADM Syring (Ret). Previous concerns about space-based missile 
defense were based on the best information available at the time. Many 
factors affect affordability and technical feasibility. The 2019 
Missile Defense Review tasked MDA to study development and fielding of 
a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense. 
This report is scheduled to be completed by July 2019, and will 
identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other requirements for a 
space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense. The affordability 
of space-based missile defenses must be a driver from the start of the 
design process. Affordability begins by picking the right mission space 
for space-based missile defense and then completely understanding the 
capabilities and limitations of an architecture designed to that 
mission space--to include the susceptibility of space-defense concepts 
to responsive adversary tactics. The proposed funding will be used to 
better understand the drivers of feasibility and costs in today's 
environment so that the leadership can make informed decisions.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. Given the potential technical 
advancements since the referenced statement, I support the Department's 
efforts to examine the benefits, feasibility and affordability of a 
range of technologies for the Warfighter to defeat the advanced threat. 
This includes a healthy re-examination with industry of past efforts as 
technologies mature and in the case of space, the evolution of 
commercial space offers economies of scale previously unavailable.

    2. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, if Russia 
or China were to move to put missile defense interceptors in space, how 
would you advise the Secretary of Defense to respond? Please provide an 
unclassified explanation.
    Secretary Rood. Russia and China have substantial missile defense 
programs. In Russia's case, that nation maintains a significant missile 
defense system that is deployed near Moscow. Though I cannot say what 
specific position the United States would take regarding a particular 
future hypothetical system, I can say that the actions the United 
States is taking to improve space-based missile defense sensor systems 
and to explore space-based interceptor concepts are fully consistent 
with our obligations under relevant international law, including the 
United Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty.
    General O'Shaughnessy. As the USNORTHCOM Commander, I am focused 
primarily on defending the Homeland against adversaries' offensive 
weapon systems targeting the United States. I would defer to the 
Missile Defense Agency Director to address this with the Department.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for 
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and 
deliver capability to the warfighter.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue and outside 
my purview, I respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense 
(Policy).

    3. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, what 
historical evidence is available to demonstrate that space-based 
missile defense has been affordable and effective for the United 
States? Please provide an unclassified explanation.
    Secretary Rood. Conceptual benefits of engaging missile threats 
from space, particularly for boost phase defense, have long been 
recognized, as well as the critical technical and operational issues 
that would have to be resolved on the way to a militarily useful and 
affordable capability. Space-based missile defense concepts have been 
studied sporadically going back to Project Defender in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. The Brilliant Pebbles program--which ran from Concept 
Definition with Industry in 1990 to its termination in 1993--was the 
last attempt to develop a capability. Given the significant advantages 
of space-based missile defenses, the 2019 Missile Defense Review 
requested the Missile Defense Agency study development and fielding of 
a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense. 
This report is scheduled to be completed between July and the end of 
2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, cost, and other 
requirements for a space-based defensive layer for boost-phase defense.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I currently rely on space-based capabilities 
to provide information regarding missile detection, warning, and 
preliminary impact, which are critical for execution of our Homeland 
defense mission. As part of an ongoing layered approach for missile 
defense in the future, I look forward to the results of Department of 
Defense's evaluation of the concepts and technology for space-based 
defenses and defer to Under Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General 
Greaves for any further details regarding potential effectiveness and 
affordability for space-based missile defense.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Conceptual benefits of engaging missile 
threats from space, particularly for boost phase defense, have long 
been recognized, as well as the critical technical and operational 
issues that would have to be resolved on the way to a militarily useful 
and affordable capability. The objective is to provide defense in depth 
and to deprive the adversary of unchallenged access to midcourse with 
complex countermeasures. Space-based missile defenses are a logical 
supplement to the existing midcourse tier of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense System. Given the significant advantages of space-based missile 
defenses, the 2019 Missile Defense Review tasked MDA to study 
development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept layer 
capable of boost-phase defense. This report is scheduled to be 
completed by July 2019, and will identify the technologies, schedule, 
cost, and other requirements for a space-based defensive layer for 
boost-phase defense.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for the MDR 
directed study on this effort, I respectfully defer to MDA. However, we 
have leveraged the Nation's significant space sensor investment in the 
conduct of the missile defense mission. I am confident that this 
historical information will be used in any cost and operational 
effectiveness study.

    4. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the 
Missile Defense Review (MDR) proposed a six-month feasibility study 
``of the concepts and technology for space-based defenses.'' What is 
the expected completion date for that study? A date range would also be 
acceptable.
    Secretary Rood. We plan to complete this study between July and the 
end of 2019.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I look forward to the Department of 
Defense's evaluation of the concepts and technology for space-based 
defenses, and I will continue to communicate our operational 
requirements that support our Homeland defense mission. I defer to 
Under Secretary Rood regarding the timeline for expected completion of 
the study.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The Missile Defense Agency will 
complete this study and publish its findings by July, 17, 2019.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for this study, I 
respectfully defer to MDA.

    5. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, depending 
on the results of the MDR's six-month feasibility study, is it possible 
that the Missile Defense Agency may request supplemental funding in 
fiscal year 2020 to continue development of space-based interceptors?
    Secretary Rood. Upon the completion of the study, the Missile 
Defense Agency and the Department will determine the next steps for 
space-based interceptors. If additional funding is required, we would 
not anticipate that request until the President's Budget request for 
fiscal year 2021.
    General O'Shaughnessy. As the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander, I 
rely on the Services and the Missile Defense Agency to program and 
acquire the necessary capabilities for our warfighter missions. I defer 
to Under Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Greaves regarding any 
potential future funding requests, pending the results of the 
feasibility study.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Upon the completion of the study, MDA 
and the Department will determine the next steps for space-based 
interceptors. If additional funding is required, we would not 
anticipate that request until President's Budget 2021.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is an MDA funding issue, I 
respectfully defer to MDA.

    6. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, how would 
a United States ballistic missile defense capability against Russia or 
China affect our ability to maintain a stable strategic nuclear balance 
with those countries?
    Secretary Rood. The United States ground-based midcourse defense 
system deployed in Alaska and California is not designed to negate, nor 
is it capable of negating, the strategic nuclear arsenal of Russia or 
China. Rather, the United States relies primarily on its strategic 
nuclear forces to deter a Russian or Chinese strategic nuclear attack. 
Even with planned growth in United States missile defense capabilities 
over the Future Years Defense Program, the U.S. will continue to rely 
primarily on strategic nuclear forces to maintain strategic stability.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential 
Iranian ballistic missile threats. It was not designed or intended to 
defend against Russian or Chinese ballistic missile threats. I defer to 
Under Secretary Rood on any potential changes relating to current U.S. 
BMD policy.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for 
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and 
deliver capability to the warfighter.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue, I 
respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). However, we 
believe United States missile defenses do not undermine Russia or 
China's large and sophisticated strategic nuclear deterrent.

    7. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the MDA 
has said repeatedly that there is no military requirement for an ``East 
Coast'' Ground-Based, Mid-Course Defense (GMD) site. MDA has also 
previously stated that the estimated $3-$4 billion cost to construct a 
third GMD interceptor site in the eastern United States would be better 
spent on improving ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) sensor and 
discrimination capabilities. Do you agree with previous MDA 
assessments?
    Secretary Rood. The United States is currently defended from 
intercontinental missile threats by 44 ground-based missile defense 
interceptors--with 40 interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska and 4 
interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The Department 
is currently in the process of deploying an additional 20 ground-based 
interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska by 2025, providing Homeland defense 
against the foreseeable projected threats. As part of continued efforts 
to evaluate optimized U.S. defensive capabilities, Congress required, 
and DOD explored, the development of additional missile defense 
Interceptor Sites in the continental United States (CIS). The 
Department continues to explore additional capabilities to address the 
advancing threat and provide operational flexibility which will be 
considered when making a final CIS decision. However, at this time 
there is no operational requirement for a third CIS.
    General O'Shaughnessy. There is some increased operational 
capability with an East Coast site, particularly in that it would 
provide increased capacity as well as dispersal of interceptors. But 
while that is important, my top operational priorities for resources 
remain focused on developing our persistent, discriminating sensor 
architecture, as well as improving interceptor reliability and 
lethality, which may prove more dynamic and responsive to future 
threats. We continue to be vigilant for future threats to the Homeland 
and are postured to readdress the assessment of the ``East Coast'' GMD 
site if needed.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The MDA assessment remains unchanged. 
The current Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) sites at Fort Greely, Alaska 
and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California provide the capability 
necessary to protect the United States Homeland against the current and 
projected Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat from North 
Korea, as well as a future Iranian ICBM threat, should it emerge. 
Twenty additional interceptors are planned for the GBI site in Alaska. 
An additional GBI site located within the United States would add 
battlespace and interceptor capacity, but would come with materiel 
development and sustainment costs. The Department has determined that 
investment in discrimination and sensor capabilities will yield more 
cost-effective near-term improvements to United States Homeland missile 
defense for threats from Iran and, hence, implementation of a 
continental United States interceptor site is not currently programmed.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. Yes, I strongly believe that the 
limited ballistic missile defense resources should continue to be 
prioritized to improving the sensor architecture and increasing 
interceptor reliability.

    8. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the 
Missile Defense Review proposes to bring the SM-3 IIA interceptor into 
the national missile defense architecture, beginning with a test of the 
interceptor against an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class 
target in 2020. Combined with the GMD system, the United States by 2030 
could have several hundred interceptors available for national missile 
defense. How do you predict Russia and China would respond to such a 
capability?
    Secretary Rood. Pursuant to the Missile Defense Review (MDR) and 
pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2018, the Department plans to conduct a test of the SM-3 IIA 
interceptor against an intercontinental-ballistic missile (ICBM) target 
in 2020. Regarding Russia's and China's reactions, it is important to 
recognize both nations are pursuing national and regional missile 
defense programs of their own. For example, Russia has a missile 
defense system ringing Moscow with 68 nuclear-tipped interceptors. 
Also, in the event that the SM-3 IIA test is successful and we decide 
to field an underlay to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 
system, we would be doing so to address the long-range missile 
capabilities of North Korea, and potentially Iran. An SM-3 IIA underlay 
for Homeland defense would be insufficient to counter the large 
quantity and sophistication of Russian and Chinese ICBMs and other long 
range nuclear missiles, and therefore would not negate their strategic 
forces.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the intelligence community 
regarding a predicted response from Russia and China if the SM-3 IIA 
interceptor is integrated with the GMD system architecture in the 
future.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for 
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and 
deliver capability to the warfighter.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue, I 
respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

    9. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, the MDR 
asserts that U.S. missile defense capabilities ``may also help dissuade 
missile proliferation among potential adversaries by reducing the 
political and military value of their missiles.'' How do you reconcile 
this assertion with North Korea's recent aggressive development of 
ballistic missiles of different ranges?
    Secretary Rood. The United States relies on a broad range of 
strategies to deter and dissuade potential adversaries. Against missile 
attacks, we take a comprehensive approach consisting of deterrence, 
active defenses, passive defenses, and offensive capabilities. Missile 
defense is one element of our broader deterrence strategy to persuade a 
potential adversary that the benefits of developing, deploying and 
using missiles will not be achieved. Should dissuasion and deterrence 
fail, it's essential that we have the ability to protect the nation, 
our forces, and allies and partners from missile attack.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to Under Secretary Rood and the 
intelligence community regarding the effects of United States missile 
defense policy and capabilities on North Korea's aggressive development 
of ballistic missiles.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. MDA defers to Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (USD(P)). As the Program Executive for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS), the Director, MDA is responsible for 
developing missile defense systems that meet technical requirements and 
deliver capability to the warfighter.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As this is a policy issue, I 
respectfully defer to Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

    10. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, as 
Congress and the Administration negotiate on defense funding for fiscal 
year 2020, do you think that it makes sense to fully leverage the 
sensors the United States currently has fielded for missile defense 
detection, discrimination and tracking before funding new programs?
    Secretary Rood. It makes sense to leverage existing fielded 
capabilities to their fullest extent, and we are doing so. At the same 
time, we must invest in new capabilities to keep pace with, and stay 
ahead of, the advanced threat in defense of the United States, our 
allies and partners. For fiscal year 2020, the DOD budget requests 
funding to continue improving existing sensor programs as well as to 
proceed with a number of other efforts that begin to move us in a new 
direction to support a holistic, cost-effective approach to space-based 
sensors. For missile defense, these include: a proliferated Low-Earth 
Orbit (pLEO) sensor technology effort; developmental work for a space 
sensor technology demonstration for hypersonic tracking; and an 
architectural assessment for a missile defense space-based 
discrimination layer.
    General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Northern Command fully leverages 
currently fielded missile defense sensors in support of our ballistic 
missile defense mission. However, these sensors do not provide the 
complete persistent discrimination capability required. Additional 
sensors, such as the Long Range Discrimination Radar, Homeland Defense 
Radar--Hawaii, and the Pacific Radar will improve persistent tracking 
and discrimination coverage of threat missiles for entirety of flight, 
which will enhance our ability to defend the Homeland.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. I agree that it always makes sense to 
apply currently fielded systems to the fullest extent to meet ongoing 
and emerging missions. To do this, we must combine keen awareness of 
the changing threat, a thorough understanding of the capabilities and 
limitations of the current systems, and detailed planning for any 
potential upgrades or refinements to keep pace with our adversaries. 
The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program has done this with improved 
discrimination made to the Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX), the Army Navy 
Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2) radars, 
and the Army Navy Shipboard Radar Surveillance and Control Series 1 as 
well as threat catalog enhancements to the Upgraded Early Warning 
Radars. Where existing sensors didn't provide enough coverage or 
project capabilities to stay ahead of the advanced threat in defense of 
the Homeland, the Department made the case for the Long Range 
Discriminating Radar, the Hawaiian Homeland Defense Radar and the 
Pacific radar. The threat assessment was clear and we responded. With 
programs like the BMDS Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) Architecture 
(BOA) and Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications and 
related fusion systems, the Missile Defense Agency and its partner 
agencies employed an enterprise approach to data sharing. Because of 
this, the BMDS has made dramatic improvements in ground processing to 
extract everything possible from existing sensors such as the Space 
Based Infrared System, AN/TPY-2s and outside data sources to enable us 
to track advanced threats in real time--and we are tracking these 
threats today. But we can only use this capability where sensors are 
actually observing the threat, and there are huge portions of the globe 
where the BMDS has limited-to-no sensor coverage. We need to fill those 
gaps. With emerging hypersonic and maneuvering threats as well as 
advanced ballistic threats, we are reaching the limits of our existing 
sensors to adequately defend the United States when these new 
capabilities become operational, as these maneuvering threats could 
evade detection and tracking by many of our current generation sensors. 
This is why I have advocated for a detection and tracking space layer 
to give us persistent coverage and adequate sensitivity to view and 
defend against this next generation of threats. A detection and 
tracking space layer will be integrated into our existing architecture 
that, by design, processes all available OPIR sensor data.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for the NDAA 
directed BMD Sensor AOA Study, I respectfully defer to MDA.

    11. Senator Warren. Secretary Rood, General O'Shaughnessy, 
Lieutenant General Greaves, and Lieutenant General Dickinson, are you 
using all available sensors, including those not originally designed 
for missile defense?
    Secretary Rood. I concur with Lieutenant General Greave's statement 
that: ``The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) leverages all 
appropriate sensors to support Homeland and regional missile defense. 
Not all sensors possess the characteristics and attributes to be useful 
for missile defense applications. The Department continues to explore 
the utility for sensors currently outside of the BMDS to support 
missile defense, and weighs the integration and testing cost with the 
assessed benefits to the BMDS. DOD has undertaken steps over the last 
decade to incorporate data sharing across multiple domains to improve 
the capabilities of the BMDS to detect and track ballistic threats, 
including significant investment in extending the service life of Cobra 
Dane, the integration and exploitation of Overhead Persistent InfraRed 
(OPIR) sensor data, the initial mobile sensor integration and 
developmental demonstrations of airborne sensor tracking, as well as, 
use of the F-35 sensor suite.''
    General O'Shaughnessy. Per the Missile Defense Review, we are 
actively working with the Missile Defense Agency to examine how 
additional discriminating radar sites in the Pacific and other 
potential sensors could add to our capability. I defer any specific 
questions to Lieutenant General Greaves.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The BMDS leverages all appropriate 
sensors to support Homeland and regional missile defense. Not all 
sensors possess the characteristics and attributes to be useful for 
missile defense applications. The Department continues to explore the 
utility for sensors currently outside of the BMDS to support missile 
defense, and weighs the integration and testing cost with the assessed 
benefits to the BMDS. DOD has undertaken steps over the last decade to 
incorporate data sharing across multiple domains to improve the 
capabilities of the BMDS to detect and track ballistic threats, 
including significant investment in extending the service life of Cobra 
Dane, the integration and exploitation of OPIR sensor data, the initial 
mobile sensor integration and developmental demonstrations of airborne 
sensor tracking, as well as, use of the F-35 sensor suite.
    Lieutenant General Dickinson. As MDA is the lead for the NDAA 
directed BMD Sensor AOA study, I respectfully defer to MDA.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
transfer of missile defense agency projects to space development agency
    12. Senator Manchin. Secretary Rood and Lieutenant General Greaves, 
the MDA was created and granted powers to prioritize correctly and 
rapidly acquire much needed systems and capabilities in the missile 
defense mission area. A significant amount of work in missile defense 
revolves around space-based detection, tracking and kill assessment 
capabilities. Already, the transfer of responsibility for the Space 
Sensor Layer research and development to the Space Development Agency 
(SDA) has apparently led to an unfunded priority designation for this 
much needed capability in fiscal year 2020. What are the plans and 
timelines, if any, to transition other space based capabilities such as 
the Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA) and the Space Tracking and 
Surveillance System to the SDA so as to not cause disruptions or slowed 
development for these critical programs?
    Secretary Rood. The Space Development Agency, as established, was 
given special authorities that are very similar to what the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) has. This allows SDA to anticipate and respond to 
some of the Department's most significant challenges in space on short 
timelines. The SDA is uniquely postured to rapidly develop and deploy 
advanced capabilities such as the Space Sensor Layer. It will rapidly 
develop and deploy next-generation space capabilities including 
rethinking how we do rapid experimentation, prototyping, and innovating 
for space. For many on-going programs, such as MDA's Space Based Kill 
Assessment (SKA) and Space Tracking and Surveillance Systems (STSS), 
the Department has concluded that it is preferable for them to remain 
with their parent Services or Agencies, rather than transferring them 
to the SDA. Regardless of which organization has the lead for these 
critical programs, the SDA, MDA, and the Services will continue to work 
closely together to ensue capability integration.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The Space Development Agency was 
recently established March 2019 and per the fiscal year 2020 
President's Budget focusing on developing the department's proliferated 
LEO architecture, primarily the transport layer. MDA expects transition 
discussions at some point in the future.
                         norther defense radars
    13. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you have now testified 
twice over the critical task of defending northern and arctic 
approaches to North America and the United States. Your testimony has 
also cited the aging Cold War era array of radars that make up the 
Northern Warning System (NWS). I am concerned that there is nothing in 
this year's budget specifically addressing the modernization or 
recapitalization of this critical capability with estimates currently 
in the billions required for these tasks. Have recent tests conducted 
with the NWS reassured your confidence in the ability of this network 
of radars to defend against ballistic and cruise missile threats or 
should we be prioritizing investment in this system to ensure safety of 
the Homeland?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Defense of our Homeland is my absolute top 
priority. The results of the North Warning System (NWS) assessment 
indicated that the NWS does not currently provide the indications and 
warning, detection, tracking, and identification required to defend 
against current and emergent aerospace threats. To get after this 
requirement, the Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of 
Alternatives (NAS AOA), led by the Air Force, is an ongoing, 
comprehensive analysis of the capabilities and architecture required to 
ensure our ability to detect, identify, and track advanced airborne 
threats in the northern approaches to the Homeland. Thanks to 
Congressional support, that critical effort was supported with two-year 
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) dollars in 
fiscal year 2019, and fully funds the NAS AOA contract through fiscal 
year 2020. The fiscal year 2020 President's Budget also includes 
Science and Technology funding to research the potential for employing 
over-the-horizon radars in the Arctic. In the meantime, we are working 
closely with the Air Force to augment and extend the capability of the 
NWS while continuing our high-priority efforts to identify and field a 
replacement capability as soon as possible.
                       thaad and patriot systems
    14. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy and Lieutenant General 
Greaves, I see the budget contains procurement for Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors and system upgrades as well 
as THAAD and Patriot integration capabilities and tests. But I do not 
see any additional THAAD battery procurements. Currently the United 
States operates only seven THAAD batteries. Both of you have testified 
that a THAAD--Patriot combination can be very effective in defeating 
terminal Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, cruise missiles and other difficult 
to track and target threats. What is the plan for procurement of these 
systems to ensure we have comprehensive coverage of critical U.S. 
assets from emerging threats?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) program has a demonstrated capability against Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missiles and we have a request into the Missile Defense 
Agency to explore THAAD's utility for our Homeland defense mission. I 
defer to the Missile Defense Agency and the Services regarding any 
potential future plans for additional THAAD batteries and Patriot 
systems.
    Lieutenant General Greaves. The Army, Joint Staff, OSD and MDA are 
conducting a study on THAAD Batteries and Interceptor quantities in 
response to the Missile Defense Review (MDR). The integrated 
capabilities of THAAD and Patriot are informing this study which is due 
out this summer. Specifically the study will provide a current 
assessment of the required number of THAAD Batteries to support needed 
worldwide THAAD deployments, including potential deployment timelines, 
and basing and deployment options. The study results will be considered 
during the development of the President's Budget for 2021. THAAD and 
Patriot could provide contributions to defend against Hypersonic Glide 
Vehicles. However, MDA, Joint Staff, Army and OSD are assessing BMDS 
architecture of Interceptors, Sensors, and Command and Control to 
counter emerging threats including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles and 
influence acquisition decisions for the future of the BMDS.
                       hypersonic defense systems
    15. Senator Manchin. General Greaves, I noticed in the MDA budget a 
decrease over the Future Years Development Plan (FYDP) in research and 
development funding for Hypersonic Defense (PE 0604181C). This is 
concerning as the hypersonic weapon threat is one of the greatest 
threats we're facing right now. Is this decline in funding due to 
meeting objectives and requiring less money or is it due to 
reprioritization to other missile defense objectives?
    Lieutenant General Greaves. Defending against the hypersonic threat 
remains a high priority for MDA. The FYDP funding profile declines as 
these objectives are met, not because of reprioritization of funds to 
other efforts. The President's Budget 2020 Hypersonic Defense program 
of record represents a near-term body of work, prior to completion of 
the Department's Defense against Hypersonic Threats Analysis of 
Alternatives (AOA). This work includes modification of existing or use 
of in-development ground-based sensors (AN/TPY-2 radar, Long Range 
Discrimination Radar, the Homeland Defense Radar--Hawaii, and Pacific 
Radar) and the C2BMC system to track and report the threat. MDA will 
consider the AOA recommendations to counter the threat in long term, 
such as potential Hypersonic Defense future architectures including 
weapon solutions, in the fiscal year 2021 MDA budget deliberations. 
Upon completion of the AOA, MDA will address recommendations to counter 
the threat in subsequent budget deliberations. Based on the preliminary 
findings in the AOA, acceleration of a Hypersonic Defense capability 
was included in MDA's fiscal year 2020 Report to Congress on Unfunded 
Priorities. The report included $719 million in fiscal year 2020 to 
begin the following:

      Development of Glide Phase Engagement Capability (Over-
the-Horizon) with 2 concepts for competitive environment

      Leverage and upgrade additional C2BMC and ground sensor 
capabilities

      Participate in partner flight tests to provide additional 
data sources for integrated capability demonstrations

      Develop land based terminal defense capability

      Invest in additional component and integrated 
technologies across the kill chain for future architecture spirals.


 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                         WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 2019

                  United States Senate,    
                  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                      U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in 
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb 
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, 
Rounds, Cramer, Hawley, King, Heinrich, Manchin, and Jones.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

    Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
    The Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on U.S. 
nuclear weapons policy, programs, and strategy in review of the 
administration's budget request for fiscal year 2020.
    Testifying before the Subcommittee today are: Ellen Lord, 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; 
David Trachtenberg, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy; General Timothy Ray, the Commander of Air Force Global 
Strike Command; and Admiral Johnny Wolfe, the Director of the 
Navy's Strategic Systems Programs.
    Thank you for appearing before us today. I also want to 
express my particular appreciation for this Department's 
emphasis on the importance of nuclear deterrence.
    Secretary Lord, your prepared testimony unequivocally 
describes nuclear deterrence as, ``the Department of Defense's 
highest priority,'' echoing similar comments from a number of 
other senior leaders, such as General Dunford. As you all know, 
a lack of senior leader attention has been a challenge for the 
nuclear enterprise in the past, and I am pleased to see this 
Department is properly prioritizing this issue.
    Similarly, I think there is bipartisan recognition in 
Congress that if foreign nuclear threats continue to grow and 
our platforms reach the end of their serviceable lives, 
modernization is necessary to ensure our deterrent remains 
credible. We look forward to hearing from each of you about 
your efforts in this regard, and your assessment of how any 
delay or disruption would impact our ability to met deterrence 
requirements.
    Your full statements will be made part of the record. But, 
first, I would like to recognize the Ranking Member for any 
comments he would like to make.
    Senator Heinrich.

              STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

    Senator Heinrich. Thank you. Let me thank Chairwoman 
Fischer for holding today's hearing.
    I also want to thank our witnesses for taking the time to 
testify today. We very much appreciate your service to our 
country and to the job that each of you perform.
    Every national security action we take is underpinned by 
our deterrent. So, it's important we continue its 
modernization. Some have claimed it's too expensive. But, even 
in its peak years, the Congressional Budget Office has said 
that its cost, relative to the Department of Defense (DOD) 
budget, will only be 6 percent. I have often said that 6 cents 
on the dollar to protect us from World War III or an 
existential threat is money well invested.
    There is a lot to cover in today's hearing, besides 
modernization. I'm concerned about pulling out of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with nothing to 
show for it. It seems to me that we have given Putin everything 
he wanted since he broached this topic with the Administration 
officials 15 years ago. In turn, we have left our North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in a bind.
    I am concerned about the upcoming expiration of the New 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). If we let this treaty 
expire, it'll be the first time since 1972 that we have not had 
some form of arms control treaty in place for strategic 
stability. The Senate ratified New START, with the condition of 
modernizing the triad, which President Obama certified in 
February of 2011, and which continues to this day. Arms control 
and modernization should go hand in hand. I take this 
relationship very seriously.
    I am encouraged that the President has recently announced 
that he wants to include China in an arms control discussion, 
and to add nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a future arms 
control agreement. But, he should renew New START first, and 
that should be our priority.
    Let me close on this issue of pit production. I continue to 
question the validity of producing 80 pits per year by 2030 
under the split production option proposed by the National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Institute for 
Defense Analyses (IDA) found that none of the options analyzed 
by the NNSA can be expected to provide 80 pits per year by 
2030, and none of the options was demonstrably better than the 
others. I'd like to note, however, that, when the NNSA analyzed 
a split production at the Savannah River site, it was for 80 
pits a year by 2030, at an added cost of some $14 billion to 
the taxpayer. I am very leery, to say the least, of the split 
option, given that an independent report said it will not even 
achieve by 2030, and it will cost even more than the additional 
$14 billion to be requested by Congress.
    Madam Secretary, you certified to this Committee on May 
10th, 2018, that the recommended alternative is, ``likely to 
meet pit production timelines and requirements responsive to 
military requirements,'' and it is also, ``cost-effective and 
has reasonable near-term and lifecycle costs that are minimized 
to the extent practicable compared to other alternatives.'' I 
would like to ask that, in light of this report, that you 
report back to the Committee on reevaluation of your 
certification.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Lord. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated ``An 
effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons 
infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt 
flexibility to shifting requirement.'' This is the Department 
of Defense's (DOD) highest priority mission and reestablishing 
a resilient plutonium pit production capability to support this 
mission is a top priority for the DOD and National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA). After several decades with 
almost no pit production, we are now faced with aging warheads 
that are nearing their end-of-life. In order to meet the 
challenges of the current and evolving security environment, 
DOD requires a steady-state ability to produce plutonium pits 
to: enhance warhead safety and security; meet future DOD and 
NNSA requirements; replace older existing plutonium pits 
deliberately and methodically; and enable the ability to 
respond to changes in deterrence requirements arising from the 
reemergence of great power competition.
    In an assessment of multiple options, we found NNSA's two-
site plutonium pit production approach most suitable because it 
meets NWC-endorsed and statutory requirements; provides 
resiliency through its use of multiple production facilities; 
and offers future potential to increase pit production above 
the minimal 80 ppy. This approach comes with some schedule and 
cost risks that can be managed given appropriate authority and 
requested funding. I am committed to working collaboratively 
with NNSA and Congress to ensure the pit production strategy is 
executed successfully.

    Senator Heinrich. Again, thank you today for coming, and I 
look forward to hearing all of your testimony.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    As I visited with the panel before we started the hearing, 
we do have four votes beginning at 3 o'clock, and so I have 
asked them to submit their statements for the record. I also 
suggested to them, during the questioning, if they feel there 
is a part of their prepared statements that they would like to 
include it at that point during the questioning, they were free 
to do so at that time.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN M. LORD, UNDER SECRETARY OF 
            DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT

    Secretary Lord. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, 
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to testify today.
    I am pleased to join Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy David Trachtenberg, General Timothy Ray, and Vice 
Admiral Johnny Wolfe to discuss what three successive 
Secretaries of Defense have called the Department of Defense's 
highest priority mission: ensuring that the United States has a 
safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent--now and 
in the future.
    I am here representing the entire Acquisition and 
Sustainment team of over 100,000 dedicated military, civilian, 
and contractor professionals who execute our mission every day.
    As Under Secretary, I am responsible for leading the 
Department's efforts to both sustain and modernize the nation's 
nuclear weapon delivery systems and related nuclear command, 
control, and communications (NC3) systems.
    I would like to frame my remarks and our discussion around 
two key points:

      1. LAlthough still militarily effective today, the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent remains dependent on rapidly aging nuclear 
delivery and NC3 systems that were built during the Cold War; 
and
      2. LAfter 25 years of primarily drawing down and life 
extending these systems, repeated decisions to defer 
recapitalization of our nuclear forces have caught up to us.

    While sustainment efforts have allowed us to defer nuclear 
modernization investments for many years, delay is no longer an 
option. Nearly all of the systems that comprise the current 
nuclear deterrent are well beyond their original service lives, 
and can no longer be cost effectively life extended.
    Now, we must concurrently acquire and field modem systems 
in each leg of the strategic nuclear triad. The choice is 
stark: either we invest in modernizing our nuclear forces, or 
we unilaterally eliminate them due to obsolescence.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for DOD's nuclear 
forces is consistent with this urgency. In total, the budget 
request includes $24.9 billion for nuclear forces, or 3.5 
percent of DOD's budget. This includes $8.4 billion for 
recapitalization and $16.5 billion for operations and 
sustainment.
    Because nuclear deterrence is DOD's number one priority 
mission, nuclear modernization programs are our highest 
investment priorities. As these programs mature in the coming 
decade, the funding they require will increase. The total 
projected cost of sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces 
will peak at approximately 6.4 percent of the DOD budget in the 
late-2020s.
    The cost of this effort is significant but manageable. From 
a historical perspective, it is far less expensive in relative 
terms than previous nuclear recapitalization programs carried 
out during the Cold War.
    Any large collection of complex and integrated programs 
faces risks, and our nuclear recapitalization and sustainment 
efforts are no different. The dedicated professionals in DOD 
and our partners at the Department of Energy are actively 
managing these programs to reduce risk, accelerate schedules, 
and seek efficiencies wherever possible.
    We recognize that this is a 20-year nuclear modernization 
journey we are embarked upon--but perhaps the biggest driver of 
risk is that we started that journey 15 years too late.
    I want to thank this Subcommittee for its longstanding, 
bipartisan support to our nuclear deterrent mission and the men 
and women in uniform who are its backbone. I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Lord follows:]

             prepared statement by secretary ellen m. lord
    Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs, and Strategy and the 
fiscal year 2020 Budget Request. I am pleased to join Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg, General Timothy 
Ray, and Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe to discuss the Department of 
Defense's (DOD) highest priority: ensuring that the United States has a 
safe, secure, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent now and in the 
future.
    role of acquisition and sustainment in dod's nuclear enterprise
    I am here today representing the entire DOD Acquisition and 
Sustainment (A&S) team of thousands of dedicated military, civilian, 
and contractor professionals who execute the A&S mission every day. As 
Under Secretary, I am responsible for leadingthe Department's efforts 
to both sustain and modernize the nation's nuclear weapon delivery 
systems and related nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 
systems.
    To enable these efforts, I chair the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) 
and the Defense Acquisition Board, co-chair the Council on Oversight of 
the National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications System 
(CONLC3S), and have been designated DOD's NC3 Enterprise Capability 
Portfolio Manager. I also serve as the Defense Acquisition Executive 
and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for all of the major nuclear 
modernization acquisition programs. In addition, A&S has three 
Assistant Secretaries focused on Acquisition, Sustainment, and Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. These and other roles and 
responsibilities of the Under Secretary for A&S put our organization at 
the center of a complex and integrated set of programs that must be 
executed successfully to ensure the long-term credibility of our 
nuclear deterrent.
   2018 nuclear posture review and today's nuclear threat environment
    For more than 70 years, U.S. nuclear forces have deterred our 
adversaries, assured our allies, and helped prevent competition among 
the Great Powers from escalating into large-scale conflict. For much of 
that history, this mission has been underpinned by the strategic 
nuclear triad consisting of ground-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable 
bombers. For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations alike 
have recognized the critical importance of the nuclear triad for 
keeping the peace.
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed the need to 
maintain the triad and other longstanding, bipartisan views on U.S. 
nuclear posture and took a clear-eyed look at the nuclear threat 
environment we face today and are likely to face in the future. The 
2018 NPR recognized that, while the U.S. has spent the decades since 
the end of the Cold War both reducing the size of the United States 
nuclear stockpile and the role of nuclear weapons in our defense 
strategy, Russia and China have gone--and continue to go--in the other 
direction. Our potential adversaries are actively increasing the role 
of nuclear weapons in their strategies and increasing the size and 
sophistication of their nuclear forces.
    For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly announced 
last year that Russia is actively developing and testing entirely new 
nuclear capabilities such as a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise 
missile and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed transoceanic underwater 
vehicle. Russia also is modernizing and expanding its arsenal of 
approximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, including nuclear 
torpedoes, nuclear air and missile defense interceptors, nuclear depth 
charges, nuclear landmines, and nuclear artillery shells--more than a 
dozen types. Russia's public statements and nuclear threats, its 
deployment of systems in direct violation of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty, its well-documented and well-rehearsed military 
doctrine to use nuclear weapons to ``de-escalate'' a conventional 
conflict, and its military resourcing decisions make clear that Russian 
leaders have not followed the United States' post-Cold War lead with 
respect to nuclear weapons.
    China also continues to expand and diversify its nuclear forces. 
China is modernizing its full array of nuclear missile forces, is 
deploying sea-based weapons, and has announced their intent to form a 
nuclear triad by developing a nuclear-capable, next-generation bomber. 
North Korea's nuclear capabilities also threaten our Homeland and our 
allies and add to an already complex strategic picture.
    As outlined in the NPR and National Defense Strategy, we must now 
face the reality of growing nuclear threats coupled with the 
reemergence of Great Power competition as a driving force in world 
affairs. After 25 years of primarily drawing down and sustaining the 
nuclear forces we built during the Cold War, repeated decisions to 
defer recapitalization of our nuclear forces have caught up to us. Now, 
we must concurrently acquire and field modern systems in each leg of 
the strategic nuclear triad--and in our non-strategic nuclear forces--
while also sustaining our aging legacy systems until modernized systems 
are available. We must also reinvigorate our science, technology, and 
innovation base to ensure that the investments we are making in our 
forces lead to the greater flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency 
called for by the NPR.
    Although still militarily effective today, the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent remains dependent on nuclear delivery and NC3 systems that 
were mostly fielded in the 1980s or earlier. Through the Services, DOD 
is sustaining these legacy nuclear forces until they can be replaced by 
modern systems. While these sustainment efforts have allowed us to 
defer investments for many years, we have reached a point where delay 
is no longer an option. Nearly all of the systems that comprise the 
current force are well beyond their originally designed service lives 
and will reach the end of their sustainability in the 2025 to 2035 
timeframe. The United States must make a choice: either we continue to 
invest in modernizing and replacing these systems or we accept the loss 
of our ability to deter the most severe threats to our nation and our 
allies and partners.
     summary of fiscal year 2020 budget request for nuclear forces
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for DOD nuclear forces is 
consistent with this urgency and is designed to address the risks we 
face across our nuclear enterprise. It funds the sustainment of our 
legacy forces and provides the necessary funding to continue 
modernizing them. In total, the fiscal year 2020 budget request 
includes $24.9 billion for nuclear forces, or 3.5 percent of DOD's 
budget. This includes $8.4 billion for recapitalization and 
modernization and $16.5 billion for operations and sustainment.
    Because nuclear deterrence is DOD's number one priority mission, 
nuclear modernization programs are our highest investment priorities. 
As these programs mature in the coming decade, the funding they require 
will increase--the cost to recapitalize strategic delivery systems and 
NC3 is expected to peak at approximately 3.7 percent of the annual DOD 
budget in 2029 before decreasing again. When added to the relatively 
flat sustainment expenses, the total projected cost of sustaining and 
modernizing our nuclear forces will peak at approximately 6.4 percent 
of the DOD budget in the late-2020s. DOD is mindful of the sustained 
financial commitment ahead of us and gratefully recognizes the ongoing 
support Congress and the American people provide for this most 
important mission.
    The cost of this effort is significant but manageable. As seen in 
the figure below, from a historical perspective, it is less expensive 
in relative terms than previous nuclear recapitalization programs. 
Comparatively, previous rounds of nuclear modernization during the Cold 
War cost the nation 10.6 percent of DOD's annual budget in the 1980s, 
and 17.1 percent in the 1960s. Measured against the catastrophic 
consequences of a major conflict or nuclear war, the cost of nuclear 
modernization is one we can afford to bear. As former Secretary of 
Defense Mattis said, ``America can afford survival.''

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     nuclear forces modernization and sustainment of legacy systems
Ballistic Missile Submarine Force
    The sea-based leg of our nuclear triad consists of 14 Ohio-class 
SSBNs armed with Trident II (D5) SLBMs. Originally designed for a 30-
year service life, our Ohio-class submarines have already undergone a 
service life extension to prolong their lifespan to 42 years. The Navy 
will continue to operate and sustain the fleet out to 2040, but further 
service life extensions of the Ohio-class are not possible. In addition 
to hull fatigue and nuclear reactor life limitations, in the coming 
decades advances in our adversaries' anti-submarine warfare 
capabilities require us to develop and field a modern submarine fleet.
    To maintain the effectiveness of the submarine force, the Navy is 
developing the Columbia-class SSBN--a next-generation strategic 
deterrent platform expected to serve until 2084. Columbia will take 
advantage of new technologies, such as a life-of-ship reactor core. 
Without the need to ever refuel, these ships will need less time in 
overhaul and therefore enable the Navy to meet the same deterrence 
requirements while reducing the fleet size from 14 to 12. This alone 
will lead to many billions of dollars in acquisition and operating cost 
savings. Additional improvements will ensure that Columbia remains 
survivable in future threat environments, while design flexibility will 
allow for future upgrades. The Columbia program is currently in the 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, and advanced 
procurement began in fiscal year 2018. Production of the lead ship of 
the class is expected to begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 
2021. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Columbia totals $2.2 
billion.
    The Navy is extending the life of the Trident II (D5) Strategic 
Weapons System (SWS) to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and 
to serve as the initial SLBM for the Columbia-class SSBN. This is being 
accomplished through an update to all SWS subsystems: launcher, 
navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Two major 
components of this effort are the D5 Life Extension (D5LE) missile and 
Shipboard System Integration (SSI) Program. The Navy deployed 24 life-
extended (D5LE) missiles in fiscal year 2018 and remains on track to 
complete deployment by fiscal year 2024. The SSI program refreshes 
shipboard electronics hardware and upgrades software to enable extended 
service life, efficient and affordable maintenance and continues to 
provide the highest level of nuclear weapons safety. The Navy completed 
16 installations in fiscal year 2018--7 more are scheduled to be 
completed this year.
ICBM Force
    For the ground-based leg of the triad, the Air Force is 
concurrently sustaining 400 deployed Minuteman III (MM III) ICBMs and 
developing their replacements, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 
(GBSD) weapon system. The MM III has been in service since 1970 and has 
been life extended several times. When it is finally retired, after 
2030, it will be the longest serving ICBM in history. For sixty years, 
MM III will have played a central role in our nuclear triad by 
providing a highly responsive capability that complicates adversary 
attack planning and decision making. However, U.S. Strategic Command 
has noted that as it reaches its end of life, MM III will face a more 
challenging threat environment that will make it increasingly difficult 
for the missile system to effectively hold targets at risk. MM III will 
also contend with attrition issues due to required testing and the 
aging and obsolescence of key missile components.
    GBSD addresses the problems of MM III aging, attrition, and 
declining capability. The GBSD program is a comprehensive effort to 
replace the missile system, weapon system command and control, and 
ground systems--as well as convert, modernize, or replace aging MM III 
infrastructure. Beginning with its initial deployment in 2028, GBSD 
will provide improved capability versus the legacy MM III, and ensure 
the ICBM force remains safe, secure, effective, and reliable out to 
2075.
    The GBSD program is currently in the Technology Maturation and Risk 
Reduction (TMRR) phase, with two prime contractors competing over the 
next year to address risk and develop the most cost-effective solution 
to meeting military requirements. The fiscal year fiscal year 2020 
budget request includes $678 million of RDT&E and MILCON funding for 
the continued development of the GBSD weapon system. By the end of 
fiscal year 2020, the program plans to complete its TMRR Preliminary 
Design Review, conduct a Milestone B review, and award the contract for 
the EMD phase of the program.
Bomber Force
    The airborne leg of the triad is currently comprised of B-52H 
bombers capable of delivering nuclear-armed air-launched cruise 
missiles (ALCMs) and B-2A bombers capable of delivering nuclear gravity 
bombs. To sustain this most visible and flexible leg of the triad and 
maintain its effectiveness in a threat environment characterized by 
continuously improving adversary air defenses, the Air Force is 
carrying out multiple modernization programs to extend the service 
lives and improve the capabilities of these aircraft. For instance, the 
B-52 fleet is scheduled to receive new engines as part of the B-52 
Commercial Engine Replacement program--this will be the first engine 
replacement for the B-52 since its introduction in 1962. B-52Hs will 
also receive an upgraded radar through the Radar Modernization Program 
and an improved communications and mission management system known as 
Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT). CONECT will provide 
an integrated communication and mission management system with a 
machine-to-machine interface for weapons targeting and will enable 
greater weapons carriage flexibility.
    Similarly, the B-2A fleet will receive upgrades to multiple 
systems, including the Defensive Management System (to ensure its 
ability to operate in highly contested environments) and its Stores 
Management Operational Flight Program software (to enable the aircraft 
to use advanced digital weapon interfaces and allow carriage of the 
B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb).
    To supplement--and eventually replace--the legacy bomber force, DOD 
is developing a modern, long-range, penetrating bomber. The B-21 Raider 
will give the Air Force a highly-survivable conventional and nuclear-
capable bomber that ensures the ability to penetrate advanced air 
defense systems in an anti-access/area denial environment well into the 
future. The Air Force plans to acquire a minimum of 100 B-21s, with the 
first expected to enter service in the mid-2020s. B-21 is currently in 
the EMD phase and is transitioning to the development of the first test 
aircraft. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $3 billion for 
the program.
    DOD is also sustaining the nuclear-armed AGM-86B ALCM, first 
introduced in the early 1980s, until it can be replaced by the Long 
Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon in the early 2030s. Developed to allow the 
B-52H to execute its deterrent missions while remaining safely outside 
the range of adversary air defenses, the ALCM has already undergone 
multiple service life extensions to keep it operational well beyond its 
original 10-year design life. As it ages, ALCM will face continuously 
improving adversary air defenses, as well as challenges to weapon 
system sustainment caused by out-of-production parts and limited 
supplies.
    LRSO will be a modern, nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile 
capable of penetrating advanced integrated air defenses. Once deployed, 
LRSO will be carried by both the B-52H and upcoming B-21 bombers. LRSO 
will be the first simultaneous development of a missile and nuclear 
warhead in more than 30 years. The LRSO program is currently underway, 
with two contractors currently performing work under TMRR contracts. 
The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $713 million in RDT&E 
funding to continue development of the missile and fund initial 
aircraft integration efforts.
Dual-Capable Aircraft
    In addition to the three legs of the strategic nuclear triad, the 
U.S. maintains a force of dual-capable tactical aircraft (DCA), capable 
of delivering nuclear-gravity bombs. This ``non-strategic'' nuclear 
capability enhances deterrence and assurance by providing an ability to 
forward-deploy U.S. nuclear forces around the globe and demonstrate to 
allies and adversaries alike that U.S. nuclear forces are prepared to 
defend U.S. interests and those of our allies and partners. Today, DCA 
missions are fulfilled by U.S. F-15E aircraft, as well as aircraft 
provided by several NATO allies, capable of carrying B61-3/4 nuclear 
gravity bombs.
    To replace the F-15E in the DCA role, the U.S. is developing DCA 
capability for the F-35A--which several of our NATO allies will also 
fly for the Alliance's nuclear deterrence mission. Fifth-generation F-
35 DCA will ensure U.S. and NATO allies retain the ability to penetrate 
advanced air defenses long into the future. The fiscal year 2020 budget 
request includes $71.3 million for the F-35A DCA program, with the 
program planning to complete software development, separation flight 
testing, and mission system flight testing during the fiscal year.
    Similarly, the B61-3/4s carried by our DCA are being modernized to 
the B61-12, which is scheduled to replace several B61 variants 
currently in service. The B61-12 Life Extension Program is a joint 
effort between DOD and the Department of Energy's (DOE) National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In this program, DOD is 
responsible for development of a guidance-capable tailkit assembly 
(TKA), aircraft integration, and all-up round integration, while NNSA 
is responsible for the bomb assembly. Production of the B61-12 TKA is 
underway and Milestone C was achieved in the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2019. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $108.3 million 
for the program.
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
    The NPR directed DOD to pursue a modern, nuclear-armed, sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM) to supplement the triad and DCA. The 
SLCM will provide a regional, non-strategic nuclear capability and will 
help address both Russia's arms control violations and the major 
imbalance between Russian and United States non-strategic nuclear 
capabilities. This program will leverage existing technologies wherever 
possible to ensure cost effectiveness and will require close 
coordination with NNSA. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $5 
million to support an analysis of alternatives for the SLCM.
NC3
    Underpinning our entire nuclear deterrent is a complex and 
resilient NC3 system that must always connect the President to our 
nuclear forces--even under the most stressful circumstances. The NC3 
portfolio comprises a complex architecture of more than 200 systems 
that allow detection of threats, support decision making, and enable 
force direction.
    Our NC3 system is reliable and effective in supporting today's 
nuclear deterrence requirements, but it is largely based on 20th 
Century technologies developed during the Cold War. Modernization is 
essential to meet modern threats, especially in cyberspace. As DOD's 
NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager, I work closely with General Hyten, in 
his capacity as the NC3 Enterprise Lead, to sustain the systems we have 
while working to develop and field new capabilities across the domains 
of space, air, and land.
    Space-based communications systems play--and will continue to 
play--a vital role in our NC3 architecture. As with other operating 
environments, space is increasingly contested and potentially a 
warfighting domain. Satellite systems operating in the extremely high 
frequency range, with their ability to communicate through severe 
nuclear radiation environments, are essential to ensuring resilient 
communications. The existing Military Strategic and Tactical Relay 
(Milstar) satellite constellation is long past its planned life. To 
replace and enhance Milstar capability, there are currently four 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites in orbit with two 
additional satellites set to launch by 2020. The fiscal year 2020 
budget request includes $149 million in total funding for AEHF. DOD is 
developing a number of airborne and land-based satellite terminals to 
take advantage of this new AEHF constellation. For instance, the Family 
of Beyond Line of Sight Terminals (FAB-T) program is developing force 
element and command post terminals to provide the resilient 
communications necessary to link senior national leaders together with 
each other and with our nuclear forces. The fiscal year 2020 budget 
request includes $198 million in RDT&E for FAB-T.
    In the air domain, the NC3 system currently relies on E-4B and E-6B 
aircraft to act as alternate command posts and communications relays to 
help direct our nuclear forces. These aircraft date to the 1970s and 
1980s and also require recapitalization. An analysis of alternatives is 
underway to replace these systems in the early-2030s with newer, more 
capable, and more sustainable platforms. Additionally, DOD is 
developing a common Very Low Frequency (VLF) receiver that, when 
fielded, will replace aging communications systems on our B-52H and B-
2A bomber fleets that are challenged by a vanishing vendor base.
    Finally, in the land domain, the Air Force's Global Aircrew 
Strategic Network Terminal (Global ASNT) is being developed to 
modernize our survivable communications links between the President and 
certain elements of the nuclear enterprise such as Wing Command Posts, 
bomber and tanker Mobile Support Teams, and more. Global ASNT will 
replace the Single-Channel, Anti-Jam, Man-Portable (SCAMP) system, 
which is based on 1980's technology. The fiscal year 2020 budget 
request includes $123 million for Global ASNT Increment 2.
            nuclear weapons council and alignment with nnsa
    As statutory chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), the Under 
Secretary for A&S has responsibility for not only sustaining and 
modernizing DOD's nuclear forces but also ensuring those activities are 
synchronized with their associated nuclear warhead development programs 
managed by NNSA. The NWC is a joint DOD and DOE/NNSA governance body 
established to facilitate alignment and coordination--and establish 
priorities--as the two Departments fulfill their shared responsibility 
for providing the nation's nuclear deterrent. The NWC continually seeks 
to guide and balance the many programs needed to maintain our existing 
nuclear weapons stockpile while also modernizing it. We also review, 
coordinate, and help set requirements that drive capability and 
capacity decisions at NNSA, which is particularly important as NNSA 
recapitalizes its nuclear weapons production infrastructure--much of 
which dates to the 1950s and 1960s or earlier.
    Regarding capability and capacity, the 2018 NPR re-confirmed, and 
the NWC supports, NNSA's efforts to establish a responsive enterprise 
capable of designing and producing the nuclear weapons DOD needs to 
deter conflict and assure allies. This includes rebuilding NNSA's 
strategic materials production and processing capabilities for 
plutonium, uranium, lithium, and tritium--as well as key capabilities 
for the design and manufacture of strategic radiation hardened 
microelectronics. While all these materials and capabilities are 
important to sustaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, pit 
production is a lynchpin. Funding to support implementing the pit 
production capability needed to meet DOD's requirements lowers risks 
associated with the aging of plutonium in existing pits and provides 
the ability to respond to potential challenges, caused by renewed 
strategic competition, in a timely fashion.
    A responsive enterprise also includes ensuring NNSA has a world-
class workforce capable of responding to the dynamic and uncertain 
nuclear future we face. With the reemergence of Great Power competition 
and increasing nuclear threats, it is important to ensure NNSA's 
workforce and infrastructure are prepared to provide a credible, 
flexible, and modern deterrent that can adapt to change and emerging 
requirements in a timely manner. As the Secretary of Defense's preface 
to the NPR stated:

        ``Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons complex of laboratories 
        and plants is also long past due; it is vital we ensure the 
        capability to design, produce, assess, and maintain these 
        weapons for as long as they are required. Due to consistent 
        underfunding, significant and sustained investments will be 
        required over the coming decade to ensure that National Nuclear 
        Security Administration will be able to deliver the nuclear 
        weapons at the needed rate to support the nuclear deterrent 
        into the 2030s and beyond.''

    The NWC regularly convenes to synchronize efforts between DOD and 
NNSA on the vision, strategy, and execution of nuclear programs. 
Similar to the challenges faced by aging nuclear delivery systems in 
DOD, the nuclear weapons produced and sustained by NNSA continue to 
age--with many well-beyond their originally expected service lives. DOD 
and the NWC support NNSA's nuclear weapon life extension programs 
(LEP), Stockpile Stewardship Program, and Stockpile Responsiveness 
Program. Collectively, these programs enable sustainment of the current 
nuclear weapons stockpile, improved understanding of aging effects in 
the stockpile, and prepare NNSA's enterprise for the future. For 
example, NNSA's Stockpile Responsiveness Program is an important means 
to develop and retain the next generation of world-class scientists and 
engineers that NNSA needs. It also allows NNSA to explore and mature 
technologies for potential insertion into future LEPs, exercise 
critical design and production skills, and develop options for 
responding to emerging threats.
       npr implementation and nuclear enterprise review follow-up
NPR Implementation
    The 2018 NPR confirmed the findings of previous NPRs that the 
diverse capabilities of the nuclear triad provide the flexibility and 
resilience needed for deterrence in the most cost-effective manner. To 
turn the NPR's policy direction into action, A&S has been leading and 
supporting a variety of implementation activities.
    For instance, the NWC took quick action to respond to the NPR's 
tasking to develop and field a low-yield, submarine-launched ballistic 
missile, completing necessary reviews and authorizations to enable NNSA 
to build a first production unit of the W76-2 warhead just 12 months 
after the NPR was released. The NWC has also reviewed requirements 
related to the nuclear-armed SLCM directed by the NPR, and NWC 
stakeholders are engaging to support the analysis of alternatives 
related to that weapon.
    More long-term, the NWC has published a fiscal year 2019-2044 
Strategic Plan, which will help guide efforts to align programs related 
to nuclear delivery platforms, warheads, and infrastructure. More 
broadly, A&S continues to assess and mitigate risks across the defense 
industrial base that may impact our nuclear sustainment and 
modernization efforts--including with respect to large solid rocket 
motors, radiation hardened microelectronics, and aeroshells.
Nuclear Enterprise Review Follow-up
    The 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER) identified a series of 
problems across the DOD nuclear enterprise and made hundreds of 
recommendations to correct them. As then-Secretary of Defense Hagel 
stated upon conclusion of the NER in a November 14, 2014, Message to 
the Force on Our Nuclear Enterprise:

        ``Our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in assuring U.S. 
        national security, and it is DOD's highest priority mission. No 
        other capability we have is more important . . . For too long, 
        we have overlooked career paths, compensation, infrastructure, 
        and small unit leadership that are mission-critical in the 
        nuclear force. That is changing. It will continue to change.''

    DOD continues to carry this torch and continues to take action to 
ensure our nuclear enterprise stays healthy. For instance, the Nuclear 
Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG), created in 2014 to ensure 
effective follow-up on the NER's recommendations, recently met and 
reviewed progress across the enterprise.
    As we institutionalize the NDERG for the long-term, A&S is leading 
the NDERG in a transition from a mission that largely looks back to 
address and close recommendations from the 2014 NER to instead also 
look forward to identify and address problems early. While the NDERG 
has closed many of the recommendations from the 2014 NER, some of the 
remaining recommendations are enduring, which will require DOD to track 
their associated metrics indefinitely. The NDERG and its stakeholders 
are also in the process of developing leading indicators and data 
analysis tools to ensure risks, issues, and opportunities across the 
nuclear enterprise are understood and effectively communicated to 
senior leaders.
                               conclusion
    History has made clear that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is the 
foundation of U.S. national security and fundamental to international 
stability. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for DOD's modernization 
and sustainment programs reflect that importance. Any large collection 
of complex and integrated programs faces risks, and our nuclear 
recapitalization and sustainment efforts are no different. The 
dedicated professionals in A&S, the Services, and NNSA are actively 
managing these programs to reduce risk, accelerate schedules, and seek 
efficiencies wherever possible. We recognize that this is a 20-year 
nuclear modernization journey we are embarked upon--but perhaps the 
biggest driver of risk is that we started that journey 15 years too 
late. Delay is no longer an option. I encourage Congress to provide the 
full amount of the budget request for nuclear programs in both DOD and 
NNSA.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, DEPUTY UNDER 
                SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

    Secretary Trachtenberg. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member 
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you 
for the opportunity to testify on the President's Fiscal Year 
2020 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces.
    For decades, the United States has led the world in efforts 
to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. 
Unfortunately, as described in the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review, Russia and China have 
chosen a different path and have increased the role of nuclear 
weapons in their strategies and actively increased the size and 
sophistication of their nuclear forces.
    For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent 
is necessary to prevent competition from escalating to large-
scale conflict.

                           THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Russia

    Russia continues to prioritize modernizing its nuclear 
forces, including every leg of its strategic triad. According 
to the Russian Defense Minister, 90 percent of the country's 
strategic nuclear forces will be upgraded by 2020.
    In March 2018, only a month after the United States and 
Russia reached New START limits on strategic systems, Vladimir 
Putin announced that Russia is developing even more new nuclear 
weapons capabilities. Moreover, Russia is modernizing and 
expanding an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed on ships, 
bombers, tactical aircraft, and with ground forces.

China

    China continues its expansive military modernization, 
including deploying advanced sea-based weapons, developing a 
new generation of road-mobile missiles, improving its silo-
based weapons, testing hypersonic glide vehicles, and 
developing a nuclear-capable, next-generation bomber.

North Korea

    North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a potential threat 
to our allies and Homeland.
    Although we remain hopeful that negotiations may produce a 
pathway to peace and denuclearization, we must also remain 
vigilant and maintain a strong deterrence posture.

                                 POLICY

    In light of these threats, the Department's 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review prioritizes maintaining a safe, secure, 
survivable and effective nuclear deterrent as the ultimate 
foundation of our nation's security. To remain credible, our 
aging nuclear forces must be modernized--delay is not an 
option.
    The 2018 NPR reaffirmed the conclusions of previous 
Republican and Democratic administrations that the diverse, 
complementary capabilities of the nuclear triad ensure no 
adversary believes it can employ nuclear weapons for any 
reason, under any circumstances.
    Unfortunately, each leg of the triad is now operating far 
beyond its originally-planned service life. If not 
recapitalized, these forces will age into obsolescence.
    The Department's request to recapitalize or modernize the 
nuclear enterprise is about 1.2 percent of the total DOD budget 
request. In addition, the budget request to sustain and operate 
nuclear forces is about 2.3 percent, for a total of about 3.5 
percent of the DOD budget.

                           DECLARATORY POLICY

    Our nuclear declaratory policy remains consistent with 
longstanding precepts that ``the United States would employ 
nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances . . . ''
    The United States has a long-standing policy of 
constructive ambiguity regarding nuclear employment that has 
deterred potential adversaries since the advent of the nuclear 
age. Establishing a policy of ``no-first-use'' of nuclear 
weapons would undermine U.S. extended deterrence and damage the 
health of our alliances because it would call into question the 
assurance that the United States would come to the defense of 
allies in extreme circumstances. ``No-first-use'' could 
embolden adversaries to test what they might perceive as a 
weakened U.S. resolve to defend our allies and vital interests 
with every means at our disposal. It could undermine U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives if allies and partners felt the 
need to develop or possess their own nuclear weapons to deter 
potential adversaries.

                              ARMS CONTROL

    With respect to arms control, as a consequence of Russia's 
clear violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty, and consistent with the Sense of Congress expressed in 
the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the 
United States suspended its obligations under the Treaty. We. 
also gave notice of our intent to withdraw from it. Let me be 
clear: It is Russia that has abandoned the Treaty as a result 
of its violation, and our Allies fully support these United 
States actions in response.
    Consequently, the United States is moving forward with 
developing conventionally-armed, ground-launched, intermediate-
range missile capabilities. What sort of system we ultimately 
develop will be driven by our assessment of military 
requirements and in consultation with Congress and with our 
allies and partners.
    More generally, the United States is committed to arms 
control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner 
security, are verifiable and enforceable, and include partners 
that comply responsibly with their obligations. Accordingly, we 
must take account of the prevailing international security 
environment, which is more complex and challenging than nearly 
a decade ago when the New START Treaty was signed.
    New technologies, the development by Russia of new 
strategic weapons systems (several of which would be 
unconstrained by New START), Russia's significant advantage in 
non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the expansion by China of 
its own nuclear capabilities present new challenges for arms 
control.

                               CONCLUSION

    Chairman Fischer, let me conclude by stating that nuclear 
deterrence is the bedrock of U.S. national security. Our 
nuclear deterrent underwrites all U.S. military operations and 
diplomacy across the globe--it is the backstop and foundation 
of our national defense. A strong nuclear deterrent also 
contributes to U.S. nonproliferation goals by eliminating the 
incentive for allies to have their own nuclear weapons.
    I thank the Committee for its previous support and urge 
continued support for the important nuclear programs and 
funding contained in the President's fiscal year 2020 budget 
request.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Under Secretary Trachtenberg 
follows:]

      prepared statement by under secretary david j. trachtenberg
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on 
the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request for nuclear forces and 
our nuclear posture.
    Today, the United States faces an extraordinarily complex and 
dangerous global security environment, in which the central challenge 
to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term 
strategic competition with China and Russia, which seek to overturn the 
long-standing rules-based international order and change territorial 
borders.
    This is acknowledged in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which 
also notes that rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran are 
destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear weapons or 
sponsorship of terrorism.
    While we are hopeful for a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, North Korea continues to pose a threat to the United States 
Homeland, as well as our allies, and Iran seeks to establish itself as 
the dominant regional power in the Middle East, restrict our access, 
support proxies, and sow violence throughout the region.
    For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce 
the role and number of nuclear weapons. Successive treaties enabled 
reductions in accountable strategic U.S. nuclear warheads, first to 
6,000, and ultimately to 1,550. Thousands of shorter-range nuclear 
weapons not covered by any treaty were almost entirely eliminated from 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Overall, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile 
has drawn down by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high.
    Unfortunately, Russia and China have chosen a different path and 
have increased the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and 
actively increased the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces.
    For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent helps 
ensure the United States competes from a position of strength and can 
deter nuclear attack and prevent large-scale conventional warfare 
between nuclear-armed states for the foreseeable future.
                           the nuclear threat
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects DOD's strategic 
priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and effective nuclear 
deterrent. The NPR examined the challenges posed by Russia, China, 
North Korea and Iran in order to recommend a nuclear force posture 
adequate to deter aggression by these and other countries.
Russia
    Russia continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to 
upgrade its nuclear forces and pursue advanced weapons specifically 
designed to counter U.S. military capabilities. Russia's nuclear 
modernization program covers every leg of its strategic triad and 
includes advanced modern road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), new submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs), and long-range strategic bombers. According to Russia's TASS 
News Agency, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced on 
February 21, 2017 that 90 percent of the country's strategic nuclear 
forces will be armed with modern weaponry by 2020.
    In March 2018, only a month after the United States and Russia 
reached the limits on strategic systems established under the New START 
Treaty, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia is developing 
even more new nuclear weapons capabilities, which include: 1) an 
intercontinental-range, nuclear armed hypersonic glide vehicle; 2) a 
maneuverable, nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile; 3) a long-
range, nuclear-powered cruise missile; 4) a nuclear-powered, nuclear-
armed underwater unmanned vehicle; and 5) a new heavy intercontinental 
range ballistic missile, called the SARMAT. President Putin, during 
this same speech, also announced that Russia developed new laser 
weapons systems ``that have been supplied to the troops since last 
year.''
    This past February (2019), President Putin declared that Russia had 
successfully tested nuclear-propulsion engines that would allow the 
nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and underwater drones to travel for 
unlimited distances and evade traditional defenses. Some of these 
weapons would not be subject to the New START Treaty's central limits 
and verification regime as they exist today.
    On top of all of this, Russia is modernizing and expanding an 
active stockpile of approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons--
often referred to as tactical nuclear weapons--that can be deployed on 
ships, bombers, and tactical aircraft, and with ground forces. None of 
these are limited by any arms control treaty. In contrast, the United 
States forward deploys to Europe small number of just one type of 
nonstrategic nuclear weapon--the B61 nuclear gravity bomb--which is 
delivered by a dual-capable tactical aircraft. Both the B61 and its 
delivery aircraft are being modernized, but not increased in number.
    Russia's military doctrine emphasizes the coercive nature and 
military value of nuclear weapons. During its military operation 
against Crimea, Russia raised the alert level of its nuclear forces and 
issued veiled nuclear threats to ensure the West did not intervene. 
Russia has repeatedly brandished its nuclear sword towards our NATO 
Allies in recent years. In July 2017, Russian President Putin signed a 
new naval doctrine that stated, ``under conditions of escalation of a 
military conflict, demonstration of readiness and determination to use 
force, including the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, is an 
effective deterrent factor.'' More recently, in his annual state-of-
the-nation address on February 20, 2019, Putin said that, if Washington 
deployed intermediate-range missiles in Europe, Moscow would target the 
countries hosting the United States weapons.
China
    China continues its expansive military modernization and is focused 
on establishing regional dominance and expanding its ability to coerce 
U.S. allies and partners. Consistent with a military strategy that 
stresses ``optimization of its nuclear force structure,'' China is 
modernizing and rapidly expanding its already considerable nuclear 
forces, with little to no transparency regarding the scope and scale of 
its nuclear modernization program. China is the only P-5 country that 
has not announced publicly the size of its nuclear arsenal, and has 
rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to engage in a meaningful bilateral 
dialogue on nuclear posture and risk reduction issues.
    China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles, with 
warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry 
vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids. In particular, China has 
developed a new road-mobile strategic ICBM and its most advanced 
ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBM).
    China has also announced development of a new nuclear-capable 
strategic bomber, indicating China's intent to develop a nuclear triad 
and has deployed a nuclear-capable precision guided DF-26 intermediate-
range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets. 
China also tested a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2014.
    China's nuclear forces include a mix of strategic-range systems 
capable of striking the Homeland as well as theater-range forces 
capable of threatening allies, United States bases, and forces in the 
region. As China's capabilities both diversify and improve, there is 
risk China may perceive that these weapons provide it with coercive 
options in a crisis or conflict. China's modernization is troubling, 
and the lack of transparency combined with growing Chinese 
assertiveness in the region is one of the most serious risks to 
regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.
North Korea
    North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a potential threat to our 
allies and the United States Homeland and add to an already complex 
strategic picture. North Korea has conducted six increasingly 
sophisticated nuclear tests and three ICBM flight tests that 
demonstrate its ability to strike the United States Homeland. Although 
we remain hopeful that negotiations may produce a pathway to peace and 
denuclearization, we must also remain vigilant and maintain a strong 
deterrence posture.
                                 policy
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects the Department of 
Defense's strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and 
effective nuclear deterrent. Nuclear forces are the ultimate foundation 
of our nation's security. Our deterrent forces must be modernized to 
remain credible--delay is not an option.
    The highest U.S. nuclear policy and strategy priority are to deter 
potential adversaries from nuclear attack of any scale against the 
United States or its allies and partners. However, deterring nuclear 
attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons. Given the diverse 
threats and profound uncertainties of the current and future threat 
environment, U.S. nuclear forces play the following critical roles in 
U.S. national security strategy:

      Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack;
      Assurance of allies and partners;
      Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and
      Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

    Effective U.S. deterrence of nuclear attack and non-nuclear 
strategic attack requires ensuring that potential adversaries do not 
miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use, either 
regionally or against the United States itself. They must understand 
that the costs far outweigh any perceived benefits from non-nuclear 
aggression or limited nuclear escalation.
Declaratory Policy
    U.S. nuclear declaratory policy is consistent with longstanding 
precepts that ``the United States would employ nuclear weapons only in 
extreme circumstance to defend the vital interests of the United 
States, allies and partners.'' The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
clarifies that the ``extreme circumstances'' that may lead the United 
States to consider nuclear use, include, but are not limited to: 
significant non-nuclear strategic attacks on U.S., allied, or partner 
civilian population or infrastructure; and significant non-nuclear 
strategic attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and 
control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities. This 
clarification is intended to reduce the possibility of adversary 
miscalculation.
    The 2018 NPR further states: ``The United States will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that 
are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations.''
No-First Use
    The United States has a long-standing policy of constructive 
ambiguity regarding U.S. nuclear employment that has deterred potential 
adversaries from nuclear coercion or aggression since the advent of the 
nuclear age. A policy of ``no-first-use'' would undermine U.S. extended 
deterrence and damage the health of our alliances because it would call 
into question the assurance that the United States would come to the 
defense of allies in extreme circumstances. ``No-first-use'' would 
likely embolden adversaries to test what they might perceive as 
weakened U.S. resolve to defend our allies and vital interests with 
every means at our disposal. Finally, a no-first use policy could 
undermine U.S. nonproliferation objectives if allies and partners felt 
the need to develop or possess their own nuclear weapons to deter 
potential adversaries.
                                posture
    The policies set forth in the 2018 NPR reaffirmed the conclusions 
of previous Republican and Democratic administrations that the diverse 
capabilities of the nuclear triad provide the flexibility and 
resilience needed for deterrence in the most cost-effective manner. 
Each triad leg is essential, complementary, and critical to ensuring no 
adversary believes it can successfully employ nuclear weapons for any 
reason, under any circumstances.
    Unfortunately, each leg of the triad is now operating far beyond 
its originally-planned service life. Over the past 25 years, the United 
States made only modest investments in basic nuclear sustainment, life-
extension, and operations. Most of the nation's nuclear delivery 
systems, built in the 1980s and prior, will reach their end-of-service 
life in the 2025-2035 timeframe and cannot be sustained further. If not 
recapitalized, these forces will age into obsolescence. Our choice is 
not between replacing our Cold War systems or keeping them, but between 
replacing them or losing them altogether. Similarly, the DOE/NNSA 
infrastructure has long been underfunded and overdue for the upgrades 
necessary to create a modern, efficient nuclear complex to meet the 
nation's national security missions. DOD relies on the continued 
investment in recapitalization of DOE/NNSA's laboratories, production 
and test facilities.
    Consequently, we must not delay the recapitalization of the triad 
and our nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system 
initiated by the previous Administration. The fiscal year 2020 Budget 
Request funds all critical Department of Defense (DOD) modernization 
requirements, helping to ensure that modern replacements will be 
available before the Nation's legacy systems reach the end of their 
extended service lives. The fiscal year 2020 Budget Request for nuclear 
forces is $24.9 billion or roughly 3.5 percent of the DOD budget. This 
includes $8.4 billion for recapitalization programs (including the B-
21, ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD) ICBM, the long-range 
standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, and the Columbia-class nuclear 
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)) and $16.5 billion to sustain and 
operate our nuclear forces.
    DOD's fiscal year 2020 request to recapitalize the nuclear 
enterprise is about 1.2 percent of the total DOD budget request. Over 
the long term, nuclear force modernization will cost approximately $320 
billion over 23 years. Recent estimates, such as those from the 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review, project that the total cost to sustain and 
modernize U.S. nuclear forces will account for about 6.4 percent of the 
Defense budget at its highest level of funding in 2029, returning to 
about 3 percent for sustainment upon completion of modernization. The 
January 2019 Congressional Budget Office report supports DOD's 
estimates concluding that the estimated cost of nuclear forces ``is 
projected to rise from about 5 percent in 2019 to about 7 percent in 
2028.''
    Finally, in support of modernizing these strategic systems, the 
bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission concluded in its 2018 
Providing for the Common Defense report that ``Given the criticality of 
effective U.S. nuclear deterrence to the assurance of allies, and, most 
importantly, the safety of the American people, there is no doubt that 
these programs are both necessary and affordable.''
Supplemental Capabilities
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the United States 
must supplement its existing stockpile with two modest capabilities to 
ensure Russia, China, and others do not perceive a gap in our regional 
deterrence posture. This is intended to discourage adversaries from 
limited nuclear attacks--strengthening deterrence and helping prevent 
conflict in the first place. By modifying a small number of existing 
SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option and restoring a modern 
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to the force, the U.S. will have 
credible response options to nuclear attacks of any magnitude. The low-
yield SLBM warhead and nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) 
are measured responses to close troubling gaps in regional deterrence 
that have emerged in recent years. In addition, redeploying a SLCM 
addresses the enormous disparity in nonstrategic nuclear forces, 
without attempting to match Russia system for system. Both systems 
complement existing capabilities in the triad by providing assured, 
tailored options in the face of increasingly advanced air and missile 
defenses. In addition, the unique attributes of a nuclear SLCM may 
incentivize Russia to accept constraints on its nonstrategic nuclear 
capabilities.
    Moreover, the supplemental capabilities do not require nuclear 
testing or developing new nuclear weapons. They do not violate any arms 
control treaties or other international obligations, and they do not 
lower the threshold for nuclear use. They are intended to raise 
Russia's threshold (or likelihood) for employing nuclear weapons by 
convincing Russia that it would gain no advantage in using low-yield 
nuclear weapons.
             nato, japan and republic of korea engagements
    The United States continues to extend nuclear deterrence 
commitments to assure allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. 
Based on our long-shared common values and interests, this commitment 
helps address allied concerns with regional threats, such as Russia's 
nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities and aggressive rhetoric; China's 
assertiveness; and North Korea's nuclear and non-nuclear threats.
    The United States exhibits its commitment to extended deterrence in 
two ways: first, it maintains the capabilities necessary to deter and, 
if necessary, to respond decisively across the spectrum of potential 
nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios that could affect our allies and 
partners; and second it sustains regular allied dialogues to facilitate 
understanding of each other's threat perceptions and to determine how 
best to demonstrate our collective capabilities and resolve.
    Within NATO, we continue to participate in the Nuclear Planning 
Group and the High-Level Group, which our Assistant Secretary for 
Strategy, Plans and Capabilities chairs. As NATO Allies reiterated in 
Brussels last July, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain 
a nuclear alliance. The Alliance's deterrence posture continues to 
depend upon both U.S. strategic nuclear forces and forward deployed 
nuclear gravity bombs with U.S. and allied dual-capable aircraft.
    In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States maintains formal 
extended deterrence dialogues with Japan--the United States-Japan 
Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD)--and with the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) (e.g. United States ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC)). 
Through regular bilateral meetings, allied site-visits to locations of 
U.S. strategic capabilities, and table-top exercises, both the EDD and 
DSC have helped us to develop a common Alliance understanding of 
deterrence principles, and to test application of those principles to 
scenarios we may face in the Indo-Pacific region. These dialogues 
contribute to alliance cohesion and effectiveness and help affirm to 
our allies that they should not doubt our extended deterrence 
commitments or our ability and willingness to fulfill them.
      intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty developments
    On February 2, 2019, after years of Russian cheating on its 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty obligations, and after 
exhausting every reasonable diplomatic, economic, and military effort 
to persuade Russia to comply with its treaty obligations, the United 
States suspended its obligations under the INF Treaty and gave notice 
of the U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty. As NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg asserted, ``Russia is in material breach of 
the INF Treaty and must use the next six months to return to full and 
verifiable compliance or bear sole responsibility for its demise.'' 
Allies fully support the U.S. decision to suspend its obligations under 
INF and the U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty.
    To be clear, what prompted the U.S. suspension was not a technical 
violation or an interpretive difference, but Russia's development, 
testing, and fielding of a ground-launched cruise missile system 
specifically banned by the INF Treaty. For those concerned that our 
suspension will cause Russia to develop these systems further, I can 
only say Russia's legal obligations under the INF Treaty proved no 
barrier to its pursuit and fielding of a banned system in the first 
place. To assert that Russia is reacting to our suspension is to ignore 
the reality of Russia's conduct under the INF Treaty.
    As the President stated in February 2019, the United States is 
moving forward with developing ground-launched missile capabilities. 
This is a direct consequence of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. 
Now that our Treaty obligations are suspended, we are beginning work 
that if pursued to completion would be inconsistent with the Treaty. 
The United States is developing systems that are conventional in 
nature, and this work is designed to be reversible should Russia return 
to compliance by verifiably destroying its INF Treaty-violating 
missiles, launchers, and associated equipment. This development will 
include flight tests, although we do not anticipate progressing to this 
stage before the United States' withdrawal from the Treaty takes effect 
on August 2. What sort of system we ultimately develop will be driven 
by our assessment of military requirements and in consultation with 
Congress and with our allies and partners.
                          the new start treaty
    As stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is 
committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and 
partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners 
that comply responsibly with their obligations. As both the 2018 NPR 
and the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit Communique noted, we must take 
account of the prevailing international security environment. In the 
arms control context, this means Russia and, increasingly, China.
    While we assess Russia to be in compliance with the central limits 
of New START, the history of Russia's arms control behavior is 
sobering. I will not recount here Russia's many violations of its 
treaty obligations and other political commitments. It is instructive, 
however, that, only a month after the United States and Russia reached 
the central limits on strategic nuclear systems prescribed by the New 
START Treaty, President Putin--with great fanfare--announced Russia was 
developing new long-range nuclear delivery systems, some of which would 
not be limited by the New START Treaty. This is troubling given that 
Russia is also modernizing its growing and increasingly capable arsenal 
of shorter-range, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are also not 
covered by New START. Members of this Committee will remember that 
Russia's nonstrategic arsenal was of great concern when the New START 
Treaty was ratified, and it remains a concern today.
    That said, the Department supports pursuing a prudent arms control 
agenda, which could include extending the New START Treaty, provided 
the outcomes improve the security of the United States and our allies 
and partners, and effectively help manage strategic competition among 
states.
                               conclusion
    Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that nuclear deterrence is 
the bedrock of U.S. national security. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must 
dissuade any adversary from mistakenly believing it can benefit from 
using nuclear weapons--even in a limited way--against the United States 
or its allies and partners.
    Our nuclear deterrent underwrites all U.S. military operations and 
diplomacy across the globe--it is the backstop and foundation of our 
national defense. A strong nuclear deterrent also contributes to U.S. 
nonproliferation goals by eliminating the incentive for allies to have 
their own nuclear weapons.
    In an increasingly complex and threatening security environment, we 
must make the investments needed to address the on-going atrophying of 
our nuclear capabilities and ensure we have the capabilities, now and 
in the future, to deter and defend against attacks on our Homeland, 
U.S. forces deployed abroad, and allies and partners.
    I urge the Committee to support the important nuclear programs and 
funding contained in the President's fiscal year 2020 Budget Request.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to 
your questions.

OPENING STATEMENT GENERAL TIMOTHY M. RAY, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR 
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND AND COMMANDER, AIR FORCE STRATEGIC-
             AIR, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND"

    General Ray. Good morning Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking 
Member Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee; 
thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to 
represent the men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command.
    After three years in Europe as the Commander of Third Air 
Force and the Deputy Commander of United States European 
Command, I had a front row seat in the great power competition 
unfolding around us in Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, 
and the Middle East.
    It became abundantly clear we must bring about a 
significant transition in our capabilities and our thinking as 
we turn our attention from seventeen years of conflict in the 
Middle East and counterterrorism operations to potential 
conflict with global competitors, with significantly more 
capable technology and growing strategic capabilities. Air 
Force Global Strike Command has a central role in delivering 
what the nation needs most: a safe, secure, reliable, 
effective, and affordable long range. Precision strike force--
both nuclear and conventional.
    Safety, security, reliability and the American Public's 
trust in the nuclear force is non-negotiable and must remain 
the bedrock of how we operate. What must change is the manner 
in which we train, prepare, sustain, and modernize. The Air 
Force nuclear arsenal can no longer be a collection of 
expensive programs; it must be grounded in relevant operational 
concepts of operations, affordable acquisition programs, 
improved and affordable sustainment, and robust training 
underwritten by effective nuclear command and control.
    Transitions are difficult, but we have a unique opportunity 
to partner with Congress, the combatant commanders, and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense to press forward with 
affordable, cost effective, and innovative solutions to ensure 
our intercontinental ballistic missile and bomber forces are 
ready for the challenges of the 21st Century.
    Part of presenting the long-range precision strike force 
our nations needs is fostering the right culture and climate 
for the best of America's sons and daughters. As we modernize, 
we are putting equal attention on developing the right leaders 
and cultivating dignity, respect, diversity, and inclusion.
    We are working to retain talent and harness the innovative 
mindset all airmen share.
    Lastly, I want to thank you for on-time 2019 funding; I 
cannot articulate enough how critical on-time funding is to 
restoring readiness; predictable, reliable, and flexible 
budgets, with the right authorities to drive competition are 
elemental to our future success.
    Chairwoman Fischer and distinguished Subcommittee Members, 
I want to thank you for your dedication to our great nation and 
the opportunity to appear before the committee, I am looking 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Timothy M. Ray follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General Timothy M. Ray
                              introduction
    For the last three years in Europe as the Commander, Third Air 
Force and the Deputy Commander, United States European Command, I had a 
front row seat in the great power competition unfolding in Europe, the 
Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East. It is abundantly 
clear we must bring about a significant transition in our capabilities 
and our thinking as we turn our attention from seventeen years of 
conflict in the Middle East and counterterrorism operations to 
potential conflict with global competitors with more capable technology 
and growing strategic capabilities. Air Force Global Strike Command 
(AFGSC) has a central role in delivering what the nation needs most: a 
safe, secure, reliable, effective, and affordable long-range precision 
strike force--nuclear and conventional. This is a dialogue of blending 
what must and must not change. Safety, security, reliability and the 
American Public's trust in the nuclear force is nonnegotiable and must 
remain the bedrock of how we operate. What must change is the manner in 
which we train, prepare, sustain, and modernize. The Air Force nuclear 
arsenal can no longer be a collection of expensive programs; it must be 
grounded in relevant operational concepts of operations, affordable 
acquisition programs, improved and affordable sustainment, and robust 
training underwritten by effective nuclear command and control.
    Transitions are the most difficult undertakings, but we have a 
unique opportunity to partner with Congress, the combatant commanders, 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to press forward with 
affordable, cost effective, and innovative solutions to ensure our 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and bomber forces are ready 
for the challenges of the 21st Century.
    Thank you for the on-time 2019 funding; predictable, reliable, and 
flexible budgets, coupled with the right authorities to drive 
competition are elemental to our future success.
                                context
    I am personally committed to the Secretary of the Air Force and 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force and their three lines of effort: the 
Air Force We Need, building a more lethal force, and fielding 
tomorrow's Air Force faster and smarter. AFGSC is the warfighting 
command responsible for simultaneously executing two legs of the 
nuclear triad, overseeing the nation's Nuclear Command, Control, and 
Communications (NC3) capabilities and accomplishing long-range 
precision strike missions across the globe. Previous commanders 
testified from the perspective of a traditional Organize, Train, and 
Equip (OT&E) major command. Today, the AFGSC Commander is the Air 
Component Commander to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 
which is a very different role. This provides a different perspective 
into how AFGSC forces are employed to fight. From this seat, it is 
possible to make decisions based on war-time operational impact rather 
than simply providing the forces. As modernization and sustainment 
programs progress, there will be ongoing analysis that leads us to 
risk-informed and balanced decisions throughout all phases of the 
acquisition process. An iterative, informed, and agile process is a key 
enabler for ensuring our deterrent and warfighting capabilities--legacy 
as well as follow-on--are firmly focused on meeting the anticipated 
challenges of the decades ahead. The pace of developing emerging 
technologies has changed drastically. Chasing the most exquisite 
technical solutions is too expensive and takes too much time. The 
pursuit should be the right strategies, ``good enough'' technology on-
time, stable requirements, and owning the tech-baseline to support 
future development.
    There have already been success stories as a result of these 
practices. For example, the Air Force selected the UH-1N replacement 
helicopter for $1.7 billion less than the service cost estimate. The 
decision to compete this contract was absolutely the right call and the 
competition it drove between the bidders resulted in lower prices for 
the Air Force. In terms of operations and sustainment, the Air Force 
will own the data rights and maintenance, which makes this option much 
more affordable in the long-term. We are particularly pleased with the 
unprecedented results digital based modeling and engineering has 
yielded in one of our most critical programs, Ground Based Strategic 
Deterrent (GBSD). This process is reducing risk at a faster rate and 
the certainty gained in the risk reduction will have a positive impact 
on the bottom line further down the road.
    Affordability is imperative to maintain relevancy and the command 
is committed to seeking innovative ways to bring the cost of 
modernization down. There is potential for billions of dollars in 
savings in modernization and sustainment programs, but the Air Force 
must be deliberate when developing the requirements and making 
subsequent investment decisions. Building this trust with the nation's 
leaders is critical to fostering productive teamwork. Make no mistake, 
the nation's nuclear weapon systems and legacy bombers are old and are 
no longer aging gracefully. The burden of cost to sustain and maintain 
our legacy systems will continue to increase, and there is no long-term 
affordable solution that does not include replacing those systems and 
components affected by age-out and technological obsolescence. The 
command's promise is to deliver those replacements as efficiently and 
affordably as possible.
               air force global strike command priorities
Componency to USSTRATCOM
    In 2018, my predecessor updated this committee on the 
reorganization effort aligning AFGSC as the single, full-time air 
component to USSTRATCOM and streamlined the lines of authority for our 
bomber and ICBM forces. The commander of AFGSC is now the commander of 
Air Forces Strategic--Air (AFSTRAT-Air) and the Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) as designated by the Commander of 
USSTRATCOM (CDRUSSTRATCOM).
    Under the previous construct, responsibilities for the air, space, 
and naval strategic missions were spread across several lines of 
authority. Now, the Joint-Global Strike Operations Center (J-GSOC) 
handles the day-to-day responsibilities of the strategic nuclear 
mission for USSTRATCOM's air component. The J-GSOC consists of the 
Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) and Joint Nuclear Operations Center 
(JNOC). The JAOC handles the conventional portion of the command's 
mission while the JNOC focuses on the nuclear portion. The National 
Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) is also aligned under the J-GSOC. 
When combined with AFGSC's existing responsibility for the E-4B 
aircraft, AFSTRAT, through USSTRATCOM, is better postured to present 
the NAOC mission to support the President and Secretary of Defense. The 
Standoff Munitions Application Center (SMAC) provides expertise in 
planning and targeting of Air Force standoff weapons. The Cruise 
Missile Support Activity Atlantic (CMSALANT) and Pacific (CMSAPAC), 
aligned under the Navy's Fleet Forces day-to-day, support the J-GSOC 
during complex, joint targeting operations required by any combatant 
commander.
    As CDRUSSTRATCOM's designated JFACC in addition to the Commander, 
AFSTRAT-Air, this dual-hatted position provides the ability to monitor, 
control, and direct all the air assets assigned or attached to 
USSTRATCOM anywhere in the world. These include the Air Force bomber, 
tanker, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and ICBM forces 
as well as the USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and Take Charge 
and Move Out (TACAMO) missions. The JFACC also supplies a common 
operating picture to CDRUSSTRATCOM that provides status and locations 
of all air assets. The success of this restructuring has been proven 
during global exercises for two years now, and this is a much better 
operations-focused construct than the previous organization.
    This is relevant because the authorities granted to these positions 
enable an assessment of how best to accomplish the warfighting and OT&E 
missions through risk-informed and balanced decision making. As the 
warfighter, executing as the Air Component Commander, it has revealed 
things that have been invalid for a long time and provided the 
opportunity to put operating concepts in place that enhance lethality 
and improve relevancy. How we prioritize sustainment and modernization, 
Forward Locate Aircraft Generate (FLAG) operations, and requirements 
validation on command and control parameters are all examples of how 
this position is able to optimize and prioritize. There is an 
opportunity to make deliberate, risk-informed decisions to bring costs 
down based on operational impact.
Security
    Security is one of the most fundamental competencies the nation 
demands of the military. The right questions about security need to be 
asked and innovative teams should determine how best to secure our 
installations and assets. This is more than Security Forces Defenders 
at the gate; this is preparing for threats from unmanned aerial 
systems, cyber, and other potential threats across multiple domains. 
The United States no longer enjoys the sanctuary it used to and the 
warfighting domains continue to expand, challenging the nation's 
collective understanding and application of warfare, ideas of national 
defense, and theories of victory. In 2017, the Secretary of the Air 
Force directed AFGSC to lead a Security Forces Review Team to provide 
Headquarters Air Force actionable items to improve the health and 
lethality of our Defender corps. While these action items are refined 
and addressed, progress is being made to shape the future of Security 
Forces as an elite, integrated team prepared to face the threats they 
encounter in and around our installations and missile fields.
    The Ground Combat Training Squadron on Camp Guernsey (Frontier 
Defender) was realigned under the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB, 
Wyoming, on 1 June 2018. The regional training center operates on a 
Wyoming Air National Guard camp, where joint cooperation enables the 
training of our elite Defenders charged with protecting our nation's 
nuclear arsenal. The 60-member staff provides the only training in the 
Air Force for Defenders assigned to nuclear security operations. 
Additionally, Frontier Defender continues to refine and execute the 
first-ever Security Forces weapons school, the 62-day Security Forces 
Weapons and Tactics Course. The objective of the course is to train 
Defenders skilled in resource analysis and the application of force 
protection concepts, through the lens of USAF Weapons School graduates, 
to ultimately provide proactive protection of our nuclear assets.
    AFGSC is also collaborating with the United States Air Force 
Academy's Research Department. The intent is to pioneer integration of 
existing communications equipment employed by AFGSC's Defenders in the 
missile fields with commercial drone capabilities. The ability to see 
and sense potential threats using small, unmanned aerial vehicles and 
provide that information quickly and securely to ground forces will 
substantially increase our capability to defend the nation's nuclear 
assets and installations. Over the past year, AFGSC has made 
significant strides in an emerging security initiative to counter-
unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) detected near important resources. 
Fielded capabilities include handheld and portable systems. Fixed-site 
and mobile vehicle-borne systems are currently being installed. These 
new capabilities will provide a necessary added layer of security to 
ensure continued weapons systems safety and operability. Additionally, 
the command has initiated blue-unmanned aircraft systems (B-UAS), a 
friendly forces pilot program, across all installations, and once 
training and testing are complete, B-UAS capabilities will enhance 
battlespace awareness to assist in meeting these emerging threats. 
These efforts with our partners will continue to ensure the robust 
integration of both existing and developing technologies to provide 
cost effective and robust battle space awareness to AFGSC defense 
forces. This is the beginning of an evolving journey. C-UAS is a 
rapidly developing technology and as a service, there will be an 
evolution to utilize the capability and defend against the threat. 
These are a few examples of how AFGSC is taking Security Forces 
training and operations in a more relevant, realistic direction.
  Weapons Generation Facilities
    Today's Weapon Storage Areas (WSA) are not simply storage 
facilities; they support rapid generation of nuclear aircraft and 
routine maintenance operations for the ground-based and air legs of the 
nuclear triad. Two ICBM wings are planned to receive modernized 
facilities for these missions, renamed Weapons Generation Facilities 
(WGFs). Additionally, bomber WGFs will be needed to accommodate mission 
growth and improve current capacity, and with the right number, will 
provide national leadership more strategic decision space. 
Affordability is the entering argument for the Air Force's way forward 
concerning WGFs. This year, AFGSC organized a cross-functional team to 
re-examine the design plans to identify more affordable options. The 
team identified options that allow for recapitalization of existing 
facilities where possible. For locations that do not have existing 
facilities capable of undergoing recapitalization, the design 
characteristics have been scaled back for more affordable construction. 
A more detailed update will be available after a final decision is made 
on the plan for bomber WGFs.
  Infrastructure
    One of the chronic challenges is the impact that degraded and 
unpredictable infrastructure funding is having on mission, Airmen, and 
families. Bases are power projection platforms and must be viewed as 
part of a ``3-D weapon system.'' They are essential elements, and this 
is particularly true for the three ICBM bases and the five bomber 
bases, as they stand as deterrent 24/7/365, ready to conduct global 
strike missions directly from these locations. For years, the Air Force 
has been forced to make deliberate decisions to take risk in 
infrastructure funding, in order to apply scarce dollars toward higher 
readiness and modernization priorities. The cumulative effect has been 
a steady erosion of facilities and core infrastructure, and significant 
growth in costs to address exponentially-growing repair and replacement 
backlogs. There is a growing risk in facilities and infrastructure 
reliability, higher overall costs due to accelerated deterioration, and 
increasing potential for unexpected catastrophic, mission-impacting 
failure. Innovative Airmen have, and will continue to, focus limited 
resources on ``mission critical, worst first'' facilities and 
infrastructure while accepting risk in the recapitalization of 
facilities with less-direct mission impact such as community and base 
support. There is without question a correlation between facility 
condition and quality of life, as well as quality of work. Without 
consistent, reliable, and flexible funding, degrading infrastructure 
will continue to increase risk of mission interruption or degradation 
and affect quality of life of Airmen and families. Providing a 
predictable, stable budget with enough resources to address degrading 
infrastructure will not only enhance lethality, but will go far in 
providing Airmen the working and living environments they deserve and 
increasing overall readiness.
           nuclear command, control, and communications (nc3)
    As the NC3 lead for the Air Force, AFGSC supports CDRUSSTRATCOM 
priorities of sustaining current NC3 systems and replacing the legacy 
systems with next generation NC3 technology to ensure secure, reliable 
nuclear command and control capabilities to the President and 
warfighters.
    Sustaining current NC3 systems includes developing maintenance 
performance indicators to track the reliability of communications 
systems and predicting future maintenance actions and spare parts 
needs. Unfortunately, there are components that suffer from diminishing 
manufacturing sources and material shortages across the NC3 enterprise. 
For example, the decades-old Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT) on the B-
52, a system that receives Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) over very 
low frequency, fell into that category. As a result of this analysis 
and planning, a vendor was identified that could manufacture the band-
pass filters required to repair the MRT receivers. Today, there are 
enough band-pass filters in stock to sustain the aging system until 
replacement.
    Continuing its sixth decade as the backbone of the nation's bomber 
fleet, the B-52 is funded in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget 
for installation of a Very Low Frequency (VLF) receiver which leverages 
the technology currently being installed on the B-2 fleet. This VLF 
terminal will provide a NC3 receive-only capability. To further 
modernize VLF capability across multiple platforms, we are moving 
forward with development of a Common VLF Receiver (CVR) capable of 
utilizing emerging waveforms for improved EAM reception. We envision 
employing this receiver on airborne and ground weapons systems. 
Additionally, the Air Force continues to develop the Family of Advanced 
Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) Force Element Terminal (FET) which will 
be integrated onto the B-52 providing access to the Advanced Extremely 
High Frequency (AEHF) satellite network. AEHF will also be integrated 
into the ICBM's Launch Control Centers (LCC), further enhancing the 
redundancy that exists for NC3 in the ICBM force. We are also assessing 
options to leverage other programs' investments in this communication 
technology to enable more rapid fielding across bombers and supporting 
reconnaissance and tanker aircraft.
    Other command and control modernization programs include the Global 
Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (GASNT) Increment 1 program, which 
will bring nuclear tasked command posts, mobile support teams, and 
munitions squadrons the capability to operate on the AEHF satellite 
network at extended data rates. The GASNT Increment 1 program is 
currently undergoing operational testing and is expected to reach a 
Milestone C production decision in the summer of 2019. The GASNT 
Increment 2 program will provide advanced aircrew alerting, Ultra High 
Frequency (UHF) Line of Sight (LOS) and advanced High Frequency (HF) 
capabilities. Additionally, the Service continues efforts to upgrade 
the Strategic Automated Command Control System (SACCS) to improve 
reliability of this primary EAM distribution system.
    Fully funded in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget, 
communications upgrades to the E-4B NAOC will ensure a reliable, 
airborne NC3 platform for senior leaders. The Low Frequency Transmit 
System (LFTS) replaces the existing dual trailing wire antenna while 
reducing aircraft weight by almost a ton. The Survivable Super High 
Frequency (SHF) system provides reliable and sustainable voice/data 
capability in scintillated and jammed operational environments. 
Tactical UHF radios will be upgraded to Mobile User Objective System 
(MUOS) capability to meet CJCS requirements. Finally, the FAB-T Command 
Post Terminal (CPT) is being installed on the E-4B fleet and will 
enable Presidential National Voice Conferencing (PNVC) to replace 
legacy MILSTAR capability and provide connectivity to the AEHF 
satellite network.
    As the E-4B is modernized, the nation must look ahead to replacing 
the aging aircraft within the National Military Command System. The 
joint-Service NAOC, Executive Airlift (EA), ABNCP, and TACAMO (NEAT) 
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is underway and is scheduled to report 
to OSD in September 2019. The AOA will evaluate whether mission 
realignments can improve the operational value of the airborne layer 
and examine potential synergies in acquiring a common platform.
    The next generation of NC3 that will be in place thirty years from 
now is currently in development. Simply replacing the old with the new 
is not the right strategy; as sustainment and modernization efforts 
progress, retaining the modularity and data rights to incorporate new 
technology and ensure compatibility with new weapon systems is a 
necessity. AFGSC stands ready to support USSTRATCOM and the initiatives 
to deliver NC3 capability on operational and threat-relevant timelines.
                              sustainment
Twentieth Air Force
    Twentieth Air Force (20 AF), one of two Numbered Air Forces in 
AFGSC, is responsible for the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM, UH-1N 
helicopter forces, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and 
Storage Complex at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, the Flight Test 
Squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and the ground 
combat training squadron at Camp Guernsey, Wyoming. The 450 dispersed 
and hardened Launch Facilities (LFs), are controlled, maintained, 
defended, and supported by AFGSC Airmen every single day, providing the 
bulk of our day-to-day nuclear alert force, and doing so with precision 
and professionalism. The ICBM forces presented to USSTRATCOM are 
deployed in place, and preserve strategic stability by providing the 
nation a credible and responsive nuclear option in a contested 
environment and presenting adversaries a nearly insurmountable obstacle 
of numbers should they consider a disarming attack on the United 
States. AFGSC's ICBM forces are New START compliant.
  Minuteman III
    AFGSC is committed to the sustainment of MMIII ICBM and its NC3 
systems and support equipment. It is critical the weapon system remains 
viable until it is replaced by the GBSD. To sustain the existing fleet 
of large missile maintenance vehicles, the $136.2 million Transporter 
Erector Program (TERP) and the $321.8 million Payload Transporter 
Replacement (PTR) remain a priority. PTR production is expected to 
begin production in fiscal year 2019.
    The ICBM LCCs will be equipped with modernized communications 
systems to improve reliability and replace aging and technologically 
obsolete systems. The LCC block upgrade, expected to begin full 
deployment in 2020, is a $94M modification effort that replaces 
multiple LCC components to include modern data storage, a weapon system 
console printer and oxygen regeneration unit. A significant security 
upgrade to the remote visual assessment capability at our LF will 
increase situational awareness and security. This $69.5 million program 
is expected to begin deployment in fiscal year 2020.
    In fiscal year 2018, AFGSC conducted three MMIII flight tests and 
two simulated electronic launch tests. In fiscal year 2019, we are 
scheduled to conduct four operational MMIII flight tests and two 
simulated electronic launch tests that will demonstrate the operational 
credibility of the ground-based component of the nuclear triad and the 
Air Force's commitment to sustaining that capability.
    In an effort to improve the nuclear capability of our ICBM force, 
the ICBM Programmed Depot Maintenance program began in fiscal year 
2016. The program places operational LFs and LCCs on an 8-year depot-
level maintenance cycle. It greatly increases the effectiveness and 
lethality of our ICBMs by ensuring their sustainment is done in an 
engineering-based, systematic way. Successful prototyping of the 
program was accomplished in fiscal year 2016 and from fiscal year 2016 
to fiscal year 2018, 100 LFs and 15 LCCs went through the first 
maintenance cycle. There are 55 LFs and 6 LCCs planned in fiscal year 
2019. This program is key to ensure MMIII viability through the 
transition to GBSD.
  UH-1N
    AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's Vietnam-era fleet of 
63 UH-1N helicopters. The majority of these aircraft support several 
critical missions: security of our ICBM fields, transport missions in 
the National Capitol Region and USINDOPACOM, and critical Continuity of 
Operations missions. Additionally, UH-1Ns support Air Force survival 
training with rescue operations. Further, they participate in the 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities program and are frequently called 
upon to conduct search and rescue activities for missing or injured 
civilians.
    AFGSC has developed a comprehensive sustainment plan for the UH-1N 
while transitioning to the replacement aircraft. The UH-1N will 
continue to operate in AFGSC through the mid-fiscal year 2020s and 
within the USAF until the mid-fiscal year 2030s. AFGSC is responsible 
for the life-cycle of all UH-1Ns in the USAF and some modernization 
will be necessary for the aircraft to remain effective; currently, all 
future modifications will be completed in the early fiscal year 2020s. 
These modifications are only occurring on UH-1Ns flying the longest to 
ensure mission effectiveness while remaining fiscally responsible. The 
sustainment of the UH-1N will ensure effectiveness until platform 
retirement.
Eighth Air Force
    Eighth Air Force (8 AF) is responsible for the B-52H Stratofortress 
(B-52) bomber, the B-2A Spirit (B-2) bomber, the B-1B Lancer (B-1) 
bomber, and the E-4B NAOC, the cornerstone of survivability of the 
National Military Command System, providing critical continuity and 
communication capability for our national leaders. Bombers provide 
decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve through generation, 
dispersal, and deployment. AFGSC's bombers are New START compliant.
    The overall size of the bomber force is driven by the significant 
contribution to conventional campaigns, now more of a concern in this 
era of great power competition. Since 1991, the Air Force has conducted 
continuous combat operations with 46 percent fewer aircraft than we had 
in 1991. During this period, the demand for bombers increased resulting 
in a growing toll on Airmen and readiness of the aircraft and 
equipment. AFGSC bombers have supported operations through continuous 
rotations in United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), United States 
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), United States Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM), and United 
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 
Additionally, AFGSC provides bomber forces to support USSOUTHCOM's 
Joint-Interagency Task Force-South, USEUCOM, and USAFRICOM through the 
Joint Staff's Global Force Management process and Bomber Task Force 
ordered deployments and missions. These opportunities enhance our 
support to our allies and display our resolve to potential adversaries. 
The core of AFGSC assurance and deterrence is our unwavering commitment 
to USSTRATCOM and our nuclear mission. AFGSC must balance global force 
posturing with our nuclear mission, while not jeopardizing readiness 
and fleet health. Unfortunately, the effects of this extremely high 
operational tempo are reverberating through the bomber fleet and 
specific examples are outlined below.
  B-1 Update
    The B-1 is a highly versatile, conventional-only, multi-mission 
weapon system that carries the largest payload of both guided and 
unguided weapons, of all the bombers in the U.S. inventory. Since 1991 
it has provided rapid support for combatant commanders around the 
globe. Multiple wartime employments, high operations tempo, and harsh 
environment exposure have proven the aircraft's combat effectiveness, 
but have significantly degraded aircraft availability.
    The B-1 was built as a low-level penetrator and is engineered for 
flight profiles different than the more stressing close air support/
strike profiles flown in support of USCENTCOM. Seventeen years of 
steady deployments in these more stressing flight profiles has resulted 
in the need for increased structural inspections and repairs. To that 
end, a dedicated, programmed depot-level repair line is planned to 
stand up at Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex beginning in fiscal 
year 2020 in order to assure our high standard of aviation safety. 
Furthermore, using Delta Airlines as a benchmark, AFGSC's Condition 
Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) initiative is now underway in the B-1 
maintenance community. This predictive approach to identifying aircraft 
subsystem degradation will optimize scheduled down time for the B-1 in 
order to concurrently make deferred repairs and change near end-of-life 
components, avoiding unscheduled breaks and ultimately resulting in 
improved aircraft availability. When fully implemented, CBM+ will 
increase mission effectiveness, aircraft availability, optimize spare 
parts forecasting in the supply chain, and minimize unscheduled 
downtime for maintenance. In combination, the additional investment in 
the B-1 structure and implementation of CBM+ sustainment processes will 
ensure the Air Force achieves the service life goal for the B-1.
    The B-1 will remain a viable platform through modernization 
programs and upgrades to carry it through to retirement. Avionics and 
weapon upgrades are critical; the Integrated Battle Station, funded to 
$56 million in fiscal year 2020-24, includes an upgraded Central 
Integrated Test System, Fully Integrated Data Link, Vertical Situation 
Display, and flight simulator upgrades. These are essential 
capabilities to provide aircrew with a more flexible, integrated 
cockpit. This fleet wide modification will reach full operational 
capability in fiscal year 2020. Upgrades to Radio Cryptographic 
Equipment, Identification Friend or Foe, Link-16, and Bomb Rack 
Modifications along with the Fully Integrated Advanced Targeting Pod 
capability will ensure the B-1 remains completely assimilated with 
Joint Combat Forces.
    The stand-off weapons currently employed by the B-1 include the 
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), the Joint Air-to-Surface 
Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER), and now, the B-1 is the 
only Air Force delivery platform for the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile 
(LRASM). This precision strike capability has guaranteed a critical 
role for the B-1 in assuring our allies and deterring potential 
adversaries now and into the future.
  B-2 Update
    For nearly 25 years, B-2s have provided the nation with the only 
stealth bomber capable of penetrating air defenses anywhere in the 
world. The B-2 holds targets at risk with
    a variety of nuclear and conventional weapons and has provided 
deterrence against our enemies and stability for our allies. The B-2's 
conventional accomplishments are numerous and incontrovertible; the 
bomber provided precision attacks during the Kosovo and Iraq Wars, 
strikes on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and on forces in 
Libya.
    B-2 modernization efforts are addressing a nuclear command and 
control need by bringing a survivable very low frequency communication 
capability to the aircraft. Additionally, with the proliferation of 
anti-access/area denial threats, we must ensure the B-2's ability to 
penetrate enemy defenses with the Defensive Management System 
Modernization (DMS-M) program. The command stands behind DMS-M as a 
must-pay bill for continued lethality and the program is fully funded 
in fiscal year 2020. Additionally, the B-2 is being upgraded to carry 
the JASSM-ER and the B61-12 nuclear gravity weapon. These upgrades are 
currently programmed for $145 million in Research, Development, Test, 
and Evaluation and $46 million in procurement. These are critical to 
ensuring the bomber leg of the nuclear triad remains a viable and 
relevant warfighting capability.
    Small fleet dynamics continue to challenge our sustainment efforts 
primarily due to vanishing vendors and the diminishing supply chain. 
There is an ongoing effort to maintain the proper balance of fleet 
modernization and sustainment while maintaining combat readiness. 
Lessons learned from the difficulty of sustaining and modernizing the 
B-2's small fleet, and an ever-decreasing technological advantage, are 
critical drivers for B-21 requirements.
  B-52 Update
    The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American 
airpower. It is able to deliver the widest variety of nuclear and 
conventional weapons, and boasts the best aircraft availability and 
mission capable rates of all three bomber platforms.
    The B-52 will remain a key element of our bomber force until the 
2050s, and therefore, it is paramount that we continue to invest 
resources into this aircraft. The modernization and sustainment of the 
B-52 should not be based on how long it has been in service, but 
rather, based on how long it will be in service. AFGSC is looking at B-
52 modernization holistically, to optimize, prioritize, and deliver 
affordable, on-time modernization to sustain this aircraft. 
Modernization programs will be prioritized and integrated in an effort 
to make deliberate decisions on timing for concurrent programs. 
Integration of the existing programs with smart and efficient 
development and test schedules is critical to deliver affordable, 
lethal combat capability. Current modernization programs include the B-
52 Radar Modernization Program, funded $1.03 billion in fiscal year 
2020-24, and entered execution in the pre-Milestone B phase. 
Furthermore, B-52 training simulators require integration of various 
programs such as Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT), 
internal weapons bay upgrade, data link capabilities, air refueling, 
and information technology refresh. Supporting the revitalization of 
these critical training tools will create high fidelity training 
environments in-line with Air Force priorities, such as Pilot Training 
Next, and directly increase the readiness of B-52 crews in support of 
nuclear and conventional missions.
    Additionally, the 1960-era TF-33 engines currently on the B-52 are 
frequently operating with parts salvaged from aircraft no longer in the 
inventory. What the aircraft maintainers accomplish on a daily basis to 
keep these jets flying is nothing short of miraculous. The supply of 
these parts, no longer made by industry, will be exhausted and leave 
the engines unsustainable by 2030. The Air Force is now funding 
efforts, $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2020-24, to integrate and deploy 
replacement B-52 engines, saving fuel and extending the aircraft's 
range while improving reliability and sustainment.
    Other initiatives include the Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade, which 
increases B-52 smart weapons capacity by 67 percent and adds JASSM and 
JASSM-ER capability. Also, there are currently 52 B-52s converted to 
the new CONECT configuration. This modification moves the B-52 into the 
digital age for the first time, providing an on-board local area 
network, allowing the aircrew to share a common battlespace picture. 
This modification is installed on every aircraft going through regular 
program depot maintenance cycle. The B-52 CONECT targeting upgrades and 
inclusion of Digital Aided Close Air Support brings a robust capability 
to long-range firepower available today to combatant commanders. 
Communications remain the cornerstone of our long-range strike 
capability. The ability to launch bombers and re-task and retarget them 
while en route to the battlespace is a powerful force multiplier. 
Additionally, the addition of Link-16, a critical communications node, 
will enhance the operational picture integrating the aircraft with the 
warfighter.
  Air-Launched Cruise Missile
    The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground, 
winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. Fielded in the 
1980s, the ALCM is over 30 years old, well beyond its 10-year life 
expectancy, and is undergoing multiple Service Life Extension Programs 
(SLEP). While the ALCM remains effective today, it is rapidly becoming 
technologically obsolete. As our ALCMs are aging-out, our adversaries 
are developing new cruise missiles and fielding more capable defense 
systems. It is imperative that the ALCM is replaced due to its aging 
subsystems, the shrinking stockpile of operational missiles, and 
advances in enemy defense. The Air Force will invest $360 million in 
fiscal year 2020-24 to continue existing SLEPs and testing efforts that 
include critical telemetry, encryption, and flight termination 
components until the Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile reaches 
operational capability in 2030.
  B61
    The B61 family of gravity nuclear weapons supports the airborne leg 
of the triad and is the primary weapon supporting our NATO allies under 
extended deterrence. The B61 is currently undergoing a LEP that results 
in a smaller stockpile, reduced special nuclear material in the 
inventory, modernized safety and security features, and reduced 
lifecycle costs by consolidating four weapon versions into one version, 
the B61-12. The B61-12 includes the addition of a digital weapons 
interface and a guided tail kit assembly. AFGSC is the lead command for 
the $157 million in fiscal year 2020-24 B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly 
program, a DOD-developed system providing reduced maintenance, reduced 
cost, and increased sustainability. The B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly 
program is in Production and Deployment Phase and is synchronized with 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) efforts. The Tail Kit 
Assembly design and production processes are on schedule and within 
budget to meet the planned fiscal year 2020 first production unit date, 
and support the lead time required for the inclusion of the Department 
of Energy (DoE) warhead service-life extension completion date of March 
2020. This joint DOD and DoE endeavor allows for continued attainment 
of our strategic requirements and regional commitments.
                             modernization
  B-21 Raider
    The B-21 Raider will fulfill two critical roles: provide a day-to-
day conventional and nuclear bomber that will eventually replace the 
conventional B-1 and dual-capable B-2. This is highlighted because the 
cost of nuclear modernization often includes this program in the 
narrative. Technology gaps between the United States and potential 
adversaries are closing. The B-21 Raider will support the nuclear triad 
by providing an advanced and flexible deterrent capability and the 
ability to penetrate modern and future air defenses. Further, the B-21 
will provide flexibility across a wide range of joint military 
operations using long-range capabilities, large and mixed payloads, and 
survivability. From the outset, the B-21 has been designed to have an 
open architecture, which enables it to more rapidly and affordably 
integrate new technology and respond to future threats. The program is 
a national security imperative that will extend American air dominance 
and lethality against next generation capabilities and advanced air 
defense environments.
    The B-21 is fully funded for $3 billion in the fiscal year 2020 
budget submission, and initial capability is projected for the mid-
2020s. Extensive campaign and mission level analysis will determine the 
minimum number of B-21s required to meet combatant commander needs in 
the face of closing technology gaps and increasing threat capabilities.
    Current bomber bases are best suited for B-21 operations, 
maintenance, security, and training requirements. The Air Force is 
conducting the strategic basing process, which includes analysis to 
determine construction and facility renovations necessary to support 
the new mission. Additionally, base operating support and off-base 
community support are well-established at current bomber bases. 
Throughout this process, the primary focus is to provide safe, secure, 
and lethal bomber operations in a cost-efficient manner.
  Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
    To ensure continued lethality and affordability of the most 
responsive leg of the triad, GBSD has successfully moved forward 
through the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) contract 
awarded on 21 August 2017. Following this competitive and cost-reducing 
TMRR phase, the source selection process will identify a single 
provider with material development efforts anticipated to begin in the 
2020 timeframe. As continued program analysis has revealed, GBSD 
represents the most-effective strategy to mitigate capability 
shortfalls while restoring warfighting effectiveness and replacing 
critically-aged infrastructure. GBSD is fully funded at $10.8 billion 
in fiscal year 2020-24. A focus on developing a competitive edge is 
evident in the leveraging of Model Based System Engineering (MBSE) 
during TMRR where there is an estimated potential to save several 
billion dollars of acquisition and lifecycle costs. This is possible 
due to MBSE's ability to decrease design cycle timelines and ensure 
design modifications and their subsequent impacts are fully realized 
without the need for traditional prototypes or extensive paperwork 
reviews.
    Furthermore, the modular design focus, a key acquisition tenet, is 
expected to reduce the need for specialized or comprehensive system 
overhauls throughout the 50-year operational lifecycle. The value 
proposition of this program is unprecedented--the Air Force will save 
money on maintenance, operations, and in personnel; physical access and 
modularity of the designs makes GBSD simpler and more affordable to 
sustain than any of its predecessors. The security requirements will 
change dramatically: there will be fewer convoys on the roads, fewer 
open launcher configurations, fewer defenders needed to guard the site 
during maintenance, and it brings new capability to the most responsive 
leg of the triad affordably.
    Additionally, there is collaboration with NNSA and the W78 warhead 
replacement program, the W87-1. As of this calendar year, that program 
is in development. The replacement warhead will use the MK21 aeroshell 
and will deploy on GBSD after fiscal year 2030.
  Long Range Stand-Off Missile
    The LRSO will be a reliable, long-range, and survivable weapon 
system and is an essential element of the nuclear triad. It will be 
flexible and compatible with B-52 and B-21 platforms. The Air Force 
dedicated $2.4 billion in fiscal year 2020-24 for the LRSO to replace 
the aging ALCM we have relied upon for 36 years. The ALCM will not be a 
viable option for employment beyond 2030. The vast majority of targets 
covered by the bomber leg of the triad require the employment of stand-
off weapons. Without LRSO on B-21s and B-52s, our ability to hold 
adversaries at risk is reduced, the risk to our aircraft and aircrew is 
increased, and the execution of the wartime mission is degraded. Stand-
off weapons reduce over-flight concerns and provide the most visible 
and responsive extended deterrent to our allies and partners, 
supporting the well-established United States counter-proliferation 
policy. Furthermore, the bombers that will deliver the LRSO are the 
Nation's only recallable asset, giving U.S. leaders the maximum amount 
of flexibility at the most critical moments.
    The LRSO missile will ensure the bomber force continues to hold 
high-value targets at risk in an evolving threat environment, including 
targets deep within an advanced integrated air defense system. 
Additionally, the current acquisition strategy ensures close 
synchronization with NNSA to fully integrate the W80-4 nuclear warhead 
with LRSO. This weapon will retain nuclear penetrating cruise missile 
capabilities through 2060. To meet operational, testing, and logistics 
requirements, the Air Force plans to acquire approximately 1,000 LRSO 
cruise missile bodies. This quantity will provide spares and supply 
sufficient non-nuclear missile bodies throughout ongoing flight and 
ground testing. The number of nuclear-armed LRSO cruise missiles (i.e., 
mated to a nuclear warhead) is planned to be equivalent to the current 
ALCM nuclear force.
  UH-1N Replacement
    In order to continue supporting critical national missions and 
fully comply with DOD and USSTRATCOM requirements, the Air Force has 
committed $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2020-24 toward replacing the UH-
1N fleet, as the legacy platform falls short of missile field 
operational needs, notably speed, range, endurance, payload, and 
survivability. In September 2018, the Air Force selected Boeing's MH-
139 as the replacement solution for the aging UH-1N fleet through a 
full and open competition, significantly advancing the capabilities 
over the legacy aircraft and saving the Air Force $1.7 billion based on 
the service cost estimate. The timely fielding of this platform will 
enable the Air Force to meet nuclear security requirements and fully 
support Presidential Continuity of Government missions in the national 
capital region. The first aircraft is already on the production line 
and is scheduled for delivery in November 2019. Initial Operating 
Capability at the first Global Strike base is anticipated in fiscal 
year 2022.
                               conclusion
    I look forward to updating the committee on our progress and 
building trust through our common goal: to protect the United States 
with a safe, secure, reliable, effective, and affordable long-range 
precision strike force. We remain focused on climate and culture to get 
us there, particularly in the areas of excellence, teams, and people. 
The Air Force requires authentic leaders who excel at two things: 
connecting with Airmen and connecting Airmen to the Air Force family. 
Leaders at every level must cultivate a culture and climate of respect, 
encourage personal and professional growth, and advocate for Airmen to 
ask for help if they need it. Our work demands excellence, not 
perfection, and Airmen at every level are valued team members working 
together to accomplish the mission. Authentic leaders encourage 
innovation, bold ideas, and better ways of going about our business. 
Revitalizing our squadrons and allowing commanders the space to lead 
boldly, to develop inclusive, diverse, and well-rounded teams of 
integrators will produce measurable results and create a better climate 
for the Airmen who will take our place. It will take teamwork to win 
tomorrow's fight and we are stronger together. We are on a good path 
moving forward, but there is a lot of work to be done.
    AFGSC is committed to affordable modernization and sustainment of 
our nuclear triad and conventional forces. During this period of 
transition, it is imperative that we continue to seek out innovative 
solutions to bring the cost of modernization down. Our Air Force 
remains the most powerful in the world thanks to the help from Congress 
and the vision and courage of those who have gone before us, but we 
cannot be static in a world where the dynamics of power are shifting. I 
am encouraged by our progress and appreciate the opportunity to update 
this committee.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, 
              DIRECTOR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

    Vice Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member 
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank 
you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of 
Defense's budget request for nuclear forces. I am honored to be 
here today. I would like to thank this Subcommittee for its 
continued support of the Navy's deterrence mission, and I 
respectfully request my written statement be submitted for the 
record.
    Nuclear deterrence is the number one priority mission of 
the Department of Defense. The nation's nuclear triad of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and 
ballistic missile submarines is the bedrock of our ability to 
deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, achieve U.S. 
objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an 
uncertain future. Most critically, the Navy continues to focus 
not only on the modernization of the nuclear deterrent, but 
also its role as trusted steward of the safety and security of 
these weapons.
    The Navy Strategic Systems Program--or SSP--fiscal year 
2020 budget that I manage supports the continued sustainment of 
the deterrent as well as the modernization efforts directed in 
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Additionally, although not 
part of the strategic nuclear portfolio, the SSP budget request 
supports the hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike progam--an 
effort leveraging SSP's unique and critical non-nuclear skill 
set that the workforce has refined for 60 years.
    The men and women of SSP and their predecessors have 
provided unwavering and single mission focused support to the 
sea-based leg of the triad for over six decades. SSP is now 
facing a bow wave of critical development activities. The 
organization must be prepared not only to sustain today's 
deterrent, but to modernize it so that it remains a credible 
and effective strategic weapon system into the future.
    Today, SSP continues to extend the life of the Trident II 
(D5) strategic weapon system to match the Ohio-class submarine 
service life and to serve as the initial weapon system on the 
Columbia-class submarine. This is being accomplished through an 
update to all subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control, 
guidance, missile, and reentry as well as our flight test 
support infrastructure. All of our life extension efforts 
remain on track. Additionally, we will continue to recapitalize 
our Strategic Weapons Facilities to continue to support and 
sustain SSBN operations.
    These collective efforts will ensure an effective and 
credible sea-based strategic deterrent on both the Ohio-class 
and Columbia-class until the 2040s. In accordance with the 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review, SSP will ``begin studies in 2020 to 
define a cost-effective, credible, and effective submarine-
launched ballistic missile that we can deploy throughout the 
service life of the Columbia SSBN.''
    In addition to our modernization efforts, our budget 
request supports the direction of the 2018 Nuclear Posture 
Review. Specifically, our budget request continues to fund the 
modification of a small number of warheads to provide a low-
yield option. This near-term capability is being accomplished 
through our strong partnership with the Department of Energy. 
This effort will not increase the overall number of deployed 
ballistic warheads. It will, in fact, bolster our deterrence 
posture.
    As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to 
represent the men and women of SSP, comprising approximately 
1,700 sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast guardsmen, 1,200 
civilians, and over 2,000 contractor personnel. It is my most 
critical goal to ensure that they are poised to execute the 
mission with the same level of success, passion, and rigor, 
both today and tomorrow, as they have since our program's 
inception in 1955. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today on behalf of the men and women who make nuclear 
deterrence their life's work. I look forward to your questions.

            Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe
                              introduction
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss 
the sea-based leg of the triad. It is an honor to testify before you 
this morning representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
    The Nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped 
with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) is essential to our 
ability to deter major warfare with adversaries and assure our allies. 
Each leg provides unique attributes and, together, provides critical 
diversity and flexibility. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
reaffirmed that foreign nuclear threats are growing and Great Power 
competition has returned and, thus, reinforced the need to recapitalize 
each component of the triad. The nuclear triad is the bedrock of our 
ability to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, achieve 
U.S. objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an uncertain 
future; it is the Department of Defense's number one priority mission.
    The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the triad with our 
Ohio-class SSBNs and the Trident II (D5) strategic weapon system (SWS) 
they carry. SSBNs are responsible for a significant majority of the 
Nation's operationally deployed nuclear warheads. The Chief of Naval 
Operations has made clear the priority the Navy places on the 
sustainment and modernization of the undersea leg of the triad, 
directing the Navy to ``be ready to deploy USS Columbia (SSBN 826) as 
quickly as possible--beating the current schedule--in order to preserve 
our ability to defeat the threat.'' Delay is not an option.
    SSP's fundamental mission is to design, develop, produce, sustain, 
and ensure the safety and security of the Trident II (D5) SWS, 
comprising the SLBM, reentry systems, and shipboard systems. We strive 
to maintain a culture of excellence, underpinned by self-assessment, to 
achieve the highest standards of performance and integrity for 
personnel supporting the strategic deterrent mission. We focus 
unremittingly on our tremendous responsibility for the custody and 
accountability of our Nation's nuclear assets. The men and women of SSP 
and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of 
our sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines, sailors, and 
coast guardsmen who stand watch, safeguarding the weapons with which we 
are entrusted by this Nation.
    Our fiscal year 2020 budget request provides the required funding 
to support the program of record for the Trident II (D5) SWS. To 
sustain this capability and usher in a new era of development efforts, 
I am focusing on my top priorities: nuclear weapons safety and 
security; the Trident II (D5) Life Extension Program; NPR-directed 
activities; the Columbia-class Program; the Industrial Base, 
infrastructure, and capabilities; support to the United Kingdom's 
continuous at-sea deterrent; and the workforce that enables this 
mission every day.
    The men and women of SSP and their predecessors have provided 
unwavering and single mission-focused support to develop, sustain, and 
secure the sea-based leg of the triad for over six decades. SSP now 
faces a bow wave of critical modernization activities, and our 
workforce is evolving from years of sustainment efforts to large-scale 
development, as most recently evidenced by the 2018 NPR implementation 
and our expanding mission into conventional hypersonic capabilities. 
The organization must be prepared not only to sustain today's 
deterrent, but to modernize it so that it remains a credible, effective 
SWS that can support our ballistic missile submarines and our strategic 
deterrent mission through the life of the Columbia-class SSBN.
    As the fourteenth Director, it is my highest honor to serve as the 
program manager, technical authority, safety and security lead, 
regulatory lead, and Polaris Sales Agreement Project Officer for the 
Navy's nuclear weapons program. Most importantly, I am honored to 
represent the men and women of SSP, comprising approximately 1,700 
sailors, 1,000 marines, 300 coast guardsmen, 1,200 civilians, and over 
2,000 contractor personnel. It is my most critical goal to ensure they 
are poised to execute the mission with the same level of success, 
passion, and rigor both today and tomorrow as they have since our 
program's inception in 1955.
                          safety and security
    The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and 
security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Navy leadership 
delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and technical 
authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons. At its most basic level, this 
priority is the physical security of one of our nation's most valuable 
assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters at Arms provide an effective and 
integrated elite security force at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities 
and Waterfront Restricted Areas in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, 
Washington. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units have been 
commissioned at both facilities to protect our submarines. Together, 
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our 
security program, while headquarters staff ensures that nuclear 
weapons-capable activities comply with safety and security standards.
    The Navy maintains a culture of self-assessment in order to ensure 
safety and security. This is accomplished through biennial assessments, 
periodic technical evaluations, formal inspections, and continuous on-
site monitoring and reporting at the Strategic Weapons Facilities. We 
strive to maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the highest 
standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting the 
strategic deterrent mission and continue to focus on the custody and 
accountability of the assets entrusted to the Navy. SSP's number one 
priority is to maintain a safe and secure strategic deterrent for the 
Navy.
                       d5 life extension program
    The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on the Ohio-class 
ballistic missile submarines for nearly three decades and is planned to 
be deployed more than 50 years. This is well beyond its original design 
life of 25 years and more than double the historical service life of 
any previous sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, SSP is 
extending the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class 
submarine service life and to serve as the initial SWS for the 
Columbia-class SSBN. Our life extension efforts will ensure an 
effective and credible SWS on both the Ohio-class and Columbia-class 
SSBNs until the 2040s. This is being accomplished through an update to 
all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire 
control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Our initial life extension of 
missile and guidance flight hardware components is designed to meet the 
same form, fit, and function of the original system, maintain the 
deployed system as one homogeneous population, control costs, and 
sustain the demonstrated performance of the system.
    The Navy's D5 life extension program is executing on schedule to 
continue to meet deterrence requirements. In fiscal year 2018, the Navy 
deployed 24 life-extended D5 missiles (D5LE) to the fleet and remains 
on track to complete deployment by fiscal year 2024. In June 2018, we 
successfully conducted the first D5LE flight test of four missiles to 
support the Commander Evaluation Test (CET) program. The CET program 
obtains and monitors reliability, accuracy, and performance data of the 
D5LE missile population in an operational environment, and is one 
method used to monitor the long-term effectiveness of this nuclear 
deterrent weapon system.
    Another major initiative to ensure the continued sustainment of our 
SWS is the SSP Shipboard Systems Integration (SSI) Program, which 
manages obsolescence and modernizes SWS shipboard systems through the 
use of open architecture design and commercial off-the-shelf hardware 
and software. The SSI Program refreshes shipboard electronics hardware 
and upgrades software, which will extend service life, enable more 
efficient and affordable future maintenance of the SWS, and ensure we 
continue to provide the highest level of nuclear weapons safety and 
security for our deployed SSBNs while meeting U.S. Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM) requirements. Our organization performed over 90 fleet and 
shore-based incremental installations over the last three years. 
Sixteen installations were completed in 2018, and two began this year 
with an additional five planned for completion. Three shipboard 
modernization increments are currently in development for future 
installation.
    The Navy also works in partnership with the Department of Energy's 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to refurbish our 
reentry systems. The Trident II (D5) is capable of carrying two types 
of warheads, the W76 and the W88, which are both undergoing 
refurbishment. Deliveries of life-extended W76 warheads, known as the 
W76-1, to the Navy are nearly 100 percent complete and are on track to 
finish by the end of fiscal year 2019. The W76-1 program has been a 
tremendous effort that informs much of our understanding of 
refurbishment programs, and I laud our NNSA partners for their support 
of the Navy's deterrent. The W88 major alteration program also remains 
on track to support a first production unit in fiscal year 2020 with 
production scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2024. These 
combined efforts to refurbish the Navy's reentry systems ensure that 
the Navy can meet USSTRATCOM requirements for decades to come.
                   nuclear posture review activities
    The Navy is also beginning an approach to maintain a credible and 
effective SWS beyond 2040. For example, we are leveraging the work 
being done today to extend the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS as well 
as investigating opportunities to innovate, such as through the 
application of model-based engineering. As directed in the Nuclear 
Posture Review, the Navy will begin ``studies in 2020 to define a cost-
effective, credible, and effective SLBM that we can deploy throughout 
the service life of the Columbia SSBN.'' These threat-informed studies 
will underpin decisions made to sustain the Trident II (D5) SLBM and to 
maintain an adaptable and flexible sea-based deterrent for the Nation. 
SSP has a history of more than 60 years of developing, producing, and 
supporting SWSs to support the undersea leg of the triad. We are 
optimizing our SWS by applying lessons learned from six generations of 
missiles and will continue to do so until the 2080s.
    As we face increasingly agile, advanced, and persistent cyber 
threats to our nuclear enterprise, SSP must be constantly vigilant of 
our adversaries' means and methods of obtaining critical technology and 
information about the Navy's SWS. In order to protect our technical 
advantage from significant harm today and into the future, we are 
laying the groundwork with our industry partners to revolutionize our 
business practices. Securing program information within the industrial 
base and adjusting procurement approaches will ensure long-term 
stability of our design, development, and sustainment efforts. The 
ability to drive concerted progress within the nuclear enterprise is 
critical to the security and survivability of our current and future 
SWS and the platform on which it is deployed to defend the Nation.
    In accordance with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review's recommendation 
to pursue supplemental capabilities, SSP is fielding of a small number 
of low-yield SLBMs and is participating in a nuclear-armed sea-launched 
cruise missile (SLCM) study. The near-term low-yield SLBM and long-term 
SLCM efforts are intended to address deterrence gaps and assure allies. 
Our budget request supports executing a low-yield SLBM option, 
configured to leverage the W76-1 life-extension efforts. The low-yield 
program, known as the W76-2, is on track to meet warfighter 
requirements. The W76-2 modification will not increase the number of 
deployed ballistic missile warheads and leverages the people, 
processes, and schedule from the W76-1 program to ensure a cost-
effective and executable approach. The W76-2 weapon system will enhance 
deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence 
that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the 
United States and its allies.
    In the mid-term, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review directed the Navy 
to investigate the feasibility of fielding the nuclear explosive 
package from the Air Force's W78 warhead replacement into a Navy 
reentry body. This ongoing effort will inform Nuclear Weapons Council 
decisions regarding SLBM warhead modernization needs.
                   sws and the columbia-class program
    The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Columbia-
class Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines. The 
continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a 
credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic 
missile submarines. Accordingly, the Navy is taking the necessary steps 
to ensure the Columbia SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested 
on time with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
    To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of 
the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Columbia SSBN will enter service with the 
life-extended Trident II (D5) SLBM, which is resident today on Ohio-
class submarines. Maintaining a common SWS during the transition 
between existing and successor submarine platforms allows the Navy to 
leverage a mature material and knowledge enterprise, thus reducing 
programmatic costs and risks. Life-extended missiles will be shared 
with both the Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines into the 2040s.
    A critical component of the Columbia-class Program is the 
development of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) with the United 
Kingdom. Today, the United States Navy shares the Trident II (D5) SWS 
with the UK aboard its Vanguard-class of ballistic missile submarines. 
Similar to the United States Navy, the UK is recapitalizing its four 
aging Vanguard-class SSBN submarines with the Dreadnought-class SSBN. 
The CMC will support the life-extended Trident II (D5) SWS to be 
deployed on the Columbia and the UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs. Our 
partnership also supports production of these two new classes of SSBNs 
in both United States and UK build yards. Collaborative efforts also 
include construction of missile tubes to support building the U.S. 
prototype Quad-pack module and the SWS Ashore integration test site at 
Cape Canaveral, Florida.
    To manage and mitigate technical risk associated with the delivery 
of the first submarines to both the United States and UK programs, SSP 
is leading the development of the SWS Ashore integration test site. 
This is a joint effort between the Navy and the state of Florida, 
investing in the redevelopment of a 1950s Polaris Missile site to 
conduct integration testing and verification for Columbia and UK 
Dreadnought programs. We reached a programmatic milestone in 2017 when 
Test Bay One, which will be used to test the Missile Service Unit first 
article, achieved Initial Operational Capability. Last year, we 
successfully installed the first Columbia missile tube into Test Bay 
Two and, in the beginning of 2020, we are scheduled to achieve the 
Initial Operational Capability for verifying and validating the SWS 
support systems for the Columbia and UK Dreadnought programs.
    To mitigate the risk in the restart of launcher system production, 
SSP developed a surface launch test facility at the Naval Air Warfare 
Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California. This facility will 
prove that the launcher industrial base can replicate the performance 
of the Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launcher system. Thirteen evaluation 
and four qualification tests were conducted in 2018, and one 
qualification test was conducted in January 2019. Eleven remaining 
tests are planned for 2019. To date, Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launch 
performance has been demonstrated.
    The Ohio-class SSBNs begin decommissioning in the late 2020s and 
the Columbia-class must be ready to start patrols in fiscal year 2031 
to maintain a minimum operational force of 10 SSBNs. The Navy has 
already extended the Ohio-class service life from 30 years to 42 years, 
and there is no engineering margin left for further life extension. 
Recapitalizing our SSBNs is a significant investment that only happens 
every other generation, making it critically important that we do it 
right. Any delay has the potential to impact not only our ability to 
meet operational requirements, but also the United Kingdom's strategic 
deterrent requirements.
           industrial base, infrastructure, and capabilities
    Ensuring robust defense and aerospace industrial base 
capabilities--such as shipyard support, radiation-hardened electronics, 
and solid rocket motors--remains an important priority. SSP places 
particular emphasis on the solid rocket motor industry and its sub-tier 
suppliers. Although the Navy maintains a continuous production 
capability of solid rocket motors, the demand from both National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force has 
precipitously declined. This decline results in higher costs for the 
Navy and puts an entire specialized industry at risk. Future Air Force 
modernization will provide some much needed relief beginning in the 
mid-2020s; however, our Nation cannot afford to lose this capability. 
While the efforts of our industry partners and others create short-term 
cost relief, the long-term support of the solid rocket motor industry, 
including its sub-tier supplier base, and maintenance of critical 
skills remains an issue that must be addressed. For example, we are 
concerned with ensured access to and affordability of certain critical 
solid rocket motor constituents, such as ammonium perchlorate. We will 
continue to work with our industry partners, the Department of Defense, 
senior NASA leadership, Air Force, and Congress to do everything we can 
to ensure this vital national security industry asset is preserved.
    As the Navy executes the total overhaul and replacement of the SSBN 
and SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, which will be in service until 2084, 
NNSA's infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the 
evolving needs of the Nation. Of most importance, an effective, 
resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability and 
capacity can address age-related risks, support planned refurbishments, 
as well as prepare for future uncertainty. Additionally, tritium, 
lithium, and uranium, among other strategic materials, are vital to 
ensuring the Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent 
requirements.
                     support to the united kingdom
    The United States and UK have maintained a longstanding shared 
commitment to nuclear deterrence, one that dates to the signing of the 
Mutual Defense Agreement in 1958 and with the Polaris Sales Agreement 
(PSA) in 1963. This year, the UK celebrates 50 years of its continuous-
at-sea-deterrent--a momentous achievement that the U.S. has proudly 
supported. Today, the Navy's support encompasses not only the CMC and 
SSBN programs but also 100 percent of the shipboard systems, missile, 
and reentry portions--the Strategic Weapon System--of the UK's nuclear 
deterrent. As the Director of SSP, I serve as the delegated United 
States Project Officer of the PSA and am solely responsible for 
fulfilling lifecycle support to the UK's program. As SSP shapes the 
future SWS, we must continue to consider the UK's connection to our 
decisions and our responsibility to our most important ally. SSP 
remains steadfastly committed to the UK's continuous-at-sea deterrent 
and to the mutually beneficial relationship we have both maintained and 
celebrated for 60 years.
                               conclusion
    History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and 
execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950s was truly 
a result of a cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and 
inspirational leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts, 
our dedicated predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners 
alike--responded to the national need with gusto and drove this program 
with a vision. Today's SSP and its industry partners will continue this 
vision by attracting, nurturing, and retaining the next generation 
workforce that will enable a capable, credible strategic deterrent for 
our Nation for the next 60 years.
    SSP ensures a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent and 
focuses on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets 
entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based 
strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security 
requirement. Our Nation's sea-based deterrent has been a critical 
component of our national security since the 1950s and must continue to 
assure our allies and partners and deter potential adversaries well 
into the future. I am privileged to represent this unique organization 
as we work to serve the best interests of our great Nation. I thank the 
committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg 
of the triad and the vital role it plays in our national security.

    Senator Fischer. With that, I will begin our first round of 
questioning.
    Secretary Lord, after the last two administrations, we've 
consistently heard testimony that nuclear modernization 
programs such as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) 
have no margin for error. Can you talk about how fragile the 
situation is and the impact that funding cuts or additional 
delays would have on our ability to meet deterrence 
requirements?
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely. Thank you, Chairman.
    We are living now with Cold War technology, and we have put 
off modernizing the triad for multiple decades. So, now we have 
no margin. We need to move forward. So, any cut in funding 
would essentially have us unilaterally stand down, in terms of 
our capability to have a credible nuclear deterrent.
    Senator Fischer. When you say we have no room for any delay 
in meeting these modernization requirements, could you speak to 
us, in this setting, on the importance of our keeping up with 
that in regard to what our adversaries, specifically Russia and 
China, are doing, and why that is so important for us to know, 
why it's important for the people of this country to know?
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely. Russia, in particular, has 
developed many capabilities, whether they be unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUVs) or different types of warheads, over 
recent years. Our systems will be timing out, in terms of their 
capability, between 2020 and 2040. We must modernize what we 
have so that we can replace our systems, one for one. GBSD, for 
instance, there is no margin to do another Service Life 
Extension Program (SLEP) on Minuteman III, because not only 
would it be more expensive than developing GBSD, but you would 
not have the resiliency in the capability, because you would 
not have the modern equipment, you would not have the actual 
capabilities from a functional-range point of view, warhead 
capability. So, we need to, by 2028, start replacing.
    Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
    General Ray, if you have anything to add to that. Some have 
argued that reducing the number of deployed Minuteman 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to 300 or 200 
missiles would be a way to extend the life of the current 
system and allow the delay for its replacement. Can you talk 
about why this isn't accurate?
    General Ray. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. Three 
dimensions to that:
    The first, of course, 400 to 450 weapons deployed is a very 
high threshold for our enemies to derail us. It would consume 
up to two-thirds of an enemy arsenal to disarm us.
    The second piece of that is the near-term challenge, as 
Secretary Lord talked about, is the timing. Last night, we had 
the successful launch of a Minuteman III. That testing program 
will consume the boosters and the propulsion system rocket 
engines much faster if we continue on this pace. We don't have 
a program to replace that.
    But, when I consider the affordability formula, it features 
some things, such as modularity. It features a competitive 
environment with a good tech baseline that we own. It features 
a good tech base of engineers and individuals.
    When I think about foregoing the GBSD, we forego a value 
proposition that gives us the modularity that lets Admiral 
Wolfe and I work together on improvements in a more affordable 
fashion. It also helps us in the competitive environment, since 
we would own the tech baseline for GBSD. But, moreover, we 
forego a value proposition of reducing our convoys by upwards 
of two-thirds and the number of times that we would penetrate 
the sites by two-thirds. So, when we think about what the 
digital engineering is helping us learn, and help drive the 
sustainment dollars down by billions, what we give up is 
probably even more than just the pricetag of a new program.
    Senator Fischer. You know, you talk about affordability. 
General Rand, your predecessor, he testified that the GBSD 
would save around a billion dollars compared to performing 
another life extension program. General Hyten, in his annual 
posture statement, said that the further life extension of 
Minuteman III ICBM is not cost-effective, nor will it provide a 
weapon system capable of adapting to advancing technology.
    Can you talk a little bit more about the savings that are 
associated with the GBSD in greater detail, and some of the 
other benefits that it's going to provide?
    General Ray. Ma'am, I think the big help to us right now--
and we've talked with your staff--is the digital engineering 
that is operating at an unprecedented level of this acquisition 
program. Secretary Roper has already declared this is the best 
acquisition program he has. The risk that we're reducing by the 
numerous design cycles--a typical design effort would take one, 
maybe two, manual efforts. We're on our ninth design cycle on 
this side of the milestone. So, the insights about how to 
manage requirements, the ability to create a competitive 
environment of areas that will give us a good return on 
investment for areas that we value, and then the insights on 
how to sustain, are tremendous to us, in terms of the ability 
to work with the Navy on new components and the ability to do 
things smartly in the design, right up front, that the two 
primes are telling us that it's a much more competitive 
environment and much more affordable approach.
    Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Under Secretary Lord, as you know, we are 
modernizing three weapons platforms, a new cruise missile, and 
multiple warhead systems, all concurrently. What contingency 
plans do you have if any one of these programs slips?
    Secretary Lord. We are the point where, for decades, we 
have put off modernizing these programs. Right now, we have no 
choice but to move forward, and move forward in lockstep with 
NNSA. So, we are focused on GBSD, particularly, and looking at 
plutonium pit production, making sure we have 30 by 2026, that 
we have 80 per year by 2030. So, we do not have any margin, at 
this point, because, for decades, we have delayed.
    Senator Heinrich. I don't disagree, and certainly, I'm 
fully committed to working with you to ensure that Los Alamos 
can get to 30 by 2026, safely and expeditiously. However, from 
a broader good-government perspective, I'm going to remain 
determined to hold both yourself and others accountable for the 
decision to split plutonium production and to build, really, an 
entirely new plutonium pit production complex. The independent 
IDA study found that none of the plutonium pit options were 
demonstrably better than any of the others. So, I have to ask, 
how did the Nuclear Weapons Council select an option that is 
literally twice the cost of other options and will force 
appropriators to find an additional 14 billion-plus dollars?
    Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council looked at the 
data we had. Since we do not yet have a conceptual design, we 
do not have firm cost data. If we get funding for the 
conceptual design in the 2020 budget, we will have it by the 
end of 2020. We will then be able to understand the cost 
implications. The IDA study that was done said there was no 
significant difference in the cost between the two 
alternatives. The multiple alternatives.
    Senator Heinrich. So, the need for redundancy has never 
been in the nuclear complex, or at least articulated, and was 
nowhere in the Nuclear Posture Review, was nowhere in the 
analysis of alternatives, or even the engineering analysis 
conducted by the Pentagon and the NNSA. So, when did the 
Nuclear Weapons Council decide that redundancy was a factor, 
even ``the'' factor, for splitting pit production?
    Secretary Lord. The Nuclear Weapons Council focused on the 
Nuclear Posture Review, which states, ``An effective, 
responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is 
essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting 
requirements.'' So, what we looked at was a resilient 
capability. It wasn't particularly redundant. What we found the 
best option to be was to, first, produce the 30 pits----
    Senator Heinrich. What does that mean, ``resilient''? How 
do you define that?
    Secretary Lord. It means we have the ability to have 
multiple options to meet our requirements. So, we will start at 
Los Alamos with the trained workforce we have there. We have to 
add about 1,000 jobs a year at Los Alamos, given everything we 
have in front of us. We then will look at South Carolina, where 
we have a facility that can be upgraded, and a large workforce 
in a community that's very, very interested in moving forward.
    So, what we are doing is, we are standing up, first, Los 
Alamos, then we will move to Savannah River, and move on from 
there with two different options to mitigate any type of 
catastrophes we might have in one or the other, and also be 
able to tap into the workforces of each of the communities.
    Senator Heinrich. How do you square your certification that 
this split production option is on track to get us where we 
need to be, when the independent study comes to such a starkly 
different conclusion?
    Secretary Lord. The independent study said that there was 
no path without risk involved, and that there was no 
significant differences in all the risks. So, we're waiting for 
the full study to be done at the end of June, and then, every 
day we don't move forward with the conceptual design and on to 
the follow-on details, we will slip. So, we think this is the 
best path forward right now, but we need to get down to work, 
and continue with it.
    Senator Heinrich. General Ray, your bomber roadmap states 
that we'll field 175 bombers, about 100 B-21s, and 75 B-52s, 
when all is said done, out in the 2030s. This has concerned 
some people, but it seems to me, as long as we're producing B-
21s, we have the flexibility, 5 or 20 years from now, to change 
that number, up or down. Do you believe this number is set in 
stone, or is it more flexible than that?
    General Ray. It is more flexible. The bomber roadmap that 
we have right now is the product of a programmatically-driven 
solution. The analysis that we're looking at for inside of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and inside the Air 
Force has revealed it will be at the forefront of anything that 
happens. The Air Force we need has shown a growth in bomber 
squadrons. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
(CSBA) study and the MITRE study show a growth in that, and so, 
my role here now in Global Strike Command is to set the 
foundation for smart and good growth.
    The decision point to look closely at the B-21 production 
rate is in about the 2024 timeframe. So, we've got a very good 
program, very good program managers there, and we all agree 
that, once we get to that point, we have some options. But, in 
the meantime, there are some sustainment options we're going to 
look at to make the bomber roadmap that we have more 
affordable. I'm convinced we're underinvested in the 
countermaritime dimension of long-range strike. We're 
underinvested in hypersonics and, potentially, counterspace. 
So, my job is to set the foundation for the Chief and the 
Secretary to have some more innovative options, here, in the 
next 2 or 3 years, to expand beyond the minimum of 100 B-21s 
and 75 B-52s.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    General Ray, first of all, I really appreciate that the 
Secretary of the Air Force's strategic decision to choose the 
Ellsworth Air Force Base as the first B-21 base is moving 
forward. Since the Air Force has requested funding in fiscal 
year 2020 for two weapons-generation facilities--and these 
would be at Warren and Malmstrom, if I'm correct--when would we 
expect to see funding requested for these weapons-generation 
facilities at all of the bomb wings, including Ellsworth Air 
Force Base, to support the B-21? Assuming fiscal year 2021 
beginning or otherwise?
    General Ray. Sir, the process we're following now, of 
course, with the main operating base (MOB) declaration and the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process that we 
started that you and I talked about is one piece of it. The 
Secretary insisted that we rethink, and we reported back to 
Congress recently that we needed to reevaluate our WGF game 
plan. We are proud to say that there is a good plan for the 
ICBM WGFs, and that remains on track. The Secretary has given 
us a homework assignment. We've gone back and looked at that 
very closely, broadened our team to collaborate on some more 
insightful and appropriate approaches to this. She's not 
blessed our roadmap just yet, and so, I'd like to be able to 
come back to you and to the committee with a more informed 
long-term game plan that would--just like Senator Heinrich's 
question, that would accompany the right bomber roadmap and 
give you better insights.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Ray. In August 2019, AFGSC briefed the Acting 
Secretary of the Air Force and received approval on the way 
ahead for bomber WGFs, subject to budgetary decisions within 
the Air Force, Department of Defense, and the Office of 
Management and Budget. The Air Force remains on track to submit 
the Barksdale WGF as part of the fiscal year 2022 budget 
submission. B-21 WGF construction will be timed to coincide 
with projected B-21 acquisition and fielding timelines; 
location and funding decisions are not yet final.

    Senator Rounds. Timeframe for that report?
    General Ray. Sir, I think the decision from the Secretary 
should be in the next couple of months, and then our ability to 
refine that, I'd like to come back to you by the end of the 
fiscal year, if that's possible.
    Senator Rounds. So, it would still be available to maintain 
on-track planned developments for fiscal year 2021 
appropriations.
    General Ray. Sir, if I could come back to you with that 
assessment, I can give you a better sense of when that would 
be.
    Senator Rounds. My point being, at this point, there is not 
an anticipated delay in the construction processes, because all 
of these new facilities need to be in place before the B-21 can 
actually be facilitated, correct?
    General Ray. Sir, not every facility has to be there, and 
that's part of the Site Activation Task Force (SATAF) planning 
that's beginning now, and part of the NEPA process. But, the 
sequencing of these things has been perturbated with the 
supplemental request for the emergency relief in our military 
construction (MILCON) game plan. So, we need to come back and 
then lay out the roadmap for the timing of how we're going to 
do all these steps. I think we should include all the bomber 
bases to give us clarity. The closest challenge that we have 
right now is for the Barksdale facility, based on the B-52 in 
the current nuclear mission, and then to add on, where we can, 
for the additional B-21s.
    Senator Rounds. Okay.
    For Secretary Lord and General Ray, both. Have you found 
that the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) 
acquisition and operational management has improved since 
Secretary Mattis designated U.S. Strategic Command as the 
enterprise lead and the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Sustainment as acquisition lead and primary 
policymaker for OSD?
    Secretary Lord. I would like to address that. Yes, I 
believe it has. In fact, we just very recently completed an NC3 
Enterprise Review with General Hyten, myself, General Selva, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), and we are 
reviewing all the key programs, looking at fragility, making 
sure we're addressing key items. Again, we need to modernize 
and sustain at the same time. We're, again, dealing with Cold 
War technology that needs to be upgraded. What is particularly 
key, in my role in acquisition and sustainment (A&S), is that I 
have your support for the 14 billets in the 2020 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that I need in order to help 
staff and move this forward.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    General Ray?
    General Ray. Sir, it's emphatically helped us as a team, 
greater coordination at all levels and echelons of influence 
and stewardship. The additional pieces, we're adding some more 
operationally relevant approaches to how we're doing business 
so that you can manage the risk. I have great coordination with 
OSD, the Joint Staff, and certainly with General Hyten. I 
believe that's going to be very helpful. I've asked for an 
independent review to come in and relook at the NC3 center that 
is in my command. When it stood up, it was stood up without the 
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) role and the oversight from 
OSD. I believe, with some minor modifications, we can be even 
more effective.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    I'd just--very quickly--and I'm not even sure who to 
address this to, so I'll offer it and then ask whoever feels 
comfortable with a response. Would it be fair to say that both 
our near-peer competitors, China and Russia, have both 
significant advantages today, in terms of the upgrades to their 
NC3 development and upgrades that basically push us to make 
certain that we are getting ours done just to be in a 
competitive and at least in a near-peer position over the next 
couple of years?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Senator Rounds, if I could, just 
generally, I would say, without getting into specific 
capabilities of Russia or China, I would note that both of 
those countries have very aggressive modernization programs 
underway, and have had them underway for quite some time. One 
of the basic premises contained within the National Defense 
Strategy is that we are at risk of losing our competitive 
advantages to potential adversaries; hence, the need--and I 
would echo the comments of my colleagues here, also--with 
respect to the importance of maintaining our NC3 architecture 
and infrastructure.
    From my perspective, sir, the nuclear command, control, 
communications enterprise is the glue that holds our nuclear 
deterrent together. Hence, it is critically important to ensure 
the robustness and reliability of that, going forward.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Secretary Lord, in your testimony, you used the word 
``credibility.'' Do you feel that, if we slip on our schedule--
for example, with Columbia or otherwise in all of the elements 
that we're trying to modernize at one time, that that 
diminishes credibility, which, in turn, diminishes deterrence?
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
    Senator King. That strikes me as one of the great dangers 
here. As you do your planning and your charts, are there gaps? 
Are there places where--for example, this is hypothetical, but 
Columbia doesn't come on until a certain period? And Ohio, 
we're starting to be retired. Are there gaps in our----
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely. There's a one-for-one with Ohio 
and Columbia, and that's why, for instance, Columbia is one of 
the major defense acquisition programs that I milestoned 
decision authority for, and I review that very, very closely. 
In fact, on Friday morning, I have a quarterly review on it, 
and I look very closely at what we have for capacity in our 
shipyards to build it.
    Senator King. Am I understanding there's been some issues 
about the tubes?
    Secretary Lord. We have a common missile chamber, actually, 
with the UK [United Kingdom], and the first ones being 
fabricated are for the Dreadnought, the United Kingdom sub. 
They're up in Quonset Point, Rhode Island, right now. There 
were some cracks on them. It's a technically challenging weld. 
There were issues with the nondestructive tests that were being 
done. We identified it. We've gotten to the root-cause analysis 
and, I think, irreversible corrective action. We're working 
very closely with a key contractor----
    Senator King. Is that going to cause the schedule to slip?
    Secretary Lord. We think it is contained. I will find out, 
again, on Friday. But, right now, there shouldn't be. I'll 
defer to Admiral Wolfe.
    Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, ma'am--yes, sir, if I could answer 
that.
    So, right now, based on, as Secretary Lord said, knowing 
what we know about the welds, getting to the root cause, we 
still have margin in the program. We have 11 months margin. If 
you look at how the Navy has responded to this, both the Navy 
and General Dynamics Electric Boat, we've staffed up, we've 
realized several things. One is, it's the fragility of the 
industrial base, which we've talked about already. So, making 
sure that we are getting that industrial base not only where it 
needs to be, but to get it to status quo and sustain it. That's 
why we've stood up, in the Navy, a separate program executive 
office just for Columbia, because this is the Navy's number-one 
acquisition program. So, we're taking all the steps to make 
sure we've got the proper oversight to keep this on track.
    Secretary Lord. If I may, just one more point on that.
    This is so very, very important to us that, frankly, after 
the last Columbia review, I had the week before Christmas, I 
had Phebe Novakovic, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of General 
Dynamics (GD), come in on the Friday afternoon before Christmas 
to sit down and talk about how the supply chain was being 
managed and what we have for staffing. So, working very, very 
tightly with Hondo Geurts, in the Navy, on that one.
    Senator King. Well, deterrence is the heart of our 
defensive posture, and credibility is the heart of deterrence. 
So, that's obviously of great concern.
    Mr. Trachtenberg, do we need to match every new Russian 
nuclear-armed delivery vehicle?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Absolutely not, Senator King, and 
it's certainly not our intent to match what Russia is doing, 
weapon for weapon. Our basic concern is that we have seen, 
through the development of Russian military doctrine, some of 
the exercises they have conducted, and our concern is that the 
Russians may believe that they have some kind of exploitable 
advantage through the development of capabilities that they 
have developed. Through our Nuclear Posture Review and the 
programs that we have asked for support for to develop, we hope 
that we can certainly convince the Russians not to miscalculate 
and believe that anything they are doing would offer them an 
advantage that could be exploitable or where they could 
miscalculate, and competition could lead to conflict. But, no, 
the short answer to your question is no.
    Senator King. But, clearly, again, getting back to 
deterrence, we need to be sure that they don't feel that they 
have a weapon that can penetrate our defenses or will otherwise 
go unresponded.
    Let me ask one more question. This is sort of an odd 
question, but you'll have to excuse it. I'm spending a lot of 
my time these days in the cyber arena. One of the big issues in 
cyber is attribution. Where is the attack coming from? Is there 
a potential for attribution issues in this area, particularly 
where you're talking about an underwater, unmanned vehicle, 
knowing where it is going? We need to know who to respond to 
and what the response will be. Am I just making something up, 
here, or is this an issue?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. No, sir. I would not say you're 
making anything up, here, Senator. I think you're absolutely 
right to focus on cyber as an element in the deterrence 
equation. What we have seen, certainly over the past decade or 
so, is the development of cyber as a domain where we need to 
pay particular attention to what is happening and what our 
adversaries are doing. Attribution is certainly one element 
when it comes to our overall deterrent and the credibility of 
that deterrent and how we might respond. Cyber is a piece of 
that.
    So, you're absolutely correct to flag that. That is one of 
the additional technologies and capabilities that we need to 
look at, and are looking at, as a Department.
    Senator King. Well, a big part of our upgrade is command 
and control. I'm out of time, but that's as important as 
anything else we're talking about here, I think.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Absolutely.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Cramer.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    This was not something I was going to ask about, but just 
to, maybe, follow up on that line of thought. How important is 
space to that, then? Because we're going to have a decision to 
make, here, on Space Force and what happens next. Maybe whoever 
wants to talk about that could add to that. But, Secretary, it 
seemed like the appropriate time to ask.
    Secretary Lord. Perhaps I'll make a comment and then pass 
it down through.
    When you talk about nuclear command and control, space is 
an incredibly important portion of that to make sure we have 
secure and resilient communications, and our space layer is 
critical for that. The cybersecurity of that is another piece. 
That's why we're working so hard to make sure that we have 
hardened systems, and why so many of these systems need to be 
upgraded, because they're just not capable of being hardened 
today.
    But, I'll hand over.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Yeah, just briefly, Senator Cramer. 
I would agree with that completely. Space is critically 
important. Almost everything that we do nowadays relies, to 
some degree, on space and space systems. Key aspects of our NC3 
architecture--for example, missile warning or command and 
control--are space-based. So, we very much need to be focused 
on the survivability, the resilience, and the capability of 
those space-based elements for the deterrence mission, as well 
as for others, as well.
    Senator Cramer. General Ray?
    General Ray. Senator, I think one of the other dimensions 
is to go beyond just simply the importance when we think about 
where we are. One of the new roles I have under Strategic 
Command, is as the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC). 
So, one of the jobs I do is to coordinate the air and space 
dimension. With space leaving STRATCOM, I now have to be the 
space coordinating authority. So, I will tell you, the 
indications and warning dimension, to get to Senator King's 
point about attribution, is foundational to everything we're 
doing. But, what it's allowed us to do in this last exercise is 
to actually map kinetic and nonkinetic threats from a space, 
cyber, and physical domain against our nuclear command and 
control and indications warnings. So, we have a better roadmap 
now, at the very classified level, about what to contend with, 
and it'll help us with the recipe of how to deal with those 
coming.
    Senator Cramer. That's probably as important in a submarine 
as it is anyplace, huh?
    Vice Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I would tell you, 
cybersecurity has to be at the forefront of everything that we 
do, moving forward. Some people would say, ``Well, you're on a 
submarine, you're kind of out, right? You don't need to worry 
about that.'' We all need to worry about it. So, it doesn't 
matter what you're doing, and everything that we're doing in 
the Navy, whether it be NC3, whether it be what we're doing in 
the Trident, cybersecurity is a part of everything that we're 
putting in place, moving forward.
    Senator Cramer. I'm going to resist the temptation to just 
go on, on the whole Space Force idea, and get, maybe, General 
Ray, from you, a broader elaboration on the importance of the 
entire triad. Because, as we're having this discussion of 
modernization, there are those in office who think that three 
legs is at least one too many, if not two too many. Maybe if 
you can just describe, strategically, why they're all relevant, 
if you believe they are, that that would be helpful.
    General Ray. Yes, sir. My perspective comes from being the 
Deputy Commander in European Command, the head of a combatant 
command on a daily basis in support of General Scaparotti. I've 
learned to look at our triad in the context of a modernized 
Chinese triad, a modernized triad-plus on the part of the 
Russians, and clearly in the minds of our allies. Any change in 
that has to make a collectively more safer plan. So, our triad 
is foundational. It has to be where we go. As we've said, we 
have to modernize it. Any change in that has to be done to 
where we do change the rest of the dynamic, and do our allies 
believe that the world is a safer place? I think there's no 
solution right now I can imagine that would say to back off the 
triad. You heard Secretary Mattis, one of the brightest 
military minds, said, ``I questioned it, and I cannot solve the 
deterrent reducing from the triad.''
    Secretary Trachtenberg. If I could----
    Senator Cramer. Please.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. May I, Senator?
    Senator Cramer. Please.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Just briefly, to pick up on what 
General Ray said. I think, in terms of the triad, I tend to 
look at the capabilities the triad brings for deterrence as 
complementary rather than redundant, because I do believe each 
of the legs brings unique characteristics that are useful in a 
deterrence perspective. I think that is why every 
administration has reiterated the importance of maintaining all 
three legs of the triad. We can discuss the numbers for each, 
but, in terms of the critical and unique capabilities each 
brings, whether it is reliable command and control, resilience, 
survivability of the sea-based leg, adaptability and 
flexibility of the air-breathing leg, the bombers, the 
geographic dispersion of ICBMs, each brings a unique component 
to the overall deterrence equation, which complicates the--any 
attack calculations that a potential adversary might have. I 
think that is sort of the inherent value of the triad.
    Senator Cramer. Oh, I appreciate it. That was a great 
summary. I'm glad you took the time to say it, because I was 
even intrigued by Senator Heinrich's question about resiliency 
versus redundancy. I think I just heard how the two are the 
same--the two parts of the same umbrella, if you will, and so, 
I appreciate that. Thank you.
    Yield back.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
    The vote has been called, but we're going to continue with 
the hearing. We're moving pretty well through questions. I 
would urge Members to stay, or go vote and come back, because 
we'll have time for more questions.
    Secretary Trachtenberg--oh, Senator Manchin, if you're 
ready, would you like to ask questions right now?
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Fischer. I'll let do your first round. That's 
putting you on the spot. Walk in the door.
    Senator Manchin. This will be to Secretary Lord. You and 
the other witnesses' testimony highlights the multiple 
modernization programs that we're undergoing right now. We have 
the ground-based strategic deterrent, the long-range standoff 
weapon, the B-61, and -12, and B-21. The list goes on and on. 
So, I'm concerned about the testimony, such as Secretary 
Trachtenberg's written testimony that highlights the rapid 
growth of China's nuclear forces in the face of all the 
corporate espionage we know they're conducting. So, my question 
would be--and I'm sorry if it's already been asked about--but, 
what steps are you taking to ensure that our nuclear 
modernization efforts remains with us and aren't stolen by the 
Chinese or Russians or from our subcontractors? The biggest 
problem we've seen to be as it goes down the food chain, 
procurement? It seems to be wide open for the taking.
    Secretary Lord. Senator, this is really on point, because, 
if there's any area that has received enhanced focus over the 
last 18 months more than any other, it's cybersecurity. So, in 
my responsibility for the defense industrial base, I've looked 
at the problem and have seen that we have a fundamental issue, 
that we have National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) cybersecurity standards that are very hard to interpret 
if you're a contractor, in terms of how you actually 
instantiate those. So, what we're doing right now is, by the 
end of this year, we will have a national cybersecurity 
standard, just like we have International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) standards for quality.
    Senator Manchin. Well, who's maintaining the visibility on 
those contracts to ensure that nuclear projects aren't being 
exposed the same way the Navy's undersea programs were last 
year?
    Secretary Lord. We are, as I have responsibility for a 
number of the larger programs, like GBSD and so forth, so it's 
a milestone decision authority. So, as we go through the 
reviews, we look at what our supply base is doing, how they are 
secure, both in their software development, especially, but in 
terms of physical security, as well. We work very closely with 
intel, with DSS----
    Senator Manchin. Do you believe the primes should be held 
responsible----
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
    Senator Manchin.--and held accountable----
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely.
    Therein lies the problem. Typically, primes are pretty 
good. Maybe the next level down. But, they lose sight, and what 
we did, just about 3 months ago, was, we introduced new 
cybersecurity clauses that are going in all the contracts, 
moving forward. So, it is absolutely clear----
    Senator Manchin. How does that change the whole business 
model--I'm so sorry, because our time will be running--how does 
it change the business model, when there's a sub, three rungs 
down the chain, who doesn't want to, basically, give you 
pertinent information or have someone else have access to that 
information? I mean, I just couldn't believe what's going on 
and how vulnerable we have been over the years. There's no 
wonder why China has accelerated the way they did, the access 
they've had to the system.
    Secretary Lord. I don't disagree with you. It all starts 
with standards that you can measure to, that have metrics, so 
we know what right looks like, in terms of cybersecurity. Then 
it turns into educating the workforce. So, we're standing up 
courses at our Defense Acquisition University. So, it comes to 
really making sure our acquisition workforce has the skillsets 
they need, and that we communicate that to our industrial base, 
and that we have actual metrics that say, ``This is what''----
    Senator Manchin. If there's not financial penalties to the 
prime, this'll never work.
    Secretary Lord. You're absolutely correct. In fact, we go 
right back to source-selection criteria. If it----
    Senator Manchin. I'm sure, any primes out there, you're not 
really happy with this line of questioning. But, it is the way 
it's evolved over the years. It's got to change.
    Secretary Lord. We have never clearly said what is 
acceptable, what is unacceptable. So, we'll start at contract 
award. But, it's a critical issue, and we're having ongoing 
discussions. We meet quarterly with the three largest 
industrial associations.
    Senator Manchin. If I may--and I'm sure anybody else--if 
you can keep us informed. If we can look and see what you all 
have been able to do----
    Secretary Lord. Absolutely, I would very much like to--we 
can come and give you a briefing----

    Secretary Lord. My office will continue to engage with you 
on this issue and keep you informed.

    Senator Manchin. Love to. I've spoke to primes and 
everything, and I've spoke to the subs all the way down the 
food chain, and there is nothing that's, basically, linking 
them together. Sometimes the primes don't even know who the 
subs are far enough down the food chain.
    Secretary Lord. Well, this is exactly what we've gotten at, 
and exactly what's going to change.
    Senator Manchin. Well, I appreciate it--I appreciate all of 
y'all here. But, we just want to help you. Our job is to help 
you.
    Secretary Lord. Thank you.
    Senator Manchin. We want to work together.
    Thank you very much.
    I'm so sorry. We're all running to vote.
    Senator Heinrich [presiding]. Well, Senator Manchin, it's 
just you and I now, so you don't have to apologize. You can 
even sneak one more in, if you want, before you go.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Heinrich. He couldn't pass that up. So, you do one 
more, and then I've got a whole pile here.
    Senator Manchin. The other one I would have is the 
relationship between the Missile Defense Agency and the Space 
Development Agency, to ensure that all aspect of nuclear 
deterrent missions are being executed under a united line of 
effort. If you have something along those----
    Secretary Lord. Well, we are just now standing up the Space 
Development Agency, and what programs are within what entity 
are just being adjudicated now.
    Senator Manchin. General Ray, I think that you highlighted 
the much-needed improvements in our satellite systems from 
advanced extremely high frequency satellites in orbit and 
production of that. How's that coming along?
    General Ray. Sir, we're making good progress with the 
terminals and the elements. We visited the team at Raytheon 
recently, and all that progress is where we'd like it. We were 
behind, and we had to restructure the program. So, I'm pleased 
with it, going forward, and the key will be to keep on the 
primes to execute as we've laid it out.
    Senator Manchin. Secretary Trachtenberg, your written 
testimony included a couple of mentions of Iran as a nation 
trying to tip the balance of power. Would you want to expand on 
that?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes, sir. You're correct, we were 
very much concerned, in terms of looking at Iran and seeing 
where Iran is going. Iran continues to be the prime supporter 
of terrorism. Iran continues to develop ballistic missile 
capabilities. So, we're watching that very carefully.
    We face a variety of threats today, not just from Russia 
and China, as large competitors, but also there are still 
threats that we need to deal with from North Korea and also, 
potentially, Iran, as well. So, we are looking at them.
    Senator Manchin. Are we selling missiles to Saudis?
    Are we providing access to missiles to the Saudis?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. I'm not sure what missile tech--are 
you talking about actual missiles?
    Senator Manchin. Uh-huh.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. If I could, I will get back to you 
on that. I'd like to take that one for the record.
    Senator Manchin. Yeah. I would, too.
    Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Senator Manchin.
    No surprise I want to return for a moment to pit production 
again. Under Secretary Lord, my understanding is that we're 
probably a few years away from a Critical Decision 2 (CD2) 
estimated independent cost analysis of what the real, sort of, 
concrete and steel costs are going to look like at the Savannah 
River site. Probably out in 2021-2022. So, how do you certify 
now that we're on track, when we don't really know even what 
those costs are going to look like yet?
    Secretary Lord. We work very, very closely with NNSA under 
the framework of the Nuclear Weapons Council. What we have from 
them is the engineering analysis, moving forward. As they move 
into conceptual design, we will begin to get clear track as to 
the actual dollars. But, the estimates we have right now, they 
certify they believe in, and we back them up, and we believe 
this is the best path forward from the alternatives we've seen 
so far.
    Senator Heinrich. One of the reasons why I'm dubious is 
because we've done the big-box thing before. We had the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project (CMRR) 
plan, and that sort of collapsed, in and of its own weight, and 
everyone moved to a modular plan, which seemed to have a great 
deal of traction. Now we're back to the big-box plan.
    I'm going to switch gears here. General Ray, I know the 
Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland coordinates nuclear 
certification of all systems involved with nuclear weapons. How 
concerned are you about the current staff levels there?
    General Ray. Sir, I'm concerned about that staff level and 
what it's going to take to deliver, when it comes to that, into 
the right sustainment game plan team, the right team to go from 
design to execution, managing that talent base. I'm worried 
about that. The NC3 enterprise, in terms of the expertise. So, 
broadly, we're in competition for a great deal of high-tech 
talent. So, as we look across the entire spectrum, it's 
something that we, as a team, have to continue to drive a 
competitive environment----
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
    General Ray.--and then to do very good planning that let's 
us forecast what we need. I think the digital engineering 
that's in front of us gives us the chance to bring in a lot of 
young talent, which is what we're really in the need of doing 
to make sure that--as Secretary Lord talked about, this is Cold 
War stuff. We may have a lot of older engineers in the game, 
and we need to bring in more and more of the young folks in the 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) program----
    Senator Heinrich. You have the incentives to be able to 
make that happen?
    General Ray. Sir, that manpower plays in a different pool, 
but I certainly would be willing to follow up with some more 
insights later, after collaborating with the team.
    Secretary Lord. May I comment on that?
    Senator Manchin. Under Secretary?
    Secretary Lord. One of the things we are very much 
challenged by is getting the talent we need at the right time. 
One of the ideas we've had, particularly on the acquisition 
side to get individuals with the technical credibility to run 
these acquisition programs, is, we are floating the idea of 
having sort of an Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) for 
acquisition professionals, where, for every year of college we 
would pay for, we would get 2 years service back. So, we would 
have 8 years of very technically qualified people to help run 
these programs.
    Senator Fischer [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    We're just going to keep going.
    Secretary Trachtenberg, from a policy point of view, can 
you discuss the importance of NATO remaining a nuclear 
alliance, and how close allies with independent nuclear 
deterrent capabilities and who are committed to NATO complement 
U.S. decisionmaking and deterrence posture?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Well, certainly, Chairman Fischer. 
Absolutely. It is critically important. NATO is a nuclear 
alliance. The NATO statements that have been made reaffirm that 
NATO is a nuclear alliance. We have very good relationships, of 
course, certainly with the UK and France, that are both nuclear 
partners--or nuclear states, I should say. Maintaining alliance 
unity, when it comes to the importance of sustaining a robust 
nuclear deterrent that is in the benefit, not just of the 
United States, but in the benefit of the alliance as a whole, 
is critically important. We engage in discussions at various 
levels with our NATO allies repeatedly. We have found a good 
sense of unity and an understanding among our allies, in terms 
of U.S. policy and the need for modernization and the need for 
our alliance to remain a nuclear-capable one.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, in the course of the Nuclear Posture Review, 
did the Department gather allied feedback on the idea of 
adopting a no-first-use policy? What was that?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. We discussed a variety of issues in 
the course of developing the Nuclear Posture Review with 
allies. The no-first-use issue, of course, is one that has come 
up repeatedly, in terms of discussions and debates over whether 
or not it makes sense, from an alliance perspective, to go down 
that path. From our perspective--and I believe it is shared by 
our allies, as well, that we have spoken with--a no-first-use-
of-nuclear-weapons policy would be counterproductive to 
deterrence. It could actually undermine deterrence. It could 
undermine the assurance value that our nuclear deterrent brings 
to our allies. It could also, by lowering allied confidence 
that the United States, in essence, has their backs and would 
be prepared to defend our allied security, at any level of 
conflict--could push at least some of our allies to consider 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons, themselves.
    So, I would argue, from the standpoint of a no-first-use 
policy, I see that, generally, as a negative, from a variety of 
levels, including the nonproliferation aspect of U.S. policy. I 
happen to believe that our current policy and our current 
extended deterrence, the so-called nuclear umbrella of security 
that we provide to others, is perhaps one of the best and most 
successful nonproliferation policies that the United States has 
implemented.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Secretary Lord, we keep hearing arguments that DOD can't 
afford everything it wants, it must set priorities, and that we 
should cut spending on nuclear forces to prioritize other 
things, like space or cyber. The implication here is that the 
Department is only requesting funds for nuclear modernization 
as a result of failing to prioritize. But, as I noted in my 
opening statement, I believe the opposite is true. Can you 
elaborate on the Department's priority level for nuclear 
deterrence?
    Secretary Lord. Three Secretaries of Defense have called 
nuclear deterrence the DOD's number-one priority. It's very 
clear. Our National Defense Strategy calls it out. The Nuclear 
Posture Review goes into much detail about how we deliver on 
that, and, as we've been talking about, we really are dealing 
with Cold War technology right now. We have weapons that are 
decades over what was supposed to be their useful life, and we 
are out of time. We need to continue on the path we're on, or 
we are going to fall behind and not have the nuclear deterrence 
that we enjoy today.
    Senator Fischer. Secretary Trachtenberg, would you like to 
add anything?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. I would, Senator. The only thing I 
would add is that, when you look at what our nuclear deterrent 
buys for us, I would argue that it is a relatively inexpensive 
investment, because that is the ultimate guarantor of our 
security. In terms of the amount of fiscal resources we invest 
in the modernization program, it is a relatively small fraction 
overall of the DOD budget, approximately 3-and-a-half percent. 
At the peak of the planned modernization program, that 
percentage may rise to about--somewhere between 6 or 7 percent 
of DOD spending, still much less, in percentage terms, than 
what we spent during the modernization cycles of the 1960s and 
the 1980s. So, from the standpoint of what nuclear deterrence 
gets us, I would have to argue that I think it's actually a 
bargain.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, critics argue that the Department plans to 
develop an intermediate-range system in response to Russia's 
violation of the INF Treaty will serve no purpose unless a 
foreign nation agrees to host them. Therefore, the program 
shouldn't proceed without such an agreement. Of course, this 
view does overlook the fact that a mobile system could be 
deployed in response to future provocation, and potential 
adversaries would have to contend with this fact. Could you 
speak to this issue and why the Department believes 
intermediate-range systems are a critical part of our response 
to Russia's dismantling of an arms control treaty?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Of course, Senator. I appreciate 
your characterization of Russia's dismantling of an arms 
control treaty, because, obviously, as a consequence of 
Russia's clear violation of that treaty, and also, I might add, 
consistent with the Sense of Congress expressed in the fiscal 
year 2019 NDAA, the United States suspended its obligations 
under the treaty, and we also gave notice of our intent to 
withdraw from it. It is, in fact, Russia, I would argue, that 
has abandoned the treaty as a result of its violation, and our 
allies, as I mentioned previously, support the actions we have 
taken in response.
    Yes, we are moving forward, as a result, with developing 
conventionally-armed ground-launched intermediate-range missile 
capabilities. What sort of system we ultimately develop will be 
driven by our assessment of military requirements and, of 
course, in consultation with the Congress and with our allies 
and partners. So, it remains to be seen where we will go, but I 
will say--and Senator Heinrich mentioned, at the start--made a 
comment--I think he expressed some concerns that we had----
    Senator Fischer. I'm sure when he returns, he'll be 
visiting with you about it.
    Mr. Trachtenberg.--absolutely--that we had gotten out of 
the INF treaty with nothing to show for it. The point I would 
make there, Senator, is, we have nothing today, because, for 
30-some years, we have been in strict compliance with the terms 
of the INF treaty that prohibited the kinds of capabilities 
that, if the treaty terminates in August of this year, we will 
then be free to develop and proceed with.
    Senator Fischer. Right, and it is a bilateral treaty. It 
does not take into account what other countries, such as China, 
may be developing. I think it ties our hands with regard to 
other nations when they are able to move freely about, and I 
agree with you on the Russians, and in regard to the INF, as 
well.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes.
    Senator Fischer. So, thank you.
    I see we have been joined by Senator Hawley. A lot of back-
and-forth here. So, if you are ready for questions, just coming 
in, please go ahead, Senator.
    Senator Hawley. Okay. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    General Ray, I appreciated the phone call that you and I 
had a few weeks ago about the stationing plans for the B-21. 
Obviously, we're very excited about that in my home State. My 
staff had the chance to visit Whiteman again last week. We are 
delighted about the future, here.
    As we've discussed the need to modernize all three legs of 
the nuclear triad, I think this may be a good opportunity to 
talk about why the bomber leg is so important. I wonder, 
General Ray, if you could talk to us a little bit about the 
rationale behind maintaining, and indeed updating, burnishing 
this particular leg of the triad and its significance for our 
defense.
    General Ray. Yes, sir. The comment has been made by 
Secretary Trachtenberg about the extended deterrence dimension 
of a bomber leg. The very visible and flexible element is just 
one piece. So, when our allies look at the extended deterrence 
and the counterproliferation dimension, they probably, more 
than likely, look at the bomber first, the ability to escalate 
and send the signal with a generation of the bomber force, the 
flexibility of the bomber force both for penetrating and for a 
standoff capability. When I consider the would-be adversaries' 
defensive systems and the complexity of that, the clear need to 
go after those challenges with penetrating and standoff to 
assure no sanctuary of anything that could harm the United 
States is one of the other particular dimensions to it. But, I 
think when you just step back and consider all three legs, the 
interrelated dimensions of this, when we think about 
modernizing an old fleet to a new fleet, the inherent risk on 
all three legs, I watch every single step of the way for the 
old fleet to the new fleet and knowing how will I close any of 
the gaps, the bomber is my most flexible and visible piece.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. May I add a comment, Senator just 
briefly?
    Senator Hawley. Yes, Mr. Secretary.
    Mr. Trachtenberg. The bomber leg of the triad is the only 
leg of the triad that is essentially recallable. Because of the 
speed, its relative slowness compared to a ballistic missile, 
it gives decisionmakers additional time and space to try to 
negotiate or reduce, in a crisis, the opportunity for 
miscalculation or any unintended or potential escalation. So, 
the bomber plays a unique role in the triad, for those reasons, 
as well.
    Senator Hawley. Yeah, thank you for that. That's very 
significant. Thank you for pointing that out.
    Let me also invite you to touch on why it's important to 
have different platforms that are able to fulfill this 
dimension. You know, it's probably hard to find two aircraft 
that are more different, for instance, than the B-2 or the B-
52. So, speak to that, if you would, General, and, Mr. 
Secretary, if you want to, or anyone else.
    General Ray. Yes, sir. I fielded a question earlier in this 
hearing about the size of the bomber roadmap. First of all, the 
size of the conventional bomber fleet is the sizing mechanism 
for how many bombers we have. The analysis we have tells us 
where a conventional campaign begins to falter without bombers. 
I can't go into that here, but all the studies are now showing 
a broader number of bombers are required, beyond a minimum of 
100 B-21s and 76 B-52s. We just pulled one out of the boneyard 
to get it refurbished. So, when I think about the standoff, the 
stand-in, and the complementary capabilities, and the need to 
grow beyond these two platforms to keep our options open as 
much as we can in the short term, to provide the leadership the 
chance to make informed programmatic decisions, here, in the 
future, the roadmap tells us, in about the 2024 timeframe, 
we'll be able to make an insightful acquisition-ramp decision 
for the B-21. Meanwhile, we've got a lot of work to do with 
sustainment for the B-1, the B-52, and the B-52. All three of 
the current bombers.
    Senator Hawley. Mr. Secretary, would you like to add to 
that?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. I certainly concur with what 
General Ray has said. Agree wholeheartedly.
    Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much.
    My time is nearly expired, so I'll yield back. Thank you, 
Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Since we are in votes and we've had two 
rounds of questions, I think, Senator Hawley, if you are 
satisfied with your questioning time----
    Senator Hawley. I might just ask one thing, since you're 
offering Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. I never should open it up to you.
    I know better.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Hawley. Never give a lawyer a chance at just one 
other question.
    You may already have testified on this, so forgive me if 
you have. Feel free to be extremely brief. But, I think it's so 
important as we think about the debate about nuclear 
modernization and about low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, 
which I'm sure you've discussed, but it never hurts to get it 
on the record again. There has been robust debate in this body, 
as you know, and in the other chamber, about a no-first-use 
policy, about whether we should even have low-yield tactical 
weapons; now that we have them, whether we should deploy them. 
If you could, just speak to, from a strategic perspective and a 
defense perspective, the importance of this class of weapons, 
from a defensive perspective, and why we need them, why we need 
to deploy them, and what role they play in our overall defense 
scheme.
    Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. If I could, briefly, Senator.
    Senator Hawley. Yes, please.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. I think that is a great question. 
The only thing I would say is that deterrence really is in the 
eye of the deteree, so to speak. What we want to do, and the 
reason why we have chosen to go forward on the path that we 
have chosen, with the low-yield ballistic missile, is because 
we have looked at what the Russians have been doing, in 
particular, and it is a cause of great concern, in terms of, I 
mentioned earlier, their doctrine, their military exercises, 
the possibility that they may miscalculate and believe that 
they could use a weapon----
    Senator Hawley. You mean their ``escalate to de-escalate'' 
doctrine.
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Absolutely, sir. Absolutely. So, 
what we are trying to do is, we are trying to foreclose any 
miscalculation on the part of any adversary, broadly speaking, 
that they may believe they have some kind of an advantage that 
is exploitable, that they could challenge us to take the next 
step that we wouldn't want them to take because they believe 
they've got a capability that allows them to do something where 
our response would be to either acquiesce or to escalate to a 
higher level of violence, which is something we clearly do not 
want to do. So, we're doing that, not to lower our threshold 
for nuclear use, but to raise the threshold in the minds of an 
adversary, or potential adversary, when it comes to nuclear 
use.
    General Ray. Sir, my last 3 years in Europe in the 
competitive environment with the Russians, it's very clear in 
my mind they will look for the line, and they'll go right up to 
it, and they'll operate inside of that gray zone. Secretary 
Trachtenberg's right, you have to eliminate the gray zone and 
create a gray zone for them so they do not miscalculate and 
they do not intimidate us in front of our allies.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    With that, I would like to thank the panel members for 
their testimony today. I'll remind you that your opening 
statements will be included in the record. So, if you have more 
to add to those, feel free to do so.
    With that, I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                            icbm replacement
    1. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, some have suggested we extend 
the life of the current Minuteman III system instead of the Ground 
Based Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) system to replace it. What are your 
views on this?
    Secretary Lord. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the 
critical importance of an effective ICBM force in deterring strategic 
threats to the Nation. In order to maintain that capability into the 
future, we must continue our efforts to replace the aging Minuteman III 
(MM III) system with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).
    MM III, first deployed in the 1970s, is well beyond its original 
design life, will experience significant component attrition 
challenges, and faces emerging critical capability gaps. As described 
in the 2014 GBSD Analysis of Alternatives, a MM III life extension 
would address only some of these issues and, thus, would result in 
retaining a system that is less cost effective over its lifecycle and 
fails to address capability gaps in the deterrent.

    2. Senator Heinrich. General Ray, do you believe the existing 
intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet can undergo 
another life extension program?
    General Ray. (AFGSC) Extending the Minuteman system service life 
comes with greater cost, complexity, and does not address shortfalls. 
The current ICBM, Minuteman III, is faced with four different 
challenges: asset attrition, component/subsystem ageout, supportability 
challenges, and capability shortfalls. These aspects all drive a 
significant investment across the entire system through the mid-2030s 
to ensure continued ICBM viability. Analysis concluded a replacement 
strategy is more cost effective than life extension. A system 
replacement strategy provides opportunity to realize efficiencies 
during both the acquisition and long-term sustainment. We have miss the 
opportunity by at least four years to implement a sustainment/life 
extension program. ement a sustainment/life extension program.

    3. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, we currently have an extremely 
effective and reliable missile guidance system. What are you doing to 
ensure the data and design can be used by the contractors who are 
competing for the ICBM replacement program or GBSD?
    Admiral Wolfe. Since 2012, the Air Force and Navy Strategic Systems 
Programs have formally collaborated in technical areas, including 
strategic guidance systems. Over the last several years, we have 
conducted commonality assessments and identified components from the 
Navy's Mk6 Guidance Life Extension program that could be used for the 
Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program. The Navy has also shared with 
the Air Force data on current guidance sensors and potential future 
sensor technologies, has provided sensors for the Air Force's test and 
evaluation needs, and has shared experiences on ground testing 
capabilities. Formal collaboration including sharing relevant design 
and guidance system data will continue under the auspices of a 2018 
Memorandum of Understanding among the Navy Strategic Systems Programs, 
Air Force GBSD program, and the Missile Defense Agency.
                      long range stand off weapon
    4. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, we have multiple life 
extensions underway all at the same time. Why do you believe it is 
important that we also build the Long Range Stand-Off Weapon?
    Secretary Lord. Maintaining a long-range, nuclear-armed, air-
launched cruise missile (ALCM) capability ensures that the United 
States retains the ability to hold targets at risk globally, even in 
areas protected by advanced integrated air defense systems. ALCMs add 
significant flexibility to the range of capabilities available to 
USSTRATCOM, allowing planners to provide the President with credible 
response and signaling options in the event of a crisis.
    The current AGM-86B ALCM will be nearly 40 years past its planned 
service life when scheduled to be replaced by the Long Range Standoff 
(LRSO) weapon, and is already facing increased threats from advanced 
air defenses that it was never designed to address. Additionally, as it 
ages, ALCM will face continual sustainment challenges from components 
that are no longer in production and limited sources for replacement 
parts.
    Additionally, as one of the less complex and least expensive 
aspects of the Administration's modernization plan, we believe LRSO can 
provide an important hedging capability for the deterrent as we 
transition from the legacy force to a modernized Triad.

    5. Senator Heinrich. General Ray, how does the Long Range Standoff 
Weapon match up against the Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities of our 
adversaries?
    General Ray. (AFGSC) The LRSO is being developed to be a survivable 
replacement for the aging Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in the 
future threat environment. Its design will feature advanced 
capabilities to allow it to penetrate current and future enemy advanced 
integrated air defenses, to include the A2/AD environment.
                            new start treaty
    6. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Trachtenberg, the Pentagon has 
frequently touted the benefits of New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START), particularly emphasizing the visibility and insight we gain 
into Russia's strategic nuclear forces. There have been rumors that the 
Trump Administration is considering either not extending the treaty or 
potentially even withdrawing from it altogether. If New START expires 
in February 2021 with nothing to replace it and there are no 
constraints on Russia's nuclear forces, would that increase or decrease 
the threat Russia poses to the United States?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Much has changed in the near-decade since 
the New START Treaty was signed in 2010, including the expansion of 
Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. A decision regarding 
extension of the New START Treaty has not yet been made, but will be 
balanced against changes in the strategic environment and broader 
concerns regarding Russia's non-compliance with other arms control and 
nonproliferation commitments. Any extension decision must weigh a 
variety of factors to ensure the national security of the United States 
and that of our allies and partners is maintained and strengthened. I 
defer to the Intelligence Community to provide a more detailed 
assessment of whether the threat from Russian nuclear forces would 
increase or decrease were the New START Treaty to expire without 
extension.

    7. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Trachtenberg, if we lose the New 
START data exchanges and onsite inspection rights, would the Pentagon 
and the intelligence community have to spend more on national technical 
means of verification to make up for this loss? If so, roughly how 
much?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. The end of the New START Treaty's 
verification regime would end one source of information regarding 
Russia's strategic forces; however, there are other sources such as 
national technical means. The resulting cost impacts of an increased 
reliance on national technical or other means would be best addressed 
by the Intelligence Community.

    8. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Trachtenberg, the President has 
indicated he would like to broaden arms control to Russia and China. Do 
you believe it is wise to first extend the New START to give breathing 
room for these more ambitious negotiations?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked for options from 
his national security team to broaden arms control to Russia and China, 
and we are working to support that process. Whether or not to extend 
the New START Treaty is part of that discussion, but the Administration 
has not made any decision yet.
                     weapons storage areas for b-21
    9. Senator Heinrich. General Ray, as you know, the Air Force is 
evaluating constructing weapons storage areas for bases where the B-21 
beds down--these are costly endeavors, not only from the special 
security requirements in the facility but also from the extra security 
forces that may be required to man them over the life of the facility. 
What is the status of your thinking on this?
    General Ray. (AFGSC) Over the last year Air Force Global Strike 
Command led a cross-functional team of subject matter experts to create 
a Weapons Generation Facility design balancing operational utility, 
resilience, and affordability. We feel we have a solution optimizing 
all three factors and are in the process of socializing our plan with 
Air Force leadership. Once the design is approved, we will move forward 
with funding a time-sequenced plan for constructing these facilities 
aligned with operational needs across the MAJCOM to include B-21 
fielding. The force structure impacts of WGF design are absolutely a 
decision factor, and they are a significant part of the larger B-21 
fielding plan.
                        solid rocket motor base
    10. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the Department of Defense's 
September 2018 defense industrial base report highlighted the decline 
in U.S. suppliers of solid rocket motors. This is an important factor 
in the GBSD program. Are you working with the Air Force to address this 
issue through the GBSD program, and what is your plan?
    Secretary Lord. The Department continually monitors the health and 
resiliency of the solid rocket motor industrial base across all defense 
programs that use solid rocket motors, including GBSD. My office works 
with all programs to ensure that they understand and consider 
industrial base risks when making acquisitions decisions. The GBSD 
program has released the Request for Proposal for Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development phase of the program. As such, the program 
has entered source selection, and any discussions related to GBSD are 
limited at this time.
                             missile tubes
    11. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, the Columbia-class submarine, 
which is intended to replace the current Ohio fleet, encountered 
welding defects in the build of the missile tubes for the submarine. 
Building missile tubes is something we have not done for 30 years. How 
serious do you take this, what are the impacts, and what are you doing 
to correct it?
    Admiral Wolfe. The Navy continues to closely oversee General 
Dynamic Electric Boat's (GDEB) efforts to define, scope, and mitigate 
any potential impact to the schedule of all missile tube efforts as 
ensuring the industrial base is ready to support Columbia is a primary 
risk mitigation effort. These actions follow the identification of 
welding issues on subcontracted missile tubes delivered for the 
Columbia and Dreadnought programs. The Navy and GDEB team have bounded 
the scope of the problem and correction actions are ongoing to recover 
from the identified issues. Initial inspections are complete and the 
Navy and industry partners are leveraging multiple resources across the 
industrial base to conduct necessary repairs and assessments. The 
current recovery plan is holding schedule margin for the Common Missile 
Compartment Super Module at 11 months ahead of the construction need 
date for Columbia.

    12. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, are you at all worried about 
the industrial base's ability to produce missile tubes in quantities 
necessary for the Columbia program?
    Admiral Wolfe. The vendor base remains one of the top risks for the 
Columbia program, including the missile tube portion. General Dynamic 
Electric Boat's (GDEB) and the Navy continue to proactively work with 
missile tube vendors to execute their scope of work. GDEB and the 
missile tube vendors also continue to execute the recovery plan from 
previous vendor quality issues associated with early missile tube 
production. The current recovery plan is holding schedule margin for 
the Common Missile Compartment (CMC) Super Module at 11 months ahead of 
the construction need date for Columbia.
                   submarine launched cruise missile
    13. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Wolfe, the 2018 Nuclear Posture 
Review recommended investigating a submarine launched cruise missile. 
We dropped it in 2010 due to maintenance and cost reasons. It seems to 
me the biggest cost will be the costs over the life of the weapon of 
certifying personnel and facilities to store, handle, maintain, and 
operate them on an attack submarine not built for it. Can you describe 
some of the issues you see as the biggest cost drivers in the program?
    Admiral Wolfe. The nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missile 
(TLAM-N) was retired primarily as a result of what was perceived to be 
a more benign security situation at that time. The recommendations in 
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflect an assessment of the current 
threats posed by revisionist powers Russia and China. While the United 
States for decades steadily reduced the role and size of its nuclear 
forces, Russia and China moved in the opposite direction and have 
increased the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and have 
modernized their nuclear capabilities. The Navy is assessing the full 
impact of reconstituting the capability for sea-launched cruise missile 
with a nuclear warhead, including costs drivers such as personnel and 
facilities.
    institute for defense analyses independent assessment of nnsa's 
                    plutonium strategy (march 2019)
    14. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) selected and you certified on May 14, 2018, a 
two-site option to produce plutonium pits where the NNSA would produce 
30 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by 2026 and 
repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at the 
Savannah River Site to produce an additional 50 pits per year by 2030. 
Two sites were selected even though NNSA's engineering analysis 
determined the lifecycle cost of splitting production was double that 
of maintaining the work at LANL. What, in your view, were the specific 
advantages of splitting production between two sites that justify the 
estimated additional lifecycle cost of about $14 billion?
    Secretary Lord. After several decades with almost no pit 
production, restoring the nation's capability to produce plutonium pits 
at a sustained rate is fundamental to the reliability, sustainability 
and credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which is the number one 
priority defense mission of the DOD. Therefore, a near-term focus on 
achieving steady-state production of 30 ppy by 2026 at LANL is 
essential, while simultaneously building a capability to produce at 
least 50 ppy at SRS to support longer-term requirements, is a necessary 
element of the overall strategy. This approach is consistent with the 
DOD requirement for steady-state production of pits that allows for the 
ability to enhance warhead safety and security and meet future DOD and 
NNSA requirements. The two-site strategy improves the resiliency, 
flexibility, and redundancy in our Nuclear Security Enterprise by not 
relying on a single production site.

    15. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the Institute for Defense 
Analysis recently completed an Independent Assessment of the Plutonium 
Strategy of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The 
independent assessment concluded that all of the options NNSA 
considered in the Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) are extremely 
challenging. Each is potentially achievable given sufficient time, 
resources and management focus, though not on the schedules or budgets 
forecasted. None of the alternatives is demonstrably superior. In light 
of IDA's conclusions, what is your assessment of the report with 
respect to the ability of any of the options considered by the NNSA to 
produce 80 pits per year by 2030?
    Secretary Lord. The IDA assessment identified that the two-site 
strategy could potentially achieve 80 pits per year given sufficient 
time, resources, and management focus. The IDA report recognized that 
because of the challenging timeline to meet pit production 
requirements, any option presents risks to producing no fewer than 80 
pits per year by 2030. With DOD's support, NNSA continues to pursue the 
two-pronged approach to pit production, and is actively working to 
mitigate the risks. The two-site approach is best for DOD in our 
assessment.

    16. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, your testimony specifically 
cites NNSA's efforts to establish a responsive enterprise, with 
production of plutonium pits as a lynchpin. However, I continue to 
question NNSA's emphasis on a so-called resilient infrastructure as the 
basis to justify splitting pit production between two sites, at twice 
the lifecycle cost. NNSA's studies never considered resilience as a 
criterion in either the Analysis of Alternatives or the Engineering 
Assessment, and it appeared only after the Nuclear Posture Review was 
released. The IDA recently completed an Independent Assessment of the 
Plutonium Strategy of the National Nuclear Security Administration. In 
light of IDA's assessment that none of the four options evaluated in 
the EA is demonstrably superior, and given the very much higher 
lifecycle cost, in your view is resilience a valid sole basis for 
NNSA's strategy?
    Secretary Lord. Resilience is a Department of Defense (DOD) value. 
Despite the higher lifecycle cost, repurposing the former Mixed Oxide 
Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) while maximizing pit production at Los 
Alamos to the extent practicable is the best alternative to reduce 
overall risk to the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This approach makes the 
Nuclear Security Enterprise more resilient to external threats or 
hazards, shutdowns, or other incidents; leverages an existing structure 
in the appropriate hazard category; and minimizes impacts to the 
mission essential work at Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 at Los Alamos.
    Additionally, the Institute for Defense Analyses report concluded 
that accounting for the additional costs of key LANL personnel for 
LANL-only one-site approaches would narrow the gap between the 
lifecycle costs estimates. These costs were not previously assessed. As 
reported in NNSA's Engineering Assessment, one-site approaches could 
also result in higher total project costs and later Critical Decision-4 
(Approve Start of Operations or Project Completion) dates as compared 
to the endorsed two-site approach.

    17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, the second of the main 
findings of IDA's report is, ``[n]o available option can be expected to 
provide 80 pits per year by 2030. DOD should evaluate how best to 
respond to this requirement shortfall.'' If you concur with IDA's 
findings, please provide the Armed Services Committee the timeline for 
the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop a formal response to the 
requirement shortfall. If you disagree with IDA's finding, please 
provide a full explanation of the basis for your dissent.
    Secretary Lord. Reestablishing a plutonium pit production 
capability is a top priority for DOD and NNSA. Over the past two 
decades, several pit production strategies were initiated and then 
halted. Because of these aborted efforts, we are now out of time and 
must commit to--and stick with--the two-site strategy approved by the 
NWC last year. The risks are known, but can be managed, given 
appropriate authority and requested funding.

    18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, under section 3120(e) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Chairman 
of the Nuclear Weapons Council is required to re-certify annually on 
April 1 that NNSA is on track to meet the military requirement to 
produce 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. In light of IDA's 
assessment, will you be able to make the certification for 2019?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, a certification of the plutonium pit 
production plan was submitted to the Secretary of Defense and 
congressional defense committees on April 30, 2019.
                  strategic rad-hard microelectronics
    19. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, has the Nuclear Weapons 
Council been briefed on NNSA's plans to sustain the unique capabilities 
of Sandia's aging Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications 
(MESA) Complex to produce strategic rad-hard microelectronics beyond 
2025?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, NNSA briefed the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) 
Standing and Safety Committee in March 2018 on its strategy for the 
MESA Complex at Sandia National Laboratories. Since then, there is 
continuing dialogue and reporting from NNSA to the NWC as part of 
Nuclear Posture Review Implementation tasks. NNSA has committed to 
maintain MESA as a design agency and trusted supplier of strategic 
radiation-hardened electronics through 2040 and has developed a 
strategy, informed by the Sandia Extended Life Program report, to 
deliver on this commitment.

    20. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Lord, do you agree that the upgrade 
of MESA should be a priority for NNSA?
    Secretary Lord. Yes, the MESA Complex is currently the only U.S. 
foundry with the capability to deliver custom strategically radiation-
hardened (SRH) microelectronic components required to sustain the 
Nation's nuclear stockpile. Both the sea-based and land-based legs of 
the strategic triad depend on the survivability of the reentry systems. 
The survivability of reentry systems requires strategic radiation-
hardened electronic devices in core circuitry in order to meet very 
high radiation requirements. The MESA Complex is a DOD Defense 
Microelectronic Activity (DMEA) accredited Category 1A Trusted Facility 
for trusted design, foundry, and test services for both unclassified 
and classified integrated circuits and other devices for the Nation's 
national security needs.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
          future arms control agreements with russia and china
    21. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, senior Administration 
officials recently told reporters that President Trump had directed his 
Administration to seek a new arms control agreement with Russia and 
China. One official told CNN that the agreement should include ``all 
the weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.'' The officials 
criticized the 2010 New START for only limiting United States and 
Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons. What does the 
Administration have in mind with this arms control outreach project?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked his national 
security team for possible options on more comprehensive agreements 
with Russia and China, and we are in the midst of developing such 
options. However, we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our 
potential negotiating strategies publicly.

    22. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, what is the 
Administration's strategy for achieving more comprehensive arms control 
deals with Russia and China?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked his national 
security team for possible options on more comprehensive agreements 
with Russia and China, and we are in the midst of developing such 
options. However, we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our 
potential negotiating strategies publicly.

    23. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, how long does the 
Administration expect it will take to negotiate such comprehensive 
deals?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Negotiating a new agreement that 
encompasses a broader range of weapons than just strategic systems and 
includes an effective verification regime will likely take time. Since 
no specific proposal has been made, it is impossible to predict how 
long such a negotiation would take.

    24. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, what does the 
Administration want China to do on arms control?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. The President wants serious arms control 
that delivers real security to the American people and our allies and 
partners. To achieve this, he believes Russia and China must be brought 
to the table. The President has charged his national security team to 
think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries 
and the weapons systems involved. If China is the great power its 
leaders claim it to be, it should increase transparency into Chinese 
nuclear forces and limit China's growing nuclear weapons ambitions in 
order to help manage strategic competition among States. Beyond this, 
we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our potential negotiating 
strategies publicly.

    25. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, what is the 
Administration willing to put on the table in talks with Russia and 
China on more comprehensive agreements?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. The President has asked his national 
security team for possible options on more comprehensive agreements 
with Russia and China, and we are in the midst of developing such 
options. However, we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our 
potential negotiating strategies publicly.

    26. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, wouldn't extending New 
START by 5 years buy additional time to develop U.S. negotiating 
positions, address issues of mutual concern that impact strategic 
stability, and avoid new risks from an unconstrained and less 
transparent United States-Russian nuclear relationship?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. We are not trying to buy time. We are 
attempting to address the core impediments to restoring trust with 
Russia and reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear 
arms control initiatives. We must consider a multitude of factors 
before making any decision on whether or not to extend the New START 
Treaty--for example, Russia's record of compliance with arms control 
agreements, its overall malign behavior on other matters such as 
Ukraine and election interference, and the fact that its nuclear 
arsenal is growing in areas not currently constrained under the New 
START Treaty.

    27. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, in 2012, then commander 
of U.S. Strategic Command General Robert Kehler stated: ``I do not 
believe that China has hundreds or thousands more nuclear weapons than 
what the intelligence community has been saying, [ . . . ] that the 
Chinese arsenal is in the range of several hundred'' nuclear 
warheads.'' Do you agree with this assessment? If not, why not?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Over the next decade, China is likely to 
double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing 
the most rapid expansion and diversification of is nuclear arsenal in 
its history. It is improving its ground and submarine-based nuclear 
capability and is pursuing a viable nuclear ``triad'' with the 
development of a nuclear capable strategic bomber. In addition, it is 
working to field nuclear, theater-range precision-strike systems 
capable of reaching U.S. territory and United States forces and bases 
in the region as well as those of our allies and partners. China's 
nuclear deterrent cannot currently be verified as to numbers and 
quality of its weapons. It refuses to offer transparency into its force 
and refuses to participate in any serious talks that would lead to any 
meaningful transparency. The scope and scale of China's nuclear 
modernization program, combined with China's lack of transparency, 
raise questions regarding its future intent. This not only increases 
the threat of possible nuclear coercion and conflict for the United 
States, and its allies and partners, but risks miscalculation and 
misperception.
                               new start
    28. Senator Warren. General Ray, the Department has frequently 
touted the benefits of New START, particularly emphasizing the 
visibility and insight we gain into Russia's strategic nuclear forces. 
There have been rumors that the Trump Administration is considering not 
extending the treaty or potentially even withdrawing from it 
altogether. If New START expires in February 2021 with nothing to 
replace it and there are no constraints on Russia's nuclear forces, 
would that increase or decrease the threat Russia poses to the United 
States?
    General Ray. (A10) Much has changed in the near-decade since the 
New START Treaty was signed in 2010, including the expansion of Russian 
and Chinese nuclear capabilities. For example, Russia is modernizing 
and expanding an active existing stockpile of approximately 2,000 
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed on ships, submarines, 
aircraft, with ground forces, and on air and missile defense 
interceptors. None of these weapons are limited by any arms control 
treaty including the New START Treaty. A decision regarding extension 
of the New START Treaty has not yet been made, but will be balanced 
against changes in the strategic environment and broader concerns 
regarding Russia's non-compliance with other arms control and 
nonproliferation commitments. Any extension decision must weigh a 
variety of factors to ensure the national security of the United States 
and that of our allies and partners is maintained and strengthened. I 
defer to the Intelligence Community to provide a more detailed 
assessment of whether the threat from Russian nuclear forces would 
increase or decrease were the New START Treaty to expire without 
extension.

    29. Senator Warren. General Ray, if we have less visibility into 
Russia's nuclear capabilities, force structure, and modernization 
plans, which would be the case without New START, what impact would 
that have on U.S. military planning and spending? What countermeasures 
would we need to consider and what would be the cost?
    General Ray. The visibility into Russia's capabilities that the New 
START Treaty provides is an important, but not exclusive, source of 
information that feeds into the Department of Defense's force 
requirements analysis. The Department of Defense will continue to make 
the necessary investments in its nuclear and conventional delivery 
systems to ensure a flexible and continuing deterrent capability in the 
face of evolving security challenges and technological developments. 
The President's Budget provides for the sustainment and operations of 
existing nuclear and conventional forces in defense of the United 
States.

    30. Senator Warren. General Ray, if we lose the New START data 
exchanges and onsite inspection rights, would the Pentagon and the 
intelligence community have to spend more on national technical means 
of verification to make up for this loss? Is there a formal or informal 
cost estimate to this effect?
    General Ray. The end of the New START Treaty's verification regime 
would end one source of information regarding Russia's strategic 
forces; however, there are other sources such as national technical 
means. The resulting cost impacts of an increased reliance on national 
technical or other means would be best addressed by the Intelligence 
Community.

    31. Senator Warren. General Ray, is there any way to replace the 
``boots on the ground'' inspections provided by New START if the treaty 
did not exist?
    General Ray. (A10) On-site inspections are just one important tool 
to build trust and verify compliance with current international 
agreements. Regardless of the state of arms control agreements, the 
United States continues to maintain robust intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance capabilities provide insights inside another 
country's military capabilities. The loss of the New START treaty and 
its on-site inspections will force the United States to rely more on 
alternate means of assessing Russian capabilities.

    32. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, is the Administration's 
position that Russia must agree to limits on its tactical nuclear 
weapons or that China must limit its nuclear forces in some way as a 
condition for extending New START?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. The President wants serious arms control 
that delivers real security to the American people and our allies and 
partners. To achieve this, he believes Russia and China must be brought 
to the table. Therefore, the President has charged his national 
security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms 
of the countries and the weapons systems involved. Whether or not to 
extend the New START Treaty is part of that discussion, but the 
Administration has not made any decision yet.

    33. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, some Administration 
officials have raised concerns about new strategic-range weapons that 
Russia is developing. My understanding is that New START envisioned the 
possible development of new kinds of strategic offensive arms during 
the period of implementation of the treaty. Article II of the treaty 
states: ``When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive 
arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question 
of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission.'' Has the Administration formally raised 
Russia's development of these new weapons for discussion in the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty's implementing body?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes.

    34. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, given the concerns you 
have expressed about some of the new nuclear weapons systems being 
developed by Russia, have you been a part of discussions with Russian 
counterparts about those weapons? Are you aware of whether any of your 
colleagues in the Department of State are having such discussions?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Most recently, in April 2019, a United 
States interagency delegation, including representatives of the Defense 
Department, met with Russian counterparts in a session of the New START 
Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to discuss ongoing New 
START Treaty implementation issues. The BCC usually convenes twice a 
year. At the April BCC, representatives from the Department of State 
and the Department of Defense engaged Russia on these systems, and we 
continue to do so.

    35. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, General Hyten told the 
Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year that he's worried 
about the threat these new weapons might pose a decade from now. Do you 
agree?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Yes.

    36. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, wouldn't extending New 
START for another 5 years buy us additional time to discuss and address 
our concerns about the new weapons with Russia while retaining 
verifiable limits on Russia's current deployed strategic weapons?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. We are not trying to buy time. We are 
attempting to address the core impediments to restoring trust with 
Russia and reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear 
arms control initiatives. We must consider a multitude of factors 
before making any decision on whether or not to extend the New START 
Treaty--for example, Russia's record of compliance with arms control 
agreements, its overall malign behavior on other matters such as 
Ukraine and election interference, and the fact that its nuclear 
arsenal is growing in areas not currently constrained under the New 
START Treaty.
                intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty
    37. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, when I asked General 
Scaparrotti at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on March 5, 
2019 whether the Trump Administration has a plan to prevent Russia from 
building more and new types of ground-launched intermediate-range 
missiles in the absence of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty, he said, ``I don't know that we have a plan today. I know we're 
working on what we think that plan might be.'' Why did the President 
withdraw from the treaty without having first developed such a plan?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. An arms control treaty that one side abides 
by while the other openly and brazenly violates it does not make us 
safer. Since 2013, the United States engaged Russia more than 30 times 
to try to resolve Russia's material breach and preserve the 
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Russia, however, 
continued to violate the INF Treaty, and has taken no steps to return 
to full and verifiable compliance. Due to our scrupulous INF Treaty 
compliance before our obligations were suspended, we do not have any 
new systems to deploy in the immediate future. Now that we have 
suspended our obligations under the INF Treaty, we are free to pursue 
work that would otherwise be prohibited by the INF Treaty. Currently, 
we have no plans to conduct flight tests of any noncompliant systems 
prior the United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty in August.

    38. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, at the Munich Security 
conference in mid-February, Polish foreign minister Jacek Czaputowicz 
stated the following: ``We are not very much in favor--we are 
definitely even against--deployment of [INF Treaty prohibited] missiles 
on our soil. But we will work out the solution with our allies in NATO 
because it must be united response to Russian threat in that case . . . 
If we do it maybe [host new missiles] it will be a decision of all the 
alliance.'' Do you agree that any decision to base U.S. ground-launched 
intermediate-range missiles should only be considered if it is 
supported by ``all of the alliance''?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Due to our scrupulous Treaty compliance 
before our Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty obligations 
were suspended, it will be some time before we are ready to hold 
discussions about potential basing options. We have kept our Allies 
fully apprised of these developments and we continue to work together 
within NATO to deny Russia any military advantage from its material 
breach of the INF Treaty. The systems we are developing are 
conventional, not nuclear, and we are committed to discussing in 
advance with our Allies any potential basing options on Allied 
territory in the future.

    39. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, has the Department 
begun conversations with any alliance members about hosting INF-range 
missiles on their territory?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Due to our scrupulous Treaty compliance 
before our Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty obligations 
were suspended, it will be some time before we are ready to hold 
discussions about potential basing options. We have kept our Allies 
fully apprised of these developments and we continue to work together 
within NATO to deny Russia any military advantage from its material 
breach of the INF Treaty. The systems we are developing are 
conventional, not nuclear, and we are committed to discussing in 
advance with our Allies any potential basing options on Allied 
territory in the future.
         supplemental sea-based low-yield nuclear capabilities
    40. Senator Warren. Secretary Trachtenberg, the 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR) recommends adding a third and fourth low-yield 
warhead option to the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the form of a low-yield 
SLBM warhead and sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). The United States 
already possesses low-yield warheads, including nuclear gravity bombs 
stationed in Europe in support of NATO, as part of the air-leg of the 
triad and plans to invest over $150 billion in then-year dollars in the 
coming decades to ensure these warheads can penetrate the most advanced 
air defenses. If current and planned air-launched options cannot deter 
or respond to Russian limited nuclear use, why are taxpayers being 
asked to spend scores of billions of dollars on these systems?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. We will continue to rely on current and 
planned air-launched options to deter Russian limited nuclear use and 
to assure allies of our security commitments. In light of the 
continuing modernization of Russian air defenses, as well as specific 
developments in Russia's forces and doctrine that create a credible 
threat that Russia would use a small number of low-yield nuclear 
weapons to deter a United States military response to aggression, a 
low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) provides the 
United States a near-term, flexible, limited nuclear response option 
that complements existing and future air-launched options. Deployed 
quickly in small numbers, the low-yield SLBM provides a tailored 
solution to this problem and, based on its attributes, corrects any 
misperceptions that Russia and others may have that the United States 
lacks credible options to deter the use of nuclear weapons in a 
regional conflict. Re-deployment of SLCM-Nuclear (N) is a response to 
broader, equally serious developments in the balance of nonstrategic 
nuclear forces (which favors Russia by a huge margin), the operational 
environment, and regional security dynamics. It provides leaders with a 
hedge for the current U.S. sea-based deterrent and a flexible and 
responsive limited use capability that further strengthens the extended 
deterrence and allied assurance framework in both Europe and East Asia. 
Proceeding with the acquisition of SLCM-N will provide negotiating 
leverage to capture Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future 
agreement.

    41. Senator Warren. General Ray, are there any targets on the 
planet that can't be held at risk by the B-2 or in the future the B-21?
    General Ray. (A10) The specific capabilities of the B-2 and B-21 
are classified. The unique combination of range, precision, payload, 
and ability to penetrate and operate in anti-access/area denial 
environments allows the B-2 to identify, locate, target, and destroy 
the highest value enemy targets. The B-21 is an Air Force acquisition 
recapitalization priority which will provide critical operational 
capability and flexibility across a wide range of military objectives, 
providing both conventional and nuclear capabilities, in fulfillment of 
national objectives. The B-21 will be highly survivable with the 
ability to penetrate modern air defenses to accomplish national 
security objectives despite an anti-access/area denial environment and 
attack targets.

    42. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, the fiscal year 2020 budget 
request for the nuclear SLCM includes $5 million to begin an Analysis 
of Alternatives of the capability. To your knowledge, did the Navy 
support President George H.W. Bush's decision to remove the TLAM-N from 
deployment in the early 1990s?
    Admiral Wolfe. To my knowledge, the Navy supported the 1991 
decision to remove the TLAM-N from deployment. The Navy similarly 
supports development of a nuclear SLCM in response to the changed 
security environment, as noted in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

    43. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, did the Navy support President 
Obama's decision to retire the missile and warhead in 2010, and if so, 
why?
    Admiral Wolfe. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review noted that the 
security environment of the time had changed dramatically since the end 
of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war had become remote, and the 
nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) served a 
redundant purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile based on the 
anticipation that the security environment would continue to improve. 
However, as the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review highlights, the security 
environment has actually moved in the opposite direction with 
adversaries, particularly Russia and China, who have increased the 
prominence of nuclear weapons in their national strategies. This is 
demonstrated by Russia's large and increasingly capable non-strategic 
nuclear weapons arsenal and China's improving forces. A new sea-
launched cruise missile capability is needed to provide a flexible, 
sea-based, non-strategic nuclear capability to improve U.S. 
capabilities to deter limited nuclear use and to assure our allies that 
we will meet our extended deterrence commitments.

    44. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, if a decision is made to re-
nuclearize the Navy's attack submarine fleet with a SLCM, can you tell 
me what doing so would entail?
    Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of 
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We 
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly 
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will 
provide that to Congress when complete.

    45. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, in addition to the cost to 
acquire the missile and warhead, would there be additional 
certification, security, storage, and operational costs for re-
nuclearizing the Navy's attack submarine fleet with a SLCM?
    Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of 
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We 
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly 
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will 
provide that to Congress when complete.

    46. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, could arming attack submarines 
with nuclear SLCMs mean that each submarine could carry fewer 
conventional Tomahawks?
    Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of 
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We 
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly 
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will 
provide that to Congress when complete.

    47. Senator Warren. Admiral Wolfe, how might arming attack 
submarines with nuclear SLCMs impact conventional deterrence?
    Admiral Wolfe. At this time Navy is assessing the full impact of 
deployment of a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. We 
anticipate starting a comprehensive Analysis of Alternatives shortly 
that will provide detail and cost estimates of the impact, and we will 
provide that to Congress when complete.
                     u.s. nuclear weapons spending
    48. Senator Warren. Secretary Lord, in January 2019 the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost of the Trump 
administration's plans to sustain and replace the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
between fiscal years 2019 and 2028 at $494 billion in then-year 
dollars. This is an increase of $94 billion, or about 23 percent, above 
the CBO's 2017 estimate as of the end of the Obama administration. By 
2028 nuclear weapons would consume about seven percent of total 
national defense spending. Do you agree with CBO's estimate?
    Secretary Lord. Generally, the basis for CBO's estimate is 
consistent with DOD's projections, although CBO's cost growth 
projections were more pessimistic than our own. However, it is 
important to clarify that very little of CBO's projected increase was 
attributed to increased program cost. Most of the growth cited by CBO 
involved factors such as economic inflation and natural increases that 
come with greater program maturity.
    Nuclear modernization remains the Department's highest defense and 
investment priority. DOD expects this effort to cost approximately 3.7 
percent of the defense budget across the 23-year modernization period. 
These costs represent a significantly smaller percentage than past 
efforts, which required 10.6 percent of the defense budget in the early 
1980s and 17 percent of the defense budget in the early 1960s.
    A large-scale nuclear attack poses an existential threat to the 
United States. U.S. nuclear forces are the indispensable means of 
deterring this threat. The modernization program is necessary and 
prudent given the nature and evolution of the threat. Accordingly, we 
believe the current modernization plan remains affordable.
                    ground based strategic deterrent
    49. Senator Warren. General Ray, in 2016 the Department set the 
cost at the GBSD program's Milestone A decision at $85 billion in then-
year dollars, but called for a more up to date estimate by March 2018. 
An estimate by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office 
put the $85 billion figure at the lower end and a scale that reached as 
high as $150 billion. Both estimates were far higher than the Air 
Force's initial estimate. My understanding is that CAPE is working on a 
new cost estimate for GBSD that will be completed in June 2019. Has the 
Air Force produced an updated cost estimate for the GBSD program? If 
so, what is it? If not, when can we expect an updated estimate from the 
Air Force?
    General Ray. (AQ) Total acquisition cost for GBSD is estimated at 
$85 billion, per the DOD Office of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) updated in June 2019. The program is fully funded 
to the low end range of the Milestone A independent cost estimate as 
reflected in the Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget request.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Then-Year $B              Jun 19 ICE              Aug 16 ICE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  RDT&E   $27.1                   $22.66
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Procurement   $56.5                   $61.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     MILCO$1.5                    $0.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Acquisition Total   $85.1                   $84.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Ops & Sustainment   $157.5                  $177.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Lif$242.6e Cost            $262.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    50. Senator Warren. General Ray, according to the 2018 NPR, the 
life of the Minuteman III ``cannot be extended further.'' However, 
neither RAND in a 2014 report nor the Air Force's 2014 Analysis of 
Alternatives determined that another life extension is infeasible. 
Moreover, at a March 28, 2019 House Armed Services Committee hearing, 
Lieutenant General Richard Clark, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration said: ``We have several of 
the [Minuteman III] components that are becoming obsolete. The 
propulsion system, the guidance system, even the ability to provide the 
solid rocket motor fuel, we only have one more opportunity to do that 
for these weapons.'' If there is ``one more opportunity'' to extend the 
life of the Minuteman III, why did the NPR claim that the life of the 
Minuteman III ``cannot be extended further?''
    General Ray. (AFGSC) There are several studies highlighting 
Minuteman III supportability challenges, component aging and asset 
attrition, diminishing manufacturing sources, vanishing vendors, and 
obsolescence. The Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the fact that 
``component aging and inventory attrition are rapidly driving it to the 
end of its sustainability,'' from a system perspective. The simple fact 
is, Minuteman III system is beyond a modernization approach. There are 
numerous components within Minuteman III system that cannot be 
supported through life extension efforts. There are insufficient 
quantities of items to support guidance, propulsion system rocket 
engine, missile inter-stage/raceway components, and flight controls, 
just to name a few. The NPR conclusion recognizes these facts combined 
with current/future adversary threats and existing platform shortfalls.

    51. Senator Warren. General Ray, in 2017 the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) projected that $17.5 billion could be saved over the next 
30 years by delaying development of a new ICBM by 20 years and instead 
extending the life of the Minuteman III by buying new engines and new 
guidance systems for the missiles. Crucially, however, this approach 
would save $37 billion through fiscal year 2036 when the vast majority 
of nuclear recapitalization spending is scheduled to take place. Do 
CBO's estimates comport with the Air Force's estimate of the cost to 
sustain the Minuteman III relative to GBSD over this more confined time 
period?
    General Ray. (AFGSC) The Air Force does not concur with the CBO 
estimate of costs to sustain Minuteman III relative to GBSD. As part of 
the 2014 Analysis of Alternatives, the Air Force reviewed a Minuteman 
III tech refresh option. This analysis, and subsequent program 
analysis, has shown that GBSD represents the most effective strategy to 
mitigate capability shortfalls while restoring warfighter effectiveness 
and replacing critically aged infrastructure. Specifically, the Air 
Force has determined that GBSD would provide lower total life cycle 
through 2075 costs than a Minuteman III tech refresh and replacement 
strategy. Minuteman III is 44 years old and will be more than 60 years 
old when finally completely replaced by GBSD in the 2030s. In order to 
counter the systemic age-out and attrition of the Minuteman III system, 
the Air Force cannot delay development of GBSD but must begin delivery 
of the weapon system by 2028. A program office analysis has indicated 
that a 4 year slip to the GBSD Full Operational Capability date would 
result in an estimated $22 billion in additional costs. The Department 
of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council has validated the need 
for a modern ICBM system. GBSD provides a more capable ICBM within the 
cost estimate for maintaining the existing Minuteman III capability. 
Additionally, GBSD is safer and more secure to operate than the current 
system, reducing the number of required convoys and open launcher 
configurations by two-thirds. The design of GBSD will provide the 
United States with a system that is more readily adaptable to evolving 
threats while significantly reducing the total cost of ownership for 
the ICBM.

    52. Senator Warren. General Ray, the Department continues to use 
Minuteman II rocket motors for military space launches, which suggests 
the Department has high confidence in the boosters. Which begs the 
question: If older Minuteman II motors are still functioning reliably, 
could the newer Minuteman III boosters reliably last longer than 
currently planned?
    General Ray. (AFGSC) No; the Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP) 
enables the Department of Defense to repurpose Minuteman motors, which 
have been removed, from operational inventory due to age-out concerns 
or arms control reductions. Since the inception of the RSLP program, 
nearly 1200 Minuteman first, second, and third stage motors have been 
transferred from the ICBM fleet. Of these, 225 have been refurbished 
and launched, 107 were static tested to validate the RSLP refurbishment 
process, 381 were deemed unsuitable for launch and destroyed, and 50 
motors have been assessed as unsuitable and await demil. The remaining 
437 motors, considered the least suitable, await assessment for use. 
Reuse of these motors is only possible through the completion of an 
extensive refurbishment effort, by which RSLP conducts an inspection 
using a priority checklist to ensure the best motors are selected. This 
process certifies each motor for one year of use, after which the 
motors must undergo recertification. The high failure rate and limited 
certification time makes this refurbishment process unsuitable for 
sustaining the ICBM force.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
    53. Senator Manchin. Secretary Trachtenberg, are we providing 
missiles to Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary Trachtenberg. Under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program, the United States is currently executing FMS cases involving 
the following ``missile'' systems: Air-to-Surface includes the Hydra-
70, High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), Hellfire and Standoff 
Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER); Surface-to-Air 
includes the HAWK; Anti-Ship includes the Harpoon; Air-to-Air includes 
the Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM); and Missile 
Defense includes the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD).


 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                         WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 2019

                  United States Senate,    
                  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

     DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m. in 
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb 
Fischer (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
    Subcommittee Members present: Senators Fischer, Rounds,
Sullivan, Hawley, Heinrich, King, and Jones.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

    Senator Fischer. The hearing will come to order.
    Good afternoon. I would like to welcome everyone to the 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee's fourth open hearing of the 
116th Congress and our final hearing before the committee 
markup for its 2020 National Defense Authorization Act.
    We meet today to receive testimony on the Department of 
Energy's atomic defense activities and programs.
    Appearing before the Subcommittee, we have the Honorable 
Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA); the Honorable Anne Marie White, 
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management; and 
Admiral James Caldwell, Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors 
at NNSA.
    Thank you all for your service and for being with us today. 
We look forward to hearing from each you. Your full statements 
will be made part of the record.
    We are in the middle of votes right now. The ranking 
Member, Senator Heinrich, is waiting to take the second vote 
before he returns here to the hearing room. But at this time, 
we will hear your opening statements. Administrator, if you 
would like to begin.

   STATEMENT OF HON. LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, ADMINISTRATOR, 
            NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Chairman Fischer and Members 
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present 
the President's fiscal year 2020 budget for the Department of 
Energy's
National Nuclear Security Administration. It is an honor to 
appear before you today proudly representing the extraordinary 
team at NNSA, a team that is indispensable for our U.S. 
national security.
    I am also delighted to share this hearing with my 
colleagues,
Admiral Frank Caldwell, my Deputy Administrator for Naval 
Reactors, and Assistant Secretary Anne White.
    Since I last testified before this committee, NNSA has been 
diligently executing our three enduring missions: one, ensuring 
the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons 
stockpile; two, reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation 
and nuclear terrorism around the world; and three, providing 
nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft 
carriers and submarines.
    The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA is 
an investment in these missions, our infrastructure, and our 
people. My priorities with this crucial funding are to 
revitalize the U.S. defense plutonium capabilities and other 
essential infrastructure, to keep our stockpile life extension 
programs on schedule and on budget, and to recruit our 
workforce of the future. My focus is on setting the conditions 
today for a resilient and responsive nuclear security 
enterprise for the next 50 years and beyond.
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided a realistic 
view of our world, with an evolving and uncertain political 
environment. The Nuclear Posture Review states that there is no 
margin for further delay in recapitalizing the nuclear security 
enterprise, an enterprise comprised of 8 laboratories, plants, 
and sites and a dedicated workforce of almost 44,000 employees.
    NNSA's $16.5 billion budget request is a necessary 
investment when you consider the stakes. Russia and China are 
pursuing entirely new nuclear capabilities. North Korea's 
intentions remain unclear, and we face the most complex and 
demanding global security environment since the end of the Cold 
War. Accordingly, our fiscal year 2020 budget request 
represents the largest increase for our nonproliferation, 
counter-proliferation, and counterterrorism programs in the 
last 5 years.
    During my nomination hearing last year, I stated that my 
highest priority was plutonium pit manufacturing, and that has 
not changed. For the next several decades, NNSA will rely on a 
combination of newly manufactured pits and the judicious use of 
existing pits to modernize the existing nuclear weapons 
stockpile. A modest pit manufacturing capability is necessary 
to ensure the safety and security of refurbished warheads while 
maintaining high confidence in stockpile effectiveness. 
Consistent with the NPR, the NNSA is committed to producing no 
fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030 to meet military 
requirements.
    Last May, the Nuclear Weapons Council endorsed NNSA's path 
forward to recapitalize a production capability that was 
shuttered in the early 1990s. Our two-site approach calls for 
pit production at both Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 
Mexico and the Savannah River site in South Carolina. Following 
this strategy, our fiscal year 2020 budget calls for nearly a 
$500 million investment in plutonium pit manufacturing 
capabilities at Los Alamos, which will remain the Nation's 
plutonium center of excellence for research and development.
    Thanks to the strong support of Congress, we have stated 
construction on the main buildings of the uranium processing 
facility at Y-12 National Security Complex. I am proud to 
report that this vital undertaking has been on budget and on 
schedule for the last 6 years.
    Indeed, all of NNSA's enduring missions are underpinned by 
the state-of-the-art scientific capabilities. As these 
capabilities become more important during this time of renewed 
great power competition, NNSA is working to stay ahead of the 
technology curve.
    A future gap in high performance computing is being 
addressed through a joint effort between NNSA and the 
Department of Energy's Office of Science. Our contribution to 
that effort will be undertaken at the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory and we will deliver an exoscale computing 
platform to the enterprise in 2023.
    From the earliest days of the Manhattan Project, the 
dedicated men and women of the nuclear security enterprise have 
answered our Nation's call. What our team has continued to 
accomplish is remarkable. We completed the W76-1 life extension 
program under budget and ahead of schedule. We have held 33 
countries plus Taiwan to become free of highly enriched 
uranium. We routinely deploy nuclear security experts to major 
public events like the Super Bowl that keep the public safe 
from radiological threats, and we are lending unparalleled 
expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program to 
ensure sea-based deterrence capabilities for decades to come.
    Finally, I would like to emphasize that regardless of the 
investments we make to modernize our enterprise, the United 
States must continue its investment in our world-class 
workforce as requested by the fiscal year 2020 budget. NNSA is 
requesting that the current 1,690 full time equivalent (FTE) 
and 600 excepted service personnel caps be eliminated in order 
to gain flexibility in hiring authorities and to better align 
our personnel resources to mission priorities. With an aging 
workforce, NNSA has launched an integrated effort to recruit 
the next generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians 
so that we can continue to answer the Nation's call and meet 
tomorrow's challenges. No other government agency can 
accomplish these unique missions on behalf of our American 
people, and I could not be prouder to represent NNSA today.
    Thank you for your continued strong support, the reliable, 
flexible, and timely budget that you provided NNSA for the 
current fiscal year, and for the opportunity to testify before 
you today. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank 
you.
    [The prepared statement of Administrator Gordon-Hagerty 
follows:]

         Prepared Statement by Secretary Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's 
Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request for the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). NNSA appreciates the 
Committee's strong support for our nuclear security mission and for the 
workforce and organizations that are responsible for executing it every 
day.
    NNSA's enduring missions are to protect our Nation by maintaining a 
safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global 
nuclear threats, and providing the United States (U.S.) Navy's 
submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear 
propulsion. NNSA has numerous strategic partners that enable, 
contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, yet no other government or 
civilian organization can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of 
the American people.
    The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of our national 
security and global stability for more than 70 years, and its 
credibility serves as the ultimate insurance policy against a nuclear 
attack. While the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has been 
an aspiration for generations, we must recognize the reality that 
foreign nuclear threats are growing. It is imperative that we modernize 
the U.S. nuclear deterrent and enterprise; our credibility assures our 
friends and allies and deters those who wish us harm.
    Thanks to continued strong support from this Administration and 
Congress, NNSA is transforming the nuclear security enterprise to be 
more responsive and resilient. The following highlights: (1) NNSA's 
accomplishments in calendar year 2018; (2) the budget request for NNSA; 
(3) Weapons Activities Appropriation; (4) Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Appropriation; (5) Naval Reactors Appropriation; and 
(6) NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses Appropriation.
              nnsa's accomplishments in calendar year 2018
    Plutonium Pit Production: The highest NNSA infrastructure priority 
is re-establishing a plutonium pit production and fabrication 
capability to meet the Department of Defense's (DOD) military 
requirements. Our national requirement, supported by numerous studies 
and analyses, requires no fewer than 80 war-reserve pits per year by 
2030. Last May, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed NNSA's 
recommended alternative calling for plutonium pit production at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). 
This two-site approach bolsters the nuclear security enterprise's 
responsiveness and resiliency.
    NNSA's Life Extension Programs (LEPs), Modifications, and 
Alteration: In December 2018, NNSA completed the final weapon 
refurbishment for the W76-1 LEP, extending the warhead's service life 
from 20 years to 60 years. The W80-4 LEP, W87-1 Modification, and the 
W76-2 Modification continue to remain on budget and schedule. We also 
continue to make progress on the B61-12 LEP and the W88 Alteration 370. 
That said, we are currently working through recently identified 
challenges that will impact delivery schedules and we are assessing 
options with DOD to mitigate delays.
    Infrastructure Investments: NNSA commenced construction of the main 
buildings of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National 
Security Complex (Y-12). UPF remains on budget and on schedule for 
delivery by the end of 2025 for no more than $6.5 billion. NNSA also 
broke ground on the new Albuquerque Complex, which will house 1,200 
employees when complete.
    Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Working with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China, and Nigeria, NNSA was instrumental 
in the conversion of a Nigerian research reactor from HEU to low-
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This marks NNSA's 74th research reactor or 
isotope production facility conversion, which was followed by 
repatriation of the HEU fuel to China, making Nigeria the 33rd country 
plus Taiwan to become HEU free.
    Nuclear Material Removal: NNSA removed or confirmed disposition of 
more than 280 kilograms of HEU from four countries, enough material for 
more than 11 nuclear weapons.
    Counterterrorism: NNSA's technical experts were deployed to 
numerous widely attended public events such as the Super Bowl and the 
Boston Marathon to provide radiation detection, identification, and 
technical advice, helping to protect the public from acts of nuclear 
and radiological terrorism. This level of support requires NNSA's 
response assets to maintain full operational readiness at all times.
    Naval Nuclear Propulsion: NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors continued 
its record of safe and reliable nuclear propulsion and nuclear fleet 
support, while contributing expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-
class program. This next generation nuclear-powered submarine will 
ensure required sea-based deterrence capabilities for decades to come.
    Supercomputing: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
unveiled the Sierra supercomputer, ranked the second-fastest in the 
world according to the Top 500 list.
    For more than 70 years, from the early days of the Manhattan 
Project to the height of the Cold War, the dedicated men and women of 
the nuclear security enterprise have overcome every obstacle in their 
way, all while accomplishing a complex and enduring national security 
mission. With Congress' continued support, NNSA will similarly overcome 
the nuclear security threats that face us today and into the future.
                 nnsa's fiscal year 2020 budget request
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (2018 NPR) calls for the United 
States to have modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear capabilities 
that are safe and secure until such a time as nuclear weapons can 
prudently be eliminated from the world. All previous NPRs highlighted 
the need to maintain a modern nuclear weapons infrastructure, yet the 
United States has fallen behind in sustaining a modern infrastructure 
that is resilient and has the capacity to respond to unforeseen 
threats. Additionally, the 2018 NPR reiterates the United States' 
commitment to effective nonproliferation and arms control measures, 
both of which are equally important as having a credible deterrent.
    For the Nation to retain a credible deterrent and prevent, counter, 
and respond to global nuclear security threats, NNSA will require 
significant and sustained investments in its nuclear security mission. 
In pursuit of these goals, the President's fiscal year 2020 budget 
request for NNSA is $16.5 billion. This is an increase of $1.3 billion, 
or 8.3 percent, over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Amounts do not reflect the transfer of funds from Naval 
Reactors to the Office of Nuclear Energy for maintenance and operation 
of the Advanced Test Reactor in fiscal year 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    weapons activities appropriation
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for the Weapons Activities 
account is $12.4 billion, an increase of $1.3 billion, or 12 percent, 
over fiscal year 2019 request levels. The programs funded in this 
account support the Nation's current and future defense posture and the 
associated nationwide infrastructure of science, technology, 
engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities.
    The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their 
intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United 
States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while 
potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons 
and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities.
Maintaining the Stockpile
    In fiscal year 2019, the science-based Stockpile Stewardship 
Program supported certifying to the President for the 23rd consecutive 
year that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and 
reliable without the need for nuclear explosive testing. This 
remarkable scientific achievement is made possible through the work 
accomplished by NNSA's world-class scientists, engineers, and 
technicians, and through investments in state-of-the-art diagnostic 
tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern facilities.
    For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2020 budget 
request is $5.4 billion, an increase of $768 million, or 16.5 percent, 
over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. Included within this request 
is funding to support the LEPs, modifications, and a major alteration. 
These modernization efforts are aligned with the needs outlined in the 
2018 NPR and approved by the NWC.
    W76-1 LEP: The W76-1 LEP, which directly supports the sea-based leg 
of the nuclear triad, completed its production run in December 2018. 
Close-out activities in fiscal year 2020 include archiving production 
tooling and program records, and completing component overbuilds to 
support hardware provisioning for the life of the warhead system.
    W76-2 Modification Program: The W76-2 is currently on schedule and 
on budget. The First Production Unit (FPU) was completed in February 
2019. By providing the U.S. an assured ability to respond in kind to a 
low-yield nuclear attack, the W76-2 discourages an adversary from 
pursuing such an attack and therefore strengthens deterrence. Having 
credible response options to a nuclear attack of any magnitude ensures 
no adversary mistakenly believes the U.S. would be deterred from 
responding to a low-level nuclear attack for fear of escalation.
    B61-12 LEP: The B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the 
B61 gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of the weapon. 
Currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, this LEP has 
demonstrated system performance in over 60 integrated ground and flight 
tests, including eight joint flight test drops. NNSA has notified your 
committee of a technical issue with the B61-12 that we estimate will 
delay the FPU. We are aggressively working to minimize the delay and 
are working with DOD to coordinate any possible impacts.
    W88 Alteration 370: This program, which also supports the sea-based 
leg of the nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4, Production 
Engineering. NNSA is aggressively managing the FPU for this program, 
which was scheduled for December 2019. The same technical issue 
impacting the B61-12 LEP will impact the W88 Alteration 370. The length 
of the delay to FPU is still being assessed and a number of mitigation 
plans are being executed at this time, in coordination with DOD, to 
minimize the FPU delay.
    W80-4 LEP: In February 2019, the NWC approved the W80-4 LEP to 
transition into Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The fiscal year 
2020 request for $899 million will allow the W80-4 LEP to remain on 
track to achieve FPU completion in fiscal year 2025 in support of the 
Air Force's Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile.
    W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 program will replace the 
aging W78 warhead, with planned first production in 2030 to support 
fielding on the U.S. Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 
(GBSD) missile system. In September 2018, the NWC authorized restart of 
Phase 6.2, Program Feasibility Study, activities on the W78 replacement 
warhead and renamed it the W87-1. The W87-1 Modification Program will 
improve the warhead's safety and security, addressing design, material 
obsolescence, performance, and survivability considerations.
    Within DSW, the fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $636 
million for Stockpile Systems, an increase of $36 million, or 6.1 
percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This program sustains 
the stockpile in accordance with the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan by 
producing and replacing limited-life components such as neutron 
generators and gas transfer systems; conducting maintenance, 
surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon reliability; detecting 
and anticipating potential weapon issues; and compiling and analyzing 
information during the annual assessment process.
    The DSW request also includes $1.1 billion for Stockpile Services, 
an increase of $76 million, or 7.2 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 
enacted level, to support the modernization of capabilities to improve 
efficiency of manufacturing operations to meet future requirements. 
This request supports all DSW operations by funding programmatic and 
infrastructure management, and maintaining the core competencies and 
technologies essential for reliable and operable stewardship 
capabilities.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget for Strategic Materials is necessary to 
maintain NNSA's ability to produce nuclear and other strategic 
materials associated with its weapons programs, as well as refurbish 
and manufacture components made from these materials. This includes 
uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium.
    Strategic Materials Sustainment: The request of $257 million, an 
increase of $41 million, or 18.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 
enacted level, will develop and implement strategies to maintain the 
technical base for strategic materials in support of NNSA's nuclear 
weapons, nonproliferation, and naval nuclear propulsion activities at 
NNSA's eight sites.
    Uranium Program: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $909 
million for the Uranium Program is comprised of Uranium Sustainment 
($94 million), Process Technology Development ($70 million), and the 
UPF project ($745 million). \2\ Uranium Sustainment supports the 
program to maintain existing enriched uranium capabilities through 
enhanced equipment maintenance while preparing to phase out mission 
dependency on Building 9212, a Manhattan Project-era production 
facility at Y-12. The funding request will enable NNSA to sustain 
uranium manufacturing capabilities while accelerating planning and 
execution of the Building 9212 exit strategy to reduce risks associated 
with transitioning enriched uranium capabilities to the UPF. Process 
Technology Development supports key capability transitions out of 
Building 9212, including chip processing, purified metal production, 
and recovery of low equity material, into enduring nuclear facilities. 
Funding for UPF will support peak construction activities in fiscal 
year 2020 and fiscal year 2021. UPF will provide uranium casting, 
special oxide production, and salvage and accountability capabilities 
for the enterprise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Process Technology Development is funded under the Advanced 
Manufacturing Development program, and the UPF project is funded under 
Infrastructure and Operations.
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    Plutonium Sustainment: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $712 
million, an increase of $351 million, or 97.2 percent, above the fiscal 
year 2019 enacted level, supports continued progress to meet pit 
production requirements. The requested funding would support efforts to 
begin the long-term plan to develop a capability to produce no fewer 
than 80 war-reserve pits per year by 2030, as directed in the 2018 NPR.
    The time to move forward is now. Repurposing the Mixed Oxide (MOX) 
Fuel Fabrication Facility and producing plutonium pits at SRS and LANL 
is the preferred path to achieve the critical DOD requirement of 80 
pits per year by 2030. Even though this approach will require NNSA to 
fund activities at two sites, any interruption or delay to pit 
production in the future due to the lack of resiliency will have huge 
cost increases across the entire nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is 
investing in the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility. The 
agency is executing conceptual design activities for the repurposed MOX 
Fuel Fabrication Facility and moving forward with National 
Environmental Policy Act activities.
    NNSA is also investing at LANL to provide all the tools necessary 
for the enterprise to successfully support an enduring plutonium pit 
production mission to produce 30 pits per year by 2026. NNSA 
anticipates $3 billion in total funding over the next five years to 
enable this, and LANL is actively installing pit production equipment 
and has begun hiring to meet future work scope. As the Nation's 
plutonium center of excellence for research and development, LANL plays 
a critical role in early design efforts for pit production.
    In addition, NNSA's budget request includes funding for the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project at LANL, which 
supports our plan to cease operations in buildings dating back to the 
Manhattan Project, in the height of the Cold War, and transition to 
modern facilities.
    Tritium Program: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $269 
million, a decrease of $21 million, or 7.3 percent, below the fiscal 
year 2019 enacted level, will provide the tritium necessary for 
national security requirements. Tritium must be replenished regularly 
because it radioactively decays at 5.5 percent per year. Tritium 
availability is dependent on both the production of new tritium and the 
recovery and recycling of tritium from returned warhead components. 
Mission requirements necessitate that tritium production double by the 
mid-2020s. NNSA's tritium strategy focuses on increasing tritium 
production in Tennessee Valley Authority reactors and modernizing 
infrastructure at SRS to support the tritium supply chain.
    Lithium Program: The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $29 
million, a decrease of $335,000, or 1.1 percent below the fiscal year 
2019 enacted level, supports a lithium bridging strategy to maintain 
the production of lithium. The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes 
$32 million for the Lithium Processing Facility (LPF), which will 
replace 1940s infrastructure at Y-12 and house lithium processing 
capabilities by 2030. NNSA completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) 
for the LPF and is preparing for Critical Decision 1, establishing the 
preferred alternative design and estimated budget.
    Domestic Uranium Enrichment (DUE): The fiscal year 2020 budget 
request of $140 million, an increase of $90 million, or 180 percent 
above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level, will continue efforts to make 
available, when needed, the necessary supplies of enriched uranium for 
a variety of national security needs. The DUE program schedule is 
driven by the nearest-term defense need--unobligated low enriched 
uranium for tritium production. Other Departmental needs for enriched 
uranium (e.g., research reactors, naval fuel) are supported by this 
effort as well.
    For Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), the fiscal 
year 2020 budget request is $2.3 billion, an increase of $264 million, 
or 13.1 percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted levels.
    Increases to the Science Program ($587 million) provide additional 
funding to support subcritical experiments for pit reuse and advanced 
diagnostics for subcritical hydrodynamic integrated weapons experiments 
that produce data for stockpile certifications.
    The Engineering Program ($234 million) sustains NNSA's capability 
for creating and maturing advanced toolsets and technologies to improve 
weapon surety and support annual stockpile assessments.
    In fiscal year 2020, the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and 
High Yield Program ($481 million) will continue to maintain essential 
experimental capabilities and expertise in high energy density 
stockpile science. These efforts continue to provide data to reduce 
uncertainty in calculations of nuclear weapons performance and improve 
the predictive capability of science and engineering models in high-
pressure, high-energy, high-density regimes.
    The fiscal year 2020 request includes $840 million for the Advanced 
Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program, which continues NNSA's close 
collaboration with DOE's Office of Science to implement the Exascale 
Computing Initiative. The ASC Program supports stockpile stewardship by 
developing and delivering predictive simulation capabilities for 
nuclear weapons systems in addition to deploying increasingly more 
powerful supercomputers at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratories.
    The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program provides safe, secure 
movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon 
components to meet projected DOE, DOD, and other customer requirements. 
The Office of Secure Transportation has an elite security workforce 
that performs sensitive and demanding work; our agents are among the 
most highly trained and dedicated national security personnel operating 
within the United States. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $317 
million, of which $80 million continues our efforts to modernize and 
replace the existing fleet of transporters with the Mobile Guardian 
Transporter (MGT). The MGT will be used for the containment and 
transport of nuclear weapons, weapons components, and/or special 
nuclear materials.
Improving Safety, Operations, and Infrastructure
    An effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons 
infrastructure is essential to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly to 
shifting requirements. Such an infrastructure offers tangible evidence 
to both allies and potential adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons 
capabilities and can help to deter, assure, hedge against adverse 
developments, and discourage adversary interest in arms competition.
    More than half of NNSA's facilities are over 40 years old, and 
roughly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project. It will take 
sustained, significant resources to modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons 
infrastructure.
    Thanks to the support of the Administration and Congress, NNSA is 
making progress in repairing, replacing, and modernizing NNSA's 
facilities and stabilizing deferred maintenance; yet much more remains 
to be done. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Infrastructure and 
Operations is $3.2 billion, an increase of $121 million, or 3.9 percent 
above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. It includes $1.1 billion for 
line item construction and over $580 million for minor construction and 
equipment recapitalization needs. Delivering these projects on budget 
and schedule is contingent upon stable and predictable funding 
profiles, and support for the President's budget request.
    Many of NNSA's excess process-contaminated facilities will 
ultimately be transferred to DOE's Office of Environmental Management 
(EM) for disposition. For example, EM commenced efforts to remove 
Building 280 Pool Type Reactor and ancillary facilities at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. NNSA identified five (including Building 
280) of the top ten highest risk excess facilities at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory.
    In the interim, NNSA is focusing on reducing risks where possible. 
NNSA has made critical investments to stabilize high-risk process-
contaminated facilities until ultimate disposition, including at Y-12's 
Alpha 5 and Beta 4 facilities. In fiscal year 2020, NNSA is using the 
authority Congress provided in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) to pursue disposition of several high-risk 
process-contaminated excess facilities with a project cost of less than 
$50 million. NNSA also remains committed to reducing the risk of non-
process contaminated facilities by dispositioning facilities where 
possible. For example, NNSA completed the Pantex Drummond Office 
Building (formerly known as the Administrative Support Complex) at the 
Pantex Plant outside of Amarillo, Texas in 2018. This building provides 
1,000 employees with modern, energy efficient workspace. As a result, 
NNSA is now disposing of dilapidated, 1950s-era buildings and 
eliminating approximately $20 million in deferred maintenance. In 
fiscal year 2020, NNSA plans to fund the disposition of 24 additional 
facilities totaling 75,000 gross square feet.
    Defense Nuclear Security's fiscal year 2020 budget request is $778 
million, an increase of $88 million, or 12.7 percent, over the fiscal 
year 2019 enacted amount. To execute its enterprise security program, 
DNS provides funding to the sites for: protective forces; physical 
security systems; information security and technical security; 
personnel security; nuclear material control and accountability; and 
security program operations and planning. While NNSA faces challenges 
replacing and refreshing aging physical security infrastructure, we are 
making key investments in recapitalizing this infrastructure through 
the Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program (SIRP). SIRP 
projects address aging high-priority security systems and related 
security infrastructure and equipment needs at all NNSA sites. NNSA 
will continue to execute ongoing line-item security projects as well, 
including the effort to reduce the Y-12 Protected Area and use security 
resources more efficiently. In addition, NNSA will sustain counter 
unmanned aircraft systems implementation and operation at sites 
possessing Category 0/I quantities of special nuclear material.
    Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every element of 
NNSA's missions. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $309 million, 
an increase of $88 million, or 40 percent over the fiscal year 2019 
request. This increase will continue cybersecurity enhancements, 
bolster cybersecurity capabilities, and support the continuation of IT 
modernization efforts. NNSA is making steady progress in enhancing and 
upgrading the components of the Enterprise Secure Computing environment 
to ensure that nuclear security enterprise missions can be completed 
without disruption. As NNSA mission requirements expand in scope, the 
IT and cyber programs require modernization, expansion, and innovation 
in a commensurate fashion. Cybersecurity is a defense and deterrence 
mechanism and a powerful tool. In the current threat environment, NNSA 
cannot afford to neglect its cybersecurity capabilities, which serve as 
frontline assets that protect the information, systems, and networks 
NNSA depends on to execute our mission.
             defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for the Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation account is $2 billion, an increase of $63 million, or 
3.3 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 request. Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation account activities address the entire nuclear threat 
spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to nuclear and 
radiological incidents around the world. The fiscal year 2020 budget 
request funds two program mission areas under this account: the Defense 
Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Program and the Nuclear Counterterrorism 
and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program.
Nonproliferation Efforts
    The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation works to: remove or 
eliminate vulnerable nuclear material; improve global nuclear security 
through multilateral and bilateral technical exchanges and training 
workshops; help prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radioactive materials; secure domestic and international civilian 
buildings containing high-priority radioactive material; provide 
technical reviews of U.S. export license applications; conduct export 
control training sessions for U.S. enforcement agencies and 
international partners; strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect and 
deter nuclear proliferation; advance U.S. capabilities to monitor arms 
control treaties and detect foreign nuclear programs; and maintain 
organizational readiness to respond to and mitigate radiological or 
nuclear incidents worldwide.
    The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program provides an 
integrated approach to addressing the risk posed by nuclear materials. 
The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $334 million, an increase of $40 
million, or 13.5, percent above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. The 
request supports the conversion or shut-down of research reactors and 
isotope production facilities that use HEU and the acceleration of 
developing new, non HEU-based molybdenum-99 production technologies in 
the United States. Additionally, the request for M3 supports the 
removal and disposal of weapons-usable nuclear material, with priority 
on expediting the removal of surplus plutonium from the State of South 
Carolina and continuing the transition to the dilute and dispose 
strategy for surplus plutonium disposition.
    The Global Material Security program works with partner nations to 
increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials 
and improve the ability to deter, detect, and investigate illicit 
trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year 2020 budget request of 
$342 million, a decrease of $65 million, or 15.9 percent, below the 
fiscal year 2019 enacted level and includes efforts to secure the most 
at-risk radioactive material in U.S. high-threat urban areas by the end 
of fiscal year 2020.
    The Nonproliferation and Arms Control program develops and 
implements programs to: strengthen international nuclear safeguards; 
control the proliferation of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment, 
technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with 
nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; and address 
enduring and emerging proliferation challenges requiring the 
development of innovative policies and approaches. The fiscal year 2020 
budget request for this program is $137 million, an increase of $6 
million, or 5.8 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This 
increase serves to advance and complete development of the new Export 
Compliance Assistance Program to deploy export control training across 
DOE and NNSA facilities, implement new 10 CFR Part 810 civil penalty 
authority pursuant to the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, and establish and 
maintain a nonproliferation enrichment testing and training platform in 
cooperation with the IAEA and select foreign partners.
    The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development 
program supports innovative unilateral and multilateral technical 
capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear 
weapons programs, illicit diversion of special nuclear material, and 
nuclear detonations worldwide. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for 
this program is $495 million, a decrease of $80 million, or 13.9 
percent, below the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This decrease is due 
to shifting the HEU Reactor Conversion program to M3, as it is no 
longer in the research and development phase.
    Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for 
DNN projects. The fiscal year 2020 budget request is $299 million, an 
increase of $79 million, or 35.9 percent, above the fiscal year 2019 
enacted level. Last year, NNSA terminated activities for the MOX Fuel 
Fabrication Facility project to pursue the dilute and dispose option to 
fulfill the U.S. commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium. 
The $220 million for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility will be used to 
continue termination activities. The request also includes $79 million 
for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition project, which supports the 
dilute and dispose strategy.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR)
    The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP) 
provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or 
radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the 
unique technical expertise found in NNSA's nuclear security enterprise. 
Highly trained personnel with specialized technical equipment maintain 
readiness to support lead federal agencies to find and render safe 
potential nuclear and radiological threat devices, to effectively 
manage the consequences of nuclear or radiological emergencies, and to 
support enhanced security operations for National Security Special 
Events (NSSE).
    NNSA's Aerial Measuring System (AMS) provides airborne remote 
sensing in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident or incident 
within the continental United States, as well as in support of 
regularly scheduled NSSE. The AMS fleet consists of three Beechcraft 
B200 fixed-wing aircraft with an average age of 33 years and two Bell 
412 helicopters with an average age of 24 years. The age of the current 
aircraft leads to unscheduled downtime resulting in reduced mission 
availability. A 2017 AOA on the AMS aircraft determined that 
recapitalization of the aging aircraft fleet is necessary to continue 
to provide Federal, State, and local officials with rapid radiological 
information following an accident or incident. In fiscal year 2019, the 
fixed-wing aircraft will be replaced, and the rotary-wing aircraft will 
be replaced in fiscal year 2020. The fiscal year 2020 budget request 
for AMS recapitalization is $35.5 million.
    NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), supports render safe teams at FBI field offices in 11 major 
American cities that are specially trained and equipped to identify and 
mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device (i.e, 
``stabilization''). CTCP will conduct stabilization training and 
operations and begin transitioning to the Capability Forward 
initiative, under which lifesaving responses to a nuclear threat device 
will be accelerated. Under this initiative, NNSA will provide 
additional training, equipment, and technical support to the current 11 
stabilization cities--eventually growing to 14 U.S. cities by fiscal 
year 2022--to allow FBI teams to execute render safe operations more 
rapidly. CTCP will also improve and expand NNSA training facilities to 
accommodate the increased training requirements associated with 
regional render safe capabilities.
    The Nation's nuclear incident response teams require the ability to 
communicate classified technical assessments in deployed, and often 
austere, environments using highly secure means. Information 
requirements encompass both nuclear device design information and 
intelligence assessments. The equipment used by NNSA's nuclear incident 
response teams is aging, resulting in increasing maintenance costs and 
heightened risks to the emergency response mission. This budget 
includes funding for recapitalization of incident response equipment 
consistent with lifecycle planning to maintain operational readiness. 
The budget also includes funding for state-of-the-art, secure, 
deployable communications systems that are interoperable with FBI and 
DOD mission partners that will help provide decision makers with real-
time technical recommendations to mitigate nuclear terrorist threats.
    CTCP maintains an operational nuclear forensics capability in three 
distinct areas: (1) pre-detonation device disassembly and examination; 
(2) post-detonation assessment; and (3) analysis and characterization 
of nuclear materials. The program maintains readiness to deploy device 
disposition and device assessment teams, conduct laboratory operations 
in support of analysis of bulk actinide forensics, and deploy subject 
matter expertise and operational capabilities in support of ground 
sample collections that support attribution of a nuclear detonation.
    The Emergency Operations program's fiscal year 2020 budget request 
includes $35.5 million under NCTIR to support NNSA's Office of 
Emergency Operations. This funding will support NNSA's all-hazard 
emergency response capabilities that positively impact the Department's 
emergency management continuity and devolution programs, enhance the 
ability of the Department to respond to, and recover from, catastrophic 
emergencies or other man-made hazards or natural disasters.
                      naval reactors appropriation
Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
    Nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of submarines and 
aircraft carriers is critical to the security of the United States and 
its allies as well as the security of global sea lanes. The Office of 
Naval Reactors remains at the forefront of technological developments 
in naval nuclear propulsion by advancing new technologies and 
improvements in naval reactor performance. This preeminence provides 
the U.S. Navy with a commanding edge in naval warfighting capabilities.
    The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2020 budget request is $1.65 
billion, a decrease of $140 million or approximately 8 percent, below 
the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. This request reflects reductions to 
planned funding levels following additional funding enacted in fiscal 
year 2018 for the S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul and Spent Fuel 
Handling Recapitalization Project. In addition to supporting today's 
operational fleet, the requested funding is the foundation for Naval 
Reactors to deliver tomorrow's fleet and recruit and retain a highly-
skilled workforce. One of Naval Reactors' three national priority 
projects, continuing design and development of the reactor plant for 
the Columbia-class submarine, featuring a life-of-ship core and 
electric drive, will replace the current Ohio-class fleet and provide 
required deterrence capabilities for decades. The project to refuel a 
research and training reactor in New York will enable 20 more years of 
research, development, and training for fleet operators. Funding will 
also be used to support construction of a new spent fuel handling 
facility in Idaho that will facilitate long term, reliable processing 
and packaging of spent nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers and 
submarines.
    Naval Reactors has requested funding in fiscal year 2020 to support 
these projects and fund necessary reactor technology development, 
equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical 
infrastructure and facilities. By employing a small but high-performing 
technical base, the teams at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring 
Site in New York; and the spent nuclear fuel facilities in Idaho can 
perform the research and development, analysis, engineering, and 
testing needed to support today's fleet at sea and develop future 
nuclear-powered warships. These laboratories also perform the technical 
evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess emergent 
issues and deliver timely responses to provide nuclear safety and 
maximize operational flexibility.
            nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for Federal Salaries and 
Expenses is $435 million, an increase of $25 million, or 6.0 percent, 
over the fiscal year 2019 enacted level. The 2018 NPR highlighted the 
need to properly support civilian personnel who protect the United 
States against nuclear threats. Effective deterrence would be 
impossible without the vital contributions our personnel make to the 
United States' nuclear capabilities and deterrence. NNSA's workforce is 
critical to the success of the Nation's nuclear security enterprise. 
NNSA must have a sufficient workforce, with the right capabilities, to 
ensure we can modernize the nuclear deterrent, recapitalize an aging 
infrastructure, and continue to meet the requirements of our 
nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs. To effectively 
accomplish our mission deliverables, NNSA's workforce must be aligned 
to meet the mission needs of today and those in future.
    NNSA's expanding and challenging national security missions require 
it to recruit, train, and retain a highly skilled and dedicated federal 
employee and Management and Operating (M&O) contract workforce. A 
skilled federal workforce is required to execute appropriate program 
and project oversight as the nuclear security enterprise is busier than 
it has been since the end of the Cold War. However, funding alone is 
not the only thing needed. NNSA must continue to provide its highly-
talented men and women with the tools necessary to support their work, 
including providing the necessary human resource authorities to 
attract, recruit, and retain its world-class workforce. To validate the 
size of the federal workforce needed to execute our mission, NNSA 
engaged in a multiyear effort to critically analyze its manpower 
requirements. Within the past year, the Office of Personnel Management 
and NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation both 
independently determined the need to significantly increase federal 
staffing levels.
    The number of additional staff recommended in both studies would 
exceed the statutory cap on NNSA's full-time equivalent employees. In 
March 2019, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) endorsed both 
OPM and CEPE's staffing analyses' conclusions and recommended that 
Congress work with NNSA on the statutory staffing cap to ensure it is 
consistent with our federal human capital requirements to meet the 
evolving needs of the mission. These studies, and GAO's recommendations 
in particular, support NNSA's request to eliminate the current 1,690 
FTE and 600 Excepted Service personnel caps to achieve greater 
flexibility in hiring authorities. Eliminating both of these caps and 
matching our Federal Salaries and Expenses budget request would allow 
the NNSA to align personnel resources to mission priorities. This is 
more pressing now because the OPM staffing study was conducted before 
new requirements from the 2018 NPR and multi-site plutonium pit 
production approach were endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council in May 
2018.
Management and Performance
    Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $2 billion in 
projects, a significant portion of NNSA's total project portfolio, 
under budget. We are committed to encouraging competition and 
increasing the universe of qualified contractors by streamlining major 
acquisition processes. NNSA will continue to focus on delivering 
timely, best-value acquisition solutions for all programs and projects, 
by using a tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that 
are appropriate for the special missions and risks at each site. NNSA's 
Office of Acquisition and Project Management continues to: lead 
improvements in contract and project management practices; provide 
clear lines of authority and accountability for program and project 
managers; improve cost and schedule performance; and ensure that 
Federal Project Directors and Contracting Officers possess the 
appropriate skill mix and professional certifications to manage NNSA's 
work.
Conclusion
    NNSA's diverse missions are critical to the national security of 
the United States: maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and 
effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of 
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and 
providing naval nuclear propulsion to the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft 
carriers and submarines. NNSA is mindful of its obligation to improve 
acquisition, safety, and security practices continually, and to use in 
a responsible manner, the resources entrusted to it by Congress and the 
American people. By investing in our nuclear security enterprise and 
continuing our efforts to modernize our scientific, technical, and 
engineering capabilities and infrastructure, NNSA will continue to 
deliver on its nuclear security mission.

    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    Secretary White, welcome.

  STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE MARIE WHITE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
              ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

    Secretary White. Chairman Fischer and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. 
The fiscal year 2020 budget request of $6.5 billion 
demonstrates the Administration's commitment to tackling the 
environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production that helped 
end World War II and the Cold War.
    Madam Chair, since the Office of Environmental Management's 
(EM's) inception, our dedicated workforce has cleaned and 
closed sites, dramatically reducing the EM footprint from 107 
sites to just 16. Progress continues at every site.
    Last month, I was in New Mexico with Ranking Member 
Heinrich to mark the 20th anniversary of the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant (WIPP), our key facility for final disposition of 
transuranic waste across the EM complex. I saw firsthand 
progress on a number of vital infrastructure projects at WIPP, 
including upgrades to electrical, fire suppression, and 
compressed air systems. WIPP not only has an amazing history to 
celebrate but a very bright future ahead.
    Over the course of the last year, workers in South Carolina 
at the Savannah River site (SRS) consolidated more than 400,000 
cubic yards of coal ash and ash contaminated soil. They got it 
done safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 million 
and earning them the Project Management Institute Award for 
project excellence.
    For the first time in the history of the Savannah River 
site, EM is processing two salt waste streams at the site. With 
help from the parallel processing systems, now more than 10 
million gallons of salt waste have been processed since salt 
decontamination operations began at SRS.
    At Oak Ridge, we took another significant step towards 
large-scale cleanup at the Y-12 site.
    During my confirmation hearings, I committed to enhance 
safety through risk mitigation and cleanup and to address 
overall taxpayer liability. That is precisely what I have 
focused on during my first year on the job. We are getting a 
clear picture of EM liabilities for the first time. We are 
increasing accountability to Congress and to the American 
people through stronger project management and oversight. That 
includes addressing issues long raised by the Government 
Accountability Office.
    There are opportunities with the potential to get cleanup 
projects done and off the books safely, sooner, and at a 
reasonable cost. The Department is evaluating these 
opportunities, including new technologies, treatment options, 
and disposal capabilities in a comprehensive way. Following on 
recommendations from wide-ranging and nonpartisan outside 
groups, the Department is evaluating its interpretation of the 
statutory term ``high level radioactive waste.''
    EM is also taking steps to get the best value out of every 
cleanup dollar that Congress provides. That includes 
identifying impactful regulatory reforms and improving 
procurements through a new end-state contracting model.
    As EM is put on a sustainable path forward, the budget 
request provides the resources to build upon recent successes 
and bring a renewed sense of urgency to the program. The 
request provides the resources to make progress on cleanup 
activities across the complex, including addressing radioactive 
tank waste at the Savannah River site and driving the direct 
feed low activity waste approach to initiate Hanford tank waste 
treatment.
    At Los Alamos, funding is included to initiate two 
transuranic waste processing lines, complete characterization 
of the high explosive plume in Canyon de Valle and implement 
the full interim measure for the chromium plume.
    In the interest of time, I will stop there and just note 
that more details about the work we have planned are provided 
in my written testimony.
    EM's historical successes have been achieved through the 
dedication of leaders on both sides of the aisle with a 
uniformity of purpose to drive the cleanup mission towards 
completion. I want to work with Congress to clean up these 
sites so that our host communities can envision a vibrant 
future with diverse and enduring economic opportunities.
    I appreciate this opportunity and the Subcommittee's 
support of the EM mission.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary White follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Anne Marie White
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 
to represent the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental 
Management (EM). I would like to provide you with an overview of the EM 
program, key accomplishments during the past year, and planned 
accomplishments through the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget request 
of $6.5 billion, which includes $5.5 billion in Defense Environmental 
Cleanup funding.
    The request demonstrates the Administration's continued commitment 
to the vital mission of EM to address the environmental legacy of 
nuclear weapons production that helped end World War II and the Cold 
War.
    This legacy is one that includes challenges like the safe 
disposition of radioactive wastes; the management of spent nuclear fuel 
and special nuclear material; the cleanup of contaminated soil and 
groundwater; and the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of 
thousands of excess facilities.
    Madam Chair, this year marks the 30th anniversary of the EM 
program. Since its inception, our dedicated workforce has worked 
effectively to reduce the footprint of the cleanup program from 107 
sites comprising a total of 3,100 square miles to just 16 sites, with 
an active cleanup footprint of less than 300 square miles.
    While it does not always make headline news, we are sustaining 
progress at each of our EM sites, and we have realized a set of key 
accomplishments over the past year.
    Last month I was out in New Mexico with Ranking Member Heinrich to 
mark the 20th Anniversary of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 
our key facility for final disposition of transuranic waste across the 
EM complex.
    I had the opportunity to see firsthand progress on a number of 
vital infrastructure projects at WIPP, which include upgrades to 
electrical, fire suppression, and compressed air systems.
    From there I headed to Los Alamos where I received an update on the 
early success of the chromium plume interim measure.
    Over the past year, EM took another significant step towards large-
scale cleanup at the Y-12 site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, by removing 
over 3 tons of mercury from equipment and completing all of the site 
preparation required for construction of the new Mercury Treatment 
Facility. This vital infrastructure will help EM fulfill a commitment 
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of 
Tennessee to reduce the levels of mercury leaving the Y-12 facility.
    Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000 cubic 
yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the Savannah River Site. 
They completed it safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 
million.
    For the first time in the history of the Savannah River Site (SRS), 
EM is processing two salt waste streams at the site. With help from the 
parallel processing streams, now more than 10 million gallons of salt 
waste have been processed since salt-decontamination operations began 
at SRS. The waste is being processed through two salt-decontamination 
operations: an integrated interim salt processing operation called the 
Actinide Removal Process and the Modular Caustic Side Solvent 
Extraction Unit, and a newly implemented process called Tank Closure 
Cesium Removal.
    Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000 cubic 
yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the SRS. They completed 
it safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 million.
    At Hanford, EM continued hot cell cleanup and workers began 
installing equipment to excavate highly contaminated soil under the 324 
Building. This facility operated from 1966 to 1996 and supported 
research involving radioactive materials.
    From my time in industry, I understand where cleanup work gets 
done. It is out in the field. Our men and women on the ground are doing 
a great job and making progress--but we must do more.
    Despite this great work and the important federal investment year 
after year, EM faces significant challenges. Cleanup progress is being 
significantly outpaced by environmental liabilities.
    Even with significant budgets, EM is swimming upstream as we gear 
up to tackle some of our remaining toughest challenges. Simply throwing 
more taxpayer dollars into EM will not address these challenges.
    This Administration, and the Secretary of Energy's senior 
leadership team are taking action to ensure the sustainability of the 
EM program and address issues long-raised by the Government 
Accountability Office.
    Since the inception of the EM program, our knowledge and technology 
have matured significantly. We need to employ a sustainable completion-
centric cleanup approach, using the latest knowledge in waste 
composition, risks, and attainable end states. We need to pursue 
cleanup in a manner that properly incentivizes performance, strengthens 
oversight, and delivers results.
    EM is committed to working in a collaborative manner with Congress 
and others toward a future that will not simply enable the cleanup 
program to continue--but will propel the mission forward and drive it 
toward completion and closure. The Subcommittee will see EM focus on 
strengthening program management, oversight, and accountability to 
ensure value for the American taxpayer.
    That starts with abandoning vague notions of our challenges and 
truly getting to the bottom of what we are dealing with using accurate 
up-to-date information.
    Work must be prioritized based on real risks and sound science, 
rather than perceived risks or soundbites.
    There are some real potential improvements for how EM treats and 
disposes of waste safely, quickly, and cost-effectively. The Department 
has a responsibility to carefully evaluate these options, including new 
technologies, treatment options, and disposal capabilities that did not 
exist when cleanup plans were first developed.
    To that end, EM is looking 10 years out at what the barriers are 
and how they could be mitigated for faster completion. We are 
developing site options analyses to identify opportunities to complete 
cleanup work through more efficient, innovative, or novel approaches 
over the next decade. This includes considering the range of 
possibilities in terms of what could be achieved at sites across the 
complex if we are willing to reassess our assumptions, consider new 
approaches and disposal options, and just think outside the box.
    EM will soon complete site options assessments and we look forward 
to engaging with Congress as well as stakeholders and regulators 
throughout the cleanup community on the best ways to move forward.
    As announced in a Federal Register notice in October 2018, the 
Department is evaluating its interpretation of the statutory term high-
level radioactive waste. In the notice, the Department sought public 
comment on an interpretation that would classify high-level radioactive 
waste based on its actual radiological content and associated risks 
rather than solely on the source of the waste. If implemented, this 
would bring the U.S. more in line with the rest of the world, and be 
consistent with many reports and recommendations from wide-ranging and 
non-partisan outside groups. It is important to note this is the first 
step in a process that must comply with existing programmatic and 
regulatory requirements and law. The Department's consideration of a 
new interpretation does not alter or abrogate the Department's 
responsibilities or policies under existing regulatory requirements or 
agreements.
    EM is also taking steps to get the best value out of every cleanup 
dollar that Congress provides.
    Consistent with the Deputy Secretary's initiative on regulatory 
reform, I have directed staff and the field to look at opportunities 
for change.
    Based on my experience in the field, this will lead to an enhanced 
safety culture because many of the reforms are common sense approaches 
that can streamline our work.
    EM is focused on driving down the operating and maintenance costs 
for its facilities, which represent a significant portion of EM's 
annual budget that could otherwise be used for actual cleanup work.
    As project lifecycle schedules drag out, aging facilities' 
components and equipment are stretching resources. We can either invest 
money towards cleanup or we can maintain aging facilities and build new 
facilities, but we cannot do it all.
    One of the most transformative initiatives is in the area of 
contracting. EM has billions of dollars in procurements coming up at 
some of our largest sites over the next few years, representing a 
significant opportunity to improve our procurement processes, contract 
management, and oversight performance.
    In February, the Department released Final Requests for Proposals 
for the first two contracts that are representative of this new ``end-
state contract'' model. Proposals from offerors are currently being 
evaluated for award later this summer.
    End-state contracting is not a contract type but an approach to 
creating meaningful and visible progress through defined end-states, 
even at sites with completion dates far into the future. This is 
intended to create and motivate a culture of completion.
    Madam Chair, this new approach to procurement; the discussions we 
are having on the regulatory front; the ongoing options analyses; and 
the funding proposed in the fiscal year 2020 budget request, will yield 
impactful results.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for EM is $6.5 billion, which 
includes $5.5 billion for defense environmental cleanup activities; 
$247 million; for non-defense environmental cleanup activities; and 
$715 million for Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning 
Fund cleanup activities.
    As EM is put on a sustainable path forward, the fiscal year 2020 
budget request provides the resources to build upon recent successes, 
bring a renewed sense of urgency to the program, and enable meaningful, 
measurable progress to projects and sites throughout the cleanup 
complex.
    From day one, the Secretary of Energy has made the environmental 
cleanup mission a key priority for the Department of Energy.
    EM's 2020 budget request provides the resources to make progress on 
cleanup activities across the complex, including increasing efforts to 
address radioactive tank waste at the Savannah River Site through 
start-up of the Salt Waste Processing Facility and continued 
construction activities for Saltstone Disposal Units.
    At Hanford's Office of River Protection, the budget drives the 
focus on the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste approach to initiate tank 
waste treatment by December 2023.
    Resources are also provided for Hanford's Richland Operations 
Office for work on River Corridor decontamination and decommissioning 
activities including remediation of the highly contaminated 300-296 
waste site under the 324 Building.
    At Oak Ridge, the request advances construction on the Outfall 200 
Mercury Treatment Facility, continues deactivation and demolition of 
remaining facilities at the East Tennessee Technology Park, and 
continues preparation of Building 2026 to support processing the 
remaining U-233 material at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
    The budget includes funding to initiate two transuranic waste 
processing lines, complete characterization of the high explosives 
plume in Canon de Valle, and implement the full interim measure for the 
chromium plume at Los Alamos in New Mexico.
    At SPRU in New York, EM would be able to complete verification of 
cleanup, site restoration, and closeout activities.
    Together, these investments for environmental management will 
enable EM to make significant progress in fulfilling its cleanup 
responsibilities.
    EM's greatest successes have historically been achieved through the 
hard work and dedication of leaders on both sides of the aisle who are 
determined to get big things done. I want to express my desire to work 
with the Congress towards a future that propels the EM mission forward 
and drives cleanup toward safe completion, sooner, and in a cost-
conscious manner.
    budget authority and planned accomplishments for selected sites

                 Office of River Protection, Washington
                         (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        $1,573,000                           $1,392,460
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
      Initiate cold commissioning of the Waste Treatment and 
Immobilization Plant to support Low Activity Waste Facility hot 
commissioning and production operations by December 31, 2023.
      Design and construct tank farm facility upgrades (i.e. 
222-S Laboratory, 242-A Evaporator and the Effluent Treatment Facility) 
for staging waste in 2021 for Waste Treatment Plant operations.
      Incorporate lessons learned from Savannah River cesium 
processing to facilitate fabrication, testing and delivery of the Tank-
Side Cesium Removal System to pretreat waste for the LAW Facility.
      Perform tank integrity activities to ensure adequate 
double shell tank space is available for Direct Feed Low Activity Waste 
(DFLAW) operations and AX retrievals.
      Complete retrieval of single shell tank AX-102 by 2021 in 
support of the corresponding Consent Decree milestone.
      Advance a production-scale offsite disposition path for 
tank waste. utilizing the regulatory pathways created by Test Bed 
Initiative
      Hanford Tank Closure End-State Contract scheduled for 
award in Q4 2019 incentivizes risk-based cleanup that reduces financial 
liability.

                 Richland Operations Office, Washington
                         (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          $954,097                             $718,098
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
      Reduce risk and facility costs by supporting construction 
activities for future relocation of Cesium & Strontium capsules to dry 
storage by the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) due date of August 2025.
      Shrink the extent of radiological and chemical 
contamination in groundwater at Hanford through treatment of 2.2 
billion gallons.
      Complete 324 Building structural modifications, removal 
of the hot cell floor, and readiness review activities for start of 
soil removal for remediation of the 300-296 waste site below the 
building.
      Hanford Central Plateau Cleanup End-State Contract 
scheduled for award in Q4 2019 incentivizes risk-based cleanup that 
reduces financial liability.

                   Savannah River Site, South Carolina
                         (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         1,551,014                           $1,642,509
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
      Complete removal of material-at-risk from Building 235-F 
which addresses remaining activities in accordance with Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board Implementation Plan to reduce residual 
Plutonium 238.
      Liquid Waste/Salt Waste Processing:
        Supports Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) start of 
radioactive operations necessary to meet State commitments and advance 
completion of cleanup mission
        Enables waste removal preparation activities required 
to support SWPF planned operations rate greater than current rate for 
salt waste processing, allowing tank closure to proceed at a more rapid 
pace.
        Continues construction of Saltstone Disposal Unit 7 and 
initiate construction of Saltstone Disposal Units 8/9 and design of 
Saltstone Disposal Units 10-12 to support SWPF planned rates.
      Funding to initiate the Savannah River National 
Laboratory's Advanced Manufacturing Collaborative facility (AMC)

                    Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho
                         (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          $443,200                             $347,654
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
      Complete exhumations at Accelerated Retrieval Project 
area in support of meeting regulatory milestone to retrieve, process 
and dispose of targeted buried waste by 2023.
      Initiate hot operations of Integrated Waste Treatment 
Unit, pending successful demonstrations of the phase 2 simulant run 
number 3 and phase 3 performance run, to begin treating liquid sodium-
bearing waste leading to closure of the final 3 liquid waste tanks.
      Complete processing and packaging of legacy transuranic 
waste so that it is ready for certification and shipment.
      Idaho Cleanup Project End-State Contract scheduled for 
award in Q2 2020 incentivizes risk based cleanup that reduces financial 
liability.

                        Oak Ridge Site, Tennessee
                         (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          $646,281                             $428,875
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
      Complete demolition of 90 percent of East Tennessee 
Technology Park facilities and continue environmental remediation work.
      Complete processing contact-handled and remote-handled 
legacy transuranic debris waste inventory.
      Complete construction of transuranic sludge processing 
test area.
      Complete preparation of Building 2026 for processing 
remaining U-233 material.
      Complete second of four years of construction of the 
Mercury Treatment Facility.
      Complete preliminary design and early site preparation of 
On-Site Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act Disposal Facility.
      Oak Ridge Reservation Cleanup Contract End-State Contract 
scheduled for award in Q3 2020 incentivizes risk based cleanup that 
reduces financial liability.

                    Carlsbad Field Office, New Mexico
                         (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          $403,487                             $398,334
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
    At Waste Isolation Pilot Plan (WIPP):
      Support receipt of up to 10 shipments of transuranic 
waste per week.
      Continue construction progress on Safety Significant 
Confinement Ventilation System (15-D-411) and on Utility Shaft 
(formerly Exhaust Shaft) (15-D-412).
      Complete two infrastructure recapitalizations (public 
address system and electrical substations).

    Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          $220,000                             $195,462
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
      Commence operations in two (of three planned) TRU 
processing lines to treat waste for shipment to WIPP.
      Reduce risk by completing 850 shipments of TRU waste to 
WIPP.
      Complete characterization of RDX (high explosives) plume 
beneath Canon de Valle and continue activities to determine final 
remedy.
      Prevent migration of Chromium plume offsite by 
implementing a hydraulic barrier.
      Continue investigation and cleanup activities required to 
meet Consent Order milestones.
      Continue groundwater and surface water sampling to remain 
compliant with the Consent Order and Individual Permit.

                  Nevada National Security Site, Nevada
                         (Dollars in Thousands)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Fiscal Year 2019 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2020 Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           $60,136                              $60,737
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2020
      Complete closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97 Yucca 
Flat/Climax Mine.
      Complete 3 percent for a total of 66 percent towards the 
closure of CAUs 101/102 Central and Western Pahute Mesa.
      Initiate and complete 18 percent towards the installation 
of 4 post-closure monitoring network wells for CAUs 97 Yucca Flat/
Climax Mine and 99 Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain.
      Conduct annual post-closure monitoring and maintenance of 
197 closed-in-place contaminated soil and industrial-type sites.
      Conduct annual post-closure sampling, monitoring and 
maintenance at 16 well locations associated with 76 closed-in-place 
contaminated groundwater sites.
      Operate DOE-owned waste disposal facility with the 
capability to receive between 1.2 to 1.5 million cubic feet of low-
level and mixed low-level waste in support of cleanup activities across 
the DOE complex.
      Maintain Nevada's Agreements in Principal and grants and 
provide funds for the Low-Level waste fee agreement.
      Nevada Environmental Program Multiple Award Small 
Business End State Contract scheduled for award in Q2 2020 incentivizes 
risk based cleanup that reduces financial liability.

    Senator Heinrich [presiding]. Admiral?

   STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL, JR., USN, DEPUTY 
  ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 
                         ADMINISTRATION

    Admiral Caldwell. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member 
Heinrich, and distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, thank 
you for the opportunity to testify here today.
    I also thank the subcommittee for consistently supporting 
Naval Reactors, enabling my team to provide the Navy with 
propulsion plants that give our nuclear-powered warships the 
incredible advantage of unmatched reliability, speed, and 
endurance to carry our national security missions around the 
world.
    Our National Security Strategy and National Defense 
Strategy recognize the increasingly complex global security 
environment marked by the reemergence of great power 
competition, and these also recognize the erosion of our 
competitive advantage. The Chief of Naval Operations has made 
it clear that the Navy must become more agile, must compete in 
ways that are sustainable, and must be prepared to control the 
high end of maritime conflict.
    Our nuclear Navy is essential in achieving these 
objectives. Today, nearly 45 percent of our Navy's major 
combatants are nuclear-powered, including 11 aircraft carriers 
and 69 submarines. In 2018, Naval Reactors supported the 
operations of the nuclear fleet, including 22 submarine 
deployments, 36 strategic deterrent patrols, and 5 aircraft 
carrier deployments.
    Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal year 2020 is 
$1.65 billion, a reduction of $140 million from last year's 
request, or 7.8 percent from the fiscal year 2019 request. Our 
budget fully supports three national priority projects.
    The first project supports the Navy's number one 
acquisition priority by developing the new propulsion plant for 
the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine which will 
feature a life-of-ship reactor core. That core is made possible 
by the reactor technologies developed over many decades. 
Because of your support, the Navy began procuring long lead 
propulsion plant equipment for the lead ship this fiscal year 
as planned, and we will begin manufacturing the Columbia-class 
reactor core later this year.
    The second project is refueling and overhauling a research 
and training reactor in New York. There is a dual benefit to 
this effort; first, facilitating the reactor development for 
the Columbia-class and, second, providing 20 years of training 
for nuclear operators.
    The third project consists of the naval spent fuel handling 
facility in Idaho which will enable long-term, reliable 
processing and packaging of spent naval nuclear fuel from Navy 
nuclear propulsion plants.
    This year's budget also invests in three key areas: first, 
developing advanced reactor technology for future classes of 
nuclear-powered warships; recapitalizing vital laboratory 
facilities and infrastructure; and also remediating efforts to 
reduce environmental liabilities of legacy facilities.
    I want to assure the Subcommittee that our planning efforts 
are done with rigor. Investments we make today in research and 
development not only advance Navy warfighting capabilities but 
also result in cost savings and improve capability for the 
fleet far into the future.
    I understand the difficult budget environment in which 
Congress must craft legislation, and I respectfully urge your 
support of our fiscal year 2020 budget request. Thank you for 
this committee's longstanding support. I look forward to 
answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
    Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you today and present the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget 
Request for Naval Reactors. Your strong support for the work we do 
ensures our nuclear Navy has the power and propulsion to carry out 
missions around the world.
    This past year marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program under the leadership of Admiral Hyman 
Rickover. In 1955, just seven years after the creation of our program, 
the first nuclear-powered warship, USS Nautilus (SSN 571) reported 
``Underway on nuclear power''. Since Nautilus, follow-on classes of 
ever more capable nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers have 
ensured our warfighting edge over potential adversaries. Reactor core 
lives have increased from just under two years to over 40 years. Our 
ballistic missile submarines have provided the most survivable leg of 
our nuclear triad for nearly six decades and are essential to our 
ability to deter major warfare and assure our allies. Our fast attack 
submarines operate virtually undetected, safeguard vital commercial 
sea-lanes, and stand ready to protect American interests. Our aircraft 
carriers--4.5 acres of sovereign territory--provide our Nation 
unparalleled mobility and the sustained ability to project combat 
power, deter conflict, and protect our interests.
    Today's security environment is dynamic and challenging, best 
characterized as a return to great power competition. In the maritime 
domain, nuclear propulsion enables the Navy to conduct missions vital 
to national security by providing unmatched mobility, flexibility, 
responsiveness, and endurance. These key attributes ensure our nuclear 
fleet can meet the demands of forward presence and crisis response 
world-wide. Today, nearly 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants are 
nuclear-powered (11 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 
50 attack submarines, and four guided missile submarines).
    Last year, with Naval Reactors support, the Navy deployed 22 
submarines and conducted 36 strategic deterrent patrols. At any given 
time, there were at least 47 submarines deployed or ready to deploy 
within days. Our carriers, USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), USS Theodore 
Roosevelt (CVN 71), USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), USS Harry S. Truman 
(CVN 75), and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) deployed during 2018. This 
past December, USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) successfully concluded a 
historic, two-part deployment as part of the implementation of the 
Dynamic Force Employment plan, demonstrating our Navy's ability to be 
more agile and operationally unpredictable to potential adversaries.
    In submarine shipbuilding, the Navy recently saw the keel laid for 
the attack submarines Pre-Commissioning Units (PCU) Montana (SSN 794) 
and Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795), and the commissioning of USS Colorado 
(SSN 788), USS Indiana (SSN 789), and USS South Dakota (SSN 790). This 
totals 17 Virginia-class submarines.
    In aircraft carrier shipbuilding, USS Gerald R. Ford completed her 
initial at sea operations and began her Post-Shakedown Availability in 
July. Construction of the John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) is nearing 
completion, and she is scheduled to be christened later this year. The 
third carrier of the Ford-class, Enterprise (CVN 80), began 
construction activities this past year and will proceed as part of a 
two-carrier buy of CVN 80 and CVN 81, which is anticipated to generate 
substantial savings for the Navy. As these aircraft carriers join the 
fleet, they will bring unmatched capabilities to our Navy. The 
propulsion plant for the Ford-class represents the first newly designed 
aircraft carrier propulsion plant in 40 years. These ships not only 
match the high speed of our Nimitz-class aircraft carriers but provide 
25 percent more energy and three times the electrical generating 
capacity. Additionally, the propulsion plant design reduces maintenance 
by 30 percent and manpower by 50 percent. These advances in propulsion 
plant design are a direct result of the dedicated and sustained effort 
by Naval Reactors and its field activities, our Department of Energy 
(DOE) laboratories, nuclear industrial base suppliers, the Navy design 
team, and the nuclear shipbuilders.
    This committee's support has enabled the safe operation of the 
nuclear fleet, substantial progress on our key projects, and our 
continued oversight and regulation of all areas across the Naval 
Nuclear Propulsion Program. Naval Reactors' budget request for fiscal 
year 2020 is $1.65 billion, a reduction of $140.2 million, or 7.8 
percent, from our fiscal year 2019 request. The budget request fully 
supports the requirements for our three major projects--Columbia-class 
propulsion plant development, the refueling overhaul of a research and 
training reactor in New York, and the construction of the Naval Spent 
Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho. The budget request also ensures Naval 
Reactors can support the operational nuclear fleet, continue research 
and development efforts for the next generation of nuclear powered 
warships, and make progress on both the recapitalization of our 
laboratory facilities and the environmental remediation of our legacy 
responsibilities.
                             major projects
Columbia-class Propulsion Plant
    The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine is the Navy's number 
one acquisition priority. Naval Reactors is on track to support the 
start of ship construction in fiscal year 2021 and is committed to 
delivering the life-of-ship reactor core and the electric drive 
propulsion system necessary for the Columbia-class program. Fiscal year 
2020 funding of $75.5 million will continue supporting procurement of 
the lead ship propulsion plant components. The Navy began procuring 
long-lead material for the propulsion plant this year, and also will 
begin manufacturing the life-of-ship reactor core.
S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $155 million to 
support the refueling overhaul of one of the New York land-based 
prototypes, which will enable an additional 20 years of Naval Reactors' 
commitment to research, development, and training. As part of this 
refueling project, we will insert recently manufactured Columbia-class 
type fuel modules in the prototype reactor as part of testing and 
demonstrating the manufacturability necessary for production and 
delivery of the Columbia-class reactor core. The prototype refueling 
overhaul is scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2021, with a return to 
training operations shortly thereafter.
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request includes $238 million to 
continue construction of the Naval Spent Fuel Handling Facility, which 
broke ground in 2017. Full support from Congress has enabled us to keep 
this project on track. The cost and schedule baselines were approved in 
September of 2018. Design and site preparation for this facility 
continues, and it is on track to receive spent nuclear fuel from 
aircraft carriers in fiscal year 2024 and be fully operational by 
fiscal year 2025.
                         technical base funding
    In addition to our three priority projects, Naval Reactors 
maintains a high-performing technical base to: 1) execute nuclear 
reactor technology research and development that supports today's fleet 
and ensures our Navy maintains its technological advantage over 
adversaries and, 2) provide the necessary equipment, construction, 
maintenance, and modernization of critical infrastructure and 
facilities. The funding required for this base also supports the lean 
federal workforce that provides the oversight necessary to carry out 
this important technical work safely and efficiently. These activities 
are vital to our ability to provide 24-7 support to the nuclear-powered 
Navy.
Research and Development
    By employing an effective technical base, the teams of talented and 
dedicated people at Program sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory 
in Pittsburgh, the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site 
in greater Albany, the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho, and our 
Washington, DC headquarters--can perform the research and development, 
analysis, engineering, and testing needed to support today's fleet at 
sea and develop more capable nuclear-powered warships for tomorrow's 
fleet. Advanced nuclear technologies such as those employed in the 
Columbia reactor require extensive development and prototyping, 
spanning a decade or more to mature the technology to a point where it 
is ready to incorporate in a ship design. Technology development will 
receive increased emphasis in the coming years as we complete our major 
projects and increase our focus on the development of tomorrow's fleet.
    Our labs perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval 
Reactors to thoroughly assess approximately 4,000 emergent issues 
annually and deliver timely responses that ensure nuclear safety and 
maximize operational flexibility. Our research and development efforts 
must continue so that we can provide the Navy more capable propulsion 
plants in the future. The performance of our reactors is key to 
maintaining advantages over our potential adversaries. The 
technological advances that go in our propulsion plants today are a 
direct result of research and development investments that began 
decades ago. Continued investment now is vital to the generations of 
scientists and engineers who will design the propulsion plants of the 
future.
Facilities and Infrastructure
    Our laboratory facilities and infrastructure are critical in 
carrying out Naval Reactors' mission. The budget request supports 
recapitalizing our Naval Nuclear Laboratory facilities and 
infrastructure systems, many of which have supported the Program since 
its inception 70 years ago. Without this recapitalization we will be 
unable to effectively support nuclear fleet operations and advanced 
research and development efforts at the level required by this complex 
technology. Our budget request this year also reflects the increase in 
our efforts in decontaminating and decommissioning (D&D) older 
facilities that have been in existence since the start of the Program 
in the early 1950s. We have approximately $8 billion in environmental 
liabilities requiring D&D efforts--about one-third of these facilities 
are no longer in use. We are increasing our emphasis on retirement of 
theses liabilities in an environmentally responsible and cost-effective 
manner to support best use of our funding.
    I want to assure the committee that the planning efforts we execute 
in budgeting for current and future projects are done with extreme 
rigor. We conduct comprehensive reviews of our budget to ensure we are 
making the right investments and tradeoffs. Our budget profile is 
consistent with projections in earlier Future Years Nuclear Security 
Plan submissions. Investments we make today in research and development 
efforts not only advance capabilities, but will also result in cost 
savings far into the future. We provide unmatched value to our Nation's 
defense and have a history of cost-effectively meeting our obligations. 
I understand the difficult budget environment in which Congress must 
craft legislation, and I respectfully urge your support for aligning 
allocations with the Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request.

    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Admiral.
    I am going to go ahead and jump into my opening statement. 
We apologize for the back and forth, but that is what happens 
when we have a series of votes around here. So Members will be 
coming and going, and hopefully by the time I am done with my 
opening statement, the chair will be back as well.
    I want to thank Chairwoman Fischer for holding today's 
hearing.
    I certainly want to thank all of our witnesses for taking 
the time to testify. We very much appreciate your service to 
our country and the job that you perform.
    There are a number of issues I want to raise today at this 
hearing. First and foremost is the issue of plutonium and the 
recent report by the Institute for Defense Analysis, or IDA, 
which essentially invalidated all NNSA conclusions from last 
year's engineering assessment.
    In that report, IDA stated that it was not feasible to 
construct and operate any facility by 2030 to produce 80 pits 
per year at the cost range you found in the engineering 
assessment. This is quite serious because we legislated last 
year based on that previous assessment.
    More importantly, the issue is not with construction costs 
although we know from the IDA that these numbers are 
drastically underestimated. What I will be looking for is the 
lifecycle cost. The real cost drivers are staffing and 
facilities and getting them fully operational and capable of 
producing our war reserve pits. I will be looking closely at 
this issue, and according to the Office of Enterprise 
Assessments (EA), we know the lifecycle costs will exceed the 
cost of other options considered by at least $14 billion, which 
I would point out is double the estimate for the alternative.
    On the critical issue of rebuilding our warheads, I am 
pleased with the cooperation with the Department of Defense 
(DOD). But I am concerned that we may be recreating a similar 
problem to what we had in the early 2000s of balancing 
workload, design, and engineering between the two weapons 
laboratories. Livermore, over the next 10 to 15 years, will be 
tasked with two major systems, the W80-4 cruise missile warhead 
and the W87-1 warhead, while Los Alamos will be exiting the 
B61-12 program. This is a serious issue, given we had just 
staffed up for the B61 program.
    Finally, Ms. White, welcome to our Subcommittee. It was 
great to see you in New Mexico recently. It goes without saying 
that you are responsible for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, 
and as you know, we have waste backed up at every major 
Department of Energy (DOE) site because of the fire and drum 
explosion several years ago at the WIPP site, as well as the 
lack of adequate ventilation at WIPP to conduct operations. I 
want you to elaborate on what is being done to bring back that 
capacity in a safe and effective manner. I know you touched on 
that in your opening statement.
    More importantly, when it does become operational, I am 
concerned, as my State has been for the past 30 years, that we 
continue to adhere to the grand bargain between the State of 
New Mexico and the Federal Government on what kind of waste can 
be disposed in this unique, one-of-a-kind facility. Until 
recent events, WIPP's success, in contrast with Yucca Mountain, 
for example, was our ability to reach a consensus between the 
State and Federal Government, and that consensus was enacted 
into law in 1992 with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Land 
Withdrawal Act under Energy Committee jurisdiction. The last 
thing we want is an upset Governor who retains Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, or RCRA, authority over this 
facility, an upset delegation, and an upset Senate committee 
over trying to dispose of waste that is not explicitly defined 
in the Land Withdrawal Act. So I will be asking you some 
questions concerning waste reclassification and attempts to 
dispose of waste not explicitly defined in the WIPP Land 
Withdrawal Act.
    Again, thank you for coming today, and I very much look 
forward to hearing all of your testimony and to questions.
    Senator Fischer [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    We will begin our first round of questions.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, as you discuss in your opening 
statement, this year's budget request of $16.48 billion for 
NNSA--this is $1.3 billion over last year's enacted level, 
which some suggest is a dramatic increase.
    However, last year's budget projected a $16 billion top 
line for NNSA in fiscal year 2020, a 3 percent difference from 
the level of funding requested in this budget. Instead of being 
a massive or an unexpected surge in spending, NNSA's budget is 
following the anticipated path. The modernization programs that 
have been planned for a very long time are finally getting 
started and they are off the ground, and the cost will increase 
as activities progress and programs become more mature.
    That being said, can you talk about the importance of 
funding this budget at the requested level and what impact cuts 
would have on your ability to build a responsive nuclear 
infrastructure, as well as your ability to meet the deterrence 
requirements set out by U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Chairman Fischer, thanks for 
the question.
    There are a number of opportunities that are critical to 
our request in the fiscal year 2020 budget. You have alluded to 
several of them. But we have three major priorities in NNSA at 
the present time. One is to continue our infrastructure 
modernization. For those that are unfamiliar, more than 50 
percent of our facilities are 40 years old or older, 30 percent 
of which were built in the Manhattan Project days. To maintain 
an infrastructure like that and ask our 44,000 men and women in 
our workforce to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent and 
provide assistance and support to nonproliferation, counter-
proliferation, counterterrorism programs to me is just 
unacceptable. So we are on a trajectory to modernize our long 
past modernization of our infrastructure, and many of the 
requirements that we have and resources for which we are 
requesting will continue us on that path.
    As I mentioned in my opening statement, for example, the 
uranium processing facility that will recover all of the work 
that has been--or most of the work that has been done in what 
is known as 92-12 at Y-12, a facility that was built during the 
Manhattan Project, long past its prime--we will be completing 
that program as long as we are receiving the funding request 
that we have asked for, which is $745 million this year, to 
continue the construction on the main processing facility. We 
will complete that facility by the end of 2025. But as long as 
we are on this trajectory and the path forward for those major 
construction activities, that is just one of so many others.
    Another one is the Los Alamos National Laboratory and our 
PF-4, a facility that is 40 years old. But we maintain that as 
our singular location to do pit work, actinide chemistry, and 
basically the basic research and surveillance on our U.S. 
nuclear weapons stockpile.
    I could explain many more facilities, but that is just one 
of our highest priorities.
    The second, of course, is our workforce. In the next 5 
years, more than 40 percent of our workforce will be 
retirement-eligible. We need to change the mindset of what we 
are doing with the challenges we have to obtaining clearances 
for new employees, for a number of other issues that we have at 
our eight labs, plants, and sites, our seven field offices and 
our headquarters. It is urgent that we find a way to be able to 
hire the existing workforce changes that we need, the increases 
that we need in our workforce, as well as the workforce of the 
future. So we have a number of different priorities that we are 
undergoing right now, but that is just to maintain the existing 
nuclear weapons stockpile.
    Senator Fischer. I think that one of the main points here 
is we are no longer just studying modernization. We are no 
longer trying to define modernization. Now we are working on 
it. We are moving forward. Would you agree with that?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, that is correct.
    Senator Fischer. We are on schedule.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, we are.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Also, this year's budget requested a significant increase 
for subcritical experiments. Can you talk about the importance 
of these activities, specifically how they will enable our 
continued certification of the stockpile without returning to 
testing and support the W80-4 and the W87-1 life extension 
programs?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. For the last 25 years, 
since we stopped underground explosive testing in 1992, a 
voluntary moratorium on underground explosive testing, the 
Department of Energy and NNSA undertook a science-based 
stockpile stewardship program, and in light of not being able 
to conduct underground explosive testing, we need to certify 
the stockpile on an annual basis. I am happy to say for the 
last 25 years, our three laboratory directors and the STRATCOM 
Commander have sent letters to the President from the Secretary 
of Defense and the Secretary of Energy certifying the stockpile 
is safe, secure, and reliable.
    But in order to do so, we need state-of-the-art scientific 
capabilities, of which one is Enhanced Capability for 
Subcritical Experiments (ECSE), which is a planned activity 
that we are going to plan on conducting at Nevada national 
security sites. Those are subcritical experiments that we 
currently undertake, but that will be a new suite of 
capabilities that we are looking forward to employing in the 
future.
    In addition to that, we have high performance computing, as 
I mentioned, exoscale at Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, which we will be able to operate that platform 
beginning in 2023. There are a number of different, very highly 
important scientific and engineering capabilities that we have 
spread out throughout our entire complex that inform us on the 
health of the stockpile.
    Senator Fischer. Without these experiments, would it be 
possible to certify the Life Extension Programs (LEPs)?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It would be highly doubtful 
that we would be able to do so with the confidence that we have 
currently.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA's 
engineering analysis back in May of 2018 provided a lifecycle 
cost estimate for each of our nation's plutonium options. Are 
you familiar with those numbers, and do you have that slide 
with you today?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I do. Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich. I have got it here.
    I want to direct your attention to alternative 1, the 
Savannah big box alternative, and then also to alternative 2C 
which I will call the Los Alamos PF4 plus modules alternative.
    For this committee and for Congress, can you state what the 
estimated lifecycle cost is for alternative 1, the Savannah?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. The number that we had when 
we completed the Environmental Assessment was $27.8 billion.
    Senator Heinrich. So can you state what the estimates were 
for the other options?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. Alternative 2 
alpha, $18.8 billion; alternative 2 bravo, $14.3 billion; and 
alternative 2 Charlie, $14.8 billion.
    Senator Heinrich. Exactly.
    The independent Institute for Defense Analysis has said 
that no one option the NNSA considered is valid for actually 
being able to produce 80 pits by 2030. So if no one option is 
fundamentally better than the others, why build an entire new 
weapons complex with an additional price tag of $14 billion in 
lifecycle costs?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator Heinrich, we 
recognize that pit production activities at two locations is 
going to result in higher lifecycle costs. Recognizing the 
numbers that I gave you, our lifecycle costs are over a 50-plus 
year period, not an annual basis, if you will, so total 
lifecycle costs.
    Additionally, this is fundamentally to ensure the 
resiliency of our nuclear weapons stockpile. At present, as a 
reminder, we have not had a plutonium pit production capability 
since the early 1990s when we shuttered the Rocky Flats plant 
in Colorado. The last time we produced war reserve pits was in 
2011 at Los Alamos. Therefore, we have a challenge ahead of us 
if we want to just maintain the current nuclear weapons 
stockpile and that of the 87-1, which is the 78 replacement, 
which is what is driving our numbers to have the not fewer than 
80 pits per year, as directed by the requirements laid out by 
STRATCOM and as approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council.
    Senator Heinrich. Well, I certainly agree with the goal of 
80 pits per year, but I am trying to understand why nowhere 
else in the entire complex do we have this requirement. We have 
one uranium facility. We have one tritium facility. We have one 
plutonium facility. The IDA study said that basically none of 
the options were any better than the other. I just think it is 
very hard to justify an additional $14 billion in taxpayer 
money.
    I want to jump to another budgetary issue, and that is you 
should have in front of you the estimated out-year costs for 
plutonium from your budget data. I am curious in particular, if 
you look at the line on Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 
pit production from fiscal year 2020 and then across to fiscal 
year 2024--and this is during the ramp to get to the point 
where we are ramping up to achieve the 30 pits per year by 
2026. So we have fiscal year 2020 at $21.2 million. Fiscal year 
2021 is $231.3. Fiscal year 2022 is at $244, then $284 in 2023. 
Then it drops to $75 million in fiscal year 2024. I am trying 
to make sense of that 75 number given that it is in the midst 
of that ramp.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, first of all, I am 
happy to say that our requirements are to place more than $3 
billion over the next several years into Los Alamos for its pit 
production capability. It is going to be a challenge at best to 
get to our 10 pits per year by 2024, our 20 by 2025, and the 30 
and then 30 in perpetuity in 2026. Those numbers come from our 
Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNCP).
    I am happy to say also that since we submitted the fiscal 
year 2020 budget, we have put more fidelity into these numbers, 
and we would be able to brief you on these. But let me assure 
you that those numbers are only going to increase, and we are 
working very closely with Los Alamos that is providing us with 
additional fidelity into what their requirements will be. So 
rest assured, we are looking to do everything we can to ensure 
operability at PF4 and throughout the NNSA enterprise.
    Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
    My time is up, so I am going to wait for the second round. 
I have got some questions, Secretary White, for you regarding 
WIPP, but we will get to it in the second round. Thanks.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Rounds?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I want to take my time and work my way through a primer 
with you, if we could. I think one of the challenges we have in 
gaining support for moving forward with the necessary 
improvements in the entire program is to have a lot more people 
understand exactly what we are talking about. So far, we are 
talking about pits. We are talking about specifics that within 
the industry itself are well known but not outside of the 
industry. Let us talk about this for just a little bit so that 
people understand the need for the additional production and 
what it entails.
    Can we start talking with just exactly what a pit is, and 
as much as we can in an unclassified session, what is involved 
in making it, and what it is used for? So this is going to be a 
primer.
    This is really important that we gather support because 
when we start talking about making changes within the nuclear 
production capabilities of our country, it is necessary that 
folks back home start to understand that there is a real need 
and that just because we have capabilities that have been here 
for years, it does not mean that we do not need additional 
capabilities for the operation of our nuclear capabilities. I 
would defer to any of you who want to work your way through 
this with us.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you. If I may start.
    First of all, plutonium is used in the primary of a nuclear 
weapon or a bomb, and it is the material, if you will, the 
ingredient that provides the necessary explosive power, plus 
additional materials, whether they are highly enriched uranium 
and the secondary and other materials that we need, critical 
materials that make up a nuclear warhead or a bomb.
    Senator Rounds. How about for the Navy itself with regard 
to the nuclear fuel needs for the carriers and our submarines?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. So that is uranium, and it is 
highly enriched uranium that we use. It is also part of the 
material that we process through our defense enterprise.
    Senator Rounds. Is it done at the same locations as these 
pits are produced?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It is actually done at Y-12 
and at other locations throughout the United States where they 
actually make the fuel rods.
    Senator Rounds. So when we talk about the pits themselves, 
we are not talking even about the amount of production needed 
for the fuel. We are talking about our need for our weapon 
systems.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. For our entire enterprise. 
You are exactly right, and this is just to maintain our 
existing nuclear weapons stockpile. We are the only nuclear 
nation that is not currently designing or fielding new nuclear 
weapons. Every other nuclear weapon state is. What we are doing 
is extending the life of our existing nuclear weapons 
stockpile. If I might, the oldest nuclear weapon system that we 
have in our stockpile right now is the B-61 that was fielded in 
the early 1960s.
    Senator Rounds. I understand that right now that we are 
upgrading or we intend to upgrade through what? About the year 
2020. We are beginning sometime in the year 2020 through what? 
2023 for the B61-12 to be available. Is that about right?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Correct. That should be 
beyond 2025. We have an issue right now with the life extension 
program on the B61, and we are addressing that right now.
    Senator Rounds. So when you do that, can you simply use the 
nuclear material that was in the earlier weapons to be redone, 
or do you need to use one of these new pits?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. In the case of the W78, which 
is what we are replacing now with something called the W87-1, 
which is currently existing in the stockpile, we will need to 
modernize our pit for that. That is precisely what we are 
trying to deal with right now----
    Senator Rounds. Now, if I understand it, the W78 is not for 
the B61.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. No. The B61--we are going to 
continue to use that and many elements of it. But what we are 
doing is increasing the safety and security of the actual 
nuclear weapon itself, and we are introducing new robust 
systems and additional surety features that we can talk about 
in a classified space, if you would like.
    Senator Rounds. Okay. When we talk about a pit itself, how 
big is a pit? How much material is it? Are they standard?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. In unclassified terms, it is 
several kilograms or more.
    Senator Rounds. Do we use multiple pits per weapon system?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. No. There is a single pit in 
the primary for a nuclear weapon system, and there is a 
secondary. It depends what the configuration is and what the 
nuclear weapon----
    Senator Rounds. If you were to talk to the public on this 
and you were to say this is the reason why we need to produce 
more pits, a lot of folks are going to say, well, we have 
already got plenty in stock. We have got lots of weapons out 
there. What is the need for the increase in production of pits? 
I think that is a really important thing to discuss.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It is based on military 
requirements and what the military requirements and target sets 
are. So we take our direction from STRATCOM, the Strategic 
Command, about what their requirements are, what our nuclear 
weapons stockpile requirements are based on direction from the 
President.
    Senator Rounds. So what you are actually saying, though, is 
that it is not even just to replace those that are there. It is 
because when we modernize, we are actually looking at different 
types of weapon systems that we need in order to be a deterrent 
force into the future. We are not just talking 2 years from 
now. We are talking 25, 30, 40 years from now.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Exactly. We are talking more 
likely 50 and beyond. That is exactly what we are doing. In 
fact, you raise a good point, Senator. One of the issues about 
plutonium right now is plutonium aging, and it is a challenge 
that we have and that is, in fact, why we are doing some of the 
studies that we are undertaking and some of the modernizations 
that we are undertaking. In fact, that is why we are doing the 
78 replacement for the 87-1, which is exactly why we need the 
new plutonium pit production capability, something again that 
we have not had since the early 1990s.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today.
    I want to go back, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, to something 
you mentioned earlier today, and that is about staffing levels. 
Let us get to some nuts and bolts.
    Forty percent of your staff is going to be retirement-
eligible in 4 or 5 years. But as I understand it, a couple of 
studies have already said it is understaffed now. Your 
responsibilities are increasing and if the Administration and 
Congress want you to do your job, we got to provide you the 
tools.
    So can we talk a little bit about staffing? What are the 
challenges that you are facing in recruiting? What can we do to 
help? Are there specific things that are stopping you from 
bringing new people on for this really important role that you 
have got here?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. We have a number of staffing 
challenges currently and ahead of us. One of the things that we 
have requested is if Congress would consider lifting the cap on 
our FTEs, for our full-time equivalents, for our federal 
workforce, which is at 1,690 at the present time. We are 
bumping up close to that right now, and that is just to staff 
our headquarters and our field offices. Most of those personnel 
are at our field offices.
    However, we have taken a look at what we need to do about 
these staffing challenges, and what we are doing is sort of 
what I consider disruptive technology. What we have done is we 
have come together with all of our labs, plants, and sites, our 
field offices, and our headquarters, and instead of doing 
basically 16 different stovepipe staffing plans, if you will, 
we are coming together and we are getting together with all the 
labs, plants, and sites hiring authorities and our field 
offices and our headquarters. We have had a hiring day, which 
we undertook in January of this year, where we had 1,700 
applicants. Just to give you some idea--for those of you in the 
federal workforce, you will understand--we actually offered 53 
jobs at that time. So that is unheard of that the federal 
workforce could actually offer those kinds of jobs.
    That said, we are working very closely with organizations 
and with some of our labs, plants, and sites such as Los 
Alamos. Los Alamos has just undertaken an agreement with 
Northern New Mexico College to start a technician program for 
radiological technicians so that they can bring in a new 
pipeline of radiological technicians to do work in plutonium 
operations and working with radioactive materials.
    We are finding different ways of trying to resource, if you 
will, or source the next generation, the best and brightest, 
and those are scientists. Those are engineers. Those are 
technicians. Those are people that put hands on weapons. Those 
people that put hands in glove boxes, as well as the primary 
and secondary designers. We are trying to find different ways 
of finding that pipeline, if you will.
    We have a number of very interesting programs now where we 
support universities and colleges around the United States 
where we can actually grow our workforce through those 
endeavors. But we really need to break that paradigm.
    I am also happy to say that we have also established things 
called national security or nuclear security enterprise days. 
We have conducted on-site employment opportunities at Georgia 
Tech, at University of California at Merced, and Texas A&M so 
far this year. We will be going to the State of Ohio and we 
will be going to the State of North Dakota in the next several 
months or so, probably in the fall time to see what we can do 
to encourage a pipeline of new students throughout our United 
States that might want to come to work at our great eight labs, 
plants, and sites, field offices, and our headquarters.
    So we are really trying to break that paradigm because it 
is crucial now. Los Alamos is looking to hire 1,000 people this 
year. Sandia is looking to hire 1,000 people this year. 
Livermore is looking to hire 500 people. We are talking about 
really thousands of people in our workforce not only in the 
next 5 years but now in order to handle the increasing workload 
that is on us right now.
    Senator Jones. All right. Well, great. I wish I had asked a 
question that you were passionate about.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Jones. Well, let me just ask this. I want you very 
succinctly if you can--we are hearing talk from different 
sectors about that it may be too expensive to modernize all 
three prongs of the nuclear triad. I do not agree with that. 
But I would like for you to just right here on the record, 
maybe in less time than you talked about the staffing, tell us 
how they work together and why it is important that we 
modernize all of the nuclear triad.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Well, I would certainly defer 
to the Department of Defense since they are the ones that 
employ the nuclear triad. But it is imperative to have a 
credible deterrent in the United States, that we have every 
capability possible in order to show that we have a robust 
deterrent and play into the global threats that we see now and 
on the horizon. It certainly would make sense to maintain the 
triad as it is.
    Senator Jones. All three work together as a part of that 
deterrent.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. All three work together. That 
is exactly right.
    Senator Jones. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley, Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you to all of the witnesses for being here.
    Administrator, if I could just start with you. It is nice 
to see you again the other day, and thank you for being here. 
Thank you for your service.
    Can I come back to Senator Heinrich's question? What is the 
answer to his question about the alternative facilities here 
for pit production? If in fact there is no advantage one over 
the other, then why build the new facility at Savannah River?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Senator, always nice to see 
you too again. Thank you.
    First of all, we believe that it is necessary to have 
resiliency throughout the enterprise. Now, admittedly, I would 
like to see a resilient enterprise that has redundant 
capabilities throughout our entire complex, but that would just 
break the budget and that is just untenable.
    However, we have decided that our highest priority is for 
pit manufacturing and production. It is our impression that 
putting all of our capabilities at a single site while we are 
maintaining plutonium pit production capabilities, which is 
what we are trying to do at Los Alamos and get them to 30 pits 
per year by 2026, we do not believe that it is appropriate to 
put all of our requirements in a single location and that 
redundancy is critical to maintaining our nuclear enterprise 
now and in the future.
    Again, as I had mentioned in the outset of my discussion, 
plutonium facility 4 at Los Alamos is over 40 years old. These 
numbers that Senator Heinrich had referred to do not include 
the lifecycle costs for either modernizing that facility or 
replacing that facility.
    So we have got challenges ahead of us no matter where we 
look in the enterprise. We had an opportunity to repurpose a 
facility at South Carolina, and we think that is the best way 
to go for a resilient and a functioning enterprise for the next 
50 to 75 years.
    Senator Hawley, The redundancy piece is really important to 
you. Is that right? Can you just explain why it is so critical?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Because putting our 
capabilities in a single location, if there is a major activity 
or a major incident at a single location, our entire nuclear 
weapons enterprise is down for any kind of pit production 
capability or monitoring, even our surveillance. So if we lose 
our single location, then we do not have an enterprise that is 
resilient and we may be unable to or it will put in jeopardy 
the capability to surveil our current nuclear weapons.
    Senator Hawley, So what I hear you saying is when you think 
about the different options here, the various alternatives, 
they are not all the same in the sense that--it is not merely 
about the amount of production you can get cumulatively out of 
these facilities. It is also about resiliency and redundancy, 
and these are important factors that weigh heavily in the 
decision-making process. Is that fair? Am I understanding you 
correctly?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. They are critical.
    Senator Hawley, Now, back to reaching the 2026 pit 
production goal, you said a little bit earlier that it is going 
to be a stretch--I think that was the word you used--to reach 
that goal. Can you say a little bit more there and what sort of 
mitigation strategies we are going to employ if we do not, in 
fact, hit that goal?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. We are working 
incredibly closely with our colleagues at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory and, for that matter, all of our colleagues around 
the enterprise pulling together a team to find out where we can 
minimize risks, maximize opportunities and working in parallel 
on several strategic plans. Los Alamos is required to put 
together a plutonium pit plan for us. They are undertaking that 
right now. We have seen the draft, and we are working on that 
plan with them to get us to that 30 pits per year. So we are 
working, doing everything we possibly can to give Los Alamos 
the tools necessary to be successful to get us to those 
requirements of the 30 pits per year by 2026.
    Senator Hawley, Very good.
    In the time I have remaining, let me just shift gears 
briefly and, Admiral, ask you. I noticed that the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) is estimating that over the next 10 years, 
about 6 percent of defense spending is going to go toward 
modernizing the triad and managing the various life extension 
programs, which is quite a bit of money and focused on a pretty 
narrow sector of our national defense. I just want to ask you 
about the effective management of some of these programs.
    I understand the Naval Reactors is moving out of the 
development phase and into production for the Columbia-class. 
Has your experience with developing this reactor informed your 
approach to program management and avoiding delays that are 
inherent to fielding new technologies like this one?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.
    I would say that my experience to date with the Columbia 
program has absolutely informed the way ahead. What I have 
realized is that we are trying to build a larger Navy and 
recapitalize an important national asset on a shipbuilding 
industry that did not build submarines through the 1990s and 
really into the start of the 2000s. That shipbuilding industry 
and the supporting vendor base has some fragility in it, and it 
requires that we manage it very carefully if we are going to be 
successful. We have learned that it takes a tremendous amount 
of oversight, in fact, in some cases intrusive oversight.
    It takes a close partnership with our partners in the 
vendor base to understand what their capacity is, to make sure 
that we are in dialogue with them, and to be very sensitive to 
increases in production or changes in the way that we tackle 
production. For example, many times a vendor will make a change 
in production to accommodate maybe affordability or maybe to 
make it easier to manufacture. If you are not careful, you can 
induce errors.
    This close relationship, partnership is critical, and 
oversight is essential if we are going to get this right. That 
comes from the Navy and it also comes from our prime 
contractors that have to be really involved with their 
subcontractors if we are going to get this right.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    This really is not addressed to you three, although you are 
part of this enterprise. I think those of us that are engaged 
in this issue have to do a better job of communicating to the 
public the importance of the modernization. I met with a group 
of Maine people yesterday who basically asked why we are 
spending all this money. Is it another nuclear arms race? By 
the way, 6 percent of the budget is $42 billion a year. This is 
not insignificant. You could do a lot of Head Start slots for 
$42 billion a year. I mean, there are a lot of other important 
priorities.
    So this is just a comment that I think the Defense 
Department and the strategic people have to really communicate 
with the public about this because this is a major commitment. 
You know, I had this discussion yesterday, as I said, with a 
group of people that were very skeptical, and I said we have 
got to have a--you used the right word--credible deterrent. 
That is the whole rationale for the modernization. But I think 
the case has to be made. What is the incremental value that we 
are getting for that $42 billion over and above what we have 
now? I hope you will take that back. As I say, that is not 
really a question, but I think it is very important as we go 
into this next year and this budget cycle.
    Admiral Caldwell, you are now developing and have developed 
a nuclear propulsion capability that has a longer life. Have 
you ever done a calculation of what that saves us over the long 
haul, in other words, not having to refuel, having a longer 
life on a submarine, for example? It strikes me that is a sort 
of hidden savings that I think is important to quantify.
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. We have done some of those 
calculations. Well, first off, we always try to build on 
technology to improve what we are delivering to the fleet. Over 
the life of the program, we have been able to deliver reactor 
cores that are life-of-the-ship cores. In fact, every submarine 
we are building today has a life-of-the-ship core, and the 
carriers have a 25-year core and they get refueled once in 
life. The ability to have a core in the Columbia submarine that 
lasts over 40 years will allow us to do the mission with 12 
submarines versus the 14 today.
    Senator King. That is a huge savings right there.
    Admiral Caldwell. That is a huge saving, and we think that 
is about $40 billion over the total ownership of the program.
    Now, there are cost savings in other ways too, sir. For 
example, if you look at the Ford aircraft carrier, we designed 
that reactor plant with 25 percent more energy in the core, 
three times the electrical generation capacity. We were able to 
take out roughly 30 percent of the required maintenance in the 
propulsion plant, and we were able thereby to reduce the 
manning in the propulsion plant by about 50 percent. So if you 
take that figure and you add that up over 11 carriers or a 12-
carrier force is what the Navy wants and you do that for the 
lifetime, that is real money. If you take all those kind of 
cost saving measures that are in the Ford, it is about $80 
million per year per carrier. So that is real money.
    We are focused on not only delivering quality but seeing 
can we manufacture these things cheaper, easier, and can we do 
it so that it is affordable from a total ownership cost.
    Senator King. Thank you. That is important. I think there 
are other areas as well. We could talk about the Truman, but 
that is another topic.
    Secretary White, this is an issue I keep raising in Energy 
and Natural Resources and here: waste. You all have developed 
waste disposal techniques and technologies. Can you please help 
us on the civilian side? Because this is the unanswered 
question with regard to nuclear power. We had a bill in Energy 
and Natural Resources to promote nuclear power. It is fossil 
free. It has a lot of positives. But we still have not answered 
the waste question that has been pending now for about 70 
years. Your thoughts.
    Secretary White. So Yucca Mountain is not within my 
purview. But I would have to vehemently agree with you that in 
order to sort of support the viability of commercial nuclear 
power, the waste question needs to get solved. We also have to 
be able to decommission these facilities effectively both in 
terms of safety and costs.
    Senator King. What we have now are effectively 100 or so 
high-level nuclear waste sites scattered all over the country. 
We have one in Maine.
    What I hope you can do is share some of your expertise and 
poke the Department because this is a question that is really 
impeding our national policy I think.
    Secretary White. I agree with you totally. I will 
definitely take that back to the Department.
    Senator King. Thank you. Yes, pass it back to my friend, 
Governor Perry. He will know who it is coming from when I say 
Governor Perry.
    Secretary White. Absolutely.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator King.
    Admiral Caldwell, for some time now, your three major 
priorities have been the Columbia-class reactor, the S8G land-
based reactor, and spent fuel handling project in Idaho. Can 
you talk about what you see as the next key challenges or 
objectives for the Naval Reactors?
    Admiral Caldwell. Yes, ma'am, I can.
    As you know, the last several years, we have been focused 
on these three high priority, national priority tasks. As the 
budget for those winds down, I would put the future funding 
requirements into sort of three broad categories.
    First is to support the operating fleet. That is number one 
in Naval Reactors in our day-to-day business. That is important 
because when you operate a nuclear fleet, you have to make sure 
that you provide the technical support and the backing for all 
the sailors that operate these great ships and make sure our 
Navy can go out there and do the things that we need to do.
    We have a number of aging platforms. We have extended the 
life of the Trident submarine out past 40 years. That was never 
intended that way. If you go back and look at the aircraft 
carriers, we never intended to operate them necessarily for 50 
years, but we are. The same is going to be true for our 688 or 
our Los Angeles class submarines. In fact, we are going to 
refuel five to seven of those, and it will take some of those 
out past 40 years of operations. So being able to support that 
current fleet is vitally important. That is number one.
    Number two is building the technologies for the future 
fleet. The Navy is examining the future capabilities that we 
need, and they are talking about more energy in the core, life-
of-the-ship cores, stealth, acoustics, and improved capability. 
So I need to invest in technologies that are going to be the 
game changers in terms of affordability, capacity, capability 
for the U.S. Navy. So that is number two.
    Number three are my facilities. I have a number of 
facilities, just as the Administrator said, that are aging, 
that go back 60 years or longer. I need to recapitalize those 
facilities and I also need to decontaminate and decommission a 
large number of those facilities. So you will see in my budget 
submission and in the future FYNCPs a budget request to support 
taking a bigger chunk out of that Deactivation and 
Decommissioning (D&D), as well as recapitalizing very important 
facilities at our labs that allow us to do this important work 
that supports the fleet.
    So those are the three big areas, ma'am.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, as we have discussed, some are 
criticizing this budget as being insufficiently committed to 
nonproliferation programs. This argument is being made despite 
the fact that the fiscal year 2020 request and the associated 
out-year funding projections would increase top line spending 
on nonproliferation above the levels projected in last year's 
budget even though it eliminates spending for the mixed oxide 
(MOX) program. Can you explain that to us in greater detail?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I can. In fact, thank 
you.
    This is the largest increase that has been requested in the 
last 5 years for our nonproliferation, our counter-
proliferation, and counterterrorism programs. As you rightly 
state----
    Senator Fischer. Sometimes we focus on the other side of 
your programs, and I think this is really important.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. It is incredibly important. 
Thank you.
    We are doing a number of things with this budget in what we 
are looking to do in the out-years, one of which is something 
that is very important, which is the cesium blood irradiators. 
Oftentimes we are replacing cesium blood irradiators that are 
large sources with non-radioactive sources. They are x-ray 
machines, and we are doing this around the United States, and 
hopefully we will be able to do this around the world as well. 
By the end of 2027, we will have completed the removal of the 
cesium irradiators from the United States, which could be an 
opportunity for terrorists to take the materials and make them 
radiological dispersal devices or otherwise known as dirty 
bombs. At the end of 2027, we anticipate completing that 
program throughout the United States. So you do see a natural 
decrease in those budgets.
    There are a number of different programs that we have that 
come to fruition. So oftentimes some might state that we are 
drawing down on our nonproliferation programs. There could be 
nothing further than the truth. We believe very strongly in 
nonproliferation goals, counterterrorism, and counter-
proliferation as well. We are working very closely with the 
interagency to put new programs in place around the United 
States to support the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
initiatives for counterterrorism, and we are working very 
closely and we have just gotten approval from the White House 
to do so. So you see that also in our engagement strategy and 
approach and request for the 2020 budget.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Assistant Secretary White, first off, I 
just want to thank you for joining me in Carlsbad last month to 
celebrate 20 years of operation at that one-of-a-kind facility.
    One of the concerns--and we talked about this a little bit 
there in Carlsbad, but one of the concerns I continue to hear 
about are the ongoing problems with air quality underground. 
Are there some things that we can do now to improve air quality 
until the new ventilation system is up and fully operational in 
a couple years? For example, have we considered switching all 
of those diesel-powered underground equipment over to electric-
powered equipment like they have in some of the other mining 
facilities?
    Secretary White. So, yes, we have been looking at switching 
over to electric. But in the meantime, though, there are 
immediate things we have been doing such as kind of simple 
operational things like ensuring vehicles are turned off if 
they are not being used.
    Other things. We have worked very closely with the miners 
themselves to say, hey, what do you think about how we can get 
more air flow. We have changed some things like operating right 
in the middle of the drifts rather than over at the side, some 
really kind of simple operational things like that, applying 
some local ventilation to get some air movement in spaces where 
there is some dead air. So we are making improvements 
constantly. We are also really trying to see if there are ways 
we can accelerate the schedule on the new ventilation system. 
So we are very concerned about it, and like I say, we are 
working very closely with the miners themselves on this.
    Senator Heinrich. I appreciate that. I want to encourage 
you on both fronts. Obviously, the miners themselves have the 
direct day-to-day experience, and it is not an easy job and we 
want them to be working in the safest environment possible.
    I want to ask you in addition, does the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant accept non-defense transuranic waste?
    Secretary White. It does not.
    Senator Heinrich. Would it require a change in the enabling 
statute to accept non-defense waste?
    Secretary White. That is a legal question. I would imagine 
the answer is yes.
    Senator Heinrich. That is my read.
    I do understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) is developing a rule for greater than class C waste, but 
under the 1986 Low Level Waste Policy Act, the Department is 
charged with disposing of it. If this new NRC rule does become 
final, what would the Department need to do to implement this 
legislation?
    Secretary White. So what we have done to date is there was 
a requirement that we submit to Congress our report on our 
environmental impact statement, the options within that. That 
was submitted to Congress in 2017. The rule that asked us to do 
this report also said then we would await congressional action. 
So we are awaiting that action.
    The other pieces and parts that need to happen are NRC 
would need to decide first in the case of Waste Control 
Specialists (WCS), if that were a selected facility. They would 
need to decide if Texas can be the regulator or if NRC would be 
the regulator and the licenser. Then also there would need to 
be a regulatory basis and new regulations and requirements 
would need to be developed. So we are a ways down the road 
before we will have a disposal option for greater than class C.
    Senator Heinrich. So my understanding is that DOE under the 
Atomic Energy Act has the authority to reclassify nuclear waste 
as long as it removes the highly radioactive component and it 
can be safely disposed of at a low level waste level and that 
last October, you made such a proposal public. Do you know how 
that proposal, if it were to move forward, would potentially 
impact WIPP?
    Secretary White. So right now, where we are in the process 
is we put out a Federal Register notice. We gathered a large 
number of comments, I think 5,500. We are doing our due 
diligence and looking very carefully through those comments, 
seeing what they have to say to make a very deliberate decision 
on this issue.
    In terms of implementation, we have not done the necessary 
studies to determine what specific waste streams would go to 
which specific disposal routes. But should the Department make 
that decision, we would like for the whole process, both the 
States where the waste resides now and the receiving States to 
be a very transparent process, and simply following our 
existing rules around the National Environmental Policy Act, 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) is not going to be enough. So we want to 
go the extra mile because this is very important to our nation.
    Senator Heinrich. I would certainly agree with you there.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Senator King?
    Senator King. First, you used the term ``dead air.'' I 
think of dead air is what happens when a reporter asks me a 
question I do not want to answer. It is dead air.
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary White. For me, it is when a Senator asks me one.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. Good for you.
    This is more a comment than a question, but it goes to the 
costs that we were talking about.
    One of the anomalies of the federal budgetary process--one 
of the many--is that we have no capital budget. Everything is 
operations even though we are buying 40-year assets. No other 
entity on earth I think would not separate that expenditure 
from paying a park ranger, and yet that is what we do. It 
distorts the way the budget works particularly when we are 
making major capital investments, as we will be over the next 
whatever the term is for this particular modernization. But it 
goes for building buildings and everything else. I mean, I just 
make that comment that it really is I think one of the 
unacceptable ways that we budget. Hopefully, that is something 
that we can try to address because to pay for a 40-year asset 
in cash essentially over the construction period is not a good 
budget. It is not budgeting or accounting. It is not an 
accurate representation of the actual cost over the life of the 
project. So I just offer that. I could not resist under this 
circumstance.
    Thank you.
    Senator Fischer. Senator Heinrich, anything else?
    Senator Heinrich. I will save my questions for the 
questions for the record.
    Senator Fischer. I would like to thank the panel for being 
here today. We appreciate all of your information that you 
provide us. I would ask that you be available for questions, 
written questions, and get those back to us as soon as 
possible.
    With that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
           work balance between los alamos and livermore labs
    1. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, Livermore will 
be leading the work on the W80-4 cruise missile warhead and the W87-1 
Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) warhead. Meanwhile, Los 
Alamos is finishing work on the B61-12. In the future, how will you 
balance work for Los Alamos for design and engineering given Livermore 
has the bulk of the work for the next 10-15 years?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. The national laboratories have 
managed varying life extension program (LEP) workloads in the past and 
maintained their modernization skills. This is now reinforced by 
initiatives like the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and the important 
peer review work done across the nuclear security enterprise. There is 
still a significant amount of LEP work to be conducted at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, as well as future LEP requirements and other 
initiatives such as the recapitalization of a pit production 
capability. Additionally, design and engineering capabilities continue 
to be utilized at both labs as these activities are required for the 
day-to-day maintenance and minor alterations and modifications needed 
to keep the stockpile in a ready-for-deployment status.
                       nnsa strategic vision 2018
    2. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, this week the 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) released the Strategic 
Vision 2018, which is in response to the findings of the Augustine--
Mies Congressional Commission on the Governance of the Nuclear 
Enterprise. Chapter one of the report presents a clear and 
implementable vision for the organization--one that changes its 
culture. How do you intend to implement and track this Strategic Vision 
document to promote the change in culture of a mission driven 
organization?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. In association with the release of 
the Strategic Vision, NNSA also released the Governance and Management 
Framework and the Strategic Integrated Roadmap. The Governance and 
Management Framework shows how the agency will deliver its mission in a 
resilient, agile, and responsive manner. The Strategic Integrated 
Roadmap illustrates the path to achieving goals now through the next 25 
years. Collectively, the three documents set the stage for realizing 
the cultural changes necessary to ensure that NNSA continues to 
demonstrate excellence and is responsive to the nation's nuclear 
security and strategic defense needs now and into the future.
    Issuing these documents alone does not transform NNSA. Doing so 
requires leadership, training, dedication, and ongoing communication. 
NNSA will work together as one team by drawing upon common values 
across the nuclear security enterprise, building enduring and trusted 
relationships, promoting transparency, fostering a passion for and 
awareness of mission, and demonstrating a commitment to success at all 
levels. NNSA is poised to continue making essential contributions to 
U.S. and global security now and into the future.
  surplus plutonium dilute and dispose--los alamos national laboratory
    3. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, my understanding 
is that to perform the dilute and dispose operations for surplus 
plutonium in later years you intend to ship plutonium from Pantex to 
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to turn it into oxide power. 
Then, you will ship it to the Savannah River Site to be packed; and 
then, ship it again back to Carlsbad, New Mexico to be disposed of at 
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Is this truly the optimal strategy and 
have you considered alternatives that could reduce the number of 
required shipments?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has previously and will continue 
to evaluate opportunities to improve the efficiency of the dilute and 
dispose process, including optimizing transportation requirements.

    4. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, looking at your 
planned plutonium funding for fiscal years 2020 through 2024, I note 
there are increased operations for Los Alamos' plutonium facility to 
dilute and dispose of the 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium that was 
to go to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) facility, while at the same time we are 
increasing operations for pit production in PF-4. Can all of these 
tasks be done effectively in the plutonium facility? How is this work 
being coordinated?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 
is aware of the need to maintain dilute and dispose (D&D) activities 
and has incorporated D&D plans into the overall site strategy for 
plutonium that is currently under development. LANL is developing an 
integrated schedule for all Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 activities to 
balance resources among all the programs that PF-4 supports.

    5. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, is it true you 
are going to have to add another entrance into the plutonium facility 
to accommodate both dilute and dispose and pit production?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is working with Los Alamos 
National Laboratory to evaluate the investments needed to support 
increased operations at Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 to meet pit 
production requirements and other missions. With an increased 
operational tempo, there will be a need to accommodate additional staff 
in PF-4. Updated staffing analyses will inform the basis for personnel-
related infrastructure such as offices, parking, training, and entry 
control capabilities.
  nnsa's plutonium strategy and the institute for defense analysis's 
                assessment for the department of defense
    6. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, with respect to 
your recommended alternative for plutonium pit production announced in 
May 2018, I continue to have serious concern over the substantially 
higher estimated lifecycle cost of establishing a second site to 
produce 50 pits year by 2030 compared to enhancing the current 
capabilities at Los Alamos. What is the status and timeline to complete 
the conceptual design to repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication 
Facility for pit production and to approve the selected alternative and 
updated cost range, including lifecycle cost, to support CD-1?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. To achieve DOD's requirement of not 
less than 80 pits per year by 2030, NNSA's recommended alternative 
repurposes the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah 
River Site in South Carolina to produce plutonium pits while also 
producing pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico. 
Though we expect the lifecycle cost of a two-site approach to be higher 
than that of a one-site approach, the recent Institute for Defense 
Analyses (IDA) study noted that this gap in costs would be reduced when 
accounting for the cost to maintain the aging Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 
and the cost of additional LANL personnel. Additionally, the proposed 
two-site approach supports the need for resiliency, flexibility, and 
redundancy across the nuclear security enterprise for the critical 
plutonium pit production mission by not relying on a single production 
site.
    NNSA is currently executing conceptual design activities for the 
proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) to 
produce 50 pits per year, with a goal of achieving Critical Decision-1 
(CD-1) by September 30, 2020. An independent cost estimate for 
refurbishment of the proposed SRPPF will be performed prior to CD-1.

    7. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, when completed, 
will you provide the Armed Services Committees notification of the 
approval of the selected alternative and the updated cost range?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, when Critical Decision-1 is 
approved, NNSA will notify the Committees of the approval of the 
selected alternative and the updated cost range.

    8. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, it is clear that 
the key milestone in NNSA's plutonium strategy is achieving 30 pits per 
year at Los Alamos. However, the Institute for Defense Analysis's 
recent independent assessment for the Department of Defense (DOD) 
presents a rather sobering and pessimistic view of the overall 
plutonium strategy. The key findings include: none of the four options 
NNSA considered to reach 80 pits was demonstrably better; each is 
achievable but not on the schedule or budget currently forecast; and 
none of the options can provide the 80 pits per year DOD requires by 
2030. What is your assessment of the report with respect to the ability 
of any of the four options considered by the NNSA to produce 80 pits 
per year by 2030?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA realizes that production of not 
less than 80 pits per year (ppy) by 2030 is an ambitious goal, but we 
remain committed to meeting the requirement laid out in the 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) study 
based its conclusion that NNSA cannot reach the 80 ppy milestone in 
2030 with any of the proposed options on the history of recent large 
construction projects within DOE. On that comparative basis, IDA could 
find no example of a project on the same scale as pit manufacturing 
being completed in the time frame we need. It is also worth noting that 
IDA could not find an example of repurposing an existing facility as a 
comparison; their assessment was based only on large construction 
projects that involved new construction. These past projects do not 
reflect the fact that DOE has incorporated lessons learned from life 
extension programs and capital construction projects as well as 
improved program management processes to facilitate execution of 
projects on schedule and within budget.
         plutonium stored at the nevada national security site
    9. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, my understanding 
is Secretary Perry has assured the Nevada delegation the NNSA will 
begin removing the half-ton of Savannah River plutonium from Nevada by 
2021. In addition, Secretary Perry has indicated the second half-ton of 
plutonium will not be shipped from South Carolina to Nevada. Can you 
tell us in open session where this plutonium is headed?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. No, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act 
(AEA), the Department of Energy is charged with safeguarding national 
security information related to the shipment of special nuclear 
material. As the material removed from the Savannah River Site will be 
used for national security missions, details of the campaign are 
classified, in accordance with the AEA.
                molybdenum 99 from low enriched uranium
    10. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the American 
Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2012 directed NNSA to implement a 
technology-neutral program, in cooperation with non-Federal entities, 
to produce molybdenum-99 without using highly enriched uranium (HEU). 
The NNSA should take a lot of credit for working with industry to 
develop a domestic supply of the medical isotope, Mo-99, using only 
low-enriched uranium. In February, NNSA completed its evaluation of 
applications submitted in response to a funding opportunity for the 
production of Mo-99 without the use of HEU. What is the status of the 
negotiations with the four U.S. companies selected for new cooperative 
agreement awards to produce Mo-99?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Currently, NNSA is reviewing the 
proposed budgets for the four potential vendors to include a review of 
pricing and cost reasonableness; total budget cost; and an assessment 
of costs proposed, to ensure costs are allowable under Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. Concurrently, NNSA is preparing contract 
documents in anticipation of four awards.

    11. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, how soon do you 
anticipate domestic production of Mo-99 will begin?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NorthStar began domestic production 
of Mo-99 in November 2018.

    12. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, are we on track 
to eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium for radioisotope 
production in the United States and overseas?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, we are on track to eliminate the 
use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for radioisotope production. The 
first domestic producer in the United States in 30 years, NorthStar, 
began production in November 2018 with non-HEU technology. Three of 
four major global suppliers now produce with low-enriched uranium 
(LEU). The fourth, Belgium's Institute of Radioelements, plans to 
convert to 100 percent LEU by June 2022.
                      domestic uranium enrichment
    13. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, since the 
closure of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 2013, the United 
States has lacked the capability to enrich uranium using a domestic 
technology. The Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA requires unobligated 
enriched uranium to meet stockpile requirements, fuel reactors that 
produce tritium, and power the nuclear Navy. In rough terms, about how 
many years will the existing inventory of enriched uranium, including 
HEU, provide NNSA to extend the need date for unobligated low enriched 
uranium for tritium production and other purposes?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA's nearest-term need for 
unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) is to fuel tritium production 
reactors. NNSA is currently executing a campaign to down-blend highly 
enriched uranium materials from the existing uranium inventory, which 
will provide enough unobligated LEU for tritium production through 
2041.

    14. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, based on the 
present projection, in approximately what year does NNSA currently 
expect it will need to reestablish a domestic uranium enrichment 
capability?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA's ongoing down-blending campaign 
will provide low-enriched uranium (LEU) for tritium production through 
2041. NNSA is currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives to 
examine all options for meeting the enriched uranium mission need. Any 
option pursued will need to be in place in time to provide LEU by 2041.

    15. Senator Heinrich. Aministrator Gordon-Hagerty, DOE/NNSA 
requires enriched uranium, but not necessarily unobligated enriched 
uranium, to fuel research and medical isotope reactors as part of its 
nonproliferation mission. Am I correct that Urenco USA's plant, the 
nation's only operating commercial uranium enrichment facility, is a 
possible near-term option to meet DOE's need for enriched uranium fuel, 
including HALEU, for these nonproliferation activities?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA's nonproliferation requirements 
for high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) have been incorporated into 
its ongoing Domestic Uranium Enrichment Analysis of Alternatives, which 
includes Urenco USA as a potential option.
                      albuquerque complex project
    16. Senator Heinrich. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, last July NNSA 
broke ground on a new state-of-the-art office facility for its federal 
workforce in Albuquerque. I was pleased to join you at the event. The 
$175 million Albuquerque Complex Project will provide modern, safe and 
reliable workspace for the 1,200 employees who support the nation's 
vital national security mission. The building will also meet a 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design gold standard. What is 
the status of the project and the expected date NNSA staff will begin 
to occupy the new office building?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Construction of the NNSA Albuquerque 
Complex Project is well underway and remains on schedule and on budget. 
The project continues to make progress toward meeting LEED objectives 
and is on track to achieve Gold level certification. NNSA staff are 
scheduled to begin occupying the building in 2021.
                              lanl cleanup
    17. Senator Heinrich. Secretary White, I have worked with Senator 
Udall to increase funding this year for cleanup work at LANL to $220 
million, consistent with the achievable scope of work. With respect to 
the future scope of work for environmental cleanup at Los Alamos, N3B 
has developed a 5-year cost baseline at the level of $220 million per 
year, $25 million above your fiscal year 2020 request. Clearly, there 
is sufficient environmental remediation work throughout LANL to 
accelerate cleanup work above the $195 million baseline request. Do you 
have any doubt that the Office of Environmental Management (EM) can 
effectively execute a scope of work at $220 million for fiscal years 
2020 through 2024?
    Secretary White. The 2016 Consent Order establishes an effective 
structure for accomplishing and prioritizing work through risk-based 
cleanup campaigns with achievable milestones and targets. The Consent 
Order has an annual planning process to update Appendix A (Solid Waste 
Management Unit/Area of Concern List), Appendix B (Milestones and 
Targets), and Appendix C (Campaigns), as appropriate. The fiscal year 
2020 Budget will support the continued retrieval and disposition of 
legacy transuranic waste at Technical Area-54 and the deactivation and 
decommissioning of excess facilities at Technical Area-21. Moreover, 
the fiscal year 2020 budget will support the final remedy and site 
completion at remaining Solid Waste Management Units that are co-
located in the footprint of the structures and will also facilitate 
progress on the ongoing Chromium Interim Measures and Characterization 
campaign and Royal Demolition Explosives Characterization campaign.
                          air quality in wipp
    18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary White, thank you for joining me 
last month at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant to celebrate 20 years of 
operation at that important facility. One concern I've been hearing 
about is the ongoing problems with the air quality in the underground. 
Are there addition steps we can take now to improve the air quality 
until the new ventilation system is operational in late 2022? In the 
interim, to improve fire safety and reduce emissions in the 
underground, does your fiscal year 2020 budget request include funding 
to replace diesel with electric- or hybrid-powered equipment, such as 
bolters, haulers, graders, Load/Haul/Dumps, forklifts, etc.?
    Secretary White. The Carlsbad Field Office is aggressively taking a 
number of approaches at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to 
address air quality in the underground. In collaboration with our 
workforce, we have identified and implemented a number of changes to 
our processes and procedures in the underground including shutting off 
vehicles if stopped for more than a few minutes, keeping running 
vehicles in the middle of drifts where air flows are higher, and 
routing exhaust to unoccupied spaces (this is done with bolters that 
sit stationary while installing bolts). Also, we are installing 
supplemental localized ventilation in low flow areas, such as dead legs 
to keep the airflow moving.
    Plans are underway to upgrade the entire underground fleet with low 
and no emission vehicles. WIPP has already ordered its first electric 
powered vehicle and is working to have it in service this summer.
                       columbia life of core fuel
    19. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, what is the status of the 
life of core fuel you are producing for the Columbia-class submarine 
and do you expect any issues when moving it into production for the 
fleet?
    Admiral Caldwell. Naval Reactors is supporting construction of the 
first Columbia-class submarine by developing a reactor plant with a 
life-of-ship core that will be in service for more than 40 years.
    In support of this effort, the types of core materials that will be 
used in the Columbia-class reactor core were also used in the 
Technology Demonstration Core being delivered this summer to refuel the 
Naval Reactors' land-based prototype at our facility in New York. We 
have completed manufacturing of the alternate core material to refuel 
this prototype. This effort proved the ability to manufacture alternate 
core material on a production scale and identified means to improve 
manufacturability and performance of the Columbia-class core.
    Earlier this year, Naval Reactors placed the reactor plant long-
lead procurement contract with Navy funding (Shipbuilding and 
Conversion, Navy), including the reactor core, to support the 
shipyard's build plan. The contract was placed on time, following 
design efforts that began in 2010, and we expect to remain on schedule 
and on budget in support of Columbia-class construction beginning in 
fiscal year 2021 with delivery in fiscal year 2028.
                       low enriched uranium fuel
    20. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, some have advocated using 
Low Enriched Uranium fuel similar to the French for their submarines. 
What are the issues, here in open session, from a technical and cost 
perspective?
    Admiral Caldwell. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has a 
history of using highly enriched uranium in naval cores. This 
technology has enabled the program to develop reactor cores that are 
capable of lasting the entire life of a submarine. The effect of this 
capability can be seen in the ability to replace 14 Ohio-class 
submarines with 12 Columbia-class submarines by forgoing a mid-life 
reactor refueling. This results in substantial savings over the life of 
the class in terms of acquisition, maintenance, and operational costs.
    Today, nearly 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants are nuclear 
powered, including 11 aircraft carriers and 69 submarines. The U.S Navy 
mission has a global reach with a high operating tempo and energy 
requirements. The French operate far fewer nuclear-powered ships. Their 
nuclear fleet is less than one-seventh the size of the U.S. nuclear-
powered fleet. The French nuclear-powered ships are typically refueled 
every seven to ten years. Transitioning the U.S. Fleet to low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) fuel would result similarly in approximately two to three 
refuelings over the life of a ship, deviating from our current life-of-
ship submarine core designs. Based on fleet size, the costs would be 
significantly greater for the U.S. Navy to maintain an LEU fleet.
    Furthermore, an LEU fuel system would not provide any military 
benefit to the performance of U.S. naval reactors. LEU fuel would 
fundamentally decrease the available energy in a naval reactor at a 
time that energy demands are expected to increase and would negatively 
affect reactor endurance, reactor size, ship costs, ship availability, 
force structure, and maintenance infrastructure.
                        idaho spent fuel project
    21. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, what is the cost and 
completion status of the spent fuel pond facility at the Idaho National 
Laboratory? Are there any issues you are worried about?
    Admiral Caldwell. The Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project 
will design and construct a new facility, the Naval Spent Fuel Handling 
Facility, to incorporate the capabilities for naval spent nuclear fuel 
handling that currently exist in the Expended Core Facility (ECF) and 
its supporting facilities. Additionally, a major portion of this new 
facility is required to support additional capability, which does not 
exist in the ECF, to handle full-length aircraft carrier naval spent 
nuclear fuel received in M-290 shipping containers.
    I approved the Performance Baseline and Start of Construction 
(Critical Decision-2/3) in September 2018. The project has an estimated 
total project cost of approximately $1.687 billion with completion in 
fiscal year 2025, of which, $40 million was included to account for 
potential increases in market-based conditions, such as unanticipated 
increases in labor costs and domestic steel prices. Naval Reactors 
continues to closely monitor and evaluate the volatility in labor costs 
and material prices as well as other issues typical for a construction 
project of this size in Idaho (e.g., winter related impacts).
    The project is completing site preparation, has begun the mass 
geotechnical excavation, and will begin permanent construction 
activities this fiscal year.
    spent fuel examination facility at the idaho national laboratory
    22. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, my understanding is the 
spent fuel facility you are building at the Idaho National Laboratory 
will not have a capability to examine the fuel. What are you doing 
about this and how much might it cost?
    Admiral Caldwell. The capability to examine naval spent nuclear 
fuel from refueled or defueled warships is vital to Naval Reactors' 
mission of delivering reliable and effective nuclear propulsion plants. 
It enables resolution of emergent fleet issues, confirmation of 
continued safe and reliable operation in the fleet, design and 
manufacture of longer-life and higher-powered cores, and demonstration 
of performance of new fuel technologies. This capability is currently 
provided by the Expended Core Facility (ECF) located at the Naval 
Reactors Facility in Idaho. ECF is more than 60 years old and requires 
recapitalization.
    Naval Reactors is taking a phased approach to recapitalizing the 
capabilities of the ECF that supports all Naval Reactors Program 
requirements, keeping recapitalization projects to a manageable scope 
and size, and considering affordability. The first step will be 
recapitalizing spent fuel handling operations to the new Naval Spent 
Fuel Handling Facility (NSFHF), which will be completed by the Spent 
Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project in fiscal year 2025. Although 
some types of spent fuel examinations will be able to be accomplished 
in the NSFHF water pools, other types of spent fuel examinations must 
be performed in a dry environment (i.e., hot cells).
    The Naval Examination Acquisition Project will recapitalize the 
spent fuel examination capabilities currently provided by the ECF hot 
cells. The project was initiated with Critical Decision-0, Mission Need 
Statement, in January 2018, and is planned to begin preliminary design 
in fiscal year 2023. The project is targeted to complete as early as 
the mid-2030s with a cost between $500 million and $1.3 billion.
                             electric drive
    23. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Caldwell, my understanding is you are 
building an electric drive propulsion system for the Columbia-class 
submarine and the contractor has had issues building it. What is the 
status of this project?
    Admiral Caldwell. In 2017, the vendor manufacturing the prototype 
Main Propulsion Motor for the electric drive system identified a 
manufacturing issue related to the procurement of improperly insulated 
material for the prototype motor stator. The vendor did not properly 
relay requirements to sub-tier vendors. This required remanufacturing a 
major portion of the prototype motor. The remanufactured prototype 
motor has since been delivered to the motor assembly facility where the 
vendor is completing final assembly and component testing. The vendor 
is under a firm fixed price contract and therefore is absorbing the 
costs associated with these actions.
    In order to de-risk the lead ship motor assembly manufacturing 
process, the vendor built a full-scale mock-up motor at its motor 
assembly facility to prove out the final assembly process and special 
tooling. Additionally, we installed an alternate motor at the test 
facility and have started system level integration testing to ensure 
the prototype system (controllers and drives) perform and communicate 
as expected. By implementing these mitigation actions, we have been 
able to preserve the required nine-month margin for the required in-
yard date for construction of the ship. As such, delivery of the 
production motor to the shipyard for construction of the lead ship will 
remain on schedule to support construction beginning in fiscal year 
2021.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                     ``low-yield'' nuclear weapons
    24. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, my understanding 
is that the First Production Unit of the W76-2 was completed in 
February 2019, and that the NNSA is currently on a path toward 
completing the W76-2 Initial Operational Capability warhead quantity 
and delivering the units to the Navy by the end of Fiscal Year 2019. 
According to your written testimony for the May 8, 2019, Strategic 
Forces Subcommittee hearing, the W76-2 ``provid[es] the U.S. an assured 
ability to respond in kind to a low-yield nuclear attack [and] 
discourages an adversary from pursuing such an attack and therefore 
strengthens deterrence.'' If funding for further work on the W76-2 were 
canceled in fiscal year 2020, would the United States have no other 
viable capabilities to deter a low-yield nuclear attack?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Cancelling NNSA funding for the W76-2 
in fiscal year 2020 would not prevent NNSA from completing 100 percent 
of the production required for the W76-2 warheads, as all production is 
scheduled to complete in fiscal year 2019. Fiscal year 2020 funding for 
the W76-2 is exclusively allocated to the administrative tasks 
associated with completing the program. The Department of Energy defers 
to the lead agency, the Department of Defense, on further details 
related to military capabilities and calculus.
              saudi civilian nuclear cooperation agreement
    25. Senator Warren. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, do you or any 
other NNSA official have current or prior involvement in Trump 
Administration efforts to negotiate a civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954? If yes, 
please explain the nature of that involvement.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, pursuant to Section 123 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Department of Energy 
provides technical support to the Department of State in the 
negotiation of all peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. The Office 
of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation within NNSA provides this function 
for the Secretary of Energy. NNSA has provided such technical support 
to the negotiations since 2012, when the previous Administration 
commenced with such negotiations.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
              environmental liability contract management
    26. Senator Manchin. Secretary White, federal accounting standards 
require agencies responsible for cleaning up any contaminated site to 
estimate their financial responsibility for doing so. As of fiscal year 
2018, the Office of Environmental Management's liability was recorded 
as $377 billion. This number is worrisome as the liability growth has 
outpaced cleaning spending from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2018, 
in large part due to contract and project management problems. During 
fiscal year 2018 alone, the Department managed 14,455 contracts and 
subcontracts valued at more than $25 billion and $375 million 
respectively. The DOE Inspector General has identified numerous issues 
to include lagging schedules, fraud, waste, and abuse specifically 
linked to weaknesses in project management and oversight. What actions 
are you and the Department taking to address the issues cited by the 
Inspector General to improve management practices and oversight to 
ultimately improve efficiency and reduce costs?
    Secretary White. EM has several initiatives in place to improve 
oversight and respond to the Inspector General's concerns. For example, 
EM is transitioning to an end state contracting (ESC) model on all 
major contracts. These contracts will focus on objective ``end states'' 
that reflect EM's goals of accelerated closure, lower financial 
liability, and lower risk. They are cost-plus-incentive fee indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity contracts with task orders that have 
shorter durations, more discrete scopes of work, and more accurate cost 
and schedule targets. EM is also aligning Performance Evaluation 
Measurement Plans for existing cost-plus-award-fee contracts with EM 
goals and ESC principles, and using a fee advisory determination board 
led by EM headquarters to share best practices and verify consistency 
in determination of award fees across the EM complex.
    EM is committed to effectively resolving the issues and challenges 
identified by the Inspector General and to uphold the Department's 
commitment to cleanup.
           environmental liability and technology development
    27. Senator Manchin. Secretary White, according to the Government 
Accountability Office, Department of Energy staff and management are 
aware of the increasing federal liability associated with defense 
nuclear waste cleanup. DOE staff noted that the change in liability 
over the past 8 years is a multifaceted problem due to the complex 
cleanup work and also the range of technologies that are available for 
remediation. The National Academy of Sciences produced a report this 
year that recommends that DOE change how it manages science and 
technology development in order to speed up remediation efforts and 
reduce cost. In the early 2000s, the environmental technology budget 
for the Department was around $200 million, but now is only around $25 
million. Do you believe the current budget for technology development 
is sufficient to meet the challenges that have been raised by the 
National Academy of Sciences and Department employees?
    Secretary White. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) has 
been very successful with its cleanup program to date, reducing the 
number of sites to be addressed from 107 to 16. The Technology 
Development program works with the sites, National Laboratories, and 
site contractors to address the remaining challenges. As the cleanup 
program has matured, the focus of technology development has shifted to 
solve site-specific technology issues. Although the EM Headquarter 
technology development budget has been reduced to $25 million, the 
sites are also investing in technology development. For example, Oak 
Ridge funds $3 million for mercury research related to a site-specific 
contamination issue, and the Office of River Protection has requested 
$10 million in the fiscal year 2020 Budget to fund a test bed 
initiative for demonstrating grouting and disposal of low-level waste. 
EM has developed a number of tools for clean-up since the organization 
was established in 1989. We are also looking at technologies and 
innovative approaches from other industries, such as the mining and oil 
industries, where we can adapt an existing technology or approach to 
address DOE's challenges.
                   y-12 facility upgrades and impact
    28. Senator Manchin. Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, on April 6 of 
this year you gave testimony to the House Energy and Water Development 
Subcommittee that pieces of the roof were falling in at the old Lithium 
Processing facility locate at Y-12 to highlight the need for repairs 
and modernization. This followed a chemical spill on April 4 reported 
at the facility. Although both incidents are considered minor and did 
not affect the overall safety of the operations there, they raise 
concerns of the condition and long-term sustainability of operations 
under current conditions. As a part of your budget there are funds 
going to continuing projects to build new Uranium and Lithium 
processing facilities. Given the recent issues and your understanding 
of the state of facilities and operations at Y-12, are the current 
timelines for construction and upgrade of weapons going to meet the 
timeline goals of the Uranium Processing facility completion in 2025 
and warhead upgrades by 2030?
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is committed to constructing the 
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) for no more than $6.5 billion by the 
end of 2025. UPF has been on budget and on schedule for six consecutive 
years. The UPF nuclear facilities were baselined in March 2018 and 
construction is underway. UPF supports NNSA's enduring uranium mission 
and its commitment to modernize its infrastructure.
    NNSA management practices ensure that we follow integrated 
schedules to align our strategic materials work with our warhead 
modernization activities. The W87-1 Modification Program, which has a 
scheduled First Production Unit date of fiscal year 2030, remains on 
budget and on schedule. As part of NNSA's overall strategy, NNSA 
continues to maintain existing facilities until such a time when 
operations can move into the new facilities.

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