[Senate Hearing 116-508, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1790
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 1
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
ARMY POSTURE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
AIR FORCE POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
----------
FEBRUARY 5, 7, 12, 14, 26; MARCH 5, 14, 26, 28; APRIL 4, 9, 2019
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 1
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND b U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND b U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA b U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND b U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND b U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND b DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE b
ARMY POSTURE b DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
b AIR FORCE POSTURE b NAVY POSTURE
S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1790
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR
SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 1
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
ARMY POSTURE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
AIR FORCE POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
----------
FEBRUARY 5, 7, 12, 14, 26; MARCH 5, 14, 26, 28; APRIL 4, 9, 2019
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-152 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri DOUG JONES, Alabama
John Bonsell, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
February 5, 2019
Page
United States Central Command.................................... 1
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 1
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 2
Witness Statements
Votel, General Joseph L., USA, Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 8
Questions for the Record......................................... 66
February 7, 2019
United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command.. 71
Members Statements
Statement of Senator Mike Rounds................................. 71
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 72
Witness Statements
Waldhauser, General Thomas D., USMC, Commander, United States 73
Africa Command.
Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN, Commander, United States Southern
Command........................................................ 89
Questions for the Record......................................... 145
February 12, 2019
United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea 165
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 165
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 166
Witness Statements
Davidson, Admiral Philip S., USN, Commander, United States Indo- 168
Pacific Command.
Abrams, General Robert B., USA Commander, United Nations Command/ 188
Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea.
Questions for the Record......................................... 230
(iii)
February 14, 2019
Page
United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber 243
Command.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 243
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 244
Witness Statements
West, The Honorable Owen O., Assistant Secretary of Defense, 246
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
Thomas, General Raymond A., III, USA, Commander, United States 250
Special Operations Command.
Nakasone, General Paul M., USA, Commander, United States Cyber 256
Command; Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central
Security Service.
Questions for the Record......................................... 293
February 26, 2019
United States Strategic Command and United States Northern
Command........................................................ 309
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 309
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 310
Witness Statements
Hyten, General John E., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 312
O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United 327
States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 378
March 5, 2019
United States European Command and United States Transportation 403
Command.
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 403
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 404
Witness Statements
Scaparrotti, General Curtis M., USA, Commander, United States 406
European Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme
Allied Commander Europe.
Lyons, General Stephen R., USA, Commander, United States 415
Transportation Command.
Questions for the Record......................................... 453
(iv)
March 14, 2019
Page
Budget Posture................................................... 473
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 473
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 474
Witness Statements
Shanahan, The Honorable Patrick M., Acting Secretary of Defense; 476
Accompanied by The Honorable David L. Norquist, Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller).
Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint 490
Chiefs of Staff.
Questions for the Record......................................... 538
Appendix A....................................................... 560
March 26, 2019
Army Posture..................................................... 581
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 581
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 582
Witness Statements
Esper, The Honorable Mark T., Secretary of the Army.............. 587
Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 590
Questions for the Record......................................... 639
March 28, 2019
The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Programs........ 653
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 653
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 656
Witness Statements
Perry, The Honorable J. Richard, Secretary of Energy............. 658
Gordon-Hagerty, The Honorable Lisa E., Under Secretary of Energy
for
Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security 667
Administration.
Questions for the Record......................................... 688
(v)
April 4, 2019
Page
Air Force Posture................................................ 705
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 705
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 706
Witness Statements
Wilson, The Honorable Heather A., Secretary of the Air Force..... 708
Goldfein, General David L., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force 709
Questions for the Record......................................... 759
Appendix A....................................................... 776
April 9, 2019
Navy Posture..................................................... 779
Members Statements
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe............................. 779
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 782
Witness Statements
Spencer, The Honorable Richard V., Secretary of the Navy......... 783
Richardson, Admiral John M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations...... 787
Neller, General Robert B., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.. 800
Questions for the Record......................................... 846
(vi)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally,
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Good morning.
The Committee today will receive testimony from the United
States Central Command (CENTCOM).
I would like to welcome our witness, General Joseph Votel,
Commander of the United States Central Command. Welcome.
General Votel will hand over the Central Command at the end
of March, and I want to thank him for his outstanding service
to our country over his 38-year career. General, you have had a
tough job at CENTCOM, and with the rise of ISIS [the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria] and the spread of Iran's proxies and
the return of Russia to the Middle East, you and the President
have grappled with some of the very hard decisions. Thank you
for all you have done to keep America safe.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to
ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS), which identifies competition with China and
Russia as, quote, the central challenge to the United States'
prosperity and security. Clearly, we do not want to be the
world's policeman, but without any United States presence, our
strategic competitors will rush to fill the void. We have seen
this repeatedly in the Middle East. When we step away from
partners, Russia steps in. When our military pulls back, Russia
pulls forward. When we do not enforce our redlines, Russia
tries to create its own.
The NDS also makes countering terrorist threats a top
priority. Part of this strategy has been achieved. The ISIS
caliphate has been defeated, but ISIS and al Qaeda are still
active in the region and threaten our Homeland.
Both priorities, competing with Russia and countering
terrorists, are at stake in Syria. As we draw down in Syria, we
must continue to support our partners and friends. I am also
interested in how we are going to prevent ISIS resurging. It is
one thing to come out, but then, of course, to stop them from
coming back up. We believe that is going to happen, and the
right person is here to explain that to us. We welcome you
General Votel.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Votel, welcome back, which will likely be your last
hearing before the Committee. Let me thank you for 39 years of
exemplary service to the Nation. We owe you and your family an
incredible debt of gratitude for the contributions you have
made to our national security throughout your career, but
especially during your leadership of the Joint Special
Operations Command, the Special Operations Command, and now
Central Command. We sincerely thank you, General.
The focus of the National Defense Strategy is, rightly, a
return to great power competition and a more resource
sustainable approach to counterterrorism. However, this has led
to some uncertainty about the United States Military's
continued role in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. As we
consider this question, it is important that we remain clear-
eyed about the continued threat to the Homeland posed by ISIS,
al Qaeda, and other extremist groups; the malign behavior of
Iran; and the objectives of Russia and China in the region.
Each of these issues are relevant to current discussions
about our military presence in Afghanistan and Syria. In
addition to a complicated military situation, resolutions to
broader stabilization, diplomatic, and political challenges
have been far more difficult to come by.
Bringing our troops home should always be our objective,
but it must be done in a deliberate and well-thought-out manner
in concert with our partners and allies. In the case of Syrian
withdrawal, contradictory statements by the President, his
National Security Advisor, and other administration officials
have only served to underscore that this decision was anything
but thoughtful and deliberate. If public reports are accurate,
the President may be about to make similar quick decisions with
respect to Afghanistan.
The conflict in Afghanistan has occurred at great cost in
terms of both lives and resources. However, in considering the
prospect of conflict termination, we must also weigh the cost
of getting it wrong. ISIS, al Qaeda, and an estimated 18 other
terrorist groups are still present in the region, and some
within the intelligence community assess that external plotting
would surge upon our withdrawal.
We must also consider our allies and partners that have
fought alongside us. As former Secretary Mattis said, ``our
strength as a Nation is inexorably linked to the strength of
our unique and comprehensive system of alliances and
partnerships.'' The allies and partners who joined us after 9/
11 and have sacrificed with us in Afghanistan deserve to be
included in conversations with respect to the future of the
conflict.
Regarding the decision in Syria, the President's statement
that ISIS is defeated may be premature. According to the
intelligence community assessment released last week, ISIS in
their words, ``very likely will continue to pursue external
attacks from Iraq and Syria against regional and Western
adversaries, including the United States.'' General McKenzie
made a similar point in December when he said ``ISIS probably
still is more capable than al Qaeda in Iraq at its peak,
suggesting it is well positioned to reemerge if pressure on the
group is relieved.''
The security and stability of key partners in the region,
most notably, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan, is bolstered by our
continued presence. While our deployed forces do not have a
military mission to counter Iran, I agree with our military
leaders that there is a derivative benefit associated with
their presence and the reassurance it provides. We should not
take these partners for granted. If we were to withdraw
precipitously from the region, we would risk the reemergence of
ISIS, squandering gains made in Iraq, destabilizing Jordan and
increasing the pressure on King Abdullah, and allowing Iran and
its proxies to become further entrenched, thereby posing a
greater threat to Israel.
No one, myself included, is in favor of endless wars or
indefinite deployments of United States troops to dangerous
parts of the world. Far too often, we view the use of the
United States Military as the solution to every problem. I
share the frustration of Americans that we have, thus far, been
unable to fully achieve our foreign policy objectives in
Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere.
However, just as decisions to employ the U.S. Military must
be given great consideration, so too must decisions to
disengage military, with particular attention paid to the
second and third order effects such a decision will have on our
security and foreign policy interests. I do not think
sufficient consideration has been given to these issues to
date.
General Votel, we look forward to hearing your views on
these and other issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Now that a quorum is present, I would ask the Committee to
consider and approve a Senate resolution authorizing funding
for our Committee from March 1st through February 28th. The
funding resolution is completely consistent with the minority
and majority leader in the January 9th agreement.
Senator Reed. So moved.
Senator Wicker. Second.
Chairman Inhofe. I would entertain a motion. Is there a
motion?
Senator Reed. So moved, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker. Second.
Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no?
[No response.]
Chairman Inhofe. The ayes have it.
[The Senate resolution approved by the Committee follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
All right. General Votel, you are recognized for your
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General Votel. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning and thank
you for the opportunity to appear before the Senate Armed
Services Committee today. I come before you representing the
over 80,000 men and women working tirelessly across the Central
Command area of responsibility. They represent the very best of
our Nation, and I am proud to stand among them as their
commander. All of these great Americans have families in
communities across our country that support their
servicemembers from near and far, and we are equally proud and
appreciative of their service and sacrifice.
I am honored to be joined today by the CENTCOM senior
enlisted leader, United States Army Command Sergeant Major Bill
Thetford. Command Sergeant Major Thetford has been with me my
entire tour at CENTCOM and for the 5 years we served together
in other commands before that. He is the most experienced
soldier in our outfit, and his support and steady leadership
helped us navigate very treacherous waters over the years. He
is representative of the people we have across this command
and, indeed, throughout the Armed Forces of our Nation. Command
Sergeant Major Thetford and his wife Allie will retire after 38
years of service later this spring, and our Nation owes them an
incredible debt of gratitude. We could not have been served
better.
There is no other region in the world as dynamic, hopeful,
challenging, and dangerous as the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, made up of the areas we typically refer to as
the Levant, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. It is
an area of great contrast and contradiction. It is an area rich
in history, culture, and resources, but also an area pulsing
with sectarianism, violence, poor governance, corruption,
disenfranchisement, profound human suffering, and economic
disparity. It is also an area where we retain vital interests,
preventing the tax on our Homeland, countering malign and
destabilizing influence, containing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring freedom of navigation
and commerce through critical international waterways. It is
worth noting that four of the five major competitors or threats
identified in the National Defense Strategy, China, Russia,
Iran, and violent extremist organizations, reside or are
contested in the CENTCOM area of responsibility every day.
In the final 2 weeks of 2018, CENTCOM supported the UN
[United Nations] Special Envoy in the establishment of a
nascent ceasefire in Yemen, enabled the efforts of the United
States Special Representative for Afghanistan, Reconciliation,
began planning for the orderly and professional withdrawal
under pressure of United States Forces in Syria, while
maintaining our coalition efforts to support the Government of
Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces in addressing the remnants
of ISIS in that country. We monitored and mitigated the
unprofessional acts of Iranian naval forces in international
waters and observed the professional mature actions of the
United States-advised Lebanese armed forces as they maintained
stability along the border with Israel. Those 2 weeks were not
an aberration for the command. They were business as usual, as
they have been in CENTCOM nearly every day since its inception
in the early 1980s.
Today in Afghanistan, the conditions-based South Asia
Strategy is working, and we continue to use military ways and
means to advance our end state of reconciliation. We recognize
this conflict will not be resolved solely by military force,
but our military pressure serves as an enabler to a whole-of-
government process and more directly supports diplomatic
efforts led by Ambassador Khalilzad. While these efforts have
had recent promise, our mission has not changed. We will
continue our military pressure in support of our national
objectives until they are met.
In Syria and Iraq, the unrelenting work of the 79-member
Defeat ISIS coalition, the determination and bravery of our
Iraqi Security Force and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF)
partners, and the support of multiple international government
organizations has largely liberated the so-called physical
caliphate of ISIS. An area of 34,000 square miles of territory
which they once controlled is now reduced to an area less than
20 square miles. The successful partnership with the Syrian
Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces was
instrumental in these gains against ISIS.
But it is important to understand that even though this
territory has been reclaimed, the fight against ISIS and
violent extremists is not over, and our mission has not
changed. The coalition's hard-won battlefield gains can only be
secured by maintaining a vigilant offensive against the now
largely dispersed and disaggregated ISIS that retains leaders,
fighters, facilitators, resources, and the profane ideology
that fuels their efforts.
As the Defeat ISIS campaign in Syria transitions from
liberating territory to enabling local security and addressing
the ISIS clandestine insurgency, United States ground forces
will depart Syria in a deliberate and coordinated manner while
we concurrently consult with allies and partners to implement
stabilization efforts. These details are being developed now
and will ensure campaign continuity and capitalize on the
contributions of the international community to prevent a
resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Today in Yemen, a fragile ceasefire in the Port of
Houdeidah is a promising, albeit challenging-to-implement step
demonstrating the willingness by both sides to negotiate, and
which will, hopefully, allow the United Nations to expand
efforts to end this humanitarian disaster. Towards this end,
CENTCOM supports the international diplomatic efforts and the
work of the UN Special Envoy to facilitate the peace process by
providing advice and assistance and serving as an interlocutor
through our trusted relationships in the region to help ensure
transparency, cohesion, and positive momentum. We also remain
steadfast in reminding the Saudi-led coalition partners of
their obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict and ensuring
that the fight in Yemen does not spread across the region
sowing more instability and threatening critical infrastructure
and United States lives and interests.
It is in the Central Region today and every day: great
promise and opportunity mixed with contradiction and conflict.
Let me conclude my remarks where I started with our people
and their families. In an era of great change when we
consistently ask our people to do more with less, the service
and sacrifice of these men and women and their families in
support of our Nation is both humbling and inspirational. For
over 17 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
guardsmen, and civilians have answered the call with an
unwavering commitment and devotion matched only by the families
who support them. We could not have accomplished what we do
without all of them, and they deserve the very best
capabilities and support we can provide from weapons and
communication systems to health care and housing. I ask for
continued strong support from Congress and from the American
people to provide our service men and women everything they
need to accomplish their vital missions and lead healthy,
fulfilling lives in continued service to our Nation.
Thank you again for allowing me to represent the men and
women of CENTCOM before you today. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Votel follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Joseph L. Votel
introduction
As 2018 came to a close, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was engaged
in critical events and catalysts for change across its area of
responsibility (AOR). In the final two weeks of December, CENTCOM
supported the UN Special Envoy in the establishment of a fragile cease-
fire in Yemen, and enabled the efforts of the United States Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation through military pressure
on the Taliban. We began planning for the safe, professional withdrawal
under pressure of United States Forces from Syria, while maintaining
our Defeat-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) efforts and
accounting for the formation of a new governmental cabinet in Iraq. We
monitored and mitigated the unprofessional acts of Iranian naval forces
in international waters that threaten the global commons; which stood
in stark contrast to the professional, mature actions of the United
States-advised Lebanese Armed Forces as it de-escalated tensions along
the border with Israel. While these events appear unconnected, they
represent the swirling dynamics of the AOR--each event marking a
pivotal point with the potential to impact the stability of the entire
region.
Since 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, CENTCOM has been charged with
the responsibility of commanding multiple, often simultaneous combat
missions in the Central Region. During that time, confronting terrorism
and defeating violent extremist groups was the primary objective of
U.S. national military power. Seventeen years later, CENTCOM is still
the only geographic combatant command conducting multiple, active
combat operations, but the strategic imperatives of a changing world
have compelled us to rethink our priorities and assess our readiness
for new challenges.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly recognized a
return to competition between the great powers that now poses a greater
long-term challenge to our Nation than the violence of terrorism. We
also noted that the National Security Strategy (NSS) directs that ``The
United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding
ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to
the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy
market,'' and that ``We will retain the necessary American military
presence in the region to protect the United States and our allies from
terrorist attacks and preserve a favorable regional balance of power.''
We at CENTCOM understand how global disorder has created a security
environment more complex and volatile than we have faced in our
Nation's history. This assessment demands a clear-eyed appraisal of the
threats, an acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and
an understanding that challenges to our national interests will largely
be transregional versus regional.
We approach our evolving role at CENTCOM with both humility and
agility, acknowledging the priorities outlined in the NSS and NDS, and
the fact that we will not be the main effort of our Nation's scarce
resources in perpetuity. We must, therefore, posture ourselves as both
the supported and supporting effort toward securing our national
interests--many of which are still heavily impacted by activities in
the CENTCOM AOR. While CENTCOM has been the primary focus of military
assets for nearly two decades, we recognize maintaining an agile
posture in the Central Region doesn't necessarily require large
concentrations of military personnel and equipment. Our strategic
strength has never rested solely on the volume of materiel we bring to
the fight, but rather on the partnerships, alliances and whole-of-
government efforts no other country in the world could recreate.
Looking forward, our challenge will be to secure our hard-fought
gains, and those of our allies and partners, while posturing for
continuing change in the Central Region. We must be ready to compete
with China, Russia, and Iran as they challenge us for regional
influence and threaten our vital national interests. We must continue
disrupting violent extremist organizations and preventing the
acquisition or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction so they
cannot be used against the U.S. or our allies. Regardless of the
challenge or level of resources, CENTCOM is committed to defending the
national interests of the U.S., and those of its partners and allies.
operating environment
Resolute Support (RS). Our current military efforts in Afghanistan
in support of the South Asia Strategy are conditions-based and focused
on two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through
Operation Freedom's Sentinel, United States Forces conduct counter-
terror missions against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-
Khorasan (ISIS-K), and associated groups to prevent their resurgence
and ability to plan and execute external attacks. Second, in
partnership with NATO allies and operational partner Nations in the
Resolute Support Mission, United States Forces advise and assist the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight
against the Taliban. The ANDSF have demonstrated exceptional resilience
through a difficult and sustained fight.
The conditions-based South Asia Strategy is working. We continue to
use military ways and means to achieve our end state of reconciliation,
recognizing this conflict will not be resolved solely by military
force. Our military and enabling missions in Afghanistan are designed
to set conditions that will convince the Taliban to negotiate for a
lasting peace, and allow Afghans to own the political and diplomatic
solutions that will eventually bring an end to the conflict.
Consistent, offensive military pressure helped bring about the first
cease fires--local and national--between the Taliban and Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in 17 years, illustrating
the Afghan people's weariness of war, and representing our first real
opportunity for peace and reconciliation since the war began. While the
Taliban continue to demonstrate the capability to mount spectacular
attacks and inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the 2018
fighting season confirmed that the Taliban cannot win militarily. We
recognize it will take a combination of sustained military pressure and
diplomacy to bring an end to the hostilities. Our military pressure
serves as an enabler to a whole-of-government process, and supports
diplomatic efforts led by United States Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The unrelenting work of the 74-
nation D-ISIS Coalition, determination and bravery of our Iraqi
Security Force (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) partners, and
support of multiple international governmental organizations has pushed
the physical caliphate of ISIS to the verge of collapse. As a result,
we are adjusting our military posture in Syria, planning and executing
a deliberate, safe, and professional withdrawal of personnel and
equipment while preserving sufficient power in the region to ensure
that we can continue to destroy remnants of ISIS fighters and ensure it
does not return. In Iraq, we work with the ISF to consolidate their
gains, improve their security capability and help them evolve into the
professional and representative force that the Iraqi people deserve.
We are grateful for the partnership of the SDF throughout our D-
ISIS mission. A reliable partner since 2014, the SDF suffered tens of
thousands of killed and wounded, and its leadership, sacrifice, and
determination to drive ISIS from SDF homelands was instrumental in the
liberation of the vast majority of ISIS' so-called physical caliphate.
Of paramount importance now, the Coalition's hard-won battlefield gains
must be secured by continued interagency efforts and mobilizing the
international community to prevent a return of the conditions that
allowed ISIS to arise.
Yemen. Conflict between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Republic of
Yemen Government (ROYG) forces, supported by the Saudi-led Coalition
(SLC), led to deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen. The UN
noted in August 2018 that the Houthis--trained, funded and armed in
part by Iran--exacerbated the crisis by restricting food and aid access
to civilian populations by controlling or threatening transportation
and logistical routes to the city of Ta'izz, and the Ports of Aden and
Hudaydah. The impact of conflict on the country and its people is
catastrophic, despite best efforts by our own U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and other UN agencies and
international aid organizations to mitigate humanitarian suffering. UN-
brokered consultations in Sweden in December 2018, and the resulting
agreement on a prisoner exchange, ceasefire and redeployment of forces
in the city and port of Hudaydah, and humanitarian access to Taiz
demonstrated promising steps and a willingness on both sides to seek a
negotiated settlement. Toward this end, CENTCOM supports the
international diplomatic efforts and the work of UN Special Envoy
(UNSE) Martin Griffiths to facilitate an end to the conflict, providing
knowledge, advice, and serving as an interlocutor through our trusted
relationships in the region to help ensure transparency, cohesion, and
positive momentum. We will continue to support our regional partners
developing processes and procedures to counter ballistic missiles (CBM)
and counter unmanned armed aerial systems (C-UAS) to help mitigate
threats to civilian populations and critical infrastructure.
Iran exerts its malign influence throughout the region, through its
increased--often unprofessional--activities in the Arabian Gulf and
Strait of Hormuz, engaging in proxy warfare through its sponsorship of
violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and proliferating advanced
conventional weapons, including theater ballistic missiles and
weaponized unmanned aerial and maritime systems. Operating in the gray
zone of competition below open conflict, Iran conducts unfettered
information and cyber campaigns against its adversaries and actively
attempts to influence or obstruct the mechanisms of effective
governance and domestic policies of several of its sovereign regional
neighbors.
Prolonged conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan have
produced instability and large-scale humanitarian crises within and
beyond the CENTCOM AOR, creating millions of displaced persons,
stressing fragile economies, opening space for the spread of extremism
among disenfranchised peoples, and providing opportunities for
adversaries to cultivate influence. Countering instability requires an
alliance-based and whole-of-government approach that CENTCOM is
uniquely positioned to support. The Department of State, USAID and
CENTCOM are partnering to counter the influence of competitors and
malign actors by addressing the drivers of instability and creating the
economic, political, and security conditions required to reverse these
trends. To alleviate suffering, CENTCOM, in partnership with USAID,
provides targeted foreign humanitarian assistance to internally
displaced persons using our Overseas Disaster, Humanitarian, and Civic
Aid appropriated funds. Stabilization and humanitarian assistance
activities provide a significant tool to reduce human suffering,
promote stability, sustain fragile governmental institutions, and
provide critical support countering our competitors' gray zone
activities.
While we maintain a strong, cooperative presence with our regional
partners in the traditional warfighting domains, there is room for
improvement in cooperative ventures with our regional partners in the
information and cyber domains. Our competitors do not play by the same
rules as the U.S. They have developed and employed asymmetric
strategies to use in the information and cyber environment to weaken
the U.S. to achieve their strategic objectives. The unconstrained and
unregulated nature of their capabilities puts the United States at a
disadvantage, while great power competitors like China and Russia, as
well as adversarial regimes like Iran, operationalize these
strategies--including information theft, media manipulation, and cyber-
attack--to strike vulnerable United States assets, disrupt our
information systems and those of our allies, and undermine the image of
the U.S. in the region and around the world.
Our CENTCOM Partner Network, a secure coalition computer network,
improves our capability to exchange crucial cyberspace threat
intelligence and operational data with coalition and regional partners.
We will pursue more opportunities to enable real-time exchanges of
classified information to meet critical coalition collaboration and
mission needs. The ability to dynamically share information with
mission partners at the speed of relevance provides us a greater
advantage against our adversaries.
Across the interagency, CENTCOM pursues whole-of-government
solutions to address transregional threats. CENTCOM places increased
command emphasis on an organizational approach to ensure interagency
integration is a high priority in all planning. For example, CENTCOM
supports National Security Council-convened threat finance fusion cells
to counter ISIS and Iran. We also provide personnel to support
interagency efforts in our Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised
Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) provides a best-in-class example of a
successful, nimble, and responsive capability in support of the
warfighter. CENTCOM relies heavily on the critical, life-saving
training, technology, and expertise JIDO provides to safeguard U.S. and
allied forces from many of the most dangerous, emerging threats on the
battlefield, including improvised explosive devices; unmanned, armed
aerial and maritime vehicles; and other improvised threats. JIDO's
functions are not replicated in any of the Services, demonstrate
enormous value, and are worthy of continued resourcing through DTRA.
strategic importance
The CENTCOM AOR is one of the most complex, diverse regions in the
world. Composed of nearly 600 million people dispersed among 20
countries, it is home to three of the world's five major religions, is
the most energy-rich region in the world, and contains three strategic
maritime choke points. The Suez Canal, the Bab al Mandeb, and the
Strait of Hormuz are major transit points for energy and trade; the
ability of commerce to transit these global commons freely being vital
for the global economy.
Much like the rest of the world, almost 90 percent of businesses in
the Central Region are small-to-medium-size enterprises. They are the
key drivers of job creation, employ nearly 66 percent of the labor
force, and help diversify their respective country's economies.
Contrary to popular belief, not every country in the CENTCOM AOR is
rich with oil and natural gas resources, and for those that are, their
economies are highly susceptible to changes in the energy market.
Strong economies, vibrant commerce, low unemployment rates, and decent
standards of living are ``must-haves'' to promote and maintain
stability. Military force cannot create strong economies. It can only
help provide safe, secure conditions for them to develop.
There are multiple drivers of instability in the region, ranging
from the toxic narrative of sectarianism, to brittle political and
economic systems, to disenfranchised and disillusioned peoples. While
drivers of instability can be addressed and mitigated through the
application of elements of national power, many have roots spanning
several generations. In our strategic approach, it is important to
acknowledge with a degree of humility that there are some things that
are beyond our power to change. Despite those challenges, we recognize
the strategic importance of the Central Region to our national
interests, and four key reasons why we must remain engaged here to
preserve them.
First, we must not allow another attack on our Homeland. The
CENTCOM AOR is the world's epicenter for terrorism and VEOs. The 9/11
attacks were based from al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan and served
as a wake-up call that terrorism could be exported from anywhere in the
world.
Second, we cannot allow VEOs or rogue nations to acquire weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs). Our active presence in this region prevents
VEOs from coming together toward that purpose and helps prevent the
proliferation of WMD materials.
Third, instability is contagious. It does not respect national
borders and grows and spreads if left unchecked. A stable Middle East
underpins a stable world. In an already volatile region, our steady
commitment to our allies and partners provides a force for stability.
As the President's National Security Strategy states, we must also
``work with partners to neutralize Iran's malign activities in the
region.''
The fourth is the reemergence of great power competition, the main
challenge highlighted in the NDS. China and Russia seek to dominate and
influence not just their own geographic regions, but the Central Region
as well. Just as great power competitors looked to influence energy and
trade in the Middle East following the first World War, China and
Russia are working very hard today to reshuffle the balance of power in
the CENTCOM AOR, trying to displace the United States from its position
of influence. The President's National Security Strategy directs that
the United States seeks a Middle East that is ``not dominated by any
power hostile to the United States.''
This is the reality of our world, and of the regional and
transregional challenges we have to address in CENTCOM. We recognize
the United States is rightly shifting its resources toward Europe and
East Asia to balance great power competition, but remain mindful that
the CENTCOM AOR represents a geopolitical crossroads and a principal
zone for that competition as well. Of the five major threats identified
in the NDS, four--competition with China; competition with Russia;
Iran's rogue, malign activities; and combatting VEOs--reside or are
contested on a significant scale in the CENTCOM AOR every day.
Many observers, and many of our partners and allies as well, hold
misperceptions of the focus on great power competition in the NDS. They
view the prioritization and alignment of efforts for long-term
competition with China and Russia as a wholesale shift in emphasis away
from the Middle East and Central Asia regions. However, that view fails
to account for the global context of the NDS and how great power
competition is not isolated to Europe or Asia, but often takes place in
other strategically important regions like the CENTCOM AOR.
Currently, CENTCOM is conducting or supporting military operations
with Coalition partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and limited
counter-terror operations in Yemen. We represent a United States
presence with military basing and support in seven countries, have
bilateral or multilateral military engagements with nearly a dozen
countries, and security cooperation agreements with 16 countries.
Across much of the AOR, however, where there is a United States
presence, there is almost always an existing or developing presence by
China, Russia, or both.
China uses its ``One Belt-One Road'' initiative as an economic
lever to provide access and influence across the Central Region. China
invested in Suez Canal development, the port of Haifa in Israel, and
Jordan to provide access, relationships and leverage on the other side
of the continent. In the United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free
Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the
Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of
Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal,
and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the
Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is
conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and
energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary
tool, and while many ``United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free
Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the
Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of
Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal,
and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the
Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is
conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and
energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary
tool, and while many ``United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free
Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the
Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of
Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal,
and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the
Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is
conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and
energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary
tool, and while many ``
Russia is focusing increasing attention to the Middle East, in part
due to its geographical proximity, but also to reestablish its image as
an influential global power. Russia invests in the Suez Canal
development and is a co-member with China in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. Russia has increased its engagement with and investment
in Egypt, including construction of a 48 megawatt nuclear power plant
in El Dabba, as well as development of a major trade and investment
zone in east Port Said. Russia conducts bilateral and multilateral
military exercises and provides economic and security support in more
than half a dozen countries in the Central and South Asia (CASA)
region, most of whom were part of the former Soviet Union and who
remain reliant on Russia for their economic and security needs. Russia
seeks to increase its own influence while limiting the influence of
others, monopolize energy transit and pipeline routes, and provide a
buffer zone against NATO enlargement. In Syria, Russia is establishing
a permanent military and economic presence, with the goal of dominating
infrastructure and energy commerce there in the coming years.
We also note the important role that nuclear deterrence plays
within U.S. strategy, as the number one priority mission of the
Department of Defense. It backstops all U.S. military operations and
diplomacy across the globe. A robust and modern United States nuclear
deterrent helps ensure competition with Russia and China, regardless of
where it originates, does not escalate to large-scale war.
The U.S. is able to exercise a great deal of control over its own
economy because we exercise a great deal of political, military, and
economic power around the world. Where we lose that power and
influence, our competitors gain--and we will be more vulnerable at home
because of it. Less than 100 years ago the Middle East puzzle came
together with the United States influencing key pieces. Today, the
puzzle is being remade and China and Russia are seeking new strategic
pieces. We must recognize our old pieces may no longer fit, and stay
engaged and agile enough to maintain our position as the dominant
influence once this new puzzle comes together. In the CASA region, for
example, our partner nations lie in close proximity to or share borders
with Russia or China. We must realistically acknowledge this tyranny of
distance, but continue to engage and compete in innovative ways that
help build partnerships, grow our influence, and serve as a balance to
the other great powers. The bottom line is simple: If left unchecked,
the expanding global reach of China's economic and military
initiatives, as well as Russia's objective to weaken or subvert Western
security structures in the CENTCOM AOR will pose a significant
challenge to United States prosperity, security, and regional
stability.
As long as terrorism is exportable, as long as the Central Region
remains a global supplier of energy, as long as we have allies and
partners to whom we are committed, the U.S. cannot afford to cede our
role as the dominant regional power. Without a continued strong
presence and consistent engagement in the region, we risk our ability
to secure the global commons, weaken our network of allies and partners
necessary to eliminate potential safe havens for jihadist terrorists,
and diminish our ability to maintain a stable global energy market.
strategic approach
CENTCOM's mission is to direct and enable military operations and
activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and
stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. Our strategic approach
is founded in three principles: Prepare, Pursue, and Prevail. This
approach drives our thinking, gives direction and intent to every level
in the command, provides capabilities to our commanders, and creates
decision space for military and civilian leadership. Each aspect of our
approach enables the next, and collectively contributes to the
successful achievement of our goals and objectives. CENTCOM uses these
aspects as the cornerstone to advance our operational approach of ``by,
with, and through.''
We prepare by forming enduring coalitions, cultivating
relationships with partners and allies, and maintaining security,
basing, and overflight agreements, or paving the way for those
agreements to be established. It means we deepen our interoperability
and expand our regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative
planning with our partners, so we can increase their capabilities and
our collective capabilities to operate more effectively in a joint and
combined environment. We communicate the winning narrative of a free
and open international order, national sovereignty, individual freedom
and dignity, and the rule of law. We foster meaningful, sustainable,
two-way relationships with people who share common interests and common
values instead of engaging in the transactional relationships and
predatory economic practices of our great power competitors. The
alliances and partnerships we forge, rooted in mutual respect, reduce
the price we pay for our position of leadership, and provide
significant asymmetrical advantages over our geopolitical rivals. These
aspects of preparation are crucial, and perhaps even more important
than maintaining a large military footprint in the region. While
personnel and equipment can be surged in a time of crisis, one cannot
surge partnerships, trust, understanding, agreements, and commitment.
Pursuing opportunities means we are proactive, always alert for
chances to seize the initiative and dictate events on favorable terms.
Regardless of whether we are investigating a new partnership or
considering a different operational approach, pursuing those openings
requires empowerment at the lowest levels, transparency, flat
communications, understanding and trust. Surrounding circumstances and
shortened decision cycles for action may induce greater risk, which we
must underwrite and manage through strong feedback loops between all
levels of leadership, including our interagency partners and allies.
Not every opportunity pans out, but an opportunity not explored is a
potential advantage lost.
Prevailing takes on a meaning different than raising a banner or
marching in a victory parade. It entails consolidating our gains,
securing and stabilizing what we and our partners have fought for. We
recognize there are no easy victories to be had in the CENTCOM AOR as
ours is a region of historical, protracted struggle. In CENTCOM,
prevailing means retaining flexibility and decision space for our
leaders, preserving our national interests and those of our allies and
partners, and maintaining a favorable balance of power for the U.S.
We operationalize this principle using a ``by, with, and through''
approach. We conduct operations primarily by indigenous partner forces,
with enabling support from the U.S. and our coalition partners, working
through U.S. and international authorities and partner agreements.
While not yet a doctrine, a strategy, or a formal military program, it
is a proven, successful, operational approach that pursues culturally
acceptable and durable solutions. It is a way of conducting military
activities and operations with reduced direct combat employment of U.S.
Forces, while developing and supporting partner capacity and
participation. While indigenous forces may not conduct operations
according to U.S. pace and doctrine, they take ownership of the fight.
Their wins are not only theirs, but ours as well; and fighting for
those wins builds legitimacy and resiliency. Currently, CENTCOM
successfully applies the ``by, with and through'' operational approach
in Operation Inherent Resolve, assisting our partners to defeat ISIS;
in Yemen, using a multilayered Arab/United States approach to counter
VEOs; and with Operation Freedom's Sentinel and the NATO-led Resolute
Support Mission to defeat VEOs and pressure the Taliban in Afghanistan.
This approach is not limited to combat operations, however, as CENTCOM
fulfills many peacetime objectives working ``by, with, and through''
other partner nations.
Employing a ``by, with, and through'' operational strategy supports
the objectives and intent of the NSS and NDS--promoting regional
stability and security, defeating terrorist threats to the U.S., and
ensuring that common domains remain free and open--while addressing
these challenges through a resource-sustainable approach, including
strengthening the indigenous capacities of, and improving
interoperability with, our regional partners and allies.
While this approach provides CENTCOM the ability to do ``more with
less,'' our ability to act decisively in the region becomes more
contingent upon the full commitment of regional partners. We must
therefore ensure transparent and contextual communication across our
own Government, and among our allies and partners. If we mistakenly or
inadvertently signal we are ``pulling back'' or ``refocusing''
priorities to address great power competition elsewhere in the world,
we risk undermining our trust and credibility with long-standing
partners here.
regional overview--central and south asia
Afghanistan remains home to numerous terrorist organizations that
threaten our interests. ISIS-K, in particular, maintains both the
intent and the capability to inspire, direct, and conduct external
operations, and if left unchecked, will continue to grow as a threat to
our Homeland. In support of the South Asia Strategy, Afghanistan became
CENTCOM's main effort. United States support for the mission in
Afghanistan evolved into a ``by, with and through'' operational
approach as recognition of the need for domestic legitimacy and
ownership increased. This ultimately strengthens the GIROA's
negotiating position toward reconciliation and reintegration.
Key Challenges: Years of conflict in Afghanistan have caused large-
scale humanitarian crises exacerbated by porous national borders, and
provided Iran, Russia, and China opportunities to expand their
influence in the region. Russia has attempted to challenge United
States influence in Afghanistan under the false pretense of supporting
the Taliban's fight against ISIS-K, while Iran continues to use the
Taliban to secure its own interests and to counter the ANDSF's attempts
to improve security conditions across the country. Militants operating
out of Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to threaten Afghan stability
as well as stoke tensions between Pakistan and India. We look to
regional actors such as Pakistan to cease behavior undermining regional
stability and play constructive roles in achieving peace in Afghanistan
as well as the whole of South Asia. Kabul's uncertain political
situation remains the greatest risk to stability as the GIROA prepares
for the 2019 presidential elections, and continues to suffer from weak
institutions and a political environment marked by a lack of unity on
core issues.
Key Opportunities: The potential for a political settlement in
Afghanistan is promising. In June, following GIROA's call for a
national ceasefire over Eid al Fitr, the Taliban responded with their
own ceasefire, giving Afghans a glimpse of a future without conflict.
October's parliamentary elections were the first run entirely by
Afghans, with only limited logistical and security support from the
Coalition. Despite Taliban and ISIS-K threats against voters and
polling centers, the ANDSF oversaw a significant reduction in violence
compared to previous election periods, with over 4 million Afghans
participating in the parliamentary elections. Applying lessons learned
will be critical to enabling successful presidential elections in 2019.
The Afghan Security Forces Fund appropriation has enabled us to
increase the combat capabilities in the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Our
security cooperation funds are used for procuring aircraft, training
aircrews and maintainers as the AAF transitions from dated Russian
platforms to modern United States aircraft. We are assisting the ANDSF
in doubling the size of the Afghan Army's Special Operations Force,
currently the most effective combat element against the Taliban and
terrorist organizations. In an effort to promote responsible
development, we closely monitor ANDSF capability growth to ensure it is
necessary, affordable, and sustainable. We continue to pursue
opportunities to develop bilateral relationships with CASA nations to
promote regional stability and encourage them, and our NATO allies, to
contribute financial and advisory support to the GIROA.
2019 Prognosis: The South Asia Strategy is working. While the
Taliban continue to demonstrate resilience and the capability to
inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the Coalition's sustained
military, diplomatic, and social pressure will be instrumental in
convincing the Taliban that reconciliation is the only path forward.
Pakistan presents the United States with challenges and
opportunities in the execution of our South Asia Strategy. As a state
possessing nuclear weapons that sits at the nexus of Russian, Chinese,
Indian, Iranian, and United States geopolitical interests, Pakistan
will always be a country of importance to the United States. However,
Pakistan's actions are often a source of frustration to United States
regional efforts in Afghanistan. Our posture with Pakistan involves
supporting our colleagues at the Department of State as they pursue a
diplomatic solution with Islamabad to end the conflict in Afghanistan
while ensuring that Pakistan's equities are acknowledged and addressed
in any future agreement.
Key Challenges: Pakistan has not taken concrete actions against the
safe havens of VEOs inside its borders. Similarly, VEOs located in
Afghanistan conduct attacks inside Pakistan. This cross-border
instability and violence generates tension along both sides of the
border. The suspension of United States security assistance funds to
Pakistan remains in place. Meanwhile, some United States Pakistan
military cooperation activities have continued, demonstrating the
importance of military cooperation, despite challenges in the bilateral
relationship.
Key Opportunities: Pakistan has taken positive steps to assist SRAR
Ambassador Khalilzad in support of Afghanistan reconciliation by
facilitating talks with the Taliban but has avoided taking any concrete
or irreversible steps such as arresting or expelling Taliban leaders
who do not cooperate with reconciliation efforts. With our strategic
focus on reconciliation and regional security, Pakistan has a unique
opportunity to make good on its promises of support to United States
efforts focused on finding a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan
conflict. If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement
to the conflict in Afghanistan, the United States will have opportunity
and motive to help Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region
is the most important mutual priority for the United States and
Pakistan.
2019 Prognosis: A peaceful resolution in Afghanistan and improved
cross-border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan would strengthen
the opportunity for mutual trade and increased economic flows not only
between them, but also potentially with India and the Central Asian
states. China is already partnering with Pakistan for the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor as a central piece of China's ``One Belt-One
Road'' initiative. Central and South Asia cooperation between the
United States and China offers opportunities for peaceful dialogue and
a chance for the United States to balance China's economic rise and
reinforce its commitment to global norms for the benefit all.
Uzbekistan and United States partnerships continue to improve, and
we are increasingly optimistic that the Government of Uzbekistan is
promoting a constructive foreign policy, improving relations with its
neighbors and becoming more involved in multilateral exchanges and
exercises. Uzbekistan is fully supportive of our South Asia Strategy
and a constructive partner in the Afghanistan peace process. Given its
large population, strong security forces, central location, and a
shared border with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan's willingness to partner
with us and its neighbors can help promote stability in the region.
Key Challenges: Russia remains the dominant power in Central Asia,
and Uzbekistan must balance cooperation with the United States
carefully to avoid actions Moscow deems provocative. As we strengthen
our partnership with Uzbekistan we must respect this balance, mindful
of Uzbekistan's absorptive capacity.
Key Opportunities: Uzbekistan is hosting the Central and South
Asian armed forces Chief of Staff conference in February, demonstrating
its growing role as a regional leader. Our mil-to-mil efforts are
focused on improving border security capacity, enhancing counter-
narcotic and counter-terrorism capabilities, and assisting the Uzbeks
with the potential return of domestic terrorist fighters returning from
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The Uzbeks expressed interest in
diversifying their military equipment and provided lists of U.S.
systems and equipment they are interested in purchasing. This interest
represents a unique opportunity to off-ramp Uzbekistan from Russian
equipment and deepen our relationship as we negotiate increased air and
land access through the Northern Access corridor.
2019 Prognosis: Uzbekistan will continue efforts to increase its
capacity, using United States security assistance to maintain a balance
between Russian and Chinese influences and to boost its professionalism
in the areas of border security, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism
and defense institution building. United States security assistance
will help maintain and potentially enhance access in support of United
States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Tajikistan remains a target of both Russian and Chinese overtures.
We continue to build our military relationship with Tajikistan, even as
Moscow deepens its influence and increases its military posture at its
base outside the capital. China's increased security cooperation,
focused on border security, is coupled with an aggressive economic
lending program. China seeks to minimize instability along their shared
border, in its eastern provinces, and protect its economic investment
in Tajikistan.
Key Challenges: The Government of Tajikistan is concerned with
stability in northern Afghanistan and security along the mountainous,
800-mile Afghan border. The inability to secure their border encourages
smuggling and has a destabilizing effect on both Tajikistan and
Afghanistan. These border concerns provide a strong nexus of mutual
interests and we support development of Tajik counter-terrorism,
counter-narcotics, and border security capabilities. We are also
assisting Tajikistan to counter trans-national threats that impact both
Tajikistan and the broader Central Asia region.
Key Opportunities: Tajikistan is eager for United States assistance
and its modest funding for security services presents an opportunity
for CENTCOM to help Tajikistan develop its capabilities and
relationships to balance Russian influence. Exercise Regional
Cooperation, a multilateral exercise Tajikistan expressed interest
hosting in August 2019, will address border security and counter terror
issues. Moving forward, CENTCOM will assist Tajikistan's efforts to
counter violent extremism and emphasize the need for building stronger
defense institutions.
2019 Prognosis: Economic investment and border security will
continue to characterize China's relationship with Tajikistan. It is
likely that both Russia and China will continue to exaggerate the
terrorist threat to further entrench and justify their respective
security relationships with Tajikistan. Russia will seek to continue to
safeguard what it considers its ``sphere of influence'' in the region
and China will continue to take actions it deems necessary to secure
its border. United States security assistance for Tajikistan can
provide a counter to this great power competition by enabling the
Tajiks to maintain their border integrity with Afghanistan while
supporting regional stability.
Kazakhstan and United States relations continue to be the most
mature and forward-thinking in Central Asia, although Russia's
proximity influences Kazakhstan's posture. Kazakhstan remains the most
significant Central Asian contributor to Afghan stability, engaging in
trade, providing electrical power, donating money to the ANDSF fund,
providing educational opportunities, supporting programs for Afghan
women, and offering technical support and services to the Afghans.
Key Challenges: Kazakhstan, like most CASA nations, must carefully
balance cooperation with the United States to avoid actions Russia
interprets as threatening. As we strengthen our partnership with
Kazakhstan, we must respect this balance. The United States should
continue assisting the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense as it focuses on
the necessary institutional reforms of its non-commissioned officer
corps, training management, human resources administration, and its
professional military education system. As we look to off-ramp Central
Asian countries from Russian defense equipment, the higher price of
United States systems will remain a challenge for nations like
Kazakhstan.
Key Opportunities: Kazakhstan has expressed interest in working
with the United States to improve its logistical, medical, and
engineering branches. We will also continue our engagement with the
Kazakhstani Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) training center to improve
Kazakhstani PKO capabilities and foster regional integration by opening
the center to Kazakhstan's neighbors. Exercise Steppe Eagle, an annual
trilateral peacekeeping exercise sponsored by the United States, United
Kingdom and Kazakhstan, has expanded to include Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. In November 2018, with United States assistance, Kazakhstan
deployed a company-level unit to Lebanon on a UN peacekeeping
operations mission--a first for any CASA nation.
2019 Prognosis: Kazakhstan will continue to use United States
security assistance to balance Russian and Chinese influences. United
States security assistance enables access for sustainment of United
States and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Maintaining mil-to-mil
programs, with a focus on defense institution building and professional
military education, will position us to maintain our comparative
advantage with a country situated on the doorsteps of Russia and China.
The Kyrgyz Republic and United States' strained bilateral relations
impede security cooperation that would otherwise further military our
objectives in Central Asia.
Key Challenges: The lack of a status of forces agreement with the
Kyrgyz Republic severely limits CENTCOM's level of engagement. Until
steps are taken to extend diplomatic protections for United States
Military operating in the Kyrgyz Republic, mil-mil exchanges and
training are suspended.
Key Opportunities: The Office of Military Cooperation in Bishkek
and the Montana National Guard through the National Guard State
Partnership Program remain postured to renew programs aimed at
developing military capabilities specifically in the areas of Field
Medicine and Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance as soon as
political conditions permit.
2019 Prognosis: Any United States security assistance for the
Kyrgyz Republic will help the Kyrgyz to maintain their national
sovereignty in the face of Russian and Chinese jockeying for influence.
Turkmenistan has a UN-recognized policy of ``positive neutrality''
by which the government balances the demands of the regional powers by
not taking sides in international conflict and not entering into
alliances or economic organizations, necessitating a subtle and agile
approach to Security Cooperation to be successful.
Key Challenges: A struggling economy, a rigid political system, and
the Turkmen policy of positive neutrality largely limits international
cooperation and Turkmenistan's security services.
Key Opportunities: We have focused our efforts on English language
training, medical engagements and the development of Special Forces
with Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense (MOD). We are encouraged by MOD's
increased participation in our exchanges and conferences. Turkmenistan
has expressed interest in enhancing its disaster response capability
and border security, providing additional opportunities for CENTCOM.
2019 Prognosis: Turkmenistan remains concerned with the instability
in Afghanistan and the potential for the flow of foreign terrorist
fighters, therefore assistance will focus on enhancing border security.
Maintaining a small, consistent security cooperation portfolio in
Turkmenistan has outsized impact and will help counter Russian and
Chinese influence.
regional overview--greater levant
Iraq's mil-to-mil relationship with the United States is as strong
as it has ever been, and Iraq has both the potential and desire to
become a formidable ally in combatting terrorism. The Office of
Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is conducting programs to enhance
professionalization of the ISF, coupled with prudent implementation and
oversight of FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Transforming OSC-I
into a permanent Title 22 Security Cooperation Office is key. Our
authority for OSC-I to conduct training activities with ISF is more
important than ever in the evolution of an ISF that is effective,
inclusive, sustainable, affordable, and cements our long-term bilateral
partnership.
Key Challenges: Reform of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to
achieve the goal of ``One ISF'' remains a challenge. Iraq's Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) are officially part of the ISF, however, the
forces are comprised of disparate groups, some of which are not totally
responsive to the direction of the Government of Iraq (GOI), the worst
of which are affiliated with Shiite militia groups directed by Iran.
Iraq's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MOPA) is largely treated as a
less-than-equal organization by the government. While some tensions
between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad have eased,
challenges with revenue sharing, disputed territory and control of oil
resources remain problematic. It is critical the ISF consolidate its
gains against ISIS and evolve from a war footing to a steady state,
which must be effective, affordable, and protect Iraqi people and their
infrastructure from terrorism.
As ISIS continues to build a clandestine insurgency, the GoI must
form an effective cabinet and government entities to manage the country
and improve economic resilience and quality of life for its people.
This includes meeting the needs of Iraq's youthful population who
demand better economic opportunities, access to essential services, and
an end to endemic corruption in the GoI. Failure by the newly formed
government to address the basic needs of Iraqi citizens may facilitate
the reemergence of ISIS or other VEOs, which capitalize on public
dissatisfaction to increase their support. Iran's meddling in the
selection of Iraqi cabinet members, notably the Minister of Defense and
the Minister of Interior, has prevented the GoI from addressing
pressing national security issues.
Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, through OSC-I, is working with our
Iraqi partners to re-integrate the GoI with its Arab neighbors. These
efforts have paid dividends in reinitiating cooperation between Iraq
and countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and Qatar;
illustrated by the reopening of shared borders. OSC-I can leverage its
authorities to support the ISF's evolution into an effective,
sustainable, and affordable force through mil-to-mil relations,
security sector reform, security cooperation, while coordinating broad-
based reform with regional partners. Key objectives include the further
professionalization of the ISF, rebalancing the ISF's force structure
to meet future threats, and reforming the ISF's human resources and
professional military education systems with increased emphasis on
force design, force management, and policy development.
2019 Prognosis: Iraq's May 2018 elections resulted in the formation
of a new, generally representative government. Newly elected Prime
Minister Abd al-Mahdi vowed to improve public services and prioritize
reconstruction of areas devastated by the conflict with ISIS. It is
likely that Iraq will retool its budget to focus on government goals
however, Iraq must also rebuild its security forces, which are
exhausted by four years of operations against ISIS.
Syria's President Bashar al Assad remains in power with the
military support of Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). Despite
significant advances, the Syrian regime has insufficient forces to
adequately secure recaptured territory. The United States withdrawal
from Syria represents the most dynamic shift in the environment since
ISIS lost its ability to govern major population centers and fight as a
conventional force and could trigger a renewed race for influence,
control, and for some, survival. Turkey's strong national security
concerns in Syria and standing as a NATO ally further complicates the
battlespace. Israel's legitimate concerns about Iran's increasingly
provocative actions in Syria, particularly the transshipment of
advanced weapons systems into and through Syria, are driving
increasingly forward leaning Israeli military actions. If the major
actors and their proxies become embroiled in a competition for
influence in Syria, this may create space for ISIS remnants or other
terrorist groups to reform or reconstitute. Because the regime was
incapable or unwilling to fight ISIS, the responsibility for D-ISIS
fighting has been borne by the Coalition and our partnered force, the
SDF, whose bravery and determination have been crucial to rolling back
ISIS. The intervention of the Coalition in the Syrian conflict blocked
Assad's ability to recapture all of northern Syria. As the United
States executes a safe, professional withdrawal, we seek to help
negotiate a secure future for the people of northeast Syria liberated
from ISIS and our partners in the D-ISIS fight.
The international humanitarian community has achieved some success,
but the Syrian regime's resistance to allow aid deliveries is largely
driven by Assad's use of starvation as a weapon of war. As a result,
there are more than 13 million Syrians who require humanitarian
assistance, including 5.7 million internally displaced persons and 5.7
million refugees in neighboring countries. While United States
humanitarian assistance reaches four million people throughout Syria
monthly, security concerns and access constraints limit the reach of
aid in some locations. Vulnerable populations in Syria will continue to
require humanitarian aid until parties to the conflict reach a
political solution.
Key Challenges: The civil war, combined with ISIS occupation and
the subsequent fight to displace and destroy ISIS has led to vast
destruction of infrastructure, degradation of government, lack of basic
services, and other humanitarian challenges. Assad's reluctance to
negotiate directly with the Syrian opposition, and Moscow's reluctance
to force him to do so, indicates significant challenges ahead in
forging a political resolution to the conflict and ending this
humanitarian crisis. A political resolution is key to the lasting
defeat of ISIS, because unless fundamental drivers of domestic
instability are addressed, conditions will remain for a resurgence of
ISIS, or ISIS-like VEOs.
While CENTCOM's ``by, with, and through'' partnership with the SDF
has been critical to the defeat of ISIS, it has created friction with
Turkey, which views the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG)
elements within the SDF as a terrorist group. Our assistance to the SDF
focuses on defeating ISIS, as we have simultaneously sought to include
measures to reassure our Turkish allies. In October 2018 the United
States and Turkey began conducting combined joint patrols in key
locations. CENTCOM will continue to assist the Turkish military in
countering VEOs that threaten their border, maintaining our emphasis on
the D-ISIS campaign.
The repatriation of ISIS foreign fighters to their home countries
to face justice remains a challenge. Both SDF and Iraqi forces are
holding hundreds of foreign fighters in prisons or temporary detention
facilities, with no single process for prosecution or repatriation.
This requires a concerted international effort involving law
enforcement, intelligence sharing, and diplomacy.
Key Opportunities: The conflict in Syria has led to an increased
demand from our regional allies and partners for improved border
security as well as improved domestic counter-terrorism capabilities.
CENTCOM is able to manage the development of these capabilities which
supports our objectives of promoting stability and countering VEOs in
the region. The United States withdrawal provides an opportunity to
reset our relationship with our Turkish allies as well as an
opportunity for us to focus on reinforcing Iraq's consolidation of its
gains against ISIS. A strong, enduring partnership with Iraq will serve
as stabilizing factor, helping mitigate concerns about long-term United
States intentions in the region.
Jordan is one of our most committed partners in the Middle East and
one of the most critical voices of moderate Islam in the region. We
must be careful to not to take their partnership for granted. Jordan's
civilian and military leadership exemplifies professionalism and
modernization within a region in crisis. Jordan is the only country in
the Levant to provide a platform for operations, in addition to
unhindered access and overflight essential to United States interests.
The Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) are a key contributor to the D-ISIS
Coalition and OIR and is a major contributor to efforts to stabilize
the region. Continued support to the Government of Jordan (GOJ) and the
JAF is critical to ongoing D-ISIS efforts, and preventing the spread of
instability in the region.
Key Challenges: Jordan currently hosts over 750,000 registered
refugees from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, straining government
resources, services, and infrastructure. The GOJ and the JAF have
effectively balanced legitimate security concerns with the humanitarian
imperative to care for these refugees, despite the strain on Jordan's
resources. Simultaneously, regional turmoil, falling remittances, and
declining tourism have led to rising unemployment and high national
debt creating a volatile environment that threatens political
stability.
Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, in conjunction with interagency
partners, uses section 333 and other title 10 funds provided by
Congress to build partner capacity and capability in Jordan. These
funds and activities are in addition to the total assistance budget of
$1.275 billion annually from the State Department, as agreed upon with
the Government of Jordan, that includes at least $750 million dollars
in Economic Support Funds and $350 million dollars in FMF. In August
2019, Jordan will host nearly two dozen countries, including regional
and NATO partners, for exercise Eager Lion, focusing on counter-terror,
border security and humanitarian assistance missions.
2019 Prognosis: Jordan will face domestic pressure to move towards
normalized relations and trade with Syria, but also seeks to avoid the
risk of triggering the extensive United States sanctions on Syria.
Russia will likely seek to capitalize on its role as a Syrian
intermediary to increase its influence in Jordan and the region. Both
domestic and external VEOs will remain a security threat, but continued
funding from title 10 programs, in addition to FMF and economic
support, will enable Jordan to develop critical capabilities and remain
a key contributor to coalition efforts.
Egypt lies on the western edge of the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, an anchor state for the region. The country is an
important strategic partner whose location, size, enduring peace treaty
with Israel, control of the Suez Canal, and moderate religious and
cultural Pan-Arab influences are significant elements that support
regional stability. Egypt is geographically positioned to counter the
flow of foreign fighters, materiel, and financial support to extremists
transiting from Libya through Egypt into the Central Region. The United
States-Egypt security relationship is resilient and growing,
exemplified by Egypt's formal request to participate in the National
Guard State Partnership Program. Egypt supports our overflight
requests, provides Suez Canal access affording short notice transits,
and trains and deploys peacekeeping troops worldwide. In the spirit of
our strong mil-to-mil partnership, in September 2018 we held a joint
Defense Resourcing Conference to increase the orientation of United
States security assistance to Egypt toward a counter-terrorism and
sustainment focus.
Key Challenges: ISIS-Sinai continues to conduct attacks against the
Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) to bolster its influence over the local
populace through intimidation. The EAF has contained most of the
violence in the northeastern Sinai Peninsula and has begun to address
societal and economic reforms to defeat ISIS-Sinai and prevent its
spread to the Nile Valley.
Key Opportunities: Through our collaborative approach with the EAF
we continue to see improvement in the security of their maritime and
land borders. The EAF have improved their efforts to stem the flow of
fighters and illicit material transiting from Libya through Egypt into
Israel and the Central Region. Mindful of the complex environment of
the Sinai, we continue our support to the Multinational Force and
Observers in order to ensure the safety of these forces, allowing this
crucial mission in support of the 1979 peace treaty to continue. We see
the beginnings of improved interoperability between the EAF, United
States, and other partner nations, exemplified in more Egyptian
participation in multi-lateral exercises and strategic forums including
exercise Bright Star 2018, the second joint military exercise held
since 2009. Egypt has expressed plans to broaden its participation in
coalition operations and has signed the Communications Interoperability
and Security Memorandum of Agreement, allowing Egypt improved access to
interoperability enabling acquisitions. We look to strengthen our
security cooperation partnership through continued engagement and FMS
programs.
2019 Prognosis: Our military assistance ensures that the United
States remains a military partner of choice and counters Russia's
efforts to expand its influence in the region. United States Government
aid and support to Egypt is crucial to our strategic partnership.
CENTCOM will continue to support the EAF's efforts in the Sinai, and
assist them with implementing a whole-of-government strategy that
addresses the underlying political, economic, and social conditions
that give rise to extremist elements.
Lebanon is a multi-confessional democracy that occupies a pivotal
geostrategic position in terms of U.S. national security interests.
Wedged between a key ally in the region, Israel, and a corridor of
Iranian influence running from Tehran through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon
has managed to remain relatively stable. Nevertheless, Hezbollah's
manipulation of the Lebanese political process thwarts needed reforms
while exacerbating sectarian tensions inside Lebanon.
Key Challenges: Lebanon faces a confluence of problems. The
stagnant economy is worsened by regional conflict and exacerbated by
the fact that nearly a quarter of the total population are refugees.
Additionally, both Russia and China are increasing their efforts to
gain access and influence in the country because of its key location on
the Mediterranean and proximity to Syria. Hezbollah holds political
clout which gives it a de-facto veto on Lebanese policy decisions,
fields an armed militia that does not act on the behest of an elected
government and builds popular support by acting as a social service
provider--all undermining the role of the legitimate Lebanese
Government and armed forces. Hezbollah has also engaged in provocative
actions with Israel, risking unpredictable escalatory actions that
threaten Israeli security and could undermine Lebanon's stability.
Through its Hezbollah proxy, Iran continues to meddle in Lebanon's
internal affairs. While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were able to
drive ISIS from all Lebanese territory in 2017, the threat from
remnants of ISIS and other extremists crossing into Lebanon from Syria
remains present.
Key Opportunities: Our efforts to strengthen the LAF are a critical
aspect of our policy to promote Lebanese sovereignty and security. The
U.S. is the LAF's top security assistance partner. Our modest,
consistent, long-term commitment and investments has led to the LAF
becoming a successfully modernized, legitimate fighting force. The LAF
is innovative, professional, and have proven their capabilities to
protect the Lebanese people from internal and external threats through
successful counter-VEO operations. It established itself as the most
trusted and respected institution in the country, undercutting
Hezbollah's claim that its armed militia is necessary to protect
Lebanon, while providing a mature, apolitical, stabilizing influence.
The even-handed, professional response of the LAF, assisted by the
professional mediation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,
was key in de-escalating the Israeli counter-tunnel operation in
December 2018.
2019 Prognosis: Successful, consistent partnership with the LAF
forms the backbone of United States influence in Lebanon, providing a
bulwark against growing Russian and Chinese interest in the country, a
reliable partner capable of fighting and defeating remnants of ISIS and
other extremist groups attempting to regroup in Lebanon. The LAF has
the potential to eventually form a deterrent to increased Iranian
activity, and a vital counterbalance to Hezbollah influence. While
Lebanese security and sovereignty is enhanced every day through our
robust relationship with the LAF, Hezbollah continues to risk the
stability and security of Lebanon by maintaining an armed militia and
advanced weapons outside the authority of the State.
regional overview--central gulf
Iran's unpredictable and reckless behavior remains a threat to our
partners, global commerce, and United States vital interests in the
Middle East. While supporting the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria,
Iran foments instability and chaos in the region through the
proliferation of advanced weapon technology and a destabilizing
ideology. To conceal its culpability, the Iranian regime masks its
malign activities through proxies and surrogates enabled by the Iran
Threat Network (ITN) in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Iran is also
attempting to build ground lines of communication through Iraq and
Syria into Lebanon to support its proxy Hezbollah. Iran has gained
influence within Iraq's armed forces with the formalization of the
Popular Mobilization Forces, and also exerted influence in Lebanon,
Iraq, and Yemen, oftentimes affecting established sovereign governance.
Key Challenges: Iran's military is composed of approximately
700,000 personnel, the largest in the region. Both of its military
arms, the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are improving their abilities to
quickly mobilize and deploy in response to internal and external
threats. Iran postures its forces and supports proxies to threaten--or
be able to threaten--strategic locations like the Bab al Mandeb and the
Strait of Hormuz. With little warning, Iran could impede commercial
traffic in these key maritime chokepoints. Iran seeks to gain hegemonic
influence through the resulting chaos of its proxies and the threat of
force. Iranian surface to air missiles pose a significant threat to
United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets
operating in international airspace. Iran also has the region's largest
ballistic missile force, which continues to increase in capability,
range, and lethality. In November 2018, Iran demonstrated its ballistic
missile capability, striking ISIS targets in Syria and Kurdish militant
targets in Iraq.
Key Opportunities: Since the United States withdrawal from the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the subsequent re-
imposition of pre-JCPOA nuclear-related sanctions, Iran has sought to
demonstrate its resolve and counter United States pressure while trying
to mitigate the impact of sanctions. However, longstanding
vulnerabilities in Tehran's fiscal policy are reducing its ability to
alleviate the impact of United States sanctions and Iran's already
fragile domestic economy will likely further decline. While Iran's
strategy is to sow chaos through its malign activities, CENTCOM will
continue to develop means of maintaining order to combat Iran's chaos.
Our mil-to-mil relationships help build local credibility in many
partner nations, while bi- and multi-lateral efforts--such as maritime
exercises and developing integrated ballistic defense--with our
regional partners helps create baffles to stifle Iranian ambitions.
2019 Prognosis: Iran will continue to seek to expand its political
influence and military presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and
to threaten international trade and regional stability throughout the
Central Region. Leaders in the IRGC-Qods Force will continue to use
surrogates, businesses, and logistics entities to execute direct
action, intelligence, influence building, terrorism, and cyber
operations against the United States. and our partner nations. Iran
intends to expand its regional influence, counter Saudi Arabia,
threaten Israel, and maintain a capability to threaten strategic
maritime transit routes. Iran will continue to acquire and develop
increasingly lethal weapons to raise the cost of direct military
conflict, and seek to pursue policies that threaten United States
strategic interests and goals throughout the region.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) suffered challenges to its
international reputation over the past year but remains a key strategic
partner. The ambitious reform agenda set forth by Mohammed bin Salman
is meant to modernize and diversify the Saudi economy and encourage
foreign direct investment. To date, however, these reforms have met
with mixed success.
Key Challenges: The conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya have
challenged Saudi Arabia's partners in the region, beset by malign
influence driven by experienced and well-funded Iranian proxies. The
Gulf Rift, pitting KSA, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain against Qatar,
complicates unified deterrence to Iranian malign activity. The
ballistic missile threat and armed UASs emanating from Yemeni territory
continue to pose a significant risk, as the Houthi's consider civil
infrastructure as legitimate military targets. High-profile civilian
casualty incidents on behalf of the Coalition in Yemen and
international backlash resulting from the murder of Saudi dissident
Jamal Kashoggi have damaged Saudi Arabia's international standing.
Key Opportunities: The Yemen conflict provided lessons learned on
military operations and tactics, adding greater urgency to
institutional defense transformation efforts. We continue to share our
own experiences and processes in an effort to improve Saudi Arabia's
operational performance and reduce civilian casualties. CENTCOM's
security cooperation with Saudi Arabia remains a critical link in our
efforts to strengthen partners in the region and meet current and
future challenges. The work of United States advisors is essential to
the success of our mission, and Saudi Arabia underwrites the lion's
share of their presence. Helping build Saudi Arabia's security forces
reflects our commitment to increase partner capacity, sustain effective
defense institutions, increase professionalism, interoperability, and
capability in order to deter aggression in the region and protect
critical infrastructure.
2019 Prognosis: Saudi Arabia plays an important role ensuring
regional stability. Despite recent strains, the United States--Saudi
Arabia security relationship is resilient and this strategic
partnership with the Kingdom is a foundational point of CENTCOM's
ability to execute our national defense strategy. Our ongoing
relationship with the Kingdom regarding regional basing and access,
interoperability, freedom of movement--exemplified by Saudi support for
CENTCOM's expansion of the Trans-Arabian Network as a primary
distribution route across the Arabian Peninsula--remains critical, and
our defense institution-building endeavors represents the
operationalization of our ``by, with, and through'' approach.
Yemen is beset by strife and riven with internal fractures. The
civil war continues unabated and the humanitarian crisis worsened in
the last year. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to lead the coalition
supporting the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG). While some elements
of the ROYG are reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG, including
President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis retain
control over Yemen'reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG,
including President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis
retain control over Yemen'reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG,
including President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis
retain control over Yemen'
Key Challenges: Terrorist groups like AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continue
to maintain a presence in Yemen and focus on attacks against ROYG, SLC,
and Houthi targets. The conflict in Yemen opened opportunities for
Iran, which continues to provide support to the Houthis aimed at
building a proxy force designed to pressure the SLC and expand Iranian
regional influence. This support enables Houthis to launch missiles at
its neighbors and target ships in the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea;
threatening Americans and our partners and raising the risk of broader
regional conflict. The prolonged conflict deepened the humanitarian
crisis, and much of the population faces severe food shortages, a
cholera epidemic and other outbreaks of disease.
Key Opportunities: Following years of fighting, security sector
reconstitution will be a priority, and any peace agreement will require
functioning, unified Yemeni security forces in which both the ROYG and
Houthis work together to maintain Yemen's stability. Leveraging
existing mil-to-mil ties with the ROYG and a supportive relationship
with the UNSE, CENTCOM is positioning itself to provide the necessary
assistance to conduct security cooperation in Yemen while continuing
not to engage in hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and the
Houthis. The Yemeni Coast Guard resumed control of six ports from the
SLC in late 2018, with training provided through the Department of
State's Export Controls and Related Border Security program.
Implementing the existing 505 agreement with Yemen will allow CENTCOM
to significantly deepen and broaden assistance and training
opportunities.
2019 Prognosis: The United States and ROYG will continue to
maintain a nascent but increasingly productive mil-to-mil relationship
with the goal of enabling Yemeni security forces to secure national
borders, defeat VEOs, and respond to existing and emerging threats in
order to provide an environment that facilitates the reconstruction of
a stable economy and reconstitution of Yemen's Government institutions
and civil functions.
Kuwait is a key strategic partner for regional security,
indispensable facilitator of the D-ISIS campaign, multinational partner
on United Nation Security Council, and linchpin of the region in
humanitarian, diplomatic, and economic stability. The Government of
Kuwait provides tremendous support for United States and Coalition
operations. Kuwait hosts the fourth largest presence of United States
troops overseas--including CENTCOM's army component, U.S. Army Central.
The United States Military presence is viewed as essential to the
defense of Kuwait, and Kuwait reimburses the United States for its
presence.
Key Challenges: Given the large military United States presence in
Kuwait, the implementation of the NDS, the evolution of missions in
Syria and Afghanistan, and the unknown of potential missions to come,
we must ensure we maintain flexibility and clear communications with
our strategic Kuwaiti partner.
Key Opportunities: Vigilant to numerous regional threats, Kuwait
sought resolution to the Gulf Rift dispute, while promoting a regional
response to the crises emanating from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Kuwait
continues to play an important role for Iraq's future. Kuwait hosted
the International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq last
February, raising $30 billion toward Iraq's reconstruction--including
$2 billion dollars in Kuwaiti loans and investments.
2019 Prognosis: Kuwait remains a key partner, combat support and
logistical hub, and enabler for CENTCOM. Our strong mil-mil
relationships with the Kuwaiti military underscores our commitment to
the defense of Kuwait. This will also allow United States access to
Kuwait ranges and training facilities and enable the United States to
realign to the NDS, while simultaneously providing flexibility to surge
forces into Kuwait as needed to preserve regional stability and United
States interests.
Bahrain is a strong security partner and a major non-NATO ally. The
Government of Bahrain (GOB) has welcomed the broader effort to confront
Iran's destabilization activities in the region. Bahrain is a strong
partner in countering threat financing, especially helping curtail
Iran's efforts to circumvent financial sanctions. Bahrain has also been
part of the GCC-wide effort to rebuild ties with Iraq and provide a
counterweight to Iran's influence. Bahrain's strong partnership with
the United States is most evident by its hosting of the U.S. Fifth
Fleet, the only operating U.S. naval base in the Central Region, and
multiple United States command and control facilities located at the
Naval Support Activity in Bahrain.
Key Challenges: Changes in oil prices have posed a formidable
challenge to Bahrain's economy, as over 75 percent of government
revenue comes from hydrocarbon sales. Despite the GOB's attempts to
shore up its fiscal position by cutting public spending and increasing
non-oil revenues, the country continues to confront significant annual
fiscal deficits and will consequently continue to rely on its neighbors
to provide financial lifelines.
Key Opportunities: Bahrain's access, basing, and overflight support
to United States and Coalition forces in the region are essential to
our force posture. Its contribution to regional security, maritime
patrols, intelligence sharing, counter-mine, and counter-piracy efforts
are an integral part of the region's overall security. Bahrain
continues to pursue military modernization initiatives that will result
in a Bahrain Defense Force more able to contribute to and lead regional
coalition military operations. Bahraini Land Force, SOF, and Air Force
support to the SLC campaign in Yemen is providing Bahraini forces with
experience in expeditionary operations, while ongoing efforts to
improve the BDF's capabilities will enable Bahrain to play a more
critical role in regional security.
2019 Prognosis: The mil-to-mil relationship between Bahrain and the
United States remains strong.
Qatar is a critical partner in the Arabian Peninsula, providing
CENTCOM with invaluable regional access, and hosting approximately
10,000 United States servicemembers and aircraft, and is home to the
Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Special Operations Command Central
Forward Headquarters, and the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters. The access,
basing, and overflight that Qatar provides would be costly to replicate
anywhere else in the region. The Gulf Rift has a detrimental effect on
joint training and interoperability between the U.S. and its Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. Qatar's recent withdrawal from OPEC
and lower-level attendance at the December 2018 GCC Summit indicate
Qatar is pursuing economic and political policies more independent of
Saudi Arabia.
Key Challenges: While the Gulf Rift had little direct impact on
CENTCOM operations, it has imposed significant restrictions on Qatar's
freedom of movement through the closure of land borders and air space.
It impacted Qatar's participation in GCC-hosted multilateral exercises,
eroded coalition building efforts, and increased Qatari reliance on
Iran to overcome the economic and commercial shipping constraints--
specifically, Qatar relies heavily on Iranian land, sea, and airspace
for transshipment of foodstuffs.
Key Opportunities: The Gulf Rift reaffirmed Qatar's commitment to
make the United States its primary defense partner. While Qatar has one
of the smallest militaries in the region, it is also, per capita, the
richest country in the world. Despite its relatively small size, Qatar
has been a major contributor to coalition operations throughout the
region and against ISIS, and seeks to expand its participation in other
regional coalitions. Qatar is the second largest FMS customer in the
world with $26 billion dollars in new cases and is on track to surpass
$40 billion dollars in the next five years with additional FMS
purchases. This investment demonstrates a clear desire to partner
exclusively with U.S. and NATO allies and become a reliable contributor
to coalition operations.
2019 Prognosis: Qatar's efforts to expand their military both in
size and capacity will result in increased bilateral military
engagements between CENTCOM and the Qatari Armed Forces. This will give
the U.S. an opportunity to make a positive impact on the military
development of a key partner in a turbulent region. Qatar will continue
to play a vital and necessary role in the region and has spent nearly
$9 billion dollars on United States-led Coalition basing
infrastructure.
United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the United States' staunchest
partners and non-NATO allies in the Central Region. The UAE's strategic
location, vast natural resources, willingness to engage VEOs, proven
expeditionary capabilities of its military, and drive to be at the
forefront of military innovations makes them an ideal partner. The UAE
has repeatedly supported United States objectives in both Syria and
Afghanistan and has taken a leading role in the fight against
terrorism--being among the first countries to join the D-ISIS
coalition. It remains active in pursuing many of the coalition's lines
of effort, including D-ISIS messaging, stabilization, and assisting in
stemming the flow of foreign fighters.
Key Challenges: Yemen is the UAE's top near-term security concern.
The UAE sees the Huthis as Iranian proxies, paving the way for a new
and unwelcome Iranian role in southern Arabia and in the seas
surrounding the peninsula. The UAE is a key partner in the SLC in
Yemen, conducting offensive operations in cooperation with Yemeni
forces around Hudaydah since May 2018.
Key Opportunities: The United States and UAE cooperate under a
strong bilateral framework to prevent and respond to conflicts and
crises, and the UAE has clearly indicated a desire to forge even
stronger military relationships with the U.S. The UAE is active in an
operational partnership to disrupt terrorist networks and reduce
terrorist attacks and is the only member of the Saudi-led Coalition in
Yemen to expand its military objectives to include counter-terrorism
alongside the U.S. Robust training and exercise programs with the UAE
increase the level and quality of cooperation between our nations. The
UAE also provides substantial access and is willing to burden-share the
costs of basing and infrastructure.
2019 Prognosis: The UAE expressed a desire to strengthen our
relationship through a nine-point Defense Cooperation Roadmap, which
supports our NDS through increased burden sharing in its own defense. A
continued robust exercise and engagement program will strengthen our
military-to-military relationships, and UAE's purchase of U.S. produced
weapon systems will help secur433iuytrewqe interoperability with U.S.
units. We expect the UAE to continue their partnership to United States
efforts in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, in addition to supporting
freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
Oman is a bastion of stability in the Central Region. The long-
standing relationship between the United States and Oman, based on
shared security and stability interests, remains strong--each Service
Chief of the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces a graduate of United States
military schools via our International Military Education and Training
program. Oman serves as an interlocutor with other GCC members,
factions in Yemen, and Iran. Oman faces some political and economic
uncertainty due to the eventual leadership transition from Sultan
Qaboos, and the continued budgetary dependence on limited hydrocarbon
revenues to fuel Omani development and employment.
Key Challenges: Oman's economy continues to experience recurring
fiscal deficits, growing unemployment, and stagnant growth. Economic
diversification is increasingly seen as a national security priority
for Oman, as reliance on the hydrocarbon sector and a growing
population result in rising unemployment, growing debt, and a
diminishing capacity to pay for the costly security apparatus that
keeps Oman safe and secure. Progress toward achieving the goal of
diversification has been slow. This economic insecurity combined with
an untested succession plan to follow Sultan Qaboos' decades of stable
rule represent significant challenges.
Key Opportunities: Oman's strategic location, outside of the
maritime chokepoints of the Bab el Mandeb and Straits of Hormuz,
provides CENTCOM with key logistical, operational, and contingency
capabilities. The United States and Oman have shared interests in
allowing increased Untied States access to Oman's military and
commercial ports and bases as the country looks to modernize its
infrastructure and diversify from an oil-based economy.
2019 Prognosis: A stronger economy in the Sultanate of Oman will
ensure a politically stable country with adequate employment
opportunities for its citizens. The United States and Oman will
continue to maintain a strong mil-to-mil relationship and Oman will
provide crucial access in the form of thousands of aircraft
overflights, landings, and dozens of port-calls in Oman. Negotiations
for enhanced access to Duqm port offer the prospect of deeper military
cooperation. Oman will participate in numerous bi-lateral exercises and
training events with U.S. Forces. Oman will continue to develop an FMS
portfolio that already includes over $2.7 billion in open FMS cases,
though Omani budgetary constraints may significantly slow new
acquisitions in coming years.
conclusion
Maintaining our competitive advantage in the Central Region relies
on more than simply overmatching those who would challenge us with a
higher volume of forces and equipment. CENTCOM's strategic approach has
never relied on physical overmatch, but on our people, our strategic
partnerships, and the ability to creatively leverage our combined
capabilities to achieve our mission. As we operate more and more in the
gray zone of competition short of combat, our people and partnerships--
based on foundations of respect, trust, and shared values--will
continue to be our source of strategic strength and key to maintaining
our edge in the region.
The CENTCOM team--our component commands, our combined and joint
task forces, our country teams, and all of our interagency partners--
more than 90,000 uniformed military and civilian strong, is the engine
that drives everything we do toward securing our national interests.
They represent America's greatest treasure. In an era of austerity and
change when we consistently ask our people to do more with less, the
service and sacrifice of these men and women and their families in
support of their nation is both humbling and inspirational. For nearly
18 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM AOR, our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians have answered
the call with an unwavering commitment and devotion matched only by the
families who support them. We could not accomplish what we do without
all of them and they deserve the very best capabilities and support we
can provide them, from weapons and communications systems, to
healthcare and housing. As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its current
missions and evolves to face new challenges, we appreciate the efforts
of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, the
interagency, and especially Members of Congress and their staffs, who
work tirelessly to provide our people everything they need to
accomplish their vital missions and lead healthy, fulfilling lives in
continued service to our Nation.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much, General Votel.
I want to bring up three things that have grown into some
controversy, and they should not have, and just very briefly
get your opinion on that.
First of all, as we draw down, I had made some statement
characterizing what the President's position was in Syria. I
was challenged by some not too friendly media on this. I would
like to quote what the President actually said initially. He
said we will have a slow and highly coordinated drawdown--this
is all a quote--and we will be leaving at a proper pace while
at the same time continuing to fight ISIS and doing all else
that is prudent and necessary. Do you think these are the
proper conditions and this is your understanding also of his
position?
General Votel. In the instructions that I have been given
and that we issued down to our organizations in Syria, that
represents our approach, a very deliberate approach to how we
depart Syria.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes. I think that was certainly our
understanding.
Do you believe that the territorial state of ISIS will be
eliminated by the time the United States withdrawal is done?
General Votel. I do, Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. What is being done to prevent ISIS from
reemerging at this time?
General Votel. Well, we continue to work with our Iraqi
Security Force partners and international coalition here to
continue to keep pressure on ISIS, and we continue our efforts
by, with, and through our partners in Syria and in some cases
for them to keep pressure on ISIS as they continue to present
threats to us. We should expect that they will attempt to
attack us and continue to regenerate themselves, and we will
continue to put pressure on them to prevent that.
Chairman Inhofe. Very good.
The second area that could be subject to some
misinterpretation has to do with Yemen. I am concerned that
disengaging our partners in Yemen will undermine Israel,
bolster Iran, and increase human suffering. In your assessment,
what are the costs of disengagement from our partners in Yemen?
General Votel. Certainly it is a very significant
humanitarian disaster in Yemen. But I do believe departing from
our partners there removes the leverage that we have to
continue to influence them, which I think we have used in a
positive manner, and I think it further endangers Americans in
the region.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes. I appreciate that.
Then the third one has to do with the IMET [International
Military Education and Training] program. I have always been
very partial to that. Primarily my activity has been in Africa.
It has been so successful not just in Africa but around the
world that we see China and Russia both, particularly China,
trying to beat us to the punch in the IMET program, recognizing
that some of what are middle officers are getting training in a
country that they are wed forever. We have seen this happen.
But the thing that is disturbing right now is China is starting
to do the same thing. What do you see as far as the benefits of
IMET? Is China moving in on us?
General Votel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think China is opportunistic, and they are
going to look for places that they can step in where we or
others may create voids.
To your comments on IMET, I think IMET, International
Military Education Training, funding dollar for dollar is
perhaps one of the best tools that the Department of Defense,
Department of State can wield in building our partnerships
throughout the region. Typically the people who take advantage
of these resources and come to our schools in the United States
often rise to positions of leadership in their countries. They
do not forget the experience they had in our military schools,
and most importantly, they do not forget the American people. I
think this is an extraordinarily wise investment for us to
continue to make.
Chairman Inhofe. I sure agree with that. You are probably
aware that in Africa, China has invited at one meeting 50 of
the leaders of the 52 nations in Africa to China, wining,
dining, and all this trying to move in on that program. It is
one we have to all be very sensitive to because they realize
the benefits that we have received from that program.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, General Votel, let me join you in recognizing the
Sergeant Major. Thank you for your service, Sergeant Major.
Generals only become generals if they listen to their first
sergeants and sergeant majors.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. General Votel, thank you again for your
extraordinary service in so many different ways.
When General McKenzie was here, he stated that ISIS
probably still is more capable than al Qaeda in Iraq at its
peak, suggesting it is well positioned to reemerge if pressure
on the group is relieved. You point out a staged withdrawal
from Syria almost, in effect, lessens some of the pressure that
is on ISIS.
Do you concur with the General that there will be some
renewed vigor with respect to ISIS?
General Votel. I do agree, Senator.
Senator Reed. We are trying as an alternative approach to
at least posit the idea that we can conduct air strikes from
Iraq and we can have forces in Iraq. Is that the fallback
position?
General Votel. Senator, right now, we are working through a
variety of planning scenarios for how we would potentially
continue to maintain pressure on ISIS as we withdraw out of
Syria. I think that is probably a discussion more appropriate
for the closed session, but we certainly are looking at all
options for how we might do that.
Senator Reed. Again, this might be something that you can
touch upon later, but there have been some indications that the
SDF, given the announcement, which was rather sudden, of our
plans to pull out, have made approaches to the Assad regime to
work out kind of an understanding of how they might cooperate
or at least tolerate each other. Is that something that has
been----
General Votel. Senator, I think something we have learned
in our experience there, certainly in my experience there, that
all these parties talk to each other all the time. We do expect
that that is occurring.
Senator Reed. Turning to Afghanistan, there are two major
functions. One is train and equip the Afghan forces and
counterterrorism. If we withdraw, presumably the first elements
that will go are the train and equip, and the last elements
would be counterterrorism because we have threats in the
region. Is that a fair summary of sort of the process?
General Votel. Senator, again, I think this is probably
that would be better discussed in a closed session. But I think
we have a more sophisticated way of looking at that. We
understand the importance of both of those missions.
Senator Reed. Turning then to the situation of Afghanistan
again, if we were to withdraw--and there is mounting pressure
and mounting evidence that that is a path that might be
pursued--we still provide the Afghan Security Forces about $4
billion a year in sustenance. If we were to withdraw our
forces, we would still have to maintain the $4 billion a year
contribution or those Afghan forces would disintegrate. Is that
an accurate assessment?
General Votel. There certainly would need to be continued
support to the Afghan forces. The amounts certainly we would
have to look at. But, yes, I think that is accurate, Senator.
Again, that money there without us I think does make it
challenging.
Senator Reed. Indeed, because I think one of the things we
provide with the presence is to a degree at least the money is
being spent appropriately. I think the experience we have had
elsewhere is if we just send money, it gets to places that we
do not want it to go. Again, I think as you are withdrawing,
this has to be a very, very careful thought out second order
effects, third order effects. Indeed, the issue is such a
complicated multinational, multifactor and analysis. We have
not yet gotten the Government of Afghanistan in the
negotiations. They are still on the sidelines. That is correct?
General Votel. That is what Ambassador Khalilzad has
reported, Senator.
Senator Reed. Long term, I think our instincts--and we have
been dealing with this for 17 years--is that unless there is
some type of regional buy-in, which would include Pakistan,
Iran to a degree, China because of its influence, Russia
because of its influence, the Stans because of their influence,
the likelihood of something stable is probably minimal. Is that
accurate?
General Votel. Absolutely. A key part of the strategy has
been the regionalization. I would add, Senator, that Pakistan
in my estimation has played a more helpful role, a more
constructive role in helping us move forward towards this
objective.
Senator Reed. Just one quick question. We were able to
identify through great staff work by both sides that the
Governments of Saudi Arabia and UAE [United Arab Emirates] owe
the United States $331 million for refueling. Have you received
a definite commitment that they are going to repay that money
they owe us?
General Votel. Senator, we are working through that. Both
those governments have acknowledged the bills that we have
provided to them, have indicated to us that they will meet the
payment schedule in accordance with the ACSA [Acquisition and
Cross-Serving Agreement], and we have teams from CENTCOM, from
AFCENT [United States Air Forces Central Comand], from DLA
[Defense Logistics Agency] that are working to resolve that
satisfactorily.
Senator Reed. You have looked at other beneficiaries in
your command to ensure that there are not other areas where
they are deficient in paying?
General Votel. We have, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself
not only with your opening statement but with the very fine
opening statement of the ranking Democrat on this Committee and
particularly thank Senator Reed for pointing out the cost of
getting it wrong as we withdraw from both Syria and
Afghanistan.
I want to enter into the record at this point, Mr.
Chairman, an op-ed that appeared in the ``Washington Post'' on
January 29 by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, entitled ``I Was
Ambassador to Afghanistan. This Deal is a Surrender.''
Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
``i was ambassador to afghanistan. this deal is surrender.''
January 2002. I arrive in Kabul to reopen the United States
Embassy. Destruction is everywhere. Kabul airport is closed, its
runways cratered and littered with destroyed aircraft. The drive south
from the military base at Bagram is through a wasteland. Nothing grows.
No structures stand. In the city itself, entire blocks have been
reduced to rubble, recalling images of Berlin in 1945.
More than two decades of almost constant war left a terrible
legacy. The damage was not only to the physical infrastructure. The
Afghan people had suffered enormously through the civil war that began
in the late 1970s and the tyranny of the Taliban that followed. None
had suffered more than Afghan women and girls.
After the United States invasion in October 2001 ousted the Taliban
for harboring the al Qaeda planners of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the
human toll from the Taliban rule is why the United States' initial
assistance efforts focused on people rather than things.
I remember taking our first congressional visitor, Joe Biden (D-
Del.), who was then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
to visit a girls school that we had helped to open. A first-grade class
that Biden visited had students in a range of ages, from 6 to 12. The
older girls had reached school age when the Taliban was in power, so
they had been denied an education. They weren't embarrassed now to be
in a class with children half their age--they were just happy to be
learning.
At the end of Taliban rule, roughly 900,000 children were in
school, all of them boys. When I left Afghanistan as ambassador in
2012, there were 8 million students, 40 percent of them girls.
We also encouraged Afghan women to play their rightful roles in
business, in the legislature, elsewhere in government and in the
military, and they did. The implicit message was that if you step
forward, we've got your back. It was a time when American interests and
American values were in harmony. I hosted receptions to recognize
Afghan women of courage. Through the U.S. Agency for International
Development, we funded efforts to establish shelters for women fleeing
spousal or other familial abuse--a reminder that in Afghanistan's male-
dominated society, it wasn't only the Taliban who threatened women's
safety.
Now the United States is negotiating directly with the Taliban. A
framework agreement was announced on Monday calling for a cease-fire
that could lead to the full withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Taliban
would commit to not harboring terrorist organizations that could
threaten United States security. In other words, the Taliban promised
no 9/11 replay.
The framework was reached without the involvement of the Afghan
Government. The Taliban has said all along that it refuses to negotiate
with the government, considering the government the illegitimate puppet
of the United States occupation. By acceding to this Taliban demand, we
have ourselves delegitimized the government we claim to support.
This current process bears an unfortunate resemblance to the Paris
peace talks during the Vietnam War. Then, as now, it was clear that by
going to the table we were surrendering; we were just negotiating the
terms of our surrender. The Taliban will offer any number of
commitments, knowing that when we are gone and the Taliban is back, we
will have no means of enforcing any of them.
It does not have to go like this. The United States could announce
that talks won't proceed beyond the framework, to matters of substance,
without the full inclusion of the Afghan Government. Right now, the
inclusion of the Afghans is only theoretical. We could also note that
unless some other solution is found, United States troops will remain
in Afghanistan as long as the current government wants them, protecting
the United States' national security interests and defending core
values, such as women's rights, that we have fostered there since 2001.
President Barack Obama proved in Iraq that the United States cannot
end a war by withdrawing its forces--the battle space is simply left to
our adversaries. In Afghanistan, President Trump has a choice.
Senator Wicker. General, thank you for your service.
Just to follow up on a couple points that Senator Reed
made. With regard to the $4 billion a year contribution, you
are not quite sure that it would still be that amount, but it
is close to that amount that we would still be obligated to
pay. We would still need to contribute, and we would not have
the oversight on the ground that we have now.
General Votel. That would be correct if we departed,
Senator.
Senator Wicker. I think also Senator Reed pointed out that
this agreement with regard to the Taliban in Afghanistan has
been made without the participation of the Government of
Afghanistan. That is correct. Is it not?
General Votel. Senator, the work of Ambassador Khalilzad--
first of all, there have been no agreements that have actually
been finalized.
Senator Wicker. There has been a framework agreement.
General Votel. His work is creating a framework for
continuing discussions moving forward here. Ambassador
Khalilzad's efforts are done with the knowledge of the
Government of Afghanistan. They are aware that we are doing
this, and they have supported our efforts to get this process
started. Ultimately, we need to get to a Taliban-Afghanistan
discussion. Only they will be able to resolve the key issues
involved in the dispute.
Senator Wicker. In the op-ed that I have entered into the
record, Ambassador Crocker points out the framework was reached
without the involvement of the Afghan Government. He goes on to
say that the Taliban has said all along that it refuses to
negotiate with the government, considering the government the
illegitimate puppet of the United States occupation. His
opinion is by acceding to this Taliban demand, we have
ourselves de-legitimized the government we claim to support.
He goes on to say this current process bears an unfortunate
resemblance to the Paris Peace Talks during the Vietnam War.
Then, as now, it was clear that by going to the table, we were
surrendering.
Further, Ambassador Crocker says the United States could
announce that talks will not proceed beyond the framework to
matters of substance without the full inclusion of the Afghan
Government. Right now, the inclusion of the Afghans is only
theoretical. I think you have touched on that, General.
We could also note that unless some other solution is
found, the United States troops will remain in Afghanistan as
long as the current government wants them. The current
Government of Afghanistan wants us to continue our presence
there. Is that right, General Votel?
General Votel. That is my understanding, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Then the Ambassador concludes, President
Barack Obama proved in Iraq that the United States cannot end a
war by withdrawing its forces. The battle space is simply left
to our adversaries.
I have asked you a question or two about specifics. Have
you read this op-ed before? I have read to you extensively from
it. Would you respond to that for the benefit of the Committee?
General Votel. Senator, I have read Ambassador Crocker's
editorial. I know Ambassador Crocker. I deeply respect him. He
is certainly one of our leading experts on the region here and
a keen observer of what is happening out there.
From my position as the CENTCOM Commander, in my
discussions with Ambassador Khalilzad and with General Miller
on the ground here, I would characterize where we are in the
process as very, very early in the process. As I said,
Ambassador Khalilzad has attempted to create a framework by
which we can move forward with discussions that would certainly
involve the Government of Afghanistan. We clearly recognize
that they have to be part of the solution and must be in the
negotiation aspects of this. We cannot do that on their behalf.
But, I do recognize also that the Government of Afghanistan is
being consulted as Ambassador Khalilzad does his work. They are
being kept informed of this and are aware of the work that we
are doing to move forward on these talks.
Senator Wicker. Well, let me just say I appreciate your
answer. I hope that turns out to be true.
I just want it to be said that the concerns in this city
are bipartisan concerns based on advice and counsel that we
receive from people who have been involved in this for a long,
long time and who understand how important it is for us to get
this right.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Reed is presiding for the next 20 minutes or so.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Votel, for your many years of service to
this country.
I heard former Afghanistan Commander Nicholson being
interviewed this morning, and he was asked about the
circumstances under which we should withdraw from Afghanistan.
He talked about the fact that it should be conditions-based. It
should not be based on an arbitrary timeline or numbers of
troops that we want to leave there.
Have you and General Miller been given conditions whereby
we should withdraw troops from Afghanistan? If so, what are
those conditions?
General Votel. Senator, I think some of that discussion is
best left for a different forum here. But, certainly General
Miller and I speak very frequently about the ongoing situation
in Afghanistan and the circumstances that we are trying to
create to support Ambassador Khalilzad and to move forward with
the reconciliation process.
Senator Shaheen. I share the concerns that have been raised
by Senators Reed and Wicker about what is happening right now
in Afghanistan and particularly the framework that is being put
in place without the engagement of the Afghan Government.
Can you tell me how the framework addresses the rights of
women in Afghanistan, given the horrific treatment by the
Taliban of women during the years in which they were in
control?
General Votel. Senator, I think that perhaps is a question
best posed for Ambassador Khalilzad at this particular point. I
do agree that the progress that has been made in Afghanistan
with women and improving their ability to be part of the fabric
of life in Afghanistan is an important one that has to be
incorporated in this, and I would envision that this would be
part of the more detailed discussions that will take place
between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. But,
certainly we acknowledge that, and we see the goodness that has
brought to the country of Afghanistan.
Senator Shaheen. I would point out that we have actually
passed legislation in this Congress that says women should be
at the negotiating table when conflicts are being resolved
around the world. Is it your understanding that is a basis on
which we are looking at negotiations?
General Votel. Certainly, again, as Ambassador Khalilzad
and our diplomats work with the Government of Afghanistan on
that, I would imagine they are emphasizing that legislation.
Senator Shaheen. To move to Syria, there is the report of a
new DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General report
relative to ISIS. The report says that the command organization
for ISIS is intact, and its fighters are battle-hardened. That
is a quote from the report. It goes on to say that within a
year, United States military commanders told the IG [Inspector
General] that ISIS would be resurgent in Syria.
Can you talk about how we can prevent ISIS from becoming
resurgent if we have no troops in Syria and if Iran and Russia
and Assad are in control in Syria?
General Votel. Well, Senator, as I mentioned in my opening
comments, that is an aspect of the ongoing planning that we are
pursuing right now. The answer to the question is that we do
have to keep pressure on this network. It is a resilient
network. It does have certain components that are still left in
it. Although they are dispersed and disaggregated, they have
the capability of coming back together if we do not. There are
a variety of different things that I would be happy to talk
about, some of the things under consideration as we get into
the closed session here. I will not speculate publicly here
about things that we might do, but there certainly are
different ways that we could do this working with partners,
working with our own capabilities to continue to keep pressure
on this network, which I think is absolutely vital.
Senator Shaheen. You do agree with the Inspector General
that ISIS is a scourge that is latent in both Syria and Iraq
and it has the potential to resurge if not addressed.
General Votel. I do agree.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
As I know you are aware, when we provide or sell United
States weapons to end users, there are requirements which
prohibit the transfer of any of those weapons to third parties
without prior authorization from the United States Government.
In legislation that we passed relative to Yemen, there are
requirements for us to certify how the Saudis are using
weapons. So far, we have not gotten authoritative certification
of how those weapons are being used. There is, again, a recent
CNN report that suggests that weapons that have been provided
to UAE and to Saudi Arabia have wound up in the hands of
Houthis, that they have been traded and been used on both sides
of that conflict.
Can you talk about what DOD is doing to address that?
General Votel. Senator, I am aware of the references that
you are making to that. We have not authorized Saudi Arabia or
the Emirates to retransfer any of this equipment to other
parties on the ground in Yemen. As you are well aware, when we
do provide equipment, whether it comes government to government
or commercially provided, that the recipients do have to agree
to certain stipulations on the use of those. We do have
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that sometimes go through
the Department of State if it is commercially provided, through
the Department of Defense if it is government to government
provided and requires us to conduct surveys. It requires us to
conduct inventories of this type of equipment so we know where
it is. There are processes in place with this.
I would also highlight that in some of these cases, again,
I think we have to look more closely at the allegations in this
particular situation to find out what happened. As we have seen
in Iraq in the past where we saw our partners overrun, we have
seen American equipment provided to them lost in the course of
a fight end up in the hands of our adversaries out there. I
think we will have to examine that better.
But, to your point of our responsibilities in terms of
ensuring proper end use of the materials, we absolutely get
that and emphasize that with our partners all the time.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, let me
recognize Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General, for appearing to
testify one last time. I know it breaks your heart that this
will be your last time to testify. Most importantly, thank you
for your many years of service and thanks to your whole team
for their service as well.
We have heard a lot about what might happen in the future
against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, but I do not think
we have heard yet just a simple answer about how the fight is
going. Can you tell us how the fight is going against the
Islamic State right now?
General Votel. In Syria, as you know, we are focused on
completing the liberation of the physical caliphate.
Senator Cotton. Where in Syria are you doing that right
now?
General Votel. In the southern Euphrates Valley, up against
the border with Iraq right now. That fight is progressing as we
envisioned it. As I mentioned in my opening comments, it is
limited to a relatively small area. It is very dense. It is
dense urban terrain. Certainly there is a lot of pressure on
ISIS in there. The area is laden with extreme explosive hazards
that pose significant threats to our partners on the ground.
They are having to proceed very closely.
I would add, Senator, that there is a civilian component to
this. There are families of fighters. There are civilians left
in the town. There are refugees that are attempting to depart
this area. What we have seen, as we have kind of closed into
this last area here, is our Syrian Democratic Force partners
with coalition assistance moving very deliberately, fully
recognizing the situation on the ground and making sure they do
not exacerbate this any more than it is. But we remain
confident that we will finish this aspect of it.
When we get done with this, we should expect that we will
do what you would remember as back clearance, going back and
reclearing areas, removing explosive hazards, instituting local
security, and then continuing to keep pressure on the remnants
of the network that have gone to ground and are operating in a
much more insurgent aspect.
In Iraq, that is the case. We do see ISIS operating in a
guerilla or an insurgent fashion. They are at a level where,
for the most part, the Iraqi Security Forces with the
assistance of the coalition are able to address those threats.
That will be important to continue to do that in the future.
In Iraq and Syria, that is where we are with the current
fight right now, Senator.
Senator Cotton. In Syria, I have heard it said that we have
taken back about 99 percent of what was once the territorial
caliphate. Is that number correct?
General Votel. That is right. We are down to about 20
square miles that they still control.
Senator Cotton. I have also heard estimates of about 20,000
to 30,000 Islamic State fighters remain. Do they remain in that
1 percent of territory, or is that only a fraction----
General Votel. No. Those fighters are geographically
dispersed across Syria, across the open areas of----
Senator Cotton. Just some are dug in in the defense in that
1 percent. Others, as you say, are spread out conducting
insurgency or guerilla type attacks.
General Votel. There are 1,000 to 1,500 fighters that are
left down in this small area right now that we are fighting
over, but the remainder have dispersed and are disaggregated in
a variety of different areas and for the most part have gone to
ground.
Senator Cotton. In Iraq and very soon, we hope, throughout
Syria as well, as you talk about countering that insurgency or
the guerilla tactics, the back clearance, could you give the
American people a little bit of a sense of what our troops in
Iraq are doing? Is it more like the Rangers that you once led,
kicking down the doors and shooting bad guys? Are we providing
them intelligence, logistic aerial support?
General Votel. The technique that we have used in both Iraq
and Syria is what we refer to as by, with, and through. We have
relied on our partners, the Iraqi Security Force and the Syrian
Democratic Force, to do the fighting. Our job has been to
enable them with our fires, with our ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], with our advice. Sometimes
we do employ our fighters in support of them and directly
engage the enemy, but our people are not actually, as you
suggest, kicking in doors in this case.
By, with, and through puts the emphasis on our partners to
do this, and then we enable them with our capabilities to do
this. This has been, I think, a very effective approach over
the last several years. I think in the end, our partners own
what is left behind. We do not. They own it. They own the
security. They own the responsibility for this. This has been a
different approach for us, but it is one that I think has
worked very well for us.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
One final question about the implications for the future.
Syrian Democratic Forces currently are detaining several
hundred ISIS fighters. Is that correct?
General Votel. That is correct.
Senator Cotton. We will not get into any more details in
the open setting here about the exact numbers or locations. But
is it safe to assume that some of those are what ISIS leaders
would call just cannon fodder, troops to be thrown into the
maw, but some are like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, terrorist
masterminds, or Ibrahim al Asiri, master bomb makers, who pose
a serious threat to the United States?
General Votel. I think that is accurate, Senator. They come
from all aspects of ISIS.
Senator Cotton. What is going to happen to those detainees,
especially those extremely dangerous detainees, in the future
if the United States is not present in Syria?
General Votel. Well, Senator, for those that we
characterize as foreign terrorist fighters, our focus needs to
be on returning them to the countries of origin. That is the
work of our partners in the Department of State, Department of
Justice, and others who are working with their counterparts in
these countries of origin to make sure they have the evidence,
the details, and we can make arrangements. Our responsibility
at this time is to make sure that the Syrian Democratic Forces
continue to treat detainees in accordance with our values, with
the Law of Armed Conflict, and then to facilitate the movement
of these fighters back to their countries.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. I hope we can do that
with most of them. I would observe there is a lot of empty bed
space at Guantanamo Bay.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, let me recognize Senator
Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Welcome, General Votel.
A moment ago, in describing by, with, and through, you
mentioned partners left behind, and I want to ask about one of
those partners. As our troops withdraw from Syria, what efforts
are being made to ensure the safety and security of our Kurdish
allies?
General Votel. Well, certainly this is a key aspect of the
ongoing planning right now, Senator. Of the many tasks that we
have of defeating ISIS and withdrawing our forces, certainly we
add to that list the protection of Turkey and making sure that
they do not have threats that would emanate from them and, I
would say, the added task of making sure that we protect those
who have fought with us. A key aspect of our ongoing planning
efforts right now, both at the diplomatic and military level,
is to address that very issue and make sure that those that
have fought with us, that have helped us accomplish our mission
are safeguarded as we depart Syria.
Senator Heinrich. I agree with you that that should be a
priority. I am asking what are those specific plans.
General Votel. Senator, I think it would probably be more
appropriate for us to talk about what is under consideration in
a closed session right now. But we certainly are looking at a
variety of different options.
Senator Heinrich. I would be happy to do that.
I worry that there is a lot of lip service right now about
making good on our promises to the Kurds, and it seems that we
are short on plans. I hope that that is not accurate. I
certainly hope that we have a plan for how to deconflict Turkey
and the Kurds because I think the consequences could be morally
terrible if we do not.
Do you believe that currently the efforts in this area are
adequate?
General Votel. I do right now. I think we have the
leadership up and down the chain of command both in the
Department of Defense and the Department of State fully aligned
in our approach as we work through what is arguably a very
complex problem here. But I think we are very well aligned and
we are very focused on exactly the challenge that you have
outlined, Senator.
Senator Heinrich. I look forward to hearing more about that
in a closed setting.
General Votel, on February 3rd, President Trump announced
that we would keep troops in Iraq to, quote, watch over Iran.
Has our military focus there shifted from ISIS to Iran?
General Votel. It has not, Senator.
Senator Heinrich. Glad to hear that.
I am concerned with the response in Iraq. As you probably
know, Iraqi President Salih responded very quickly saying that
the President and the United States did not ask Iraq about
this. Are you at all concerned that Iraq will now be skeptical
of our motivations for being there, and how will that
perception affect our ability to relocate United States troops
from Syria to Iraq?
General Votel. Senator, this is not particularly newfound.
I think the Government of Iraq understands the relationship or
the view that we have on Iran and understands our concerns with
Iran and the variety of destabilizing activities that they
conduct around the region. But having said that, our military
mission on the ground remains very focused on the reason that
the Government of Iraq asked us to come there, and that is
focusing on the defeat of ISIS and now preventing the
resurgence of that particular organization.
Senator Heinrich. Let me pivot just a little bit to Russia.
General Votel, as you know, on January 30th, Russia pledged to
support Iraq in its fight against ISIS in preparation for the
United States' withdrawal from Syria. What is your current
perception of Russian influence in Iraq?
General Votel. I think right now, Russia has limited
influence in the country of Iraq.
Senator Heinrich. Do we have plans or a strategy for
countering that Russian influence once withdrawal from Syria is
complete?
General Votel. Well, I do not have any specific military
tasks that are related to that, Senator. But what I would
highlight is that one of the most effective tools that we have
is being good, reliable partners on the ground, and that is
what we intend to do and that has always been our approach with
the country of Iraq, focused on what they have asked us to do
and then being very reliable partners to them.
Senator Heinrich. Chairman, I am going to yield the
remainder of my time.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thanks for all your hard work. Thank you for
your service.
I met the other day with some opposition leaders from
Syria, and while they expressed some concern about exactly how
the withdrawal would happen, they did ask what the ability
would be to do a no-fly zone afterwards which they thought
would have a positive impact of keeping Turkey in place. Have
you considered that as a doable?
General Votel. Again, we are looking at a variety of
options that I will be happy to talk about in a closed session
right here. I would not characterize what we are looking at
right now as a no-fly zone.
Senator Scott. Why do you believe Russia has continued to
be involved in Syria? What is their strategic advantage for
them to be involved? Is it just to cause problems for us, or is
there a strategic interest they have?
General Votel. Russia does have some long-term interests
that they have had in Syria that go back some ways. But
certainly part of their motivation is by making sure they have
warm water access into the Mediterranean and the access that
that provides. They are interested in preserving that. They are
interested in preserving a regime that is friendly and
supportive to their motives and interests. I also believe that
they share an interest in trying to subvert our influence and
interests in the region. I do think they see that as an
opportunity for them, and I think they are attempting to
exploit that.
Senator Scott. After President Trump made the announcement
that we would do a withdrawal, have you seen Turkey take
different action on the ground? Is there anything they are
doing that causes you concern?
General Votel. Well, Senator, I think we probably can talk
a little bit more about that in the closed session. But in
general, what I would tell you is we have seen all actors begin
to posture themselves for what might come, and we have seen
that on all sides.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
I am finished, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. We are not used to
such subtle and penetrating questions. Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Senator Jones, on behalf of Senator Inhofe.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Thank you, General, for your service. I echo that and also
for all of the team that is behind you. I am well aware that
your success is only as good as the success of those that serve
with you. I use that term appropriately as opposed to the chain
of command below you. They serve with you. I appreciate all the
folks sitting behind you and all of those that are still over
there.
I want to follow up briefly with kind of a question that
Senator Shaheen asked about the CNN report of our military
equipment somehow getting into the hands of others, but I want
to come at it in a little bit different way.
Last year, you stated that due to political considerations,
cost, or delivery speed, some of our partners are seeking
alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer
competitors like Russia and China. When our partners go
elsewhere, it reduces our interoperability and challenges our
ability to incorporate their contributions into theater
efforts.
I think it is critical that we align our practices with
what is necessary to achieve these goals, as you alluded to,
and we want our partners to come to us. Particularly I am
concerned when they are going to communist China, communist
Russia to get that because we are seeing around the world the
influence of those countries.
My question is, does this challenge persist today, and if
so, could you please talk a little bit more about those
challenges or barriers that exist to our partners coming to us
for equipment and what steps you believe we need to take in
order to keep them coming to us rather than communist Russia
and communist China?
General Votel. Senator, thank you.
To some extent, they do continue to exist today. I
certainly recognize that our foreign military sales, foreign
military funding process must be a deliberative one. We should
make very deliberate decisions about the things that we sell to
people, and that has to go through a process.
I am concerned that the process is lengthy and is not as
responsive as our partners require on the ground. I am very
much in support of trying to look at how we make those
processes more responsive to the needs that they have on the
ground. I think we should always strive for that. There are a
lot of steps that we go through to provide equipment to people.
Some of them are within the Department of Defense, some of them
within the Department of State, and certainly some over here in
Congress. To the extent that we can have a more rapid process
to answer the requirements of our partners, I think that would
be beneficial. In some cases, if we are not going to provide
things to them, we should be very honest with them up front and
tell them we are not going to. I think it is always better to
give them a yes or a no answer than it is to string them along
because I think that leads to more frustration for our partners
and it does cause them to go do other things.
I also think a key part of this is our work on the ground
beforehand with our partners. This is within the military here,
is making sure that the things that they are asking meet the
needs of each of their countries in their own defense. We
should try to steer them away from just buying things that they
cannot maintain, they cannot sustain, they cannot man long
term, and we should be focused on the equipment that they can
and equipment that can be integrated with us and other partners
in the region to provide a more formidable deterrent effect or
a defense, if needed.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you, sir.
With regard to the Iran nuclear deal, it looks like we are
out. How will United States withdrawal from the Iran nuclear
deal affect our posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?
General Votel. Well, I do not know that withdrawal from the
Iran deal will specifically impact our posture. Our posture
will be more driven by the National Defense Strategy than it
will be by a decision to depart from the JCPOA [Joint Common
Plan of Action].
I would just add that as I look across the region, Iran
does continue to present concerns to me. It is the major
destabilizing factor in the region. While the nuclear weapons
program is one aspect of the threat that they presented, their
facilitation of ballistic missiles, of unmanned aerial systems,
of other lethal materials to their proxies in Yemen, in Syria,
in Iraq, other places here, I think this should give us very,
very significant cause. Their continued efforts to exercise
control over critical waterways I think should give us
continued cause here.
Iran continues to present threats to us across the region,
and as we look at implementing the National Defense Strategy--
and I agree with the focus on great power competition--my best
advice back up through my chain of command will be to ensure
that we do retain sufficient capabilities and sufficient
response capabilities to deal with the threats that remain in
the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you, sir. Thank you very
much.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Hawley please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
General, thank you for being here. Thank you again for your
service.
I want to stay on that same topic about the National
Defense Strategy and Iran and just explore some of the tensions
that the National Defense Strategy creates for your area of
operation.
Can I just ask you, in your judgment, are we in a position
to remove, draw down forces, move forces from your area of
operation to Asia or Europe in accord with the National Defense
Strategy's priorities on great power competition with China and
Russia? Are we in a position to do that and also engage, if
necessary, Iran should that nation provoke a conflict with us
or should they continue to accelerate further their uranium
enrichment program?
General Votel. Senator, the National Defense Strategy
necessarily puts focus on the United States regaining its
competitive advantage against great powers, Russia and China in
this particular case. I agree with that, and we are absolutely
supportive of that from a CENTCOM standpoint. We do recognize
that that will necessitate some change in our posture in the
region. As we go through the discussions and the planning
aspects of that with the Joint Staff, with OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense], and certainly with the services, we will
seek to maintain the capabilities that we need to and then
ensure that we have the right response capabilities to address
threats as they present themselves in this area.
Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you a little bit more about
that. The National Defense Strategy calls for more efficient
ways of operating in the greater Middle East, in your area of
operational authority, the idea being again to enable us to
maintain the focus on Iran and terrorists there and also to
shift attention towards a great power conflict.
Can you tell me about your plans to make operations in your
area of responsibility more efficient? What does that mean?
What does that look like? Can you give us a tangible sense of
it?
General Votel. Certainly. One of the areas where we can
continue to be more efficient is how we operate along our
bureaucratic combatant commander seams. With me, I share a
boundary with EUCOM to the north. I share one with AFRICOM to
the west, and with INDOPACOM to the east. I think it is
extraordinarily important as we look at managing resources that
we look at positioning and employing these resources in a way
that they can be of the maximum utility to multiple combatant
commands. Today we actually do that with some of our resources
in the region.
You might be aware, for example, that AFRICOM supports us
with basing that we require for our activities in the Arabian
Peninsula, and the resources that we have there benefit both
General Waldhauser in his command and they benefit me. I think
there are some smarter ways of doing this.
Certainly the Department's focus on dynamic force
employment where we exercise strategic predictability but
operational unpredictability I think is a good concept of this
where we are able to move resources in a more agile fashion
into areas where we see opportunities with this. I think this
is another area that we need to continue to focus on.
Senator Hawley. In this same vein, we have heard some and I
have read some about light attack aircraft and security force
assistance brigades. Can you give me your sense about the
progress on those initiatives and what else you might propose
in that vein?
General Votel. On both of those initiatives, the security
force assistance brigades--you know, my service, the Army, I
think did us a significant service by establishing this
organization. What this essentially did--we talked about by,
with, and through, but what this really allowed us to do is it
gave us a purpose-built organization that was specifically
focused on this type of advising and the type of relationship
we wanted to have with our indigenous partners on the ground.
Over the deployment of the first security force assistance
brigade last year in Afghanistan, we saw significant
improvement in our ability to do that, a higher level of
capability, a much more focused organization, and I think we
helped the Army preserve its readiness frankly. We did not take
a brigade, break it apart just to pull the leaders out to do
advise and assist. We actually had a purpose-built organization
that did that. I think this is a very positive thing.
The light attack aircraft. Being able to train our partners
in terms of employing those things I think reduces the burden
on us, and it provides self-sufficiency for them. It does it
without creating a significant logistical burden. Whether it is
A-29's that we see with the Lebanese armed forces or A-29's we
see with the Afghan security air force, these I think are good
investments. In both cases we have seen those resources be
directly responsible to their forces on the ground. It is
nascent. It is growing. We have to continue to support this,
but I think this is exactly the direction we need to go to
really enable our partners.
Senator Hawley. Last question. You are satisfied, General.
I mean, you think that those programs, for example, are on
track. You think that we are making good progress in both of
those initiatives.
General Votel. I do. I think both of those are excellent
programs.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Thank you, General Votel. Thank you for your testimony here
today and your many years of distinguished service.
General, in your written testimony, you described Jordan
as, quote, one of our most committed partners in the Middle
East and one of the most critical voices of moderate Islam in
the region. Your testimony goes on to discuss the role that
Jordan plays in hosting over 750,000 refugees from Syria, Iraq,
and elsewhere and Jordan's contributions to the fight against
ISIS and Jordan's role in hosting Exercise Eagle Lion, which
includes nearly 2 dozen countries training in the
counterterrorism mission.
Today in the Senate, we are debating S. 1, Strengthening
America's Security in the Middle East. It includes a United
States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Extension Act. The premise of
the legislation is that Jordan is playing a critical role in
addressing the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the fight
against ISIS and, therefore, extends our defense cooperation
agreement.
Could you describe and talk a little bit more about the
contributions that Jordan is making, what are some of the
challenges Jordan faces in making these contributions, and why
this extension is important?
General Votel. Thank you, Senator. I would just share
everything that you just said there about what a great partner
they are.
Certainly Jordan is not a rich country. They face economic
challenges by virtue of where they are. His Majesty is working
through that aspect with his parliament right now and with the
international community, and I think we should continue to be
supportive of that.
As you have said, given the chance to say no, they say yes
every time to everything that we seek.
I would share with you, Senator, the last week I was in
Jordan. I had an opportunity to visit the border, up along the
border between Jordan and Syria, and I had an opportunity to
witness the investments that our country has made in their
border security initiatives: equipment, training, command and
control for this. What I witnessed there I think would make any
Member of Congress or, indeed, any American very proud to see.
It was extraordinarily professional. It was very effective.
They had very good situational awareness and understanding of
what was happening along their border, and everything that they
were doing was sustainable. They have been doing it for several
years and with the prospect of continuing to do it in the
future. These are the kinds of investments that we need to be
making in these very good partners right here like Jordan.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
Today in this bill, it also includes the Caesar Syria
Civilian Protection Act. It is a bill named after a defector
from the Syrian army who shed light on Assad's atrocities,
revealing photographs of torture and significant human rights
abuses that I know you are very aware of. The legislation
imposes sanctions on individuals who support Assad's regime in
Syria by providing financial and material or technological
support. This includes sanctions on those who provide aircraft
or spare aircraft parts for military purposes, sanctions on
those who collaborate with mercenaries, military contractors,
paramilitary forces operating on behalf of Syria, Russia, or
Iran, and sanctions those who help the Government of Syria
maintain or expand its production of natural gas and petroleum.
Your written testimony describes the Assad regime's use of
starvation as a weapon of war by denying humanitarian aid to be
delivered where it is critically needed.
My question to you, General, is to what extent do you
believe that imposing additional sanctions on the Assad regime,
including limiting access to aircraft and aircraft spare parts,
will degrade Assad's ability to attack innocent civilians and
exert pressure in a positive direction towards improving the
horrible humanitarian situation that we have there.
General Votel. Senator, my belief is history speaks for
itself here with the Assad regime, and we should continue to
keep the maximum amount of pressure on them to prevent them
from appropriating the atrocities that they have in the past on
their own people. I am supportive of all measures in that
regard.
Senator Peters. The last question, General. Last week, the
Committee held a hearing on the threats posed by Russia and
China. You have answered some questions related to what we
heard, as to how we need to have more efficient use of
resources in the Middle East. What came up was the possibility
of a review of the use of aircraft like the B-1 and the F-22 in
Afghanistan where those platforms might be better focused on
dealing with our near-peer competitors.
My question to you is--I have worked to extend and support
A-10's operating and to make sure that they have the wing
replacements so that A-10 aircraft can continue to operate. To
what extent is the A-10 necessary for you to conduct your
mission in places particularly if we look at moving B-1's and
F-22's out of theater?
General Votel. Well, Senator, I do not think you are going
to find any Army guys or infantrymen that are going to argue
against the A-10. It is an incredibly responsive capability
that has, I think, served us extraordinarily well in the past.
I know it is an old airplane, and so I share some concerns
about its sustainability. But certainly it has definitely
proven its worth to us, and we will continue to require that
type of support, some type of very responsive, close air
support capability well into the future.
Senator Peters. So you believe Congress should continue to
support that program in your estimation?
General Votel. I think we should continue to support that
program, and then we should be looking at other programs that
would provide those capabilities in the future.
Senator Peters. Appreciate it. Thank you, General.
Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, first of all, thank you for your service. Thank
you to your team as well.
The National Defense Strategy makes clear that the
Department's focus is preparing to deter and win, if necessary,
great power conflict with China and Russia. But we have also
got several partners in the region as I think Senator Peters
has just mentioned. Jordan is a great ally. So is Israel.
Israel has reportedly agreed to allow a Chinese Government-
connected firm, Shanghai International Port Group, to run
commercial operations at the Israeli Port of Haifa. This port
reportedly periodically hosts joint United States-Israeli naval
drills and visits from American vessels. From a U.S. military
perspective, do you have concerns regarding this deal? If this
deal goes forward, might it impact decisions to have the U.S.
Navy vessels visit the port?
General Votel. Senator, Israel resides outside of the
CENTCOM area of responsibility. So with regard to that, General
Scaparrotti would probably be the best one to answer that
question.
But I would share with you, as I look at the region in
which I do have military responsibilities, in the Gulf, in and
around the straits, particularly the Bab-el-Mandeb and these
areas, I am concerned about the increasing presence of Chinese
maritime activity in the region and their continued outreach to
different partners there to secure military access that is
likely linked to their economic objectives, their One Belt One
Road aspects that they propagate around the world but, in
particular, in the area in which I have military
responsibility. I deeply share your concern.
The United States and a number of our partners have long
provided maritime security in this area. Frankly, I think China
has been a free rider in this and taken advantage of that, and
now we see them beginning to develop their own infrastructure
in here principally for their own purposes, not for the
purposes of broader regional security in the region. I am
concerned about that.
Senator Rounds. In terms of how we separate out the
different areas of responsibility--and I respect the fact that
you have specific areas. Most certainly activity communication
with our ally Israel is a part of that responsibility, though.
Can you share with regard to how this impacts your ability and
does it? Or is it simply a matter of we are aware of it and we
will allow other individuals responsible in other areas of
responsibility to handle it?
General Votel. Senator, as I remarked earlier, we pay
particular attention to our bureaucratic, geographic seams out
here. General Scaparrotti and myself and our respective staffs
are very closely aligned with this. With his support, we
maintain a close relationship with Israel. As we have
recognized, many of their security threats reside within the
military area in which I have responsibility. I think this is
another aspect of how we cooperate across our combatant command
boundaries here, sharing responsibility. I absolutely
understand what you are saying, and I am very confident that
the mechanisms that we have in place are helping us address the
concerns that all parties have in the region.
Senator Rounds. Let me go to another area of bureaucracy.
Much has been written and said about the need to streamline
DOD's acquisition processes. Can you comment on the process and
the amount of time that it takes to fill validated requirements
in the CENTCOM area of operations? Do you believe that we must
reform the acquisition process to more quickly fill the urgent
and operational needs of our warfighters?
General Votel. Senator, I absolutely agree we should
continue to do everything that we can to address the needs of
the warfighters and try to do it as fast as we can. I am aware
of a number of initiatives that are underway to address that,
whether it is rapid prototyping or other things that we can do.
Our view in CENTCOM, as we confront emerging threats here, is
that we have tried to be supportive of the services bringing in
capabilities, trying them out, recognizing some of these will
fail. They will not succeed the way they are. But in the hands
of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the ground,
they will begin to provide very direct feedback that will help
these programs move along quicker.
From a CENTCOM standpoint, what we are principally
concerned about is making sure that we have a system in place
where we can bring things forward. We can rapidly test them. We
can get them in the hands of our people. They can provide
feedback. That goes back into the commercial or the industrial
base. They make the improvements and then bring us the improved
product out there that we can use. That to me is
extraordinarily important in an area like CENTCOM.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, were you aware of the President's intention to
order the withdrawal of our troops from Syria before that was
publicly announced?
General Votel. I was not aware of the specific
announcement. Certainly we are aware that he had expressed a
desire and intent in the past to depart Syria.
Senator King. You were not consulted before that decision
was announced.
General Votel. We were not. I was not consulted.
Senator King. You mentioned in your testimony that--you
used the word ``remnant'' with regard to ISIS. Can you give us
a better number than remnant? What are we talking about here?
Senator Cotton mentioned 20,000 to 30,000 fighters scattered in
various places around the world. Is that accurate?
General Votel. I think that is approximately what the
intelligence community has estimated that is left behind. I
think we would generally share with that. That includes people
of a variety of different characters. It includes fighters. It
includes supporters. It includes facilitators within that.
Senator King. How about in Syria and Iraq? What number
would you put that?
General Votel. I think in general from what I have seen,
that is about the number that I have seen.
Senator King. Twenty to thirty thousand.
General Votel. Yes, but Senator, this is probably a low to
moderate confidence number.
Senator King. Is it a low estimate? I am sorry. You threw
me with that. Do you think it is a higher number?
General Votel. I think we do not fully know.
Senator King. You do not have a precise number.
General Votel. We do not have it with any specific
accuracy. It is always going to be a range. The number is
always going to be a range.
Senator King. One of my concerns about the withdrawal with
that many ISIS fighters still in the area is that they will
just wait us out. The President announces a withdrawal. The
saying I have heard is the Americans have the watches, but we
have the time. Are they just going to wait and hunker down for
a couple years or a couple of months and then resuscitate their
efforts? If you were their military commander, would that not
be what you would do, say these guys are leaving, we will just
bide our time?
General Votel. Well, certainly, Senator. But our approach
here, as I mentioned in my opening comments, is as we look to
withdraw from Syria, we are in a very deliberate planning
process for how we will work with the international community,
with our partners on the ground with the rest of the coalition
to ensure that we can keep pressure on this organization to
prevent exactly what you are talking about.
Senator King. I think it is very important. Perhaps you can
share with the Committee in closed session what the strategy is
for maintaining that pressure and how success is defined that
will allow us to withdraw.
Let me move on with regard to, again, the withdrawal.
Senator Heinrich mentioned the danger to the Kurds. I sincerely
hope that in your exit interview with your successor, which
will take place very soon if not already, that you emphasize
the importance of protecting the Kurds. If they are slaughtered
by the Turks within the reasonable proximity of our leaving, it
will be a stain on the honor of this country that will persist
not only in terms of honor but also in terms of our ability to
attract allies to assist us in future projects of this kind.
That is my biggest fear about what is going on now, and I
believe the Turks are waiting.
General Votel. Senator, again, I think this is a key task
that we are looking at right now and that is the protection of
those who have fought valiantly with us and ensuring that they
remain safe as our diplomats and United Nations and others
pursue a political solution here in Syria.
Senator King. I certainly hope that is of the highest
priority.
You mentioned Iran and listed a whole series of malign
activities in the region. Which would you prefer? The current
malign Iran or a malign Iran with nuclear weapons?
General Votel. Certainly I think an Iran with nuclear
weapons poses a more enduring and serious threat to us long
term. Our approach to them does need to make sure that we deny
all paths for them to get to a nuclear weapon.
Senator King. Well, unfortunately, we have just abrogated
an agreement that did just that, but we can discuss that in
another setting.
Final question on Afghanistan. I do not understand that we
are negotiating unilaterally with the Taliban and not involving
the Government of Afghanistan. I do not understand how that is
going to get us to a final result of the Government of
Afghanistan if we give away things they are not willing to give
away.
General Votel. Again, Senator, I think the way I would
characterize Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts is he is at the
beginning of process here to put together a framework that will
allow the Afghans and Taliban to come together at some
particular point to conduct some negotiations. All of this is
being done with the knowledge of the Government of Afghanistan.
They understand what he is doing. I cannot speak for the exact
process itself since that is Ambassador Khalilzad's. But I do
know that he is in frequent consultation with the Government of
Afghanistan to ensure that they are best informed on the
approaches that he is taking to continue to get this framework
in place.
Senator King. Good. I hope that is the case. Thank you. I
appreciate it. Thank you, General.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
As a reminder, you made several references as to a
different setting for some of the answers to your questions. We
will be having a closed meeting at 2:15 in the Visitor Center.
So you have that opportunity.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, good to see you again. I want to thank you and
Sergeant Major for your outstanding service to our Nation and
very, very much appreciated.
I wanted to dive in a little bit more. We have had this
discussion I think on both sides of this idea as we are
refining our force posture in the region, this notion of having
a robust counterterrorism force that can still focus on U.S.
interests, whether it is the rise of ISIS, whether it is the
rise again of al Qaeda, whether it is the malign activities of
Iran. I think, unfortunately, some of my colleagues like to
look a blind eye. I am going to ask you a couple questions
about that.
But what is that concept of--you know, this is something
the President has talked about, but your predecessor, a general
who I happen to have a lot of respect for, General Abizaid, has
talked a lot about this idea of a raid force component, robust
CT [Counter Terrorism] element in the Middle East that can
continue to focus on our key strategic interests. How would
that work, and are you thinking through that, whether it is in
Iraq, whether it is in other parts of the Middle East? Do we
have the capability not only to go after our counterterrorism
goals but, say, for example, control the airspace in northern
Syria, which a number of us think is important even if we are
not on the ground there?
General Votel. Senator, I believe that we do, and we are in
fact thinking through the different ways that we would continue
to address our enduring concern about violent extremist
organizations operating in this region who harbor interests in
coming against the Homeland.
Senator Sullivan. That is our overriding national interest.
General Votel. It is. As we look at all of the activities
that we are conducting across the region, I think safeguarding
that particular national interest has to be among the very top
things that we are doing. There are a variety of different
approaches that we can take to this. Certainly the by, with,
and through approach using partners on the ground, enabling
them to keep pressure on them is one way of doing this. In some
instances, it may require us to have some of our capabilities
forward in different locations to ensure that we can do that.
Senator Sullivan. Are we looking at those options right now
to make sure----
General Votel. We actually are looking at a variety of
different options for how we might address this.
Senator Sullivan. Are you confident we can address this,
not only given your role as CENTCOM Commander, but your
previous role as SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command]
Commander?
General Votel. I am supremely confident in both our SOF
[U.S. Special Operations Forces] and conventional forces in the
ability to meet the missions that our Nation has in this area
and in others.
Senator Sullivan. Let me talk about Iran a little bit. You
know, my colleague from Maine, who I consider a good friend and
deeply respect--he mentioned the Iran nuclear deal. The Iran
nuclear deal essentially gave Iran the freedom to be on the
verge of becoming a nuclear nation within 10 years anyway. We
always forget that. That is a short time span in the Middle
East. That was the agreement.
You know, General Dempsey, when he was Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, testified in front of this Committee that when
the Iranians were supplying--the Quds Force and others were
supplying sophisticated IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] to
the Iraqi Shitte militias, they were responsible for the
killing and wounding of over 2,000 American soldiers, airmen,
and marines. Do you agree with that assessment?
General Votel. I do agree that Iran facilitated equipment
to organizations that caused casualties on Americans.
Senator Sullivan. Massive casualties.
General Votel. Massive casualties.
Senator Sullivan. It often gets forgotten that Iranians
were, in my view, directly responsible for killing and wounding
over 2,000 American soldiers and other military members on the
ground in Iraq. Is that not correct?
General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. One of the big selling points of the Iran
nuclear deal was that it was going to moderate Iranian
activities. This was sold by Secretary of State John Kerry and
even President Obama. Have they moderated their malign
activities in Syria?
General Votel. Senator, they have not.
Senator Sullivan. No. It has gotten worse. Is that not
true, General?
General Votel. It is my observation that during the time
that the agreement was in place, we did not see a modification
to their behavior.
Senator Sullivan. How about with regard to Yemen? A lot of
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle forget who started the
war in Yemen. It was not the Saudis. Was it?
General Votel. Well----
Senator Sullivan. The Houthis backed by the Iranians?
General Votel. The Saudis were concerned about the presence
of an Iranian-backed organization along their southern border.
Senator Sullivan. With regard to Israel, they [Iran]
certainly have not moderated their malign activities. Have
they? Iran?
General Votel. I think if you talk to the Israelis, they
certainly would agree with that.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question with regard
to--Secretary Pompeo gave a speech in Cairo that was laying out
what I thought was a very well articulated, robust counter-Iran
strategy. How are you looking as the CENTCOM Commander to
execute this strategy, which I think is one of the most
important things we can be doing in the Middle East?
General Votel. Well, Senator, I have responsibility for
helping put together the military global campaign plan for
Iran. As I look at that, I look at a variety of different
things that we have to do as part of that. We have to assure
our partners. We have to challenge Iran in the areas where they
are trying to exert their malign influence. We have to be
prepared to deter them. We have to be prepared to delay and
respond to their activities in the region. As I look at the
planning that we are doing against that, those are the types of
things that I am trying to incorporate into a comprehensive
plan to address the threat of Iran.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Duckworth?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for being here. I also want to
recognize that your Command Sergeant Major is here. Sergeant
Major Thetford, thank you for all of your years of work as well
on behalf of our Nation.
General, I want to go back to a theme that you have talked
about a lot in terms of relationship building and setting the
groundwork with our partners beforehand in the region and the
like. You and I touched a little bit on some of the programs
that exist that allow us to do that, to build these habitual
relationships. I know that the Ranking Member had talked about
IMET programs.
I would like to touch on the State Partnership for Peace
programs. This is a program where, when I was serving, from the
time I was a second lieutenant, I had a partner nation in
Illinois' case, Poland, that we trained and worked with. I grew
up in the military along with my Polish counterpart from being
young second lieutenants all the way up through our command
time. That developed a relationship and an understanding of how
that worked.
Can you speak a little bit about the different types of
U.S.-funded military exchange programs that you see implemented
in the CENTCOM region? Talk about the values of those programs
contributing to our warfighting capabilities.
General Votel. Thank you. Senator, let me just start and
talk about the State Partnership program. This is an excellent
program. We have four or five States that are partnered with
countries across our region, and in almost every case, these
are deeply valued programs by our partners in the region and I
believe by the States that orchestrate them. We get a lot of
benefit out of that, not just in the countries in the region,
but again by people from those countries coming back to America
to participate in exercises to build the relationships back
here. I think this is an extraordinary program. It is long-
term. It is enduring, and I think it serves us particularly
well.
You have already talked about the impact of IMET. This is
an extraordinarily important program. I will not belabor that.
I also think that the program of exercises that we continue
to orchestrate across the region are extraordinarily important
in terms of building interoperability, in terms of building
readiness, and in terms of building reliability in our
partners. As we have continued to move forward, I think this
will be again continuing investments that we will want to make.
For example, with Egypt, we have restarted the Bright Star
exercise, but we have changed it more to deal with the
contemporary threats that we are dealing with and that Egypt is
dealing with in the terrorism realm as opposed to perhaps the
sweeping tank battles of the past. That is not what we are
doing.
I think through our exercise programs, we have the ability
to make these very specific to the needs of the region and
address it.
I would add one final program that I think is
extraordinarily valuable, and it is our combined maritime force
where we invite different partners in the region, some from
outside of the region to come in and participate as part of our
combined maritime forces operating in the Gulf and in the
waters of the region. These are extraordinarily important. We
see countries like Pakistan who step forward, provide
significant resources in this, and provide leadership to these
organizations. This allows us to make sure that we share the
burden, we leverage the capabilities that everybody brings, and
it adds to a much more collective approach to security in the
region.
Those are just four key programs of probably several others
that could be discussed as well.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
That last point speaks a little bit to my logistical
officer heart. When I look at a map of the CENTCOM region, I
cannot help but wonder how your J-4 is able to transport
people, equipment, and supplies throughout the theater
especially in light of great power competition and the changing
environment as it is. It becomes even more salient when I think
about the potential for Iranians to close the Strait of Hormuz
and restrict movement in the Arabian Gulf.
Going back to the exercises you just mentioned, do you
regularly exercise against this threat, and how confident are
you that our logistical supply chain will not be gravely
impacted, should conflict with the Iranians escalate in the
region?
General Votel. Certainly we do. I mean, one of the
principal concerns we have is the mining of the straits and the
impact that that would have. We do regular mining exercises and
counter-mining exercises in the maritime environment here. We
have a big exercise planned later this fall with a number of
different countries that will come in. But this is certainly
something that we are focused on.
You are really hitting on the resiliency of our logistics
networks in the region, and I do think that our command, our
components out there, and our partners have really begun to
address this. Certainly you are familiar with the northern
distribution network that kind of goes up through the Central
Asian states. That has been important for us. We continue to
exercise that. It certainly does have some influence from
Russia and that. It is a more difficult network to orchestrate,
but it is not impossible. We do continue to move materials
across that area.
Across the Arabian Peninsula, we have what we refer to as
the Trans-Arabian Network that links a variety of ports and
cities and airports not only in the Arabian Gulf but down in
the Gulf of Oman and over to the Red Sea. It gives us extreme
resiliency in terms of how we can move material, men, forces
into the region to respond to capabilities.
We are very much focused on that. In fact, as we look at
implementing the National Defense Strategy, what that might
mean for CENTCOM, our focus on these logistic networks and our
ability to have agreements, basing, and other things in here I
think become even more important than they already have. We
have tried to prioritize that and we will continue to do that
as we move forward.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Vitally important, indeed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
First, Sergeant Major, thank you for your wonderful years
of service and commitment to our great United States. We
certainly appreciate that.
Major Votel--Major Votel--many years ago, a number of your
colleagues and your soldiers believed that you would become a
great leader. I have to say, General, that they were correct
all those years ago. Thank you so much for your wonderful
service. I appreciate that.
One of our most effective resources for building
partnerships and capacity, while maintaining the pressure that
we have on those violent extremist organizations, is done
obviously through our special operators, and you are intimately
familiar with that. How do you see the role of our special
operators evolving across the CENTCOM AOR [Area of
Responsibility] with regard to counterterrorism and capacity
building, as well as the role more broadly nested within the
National Defense Strategy? If you can talk a little bit about
that role, how we are developing them.
General Votel. Thank you.
So, Senator, as you suggest, the special operations forces
will continue to play a key role in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility as we confront violent extremism here. They have
developed a level of expertise and proficiency in this that is
certainly unmatched anywhere else. We will depend on that.
I would add this, that one of the things I am most proud of
as CENTCOM Commander and as a former SOCOM Commander, is how
well our special operations forces and our conventional forces
are integrated in the areas in which we operate. In many cases,
it is almost indistinguishable. There is very little concern
with who gets the credit or who is calling the shots here. It
is an extraordinarily collaborative environment between all of
our forces on the ground.
This will be essential as we move forward. As you know, our
special operations capabilities are limited. They are in great
demand not just in CENTCOM but in other areas. That will be
brought out as we fully implement the National Defense
Strategy. Reliance on our conventional forces beginning to do
some of these things and to develop the same methodologies that
our special operators have developed over the course of many
years will become very, very important as we move forward.
Senator Ernst. General, as we are drawing down the number
of troops that we have, whether it is Syria, Afghanistan,
elsewhere, we do continue to maintain, train, advise, assist,
and at times accompany missions. Do you see that continuing
forward as a force multiplier with partners in that region?
What more can we do in that area?
General Votel. I do, Senator. I think this idea, by, with
and through, and focused on training, advising, assisting,
enabling our partners is a proven method for us, and I think it
works extraordinarily well in this particular region. I do see
that moving forward.
Going forward, it will be important for us to maintain
these relationships. The relationships that we depend on in
this region are not those that can be put together in the
course of a crisis. They have to be developed and they have to
be nurtured over time. As Admiral McRaven often reminded us
when he was the SOCOM Commander, you cannot surge trust in
times of crisis. That has to be done in advance. I think the
lifeblood of what we do out here will be the development of
resilient, trustful relationships across our region.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. I appreciate the comments
made by my colleagues as well about the State Partnership
programs, the IMET programs, and so on. Those are very, very
important in developing that level of trust.
Just very briefly, because I am running out of time,
General, of course, we do have some other big players in the
region. We see Russia, of course, in Syria. We see China's
investments in Pakistan. Where else do you assess that China
and Russia are involved in that AOR, and what is the extent of
that and what are their intentions from your perspective?
General Votel. Thanks.
Well, starting with Russia, certainly Russia has
extraordinary interests in the Central Asian states, these
being former Soviet republics. They maintain a long-term
relationship there. This will always continue to be something
that we will have to contend with in this particular region. We
have seen in the past Russia working with countries like Egypt
and others to potentially fill in voids there. We have to be
mindful of those relationships as well.
When you look at China, I think their motivations are
principally driven by their economic objectives, again really
driven by the One Belt One Road approach that they are taking
to link trade routes back to China. I think the thing we have
to continue to be watchful of is their developing relationships
with other partners across the region, particularly in the
maritime environment, in the countries that are along the
waterways in the region, whether they are some of the Gulf
states or whether they are some that are on the African
continent, but which certainly give them very good access into
the CENTCOM waters here. These are the areas I think that we
will have to pay attention to in the future.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. They have a long game, and we do
need to pay attention.
My time has expired, but General, my best to you and your
beautiful family. Thank you so very much.
General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join my colleagues in thanking you for your service and
thanks for your very forthright and helpful answers today.
I want to come back to a line of questioning that Senator
Reed began about the $331 million that we are owed by the
Saudis for aerial refueling. Have we made a demand to the
Saudis that they pay that money?
General Votel. Senator, we have presented all those bills
to the Saudi-led coalition. They have them there, in receipt of
them. They acknowledge that. We are working through to ensure
that the products that we have given to them are--they
understand what that is and they will be able to respond to us.
They have given us every indication that they intend to meet
the requirements for reimbursement that we have asked for.
Senator Blumenthal. There is no question in your mind, is
there, that that $331 million is owed to our country?
General Votel. That is reimbursement for fuel that we have
provided for them, and it is reimbursement for the flight hours
associated with the aircraft that provided that fuel.
Senator Blumenthal. When will they make that payment of
reimbursement?
General Votel. We expect that, in terms of the flying
hours--bills have been presented to both Saudi Arabia and to
the Emirates--for flying hours we will see responses as early
as March and then likely for the fuel, by the May time frame.
The ACSA requires that they provide reimbursement within 90
days of notification.
Senator Blumenthal. These are U.S. taxpayer dollars that
they owe us, to put it most simply. Correct?
General Votel. Yes, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. You mentioned--I may have misheard
you--that there is the possibility of other instances where
they or other countries owe us for similar kinds of expenses?
General Votel. I do not think we have identified any other
than that. I think the question was have we looked more broadly
across the region to ensure that we do not have this problem
with others, and we are in the process of doing that, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. You are reviewing----
General Votel. Exactly to make sure that we have not had an
oversight on this.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you found any indications that
there have been other failures to repay?
General Votel. I have not been notified of any thus far,
Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. I would like to ask you about the
special operators, and Senator Ernst asked you a number of
questions. Can they operate as effectively from bases in Iraq
as they can from where they are located now?
General Votel. Senator, I think our special operators are
extraordinarily capable. You know, in the beginning of our
operations in both Iraq and Syria, there was a time when we did
not have anybody on the ground, and yet we were able to have a
relationship with our partners on the ground in Syria and we
were able to do that from remote locations. We do that in other
places. They are extraordinarily innovative, and so we will
look at all options that we can use here.
Senator Blumenthal. I guess my question, just to rephrase
it, was not whether they can operate at all, but whether they
can operate as effectively if they are based remotely. Are they
not more effective if they are, in effect, in the combat area
where they are supposed to operate?
General Votel. Well, Senator, I would agree with you that
it is always best to be with your partner and to be sharing
everything that they are experiencing. I think that is optimum.
But certainly I think we have demonstrated in a variety of
different areas here that through a remote location, we can
achieve the objectives that we are focused on.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, knowing how skilled and effective
our special operators are, I have no doubt that they can
operate from very remote locations. But I take it you would
agree with me that the optimum situation, from the standpoint
of military impact, would be to have them actually on the
ground where they are supposed to do their work.
General Votel. Yes, Senator, I would agree. I think it is
always best to be with your partners.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thanks very much, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your career and dedication and
sacrifices. Sergeant Major, thank you for 38 years. Do not ever
think it was ever taken for granted. It will never be
forgotten. God bless you.
General, in your AOR, you have all five threats, if you
assume and believe that North Korea and Iran have a
particularly good relationship, in across at least three
domains, probably four domains. The question I have is relative
to what China and Russia are doing longer term, particularly as
we think about our future in Afghanistan, what China has done
in the China-Pakistan economic corridor is basically
handcuffing Pakistan. As you said earlier, Pakistan is a major
player in determining the long-term future of Afghanistan. I
would argue that India, as well as the Stans and other players
in the region, are because of the Pashtun problem. But this
debt problem is up to--I think it is $23 billion now. It could
go to $62 billion, and there are $90 billion committed there in
that effort. That is huge in terms of Pakistan.
What I am concerned about is what Pakistan is also
representing to China with regard to what China has done with
their BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] across that area. You just
mentioned the maritime interest with Gwadar and Hambantota.
Hambantota is just south of Colombo in Sri Lanka, and they have
already foreclosed on their partner there. It is a proprietary
debt situation. They have done the same thing in Gwadar and 31
other places around the coast of Africa. You just mentioned
that.
The question is, how are we as a military--I understand
this is a diplomatic issue as well. How are you in the military
dealing with China's effort to develop this string of pearls,
particularly in the perspective that Russia with Vladiky and
Tartus, with China in Djibouti, in this area as we consider our
future in both Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan? How are we
addressing that China and Russia threat relative to their
permanent strategy in that area as it relates to our NDS?
General Votel. Thanks, Senator. I think you highlighted a
real challenge for us. I think as we look at great power
competition, I think we have to recognize--and I believe we
do--that the threat of Russia or that China poses to us is not
limited to a particular geographic area but, in fact, it is
global with these partners. As we look at our plans to compete
with these partners to pursue our national interests, we have
to look in all areas where we do this, to include the CENTCOM
area of responsibility. There will be things that we can do in
CENTCOM that can contribute to a broader campaign to compete
with China and Russia. I think as we look at this, we have to
look for opportunities where we can do that and how we
integrate into a broader plan.
More specifically though, what I would tell you--I think
one of the most important things--and I mentioned this a little
bit earlier--for us to do is to continue to be seen by our
partners in the region as a valued partner. You know, as I look
at the recent Iraqi elections, I have noted the presence of
United States and coalition forces on the ground was not an
election issue there. I think that is because of the manner in
which we presented ourselves. It was the manner in which we
conducted our activities there. I think preserving our
relationships and continuing to be seen as reliable partners is
perhaps one of the best defenses that we have against the
influence of great power actors, particularly in the CENTCOM
region. To the extent that we can continue to do that in the
future, I think that will continue to be a key factor in
CENTCOM as we move forward.
Senator Perdue. Well, I think after 17 years, we have
certainly earned that right, and I hope we will continue to do
that relative to getting our allies to help us in that region.
Specifically, you mentioned the parliament there in Iraq.
I have a question about a specific garrison, the al-Tanf
Garrison in southern Syria. We have had a request from Prime
Minister Netanyahu to consider keeping a permanent presence
there because of where it is strategically located on the
supply route between Iran and Hezbollah. There is a 34-mile
exclusion area there. What are the rules of engagement that we
currently have with our garrison there, and is this currently
being considered as a longer-term installation?
General Votel. Well, this is a key part of the ongoing
planning that we have going here. I will not comment publicly
about what we might do there. But we certainly understand the
impact of that.
Our reason for being at al-Tanf is principally driven by
our Defeat ISIS mission. That is what brought us there. That is
what kept us there. We continue to confront it. It is located
in an area where we do see routine traffic from ISIS as they
move from the middle of the Euphrates Valley to the western
part of the country. It is a very good operational location
from that standpoint.
It does have the derivative value of being along a
principal line of access, line of communication that Iran and
her proxies would like to exploit. While that is not our
mission, we do recognize the indirect impact that we have with
that.
As we move forward, Senator, the disposition of al-Tanf
will certainly be something that we will consider very, very
carefully as we look at our overall withdrawal plans from
Syria.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Votel, for being here. I appreciated the
chance to meet with you last week.
As you know, I have serious concerns about our support to
the Saudi-led coalition and its military campaign in Yemen. At
a hearing like this last year, I asked you if the United States
Government knew where the coalition jets went and what targets
they bombed after receiving fuel from U.S. tankers. You said
that CENTCOM does not track that information.
In late December, ``The New York Times'' reported that
American military personnel assigned to the coalition's
headquarters in Saudi Arabia readily had access to a, quote,
database that detailed every air strike, warplane target,
munitions used, and a brief description of the attack. End
quote.
Let me just ask you, does this database exist?
General Votel. Today we do have a database that does have
that information, and we have the ability to see that.
Senator Warren. CENTCOM has access to this database?
General Votel. We do have access to it today.
Senator Warren. Okay. You know, this is troubling
information because it suggests that we could determine
retroactively if coalition warplanes that bombed civilians did
so with American assistance. You know, there is clear evidence
that we enable and support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
Until recently, we refueled their jets. We provide military
advice and intelligence support. We continue to sell them
American-made bombs, bombs that public reports indicate kill
Yemeni civilians. We provide their air force with sustainment
and logistics support for their American-made fighters.
I am asking you questions. I want to ask some questions
about the details of the help we give the Saudis because they
continue to conduct bombing runs. They continue to perpetuate
one of the worst manmade humanitarian disasters in the modern
era. During this civil war, more than 85,000 children under the
age of 5 have starved to death, and tens of thousands of
civilians have been killed. This military engagement is not
authorized. We need to end U.S. support for this war now.
Let me ask you about detainee abuse. Section 1274 of the
Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to
review whether members of the armed forces or coalition
partners of the United States abused or witnessed abuse of
detainees during operations in Yemen. DOD submitted this report
to Congress last month and in the unclassified summary
concluded that, quote, DOD has determined that DOD personnel
have neither observed nor been complicit in any cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment of detainees in Yemen. End quote.
Can you just say a brief word--I just have a little bit of
time--about how DOD reached this conclusion?
General Votel. We principally derived that based on
discussions and reports from the people that we do have on the
ground and what they have seen. We, obviously, take this very
seriously, Senator, and our individuals that are in positions
where they might see some of this are under the obligation to
report this. I do routinely receive reports, many of them
unsubstantiated, not just linked to Yemen but to other areas in
which we operate where our people have received a report of
abuse and we have a reporting mechanism for that. We do take
that extraordinarily seriously.
Senator Warren. Okay, but this report says neither observed
nor been complicit in any cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.
The Associated Press, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and the United Nations all conducted their own
investigations and came to a very different conclusion. They
determined that our Emirati partners oversaw a network of
detention centers that regularly engaged in torture and other
abuse.
Now, does DOD find these independent investigations
credible?
General Votel. Well, we certainly take all of these
independent investigations seriously, Senator. But I think what
I am saying to you is that we have no observations of our own
from our people that have actually seen this.
Senator Warren. Fair enough. Then let me ask it this way.
Has DOD reached any conclusions about whether or not our
Emirati partners are engaging in detainee abuse when DOD
personnel are not present?
General Votel. I have not reached any kind of conclusion
that they are conducting these activities. Certainly in our
interaction with all of our partners, in this conflict and
across the region, we continue to emphasize the obligations
under the Law of Armed Conflict and the proper detention and
treatment of detainees across the board.
Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate your walking me through
your assessment of these independent reports, but I remain very
concerned about abuses in the region. Turning a blind eye is
not acceptable, and I am going to keep asking questions on
this. Thank you.
General Votel. Senator, I am in receipt of your letter, and
we will provide a response to you. Thank you.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Blackburn?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your time and to your team who is
with you. We appreciate your service and your time.
I do have some questions I want to ask you this afternoon
when we are in closed session dealing with the NDS and the
competition with Russia and China and maintaining the right
balance in the Middle East, but also being aware of the
competition that is there. I think you are so right. As you
have said in your comments, this is something we cannot lose
sight of.
Let me go to Syria. I will tell you that I think the
administration really has sent some mixed messages about the
terms of United States withdrawal from Syria and whether there
is protection for the Syrian Kurds, whether there is the total
defeat of ISIS or the establishment of a safe zone with Turkey,
and what is a prerequisite.
Senator Duckworth and I just recently sent a letter
pertaining to the Kurds because Nashville has the largest
Kurdish population in the United States. It is for this reason,
in addition to their partnership in the global coalition to
defeat ISIS, that protection of the Kurds is very important to
me and to a lot of Tennesseans. I believe that any withdrawal
from Syria must be conditions-based, and clearly there has to
be a plan to protect the Kurds. Any plan to protect the Kurds
must clearly outline our expectations of Turkey.
I would like to just hear from you. The withdrawal from
Syria--is it calendar-based? Is it conditions-based? If it is
conditions-based, what are those conditions going to be there
on the ground? What has been communicated to the Turks, and
what has been communicated to the Kurds?
General Votel. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to
talking a little bit more about this with you in the closed
session.
But I would just say I do not consider this to be either
time-based or conditions-based. The fact is the President made
a decision and we are going to execute his orders here to
withdraw forces from Syria. As we do that, we are going to do
that in a very deliberate manner. We are going to do that in
conjunction with our campaign plan, and we are going to
consider things like protection of our partners, the Kurds. We
are going to consider the concerns that Turkey has along their
border. We are going to consider how we keep pressure on ISIS.
All of that is taking place right now. I am not under pressure
to be out by a specific date, and I have not had any specific
conditions put upon me. I look at this as an additional task
within the confines of the current campaign plan that we are
operating, and that is how we are approaching it.
Senator Blackburn. In the January 16th attack, we lost a
chief warrant officer, Jonathan Farmer, who was a Fort Campbell
soldier. I will tell you in Montgomery County, Tennessee and
Clarksville, Fort Campbell, it was noted with great sorrow by
so many that are there at the post.
One of the questions that comes up from Tennesseans who are
involved in defense of our Nation is did we underestimate the
power and the threat of ISIS in Syria.
General Votel. Senator, I do not think we do. I think those
of us who have had the opportunity to be involved in this for a
long time develop a respect for our enemies. We do not agree
with the things that they are doing, but we certainly have to
respect the capabilities that they bring. We have always
recognized that ISIS is a savvy organization and they will look
for ways to harm us, to hurt us in the conduct of our normal
operations or certainly in the conduct of operations that we
have coming up as we get ready to depart Syria. I do not think
we underestimate their capabilities to exact a toll against us.
Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that.
I have got a couple of questions on Yemen. I will save
those for the afternoon. I yield back my time.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Chair, am I to interpret after 6 years on the Committee
anything negative from the fact that I have been moved to a
chair without my own microphone?
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaine. General Votel, thank you for your great
service. You are a wonderful public servant, and we are going
to miss you on the Committee.
I want to ask you about an interview that President Trump
gave on Face the Nation on February 3rd, a couple of comments
that he made dealing with Iran. He indicated one of the reasons
I want to keep it--``it'' referring to an airbase in Iran--is
because I want to be looking a little bit--I am sorry--an
airbase in Iraq--is because I want to be looking a little bit
at Iran because Iran is a real problem. He was asked a question
by Margaret Brennan. He said, no, because I want to be able to
watch Iran.
I am on the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations
Committee, and I have not had a briefing either in open or
classified in either committee during my time in the Senate
suggesting that we are currently in Iraq primarily to watch
Iran. My understanding is that we are in Iraq right now to help
Iraq defeat ISIS. Is that your understanding as well?
General Votel. That is exactly my understanding, Senator.
Senator Kaine. As far as you know, there is not a change in
the definition of the mission, at least as far as the Pentagon
is concerned?
General Votel. I have no additional tasks that have been
given to me with regard to that.
Senator Kaine. If the United States were to change its
definition of the mission in Iraq to be a mission about
watching Iran, would it not be pretty important to have Iraq
agree that that would be the focus of the mission if we were to
be having troops in their country to carry out such a mission?
General Votel. Senator, we are in Iraq at the invitation of
the government. So, yes, I agree.
Senator Kaine. We were invited in in the summer of 2014 to
help them defeat ISIS. Correct?
General Votel. That is right, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I would like to put into the
record an article from the ``New York Times'' this morning,
``Trump's Plan for United States Forces in Iraq Met with
Unified Rejection in Baghdad.'' General Votel mentioned that
one of the great things about the recent elections in Iraq was
United States presence was not a political issue, but the
recent statements of the President, quote, the problem for Mr.
Trump was that the unity was a collective rejection of his
proposal and added momentum to propose legislation that could
hamper American troops' ability to operate in Iraq. I would
like to put this in the record.
Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
trump's plan for united states forces in iraq met with unified
rejection in baghdad
President Trump's unexpected announcement that he wanted American
troops in Iraq to stay there to ``watch Iran'' achieved a previously
unattainable goal on Monday: unity in the Iraqi political
establishment.
The problem for Mr. Trump was that the unity was a collective
rejection of his proposal, and added momentum to proposed legislation
that could hamper American troops' ability to operate in Iraq. The
measure, which is now being drafted, would limit American troop
movements and activities in Iraq.
Mr. Trump's remarks, made in an interview that aired Sunday on
CBS's ``Face the Nation,'' reverberated through Iraq late Sunday and
were rejected by all corners of the government, even by some of the
United States' staunchest allies, including President Barham Salih, a
Kurd.
``Don't overburden Iraq with your own issues,'' said Mr. Salih, who
was speaking Monday in Baghdad at the Al Rafidain Forum, which brings
to get her Iraqis, regional figures and international experts to
discuss policy challenges.
``The U.S. is a major power, but do not pursue your own policy
priorities, we live here,'' Mr. Salih said, addressing his comments to
the American administration.
Mr. Salih's comments were mild compared with those from Iraqi
Parliament members and political leaders who have long felt that the
United States has been disrespectful of Iraq's sovereignty.
On Monday, some called on Parliament to act quickly to push out the
Americans. One of the more extreme statements came from the military
spokesman for the Hezbollah Brigades, an Iraqi armed group that now has
a political arm (and which is not directly connected to Lebanon's
Hezbollah), who said that Mr. Trump's comments made the ``American
forces legitimate targets for the Iraqi resistance.'' Over all, the
incident lays bare that the American presence in Iraq is on thin ice
and that United States military and political leaders have little room
to maneuver.
American diplomats and military officials in Washington and in
Baghdad scrambled on Monday to contain the political fallout in Iraq
from Mr. Trump's assertion that American troops would remain there to
monitor any nefarious activities by neighboring Iran.
One saving grace that might have helped mitigate the Iraqi outrage,
one American official said, was that the Iraqi Parliament was not in
session, perhaps sparing Washington even greater fury.
``Our troops are in Iraq to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS,'' a
senior administration official said on Monday, in a conference call
with reporters ahead of a meeting this week in Washington with
representatives of the nearly 80 countries that belong to the coalition
fighting the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq and several other countries
where the organization has offshoots.
Mr. Trump seemed to have stepped on a diplomatic hornet's nest
inadvertently, American diplomats and military experts said, when he
discussed the nature of the sprawling Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq,
which he visited in late December and referred to on Sunday, and where
American troops operate with Iraqi permission. He suggested Americans
could use the base to carry out surveillance of Iran.
``We have a base in Iraq and the base is a fantastic edifice,'' Mr.
Trump said in the CBS interview. ``I was there recently, and I couldn't
believe the money that was spent on these massive runways.''
American military and intelligence officials expressed bafflement
at Mr. Trump's claim that United States forces at Al Asad, or at most
any other Iraqi base, could take a leading role in monitoring Iran's
nuclear program or other suspicious activities.
Such intelligence collection is typically conducted by a
combination of American spy satellites, electronic intercepts collected
by the National Security Agency and possibly covert operations by
C.I.A. spies.
Mr. Trump's visit to Al Asad in December provoked similar anger
from Iraqi politicians, some of whom called it an arrogant affront that
recalled American behavior dating back to the 2003 invasion and what
followed: the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; incidents with civilian
casualties; and widespread sectarian violence.
The decision that upset the broadest spectrum of Iraqis was the
departure of American troops from the country once the status of forces
agreement, which set the terms for United States forces in Iraq,
expired in 2011. Although American troops had little choice but to
leave the country after the expiration--and though Iraq's leaders
played a large role in their exit--many Iraqis now describe the
departure as an abandonment and part of what led to the growth of the
Islamic State and continued fighting on Iraqi soil.
``It will not be forgotten what happened after the American
withdrawal ,'' said Jowad al-Musawi, a member of Parliament from the
bloc allied with Moktada al-Sadr, a Shiite leader. ``It will not be
forgotten that America would at any moment leave you alone to confront
war or terrorism.''
With the Islamic State's territory in Iraq and Syria dwindling to
just a sliver, many Iraqis are not sure what American forces are doing
and where they are now based. They are fearful that Iraq will become
the turf for a conflict between the United States and Iran, and they
recognize that many Iraqis rely on Iran, which in recent years has been
an ally, supplying some of southern Iraq's electricity and supporting
Iraq when the Islamic State invaded in 2014.
``We strongly reject having Iraq be a place for settling regional
or international scores or a place to provoke neighboring states,''
said a Twitter statement from Ammar al-Hakim, a Shiite leader in
Parliament and part of a revered religious family in Iraq.
``Making our land into a place to attack neighboring states is a
threat to our national interests and our Iraqi security,'' he added.
``Iraq will not allow this.''
There are about 5,200 American troops in Iraq, training and
advising Iraqi troops and helping them carry out counterterrorism
missions inside the country. But the United States military has a fluid
number of soldiers and military contractors in the country, and for
security reasons it does not give exact numbers or acknowledge all the
locations where those forces are stationed.
The United States has quietly been negotiating with Iraq for weeks
to allow American Special Forces and support troops now operating in
Syria to shift to bases in Iraq and strike the Islamic State from
there.
In just the last two weeks, an unverified incident has worsened
fears of those who would rather not see the American military return to
Iraq: a Kurdish politician announced he had just come back from a trip
with an American colonel to see three bases previously used by American
troops near the Iranian border and that the plan was for troops to
return to them.
The Iraqi authorities have not confirmed the politician's story.
But those close to the Iranians were alarmed and concluded that either
it was a form of psychological warfare, designed to unnerve Iran, or
that the Americans really were coming back with the goal of using Iraq
as a base for monitoring or even attacking Iran.
Some senior American officers and diplomats expressed fears on
Monday that Mr. Trump's comments could undercut the delicate
negotiations in Iraq and weaken the United States' ability to respond
to the Islamic State's remnants in Syria and Iraq, where they remain a
dangerous presence--although far smaller and less lethal than in the
past.
But other analysts, both Iraqi and Western, said that the often
tumultuous relationship--between Baghdad and Washington would survive
this upset.
``The Iraqis know that ISIS will take years to defeat, so they also
know the United States-Iraq military partnership will probably outlast
this United States presidency,'' said Michael Knights, a senior fellow
at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Wathiq al-Hashimi, head of the Iraqi Strategic Studies Group, a
think tank in Baghdad, noted that despite all the heated statements,
``my analysis is that this will not escalate into a confrontation,'' he
said.
``Iran will not risk hitting the American forces and America does
not want to hit Iran because both sides understand that Iraq's role is
to calm the situation and bridge relations,'' between the United States
and Iran, Mr. al-Hashimi added.
Senator Kaine. Second, General Votel, President Trump said
as follows: I am going to trust the intelligence that I am
putting there, but I will say this. My intelligence people, if
they said, in fact, Iran is a wonderful kindergarten, I
disagree with them 100 percent.
Are you aware of a single United States intelligence
official of any position who has told President Trump that Iran
is a kindergarten?
General Votel. No, Senator, I am not aware of that.
Senator Kaine. Nor am I. I have been, again, on this
Committee and the Foreign Relations. Over the last years, we
have heard open and classified testimony again and again and
again about dangers that Iran poses. We have not heard a single
intelligence official say Iran is a kindergarten. We have had
General Dunford and Secretary Mattis before us saying that the
Iran nuclear deal was in America's national interests and that
Iran was complying with the deal. The House heard testimony in
open session last week from a variety of intelligence officials
saying that Iran was still complying with the nuclear deal that
the United States unilaterally withdrew from.
I worry--and I am not asking you this question--that the
President hears testimony like that and equates it with
officials saying Iran is like a kindergarten, which I find
completely illogical.
Third, President Trump said this. When I came in as
President of the United States, my first year, I went to the
Pentagon 2 weeks after I came in, a short time after, because I
wanted to know what is going on with Iran. We were in so many
locations in the Middle East in huge difficulty. Every single
one of them was caused by the number one terrorist nation in
the world, which is Iran.
We did not go into Afghanistan with United States military
forces in 2001 because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
General Votel. No, Senator, we did not.
Senator Kaine. We did not go into in Iraq in March of 2002
because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
General Votel. We did not, Senator.
Senator Kaine. We did not go into Iraq in August of 2014
because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
General Votel. We did not, Senator.
Senator Kaine. In terms of where our troops are positioned
in the Middle East overwhelming now, there are some in Syria
also fighting ISIS, not Iran. The places where United States
troops are in your AOR--we are not there because of Iran.
When the President says this, we are in the Middle East
because of Iran, it causes me great concern. Together with
other statements made by this President, other members of the
administration, I worry that the President is thinking about
military action against Iran is something that would be a good
idea.
Let me just put this on the record. In the current state of
affairs, I think it would be a horrible idea. I think it would
be a horrible idea. In classified, I am going to ask you a few
questions about, what planning has been done and what could
potentially be a legal rationale for such a thing. But to think
that we are in the Middle East because of Iran when in these
three areas we are clearly not there because of Iran causes me
grave concern.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator McSally?
Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you, General Votel. Thanks to you for your
service and your sacrifice over the years.
A very extensive testimony on a lot of issues. As someone,
like many of you and those with you today, who has been to your
region many times, six deployments in my time in uniform, it is
a very complex region, as you have talked about. I appreciate
in your testimony with the National Defense Strategy bringing
us back home as to why are we there and what are our vital
national interests in the region because our longer-term
threats per the NDS are more of the great state competition and
potential conflict.
But many of us--many of you--we have spent our entire
military careers deploying to the Middle East. This is all we
know. Right? This is all we know, is dealing with Desert Storm
and Northern Watch and Southern Watch and then OEF [Operation
Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom]. We have
invested so much into this, as you know, a lot of blood and
treasure, a lot of sacrifice.
It is part of our nature I think to just give us a little
more time, just give us a little more resources and we can fix
the situation. I am particularly thinking about Afghanistan. It
is just our nature--right--that we want to just--we are almost
there. We are almost going to have this where we want it to be.
But I think it is very important--and I appreciate that the
administration and as you testified today--we kind of come back
to what are we doing there. What are our vital national
interests in the Middle East? There has been tremendous drain
on our military over the last 30 years in that region, and we
got to get back to the core of we have to make sure there is no
safe haven for jihadists and terrorists that are going to kill
Americans, and we have got to make sure that there is not a
hostile power in the region. That is in your testimony. Right?
That is a generational fight against terrorism. It started
before us. It is going to continue on. We have got to make sure
there is no safe haven in any of these countries. You squeeze
them in one place, they will go to another place. We will find
them in other regions, as you know. Then we want to make sure
there is not a hostile power, which is Iran right now.
I just want to bring it kind of back home. I think it is
hard for us, those who serve, because we are like what are we
doing there. We want to make sure--we got to build more
schools. I think there have been a lot of mistakes over the
years. We got to build more schools in America. We do not
necessarily need to bring some of these countries to be
thriving 21st century democracies. We may hope that happens for
them, but that is not our vital national interest. It is to
keep America safe.
As we are thinking of that and as you have testified about
that, when you look at Afghanistan and when you look at still
the safe haven they have in Pakistan--last time I was there, 3
years ago, there were 12 different terrorist organizations
there. Our military's hands were tied. They were not able to go
after a lot of the terrorist organizations. How can we now,
moving forward with everything you have talked about today, in
accordance with the National Defense Strategy, make sure that
we achieve that mission in Afghanistan? What does that look
like to keep America safe and focusing on our drawdown there
while we still make sure that we keep America safe and it is
not a safe haven for terrorism?
General Votel. Senator, thank you very much.
I think when I look at what winning or what prevailing in
Afghanistan looks like, it looks like two things to me. It
looks like a negotiated settlement, and it looks like
safeguarding our national interests. I think as you have very
clearly said here, we have to stay focused on those particular
things. All our efforts at this point need to be focused on
those particular objectives and passed to those objectives. I
think that is certainly my approach on this, and I believe it
is the approach of General Miller, our commander on the ground
as well, as we try to support this.
I think the strategy that we have in place is the right one
focused on this. We have got to stay focused on that. I think
we will meet our requirements if we can get a negotiated
settlement that addresses the instability of that region, and
we can continue to safeguard our national interests.
Senator McSally. Great. Thanks.
Then on to Iran, again this is the largest state sponsor of
terror. This is the one that has malign activity in the region,
great destabilization, killing of American troops. What is the
focus there as we are keeping our eye on the ball of this
region and the National Defense Strategy? Because this is the
biggest threat. You talked a lot about working with
partnerships, but what else can we do and what else are you
doing in order to counter that threat?
General Votel. Certainly I think one of the most important
things we do is continue to build partnerships and begin to
build interoperability across the region. You know, whether we
look at integrated air and missile defense to ensure that we
can address the increasing ballistic missile capability that is
coming out of Iran, that is an important aspect that we do or
whether we address maritime security issues that allow not just
the United States but the countries of the region to better
patrol their own waters and prevent the movement of illicit
goods and weapons and other things through there, I think these
are the types of things that we can do. They are very
attainable to us as we move forward to not only optimize the
capabilities that we remain in place, but more importantly make
sure that our partners are bearing the burden and taking
responsibility for their own security as well.
Senator McSally. Exactly. Thanks.
I am out of time. I want to say I am grateful for Senator
Peters' statements about the A-10 warthog as well. I do not
think we should be using fifth generation fighters to chase
around jihadists on Mopeds. We got to make sure that we have
the right tools for that mission while we are using our next
generation to deal with the larger threats that are out there.
I found a new wingman here for fighting for the A-10.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it. I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
We will recess the meeting till we get back together at
2:15. That is going to be in the Visitor Center, room 217.
Thank you very much for a long meeting and for your answers. We
will reconvene at 2:15 in the Visitor Center, and we will
recess this meeting. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
israel move from eucom to centcom
1. Senator Cotton. General Votel, what are the possible benefits
and challenges with a move of Israel from EUCOM AOR to CENTCOM AOR?
General Votel. Were the Department to review moving Israel from
EUCOM AOR to CENTCOM AOR, we would DOD need to assess the effect on:
existing United States-Israel security cooperation architecture;
adequacy of resources and posture to assist in Israel in Israel
defense; and opportunities as well challenges in DOD support to
diplomacy.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
special federal aviation regulations (sfars)
2. Senator Rounds. General Votel, has the DOD studied how SFARs
might be restricting the DOD's ability to acquire qualified aviation
support services in the CENTCOM AOR?
General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.
3. Senator Rounds. General Votel, how do SFAR restrictions affect
competition for aviation support services contracts within the CENTCOM
AOR?
General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.
4. Senator Rounds. General Votel, does the inability of foreign
pilots and air crews to obtain security clearances increase the
operational risk of sensitive DOD missions?
General Votel. No, our command and control structure has
flexibility which allows us to compartmentalize sensitive information
when joint flight operations are required.
5. Senator Rounds. General Votel, does the DOD have a central point
of contact to engage with the FAA on the SFAR issue?
General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.
6. Senator Rounds. General Votel, what is the current process for
applying a DOD ``state use'' designation to aircraft operated by
commercial U.S. air carriers and would applying ``state use''
designations more frequently be more advantageous than relying on
foreign air carriers?
General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
yemen
7. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, exactly what types of support
are we providing to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, how would you characterize the
focus of United States intelligence support and military advice? Would
you characterize that support as defensive in nature?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, if the United States ceased
providing intelligence support and military advice to the Saudi-led
coalition, how do you assess that this might affect the Saudi-led
campaign in Yemen? How do you assess that this would impact Saudi and
Emirati cooperation against terrorist threats more broadly?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, to what extent have the Saudi
and Emiratis assisted us against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
ISIS in Yemen up until this point? To what extent have the Emiratis
assisted us in Afghanistan? Can you update us on overall progress?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
effect of operations in the area of responsibility
11. Senator Hirono. General Votel, you testified before the SASC in
2018 regarding the situation in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility and
stated that ``Our success over the last year is largely due to the
unyielding support of our allies, tremendous cooperation with our
interagency partners, provision of additional authorities, and the
continued faith of the American people in our military. However,
despite the great strides we have made, there is much work left to
do.'' At that time, you identified regional challenges to include:
terrorism, violent conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile threats,
humanitarian crisis, and radical violent ideologies. Where do you feel
the U.S. stands today with regards to those ``strides'' and the
remaining work that you mentioned in your 2018 testimony?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
removal of troops from syria
12. Senator Hirono. General Votel, on December 18, 2018, President
Trump ordered the withdrawal of 2,000 American troops from Syria,
seemingly marking the end of the United States campaign aimed at
vanquishing the Islamic State (ISIS). This decision has received
criticism from both parties as well as from many U.S. Military leaders.
Former Defense Secretary Mattis and other top national security
officials argued that a withdrawal would, essentially, surrender
Western influence in Syria to Russia and Iran who are the chief
benefactors of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. What is your
assessment of the impact of this decision both currently and in the
future?
General Votel. United States military forces in Syria are working
by, with, and through our coalition and Syrian Democratic Force
partners to defeat ISIS. The withdrawal of United States Forces does
not change that mission. We will continue to work with allies and
partners to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS's so-called physical
caliphate; however, the decision does create difficulties in
maintaining our relationship in its current form with the Coalition.
President Bashar-al Assad will remain in power with the support of
Russia and Iran but has insufficient forces to secure Syrian territory
once held by ISIS. As we execute the safe and professional withdrawal
of United States military forces from Northeast Syria, a multi-lateral
whole-of-government approach supporting stabilization efforts in
Northeast Syria will help prevent an ISIS resurgence. We are cognizant
that military efforts alone are insufficient to enable stabilization,
but the military does have unique capabilities that can be brought to
bear during stabilization. Only through the United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 process can a political settlement to
the Syrian Civil War be accomplished, resulting in a Syrian Government
that is representative of the will of the Syrian people and can address
the underlying issues that allowed ISIS to rise.
13. Senator Hirono. General Votel, since President Trump's
withdrawal announcement, what actions have the Syrian regime, Russian,
and Iranian-backed forces taken?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
14. Senator Hirono. General Votel, what are the strategic
implications of these moves regarding the stability of Syria and the
larger Middle East?
General Votel. Syria is a microcosm of the region where several
state and non-state actors, with different objectives, are vying for
access and influence to achieve their desired end states. Without a
sustained effort put behind United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 2254, there will not be a political resolution to the Syrian
Civil War and the establishment of a government representative of the
will of the Syrian people that is able to address the underlying issues
leading to the rise of violent extremist organizations. Lack of
security and stability in Syria will result in a safe haven for Violent
Extremist Organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda, and the continued
humanitarian crisis that will further impact Syria's neighbors as
refugees continue to surge across uncontrolled borders, thereby
stressing their limited resources. Syria as a safe haven for Violent
Extremist Organizations drives a deeper need for continued support to
the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure security and stability of Iraq.
15. Senator Hirono. General Votel, with the President's stated
objectives of permanently destroying ISIS, ensuring our Kurdish allies
are protected and containing Iran, what would be an appropriate
timeline for withdrawal of United States troops from Syria?
General Votel. The withdrawal of United States Forces must be
conditions based. We will need to continue providing training and
advice to our local counterterrorism partners, including the Syrian
Defense Force/Syrian Arab Coalition (SDF/SAC), as they deal with the
remnants of ISIS that have organized into smaller cells, as the SDF/SAC
transitions from the conventional fight to defeat ISIS to one of
Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism. There is also the requirement
for a negotiated policy with Turkey to help prevent North Eastern Syria
from becoming an ISIS safe haven.
framework for agreement with the taliban
16. Senator Hirono. General Votel, in your opinion, has the proper
groundwork for withdrawal of United States Forces been established in
Afghanistan to ensure that the gains that have been made in the past 17
years will not be put in jeopardy?
General Votel. The Department of State has the lead for
negotiations with the Taliban. The Department of Defense continues to
support the United States Special Representative for Afghan
Reconciliation. USCENTCOM also continues to conduct prudent planning to
address all eventualities in Afghanistan. That being said, United
States Force presence remains conditions-based, and no force
withdrawals will occur until the Government of Afghanistan and the
Taliban have reconciled and agreed to measurable steps to govern and
provide security for the Afghan people and are committed to preventing
attacks against the United States Homeland.
effects of the great power competitors
17. Senator Hirono. General Votel, we continue to hear of the
resurgence of the great power competition in your area of
responsibility. Specifically, with China developing long-term, steady
economic growth and increased military posture and Russia continuing to
cultivate its relationship with the regime of Syrian President Bashar
Assad. What are the risks that increased Russian and Chinese investment
and influence have in your area of responsibility, both in the short-
and long-term?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
18. Senator Hirono. General Votel, last year, President Trump
suspended nearly $3 billion in security assistance to Pakistan for
failing to rein in terrorist groups there. As a result, Pakistan has
turned to China to bolster their Navy and improve local Pakistani
infrastructure through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
valued at $62 billion. Has the decision to withdraw United States
assistance impacted your operations in the region? If so, how?
General Votel. No, the withdrawal of security assistance money has
not impacted USCENTCOM's operations in the region.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
use of 2002 aumf
19. Senator Kaine. During your testimony you said that United
States Forces are in Iraq at the ``invitation of the Government of
Iraq.'' Is the Administration relying upon the 2002 AUMF--which was a
war declaration against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein--as the sole
legal authority for any United States Military operations in Iraq or
elsewhere in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility?
General Votel. No. The authority for our presence in Iraq and our
continued military operations against ISIS remains unchanged from that
as articulated by the previous and current Administration. As we are
conducting military activities in Iraq with the consent and at the
invitation of the Government of Iraq and as a matter of domestic law,
pursuant to the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs (among other authorities).
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
isis in syria
20. Senator Jones. Previously, you've stated ``given the many
forces driving change and uncertainty in the region, United States
commitment to the CENTCOM area of responsibility is more important now
than ever. Recent experience has shown that a precipitous withdrawal of
support, before conditions for stabilization have been set, can lead to
catastrophic results.'' Do you believe we have definitively defeated
ISIS in Syria, and how do we go about ensuring that victory over ISIS
is enduring?
General Votel. The territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria is a
significant milestone in the global effort to defeat ISIS, but it does
not represent the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.
In Syria, this cannot be achieved unless the underlying conditions that
allowed ISIS to rise in the first place are addressed and resolved. The
mechanism to address those issues is United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 2254. This process was designed to bring about a
political settlement to the Syrian Civil War and establish a government
that is representative of the will of the Syrian people. Supporting
local efforts, through a Global Coalition, that sustain the military
gains and promote regional security and stability is an approach to
ensuring victory over ISIS is enduring. A sustained relationship with
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and continuing to build up the capacity
of the Iraqi Security Forces are two ways we can militarily support the
enduring defeat of ISIS regionally. This cannot be overstated; we must
address the disposition and de-radicalization of the thousands of ISIS
fighters in the custody of the SDF and the tens of thousands of
unrepentant ISIS family members segregated in camps. This massive at-
risk population could easily become the core of a resurgent ISIS or
other violent extremist organization with global reach. Dealing with
this industrial-scale issue requires a non-military led interagency
approach and extensive participation by countries of origin.
negotiations with taliban
21. Senator Jones. Last week, Special Representative for
Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced an agreement in
principle with the Taliban on 2 major points; 1) the Taliban promises
Afghanistan's territory will not be used by international terrorist
groups, and 2) the United States agrees to withdraw its forces. How do
you think the Taliban can go about fulfilling this agreement?
General Votel. [Deleted.]
negotiations with taliban
22. Senator Jones. Do you believe the United States should wait for
successful negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban
before withdrawing?
General Votel. Our primary focus of operations in Afghanistan is to
support Ambassador Khalizaid's negotiation efforts for a Peace
Settlement. Therefore, any force withdrawal should support that
process. The primary objective of the South Asia Strategy is to seek a
political settlement to the Afghanistan War. The negotiations are in
the nascent stage of framework development and it is my judgement that
the U.S. should allow the negotiations to mature before a large-scale
withdrawal.
u.s. weapons tracking
23. Senator Jones. On February 5, 2019, there was a report that
American-made weapons have made their way into the hands of al Qaeda-
linked fighters and Iranian-backed rebels in Yemen. It's my
understanding that legitimate purchasers of United States weapons must
seek U.S. permission before transferring those weapons to third
parties. The news report says that there is a Defense Department
investigation into the issue. When and how did the Defense Department
learn about this situation and what can you tell us about the status of
the investigation?
General Votel. We have seen the news report in question, and we
take allegations of unauthorized transfers of U.S.-origin military
equipment seriously. My understanding is that the Department of State
is leading an investigation to determine whether United States weapons
or other defense articles have been transferred to unauthorized end
users in Yemen and has reached out to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in
order to obtain more information regarding these allegations. As such,
USCENTCOM stands ready to assist, but I would refer you to the State
Department for the status of their inquiries into the validity of the
news report's claims.
detainees in syria
24. Senator Jones. On February 5, 2019, it was reported that the
number of foreign terrorist fighters detained by the Syrian Defense
Force is now more than 800, and that on February 4 the State Department
called on other nations to repatriate and prosecute their citizens. So
far, very few countries have been willing to do so. What is the plan
for these detainees after the U.S. withdraws, in the event their home
countries refuse to take them back?
General Votel. We continue working to support the Department of
State is lead effort on this difficult challenge. The key to the long
term stability of the region is ensuring these fighters do not get
unexpectedly released only to return to the battlefield in Iraq or
Syria or slip back into their home countries. We are working closely
with the Syrian Democratic Forces to support their efforts to have
nations repatriate and prosecute their citizens. While we continue to
face challenges there has been some progress but more is needed. This
situation would be further complicated if a military incursion by
Turkey occurred.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m. in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Inhofe (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, McSally, Scott, Blackburn,
Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King,
Peters, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS
Senator Rounds. The Committee will come to order.
Good morning. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, he has
indicated that he wants to start these on time, and asked if we
would begin with opening statements. He should be here shortly.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on United
States Africa Command and Southern Command. I welcome our
witnesses and thank them for their service: General Thomas
Waldhauser, Commander, United States Africa Command; Admiral
Craig Faller, Commander of United States Southern Command.
General Waldhauser, this is likely your last hearing before
this Committee. I want to thank you for your nearly 43 years of
dedicated service to this Nation.
It's also fitting to note that 12 years ago yesterday,
February 6th, 2007, President George W. Bush directed the
creation of United States Africa Command. It was the right
decision, and AFRICOM continues to play a vital role in the
defense of our Nation.
This Committee's top priority is to ensure the effective
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which
identifies competition with China and Russia as the central
challenge to United States prosperity and security. Both
AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM should be viewed as key fronts in our
global campaign to compete with China and Russia. In both of
your areas of responsibility, China and Russia are increasingly
active, using economic and military means to expand their
influence and challenge United States interests.
While, on behalf of the Chairman, we agree with the need to
prioritize our efforts against China and Russia, we cannot take
pressure off of terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda.
Despite operational setbacks, these groups continue to control
territory in Africa and still pose a very real threat to United
States interests and our partners.
Lastly, while the challenges in your areas of
responsibility are on the rise, both of your commands have long
suffered from resource shortfalls. We look forward to you to
explain how these shortfalls increase risk to your forces and
impact your ability to execute the National Defense Strategy.
Want to remind our Members that Admiral Faller and General
Waldhauser will be available at SVC-217, immediately following
the open hearing that we're in today, to discuss any classified
matters that may come up today.
With that, Ranking Member.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
Let me join you in thanking our witnesses for appearing
today to provide an update on our security situation and the
U.S. military activities in your respected areas of
responsibility. Both of you are leading commands during very
challenging times, and we thank you for your continued service.
Please also extend our gratitude to the men and women under
your command for their outstanding service and dedication. Let
me join Senator Rounds, General Waldhauser, in thanking you for
your distinguished service to the Nation in the Marine Corps.
I'm very concerned about the growing Chinese and Russian
influence in both Latin America and Africa. China is leveraging
its economic might and influence to gain access to ports and
loaning large sums of money for infrastructure projects, many
of which are not economically viable and will leave these
countries beholden to Beijing. Russia is engaging in massive
disinformation campaigns to undermine United States influence
and propping up authoritarian regimes in both regions. Both of
you are tasked to counter Russia and Chinese influence with
limited funds, equipment, and people, as many of the
Department's resources are being diverted to the INDOPACOM and
EUCOM AORs [Areas of Responsbility]. I would like to hear how
this implementation of the National Defense Strategy has
affected the resources that you have to counter Russian and
Chinese influence in these critical regions, as well as any
additional resources you might need for this vital task.
In Africa, as in South and Central America, we are working
with local and international partners to advance our shared
security goals. However, the complex and often interlocking
challenges to stability will not be solved by military means
alone. Indeed, many significant issues, including rapid
population growth, demographic changes, famine, and migration,
are long term and multidimensional in nature and require whole-
of-government policies that take an equally long-term view of
investment and engagement in the region.
In December, the administration announced a new United
States strategy for Africa that highlighted the importance of
the region to the United States economic interests and the
growing competition with China and Russia throughout the
continent. However, the administration has repeatedly submitted
budgets that slash critical aid dollars and reduced engagement
across the AOR. General Waldhauser, I hope you will discuss the
importance of long-term engagement in Africa and the types of
investment we should be prioritizing to best position ourselves
for strategic competition in your AOR.
Admiral Faller, you also have a difficult problem set.
Narcotrafficking has flooded central and South America with
illicit funds that exacerbate rampant corruption, especially
among police forces. Poor economic conditions and a lack of
citizen security has led to a humanitarian crisis that forces
families to flee to look for better living conditions.
Authoritarian governments propped up with Russian and Chinese
support are undermining democratic values and destabilizing the
region.
Despite all of these problems, I do want to note that there
are some bright spots. We have several capable partners in the
region, such as Colombia, Peru, and Argentina, who are willing
to work with us and are now net exporters of peace and
security.
On a final note, Venezuela is an unfolding crisis. I am
hopeful that there will be a peaceful and democratic transition
in Venezuela led by the Venezuelan people and supported by the
international community. It has been terrible to watch the
starvation of the Venezuelan people and the destruction of the
Venezuelan economy by Maduro and his regime. Current efforts to
support interim President Juan Guaido are being led by the
State Department and Treasury. Congress must be consulted if
there is any military planning action beyond the current
planning for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and embassy
personnel. I know the events on the ground are changing day by
day, and it is impossible to tell what event or set of events
will trigger Maduro's departure. I'd like to hear any updates
you might have on what you expect in the weeks to come.
Again, thank you, to our witnesses.
Senator Rounds, thank you.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Senator Reed.
General Waldhauser, would you care to begin with your
opening statement? Your full statement will be made a part of
the record.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
General Waldhauser. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds. I
appreciate it.
Senator Rounds, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to update you
on the efforts of United States Africa Command. I am honored to
be here this morning with Admiral Faller to discuss many of the
similar challenges we face in both the AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM
areas of responsibility.
I would like to begin this morning by remembering the
soldier we lost on the continent during operations in Somalia
this past year. I offer my sincere condolences to the family of
Staff Sergeant Alexander Conrad, United States Army. We honor
his commitment, service, dedication to duty, and dedication to
our country.
We also honor the sacrifice of our African partners, who
paid the ultimate price across the continent this year, as
well, to bring security, stability, and prosperity to Africa.
Additionally this morning, I would like to thank our
families, servicemembers, and civilian workforce, especially
those who serve on the continent, oftentimes in remote
locations, for their professionalism and commitment to
AFRICOM's mission.
2019 marks the beginning of AFRICOM's second decade as a
combatant command. As we enter this period, we have adapted our
strategy for Africa based on updated national guidance, which
includes the President's 2017 National Security Strategy and
the 2018 Secretary of Defense National Defense Strategy. These
documents have shaped the focus of the armed services,
outlining broad guidance to enhance readiness for high-end
combat while instructing the combatant commands, among other
things, to strengthen alliances and attract new partners.
The recently released United States Strategy Towards
Africa, the Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and the
National Strategy for Counterterrorism refocused our whole-of-
government approach in the era of great-power competition to
advance United States influence and maintain strategic access
not only in Africa, but around the globe.
Taken comprehensively, the overall United States strategic
interests in Africa are very clear: prevent the undermining of
our alliances or destabilization of African nations, counter
violent extremist organizations, decrease the potential for
Africa to become a failed continent, protect United States
citizens and the Homeland, and advance American influence,
including economic opportunities and transactions.
To underscore the strategy for disrupting extremists, we
remain committed to synchronizing our kinetic authorities.
Persistent pressure on al-Shabaab, ISIS, and al Qaeda-
associated groups remains necessary to prevent this
destabilization of African nations. United States strategic
interests on the continent cannot be solely advanced through
the use of military force alone. As such, AFRICOM utilizes the
military tool, in concert with diplomacy and development
efforts, to help negate the drivers of conflict and create
opportunity.
In Somalia, we work closely with the Ambassador, now
permanently stationed in Mogadishu alongside with the USAID
Mission Director, to help the Somalis assume responsibility for
their own security and own prosperity.
In Libya, our counterterrorism commitment supports the
United States Charge, who works closely with the international
community to prevent civil conflict and facilitate the
political reconciliation process.
Additionally, our engagements, exercises, and activities
throughout Africa are designed to increase United States
influence, strengthen local security, and ensure our status as
the preferred security partner. For example, in East Africa,
our programs continue to modernize partner security forces, as
in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, who also export security and
contribute forces to the African Union mission in Somalia.
In North Africa, we have seen significant return on
investment with Tunisia and Morocco, demonstrating the capacity
to absorb advanced United States programs and to lead security-
related exercises and operations.
In the Western Sahel and Lake Chad region, AFRICOM provides
training, advice, and assistance to the western African
nations, which make up the G5 Sahel organization, as well as
those who make up the Multinational Joint Task Force, working
to contain violent extremism and secure the borders of the Lake
Chad Basin countries.
Our partner networks and influence ensure U.S. access for
United States Forces in times of crisis to protect our
personnel and facilities on the continent, such as in Djibouti,
a location which has strategic significance to multiple
combatant commands.
In conclusion, the most important use of the military tool
on the African continent is where our engagements emphasize
relationships and capacity-building. I am proud to lead a team
of professionals who have built a--strong and trusting
relationships with our African partners, United States
interagency, and the international community to foster
security, stability, and prosperity in Africa.
On behalf of the servicemembers, the civilian employees,
and families of United States Africa Command, thank you for
your support. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you here
this morning. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Waldhauser follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Thomas D. Waldhauser
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, I am honored to represent the men and women of United
States Africa Command and share with you their accomplishments over the
past year. Since I last updated the Committee, the new National
Security, Defense, and Military Strategies, the United States Strategy
Toward Africa, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the
Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and a new United States
Africa Command Strategy and Campaign Plan have shaped our efforts on
the continent. Each of these foundational documents acknowledges and
underscores the strategic importance of Africa and the command's
mission: United States Africa Command, with partners, strengthens
security forces, counters transnational threats, and conducts crisis
response in order to advance United States national interests and
promote security, stability, and prosperity.
Africa is an enduring interest for the United States, and security
is a pre-requisite for economic growth and development. As a partner-
based command, United States Africa Command assists African nations in
building capable and professional militaries subordinate to elected
civilian authority and respectful of human rights, the laws of armed
conflict, and international humanitarian law. By making deliberate
investments in defense institutions, the United States can assist
African partners in meeting the basic conditions needed for good
governance, economic development, and stability.
During 2018, United States Africa Command commemorated its tenth
year as a geographic combatant command, reaffirming Africa's importance
to the United States global strategy for defending and ensuring the
economic well-being of the U.S. Homeland. Our network continues to
focus on shared goals of a secure, stable, and prosperous Africa, which
benefits not only our African partners and the United States, but also
the international community.
Headquarters United States Africa Command employs a team of
military, civilian, interagency, and contract professionals to fulfill
the mission. Moreover, United States Africa Command is supported by
families who bring with them the spirit of community and teamwork,
without which the command could not succeed. United States Africa
Command has partnerships with the Department of State, United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), and other interagency
organizations who all work towards providing stability and prosperity
on the continent. Globally, we collaborate with our European allies,
the United Nations, the African Union and regional mechanisms, the
European Union, non-governmental organizations, and other groups to
pursue stability and security in Africa.
By employing a partner-centric approach, United States Africa
Command complies with the specific direction in the National Defense
Strategy to ``support relationships to address significant terrorist
threats in Africa.'' To address this directive, United States Africa
Command builds on two strategic principles. First, very few, if any, of
Africa's challenges can be resolved using only military force.
Consequently, United States Africa Command emphasizes military support
to diplomacy and development efforts. Our activities directly
complement Department of State and USAID efforts to reduce the spread
of harmful ideologies, strengthen governments who protect their
citizens and foster security and economic successes.
Second, persistent pressure on terrorist networks--whether it be
operational, financial, or political--is necessary to prevent the
destabilization of our African partner nations. Our principal means for
applying pressure is working through our African and with our
international partners, increasing their security capabilities and,
only when necessary, using kinetic force. Ultimately, our use of
military force in Africa, for example in Libya and Somalia, supports
the host government's effort to provide the security and economic
growth required for long-term stability and prosperity.
By design, United States Africa Command military assistance and
activities occur in partnership with the host government and within
overlapping regional and global mandates. In Somalia, the command
supports the Federal Government of Somalia, while operating in support
of African Union and United Nations mandates. In the fight against Boko
Haram and ISIS-West Africa (WA), we operate with partners in the
African Union-endorsed Multinational Joint Task Force, which was
established under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. In
the Sahel, we partner with five national governments and within the
overlapping mandates of the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations. In Libya,
our activities support the UN-led political reconciliation process and
the UN-recognized Government of National Accord. Even when we operate
unilaterally, those actions are firmly embedded in international law
and international legitimacy.
United States Africa Command also plays a significant role in
advancing the priorities outlined in the National Security and Defense
Strategies, which emphasize the rise of China and Russia as key
competitors. United States Africa Command has also observed increased
engagement of non-traditional security actors, such as Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as both challenges and
opportunities to our mission. United States Africa Command strives to
ensure the United States remains the partner of choice, in Africa, by
maintaining our high standards of professionalism, demonstrating
commitment to addressing their security needs, and providing high-
quality equipment.
Targeted investments in innovative, cost-effective, and sustainable
approaches are common practices within Africa, and United States Africa
Command endeavors to maximize the returns on our investments. For
example, our strategy in Somalia features a distinct set of Advise,
Assist, and Accompany authorities in support of the Federal Government
of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to provide
the opportunity for the Somali National Security Forces to successfully
assume security responsibilities. This carefully tailored level of
operational support reduces risk to U.S. personnel and is a cost-
effective way to further advance U.S. security interests.
Each day, we have approximately 7,000 personnel conducting their
assigned tasks on the African continent. These include U.S. uniformed
personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors of all
Services, career fields, and specialties working to address global
security challenges and maintain strategic access and influence. These
personnel perform duties in countries such as Cameroon, Djibouti,
Kenya, Niger, and Somalia. Over the course of 2018, the command and our
component commands conducted numerous engagements, exercises, security
cooperation events, and operations across the continent. These
activities strengthen mutually beneficial networks between the U.S. and
partners and enhance the capability of partner nation defense forces to
provide effective and legitimate security.
strategic environment
For scale, Africa is over three times larger than the United States
The United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility encompasses 53
countries with a population of 1.3 billion. By 2050, this figure is
forecasted to almost double to over 2.54 billion, with one out of every
four people on the planet living on the African continent.
Additionally, the continent faces a large and growing youth population
as Africa is home to 21 of the 22 countries in the world with the
youngest average populations. Forty-one percent of Africans are under
the age of 15, while 60 percent of the total population is under the
age of 24. Economic development, leading to employment, is necessary in
order to assist in preventing conflict, as Africa needs to add
approximately 20 million jobs each year to keep pace with the growing
population.
The lack of economic and educational opportunities, a large,
disenfranchised youth population, and inadequate natural resources are
potential drivers of extremism, which, when coupled with authoritarian,
corrupt, or ineffective governments, contribute to persistent
instability. According to the Fund For Peace's 2018 Fragility State
Index, 33 of the 50 countries most at risk of becoming unstable are in
Africa. This includes seven of the top ten most fragile states.
According to the United Nations Development Programme's Human
Development Index, 32 African countries are listed in the ``Low Human
Development'' categories of health, education, security, and
employment.
United States Africa Command employs the broad-reaching Diplomacy,
Development, and Defense approach to foster interagency efforts and
help negate the drivers of conflict and extremism. With the Department
of State and USAID, United States Africa Command supports programs and
initiatives fostering political reconciliation and elections in
countries such as Libya. Our diplomatic and development partners work
with African partners to provide jobs, food, clean water, and
education, such as in Ethiopia and Nigeria, helping to counter
incentives offered by violent extremists organizations (VEOs) or
criminal networks.
In Africa, VEOs remain a serious threat to the shared interests of
our partners, allies, and the United States These VEOs and criminal
networks prey upon disenfranchised populations, creating a cycle of
recruitment and allowing extremist ideology to fester. Extremist
networks also exploit criminal networks for the illicit transport of
narcotics, weapons, and persons. VEOs cultivate and encourage an
environment of distrust, despair, and hopelessness to undermine
governments, allowing for the expansion of their radical ideology.
Over the next decade, Africa will be shaped by the increased
presence of external actors and the effects of environmental change.
The United States welcomes those partners pursuing helpful and
constructive interests in Africa to develop its economic,
infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors. However, with
emerging markets and a growing consumer class, external actors often
employ exploitative tactics and ``debt trap'' diplomacy to garner undue
influence.
Over the past decade, China has injected considerable amounts of
financing into the continent, including offering key loans to
strategically-located countries, like Djibouti, Senegal, and Angola.
Chinese interests include gaining greater access to Africa's mineral
and other natural resources, opening markets, and accessing naval
ports. In the short term, the complete financial packages can make
China appear to be an attractive partner for African nations. For
example, African nations who become signatories to China's Belt and
Road Initiative (the BRI) receive promises of development, defense, and
cultural investments in their countries, further enhancing China's
influence while challenging our own partnerships in Africa.
African leaders are growing increasingly wary of their business
ventures with China. For example, the Nairobi-Mombasa Railway in Kenya
has met with criticism for its high price and the relatively low number
of African workers in dispatcher and locomotive driver positions,
relative to Chinese workers. While Chinese officials say their business
agreements come with no strings attached, construction work on the
continent is often carried out by Chinese companies and Chinese workers
failing to boost local employment. African countries, which can access
financing through China's state-owned banks, often commit to contracts
that can lead to debt-equity swap arrangements when debt obligations
are unfulfilled. For Kenya, which financed 90 percent of the total $3.6
billion railway project from China in 2014, loan repayment rates are
scheduled to triple in 2019 per the conditions of the loan agreement
risking this scenario.
Russia is also a growing challenge and has taken a more
militaristic approach in Africa. By employing oligarch-funded, quasi-
mercenary military advisors, particularly in countries where leaders
seek unchallenged autocratic rule, Russian interests gain access to
natural resources on favorable terms. Some African leaders readily
embrace this type of support and use it to consolidate their power and
authority. This is occurring in the Central African Republic where
elected leaders mortgage mineral rights--for a fraction of their
worth--to secure Russian weapons. Russia also garners additional
support at the United Nations and gains more customers for its military
arms sales.
Russia is more deliberate in Libya as they invoke Qaddafi-era
relationships and debts to obtain economic and military contracts.
These agreements are aimed at accessing Libya's vast oil market,
reviving arms sales, and gaining access to coastal territories on the
Mediterranean Sea, providing Russia closer access to Europe's southern
border.
Consequently, the cross-border and global nature of Chinese and
Russian actions and influence in Africa necessitates collaboration
between United States Africa Command, United States European Command,
United States Central Command, and United States Indo-Pacific Command,
amplifying the global complexity of this issue.
The second emergent challenge in Africa is the effect of
environmental change on African security. A large number of Africans
make their living on the land, whether they grow crops or raise
livestock, and many live at a subsistence level. Settled farmers and
nomadic herdsmen are increasingly engaged in land-use disputes, which
are emerging as major driver of conflict in central Mali, through the
Middle Belt Region of Nigeria, in South Sudan, and into the Central
African Republic. More people are competing for less arable land, while
both modern state institutions and customary institutions are failing
or have failed to regulate this competition.
Poor land-use policies, changing weather patterns, rising
temperatures, and dramatic shifts in rainfall contribute to drought,
famine, migration, and resource competition. In the greater Sahel
region, the Sahara Desert has expanded southward by over 10 percent
since the 1920s, reducing the amount of productive land. Due to changes
in weather patterns aggravated by poor resource management, Lake Chad
has contracted 90 percent since the 1960s, significantly decreasing the
region's largest source of fresh water. The reduction in arable land
for crops and grazing land for livestock has created strong competition
between the region's farmers and herders who migrate across borders
searching for usable land. As each group seeks land for its own
purposes, violent conflict can ensue. Armed groups and criminal
networks exploit this situation, leading to human trafficking, slavery,
and more violence.
Environmental degradation and the overuse of natural resources
exacerbate weak or ineffective governments who are unable to respond
and cope with their already serious, on-going political, economic, and
social challenges. United States Africa Command and our partners are
investing to build the capability and capacity of governance,
infrastructure, and defense institutions, so African Governments can
mitigate the effects of environmental degradation. This can be
accomplished with, for example, sustainable electric grids, viable
water treatment facilities, environmentally-sound agricultural
developments, and professional security forces.
Despite the challenges on the continent, Africans are eager and
receptive to work with the United States to advance common strategic
interests. Africa's future depends on urgent action to address the
needs of growing populations, mitigate the influence of harmful
activities, and combat the effects of environmental change. United
States Africa Command's role within the Diplomacy, Development, and
Defense construct supports partner efforts to enable economic growth
and prosperity by providing a stable security environment.
united states africa command strategic approach
The successful advancement of United States interests in Africa is
best achieved with stable nations on the continent. Accountable
governments, well-trained and disciplined militaries with a respect for
the rule of law and human rights, and growing economies are
cornerstones to this stability. Over the past year, consistent with the
updated national strategies, United States Africa Command revised our
strategic approach to effectively strengthen our African partners by
evolving our security cooperation from a focus on crisis response to
capability and capacity building against our new strategic priorities:
state fragility, increased involvement of China and Russia, VEO
expansion, and threats to United States access and influence.
The United States Africa Command strategy prioritizes five
objectives: 1) African Partners contribute to regional security, 2)
threats from VEOs and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are
reduced to a level manageable by internal security forces, 3) U.S.
access and influence are ensured, 4) United States Africa Command sets
the theater by aligning forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints,
and agreements, and 5) U.S. personnel and facilities are protected.
These objectives nest within the foundational strategies and provide
the framework for the revised five-year focus in the United States
Africa Command Campaign Plan and the United States Africa Command
Theater Posture Plan.
Foundational Strategies
For United States Africa Command, the 2018 National Defense
Strategy underscore the importance of our African Partners, European,
and international alliances to build partner capabilities and capacity
in order to create a more secure, stable, and prosperous continent.
Furthermore, the strategies emphasize the protection of the American
people, Homeland, and the American way of life.
The National Defense Strategy focuses on Great Power Competition
and expanding the use of lethality, partnering, and process reform.
Additionally, the National Defense Strategy continues to emphasize the
threat posed by VEOs to the United States Homeland, our allies, and our
African Partners. Much like the National Defense Strategy, United
States Africa Command links VEOs to instability in Africa. Hence, the
importance of alliances and partnerships is amplified in the command's
strategy and campaign plan and in the command's response to regional
crises, whether humanitarian or security related.
Two other key foundational documents provide the policy guidance to
synchronize United States Africa Command efforts with that of the whole
of the United States Government. First, the Department of Defense
Strategy for Africa mandates United States Africa Command strengthen
African security forces and develop institutions at the national and
regional levels. United States Africa Command's focus on security
cooperation is a key component in the United States whole-of-government
approach. Moreover, by seeking low-cost and resource-sustainable
security solutions, the Department of Defense Strategy for Africa
framework sets the conditions for United States Africa Command to adapt
to current and emergent challenges in Africa.
Next, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism emphasizes the use
of all instruments of American power, with a focus on non-military
capabilities. The strategy's framework encourages working with a wide-
range of partners in both the public and private sectors (e.g.,
technology, financial institutions) and allied governments to encourage
counterterrorism burden-sharing. Information sharing, counter-finance,
reintegration of returning foreign fighters, and counter-messaging
promote positive narratives to increase partner awareness and
strengthen partner capability to address the broader counterterrorism
challenges within Africa. These foundational strategies are
synchronized with the United States Africa Command Strategy and
Campaign Plan, promoting a consistent approach, over time, to
strengthen relationships and enhance the capability of our African
partners.
In December 2018, the President signed the United States Strategy
Toward Africa, which focuses on economic partnerships to build self-
reliance among our African partners in the era of great power
competition with external actors, such as China and Russia. This
strategy aims to advance trade and commercial ties with key African
states to increase United States and African prosperity. Doing so helps
to protect the United States from cross-border health and security
threats, and supports African states' progress toward stability and
citizen-responsive governance. The strategy also prioritizes foreign
assistance to help our African partners achieve sustained economic
growth and self-reliance to combat transnational threats. Ultimately,
the United States Africa Command Strategy seeks to strengthen
partnerships to increase United States influence, protect United States
personnel and facilities, and ensure access, as specifically directed
in the United States Strategy Toward Africa.
United States Africa Command Campaign Plan
Based on the National Security and Defense Strategies, and as
indicated in our mission statement, the revised United States Africa
Command Campaign Plan provides the command, and our component commands,
strategic direction to advance our strategic goals on the continent. It
does so in a burden-sharing and balanced approach, accounting for the
increased presence of external actors, namely China and Russia, and the
continued threat posed by VEOs.
To achieve the United States Africa Command Campaign Plan
objectives, the command emphasizes six approaches: 1) Strengthen
Partner Networks; 2) Enhance Partner Capability; 3) Develop Security in
Somalia; 4) Contain Instability in Libya; 5) Support Partners in Sahel
and the Lake Chad Region; and 6) Set the Theater to facilitate United
States Africa Command day-to-day activities, crisis response, and
contingency operations.
Strengthen Partner Networks
United States Africa Command strives to further United States,
allied, and partner interests and access to mitigate destabilizing
influences on the continent. The Strengthen Partner Network approach is
the primary effort in which the command seeks to establish new
partnerships with countries and organizations, strengthen existing
relationships through enhanced communication and synchronization, and
counter the activities of external actors such as China and Russia.
This approach focuses on maintaining the United States as the preferred
security partner in Africa.
For example, in April 2018, United States Naval Forces Africa
conducted Exercise Lightning Handshake with the Royal Moroccan Navy and
Air Force. This was the most sophisticated bilateral exercise the
United States conducted with an African partner. It included a United
States Carrier Strike Group executing close air support and naval
surface fire support missions at the Tan Tan live fire range in
Morocco.
Enhance Partner Capability
This approach is applied continent-wide and includes building
African partner capability focused on defense institution building,
countering illicit trafficking, maritime security, counter-improvised
explosive devices (IED) efforts, humanitarian assistance, infectious
disease control, and counter-VEO efforts. Engagements and exercises,
managed by United States Africa Command and its component commands,
strengthen key partnerships and improve partner capabilities. Since
challenges in Africa intersect the activities of a multitude of United
States Government agencies and international organizations, United
States Africa Command maintains a broad group of federal, allied, and
partner command liaisons to coordinate our capability-building efforts.
One of those mechanisms is our Multilateral Planning Group, tri-chaired
by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, where we are able
to discuss and synchronize our efforts on the continent.
Develop Security in Somalia
This approach supports not only AMISOM and Somali Security Forces,
but also the United Nations, European Union, African Union, and other
allies and partners contributing to the international effort to counter
al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. Anchored by the AMISOM Troop Contributing
Countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, this
approach allows for creating the opportunity to build the capability,
capacity, and willingness of the Somali Security Forces. The approach
centers on security cooperation, engagements, and exercises, as well as
Advise, Assist, and Accompany authorities, to strengthen the Somali
Security Forces. Taken in concert with the Enhance Partner Capability
approach, the effort also addresses the capacity-building needs of the
Troop Contributing Countries. The cumulative effects of the two
approaches aim to support Somalia and the Somali Security Forces as
they work to achieve regional stability and to support the vision of
the Federal Government of Somalia.
Contain Instability in Libya
This approach guides the command's efforts to contain instability
brought on by the lack of a unifying government and the presence of
VEOs in Libya, which include ISIS-Libya and al-Qaeda in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The approach is focused on using the
military tool to advance diplomacy, conduct operations to degrade VEOs,
improve the security architecture of the Libyan Government of National
Accord, and, once a political reconciliation is achieved, strengthen
the national security forces of a recognized Libyan Government. United
States Africa Command, working with the Libya External Office of the
United States Embassy to Libya, conducts engagements with Libyan
political and military leaders to bolster relationships and maintain
progress toward reconciliation. United States Africa Command stands
firmly with and supports the efforts of the United Nations as it leads
the political reconciliation process, the immediate next step for
Libyan stability.
Support Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Regions
In West Africa, roughly the size of the continental United States,
this approach provides capabilities and support to counter-VEO
operations, primarily against Boko Haram, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal
Muslimin (JNIM), ISIS-Greater Sahara, and ISIS-West Africa. The
command's efforts support the Multinational Joint Task Force countries
of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and the G5 Sahel Joint
Force countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. To
support the Multinational Joint Task Force, the G5 Sahel Joint Force,
and their individual member states, the command conducts engagements,
exercises, and limited operations, and provides appropriate security
assistance to increase the partners' willingness and capabilities in
counter-VEO efforts.
Set the Theater
The logistics challenges of supporting our engagements on the
continent necessitate the command align with a whole-of-government
approach to support national security interests. This whole-of-
government approach ensures we have the authorities, capabilities,
footprint, agreements, and understandings in place to maintain access
and accomplish our missions. The United States Africa Command Theater
Posture Plan details the command's footprint of forces and agreements
on the continent. Posture initiatives focus on expanding strategic
access to enable day-to-day activities, contingency operations, and
crisis response. The backbone of access in Africa is our network of
enduring contingency locations and agreements with key African
partners, which provides freedom of action and status protection for
United States personnel.
Ensuring strategic access requires complementary defense,
diplomatic, and development efforts across the interagency and with our
allied and African partners. An enduring mission of the command is to
support the Department of State-led mission to protect U.S. personnel
and facilities on the continent. We maintain defense cooperation
agreements with several African nations allowing for forward staging
locations to enable more efficient recovery and evacuation. As such, we
maintain enduring locations and contingency locations throughout
Africa, which provide a flexible and diverse posture for operational
needs and the protection of United States personnel and facilities.
Our capable posture network also allows forward staging of forces
to provide flexible and timely responses to crises involving U.S.
personnel or interests. At Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, the only forward
and enduring United States military installation in Africa, United
States Forces engaged in security cooperation activities, contingency
operations, and logistics support to five combatant commands: United
States Africa Command, United States Central Command, United States
European Command, United States Special Operations Command, and United
States Transportation Command. Camp Lemonnier is our hub in East Africa
and remains a vital link to build stability in this key region.
One of United States Africa Command's newest and most important
posture initiatives is the development of the West Africa Logistics
Network. The West Africa Logistics Network provides and positions
right-sized aircraft throughout West and Central Africa to facilitate
the distribution of supplies, personnel, and equipment to support
locations.
implementing the united states africa command strategic approach
Achieving and Maintaining Influence
United States Africa Command continues to advance United States
strategic objectives through the execution of activities and the
expenditure of resources to respond to both regional crises and
instability, while prioritizing Great Power Competition efforts across
the continent. This approach requires the United States to continue
with our authorities to counter transnational threats, including
terrorism and infectious diseases, which threaten African Governments
and the United States and its interests in Africa. It also strives to
enhance security cooperation with our African partners, so they may
become more stable, well-governed, and self-reliant, thereby setting
the conditions for economic growth and development.
United States Africa Command aspires to achieve and maintain
influence with our allies and African partners through security
cooperation, exercises, engagements, operations, and efforts to mature
the theater. This requires the synchronization of emerging policy and
guidance from the National Defense Strategy and other strategic
documents to drive United States Government activities and engagements
across Africa, reinforced by the importance of capturing a return on
investment. As such, the command and its component commands have a firm
understanding of the necessity to coordinate a whole-of-government
approach toward strengthening relationships and building partner
capability in support of national defense objectives.
Consistency in resources is the most effective method for
implementing our strategic approach in Africa, as United States Africa
Command does not have an abundance of dedicated assigned forces. These
resources include the authorities, capabilities, funding, and allocated
personnel to further our international and interagency relationships
and provide appropriate military support and security cooperation to
diplomatic and development efforts with our African partners. This
consistency allows for the planned execution and delivery of senior
leader engagements, security capabilities, and multinational exercises
necessary to bring about a secure environment for the advancement of
U.S. national interests and sustainment of military advantages.
Additionally, various programs and funding allow United States
Africa Command to further its campaign objectives. At its headquarters,
United States Africa Command imbeds fifteen military personnel from
allied and partner nations in the Multinational Coordination Center
fostering an enduring relationships and increasing interoperability
with allies and partners. The foreign military personnel do not command
United States Forces or make final determinations on plans or
directives but do assist in coordinating military engagement efforts
and exercises to further U.S. multinational partnerships. Additionally,
United States Africa Command leads and participates in multilateral
planning groups for East Africa, North Africa, and the Sahel region.
Likewise, our component commands host senior leader staff talks with
their respective component equivalents. The U.S. Army Regionally
Aligned Force also assists with the United States Africa Command
mission. Working within the security cooperation framework, the
Regionally Aligned Force executes a significant share of the military-
to-military activities in Africa. Sustained access to the Regionally
Aligned Force is critical to mission success.
The U.S. National Guard's State Partnership Program is by far one
of United States Africa Command's most valuable implementing programs.
The State Partnership Program pairs 14 African nations with 11 United
States states and the District of Columbia and creates enduring
relationships with their African partners to build and improve
peacekeeping capacity, disaster management competency, and overall
partner readiness. United States Africa Command continues to see a
great return on investment with the State Partnership Program,
conducting 120 events this past year and engaging over 3,000 partner
nation personnel at a cost of four million dollars. We look forward to
expanding this outreach as several more African countries have
requested partnerships, which are currently under consideration.
Other programs mitigating the lack of dedicated forces and, in
turn, building partner capability include the Department of State
Global Peace Operations Initiative, the African Peacekeeping Rapid
Response Partnership, and the Women, Peace, and Security Initiative.
The Department of Defense also coordinates closely with the Department
of State on programs in Africa including the Partnership for Regional
East Africa Counterterrorism, Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership, Africa Military Education Program, and Africa Maritime
Security Initiative to support critical counterterrorism, maritime
security and overall military professionalization efforts.
These programs continue to professionalize partner militaries and
security forces through training and institution building, and their
concepts are integrated into military-to-military engagements; training
on human rights, rule of law, and prevention of gender-based violence;
and exercises.
East Africa
In 1991, the United States closed the Embassy in Somalia as the
country descended into rampant violence and insecurity. Al-Shabaab and
al-Qaeda eventually filled the security vacuum and, with Mogadishu
firmly under their control, used this safe haven to plan and launch
terror attacks not only inside Somalia, but also regionally throughout
East Africa. Since al-Shabaab's first external attack in 2010, the
group has killed hundreds through external operations, with the most
lethal attacks occurring in Kenya and Uganda. Somali pirates have also
disrupted commercial shipping lanes, reaching as far north as the
Arabian Sea and as far south as Tanzania, while attacking and hijacking
sea vessels for ransom.
By 2007, AMISOM was activated in Somalia, with Burundi, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda contributing troops and conducting military
operations, which eventually led to the return of the capital city to a
newly formed Somali Federal Government. Today, a United States
Ambassador is permanently located in Mogadishu and, along with the
USAID Mission Director, is working with the Federal Government of
Somalia to improve the security environment and promote stability. As
such, U.S. military operations and activities are part of a whole-of-
government approach working in support of diplomatic and development
efforts.
Somalia remains key to the security environment of East Africa, and
its long-term stability is important to advancing United States
interests in the region. When assessing Somalia, it is important to
understand incremental progress has been made over the last decade as
the result of a truly international effort inside the country. The
United States works closely with our international partners, which
include the United Nations, European Union, African Union, AMISOM and
the troop contributing countries, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and
others, on security sector development efforts. Together, we remain
committed to Somali-led progress on improving conditions for a well-
trained Somali National Security Forces that can assume and sustain
security within the country.
The United States also continues to target al-Shabaab and ISIS-
Somalia. United States military activities in Somalia include remote or
accompanied advise and assist missions, the building, training, and
equipping of Somali combat units, and when necessary, kinetic action.
The effects of our kinetic activities serve to disperse al-Shabaab and
ISIS-Somalia leadership, disrupt how they communicate, and further
decentralize how they conduct operations. Ultimately, our kinetic
activities, encouraged and supported by the Federal Government of
Somalia, create opportunities for governance to take hold.
Our actions are synchronized with AMISOM's mandate to reduce
threats and support stabilization, reconciliation, and peacebuilding.
We are supporting the AMISOM transition plan, which envisions
conditions for an effective, responsible, and gradual handover of
security responsibilities from AMISOM by 2021. Recent efforts by Somali
security forces, working with AMISOM, to stabilize the area in and
around Merka, is a positive step. However, the Federal Government of
Somalia must continue to demonstrate sustained progress in implementing
the federated security model, within its national security
architecture, and increase coordination and cooperation with the
Federal Member States.
The United States brings leadership and influence to Somalia, led
by the United States Ambassador, to synchronize and support the
international community's ongoing security and stability efforts. While
United States military training and operations alone cannot defeat al-
Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, alongside United States diplomatic and
development efforts, they provide legitimacy to the Federal Government
of Somalia and create opportunity for political and economic growth,
and security and stability in the broader region.
United States Africa Command's security cooperation is closely
linked with the United States Mission to Somalia's political and
economic initiatives targeting the root cause of instability. The
Department of State and USAID provide effective tools to build and
reinforce stabilization, democratic institution building, education,
and health development programs. Somalia has held a credible federal
presidential selection process, and political leaders have formed four
Federal Member States and selected regional presidents and parliaments.
While Somalia remains a fragile state, the gross domestic product has
moderately increased over the past two years and, combined with other
positive economic indicators, has the potential to lead to debt relief
and additional international financing and investments.
While there have been signs of improvement in Somalia, progress is
not irreversible and sustained international engagement will be
necessary to keep the country on a positive trajectory. The United
States, by virtue of our capabilities, influence, and credibility, is
uniquely postured to support Somali efforts, including to help
coordinate other international partner engagement. As such, the Federal
Government of Somalia must now take advantage of the opportunities
before them, with a clear understanding future assistance will depend
on demonstrated progress.
In Djibouti, the United States remains a steadfast partner. In May
2018, members of the Djiboutian Army's first ever Rapid Intervention
Battalion graduated from training. The Texas National Guard, assigned
to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, provided the Rapid
Intervention Battalion with comprehensive individual and collective
training in support of the unit's mission as a multi-purpose reaction
force responsible to the leadership of the Djiboutian Army.
However, Djibouti's increasing partnership with China across
defense, trade, and financial sectors encroaches on and, at times,
diminishes United States access and influence. In 2018, Djibouti
nationalized the Doraleh Container Port. Despite the increased presence
of China within the port complex, Djibouti has retained control of the
container port, increasing shipping volume and through-put since
removing Dubai Ports World. Our continued access and unimpeded usage to
this facility is critical to our logistical efforts in East Africa.
Additionally, China's first overseas naval base in Djibouti, only a
few miles from Camp Lemonnier, creates air space and coordination
challenges for all international partners. United States Africa Command
considers access to Djibouti and to critical global shipping lanes
through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait an imperative to ensure United States
strategic interests are not compromised. We work closely with the
United States Ambassador to Djibouti and his initiative to coordinate
with the host nation, the Chinese, and other countries based in
Djibouti to de-conflict operations, ensure the safety of forces, and
maintain appropriate access for our military activities.
In Ethiopia last April, Abiy Ahmed Ali became Prime Minister, and
his commitment to political reform, human rights, and unity has been a
positive contribution to peace and stability in the region. By June,
Abiy's Government made significant progress implementing the 2000
Algiers Accord to end the war with its neighbor, Eritrea. Since then,
both countries have taken numerous positive actions to conclude
Africa's longest running border conflict. Commercial flights between
the capitals of Addis Adaba and Asmara now occur daily, Ethiopian
commercial vessels operate through Eritrean ports, communication
channels are open between the populations reuniting families and
friends, and military forces are withdrawing from contested territory.
Prime Minister Abiy's reform agenda represents an unprecedented
attempt to comprehensively reset Ethiopian governance. The Government
of Ethiopia is working with various ethnic factions inside the country
to address root causes of conflict and expand the political discourse.
Prime Minister Abiy restructured his cabinet, establishing a Ministry
of Peace and appointed women to 50 percent of the positions, to include
the Minister of Defense, a first for Ethiopia.
In partnership with the Government of Ethiopia and in support of
our diplomatic mission, United States Africa Command is developing
additional support options to improve security cooperation with this
key partner. Ethiopia is already benefiting from security cooperation
programs, including intelligence sharing initiatives, and we will
identify avenues to enroll more personnel in United States military
education and training programs. In July 2019, Ethiopia will host
United States Africa Command Exercise Justified Accord in order to
enhance AMISOM's Troop Contributing Countries' ability to conduct peace
operations. Ethiopia is the largest contributor of United Nations
peacekeeping forces and provides approximately 4,200 troops to AMISOM.
United States Africa Command will seek to expand our military-to-
military relationship in support of Prime Minister Abiy's fast-paced
internal reform efforts and regional outreach.
North Africa
Since 2011, with the overthrow of Libyan dictator Muhammar Qaddafi
and the rise of the Arab Spring, Libya has been in a constant state of
turmoil. In 2014, Libyan militants began pledging allegiance to the
Islamic State and its cause. By 2015, the Islamic State had infiltrated
the coastal city of Sirte, shifted aspirations of the militia members
there, and declared it a part of the caliphate. Soon militants from
outside Libya joined the organization, now branded as ISIS-Libya, and
their numbers swelled into the thousands.
In 2016, the Libyan Government of National Accord requested
assistance from the United States and our European allies to rid the
country of ISIS-Libya. Together, we assisted Libyan forces aligned to
the Government of National Accord and conducted hundreds of kinetic
strikes in support of its ground operations in Sirte. Within months,
Sirte was liberated. Since then, the United States has remained engaged
in the international efforts to stabilize Libya.
United States Africa Command focuses on three objectives for Libya.
First, United States Africa Command assists in degrading terrorist
groups, such as AQIM and ISIS-Libya, who pose threats to United States
and Western interests and destabilize Libya and its neighbors. Second,
every effort is made to prevent widespread civil conflict that would
threaten security and stability. Finally, United States Africa Command
supports the political reconciliation process by providing security to
facilitate diplomatic engagements in Libya.
United States Africa Command continues to support the United States
Libya External Office's diplomatic efforts to promote the United
Nations-facilitated Libyan political reconciliation process. The recent
return of a former Ambassador to Libya as the Charge d'Affaires of the
Libya External Office offers a seasoned diplomat, who is familiar with
the multi-layered problem set. The U.S. is now better positioned to
manage the diplomatic and counterterrorism strategy. In 2018, United
States Africa Command conducted kinetic strikes targeting the
leadership and operational commanders of both ISIS-Libya and AQIM
providing the opportunity for the Libyan Government of National Accord
to continue its efforts to improve security and work towards political
reconciliation.
Tunisia is one of our most capable and willing partners. In May
2018, United States Marine Corps Forces Africa conducted Exercise
African Lion in Tunisia and Morocco. This annual, multinational
exercise enabled United States Forces and our African partners to
increase interoperability and further refine tactics, techniques, and
procedures for countering VEOs.
Furthermore, United States Africa Command-managed security
cooperation programs work to develop Tunisian counterterrorism and
border security capabilities. Through fiscal years 2017 to 2019, over
$165 million in title 10 and title 22 funding will be invested in
developing maritime and rotary-wing capabilities to bolster Tunisian
border control forces. Tunisia is also developing its counter-IED
awareness program through training provided by United States Army
Africa and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. With this
state-of-the-art training, Tunisian special operations forces will be
better trained and equipped to counter IED attacks.
Tunisia is also capable of managing more advanced logistics
training and maintaining increasingly complex intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance assets. For example, United States Air
Forces Africa completed proof-of-principle flights with the Tunisian
Air Force as part of an initiative to leverage their transport
capability for rapid mobility requirements across the theater.
Continued flights over time will serve as an opportunity to enhance the
capability of the Tunisian Air Force, while reducing the stress on U.S.
airlift assets and personnel. Tunisia remains a political and military
leader in the region and a net exporter of security.
The Kingdom of Morocco remains a vital United States security
partner and ranks in the top five of African countries providing
peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa. Additionally, Morocco is a key
exercise integrator serving as the permanent host of Exercise African
Lion which focuses on counter-VEO, interoperability, and strengthening
regional relationships. In 2019, Morocco will also host Exercise
Phoenix Express, the premier United States Naval Forces Africa exercise
emphasizing maritime security and counter-illicit trafficking.
Algeria is a capable partner in the fight against extremism. With
the largest army in Africa, Algeria conducts frequent military-to-
military engagements to build its border protection and
counterterrorism forces. United States relations with Algeria continue
to foster cooperation and further regional stability.
Sahel and Lake Chad Regions
Within the Sahel region of northern and western Africa, dangerous
pockets of extremists control numerous under-governed spaces. The
African-led, French-assisted, and United States-supported G5 Sahel
Joint Force, comprised of forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger, is a successful example of burden sharing. The
U.S. is providing bilateral security assistance for the countries of
the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and United States Africa Command contributes
operational planning support to compliment the funding and operational
assistance provided by our European allies to the G5 Sahel Joint Force.
United States Africa Command remains committed to assisting the
African-led operations to degrade VEOs and to build the defense
capabilities within the G5 Sahel Joint Force and, in turn, build the
capabilities of individual countries within the joint force.
Mali remains the epicenter of instability and a haven for many
terror groups to stage and launch attacks across the region. The United
Nations Mission in Mali continues to support the stabilization of the
country and implementation of the Algiers Accord for Peace and
Reconciliation in Mali. Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and
Togo are the leading African nations contributing to United Nations
Mission in Mali, which has more than 11,000 military personnel. Our
European allies provide military education, advice, and training to the
Malian Armed Forces through the European Training Mission-Mali. This
mission has trained over 12,000 personnel in an effort to strengthen
the Malian Armed Forces to defend its territory and protect its people.
United States Africa Command lends critical support to partner
counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel. This primarily takes the form of
providing key enabling capabilities to the French and members of the G5
Sahel Joint Force. Furthermore, we continue to build military
operational and defense institutional capabilities through measured
security cooperation coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies'
diplomacy and development efforts. Through these actions, we complement
the international effort to maintain persistent pressure on terror
networks and increase security and stability in Mali.
In Burkina Faso, United States Africa Command finds a willing and
capable partner in West Africa. With almost $40 million in U.S. title
10 expenditures, the Burkinabe armed forces remain dependable exporters
of security with trained security forces capable of contributing to the
G5 Sahel Joint Force. Despite manpower and equipment challenges, the
Burkinabe security forces continue to conduct counterterrorism
operations in both the North and Eastern regions.
In Niger, serious governance and development issues are exacerbated
by rapid population growth, environmental degradation, economic
stagnation, and stressed infrastructure. Moreover, regional VEOs, such
as ISIS-Greater Sahara, JNIM, Boko Haram, and ISIS-West Africa, overlap
within Niger. As such, our policy goals aim to assist Niger's continued
development as a stable democracy with accountable governance, become
an increasingly capable partner against regional threats, and achieve
social and institutional development and broad-based economic growth,
which will further strengthen the population against VEO recruitment
efforts. In spite of these challenges, Niger is an increasingly capable
regional partner.
Over a three year period, United States Africa Command-managed
title 10 support has increased Nigerien counter-IED capability, as well
as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset sustainment,
maintenance, and operations. This includes the Government of Niger-
requested development of an expeditionary, contingency support location
in Agadez, scheduled to be initially operationally capable in the
summer of 2019.
In April 2018, Niger hosted Exercise Flintlock, the annual United
States Special Operations Command-Africa exercise to develop capacity
and interoperability among African, allied, and United States Forces.
Exercise Flintlock was entirely facilitated by the special operations
force units of more than 20 African nations with the support of western
nations. This successful multilateral event enhances coordination among
partners and improves special operations force capabilities to combat
violent extremist organizations.
Within the Lake Chad Region, the Multinational Joint Task Force
comprises forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and
remains a strategically significant organization in the efforts to
counter Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Boko Haram and ISIS-West
Africa attack military and civilian targets throughout Northeast
Nigeria and the Lake Chad Border areas of Niger, Chad and Cameroon,
thus dominating large swaths of territory and displacing millions from
their homes, contributing to a multi-border displaced persons crisis.
United States Africa Command and USAID work with the Multinational
Joint Task Force to deliver humanitarian support and facilitate
international relief efforts to bring basic health care, clean drinking
water, adequate sanitation, and food supplies to the hardest hit areas.
However, the persistent violence and the growing number of displaced
persons impact the ability for organizations to deliver the required
assistance.
Nigeria has faced multiple setbacks in the volatile Northeast Borno
State as ISIS-West Africa has seized military bases and materiel,
including armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. This series of
ISIS-West Africa high-profile attacks has placed tremendous strain on
the Nigerian military's readiness and capabilities. The attacks also
underscore the need for the contributing countries to the Multinational
Joint Task Force to increase their commitments, resources, troop
deployments, and regional operational coordination to counter ISIS-West
Africa's momentum.
Nigeria also faces instability over the violent herder-farmer
conflicts in the middle belt region, as these groups fight over the
scarcity of resources and usable land required to feed the growing and,
often due to conflict, displaced and transient population. By 2050,
Nigeria will overtake the United States as the third most populous
country in the world, further compounding the strain on natural
resources and risking the disenfranchisement of a population
increasingly dissatisfied by the lack of security and basic services.
United States Africa Command is working to assist the Nigerian
military through a variety of security cooperation efforts. In April
2018, forty African senior military leaders represented their countries
at the sixth annual African Land Forces Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. Co-
hosted by the Nigerian Army and United States Army Africa, the African
Land Forces Summit provided a forum to develop cooperative solutions
for improved trans-regional security and stability.
Over the past year, we have expanded our intelligence support and
are currently working with the Nigerian Air Force to increase their
effectiveness in line with international standards. In the upcoming
years, utilizing title 10 and title 22 funding, United States Africa
Command will execute tailored programs to expand Nigerian intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; intelligence; counter-IED; and air-
ground integration capabilities. United States Africa Command will
continue to work with Nigeria and seek additional partnership
opportunities following Nigeria's planned presidential election in
early 2019.
Cameroon has been the focus of long-term United States Department
of State, U.S. Department of Defense, and United States Africa Command
security cooperation efforts to boost the country's capacity to counter
Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa in the Lake Chad region. Cameroon has
been an effective partner within the Multinational Joint Task Force.
Cameroon also ensures security in the Gulf of Guinea and in neighboring
Central African Republic, where it plays a valuable role in the UN
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic.
The United States has urged the Cameroonian Government to address
human rights concerns, investigate allegations thoroughly, hold
accountable perpetrators of abuse, and disclose the outcome of its
investigations to the people of Cameroon. In accordance with the Leahy
law, the U.S. Government does not provide assistance to security force
units or individuals against whom credible allegations of gross
violations of human rights have been lodged.
The crisis and credible allegations of gross violations of human
rights in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon is
a concern. The violence stem from a long-term sense of marginalization
and political disenfranchisement among Anglophone Cameroonians,
compounded by government suppression of moderates, and the government
and separatists inability to enter into any constructive dialogue to
resolve the conflict. The Government of Cameroon has assured the United
States no security assistance will be diverted from counter-Boko Haram
and ISIS-WA efforts to the Anglophone regions.
Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa
In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime security remains crackdown a
strategic priority due to its role in global oil markets, trade routes,
and the residence of approximately 75,000 U.S. citizens. Piracy and
other illicit maritime activities threaten development efforts, weaken
state security, and rob states of precious resources required for
greater economic growth and effective governance. In 2018, piracy
incidents trended lower as cooperation increased among the Gulf of
Guinea partners.
For example, last summer, United States Naval Forces Africa
conducted Operation Junction Rain as part of the African Maritime Law
Enforcement Partnership Program. Under this framework, United States
Coast Guard law enforcement personnel partnered with Cabo Verdeans and
Senegalese on board their naval vessels countering illicit trade and
criminal activities. Capacity building remains paramount to continue
the downward trend in piracy and address the growing threat of illicit
trafficking of drugs, arms, and persons in the region.
In Central Africa, the most visible nontraditional threat this past
year was an Ebola outbreak in an unstable region in eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The outbreak, which began in August 2018, is
presently the second most lethal in history. Furthermore, the medical
response has been hampered by armed conflict in the region.
External actors in Central Africa, such as Russia, have also
undermined security and countered United States interests. For example,
in the Central African Republic, Russia has bolstered its influence
with increased military cooperation including donations of arms, with
which it has gained access to markets and mineral extraction rights.
With minimal investment, Russia leverages private military contractors,
such as the Wagner Group, and in return receive political and economic
influence beneficial to them.
Recently, the President of the Central African Republic installed a
Russian civilian as his National Security Advisor. The President also
promised the armed forces would be deployed nationwide to return peace
to the country by forces likely trained, equipped, and in some cases,
accompanied by Russian military contractors. Russia's ability to import
harsh security practices, in a region already marred by threats to
security, while systematically extracting minerals, is concerning. As
Russia potentially looks to export their security model regionally,
other African leaders facing similar instability and unrest could find
the model attractive.
Southern Africa
In comparison to a large portion of Africa, many countries in
Southern Africa have suffered fewer consequences from terrorism and
violent conflict. However, it still struggles with economic, societal,
governance, and environmental challenges, including poverty, crime,
social inequality, corruption, and lack of water and is influenced by
China's growing presence in the region. The majority of United States
Africa Command's engagements with Southern Africa aim to strengthen
partnerships and build partner capacity for peacekeeping and crisis
response, including infectious disease outbreaks.
We work closely with our diplomatic and development partners to
support and complement their efforts across Southern Africa. For
example, the largest exporters of security in the region are Zambia,
Malawi, and South Africa. Our primary investment in these countries is
through title 22, through such programs as the International Military
Education and Training program and Global Peace Operations Initiative,
which are designed to improve interoperability and develop long-term,
sustainable peacekeeping capability and capacity.
Finally, in addition to our title 22 commitments, the South Africa-
New York State Partnership Program is the oldest on the continent and
offers the most meaningful United States mil-to-mil [military-to-
military] engagements in South Africa. In 2018, South Africa hosted
Africa's largest air show, the Aerospace and Defense Exposition, and
the New York Air National Guard supported with two cargo airplanes, an
unmanned aerial vehicle system, and 38 soldiers and airmen. Such
engagements offer a low-cost solution to improve U.S. partnerships,
particularly in a relatively accessible and neutral ground where our
competitors seek influence in both the military and economic spheres.
Ensuring Strategic Access
Our efforts to ensure strategic access must also be viewed through
the lens of competitor influence and coercive activities, which seek to
gain advantages over the U.S. by moving faster in economic and security
markets where we are constrained by our values and law. China is a
strategic competitor which uses economic and security outreach to
foster investment incentives, jobs, and infrastructure growth in return
for access to Africa's strategic locations, natural resources, and
markets. China has most successfully employed this model in Djibouti,
holding 80 percent of the Government of Djibouti's debt, where access
through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal
remains a United States strategic imperative.
Today, on the African side of the Red Sea and in the Bab-el-Mandeb
strait, which encompasses Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt,
the Great Powers and the Gulf States both cooperate and compete for
real estate and port facilities.
Along Somalia's northern coast, the semi-autonomous region of
Somaliland is working with Dubai Ports World on developing its Gulf of
Aden port city of Berbera. When development is complete, Berbera's
location, close to the entry and exit point of the Bab-el-Mandeb
strait, will be strategically valuable for both Somaliland and with
whomever they choose to partner.
Djibouti, a nation about the size of New Jersey, remains congested
with a preponderance of foreign forces from the United States, France,
Germany, Japan, and China maintaining bases and competing for access
and airspace. Currently, the Djiboutians operate the Doraleh Port
facility, through which passes 90 percent of all logistics and materiel
for United States operations in East Africa. Continued access to the
Doraleh Port Facility remains a U.S. strategic imperative.
Just north of Djibouti, other geopolitical developments have had
ramifications on the future of the Red Sea. With the normalization of
relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United Nations Security
Council lifting sanctions on Eritrea, other nations will undoubtedly
look to Eritrea to unlock its coastline for Red Sea port access.
Given its strategic location, coupled with its already developed
infrastructure, Sudan is also looking to develop its Red Sea coast. In
fact, Sudan recently entered into an agreement to allow Russia to
explore natural gas fields off Port Sudan.
Along with U.S. Central Command, the strategic evolution of the Red
Sea remains a command priority, as we consider how Red Sea access can
be maintained and expanded on the continent. It is imperative for the
U.S. to not only maintain our status as the preferred security partner
of choice, but also look to diversify our strategic access to the Red
Sea.
In 2018, United States Naval Forces Africa continued its annual
exercise series, which consisted of Exercises Phoenix Express, Cutlass
Express, and Obangame Express. These exercises aim to build the
maritime capabilities of African partner nations, and Exercise Obangame
Express this past year included participation from the Somali Maritime
Police. Their participation marked the first time in nearly 30 years
Somalia has participated in a security event outside its borders.
United States Africa Command seeks to build partner networks and
assist in establishing the security environment required for economic
opportunity and trade to flourish. Through a whole-of-government
approach, enhanced security fosters development and investment with
initiatives such as The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development (BUILD) Act. The BUILD Act facilitates private-sector
investments and institutional engagements with low and lower-middle
income countries. It also opens the door for United States companies to
compete overseas and respond to China's increased economic engagement
in Africa, most notably the $60 billion, largely in loans with some
security and development funding, recently promised during the 2018
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
Additionally, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, established by
the U.S. Congress in 2004 to apply a new philosophy toward foreign aid,
works with partner nations to promote growth in agriculture and
irrigation, power and energy, and transportation infrastructure. In
November 2018, the Millennium Challenge Corporation provided a $550
million investment into the Senegal Power Compact to increase
electricity access and reliability for one of Africa's fastest growing
economies.
The U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) delivers skills training,
education, grants, and research through local and international
partnerships. USIP also serves as a conduit for various non-
governmental organizations to interface with the broader diplomatic and
development stakeholders in Africa. During 2019, USIP and United States
Africa Command will host a symposium to discuss how non-governmental
organizations can support and, when appropriate, integrate into the
United States whole-of-government approach.
United States Africa Command's component commands engage every day
on the continent to enhance partner capability, where an important
aspect of maintaining relationships is continued engagement between
senior leaders. In 2018, senior leaders from United States Africa
Command and its components conducted numerous key leader engagements,
including visits to Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Uganda.
United States-facilitated exercises and conferences offer the best
return on investment for our security assistance efforts and provide
our African partners with access to American values, expertise, and
professionalism. In October 2018, senior military leaders from 28
African air forces and United States Air Forces Africa met in Morocco
for the African Air Chiefs Symposium. This annual symposium provides a
forum to discuss common defense issues, increase cooperation, and
improve command and control of air operations.
Throughout 2018, United States Army Africa continued its annual
exercise series, which included Exercise Unified Focus in Cameroon,
Exercise Justified Accord in Uganda, Exercise United Accord in Ghana,
and Exercise Shared Accord in Rwanda. These exercises provided
integrated training opportunities, with a focus on respecting the rule
of law and human rights, integrating women into peacekeeping
operations, and responding to allegations of abuse.
Finally, in October 2018, led by the Command Senior Enlisted
Leader, United States Africa Command hosted its second annual African
Senior Enlisted Leader Conference with over 50 Africa enlisted leaders
from 25 countries. African enlisted leaders engaged with senior United
States and NATO enlisted leaders on professional development, civilian
control of the military, respect for human rights, and caring for
soldiers and their families. The conference advanced key
professionalism concepts and training opportunities vital to sustaining
African security and peacekeeping forces.
Conclusion
In summary, United States Africa Command remains poised to meet
Africa's current and future challenges. The men and women of the
command, our partners on the continent, and our collection of
stakeholders understand how important Africa is to the global economy
and security environments. The National Defense Strategy and its
supporting foundational documents have outlined the importance of long-
term Great Power Competition with China and Russia and the need to
limit the harmful influence of non-African powers on the continent.
As the United States Africa Command Campaign Plan guides the
command into the next decade, our partner-centric approach remains
central to advancing United States interests in Africa. Much work
remains, as United States Africa Command continues to contribute to the
broad-reaching Diplomacy, Development, and Defense approach for further
economic growth and prosperity in Africa.
Finally, it remains an honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, coast guardsmen, civilians, contractors, and families of
United States Africa Command. Together, their efforts have made the
United States safer and kept Africa on the road towards prosperity.
Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Waldhauser.
Admiral Faller.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral Faller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, thank
you for the opportunity to testify before you today with my
shipmate, General Waldhauser. Thank you for the steadfast
support you provide our men and women every day.
I'm joined today by my wife, Martha, who is passionately
committed to serving our military families and ensuring their
readiness and welfare. Also with me are SOUTHCOM's Command
Sergeant Major Brian Zickefoose, my eyes and ears, representing
the backbone of our military, our noncommissioned officers, and
Master Chief Stacie U'Ren, our dedicated gender advisor.
Sergeant Major, Master Chief, and our human rights team work
together to build professionalism both within our SOUTHCOM team
and with our partners. Professional forces have legitimacy
within their ranks and their populations. Professional ready
forces build trust.
The Western Hemisphere is our shared home. It's our
neighborhood. We're connected to the nations in Latin America
and the Caribbean by history, culture, and geography. From my
headquarters in Dural, Florida, it takes me longer to travel to
DC than it does to many of the countries in our area of
responsibility. We're connected in every domain: sea, air,
space, cyber and land. Our security and prosperity are
inextricably linked. When our neighbors succeed, we succeed.
When our neighbors are threatened, we are threatened. Our
partnerships in this region are critical to the layered defense
of our Homeland and to our collective ability to meet complex
global challenges. Ultimately, we want enemies to fear us,
friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to shine
as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.
To ensure the security of the Homeland, SOUTHCOM works
closely with interagency teammates: the Department of State,
USAID, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
Justice. Teamwork within the Defense Department, especially
with Northern Command and the U.S. Coast Guard, is also
critical to mission accomplishment.
Over the past 2 months, I've traveled to Colombia, Trinidad
and Tobago, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to get a
firsthand view of the opportunities and challenges that
directly impact the security of this Hemisphere. Criminal
organizations, narcotraffickers, illegal immigration, violent
extremists, corruption, and weak governments are principal
among those challenges.
The most disturbing insight, however, has been the degree
to which external state actors, especially Russia, China, and
Iran, are expanding their influence in the Western Hemisphere.
Russia, in particular, enables actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua,
and Cuba that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity. As
a leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, Iran's
activities in this hemisphere are concerning.
Venezuela. The situation in Venezuela is dire. Maduro's
illegitimate government starves its people by using food as a
weapon, while corrupt generals are rewarded with money from
illegal drug trafficking, oil profits, and businesses, all at
the expense of the population and other--and the rank-and-file
military. Migration out of Venezuela is now over 300 million,
creating a crisis for our friends in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador,
and Peru. While Russia and Cuba and China prop up the Maduro
dictatorship, the remainder of the world has united. SOUTHCOM
is supporting diplomatic efforts, and we are prepared to
protect U.S. personnel and diplomatic facilities, if necessary.
I saw, firsthand, the impacts of this humanitarian crisis
in Venezuela when I visited the United States naval ship
Comfort. The solidarity and compassion displayed by Comfort's
international medical team made a lasting difference in the
lives of thousands. The United States of America provided
Comfort as part of our enduring promise to the Hemisphere,
while Russia flew nuclear-capable bombers. Who would you want
as your friend? Who would you trust?
Building strong partnerships is the best way to counter
threats and turn the challenges of our hemisphere into
opportunities. In this hemisphere, our neighborhood, a little
goes a long way. We need the right, focused, consistent
military, education, and presence. We cannot achieve positive
results and influence outcomes without being on the playing
field.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you again for the
opportunity to testify today. SOUTHCOM team--our civilians,
military members, and our families--appreciate the support
Congress has provided us. We will continue to honor the trust
you and our fellow citizens have placed in us. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Craig S. Faller
introduction
I want to thank the Congress, and especially this Committee, for
your support to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The men
and women of our team work every day to earn the trust of partners in
Latin America and the Caribbean. We are friends and neighbors, bound
together by shared values and a shared stake in our common future. The
nations of this neighborhood are connected in every domain--sea, air,
land, space, and cyberspace. Our partnerships are vital to security and
prosperity in this hemisphere, and to our collective ability to meet
complex global challenges. We recognize that the success and security
of future generations depend on how effectively we build trust with
allies and partners in the hemisphere today, working with and through
interagency partners like the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Ultimately, we want enemies to
fear us, friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to
shine as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.
The strengths and opportunities of our hemisphere--democracy,
respect for human rights and rule of law, and military-to-military
relationships rooted in education, culture, and values--are matched
with a troubling array of challenges and threats to global security and
to our Homeland. These include natural and man-made disasters, weak
government institutions, corruption, under-resourced security
organizations, violent crime, criminal organizations, and violent
extremist cells. China has accelerated expansion of its Belt and Road
Initiative at a pace that may one day overshadow its expansion in
Southeast Asia and Africa. Russia supports multiple information outlets
spreading its false narrative of world events and United States
intentions. Iran has deepened its anti-United States Spanish language
media coverage and has exported its state support for terrorism into
our hemisphere. Russia and China also support the autocratic regimes in
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, which are counter to democracy and
United States interests. We are monitoring the latest events in
Venezuela and look forward to welcoming that country back into the
hemisphere's community of democracies. Where threats are transregional,
multi-domain, and global, the United States must renew focus on our
neighbors and our shared Western Hemisphere neighborhood.
partnerships
Modest, smart, and focused investments in U.S. Forces and security
assistance continue to yield meaningful returns in the form of partners
who are ready to address threats shoulder-to-shoulder with us.
Strengthening partnerships is at the heart of everything we do.
USSOUTHCOM's mission is about the smart, focused use of force--not
economy of force.
Working from a foundation of mutual respect and shared interests in
regional cooperation and interoperability, we are enhancing our
partnerships with Brazil, Colombia, and Chile, which are forces for
regional and global security. Argentina has reinvigorated military-to-
military interaction, and co-hosted our annual South American Defense
Conference. Peru continues a tradition of strong liaison officer
exchanges with USSOUTHCOM and recently conducted training with a
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF). We reinitiated
security cooperation with Ecuador, and are moving forward with a
renewed military-to-military partnership.
In Central America, partners like El Salvador and Panama have
stepped up cooperation in the area of counter-narcotics (CN); in
addition, El Salvador co-hosted our Central American Security
Conference last year. Honduras hosts our Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo
at Soto Cano, providing a regionally-based security cooperation
platform, the presence of which allows a rapid response capability. Our
support to Guatemala's defense institution building efforts has helped
its Ministry of Defense increase efficiency, transparency, and
sustainability of its investments.
Across the Caribbean, our partners continue to look at USSOUTHCOM
as their security partner of choice. Trinidad and Tobago co-hosted our
annual Caribbean Nations Security Conference, and thwarted a terror
attack with the support of United States special operations forces
(USSOF). Jamaica has stepped up its CN efforts, recently purchasing a
maritime patrol aircraft that will support regional drug interdiction
operations.
We continue to expand our cooperation with allies and partners in
humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) missions and counter-
threat efforts, such as drug detection and monitoring, and support to
interdiction operations in Central America and the Caribbean. Allies
and partners contributed to nearly half of the successful drug seizures
credited to Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) last year. In
addition to continuing cooperation in traditional areas like
peacekeeping and drug interdiction, we are building interoperability
for high-end expeditionary operations and in the space and cyber
mission sets. In the past year, Brazil became the first Latin American
country to sign a Space Situational Awareness Agreement, Colombia
became NATO's first global partner in Latin America, and Chile led the
maritime component of the world's largest international naval exercise,
Rim of the Pacific--a first for a Latin American sea power. Later this
year, Brazil will send a Major General to serve as United States Army
South's next Deputy Commander for Interoperability, the first Brazilian
officer to serve in this role.
The majority of nations in this hemisphere share democratic
values--including respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of
law--and interests in advancing democracy and countering radical
ideologies. These shared values and interests are the foundation of our
military-to-military relationships. We reinforce and build on these
shared values and interests through institutional capacity building
efforts, information and intelligence sharing, education, personnel
exchanges, and exercises. In the past year, we have improved the
quality, depth, and frequency of information and intelligence exchanges
with partners, producing joint products on transnational issues of
mutual concern.
We also build on those shared values by working with our partners
to elevate and integrate all elements of professionalism as a
foundational component of every security conference we conduct. The
professionalism of U.S. Armed Forces is the bedrock of our legitimacy,
both as a fighting force and in our ability to build trust with our own
people. Professionalism encompasses human rights, jointness, gender
integration, and non-commissioned officer development.
Education and training--funded by the Department of Defense's
William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the
Department of State's International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program--and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases made
possible by Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants are force
multipliers. Our partners prefer U.S. education and training, and these
exchanges facilitate mutual understanding of values, doctrine, and
culture that enable us to operate together more effectively. Our
participation in multinational exercises like UNITAS (a naval
integration exercise), PANAMAX (defense of the Panama Canal), and
Brazil's CRUZEIRO DO SUL (regional air exercise) is another important
way we increase mutual understanding, interoperability, and collective
readiness.
In the absence of an enduring United States military presence in
most of Latin America and the Caribbean, recurring rotations of small
teams of USSOF, soldiers, marines, and National Guard personnel \1\
play central roles in building trust and enabling the exchange of
critical expertise. By carefully tailoring these rotations, we ensure
they build the readiness of U.S. Forces as well as building partner
nations' capabilities. On any given day, small USSOF teams conduct over
30 missions in support of about 12 partner nations throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean. Many live and work alongside regional
forces, building the trust, confidence, and lasting relationships that
reinforce our status as the partner of choice and enhance our ability
to respond quickly to contingencies.
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\1\ The State Partnership Program (SPP) links a unique component of
the Department of Defense--a state's National Guard--with the armed
forces or equivalent of a partner nation, leveraging National Guard
capabilities for engagements that build enduring relationships and
advance mutual defense and security goals. Twenty-four of the SPP's 75
partnerships worldwide are in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
including a partnership with Venezuela that is currently inactive.
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Humanitarian support efforts like medical engagements, civil
affairs activities, and the recent deployment of the hospital ship USNS
Comfort demonstrate our enduring solidarity and friendship with
neighbors, while countering negative messaging by adversarial nations.
The international medical team aboard Comfort treated more than 26,000
patients in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras. This team conducted
more than 100 training engagements, relieving pressure on regional
health systems caused by the Venezuelan migration crisis and giving
local medical providers more flexibility to deliver care. The
integration of more than 100 military and non-governmental organization
(NGO) personnel from 10 other nations helped us build trust, tell our
story effectively, and enhance regional perceptions of the United
States. The U.S. military medical and command staff also returned from
the deployment more ready, able to operate with foreign partners, and
prepared to provide critical care to U.S. warfighters. These impacts
will far outlast Comfort's 70-day deployment.
Strengthening our partnerships is our best bid for addressing
regional and global threats. We work by, with, and through partners to
enhance the security of both the United States and our partners, and to
help grow bilateral security relationships into regional and global
security initiatives. Our networked approach to countering threats
recognizes that nothing happens without robust and enduring
partnerships across the U.S. interagency, region, and civil society.
Our ultimate advantage is using the power of our ideals, ideas, and
people to build trust with friends and create dilemmas for competitor
nations. This is the primary dimension in which we expand the
competitive space.
threats
Six state actors (Russia, China, Iran, and their authoritarian
allies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) and a system of interrelated
threats challenge the security of our partners and the region. Threats
like natural and man-made disasters and criminal networks feed and fuel
drivers of instability, including weak institutions, poverty,
corruption, and violent crime. Addressing these challenges requires
whole-of-government efforts, led by partner nations at a pace they can
sustain, to strengthen democratic institutions and expand economic
opportunity. Often, improving security is the first step.
Nation State Competition and Malign Actors.
Russia and China are expanding their influence in the Western
Hemisphere, often at the expense of United States interests. Both
enable--and are enabled by--actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba
that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity, and the actions of
those three states in turn damage the stability and democratic progress
across the region. As the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the
world, Iran's activities in the region are also concerning.
Russia continues to use Latin America and the Caribbean to spread
disinformation, collect intelligence on the United States, and project
power. Russia's deployment of two nuclear capable bombers to the
Western Hemisphere was intended as a demonstration of support for the
Maduro regime and as a show of force to the United States. Russia has
also deployed intelligence collection ships to the region, as well as
an underwater research ship to Latin America capable of mapping
undersea cables--information it could use to cut critical lines of
communication during a future crisis. Additionally, Russia is
establishing joint space projects with partners in the region, which it
could eventually leverage for counter-space purposes in the event of a
global conflict.
China utilizes the same predatory, non-transparent foreign lending
practices it has implemented around the world to exert political and
economic leverage in certain countries. China has pledged at least $150
billion in loans to countries in the hemisphere, \2\ and 16 nations now
participate in the Belt and Road Initiative. However, many countries
are beginning to recognize the long-term consequences of mortgaging
their future to China, as we've seen in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Sierra
Leone, Djibouti, and the Maldives. In the future, China could use its
control of deep water ports in the Western Hemisphere to enhance its
global operational posture. Particularly concerning is China's effort
to exert control over key infrastructure associated with the Panama
Canal.
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\2\ Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2017) ``China-Latin
America Finance Database.'' Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue
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China's presence and activities at Argentina's deep space tracking
facility is also concerning. Beijing could be in violation of the terms
of its agreement with Argentina to only conduct civilian activities,
and may have the ability to monitor and potentially target United
States, Allied, and partner space activities. Additionally, Chinese
firms like Huawei and ZTE have aggressively penetrated the region,
placing intellectual property, private data, and government secrets at
risk. If governments in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to
gravitate toward using Chinese information systems, our ability and
willingness to share information over compromised networks is likely to
suffer.
Russia and China aggressively court students from Latin America and
the Caribbean to attend their military schools, offering free training
in cyber, policing, and CN. Since 2012, security officials from nearly
all Central American countries and nearly half of South American
countries have received Russian CN training. These engagements,
combined with Russia's Counter Transnational Organized Crime Training
Center (CTOC) in Nicaragua, potentially provide Moscow with a regional
platform to recruit intelligence sources and collect information.
Russia and China also support their authoritarian partners in Cuba,
Venezuela, and Nicaragua, often through propaganda and other
information-related tools. Moscow, for example, provides positive media
coverage of its authoritarian allies, papering over repression and
socioeconomic inequity in Nicaragua. Moscow also seeks to undercut
United States policies and regional relationships through information
operations and intelligence collection, and by influencing political
systems, public opinion, and decision makers. Russia published hundreds
of articles last year in its Spanish and Portuguese-language media that
deliberately distorted our defense engagements.
The linkages between these malign actors are negatively
reinforcing. Emboldened by Russian and Chinese \3\ support, Venezuela
is engaging in increasingly provocative actions, threatening Guyana's
sovereign rights and jurisdiction and providing sanctuary for National
Liberation Army (ELN) fighters that threaten Colombian stability.
Russia and Cuba are both complicit in Venezuela's descent into
dictatorship, but Cuba is particularly influential in supporting
Maduro. Following the Cuban Government's advice and assisted by its
intelligence machinery, Maduro is adhering to the autocratic blueprint
Cuban leaders have ruthlessly executed for over six decades. Nicaragua
appears to be going down a similar path following Cuba's playbook, with
Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela enabling President Ortega's repression of
his political opposition. These relationships give Russia, in
particular, a foothold close to our Homeland. As tensions increase with
Russia in Europe, Moscow may leverage these longstanding regional
partners to maintain asymmetric options, to include forward deploying
military personnel or assets.
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\3\ For example, China is Venezuela's single largest state
creditor, saddling the Venezuelan people with more than $50 billion in
debt, even as their democracy vanishes.
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Iran is also looking to reenergize its outreach after reducing its
efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. It has
deepened its anti-United States influence campaign in Spanish-language
media, and its proxy Lebanese Hezbollah maintains facilitation networks
throughout the region that cache weapons and raise funds, often via
drug trafficking and money laundering. Last September, Brazil arrested
a Hezbollah financier in the tri-border area near Paraguay and
Argentina, and in recent years Paraguay, Peru, and Bolivia have
arrested multiple Hezbollah-linked suspects.
What we're doing.
We are increasing cooperation with partners to better understand,
expose, and counter the malign activities of Russia, China, and their
authoritarian allies. We are also working more closely with other U.S.
combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure that globally
integrated plans and operations are informed by threats and
opportunities in this hemisphere. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's globally integrated planning is exactly the right approach for
addressing the transregional, transnational nature of today's threat
environment.
Within the region, we have to be on the playing field to compete.
The same presence that strengthens our partnerships sends a powerful
signal to Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua (the six
negative state actors) that the United States is committed to the
region and to the security of our neighborhood.
Strong partnerships--founded in effective and transparent
institutions, intelligence and information exchanges, institutional
capacity building, education, exercises, and presence--are our primary
bulwark against the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere and
are bolstered by our work together on military professionalism. Our
work with partners to reinforce the hemisphere's substantial, but
incomplete, progress in human rights is even more critical in light of
Russia and China's own disregard for human rights. USSOUTHCOM's Human
Rights Initiative--which just celebrated its 20th anniversary--has
conducted more than 200 human rights engagements that have enhanced the
ability of partner nations to build professional forces that have
legitimacy in the eyes of their populations.
As I told this Committee during my confirmation hearing, the
Department of State's security assistance programs--like IMET and FMF--
are strategic game changers. Since 2009, IMET has provided
opportunities for over 55,000 students from the region to attend
schools like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHINSEC), the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA), and the Inter-
American Defense College (IADC). These numbers aren't just seats in a
classroom. They represent lifelong relationships with future leaders
\4\ who trust us, understand our culture and doctrine, and are prepared
to work with us on a range of challenges.
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\4\ IMET has trained numerous individuals who have gone onto serve
in key leadership positions, including the former President of Chile,
Trinidad and Tobago's Chief of the Defense Staff, and Argentina's
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who helped foster our
reengagement with the Argentine military after the political dynamics
changed.
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In addition to strengthening partnerships, we support interagency
efforts to hold individuals accountable for supporting the activities
of negative actors. For example, in collaboration with the Department
of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), we provided
information that supported the development of sanctions against
Venezuelan Government officials involved in drug smuggling, money
laundering, corruption, and serious human rights abuses.
Drugs and Transnational Criminal Organizations.
Drug trafficking threatens our national security and that of our
regional partners. Drug overdoses killed more than 70,000 Americans
last year, and nearly half a million people across the world in 2017.
\5\ Fueled by drug demand--especially ours--drug traffickers
transported enough metric tons of cocaine (that we know of) from South
America by air, land, and sea last year to cover four football fields--
and the majority of it was headed for our streets. Upon landfall, this
bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller loads and smuggled
into the United States, making large interdictions exponentially more
difficult. In addition to cocaine, traffickers also transport heroin,
synthetic opioids like fentanyl, and precursor chemicals from China.
While Mexico remains the primary source for heroin smuggled into the
United States (and China the prime source of fentanyl), the Dominican
Republic is emerging as a regional transit point for opioid trafficking
into major United States cities like Philadelphia, Boston, and Miami.
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\5\ Centers for Disease Control, National Health Statistics; United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2018 World Drug Report.
Geneva.
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Established drug trafficking routes and techniques provide
opportunities for the illegal movement of other commodities and
people--including terrorists. Several years ago, the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dedicated an article to a scenario in which its
followers could leverage established trafficking networks to make their
way to our border. This remains a potential vulnerability we watch as
closely as we can.
Drug trafficking comes with significant costs, in more ways than
one. After marijuana, cocaine remains the second most valuable
commodity in the global drug trade, \6\ generating dirty money that
flows directly into the hands of criminal groups. In many cases, these
groups are better funded than the security organizations confronting
them. Dirty money fosters corruption and insecurity that tear at the
fabric of communities, erode institutions of governance, and drain the
region's potential. The vicious side effects of illicit trade also cost
American taxpayers billions of dollars every year. This is more than a
national security threat; it's also an economic one that affects every
nation in our neighborhood.
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\6\ Global Financial Integrity, ``Transnational Crime and the
Developing World.'' March 2017.
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What we're doing.
Leveraging capabilities like information-sharing, network analysis,
and the Department of Defense Rewards Program, we support operations by
DHS and the DOJ's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)
and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to interdict drug shipments
and disrupt transnational criminal networks. For example, our
intelligence support--enabled by our Army Military Intelligence
Brigade--to operations by Homeland Security Investigations and other
interagency partners helped dismantle one of the largest maritime
illicit smuggling networks in Central America last year.
At the tactical level, JIATF-S continues to deliver steady returns
on investment and improve its efficiency in targeting drug movements.
Last year, it helped keep the equivalent of 600 minivans full of
cocaine off U.S. streets. But even this isn't enough to keep pace with
the increasing demand and the volume of drugs flowing north through the
Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. While improving efficiency, we still
only successfully interdicted about six percent of known drug
movements. \7\ Doing more would require additional ships and maritime
patrol aircraft and greater participation by interagency and
international partners that form the backbone of JIATF-S. The U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provide
the bulk of JIATF-S's maritime and air capabilities. The United
Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Netherlands lead multiple interdiction
operations in the Caribbean, while we focus U.S. assets on the Eastern
Pacific. Last year, 17 international partners conducted nearly half of
the interdictions supported by JIATF-S. U.S. Northern Command remains
our closest and best Department of Defense partner and we continuously
look for ways to enhance our teamwork, recognizing that threats exploit
our geographic combatant command boundaries.
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\7\ Figure based on JIATF South utilization of Consolidated
Counterdrug DataBase (CCDB) data.
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Our capacity-building activities, whether at the tactical,
operational, or institutional level, play a key role in this fight. For
example, after years of USSOF training, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales
Navales (FEN) is now among Central America's most competent and
responsive maritime interdiction units. U.S. training, equipment, and
interagency teamwork have also enabled Costa Rican and Panamanian
forces to partner seamlessly with the USCG in interdiction operations.
Partners are also working with us to address their ability to sustain
capabilities that we have developed together. For example, Colombia has
increased its eradication and interdiction efforts while also
conducting increased operations against the ELN.
Drivers of Migration.
Violence, unemployment, corruption, poverty, and impunity for gangs
and transnational criminal organizations are some of the main drivers
of insecurity that fuel migration to our southern border. Fourteen of
the top 20 most violent countries in the world are in Latin America and
the Caribbean. \8\ Migration challenges are exacerbated by weak
institutions, corruption, violence and instability wrought by
authoritarian governments. Migration from Venezuela is on track to
approach the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, straining the capacity
and resources of its neighbors. The United Nations estimates that 5.3
million Venezuelans will have fled their country by the end of 2019--
with over 2 million leaving this year alone. \9\ Last year, thousands
of Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica and other neighboring countries to
seek protection, a number that will likely grow as President Ortega
keeps a tight grip on power. Many Haitians continue to leave their
country in hopes of finding economic opportunity elsewhere.
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\8\ Igarape Institute (Regional think tank), ``The World's Most
Dangerous Cities.'' March 31, 2017 (available at https://
igarape.org.br/en/the-worlds-most-dangerous-cities/)
\9\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
International Organization for Migration (IOM), December 14, 2018.
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What we're doing.
We are working closely with Central American and other partners to
share information and provide training and equipment that enhance their
ability to secure their borders. We assist partners in developing
strong institutional foundations needed for legitimate, effective, and
sustainable defense sectors through organizations like the William J.
Perry Center, \10\ the Center for Civil Military Relations, and the
Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, which help our
partners build trust and confidence with their citizens. Through
collaboration with the Department of State, USAID, and non-governmental
partners, our civil affairs teams execute low cost, high impact civic
action projects that help partner nations and extend governance to
vulnerable communities.
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\10\ The Washington, DC-based William J. Perry Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, one of DOD's five regional centers,
develops and engages the Western Hemisphere's community of defense and
security professionals to seek mutually supportive approaches to common
challenges in order to develop effective and sustainable institutional
capacity, and promote a greater understanding of U.S. regional policy.
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terrorism.
As Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan recently noted,
transnational terrorism poses an immediate threat to the Western
Hemisphere. \11\ Groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, ISIS, and al-Qaida
operate wherever they can garner support, raise funds, and pursue their
terrorist agendas. ISIS and other groups have demonstrated their
ability to inspire and recruit violent extremists to plan attacks in
South America and the Caribbean. While the travel of foreign fighters
from Latin America and the Caribbean to Iraq and Syria has diminished,
the potential return of battle-trained extremists remains a threat.
Another potential threat is posed by smuggling networks that move
Special Interest Aliens from East Africa, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia through the hemisphere to attempt entry into the United
States.
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\11\ Remarks at the Western Hemisphere Ministerial on
Counterterrorism, December 11, 2018.
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What we're doing.
USSOUTHCOM leads several annual exercises with interagency partners
and partner nations to improve interoperability, preparedness, and
response for a possible terrorist attack. Our neighbors are taking
increasing steps to address the threat of terrorism in the hemisphere,
as evidenced by the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) development of a
regional counter terrorism strategy in collaboration with the United
States Department of State and USSOUTHCOM. In addition to these
efforts, we work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to help
regional partners build their capacity to combat weapons of mass
destruction, another issue of growing interest to several partners.
We work closely with lead federal agencies and regional partners to
detect and disrupt terrorist activity and strengthen counter-terrorism
(CT) legislation. Trinidad and Tobago recently strengthened its CT
legislation (including the creation of several new terrorism-related
criminal offenses), and other countries are also updating theirs. In
collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and
other interagency partners, we work with Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
Chile, and others to share information and strengthen regional capacity
to manage extremist threats. United States training and biometrics
equipment are improving the ability of partners to control their
borders, and in the past two years, we've helped interagency partners
stop individuals with known or suspected ties to terrorism.
Additionally, our small civil affairs teams work closely with U.S.
embassies and USAID to counter radicalization and recruitment and
amplify moderate voices in local communities.
Detention operations also play an important role in the global
fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the
battlefield. The medical and guard teams at Joint Task Force Guantanamo
(JTF-GTMO) continue to conduct safe, legal, and humane detention
operations. In line with Executive Order 13823, we are examining ways
to address medical support, capacity, and infrastructure issues
associated with continued detention operations.
Natural disasters.
Our ability to respond rapidly in crisis is an important aspect of
USSOUTHCOM's mission. Our neighborhood experiences approximately 50
natural disasters every year, of almost every type--from hurricanes to
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, mudslides, and more.
Protecting citizens before and after disaster strikes is a core mission
for every military in our hemisphere. The question is not whether, but
when, we will face the next disaster, and we must be ready.
What we're doing.
Last October at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas
in Cancun, Mexico, the United States Secretary of Defense and his
counterparts from across the hemisphere committed to strengthening
regional military cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief in support of lead civilian agencies. In support, USSOUTHCOM
works closely with partner nations, Department of State, USAID, NGOs,
and multinational organizations like CARICOM's Caribbean Disaster
Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the Regional Security System
(RSS) to build national and regional response capacities. Our training,
exercises, and low-cost humanitarian projects have helped our partners
to be more prepared to respond to emergencies in their own countries,
and more able to assist their neighbors in crisis. As an example, last
year the Jamaican Defense Force deployed a team to Dominica for 60 days
to provide medical aid and other emergency assistance in the wake of
Hurricane Maria. We are assessing our authorities to ensure we can
provide the necessary support for our partners to take on increasing
responsibility for disaster responses.
When United States military support is required, our forward-
deployed JTF-Bravo in Honduras, along with our annual SPMAGTF
deployment, provide operational flexibility and agility. I'm proud to
note that last year we integrated Chilean and Colombian officers into
the SPMAGTF leadership team for the first time. Brazil will join the
SPMAGTF this year, in addition to co-leading our UNITAS AMPHIB
multinational naval exercise. This iteration of UNITAS will practice
the establishment of a multinational task force to support humanitarian
response, a capability we haven't employed since the Haiti earthquake
in 2010. Building on this initiative, we are working with allies and
partners to develop a concept for a scalable multinational task force
that works within existing security cooperation frameworks to enhance
our collective ability to respond rapidly to crises.
congressional support for ussouthcom's mission and this neighborhood.
I invite you to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that
we value this region--the only region that is tied to our Homeland by
all domains--and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood
safe.
I also thank the Congress for providing the Department's fiscal
year 2019 appropriations prior to the start of fiscal year 2019, which
minimized the impacts of the current partial government shutdown to the
Department of Defense. As we look ahead, confidence in stable budgets
and ensuring all of our U.S. Government security partners, like our
USCG, are open for business will reassure friendly nations that we are
reliable security partners.
Support for our people.
After several years of running the detention facility at JTF-GTMO
as a temporary mission, we have been directed to keep the facility
open. Much of the current infrastructure used by the JTF has long
outlived its useful lifespan. We are undertaking a comprehensive review
of the existing facilities to determine requirements for mission
success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. Closer
to home, we are working to find ways to better support our personnel,
including exploring ways to mitigate the limited military support
services in the Miami area. I will keep this Committee informed of our
progress.
Capabilities to defend our Homeland.
We appreciate the support of the Congress to ensure the continued
operations of the USCG, which provides the majority of U.S. maritime
assets supporting JIATF-S operations. The new National Security Cutters
have proven very effective in the drug detection and monitoring
mission, leveraging increased intelligence collection capability and
on-scene endurance. Maritime patrol aircraft are also crucial to
detection, monitoring, and interdiction by the USCG and partner
nations. Continued congressional support for the new Offshore Patrol
Cutter will enable the USCG to maintain its capacity in the hemisphere.
While those new ships are beginning construction, maintenance funding
is essential to keep the aging Medium Endurance Cutters--some of which
are close to doubling their planned 30-year service lives--hard at work
supporting JIATF-S. We also appreciate the support of the Congress to
resource our intelligence capabilities like human intelligence (HUMINT)
and innovative analytic tools utilized by the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) that
allow us to exploit publicly available information and intelligence.
Thanks to congressional support, we contracted a Multi Mission
Support Vessel (MMSV) to help fill capability gaps. True to its name,
the MMSV was used for SOF training exercises and will now be employed
to support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement in CN and CT
operations. Increased U.S. joint and naval presence in regional
operations and exercises will encourage partner forces, to include
navies, to participate in regional security efforts such as HA/DR, CN,
and CT. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is mission fit for this region
and we welcome its deployment this year. We are also leveraging our
growing science and technology portfolio--including innovative projects
like small-satellite and aerostat surveillance programs--to mitigate
our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps, and help the
Services to test new capabilities that hone the U.S. military's
technological advantage.
Capabilities to strengthen our partnerships.
We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that streamline
security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security
partner of choice. Your continued support to programs and capabilities
that help build trust and long-term relationships with partners
enhances our ability to defend the Homeland by providing more capacity
for defeating threats and sending a visible signal to our partners (and
our competitors) about the depth of our commitment.
conclusion.
Partnership goes a long way in this part of the world. The right
focused and modest investments in this hemisphere yield a solid rate of
return for the United States and our partners. Our competitors benefit
when we don't invest in our neighborhood.
Our partners share our vision of a hemisphere that is a beacon of
peace, prosperity, and opportunity. They want to work with us to
achieve this vision. It is in our national interest to work with them.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. All right. Thank you very
much.
First of all, let me apologize for being late. I had a very
small part to play in the National Prayer Breakfast, so I had
to choose Jesus over you guys.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. But, that's behind us now, so we're ready
to get back to work.
First of all, let me just go ahead and--with the areas that
you're working so hard in. I've been concerned about China for
a long time, because we saw it coming. In fact, in Djibouti,
that was the first time--it's my information, anyway--that
China actually did devote its attention to starting a function
in a country outside its city limits. That happened in
Djibouti. Now they're as far south in Africa as Tanzania.
They're making things happen. I mean, everywhere you go, the
same thing, they say, ``America tells us what we need, and
they--China--gives us what we need.'' They have also--you know,
I--we're all committed to the IMET program. They actually, in
China, as you and I discussed in my office, for the first time,
they've invited 50--50 of their leaders showed up in China, in
Beijing, out of 52 nations, talking about--how close they want
to be with them and trying--what they're trying to do is expand
the IMET program, that we've been so successful in, into China.
So, anyway, that's something that is there, and I'm sure you're
feeling some of the effects of that.
I'd ask both of you--because it's happening also in
SOUTHCOM, what are the effects right now that you're seeing
from China that weren't there until recently? Starting with
you, General.
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
You know, it's interesting about Djibouti. It is the first
overseas base that China has developed.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, the first one. Now, people are not
aware of that, that this is the first base that they've
established outside of their city limits.
General Waldhauser. That's correct. You know, it puts us in
a very unique position, because we have a Chinese base roughly
several miles from the front gate of our location in Djibouti.
We have some interesting engagements with safety flight,
weapons training on the ranges, and so forth. We have a
requirement to work with them to work through some of those
issues.
But, that said, overall on the continent, China has been
there for quite some time, and they have worked at this
relationship. What we try to do, from the AFRICOM or DOD
perspective, is try to show that we are the best partner--the
type of training we give them, the weapons, perhaps, that are
sold by the United States of high quality--and try to make sure
that our influence remains. It's a difficult task.
You mentioned the issue of all the security chiefs into
Beijing. You know, as an anecdote--I have no way to prove this,
but in April of 2017, we, in AFRICOM, invited all the chiefs of
defense to Stuttgart for a conference. We had about 40 or so
turn up. I believe the Chinese read our playbook, and I
believe, after that particular engagement, they saw it, and
they wanted to make sure that they were on the same playing
field as we were.
But, moreover, I would say that, in addition to the Chinese
defense--or their defense group, in September of this year,
China had a forum for cooperation between China and Africa,
where over 50 of the heads of state of Africa went to Beijing,
and where President Xi rolled out $60 billion or so of loans
and grants and programs.
The Chinese work at the relationship, and that's one of the
things that we try to combat in AFRICOM by just being good
partners.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. It's been my experience in the
continent that China never comes in unless there's something
they can gain from it. Of course, they use their own labor, and
they're not doing that much of a benefit. Nonetheless, they
have resources. I can't figure out where it all comes from, but
much more than we seem to.
The same thing, you don't hear so much in SOUTHCOM about
the activity of China. Briefly, what are your thoughts on that?
Admiral Faller. Senator, in SOUTHCOM, they're invested in
over 56 ports. I recently returned from a trip to Central
America, and my small team, the entire hotel floor right below
ours was completely booked by Chinese people. They're offering
schools, all expense paid, 13 days for a half-day school, no
strings attached, and cash for the countries to do what they
want. Again, they're there, and they're there in force, and
they have a long-term vision, economically and militarily. Our
best counter is education and being there. The IMET program is
huge for our partners. They want to come to the United States.
They want to go to our schools. Our schools remain the world's
best and something to emulate.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. This is my own opinion, but I think
some up here agrees with this. Of all the coms [combatant
commanders] that we have, AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM are the two that
are the most under-resourced. I'd like to have you be very
blunt--just very briefly--do you agree with that? What do we
need to do to correct it?
General Waldhauser. Senator Inhofe, I do agree that we're
under-resourced. However, we do make the best and the most of
what we have.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, I know that.
General Waldhauser. Certainly, with reconnaissance assets,
ISR assets, Medevac assets, and also non-episodic, but where we
can count on----
Chairman Inhofe. Of those you just named, which are the
least resourced right now? ISR----
General Waldhauser. As any COCOM would say here, we would
prefer more ISR for our counter-VEO [violent extremist
organizations] fight.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Yeah.
Do you agree with that, Admiral?
Admiral Faller. I would agree with that. We could also use
some naval assets, as well, Senator. I know our Navy needs a
bigger navy. We need some of that.
Chairman Inhofe. I understand that. You're doing great
work.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
Admiral Faller, with respect to Venezuela, your views would
be very much appreciated, but there's a presumption that the
military, at this point, is the key, sort of, power base for
Maduro, and that, as long as they stay with him, he will be
incentivized to stay in Venezuela. Is that accurate, from your
perspective? What are we doing to try--and what are the
Venezuelans--the legitimate President, what is he trying to do
to pull the military away?
Admiral Faller. Senator, Venezuela has about 2,000
generals, more than all of NATO combined. A majority of them
are on the payroll of Maduro via illicit drug trafficking and
corrupt businesses. That's what he's using to buy their loyalty
and their protection. In addition, Cuba, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, pretty much owns the security around Maduro,
and is deeply entrenched in the intelligence service. We can go
into more detail in closed session. That remains the center of
gravity for Maduro.
The legitimate government of President Guaido has offered
amnesty and a place for the military forces, most of which we
think would be loyal to the constitution, not to a dictator, a
place to go. I think the diplomacy path is that path that we're
trying to support.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Over many, many years, I have had complaints about the
human rights abuses in America--Honduras and Guatemala,
particularly. In fact, there's a report, regionally, that--
provided by the Sisters of Mercy, that a former member of the
Honduran Congress who's been in prison for suggesting in a
press conference, who might have been involved in the killing
of Berta Caseras, who was a prominent environmentalist in
Honduras. This is one example. How are we conditioning our
security assistance and our human rights training in these
countries to promote the rule of law?
Admiral Faller. During my recent trip, Senator, I
emphasized professionalism as the key to being a legitimate
force. Professionalism, a big part of that is human rights.
It's like blood running through your veins. If you're not
legitimate to your people, you're not going to have a force
that is going to, ultimately, secure that population. We had
those discussions with all the leaders of those countries, the
chiefs of their defense. We have a human rights team that goes
in there and performs workshops. Part of the steps that must be
taken by the embassy and our country teams to certify the
deliverance of those aides includes a certification that
they're going to go to vetted forces and forces that have
complied. We're looking at that every day, Senator. It's very
important to our efforts.
Senator Reed. Let me turn to General Waldhauser. But,
there's a--I think, an issue that both of your AORs share. It's
under-resourcing, both military, but also on the--the AID,
State Department, et cetera. When you talk about capacity-
building, both of you are very eloquent and very focused, but
I've traveled through AFRICOM, as you know, General Waldhauser.
You were hosted when I returned. In Somalia, one of the reasons
al-Shabaab is so influential is that they're able to collect
taxes, administer justice, provide basic public services, the
civilian capacity. The question here now is even with all the
military effort we put in, if we don't have the civilian
capacity component, I don't think your mission is going to
succeed. Can--you can start and--you have similar problems, I
think, in South America, also.
General Waldhauser. Senator, thank you.
To just provide some context, you know, today, the first
time since 1991, we have a USAID Mission Director in Mogadishu
with the Ambassador. Now, this is a very important step,
because, in December of 2017, USAID signed a--over $300 million
compact with the country of Djibouti. This is very significant.
There are issues of education, agriculture, of government
business, and so forth. It's very important now that we have an
Ambassador in the country, alongside with a senior USAID rep,
who can oversee and synchronize those development efforts and
make sure that the return on investment of that $300 million is
well spent.
Senator Reed. But, that is a good example of how it's
working, but there are many more examples where we don't have
the resources, we don't have Ambassadors. The Ambassador in
Mogadishu arrived, what, a few months ago, finally, after
years? So, I mean, there is this complementary civilian-
capacity issue that, if we don't get right, you can do your
jobs very well, and we will not succeed.
Admiral Faller, your points? Because there are many of the
same situations in South America and Latin America.
Admiral Faller. Exactly the same situation. The military
needs to be the small ``m'' in support of the big diplomacy and
the big economic ``e.'' I see that, where it's working. An
example would be in El Salvador. We've made some significant
progress in the reduction of violence. This has been done by
targeting in really bad neighborhoods, some 50 locations, where
USAID comes in with public and private partnerships and
partnership with the Government. We're there in small presence
to connect those vetted police force with the military.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
I think we're all aware that we're going to have a closed
session after this. Anything that gets into an area that's more
appropriate in a closed session, you can pass that on to that
one.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Waldhauser, I'm just curious. In your opening
statement for the record regarding Djibouti, you note that our
continued access and the ability to use, in an unimpeded basis,
the Doraleh Container Port is critical to our logistical
efforts in and around East Africa. Given China's increased
presence within the port complex, do you have any concerns that
our access and usage could be at risk, short or long term?
General Waldhauser. Senator Rounds, thank you.
You know, last year at this time when I testified, Djibouti
had just taken that port over from the UAE. Now, there's been
some international court issues of adjudication. I won't get
into that today. But, the Djiboutians have run that port now
for over a year. Based on data that we get from the Embassy,
the Djiboutians have, quite frankly, done a better job, been
more efficient and have had better throughput than when the
Emirates ran the port. I have spent time directly with
President Guelleh, talked with him and with the Ambassador--our
Ambassador there, and spoke with him about our concern that we
need unimpeded access. Because it's no secret that roughly 98
percent of the logistics support for Djibouti, as well as
Somalia and East Africa, come through that port. That port is
one of five entities in the overall Djiboutian port. Our access
there is necessary and required.
We have the word from President Guelleh that we will always
have access there. They have no intention of selling out to
China. Those are his words. His actions, thus far, have backed
that up, so I have no reason not to believe that.
But, the bottom line is, I still remain concerned about our
access there, because if we were denied access or had limited
access, it would have a significant impact on our activities in
East Africa.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
I'm also curious. I want to just change subjects a little
bit. You made a comment in your statement for the record
pertaining to Algeria. You note that United States relations
with Algeria continue to foster cooperation and further
regional stability. Can you give us some examples of what
AFRICOM can do to foster the United States-Algerian security
relationship?
I just want your thoughts, also, with regard to the
security implications of the Tindouf refugee camps for Algeria.
That refugee camp has been there for 40 years, and there
clearly is an issue there. I've been there once, and I plan on
being there again. I'm just curious, what are your thoughts
about that situation? How big of an issue is that for security
for Algeria, who is clearly allowing these folks to be there,
and they're providing humanitarian aid at this time? I'm
presuming that we're offering some assistance there, as well.
General Waldhauser. Let me start by talking a little bit
about our relationship with Algeria. First of all, I would say
that the Russians' weapon sales on the continent, that's one of
their number-one customers. They sell high-end weapons to
them--ships, submarines, that type of thing. The Russians, who
sell the majority of equipment on the continent, Algeria
remains a big partner of theirs.
That said, I've personally visited Algeria, met with senior
officials there, and the AFRICOM relationship is one that is--a
crawl-walk-run stage. We have limited engagements, but we work
some issues with equipment and repairs, we have visits
periodically. We've participated in some of these D-Day
activities, and so forth. So, although it's an arm's-length
relationship, we do all we can to continue to foster that.
Now, with regard to the refugee camps, you know, there are
12.3 million internally displaced people all over the
continent. This has a lot to do with conflict, it has a lot to
do with famine, drought, and the like. All these particular
camps require a lot of care and the ability for our
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to work there freely.
This has been a significant issue over the last few years,
because some of the terrorist groups don't adhere to the rules
of war or the laws of war with regards to NGOs. So, these
camps, they're perpetuated all over the continent, and the one
in Algeria, though, I'm not directly familiar with.
Senator Rounds. Okay. Well, I understand that it has to do
with relationships between Algeria and Morocco, challenges for
the group of people that have been literally out of their--what
they consider to be--their homeland for nearly 40 years now. It
seems to me that, at some stage of the game, some additional
attention to that would be appropriate. I'm not sure whether it
starts with you or with the State Department, but most
certainly it's an item that I think should be of interest.
Admiral Faller, I'm just curious. You mentioned that, most
certainly, the U.S. Navy could use some additional assets. On
your wish list, if you were to request additional resources,
specifically what would be the resource that would be number
one on your list of requested items or equipment?
Admiral Faller. Senator, the additional ISR, maritime
patrol aircraft, helicopters, coupled with ships. The Navy
plans to deploy a littoral combat ship later this year. That's
mission fit for the kind of missions that we'd have down there,
which would involve partnering with nations, training,
humanitarian assistance, possibly, but also the drug
interdiction. So, that would be number one, top of my list,
sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both very much for your many years of service.
General Waldhauser, we will miss you. I'm sure you won't
necessarily miss coming before this Committee, however.
You reference, in your written statement, General
Waldhauser, the Women, Peace, and Security Initiative. In the
2019 Defense budget, we included $4 million in funding for
full-time gender advisors. I was pleased, Admiral Faller, that
you introduced your gender advisor, who is here this morning.
AFRICOM has been commended as a leader in implementing the
Woman, Peace, and Security Initiative. Can you talk about what
you have seen, and the success of this initiative, and how
you've seen it be helpful in Africa?
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Shaheen--I think the
strategy we've applied over the last few years is just: take
little things and keep moving forward. For example, out of the
AFRICOM headquarters, we run a program every year where we
bring about 15 to 20 females from the African continent and
take them all over the United States to talk to various
military leaders, and so forth, to give them, basically, a
leadership seminar. We also have seen growth--for example, we
run communications seminars in Capo Verde, which is an island
off of western Africa. The number of females who have come to
those particular engagements has increased significantly over
the last few years.
You also have an example of--we have a Flintlock Operation,
which is a Special Operations main exercise of the year, which,
by the way, will start here later this month in Burkina Faso.
Last year, when it was in Niger, USAID was able to bring
together leaders--women leaders, business leaders, bring them
to this exercise, and have a discussion, in a forum with
military members, about women and peace and what women can
contribute.
The bottom line is, we kept chipping away at small
programs. We think they're having an impact. We're pretty proud
of how well we do.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I agree. I think you're to be
commended. Can you talk about what kind of impact you see? Why
does this make a difference?
General Waldhauser. Well, I think, first of all, it's just
exposure. I mean, to see that, you know, a mixed-gender
military is a better military. With various--you know, we have
a large continent, with different countries and different
cultures, and so forth, and it exposes them to our leadership,
it exposes the African military male leaders to what the female
can bring, if you will, to the military. So, I think, from that
perspective--it's really a bottoms-up approach.
Senator Shaheen. Great.
Admiral Faller, I want to switch topics, because we are
still struggling with the opioid epidemic here in America. New
Hampshire has had, consistently, unfortunately, one of the
highest overdose death rates in the country from opioids. Much
of what we're seeing in New Hampshire is heroin that has been
produced in Mexico, but also in a number of Central American
countries. It comes in by boat and by air into the United
States. At one point, we had a--before you became the head of
SOUTHCOM, we had a briefing with then-head of SOUTHCOM, who
said that we interdict a very small percentage--my recollection
was about 20 percent of what we see that we could interdict--
because we are lacking in resources. Can you update us on
whether you're seeing an improvement in those numbers and what
you need to have in order for us to do a better job with
interdicting those drugs coming into the country?
Admiral Faller. Senator, it's a national security crisis.
Over 70,000 deaths, as you're well aware, from your home State.
While I'd say we've made progress--2017-2018 were record
interdiction years--we've got a lot of work to do. We're not
there. We're focused on our partners. El Salvador stepped up.
Guatemala, Panama. But, there are other partners that need to
do more. We need some additional assets--some ships, some
force--we call them force packages from the ISR that we would
need to detect what you'd need to interdict. More work to be
done, for sure, in this problem, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I'm glad you mentioned El
Salvador, because New Hampshire's National Guard has a State
Partnership Program with El Salvador. Can you talk about the
difference that those partnership programs make in a country
like El Salvador?
Admiral Faller. It's one of our main efforts. They bring a
lasting, long relationship to the State. Before I went to El
Salvador, I had a videoconference with your general, and we
shared--he shared more with me than I was able to share with
him. I sent him my trip report afterwards. It really helps us
build capacity. They go in there, and they work on that
military-to-military engagement. They also work on civil
affairs projects, where they'll go out, build a school, dig a
well, and other things that we need to help stabilize the
conditions for the citizens. It's very important, Senator.
Thank you for the support.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I'm out of time, but, General Waldhauser, the last time you
were here, I asked you about the girls who had been kidnapped
by Boko Haram, and what we're doing in AFRICOM to help the
Nigerians, in particular, address that issue. Do you have any
update for us?
General Waldhauser. Ma'am, I really have no update. I would
just tell you that, of the 276 girls who were kidnapped in
April of 2014, I think the number of 163 have been recovered.
There's 113, or thereabouts that still are unaccounted for. I
could talk in more detail in a classified session. But, the
bottom line is----
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
General Waldhauser.--there has not been much progress, from
what I can see, in terms of getting any of those remainder
back.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator McSally.
Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, gentlemen, for your leadership.
General Waldhauser, it was about 12 years ago that I was
sent to Stuttgart as part of the AFRICOM transition team to
stand up your Command. We had just a handful of us, no
resources, no facilities, no assets at the time. We were going
to be the kinder, gentler command, without a whole lot of
operational focus. I was the J-33, Chief of Current Operations.
We very quickly realized, you know, Africa continues to be a
potential hotspot for terrorist activity, both on the east
coast and the west coast and other areas in ungoverned spaces.
We had to ramp up very fast to be able to take on that task.
However, you know--and I see, in your testimony, you're talking
about al-Shabaab and the challenges in Somalia. At the time,
when we were running the time-sensitive targeting operations,
we watched--literally watched, with our ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance], hundreds and hundreds and
hundreds of al-Shabaab-trained militants out there in the
middle of nowhere, with no collateral-damage concerns, being
trained at training camps, and then being released, because
the--at the time, the civilian political leadership in our
country didn't want to--didn't feel needed to do anything about
it. Like a cancer growing and metastasizing, we continued to
see their strength grow, and their capabilities grow, but we
just didn't do anything about it. Do you have the authorities
you need to address the terrorist threat in your area of
responsibility now, unlike back when I was there? I've got bad
memories about all that. Also, you know, how does that fit
within our vital national interests and the National Defense
Strategy?
General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator. There's a lot
there, and I hope we are living up to your expectations of how
AFRICOM is performing. It's a little bit better than when you
were there, starting things up.
Senator McSally. I know.
General Waldhauser. Look, let me just take the strikes on.
I'll try to be brief, but I think it's important to provide
some context.
In April of 2017 we were given authorities, from the
national security apparatus, to initiate, to be able to have
offensive capabilities inside of Somalia. That, combined with
the legitimacy of a federal government there, our strikes are
tied to their strategy. Our legitimacy comes from our
authorities as well as the Federal Government that we're tied
in with. We had strikes for 7 months in the year of 2017, where
we had 35 strikes. Last year, in 2018, we had 47 strikes for
the overall 12-month period. Thus far this year, we've had, I
think, 12, so far. The point I want to make is that the strikes
are tied to the transition strategy that the federal government
of Somalia and the Somalian National Army are trying to
execute. In other words, we're trying to support their plan.
Senator McSally. Right.
General Waldhauser. President Farmajo has indicated that
his main effort for security is Mogadishu. His transitional
strategy has that in mind.
Finally, I would just say that, at the end of the day,
these strikes are not going to defeat al-Shabaab, but they're
going to provide the opportunity for the Federal Government and
the Somali National Army to grow and assume the security of
that country.
I would just say that my bottom line is, the strikes won't
defeat. We know that they are causing problems. We know that
they are deterring. It's an open question as to how much, but
we know it's causing al-Shabaab problems, giving this
opportunity for the government. But, the bottom line is that
the Somali National Army needs to grow, it needs to step up,
and it needs to take responsibility for their own security, not
only for our strikes, but the overall international community
that's tied there. We're talking about the European Union,
we're talking about the United Nations, the U.K., Turkey. We
all have pieces of the puzzle down there, and one of our pieces
is the strike aspect.
The bottom line is, the Somali National Army needs to grow,
needs to step up. We have made this point very clear, both the
new Ambassador and myself, on numerous occasions to President
Farmajo and Prime Minister Khayre. They know this. They've got
to step up. It's up to them to take advantage of the
opportunity that they have right now.
Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
Admiral Faller, I just have a little bit of time left, but
I want to get back on to the counterdrug and the drug flow in
your AOR. I know you're short of resources that you need. What
are you seeing, as far as the trends of the cartel activity
over water, over land, submarines, light aircraft? I mean,
they're nimble, and they're innovative. What are the trends?
Are they still going, kind of, over water, up until then--over
land, from Mexico up, or, like, what are you seeing the trends,
and what else do we need to combat it?
Admiral Faller. They are very nimble, and they're agile and
in many cases, better funded than the security forces they
face. They adapt. We're seeing them go further out to sea, as
far out into the Pacific as around the Galapagos and up. We're
seeing them integrate with fishing vessels in a different
manner. We're seeing them with lower-profile vessels, including
some submerged vessels. In the air, we're seeing them use
Venezuela as a launch point to fly out of Venezuela. Cross-
border traffic, if you will, using Venezuela's current state as
a launch point up through the middle of the Caribbean and then
into remote airfields throughout Central America. As they
adapt, we adapt. But, they adapt faster, and they have more
flexible resources. We're trying to get after it. But, it's a
challenge.
Senator McSally. Thanks.
I'm out of time. I appreciate it.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator McSally.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today and your
distinguished service over many years.
Admiral Faller, last year, I asked Admiral Tidd about the
situation in Venezuela, including the role of military advisors
from Cuba. Certainly, a lot has changed since that meeting. I
want to follow up on the question that Senator Reed asked that,
basically, related to the military. Your response was that
there are more generals in Venezuela than there are in NATO. My
question is: If Maduro's going to be really relying on this
military to prop him up, what is the extent, to the everyday
soldiers, the enlisted folks, the discipline in the military?
Do those generals really have command over that military?
Admiral Faller. Senator, the leaders, including the Cuban
guards that completely surround the illegitimate Government of
Maduro, seem to have a grip on the top level. What we read in--
at this level, that we can talk about more in a classified
session--that the rank-and-file are starving, just like their
population. I had the opportunity to go on the Colombian-
Venezuela border to one of our medical camps--that was
operating off the Comfort, and see some of these kids that had
lost 25-30 pounds in a year. They were stick thin. They had
never had medical attention. We think that condition affects a
large swath of the population. We think that that population is
ready for a new leader, Senator.
Senator Peters. Admiral Faller, you also mentioned some of
the additional assets that you need: ISR and ships. You
mentioned the littoral combat ship coming online, and how
that's going to contribute to the fulfillment of your mission.
Could you give us some sense of the status and timing of that,
and how you see that being fully developed in the months and
years ahead?
Admiral Faller. Senator, we expect to have a littoral
combat ship this year, and that will be a big benefit for our
exercise program, for our engagement with partners, and because
of the flexibility it brings for counternarcotic interdiction.
Counternarcotic will be its first mission. Then we forward to
continuous presence, moving forward.
We're working with our Navy. They have readiness
challenges, and they don't have enough ships. I think that's
been discussed well before this Committee. We have the support
we need. We look forward to the assets.
Senator Peters. In addition to those assets, I know your
predecessors have talked about the fact that the Navy and the
Southern Command has white hulls. That's the U.S. Coast Guard.
That performs brilliantly in those counternarcotics missions,
as well as other missions related to your task. You know, I
visited Coast Guard units in Michigan who were incredibly
stressed as a result of the Government shutdown. They're
concerned about their families, particularly junior enlisted,
that were living on the edge. You have men and women in the
Coast Guard being deployed away from home, worrying about their
families. Could you talk a little bit about the impact of the
shutdown on morale and the ability to execute the mission?
Admiral Faller. Sir, Monday morning, I had the opportunity
to stand on the deck of the Coast Guard cutter Ford with
Admiral Schultz, the Commandant of the Coast Guard. This crew
of 110 of America's finest had deployed over Christmas with
record-number seizures. Seventeen metric tons of cocaine, which
is hundreds of lives saved in the U.S. They did that deployment
in large part, without pay and without adequate parts, because
that was affected by contracting. It was difficult for Admiral
Schultz and I to address some of their questions. They had
remarkable resiliency and a remarkable attitude. They are our
main battery. During that period, there was nine Coast Guard
cutters deployed, counternarcotics missions, some 1600 Coast
Guard men and women working for United States Southern Command,
and it did have an impact. We're thankful that the shutdown's
over, Senator.
Senator Peters. That's why we can't have any more
shutdowns, for that very reason, to make sure that our men and
women of the Coast Guard are getting paid, like every other
member of the military out there defending us. I appreciate
those comments.
General Waldhauser, we have talked in this Committee quite
a bit about China's influence in Africa and how it continues to
increase. You mentioned, in your opening comments, that Russia
is also increasing its involvement. Would you please elaborate
on that involvement to the Committee, and why we should be
concerned about Russian involvement on the continent?
General Waldhauser. Senator, I think the issue with Russia
has to do with influence. I think, in recent months over the
past year, they perhaps got more involved in mineral
extraction, but, to a large degree, it's still a matter of
influence, especially in areas we're not or especially in areas
where they can say that the United States or the U.K. or
Western partners are perhaps backing away from Africa. It's, I
think, clear that their strategy along the northern part of
Africa, southern part of NATO, if you will, in the
Mediterranean, to have influence inside Libya, for example, the
relationships across that country, they want to have--across
the continent--they want to have influence on the continent.
I would just point to the Central African Republic right
now, where the Wagner group has about 175 trainers, where some
individuals are actually in the President's cabinet, and
they're influencing the training, as well as, at the same time,
having access to minerals in that part of the country. We're
concerned that that model might be looked at or viewed
positively by other countries, in terms of their ability to
train and their ability to influence the government at the
presidential level, as well as then getting involved in
extraction of minerals.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Faller, can you talk about Cuba's intelligence,
security, military influence in Latin America, and what they're
doing, and how we can combat it?
Admiral Faller. I Can't talk about Cuba without talking
about Russia. Russia is entrenched in Cuba, weapons systems and
support. Looking across Latin America, we see Cuba
inextricably, intertwined in all elements of Venezuela. In
fact, the National Security Advisor called it ``Cubazuela''
yesterday. I would agree with that characterization. We see
that in Nicaragua, as well. It's not helpful to democracy, and
it's an autocratic way of life that runs counter to, really,
the principles of the hemisphere, which are very much a
democratic hemisphere.
Senator Scott. The sanctions that we've imposed on
nationals in both Cuba and Venezuela, have you seen them have
any impact? Have you seen anybody change their action as a
result of them?
Admiral Faller. We're watching that closely. We're watching
the intelligence. There's a discussion of the impact. We are
seeing impacts. But, we haven't seen the desired result, which
is a peaceful, democratic transition to a legitimate
government, yet, Senator.
Senator Scott. The sanctions we've done against individuals
in Cuba--and we've done that over a period of time. Have you
seen--has anything happened?
Admiral Faller. It doesn't seem to have affected the
overall calculus of the Cuban regime, other than harden it,
solidify it, and tie it more closely to Russia. But, I think
it's almost like deterrence: you don't know what happens when
you don't have them, Senator. It probably has an impact. We
don't see it. I would recommend--full-court pressure works.
Senator Scott. Okay. In the Venezuelan military, have you
seen any cracking, from the standpoint of what we've been doing
over the last--especially the last 2 weeks? Has anything
changed?
Admiral Faller. Certainly, there's been readiness aspects
of their military that we've watched very closely. It's a
degraded force. But, it's still a force that remains loyal to
Maduro, and that makes it dangerous. We're looking for signs of
those cracking, and we can talk, in the closed session, on some
more details and trends we're seeing.
Senator Scott. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I'd like to ask you about a question----
Well, first of all, thank you both for not only your--being
here today, but for your service and all you do for this
country.
General, I'd like to ask you about an article yesterday by
Reuters concerning the cutoff of assistance to Cameroon because
of concerns about human rights abuses by the Cameroon
Government. That program halted--included C-130 aircraft, a
number of different things. That report indicated there was a
2017 report by the U.S. State Department that listed a number
of significant human rights violations and abuses that were
observed in the Cameroon Government. Could you comment on what
we're doing there, other than just this halt? Are we making
progress on trying to get that government to stem the tide of
their human rights violations?
[The article referred to follows:]
U.S. Halts Some Cameroon Military Assistance Over Human Rights:
Official
Lesley Wroughton
WASHINGTON (Reuters)--The United States said on Wednesday
it was halting some military assistance to Cameroon over
allegations of gross human rights violations by its security
forces in the northwest, southwest and far north regions.
A State Department official said the United States had
terminated a C-130 aircraft training program, and halted
deliveries of four defender boats, nine armored vehicles and an
upgrade of a Cessna aircraft for Cameroon's rapid intervention
battalion.
Furthermore, the United States had withdrawn its offer for
Cameroon to be part of the State Partnership Program, a
military cooperation program, the official said.
``We do not take these measures lightly, but we will not
shirk from reducing assistance further if evolving conditions
require it,'' the official said. ``For the time being, other
programs will continue.''
Cameroon has cooperated closely with the United States in
the fight against Islamist militant group Boko Haram in West
and Central Africa. But rights groups have accused authorities
of using the fight against Boko Haram to crack down on
political opponents, and make arbitrary arrests and torture
people.
Authorities arrested opposition leader Maurice Kamto in
January, accusing him of mobilizing dissent against President
Paul Biya, who has ruled the country since 1982.
Biya has been accused by the opposition and rights groups
of cracking down in the Anglophone Southwest region to root out
armed separatists trying to end his grip on power.
Tens of thousands of people have been displaced in Nigeria
and neighboring Chad, Niger and Cameroon during Boko Haram's
campaign to carve out an Islamic caliphate in northeast
Nigeria.
``We emphasize that it is in Cameroon's interest to show
greater transparency in investigating credible allegations of
gross violations of human rights security forces,'' the State
Department official said.
Admiral Faller. Senator, thank you. Let me try to explain
this. I'll start by why we're in Cameroon and what we're doing
there.
We talked this morning about the Chibok girls from a couple
of years ago, but Boko Haram is the issue there. In 2015, they
were the number-one terrorist group on the planet. Depending on
what you read, they have killed over 20,000 people, some
estimates quite higher than that, over this timeframe, the
Chibok-girls issue, all kind of atrocities. They are an
extremely volatile group that needs to be dealt with. So, in
that region, our mission is to train the counterterrorism
forces in northern Cameroon that deal with Boko Haram. We have
been doing that for several years, and, quite frankly, the BIR,
the brigade of rapid intervention, is the top-shelf
counterterrorism unit inside Cameroon. They have performed
well, and they--and that training, by the way, has, certainly,
law-of-war and battlefield ethics. So, that's why we're there.
The issue on the Anglophone piece, I won't go into detail
on that. I think the article, plus the video this morning, did
a very good job of explaining the history of how it got to the
point where we are today. In October of 2017, when it came,
kind of, to a head, the Anglophone states said, ``We want to
actually form our own state, the Ambazonia state.'' There have
been issues there with atrocities, issues with allegations of
law-of-war issues. This is something that brings all this to a
head.
Over the last several months or so, the State Department
has put on hold several security force assistance programs.
Right before the election in October, I, with the Ambassador,
went and paid a visit with President Biya, and we had a very
direct conversation with him with regards to investigation into
these atrocities, transparencies of these atrocities, and
appropriate battlefield behavior. Since that time, the State
Department has made the decision not to allocate significant
money, but, at the same time, they've released some money
that's been on hold to things like ScanEagle and Cessna
aircraft that assist in the Boko Haram fight in the north. We
still have programs that we continue with them, all kind of
small engagements, as well as exercises. We did have the--we
talked about the State Partnership Program with Nebraska. We
put that on hold. In conjunction with the Ambassador, AFRICOM,
we decided not to pursue that, because it wouldn't have been a
good place for that particular group to be, so we put a halt to
that.
The bottom line is, right now in Cameroon, they have been a
good partner with us, counterterrorism-wise, but you can't
neglect the fact that they have--there are alleged atrocities
in what's going on there. We continue to take our cues from the
State Department and from the Ambassador, and our level of
engagement will continue, but not get out ahead of what the
State Department would say if we have to take other actions. We
were very emphatic with President Biya that the behavior of his
troops, the lack of transparency, could have a significant
impact on our ability to work with them.
Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much for that.
Admiral, I was struck by a couple of things with your
testimony. Number one, I was struck by the charts that you
provided. Because I think people are not paying as much
attention. We've always heard of--since the Cold War--the
influence of Russia, but the Chinese influence in our backyard
is just incredible to me. I was struck by your initial comments
about our shared responsibilities, our shared security with our
neighbors, and how we share so many things together. I'm new to
this Committee, and so I've been reading a lot, and I've seen
that there are initiatives for the Pacific and in Europe. Would
some similar initiative to that be appropriate for Central
America or for SOUTHCOM?
[The charts provided to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Admiral Faller. Senator, I think a big idea, an initiative
that recognizes the importance of our neighborhood, recognizes
what goes on right here in areas connected by sea, land, air,
space, cyber, is important to our shared security and our
future, would be of great benefit. I worry, Senator, that we're
not going to be present on the field in enough numbers to play
the game. We've got to be there to influence the outcome and
the results.
Senator Jones. All right. Well, thank you, sir. We'll send
you some more Mobile-built LCSs.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
today and your service to our Nation, for all those men and
women who serve underneath you in Africa Command and Southern
Command.
Admiral Faller, I want to return to your comments about the
presence of Cuba and Russia in Venezuela. You said, earlier,
Cuban guards completely surround the Maduro Government. Does
that mean that Maduro is dependent on the Cuban security and
intelligence forces for his continuation in office?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I think it's a good sense of where
the loyalty of the Venezuelan people are that his immediate
security force is made up of Cubans.
Senator Cotton. So, the men that surround Maduro, like our
Secret Service, are Cubans, not Venezuelans.
Admiral Faller. That is my understanding and assessment of
the situation.
Senator Cotton. So, Venezuela's intelligence security
services are so corrupt, so incompetent, so disloyal, so
sclerotic that Maduro cannot even count on his own personal
safety in his bed at night, on his own people.
Admiral Faller. That's a fair assessment, as I understand,
Senator.
Senator Cotton. How far does that go throughout the
Venezuelan security and intelligence services? Does Nicolas
Maduro have to depend on Cubans and Russians on the streets to
beat his own people to keep them in line?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I'm not--beyond the--what I
characterize--I'm not aware of the details, but we watch that
closely. We've seen reporting of Russian security forces being
flown in. We're looking for evidence of how that will play out.
Certainly this is an area that has our focus, as well as all
our partners in the interagency.
Senator Cotton. That was another point. You mentioned
that--you said you can't speak of Cuba's presence in
Venezuela--let me stop myself.
Can you estimate, in this setting, how many Cuban security
and intelligence officers there are in Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. Sir, I don't have that number. I'd take
that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
We estimate the number of Cuban security and intelligence
personnel in Venezuela is somewhere in the thousands; this
number is in addition to the over 20,000 medical personnel Cuba
provides to Venezuela.]
Senator Cotton. Is it fair to----
Admiral Faller. I'm----
Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say there are lots?
Admiral Faller. I'd say there's--there are many, sir.
Senator Cotton. And----
Admiral Faller. I also would mention, Senator, the presence
of China has not been helpful in a diplomatic way. I'll leave
that to the diplomats. China's in there, and they're involved
in cyber in ways that are absolutely not helpful to a
democratic outcome.
Senator Cotton. You talk about Russians traveling into the
country. Have we seen an increase in Russian presence in
Venezuela in the last 2 months as the National Assembly began
to take its seat and President Guaido declared himself as
interim President, and the United States and so many other
nations around the world have recognized his legitimacy?
Admiral Faller. Senator, it's hard, with Russia, to figure
out what they're really up to. I----
Senator Cotton. You don't say.
Senator Cotton. There was reports last week by Russian
official TASS news agency that I was actually on the Colombian-
Venezuela border, and they rolled that with B-roll footage of
amphibious landings and helicopter assaults. I was actually
walking out of Senator Rubio's office at the time. I don't
think the truth goes very far when it comes to their media,
sir.
Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you for those comments, Admiral
Faller, about Venezuela.
You mentioned China's activity in Venezuela in the cyber
domain. They obviously are very active, as well, in what you
might call debt diplomacy through their Belt and Road
Initiative. Secretary of State Pompeo was in Panama last
October cautioning that nation, and all nations who are
participants in China's Belt and Road Initiative, about what it
could mean for their sovereignty. Obviously, China has
foreclosed in the port outside Colombo, in Sri Lanka. Malaysia
recently left the Initiative because of China trying to throw
its weight around. What's been the results of Secretary
Pompeo's visit in the region? What feedback are you getting
from some of these Belt and Road Initiative members?
Admiral Faller. Senator, the states in the region, the
countries, they want to continue to partner us, but I've
cautioned the leaders that I've met with that, ``While you
might want to do that, if you leverage your ports and many of
your businesses, including your IT infrastructure, to Chinese
companies, with no strings attached and limited understanding
of what the internal workings are, that you've actually put
yourself in jeopardy of having a meaningful security
relationship with us. It gets to a point where I won't be
allowed or authorized to share information, because I just
don't know where that information is going.'' So, I've been
very emphatic about that, in terms of how it would affect us
being a partner of choice. This is my concern to other
questions that have been asked about what this hemisphere looks
like, 10, 15, 25 years from now, and who the partner of choice
is. We've got to be present, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral Faller.
General Waldhauser, one question for Africa. This is a
little bit outside the warfighting domain, but the American
military is called upon to do a lot outside that domain around
the world, especially in your area of operations. Nigeria has
its elections next weekend. Nigeria is the seventh-largest
country in the world, way larger than Russia or Mexico or
Japan. An important ally of ours. What are the prospects for
that election? Does it appear that it will be free and fair,
and that either party, should they win, will continue to be a
partner of the United States?
General Waldhauser. Senator, we're very much aware of the
elections on February 16th. From the military perspective, we
will watch that from the standpoint of actions leading up to
and what will happen afterwards. We are--on the intelligence
reports, we hope it'll be a peaceful election, but I think our
sights are set on forward, and not in the rearview mirror,
meaning that whoever would win, that now, okay, let's sit down
and talk about where we are and how we can best help, whether
it be the displaced people and the issues with--humanitarian
issues in northern Nigeria, whether it's their army and their
work against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. So, my answer to
that question is, let's get the election over. They're watching
this today, by the way. I mean, my comments are going to be
watched in Nigeria, and it's very important that I don't sway,
either way.
Senator Cotton. Sure. Well----
General Waldhauser. The bottom line is, whoever wins, we
want to sit down with them and now, how do we move forward and
improve the situation?
Senator Cotton. Good. Well, I appreciate that answer. Of
course, their election is a choice for the Nigerian people, and
we want to have a good, stable relationship with whoever wins,
to help continue that partnership.
Thank you, General.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
We've already discussed and gotten a good idea of how
complex your missions are in both of your areas of operation.
Our own vital national interests are threatened by violent
extremists, by great-power competition, and all of multifaceted
challenges that you face. As I looked at recent reporting on
SOUTHCOM, much attention has been on the dictator's effort to
cling to power; in AFRICOM, the persistent presence of violent
extremists. Are these events merely symptoms of a larger
systemic problem in both regions? What, in your assessment, are
the prime drivers of instability in SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM? How
are your commands postured to deal with the root causes? It's
one thing to deal with the symptoms, but what are we doing to
really get to the root causes that are occurring in both of
your regions?
General Waldhauser. I'll go first, Senator. Thank you very
much.
I'll use Niger as an example. Niger has a population of
about 19 million. About 50 percent of those are under the age
of 15. They certainly are in a very difficult area of Africa,
meaning that they have a pressing from all sides, whether it be
ISIS-West Africa, JNIM [Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin], in
the west; whether it be AQ [al Qaeda] coming down through the
Algeria-Nigerian border on the way to Mali; they have ISIS-West
Africa on their eastern flank. They're in a tough situation.
What goes unnoticed sometimes is the whole-of-government
approach that is used in Niger. For example, USAID has about
$150 million a year that they use for things like education,
especially for young girls, for government, and--government
infrastructure, and so forth. Moreover, the Millennium
Challenge Corporation--they're on the--I think, second year of
a 5-year compact down there which has to do with agriculture,
watering crops, and so forth. If you look at the security
assistance that we're providing, and you add to that USAID's
effort and the Millennium Challenge compact, that's, I think, a
good example of a whole-of-government approach of how we're
trying to deal with a country that has some very significant
security challenges.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Admiral Faller?
Admiral Faller. We do have some bright spots. I'd like to
point out, Brazil has been a exporter of security in our
history, same with Colombia. The trajectory of both our mil-to-
mil relations with those countries is very positive. In the
current Venezuela situation, we're sharing a lot of
information, we're looking at this as a regional solution.
Chile commanded, in our largest exercise, the Rim of the
Pacific. But, around the region, corruption, weak governance,
lack of jobs, these are things that are of effect. The military
is a part of this whole government solution.
I saw this in Honduras. I was in an outreach center run by
USAID. It was right next to a partnered police station. We had
a few Army civil affairs people there meeting with some young
men and women that had been supplied jobs. I asked the one
individual--he had gone all the way to the United States-Mexico
border, and turned around and came all the way back. He walked,
as part of the caravan, but he came back. I said, ``Well, why
did you come back?'' He said, ``It was pretty scary for me. I
felt that I should come home.'' I said, ``Well, why did you
go?'' He goes, ``The family next to us was starving--or we were
starving, and the family next to them was starving, but across
the street, they had some food because their father had made it
to the United States and was sending remittance back.'' So, at
the heart of this is the want of a better life and economy, and
the want to have your kids go to school. All citizens of all
the world deserve that.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Looking at this whole-of-government approach, how easy has
it been--or, for you each, to work with other executive branch
agencies to provide a coordinated whole-of-government approach?
Is this happening--for example, you may be happening in Niger,
but is it happening in other parts of Africa? How are we--are
we consistent in applying this approach? What can we do to
really help you be part of this, this team, so that we can get
at the root causes?
General Waldhauser. Well, Senator, I would say that the
AFRICOM staff has individuals from those agencies that work
very closely with us on a daily basis. Moreover, as dollars
become tight, our return on investment needs to be
demonstrated. As a consequence, we have to be better stewards
of our efforts, in terms of where we want to place our
emphasis. We need to coordinate that and synchronize that with
this agency, because, really, it gets, I think, to the larger
issue of influence, and the China influence, as well. We need
to demonstrate that we can compete with them. We may not be
building soccer stadiums or government buildings, but, at the
same time, we're teaching them how to be better farmers, we're
showing them what education can do for them. So, the bottom
line for us is, we need to continue to work with our partners,
which we have good relationships with, by the way. This
development, diplomacy, and defense effort in the AFRICOM--at
State Department and with AFRICOM is very, very positive
experience.
Senator Duckworth. Admiral?
Admiral Faller. We have representatives from every
interagency at my headquarters, and they sit in at every
meeting. We're working this problem set hard, and we're work it
in conjunction with country teams in the Embassy. A consistent
level of resourcing is important, and recognizing this is a
problem that will take years to solve, not months or days.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and, of course,
to the men and women in your commands. We thank them for what
they do for all of us. To the family members that are here,
thank you so much for the support that you give to your loved
one. So, thank you.
Admiral Faller, I'll start with you. We've talked about a
lot of different groups that are engaged in SOUTHCOM, but what
I'd like to do is dive in a little bit to Hezbollah. They do
have a notable presence in South America. As we saw last year,
Argentina and Brazil, they both took action against Hezbollah
assets in their respective countries. We've heard, from
regional authorities, that they are aware of Hezbollah's
presence in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and
Paraguay. Can you go a bit further into the threat that
Hezbollah presents in SOUTHCOM? What are our interests in
making sure that they are not affecting us? What are those
national security interests for us and our partners?
Admiral Faller. Hezbollah is present. We watch them
closely. It points to the importance of partnerships in the
intelligence-sharing relationships that we are keen to develop
and strengthen even further, because a lot of what's required
to monitor them is human intelligence, and those nations know
their terrain best.
Hezbollah's connection to Iran can never be understated.
Iran is the largest sponsor of state terrorism in the world.
There is a nexus there that goes back. We watch that working,
in partnership with the other combatant commands, Defense
Intelligence Agency, very, very closely. We look for trends,
indications, and warnings. A terror threat anywhere around the
world could be a threat of our Homeland.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate you highlighting how Iran is
interconnected here. We talk about some of those near-peer
threats with China and Russia in the SOUTHCOM AOR, but we also
need to recognize that Iran is a player, as well. So, thank you
for making that connection.
Do we have sufficient information-sharing authorities in
place, then? You've mentioned the need to communicate with
friends and allies. Do we have the right authorities available?
Admiral Faller. Senator, we have to work that on a country-
by-country basis. It's a key thing that we look at when we do
our country engagements. So, the answer is, we never have
enough. We have countries where we want to sign additional
agreements. We have to get assurances with them about what
they'll share and who they'll share it with. It goes back to my
concern about who owns the IT infrastructure in a given city or
a given fusion center. We're constantly looking at this. I fly,
Sunday, to Brazil for my meeting with their new military
leadership. This will be one of our top areas of discussion. I
would say that's a very healthy intel-sharing relationship
that's growing, and we've been able to really work with our
partners, because sharing information intelligence builds
trust, frankly. Building trust is what is going to ensure our
long-term interests in this hemisphere are safeguarded.
Senator Ernst. That is very good. We've also talked about
the role that Special Operations plays in achieving your
objectives in SOUTHCOM. Part of that ties back into Hezbollah
and others. What are some of the biggest challenges that you'll
face with regard to resources or authorities when it comes to
our Special Operations and how we employ them in SOUTHCOM?
Admiral Faller. We have very small numbers of Special
Operations teams that are engaged with partners, building their
security forces, and building it very effectively. Those need
to be habitual relationships that are keyed off of what the
partner needs. It's also good for our training, as well, as our
partners train in jungles and a tough kind of terrain.
I would say our challenge is maintaining that. Our SOF
forces are under pressure worldwide. As we look at what their
deployment ratio is, the amount of time they're spending away
from home to the time they spend at home, making certain that
we get that balance right, making certain that we don't
decremate the small presence that we have, which would break
trust and really break the training and stability of our
partner nation security forces.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. Yes, our dwell time is very
small. We need to work on that.
Before I move on to the General, we have also talked about
GITMO, Guantanamo Bay. Right now, we do have Iowa National
Guard soldiers deployed there as a security force. What can we
do to ensure that the troops we have that are stationed or a
rotational force at GITMO, that they are being cared for, that
they are safe? Not only do we want to make sure that those that
are held there are kept in a safe environment, but also for our
troops. What more can we be doing? Can you explain some of the
challenges that we have at Guantanamo Bay right now?
Admiral Faller. I had the honor to visit with some of your
Iowa Guard prisoner guards, detainee guards----
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
Admiral Faller.--just last weekend, Senator. They're doing
fabulous work. So, thanks----
Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you.
Admiral Faller.--for the--to the State for that.
The facilities were built with about a 5-year lifespan, and
that's been 15-20 years ago. Our responsibility is the safe,
humane treatment of the detainees, but also the safety of that
Guard force. We have facilities that were beyond the ability to
repair the roofs, where the alarm systems are questionable,
based on the water intrusion. When the President's budget is
released, I expect it to include money that would be put for
some long-term facility upgrades in development. We need that
for the safety of the Guard force and for the future of safe
detainees.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that.
In the few seconds I have remaining, General, as well,
Special Operations Forces in Africa, do we need to maintain our
Special Operators in Africa and the work that they are doing?
General Waldhauser. Well, we certainly need to maintain
them, and we certainly have to take a close look at how we
employ and deploy them, and what their schedules are. We do--we
continually reevaluate that all the time. The bottom line is,
yes. But, I would say, what we really need in AFRICOM are some
predictable general-purpose forces that can do things with
regular armies on a somewhat episodic, but yet predictable,
basis.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you, General. I appreciate
it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, to our witnesses.
The Chair and Ranking indicated that a unifier in your two
regions is that you're under-resourced. I think another unifier
is, in both your regions, you have a real cross-disciplinary,
non-siloed focus, not just military assets, but the entire
spectrum of what the U.S. can do. I think that's a--something
about SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM that I really appreciate.
Admiral Faller, let me start with you. The discussion about
Venezuela is a really important one. If the world wants to see
a democracy-versus-dictatorship challenge, Venezuela is just,
like, the perfect test case for circa 2019. What do democracies
care for, and what do dictatorship care for? The Venezuelan
Government of Maduro is supported by Russia, Cuba, and Iran.
They're enabling him to do all kinds of horrible things,
economically and in violation of human rights, et cetera. The
Guaido interim government, which has a constitutional claim
that, in the vacancy of a President, the Speaker of the
legislative assembly becomes an interim President, is supported
by the United States and the EU. You really can see what the
difference between democracy and the aspirations of democratic
governments and dictatorships, and what they care about, writ
very clearly in the Venezuelan circumstance now.
But, here's a reality. We're dealing with regional
institutions, like the Organization of American States (OAS),
for example. In the OAS, every nation has one vote. The United
States has a hard time getting the OAS to firmly come out
against the Maduro Government, because many Caribbean nations
still support the Maduro Government. They have been bribed to
do so, with low-price oil. It's very hard for us to do
something like this on our own. When a principal regional
institution like the OAS isn't completely with us, it's hard to
put the appropriate pressure on.
I guess the point that I want to make is: Hard to beat
something with nothing. The Chinese and Russians have been
investing so heavily in Venezuela, tens of billions of dollars,
over and over and over again. These Caribbean nations, they
might feel culturally closer to the United States, but they're
getting something from Venezuela that they need.
Your point about ``We need to be on the field'' is really,
really, important. As I talk to leaders in this region, they
say, ``We would so much more like to do work with you guys. We
are culturally connected, and we're all Americans, you know,
but the other guys are there and present and investing. Even if
we have suspicions, they're there with resources, and you
aren't.'' I think that's an important lesson.
Want to ask about the Northern Triangle. It's a resource
question, as well. The Alliance for Progress has been an
initiative in the last few years to invest money and security
and economic development assistance in the three nations in the
Northern Triangle. Would it be your recommendation--so long as
we can make those investments smart, would it be your
recommendation that, if we can improve the security and
economic development arc in those three countries, that that
would help us deal with some of the challenges that SOUTHCOM
has to deal with?
Admiral Faller. Senator, the week before last, I visited
projects, in all three countries, that were a direct result of
the investments that you just cited. Those projects were USAID,
State, INL, and a small footprint of Department of Defense
working side by side to bring security, with local policing,
and jobs, and host-nation investment in a way that stabilized
some of the worst neighborhoods and showed hope. We talked to
citizens that live there. We saw the results. I think
consistent investment, in accordance with our laws, is a good
thing in that area. Investment, a dollar there is going to save
lives and result in better security here at home.
Senator Kaine. That's really important. The funds for those
initiatives have been pretty dramatically slashed, the last 2
years. We don't know what the budget submission will be that
we'll get, hopefully, by the end of the month. But, I think
it's penny wise and pound foolish to cut development and
security assistance and then complain about people coming to
our border. We need to help build and support economies there,
and security there, if we want people to not leave their own
countries.
Let me quickly--General Waldhauser, to you--on page 5 of
your submitted statement, you write, ``In the fight against
Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, we operate with partners in
the Africa Union-enforced Multinational Task Force.'' The
fiscal year '18 NDAA included a provision, in section 1264,
that required the administration to provide an initial report
and subsequent updates on the legal and policy frameworks for
use of military force. I'm interested in the initial report,
which was submitted in March of 2018. I'd like to put that in
the record, if I could. It makes no----
Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Kaine. It makes no mention of ISIS-West Africa or
Boko Haram as an associated force. As far as I know, there's
not been an updated report submitted to this Committee, as
would be required if any new determination were made. Has Boko
Haram or ISIS-West Africa been determined to be an associated
force within the--either the 2001 or 2002 AUMF?
General Waldhauser. Senator, first of all, we do not have
offensive strike capabilities or authorities in those
countries. So, we can't strike. We can strike in Somalia, we
can strike in Libya, but not in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and
the like. We don't have authorities there.
Now, ISIS-West Africa has grown--they go by different names
every once in a while, but they have grown in numbers. They're
now probably in the neighborhood of around 3 to 4,000. That's
the best estimate that we have. They have been very aggressive
over the summer, into this year. They now have taken large
pieces of real estate in northern Nigeria. I think, of the two,
right now they're the one that we have the most concern about,
because we're not sure what their intentions would be with
regards to outside the region. Boko Haram, probably around
1,000. Bottom line, though, Senator, I can't say for sure
whether they have been designated or not. I know that we don't
strike them.
Senator Kaine. When you say you ``don't strike,'' you also
include don't strike under a collective self-defense doctrine?
General Waldhauser. No. Collective--we--if we are
accompanying--that's the whole key here, now--if we are
accompanying, we have the right of self-defense and collective
self-defense. If we are not accompanying, which we have not
done at all in Nigeria, and we haven't accompanied inside other
places for quite some time--we do not have collective self-
defense, because I haven't designated it, and we don't use it.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being
here. Thank you again for your exemplary service, and for all
those under your command.
General, let me start with you. The National Defense
Strategy, of course, reemphasizes great-power competition that
we've talked a lot about today and you mentioned, to great
degree, in your testimony. I want to ask you about China, in
particular, in your AOR. What could you tell us--to what degree
and in what ways are we continuing to shift focus and resources
to engage in this great-power competition and counter Chinese
influence in your AOR? I'm thinking, in particular, of China's
growing influence. Its base in Djibouti. I've seen estimates
that there may be as many as 25-27 Chinese bases across the
continent. What can you tell us about that and what we're doing
to counter this growing influence there?
General Waldhauser. Well, thank you, Senator. Let me try to
take that from the 50,000-foot level. First of all, just to
emphasize, China has one overseas base in Djibouti. They
participate in UN peacekeeping operations, places like Mali,
places like Sudan, but they do not have other bases. Is that in
their future? That's perhaps.
What I would say is--from the African perspective, is,
China has been there for quite some time. They're in the
process of building over 300 miles worth of railroads,
railroads tied primarily to areas of mineral extraction, which,
again, then take this goods to a port somewhere. So, they're
heavily invested and heavily involved.
From the African perspective, they, the Africans, do not
want to be in the middle of this. They don't view it as, ``We
either choose the United States or we choose China.'' They
don't want to be in the middle of that particular engagement.
I think that one of the things that we do, from the DOD
perspective, is, we try to just show--just be good partners.
When Secretary Tillerson was there, a year or so ago--or
whenever the visit took place, I believe it was a year or so
ago--you know, he talked about, ``We need to work with the
governments of those countries to make sure the arrangements
they make are in their best interests.'' You had leaders from
the African Union, you've had--Paul Kagame is another one
that--you know, that--the African Governments will make their
decisions based on their best interests, and they're capable of
doing that.
On the other hand, Chinese efforts, in terms of selling of
equipment and some of the arrangements that have been made,
there has been some blowback from various countries. Sierra
Leone, for example, is walking away from an airport agreement
that was supposed to be built by the Chinese. The Kenyans, for
example, have problems with the Chinese equipment that's been
sent to them. So, again, the bottom line is, in the AFRICOM
AOR, China is there.
The final thing I would say, in order that--this issue of
influence and how we want to be the best partners--the Chinese
work hard at developing and maintaining the relationship with
the senior officials of the governments inside the African
continent. We are very grateful, for example, of Senator Inhofe
and his team and his visits that they make there, but I read an
article the other day that talked about, in the last decade, 80
senior-level--we're talking Minister and above, to include the
President of China--visits on the African continent. That's a
lot. Moreover, since 1990, their Foreign Minister, his first
trip is--every year, in January, is to a country in Africa,
just to see how they're doing.
So, I would just say, the whole-of-government approach, if
we want to maintain influence, we have to kind of up our
engagement, and develop and work at the relationship part of
this.
Senator Hawley. You testified, I think, last March--to a
House committee, March of 2018--that you expected China would--
we should expect an increasing number of bases--outright
military bases. Is that still your assessment?
General Waldhauser. Well, I think first of all, the Belt
and Road Initiative is what is driving all of this. I think
what the Chinese are doing is, they're taking a lot of lessons
learned, and they are learning a lot from their first overseas
base that they have in Djibouti. This is not an easy thing to
do. The United States is very good at it. They watch what we
do. But, they're learning this. They certainly have their eyes
on other facilities. Ports, for example, are a key to what
would facilitate their, not only mineral extraction, but their
markets for their goods to come into the continent, as well. I
mean, they view this large youth bulge, the population
demographics, which we haven't talked about today, but it's in
the testimony--they view a large consumer class as a place
where they can sell their goods sometime in the future. So,
although Djibouti is the only base, they certainly are looking
at other options.
Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, more generally, about
our European allies and their help, or lack thereof, in your
AOR. What things should we be doing in order to encourage our
European allies to--in this era of renewed great-power
competition, to be helping us with our strategic objectives in
your--in the area under your command?
General Waldhauser. From the AFRICOM perspective, the
European Union does a lot on the continent with regards to
training, so there are European Union training missions in
Mali, there are European training missions inside Somalia.
Those are just two examples. We work closely with them, because
we are one--for example, I've indicated, in Somalia, we are one
of a group of in--of organizations and countries that is trying
to, you know, make things right there. The European Union is a
big player, and we coordinate with them. I talk with their
leadership all the time. Our effort to coordinate the training
activities in a place like Somalia, the European Union is a big
player. They do a lot. They, by the way, are the ones who pay
the stipends for the Somali National Army. They've put a lot of
money into Somalia, no doubt about it.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Blumenthal.
It's Senator Reed, presiding.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and for being here today in
critical commands that are perhaps less in the spotlight, but
no less important than any of the others that we oversee, both
of them absolutely critical to our national security. Thank you
and the men and women who serve with you, for your service to
our Nation.
I want to begin on the topic of military partnership
programs, also perhaps less visible to the public, but very
important. Both of you, I think, have endorsed the State
Partnership Programs. The International Military Education and
Training Program, as General Votel testified on Tuesday, are,
he said, ``dollar for dollar, the most effective funding that
CENTCOM receives, from a strategic perspective.'' The
Connecticut National Guard, as a matter of fact, is an active
participant in the State Partnership Program, and currently
partners with Uruguay. Next year is the 20th anniversary of
this partnership. To date, the Connecticut National Guard has
conducted over 110 mutually beneficial exchanges with their
Uruguayan partners. In April, the Connecticut National Guard
will send 40 soldiers and airmen on a Connecticut Air National
Guard C-130H to Uruguay, marking our last--largest contingent
to Uruguay to date. This is an enormously educational,
beneficial experience for them, for the Uruguayans, and it is
repeated again and again and again all around the world. This
kind of relationship, I think, is extremely important to both
countries, to us and other countries around the world. So,
thank you for your support. General Evon, our TAG, was here
this morning, and we had a chance to meet with him.
I want to ask you, General Waldhauser. I was searching for
the exact statement you made, about a year before the Niger
tragedy, if I may put it that way, about the lack of sufficient
intelligence resources devoted to your command, particularly to
that area of your command. I note, in your testimony, you say,
``Over a 3-year period, United States Africa Command has
increased Nigerian counter-IED capability, as well as
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets,
sustainment maintenance, and operation.'' Your estimate as to
the dearth and deficit of intelligence in that part of the
world was striking to me before the Niger incident. How much
improvement has there been in the investment in intelligence in
that part of the world?
General Waldhauser. Senator, I think the best way to answer
that question is, you know, our mission there really is to work
with our partners. In this case, it's the French. I would say,
over the last year, that our relationship with the French, to
include intelligence-sharing, has really gone to as good as
I've seen it. The French have the lead in that area. We support
partners, and, in that particular case, in the Sahel area of
northern Mali, Niger area, they have the lead, and it's our job
to support them. So, we kind of use the phrase, ``It's African-
led, French-assisted, and United States-supported.'' What I
would say is that our intelligence professionals, as they
synchronize what we bring and what they bring, is something
that has really added to our ability to understand the
situation there over the last year.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think, now, that it is
satisfactory? Adequate? Excellent? How would you characterize
it? You said ``as good as you've seen,'' but that was not very
good in the year before the Niger incident.
General Waldhauser. So, I would use the words, as you said,
``satisfactory and adequate.'' We're never going to have the
ISR total that we need, to include the human intelligence that
goes into places like that, but, for our support and for what
our mission is, it's adequate ISR now as we utilize our
partners, and how we train and how we assist the Nigerian
forces, as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you say, Admiral Faller, that
that's true in your command, as well, that you're satisfied
that there are sufficient ISR--intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance--resources devoted?
Admiral Faller. Senator, we're constantly looking at this.
I think we do have gaps. We mitigate those gaps with different
sources of intelligence. We are deficient in our ISR for the
counternarcotics mission.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe,
Senator Blackburn, please.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you for being here today. We look
forward to a closed session with you.
I want to come back to something each of you have mentioned
but we've really not talked that much about, and that is the
telcom issues that are in each of your AOR, and the
participation of China--Huawei, ZTE--and their relationship
with the Russians. The Chairman mentioned, earlier, his concern
about how China is putting their fingers into every area when
it comes to not only the ISR, but the communications component,
building out these networks. He mentioned he didn't know where
the money came from. General, I'd be interested to hear from
you. When you talk about China and how they are advancing, how
much of the bankrolling of this comes from Russia? Or do you
all know?
General Waldhauser. Well, ma'am, the best way to answer
that is, I think that when the Chinese come to a country with a
plan, whether it's to build railroad, infrastructure, bridges,
and the like, they come with a full plan. They come with the
charts to do it, they come with the money to do it, they'll
bring the workers to do it. It's just kind of a one-stop-one---
--
Senator Blackburn. Does the money come from Russia,
primarily?
General Waldhauser. This is Chinese, now. I would--in fact,
how I would answer that is, in kind of a--not to be--in a kind
of anecdotal way, but recently in the elections in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Joseph Kabila just
was--went out of office, one of his opponents said that the
Chinese bring the money, and the Russians bring the muscle.
Senator Blackburn. Got it.
General Waldhauser. So, I think that's a good way to try to
illustrate, kind of, where these two different countries are
when it comes to their engagement.
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
Let me ask you this. When we look at what has happened with
the Chinese and with their access into the telcom area, and as
we look at artificial intelligence and 5G, how do you see
Huawei and their participation? How is that going to affect the
buildout in your AORs?
Admiral, if you want to go at it first, and then the
General.
Admiral Faller. It's concerning. The extent to which China
would own the IT infrastructure of a country, their
intelligence or fusion centers would affect our relationship
and our ability to----
Senator Blackburn. Do they understand that you will not
share information with them if it is going over Huawei or ZTE?
Or----
Admiral Faller. We've had frank discussions----
Senator Blackburn. Very frank discussions.
Admiral Faller.--Senator, about this.
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
General Waldhauser. Senator, the way I would answer that
is, we obviously have some unique challenges in Djibouti. I
mean, the Chinese bases have several miles away from where
we're located. The Djibouti base services not only AFRICOM, but
it does CENTCOM and SOCOM, I believe, as General Votel
testified the other day. We'd be naive to think that the
counterintelligence and the communication issues, and the fact
that they have actually built the system inside Djibouti,
they're not trying to get after what we're trying to do.
Senator Blackburn. Okay. How do you make certain--what is
your best effort in making certain that we remain the partner
of choice?
General Waldhauser. Well, again, as I said several times
this morning, from our military perspective, we want to be
sincere in our efforts, we want to deliver what we say we can
do, we want to be role models when our troops train with
African troops, we want our equipment to be quality equipment,
and we just--we, essentially, want to be good partners. I think
that, when you bring in the agencies that we talked about--
USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and so forth, their
projects--I mean, we've got to make sure we elevate those,
because, in places like Senegal, for example, they're--the
Chinese will build a wrestling stadium, but, at the same time,
we have all kind of compacts ongoing that don't get the
publicity that some of these things do. So, it's--bottom line
for us is, we have to make sure that we're really doing an--
overall whole-of-government approach, and we're synchronizing
our efforts, and we make sure that--we take credit for some of
these programs that may not get the visibility that a brand-new
infrastructure would.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you for the comments. We hope that
that whole-of-government approach continues to include making
certain that we're paying attention to those telcom and
wireless networks.
Yield back.
Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
Let me just announce--it looks like we're down to the most
important one, of course--last, we say for--we are going to
have--I say to the staff of those who are not here right now,
we're going to have a closed session immediately following
this, in S---in Visitors Center, 217, for those who would like
to come and ask some of the questions that were not appropriate
to be asked in an open session.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Faller, you're not going to be surprised by this
question. The question is, interdiction of drug shipments--and
I understand it's already been discussed, to some extent--what
do you need? If you were given a blank sheet of paper--or not
a--what do you--what does the Coast Guard need? What do you
need? What do we need to do a better job of interdicting those
drug shipments that we know about? I just--it just is in--it's
so frustrating that we are only interdicting about 25 percent
of what we know about. So, do we need 18 more cutters, 12 more
Zodiacs? What's on your list of assets?
Admiral Faller. It's all of our responsibility, and we've
got to start at the source. So, very encouraged by the
Colombian Government getting back into--seriously back into the
eradication game. They've met their goals for 2018, and we're
seeing progress in 2019. So, record cocaine is going to mean
record drug flows, and we've got to stop it along the way. That
requires ISR, intelligence and surveillance assets, maritime
patrol aircraft, helicopters----
Senator King. No, I understand that, but I'm asking you for
some specifics. Do we need eight more Global Hawks? Do we need
14 more cutters? What is it we need?
Admiral Faller. We need more Navy ships.
Senator King. Okay.
Admiral Faller. More U.S. Navy----
Senator King. Of what nature?
Admiral Faller. Sir, the littoral combat ship is fit for
purpose for this type a mission, Senator. We need multiple
force packages. We need the Coast Guard, a sustained presence.
They've stepped up in a big way, from five to eight cutters
over the holiday. Then we need the partners in the game. We're
seeing improvements in some of the partners. I'll credit El
Salvador, Guatemala. We need others to step up. That requires
pressure from our government and myself to get that to happen.
So, a lot of work to be done, Senator.
Senator King. Do you feel we are moving the needle? Are we
moving forward on these multiple fronts?
Admiral Faller. We had record interdiction in 2017, 2018,
but it's insufficient. We're nudging, but we're not moving the
needle enough, Senator. One of the areas you asked me to look
at previously, I need to get back to you on, is the authority
piece and whether we have artificial seams between the air-land
boundary, and how we can better utilize and work across that
boundary. We've stepped up our partnership, within the last
year, with Drug Enforcement Agency and fusion centers here in
the United States. Again, more needs to be done to stay ahead
of the threat.
Senator King. I just hope, if there are assets, in terms of
either budgetary resources, authorities, you will let us know,
because these drugs are killing our people, and--one a day, in
Maine. This is a--it seems to me, a high-return opportunity,
here, given the fact that we know of the shipments that we
can't interdict.
Admiral Faller. Senator, I agree 100 percent. It's a threat
to our Nation, killing our citizens. It's killing citizens of
our partner nations, as well. The money from this is fueling
those drug and criminal organizations, which is driving
instability, it's contributing to the other factors we see,
like the illegal migration. So, it's important, for many
reasons, that we have to get after this.
Senator King. Well, keep--stay with us on this, Admiral.
Thank you.
On the issue of--and you mentioned in your testimony, I
think, in answer to Senator Kaine, about progress you're seeing
in the northern triangle countries based upon American
investments. I would point out that there was a huge refugee
problem in the world in 1945. There were about 10 million
refugees in western Europe after World War II. One of the
responses of this country was the Marshall Plan, which was
designed to stabilize the economies of those of that region. It
was very controversial at the time, but it--I think all would
agree now, it was immensely successful. I think we need a
similar kind of approach to stabilizing those countries so
people don't have to flee. The best way to stop someone coming
to our border is that they never start on the journey. That
means--I believe you agree that that means work, AID,
agriculture, all of those programs in those countries, again,
dealing with the issue of corruption, but to try to do that
effectively. Do you agree that that's a--should be a priority?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I agree. That should be a
priority.
Senator King. Thank you.
Quick question, General. By the way, these graphics are
terrific on the--on Chinese and Russian influence in Latin
America. I compliment your staff, whoever presented them.
They're very dramatic and sobering.
General, in Africa, China's doing similar kinds of things:
investing, blending, developing infrastructure, all those
things. Is there a concern that this is a precursor to a
military presence? I mean, is Djibouti a beginning of a
militarization process that presents a kind of global threat or
an expansion of a threat from China?
General Waldhauser. Senator, I think, at this point in
time, it's too early to make that leap at this point. I mean,
they obviously want to--one of the reasons for their engagement
there is, they've got, you know, 2,000 or so peacekeepers,
they've got 300,000 or so civilians there. They want to be able
to protect their interests in their projects that they're
working on. So, whether that leads to a militarization of the
continent, it's still early to tell. But, I would say that one
of the areas of concern that we have there is, in the
Djibouti--the Straits of Bab al-Mandab area, where the Red Sea
comes down, where we've had really open access for quite some
time, that is an area of concern, because not only the Chinese,
but the Russians, the Emiratis, the Saudis are all interested
in real estate on the Red Sea, on the African side--Sudan,
Eritrea----
Senator King. They're using an interesting technique of
lending money and then calling it. It's a kind of debt
colonialism.
General Waldhauser. Well, they have leverage in some--in
many of their situations. As I said, I mean, the--these are
decisions these governments have to make, but Djibouti's a--
really a classic example, where the Chinese own over 80 percent
of their overseas debt. This is a--certainly a concern.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Before Senator Perdue is recognized, I want to repeat to
the staff that's here that there will a closed session after
this. Hate to ask you to go over, because there may be nobody
there when you get there. But, nonetheless, there will be this
opportunity. All right?
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you both for your careers and for being here today.
I want to beat a dead horse, because I don't think we've
gotten to the essence of the issue yet. We're all concerned
about what China and Russia are doing in your AORs. General
Votel was in this week. We had the same conversation about
China's Belt-Road Initiative in harbors like Hambantota, in Sri
Lanka, Gwadar, in Pakistan. We've just seen the first
foreclosure in Sri Lanka, obviously, but what Russia is also
doing in Kaliningrad and Sebastopol and Latakia and Tartus--
Americans have always projected power based on our Navy and
based on our allies, who allow us to service our military
through their geography. Russia and China are both now--because
we have such an advantage on--in the sea, it seems to me that
they are setting the stage across three continents that are of
tremendous strategic importance. I'd like us to talk about what
the NDS does or doesn't do, and what you both need in your AORs
to deal with what we naturally have to assume is an effort that
is an economic, if not military, involvement that is beyond
anybody's expectation 5 years ago. When I look at what Huawei
is doing in some of these Latin American cities, I'm very
concerned. So, I'd love both of you to address the question
specifically.
Before I ask you both--General, first of all, in Africa, we
know now--Admiral, you've just told us--there are 56 port
investments in South America. In Africa, General, do we have a
similar estimate of the ports that they've made these--what I
call ``debt-trap diplomacy loans'' in the specific port
infrastructure?
General Waldhauser. Senator, I'm not an expert in that
area, and we can take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Waldhauser. China has invested in ports in 23 of
Africa's 33 coastal nations. We currently have no indications
Beijing made these investments with the prior intent to create
leverage over the host nation or port operators. However, it is
possible China could use these investments in the future to
apply pressure to those African states or seize port control.
General Waldhauser. But, what I will say, the Chinese are
involved in port operations all around the world.
Senator Perdue. Yeah.
General Waldhauser. So, it's not unique that perhaps you
have a Chinese company that has equities in a port on the
African continent.
Senator Perdue. Right. So, what we saw in the South China
Sea, though, is where they had, quote, ``nonmilitary
interests'' have now--we've got plenty of evidence that they've
converted those to military bases. I have no doubt that they're
going to have some of the same interests in--particularly in
Hambantota, right there. That's such a strategic thing--
location.
The question I have is--I don't think the NDS actually
addresses this growing potential threat, because we haven't
been able to confirm it, as you just said, General. So, my
concern is--in these two AORs, you and General Votel are three
guys that sit right in the middle of what China and Russia are
both doing. I'm worried, because of the effort and the focus we
have on the current crisis today around the world, where we're
taking our assets and spreading them very, very thinly, what
are we doing now to preclude the potential that we won't be
able to show up, it'll be too late once we recognize that
they've actually done what we were worried they were going to
do? Would you both address that in--as it relates to the NDS?
General Waldhauser. Well, Senator, let me just kind of
clarify. You know, I don't have a crystal ball to predict what
the Chinese will do militarily on----
Senator Perdue. Understood.
General Waldhauser.--African continent. But, what I do know
is that they've made a conscious decision to put their military
on the world stage in an area where the United States is not
necessarily engaged to a large degree.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
General Waldhauser. So, they work in areas where they don't
really have any competition from us. We're not in countries
where they are. We're not at places where ports on the western
side of Africa, which is my big concern, by the way--on the
western side of Africa, we're not really located there. So,
there's no doubt about the fact that they have long---a long-
term vision, and, by 2049, the 100-year anniversary, part of
this Belt and Road Initiative, this is not--Djibouti is not the
first, and it won't be the last port. The growth of their
military on the continent, I don't know what it'll turn out to
be, but I do know that the Chinese--they made a conscious
decision to start there, and they're not going to get smaller.
Senator Perdue. Other than Djibouti, do we have any other
access ports in Africa?
General Waldhauser. Well, I think I would say Capo Verde,
Senegal. These are places that we've talked about before that
are--you know, they're good locations for the Chinese. They
want to have a government that's relatively stable. They don't
want to have to deal with problems and so forth. You look where
you--where the military geography--meaning deepwater ports are
there. So, I mean, they certainly want other ports on the
eastern--and I could--you know, there's all kind of speculation
about what those other ports might be on the eastern side. But,
I do know they're looking on the western side, and that's a
concern for us, because----
Senator Perdue. Yes.
General Waldhauser.--they can be in the Atlantic Ocean
rather quickly.
Senator Perdue. Admiral, the Ambassador in El Salvador
actually warned, last August, about what the Chinese military
is planning to do in La Union, that commercial port, where they
do have a proprietary loan there. Can you speak to how the NDS
will affect this in your AOR?
Admiral Faller. Senator, I think the NDS rightly shined a
light on this as a biggest challenge that will confront us
perhaps in the next generation----
Senator Perdue. But, we haven't resourced it yet.
Admiral Faller. We're working on the resourcing. It's not--
as I've mentioned in previous questions, we need that
consistent level of resourcing in this AOR. In addition to the
ports you mentioned, I will also point out the space stations
that the Chinese are investing in and partnering in in this
AOR. They--and again, back to the education, some of the basic
military building blocks, they're taking a page from our
playbook. The Peace Ark deployed to South America and the
Caribbean this past year, they're trying to replicate our
playbook to win both access and influence, and our counter has
to be to remain present. We have the ability to have the
winning hand, based on our values, our democratic principles,
and the shared interests that we have in this hemisphere.
Senator Perdue. Thank you both.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
All right. It seems this has come to a conclusion.
We appreciate your attention very much. It has been very
significant. Also appreciate the time both of you have spent
with me and other Members of this Committee.
If it's not an inconvenience to do so, we will now go to
the Senate Visitors, number 217, and we'll see how many people
want to conclude this with some questions that may not have
been appropriate for open session.
So, with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
colombia
1. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, with the re-emergence of the
FARC and the net production of drugs still rising, do you foresee the
reduction in United States monetary support to Colombia (counter-
terrorism, counter-narcotics and counter-transnational organized crime)
causing any issue for the SOUTHCOM mission?
Admiral Faller. A reduction in United States monetary support to
Colombia would negatively impact the SOUTHCOM mission. The United
States funding that goes to Colombia is not only used for
counternarcotics and counterterrorism within Colombia, but it also
partly funds the United States-Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), in which
Colombia exports security throughout the region by training other
partner nations to address these challenges to regional security. As an
example, in 2019 the Colombian Military will train over 2,100 security
force personnel from Central America and the Caribbean to strengthen
their capability to provide security, support the rule of law, and
enhance their ability to participate in regional security and
humanitarian response operations. The Colombian Military and Police
exporting security capacity under USCAP is a shining example of the
return on investment from the United States support to Plan Colombia.
It shows that the U.S. military can rely on its partners to share their
expertise to address common regional security challenges. In addition,
the Colombian Military is currently providing extensive support in
responding to the Venezuelan migration crisis requiring them to divert
funding and manpower from security operations. Any cuts in U.S. funds
would further strain their national security budget.
foreign influence in venezuela
2. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, Cuba has sent military envoys
Venezuela since early 2000's. As early as 2010, Iranian Quz force were
patriated as Cuban citizens and joined these military envoys. In recent
years, Russia has continued this trend both overtly and covertly. How
many Cuban, Russian and Iranian actors are currently in Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. We have limited information on the number of Cuban,
Russian, and Iranian security personnel supporting the Maduro regime.
We estimate the number of Cuban security personnel in Venezuela is
somewhere in the thousands; this number is in addition to the over
20,000 medical personnel Cuba provides to Venezuela. Russia maintains a
diplomatic defense presence in Venezuela, and at times likely sends
teams of military technical experts to guide Venezuela in the use and
maintenance of acquired weapons systems. Iranian entities maintain a
small, limited presence in Venezuela, but we remain concerned that the
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism could take advantage of
turmoil in Venezuela to expand its presence.
3. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, what are their roles in
security?
Admiral Faller. Cuba: Cuban military personnel serve as security
and military advisors who assist Venezuelan security services'
monitoring of both the population and military for signs of dissent,
are part of Maduro's personal security detail, and help collect
intelligence. Russia: Moscow provides the Maduro regime with security
materiel, training, and disinformation assistance. Russia is
Venezuela's largest supplier of weapons to include surface- to-air
missile systems, combat and fixed wing aircraft, tanks, and artillery,
with Moscow selling Caracas $9 billion in military equipment from 2008
to 2018. The two countries regularly conduct combined military
exercises; their most recent exercise in December 2018 included the
deployment of two long-range bombers (Tu-160 Blackjacks) capable of
carrying nuclear weapons. Also, in mid-March, two Russian aircraft
arrived in Venezuela carrying a reported 100 Russian military personnel
that Moscow officially said were in Venezuela to fulfill existing
military contracts. Separate, Maduro-affiliated Venezuelan sources said
the troops would assist with cyber security and air defenses. Iran:
While Iran's relationship with Caracas in the past few years has
largely centered on economic cooperation, Iran and Venezuela have
officially been cooperating on defense issues for almost a decade.
Given this longstanding relationship, it is possible that Tehran may be
providing the Maduro regime with security advice, and potentially
assisting with military equipment maintenance. Last year, the Iranian
naval deputy commander, Rear Admiral Touraj Hassani Moqaddam, relayed
Iran's intent to deploy naval vessels with helicopters to Venezuela.
China: Additionally, China remains the top provider of sovereign loans
to Venezuela, with Caracas owing $20 billion. Beijing also has sold
Venezuela over $1 billion in military equipment, including assorted
missile variants, fixed wing transport and combat aircraft, light
tanks, mortar systems, and radars.
4. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, what are their roles in
controlling or influencing Policy?
Admiral Faller. Cuba: Havana is the Maduro regime's principal
foreign supporter, and is the external actor with the most influence
over Maduro's decision-making. Cuba helps to prop up the regime by
backing Maduro in international forums, helping to rally support for
the regime, and supporting information operations to discredit the U.S.
It is likely that Maduro is turning to Havana for advice on how to
handle mounting social unrest and an emboldened opposition. Russia:
Moscow plays a key role in providing financial support and access to
the Maduro regime, probably affording Russia some sway over Venezuela's
policy decisions. Venezuela is likely to increasingly rely on Russian
banks to move financial assets in ways that skirt sanctions and secure
cash flow. Additionally, Russia is one of the top providers of
Venezuela's sovereign loans, with Caracas owing Moscow over $3 billion.
Iran: We assess Iran holds less influence over the Maduro regime's
policies, given that Caracas's relationship with Tehran has not been as
essential to the regime's survival. China: Separately, China remains a
key financial backer of the Maduro regime, and appears to be supporting
the regime's efforts to monitor the population. Beijing is the top
provider of sovereign loans to Venezuela, with Caracas owning $20
billion. Since 2016, Chinese telecommunications company ZTE embedded a
special unit within Venezuela's telecommunication company to support
national ID cards that have the potential to monitor citizens'
behavior. Beijing also has sold Venezuela over $1 billion in military
equipment, including assorted missile variants, fixed wing transport
and combat aircraft, light tanks, mortar systems, and radars.
venezuelan military composition
5. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, Venezuela has more Generals than
the United States and NATO combined. Additionally, Maduro's regime,
described as a mafia state, retains only 20-25 percent support across
the nation. What is the actual composition and force structure of the
military, loyal to Maduro?
Admiral Faller. Venezuelan armed forces branches include the
Bolivarian Air Force, Navy, Army, and National Guard. The commanders
and top-ranking military officers in each of these services remain
loyal to the Maduro regime. Of the over 1,000 defections since Interim
President Guaido took office, only two of the defectors have been
general officers, indicative of senior military leaders' commitment to
the regime and the benefits they receive. The President is the
commander-in-chief of the Bolivarian Armed Forces, and appoints the
Minister of Defense, Commander of the Operational Strategic Command
(akin to the U.S. Joint Staff), and the commanders of each of the
services. The Maduro regime also relies on the National Militia and
armed gangs, known as colectivos, as force multipliers for conventional
forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
threats posed by african terrorist organizations
6. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, you stated that Boko Haram
and ISIS-West Africa focus on attacking military and civilian targets
throughout numerous areas in Africa and contribute to a multi-border
displaced persons crisis. Can you expand on your assessment of the
global threat posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-West? Do they currently pose
a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland? If so, to what extent? If not,
when are they expected to pose a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland?
General Waldhauser. We do not currently assess Boko Haram and ISIS-
West Africa are threats to the Homeland. Africa-based ISIS groups and
Boko Haram have neither conducted nor inspired external attacks against
the United States Homeland. However, their diffuse extremist networks
enable or inspire attacks against United States and other Western
interests in Africa and in Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al Qaeda safe
havens in North Africa, the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring
threat to stability, and United States, allied, and host-nation
interests within those regions.
7. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, what do you see as the
greatest threat Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa poses to the United
States Homeland in the near-term, mid-term, and long-term?
General Waldhauser. Africa-based ISIS groups and Boko Haram have
neither conducted nor inspired external attacks against the United
States Homeland, and are not projected to pose a threat to the Homeland
in the mid or long term. Due to their diffuse extremist networks Boko
Haram and ISIS-West Africa are capable of enabling or inspiring attacks
against United States and other Western interests in Africa and in
Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al-Qaeda safe havens in North Africa,
the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring threat to stability, and
United States, allied, and host-nation interests within those regions.
sof's role in supporting the national defense strategy
8. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, the recently released
National Defense Strategy clearly identifies great power competition
between the United States and China and Russia as the highest priority
threats to our national security. Are we over-utilizing out elite
special operations forces on low-intensity threats in AFRICOM?
General Waldhauser. Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) possess
unique capabilities and we continue to evaluate how we employ and
deploy them. USAFRICOM aligns forces and resources on the continent to
best support the National Defense Strategy. In addition to SOF that
provide heightened capability, USAFRICOM also needs predictable general
purpose forces that can conduct those missions that do not require SOF
unique capabilities.
9. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, how do you intend to
balance the competing requirements of continuing the counterterrorism
fight while also supporting the new primary lines of effort in
countering China and Russia? Are security force assistance brigades
(SFABs) the right solution?
General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM is currently in our first year of a
five-year campaign plan specifically designed to balance requirements
that address VEOs and global competitors. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan
applies a balanced approach to account for the increased presence of
external actors, namely China and Russia, and the continued threat
posed by VEOs. Our ability to balance efforts to address those
challenges relies on our ability to effectively work with a wide range
of able and willing partners-United States interagency partners, other
combatant commands, European allies, the United Nations, European
Union, the African Union, and most importantly African partners.
USAFRICOM would make full use of the range of organic capabilities
within a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), as that unit is
specifically designed with many of our partner-centric objectives in
mind. We would welcome the assignment of an SFAB to USAFRICOM.
10. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, how does AFRICOM envision
supporting an enduring counter-Violent Extremist Organization (VEO)
effort while supporting efforts to deter Russian and Chinese aggression
in other theaters?
General Waldhauser. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan applies a balanced
approach to account for the increased presence of external actors,
namely China and Russia, and the continued threat posed by VEOs. Our
ability to balance efforts to address those challenges relies on our
ability to effectively work with a wide range of able and willing
partners-United States interagency partners, other combatant commands,
European allies, the United Nations, the European Union, the African
Union, and African partners. The United States Security Force
Assistance (SFA) programs to African partners also increase our ability
not only to counter violent extremist groups but also influence great
power competitors. Through Sec 333 authorities, many of our SFA
programs enhance our relationships with partners while improving their
ability to conduct their own C-VEO operations. These SFA programs are
fundamental to our effort to remain the partner of choice by
reinforcing the sincerity of our partnerships and the high quality of
our products, which African nations largely view as superior to those
offered by the Chinese and Russians. Our efforts to foster positive
relationships further support our goal of ensuring a stable and
prosperous Africa, which inherently-assists to deter Chinese and
Russian malign action. To the extent that we enable deterrence of China
and Russia in the USAFRICOM AOR, we are engaged with USINDOPACOM and
USEUCOM Globally Integrated Planning efforts in their capacity as
Coordinating Authorities to the China and Russia global campaign plans.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
russian influence in africa
11. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, you state in your
testimony that the Central African Republic has recently installed a
Russian civilian as the country's national security advisor. What does
this appointment signal in terms of Russian influence in the Central
African Republic? How does this further Russian strategic interests?
General Waldhauser. As of this time this individual has stepped
down as the national security advisor. Should this individual remain
involved in Central African Republic (CAR) policy-making, he would be
able to facilitate agreements between the CAR and Russia. We are unware
of efforts to replace him, or to leverage his relationship to CAR for
future Russian efforts. CAR provides Russia three key opportunities:
First, it is a chance for Russia to publically supplant French and
Western influence with Bangui's support. Second, CAR represents an
opportunity for the Russian Oligarchs (including those the United
States has sanctioned) to generate profit by exchanging security
services for mining contracts, demonstrate private military
capabilities, and supplement limited Russian state resources. Lastly,
CAR provides an operating environment with little to no governmental
oversight, considerable freedom of movement to militarily strong
actors, and limited regulation or Rule of Law that could inhibit
unilateral action.
12. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, you mention that Russia
is importing ``harsh security practices'' into the Central African
Republic. In addition to the murder of Russian journalists, what other
harsh security practices are being employed?
General Waldhauser. Russian private military contractors (PMC) are
reportedly abusing locals who approach Russian mining interests,
investigating crimes committed against Russian personnel or property,
physically abusing host nation security trainees, and intimidating
foreign and local travelers. The Russian contractors also reportedly
cooperate with local armed militias and turn a blind eye to human
rights violations committed by those groups. The UN is currently
investigating at least one alleged incident of abuse and has asked the
CAR government to take actions against the PMCs. In 2018 three
independent Russian journalists were murdered in the CAR while
investigating the activities of the Russian PMCs.
13. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, in your testimony, you
also state that other countries could find the Russian model of harsh
security practices attractive. What countries in the African
subcontinent are you concerned about being most susceptible to Russian
influence, and what can AFRICOM do to thwart Russian efforts?
General Waldhauser. Several African nations are susceptible to
continued or increasing Russian influence, particularly where Russia
already has extensive ties. Russia's influence in Algeria and Angola
stems from legacy Soviet relationships, though Algeria has largely
restricted the relationship to arms sales transactions. Russia is
providing support to the Libyan National Army (LNA), who is increasing
pressure on Tripoli. Russia already has extensive influence in CAR,
embedding private military contractors in the country in return for
mining rights and influencing the government. Mauritania's and
Tunisia's nascent economies and desire to improve defense capabilities
may provide Moscow with opportunities to expand its influence there.
Russia is increasing its influence in Sudan; the Sudanese Parliament
recently advanced plans to create a Russian military base in the
country, and Russian private military contractors are reportedly
operating in the Darfur region. In West Africa, Mali, Guinea, and
Guinea-Bissau are probably most susceptible to Russian influence, due
to longstanding Russian military sales and training programs. Russia
has economic interests in these countries, usually centered on mining,
and the local leaders are likely interested in military aid, without
preconditions, that would help them to remain in power. To thwart
Russian exploitative efforts, USAFRICOM continues to work with a host
of partners to be the military partner of choice in Africa and advance
our shared values.
hezbollah
14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, how would you characterize
the threat from Hezbollah in your area of operation? Which countries
are most susceptible to influence from Hezbollah?
Admiral Faller. Hezbollah is the most capable Violent Extremist
Organization (VEO) in the region. Since 1992, LH has successfully
conducted three major terrorist attacks in Central and South America,
killing 135 people and wounding hundreds more. The majority of
countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR do not recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization, which enables Hezbollah to maintain an operational
presence in the area. This operational presence includes well-developed
networks of businesses owned and operated by Hezbollah associates and
networks that are used to facilitate criminal activities, conduct
fundraising in support of Hezbollah, and perform international
financial remittances. Through a vast array of political, religious,
and social networks, Hezbollah leverages influence over vulnerable
populations in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Paraguay and
Argentina. Most of this influence is political and social in nature,
with some loosely affiliated elements engaged in criminal and illicit
activities, primarily in the TBA and other Free Trade Zones in Central
and South America. Countries such as Venezuela and Paraguay, with high
levels of institutional corruption, insufficient Anti-Money Laundering
regulations, and unproven judicial ability to prosecute individuals
involved in the facilitation of terrorism, or narcotics are most
susceptible to influence from Hezbollah.
15. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, what are you doing to
address the threat--including Hezbollah's terrorist activities, money
laundering, and drug trafficking?
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM collaborates with the Interagency and Law
Enforcement to share intelligence and information and support
operations and activities to degrade Hezbollah's ability to conduct
illicit activities throughout the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
ultimately denying funds to Hezbollah. Our analytical and operational
support to Department of Treasury sanctions, Law Enforcement
investigations, and the detection and monitoring mission are at the
forefront of our efforts to address the Hezbollah threat.
16. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, your predecessor, ADM Tidd,
has testified that Venezuela has long provided a haven for narco-
terrorist groups and Lebanese Hezbollah supporters. What is your
understanding of the current links between Hezbollah and the Government
of Venezuela? What support, if any, is Hezbollah providing the Maduro
regime in Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. Venezuela is home to well over a million people of
Lebanese ancestry. Some of the members of the Lebanese diaspora
community in Venezuela have been linked to illicit business, money
laundering, narcotic sales, and document forgery. The Government of
Venezuela has been employing and providing safe haven to Hezbollah
associated facilitators and financiers since at the least the mid-
2000's. There have been multiple reported links between prominent
Venezuelan businessmen and politicians and Hezbollah-associated
individuals. Most notably, former Venezuelan Vice President and current
Minister of Industries and National Production, Tarek El Aissami, may
have been involved in a number of illicit financial transactions and
been leveraged by other corrupt Venezuelan officials to provide travel
documentation to benefit associates of Hezbollah over a period of
years. Hezbollah openly expresses support for the Maduro regime.
Hezbollah likely wants Maduro to remain in place, as Hezbollah has
operated throughout Venezuela with minimal scrutiny during Maduro's
regime. Hezbollah likely perceives that the United States-recognized
president, Juan Guaido will work to deter Hezbollah-associated activity
within the country.
17. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, are you working to build
the capacity of regional allies to address Hezbollah's malign
activities? How can Congress support SOUTHCOM in this effort?
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM routinely engages with partner nations to
share information, provide training, and encourage actions to counter
threat networks throughout the region. Our staff coordinates with
Interagency, Law Enforcement and Global Organizations, such as the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to enable operations by
Partner Nation Law Enforcement to disrupt, degrade, and deny Hezbollah
activities. Congressional support over the years has enabled SOUTHCOM
to build our partners' capacity to counter Hezbollah's malign
activities. Continued support of the Department's security cooperation
activities in this region, as well as programs throughout the
Interagency that strengthen our relationships with our partner nations,
such as State Department's International Military Education and
Training program, would be helpful.
18. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, in your testimony, you note
that groups like Hezbollah operate wherever they can garner support and
raise funds to pursue their agendas. Where do you see them gaining
support and funding, and how is SOUTHCOM confronting them?
Admiral Faller. Hezbollah receives significant and continuous
financial support from the Lebanese expatriate, Shi'a Muslim diaspora
in Latin America. Lebanese expatriate remittances are a pillar of the
Lebanese economy--their familial and sustainable structure makes them
an economic and social services backstop in the absence of a state
entity capable of providing basic security and social services. Free
Trade Zones provide illicit financial networks with plentiful
opportunities to leverage existing conditions to enable money
laundering activities and the import/export of illicit goods.
Characteristics of Free Trade Zones that enable these activities
include: high volume of goods being imported/exported through the area,
the high use of cash, and greater profitability due to tax benefits.
africom mission
19. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, in your written
testimony, you justify the current AFRICOM posture by emphasizing the
need to ``address significant terrorist threats and apply persistent
pressure on terrorist networks.'' Based on your testimony and the
current force posture, is it fair to say the primary mission in Africa
is defeating Violent Extremist Organizations?
General Waldhauser. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan applies a balanced
approach that accounts for the increased presence of external actors,
namely China and Russia, and the continued threat faced by VEOs. Our
ability to balance efforts to address those challenges relies on our
ability to effectively work with a wide range of able and willing
partners; United States interagency partners, other combatant commands,
European allies, the United Nations, European Union, the African Union,
and African partners. The USAFRICOM mission strikes a balance between
countering VEOs and great power competition. The three mission areas
called out in our mission statement are strengthen security forces,
counter transnational threats, and conduct crisis response.
20. Senator Blumenthal. . General Waldhauser, do you think that the
National Defense Strategy appropriately prioritizes the threats to
American interests that we face in your area of operations?
General Waldhauser. From a USAFRICOM perspective, the NDS
accurately characterizes the global challenges and threats. We are in a
dynamic environment with great power competitors, constant competition,
and an array of state and non-state actors. All five threats detailed
in the NDS manifest in Africa to varying degrees, representing an
important cross section in a globalized world.
21. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, despite the apparent
focus on counterterrorism efforts in Africa, in your testimony, you
state AFRICOM plays a ``significant role'' in fulfilling National
Defense Strategy priorities towards Russia and China. Why is your role
in great power competition so significant and how are you fulfilling
this role?
General Waldhauser. Great Power competitors, China and Russia, are
increasing engagements in Africa and enhancing their access and
influence. China's expanding engagements in Africa are probably
intended to protect China's citizens and investments, and project the
image of being a responsible global power while growing its influence
on the continent and internationally. For its part, Russia seeks to
counter United States influence and interests while bolstering its own
influence through security cooperation, arms sales, and energy
partnerships. Our proximity to Chinese forces in Djibouti offers us a
unique opportunity to demonstrate our resolve to counter China outside
of Asia. Our interaction with key partners such as Morocco, Tunisia,
Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia help secure geostrategic locations
necessary for stability on the continent. Working in close cooperation
with nations such as Ghana and Senegal, we help to ensure Chinese
compliance with international norms by exposing illicit activity such
as illegal fishing or other resource extraction sanctioned by the
Chinese Government. By working with other nations such as Uganda, Cabo
Verde, Seychelles, Botswana and Gabon, we may be able to ensure that
when China or Russia do gain military access to ports, bases or
airspace, that they are unable to take full advantage of that access to
threaten United States freedom of maneuver in and around Africa.
22. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2018 lists two known African terrorist
organizations, al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb and Al Shabaab as
``associated forces'' included in the authorization. Have you, or will
you, use military force against any other Violent Extremist
Organizations in your area of operation?
General Waldhauser. Under my authority, as directed by the
Secretary of Defense, we have used military force against violent
extremist organizations, in the USAFRICOM AOR, associated with those
included in the 2001 AUMF. The Secretary based that direction on a
thorough vetting of their function, connection to the organizations
included in the 2001 AUMF, and threat to the United States. In the
future, we will continue to target violent extremist organizations
using this authority. These designated organizations remain classified
and the information can be provided to your staff. Additionally, we
have used military force under our collective self-defense authorities
to defend our designated partners, and we will continue to use force to
defend ourselves, regardless of who is attacking us. If attacked, we
will defend ourselves and our partners.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
political uncertainty in venezuela
23. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, on January 23, 2019, the
elected leader of Venezuela's National Assembly, Juan Gerardo Guaido,
declared his position as the interim president of Venezuela based on
constitutional authority. He has since been internationally recognized
as the true President of Venezuela by Spain, France, Germany, the UN,
Kosovo and the United States. From your perspective, what effect have
the sanctions established by the United States had on Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
has aggressively employed its Venezuela sanctions authorities to target
nearly 150 individuals and entities, including regime insiders and
their support networks involved in corrupt activities, in an effort to
hold the Maduro regime accountable. As a result of OFAC actions, all
property and interests in property of these entities and individuals,
and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent
or more by these blocked entities and individuals that are in the
United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are
blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC's regulations generally
prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the
United States that involve any property or interests in property of
blocked or designated persons. These actions furthered international
efforts to deny Maduro and his supporters of their revenue sources and
continue pressure on the regime. For additional insights into the
effect of United States sanctions on Venezuela, I defer to the
Department of State and the Department of the Treasury.
24. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, we have heard of the grave
humanitarian crisis in the area with the displacement of more than 3.3
million people. What impact will this have in your AOR and what role,
if any, does CENTCOM have in mitigating this crisis?
Admiral Faller. The current number of Venezuelan migrants since
2014 is 3.4 million, or over 10 percent of Venezuela's population. The
UN is projecting 2 million more Venezuelans will emigrate in 2019, with
most of these migrants staying in Latin America. Most Venezuelan
migrants have settled in Colombia, with over one million migrants in
Colombia so far. The second-largest Venezuelan migrant recipient is
Peru, which hosts about 500,000 migrants, followed by Chile with over
280,000 and Ecuador with over 200,000 migrants. The displacement of
millions of Venezuelans has had a profound effect throughout the region
across nearly every spectrum of society. In the area of defense,
neighboring countries like Colombia and Peru have had to divert
resources that were otherwise appropriated for important security
initiatives. In Colombia for example, resources that could have been
used to fund peace accord consolidation efforts have been diverted to
help ease the suffering of Venezuelan migrants. We are also seeing some
transnational organized crime groups, such as Colombia's National
Liberation Army (ELN), are taking advantage of these conditions to
recruit desperate Venezuelan migrants, increasing criminality along the
border between the two countries. SOUTHCOM certainly has played a role
in mitigating the crisis. We have provided direct support with air lift
to deliver humanitarian assistance supplies on behalf of USAID. We also
deployed the USNS Comfort to the region, providing medical care to over
26,000 patients--relieving some of the burden placed on these
neighboring countries to provide medical care. In addition to direct
support, SOUTHCOM plays an important role in reducing tensions and
encouraging collaboration among regional military leaders.
great power players and influence in aor
25. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, China is
making aggressive investments in both of your areas of responsibility
with the ``Belt and Road Initiative'' (BRI). At the Senate Intelligence
Committees' worldwide threats hearing, the Director of National
Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated that ``Traditional adversaries will
continue to attempt to gain and assert influence, taking advantage of
changing conditions in the international environment increasingly
isolationist tendencies in the West, and shifts in the global
economy.'' With the increased economic competition with the United
States from China, have you experienced, or do you expect to
experience, deterioration of United States partnerships in your area of
responsibility?
General Waldhauser. This is probably our biggest challenge in
Africa, because Africa's issues will not be solved militarily. Although
security is important, it will not ultimately be the deciding factor in
how Africans choose to partner with the United States. African states
are seeking to diversify economic and security relationships in order
to bolster development, investment, and economic growth. China
understands this and is using its investment in infrastructure and
other development programs to buy leverage with African countries. We
have seen this pattern play out in Asia and are now seeing it begin to
play out in Africa. China increasingly funds both incumbent politicians
and opposition leaders within our AOR, as well as decision makers
within ministries related to their commercial or posture objectives.
This illicit individual funding, combined with legitimate investment
that nevertheless causes heavy debt burdens, has slowed and complicated
governance reform and our engagement in some partner states.
Additionally, we have seen China adopt tactics of political involvement
where their economic interests are concerned. To counter China's
advance, both Department of State and Department of Defense have
invested in programs such Defense Institution Building and the Security
Governance Initiative as ways to deepen long standing United States
support to security sector reform, governance, and rule of law within
our AOR. As we encourage governments to become more transparent and
provide them the means to fight corruption, we can then potentially
ensure that Chinese investment on the continent complies with
international norms and does not provide China undue influence.
Admiral Faller. Latin America and the Caribbean is our neighborhood
and we do have very strong partnerships in this region. However, China
is seeking to inch out the United States as the preferred partner.
China uses predatory economic policies to exert political leverage and
gain access to key infrastructure, ranging from ports to
telecommunications architecture. Greater Chinese involvement in
regional governments' IT and telecommunications will limit our ability
to share information with them given the ensuing counterintelligence
concerns. For example, Chinese telecommunications firms, such as Huawei
and ZTE, as of 2014 were the purveyors of 32 percent of all phone
connections in Latin America, and are expected to reach 68 percent or
605 million smartphones by the year 2020. China also has increased the
tempo of its key leader engagements in the region, and frequently
provides all-expenses paid security training as a way to further
ingratiate itself with partners. While most countries in the region
continue to view the United States as their preferred partner, we
remain concerned that China's charm offensive and the accompanying
indebtedness it promotes could increase countries' exposure to Chinese
coercion.
26. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how are
you working with the Department of State, other government entities and
our allies within your AOR? Are there areas of improvement that should
be examined? If so, what are these areas?
General Waldhauser. We work very closely together with the
Department of State (DOS) and USAID on these issues daily and at many
levels. In what we refer to as a 3D approach: Diplomacy, Development,
and Defense. DOS political advisors, USAID development advisors, and
representatives from other government agencies are embedded throughout
USAFRICOM, and we have regular synchronization meetings with both our
United States Embassies and DOS. USAFRICOM also hosts an annual Africa
Strategic Dialogue, which brings together senior stakeholders from the
Departments of State, Defense, and USAID to coordinate strategic
approaches and harmonize guidance for Africa. In addition, the Africa
Strategic Integration Conference brings together officials from across
the United States Government, including many from Africa, to discuss
regional issues facing the United States in Africa and to help us to
develop unified responses. Our allies are integrated into our work in
similar ways. Through our Multinational Coordination Cell, we host
Liaison Officers from 17 partners and jointly plan our assistance and
operations through regionally-focused multinational working groups.
Admiral Faller. We have a robust relationship with the Department
of State positioning the U.S. as the partner of choice throughout the
region with very few exceptions. It starts at the ground level in the
embassies where DOD members form an important part of the country
teams. We integrate our operational and capacity building activities in
the region in direct support of--and aligned with--Department of State
Integrated Country Strategies. SOUTHCOM implements several key State
security assistance programs such as International Military Education
and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and the Global Peacekeeping
Operations Initiative to build our partners' capacity to counter mutual
threats and enhance global security in a way that other powers cannot.
The gold standard for Interagency cooperation and coordination is the
Joint Interagency Task Force-South where DOD, as the lead federal
agency for detection and monitoring of air and maritime narcotics
trafficking, provides a vital coordination link for alignment with the
various federal agencies that carry out the other phases of the
interdiction continuum. The close coordination between SOUTHCOM and our
State and USAID partners manifests itself nearly every year during
hurricane season and for other disasters that strike. Also, we work
closely with regional partners to expose Chinese malign influence,
ensure our partners understand the dangers of China's predatory
financial practices, and have the complete picture concerning so-called
promises of Chinese IT and cyber cooperation. Given their bleak fiscal
outlook, most countries in the region feel pressure to pursue economic
cooperation with Beijing. Many of these countries lack the expertise
and experience to scrutinize fully Chinese bids and safeguard against
unfavorable terms; our regional partners would likely benefit from
access to experts who can help them discern bad deals.
climate change
27. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, while
some dispute the existence of climate change and the extent of its
global impact, climate-related events provide a significant risk to our
national security and that of our allies. What steps are you taking
within your areas of responsibility to address the security risks
associated with climate change?
General Waldhauser. In addition to complying with responsibilities
set forth in DOD Directive 4715.21, ``Climate Change Adaptation and
Resilience'', USAFRICOM supports environmental security engagements
with partner nations, interagency, and non-governmental organizations
across the area of responsibility. The effects of climate change
threaten environmental security by degrading natural resources and the
environment. Environmental issues can easily manifest into human
conflict, increasing competition and tension between populations.
Environmental security engagements are a tool in abating these concerns
- advancing cooperation amongst nations and regions while promoting
security and stability. Some examples of these engagements are water
security initiatives and mangrove forest management. Ultimately,
solutions to climate change and environmental problems contribute to
national security objectives.
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM does consider climate change in its
strategic planning. During environmental compliance and assessments,
climate change is incorporated into learning objectives in order to
mitigate impacts of natural disasters to include frequency and
severity. Additionally, to ensure our own personnel and families are
ready, SOUTHCOM conducts annual hurricane preparedness training for all
personnel assigned to our headquarters. The threat of instability
caused by climate change has led to the inclusion of climate change
scenarios in some of SOUTHCOM's major exercise scenarios like
TRADEWINDS. During the TRADEWINDS annual exercise, national agencies
and partner agencies practice collaboration and coordination to limit
the impacts and severity of the weather systems often attributed to
climate change. These efforts attempt to reduce the risks of local,
regional, and international instability during crisis and disasters in
our AOR. The associated risks include, but are not limited to,
immigration, cultural property protection, and environmental impacts.
Lastly, we conduct environmental subject matter expert engagements that
are often related to pre- and post-natural disaster planning, such as a
recent engagement on post disaster waste management.
28. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how have
United States Forces been trained and equipped to respond to natural
disasters in your AOR?
General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM routinely conducts deliberate
planning to prepare for contingencies to respond to crises which may
result from natural disasters including, instability, pandemic
influenza/infectious disease, and non-combatant evacuation. Currently,
we are conducting disaster relief support in response to the flooding
in Mozambique. These efforts take into account a whole-of-government
approach to include how we will coordinate with and support interagency
partners such as DOS and USAID. In addition, we provide guidance to
USAFRICOM service components, so they can forecast necessary recourses
and training to support mission requirements. For example, United
States Army Africa developed and approved a plan to support Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance which involved its Headquarters and staff
working with both DOS and USAID. Along with service components,
USAFRICOM relies heavily on other capabilities like the State
Partnership Program to increase partner readiness. Currently, Africa
has 14 State Partnership Programs. These programs bring unique
capabilities as many of the National Guard units consist of first
responders and emergency personnel who bring this expertise when they
conduct emergency management and natural disaster response training and
exercises.
Admiral Faller. The Services are responsible for training and
equipping forces, providing ready forces for the combatant commands. At
the combatant command level, we help the Services maintain and build
readiness by tailoring bilateral and regional exercises and training
events to increase the readiness of U.S. Forces for a range of
missions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The
countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR experience approximately 50 natural
disasters every year ranging from wild fires, to volcanic erruptions,
to hurricanes, and earthquakes. We work closely with our partner
nations and regional coordination mechanisms such as the Caribbean
Disaster Emergency Management Agency and the Coordination Center for
the Prevention of Natural Disaster in Central America to build our
collective capacity to respond to and/or coordinate disaster relief
efforts. We've seen a decrease in requests for assistance following
these disasters because our partners are increasingly prepared to
handle the responses themselves.
29. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how have
United States Forces been equipped and prepared to help address the
growing health crises associated with climate change?
General Waldhauser. Climate change creates a number of challenges
within the USAFRICOM operational environment. Increasing spread of
infectious diseases (e.g. malaria and cholera), fresh water loss (e.g.
Lake Chad Basin), desertification, sea level change, and extreme
weather (e.g. flooding and heat waves) are significant concerns. These
issues lead to increasing risks for complex humanitarian disasters,
exacerbation of conflicts, and instability in fragile states. Although
primary responsibility for training and equipping United States Forces
lies with each individual service, USAFRICOM supplements the services
in multiple ways. First, we educate our forces on the health threats
posed by climate change through programs such as the Africa Today
course, the USAFRICOM Newcomer's Course, and the Joint Humanitarian
Operations Course. Second, we execute several health engagement
programs designed to build the capability of our African Partners to
manage health risks worsened by climate change. Two examples are the
Africa Malaria Task Force (AMTF) and the African Partner Outbreak
Response Alliance (APORA). Finally, the USAFRICOM Campaign Plan
includes objectives focused on preparation to respond to all types of
disaster as well as increasing African Partner capability to prevent
and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. Numerous humanitarian and
security force assistance activities support these objectives and
ultimately build awareness and preparation for both the United States
and our African Partners.
Admiral Faller. United States Forces have expeditionary units with
capabilities in disease surveillance, vector control, preventative
medicine services, dental services, damage control resuscitation and
surgery, as well as veterinary services and medical logistics
capabilities. These capabilities are primarily designed to support
organic DOD forces to allow DOD security forces, engineers, and
logisticians to bolster State and local government response
capabilities. Historically, the DOD has supported USAID's Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance in responding to natural disasters,
including extreme weather events. Often, this support includes
capabilities that account for adverse health outcomes that may result
from a natural disaster. To illustrate this, in 2010 SOUTHCOM stood up
a joint task force to assist in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake.
SOUTHCOM, in support of USAID, conducted Foreign Disaster Relief
operations in support of the Government of Haiti and the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) by providing localized
security, facilitating the distribution and restoration of basic human
services, providing medical support, and conducting critical
engineering operations in order to alleviate human suffering and
provide the foundation for the long term recovery of Haiti.
withdrawal of united states troops and the war in the middle east
30. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, despite
the announcement of the defeat of ISIS and the immediate withdrawal of
troops from Syria and the framework for peace with the Taliban in
Afghanistan, ISIS continues to be an active and legitimate threat that
is likely to pursue external attacks. What kind of threat does the
Islamic State pose in your Areas of Responsibility?
General Waldhauser. Africa-based ISIS groups have neither conducted
nor inspired external attacks against the United States Homeland.
However, their diffuse extremist networks allow enabled or inspired
attacks against United States and other Western interests in Africa and
in Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al Qaeda safe havens in North Africa,
the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring threat to regional
stability and a continued threat to United States, allied, and host-
nation interests within those regions.
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM views self-radicalizing individuals
responding to ISIS's messaging as one of the principal violent
extremist organization threats in the region. Currently, ISIS lacks
operational capacity in the AOR, but does have many sympathizers who
have left this region to fight on behalf of ISIS. ISIS has used the
story of a Trinidadian fighter in their magazine Dabiq to recruit and
radicalize other westerners. An alleged terrorist plot in Trinidad was
thwarted in early 2018 with the help of United States authorities. The
disruption led to the arrests of 14 Trinidadian ISIS sympathizers who
were subsequently released. SOUTHCOM is concerned with the possible
return of many Trinidadians and other South Americans who may possess
combat experience in Iraq and Syria.
31. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, what
concerns do you have in terms of the withdrawal of troops from Syria as
well as the potential agreement with the Taliban?
General Waldhauser. Both the withdrawal of troops from Syria and
the potential agreement with the Taliban could provide propaganda
fodder for both the Islamic State and al Qaida to rally extremist
support within Africa. The narrative that the Taliban 'won' a
protracted war against the United States and its allies would very
likely be used in extremist circles to recruit new members and garner
materiel or financial support for Islamic State or al Qaida networks on
the continent. The withdrawal of troops from Syria could also allow
remnant ISIS networks to rebuild connectivity with its provinces or
aspiring networks in Africa, although are currently not seeing this at
this time.
Admiral Faller. ISIS remains a resilient enemy with many loyal
fighters and supporters throughout the world including Latin America
and the Caribbean. I defer to OSD and United States Central Command on
the specific implications of the withdrawal from Syria and the
potential agreement with the Taliban.
operations of u.s. coast guard
32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, the Joint Interagency Task
Force South (JIATF-S) executes detection and monitoring of illicit
trafficking across all domains, and facilitates international and
interagency interdiction to enable the disruption and dismantlement of
illicit and converging threat networks in support of national and
regional security. Despite its effectiveness, last year, only 6 percent
of known drug movements were interdicted. What would you require in
your AOR to increase the overall effectiveness of the Joint Interagency
Task Force South (JIATF-S)?
Admiral Faller. More Maritime Patrol Aircraft to detect drug
trafficking movements and provide overwatch in support of interdiction
operations would enable our partners to increase drug seizures.
Currently, partners conduct nearly 40 percent of interdictions
supported by JIATF-South. To increase the effectiveness of United
States interdiction operations, JIATF-S requires integrated force
packages that include a ship with an on board Law Enforcement
Detachment (LEDET), helicopters (with airborne use of force
capability), small boats for boardings, and supporting maritime patrol
aircraft (MPA). Annually, every additional force package allotted to
JIATF-S projects to seize and/or disrupt 33 metric tons (MT) of
cocaine. The greater the number of fully integrated packages--the more
drugs can be taken off the high seas.
33. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, what effect, if any, did the
recent government shutdown have on the readiness of the U.S. Coast
Guard and their effectiveness to perform these essential operations in
your AOR?
Admiral Faller. While operations continued during the lapse in
appropriations, the Coast Guard was forced to defer or delay
maintenance on 75 cutters, many of which routinely deploy in support of
SOUTHCOM counter-narcotics missions. Similarly, deferred aviation
maintenance and a shortage of nearly 500 spare parts caused by the
lapse in appropriations will impact the availability of armed Coast
Guard helicopters crucial to drug interdiction efforts in the Western
Hemisphere. In spite of not being paid during the partial government
shutdown, approximately 1600 Coast Guard personnel deployed throughout
the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility continued to protect the Homeland
from drug traffickers and provide force protection to our personnel at
JTF-Guantanamo. This is the first time on record that members of the
U.S. military were not paid during a lapse in appropriations. Finally,
and most importantly, the shutdown had a detrimental effect on the
morale of these servicemembers and placed an undue burden on their
families. The professionalism and resiliency shown by our Coast Guard
brothers and sisters and their families during this time was truly
impressive.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
associated forces
34. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, during testimony you stated
that you could not say for sure whether Boko Haram or ISIS-West Africa
had been designated an Associated Force pursuant to the 2001 AUMF.
Could you provide me a list of what groups have been deemed Associated
Forces under the 2001 AUMF within the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility?
General Waldhauser. The names of groups in the USAFRICOM AOR
designated as associated forces under the 2001 AUMF are classified.
Those designated organizations were thoroughly vetted by the Secretary
of Defense, connected to the organizations listed in the AUMF, and
demonstrated a threat to the U.S. This classified information can be
provided to your staff.
collective self defense
35. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, in response to my question
about collective self-defense you stated ``if we are not accompanying .
. . we do not have collective self-defense because I haven't designated
it and we don't use it.'' While you may have applied restrictions to
accompany missions and the use of collective self-defense, do you have
the legal authority to use collective self-defense for a partner force
when U.S. Forces are not present or threatened themselves?
General Waldhauser. Let me clarify the remarks I made during
testimony. While I have, in certain situations, applied restrictions to
accompany missions in the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility, I do have
the legal authority to use collective self-defense for a designated
partner force when U.S. Forces are not present or threatened
themselves. Under authorities granted to CDR USAFRICOM by the Secretary
of Defense, transmitted in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Execution Orders, we retain the ability to provide assistance to
designated partner forces during counterterrorism operations where we
do not accompany them on the mission. Through our remote advise and
assist efforts, we observe the partner force and enemy activity through
visual means, typically the employment of Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Achieving this visual perspective
enables the conduct-based characterization of the enemy activity,
meaning that once the attacking force has committed a hostile act or
has demonstrated hostile intent towards the designated partner force
our use of lethal force may be authorized.
36. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, has the Department of
Defense provided you any legal framework regarding the use of
collective self-defense? If so, could you please provide us a copy of
that framework? If not, what are the standing guidelines and Rules of
Engagement you have disseminated to your commanders regarding the legal
use of collective self-defense?
General Waldhauser. The collective self-defense authority is
discussed in the Chairman's Directive on the Standing Rules of
Engagement and, in some cases, within operational orders provided by
the Secretary to CDR USAFRICOM. These resources do not specifically
discuss the legal framework surrounding the collective self-defense
authority. USAFRICOM executes its collective self-defense authorities
in compliance with domestic and international law as articulated in
orders issued by the Joint Staff and USAFRICOM. Additionally, although
classified, CDR USAFRICOM has provided restrictions and standing
guidelines on the use of collective self-defense, which are also
outlined in USAFRICOM orders.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
military defections
37. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, on February 2, 2019, Air
Force General Francisco Yanez announced his departure from Mr. Maduro's
military and declared his support for Mr. Guaido. He is the highest-
ranking military officer to defect, thus far. Do you know how many
troops have defected?
Admiral Faller. We assess based on regional partners' migration
figures that over 1000 Venezuelan troops have defected between mid-
January and mid-March 2019. Most defectors are junior officers and
enlisted personnel. Only two general officers have defected, and they
lack the sufficient influence to cause a groundswell of high-ranking
officials to defect.
38. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, is there any safe haven for
troops once they defect?
Admiral Faller. Most Venezuelan military defectors seek refuge in
Colombia and Brazil after pledging their allegiance to Guaido. Both of
these partners are playing pivotal roles in resettling the defectors
and their families. Interim President Guaido has publicly promised to
extend amnesty to members of the armed forces who assist in reinstating
the constitutional order. To date, most high-ranking officials appear
to remain skeptical of the amnesty offer.
39. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, if Guaido succeeds, what
would the Venezuelan military look like, and what do you envision would
be the role of the United States?
Admiral Faller. While Venezuela has a longstanding military
culture, we assess it will take some time for Interim President Guaido
to rebuild the military to eliminate longstanding corruption; root out
officials who remain loyal to the ideology of Chavismo (which is the
only ideology many of the junior officers and enlisted have ever
known), Cuba and other external state actors; and regain military
interoperability with West. There are many military officials who under
Maduro have used their position to profit from the drug trade, and have
allowed transnational criminal groups access to Venezuelan air space.
Cuba, in particularly, has deep inroads into Venezuela's military and
overall security apparatus, and it will take some time to undo that
influence. Additionally, for almost 20 years, the Venezuelan military
has been more aligned with Russia and China, receiving military
training from those nations and using their equipment and weapons.
Further, criticism of Maduro often stems from the rank-and-file
believing he has betrayed Chavismo, and the prevalence of true
believers within the military's ranks will complicate Guaido's efforts
to build a cohesive, unified military. The Venezuelan military's senior
ranks will probably suffer the greatest reductions due to the
predominance of corrupt supporters of Chavez and their close
relationship with Cuba and Russia. This will leave a critical gap in
leadership. SOUTHCOM engagement will depend on policy decisions that
must explore funding from Department of Defense and Department of State
for areas such as military professionalization and institution
building. A security cooperation relationship will need to be rebuilt
from the ground up following years of severed ties.
blinding lasers--djibouti
40. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, there have been reports
of China using blinding lasers against our pilots in Djibouti. Have you
raised this issue with your Chinese counterparts?
General Waldhauser. In this particular incident, the United States
has made it clear to the Chinese that we will not tolerate any
deliberate act to harm United States servicemembers. United States
responses have included: issuing a demarche on April 16, 2018 that
outlined the violation of the United States-China Memorandum of
Understanding regarding air and maritime safety; raising the issue
through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism;
requesting the results of an internal People's Liberation Army
investigation into the event; and publicly naming China as responsible
for the incident. To date, we have not had another such incident.
USAFRICOM has a policy in place directing aircrews to utilize laser eye
protection in Djibouti. USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA track and report
suspected lasing incidents; certain lasing events have been assessed as
originating from the Chinese People's Liberation Army Naval facility in
Djibouti. USAFRICOM works closely with our Department of State
counterparts to ensure that China is aware of the hazard these lasers
present and the specific threat it poses to pilots flying in Djiboutian
air space pursuant to the permission of the Djiboutian Government.
41. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, do you believe there has
been sufficient consequences for China's breach of the Protocol on
Blinding Laser Weapons in Djibouti?
General Waldhauser. It remains in our interest to deter aggressive
acts that violate international safety conventions by raising the costs
of such behavior. Actions like the lasing incident are part of China's
strategy of operating below the United States threshold for military
engagement and in a protracted state of hostility attempting to weaken
U.S. Forces in incremental steps. In this particular incident, the
United States has made it clear to the Chinese that we will not
tolerate any deliberate act to harm United States servicemembers. Our
responses have included issuing a demarche on April 16, 2018 that
outlined the violation of the United States-China Memorandum of
Understanding regarding air and maritime safety; raising the issue
through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism;
requesting the results of an internal People's Liberation Army
investigation into the event; and publicly naming China as responsible
for the incident. We believe China has gotten the message. To date, we
have not had another such incident.
china and russia in africa
42. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, in 2018, the Trump
Administration signaled plans to reduce forces in Africa by nearly 10
percent over the next several years, citing the need for greater
emphasis on China and Russia. You are saying that China and Russia are
threatening our influence in Africa. Is a drawdown of resources in
Africa appropriate, given what you describe?
General Waldhauser. The ten percent reduction of forces in Africa
only applies to counter-VEO Special Operations Forces. As a result, the
reductions USAFRICOM has proposed to meet the Administration's guidance
will not adversely affect USAFRICOM's ability to counter China or
Russia in Africa. This is because we have carefully chosen the
reductions so as to minimize its impact on missions outside of the
counter-VEO fight. For example, we will continue a robust exercise
program and significant Security Force assistance with our African
partners.
43. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, would a drawdown of
resources in Africa threaten United States interests, and allow for
unchecked Chinese and Russian influence?
General Waldhauser. Yes, a further reduction of resources in Africa
carries increased risk that our African partners may begin to view us
as a less reliable partner. Should this occur African nations are
likely to turn to those whom they perceive as most capable of meeting
their needs. A successful approach to protecting United States
interests in Africa against Chinese and Russian expansion requires a
whole-of-government response. DOD plays a unique role within that
response and a reduction of already sparse resources allocated to the
USAFRICOM AOR would ignore the importance of Africa's role in China's
global ambitions and Russia's desire to enhance their access and
influence. If ordered to further reduce our forces and funding for
activities in Africa, we will work to minimize the potential impact to
our counter-China and counter-Russia efforts.
debt diplomacy in latin america
44. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, more and more countries are
discovering the pitfalls of signing onto China's investment strategy.
Are you taking any efforts to warn countries in Latin America against
accepting financial assistance from China? If so, how?
Admiral Faller. We work closely with partners in the region to
expose Chinese malign influence and ensure they understand the dangers
of China's predatory, opaque, and corrupt financial practices and
promises of IT and cyber cooperation. This includes sharing case
studies of China's activities in other regions, including China's
efforts to purchase long term control of strategic infrastructure, such
as in Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. There are security considerations
to allowing the Chinese to build and operate infrastructure with little
host nation oversight such as the satellite facility in Argentina.
Highlighting the inherent danger in these agreements is a consistent
focus area for myself as well as SOUTHCOM component commanders and
senior staff during engagements with partner nation leadership. We
closely coordinate with interagency partners to ensure messaging
alignment and consistency.
45. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, are you taking any
efforts to warn countries in Africa against accepting financial
assistance from China? If so, how?
General Waldhauser. United States Africa Command follows the lead
of the Departments of State and Commerce for debt issues in Africa and
respects our African partners' rights to manage their political,
military, and economic relations according to their interests. The
Departments of State and Commerce, with the International Monetary
Fund, World Bank, and broader international community, may advise
countries in Africa on the perils--and benefits--of Chinese financial
assistance. United States Africa Command advocates for the United
States to remain the partner of choice by maintaining our high
standards of professionalism, demonstrating our commitment to
addressing partner security needs, and providing high-quality
equipment, in comparison to peer and near-peer competitors. Further, we
offer comprehensive training and equipping programs to meet the long-
term military requirements of our partners, under conditions
sustainable by the partner's budget and resource availability.
russian influence in venezuela
46. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, Russia just sent 400 military
contractors to Venezuela, in support of Mr. Maduro. This is on top of
Russian-made surface-to-air-missiles, and periodic visits of nuclear
capable aircraft. What other Russian assets are in Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. Russia is Venezuela's top arms supplier. From 2008
to 2018, Moscow sold to Caracas over $9 billion in military equipment
to include combat aircraft, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, tanks,
armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launch systems, artillery,
mortar systems, and assorted missile variants. It is likely that
technicians, training personnel, and other associated materials/
equipment are provided through provisions negotiated during these
sales. We have no information to corroborate the claim that 400 Russian
private military contractors arrived in Venezuela in January 2019.
Additionally, Russia will periodically deploy naval assets to
Venezuela, such as naval surface actions groups.
venezuela and turkey
47. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, President Trump signed an
executive order banning United States persons from engaging in
Venezuela's gold trade. That could be extended to third parties such as
Turkey, who imported roughly 23 tons last year. What is your
understanding of this trade relationship?
Admiral Faller. Turkey's relationship with Venezuela has deepened
in part by an affinity between the two presidents. In the past two
years, Ankara has expanded its trade with Venezuela, importing about
$900 million in gold in 2018. The Maduro regime last year began
refining its gold in Turkey as a way to bypass United States sanctions.
48. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, are you monitoring movement
of gold outside of Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. Yes, we are monitoring movement of gold outside of
Venezuela and collaborate closely with interagency partners to
determine the effect these gold movements are having on internal and
regional security. The Maduro regime continues to avoid penalty from
United States sanctions, pursuant to E.O. 13850, by selling gold to
African and Middle Eastern countries such as Uganda and United Arab
Emirates, respectively. Russia remains Maduro's principle partner in
helping move the gold via a Boeing 777 belonging to Russian-airline
Norwind.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
venezuelan refugee situation
49. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, according to the United
Nations, over 3 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants have already
fled their homes. A Brookings study published in December estimates
that this number could grow to 8 million people if economic conditions
remain dire, which would be even larger than number of persons
displaced by the Syria crisis. In an interview with the Miami Herald,
the study's author said the number could grow this large within only 2-
3 years. What is your assessment of the consequences of millions of
people leaving Venezuela?
Admiral Faller. The UN projects that by the end of 2019
approximately 5 million Venezuelans will have left the country since
2014. Most Venezuelan migrants resettle within Latin America, taxing
regional partners' social, humanitarian, and security services,
particularly in towns along the border with Venezuela. Every country in
South America and parts of Central America and the Caribbean are
hosting Venezuelan migrants. Some of the notable figures are: over one
million Venezuelan migrants have relocated to Colombia; 700,000 to
Peru; over 280,000 to Chile; 200,000 to Ecuador; 130,000 to Argentina;
and close to 100,000 in both Brazil and Panama. The sudden influx of
Venezuelan migrants has strained health and education services and has
outpaced the ability of some governments, such as Colombia, to provide
shelter and resources. Along the border between Colombia and Venezuela,
the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) dissidents, and other Colombian criminal organizations
exploit Venezuelan migrants crossing the border. For example, the ELN
has recruited Venezuelans as young as 15 to join their ranks for
unspecified illegal activities, according to the Colombian Army and
local non-governmental organizations. Finally as this tragedy grows,
the neighboring countries, especially Colombia, will have fewer and
fewer security forces to devote to counterdrugs missions as they shift
forces to help refugees in dire need of food and medical care.
50. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, are Venezuela's neighbors
prepared to deal with a crisis of this magnitude?
Admiral Faller. The exodus from Venezuela is producing the largest
mass migration in Latin American history with an estimated 2.7 million
migrants and refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean and 3.4
million globally as of February 2019. Neighbors, particularly those
sharing borders or close to Venezuela are experiencing severe strains
on social services, including their ability to provide sanitation,
housing, feeding, and dealing with outbreaks of infectious disease.
Both Brazil with 96,000 and Colombia 1.1 million have well organized
governmental responses to deal with border crossings, but Colombia's
challenge is complicated but much larger numbers of migrants and
increased violence, primarily from terrorist activity by the National
Liberation Army (ELN) which uses Venezuela as a safe haven and is
taking advantage of the Colombian military being stretched thin to
support the humanitarian effort. Although all of South America and the
small neighboring Caribbean Islands such as Trinidad and Tobago,
Curacao, and Aruba are particularly short of resources to handle the
influx of migrants, other more distant, larger countries are also
significantly impacted with over 700,000 in Peru, 288,000 in Chile, and
130,000 in Argentina which is simultaneously in the throes of a
significant financial crisis undermining its ability to deal with a
large influx of migrants. With the outpouring into the region expected
to continue unabated, most of the impacted countries will require
significant international assistance to avoid a greater catastrophe
than it currently is. Relief supplies are currently staged in both
Colombia and Brazil, ready to distribute within Venezuelan as soon as
the Venezuelan military will allow it.
51. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, what, if anything, is SOUTHCOM
or your partner agencies doing to assist Venezuela's neighbors and
these refugees?
Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM's assistance to the Venezuelan migrants
and those neighboring countries impacted by the crisis has largely been
the support provided by the deployment of the USNS Comfort in the fall
of 2018 and the air lift used to deliver humanitarian aid to the region
this year. From October to December 2018, the USNS Comfort visited
Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras. The Comfort deployment improved
interoperability with partner nation, non-governmental organization,
and U.S. medical providers. The physicians from the USNS Comfort
treated 14,554 medical patients, 3203 dental patients, 8335 optometry
patients, and conducted 599 surgeries. They conducted 53 tours and
engagements and 120 subject matter exchanges. Comfort had an engagement
with the Ecuadorian President, Peruvian Congress, and Honduran
President. The deployment of the Comfort highlighted the Venezuelan
migrant crisis, with news coverage reached an estimated 222 million
people. In February and March, DOD transported over 126 metric tons of
USAID-provided humanitarian relief commodities, including water
treatment equipment, hygiene kits, non-pharmaceutical medical supplies,
ready-to-use supplementary food, and bulk rice, on 7 United States
military flights to Cucuta, Colombia.
drug smuggling and interdiction
52. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, Southern Command works hard
every day to deter criminal networks that try to smuggle drugs into the
United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are devastating the
health and safety of Americans across our country. The United States
Customs and Border Protection recently seized over 250 pounds of
fentanyl at a legal port of entry on our border with Mexico. It was the
largest bust ever of this opioid. Where do most of the illegal drugs
shipped from your area of responsibility enter the United States?
Admiral Faller. The majority of illegal drugs shipped from the
SOUTHCOM area of responsibility enter the United States through Mexico.
More than 80 percent of United States-bound cocaine shipments departing
South America transited the eastern Pacific Ocean last year, mostly
aboard noncommercial maritime vessels. The vast majority of cocaine
seizures occur on the high seas, or in South America, before the drug
ever reaches Central America, Mexico, or the Caribbean Islands.
Colombia remains the primary source for the majority of cocaine seized
and tested in the United States. In 2018, at least 84 percent of the
documented cocaine departing South America transited the Eastern
Pacific and 9 percent through the Western Caribbean, totaling 93
percent of the known flow through the Central American corridor to
Mexico.
53. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, of the drugs that are
interdicted, how many of these are intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard?
Admiral Faller. In fiscal year 2018, the Joint Interagency Task
Force-South (JIATF-S) supported the interdiction of 273 metric tons of
cocaine in 287 maritime events. The U.S. Coast Guard played a critical
role in those interdictions, participating in 171 events (60 percent).
Also note that our partner nations play a critical role in maritime
interdictions, participating in 116 events (40 percent). JIATF-S does
not execute actual law enforcement interdiction but directly supports
the U.S. Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies, and partner
nations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
venezuela
54. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, with the increased complexity
of foreign defense partnerships within the Venezuelan Government such
as Russian bomber visits and military equipment sales, Cuban
intelligence and security forces, and the presence of Hezbollah, do you
foresee dangers in an open conflict with Venezuela bleeding over into
direct conflict with another foreign power or of a conflict in
Venezuela devolving into a proxy war?
Admiral Faller. Although Russia, Cuba, and Hezbollah do have
varying degrees of presence and involvement in Venezuela, at this time,
there is no indication that any open conflict would occur nor that it
would devolve into a proxy war.
chinese investment in soutchom
55. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, base on continuing Chinese
investment in multiple areas such as infrastructure, port projects, and
canal construction, are we as the United States at risk of losing
access or influence with our allies either through physical barriers to
operation or through risk of compromise of information networks?
Admiral Faller. China is seeking to inch out the United States as
the preferred partner in the region. China uses predatory economic
policies to exert political leverage and gain access to key
infrastructure, ranging from ports to telecommunications architecture.
For example, Beijing's offers to Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El
Salvador of greater economic engagement likely played a key role in
these countries' decisions to diplomatically recognize China. Shortly
after El Salvador recognized China, Beijing tried to develop a
commercial port there (La Union), a move the United States ambassador
said demonstrated China's intentions to turn the port into a military
base. Greater Chinese involvement in regional security services' IT and
telecommunications may mean we need to reassess how we share
information with them given the ensuing counterintelligence concerns. A
reduced ability to share information with these partners likely would
affect our ability to pass actionable intelligence that allows partners
to detect, monitor, and disrupt narcotraffickers.
guantanamo bay
56. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, if the requested funds are
authorized and appropriated for recapitalization of Joint Task Force
Guantanamo Bay facilities, how long until additional funds will be
required for further repairs or updates? What is the long term cost
estimate of housing the 40 current detainees indefinitely?
Admiral Faller. Recapitalizing the infrastructure at Joint Task
Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) will require a phased approach. The
majority of facilities at JTF-GTMO were designed to expeditionary (one
year design life) or temporary standards (five year design life) and
constructed between 2004 and 2008, putting them long past their life
spans. Not only is the infrastructure failing, but the various systems
within those buildings are also starting to fail, such as plumbing,
electrical, and IT systems. With the signing of Executive Order 13823
and subsequent policy guidance, the JTF has been directed to plan for
continued operations for at least 25 years. The JTF is currently
assessing all of its infrastructure requirements to meet this mission
and I will be reviewing it carefully to ensure a balance of troop
safety, security of detainees, and good stewardship of taxpayer funds.
combatting violent extremist organizations in africa
57. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, with the limited ability
to conduct kinetic strikes with United States assets against militants
and extremist organizations in many regions of Africa, what efforts are
currently being undertaken on the security cooperation and governance
fronts to contain or combat the rapidly growing extremist threats in
many of Africa's ungoverned areas?
General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM has a limited authority to conduct
kinetic strikes with United States assets; however, the USAFRICOM
Campaign Plan (ACP) supports the broader U.S. whole-of-government
policy and strategy implementation to defeat priority VEOs globally.
Defeating VEOs in Africa requires a synchronized, sustained, and multi-
year regional campaign that leverages African, international, and
interagency partners. In East Africa, USAFRICOM continues to build upon
the focus and of over a decade of investments, both directly with the
Somalis as well as with the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
troop contributing countries (TCCs), Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Uganda, to consolidate gains and accelerate towards long-
term recovery and stability in Somalia. These efforts allow our
partners in Somalia to collaborate on C-VEO efforts with the United
States and other regional partners and international organizations.
USAFRICOM achieves USAFRICOM Campaign Plan North African Counter-VEO
(C-VEO) Build Partner Capacity (BPC) effects and fulfills its security
cooperation obligations by engaging with key partner nations to develop
capabilities to detect/disrupt/degrade VEO operations, lines of
communication, and safe havens. These BPC efforts allow our partners in
the Maghreb to collaborate on C-VEO efforts with the United States and
other regional partners and international organizations. The two
primary countries USAFRICOM partners with in the North African region
are Morocco and Tunisia. USAFRICOM supports and executes operations and
activities in the West African Sahel Region to enable French counter-
terrorism operations, enable the African led GS Sahel Joint Force to
execute independent C-VEO operations, and assist Sahel partner forces
to execute independent operations that apply pressure to VEO networks
in West Africa. In the Lake Chad Region (LCR), USAFRICOM supports and
executes operations and activities to assist partner forces in applying
pressure to the Baka Haram and ISIS-West Africa (WA) networks and
enable local LCR Government officials to promote and process defectors
from Baka Haram and ISIS-WA. USAFRICOM's defense efforts must be
executed in parallel with comprehensive diplomacy and development
measures to address the underlying political, societal, and development
grievances that often contribute to violent extremism in Africa. To
address these issues, the United States Government (USG) and
international partners conduct diplomatic and development engagements
with African partners to underscore the importance of human rights
standards and civilian control of the military. These efforts, which
will strengthen the perceived legitimacy of our African partner
governments and militaries, are essential to long-term prosperity and
stability on the continent.
chinese expansion in africom
58. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, does Chinese military
expansion in Africa such as their naval base in Djibouti and security
cooperation efforts tied to their investments currently have the
potential to inhibit our operations to secure a more stable African
continent?
General Waldhauser. Current Chinese military efforts in Africa are
unlikely to inhibit our operations and access in the region. However,
if current trends continue, China could gain that capability within the
next decade. China is actively working with African partners to open
new bases in several locations across the continent. Additionally,
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) links existing and planned dual-
use ports across the continent to Chinese facilities in Asia. Some of
these ports are entirely operated by Chinese commercial entities and
other ports only have a section controlled by Chinese firms. These
ports are often connected to BRI rail, road, and pipeline
infrastructure built with Chinese loans. We have seen instances in
which China has leveraged infrastructure debt to pressure Africa
leaders to take actions against American interests. If Chinese control
over African infrastructure continues to expand, our operations will
likely start to encounter reduced access in several theaters.
russian involvement in africom
59. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, what efforts or strategy
are we currently undertaking to combat or counterbalance the
destabilizing effects of Russian sanctioned and supported arms sales
and quasi-military personnel support to autocratic regimes in Africa
such as the government in the Central African Republic?
General Waldhauser. Our efforts across Africa are designed to
demonstrate that the United States and its Allies are superior security
partners. Our military to military engagements throughout the region
support broader U.S. Government objectives of fostering more
transparent and responsive governments, which in turn leads to more
resilient government institutions. As governments become more
resilient, they are able to withstand Russian coercive actions that
could lead to instability. In addition to supporting other government
agencies in their mission of helping Africans develop more resilient
governments, USAFRICOM is also working with our Allies to directly
address specific Russian actions in countries where our Allies have
shared interest with us such as in CAR. Due to long-standing and deep
ties our Allies have with many African nations, it may be more
appropriate for them to take the lead in countering Russian
destabilizing activities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
cameroon
60. Senator Jones. General Waldhauser, in response to my question
regarding Cameroon you testified that: `` they have been a good partner
with us counterterrorism wise, but you can't neglect the fact that they
have--there are alleged atrocities and what's going on there. We
continue to take our cues from the State Department and from the
ambassador and our level of engagement will continue but not get out
ahead of what they do State Department would say is if we have to take
other actions. We were very emphatic with President Biya that the
behavior of his troops, the lack of transparency could have a
significant impact on our ability to work with them.'' In your written
testimony you said ``The government of Cameroon has assured the United
States no security assistance will be diverted from counter-Boko Haram
and ISIS-WA efforts to the Anglophone regions.'' Has the Cameroonian
Government shown a willingness to hold human rights violators within
their military accountable?
General Waldhauser. Cameroonian officials have stated they have
taken steps to investigate allegations of human rights violations by
the security forces. We continue to urge the government to share
information with us about military prosecutions and have informed the
government that lack of progress and clarity on this issue could result
in a broader suspension of U.S. assistance.
61. Senator Jones. General Waldhauser, what type of assurances have
we received from the Cameroonian Government and, considering what you
referred to as a ``lack of transparency'' what type of monitoring and
verification regime to we have in place to ensure our aid is not
diverted to the Anglophone states where these atrocities are alleged to
have taken place?
General Waldhauser. We have expressed grave concern over the crisis
in Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest Anglophone regions and have urged
the Cameroonian government and the separatists to end the violence. In
accordance with the Leahy law, assistance to those Cameroonian security
force units that are credibly accused of committing gross human rights
violations has been suspended. In addition, separate cuts have been
made to our security assistance to Cameroon to reflect our concern.
Also, we have requested Cameroon to be more transparent about
investigating credible allegations of human rights abuse. We have made
it clear to the government of Cameroon that our security assistance is
only to reinforce their capability to fight against Boko Haram and
ISIS-WA, ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea, and help secure
neighboring Central African Republic through participation in the UN
Stabilization Mission in Central Africa.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Manchin,
Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. The Committee meets today to receive
testimony on the posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) and United States Forces Korea. I'd like to welcome
our witnesses, Admiral Phil Davidson and General Robert Abrams.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to
ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS). That means we need urgent change at a
significant scale to address the challenges of strategic
competition with China. Our military advantage and deterrent
edge in the Indo-Pacific is eroding. The Chinese Communist
Party leadership in Beijing senses weaknesses. They are testing
our resolve, and if we do not act urgently, they may soon
conclude that they can achieve their goals through force. We
can't take peace for granted.
Admiral Davidson, I look forward to hearing from you about
the strengthening of the deterrence in the Indo-Pacific; in
other words, how we and our allies can achieve the
capabilities, capacity, and posture necessary to prevent a war
by convincing Beijing that it cannot win.
General Abrams, as another United States-North Korea summit
approaches, I look forward to hearing from you on how we ensure
that our military is prepared to add strength to our diplomacy
to deter conflict and win, if necessary.
Finally, I hope today's hearing will serve as a reminder
that the greatest sources of American power are our alliances
and our partnerships. Whether it's strategic competition with
China or addressing the threat posed by North Korea, America
cannot do this alone. Strategic success in the Indo-Pacific
simply is not possible without allies who share our values and
our interests and who share our burden of our common security.
I think those of us that are together in the South China Sea
know exactly what this means.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join
you in welcoming our witnesses today and thank them for their
distinguished service to the Nation. You are both leading
commands during very challenging times. We thank you for your
continued service, and also, we would ask that you'd extend our
thanks and gratitude to the men and women under your commands
who each day sacrifice and serve the Nation, and their
families, also.
I'd first like to address the current situation on the
Korean Peninsula. General Abrams, you've been in command now
for approximately 90 days. I look forward to hearing from you
about the readiness of our forces and how you are mitigating
the effects of the modification and suspension and cancellation
of our joint exercises with the Republic of Korea's forces. I
am concerned that if we continue in this vein, we will begin to
experience a serious deterioration of the readiness of the
joint forces. While I acknowledge the suspension of exercises
has created diplomatic space for negotiations with North Korea,
I do not believe there has been sufficient progress on the
denuclearization front to justify the reduction in readiness.
I'm also not optimistic that the upcoming second summit
between President Trump and Kim Jong-un will yield substantial
gains in the denuclearization of North Korea. For example,
without a declaration of all nuclear and missile sites and
programs, I do not think there will be a sufficient roadmap to
move toward complete and verifiable, irreversible
denuclearization.
I'm also concerned that President Trump may consider
withdrawing troops on the Korean Peninsula as a result of some
agreement he reaches with North Korea. That action would
significantly undermine regional security and our ability to
fulfill our treaty obligations to South Korea.
The United States and South Korea (ROK) recently concluded
negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement in which South
Korea agreed to substantially increase its financial support
for our troops. The Special Measures Agreement reflects how
much of a share South Korea pays for the burden of housing our
troops on the peninsula. In addition to the Special Measures
Agreement, South Korea has also spent approximately $10 billion
to build Camp Humphreys, the largest overseas United States
military base. We need to acknowledge the extraordinary
financial support South Korea provides to the alliance and
continue to recognize that our alliances with Japan and South
Korea are the cornerstone of regional security in the INDOPACOM
region. At the end of the day, the preservation of our
alliances is critical in countering the very real threats that
we face from North Korea and to counter Chinese coercive
activities in the region.
Now, Admiral Davidson, while North Korea presents the
immediate challenge to our forces in the region, China presents
the most significant long-term strategic threat that this
country has faced in many, many years. China's Belt and Road
Initiative has left several countries, notably Sri Lanka and
Malaysia, severely indebted to China. Beijing often targets
corrupt local governments that personally profit from inflated
loans but leave their state treasuries bankrupt and beholden to
President Xi's administration. It is an economic initiative
with significant national security implications for the United
States.
Countering Chinese aggression globally will require us to
rely on our partners and allies to a greater degree in the
decades to come. Funding for programs like International
Military Education and Training, or IMET, and Foreign Military
Finance, or FMF, are crucial in the INDOPACOM area. Bolstering
the ability of team partners like Vietnam and the Philippines
to monitor and defend their territorial waters through funding
from the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative will create
more regional security and stability and protect freedom of
navigation for all nations in the region, regardless of size.
The United States needs to recognize the work of allies
like Australia who are enabling small Pacific nation states in
Oceania so they can counter China's predatory economic
behavior. The United States must also continue its support of
the states represented in the Compact of Free Association
(COFA) between United States and Micronesia, Palau, and the
Marshall Islands. It's clear that China is targeting these
Pacific islands in an effort to increase its influence and
diminish ours.
Admiral Davidson, we have not yet seen the President's
budget request, but I hope that it will align with the National
Defense Strategy and reflect real DOD [Department of Defense]
investments in the Indo-Pacific region. I also hope it reflects
the resources needed for the whole-of-government approach that
we need to counter China in the long run. As the Commission on
the National Defense Strategy noted, if we don't ensure
adequate funding for critical national security functions
beyond the Department of Defense, in their words the ``United
States will be at a competitive disadvantage and will remain
ill-equipped to preserve its security and its global interests
amid intensifying challenges.''
One other point I'd like to make is that we're all, I
think, alarmed by President Xi's brutal crackdown on the
Uighurs in the west and the bellicose statements about Taiwan.
These present serious human rights problems for the
international community, and as a global leader for human
rights, we have to call out China on these issues. We must also
never lose focus on the fact that it is our values, especially
our devotion to human rights and democratic principles, that
resonates so well around the globe and enhances our military
power.
Again, thank you to our witnesses for their service. I look
forward to your testimony.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Admiral Davidson, we'll start with you for an opening
statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of the
record, but give us your overview.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Davidson. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear with General Abrams before
you today to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. I am joined by
Sergeant Major Anthony Spadaro, my senior enlisted advisor who
represents the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the
Indo-Pacific area of operations. I'm most grateful for his
service in the headquarters.
First, let me say thank you for the significant support we
have received from Congress over the last 2 years. The
temporary relief from the Budget Control Act (BCA) and an on-
time fiscal year 2019 budget has helped to relieve pressure to
military readiness and has added to the lethality necessary to
safeguard United States vital national interests in the Indo-
Pacific. But there is indeed more work to do.
When I took command of INDOPACOM nearly 9 months ago, I
said that for more than 70 years the Indo-Pacific has been
largely peaceful. This was made possible by two things: the
willingness and commitment of free nations to work together for
a free and open Indo-Pacific and the credibility of the combat
power within United States Indo-Pacific Command. This
commitment and this credibility have worked to liberate
hundreds of millions of people and lift billions out of poverty
in those seven decades, all to a level of prosperity previously
unseen in human history. Today, the concept of a free and open
Indo-Pacific resonates with our allies and partners across the
region and includes economic, political, and security
dimensions, and it demonstrates our commitment to a safe,
secure, and prosperous region that benefits all nations, large
and small.
As the primary military component of the United States'
efforts to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, USINDOPACOM
works with the rest of the United States Government and a
constellation of like-minded allies and partners to advance our
shared vision. When we say ``free,'' we mean free both in terms
of security--free from coercion by other nations and in terms
of values and political systems. Free to choose trading
partners. Free to exercise sovereignty.
An open Indo-Pacific means we believe all nations should
enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which all
nations' economies depend. Open includes open investment
environments, transparent agreements between nations,
protection of intellectual property rights, and fair and
reciprocal trade, all of which are essential for people, goods,
and capital to move across borders for the benefit of all.
While the term ``free and open Indo-Pacific'' is new, the
underlying values and principles to which the vision speaks to
are not. In fact, this is how the United States has approached
the region throughout our 240-plus-year history. But there are
indeed challenges to this shared vision of a free and open
Indo-Pacific. There are five key challenges that I believe
challenge our national interest and the rules-based
international order.
While we have made significant progress over the past year,
North Korea remains the most immediate challenge. I'm
optimistic about the upcoming United States-North Korea summit
later this month as we work toward identifying the path to
final, fully-verifiable denuclearization as agreed upon by
President Trump and Chairman Kim at their 2018 Singapore
summit.
Our military combat readiness and combined lethality are
the best deterrents against any threat from North Korea, so I
will continue to emphasize military readiness while
simultaneously supporting the United States Department of
State-led pressure campaign. I should add, the United States
and Republic of Korea alliance has become the linchpin of peace
and security in Northeast Asia and for the long-term in the
Pacific region and demonstrates what great democracies can
accomplish when we work together.
Back to our challenges. China represents our greatest long-
term strategic threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific and to
the United States. Those who believe this is reflective of an
intensifying competition between an established power in the
United States and a rising power in China are not seeing the
whole picture. Rather, I believe we are facing something even
more serious: a fundamental divergence in values that leads to
two incompatible visions of the future. Through fear and
coercion, Beijing is working to expand its form of ideology in
order to bend, break, and replace the existing rules-based
international order. In its place, Beijing seeks to create a
new order, one with Chinese characteristics, led by China, an
outcome that displaces the stability and peace of the Indo-
Pacific that has endured for over 70 years.
I'm also concerned about the growing malign influence of
Russia throughout the region. Moscow regularly plays the role
of spoiler, seeking to undermine United States interests and
impose additional costs on the United States and our allies
whenever and wherever possible. Terrorism and other non-state
actors also pose threats to our vision of a free and open Indo-
Pacific as they seek to impose their views and radicalize
people across the region, as evidenced in 2017 when ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] captured the southern
Philippine city of Marawi, a city of more than 200,000 people.
Lastly, the Indo-Pacific remains the most disaster-prone
region in the world. It contains 75 percent of the Earth's
volcanoes, and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the Ring of
Fire that surround the Pacific Basin. The UN [United Nations]
estimates economic losses in the region due to disasters could
exceed $160 billion annually by 2030, and many countries across
the region lack sufficient capability and the capacity to
manage natural and man-made disasters.
To address all of the challenges I mentioned, USINDOPACOM
is focused on regaining our competitive military advantage over
the short- and long-term. We must field and sustain a joint
force that is postured for two distinct security rules: to win
before fighting and, if necessary, to be ready to fight and
win. USINDOPACOM's ability to prevail in armed conflict is the
foundation of combat-credible deterrence. By fielding and
maintaining a joint force ready to fight and win, we reduce the
likelihood that any adversary will resort to military
aggression to challenge or undermine the rules-based
international order.
This deterrence is absolutely necessary to prevent
conflict, but deterrence alone cannot ensure a free and open
Indo-Pacific. Our adversaries are pursuing their objectives in
the space between peace and war, using fear and coercive
actions across all of their instruments of national power to
revise the rules-based international order without resorting to
armed conflict. Alongside like-minded allies and partners,
USINDOPACOM, and the whole of the United States Government, we
must compete in the gray zone between peace and war to win
before fighting. These deliberate actions will ensure a free
and open Indo-Pacific against those malign actors that seek to
accomplish their political objectives short of armed conflict.
I want to thank this Committee for your continued support
of the men and women of USINDOPACOM and for your efforts in
helping us ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Thank you, and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral Philip S. Davidson
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. First, let me say thank you for the
significant support we have received from Congress over the last two
years. The temporary relief from the Budget Control Act and an on-time
fiscal year 2019 budget helped to restore the military readiness and
lethality necessary to safeguard U.S. vital national interests in the
Indo-Pacific.
overview
For more than 70 years the Indo-Pacific has been largely peaceful.
This was made possible by three things: the willingness and commitment
of free nations to work together for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific; the
credibility of the combat power of United States Indo-Pacific Command;
and a robust and modern United States nuclear deterrent. This
commitment, and this credibility, have worked to liberate hundreds of
millions of people, as well as lift billions out of poverty, all to a
level of prosperity previously unseen in human history. It has also
ensured that tensions, regardless of how or where they arise, do not
escalate into large-scale war.
Our nation's vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, announced in
2017 at the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) summit in Vietnam,
demonstrates our commitment to a safe, secure, and prosperous region
that benefits all nations, large and small. The concept of a Free and
Open Indo-Pacific resonates with our allies and partners across the
region and includes economic, governance, and security dimensions. The
vast majority of nations across the region share similar values,
including the core beliefs that governments should be accountable to
their people. We must stand together in support of our shared values
and be unambiguous in condemning those who attempt to undermine those
values.
USINDOPACOM is the primary military component of our government's
efforts to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Every day we work with
a constellation of like-minded allies and partners and the rest of the
United States Government to advance our shared vision for a Free and
Open Indo-Pacific.
When we say Free we mean Free both in terms of security--free from
coercion by other nations--and in terms of values and political
systems. Free to choose trading partners. Free to exercise sovereignty.
An Open Indo-Pacific means we believe all nations should enjoy
unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which all nations'
economies depend. Open includes open investment environments,
transparent agreements between nations, protection of intellectual
property rights, and fair and reciprocal trade--all of which are
essential for people, goods, and capital to move across borders for the
benefit of all.
While the term ``Free and Open Indo-Pacific'' is new, the
underlying values and principles to which the vision speaks are not. In
fact, this is how the United States has approached the region
throughout our 240-plus year history. We are now seeing a general
convergence around the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific
across the region--as Japan, Australia, France, New Zealand, and India
have all put forth similar concepts or visions.
The United States is an enduring Pacific power. Our historical,
structural, economic, and institutional ties to the Indo-Pacific are
indelible.
U.S. power underpins the post-WWII international system that helps
strengthen the essential foundation of a rules-based international
order for economic growth and prosperity in the region for everyone.
Furthermore, USINDOPACOM's role as a guarantor of security in the
region has enabled our economic power and allowed our partners and
allies to focus on their economic development, which in turn has
increased opportunities for U.S. economic engagement and prevented
costly conflict. A peaceful, free, and open Indo-Pacific is especially
vital to our economy in the 21st century when you consider the
following:
The United States conducted more than $1.8 trillion in
two-way goods trade with Indo-Pacific nations in 2017, and more than
$1.3 trillion by the third quarter of 2018.
In 2017, U.S. foreign direct investment in the region
reached $940 billion--more than doubling since 2007.
The Indo-Pacific is home to half of the 20 fastest
growing economies.
The Indo-Pacific currently contains over a third of
global GDP and 60 percent of the global GDP growth.
By 2030, 65 percent of the world's middle class will
reside in the Indo-Pacific, representing an unrivaled amount of
purchasing power.
As the above statistics portend, this dynamic and economically
robust region will continue to play a vital role in our economic future
throughout the 21st century.
five key challenges
In my view, five key challenges threaten our vital national
interest in ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. While we have made
significant progress over the last year, North Korea will remain the
most immediate challenge until we achieve the final, fully verifiable
denuclearization as committed to by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the summit
in June 2018. China, however, represents the greatest long-term
strategic threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to the United
States. Through fear and economic pressure, Beijing is working to
expand its form of Communist-Socialist ideology in order to bend,
break, and replace the existing rules-based international order. In its
place, Beijing seeks to create a new international order led by China
and with ``Chinese characteristics''--an outcome that displaces the
stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific that has endured for over 70
years. Russia is also active throughout the region. Moscow regularly
plays the role of a spoiler, seeking to undermine United States
interests and impose additional costs on the United States and our
allies whenever and wherever possible. I am also concerned about the
threat posed by non-state actors. Violent Extremist Organizations
(VEOs) seek to impose their views and radicalize people across the
region, as evidenced by the capture of Marawi City in the southern
Philippines in 2017--a city of over 200,000 people--by ISIS extremists.
Lastly, natural and manmade disasters are an ever present danger in the
region. Let me describe these five key challenges in more detail.
North Korea:
Denuclearization. USINDOPACOM's assessment on North Korean
denuclearization is consistent with the Intelligence Community
position. That is, we think it is unlikely that North Korea will give
up all of its nuclear weapons or production capabilities, but seeks to
negotiate partial denuclearization in exchange for United States and
international concessions.
Following a rapid series of nuclear and missile tests into 2017,
tensions declined; North Korea halted nuclear testing in September 2017
and ICBM testing in November 2017. President Trump's meeting with
Chairman Kim in Singapore in June 2018 was a significant milestone, and
I am optimistic about another United States-North Korea summit. North
Korea has taken some steps in the direction of denuclearization, most
notably the reversible dismantlement of tunnels at the Punggye nuclear
test site, yet much needs to be done to make meaningful progress.
In early 2018, the two Koreas initiated a season of rapprochement,
beginning with the Winter Olympics in February 2018, and continuing
through three subsequent Korean summits between President Moon and
Chairman Kim and multiple lower-level meetings. More recently, North
Korea has undertaken measures in accordance with the Comprehensive
Military Agreement it signed with South Korea in September 2018, to
include dismantling guard posts within the demilitarized zone and
removing land mines near Panmunjom. North Korea also returned remains
of United States servicemembers from the Korean War, which provided
great comfort to mourning families.
I welcome these steps, but we must remain vigilant to the threat
North Korea still poses to the United States and the international
community. North Korea has demanded ``corresponding measures'' from the
United States in return for these above actions. Kim warned in his 2019
New Year's speech of a potential ``new path,'' which could indicate an
eventual return to missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
testing if he is not satisfied with the pace of negotiations and
potential benefits. Our military combat readiness and combined
lethality remain the best deterrent and the best leverage against any
threat from North Korea.
Sanctions. North Korea is continuing efforts to mitigate the
effects of international sanctions and the United States-led pressure
campaign through diplomatic engagement, counter pressure against the
sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion. USINDOPACOM will
continue to support the President's pressure campaign by ensuring the
military readiness of the combined force and supporting sanctions
enforcement as directed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions
(UNSCR). UNSCR sanctions resulted in a decline in North Korea's export
earnings and cut off key cash flow sources. However, recent calls from
Russia and China to change the sanctions against North Korea threaten
to undo these positive developments.
Additionally, North Korea has a long history of flouting
international sanctions, and Pyongyang regularly attempts to circumvent
them. Early in 2018, North Korea exceeded its sanctioned limit on
refined petroleum imports through illicit ship-to-ship transfers.
USINDOPACOM is working with partners and allies to disrupt illicit
ship-to-ship transfers that occur primarily in the East China Sea,
often near or in Chinese territorial waters, and in the Yellow Sea.
North Korea is also engaged in cross-border smuggling operations and
cyber-enabled theft to generate revenue, while simultaneously
circumventing United Nations Security Council prohibitions on coal
exports.
China:
Military Modernization. Over the last 20 years, Beijing has
undertaken a massive effort to grow and modernize the People's
Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is the principal threat to U.S.
interests, United States citizens, and our allies inside the First
Island Chain--a term that refers to the islands that run from northern
Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia--and the PLA is
quickly increasing its ability to project power and influence beyond
the First Island Chain. Beijing pursues both qualitative and
quantitative efforts to transform its military, modernizing its
military platforms while simultaneously increasing the number of
platforms in service. Newly-fielded systems include:
Beijing's first aircraft carrier group, centered around
its refurbished Soviet-built carrier, reached initial operational
capability in mid-2018.
Beijing's first domestically-built aircraft carrier, has
completed four sets of sea trials since May 2018 and will likely join
the PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet in 2019.
The Renhai-class guided missile cruiser, was launched in
2017; three additional vessels were added to the PLA Navy's inventory
in 2018. This class of vessels will be a key component of PLA Navy
carrier strike groups.
The Fuyu-class fast combat support ship, developed
specifically to support aircraft carrier task group operations, was
commissioned less than a year ago.
The J-20, the PLA's first 5th-generation stealth fighter,
entered service in February 2018; plans are underway to research a
sixth-generation fighter.
The Y-20, a domestically-produced heavy-lift aircraft,
entered military service in 2016; the Y-20 has a significantly larger
payload capacity and range than the PLA's previous heavy and medium-
lift aircraft, which advances Beijing's strategic airlift capability.
The S-400 advanced surface-to-air missile system,
received from Russia in April, 2018; the S-400 has a 250-mile range,
which could expand the PLA's air coverage over the Taiwan Strait and
other high priority facilities.
The PLA maintains a high operations tempo, primarily in and near
China, but is quickly expanding its operating areas beyond the region.
The PLA's Naval Escort Task Force (NETF)--now in its 31st iteration--
follows its anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa by conducting
naval diplomacy deployments to Europe, Africa, and the South Pacific.
From May-July 2018, the 28th NETF completed a three-month naval
diplomacy tour conducting port visits and bilateral exercises in Spain,
Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, South Africa, and Indonesia before
returning to China. Beijing regularly conducts joint military exercises
across its ground, sea, air, and space forces, including amphibious
assault training that is designed and specifically timed to intimidate
Taiwan. This spring, approximately 10,000 PLA marines traveled more
than 1,200 miles as part of a large-scale exercise designed to improve
long-range maneuverability. In April, Beijing conducted a live-fire
exercise into the Taiwan Strait with coastal artillery, and PLA Air
Force (PLAAF) bombers regularly circumnavigate Taiwan.
Beijing continues pursuing next-generation technologies and
advanced weapons systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles, directed
energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, and
unmanned and artificial intelligence-equipped weapons. The PLA has also
made significant technological, game-changing developments in its
ability to defeat, or drastically reduce, the effectiveness of U.S.
sensors and defensive weapons. The PLA has tested hypersonic missiles
since 2014, including the WU-14, with speeds approaching Mach 10. In
August 2018, Beijing claimed to have successfully tested its first
hypersonic aircraft.
Beijing is also modernizing and adding new capabilities across its
nuclear forces. China's third generation Type 096 nuclear-powered
Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) will be armed with JL-3 sea-launched
ballistic missiles and will likely begin construction in the early-
2020s. In April, Beijing confirmed the DF-26 entered service--a road-
mobile, nuclear, and conventional capable Intermediate-Range Ballistic
Missile (IRBM), expanding Beijing's near-precision strike capability as
far as the Second Island Chain (a term that refers to the southern part
of the Aleutian Islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands,
Guam, the Republic of Palau, and northern Papua New Guinea). Beijing
continues testing its DF-41 road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM), which carries multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles and has a range of up to 9,300 miles.
South China Sea. Beijing maintains maritime claims in the South
China Sea that are contrary to international law and pose a substantial
long-term threat to the rules-based international order. Beijing
ignored the 2016 ruling of an Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex
VII of the Law of the Sea Convention, which concluded that China's
claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction,
with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed
by the ``nine-dash line'' are contrary to UNCLOS and without legal
effect. In April 2018, Beijing continued militarizing outposts by
deploying advanced military systems that further enhance the PLA's
power projection capabilities, including missiles and electronic
jammers. These actions run directly counter to President Xi's 2015
commitment not to militarize these features. On multiple occasions,
Beijing has landed military transport aircraft on the Spratly Islands
and long-range bombers on the Paracel Islands. Additionally, Chinese
Coast Guard vessels now fall under the command of the Central Military
Commission and regularly harass and intimidate fishing vessels from our
treaty ally, the Philippines, operating near Scarborough Reef, as well
as the fishing fleets of other regional nations.
East China Sea. Beijing continues using its military forces to
advance its territorial claims in the East China Sea. Beijing maintains
a high level of surface combat patrols in the East China Sea.
Additionally, Chinese Coast Guard vessels frequently enter the
territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, which the United States
recognizes as being under the administrative control of the Japanese.
In 2017, these incursions occurred on an average of once every ten
days, and continued in 2018 at about two per month. Additionally, while
Beijing mostly implements United Nations Security Council Resolutions
against North Korea, in a number of cases, illicit ship to ship
transfers continue to occur within Chinese territorial waters.
Economic Pressure. While the United States strives to promote a
Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Beijing is leveraging its economic
instrument of power in ways that can undermine the autonomy of
countries across the region. Beijing offers easy money in the short
term, but these funds come with strings attached: unsustainable debt,
decreased transparency, restrictions on market economies, and the
potential loss of control of natural resources. Beijing's actions in
this regard have potential military ramifications as well. Beijing
touts its need to safeguard its citizens abroad and defend its
expanding global interests in order to justify increased permanent PLA
overseas basing and presence. Beijing is also exploiting growing debt
burdens to access strategic infrastructure in the region. In December
2017, Sri Lanka handed over control of the newly-built Hambantota
seaport to Beijing with a 99-year lease because Sri Lanka could no
longer afford its debt payments to China.
Over the last year, we have seen that countries across the region
are becoming more aware of the threat Beijing's economic policies pose.
Malaysia announced the cancellation of three projects worth $22 billion
in August 2018, declaring that it could not afford Beijing's projects,
decrying the corrupt practices associated with the projects, and
criticizing the loans as a ``new version of colonialism.'' The
Maldives' former president described Beijing's investments as a ``land
grab'' under the guise of development. In contrast, the United States'
vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strives to preserve the
autonomy of independent nations in the Indo-Pacific region. We must
continue to support countries that stand up to Beijing's coercive
economic policies whenever possible and help those countries offset any
economic blowback from Beijing. Our engagement in the Indo-Pacific must
truly be a whole-of-government undertaking, in partnership with the
private sector and civil society, to counter China's economic coercion.
Arctic and Antarctic. Beijing recognizes the growing strategic
significance of the Arctic and Antarctic and has signaled its plans to
assert a greater role in these regions. Despite not being an Arctic
nation, Beijing published its first Arctic policy paper in 2018, which
defends Beijing's role in the region and outlines Beijing's vision of a
``Polar Silk Road'' to complement its other economic initiatives.
Beijing launched its first domestically built icebreaking research
vessel in September 2018, and Beijing plans to launch its second in
2019. Beijing also opened bidding for construction of its first
nuclear-powered icebreaker. Beijing wants to boost its polar research
and expedition capabilities and recently announced plans to double the
frequency of its Arctic expeditions to once a year. Beijing has also
expressed increasing interest in Antarctic operations and establishing
logistics stations to supply them. This is of increasing concern to our
ally Australia, as well as New Zealand, as Beijing seeks positional
advantage and control of territory and natural resources in these vital
regions.
Fentanyl and Pre-Cursors Chemicals. Another challenge that affects
the security environment indirectly is the continuing fentanyl and
opioid crisis in the United States. Illicit fentanyl, as well as legal
pre-cursor chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs primarily
originate from China. Moreover, technological advancements in e-
commerce and commercial shipping present a different business model
from the traditional methods used by transnational criminal
organizations for drug trafficking. These innovations represent a new
level of complexity for U.S. law enforcement agencies and policymakers
alike. I welcome the PRC's decision to designate and regulate fentanyl
as a controlled substance after President Xi's meeting with President
Trump in Argentina in December of last year, and we look forward to
seeing tangible progress.
Russia:
Military modernization. Moscow continues to modernize its military
forces, viewing military power as critical to achieving key strategic
objectives and global influence. Nuclear weapons remain an important
component of Russia's power projection and deterrence capabilities, and
the Russian military conducts regular nuclear-capable Tu-95 Bear bomber
long-range aviation flights off the coasts of Japan, Korea, Canada, and
Alaska. For the past decade Russian military planning has emphasized
the development of modernized platforms and weapons systems, and Moscow
is pushing these platforms to the Indo-Pacific region. In recent years,
the Eastern Military District has become increasingly important for
Russian security interests. Russia has invested in military
infrastructure, improved its command-and-control capabilities, deployed
anti-ship missile systems, and modernized its anti-air capabilities in
the region. For example, Russian units in the Eastern Military District
expect to take delivery of thirty-seven new vessels by 2024, which is a
major increase compared to the twenty-eight new units received in the
region over the last decade. Moscow recently announced plans to expand
its combat forces in the Eastern Military District and to substantially
reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Despite the threat of U.S. sanctions
through the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), Russia continues to export weapons to the Indo-Pacific
region.
Furthermore, Russia hosted its largest military exercise since
1981, Exercise VOSTOK 2018, simulating land, sea, and air operations in
the Eastern Military District and mobilizing forces from across Russia
to engage in multiple live-fire missile launches. Of note, Chinese
forces participated in Exercise VOSTOK for the first time. While
Beijing's military cooperation was largely symbolic, because the forces
remained segregated with separate command posts, Vostok 2018 was still
a significant first step in forging a closer military partnership.
Japan-Russia Relations. Japan and Russia have a long-standing
territorial dispute since the Second World War over the Northern
Territories/Kuril Islands, which are strategically important for
Russia's access to the Pacific Ocean. Russia has further entrenched
itself in this contested territory by reestablishing an airfield on
Matua Island, located in what it calls the central Kuril Islands, to
accommodate light military transport aircraft and helicopters. Russia
has also deployed coastal defense cruise missile systems and SU-35
multirole fighters to the islands and also announced plans to build a
naval base. This more assertive approach to its eastern front reflects
growing focus in Moscow of the vital importance of the broader Indo-
Pacific for Russia's long-term security. Although Prime Minister Abe
and President Putin have met on several occasions to negotiate a peace
treaty that could, in part, resolve this territorial dispute, they have
not reached an agreement. Russia remains concerned that the United
States could establish military facilities under Article VI of the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the Northern Territories
if they are returned to Japan
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs):
In the wake of the 2017 siege of the southern Philippine city of
Marawi, Philippine security forces have maintained consistent pressure
on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) networks in the Philippines,
conducting a number of arrests in 2018. Additionally, counterterrorism
operations on the Philippine island of Jolo against ISIS-supporting
elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group succeeded in disrupting kidnap-for-
ransom operations. ISIS claimed credit for multiple small-scale attacks
in the Philippines, including a mid-2018 vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device attack at a military checkpoint in the southern
Philippines. Outside of the Philippines, we saw a number of small-scale
attacks in 2018, and I remain concerned about the growth of ISIS in the
region. Over 1,000 foreign terrorist fighters have traveled to Iraq and
Syria from the Indo-Pacific region, and at least 170 have returned. We
expect the number of returnees to increase with the persistent loss of
ISIS-held territory. ISIS' Amaq News claimed responsibility for a
series of mid-May 2018 bombings against churches and a police
headquarters in Surabaya, Indonesia. Other countries across the region
remain concerned about the potential for disenfranchised and vulnerable
populations to become recruitment targets. Self-radicalized violent
extremists who are influenced or inspired by ISIS or other extremists
are another cause for concern. The recent attack on a local Catholic
parish in Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago is evidence of continued
concern.
Natural and Man-made Disasters:
The Indo-Pacific remains the most disaster-prone region in the
world. It contains 75 percent of the earth's volcanoes and 90 percent
of earthquakes occur in the ``Ring of Fire'' surrounding the Pacific
Basin. Since 2008 the Indo-Pacific has lost half a million lives and
suffered over $500 million in damages, with over one and a half billion
people affected by natural and manmade disasters overall. The UN
estimates that economic losses in the region due to disasters could
exceed $160 billion annually by 2030. Many countries across the region
lack sufficient capability and capacity to manage natural and man-made
disasters.
A key element of USINDOPACOM's engagement strategy in the region is
building capacity with our allies, partners, and friends to improve
their resilience and capability to conduct their own humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).
USINDOPACOM directly supports HA/DR efforts across the region, as
well. In July 2018, we sent special operations forces to help the
international effort to rescue twelve Thai boys and their coach from a
flooded cave. USINDOPACOM also assisted relief efforts in Sulawesi,
Indonesia last year with sixty-four personnel and three C-130 aircraft
after an earthquake and tsunami hit the country. Another recent example
of USINDOPACOM's support continues today after the Super Typhoon Yutu
hit Tinian and Saipan. USINDOPACOM responded quickly by providing joint
forces, equipment, and fresh drinking water, and by building temporary
shelters and assisting with clearing debris from roads and homes.
usindopacom's security role in the indo-pacific
The most important security development in the Indo-Pacific has
been the rapid modernization of the PLA. The scope and scale of that
modernization has caused USINDOPACOM's relative competitive military
advantage to erode in recent years. With the 2018 National Defense
Strategy as a guide, USINDOPACOM is focused on regaining our
competitive military advantage and ensuring a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific over the short- and long-term.
My strategy centers around fielding and sustaining a force capable
of combat-credible deterrence that is postured for two distinct
security roles: to win before fighting and, if necessary, be ready to
fight and win.
Ready to Fight and Win. USINDOPACOM's ability to prevail in armed
conflict is the foundation of combat credible deterrence. By fielding
and maintaining a joint force ready to fight and win, USINDOPACOM
reduces the likelihood that any adversary will resort to military
aggression to challenge or undermine the rules-based international
order.
Win Before Fighting. Deterrence is necessary to prevent conflict,
but deterrence alone cannot ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Our
adversaries are pursuing their objectives in the space between peace
and war, using fear and coercive actions across the instruments of
national power to revise the rules-based international order and
without resorting to armed conflict. Alongside like-minded allies and
partners, USINDOPACOM must compete in the ``gray zone'' between peace
and war. These deliberate actions will ensure a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific against those malign actors that seek to accomplish their
political objectives short of armed conflict.
usindopacom focus areas
Given the challenges in the region, ensuring a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific requires that USINDOPACOM remain ready to execute high-end/
high-tech wartime missions on short notice. USINDOPACOM must be
postured to achieve a more advantageous security environment without
the lethal use of military force. The following four focus areas guide
the command's efforts toward meeting both of the aforementioned
security roles:
Focus Area 1. Increase joint force lethality. We must
continue to develop and field capabilities necessary to deter
aggression and prevail in armed conflict should deterrence fail.
Focus Area 2. Enhance our design and posture. We will
adapt from our historic service-centric focus on Northeast Asia only to
a more integrated joint force blueprint that is informed by the
changing threat environment and challenges of the 21st century across
the entire Indo-Pacific region.
Focus Area 3. Exercise, experiment, innovate. Targeted
innovation and experimentation will evolve the joint force while
developing asymmetric capability to counter adversary capabilities.
Focus Area 4. Strengthen our allies and partners. Through
increased interoperability, information-sharing, and expanded access
across the region, we will present a compatible and interoperable
coalition to our adversaries in crisis and armed conflict.
Focus Area 1: Increase Joint Force Lethality
Over the last two decades, adversaries have rapidly closed the gap
in many of the areas that used to be clear asymmetric advantages for
the United States, encroaching upon USINDOPACOM's ability to deter
conflict or prevail in armed conflict should deterrence fail. Our
adversaries are fielding advanced Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD)
systems, advanced aircraft, ships, space, and cyber capabilities that
threaten the U.S. ability to project power and influence into the
region. Increasing joint force lethality means developing and fielding
systems and capabilities to preserve our key asymmetric advantages in
order to prevent any potential adversary from thinking it can achieve
its political or military objectives through armed conflict. Increasing
our joint force lethality means joint and combined interoperability, an
integrated fires network that enables long-range strike, and advanced
missile defense systems capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging
advanced air, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats from all
azimuths. In short, we must be able to defend our forces and project
power so that no adversary can achieve sustained dominance in the Indo-
Pacific and threaten our key allies and partners.
Air Superiority. The United States cannot assume that it will have
air superiority in the Indo-Pacific. For over fifteen years, the
predominant employment of United States armed forces has been in the
ongoing fight against terrorism in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan where
our ability to dominate in the air domain was unchallenged. In
contrast, the United States faces peer competitors in the Indo-Pacific.
Beijing has invested heavily in systems that challenge the United
States' ability to achieve air superiority. The U.S. Government must
continue to pursue multi-domain capabilities to counter anti-air
capabilities and we continue to prioritize 5th generation fighter
capabilities to the Indo-Pacific.
Undersea Warfare. The United States must maintain its advantage in
undersea warfare--an asymmetric advantage that our adversaries are
focused on eroding. There are four-hundred foreign submarines in the
world, of which roughly 75 percent reside in the Indo-Pacific region.
One-hundred and sixty of these submarines belong to China, Russia, and
North Korea. While these three countries increase their capacity, the
United States retires attack submarines (SSNs) faster than they are
replaced. USINDOPACOM must maintain its asymmetric advantage in
undersea warfare capability, which includes not just attack submarines,
but also munitions and other anti-submarine warfare systems such as the
P-8 Poseidon and ship-borne anti-submarine systems. Potential adversary
submarine activity has tripled from 2008 levels, which requires at
least a corresponding increase on the part of the United States to
maintain superiority.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The Indo-Pacific's
dynamic security environment requires persistent and intrusive
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to provide
indications, warning, and situational awareness across over half the
world. USINDOPACOM supports a re-allocation of DOD ISR assets to better
satisfy intelligence needs in line with National Defense Strategy-
priorities. USINDOPACOM relies on a mix of Airborne ISR (AISR) assets
to provide a dedicated and flexible ISR capability across the entire
region.
USINDOPACOM supports efforts to re-capitalize critical AISR
capabilities and the continued development of future ISR platforms,
such as the MQ-4C Triton, as well as our interoperable Processing,
Exploitation, and Dissemination architectures.
Space. Space is a vital strategic domain. U.S. adversaries are
militarizing space; USINDOPACOM must have access to resilient and
defensible space systems that can operate in a contested environment.
USINDOPACOM relies on space-based assets for satellite communications
(SATCOM), ISR, missile warning, and Positioning, Navigation, Timing
(PNT) capabilities, which support missions across the range of military
operations. The command's vast geographic expanse increases the strain
on USINDOPACOM's requirements and our reliance on low-density space-
based assets that are in high-demand.
As Beijing's and Moscow's military modernization continues, they
are pursuing broad and robust counter-space capabilities. While not as
advanced, North Korea remains a threat through its employment of SATCOM
and PNT jammers. The threat to the electromagnetic spectrum continues
as our adversaries develop means to deny our space-enabled
capabilities. As Space Command (SPACECOM) transitions responsibilities
from United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) into the future Space
Force, USINDOPACOM looks forward to continued collaboration in this
critical domain as we work to further integrate space-based
capabilities into our daily operations and contingency planning.
Cyber. USINDOPACOM is heavily reliant on cyber capabilities and
faces increasing threats in the cyber domain from both state and non-
state actors, such as Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and criminal actors.
The United States must ensure it has a robust and capable cyber force
with all required equipment and a common network operational structure
necessary to ensure command and control. Moreover, USINDOPACOM requires
an agile and defensible mission command network infrastructure to
ensure adequate command and control, and enable interoperability with
our allies and partners to fully leverage our combined capacities.
Furthermore, the DOD must prevent and, if necessary, respond to cyber-
attacks against non-military critical infrastructure in both Homeland
defense and in support of civil authorities.
The U.S. military's offensive cyber capabilities provide additional
tools to leverage as part of multi-domain operations to compete and
win, but these tools must become more responsive to the operational
requirements of the combatant commands. The growth in these offensive
capabilities is not limited to equipment--we need talent and
innovation. The development and retention of personnel with subject-
matter expertise is a critical component for our Nation's success.
My staff coordinates extensively with USCYBERCOM to integrate
effective offensive, defensive, and network operations into my multi-
domain plans and operations. Our staffs collaborate daily on current
operations through our respective operations centers, at least weekly
on future operations planning, and at least quarterly on future
capability requirements.
Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations. As adversary military
forces grow in both quantity and quality, USINDOPACOM must integrate
operations in all domains to be successful in the 21st century. The
Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations concepts of the services
incorporate the capabilities of the physical domains and place greater
emphasis on space, cyberspace, and other contested areas including the
electromagnetic spectrum, the information environment, and the
cognitive dimension of warfare. Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations
allow U.S. Forces to outmaneuver adversaries physically and
cognitively, advancing the 20th Century concept of combined arms into
the 21st century's requirement to operate across all domains, at all
times.
I fully support all services and functional commands efforts to
operationalize Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations concepts. In
2018, USINDOPACOM successfully demonstrated Multi-Domain and
Distributed Operations capabilities in major exercises while also
integrating new technologies and approaches across the joint force. In
the years ahead, USINDOPACOM will progress from experimentation to
validation of concepts, culminating in an overall increase in the
lethality of the joint force.
Advanced Munitions. Developing and fielding advanced munitions is a
critical component to increasing joint force lethality. The following
are some of the more pressing munitions upgrades based on the
challenges we face in the region:
Improvements to Missile Defense--Patriot Missile Segment
Enhanced (MSE), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) upgrades,
and other capabilities to defend against maneuvering and hypersonic
missiles.
Innovations in heavy weight torpedo technology provide
force-multiplying effects that currently do not exist, including long
range in-port or at-sea attack and shallow water covert mine laying.
The immediate resourcing and integration of ATACMS system
and/or the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile with HIMARS/MLRS to support
Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) units conducting Multi-
Domain Operations and sea control missions.
Continued investments in Hard Target Munitions (HTM).
There is a significant increase in the number of hard and deeply buried
targets in the theater requiring HTM.
Hypersonic long-range strike (H-LRS)--these emerging
weapons dramatically improve probability of engaging time sensitive
targets and have increased survivability and thus higher probability of
success.
Effective counters to the expanding asymmetric unmanned
aerial system (UAS) threat including potential for multiple swarms of
small UAS.
Focus Area 2: Enhance Design and Posture
To effectively defend U.S. interests, USINDOPACOM must update its
existing design and posture to compete with our adversaries across the
entire Indo-Pacific. At present, USINDOPACOM forces west of the
International Date Line are focused in Northeast Asia--an historical
legacy of the Second World War and Korean War. We must update our
design and posture to preserve strength in this key region, but also
ensure that the United States is ready to compete and win before
fighting across all of the Indo-Pacific. By recalibrating theater
posture to balance capabilities across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and
Oceania, USINDOPACOM will be able to respond to aggression more
effectively throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Similarly, the USINDOPACOM Joint Logistics Enterprise must be
capable of supporting joint warfighting requirements across the entire
theater in a more dynamic and distributed posture. Posture and pre-
positioning are essential to overcome the region's tyranny of distance.
Ship sailing times are upwards of ten days from the U.S. west coast,
and it takes significant lead-time to reposition strategic airlift and
tanker support to enable major force flow.
The speed of war has changed, and the nature of these changes makes
the global security environment even more unpredictable. It's dangerous
and unforgiving. Time and decision space have collapsed, so our
approach to warfare must adapt to keep pace; with the speed and
multiple avenues that our adversaries are able to pursue. We require a
force posture that enables the United States to undertake a spectrum of
missions. These missions include: capacity building for partners that
face internal and external vulnerabilities, cooperation on
transnational threats, and joint and combined training. Our
enhancements to interoperability make for more effective coalitions in
crisis.
USINDOPACOM will ``regain the advantage'' by positioning theater
infrastructure that supports:
Expeditionary capability that is agile and resilient.
Dynamic basing for our maritime and air forces.
Special operations forces capable of irregular and
unconventional warfare.
Anti-submarine warfare capabilities unmatched by any
adversary.
Land forces equipped with weapons systems that hold an
adversary's air, sea, and land forces at risk.
Cyber and space teams integrated into Multi-Domain and
Distributed Operations.
Unique intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities.
Global Force Management (GFM) and Posture. The Indo-Pacific is a
theater that requires short response timelines across a vast region.
Regional threats require U.S. Forces to maintain a high level of
readiness to respond rapidly to crises. USINDOPACOM's readiness is
evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency
plans. The plans place a premium on ready and immediately responsive
forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations'
militaries. Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date
Line decrease response times, bolster the confidence of allies and
partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential
adversaries. Contingency response times require that I have the
essential conventional and strategic forces assigned to USINDOPACOM.
In line with the National Defense Strategy, USINDOPACOM prioritizes
stationing and deployment of 5th generation aircraft in the Indo-
Pacific. Additionally, the United States has deployed some of our
newest and most advanced aviation platforms to the region, such as the
P-8 Poseidon, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MV-22 Osprey, EA-18G Growler, E-2D
Hawkeye, and C-130J Super Hercules.
In addition to forward stationed forces, the ability of the United
States to surge, rotate, and globally maneuver ready forces is an
asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. The high operational
demands, delayed maintenance, training pipeline shortfalls, and
shortage of ready surge forces limit USINDOPACOM's responsiveness to
emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk. The challenges grow
each year as our forces continue to deploy at unprecedented rates while
the DOD grapples with fiscal uncertainty.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense. USINDOPACOM faces unique
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) challenges in the Indo-
Pacific to protect our forces and allies. Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific
Territories are part of our Homeland and must be defended. Hawaii is
currently protected from North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. This
system includes Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California;
ground, sea, and space-based sensors; and redundant command, control,
and communications systems.
For the defense of Hawaii, the planned Homeland Defense Radar
Hawaii (HDRH) will improve U.S. capabilities. A Notice of Intent to
Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement was released in June 2018,
and the radar is projected to be operational by late 2023. The HDRH
will provide an enhanced ballistic missile sensing and discrimination
capability in the Indo-Pacific, and it increases the capability of the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System to defend Hawaii.
Meanwhile, our adversaries continue to improve their capabilities
in ways that challenge the United States' strategic, operational, and
tactical freedom of movement and maneuver. Beijing and Moscow continue
to develop and field advanced counter-intervention technologies, which
include highly maneuverable reentry vehicle and warheads (hypersonic
weapons). Beijing and Russia possess cruise missiles and small-unmanned
aerial systems (sUAS) that fly different trajectories, making them hard
to detect, acquire, track, and intercept due to unpredictable low-
flight profiles and sophisticated countermeasures. North Korea retains
its nuclear and ICBM capabilities.
USINDOPACOM's IAMD priority is to establish a persistent, credible,
and sustainable ballistic missile defense by forward deploying the
latest missile defense technologies to the Indo-Pacific. Through
forward and persistent presence, these active missile defense
capabilities would help mitigate the risk to missile threats faced in
the region and to the Homeland. USINDOPACOM addresses this IAMD
priority in the following ways:
USINDOPACOM works with the DOD, Missile Defense Agency,
the services, academic institutions, and industry to deploy
capabilities that counter the advanced missile threats in the region.
USINDOPACOM maintains an active Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) battery on Guam to protect United States citizens
and strategic military capabilities from North Korean intermediate-
range ballistic missiles (KN-17 and MUSUDAN).
USINDOPACOM employs additional radars across the theater
supporting Homeland and regional missile defense, as well as continued
testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
In 2017, USINDOPACOM and USFK, with support from the MDA
and the DOD, deployed a THAAD battery to the Korean Peninsula that is
fully operational. The MDA and the services deliver improved BMDS
capability to the Korean Peninsula, including integration of existing
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) assets to improve engagement options
and coverage area.
The United States Navy completed its forward deployment
of the USS Milius from San Diego, CA to Yokosuka, Japan in Spring 2018.
This port shift provides the U.S. Seventh Fleet improved capability to
support the United States-Japan Alliance.
USINDOPACOM continues working with Japan, South Korea,
and Australia toward creating a fully-integrated BMD architecture that
addresses the increasing cruise missile threat.
USINDOPACOM supports MDA and the services to develop and
test emerging missile and counter-small UAS defense capabilities
through modeling and simulation, as well as live-fire testing conducted
at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, the Ronald Reagan Test Center at
Kwajalein Island, Point Mugu, and other testing ranges located in the
continental United States and Alaska.
I support all efforts that improve the capability and capacity of
ballistic missile, cruise missile, and UAS defense technologies to
further enhance Homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional
locations. The development of a credible and effective defense against
advanced and future missile and UAS threats remains vital to our
operational plans and critical to the continued defense of the United
States.
Logistics and Supply. Driven by budgetary pressure, our logistics
system has become a more efficient business process, and a less
effective warfighting function over the last 20 years. Efficiency has
come at the cost of increased vulnerability and decreased redundancy.
While this arrangement is sufficient for peacetime operations, it is
insufficient for combat. Congress' Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative
could significantly help reverse the current trend toward a less
resilient Joint Logistics Enterprise in the Pacific.
As adversary capabilities improve, joint operations will
increasingly rely on distributed supply chains in order to fight and
win against a peer adversary. The joint logistics enterprise must be
postured with the right capability and capacity at the right locations
in order to effectively support multi-domain and distributed
operations. This means developing infrastructure at both enduring and
contingency operating locations; identifying and sourcing
transportation, distribution, and maintenance requirements; and
developing the processes to enable logistics decisions at the speed of
war. USINDOPACOM is critically dependent on tactical airlift and sea
lift capacity, which expands options for force design and maneuver.
Increased tactical airlift and sealift capacity further increase
survivability as it becomes more difficult for an adversary to counter
a highly maneuverable joint force. These tactical lift assets play just
as important a role as strategic lift assets in ensuring our ability to
create a resilient and agile logistics network.
Significant and sustained investment in munitions is needed to
reduce risk to current and future strategic readiness. Services must
fund and continue investment in munitions research and development,
while setting relatively steady requirements to maintain a healthy
production capability for current and new munitions. I appreciate
Congress' action to enhance munitions funding in fiscal year 2018 and
fiscal year 2019, but shortfalls remain. USINDOPACOM's top priorities
for increased procurement are Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles, SM-6, MK-
48 torpedoes, AIM-9X, BGM-109 Block IV (Maritime Strike Tomahawk), and
AIM-120D. The Services must also upgrade storage facilities and
reassess prepositioning based on the new security environment.
Fuel supply agility and resilience are central to our success in
being competitive, responsive, and lethal. The changing threat
environment, energy security risks, and adversarial geopolitical and
economic influences are driving longer supply lines, necessitating a
flexible resupply chain and more resilient, agile, and interoperable
petroleum distribution capabilities. Continued investment in next
generation petroleum distribution systems is required to mitigate
sustainment risk in austere, contested, and denied environments. Access
and positioning of fuel remains a key pillar of our logistics posture
and is vital to USINDOPACOM's ability to ensure operational freedom of
maneuver throughout the theater.
Focus Area 3: Exercise, Experimentation, and Innovation
Our exercise, experimentation and innovation program is key to
maintaining readiness while also developing and integrating new
capabilities and concepts. This program also highlights our
capabilities and capacity to deter competitors while simultaneously
reassuring allies, partners, and friends.
Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability
(PMTEC) Initiative. USINDOPACOM's Joint Exercise Program has
traditionally monitored the operational and warfighting readiness of
assigned theater and partner nation forces for crises, contingency
operations, and HA/DR. Exercises have advanced key objectives including
strengthening regional alliances and partnerships, while deepening
interoperability through combined training. The current Joint Exercise
Program has been useful for enhancing the readiness of USINDOPACOM's
assigned forward deployed forces; I am now looking to move to the next
level of integration.
Scarce resources have reinforced the need to integrate all major
test and training ranges in the Pacific region through a Pacific Multi-
Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) initiative. This
USINDOPACOM initiative combines the existing Air Force Joint Pacific
Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), the Navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility
(PMRF) and the Army's Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA) in Hawaii, the
Delamere Air Weapons Range in Northern Australia, and the Marine Corps'
future Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military
Training (CJMT) range into a fully networked and integrated training
constellation that supports joint, combined, multi-domain training.
PMTEC will also ensure USINDOPACOM has the ability to prioritize
training, readiness, and experimentation to achieve a more integrated
and lethal joint force that can both deter and when necessary, fight
and win. As the next layer of integration, PMTEC will also link test-
ranges (e.g., the Ronald Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein) to enable
experimentation with developing technologies to create new, more
effective, joint operating concepts that will ensure future warfighting
success.
The PMTEC initiative also integrates cyber and space capabilities
to enable joint and combined experimentation and testing that is truly
multi-domain. Currently, many of these ranges restrict operations to
just air and land capabilities or just air, land, and maritime
capabilities. As a result, our forces often have to simulate or provide
exercise injects that replicate space and cyber effects. We are working
to fully incorporate space and cyber into our exercises.
Experimentation and Innovation. USINDOPACOM relies on innovation
and experimentation, underpinned by strong partnerships, to address our
capability gaps in the region. This includes testing and integrating
new technologies, developing new capabilities, and exploring new
concepts of operation and employment. USINDOPACOM makes extensive use
of OSD's Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, Coalition Warfare
Program, and other rapid prototyping programs to focus cutting edge
technology-based capabilities and innovation to enhance our readiness.
Innovation is crucial to increasing logistics agility and
resilience. USINDOPACOM will continue utilizing the Joint Capability
Technology Demonstration program to identify technological solutions to
our critical logistics capability gaps. To facilitate greater
resilience, USINDOPACOM will protect and harden our critical logistics
infrastructure, information systems, and enablers. For example,
USINDOPACOM is developing the capability to rapidly repair damage to
critical seaports and airfields.
As part of our innovation and experimentation efforts, USINDOPACOM
maintains robust engagement with a variety of partners to identify,
promote, and incorporate research and development to address key
capability gaps. USINDOPACOM has worked with some of the best DOD
industry partners on advancing man and machine teaming, artificial
intelligence, machine-learning, hypersonic technology, autonomy,
command and control, and block chain technology. USINDOPACOM benefits
from engineers, operations analysts, and theater-experienced operators
from Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) and
University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) partners. These partners
perform robust military utility assessments of emerging technology in
the context of theater plans. The ability to harness the knowledge and
experience of the individuals from these organizations is vital to
advancing key capabilities for targeting, cyberspace operations,
undersea warfare, electronic warfare, and ISR.
Focus Area 4: Strengthen Allies and Partners:
The United States' network of allies and partners is our principal
advantage against any adversary. USINDOPACOM depends upon the
collective capabilities of our allies and partners to address the
challenges to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The most obvious point--one
made abundantly clear in the National Security Strategy--is that
whatever we do, we must do it with our allies and partners. The keys to
our bilateral and multilateral relationships are communication,
information-sharing, and interoperability.
Agile Communications. Agile communications are crucial--not only
for our readiness, but for our relationships in the region. USINDOPACOM
works with allies and partners in order to enhance our interoperability
throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Currently, USINDOPACOM is not fully
postured with the latest technology to operate in cyberspace with
dynamic multiple-partner combinations in all phases of military
operations. Furthermore, our Nation is still developing the
communication capacity and sharable encryption capability necessary to
support most modern warfighting platforms and weapon systems with our
allies and partners. Although USINDOPACOM does not have formal
agreements for exchanging information with many of the nations or
organizations within the region, there is continued progress. The
recently concluded Communications, Compatibility, and Security
Agreement (COMCASA) with India is a step in the right direction.
COMCASA is a bilateral agreement that allows the Indian military to
procure United States cryptological equipment to enable secure voice
and data exchange for enhanced interoperability. There will be similar
efforts undertaken with others in the Indo-Pacific. As we continue to
improve our agility in coalition information-sharing environments, our
future capabilities will allow ally and partner forces alongside of our
forces to adequately respond to natural disasters and contingencies. We
will have agile, secure, dynamic information technology capabilities to
support the full spectrum of military operations with our partners and
allies in order to enhance interoperability.
Security Cooperation and Capacity Building. Security cooperation
and capacity-building engagements in the region help build ally and
partner capabilities, information-sharing, and interoperability.
Addressing maritime security and maritime domain awareness challenges
remains a key priority for nations across the region. The 2019 National
Defense Authorization Act extended the fiscal year 2016 NDAA section
1263 ``Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)'' for another
five years (fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025), and expanded
MSI to encompass portions of South Asia. The MSI authority, along with
other DOD authorities such as the title 10 section 333 Global Train and
Equip, and Department of State authorities such as Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training
(IMET), in addition to the new Asia Reassurance Initiative Act,
represent weighty tools available for building partner readiness,
reducing capability gaps, and building capacity. The Department of
State's one-time reprogramming of $290.5 million of FMF to the Indo-
Pacific in 2018 is a clear effort to assist our region, for which
USINDOPACOM is grateful.
addressing the indo-pacific together: enhancing partnerships with our
allies and partners
The Indo-Pacific is one of the largest and most diverse regions on
earth. These differences are our strength, and the thousands of miles
of ocean and sky between us do not divide us, they are the connective
elements that bind us together. As I look at the depth and breadth of
the Indo-Pacific, I see opportunities in each of the regions to advance
our shared values in ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Throughout
the Indo-Pacific, the most effective way to address the challenges I
have described is through collective action of multiple nations.
The security landscape mirrors the diversity of the Indo-Pacific.
In Northeast Asia, the security environment where our strong alliances
with Japan and South Korea dominate, I am focused on the immediate
threat presented by North Korea and the long-term threat posed by
Beijing's and Moscow's aggressive policies. In Southeast Asia, I am
focused on working with our allies, Thailand and the Philippines, and
our strong partners, Singapore and Vietnam, to strengthen ASEAN, expand
multilateralism, and improve their combined capacity to stand up to the
malign influence of state and non-state actors, especially in the South
China Sea. In South Asia, I am focused on expanding cooperation with
the world's largest democracy, India, and working with all South Asia
countries to increase air and maritime domain awareness across the
Indian Ocean. Finally, in Oceania, I am encouraged by the opportunities
to partner with our strong allies, Australia and France, and strong
friend, New Zealand, to improve information sharing and maritime
cooperation as the Pacific Island Countries address the challenges
associated with Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing,
natural disasters, narcotics trafficking, and economic coercion from
Beijing.
Northeast Asia. The command's goal is to stabilize Northeast Asia
and leverage our strong alliances with Japan and South Korea to improve
stability across the broader Indo-Pacific. In order to achieve this,
USINDOPACOM needs a security environment that is secure from coercion
from Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow. As the region becomes more stable,
we will encourage Japan and South Korea to take a greater role in the
alliances related to their own security and contribute to security in
the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Japan. The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our
efforts to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The government of Japan
released its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2017, and Japan
is looking to become more involved across the broader Indo-Pacific
region. Additionally, Japan is a key supporter of UNSCR enforcement
operations and hosts the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) in
Yokosuka, Japan. Tokyo intends to procure high-tech United States
platforms that will increase interoperability, including F-35A, E-2D
Hawkeye, Global Hawk UAS, MV-22, and Advanced Electronic Guides
Interceptor System (AEGIS) Ashore. Furthermore, Japan's 2018 National
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) call for strengthening the United
States-Japan alliance, and expanding their international security
cooperation with like-minded partners in the region. They also
prioritize advancements in Japan's space, cyberspace, and electro-
magnetic capabilities.
USINDOPACOM and Japan's Self Defense Force have transformed the way
military alliances plan and campaign together. Our approaches for a
Free and Open Indo-Pacific are synchronized in our national policies
and defense strategies, and communication mechanisms exist at every
level of our governments to ensure we are synchronized on key issues.
The United States-Japan alliance is committed to supporting countries
that respect and adhere to the rule-of-law, and our alliance seeks to
enable opportunities for economic prosperity throughout the region.
South Korea. The United States-South Korea alliance remains
ironclad, and we are both committed to the final, fully verified
denuclearization of North Korea. South Korea is also a key supporter of
UNSCR Enforcement activities against North Korea. USINDOPACOM works
closely with Seoul in obtaining capabilities required under the
Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP)--the
ongoing plan to transfer Combined Forces Command (CFC) to South Korean
leadership. Seoul has future procurement plans for the P-8, advanced
munitions, upgrades to PAC-3 missiles, and F-16 fighters. All these
assets will increase interoperability with the United States.
Taiwan. In accordance with our One China Policy, based on the
Taiwan Relations Act and three United States-China Joint Communiques,
the United States and Taipei maintain a substantive and robust
unofficial relationship with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA). Taiwan's values reflect our own--it features an open economy
with a free and democratic society that respects human rights and the
rule of law. The United States opposes any unilateral change to the
status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The United States continues to support
the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and
pace acceptable to the people on both sides. USINDOPACOM's engagement
focuses on improving joint interoperability within Taiwan's military,
improving Taiwan training and readiness, and supporting Taiwan's
military and professional development.
Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically isolate and
economically constrain Taiwan. Taiwan has only seventeen diplomatic
partners left after losing El Salvador, Burkina Faso, and the Dominican
Republic as diplomatic partners in 2018. Beijing continues to press the
international community and private businesses to remove or modify any
references to Taiwan on websites and publications and is attempting to
deny Taiwan's participation in international fora.
As evidenced in President Xi Jinping's New Year's speech, China is
focused on achieving reunification as a part of the PRC's national plan
of rejuvenation by ``reserving the option of taking all necessary
measures and not renouncing the use of force.'' We continue to be
concerned with China's military buildup across the Strait, Beijing's
opaqueness about its military capability and capacity, and its
unwillingness to preclude the use of force to resolve the cross-strait
issue. The United States has a deep and abiding interest in peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait and welcomes steps by both sides to
reduce tensions and improve cross-Strait relations. President Xi's
solution of a one country, two systems approach to reunification does
not reflect the wishes of both sides. We hope that there will be
continued high-level communications and interactions going forward
through which both sides can continue their constructive dialogue on
the basis of dignity and respect. Although President Tsai and her
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have committed to
``avoid confrontation and prevent surprises'' with China, the cross-
Strait situation is of increasing concern given the harsh rhetoric from
Beijing toward the leadership in Taipei.
Taiwan recently passed its 2019 defense budget, which will fund
foreign and indigenous acquisition programs as well as near-term
training and readiness. Consistent with the TRA, USINDOPACOM engages
with the Taiwan military to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
self-defense capability that is credible, resilient, and cost-
effective.
Mongolia. Mongolia is a strong partner and contributor to the
United States' regional and global policy objectives. Mongolia supports
missions in Afghanistan and United Nations Peace Keeping Operations,
making Mongolia a model for emerging democratic countries that want to
be more active globally. Ulaanbaatar's ``Third Neighbor Policy''
intends to balance Russian and Chinese influence by developing
relationships with the United States and other like-minded countries.
USINDOPACOM and Mongolia have had inaugural land forces talks,
developed a five-year security cooperation plan, and laid the
groundwork for Airman-to-Airman Talks. The United States is helping
Mongolia improve their special operations forces, peacekeeping
operations, and Air Forces.
Southeast Asia. USINDOPACOM's objective in Southeast Asia is to
strengthen the sub-region's ability to deny adversaries' attempts to
dominate or disrupt the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
while enabling the region to promote their sovereign interests, resist
economic pressure from others, and preserve conditions for continued
economic growth. USINDOPACOM is setting conditions in the security
environment that support this goal, which ensures that all nations can
freely access shared domains. Adversary militaries will be unable to
dominate the global commons that enable trade and the global economy.
The command's efforts will improve the region's awareness and
capability to enforce their borders, territorial waters, and exclusive
economic zones. USINDOPACOM will advocate for multilateral venues like
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to advance
collaboration, settle disputes equitably, and strengthen resolve
against the malign influence of state and non-state actors. We are very
grateful to Congress for its continued support for the $425 million
Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia which enables Thailand,
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and India to increase their capability
and capacity in continued maritime domain awareness over the next five
years.
ASEAN. The United States and ASEAN share the common principles of a
rules-based international order, respect for international law, and the
peaceful resolution of disputes. The ten ASEAN member states, under the
chairmanship of Singapore in 2018 and Thailand in 2019, continue to
seek ways to improve multilateral security engagements and advance
stability in the Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM is committed to
strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Defense
Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. USINDOPACOM
participates in ASEAN exercises, key leader engagements, and
multilateral cooperation on a number of shared transnational
challenges, and will host an ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise in 2019.
USINDOPACOM co-chairs the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus
Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
with Malaysia through the end of 2019. USINDOPACOM's engagements with
ASEAN, and with the respective ASEAN member states, build and
strengthen relationships, and convey the United States' steadfast
commitment to the region.
Cambodia. USINDOPACOM reduced the number of engagements with
Cambodia. During these limited engagements the command reaffirms the
importance of strengthening democratic institutions and maintaining an
independent foreign policy. The United States and other countries in
the region are concerned about the possible construction by a Chinese
state-owned enterprise of a facility in Cambodia. USINDOPACOM
appreciates the statements by the Prime Minister noting that foreign
military facilities are prohibited under their constitution. However,
the command remains concerned about the possible militarization of
Cambodia's coast including the prepositioning of military equipment,
the stationing of military units on long term rotations, and the
construction of dual use facilities.
Indonesia. This year, the United States and Indonesia celebrate our
70th anniversary of bilateral relations, which provides an opportunity
to highlight our growing strategic relationship. USINDOPACOM is
committed to a strategic partnership with Indonesia. Indonesia's
strategic location, its status as the third largest democracy, fourth
most populous country, and its expanding economy all underscore its
essential role in the regional security architecture. Indonesia is the
largest recipient of United States training and education programs in
the region. We continue to support the Indonesian military's focus on
external threats and national defense, particularly maritime domain
awareness and maritime security.
Laos. After decades of stagnation in the United States-Lao
relationship following the Vietnam War, we have seen some significant
advancements over the last two years. In 2016, the United States and
the Lao People's Democratic Republic signed a Comprehensive Partnership
that resulted in a surge of bilateral military engagements. The
command's engagement goals are to partner and assist Laos in becoming a
stable, prosperous, and independent member of ASEAN that is willing and
able to promote its sovereign interests and respect international law.
These engagements focus around unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance,
POW/MIA recovery, and military medicine. Laos actively supports the
Defense Personnel Accounting Agency (DPAA) in the search for 290
missing United States servicemembers with an aim to honorably conclude
war legacy issues (UXO and POW/MIA recovery missions) by 2030.
USINDOPACOM is expanding engagements with the Lao military.
Malaysia. Malaysia remains a critical partner of increasing
importance in the region ever since the United States elevated the
relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership in 2014. USINDOPACOM is
exploring expanded collaboration in the areas of maritime security,
counterterrorism, information-sharing, and defense institutional
reform. Malaysian Armed Forces have demonstrated the professionalism,
capacity, and resolve to contribute to regional security, and we
continue to evolve our defense relationship on mutual areas of
interest.
Philippines. The Philippines is a treaty ally and a partner in
preserving a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and our military-to-military
relationship has never been stronger. USINDOAPCOM has increased the
number and scope of exercises in recent years, to include the
resumption of live-fire exercises. Terrorism continues to pose a
security challenge in the Philippines, and USINDOPACOM is committed to
helping the Philippines ensure that the southern Philippines does not
become a safe-haven for terrorists that would threaten the entire
region. I am also focused on helping to develop the territorial defense
capability of the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) and look forward to
re-engaging with the Philippines National Police Maritime Group to
continue improving their ability to protect their sovereign interests.
Singapore. Singapore remains a steadfast security cooperation
partner in Southeast Asia with a strong commitment to promoting a Free
and Open Indo-Pacific. Though not a formal ally, Singapore provides
valuable access to the strategically-located entrance of the Malacca
Straits and South China Sea. Singapore supports a strong United States
presence in the region as well as a deep and broad defense relationship
between our two countries. Singapore supports our objectives on North
Korea, and in 2018, Singapore hosted the historic United States-North
Korea summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un.
Singapore also hosted the transit and rotational deployment of more
than 1,500 U.S. military aircraft and vessels (2015-2018), making the
United States the heaviest foreign user of Singapore's facilities at
Sembawang Port, Paya Lebar Air Base, and Changi Naval Base. Singapore
maintains training facilities at Luke Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona (F-
16); Mountain Home AFB, Idaho (F-15SG); Marana, Arizona (Apache AH-
64D); and Fort Sill, Oklahoma (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS). Moreover, USINDOPACOM and Singapore steadily increased
interoperability through increasingly complex exercises, and we
continue to strengthen cooperation in counterterrorism and maritime
security. Singapore annually sends 1000 students to training and
education courses in the United States, representing the largest
training presence in the United States from any foreign military.
Thailand. Last year marked 200 years of friendly United States-Thai
relations, and Thailand remains a key ally and security partner. In
2019, I am focused on advancing our alliance and restoring elements of
our military-to-military relationship following the restoration of a
democratic government after elections in March. Thai facilities provide
vital training opportunities for USINDOPACOM personnel, and logistical
nodes that are essential to operate throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
Thailand assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2019 and continues to
play a vital leadership role in the Indo-Pacific region.
Vietnam. Vietnam has emerged as a key partner in promoting a secure
and rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region.
USINDOPACOM's defense partnership with the Vietnamese military is among
the strongest aspects of our growing bilateral relationship. As a
symbol of closer ties between the United States and Vietnam, the
aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made a port call in March 2018 to
Vietnam, the first of its kind since the end of the war in 1975.
Vietnam shares many of the United States' principles on issues such as
international rule of law and freedom of navigation, and Vietnam is one
of the loudest voices on South China Sea disputes. USINDOPACOM's and
the Vietnamese military's military-to-military engagements prioritize
enhancing Vietnam's maritime capacity, which will be bolstered by
Vietnam's acquisition of Scan Eagle UAVs, T-6 trainer aircraft, and a
second U.S. Coast Guard cutter. I look forward to Vietnam assuming the
ASEAN Chairmanship in 2020 and increasing its leadership across the
region.
Burma (Myanmar). Ongoing human rights abuses, including growing
restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the
press, and atrocities [including ethnic cleansing], and instability in
some ethnic minority areas comprise threats to Burma's democratic
transition. Due to credible information of serious human rights
violations and abuses, especially in relation to Rohingya, as well as
restrictions that remain in place based on decades of military rule,
United States-Burma security cooperation is minimal. The United States-
Burma security relationship is limited to lower-level engagements at
select regional security events and conferences, and participation in
multilateral exercises focused on HA/DR. Burma military personnel are
not attending academic exchanges, including at the region's DOD
academic institute, despite the importance of engaging the next
generation of officers.
South Asia. USINDOPACOM's goal in South Asia is to create and seize
opportunities to broaden critical partnerships to ensure shared domains
remain open to all. In conjunction with India's contributions to
regional security, these actions will prevent adversaries from
establishing an effective military presence in the Indian Ocean that
threaten the security of vital commerce and continued economic growth
and development. As a result, the regional states will be able to
reduce internal conflicts, respond to regional security challenges, and
resist adversaries' military and economic coercion.
India. The United States-India strategic partnership continues to
advance at an historic pace as we continue to increase our
interoperability and information-sharing capabilities. The inaugural
2+2 Ministerial and signing of the COMCASA in 2018 were pivotal moments
in our relationship. USINDOPACOM expects this trajectory to continue
and that 2019 will be a significant year in bilateral relations. The
United States and India are natural partners on a range of political,
economic, and security issues. With a mutual desire for global
stability, support for the rules-based international order, and a Free-
and-Open Indo-Pacific region, the United States and India have an
increased agreement on interests, including maritime security and
maritime domain awareness, counter-piracy, counterterrorism,
humanitarian assistance, and coordinated responses to natural disasters
and transnational threats. Over the past year, the United States and
Indian militaries participated in five major exercises, executed more
than fifty other military exchanges, and further operationalized the
2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). The LEMOA
enables the United States Navy to replenish supplies from Indian navy
logistics platforms. USINDOPACOM is working with the Indian military to
operationalize the COMCASA, which will boost interoperability between
our militaries. Defense sales are at an all-time high, with India
operating United States sourced platforms such as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s,
AH-64s, CH-47s, and M777 howitzers. Additionally, India recently agreed
to a $2.1-billion purchase of MH-60R multi-role sea-based helicopters
and is considering a number of additional U.S. systems for purchase.
USINDOPACOM fully supports the purchase of U.S. systems, F-16 and F/A-
18E aircraft, a reorder of 12-15 P-8Is, and a potential purchase of Sea
Guardian UASs.
Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an important security partner with strong
potential to enhance regional stability and advance United States
interests in South Asia on counter-terrorism, Muslim outreach,
countering violent extremism, supporting humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, and supporting United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
(UNPKO). The humanitarian crisis caused by the presence of more than
700,000 Rohingya refugees from Burma (Myanmar) in Bangladesh has
strained the government of Bangladesh. Bangladesh's December 30
elections point to concerning trend of consolidation of power by the
ruling Awami League and raise fears that PM Hasina is aiming to achieve
a de facto one-party state. Military-to-military engagement with
Bangladesh fits into a broader strategy and commitment to uphold an
international, rules-based order in the vital Indo-Pacific region and
contributes to building a regional security framework.
Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka remains a significant strategic opportunity in
the Indian Ocean, and our military-to-military relationship continues
to strengthen. However, political turmoil and ethnic tension between
the Tamil and Sinhalese populations remain drivers of instability and
potential obstacles to continued growth in our partnership. Moreover,
Sri Lanka has handed over the deep water port of Hambantota to China on
a 99-year lease due to its mounting debts to China, which has caused
international concern. Despite the political upheaval, it is in our
interests to continue military collaboration and cooperation with Sri
Lankan Forces. USINDOPACOM cooperation with the Sri Lankan Military
centers on building capacity in maritime security and maritime domain
awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as
humanitarian de-mining, medical assistance, and peacekeeping
operations. Increasing navy-to-navy engagement with Sri Lanka will be a
USINDOPACOM focus in 2019. The Sri Lankan Navy is a well-trained and
professional force with the potential to contribute to multi-lateral
maritime interoperability in the Indian Ocean. The recent transfer of
an excess United States Coast Guard cutter to Sri Lanka in August 2018,
along with additional platforms from Japan and India, provide the Sri
Lankan Navy greater capabilities to contribute to regional maritime
domain awareness initiatives. Going forward, it is necessary to sustain
engagement with Sri Lanka, particularly the navy, and construct a
multi-lateral approach to capacity building with like-minded partners
to rapidly enhance the Sri Lankan Navy's capabilities.
Oceania. USINDOPACOM is deepening engagement with the Pacific
Island Countries (PICs) of Oceania to preserve a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific region, and we are committed to strengthening the region's
future security and prosperity with our partners and allies. In close
coordination with Australia, Japan, France, and New Zealand,
USINDOPACOM is working to strengthen the resilience of the PICs by
tackling common challenges: drug trafficking; Illegal, Unreported,
Unregulated (IUU) fishing; the existential threat of rising ocean
levels; natural disasters; and the heavy debt burdens that threaten
their sovereign interests.
Australia. Our alliance with Australia underpins our relations
across Oceania, and Canberra plays a leading role in regional security
and capacity-building efforts for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
Australia is increasing its diplomatic presence, military and economic
assistance, and infrastructure investments in Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
and the other PICs to enhance security in the region. Australia is a
key supporter of UNSCR enforcement operations against North Korea as
well. The U.S. Marine Corps completed its sixth successful Marine
Rotational Force-Darwin deployment, and we expect to reach the full
authorized strength of 2,500 marines later this year. These deployments
maintain significant combat power west of the International Date Line
with an ally. Moreover, Australia is procuring high-tech United States
platforms, such as the F-35, that will increase interoperability.
Compact of Free Association (COFA) States. The Republic of Palau,
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands (RMI), collectively referred to as the ``Compact'' states, are
threatened by external pressures including the pernicious use of
Beijing's economic leverage. The Republic of Palau, FSM, and RMI
entered into a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United
States more than 25 years ago, allowing the United States to foreclose
access or use of those countries by third-country militaries. Under the
COFAs, the Compact States receive economic assistance, including
grants, access to various U.S. Federal programs, and for many citizens
of the Compact States, visa-free travel to the United States. U.S.
contributions to the trust funds established by the COFA are scheduled
to end after 2023. Moreover, these island nations are under increasing
pressure from Beijing's economic strategy. Additionally, the changing
climate represents an existential threat to these nations as they
urgently seek to mitigate damage from higher tides and rising sea
levels, shifting patterns of fishing populations essential to economic
livelihood, and greater intensity of natural disasters such as tropical
storms and droughts. The continued support that the COFA has engendered
also benefits the United States. We provide support to these countries
and they support the United States. The patriotic citizens of these
nations join the U.S. Armed Forces in larger numbers per capita than
most U.S. states, and I value their service. The Compact states rely on
continued support from the United States to mitigate these threats and
the United States would like to continue to benefit from the good will
of these Pacific Island Countries to further our strategic interests in
Indo-Pacific region.
Fiji. USINDOPACOM's relationship with the Republic of Fiji is
thriving and robust, and we were pleased to see a credible election
process there in 2018. Australia's decision to invest in the Black Rock
International Peacekeeping Center was welcomed, and will ensure that
Fiji continues to play an important role in peacekeeping missions
around the world. USINDOPACOM is postured to provide engineering
support for improvements and new construction to the Ground Forces
Training Center and to assist Australian engineers with the Black Rock
International Peacekeeping Center. In 2018, Fiji signed a United States
ship-rider agreement, opening up new opportunities for maritime
security cooperation between our two countries. Additionally, the
establishment of Fiji as a partner in the National Guard's State
Partnership Program opens up another door for our two militaries to
train and work together. The $5 million plus-up in foreign military
sales (FMS) allows USINDOPACOM to deepen our military relationship with
the Fijian military.
France. France, a NATO ally with significant territory in the Indo-
Pacific, is increasing its operational activities in the region and is
a key contributor to the multilateral efforts. The United States,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and France coordinate operational
support and capacity-building with the PICs. The primary operational
engagement provides support to the Forum Fisheries Agency to address
IUU fishing. France is also becoming increasingly active across the
broader Indo-Pacific region, and I welcome both French support to UNSCR
sanction enforcement activities against North Korea, and increased
French activity in the South China Sea.
New Zealand. New Zealand remains a steadfast and key partner who,
in 2018, increased investment, foreign assistance, and infrastructure
support to the South Pacific. USINDOPACOM greatly appreciates this
commitment of additional resources to the PICs. For the last six years,
the United States and New Zealand, through bilateral defense dialogues,
have increased interoperability collaboration headlined in 2018 by New
Zealand's purchase of P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to replace
aging P-3 Orion aircraft. Additionally, New Zealand has provided key
support to UNSCR sanctions enforcement against North Korea.
Papua New Guinea (PNG). USINDOPACOM's engagement with PNG improves
regional posture and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the region.
With security support from Australia and the United States, PNG hosted
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2018. During
APEC, Vice President Pence announced that Australia and the United
States would partner with Papua New Guinea to develop the Lombrum Naval
Base on Manus Island in the northern part of PNG. USINDOPACOM looks
forward to assisting Australia and PNG in developing options for this
base.
Additional Allies
Canada. Like the United States, Canada is a member of NATO and a
Pacific nation. Canadian policy in the Indo-Pacific focuses on
cooperation and building partnerships as they increase operational
activities in the region. By focusing on consistent engagement with all
willing parties, Canada hopes to deepen its relationship with
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Canada wants to provide
a continued presence in the Pacific to enhance regional stability,
specifically citing tensions on the Korean Peninsula in their National
Defence Policy. Ottawa provides support to ongoing North Korea UNSCR
sanctions enforcement as well.
United Kingdom (UK). The UK, another NATO ally, remains one of the
strongest defenders of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and sees
prosperity and security in the Indo-Pacific as an essential driver of
global economic growth. The UK recently established three new
diplomatic posts in the Pacific and increased foreign aid to the
Pacific by 6 percent in 2018. The recently concluded cooperative
deployment with the HMS Argyll and USS McCampbell in the South China
Sea highlights the value of multinational operations and, more
importantly, the international message to those who seek to infringe on
the ability to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows.
conclusion
In the 21st century, U.S. security and prosperity will increasingly
depend upon a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region--one that
features respect for states' sovereignty, freedom of the seas and
skies, and adherence to international norms, rules, and behavior. In
short, it is in our vital national interests to ensure a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific over the short- and long-term. As the Commander of
USINDOPACOM, my focus is first and foremost on preserving and advancing
the security and stability of the region, over the short- and long-
term.
I will ensure the 375,000 men and women of USINDOPACOM remain ready
to fight and win, if necessary, while also focusing on competing and
winning below the level of armed conflict. It is in this so-called
``gray zone'' between peace and war where many of our adversaries
currently operate, and we must be equally prepared to compete with our
adversaries before and after the initiation of hostilities. To do this,
we need a comprehensive approach across multiple U.S. Governmental
departments, and partnerships with civil society and the private
sector, to engage in areas that transcend traditional military core
competencies. Our armed services must be manned, trained, and equipped
to overcome the full spectrum of challenges presented by state and non-
state actors. With the continued support of Congress, and together with
our allies and partners, I believe we will be successful at this
important mission.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Davidson.
General Abrams.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. ABRAMS, USA COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES
KOREA
General Abrams. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you today.
I've had the privilege to serve in this position for just
over 90 days. In that short time, I have assessed the ROK-
United States military alliance to be stronger than ever. Our
combined force is a strategic deterrent, postured to respond to
potential crisis or provocation and, if called upon, ready to
defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in the region.
Today in Korea, we have tremendous opportunities before us
as well as some great challenges. Ongoing diplomatic engagement
between the Republic of Korea, the DPRK, and the United States
has led to a significant reduction in tension compared to the
recent past marked by missile launches and nuclear tests.
Diplomacy is creating the opportunity for North Korea to choose
the path of denuclearization, forge a lasting peace, and build
a better future for its people.
The first steps towards realizing that future have already
begun. We have witnessed multiple presidential summits, inter-
Korean dialogue, and international support to sanctions. The
steps agreed to at Panmunjom and specified in the Comprehensive
Military Agreement, combined with the aforementioned diplomatic
efforts, have all contributed to a marked reduction in tensions
on the peninsula and created mechanisms for the development of
cooperation and confidence building, central ingredients to the
incremental process of making history on the peninsula.
Still, I remain clear-eyed about the fact that, despite a
reduction in tensions along the DMZ [Korean Demilitarized Zone]
and a cessation of strategic provocations, coupled with public
statements of intent to denuclearize, little to no verifiable
change has occurred in North Korea's military capabilities.
For instance, we are watching the ongoing Korean People's
Army Winter Training Cycle, including a slate of full-spectrum
exercises, which is progressing along at historic norms,
meaning that we have observed no significant changes to size,
scope, or timing of their ongoing exercises compared to the
same time period over the last 4 years. Further, North Korea's
conventional and asymmetric military capabilities, along with
their continued development of advanced conventional systems,
remains unchecked. These capabilities continue to hold the
United States, the Republic of Korea, and our regional allies
at risk. As such, I believe it is necessary to maintain a
postured and ready force to deter any possible aggressive
actions.
Fielding our force in Korea requires a foundation of
support and sustainment to meet our war-fighters' needs. Today,
that foundation is sound. It serves as the bedrock from which
we deter aggression and ensure stability, not only on the
Korean Peninsula, but in Northeast Asia. Our posture allows our
diplomats to speak from a position of unquestioned strength as
they work to achieve enduring peace and final full
denuclearization of the DPRK.
I want to thank you for the support we have received from
the Congress over the last 2 years, as we have significantly
improved the posture and readiness of our forces on the
peninsula, from munition stocks to additional ballistic missile
defense capabilities and more. I can't underscore enough the
importance of the on-time appropriation in 2019, as it has
enabled us for the first time in many years to make smarter
investments, improve our planning, and provide predictability
to our commanders in the field so they can sustain the hard-
earned readiness that is essential to being a fight tonight
force.
The readiness required to be a credible deterrent is
perishable. We must continue to exercise the core competencies
necessary to the planning and execution of joint and combined
operations under the strain of crisis. However, we must also
strike a balance between the need to train and the requirement
to create space for diplomacy to flourish. As such, we are
innovating our approach to training and exercises by tuning
four dials that modify exercise design and conduct: size,
scope, volume, and timing. Adjustments to these dials enable us
to remain in harmony with diplomatic and political requirements
without sacrificing war-fighting readiness to unacceptable
levels.
Our combined forces, the Republic of Korea and United
States, continue to train using this new construct so they can
be ready should the call come for them to respond to crisis,
defend the Republic of Korea, and prevail against any threat.
The ROK-United States alliance remains ironclad. It has been
tested multiple times over the last 65 years and has only
become stronger. Our military partnership continues to deepen
and broaden the long-standing relationships that exist at every
echelon. On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians,
contractors, and their families on the peninsula, we thank you
for your unwavering support. I am extremely proud to be their
commander and to work hand-in-hand with the Republic of Korea
to protect our great nations. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Abrams follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Abrams
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Senators of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture
and readiness of our forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Thank you
as well to the Congress, and in particular this Committee's leadership,
for delivering the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
and related Appropriations on time. Predictable, stable resourcing,
more than any other factor, allows us to sustain the military readiness
we have rebuilt over the last few years. In 2018, the Services, under
the leadership of Chairman Dunford and former Secretary Mattis, made
significant strides to improve the overall readiness posture of Unites
States Forces Korea (USFK) and our ability to ``fight tonight.'' We are
grateful for their continued support.
I have had the distinct honor to command the United Nations Command
(UNC), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and USFK for nearly 90 days.
During that short time, I have prioritized firsthand visits and a
personal review of the posture, readiness, and character of the
warriors and organizations of these three commands. My assessment is
that the ROK-United States military Alliance is stronger than ever, and
that our combined force stands as a strategic deterrent, postured to
respond to potential crisis or provocation and, if called upon, ready
to ``fight tonight'' in the defense of the Republic of Korea. The
alliance between South Korean and American forces is ironclad--forged
in blood, shaped over 65 years of combined military operations and
training, and hardened by the crucible of war. Shared sacrifice and
mutually agreed principles underpin our Alliance and ensure it endures
the winds of change.
This posture statement, along with my testimony before the
Committee in open and closed session, is my first opportunity to
provide you my personal assessment and measurement of progress within
our four enduring priorities: sustain and strengthen the Alliance,
maintain the armistice, transform the Alliance, and sustain the force.
To that end, this statement provides a summary of the changes in our
operating environment, an assessment of our posture and readiness, an
overview of our exercise planning and conduct, a discussion of how we
take care of our warriors and their families, and a review of our
current resourcing priorities. The continued support of this Committee
for the incredible men and women of UNC/CFC/USFK is appreciated. We are
a better postured force because of your unwavering commitment to
military readiness on the Korean peninsula.
operating environment
Ongoing diplomatic engagement and summitry among the leaders of the
ROK, United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
in 2018 led to a palpable reduction in tension when compared to the
recent years of missile launches and nuclear tests. The inter-Korean
Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) has produced a number of nascent
confidence-building measures: demilitarization of the Joint Security
Area (JSA), demining small areas of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in
preparation for ROK-DPRK joint remains recovery operations this spring,
mutually-verified removal of select guard posts along the DMZ, and
increased interaction between UNC forces and Korean People's Army (KPA)
forces operating within the JSA. All of these measures support improved
military-to-military communications among the ROK, DPRK, and UNC, and
some have sparked limited cooperation. These steps, regardless of size
or scope, are positive indicators of the impact sustained diplomatic
efforts have begun to bring about. Current modifications in
atmospherics, however, do not represent a substantive change in North
Korea's military posture or readiness. The North Korean military
remains formidable and dangerous, with no discernable differences in
the assessed force structure, readiness, or lethality my predecessor
reported in 2018.
While Kim Jong-un's (KJU) 2019 New Year's speech called for South
Korea to halt joint military exercises with the United States, the
KPA's Winter Training Cycle this year commenced as it has for the past
five years--with a force of over one million engaged in individual and
unit-level training throughout the country. Notably, the size, scope,
and timing of training events are consistent with recent years. The
only observable change has been a reduction in the attention and
bellicosity the regime layers onto its military activities. Since the
end of 2017, Pyongyang has reduced its hostile rhetoric and halted
media coverage of KJU attending capstone events such as large-scale,
live-fire training or special operations raids on mock-up Alliance
targets. It is, however, too soon to conclude that a lower profile is
indicative of lesser risk.
The hard work of diplomacy continues to reduce tensions and create
the environment necessary for North Korea to choose the path of
denuclearization, forge a lasting peace, and create a brighter future
for its people. Still, I am clear-eyed about the fact that little to no
verifiable change has occurred in North Korea's conventional and
asymmetric capabilities that continue to hold the United States, South
Korea, and our regional allies at risk. For these reasons, the security
situation continues to demand an appropriately postured and ready
force.
Amid shifting atmospherics, 2018 was also a seminal period for all
three commands as initiatives for setting the force matured,
dramatically changing the geography of three headquarters. The USFK and
UNC Headquarters relocated to Camp Humphreys, joining Eighth Army and
2nd Infantry Division in new state-of-the-art facilities on the largest
U.S. Army facility outside of continental United States. The
headquarters for CFC remains in Seoul at Yongsan and the combined ROK-
United States staff is redefining normal operations based upon this
change in geography. While distance will not erode the strength of the
Alliance, it has forced, and will continue to require, deeper thought
about how to sustain operational readiness across the components and at
each echelon. For any member of Congress who has not been to Korea in
the past 24 months, we have reset the force significantly and
consolidated tremendous capability in Pyeongtaek--the conditions for
the development and sustainment of combat readiness have changed.
The Armistice Agreement and United Nations Command
The significantly changing environment along the DMZ, and within
the JSA specifically, is proving the inherent utility, adaptability,
and importance of the UNC. Over the past 14 months, we have evolved as
the CMA and inter-Korean dialogue birthed several of the confidence-
building measures summarized above. CMA-related activities are
important to the development of the confidence and trust necessary to
diplomatic progress and are proving to be value-added reinforcements to
the tools which have helped ensure the security of Korean peninsula for
the last 65 years--the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the command that
fulfills it. UNC was formed to organize and operationalize the
international community's defense of South Korea during the war and
has, since 1978 when South Korea assumed armistice operational control,
endured as the body explicitly tasked with ``ensur[ing] a complete
cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until
a final peace settlement is achieved.'' The events of 2018 highlight
UNC's critical role as the home for international commitments on the
Korean peninsula while simultaneously driving the command toward a
marked increase in activity, exposure, and international engagement.
While enforcing the Armistice Agreement, securing the JSA as a
place for diplomacy, and acting as a principal partner with ROK and KPA
in the trilateral military talks, the UNC Military Armistice Commission
(UNCMAC) approved 13,066 border crossings in 2018 (compared with five
in 2017), passed 152 official messages (56 in 2017), and participated
in several staff-level and General Officer-level negotiations. UNC
staff met the dramatic increase in requirements while simultaneously
continuing the work of evolving the command by increasing UN Sending
State staff and senior officers and simultaneously executing the move
from the legacy facilities at Yongsan to a new facility on Camp
Humphreys. Today, UNCMAC is a vital participant in the ongoing
negotiations and it provides international legitimacy and validation to
all of the ongoing confidence building measures. UNCMAC has adapted to
new conditions and remains the vital tool envisioned in the 1953
agreement. UNC as a command, enabled during armistice by the UNCMAC,
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and UNC-Rear in Japan, also
remains prepared to be the critical link between the international
community and the other two commands during periods of crisis or
contingency as the home for Sending State force contributions.
posturing and sustaining a ready force
Fielding a ready force requires establishing a foundation of
support and sustainment capable of meeting the warfighters' needs in
the dynamic and uncertain environment of the 21st century. On the
Korean peninsula, we operate at the distant edge of our military's
global logistics chain. Our position requires tight integration with
our South Korean ally, meticulous planning, and organized efforts to
forward-position adequate capabilities and the materiel essential to
power projection and contingency response. Today, that foundation is
sound and serves as the bedrock from which we deter aggression and are
prepared to defeat, if necessary, any adversary. Moreover, our posture
supports this period of detente and negotiation by permitting our
diplomats to speak from a position of unquestioned strength and
capability.
Sustaining a combat-ready force requires focused investments, and
South Korea is an exemplary ally in that regard. President Moon's
administration is committed to resourcing the Republic of Korea's
defense and has increased annual spending by bringing total outlays to
2.7 percent of GDP. Further, the Moon administration has pledged to
raise ROK defense spending to 2.9 percent of its GDP by 2022. South
Korea's 2019 Defense Budget increased 8.2 percent from the previous
year and it apportions funds to programs necessary to advance the
Conditions-Based OPCON Transition Plan and the Defense Reform 2.0
initiative. The ROK has invested more in its defense over the past 15
years than it had in the previous 50, increasing foreign military
procurements from the United States such as the KF-16 and PATRIOT
battery upgrades, AH-64E Apaches, the F-15K, RQ-4 Global Hawk variants,
and the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. This level of investment funding
traditionally exceeds the commitment of other allies and regional
partners. In 2018 alone, the ROK signed $2.160 billion in Foreign
Military Sales cases (including a purchase of P-8A aircraft) in support
of our shared security commitments as allies.
Since 1991, a key element of sustaining the force has been the
Special Measures Agreement (SMA), whereby the South Korean Government
shares the cost of sustaining the USFK force posture. The SMA assures
essential readiness-related personnel and activities, such as the
contributions of 9,000 Korean National employees serving in crucial
roles of public safety, health care, emergency response, and quality-
of-life delivery operations. The most current SMA expired on December
31, 2018; as of this writing, the United States and the Republic of
Korea have reached an agreement, in principle, on a new SMA. Both sides
are committed to resolving remaining technical issues as quickly as
possible. The United States appreciates the considerable resources our
ROK ally provides, including SMA contributions toward the cost of
maintaining United States Forces in Korea.
Similarly, South Korea's continued investment in military
construction and modernization helps ensure our forces are postured,
prepared, and properly set for the future. The Land Partnership Plan
(LPP) and the associated Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) are two
bilateral agreements that provide the foundation for streamlining
USFK's footprint while returning facilities and valuable land to the
South Korean Government for future development. USFK and UNC took a
major step forward in 2018 by relocating both commands from United
States Army Garrison Yongsan, a legacy cantonment in the heart of
Seoul, to Camp Humphreys, a large, modern base, which serves as the
fulcrum for the enduring United States presence in Korea. In total,
USFK has returned 49 sites to the ROK since 2003 while simultaneously
moving the majority of our forces and families away from the DMZ and
closer to centralized support hubs located near major air and sea
ports.
With the support of this Committee, the Secretary of Defense, and
INDOPACOM, in 2018, USFK improved its posture by forward-locating onto
the peninsula certain capabilities, improving others, and increasing
the capacity of the most crucial warfighting functions. Significant
gains in posture during 2018 include essential munitions, ballistic
missile defense systems, and pre-positioned wartime stocks. Our
efforts, with assistance from the Services, have reduced stocks of
forward-positioned, outdated munitions by over 214,000 tons. We are on
track to complete the required retrograde by December 2019. The
Department continues to apply the $784 million appropriated since 2017
towards resolving our joint emergent operational need statement related
to improving the posture, sustainment, and integration of our missile
defense systems. The recent draw, operational testing, and turn-in of
14 M1A2 tanks from our prepositioned stocks was the first in a series
of exercises validating the concept and improving our preparedness to
rapidly execute similar activities during contingency conditions.
Additionally, rotational forces augment the 28,500 member baseline,
bringing with them high-end systems and leaving with invaluable
experience in the theater operating environment and combined
interoperability.
The aggregate result of seven decades of committed partnership
under our Mutual Defense Treaty is our ironclad Alliance and capable
forward presence, the elements directly responsible for creating and
sustaining an environment conducive to both deterrence and diplomacy.
As we sustain readiness for any potential provocation or conflict, we
support those working toward enduring peace and denuclearization.
exercising the force for joint and combined competency
Last year we commemorated the 40th Anniversary of the establishment
of the CFC, which has played a central role in deterring war on the
Korean peninsula and defending the ROK since November 7, 1978. During
2018, the CFC made significant advances to ensure the long term
relevance of our combined warfighting capability. The Alliance Guiding
Principles, a framework to ensure a unified, ready defense posture
following OPCON transition, was bilaterally developed and endorsed by
our two governments. Progress in operational concept refinement,
military plans, and strategic documents has further enhanced our
combined defense capabilities. Advances across CFC, the heart of the
ROK-United States Alliance, serve as evidence of the ironclad nature of
the ROK-United States Alliance and reinforce my view that our combined
force relationship is stronger than ever.
Planning is regarded as an indispensable element of military
readiness, and in 2018 the Joint Staff and INDOPACOM worked diligently
with USFK to assess and refine plans for potential contingency
operations on the Korean Peninsula. A bottom-up review of force
requirements, unit-level readiness, and global mission impact has been
accomplished. In accordance with the National Defense Strategy, we
stand prepared to rapidly receive and integrate the personnel and
materiel necessary to buttress the forward-deployed force in Korea
during periods of crisis or conflict.
Combat readiness is perishable. This fact is especially true of
forces in Korea due to the high-turnover among our servicemembers,
American and Korean alike, across the spectrum of missions and roles.
The benchmark for readiness is demonstrating the competencies necessary
to plan and execute joint and combined operations under the strain of
crisis or wartime conditions. Tactical training sharpens the baseline
skills essential to success on the modern battlefield for our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines. Exercises provide the venue to coordinate
and synchronize operational-level headquarters like CFC (the
warfighting command on the peninsula) and the service Components across
time and space in a dynamic environment--a critical operational
competency during times of crisis. This is true for militaries the
world over, all of whom strive to exercise under conditions anticipated
in potential conflict. To succeed in war, we must train hard in peace.
To succeed in Korea, we must train the CFC in the essential tasks
necessary to credibly deter aggression and readily deliver victory if
challenged.
However, we must continuously strike a balance between the clear
need to train and exercise military capability and the requirement to
create space for and support strategic diplomacy. To help achieve this
equilibrium, we are innovating and evolving our approach by tuning 4
dials that adjust exercise design and conduct--size, scope, volume, and
timing. Adjustments to these dials allows exercise design to remain in
tune with diplomatic and political requirements without sacrificing the
training of essential tasks. Additionally, such fine tuning allows for
the mitigation of impacts inherent to rapidly switching from our
traditional large-scale exercise program to one of more targeted
events.
USFK and CFC are working closely with our South Korean partners and
INDOPACOM to conduct exercises routinely, both joint and combined, to
test the preparedness and resiliency of our foundation, refine
operational concepts, and sustain proficiency of mission essential
tasks. Recent examples include Combined Staff Training (CST) and the
on-going Korean Marine Exercise Program (KMEP). CST stresses the CFC
and USFK headquarters and networks to respond to crisis by effectively
coordinating and communicating activities from the tactical to the
strategic level. The KMEP series puts combined marines through their
paces in simulated wartime conditions testing a full spectrum of
essential tasks and core competencies. Since October 2018, we have
conducted dozens of small-scale exercises among the components--our
air, ground, naval, and marine forces train habitually with their ROK
counterparts on the fundamentals of warfighting.
Together, these exercises provide the benchmark from which we are
evolving our program and mitigating the near-term effects of recently
suspended traditional, large-scale training events. We continue to
aggressively pursue innovative approaches to joint and combined
training and are committed to demonstrating that creating space for
diplomacy need not impede military readiness.
Taking Care of our Warriors and their Families
Servicemembers, civilians, and families are our most precious
resource, and I am committed to providing the best possible quality of
life for them as they serve their nation while stationed in South
Korea. Among my priorities of effort are sexual assault prevention and
response, command sponsorship, and high quality medical care.
United States Forces Korea is committed to strict compliance with
all Secretary of Defense and Service Chief Requirements and is working
toward the goal of eliminating sexual assault by fostering a culture of
dignity and respect across the Command. Our approach is prevention-
focused with an uncompromising adherence to commander involvement and
victim assistance guided by five critical focus areas: prevention,
victim assistance, investigation, accountability, and assessment.
My personal philosophy is ensuring personnel understand they are
responsible for fostering a climate where sexist behavior, harassment,
and assault are not tolerated. Additionally, victims' reports are to be
treated with the utmost seriousness and bystanders are expected to
intervene--offensive or criminal conduct is neither tolerated nor
condoned.
I continually assess the wellbeing of the 7,600 Department of
Defense dependents living in Korea. The Command Sponsorship Program
enables 24-36 months accompanied tours for servicemembers. These tour
lengths are far superior to 12-month unaccompanied tours and benefit
our warriors, our families, and the commands. Serving in Korea
accompanied by one's family improves quality of life and morale while
simultaneously increasing continuity and heightened levels of theater-
specific competency. I fully support our Command Sponsorship Program
and assess South Korea to be among the safest locations for
servicemembers and their families to serve abroad.
Among the most important quality of life issues in South Korea is
access to high quality medical care for servicemembers and their
families. TRICARE beneficiaries in South Korea have access to the
entire spectrum of healthcare services through Department of Defense
hospitals and clinics plus a TRICARE network of 30 first-class host
nation hospitals. In addition, the construction, validation and
certification of the new, state-of-the-art Brian Allgood Army Community
Hospital at Camp Humphreys, once delayed by as much as 8-months, has
now been placed on track for completion by November 2019. Before year's
end, we will deliver a new facility for our families, one that meets or
exceeds all U.S. medical requirements and standards.
resourcing readiness
I wish to thank the Committee for their continued commitment to the
readiness of UNC/CFC/USFK and for supporting the development and
fielding of capabilities critical to sustaining our edge and mitigating
asymmetric threats. To further harden our posture and improve our
readiness to act, my prioritized areas of concentration for future
investment are: the network, situational awareness, lethality, and
interoperability.
The dynamic nature of conflict, particularly in a combined setting,
applies unique stress on the networks upon which command and control,
communication, computers, and intelligence rely. Our networks must
remain impervious to cyber intrusion or effect; the DPRK demonstrates
increasing cyber capacity that must be matched and thwarted.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets along with
sensors capable of detecting a broad array of threats and activities
provide the situational awareness that informs decision-making during
both armistice conditions and crisis. We require persistent ISR that
overcomes the inherent challenges of geography and allows for reliable
operational indications and warning that prevents strategic
miscalculation. Increasingly lethal capabilities, from the tactical to
operational, are required for unquestioned power projection in a region
with rapidly advancing competitors and adversaries. Our superiority in
the air remains vitally important; our ability to rapidly counter
aggression and defend South Korea relies upon dominant air power.
Lastly, interoperability remains essential if we are to derive the
benefits of joint and combined warfighting.
We are making progress in each of these areas by working in close
coordination with the Department of Defense, INDOPACOM, our South
Korean ally, UN Sending States, the interagency, industry, and academic
partners. I look forward to answering your questions concerning these
initiatives and providing you with all relevant information required to
inform this Committee's work.
conclusion
I remain confident that our four enduring priorities are correct in
the short term: sustain and strengthen the Alliance, maintain the
armistice, transform the Alliance, and sustain the force. The central
themes of my 90-day personal assessment will underpin my continued
review of readiness in an ever-changing strategic environment and will
help us remain focused on these priorities.
The men and women, military and civilian alike, who serve within
the UNC, CFC, and USFK have the tools required for success. They are
highly motivated, capably armed, and well supported by their parent
service, the Department of Defense, and this Committee. The force is
sufficiently postured to deter aggression and defeat any adversary, if
necessary. We continue to train at echelon to maintain the readiness
required to translate a strong military posture into decisive victory
on short notice.
Our Alliance with the Republic of Korea remains ironclad and stands
as a testament to our shared history of service and sacrifice. The
combined strength of that alliance is formidable as our warriors embody
our slogan--Katchi Kapshida (We go together)! As soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines of both nations make the daily sacrifices inherent
to uniformed service, we strive to ensure we provide for them and their
families. A well postured, ready, and nurtured force strikes fear in
the heart of those who would challenge it.
We are in a historic period on the Korean Peninsula. While the
near-term future is unclear, the significance of this moment cannot be
overstated. In the midst of dynamic change, UNC/CFC/USFK stands as a
steadfast, stabilizing presence in the region. This has been the case
for over 65 years and will continue into the decades ahead. I am proud
to lead the men and women who carry on the noble work of generations
past. I am confident that our actions--our readiness--directly
contributes to the defense of the United States and the security of
South Korea, while providing the credible military strength from which
our distinguished diplomats can negotiate and advance lasting peace for
the Korean peninsula and the region.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General. Let me first of all
mention something that we've talked about quite a bit of times.
You know, the American people are not really aware of the
threats that we face. I think we all understand that. The
problem with this is for us to have the proper priorities for
our military, I think it's necessary for the American people to
understand why we're having to do all of this. You still see
things that are happening, that they still believe that we have
the best of everything and nothing to worry about because
that's how it's always been and so forth, but they don't
realize how fast China has modernized and the problems that
we're facing out there.
Admiral Davidson, what do you think can be done? Our
military has come forth--General Dunford, when he said, ``We
have lost our qualitative and quantitative edge over the
adversaries.'' Milley said, ``In terms of artillery, the Army
is outranged and outgunned by our adversaries.''
Same thing was true with Moran in talking about the Hornet
Fleet. You know, I've been on the Senate and the House Armed
Services Committee for many, many years. I don't ever remember
a time when the military has come forth with the shot of
realism like they have recently. I'd like to know, what can you
guys do more to make the American people more aware of the
threats that we face?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator, for your
question. The advances made by China, especially, but the other
threats I articulated in the region, Russia specifically in the
21st century, have really been profound. While our Nation has
been focused on the efforts of land wars in Southeast Asia,
these advances have been basically unchecked with the economic
power that China has brought to bear, and they have greatly
advanced their capability truly in all domains.
You mentioned space. What was essentially a handful of
satellites at the turn of the century has now become hundreds
of satellites--capabilities and communications and surveillance
and reconnaissance and other capabilities in space. If I move
it all the way down through air, they've now got fourth- and
fifth-generation fighters, which were not there at the
beginning of the century, and they have now advanced surface
and submarine assets that they also did not enjoy at the turn
of the century.
The time to invest in these things is now. I'm quite
encouraged by all the concepts that you've seen come forward
from the services, from Multi-Domain Task Force to the
distributed maritime operations, as well as the commitments and
the profiles that the services have begun to make and being
able to operate in these multi-domains where these advances
have taken place.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, I think you're right on that, but
we're also seeing them rubbing our noses in it. We've not seen
this before. Admiral Greenert wrote a recent paper that his
Chinese counterpart, the head of the PLA [Chinese People's
Liberation Army] Navy, was surprised that ``the United States
did not have a more''--and I'm quoting now--``a more forceful
reaction'' when China began its island building in 2013.
They're actually talking about us. Where this is reflected
is with our allies. Several of us on this Committee were in the
South China Seas just a short while ago, and our allies, you
know, they're almost looking at what's happening in the South
China Seas, with the island building and all of that, as the
Chinese preparing for World War III and, you know, which side
are we going to be on?
That's something that does bother me. I think, also, it's
affecting a lot of the attitudes. I know that Xi Jinping said
that he would not--and this is his quote--``abandon the use of
force as a potential means of achieving the unification of
Taiwan.''
Now, what more can we do to try to overcome this attitude
that's out there and is having an adverse effect on our allies?
Any thoughts on that?
Admiral Davidson. In the operational space, one of the
things we've been able to do in just the last 5 months,
Senator, is get our allies and partners to join us in the South
China Sea. Not all of their operations are defined as freedom
of navigation operations as we would define them, but their
willingness to sail independently in there, to work with us on
exercises demonstrates the international commitment to
maintaining the freedom of those seas and airways. I think it's
critically important to message China that it's not just the
United States that is concerned about the freedom of the South
China Seas, but indeed all nations. I expect allies and
partners to continue to help here in the months ahead, both
with some combined operations that we'll be executing, as well
as some individual operations as well.
One of the other factors that we're working on in the
diplomatic space is to help ASEAN [Association of Southeast
Asian Nations] in this discussion about Code of Conduct
negotiations with China. China has essentially delivered a
draft that dictates to those ASEAN nations when and where and
who they would sail with in the South China Sea. Helping them
protect the international freedoms of the seas and airspace
that have been long established in maritime law that the United
States and others have fought for over the centuries is quite
important.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, well that's good.
My time is expired, General Abrams, but I will have a
question for the record having to do with South Korea and
what's going on.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Abrams, there's been discussions about the cost of
our forces on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump suggested a
few times that it's expensive. These negotiations with the
Special Measures Agreement seem to be more controversial than
previous years and, interestingly enough, it's just for a term
of 1 year, where typically it's a 5-year term, so we're going
to be right back in the saddle of talking about supporting
forces and the South Korean support for our forces on the
peninsula.
Can you talk about the significance of maintaining our
force presence there? Is it critical or can we afford to draw
down?
General Abrams. Senator, our presence and our posture is
appropriate in terms of providing an adequate deterrent against
the DPRK. It provides a force structure in numbers and
capability that's capable of responding to hostilities and
provocations and prepared to defend the Republic of Korea if
they are called upon. Our posture there also serves as a
stabilizing factor, stability in Northeast Asia. It provides
reassurance to not only the Republic of Korea, but to Japan and
other partners in the region, and serves as a bulwark against
the expansion of China, as Admiral Davidson just outlined. Our
presence there serves multiple purposes.
Senator Reed. One purpose I suspect also, too, is to give
confidence to our allies, the South Koreans and the Japanese
particularly. Would they be concerned if we drew down our
forces in any way?
General Abrams. Senator, I hesitate to speak on behalf of
the Republic of Korea or Japan, but in my dealings with both of
them I would say yes, they would be concerned if we were to do
that.
Senator Reed. One of the other aspects in this relationship
between the South Koreans and Japanese is there is a long, long
history there. There are at times some difficulties between
that relationship. Can you characterize the relationship? I
think many people assume it's just completely harmonious, but
I've observed comments and issues in which there was some
friction. Is that still the case?
General Abrams. Senator, as you stated, there are long-term
items of friction between those two countries. In my
experience, it's difficult for Westerners to appreciate the
breadth and depth of some of that tension as these are very old
countries, ancient societies, and many of their tensions go
back hundreds and hundreds of years. Occasionally, it flares up
with misunderstandings between the two that are exacerbated by
topics of the current day. Those only serve to re-inflame those
old grievances.
Having said that, militarily we continue to see cooperation
and commitment on both sides because they both understand that
there are much bigger concerns for them to worry about than
some of their long-term friction points. They've got some
mutual goals that they've got to work together on.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Davidson, again, thank you for your service, too.
One of the proposals consistent with the National Defense
Strategy that the Marine Corps is advancing is to occupy
islands forward of their present position and use them not only
to protect them from seizure by anyone, but also to help defend
the fleets and our air forces operating in the region. Is that
a concept that you support?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, all the services have put forth
expeditionary concepts like that. They all have slightly
different names--the EABO [Expeditionary Advanced Base
Operations] concept, the Multi-Domain Task Force--but those are
capabilities that I think serve a deterrent basis in the region
and they're also fight-and-win capabilities that we may have to
utilize in the future.
Senator Reed. Let me just, in general, are you satisfied in
terms of the weapons systems that you have available given what
the Chinese, in particular, are developing so quickly? You
alluded to them in your comments repeatedly--new generations of
fighters, long-range precision missiles that threaten our
carriers that 10, 15 years ago were not even on the--certainly
not deployed. Are you satisfied you're getting kind of the
weapons that can counter those weapons?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, we speak frequently about the
erosion of our advantage in the theater, which is really the
case here. China has seriously eroded that quantitative
advantage--the number of assets that they have--but they're
also eroding that qualitative advantage is what I'm talking to
you about fourth- and fifth-generation. Are we now making
progress, I think, in that budget? Yes. We do have the roots of
some capabilities, many capabilities, that would be applicable
in any warfare scenario as I see the future play out. But the
investments, I think, need to come more rapidly, and we need to
be willing to innovate to get there as well.
There is much to be done in this space. I don't want to
give the impression that last year's budget necessarily is
putting us on the track to regain that advantage. On-time
budgets and the kind of investments that we've been talking
about in the Department for the 2020 and 2021 budget to come,
which I haven't seen the final 2020 budget, I think are
critically important to regaining that advantage.
Senator Reed. Just a final comment. If there is a
particular system that is being developed that you think that
would be very applicable, but it's not being adapted by the
services from your standpoint, both of you as combat
commanders/field commanders, please let us know. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
During the course of this hearing, we are going to have
some subjects come up that would be better addressed in a
closed session. There will be a closed session at 2:30 this
afternoon.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed has touched on an issue that is surprising to
many of us and I believe that needs some more attention. He
asked General Abrams about the worsening relations between two
of our great allies, the Republic of Korea--South Korea, and
Japan. I would submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, two
articles; one from the February 9th Washington Post entitled
``Japan-South Korea ties worst in five decades as United States
leaves alliance untended'' and also a February 10 article from
The Nelson Report entitled ``Japan, ROK crisis gets worse.''
[The information referred to follows:]
japan-south korea ties `worst in five decades' as united states leaves
alliance untended
By Simon Denyer
February 9
TOKYO--Leaders have turned their backs on each other. They have
traded barbs. Military and business ties are fraying, and the media is
up in arms.
Relations between Japan and South Korea, the most important United
States allies in the Asia-Pacific region, are unraveling fast. And
while the leaders of both countries share the blame, the Trump
administration has taken its eye off the ball, experts say. This has
allowed spats to grow that could undermine United States efforts to
sustain a coalition of Asian democracies and contain China.
Japan ruled over South Korea from the beginning of the 20th Century
until the end of World War II, and Seoul and Tokyo's complicated
history has always loomed large in the background.
But the rancor that has soured relations lately is among the worst
in generations.
``The relationship between South Korea and Japan is suffering a
compound fracture unprecedented in the five decades since the two
countries established diplomatic relations,'' said Shin Kak-soo, a
former South Korean ambassador to Japan.He added, ``The Trump
administration did not pay attention to the alliance.''
The rift came after a South Korean Supreme Court decision in
October ordering a Japanese steel producer to compensate Korean workers
forced into labor during Japanese colonial rule, but the root of the
crisis runs much deeper and its effects have reverberated in all
directions since.
In November, South Korea shut down a foundation established to help
care for the Korean women--more commonly known as ``comfort women''--
who were forced into sexual slavery in Japanese military brothels
during World War II. The foundation was funded by Japan as part of a
2015 deal intended to put the issue to rest.
[Japan's Abe stakes out new regional identity]
Then Tokyo went public with accusations that a South Korean warship
had locked its fire-control radar onto a Japanese patrol plane, a move
seen as a precursor to actually firing.
Seoul denied the accusation and countered with the charge that the
Japanese plane had been flying dangerously low. Japan's conservative
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korea's liberal President Moon Jae-
in come from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.
In South Korea, Abe is an unpopular figure, seen as reluctant to
express genuine remorse for Japan's behavior during its colonial rule
over the peninsula.
In Japan, Moon is seen as the latest in a long line of South Korean
leaders who have exploited popular resentment of Japan to shore up
their own flagging popularity and reneged on agreements reached by
previous governments.
Tokyo says the Supreme Court decision violates a 1965 deal
establishing diplomatic relations, under which Japan gave South Korea
much-needed economic aid as compensation for forced labor. But if Japan
takes a legalistic position, then many South Koreans are more concerned
with what they see as justice, said Shin. Moon himself was a human
rights lawyer who once represented claimants in a case against
Mitsubishi over forced labor.
Liberals in South Korea tend to see the 1965 agreement as an
unequal treaty imposed by Japan on a weak country still recovering from
the ravages of war, led by military strongman Park Chung-hee, who
trained in the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria during the final
stages of World War II.
To outsiders, the antipathy between the two countries--both free
market democracies with close relationships to the West--can come as a
surprise.
But the tragedy of the current crisis, according to Yasushi Kudo of
the Japanese think tank Genron NPO, is that this antipathy had been
gradually subsiding, especially among young people, thanks in part to
booming tourism and a mutual affinity for the other country's popular
culture.
A territorial dispute over a group of small islands, administered
by South Korea but claimed by Japan, has also inflamed passions,
notably when then-President Lee Myung-bak visited the islands in 2012.
But the relationship is also complicated by the immense changes
that have swept through South Korea over the past five decades, as the
country has emerged from Japan's shadow to become a thriving democracy
and economic powerhouse in its own right.
South Korea grew up, and Japan never really accepted that,
according to Koichi Nakano, a political science professor at Tokyo's
Sophia University.
``Many Japanese leaders are still caught up with a condescending,
or even perhaps bordering on a racist, attitude toward South Korea as a
smaller and less developed country,'' he said. ``There is this attitude
among conservatives that, at the end of the day, we can bully Korea
into submission.''
South Korea, fiercely nationalistic in its own right, is far from
overawed. In fact, it's preoccupied with other issues--its
relationships with North Korea, the United States and China are today
seen as more important than its relationship with Japan.
Liberals in Seoul tend to place less value than conservatives on
the alliance with the United States, and so less value on the
triangular relationship with Japan, said Junya Nishino, director of
contemporary Korean studies at Keio University in Tokyo.
At home, though, both leaders are playing populist tunes, and the
media in both countries is dancing to it.
Nishino fears the situation is about to get worse. Despite
tensions, the relationship was founded on strong ties between the two
militaries, civil society contacts and extensive business and trade
links.
All three have suffered in the latest dispute.
Former U.S. president Barack Obama played an important role in
mending ties between the two countries earlier in the decade, arranging
a trilateral summit in 2014 and brokering the comfort women agreement
the following year. By contrast, Trump has shown much less interest in
or affinity for America's Asian allies, experts in both countries said.
The crisis is bad news for the United States, experts say, and
undermines United States efforts to gather like-minded nations under
the banner of a free and open Indo-Pacific and counter China's rising
influence.
However, it also undermines Japan's ``brand'' in Asia, Nakano said,
with its ability to play a leading role in the region hobbled by its
failure to resolve disputes over its wartime past, especially with a
fellow democracy.
``Japan can't continue to have the influence it used to have in the
region without getting along with Korea,'' he said. ``As a democracy,
we were supposedly at the forefront of progress in Asia in the postwar
period, but we are becoming more and more reactionary, a declining
power.''
Admiral Davidson, I don't want to spend the whole time on
this, but General Abrams commented on it. This is a serious
problem which potentially affects our ability to gain
cooperation between our allies; is that correct?
Admiral Davidson. I think both nations recognize, Senator,
that the future in the Indo-Pacific is going to require great
democracies like Korea, Japan, the United States and others to
work together here for the very long term.
I can tell you, to the point about whether the alliance is
being tended to, I've spoken to both the chiefs of defense in
Korea and Japan in the last week. I will return a call to the
chief of defense in Korea later this week. I've talked to both
our ambassadors in the last week there, met with one of them--
both of them, actually--personally. Much is going on to help
facilitate our mutual concerns in the region and our alliances.
Senator Wicker. Does State and DOD, do they both understand
the seriousness of this deterioration, and are they both
tending to it?
Admiral Davidson. I would say the answer to that is yes,
sir.
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Very good. That's, I think,
surprising to hear and good to know there are efforts made.
Now, after the USS Fitzgerald and McCain, tragic collisions
resulting in fatalities and the loss of hundreds of millions of
dollars, there were two investigations. Senator McCain and I
introduced the Surface Warfare Enhancement Act asking that many
of the recommendations of these investigations be implemented.
This led to inclusion of most of our legislation in the Fiscal
Year 2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
Are we on track to fully implement the Surface Warfare
Enhancement Act? The reviews that caused so much concern were
that demand for naval power was far outstripping the supply of
ships and submarines. That was what led in part to these
collisions and tragedies. What's the state of that imbalance
today,
Admiral Davidson, and what do you need compared to what you
have now?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. I have been quite
pleased with the progress that Navy has made on the
recommendations that I made in the Comprehensive Review. I'll
be watching the 2020 budget when it comes together. There are a
couple of items in there, investment in schoolhouses, that I
want to make sure are followed through on.
I'm quite confident in Admiral Aquilino's approach to the
OPTEMPO [Operating Tempo] out in Seventh Fleet right now. We've
had the good fortune of being able to relieve some of the
responsiveness based on the easing of some of the tensions on
the peninsula, as well as reshuffling some of the priorities
there in the region. He continues remediation efforts of the
Seventh Fleet in terms of training and maintenance there in
Yokosuka, particularly in the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, and so
I'm quite pleased with how he's managing that force.
Senator Wicker. Just to make sure, the previous NDAA placed
a 355-ship requirement that the Navy had established as a
statutory policy of the United States. Are you still committed
to that 355-ship Navy and do you still view it as the statutory
law of the land?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, in the Indo-Pacific region, I think
we need more capacity in the maritime, to be sure. The Navy is
undergoing another force structure review I think to look at
that number again and affirm that for the Department.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today and for your service to our country.
General Abrams, North Korea transferred 55 boxes of remains
of missing United States servicemen from the Korean War after
the last summit between the President and Kim Jong-un. Can you
tell me if we're still cooperating with the North Koreans on
trying to return more missing servicemen? My understanding is
we think about 5300 of the 7700 soldiers who are missing are
believed to have died someplace in North Korea.
General Abrams. Senator, the short answer is yes, we are. I
am aware of the DPAA's [Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in
Action Accounting Agency] efforts to continue dialogue with
North Korea to move forward in execution of our solemn
responsibility to do everything that we can to bring home our
missing in action.
Senator Shaheen. Do you know if that's on the agenda for
the President's upcoming summit?
General Abrams. Senator, I'm not aware specifically. I am
aware that there is a commitment to continuing that dialogue
that came out of the June summit, but I have not seen the
specific agenda for this upcoming summit yet.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Admiral Davidson, our office was contacted by several
United States employees who had been stationed at our embassy
in China who have medical documentation to indicate that they
are suffering from traumatic brain injury and the same symptoms
that we saw from embassy personnel who were evacuated from
Havana, Cuba.
Are you aware of any Americans in China who have been
affected by those same symptoms, and are you aware of any DOD
personnel who have experienced the symptoms?
Admiral Davidson. No, Senator, I am not.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Abrams, you talked about the DPRK currently
engaging in very extensive military exercises and also about
what we continue to do to train with the Republic of Korea. Do
you believe it would be helpful to resume military exercises
with the Republic of Korea?
General Abrams. Senator, to be clear, there have been
cancellations of some exercises that have been well publicized.
But as I mentioned in my opening statement, at least since I've
been there in November, we are continuing to train, conducting
combined training and exercise, with our ROK counterparts. That
is continuing unabated. But it's adjusted in accordance with
some innovative things that we've done by adjusting size,
scope, volume, and the timing so that we can continue to
preserve space for Mr. Biegun and the Department of State to do
their job.
Senator Shaheen. Again, do you believe it would be helpful,
in terms of our readiness, to resume the previous kinds of
exercises?
General Abrams. Senator, I have been given authority to
continue planning for those type exercises typically
characterized as large-scale exercises. Historically, we've
conducted one in the spring and one in the summer, and I have
continued planning for execution of one in the spring. I worked
very closely with the ROK JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the
ROK chairman himself in that new construct and have forwarded
that up to the Department of Defense and received full support
to continue with our planning.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Admiral Davidson, you talked about Russian influence in the
Indo-Pacific area in your testimony, and you lay out some
pretty extensive activities that the Russians are doing in your
written testimony. Are we seeing the kind of cyber intrusions
and disinformation from Russia in this area of operation that
we've seen in Europe?
Admiral Davidson. They are on the same scale, yes, ma'am. I
would say though that their conventional activities, their air
and maritime activities especially, are a little less than
what's been going on in Europe.
Senator Shaheen. Are we seeing any kind of an effort to
destabilize the democracies, some of which are fragile, in that
region?
Admiral Davidson. Using cyber means?
Senator Shaheen. Or disinformation, using whatever means
they have available. Do we expect any kind of gray zone issues
like we've seen in Ukraine and other parts of Eastern Europe?
Admiral Davidson. Russia is maneuvering in the region, and
I think globally, using information to subvert the
international rules-based order and our objectives in the
region.
Senator Shaheen. Do we have a response to that in the same
way that we have a response to what's going on in Europe?
Admiral Davidson. I think, ma'am, that when we talk about
an information campaign that's global, it is a global response
that it takes, and the United States Indo-Pacific Command is a
part of that global response, yes.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
and your continued service.
General Abrams, let's dig down a little bit deeper into
this training question. At what level would your troopers
recognize a difference from what was happening, say, a year
ago, to what's happening now? Would a new rifleman in his first
tour on the Korean Peninsula notice a difference in his
training level or the training exercises he conducts?
General Abrams. No.
Senator Cotton. A squad leader?
General Abrams. No.
Senator Cotton. Platoon leader?
General Abrams. No.
Senator Cotton. Company commander?
General Abrams. No.
Senator Cotton. Battalion commander?
General Abrams. Senator, he has not noticed a difference
yet, but he might in the upcoming months.
Senator Cotton. Then, presumably, the command levels above
battalion might notice a difference in the kind of exercises
they conduct?
General Abrams. Yes, within those four dials. They would--
at that echelon, they would notice it.
Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say that the commanders at
that level, the full bird colonel level up to the General
Abrams level, are pretty well versed in the demands of their
job from their previous levels of command?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
Senator Cotton. That's good to know.
Admiral Davidson, the INDOPACOM is characterized by the
longest distances in any of our combatant commands. I presume
that places a premium on long-range precision strike for you
and your forces?
Admiral Davidson. It does, absolutely. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Currently, those are predominantly maritime
and air based systems?
Admiral Davidson. That's correct.
Senator Cotton. There's been a lot of news coverage
recently about the President's decision--long overdue, in my
opinion--to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty [INF Treaty], and it's focused, understandably, on what
it means for Europe and Russia since that was a treaty between
the United States and Russia back when it was the Soviet Union.
But what does it mean for you and your theater to have the
prospect of intermediate-range missiles available for ground
basing.
Admiral Davidson. China, since they are not party to the
INF Treaty, has been investing in the kind of weapons that
create a serious challenge to us. Over 95 percent of their
ballistic missiles would not be permitted under the INF Treaty.
For us to have a land-based component with that kind of
capability restores maneuver to the force, meaning it'll make
the air, the maritime, and the land component much more viable
in any warfare scenario and present a much greater challenge
for our adversaries to threaten.
Senator Cotton. All those land-based systems are presumably
cheaper, easier to operate since they just sit there on land,
they don't have to move around on a ship or an aircraft all the
time?
Admiral Davidson. Well, one of the things that will be
required, Senator, is mobility out of those assets. I think
land-based assets will be that way. In this day and age, if it
is fixed on the planet, it is dead. You don't even need space
assets to support that. The globe has been mapped and a
ballistic missile can find its way there based on its own
internal targeting. We would have to have some mobility in
those land-based assets.
Senator Cotton. Your counterparts sitting in the People's
Liberation Army, do you think it makes them happy that you may
soon have land-based missiles that can reach intermediate
ranges?
Admiral Davidson. No, I think it makes them unhappy.
Senator Cotton. General Abrams, what about your
counterparts in North Korea; do you think they're happy or
unhappy that they may soon face land-based intermediate-range
missiles?
General Abrams. I can't characterize whether they're happy
or not, but I'm certain that it makes them very nervous and it
is certainly changing their calculus.
Senator Cotton. Complicates their planning.
General Abrams. Absolutely.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Gentlemen--well, I'll address this to
Admiral Davidson. You can reserve specific details for our
closed session, but one point of criticism we've heard is that
we may not have places to base these systems. As you point out,
they're mobile, they're not often much bigger than a tractor-
trailer. Do you think we'll be able to identify places in the
INDOPACOM where we can base land-based intermediate-range
missiles?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, I think they'll be viable
assets for us, but it's probably a conversation better to have
in closed session.
Senator Cotton. We'll talk about that in greater detail
this afternoon. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the
witnesses.
I want to ask a question about North Korea and then about
China. On North Korea, I'm struck by the fact that as a member
of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, we have
still not had a briefing about any details about commitments
that were made in the Singapore summit, which was nearly a year
ago, in either of the Committees.
I note, General Abrams, your testimony, and I just want to
read it, ``I am clear-eyed about the fact that little to no
verifiable change has occurred in North Korea's conventional
and asymmetric capabilities that continue to hold the United
States, South Korea, and our regional allies at risk.''
What I'm looking for is what real evidence is there of any
changed trajectory on behalf of North Korea? I applaud the
President, actually, for having the dialogue with North Korea
leadership. Dialogue guarantees nothing, but the absence of
dialogue often guarantees a bad outcome. I appreciate dialogue.
But what I'm looking for is what is the evidence that we would
want to see to determine that North Korea is serious about
denuclearization?
In the Foreign Relations Committee, the testimony we've
received pretty consistently is the evidence that shows they're
serious is if they agree to provide some kind of inventory of
their nuclear assets. Until there is transparency and
disclosure, we have no reason to believe they're serious. If
there is transparency and disclosure, they might be serious.
That would be sort of the first step to show they're serious;
more work to be done, obviously.
To this point, February 12, 2019, are you aware of any
commitment that North Korea has made to provide an inventory of
nuclear infrastructure or assets that they have?
General Abrams. Senator, I am not aware of that.
Senator Kaine. Admiral Davidson, are you aware of any?
Admiral Davidson. No, I'm not.
Senator Kaine. That's what we really need to see coming out
of a next summit in Vietnam, or hopefully soon. Until we see
it, I think this issue about no verifiable progress, we have to
be skeptical. North Korea has made promises in the past,
they've been willing to talk in the past, but the question of
what shows progress, we've got to see some willingness to
disclose. Let me move to China.
Admiral Davidson, you talked a little bit about, in your
testimony and in response to some of the questions, that some
nations are starting to realize that China may seem friendly up
front, they may have assets and resources to offer up front,
but the terms kind of overly debt-burdening. Nations like Sri
Lanka and others have started to appear very onerous. Malaysia
has canceled projects and basically has criticized China's way
of dealing with them as sort of a new form of colonialism.
We hear this all over the world, not just in Asia--we hear
it in South America, we hear it in Africa--that the strings
attached to Chinese assistance, up front they may seem fine,
but they start to really chafe, and nations are starting to be
wary. But you can't fight something with nothing. If China is
there promising resources, a lot of the military posture of the
United States does also involve what soft power we bring to the
table to try to encourage nations to not accept the sugar-high
promise up front only to regret it later.
What would your advice to us be, not just as Armed Services
Members, but we're on all kinds of other committees as well,
what would your advice to us be in terms of the kinds of
additional focus the United States should be offering in the
INDOPACOM area to try to wean nations away from over-reliance
on this dangerous Chinese strategy of kind of getting claws in
other nations?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, I think when we look back in
history, I think it will look very kindly on the passage of the
BUILD [Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development] Act here last fall. The transition from OPIC
[Overseas Private Investment Corporation] to the Development
Finance Corporation, the consolidation of some independent
foreign financing mechanisms in the country, the doubling of
the investment, the freeing of private investment, these are
critically important efforts. When we talk about whole-of-
government, that's the kind of thing that we're talking about.
The other key factor is----
Senator Kaine. Just, BUILD Act, if anybody wonders if
Congress can do things bipartisan, very bipartisan, really was
to try to amass the governmental resources but also enable them
to better attract private resources so if we go into nations in
your or any part of the world, we have more to offer to counter
the Chinese strategy.
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. We're also working quite
closely with allies and partners in the region--Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, especially--particularly in some of the areas
that are in key competition with China. Leveraging their
investments and their interests, I think, on this will be
critically important for the free and open Indo-Pacific as
well.
Then I'd say lastly, right now, the Indo-Pacific Command
gets just a small portion of the foreign military financing;
really, less than 5 percent of that overall. We need to take a
look at where we can better port that money in the region to
help compete in this whole-of-government environs that we're
talking about.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you both for your service to our country.
Admiral Davidson, you indicated in your opening statement
that there was not just China as a threat or the Republic of
North Korea, but you also indicated that Russia was playing a
role. Could you expand on that just a little bit and explain to
us where you see them and what their role is today and how they
make an impact?
Admiral Davidson. It's not unlike what's happening in the
Atlantic in Europe. They're certainly engaging in the region
diplomatically and in the information space to act as a
spoiler, really to undermine the rules-based international
order. They're doing almost nothing to help sanctions with
North Korea. I can't say that they're specifically opposed to
them in this forum, I mean actively opposing them, but they are
doing little to help there.
One of the key things that occurred last fall is they ran a
combined portion of their very major exercise, Vostok, in 2018.
They invited the Chinese to attend that as well, which I think
is also problematic in signaling to the region.
Senator Rounds. If you were to look at their activity
within the cyber realm, within the domain, are they active with
regard to cyber activity, actively involved in cyber activity
in the Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Davidson. You know, that capability that Russia has
is a global threat, sir.
Senator Rounds. With regard to ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], you have some resources. I
would assume, as all commanders would suggest, you could use a
lot more. Do you see any activity or improvements, and can you
expand a little bit on the discussion of ISR threats to our
well-being and to the safety and security of our forces in your
region by all three--Korea, China, and Russia?
Admiral Davidson. ISR is a critical need in the region,
sir. Less than half of my requirements are served by the ISR
that's available the region. Some of that will be investment
over time. Some of it is the balance globally between the
combatant commanders, what's required to facilitate our overall
interests in those regions. I'm thankful for some of the tools
that Congress has given. There is a contracting tool that was
activated last year and I'm in conversation with the Department
of Defense to see if I can gain some of those assets, and I'm
grateful for that.
Senator Rounds. General Abrams, same question with regard
to ISR. How do you see your ISR capabilities as compared with
that of the anticipated adversary in this particular case?
General Abrams. Senator, our ISR capability--well first
off, it outpaces the DPRK's. But that should not change our own
commitment in terms of calculus because our ISR is what gives
us not just intelligence, but really, early warning. It
provides us clarity so that we can begin to see early and with
some clarity and conciseness so we can prevent miscalculation
on either our part or their part. That's really the importance
behind the ISR requirements that we have on the peninsula.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Admiral Davidson, with regard to our allies in the region,
and we have a number of them there, could you sum up for us, if
they were expressing concerns to you about our commitment to
the region, could you share with us what you believe their
thoughts are with regard to our commitment to the Indo-Pacific
region?
Admiral Davidson. I think certainly in conversations with
my counterparts, sir, there's been a general convergence around
the idea that a free and open Indo-Pacific is going to take all
of our efforts working together. I think the United States'
commitment in a variety of operations, whether it's our freedom
of navigation operations in the South China Sea, our total
totality of the exercise program in the United States, the
assistance that we provide to partners in addition to allies,
and then the commitment that our allies understand in the basis
of our treaty alliances and our support to those treaties, I
think, is unquestioned.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your service.
General Abrams, the United States-Republic of Korea
military exercises, they've been scaled back or canceled as
part of a wider diplomatic effort to ease tensions with North
Korea and push them towards denuclearization. What is your
confidence level that the talks with North Koreans over
denuclearization will make any improvements?
General Abrams. Senator, a couple of data points.
First off, today is day 440 since the last strategic
provocation from the DPRK, the last time since we've had a
missile flight test or a nuclear weapons test. As I mentioned
in my opening statement, the reduction in the tension on the
peninsula, it's palpable. If you have not been on the peninsula
in a while, along the DMZ there has been significant reduction
that has enabled nation confidence-building measures, it has
increased prevention--I should say it's decreased the chance of
mistakes, miscalculation, and it's continued to preserve space
for the main effort, the Department of State to continue along
this road of negotiations and discussion with the DPRK.
I think my personal opinion is the announcement of a second
summit between President Trump and the supreme leader Kim is a
positive sign of continued dialogue because it certainly beats
the alternative of what we were living with in 2017.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Davidson, you stated in your confirmation hearing
that China is already capable of controlling the South China
Sea in any scenario short of war with the United States. So my
question would be what's stopping them right now from
exercising this capability whenever they feel like it, and what
are we as the United States or our allies in the region doing
to continually discourage them from exercising this power?
Admiral Davidson. One of the things that I think has set
them back was the international community coming together in
the South China Sea here in about the beginning of September
time frame. We've had allies and partners in the region, the
UK, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, all in one
form or another step up their operations in the South China
Sea, and I think that shows the international community's
willingness to push back.
Senator Manchin. Sir, do we currently have the logistical
capability to surge necessary combat power to the Indo-Pacific
region if needed to combat Chinese aggression?
Admiral Davidson. Any discussion of the logistics and
sustainment that's required depends on the total scale and
scope of what might be happening. That's true both in our
ability to defend it from sabotage, special operations attacks,
you know, conventional maritime and air attacks, as well as
cyber attacks that might disrupt our logistics networks and
prevent all those assets from arriving.
One of the other key needs for the region, sir, is--and
you're hearing this from other combat commanders as well as the
services--is the need to recapitalize our sealift fleet. It is
decades old now and needs to be replaced nearly desperately.
Senator Manchin. Also, according to the World Economic
Forum, by 2030, your AOR [Area of Responsibility] will be home
to many of the world's mega-cities. This will continue to
present vast complicated governance issues, and my fear is that
these governments will look to an authoritarian China as a
model over the United States.
The question would be, from the military perspective, what
are some meaningful steps that can be taken to help leaders in
India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines so that they don't
start looking at authoritarianism as the way to go?
Admiral Davidson. Well, I think one of the things that we
can do is to continue our whole-of-government approach on a
free and open Indo-Pacific. We have a burgeoning relationship
with India. We've made significant defense progress on that
relationship just in the last year with the cosigning of the
COMCASA [Communications, Compatability and Security Agreement].
We are working to operationalize that--it's essentially an IT
[Information Technology]-sharing agreement--in a way that shows
India the power of being able to link with us in a tactical
sense and an operational sense as well.
Committing to that rules-based international order and
working to that free and open Indo-Pacific ends will attract
these nations along with us. I can't imagine any country would
be willing to have an international order led by a nation that
has a closed and authoritarian internal order. It's just not to
the benefit of any of us.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here today.
We've seen a lot of discussion about China, North Korea, a
revisionist China, and a nuclear North Korea. We also have
extremist groups that exist within your regions, as well, with
ties to ISIS and other types of terrorist groups.
Admiral Davidson, I'd like to start with you. I understand
that there are a couple of countries or a few countries out
there, like Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, that operate
under Compacts of Free Association. We have financial
assistance that's provided through that, and we've talked about
a number of different ways that we're cooperating with various
countries, allies in the region.
These Compacts of Free Association, some of them will be
expiring in four to five years. Can you maybe talk us through
why those are so important? What do we realize out of those
types of compacts and should they be funded or should we allow
them to expire?
Admiral Davidson. In short, Senator, those compacts are the
connective tissue between the United States and the physical
air and maritime and terrestrial space to 60 percent of the
world's economy. The compacts obligate us to defend those
nations as we would defend ourselves. It also gives them some
financial assurances and the ability to participate and work in
our countries without immigrant classifications.
I can tell you that these nations contribute way out of
proportion to their population in our defense. I meet
servicemembers from Palau and the Marshall Islands, all over
the Indo-Pacific, and they have served quite bravely and
honorably, in the last 15 years in Southwest Asia.
Those compact agreements are going to expire in--at least
the financial mechanism is going to expire in 2023, and 2024
for Palau. I think the need for us to sustain those obligations
is important because of the freedoms that it gives us. It
allows us to keep any third-party nation from taking military,
from occupying it, from them making a military agreement with
them. It gives us the strategic flexibility to block that.
The financial mechanisms are going to expire in the 2023/
2024 time frame. But the fact of the matter is these nations
are at risk from the very pernicious approach that China has
taken with their economic vehicles in the region. To prevent
that from happening, we should look at the long-term need on
those COFA states, what the financial mechanisms are that
retain this strategic alliance for us and the benefits that it
accrues to the United States military and, truly, the defense
to the United States. Without those three countries and our
strategic alliance, the logistics and sustainment of our
operations in the Western Pacific would be severed.
Senator Ernst. So bottom line, those agreements are very
important, correct?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely, ma'am.
Senator Ernst. Outstanding. That's a great explanation. I
appreciate that very much.
General Abrams, in looking at the threat that's been talked
about with North Korea, I also want to talk about North Korea's
special forces, their special operations forces. They presented
a tactical operational threat to South Korea and the role of
our own special operators in countering that threat. Could you
maybe just briefly describe the threat that is being posed by
North Korean special operators?
General Abrams. Senator, thank you. In this unclassified
setting, here's what I can say. Since Kim Jong-un assumed
responsibility for leading his regime, this has been one of his
specific investments in terms of increasing the size and
capability of his special operations forces, and secondly, they
spend a considerable amount of time doing training. I'm happy
to give you more detail in the classified session.
Senator Ernst. We can talk about that later, and I
appreciate that very much. Are we integrating our own special
operators to specifically train to push back on the North
Korean special operators?
General Abrams. Senator, we are. We have a very small
Special Operations Command Korea, but extraordinarily capable.
They punch way above their weight class. We're lucky; we're
fortunate enough to have a rotational U.S. Army Special Forces
ODB [Operational Detachment-Bravo]. So for instance, today on
the peninsula, we have five ODAs' [Operational Detachment
Alpha] persistent presence embedded with ROK-SOF [Republic of
Korea Special Operations Forces] training and partnering every
single day.
Senator Ernst. That's outstanding. My time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We hear a lot of testimony in this Committee about the
threats posed by China, Russia, rogue states, transnational
terrorist groups. A strong military is critical to addressing
those challenges, but there's some threats that can't be solved
by traditional military power at all. One of those is climate
change.
The unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment by the
director of national intelligence said, and I'm going to quote
here, ``Global environmental and ecological degradation, as
well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for
resources, economic distress, and social discontent through
2019 and beyond.'' That assessment also said, ``Damage to
communication, energy, and transportation infrastructure could
affect low-lying military bases, inflict economic costs, and
cause human displacement and loss of life.''
Admiral Davidson, do you agree with the intelligence
community's assessment of the climate change threat?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. How does climate change impact operations
in your area of responsibility and what are you doing to
prepare for climate change?
Admiral Davidson. Well, the immediate manifestation, ma'am,
is the number of ecological disaster events that are happening.
I've just wrapped up after some 3\1/2\-months of assistance in
Tinian and Saipan, a contribution of title 10 forces in
significant numbers, to help clear debris, to help fix roofs,
to help restore the infrastructure there writ large.
I've also been called to respond and assist in Indonesia in
the wake of the earthquake and the tsunami that happened last
year. A little separate from climate change. But our assistance
in terms of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, our
ability to command and control, to marshal troops, to deliver
logistics is important training for the region and something
that they all need. One of the things that my headquarters does
is we run a center for excellence in disaster management. That
training is available not just to the title 10 folks but also
our interagency here in the United States, and we export those
courses, as well, to countries throughout the Indo-Pacific and,
really, globally, to help assist them in these matters.
Senator Warren. Thank you. You know, adapting to climate
change impacts our military readiness. I'm glad that our
military commanders take the threat of climate change
seriously. I think we, your civilian leaders, owe it to you to
enact policies here in Congress that recognize that climate
change is happening and that we need to do more to stop it. So
thank you. I appreciate it, Admiral.
I want to, in my remaining time, ask about one other area.
In this Committee, we also talk a lot about strategic
competition between the United States, China, and Russia. I
want to focus on China for just a minute.
China is challenging the United States and our interests in
a variety of domains. Our intelligence community's unclassified
Worldwide Threat Assessment said, and I'm going to quote again,
``China's leaders will try to extend the country's global,
economic, political, and military reach while using China's
military capabilities and overseas infrastructure and energy
investments to diminish United States influence.''
Admiral Davidson, do you agree with the intelligence
community's assessment on this?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am, I do.
Senator Warren. Well, in a recent hearing, a former deputy
of national security advisor and State Department official
responsible for China policy, Ely Ratner, told this Committee
that regardless of whether we're talking about Chinese economic
coercion, human rights, or the South China Sea, the United
States needs a comprehensive strategy that enhances all aspects
of our competitiveness. We can't pick just one strategy--
military or economics or technology or diplomacy--and hope that
that's going to be the silver bullet.
Admiral Davidson, do you agree with that?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, I do. It's going to take a whole-of-
government approach.
Senator Warren. Can you just say a word more about that
quickly--we're about to run out of time--about why it's
important to use all of our tools of national power and not
just military power?
Admiral Davidson. I speak quite frequently in the region
about this, madam, and one of the things that competes so
strongly for the United States in the region is our values.
Whether they're allies, partners, or nations that merely aspire
to have the values that we have, they compete in a more
pronounced manner than any handful of dollars ever could. But
it has to be proactive, and we have to move out in the
diplomatic and the information space, as well as the economic
space, quite briskly because China is spreading dollars around
very perniciously through corruption, through the mechanisms
that you talked about earlier, and we've got to be willing to
work in these other realms.
Senator Warren. Yes, and to project our power abroad, we
have to be strong here at home. Military power is important,
but we need strong, sustained investments in education, in
research, and other domestic priorities if we are going to
maintain a competitive advantage.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Scott.
Senator Scott. Could each of you give us your thoughts on
what the Congress could do to help you better fulfill your
missions? What do you need from us?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, the support we've had the last 2
years have been incredible. Having those budgets administered
on the 1st of October so they can be executed is critically
important to the efficiency of the Department of Defense and
the execution of all the things that we do, from contracting to
steaming on a day-to-day basis, to use my Navy parlance.
The other thing we can do is lift the BCA caps. The threats
that are out there challenge the sovereignty of the United
States in a way that has not existed since the Cold War. The
investments that are going to be required to do that, I think,
are going to be significant.
General Abrams. Senator, I'd like the opportunity to foot-
stomp. In my view, the single most important thing is a timely
appropriation. In my previous assignment as the Army's force
provider for 3 years, I can't overstate the impact of a
continuing resolution at every level. Most importantly, those
that should have to worry about it least, we put it on their
backs, and that's on soldiers and families, because we did not
have a timely, on-time appropriation. That would be point
number one.
Point number two, I'd say for those programs that we have
that have reached furthest along in their development and we
have committed to them, that we have worked on for multiple
years and are testing shows that it is capable and it's meeting
those key requirements, continued support of those so that we
can see them through. One in particular for me is in the
missile-defense business, and this is one we are keen to. It's
a key capability. We're grateful for the support of this
Committee and the Congress. We just need to see it through.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Admiral Davidson, China has been a big supporter and a big,
I guess lender, to Venezuela. Why is Venezuela of any strategic
interest to China, and how is that helping them?
Admiral Davidson. China is challenging and threatening the
rules-based international order. It's not a regional thing for
China; it's a global approach. Anywhere that they can make
inroads on that international order, they will take it. They've
been moving quite rapidly. I think as Admiral Faller indicated
last week, in Southern Command as well.
Senator Scott. Do you anticipate that they would use any
military resources in Venezuela?
Admiral Davidson. In the very near term, I don't think
China would, no.
Senator Scott. How reliable a partner do most of the
democracies in Asia perceive America right now?
Admiral Davidson. I think in our alliances, I think they're
quite confident in those five treaty allies that we have there
in the region. This is another area, though, that's under
threat from China. China maneuvers in the information space in
a way that undermines everything we do; factually,
informationally, everywhere.
Sir, when we all used to read newspapers every Sunday, you
used to get up and you used to have the Parade magazine as a
Sunday insert. Throughout the region, there is a China daily
insert which is Chinese propaganda appearing in newspapers,
over more than half the population of the globe. It's quite
pernicious.
Senator Scott. Are we doing anything to counteract that?
Admiral Davidson. I would say in the information space we
do more. We've talked about the BUILD Act, what we are doing in
the military space. One of the key factors here is the fact
that we're working with allies and partners in key areas of the
region.
You've seen Australia step up, and Papua-New Guinea
recently, Fiji. New Zealand has made it clear that their very
near-abroad is going to take some investment. We are working on
an Indo-Pacific strategy with Japan and looking for
opportunities of where our economic investments can cooperate
and collaborate. In just my space alone, just last week we had
a trilateral at the planning level between Japan, the
Philippines, and the United States. These are all constructs
that will help combat China's influence. Senator Scott. Thank
you, and thanks for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, both for being here today and for your service.
Admiral Davidson, I'd like to ask you a little bit about
the freedom of navigation operations that we have in the South
China Sea. I know that there were some that occurred back in
January and even, if I'm not mistaken, this past Sunday there
was a couple of our fleet near the Spratly Islands. In
response, the Chinese foreign minister has accused the United
States of trespassing, infringing on China's sovereignty, and
damaging regional peace, security, and order, even though it is
my understanding these operations are going on in international
waters.
With that, I think it's important that we continue these.
But what's not clear to me is how we're resolving the conflict
between China's stance on these, on our operations, and the
international community. Are you aware of any conversations or
discussions that are taking place on this specific issue, and,
you know, can you talk about contingency plans? Obviously a lot
of saber rattling can lead to some bad consequences. Are there
contingency plans if the impasse continues this way?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, to your last point about contingency
plans, I'd rather hold that for the closed hearing, if I could.
Senator Jones. Certainly.
Admiral Davidson. To be clear, not all our freedom of
navigation operations happen in international waters. Sometimes
they happen in disputed waters, which was the case this past
weekend--I won't comment on every one--but was the case this
past weekend. Other nations lay claim to those waters. Then the
legal construct of what those features are dictate as to
whether we can operate and how close we can operate them and in
what mode, whether it's solely innocent passage, which is the
way any ship would move through the region, or whether normal
operations that military assets could use would be effective.
I'd also like to hold off on a discussion about the
rhetoric that China responds with in the wake of these
operations. But I will say this. The vast, vast majority of
interactions in the South China Sea, that China responds
professionally and safely.
These operations are critically important, not for the
United States, and they're not about two destroyers passing
safely in this region. This is about the free flow of
communications. That's oil. That's trade. That's economic
means. It means the cyber connectivities on the cables that
travel under the South China Sea, which are deep and profound,
coming out of Singapore. It includes the free passage of
citizens between all the great nations of the world.
If you're taking a flight from Singapore to San Francisco,
from Sydney to Seoul, from Manila to Tokyo, you are flying over
the South China Sea. Each time that happens, there is somebody
with a surface-to-air missile and a Chinese soldier evaluating
whether that traffic can go on a day-to-day basis. It's quite
hazardous to the global security, and I think it's quite
pernicious that China would take such action.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Admiral.
General Abrams, let me ask you about, there's been a lot of
discussion over the years and more recently about the transfer
of the Combined Forces Command to the ROK. That's been
discussed a lot. There are conditions, I think, that are out
there. Can you talk a little bit about the transfer of command,
what it might mean to the United States presence on the
peninsula, and specifically, what it would mean to the forces,
the manning levels that we have on the peninsula?
General Abrams. Senator, we refer to it as conditions-based
OPCON [Operational Control] transition. It was most recently
ratified again in 2015 with the specific conditions that you
outlined--there's three key areas. The Republic of Korea is
making good progress towards meeting those conditions.
This last set of consultative meetings that we had in
October, there was a reaffirmation from then-Secretary Mattis
and our brand new minister of defense for the Republic of Korea
to look for opportunities to accelerate the conditions-based
OPCON transition. I'm working very closely with the ROK
chairman, General Park Han-ki, to do just that, look for
opportunities, understanding that the conditions will have to
be met. We're working on ways to ensure that we have a shared
vision as to the way ahead.
To your specific question about what is the potential
impact to troop presence, that is not part of the equation for
conditions-based OPCON transition. This is merely about putting
a ROK commander, a Republic of Korea commander, in command of
Combined Forces Command, that position that I currently serve
in in one of my three positions on the peninsula.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
Back to you, Admiral Davidson. You mentioned in your
testimony some sanctions against North Korea, and there's some
ongoing ship-to-ship transfers that take place primarily in the
East China Sea. Can you tell me what's the biggest challenge
that you have in investigating these ship-to-ship transfers,
what have we done to maybe stop these, and particularly, is
China involved? What role might China be playing in these
transfers?
Admiral Davidson. I should say to your last point, Senator,
that China is neither helping nor hurting the effort at least
in the maritime space.
We have an ongoing multinational ISR and ship effort to
disrupt refined oil that's going in by sea into North Korea.
This requires a significant amount of network work to cut it
off at the supply. The fact of the matter is that you're not
going to deter the DPRK from pursuing fuel. They have to have
it. They've been adapting their tactics as we've been adapting
ours--adding ships, doing transfers in their own territorial
waters or near their own shores and, occasionally, there have
been some transfers in Chinese territorial waters.
We are going to have to go after these things at the
source. I've got partnership across the DOD, with cyber
command, especially, to make sure that we understand what's
happening so that we can disrupt these things at the source,
refer providers, whether it's shippers, whether it's oil
brokers, whether it's the oil companies themselves, notify the
United Nations of those contributions, and then have them
pursued both by State demarche and Treasury action to prevent
their future transfers.
Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you for your
exemplary service and for the service under your command.
Admiral, it's a particular privilege to welcome you here as a
native Missourian. We're very proud of you and very proud of
your service. Thank you for what you do.
You have a tough job, Admiral, as the commander of what the
National Defense Strategy tells us is perhaps the decisive
theater in our current set of priorities that we have,
strategic priorities as a nation. I want to ask about some of
the challenges that we're facing. Help us think, if you could,
about the forward defense posture that the NDS tells us is
absolutely critical for this AOR, and, if you could, tell us
what you need from this Committee in order to ensure that we
have the forward defense posture that is necessary in order to
prevent a fait accompli in the South China Sea or in Taiwan.
I just want to pick up on--Senator Manchin mentioned a
little earlier about surging into the region, but of course we
know from the NDS that our ability to surge into the region
after aggression by China is difficult given China's A2/AD
[Anti Access/Area Denial] capacities and capabilities. Could
you tell us what is our progress in adopting that offense
posture that we need in order to prevent a fait accompli and
what you need from us to ensure that we get there?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator.
Some of what we need to talk about I'd like to do in the
closed hearing this afternoon. But in an unclassified sense,
the NDS really asked me to lift my eyes and take a longer view
of the region and how it's evolving. So much of our basing and
rotation has been focused on what's been transpiring in
Northeast Asia, not just in the last couple of years, but
really over the last several decades.
This is going to require us to revisit some of the places
in which we operate and rotate forces, absolutely. It's going
to require us to think about some places, if not bases in
areas. We are in conversations with partners and allies about
what some of the opportunities might be there. But it also
speaks to concepts, the kind of capabilities that we can bring
forth, and what you're seeing, new concepts from the services,
Multi-Domain Task Force operations, distributed maritime
operations, and the logistics that are going to be required to
supply that. There is going to be requirements for investments
across all domains, from the bottom of the sea to space. We
have to accept the fact that the environment is changing so
drastically in the South China Sea that it's going to require
new approaches in many cases and not just iterative ones.
Senator Hawley. Just to be clear, the level of investment
that we have seen in these force capabilities and technologies
over the past 5 years has not been adequate to the challenges
that we face; is that fair to say?
Admiral Davidson. I think that's correct.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you in the time I have
remaining, and I want to come back to the subject, the subject
we were just talking about, in a closed session, but let me ask
about the Philippines, if I could. Given, again, our unique
strategic challenges in your AOR and the significance of the
Philippines to us in order to meet those strategic challenges,
let me ask you just about your sense of our relationship there.
I know that last fall, I think it was, we announced a new
agreement to hold an increased number of exercises this year in
2019 instead of 2018, but President Duterte has also announced
plans for joint oil and gas exploration with China and has made
other entrees to China. Can you give us an assessment of the
state of the bilateral relationship and what direction you
think it's heading for this critical ally in this region?
Admiral Davidson. Sir, I think the relationship is trending
in a positive direction. I can tell you in the military space,
since 2017 when we were able to manifest some of our indirect
assistance to their fight in Marawi, it has restored the
military relationship in a way we haven't seen in a couple of
decades. It has led, in fact, to things like the EDCA [Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement] as well as the advancement in
the exercises here in 2018 and 2019.
There is no doubt that at the political level, some of the
relationship has been politically fractious. But I take as a
positive sign the vagueness of the agreements that President
Duterte signed with President Xi last fall. I think we should
take a little bit of comfort in that, that we can continue to
advance this relationship moving forward. Senator Hawley. Let
me just ask you one other question about that in my time
remaining. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is a
flashpoint, as it has been for some time, but political
leadership in the Philippines has been talking about it a lot
more it seems recently, including saying that they may need to
review it and consider leaving it if the United States does not
make various security commitments related to the South China
Sea.
Can I just ask you what a review by the Philippines and
potential departure of the MDT might mean for us and our
relationship with them and our strategic posture in your AOR?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. That's been reported
pretty widely. I think what's been absent from that discussion
is some of the context in which the Philippine defense minister
responded to some questions. But to me, the Mutual Defense
Treaty is quite clear. It says that an armed attack on either
of us, on the metropolitan territory or on the island
territories under Philippine jurisdiction in the Pacific, where
it's armed forces, our public vessels, or our aircraft,
activates Article 5 of that treaty.
I think the Philippines should be quite confident in our
support and our alliance. I'll tell you, I'm quite confident in
Philippine support, which--and frankly, in our defense, that
support begins in the Philippines.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and also to the men and
women under your command, and thank you for your clear-eyed
testimony today, if I may use the word that you did, General
Abrams, in describing what I view to be a stark and stunning
lack of any action, any progress, any steps to slow or suspend
the North Korean nuclear program. Would you agree with me that
they are proceeding full pace with their nuclear program?
General Abrams. Sir, I'd say two things. First, as I said
earlier, it's been 440 days since the last strategic
provocation from the DPRK, so since a missile test or a nuclear
weapons explosion or test. The reduction in tensions and
nascent confidence-building measures along the demilitarized
zone and across that part of the Korean Peninsula, those
reductions are palpable, they're real, and they are having a
significant positive effect to begin to prevent additional low-
level--additional confidence-building measures.
Senator Blumenthal. But do you----
General Abrams. Having said all that, we have not observed
activity that's consistent with a full-court press on
denuclearization.
Senator Blumenthal. Or any slowing of the nuclear program.
You said no verifiable progress, I believe.
General Abrams. I'd say the activity we see is inconsistent
with that. Senator, we can talk about that in detail during the
closed session.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, let me ask you this. Because
Admiral Davidson, you state, ``North Korea is continuing
efforts to mitigate the effects of international sanctions and
the United States-led pressure campaign.''
I assume you would agree that sanctions are important in
bringing pressure to bear on North Korea?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. Has there been a reduction in the
effect of those sanctions so far as you know?
Admiral Davidson. In many aspects, yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Why is that?
Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, can you restate your question?
Senator Blumenthal. Yeah, I apologize for interrupting.
Admiral Davidson. I want to make sure I understand the
question you're asking me. Have sanctions taken some effect?
Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. That's a good question.
Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, sir. It has. We do observe
raised fuel prices in Korea. That's been evident really since
before sanctions. The prices have gone up. There have been some
restrictions on luxury goods and some other things in there.
The impact and its ability to force them to denuclearize, it's
tough to say whether that's making any progress.
Senator Blumenthal. Has there been a reduction in the
effects of sanctions because of lack of consistent application
of them, either by ourselves or by our allies or others?
Admiral Davidson. No, we're on a sustained level of effort
just on the ship-to-ship transfers realm. I stepped it up in
the September time frame and expanded the concept of
operations. We've had a number of allies come alongside to
help--Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. Japan and
Korea are sitting side-by-side with us in Yokosuka right now,
working on this effort. I'm quite grateful for all the
contributions they've made. I should add that UK has been there
as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. In terms of our capabilities
in that part of the world, I note that your testimony focuses
on our undersea warfare advantages. Do you see those advantages
are eroding, and how important is it that we continue to build
submarines?
Admiral Davidson. I think continuing to build submarines is
critically important, sir. Our most significant advantage in
all domains right now is in the subsurface. But some of those
diversions I'd rather discuss in closed hearing, if you don't
mind.
Senator Blumenthal. Sure, and again, maybe more
appropriately for a closed setting, although I think, really,
the American people need to know answers to a lot of these
questions. Our adversaries know the answers. We know the
answers after we're briefed in closed sessions. The only ones
who don't know the answers to many of these questions are the
American people.
I regret that so much has been kept from public view. Not
to be critical at all of you or the Pentagon in that respect. I
recognize that you operate under rules that may constrain you
from talking publicly. But I hope we'll have an opportunity to
explore in greater detail these questions and also the
vulnerability of our aircraft carriers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General,
Admiral, good to see you. Thanks for your great service and
thanks for being here today.
Admiral Davidson, I wanted to begin just kind of making
sure we have very, very clear understanding of what's going on
in the South China Sea. I think it's pretty obvious, but just
having you state this to the American people, to our allies in
the Asia-Pacific.
Standing next to President Obama in the Rose Garden in
2015, President Xi Jinping said, ``China does not intend to
pursue militarization of the South China Sea.'' That was a
quote from the president of China next to the president of the
United States.
Just a few months ago in January, China's major state-run
newspaper, the People's Daily, stated, ``As China's military
size and quality improve, so does its control of the South
China Sea. China is able to send more naval vessels as a
response and can take steps like militarizing the islands.''
This is the mouthpiece of the Communist Party.
President Xi, obviously he didn't keep his word when he
made that statement in the Rose Garden next to President Obama;
is that correct?
Admiral Davidson. That's correct, sir. In the most liberal
interpretation of militarizing those islands, China in April of
2018 populated those islands with antiship cruise missiles,
with surface-to-air missiles, and electronic jammers.
Senator Sullivan. Ten-thousand-foot runways?
Admiral Davidson. Those were already there. But now they
have the weapons, they've got sufficient military cadre, and
they've stepped up their operations both in the maritime and
with bomber sorties and fighter sorties in a way that makes it
clear that those islands are to support them militarily.
Senator Sullivan. Just to be clear, 2015, two presidents,
Rose Garden, and President Xi obviously didn't keep his word on
that issue.
Admiral Davidson. I agree with that. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate what you're doing in
terms of regular FONOPs [Freedom of Navigation Operations] our
allies. The more we can do, the more regular--the previous
administration seemed to be a little reluctant to do these. I
think you guys are doing a much better job, so I commend you
for continuing to do that. The more we can bring our allies--a
lot of talk about allies here--with regard to those FONOPs or
some of the operations you described, the better.
General Abrams, I wanted to turn to the issue that Senator
Reed raised and just get your professional military views on
what would be the tactical effects of removing a large portion,
or all, of United States Forces from the Korean Peninsula?
General Abrams. Senator, just for clarity, under the
current set by the DPRK?
Senator Sullivan. I'm talking about our forces----
General Abrams. No, I understand. But nothing's changed on
the North side of the MDL [Military Demarcation Line]?
Senator Sullivan. Correct. Correct.
General Abrams. It would impose significant tactical and
operational risk if there's no change on the other side of the
MDL.
Senator Sullivan. Strategically, hasn't Russia and China
sought the removal of United States Forces from the Korean
Peninsula for decades as a core strategic goal of theirs?
General Abrams. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. China and Russia and North Korea would be
pleased by such a withdrawal?
General Abrams. Again----
Senator Sullivan. If, say, it happened tomorrow?
General Abrams. There's actually some debate. You know----
Senator Sullivan. Really?
General Abrams. Yeah.
Senator Sullivan. There's debate?
General Abrams. There is some debate----
Senator Sullivan. China wouldn't be happy that----
General Abrams. No, sir; it's on the DPRK. There's some
mixed views on whether the DPRK really wants us down.
Senator Sullivan. How about China and Russia?
General Abrams. Absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. You might recall we passed a law, the
NDAA last year, that actually states that the significant
removal of United States military forces from the Korean
Peninsula will not be supported in terms of authorized
appropriated funds by the Congress below 22,000 troops unless
the secretary of defense first certifies to this Committee that
it would be in the national interest of the United States to do
so.
I just want you to remind everybody who's working on that
that that's actually in the law right now.
Senator Sullivan. Finally, Admiral, I just wanted to touch
base, and I think we can do it in a better sense in a
classified setting this afternoon, but there is, I think, a lot
of concern, and a lot of concern on this Committee, on the
force posture of how our forces are deployed throughout the
region to be ready for what is really kind of the big strategic
challenge facing the United States, which is the rise of China
over the next 50 to 100 years.
I'll be interested in going into a lot more detail on the
force posture issues, but I think there's a lot of good work
that's been going on, but some of it seems to get stuck in the
Pentagon. I would welcome your views on that. But I think we
need to be a little bit more creative on how we're looking at
force posture.
I would want to remind you, and I know you know it, but
Alaska is not necessarily in your AOR, but the forces there,
which are significant, your Reserve forces, for example,
General, on the Korean Peninsula, our OPCON to PACOM, and a lot
of those forces are actually closer to the Korean Peninsula and
other places than forces, say, in Australia. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Davidson, are you familiar with the ProPublica
publication this past week on the analysis of the
accountability for the collisions with the McCain and the
Fitzgerald?
Admiral Davidson. I saw the first article, Senator.
Senator King. There's, I believe, a second one. I commend
it to you. It's one of the most sobering analyses of a disaster
that I've ever seen. It takes responsibility all the way up
through the very top of the Navy to this Congress, I should
say. Sequestration in 2013 was one of the contributors.
But I would like, if you could--and perhaps I'll prepare a
question for the record--I would like to see specific data on
where we stand with issues like certification of sailors and
personnel on the ships, maintenance status of the ships,
training rules, staffing levels. I want real numbers. I don't
want general ``we're working on staffing'' or ``we're working
on more training.'' Because these were avoidable tragedies. I
would like to drill down on the specific data points that
indicate the level of readiness for these, for our fleet
generally, the Seventh Fleet and other naval assets in the
region.
Is that something that you can do? You're the handiest,
highest naval officer I have here today. I don't mean to say
that you have to be the specific one to respond, but I would
like to see specific responses from the Navy, not promises and
not good feelings. This was a--this story is terrible.
Admiral Davidson. Sir, if I could, a couple of points. One,
there's a quarterly review that was provided over here to the
professional staff members by the Vice Chief, Admiral Moran.
All those numbers are available.
The idea that there's not transparency in this readiness I
think is appalling, or that it was some kind of secret or that
only a few knew about it in the Navy is incorrect. I personally
testified before the House Seapower and Personnel Subcommittees
with Chairman Thornberry there in 2016 on the kind of things
that it took, you know, to keep the fleet going.
We can't forget one other thing. These two collisions were
a tragedy. There's no doubt about it. All the senior leadership
of the Navy feels an immense amount of accountability for that,
and I'll come back to it. But the fact of the matter is 280-odd
other ships weren't having collisions. More than a dozen of
those ships were performing exceptionally well----
Senator King. I'm sorry, that doesn't----
Admiral Davidson. Excuse me, Senator.
Senator King. Airplanes are landing all over America, and
just because they aren't all crashing doesn't mean they don't
need a high level of maintenance. To tell me that isn't very
convincing. I think it was 40 years since we've had collisions
of this nature. Are you saying that there were no failures that
led to these collisions because there were 280 ships that
didn't have collisions? Isn't that the standard, no collisions?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. No collisions is the standard.
Certainly it's been 40 years since we had lost life to that
extent, but there had been collisions in the recent past.
The other thing that we have to remark upon is the combat
performance. We've had ships in the Red Sea shooting down
antiship cruise missiles, we've had extraordinary Tomahawk
performance in this time frame, we had aviation squadrons shoot
down a MiG aircraft from Syria. You know, these units have been
tested in combat and doing quite well.
Senator King. I'm not suggesting otherwise. What I'm
suggesting is--and I urge you to read that study--I'm
suggesting that we had a preventable problem; there were
multiple warnings, it wasn't acted upon, and I want to be
reassured that it is being acted upon, and I'll be glad to
review those reports.
Admiral Davidson. But sir, this is why I'm saying the Navy
feels a huge amount of accountability for this. They tasked me
to review those two collisions, I produced a 170-page report
with 58 recommendations, and the Navy has been moving out on
those recommendations to provide the kind of unit personnel
training, to provide advice and resources to the type
commanders, the fleet commanders, the Naval Systems Command,
all with recommendations to improve this situation in a way
that eliminates the variance that I'm talking about.
Senator King. I'm delighted to know that, and I've heard
that before. I just want to see the data that backs up the fact
that these recommendations are in fact being executed.
Admiral Davidson. Okay. All right. I'll be sure to do it. I
mentioned earlier in testimony, there are some recommendations
in the Comprehensive Review that I made that I'm watching
closely for the 2020 budget to make sure that they're
accommodated as well.
Senator King. I don't mean to imply--I said in my opening
that the responsibility goes all the way up to this Congress.
Continuing resolutions, which you talked about, are pointed out
to be part of the problem, and the sequester was part of the
problem. There's responsibility to go around. But I just, as I
say, want to see where we are in terms of the data on executing
on those recommendations. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to each of you for being here today, for your service to our
country, for the testimony that you've prepared and presented
to us, and for taking the time to take our questions here and
again as we go into a closed session this afternoon.
I thought it was so interesting this morning reading Wall
Street Journal; there is a book review in the opinion section
and it's on the future of Asia: ``The Future is Asian.'' It
made me think a little bit about something we talked some about
in this Committee. It is how the commercial complex and the
military complex in China have a tendency to be one and the
same. You see this reflected in their Belt and Road Initiative,
the Thousand Talents Program, things of that. They even talk a
little bit about building that dual-use sectors. This is
something that is going to have an impact on their power in the
coming years.
There will be some of this that you can answer now and some
we'll need to take up in a closed session, but one of the
things, Admiral Davidson, that I think as you look at this from
where you sit and you hear the term ``expanding the competitive
space'' for China, how do you interpret that to your mission? I
know Senator Hawley asked what your needs are going to be, what
changes you need to see in the force.
Then for you, and also, General Abrams, for you, when you
look at the cyber capabilities that they are using to push
themselves to information dominance, which would be a goal for
them, how do you see that slowing our warfare activities and
how would they use that as a force-multiplier for their
conventional capabilities and use it to target the links and
nodes in our mobility system?
With that, I will give you the time, and thank you for
your----
Admiral Davidson. Quickly, ma'am, it is going to take a
whole-of-government approach on our behalf as well. We talked a
little bit earlier today about the kind of tools like the BUILD
Act provides in this whole-of-government approach. I'm quite
encouraged by all the concepts that are coming forth from those
services. It's our obligation to knit that together in a war-
fighting concept out there in the Indo-Pacific.
It's going to require some investments and some
capabilities that are, I would say, nascent in our country
right now, and it's also going to require us to invest in a way
across the region, the posture of how we are situated, and then
some of the capabilities from the training apparatus and how
that might support all this new capability that's coming
online, as well as the way in which we share and collaborate
with information with our allies and partners in the region to
make this whole. But some of the specifics of all of this is
better discussed in closed hearing.
Senator Blackburn. Correct.
Admiral Davidson. Thank you.
General Abrams. Senator, I'd just like to talk a little bit
specifics about cyber. As you mentioned, it's one of the key
components in our interest of achieving information dominance.
First and foremost, I'll tell you that the creation of U.S.
Cyber Command has given us now the right level of command
integration. He is a supporting commander to all of the
combatant commands, and General Nakasone's done a fantastic job
and I'm personally appreciative of all the efforts that he's
done to support our efforts to integrate cyber as part of our
holistic campaign on the peninsula.
It is a critical capability. We're still working on getting
the appropriate authorities delegated to the right level should
we need them in a period of hostilities, and we can probably
talk about that in greater detail during the closed session.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both of you. General Abrams, good to see you again.
Just as a mention, Senator Wicker asked you, Admiral, about
the 355-ship Navy, and as you undergo a review of the
appropriate number of ships for our Navy, I hope that that will
be a continuing commitment for that number of ships at least,
and also that we have the resources necessary to repair and
maintain the ships we already have.
The Defense Department recently released a 2019 Missile
Defense Review, which, among other items, noted the
installation of a Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, very
important to us as a way to improve the performance of our
current missile defense system and increase the protection of
Hawaii.
Admiral Davidson, are you satisfied that with the
installation of the Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, the
defense of Hawaii is optimized for the current and near-term
threats?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. It fills in a gap in our
detectability that I think is critically important not only to
the defense of Hawaii, but really, the defense of all the
continental United States as well, and Alaska.
Senator Hirono. Of course I'd ask you to continue to pay
attention to the timing of when the installation will occur. I
think it's set for 2023 or somewhere in there.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. That's correct.
Senator Hirono. General Abrams, do you believe that our
current missile defense system in place in and around the
Korean Peninsula serves as an effective deterrent against North
Korean ballistic missile threat?
General Abrams. Yes, I do.
Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, you noted in the
testimony that your command only gets 5 percent of foreign
military funds. What command gets the largest percentage of
these funds?
Admiral Davidson. I would say Central Command.
Senator Hirono. Central Command?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. When you get only 5 percent of these funds,
how do you prioritize with the small amount of funding, how do
you prioritize where the funding goes in a region as large as
your AOR?
Admiral Davidson. My own approach is to make sure that
where we're investing is complementary to our capability and
also advances the capability of the countries in which we're
providing this assistance.
Senator Hirono. Getting only 5 percent of these funds in an
area as large as yours seems like an underinvestment to me.
Does this kind of underinvestment in a partner or potential
partner with these funds provide an opportunity for China to
increase its influence in these nations?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Both China and Russia.
Senator Hirono. Who makes the decision as to the percentage
of these funds that goes to all of our commands?
Admiral Davidson. It's an interagency decision the way all
these things come together, between Defense recommendations,
State disbursements at the end of the day. I think as you
examine the budgets that will be coming in the next few years,
you'll see a shift in priority for Pacific Command.
Senator Hirono. That's good news. Thank you.
I'm glad that Senator Ernst asked you, Admiral Davidson,
about the importance of our COFA and the fact that China is
very much in these nations, Oceanic nations, to widen their
influence and certainly their economic activities in this area.
What more can we do as a whole-of-government approach to
counter China's influence in Oceania?
Admiral Davidson. We're continuing to work along those ends
already, ma'am. I can tell you we're partnered with Australia,
New Zealand, certainly on what I would call their very nearest-
abroad. I think the United States feels an immense amount of
responsibility for the COFA states themselves. You know, Japan
has done a lot across Oceania. In just the last 3 months,
France has made it clear that their interests--New Caledonia to
Polynesia, the two bookends there, they want to be part of this
conversation to make sure that our efforts are all working
collaboratively and cooperatively.
We've also stepped up our engagements, not just from Indo-
Pacific Command, my own visits to the region, but we've helped
to facilitate visits by the Department of Interior and attended
some forums like the Pacific Island Forum on providing some
assistance to make sure that the security in Palau for the
Oceans Conference in 2020 is going to be sound as well. We have
to step those things up additionally.
Senator Hirono. I agree, because these are very small
nation states. As you mentioned that the citizens of these
compact nations can travel to our country to any state without
a visa requirement, and they mainly come to Hawaii and they go
to Guam. Whatever we can do to provide the kind of support for
these citizens I think will be very much appreciated because I
know they feel that we have not done quite what we should be
doing with regard to their needs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. General Abrams, it's
great to see you again. I appreciated all your hospitality and
time that we spent together back when you were down at Fort
Bragg.
Admiral Davidson, I'll start with you because the subject
of the 355-ship Navy has come up. To be honest with you, I'm
not obsessed with a set number. In fact, I think it could be
dangerous for us to say you've just got to check off until you
get to 355 because I'm more concerned with capabilities. It
would seem to me that over time, you're going to determine that
we need more or less, depending upon how we match up against
the increasing capabilities.
Could you talk a little bit about how you could get to a
point where you start describing the aggregate capacity of a
355-ship Navy and that that may ultimately manifest itself in a
very different footprint over the period of time that you could
actually get to 355?
Admiral Davidson. As I mentioned earlier, Senator, the
chief of naval operations and the Navy, they've undertaken
another force structure assessment, I think to get after
precisely what you're talking about, make sure that they
understand not only the capability mix of platforms themselves,
but what the opportunity is for autonomous and unmanned
vehicles as they come into this as well, and then how that
might adjust those numbers going forward.
Senator Tillis. Well I would think so, because I think if
you take a look at the inherent cost and survivability with
manned vessels versus unmanned vessels, the multiplier that you
could get through relying on different platforms is something
we should all look at. I get that there are supply chain issues
and there are shipyards across the country that can see and
touch and feel a target number for the number of ships that are
going to be built in a given place, but I don't care about
that. What I care about is projecting the maximum capabilities
for the minimum cost based on what the experts believe is the
best way to match up against the adversary.
One other question for you. It has to do with the 58
recommendations and the exchange that you had with Senator
King. I'd be very curious when you respond to that, in terms of
progress, the ones that require statutory action. I'd also be
very curious to see, of the 58 recommendations, maybe why they
were necessary based on a lack of funding or other factors that
are clearly the responsibility of Congress at the end of the
day, I believe rooted, and much of the problems are really
congressional inaction or inconsistency with funding, being
able to do something I know is very important to General
Abrams, readiness, and I don't know how many times you chanted
the mantra of readiness when you were down at Forces Com. But
most of that's rooted in inaction or inconsistency on our part.
We need to put a mirror down there when we're looking at those
recommendations and recognizing the folks in suits caused a lot
of those problems.
General Abrams, you mentioned 440 days with respect to
Korea in terms of any--we were at a point to where it seemed
like every week we were watching a missile get launched or some
sort of test being executed. On the one hand, we'll say that
they're moving at the current pace and speed, but isn't it fair
to say that if they're no longer launching missiles, some of
which failed and they learn a lot from failed tests, they can
accelerate their program; isn't it fair to say that just that
lack of activity has had some impact on their rate of growth?
I know we'll go in the closed session for specifics, but it
just seems logical from the outside observer, not something we
would discuss in the closed hearing, that that lack of outward
activity, that data collection that comes from missile launches
and tests, has to have some dampening effect on their rate of
growth unless they've figured out how to do something in a test
tube versus these ``when we test, it has to be perfect, we
don't like to test and learn from failure, we want all of our
tests to succeed.''
There's an inherent cost in that. But it would seem to me
that some of the benefit that North Korea was getting from that
pace that they had up until about 440 days ago has diminished
now that they're changing their approach. Would you agree with
that?
General Abrams. Senator, I'm not the expert on missile
flight tests nor on nuclear weapons testing, but I have spoken
to a number of them. It gets to a point in programs, and we can
talk more about it this afternoon, that when you get to a
certain point in that volume of testing that they did, and it's
that point where the mature programs, if they are mature, then
they can transition to simulation and modeling.
Senator Tillis. They've captured enough to actually go to
simulation.
General Abrams. There's potential of that, Senator, and we
can talk more about it this afternoon.
Senator Tillis. Fair enough.
Last thing. If you could tell me the progress you're
making, we're talking about more extended deployments in Korea
to create a work-life balance versus the 1-year iterations that
we typically have. Have you made any progress on that?
General Abrams. Senator, we have, and we're working very
closely with the services to find the right balance so that we
can do just that. We're looking at different force mixes as a
possibility in the future to do exactly what you're talking
about.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we've already discussed throughout this hearing
today the tyranny of distance in the Pacific and some of the
challenges that we face. I myself grew up in Southeast Asia,
living in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, so I am personally
familiar with the tyranny of distances.
You talked a little bit to, Admiral, the need for
increasing our sealift capabilities. Could you discuss a little
bit other requirements, such as airlift, heavy lift aircraft,
that sort of thing, that we might need to plus up in order for
you to be able to more efficiently and able to react more
quickly to any type of changes in the situation in the pacific?
Admiral Davidson. Thank you, ma'am. I would just add, you
know, one of the key areas we need to do is better cyber
defenses of our logistics networks, which touch commercial
industry so profoundly, both in terms that the people that we
help contract for their support both in the United States, but
overseas as well. Some of the inroads with ZTE and Huawei in
some of these other countries are going to challenge our
ability to use our existing logistics network without adapting
it in a cyber sense moving forward.
Senator Duckworth. Are you speaking to upgrading and
improving the capabilities of organizations like TRANSCOM
[United States Transportation Command] in addition to the cyber
capabilities itself?
Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. TRANSCOM bears some
responsibility for those networks that support their logistics
operations; that's absolutely one of them. As you mentioned
earlier, airlift is going to be critically important out there
in the Indo-Pacific region.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
General Abrams, can you expand a little bit on the work
we've done and the work that still needs to be done to ensure
we have the necessary logistical tail to support United States
Forces Korea in any contingency?
General Abrams. Senator, there's been extensive investment
by the services over the last couple years under the leadership
of Chairman Dunford and then-Secretary Mattis to properly not
only posture the force to improve our posture in terms of
munitions and other key supplies to appropriate levels based on
where we were in 2017, but also made the right investments now
in the supply chains to be able to sustain that if we ever had
to get to a point of hostilities.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Can both of you give me your brief assessments of how the
recently-passed Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (AKIA) will
affect our relationship in the region and what more needs to be
done to make sure it's effectively implemented?
Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, Senator, could you repeat
that? I apologize.
Senator Duckworth. Sure, no worries. I'm the last
questioner, so totally understandable.
Can you speak a little bit about the recently-passed Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act and how that will affect our
relationships within the region? You know, the importance of
our alliances in INDOPACOM, particularly Republic of Korea and
Japan. I don't think it's something we stress enough.
I think that the successes that we're having in the region
diplomatically and politically really also stems from the fact
that we have a solid alliance militarily between United States,
Korea, and Japan, and that must remain strong in order for us
to move forward on the other fronts.
Admiral Davidson. I couldn't agree more, ma'am. We've
talked frequently about the whole-of-government approach in the
region, it can't just be in the military space, that we're
competing out there. The ARIA Act is going to be one of the key
vehicles in which to advance these relationships going forward.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. General?
General Abrams. Senator, the only thing I'd add to that,
specifically in Northeast Asia: no stronger allies than the
Republic of Korea and Japan. So I absolutely agree with what
Admiral Davidson said in terms of it's a whole-of-government
approach that can only serve to strengthen those two great
democracies as well as our own.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Finally, my last question. Admiral, could you speak a
little bit to the role of the State Partnership Programs in
terms of the forces and the work that you do in countries like
the Philippines and the like and the availability of those
troops to augment your Active Duty forces?
Admiral Davidson. The State Partnership Programs not only
in the Indo-Pacific Command region, but speaking for the other
combatant commanders----
Chairman Inhofe. Excuse me, Admiral. Before you answer,
Senator Reed presiding. Go ahead.
Admiral Davidson. Have been quite important to us building
military-to-military relationships. The frequency at which
those State Partnership Programs can touch some of these other
nations is quite good, and we've been able in just the last few
months to expand one of those State Partnership Programs in the
Oceania region. I don't want to say where and who just yet
because we haven't announced the final selection of who the
State partner will be. But it's an area in which I'm looking to
expand some relationships in the region as well.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Reed. [Presiding] Chairman Inhofe indicated that
Senator King requested another question.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Abrams, in thinking about Korea and the history,
we're currently focused on the nuclear threat of course, but we
had troops there, a substantial troop commitment, for 50 years
before the nuclear threat became what it is today. What I'm
getting at is will we necessarily be able to remove those
troops if the nuclear threat is reduced or eliminated given the
conventional power that the North Koreans have, the array of
artillery along the border, the threat to Seoul, and all of
that? I want to try to put this discussion into some historical
perspective.
Admiral Davidson. Senator, no, you're absolutely right. Our
troop posture----
Senator King. Could you say that again? I like hearing
that.
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I'm just teasing.
Admiral Davidson. Our troop posture, you know, it's been
modulated since the armistice in July of 1953, and it's been
modulated based on that conventional threat that you're talking
about as well as other commitments that we had. For instance,
we had a reduction in forces on the peninsula during the
Vietnam era, and in fact, the Republic of Korea, really as a
sign of solidarity to the United States committed two ROK
divisions to South Vietnam in that conflict.
So it has, but our conventional capability on the peninsula
is essentially, as I said earlier, the deterrent against the
DPRK's conventional threat and their asymmetric threat.
Senator King. Which may well be necessary even with the
elimination of the nuclear threat or the reduction of the
nuclear threat unless there is a concomitant reduction in the
conventional threat.
Admiral Davidson. Yes, Senator, and until there is a peace
treaty. Because we still remain in a state of armistice, a
cessation of hostilities, until such time that there is a peace
treaty between all the parties.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen, and thank you
for your testimony.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, I will adjourn the hearing
and see you later at the closed session.
Thank you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
OKINAWA STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT
1. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, the United States and
Japan are working together to complete the strategic
realignment of United States Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam
and other locations. Okinawa has historically hosted a large
share of United States servicemembers deployed to Japan
including about 19,000 marines. Please provide the Committee
with a detailed update on the progress on the realignment of
Marine forces.
Admiral Davidson. Relocation of U.S. marines from Okinawa
to Guam remains an INDOPACOM area of emphasis. Over the past
few years with Congress' help, we have made notable progress in
this strategic realignment. On Okinawa, the pace of
construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp
Schwab increased over the last year with steady progress made
on the seawall and the start of landfill work in December 2018.
Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly reaffirmed his strong
commitment to FRF. Guam's main cantonment construction has
commenced following a favorable report from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to protect newly identified endangered
species. Clearing work is underway in support of utilities and
site improvements. The fiscal year 2018 NDAA included several
projects for the Guam relocation, including Marine Aviation
Logistics Squadron facilities, a corrosion control hangar, and
a second aircraft maintenance hangar at Naval Support Activity
Andersen; a water well field to feed the new Marine Corps Base
Guam; and a medical clinic at Apra Harbor Naval Station. Also,
the fiscal year 2019 NDAA includes ordnance operations, a
machine gun range, and a combination high intensity tactical
training facility and dining hall for the air component all
located on Naval Support Activity Andersen. The Commonwealth of
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military Training (CJMT)
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is under revision due to
comments received during the public comment period in 2015. As
you will recall, CJMT will provide for large scale U.S. Marine
Corps forces training. The new CJMT Revised Draft EIS will go
through another comment period after public release of the
draft. Due to competing interests with the USAF divert program
on the island of Tinian--and at the request of the Governor of
CNMI--we paused engagement with CNMI officials and agencies,
causing progress on the CJMT EIS to slow. In late February
2019, INDOPACOM met with the CNMI Governor to set the
conditions for re-engagement on CJMT.
UNACCOMPANIED TOUR HOUSING AT OSAN AIR BASE
2. Senator Wicker. General Abrams, the vast majority of
servicemembers deploy to Osan Air Base on an unaccompanied 1-
year assignment. Osan has the largest dormitory inventory in
the operational Air Force. Please provide the Committee an
update on unaccompanied tour housing for servicemembers
stationed at Osan Air Base. What are your specific plans to
improve the quality of housing?
General Abrams. There are approximately 4,547 unaccompanied
airmen assigned to Osan with 3,228 residing on-base and 1,319
off-base. Osan Air Base currently has 37 dormitories consisting
of 4,711 rooms, including two dorms ready for demolition and
two unoccupied dorms under renovation. The average age of Osan
dormitories is 24 years with the oldest being 34 years old and
the newest built 5 years ago. In the last 10 years, 2 new dorms
valued at $42 million were funded with Military Construction
funding (MILCON) and 1 new $67 million dorm was built with
Republic of Korea (ROK) funds. In the last 10 years there have
also been 71 United States-funded projects using Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) funding valued at $52 million and 14 ROK
funded ``O&M'' projects valued at $4 million. The overall
quality of Osan dorm rooms is good, and the average facility
condition index of the dorms is 80 (on a scale of 0-100, worst
to best). However, the average condition of the HVAC systems
for the dorms is 60, and the majority of problems that exist in
Osan's dorms relate to aging infrastructure, particularly when
it comes to boilers and HVAC systems. This drives the engineers
at Osan to work around the clock responding to routine and
emergency work orders (e.g. completing 14,050 corrective
maintenance tasks between 1 Mar 2018 and 1 Mar 2019). Due to
the aging infrastructure in Osan's dorms and ongoing HVAC
issues, the base will continue to rely on portable chillers,
space heaters and small A/C units to assist with Quality of
Life standards until all programmed projects are funded and
complete. Osan wing leadership has consistently focused on
maintaining suitable living conditions for all base residents
and they will continue to pursue initiatives to ensure quality
housing for our airmen, soldiers, and marines into the future.
3. Senator Wicker. General Abrams, what resources are
required and are those resources accounted for in your budget
plans?
General Abrams. Osan Air Base currently has 6 Facility
Sustainment Restoration & Modernization (FSRM) projects for
dorms in active construction or design valued at $24 million
(2x FY16, 2x FY17, 2x FY20). These projects are in-depth
repairs targeting a broad array of issues, such as electrical
and mechanical systems. An additional 35 projects valued at $69
million are planned and programmed for future years and will
compete with other AF priorities for funding. Four of the 35
FSRM projects, valued at $11.9 million, were programmed for
fiscal year 2019 execution and have currently been placed in
the fiscal year 2020 program due to higher priorities in the
fiscal year 2019 Air Force budget. A new Military Construction
project for a 528 room, $71 million dormitory is programmed and
has been submitted through the Air Force MILCON process
annually since 2012. This new construction is much needed and
would replace six aging facilities. It is currently the base's
second MILCON priority and twenty-sixth in Pacific Air Forces'
(PACAF's) fiscal year 2021 MILCON program. Osan continues to
mitigate issues as it competes for AF MILCON funding.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
TERRAIN SHAPING OBSTACLES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND WITHIN THE
INDPACOM AOR IN GENERAL
4. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, I'd like to discuss your
perspective of the importance of terrain shaping on ground
maneuver on the Korean peninsula. As a commander, you possess
the last stock of landmines in the U.S. inventory--a capability
that has renewed relevance in a fight with peer competitors.
Can you comment on the importance of these capabilities to
provide standoff for United States ground forces in a
conventional war on the Korean peninsula, both to allow
maneuver and protect soldiers on the battlefield--especially in
light of USFK's [United States Forces Korea] priority to ``be
ready to fight tonight''?
General Abrams. USFK and CFC's continued use of land mines
as part of our arsenal of terrain shaping measures is
critically important to our defensive posture. Depite the ROK-
United States Alliance qualitative military advantage, DPRK
maintains a quantitative lead in fielded land forces of nearly
two to one. Terrain shaping munitions, such as land mines,
mitigates the challenge presented by DPRK's force posture by
permitting Alliance forces to create operational dilemmas for
the enemy by restricting their maneuverability while increasing
the targeting opportunities of our more lethal systems. It must
be noted, the aging arsenal of scatterable mine delivery
systems (e.g. Gator and Volcano) leave the joint and combined
force insufficient munition capacity to cover a doctrinal
division front or shape the deep fight.
5. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, in your professional
military opinion, how important is it for the Army to field
terrain shaping obstacles to enable maneuver, protect friendly
forces, and ultimately require less of a prohibitively
expensive force structure?
General Abrams. Fielding terrain shaping obstacles, to
include land mines, is critically important in Korea. The
quantitative advantage held by DPRK land forces creates both
risk to force and risk to mission. These risks are mitigated
through the collective use of terrain shaping obstacles and
combined fires. The continued use of land mines as part of our
arsenal of terrain shaping measures also contributes to near-
term cost savings. However, of concern is the modernization
efforts on the part of near-peer competitors in the area of
mines, munitions, and breaching capabilities, while we continue
to operate with 1980s technology. Existing non-materiel
solutions to mitigate this growing capability gap have been
evaluated and determined to be impractical. Ceding the
qualitative advantage in any area increases underlying risk to
force and risk to mission.
6. Senator Rounds. Admiral Davidson, can you comment on the
need for these capabilities in other places in your area of
responsibility?
Admiral Davidson. United States policy prohibits the use of
anti-personnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and I
support this policy. However, another subset of terrain shaping
obstacles, anti-vehicular mines, could improve joint force
lethality and agility in the region. With the Indo-Pacific home
to seven of the world's ten largest armies and significant
time-distance challenges, anti-vehicular mines could provide
advantages by facilitating effective maneuver for forces even
when outnumbered. Further, these will also help to enhance the
protection of bases and other critical infrastructure.
7. Senator Rounds. Admiral Davidson, are you concerned with
the United States capability gap in this area, which has grown
exponentially since 2001?
Admiral Davidson. Yes, I am concerned about growing terrain
shaping obstacle capability gaps particularly with China,
Russia, and North Korea. I support service efforts to develop
the next generation of mine capability--particularly ``man-in-
the-loop ``discriminatory systems--which could help close the
advantage held by other countries in this area.
TACTICAL EXERCISES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
8. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, during the hearing,
multiple Senators addressed the impact of the cancellation of
military exercises in the Republic of Korea [ROK], especially
Ulchi Freedom Guardian and other command post exercises. I,
too, believe those exercises are critical to maintaining
readiness, building relationships, and integrating friends and
allies, but I am also very concerned about the cancellation of
tactical exercises. Can you comment on the overall impact that
the cancellation of tactical exercises in the Republic of Korea
has on the readiness of USFK/ROK-United States Combined Forces
Command?
General Abrams. The suspension of large-scale exercises
coincident with senior-leader engagements in 2018 was a prudent
action in support of diplomacy. Following those suspensions,
and in accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary of
Defense, we have worked to modify our exercise design and
execution to maintain readiness through combined training and
exercises while preserving space for ongoing diplomacy. To
achieve this balance, we have adjusted four dials--size, scope,
volume, and timing. Adjustments to volume (projecting exercise
details and atmospherics into the information domain for
effect) have been key as the design of legacy Key Resolve, Foal
Eagle, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian purposefully maximized volume
in order to leverage combined exercises as an element of our
military deterrence strategy. As we have moved from an
environment of provocation to detente, it is appropriate to
change our active messaging posture to achieve the same
deterrent effect. What is unchanged is the readiness and
posture of our forces to act as a strategic deterrent postured
to respond to potential crisis or provocation, and if called
upon, ready to defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in
the region. This ``Fight Tonight'' posture is maintained
through the regular conduct of tactical and operational
combined Field Training Exercises paired with two Command Post
Exercises. These training and exercise events focus on ensuring
operational and support units, staff, and senior leaders are
well trained in their core competencies and are prepared to
conduct the planning and execution of joint and combined
operations under the strain of crisis.
9. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, can you also comment on
the specific impact the cancellation of tactical exercises has
on individual soldiers, leaders, and units from squad to
brigade level, especially on gaining/maintaining detailed
knowledge of the terrain they would potentially be fighting on
and integration into combat-effective combined arms task
forces?
General Abrams. We continue to conduct combined and
unilateral tactical and operational training at the unit and
component command level. In some cases, we have actually
increased this level of training (e.g. combined Marine training
has increased 20 percent over the last six months) and I am
comfortable with the state of core competency and warfighting
readiness among our joint and combined force. Additionally, we
continue to rotate Brigade Combat Teams through nine-month
rotations, thereby creating a depth of experience across our
formations.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
CHINA / CYBER
10. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, how does
INDOPACOM's concept of operations need to change in order to
account for Chinese electronic warfare and cyber capabilities?
Admiral Davidson. Beijing has developed significant
electronic warfare and cyberspace capabilities. In the event of
armed conflict, the PRC will employ these capabilities to
create a degraded and contested operational environment-
something the U.S. has not had to persistently contend with for
over 25 years. INDOPACOM 's concept of operations must
emphasize agility and resilience across all domains of
operations to enable the Joint Force to operate effectively in
this kind of environment. Below the threshold of armed
conflict, China continuously operates in and through cyberspace
to achieve strategic advantage. INDOPACOM must collaborate and
share information with a broad array of partners in order to
build situational awareness and enable a proactive posture to
defeat malicious cyber activity at the source.
11. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, could you expand
on your statement that INDOPACOM is exploring ``capabilities
that are nascent''?
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM in coordination with
USCYBERCOM has changed our approach to countering Chinese
actions in cyberspace. This new approach emphasizes stopping
attacks before they penetrate our cyber defenses, taking
actions that influence adversary behavior, and introducing
uncertainty into competitor or adversary calculations. Full
implementation of the approach requires innovative thinking
about and experimentation with promising, though nascent,
tactical, technical, and procedural cyberspace capabilities.
12. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what is your
assessment of China's capabilities in electronic attack or
electronic warfare?
Admiral Davidson. China considers electronic warfare (EW
[of which electronic attack is a component]) an integral
component of modem warfare. The PLA has fielded an impressive
array of ground-, sea-, and air-based EW systems that are
capable of operating against a wide swath of the
electromagnetic spectrum. As part of the late 2015-early 2016
force-wide reorganization, the PLA created the Strategic
Support Force to command, operate, and synchronize space,
cyber, and electronic warfare elements. PLA EW units routinely
train to improve their technical proficiency. More importantly,
they are integrated into most major PLA training events, both
supporting friendly forces with EW capabilities and acting as
adversaries I opposing forces, creating a complex
electromagnetic environment within which PLA forces must
operate. PLA capabilities include the ability to impact
adversary systems operating in radio, radar, microwave,
infrared, and optical frequency ranges, as well as computer and
information systems. Like all PLA capabilities, their EW force
is progressing rapidly but still faces challenges effectively
integrating into complex, modern combat operations.
13. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what practical
operational implications does this have for U.S. military
forces in a potential conflict?
Admiral Davidson. In the South China Sea, the PLA has
constructed a variety of radar, electronic attack, and defense
capabilities on the disputed Spratly Islands, to include:
Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef,
Johnson Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef. These facilities
significantly expand the real-time domain awareness, ISR, and
jamming capabilities of the PLA over a large portion of the
South China Sea, presenting a substantial challenge to United
States military operations in this region.
14. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what is your
assessment of China's capabilities in cyber and space?
Admiral Davidson. China is developing cyber reconnaissance
and cyberattack capabilities to support a range of objectives,
from collecting intelligence and stealing intellectual property
to manipulating data and posturing for destructive actions.
China has targeted United States DOD networks to fill gaps in
its research programs and to gather intelligence on our
strategies and plans. In addition, China is suspected of
targeting neighboring countries--particularly in Southeast
Asia--focusing on political, military, and economic issues--as
well as on disputed territories, and media organizations and
journalists. China continues to strengthen its military space
and counterspace capabilities--including space-based
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms,
satellite jammers, antisatellite missiles, and directed-energy
weapons--despite its public comments against the militarization
of space. China's national policymakers emphasize the
importance of its space program in bolstering the country's
scientific and technological modernization and growing its
high-technology industrial base. China has increasingly sought
to integrate its civil and military space efforts to streamline
research and development processes and develop dual-use
technologies. The consolidation of space, cyber, and other
capabilities under the Strategic Support Force is probably
intended to generate synergies between these capabilities to
make each more effective.
15. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, how would you
characterize the level of risk to U.S. space-based assets?
Admiral Davidson. China's space surveillance sensors are
capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing United
States satellites. China has already demonstrated ground-
launched weapons capable of destroying satellites in orbit.
Additionally, China is developing satellite jamming
capabilities, directed-energy weapons, and offensive
cyberattack capabilities, all of which could be used to support
military operations against United States space-based assets.
The vast geographic expanse of the Indo-Pacific AOR, makes
INDOPACOM highly reliant on the global coverage provided by
space services to accomplish our mission. China recognizes our
dependence on space and has fielded these counter-space systems
to hold the majority of United States and allied satellite
systems at risk. U.S. assets at risk include critical
communications networks, navigation, weather and intelligence
sources vital to steady state and contingency operations.
16. Senator Blackburn. General Abrams, could you expand on
your statements about command and integration of Cyber Command
on the peninsula, including delegation of authority?
General Abrams. USCYBERCOM is fully integrated into USFK
and provides Direct Support to the USFK and the Joint Cyber
Center. USCYBERCOM provided personnel as part of the Cyberspace
Operations--Integrated Planning Element (CO-IPE). USCYBERCOM
provides tremendous cyber capability to USFK and as the
supporting command to USINDOPACOM, the USCYBERCOM CDR is on
record as having all the required authorities to carry out
their mission in support of USFK and USINDOPACOM.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
CLIMATE
17. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, the
most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment from the DNI [Director
of National Intelligence] states that ``Extreme weather events,
many worsened by accelerating sea level rise, will particularly
affect urban coastal areas in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and
the Western Hemisphere. Damage to communication, energy, and
transportation infrastructure could affect low-lying military
bases, inflict economic costs, and cause human displacement and
loss of life.'' Please comment on our preparedness to respond
to future extreme weather events in South Asia, Southeast Asia
and the Pacific Islands.
Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM stands ready to support
partner nations, in coordination with the lead federal agency
USAID/OFDA, in response to future extreme weather events. I
would note that the number of times we have responded to these
events have declined in recent years because of increased
partner nation resiliency and capacity. However, for the most
extreme events, we are typically the only entity with the
resources and capabilities to respond quickly in order to
minimize loss of life and suffering.
General Abrams. USFK works closely with our ROK and
regional allies and partners, USINDOPACOM, and the interagency
to maintain the posture and readiness necessary to surge the
operational and logistic capabilitiy and capacity necessary to
contend with a an extreme weather event. The same posture and
readiness essential to our ability to deter aggression and
defend South Korea prepares us for the challenges of
humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions.
Further, USFK participates in regional training and exercise
events which focus on that mission set and the core
competencies required for rapid and in-depth response. Of note,
USFK recently provided support to fighting wildfires in
northeastern province of Gangwon-do. The training and
capabilities which facilitated that response are an example of
the ability to conduct rapid response resident throughout the
combined ROK-United States readiness posture. Additionally,
USFK serves as a forward postured arm of USINDOPACOM in the
event of regional humanitarian assistance/disaster response
missions.
18. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, what
are some of the risks to regional stability that such extreme
weather events might pose and can you comment on the demands
that such events have placed on U.S. Forces over the last few
years?
Admiral Davidson. In general, the frequency, timing, and
severity of extreme weather events all factor into the impact a
disaster might have locally and regionally. Mega-earthquakes,
mega-tsunamis, and super-typhoons hold the potential to cause
massive casualties and damage. The resulting widespread human
suffering, food and water shortages, and extensive power
outages could serve as precipitating events for regional
instability, if not properly managed. Over the past several
years, U.S. Forces have been called upon and less and less for
assistance because our partners and allies have, with our help,
built up their own capabilities to respond to these kinds of
events.
General Abrams. Extreme weather events threatening
stability on the Korean peninsula, and in the broader NE Asia
region, include tropical storms and typhoons but also periods
of sustained drought. The storm surge and torrential rains
associated with tropical storms and typhoons are particularly
impactful to South Korea given the topography of the peninsula
and the associated high population density in low-lying and
coastal areas. Critical infrastructure and sources of food and
commerce such as fisheries, crops, and livestock are all
vulnerable in the event an extreme storm overwhelms existing
waterways and containment systems. Likewise, communities in the
heavily forested and mountainous central and northeastern
highlands are at risk from wildfires fueled by dry, windy
conditions and localized drought. Recently, USFK provided
support to fighting wildfires in northeastern province of
Gangwon-do. While episodes such as this have been limited, USFK
exercises its ability to rapidly deliver operational and
logistic support to humanitarian assistance and disaster
response missions. Training and exercising to conduct rapid
response impoves the combined ROK-United States readiness
posture to provide relief in the event of a natural disaster.
Additionally, USFK serves as a forward postured arm of
USINDOPACOM in the event of regional humanitarian assistance/
disaster response missions.
19. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, the
recently published Worldwide Threat Assessment from the DNI
indicates that: ``Global environmental and ecological
degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel
competition for resources, economic distress, and social
discontent through 2019 and beyond.'' For example, there are
indications water shortages will induce stress in South Asia,
especially given the rapid decrease in Himalayan glaciers. What
is your assessment and the extent to which decreasing water
resources could inflame tensions within INDOPACOM, USFK, and
the surrounding regions?
Admiral Davidson. I believe the availability of fresh water
is, and will continue to be, one of the largest threats to
stability in SE Asia and beyond. Wars have and will be fought
over fresh water. The potential for supply side decreases at
the same time as potential increases in demand would make this
issue more challenging. Additionally, there are pressures being
placed on countries downstream who are often denied access to
clean water through upstream activities increasing pollution
and/or flow control for hydroelectric, agricultural or other
purposes. The nation that controls the water flow might use
that to control the countries who require access to that water.
Decreasing water resources could have significant economic and
food security implications. For example, the area of Kashmir
sits in a geographic location highly susceptible to climate-
change induced drought. Climactic instability there could
trigger conflict between nuclear-armed countries over water
rights. Urbanization likewise is changing risk profiles for
millions in this AOR, compounded by uncertainty due to climate
change.
General Abrams. Given the availability of fresh water
stores and the plentiful rainfall in much of Korea, the
competition over water is unlikely to be a significant driver
of tension in the near future. Instead, based on its unique
topography and extensive coastline, South Korea's exposure to
rising sea levels and increased annual coastal rainfall is
placing at risk the housing and infrastructure throughout the
eastern and southern lowlands. This creates the potential for
internal socio-economic and political disruptions should there
be an extreme environmental event which leads to excessive
flooding and the inundation of either or both agricultural land
and metropolitan areas.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
PACIFIC FLEET COLLISIONS
20. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, recommendations
that you helped author in the Comprehensive Review of Surface
Force Incidents included enhanced reporting processes to share
lessons across the surface force, improved safety programs
across the Navy, and enriched individual navigation skills and
training opportunities. Last April, you testified that the Vice
Chief and the Under Secretary of the Navy were leading an
oversight council to ensure that these recommendations are
appropriately implemented. Is the Navy implementing the review
recommendations in a timely manner? Please share any updates
you have.
Admiral Davidson. In incorporating the CR/SRR
recommendations, the Navy is implementing and
institutionalizing the lessons learned in 2017. To date, the
Navy has implemented 91 of 111 CR/SR actions and there are
clear paths forward for the remaining items.
21. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the collisions of
the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain were both deemed
avoidable, for several reasons. Are you confident that
implementing the recommendations will prevent future unforced
errors that lead to tragic collisions?
Admiral Davidson. I am confident that these measures will
minimize the risk of these types of errors in the future.
However, due to the nature of the mission and operations in the
Indo-Pacific, the element of risk cannot be completely
eliminated.
22. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, are there any
additional measures or investments that Congress should
consider during this year's budget cycle to address the
recommendations of this report and support naval operations
throughout INDOPACOM?
Admiral Davidson. The Navy's fiscal year 2020 budget
request includes funding to establish Maritime Skills Training
Centers in the fleet concentration areas in San Diego, CA and
Norfolk, VA. I ask Congress to support this initiative which
implements specific recommendations from the Comprehensive
Review.
INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY
23. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the United States
can reach both Asia and Europe with sea-based and air-delivered
missiles, neither of which violate the INF [Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces] Treaty. You noted in your testimony that ground
based systems must remain mobile to be a viable military
option. Why are ground-based missile systems necessary to
counter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea when the
United States is already investing in the construction of
Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines that are mobile by
nature?
Admiral Davidson. Land-based precision fires would
complement sea and air based systems but not replace them.
These systems would provide the following military advantages:
increase our deterrence posture with respect to Beijing and
improve regional security present a persistent, credible threat
to the PRC forcing PRC investment in costly defensive systems,
provide a relatively inexpensive augmentation to air and
maritime strike platforms, helping to restore their freedom of
action, create a multi-domain targeting dilemma for Chinese
planners, further demonstrate United States resolve against PRC
military coercion.
24. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, why not continue
this investment in order to maintain our asymmetric advantage
in undersea warfare?
Admiral Davidson. I fully support continued investment in
undersea capabilities and do not view this issue as an
``either/or'' proposition between ground- and sea-based
systems. We must have sufficient numbers of technically
advanced, reliable, and integrated air-, sea-, and land-based
systems available to add depth to our defenses and to counter
the increasingly sophisticated threats we face.
25. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, many of our
allies--including Japan--oppose withdrawal from the INF.
Others, such as South Korea and Australia, do not want to host
United States offensive missiles. NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] allies also oppose the treaty withdrawal. How is
INDOPACOM managing this opposition?
Admiral Davidson. Many of our allies, Japan included, would
optimally like to see a multi-lateral treaty with China
involved and also for Russia to return to INF compliance.
Pragmatically the prospects for this seem slim. In my view,
land-based precision fires would increase our deterrence
posture with respect to Beijing and improve regional security
and safety of all people. We believe that, through dialogue,
our allies and partners will see this, too.
26. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, if regional
allies will not support the deployment of ground-based
missiles, how will INF withdrawal impact regional stability?
Admiral Davidson. If regional allies are unwilling to host
ground-based missiles then the Chinese military (PLA) might
continue to enjoy the unchallenged advantage they have gained
by not being an INF signatory China has never been restricted
by the treaty and has fielded approximately 1900 land-based
missiles with ranges between 500-5500 km; we have none.
Deploying land-based missiles would increase our deterrence
posture with respect to Beijing and improve regional security.
27. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, given the
significant United States military presence on Guam, the island
is already deeply vulnerable during any conflict with China. If
the United States deploys land-based missiles on Guam upon
withdrawal from the INF treaty, how will this compromise
regional security and the safety of United States
servicemembers stationed on the island?
Admiral Davidson. Guam is already at risk to PRC
intermediate range missiles. Deploying land-based missiles to
Guam would increase our deterrence posture with respect to
Beijing, improving regional security and the safety of all
people on Guam.
28. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, how do you
anticipate that China would react to the deployment of ground-
based missiles in your command?
Admiral Davidson. I suspect China would protest loudly and
stridently. They would be losing a significant military
advantage and would do everything in their power to try to
maintain that edge. This includes exerting diplomatic and
economic pressure--Including veiled and overt threats--against
our regional allies and partners to attempt to force them to
deny our access.
CLIMATE CHANGE
29. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, DOD's [Department
of Defense] Climate Change report mentioned that ``at Naval
Base Guam, recurrent flooding limits capacity for a number of
operations and activities . . . that support mission
execution.'' How does this flooding jeopardize INDOPACOM
operations?
Admiral Davidson. Specific operational impacts from
flooding on Naval Base Guam are currently limited, and in
general, present a low impact to operations and activities that
support mission execution. Those impacts are primarily the
result of a slightly wetter climate compared to historical
standards and recently, an increase in tropical storms.
Overall, major impacts to operations on Guam result from
tropical storms and typhoons. Guam lies in one of the world's
most active regions for tropical storms. In addition to the
destructive nature of these storms, they often force the
dispersal of aircraft and ships from the island, resulting in
lost training opportunities and follow-on operational impacts.
30. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do you require
additional resources to effectively combat the effects of
climate change?
Admiral Davidson. No, we do not require additional
resources to effectively combat the effects of climate change
at this time.
31. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the DOD Climate
Change report failed to list the 10 most vulnerable military
installations for each service, and did not list a single
United States military installation outside the United States.
In addition to Naval Base Guam, which military bases throughout
INDOPACOM are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change?
Admiral Davidson. I have concerns about the vulnerability
of military installations on Guam, Kwajalein Atoll in the
Republic of Marshall Islands, and Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii to the
impacts of climate change. At this time, DOD lacks sufficient
data to identify installations as more vulnerable to climate
change than others. Working with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the DOD expects to complete
a study in the next two years that will help us better
understand how to analyze the vulnerabilities of military
installations to climate change.
32. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the Pentagon's
climate change report briefly mentioned that flooding and
earthquake-induced tsunamis in Indonesia contribute to
instability throughout INDOPACOM. How does this instability
impact your mission?
Admiral Davidson. In general, the frequency, timing, and
severity of these types of disasters may impact our overall
mission. However, humanitarian assistance and disaster response
(HADR) missions have a positive impact on our strategic
relationships with allies and partners. Our HADR efforts are a
visible, tangible demonstration of America 's goodwill in the
region and come with no strings attached, putting us in stark
contrast with China. Additionally, we have expended a lot of
effort toward helping our allies and partners build their own
capability and capacity to effectively respond to disasters,
lessening their dependence on U.S. assistance. Indonesia is a
key partner in the region and sits at the center of vital
transportation routes susceptible to many types of significant
natural disasters. In the last fifteen years, Indonesia has
made significant progress in developing the capabilities to
mitigate these kinds of disasters. For example, the two 2018
tsunamis that the country faced--one from tectonic activity and
the other from an underwater landslide--required minimal U.S.
Government/military assistance.
NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION, SANCTIONS, AND CYBERSECURITY
33. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General
Abrams, do you think there is a common definition for
denuclearization and how would you define a denuclearized North
Korean peninsula?
Admiral Davidson. The United States and the international
community have a shared understanding of what final, fully
verified denuclearization--or FFVD--entails. FFVD means the
removal of all key components of North Korea's nuclear fuel
cycle, removal of all fissile material, removal of North
Korea's nuclear warheads, removal or destruction of all
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and permanently freezing
any other weapons of mass destruction programs.
General Abrams. The definition of denuclearization, as
noted by our State Department, is nothing short of the final
and fully verified dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear
program. Shortly after his July 2018 visit Pyongyang, Secretary
Pompeo in responding to a similar question said that he had
``lengthy discussions about the scope of what complete
denuclearization means'' during his visit, and that
denuclearization is broad in nature: ``weapons systems to
fissile material to the production facilities, enrichment
facilities, across the range of weapons and missiles.'' Again,
Secretary Pompeo noted that ``The North Koreans understand that
and have not challenged that,'' and also that ``they also
understand that denuclearization makes no sense absent
verification, and they acknowledge that as well. There will be
a verification connected to the complete denuclearization.''
34. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, in your
testimony, you state: ``North Korea is continuing efforts to
mitigate the effects of international sanctions and the United
States-led pressure campaign.'' What indicators would you look
for in North Korean progress toward denuclearization to
determine that the United States could responsibly consider
lifting the current comprehensive sanctions on North Korea?
Admiral Davidson. As our diplomats have stated following
the Hanoi summit, our position remains that we expect final,
fully verified denuclearization before sanctions relief.
35. Senator Blumenthal. General Abrams, in your testimony,
you state that North Korea ``demonstrates increasing cyber
capacity that must be matched and thwarted.'' Do United States
Forces-Korea possess matching cyber capacity to thwart attacks?
General Abrams. Yes. USFK and USINDOPACOM work closely with
USCYBERCOM to ensure we are postured to match and thwart the
cyber threats posed by the DPRK. Our activities and current
posture are much improved thanks to the development and
implementation of the National Cyber Strategy, the DOD Cyber
Strategy, the certainty and resourcing provided by Congress
over the last two years, and as a result of changes in
Presidential Policy providing increased latitude for USCYBERCOM
to prepare and act.
36. Senator Blumenthal. General Abrams, do you require any
additional investment in intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets in order to inform decision-making and
military strategy on the Korean Peninsula?
General Abrams. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and United
States Forces Korea (USFK) require increased, multi-discipline,
persistent ISR capability and associated exploitation support
to lengthen the warning time necessary to provide adequate
decision space. The requirement for collection capabilities and
capacity is shaped, in part, by North Korea's behavior. If we
see a return to demonstrations of threatening military
capability and associated increase in military tensions,
collection requirements will be greater. Additionally,
collection requirements change as the target evolves
capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Additional
information is provided in a classified response.
37. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General
Abrams, last year, the United States suspended several combined
military exercises with South Korea, purportedly to increase
the potential success of nuclear negotiations. Did the
suspension and scaling back of recent military exercises make a
tangible impact on diplomacy?
Admiral Davidson. In my view, the suspension of certain
military exercises with South Korea created space for
diplomacy. While we have not yet reached an agreement with
North Korea, the President's initiative to engage North Korea
directly has reduced tension on the Korean peninsula and
provided the possibility for an escape from the long-running
cycle of North Korean escalation and de-escalation.
General Abrams. The suspension of exercises in 2018,
combined with the modifications to training and exercises going
forward, have been instrumental to creating the necessary space
for diplomacy by effectively turning down the volume on the
regional military tensions that escalated throughout 2017. That
reduction in military tensions has continued through the
efforts of South Korean, North Korea, and the United Nations
Command to coordinate, plan, and implement the slate of
confidence-building measures reducing military activity along
the DMZ. The outcome of these activities is the sustained
reduction in military tensions throughout 2018 and into 2019
which supports our ongoing period of detente and its continued
diplomacy.
38. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General
Abrams, did these suspensions negatively impact military
readiness?
Admiral Davidson. At the battalion level and below, we had
no change in exercises or military readiness. I believe we
accepted some prudent risk to military readiness at the
operational headquarters level last summer to create space for
diplomacy, but have made adjustments beginning in 2019 to
account for and mitigate any previous readiness impact at the
headquarters level.
General Abrams. The 12 June 2018 Summit presented a
historic occasion to re-shape strategic settings and relations
on the Korean peninsula. The United States and South Korea have
spent almost seven decades refining strategic, operational and
tactical readiness to defend the Republic of Korea and deter
aggression. The suspension of certain exercises during the
spring and summer of 2018 was a prudent step which created
additional space for diplomacy. Negotiations with the DPRK are
difficult and require continuous patience, but they provide an
important mechanism for the development of confidence building
measures and other steps that have reduced military tensions on
the Korean Peninsula. Within the resulting period of detente,
the DPRK has suspended nuclear and ballistic missile testing, a
development which represents a significant improvement since
the apex of tensions in late 2017. The center of gravity for
our military readiness in Korea is the ROK-United States
Alliance. We have worked to proactively modify our exercise
design and conduct to maintain that diplomatic space while
allowing our negotiators to operate from a position of
strength. During our spring exercise, DONG MAENG 19-1 (DM 19-
1), we adjusted four dials--size, scope, volume, and timing--in
order to balance readiness with diplomatic requirements. CFC/
USFK effectively used DM 19-1 to train 14 of 14 warfighting
Mission Essential Tasks, validate our C4I and Alliance
decision-making processes under the stress of simulated crisis
and hostilities, and demonstrate our Alliance commitment to
combined readiness.
----------
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY
39. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, you have spoken at
length about your command's goal to maintain a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific. What does China perceive as the likely effects of
this strategy?
Admiral Davidson. China probably perceives the strategy as
constricting its ability to impose a China-centric system on
the region. Chinese leaders increasingly seek to assert China's
model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative development
path. Many in Beijing view nearly every United States action as
part of a larger containment strategy and have chosen to frame
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific as an integral part of that
approach. It is not. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific is exactly
what its name suggests, an environment that allows all nations
to freely choose with whom to associate or trade; an
environment where all nations have free and unfettered access
to the air, sea, space, and cyber domains; an environment in
which all nations can flourish free from coercion or threats.
40. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, does China view the
Free and Open-Indo Pacific strategy as a threat?
Admiral Davidson. The Free and Open lndo-Pacific presents a
viable, time-tested, and successful model for international
relations. As noted in my response to question 39, Beijing is
trying to present its model as a better alternative. China's
model is many things, but certainly not ``free'' or ``open.''
41. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, should the United
States ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) as a step to promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. I continue to strongly support accession
to UNCLOS and believe such a step would reinforce U.S.
commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Accession would
express formal U.S. commitment to the rights and freedoms
reflected in UNCLOS as shared values with our allies and
partners. It would also strengthen our position vis-a-vis China
by improving our ability to call out China's actions that are
contrary to the treaty.
42. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, beyond some of the
actions we have already seen in the South China Sea, what is
the likely next step in escalation China might take to counter
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy?
Admiral Davidson. Chinese leaders are likely to do many
things to challenge the tenets and principles of the Free and
Open Indo-Pacific strategy through their counter-framework of
Community of Shared Future for Mankind. China will almost
certainly continue to pursue efforts to upend the global
governance system by proliferating its anti-United States
messaging through targeted investments and propaganda. China
may also choose to challenge unfettered access to the seas and
airways by deploying additional air defense or anti-ship
missiles or other capabilities to strategic locations. China
already challenges free transit by erroneously claiming
international space in the South China Sea is ``indisputable
Chinese sovereign territory,'' a claim specifically not upheld
by the Hague's Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016. China
may challenge basic human rights by proliferating to other
nations the intrusive monitoring technologies they're using
against their own citizens. Or China may challenge the
transparency of trade agreements or protection of intellectual
property rights by expanding the already large number of unfair
and non-competitive regulations imposed on those firms that do
business in or with China.
43. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, how likely is China
to undertake any escalatory actions in the next 2 to 3 years?
Admiral Davidson. Chinese leaders have been--and will
certainly remain--committed to aggressively changing the status
quo in many areas through economic, diplomatic, military, and
informational activities, which unfortunately can include
coercion and/or threats. I think we should expect China will
engage in many activities, that depending on the circumstances
and location could be considered ``escalatory.'' A few examples
might be deploying to and operating combat aircraft from the
three Spratly Island airfields; pressuring Taiwan's diplomatic
partners to switch formal recognition to Beijing by economic or
diplomatic means; establishing additional overseas bases by
exploiting host nation debt to China; or fielding potentially
destabilizing military capabilities (such as space-based
weapons).
RUSSIA'S GOALS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
44. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, while much of the
public focus regarding the Indo-Pacific focuses on China and
North Korea, you noted in your written testimony that Russia
remains a power in the Indo-Pacific. What are Russia's goals in
the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. Russia's strategic goals in the Indo-
Pacific are consistent with its aspirations as a global power--
namely, to protect its sovereignty, strengthen its economic
relationships, project a powerful military deterrent, and
expand its regional influence while simultaneously offsetting
United States influence. Moscow views the Indo-Pacific region
as key to its prosperity and great power status, particularly
as it seeks to overcome diplomatic isolation and mitigate the
effect of Western economic sanctions.
45. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, what is Russia's
strategy to realize their goals in the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Davidson. Russia pursues activities across the
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spectrums to
further its goals in the region. In military activity, Russia
uses long-range bomber patrols, naval diplomacy, exercises with
Indo-Pacific nations, and foreign military sales to advance its
interests. Additionally, Russia is modernizing its Far East
military capabilities across the services. More capable
aircraft, surface ships, and submarines will be operational in
the Pacific in the months ahead, while infrastructure
improvements are also made to improve airfields and bases in
the Arctic and Kuril Islands. On the diplomatic front, Russian
leaders are increasingly engaging regional counterparts--
whether bilaterally or through multilateral institutions such
as ASEAN--In an effort to expand Moscow's political and
economic influence.
46. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, what are Russia's goals
specific to the Korean Peninsula?
General Abrams. Russia's strategic objective on the Korean
Peninsula is to maintain the status quo of two separate Korean
political entities. Russia shares a border with the DPRK, and
has an interest in ensuring potential DPRK internal instability
does not cross the border via refugees or a humanitarian
crisis. Russia also has an interest in undermining the U.S.
alliance network and the current rules-based international
order. Historically, Russia has been an active actor in
diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of North
Korea going back to the Six-Party Talks era. Additionally,
Russia is seen as enforcing elements of standing sanctions on
North Korea, but could do more to prevent North Korea's efforts
to circumvent those sanctions.
47. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, what are some
specific steps the United States can take in the Indo-Pacific
to ensure that Russia's goals, where they run counter to the
interests of the United States and the broader international
community, are not realized?
Admiral Davidson. We must continue to conduct consistent,
persistent operations throughout the Indo-Pacific as a
deterrent, demonstrating the readiness, modernity, and
lethality of all of our capability and capacity. To the extent
we do this with Allies and Partners, the outcomes are more
substantive. Every action we take with Allies and Partners--
especially our suite of bilateral and multi-lateral exercises--
provides a meaningful check against Russian influence. As with
China, one area where we possess a distinct advantage against
Russia is with our values. The region desires a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific, the region knows that we are a reliable ally and
that China and Russia are the greatest threats to a free and
open lndo-Pacific. All of our messaging should incorporate this
theme.
SPECIAL MEASURES AGREEMENT
48. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, the week of the hearing
the United States and South Korea signed a new Special Measures
Agreement that increased the share of the cost paid by South
Korea to keep United States troops on the peninsula. The
agreement is only for 1 year, instead of the 5-year deal that
has traditionally been agreed to by the United States and South
Korea. Does the inability to reach a 5-year deal create a point
of conflict in the overall relationship between the United
States and Korea?
General Abrams. The ROK began its direct monetary
contribution to the Alliance in 1991. The 10th Special Measures
Agreement (SMA) was signed on March 8th. Once ratified by the
ROK National Assembly, this agreement will provide the
framework for ROK support for the next year. The SMAs have
varied in length over the past three decades. This is the first
one-year agreement, and while a longer-duration agreement may
bring more stability and predictability to our fiscal budgeting
processes, the period it covers does not negatively impact the
ROK-United States Alliance. The Alliance will remain strong
under the 2019 SMA, and will build on this strength with the
next SMA in 2020.
49. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, does the inability to
reach a 5-year deal on the Special Measures Agreement disrupt
or impede the military relationship you and your forces have
with the South Korean military?
General Abrams. The ROK-United States military Alliance is
stronger than ever and is grounded in decades of shared
sacrifice and a foundation of shared values. The Alliance
recently conducted the first of our new DONG MAENG exercises.
The combined command post exercise provided an outstanding
opportunity for ROK-United States senior leaders and staff
members to come together to solve problems under the simulated
stresses and challenges of crisis and contingency conditions.
Additionally, our combined force continue to train and exercise
during numerous unit and component-level events throughout the
year. Close and frequent combined interactions assure that our
Alliance remains ironclad and will continue to do so under the
2019 SMA, and will build on this strength as our Department of
State negotiates the next SMA in 2020.
50. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, would a new 5-year
agreement negotiated by the end of this year improve the United
States-South Korean relationship, both diplomatic and military?
General Abrams. The Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) have
varied in length over the past three decades. While a longer-
duration agreement may bring more stability and predictability
to our fiscal budgeting processes, the period it covers does
not negatively impact the ROK-United States Alliance.
Regardless of the length of the agreement, the Alliance will
remain strong and the ROK and United States will continue the
critical work of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER
COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Kaine,
King, Heinrich, Warren, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the
posture of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
and the United States Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
I'd like to welcome our witnesses: The Honorable Owen West,
whom I met for the first time today; General Tony Thomas, who
is planning to retire, somebody told me--and I think you're far
too young to retire, but that's up to you, and particularly,
you have two sons that are West Point graduates. You don't need
to cut them loose that soon, and then General Nakasone. I
appreciate very much the fact that, in the last couple of days,
we've had both open and closed meetings because of the
seriousness of the thing we'll be addressing this morning.
The Senate Armed Service Committee's top priority is to
support the effective implementation of the National Defense
Strategy (NDS). Central to the NDS is a growing focus on
competition with China and Russia, our peer competitors. Of
course, we also, at the same time, don't want to forget about
the threat that's posed to us from the terrorist organizations.
Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven remarkably
effective in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups over the last 17
years. However, these groups remain resilient and continue to
pose a real threat to the United States and our allies. At the
same time, the military advancements by China and Russia pose
new and increasingly complex challenges to our national
security.
When you talk to people out in the real world in America,
there's this assumption that we have the best of everything.
It's hard to explain, sometimes, that we don't. When we have
our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) talking about
how we are actually outranged and outgunned by our adversaries
in artillery we are advancing, and are ahead of us in some
areas.
Another critical component of implementing the NDS is
developing robust capabilities to counter growing threats in
cyberspace. The Department of Defense (DOD) is making important
progress, including the elevation of the Cyber Command to a
fully combatant command and the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF)
achieving full operational capability. Additionally, DOD
released a new Cyber Strategy last year that provides a roadmap
over how we will operate in the cyber domain. I look to our
witnesses to describe what investments will be needed to meet
these objectives.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming our witnesses for this update on the
readiness and the posture of U.S. Special Operations and U.S.
Cyber Command.
General Thomas, I'd also like to thank you for your
extraordinary service and your coming retirement after 39 years
in service. You've ably led SOCOM during difficult times.
You've done it with great energy, great foresight, and great
dedication to the men and women you lead. I thank you for that.
I also want to thank your family, because they served alongside
you, and they continue to serve with you. Nice to see that your
sons got good educations, also. So, thank you.
General Nakasone, this is your first time to appear before
the Committee since Cyber Command's been elevated to a unified
command. Congratulations on this. Also congratulations on your
accomplishments, in partnership with National Security Agency
(NSA) and other agencies recently, in combating some of our
adversaries in the cyber sphere. Thank you very much, sir.
SOCOM is unique within the Department of Defense as the
only functional combatant command with service-like
responsibilities for the training, equipping, organizing, and
readiness of Special Operations Forces. For that reason, it's
appropriate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Long-Intensity Conflict, the ASD SOLIC, Owen
West joins us today in his role as the Service Secretary-like
official responsible for oversight. So, welcome, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you.
Since passage of the ASD SOLIC reforms contained in the
2017 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD has made important
progress, including hiring additional personnel and more
effectively integrating the ASD SOLIC into departmental
processes related to budgeting, acquisition, readiness, and
personnel management. These efforts are necessary, but not
sufficient, to fulfill the intent of the SOLIC reforms.
Secretary West and General Thomas, I hope you will provide your
assessment of what more needs to be done and how this Committee
can continue to support your efforts.
SOCOM, as a microcosm of the broader Department and Joint
Force, continues to adjust the complex security environment and
the focus of the National Defense Strategy on great-power
competition. This change will have implications for the
Department's management of SOF forces, their readiness,
capabilities, and development, and the operational authority
that they have to undertake. As the demand for SOF continues to
grow, we must also keep in mind that there are limits to the
hardships we can ask Special Operations Forces and their
families to endure. The United States, along with our allies
and partners, face an urgent and continuing threat from
information warfare attacks by Russia and other foreign
adversaries. Russia attacked our democracy in 2016, and we must
view these attacks with the same level of seriousness and
resolve as a military attack.
While we appear to have had some success in countering
Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections, we should
not take this as a sign that we can let our guard down. We must
do more to anticipate and counter these increasingly
sophisticated attacks, including by ensuring we are properly
organized across the U.S. Government and inside the Department
of Defense. General Thomas and General Nakasone, your commands
sit at the nexus of DOD efforts to operate more effectively in
the information environment, and I hope you will give a full
assessment of what has been accomplished to integrate
capabilities and authorities in this arena, and what gaps
remain.
With respect to CYBERCOM, while much progress has been made
in the last year, many serious challenges remain. DOD has
developed what appears to be a viable cyber strategy and has
conducted a serious cyber posture review. This posture review
identified gaps in capabilities across the enterprise, and the
principal cyber advisor's (PCAs) cross-functional team is
defining objectives, specific tasks, resources, and timetables
to correct them. When completed, these activities should
greatly increase the Department's cybersecurity and the
effectiveness of Cyber Command.
The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) explicitly established that unacknowledged activities in
cyberspace conducted below the level of armed conflict are a
legal form of so-called traditional military activities. The
NDAA also provided authority to the President to take action
against sustained campaigns of specific adversaries against the
United States, including Russia's malign influence campaign.
This legislation, along with a recent presidential directive,
provided DOD and Cyber Command with the needed authority to
plan and conduct more vigorous actions in cyberspace to defend
the country.
To support such operations, Cyber Command has developed an
operational concept to employ so-called persistent engagement,
in line with the National Defense Strategy. This is an
important milestone, which I hope will provide an even more
effective model for engaging our adversaries without undue risk
of escalation. General Nakasone, I look forward to hearing more
about this operational concept.
We have come a long way, but we have a long way to go
further. I know, with General Nakasone's leadership, General
Thomas's leadership, and soon-to-be-General Clark's leadership,
and with Secretary West, we'll continue forward.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We'd now have opening statements. We're going to try to
confine our remarks to 5 minutes.
We'll start with you, General Thomas, and work across to
General Nakasone.
Okay. All right, I've just been corrected. We're going to
start with Secretary West.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE OWEN O. WEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Secretary West. Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Everyone's pointing at you, anyway, so----
[Laughter.]
Secretary West. Senator Reed, Chairman Inhofe,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify alongside my partner, General Tony
Thomas, on our global posture for our Nation's Special
Operations enterprise. Tony's command of SOCOM has safeguarded
the Nation for 3 years. I look forward to continued progress,
working with Richard Clark, when he assumes command next month.
We're honored today to team with General Paul Nakasone,
whose command defends the Nation at the leading edge of the
modern battlefield.
The breadth and capability of our Special Operations Force
is astonishing. In over 80 countries, this vanguard force
tackles our most pressing challenges in the most hostile
environments. In the past 2 years, 23 SOF personnel have been
killed in action, and many more have sustained life-altering
injuries. Representing just 3 percent of the Joint Force, SOF
have absorbed over 40 percent of U.S. casualties in this time.
This sacrifice serves as a powerful reminder that special
operators are in the risk business. Their families carry the
burden of individual tragedy so that we might prevent a
national tragedy.
This is a unique time to serve the SOF enterprise, because
it is at an inflection point. First, the section 922
legislation has reinvigorated the partnership between my office
and SOCOM. Second, the National Defense Strategy has challenged
all of DOD to increase focus on long-term strategic competition
with Russia and China.
The SOF enterprise is in the midst of transformation,
something special operators have always done very well. Any
transformation starts with people. In November, General Thomas
and I issued the first-ever joint vision for the SOF
enterprise, challenging professionals to innovate relentlessly
in pursuit of decisive competitive advantage. Special
Operations should be viewed as an integral point of the Joint
Force, designed to quickly and cost-effectively solve risky
problems that do not lend themselves to mass or scale.
General Thomas has made tremendous progress in reducing the
strain caused by the high operational tempo and demand. At the
height of the wars, a large proportion of the force was
spending as much time overseas as in the United States. This
year, over 90 percent of the force will spend at least twice as
much time in the United States as they will on deployment. I'm
proud to report to you that our Special Operations Force is
neither overstretched nor breaking, but very healthy, poised
and eager to defend the Nation against increasingly adaptive
foes.
Despite this clear progress, General Thomas and I are
concerned about serious ethical failings by some members of our
SOF community. These incidents have our full attention. They
are totally unacceptable and do not reflect the true nature of
the SOF professional.
Finally, I would like to thank General Thomas for 39 years
of service, much of it in combat. From 2001 to 2013, he
deployed to Afghanistan every year, except for one in which he
was wounded in Iraq. His relentless desire to defend the Nation
is an inspiration to us all. He epitomizes quiet
professionalism as a public official, but, in leading his
troops and behind Pentagon doors, he is not shy. He
consistently demonstrates blunt intellectual integrity that has
personally inspired me. Our Nation will miss him. His wife,
Barbara, less so now, and probably less in a year.
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to testify
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary West follows:]
Prepared Statement by The Honorable Owen West
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
our global posture for the Department of Defense's Special Operations
Enterprise. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus
on my statutory authority within the administrative chain of command
for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) overseeing the Special
Operations Forces (SOF) Enterprise. Today, the SOF Enterprise is
prepared to address the most pressing security challenges our Nation
faces. I'm honored to have General Tony Thomas as a partner. His
command has safeguarded this Nation for the past three years. I look
forward to continued progress working with General Richard Clarke when
he assumes command next month.
Having served in this capacity for the past year, I am humbled by
the daily service and sacrifice of the over 70,000 soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civil servants who comprise the SOF Enterprise.
Its breadth and capability is astonishing. In over 80 countries, this
vanguard force tackles our Nation's most pressing national security
challenges, from Salafi Jihadism to great power competition. These
guardians often serve in hostile environments. In the past two years,
23 SOF personnel have been killed in action, while many more have
sustained life-altering injuries. Special operations personnel, just
three percent of the Joint Force, have absorbed over 40 percent percent
of the total U.S. casualties. This sacrifice serves as a powerful
reminder that special operators are in the risk business. Their
families carry the burden of individual tragedy so that we might
prevent a national tragedy.
This is a unique time to serve the SOF Enterprise because it is an
inflection point. First, the section 922 legislation has reinvigorated
my office's role in overseeing and advocating for the SOF Enterprise.
Second, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) has challenged all of
DOD to deter rogue regimes and defeat terrorist networks while placing
new focus on the long-term strategic competition with Russia and China.
The SOF Enterprise is in the midst of transformation, something special
operators have always done very well.
alignment of sof capabilities to nds objectives
The NDS calls on us to ensure our special operations capabilities
will compete--and win--in today's complex national security
environment. The NDS emphasizes the importance of counterterrorism in
protecting our Homeland from threats to our core national interests,
while prioritizing investments that restore a decisive competitive
advantage with our principal strategic competitors. In November,
General Thomas and I issued the first-ever joint vision for the SOF
Enterprise. We challenged our SOF professionals to innovate
relentlessly in pursuit of decisive competitive advantage. Our enemies
have scattered from the conventional battlefield. SOF is a fast-
adapting, full-spectrum force, uniquely capable of imposing costs on
our adversaries wherever their threat resides and whatever form it
takes.
As the Department implements the NDS's vision for strategic
competition, the SOF Enterprise must adapt to meet the demands of our
modern security environment. In this environment, both state and non-
state actors threaten our national security interests with increasingly
sophisticated and asymmetric capabilities below the level that would
provoke a U.S. conventional response. SOF's unique capabilities,
understanding of the threat environment, and interagency and
international partnerships are critically important in addressing these
challenges.
My team, in coordination with USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, the
Services, and combatant commands, is working to institutionalize our
approach to irregular warfare across the Department to meet the demands
of an evolving and increasingly complex security environment. Although
irregular warfare remains a core SOF competency, successful irregular
warfare in competition short of armed conflict and against high-threat
violent extremist organizations will continue to require support across
the entire Joint Force and close cooperation with our interagency
partners.
Even as we and international partners eliminate ISIS's physical
caliphate, the threat from international terrorists to our interests at
home and abroad persists. SOF are essential to direct action against
high-value targets, supporting key allies and partners, and deterring
state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using
weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, Southwest Asia and the
Middle East will continue to be the focus of these efforts, but,
because these transnational threat networks operate globally, USSOCOM's
worldwide reach will be essential to confronting them.
Enabling free peoples to fight for mutually shared interests is the
original core competency of SOF. Reassuring allies and building and
sustaining partnerships remain critical to accomplishing our national
security objectives. Along with general purpose forces' increasing role
in security cooperation, SOF provide the Joint Force with deep
cultural, linguistic, stabilization, and operational expertise to build
the capacity of our partners and allies and develop lasting
relationships. SOF also provide critical stabilization expertise and
capability, assisting the interagency in addressing instability across
much of Africa and the Middle East. From Eastern Europe to South Korea
and from Colombia to North Africa, SOF presence and partnerships
support United States national security interests in key regions.
As the NDS notes, the surest way to prevent a war is to be prepared
to win one. In this strategic context, SOF personnel, capabilities,
agility, and technological advantages help enable decisive combat power
as an integral part of the Joint Force. We have long recognized that
the vast majority of special operations depend upon a broad array of
Service-provided capabilities. At the same time, SOF's role as part of
the Joint Force in a traditional wartime construct is critically
important in disrupting our adversaries' operations, creating complex
dilemmas and imposing asymmetric costs. Special Operations should not
be viewed as distinct but an integral part of the force with a unique
role derived from its basic value proposition: quickly and cost-
effectively solving risky problems that do not lend to mass or scale.
Within this strategic partnership with the Services, SOF capabilities
serve as a fulcrum that help maximize the effectiveness of the Joint
Force.
USSOCOM is an exceptional National investment. Representing
approximately two percent of the overall Defense budget, USSOCOM
provides extraordinary leverage to national security. In a
transformative era, our basic obligation is to tie USSOCOM's fiscal
strategy with its future operating concept, driving budget discipline
and delivering downstream performance. The section 922 reforms have
bolstered this effort. To optimize the efficiency and performance of
every dollar spent, we foster a culture of performance, accountability,
and innovation, and the section 922 reforms have strengthened our
oversight to better inform budgetary and programmatic decision-making.
As a starting point, the SOF Enterprise capability and program guidance
is now jointly issued by the Commander, USSOCOM and myself. My office
is now responsible for approving USSSOCOM's Program Objective
Memorandum five-year budget plan and is also now authorized to approve
and submit program and budget review issue papers on behalf of the SOF
Enterprise.
With fiscal strategy aligned with future concepts, the SOF value
proposition as an integral part of the Joint Force is reinforced. Over
the years, SOF has also developed a culture of innovation, driving a
battlefield technical revolution in developing a surveillance-strike
capability that no competitor can quickly replicate. Protecting the
nation against a terrorist attack remains our enduring task.
Additionally, we must meet the challenge as a vanguard force in great
power competition.
readiness and resilience of the force
The SOF Enterprise has enhanced its readiness by balancing
deployments and dwell-time for strained units, modernizing equipment
and capabilities, aligning our efforts with NDS priorities, and
investing in the well-being of SOF members and their families.
Since 2001, SOF has expanded from approximately 45,000 to over
70,000 personnel. As we focus on our core tasks and responsibilities in
implementing the NDS, today's SOF is ready and capable to conduct major
contingency operations with the Joint Force, conduct and respond to
irregular warfare, and provide national leadership with options for
responses to high-priority crises. We have prioritized investments in
technologies to enhance lethality and effectiveness of the force,
focusing our modernization on precision strike, directed energy,
artificial intelligence, close-combat lethality, cyber and space
operations.
To improve its readiness for contingencies across the vast spectrum
of warfare, General Thomas has made tremendous progress in reducing the
strain caused by the high operational tempo of certain SOF units. Not
long ago, it was common for many SOF units and personnel to operate on
a 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratio. For example, a typical Green Beret
could have expected to spend six months deployed followed by only six
months in the U.S. before redeploying. This high tempo strained our
personnel and their families and eroded our long-term readiness. Given
that the demand for SOF from the geographic combatant commands will
likely remain high, we must ensure that these forces are provided on a
sustainable basis. I am proud to report that SOF is a healthy force,
and the men and women who comprise this force are prepared to deploy to
combat at a moment's notice in defense of our Nation.
Through General Thomas's leadership, we continue to make progress
toward our 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio target for the Enterprise,
and, today, 90 percent of our deployed forces are at or above this
target, allowing more time to train for the full spectrum of special
operations missions and increasing the time our people spend at home
with their families. However, we still have more progress to make.
Approximately 10 percent of our force remains below a 1:2 deployment-
to-dwell ratio. Many of these personnel are high-demand/low-density
specialists performing crucial functions. Thanks to the support of
Congress and the Department, we have plans in place for small and
targeted end-strength growth that will reduce the strain on these
essential skillsets.
My primary concern regarding SOF readiness is our ability to
continue to attract top talent and retain our high-quality personnel.
While the challenges SOF face in this area generally mirror those of
the Services overall, our challenges will likely be magnified given the
necessary experience levels of our people and our generally lengthy
training pipelines. We are addressing current and projected shortfalls
by offering special pay and incentives for high-demand career fields,
improving recruitment and marketing practices, and optimizing our
training pipelines.
Through efforts such as Preservation of the Force and Family
(POTFF), as well as Service-specific programs and activities, we are
enhancing the resilience of SOF personnel and their families. As a
community, we are only as good as our people, and that includes the
well-being of our families. Programs and resources like these help
families overcome significant physical, mental, and emotional
difficulties that accompany deployments. POTFF resources help shorten
recovery time toward healthy and productive lives, in and out of
service.
culture and accountability
Despite this clear progress, General Thomas and I are concerned
about serious ethical failings by some members of our SOF community.
Such incidents erode morale of our force, confidence of our allies and
partners, and the moral authority of American values. In other words,
moral failings are not individual but can impact our large-scale
mission. While these specific incidents are being addressed by
appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, General Thomas and I are working
to identify any potential systemic problems and to enhance policies
that hold leaders and individuals accountable. Because SOF operate at
the forefront of highly complex military operations in remote and high-
threat environments, we must maintain the highest standards of personal
conduct, and the recent joint guidance General Thomas and I have issued
emphasizes the standards of trustworthiness and accountability we
expect from our SOF community. SOF is a mature and elite force and it
will be held to the highest standards--and those standards include
professionalism, ethics, and accountability. My office is currently
conducting a review of SOF professionalism and ethics, as required by
the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, which is due to Congress next month.
These incidents have our full attention. We also recognize that
they do not reflect the true nature of the SOF professional. When I
visit with our SOF servicemembers at home and in the field, their
selfless energy and devotion to mission are clearly evident, and they
are exemplars of American values when deployed overseas.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by, again, thanking the Committee for
supporting SOF with the legislation and appropriations essential to
combating terrorists, building critical partnerships, and enabling the
Joint Force. Finally, I would like to thank General Thomas for 39 years
of distinguished Military Service and for his partnership in leading
our Nation's Special Operations Enterprise. General Thomas has been an
inspiration to me and countless others in the SOF formation. From 2001
to 2013, he deployed to Afghanistan every year but one in which he
deployed to Iraq, where he was wounded in combat. I have been
particularly impressed with his dedication to ensuring the well-being
of SOF servicemembers and their families. Under his command over the
past three years, USSOCOM continues to field the most professional,
most highly trained, best equipped, and most effective special
operations warriors in the world.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Now General Thomas.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND A. THOMAS III, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Thomas. Chairman Inhofe, Senator Reed, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm grateful for the
opportunity to speak to you today on the posture of United
States Special Operations Command.
I'm privileged to be here today with Assistant Secretary
Owen West as well as my friend and teammate, General Paul
Nakasone, from CYBERCOM. Since its inception, we have enjoyed a
tremendous relationship with the world-class team at U.S. Cyber
Command and have forged the type of partnership, reinforced in
combat, that ensures our absolute collaboration and cooperation
in our shared mission of defending the Nation.
USSOCOM continues to field the world's most capable Special
Operations Forces. We are an integral part of the Joint Force
and integrated into every facet of the National Defense
Strategy. Our numerous successes over the past years would not
have been possible without the support and resources provided
by the Congress. For that, I thank you.
For the last 18 years, our number-one priority has been the
effort against violent extremist organizations (VEOs). As part
of the Joint Force, we continue to be the main effort, or major
supporting effort, in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia,
Libya, the Sahel, the Maghreb, Lake Chad Basin, and the
Philippines. Everywhere ISIS and al Qaeda and affiliated
organizations are, we are relentlessly pursuing them to ensure
this country never, ever endures another 9/11. We remain
focused on finishing this effort by, with, and through our many
coalition partners.
At the same time, again, as part of the Joint Force, we are
endeavoring to provide a more lethal and capable Special
Operations Force to confront peer competitors. USSOCOM is
already well-oriented to the challenges of great-power
competition, particularly in the competition space short of
armed conflict. Our SOF network, integrated with interagency
and international partners, is focused on producing unorthodox,
yet complementary, capabilities and solutions in support of
U.S. policies and objectives. We continue to maintain strong,
enduring international partnerships while leveraging
authorities in core expertise to convert indigenous mass into
combat power to deter, deny, disrupt, and ultimately defeat our
adversaries.
To build a more lethal force, strengthen our alliances and
partnerships, and reform for greater performance and
efficiency, we are reshaping and focusing our current forces
and capabilities while simultaneously developing new
technological and tactical approaches to accomplish the diverse
missions that SOF will face in the future. The joint SOLIC-
USSOCOM SOF vision that Assistant Secretary West mentioned is
our guide to move us forward. The emerging security challenges
will require SOCOM to be an organization of empowered SOF
professionals, globally networked, partnered, and integrated,
and relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain for the
Joint Force and the Nation.
In addition to our service-like responsibility to man,
train, and equip the world's most capable Special Operations
Forces, over the past few years USSOCOM has experienced
considerable development in our other legislative role as a
combatant command. We are currently assigned the role as the
coordinating authority for three major global mission sets:
counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
and, recently, messaging/countermessaging. These roles require
us to lead planning efforts, continually assess Joint Force
progress towards campaign objectives, and recommend
improvements or modifications to our campaign approach to the
Secretary of Defense. In parallel, USSOCOM has begun pursuing
an aggressive partnership with the other combatant commands
with global portfolios--CYBERCOM, here today, Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. Space
Command (SPACECOM)--designed to leverage our respective
capabilities towards providing more agile solutions to the
Department of Defense.
SOF has a long tradition of solving hard problems, adapting
to changing conditions, and fielding innovative technology and
tactics to give us the decisive advantage in combat. We believe
that this tradition will continue to serve us well in the
future. We are increasing our investments in a wide spectrum of
emerging technologies, to include artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning, automated systems, advanced robotics,
augmented reality, biomedical monitoring, and advanced armor
and munitions development, just to name a few.
We are in the formative stages of establishing an
experimental force, which will more coherently focus and
integrate our future force development in the pursuit of the
required peer-competitor capabilities. Leveraging our proven
ability to rapidly develop and field cutting-edge technology
flowing from our focus on the tactical edge of combat, this
joint experimentation initiative will bring together innovative
efforts from across our Special Operations Force tactical
formations to ensure that commanders' combat requirements are
addressed with the most advanced concepts and equipment
available.
Finally, in 44 days, I'm scheduled to relinquish command of
the greatest Special Operations Force in history. I know that
sounds a bit haughty, but the men and women of USSOCOM back
that statement up every day. They represent the best that
America has to offer, an exceptionally dedicated, effective,
and resilient group of warriors and problem-solvers. I'd like
to publicly thank them for the opportunity to be their
teammate. It has been an incredible privilege to serve with
them over the course of 39 years of service.
I'd like to also personally thank Command Sergeant Major
Pat McCauley, our SOCOM Senior Enlisted Advisor, appearing with
me again today, for his service as a critical member of the
SOCOM command team. Pat is the epitome of the best that USSOF
has to offer, and, in a few short months, will conclude 30
years of faithful and devoted service to the United States
Army, United States Special Operations Command, and the Nation.
During his distinguished career, he's inspired many by his
personal courage on the battlefield, his sage counsel to
commanders and leaders at every level of command, and his moral
and physical leadership. He represents everything that is great
about this Command--most importantly, our people.
Thanks again for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Thomas follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Raymond A. Thomas, III
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Senator Reed, and distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for this opportunity to inform you on the posture
of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and your Special
Operations Forces (SOF). USSOCOM continues to field ready and capable
SOF to conduct global operations as an integral part of the Joint Force
against state and non-state threats to America and its interests, and
to advance U.S. policy objectives. We greatly appreciate the consistent
support of the Congress in this endeavor.
Since my last address, USSOCOM has focused its efforts on
addressing the defense and security threats and challenges from near-
peer competitors as well as violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
identified in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) along the directed
lines of effort: building a more lethal force, strengthening
relationships, and reforming our institution for more efficient
performance. Consequently, we are re-shaping our current forces and
capabilities even as we develop new technological and tactical
approaches for our diverse missions. Toward this end, Assistant
Secretary West and I co-authored a shared US SOF vision to guide us
into the future. In short, it directs that USSOCOM must be an
organization of empowered SOF professionals, who are globally
networked, partnered and integrated, and relentlessly seek advantage in
every domain for the Joint Force and the Nation. To achieve this
vision, we are embarking on a path I will outline for you today.
sof vision--``empowered sof professionals . . . ''
Our vision recognizes the enduring truth that ``humans are more
important than hardware'' by emphasizing that our people--more than
platforms--are the source of our decisive advantage. To that end, we
continue to recruit, assess, select and retain the Nation's finest
human potential. We empower them with training, technology and
authorities to solve some of the most complex and dangerous mission
challenges. We steward people throughout their careers and their
transition out of service, placing a special emphasis on resiliency by
providing exceptional care to them and their families.
We appreciate your support of SOCOM's Preservation of the Force and
Family (POTFF) programs through the authorities and funding provided.
Over the past seven years we have made substantial improvements in the
readiness and resilience of our force and their families.
As we address core issues of high operations tempo and personnel
tempo, we are better suited to holistically address their impacts on
our people. Last year, I referred to POTFF as ``our stay well plan.''
This year I would go further and echo the sentiment of my commanders
across the SOF enterprise and say that it is our lifeblood. POTFF
resources fuel our ability to continue meeting today's operational
demands and enables longer, more productive careers in SOF. I am more
convinced than ever that this is the right thing to do, and that the
embedded, multidisciplinary model of POTFF is the right way to do it.
So strong is my conviction, that I have directed mandatory
participation in the physical and psychological services of POTFF for
all SOF members.
In order to execute this program in all of its aspects, we plan to
add additional behavioral health and psychological performance
resources. We also plan to expand our Human Performance efforts to
address rehabilitative needs. Our POTFF programs must be agile and
innovative, taking advantage of advancements in medicine, psychology
and data science. I hope we can rely on your continued support as SOCOM
moves forward with these program improvements.
USSOCOM is appreciative of Congress' sustained support for our
Warrior Care Program. Wounds, injury, and illness threaten the ability
of our SOF personnel and their families to continue to serve. Our
Warrior Care Program--the largest in the Department of Defense with
over 15,000 participants--contributes to the resiliency of our force by
providing advocacy and care coordination through the recovery and
rehabilitation process, returning SOF professionals to the fight, and
restoring their families' footing as rapidly as possible.
We continue to make strides in managing the Deployment-to-Dwell
(D2D) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) of our personnel. Based on
updated Department guidance, SOF formations are now focused on
achieving a minimum of a 1:2 ratio and with the exception of a select
few critical skill sets and career fields, the vast majority of SOF
deploy at or above the deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:2. This guidance
is driving ongoing efforts to optimize our current force generation
models to ensure SOF will continue to provide ready forces at a
consistent and sustainable rate to meet the NDS and National Military
Strategy (NMS) objectives. A planned increase of personnel in fiscal
year 2019-2020 will help close current gaps among our enabler forces.
These additional support personnel, and adherence to a 1:2 rate for
Active and 1:5 for Reserve Forces, will ensure SOF can sustain our
support to future geographic combatant commander requirements with the
capabilities they require.
The nature of our special operations missions brings a high
expectation that USSOF will operate with the highest standards of
ethics and honor. We are working closely with ASD West to complete the
assessment of culture and accountability within the USSOCOM enterprise
mandated by Congress. On January 1st of this year, we began a 90-day
internal focus on core values. Commands are reviewing programs of
instruction for opportunities to address SOF culture and implement
values-based decision making to reinforce moral courage. Command teams
at the battalion/squadron level and above will conduct direct
engagements with their personnel on the cultural climate of their
units. Our goal is that all of our special operations teammates operate
in a culture that is mission-focused and undistracted by misconduct,
harassment, or abuse. 99.9% of the USSOCOM teammates continue to serve
with honor and distinction as our ethos demands. That is 0.1% short of
our goal. We will not be complacent and will push forward our efforts
to inculcate and reinforce our core values.
sof vision--``globally networked, partnered and integrated . . . ''
SOF is an integral part of the Joint Force and the whole-of-
government effort that must successfully compete on a global scale.
USSOCOM provides critical coordination and assessment functions for the
Department's operations and activities against VEOs and WMD threats.
And SOF's worldwide access and placement and our networks and
partnerships enable the Department to understand adversary actions and
intent and to respond across the spectrum of competition, especially
beneath the threshold of conflict where our competitors such as Russia
and China continue to hone their skills and advance their strategic
objectives.
As the Coordinating Authority (CA) for the C-VEO mission, USSOCOM
collaboratively works with geographic and global functional combatant
commands on the Global Campaign Plan for counter-VEO operations (GCP-
V). USSOCOM provides an annual assessment on VEO trends--which we have
just completed--and the Joint Force's progress towards campaign
objectives. Along with this assessment, we make recommendations on
campaign adjustments to the Secretary of Defense. To facilitate GCP-V
execution, USSOCOM integrates Joint Force, Interagency, and partner
nations' activities into a unified effort, the Transregional
Synchronization Forum (TRSF). Current campaign efforts are focused on
disrupting the financial, messaging, and foreign terrorist fighter
networks that enable and sustain VEOs. Severing these conduits will
degrade and disrupt VEO attacks against the U.S. Homeland, our
interests, and against our allies and partners.
Similarly, as the CA for countering weapons of mass destruction
(CWMD), we continue to develop and refine our capabilities to execute
CWMD campaigns. We completed and signed the DOD Functional Campaign
Plan to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction last November. This
campaign nests under, cross-cuts, and complements the NDS, the NMS, and
global and other functional campaigns across the Department. Our
USSOCOM CWMD Fusion Cell guides and coordinates the planning and
assessments of CWMD campaign execution, and makes recommendations to
the Chairman and Secretary of Defense on actions to disrupt and deter
adversary WMD programs.
USSOCOM also now has the mission to field a transregional Military
Information Support Operations (MISO) capability to address the
opportunities and risks of the global information space--one of the
domains that challenges the Department's command and control
boundaries. By April of this year, the Joint MISO WebOps Center (JMWC)
will be operating in close coordination with the interagency and
alongside combatant command teams to provide global messaging
capabilities to a broader portion of the Joint Force and beyond CVEO
themes. The JMWC will support the combatant commands with improved
messaging and assessment capabilities, shared situational awareness of
adversary influence activities, and the capability to coordinate
internet-based MISO globally. We remain on track to achieve Initial
Operating Capability in a new temporary facility by the end of fiscal
year 2019.
To help the Joint Force address the complexity of networked,
globalized threats and great power competition, USSOCOM has begun
collaboration with other global-reach combatant commands to provide
integrated options to address these challenges. USSOCOM, Cyber
Command (CYBERCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)--combatant commands whose global
presence and responsibilities shape our perceptions and the
capabilities we provide to the Joint Force--are working toward a model
for integrating our global capabilities more effectively into the
Department's efforts. Our goal is to help close the seams created by
our post-WWII (1946) geographic combatant command framework--seams that
are currently exploited by adversaries who act globally, unencumbered
by similar regional frameworks.
We continue to work with and rely extensively upon the capabilities
provided by DOD. These include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA). I want to draw particular attention to the work of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for their exceptional work in
CWMD and counter-proliferation (CP). DTRA plays an integral role in
creating shared awareness of the threat that supports our campaign
planning. We are also working closely with them on the very pressing
and expanding asymmetric threat of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
by VEOs and state actors is a significant concern to the Joint Force.
USSOCOM fully endorses DTRA's initiatives to understand and counter
this threat and is working with them on several fronts toward this end.
Beyond our national collaborative efforts, USSOCOM also extends its
network abroad to engage willing international partners, as well.
USSOCOM hosts highly qualified and talented Special Operations officers
and Non-Commissioned Officers from 24 nations with established SOF
capability, many of whom are contributing combat forces to today's CVEO
efforts. We also maintain US Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLOs)
in 21 countries. These liaison relationships provide agility to a
global network that creates a common understanding of threats, develop
response options, and--in some cases--to develop technology, tactics
and equipment for mutual benefit to our forces.
For developing countries, security cooperation activities are a key
tool for enabling them to tackle threats and challenges of common
concern. USSOCOM appreciates Congressional consolidation of security
cooperation authorities in 10 USC 333. USSOCOM and GCCs have leveraged
this authority to provide partner nations the necessary skills and
equipment to conduct security operations in their own self-defense and
to become more capable partners.
SOF continues to use section 1202 to work by, with, and through
partners, and in support of the geographic combatant commands. This
authority fills a gap in our arsenal at a critical juncture for USSOF,
and as the Joint Force re-orients on NDS threats beyond VEOs. Through
these authorities, we will operationalize select regular and irregular
forces possessing unique access and capabilities to confront peer
competitors--at an appropriate level below armed conflict. Recognizing
the strategic implications of great power competition, we will move
forward deliberately, coordinated with interagency partners, while
providing full transparency to Congress.
sof vision--``relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain to compete
and win . . . ''
In addition to geographic domains, we must fight and win enabled by
the latest technological advancements. The increasingly data-driven,
networked, miniaturized, and automated world where goods, information,
and people move across the globe at a furious pace significantly
impacts virtually every aspect of SOF operations. We need to understand
this impact and embrace and harness the opportunities offered by
technology. Data science, artificial intelligence, automated systems,
and cryptography are no longer restricted or isolated products
available to select powers. They are commodities accessible to all.
Social media and publicly available information presents us with a
world of far fewer shadows for concealment and yet opportunities for
understanding heretofore unseen indicators of adversarial intent or
action. For this reason, to achieve our mission we cannot relent in our
pursuit of capabilities that will sustain and increase our advantage
along the entire spectrum of conflict.
To address these challenges and to seize these opportunities,
USSOCOM is sustaining previous efforts that are proving impactful,
establishing new efforts to provoke change in our workforce culture and
mindset, and intent on confirming our results and findings through an
experimentation force that will ensure that our pursuits remain solidly
in support of our operational success on the battlefield.
In 2018, USSOCOM established the position of Chief Data Officer
(CDO) to lead the integration of artificial intelligence and machine
learning (AI/ML) across the enterprise and create a culture of data-
driven decision making. Our CDO is guiding data governance efforts and
leading engagement with the Defense Digital Service, the Joint
Artificial Intelligence Center, Project Maven, and related activities.
Under the direction of the CDO, USSOCOM is also building a data
engineering lab and operationalizing a Development Operations (DevOps)
environment that enables world-class talent to collaborate and deliver
technical solutions for the SOF enterprise.
Embracing these technologies will allow our workforce to consume
and process data in ways that exceed basic human cognitive capabilities
and reserve our valuable manpower for the tasks that are the
exceptional domain of the human. To maximize the effectiveness of
available technology, we must also address data architecture and data
management as priorities. We will transition to cloud-based data
services and treat our data as a critical, strategic asset. We will
ensure that data is defended from our adversaries while remaining
usable and accessible to those who need it.
To ensure that these changes are rooted in SOF unique requirements
and relevant to our special operations missions and tasks, USSOCOM will
expand the use of wargames, and establish a joint SOF Experimental
Force (EXFOR) within our force structure. The EXFOR will test concepts
developed in our SOF Future Operating Concept alongside technology and
equipment developed from our innovation efforts. The EXFOR will consist
of existing units and personnel from our SOF service components and
operational commands and will serve as the pacing element for the
development and fielding of innovative concepts, equipment, and
tactics.
USSOCOM values its acquisition authority and welcomes recent
legislative acquisition reforms such as expanded authority under
section 2371b and section 803 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority. These
initiatives enable our SOF acquisitions personnel to leverage non-
traditional DOD and commercial markets for emerging technologies and
capabilities. We are also in our fourth year of leveraging the
authority to enter into a Partnership Intermediary Agreement to manage
our SOFWERX efforts. SOFWERX connects a growing ecosystem of over
40,000 traditional, non-traditional, large and small companies,
individuals, academia, and government labs to address capabilities
across SOF mission areas. SOFWERX has conducted over 2,000 events to
include collaborations, hackathons, rapid prototyping, and
experimentation to drive speed and efficiency into our acquisition
processes. We have completed over 96 projects in support of our
Component and Theater Commands. SOFWERX is currently growing its
strategic partnerships across the Services' Rapid Acquisition Offices
and with Other Government Agencies to mitigate redundancy and increase
the speed of delivery of capabilities to DOD.
We are enthusiastically supportive of the initiatives of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) to
streamline policies and procedures within the Department and fully
support her efforts to minimize constraints and promote a more agile
process. We also support her call for improvements in DOD software
development, specifically through increasing the number of program
managers and contracting officers who are conversant in the commercial
processes of this domain. USSOCOM engagements with the Defense Digital
Service has helped us in this regard and we will continue to bring in
``digitally native'' talent for the SOF acquisition workforce. We are
heavily involved with the USD(A&S) effort to increase the use of Other
Transactional Authorities (OTAs), enabling us to interact with non-
traditional vendors in a far more commercial format. In the last year
we have exercised 10 OTAs and will benefit from Defense Acquisition
University's increased emphasis on OTA training.
In the push by USD(A&S) towards increased prototyping under Middle
Tier Acquisition (MTA) rules, USSOCOM comprises 20 percent of the
Department's total MTA effort. We expect this number to increase
substantially in fiscal year 2019. MTAs allow for abbreviated
requirements approval and tailored acquisition approaches. As we move
forward, we are closely adhering to reporting requirements in order to
ensure compliance with the statute.
conclusion
Before I conclude my update, I would like to highlight that USSOCOM
will host the 2019 DOD Warrior Games in Tampa, Florida from June 21st
through June 30th. Approximately 300 wounded, ill and injured
servicemembers and veterans will participate in 11 sporting events. The
Warrior Games were established in 2010 to enhance the recovery and
rehabilitation of our personnel with health challenges. The athletes
will represent the United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force,
and Special Operations Command. Additionally, allied athletes from the
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands will
compete. A large contingent of these athletes' families will also
attend. I invite all of you to attend these games, and join us in
cheering alongside them and honoring their courage and perseverance.
Before I conclude, I want to take a moment to remember the long and
dedicated service of the late Senator John McCain, who chaired this
hearing just over a year ago. Senator McCain was a consummate servant
leader to his Nation--a true statesman and hero who put the interests
of his fellow citizens ahead of his own. His presence is missed but his
impact on our command will never be forgotten.
In closing, I thank the Congress for the steadfast support for
USSOCOM. We are already competing with adversaries and adapting to
complex challenges facing our country and will continue to do so now
and into future.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Thomas.
General Nakasone.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
General Nakasone. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for your
enduring support and the opportunity to testify today about the
hard-working men and women of United States Cyber Command. I'm
honored to lead them.
I'm also honored to sit alongside these great leaders,
Assistant Secretary of Defense West and General Tony Thomas.
For Tony, my congratulations to you and Barb for your
steadfast service to our Nation. It's been a tremendous journey
for you, and I've enjoyed our close partnership and friendship.
My personal best wishes to you, Tony, and your family.
As the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, I'm responsible for
conducting full-spectrum cyberspace operations supporting three
mission areas: defend the Nation against cyberattacks, defend
the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN), and
enable our Joint Force commanders in pursuit of their mission
objectives.
In the cyber domain, we are in constant contact with our
adversaries, who continue to increase in sophistication,
magnitude, intensity, volume, and velocity, and remain a threat
to our national security interests and economic well-being. The
National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense
Strategy highlight the return of great-power competition.
Beyond near-peer competitors, China and Russia, rogue regimes,
like Iran and North Korea, continue to grow their capabilities.
Using aggressive methods to conduct malicious cyberspace
activities, adversaries have, until recently, acted with little
concern for consequences.
The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy identifies the
need to defend forward during day-to-day competition with our
adversaries. This strategy aims to maintain our superiority in
cyberspace through protection of our critical infrastructure
and networks. At U.S. Cyber Command, we implement the DOD
strategy by adopting an approach of persistent engagement,
persistent presence, and persistent innovation. This past year
witnessed the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to combatant
command status, the opening of our Integrated Cyber Center, and
our shift from building the force to the readiness of that
force. This progress ensures our ability to execute our mission
requirements for the Department in defense of our Nation.
The defense of the 2018 midterm elections posed a
significant strategic challenge to our Nation. Ensuring a safe
and secure election was our number-one priority and drove me to
establish a joint United States Cyber Command/National Security
Agency effort we called the Russia Small Group (RSG). The
Russia Small Group tested our new operational approach. With
the organization and direction from the President and Secretary
of Defense (SECDEF), the Russia Small Group enabled
partnerships and action across the government to counter a
strategic threat. Our response demonstrated the value of a
tightknit relationship between United States Cyber Command and
the National Security Agency, bringing together intelligence,
cyber capabilities, interagency partnerships, and the
willingness to act.
Through persistent engagement, we enabled critical
interagency partners to act with unparalleled coordination and
cooperation. Through persistent presence, U.S. Cyber Command
and the National Security Agency contested adversarial actions,
improving early warning and threat identification, in support
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others.
Beyond the interagency, we partnered and engaged with
allies and public and private sectors to build resiliency. For
the first time, we sent our cyberwarriors abroad to secure
networks outside the DOD Information Network. Our operations
allowed us to identify and counter threats as they emerged to
secure our own elections and prevent similar threats
interfering in those of our partners and allies.
The Russia Small Group effort demonstrated that persistent
engagement, persistent presence, and persistent innovation
enable success. Effective cyberdefense requires a whole-of-
nation effort. Information-sharing plays a vital role in
enabling everyone, including government agencies, to defend
their networks. Therefore, we are now sharing computer malware
we find during our routine operations with the private sector
and the broader cybersecurity community. We have posted
numerous malware samples for crowd-sourcing analysis. We
believe our actions will have a positive impact on improving
cybersecurity globally.
Our actions are impacting our adversaries. Our shift in
approach allows us to sustain key competitive advantages while
increasing our cyber capabilities. As we review lessons learned
from securing the midterm elections, we are now focused on
potential threats we could certainly face in 2020.
Looking forward, we need to continue building a warrior
ethos similar to our other warfighting domains. Cyberwarriors
are, and will continue to be, in constant contact with our
adversaries. There are no operational pauses or sanctuaries. We
must ensure sufficient capability and capacity, people,
technology, and infrastructure, which we are decisively focused
on now.
Through persistent presence, we are building a team of
partners that enable us and them to act more effectively. The
complex and rapid pace of change in this environment requires
us to leverage cyber expertise broadly across public and
private sectors, academia, and industry. Therefore, we aspire
to increase our effectiveness and capabilities through
persistent innovation across these partnerships.
Cyberdefense is a team effort. Critical teammates, such as
the National Guard and Reserve, are integral parts of our
cyberforce. They provide strategic depth and provide the Nation
a Reserve capacity of capable cyberwarriors.
Finally, improving readiness continues to be one of my key
focus areas. I continue to work with the services and
Department to actively measure and maintain readiness, manning,
training, and equipping, and certainly an ability to perform
the mission.
After a year of change and progress, we see 2019 as a year
of opportunity. We have much work ahead as CYBERCOM matures. We
assure you that our people merit the trust you have placed in
them and that, with your support, they will accomplish the
tasks that our Nation expects.
Thank you again for inviting me here today on behalf of
U.S. Cyber Command, and for your continued support. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Paul M. Nakasone
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to represent the men and women
of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I am honored to lead them,
and grateful for the opportunity to highlight their accomplishments.
Our Command has seen a year of change and progress, featuring the
elevation of USCYBERCOM to a unified combatant command with an expanded
mission and additional authorities and responsibilities, and the
completion of the build of 133 teams in our Cyber Mission Force (CMF).
We have transitioned from building the force to ensuring its mission
readiness, and in 2018 we enhanced that by opening our new, state-of-
the-art Integrated Cyber Center. Enabled by changes in law and policy,
we have produced defensive and offensive operational successes. My
testimony will summarize threats and opportunities in our strategic
environment, explain how we prepared ourselves to meet them and what we
did, and explain our priorities for the future of a USCYBERCOM that
enables our partners and acts in cyberspace to defend the nation.
USCYBERCOM's task is to plan and execute global cyberspace
operations, activities and missions to defend and advance national
interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners
across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. Our
responsibilities include providing mission assurance for the Department
of Defense by directing the operation and defense of the Department's
information systems (what we call the DODIN); deterring or defeating
strategic threats to national interests and infrastructure; and helping
the combatant commanders achieve their missions in and through
cyberspace. This fiscal year we are executing a budget totaling roughly
$610 million. Our full-time personnel amount to 1,520 military and
civilians, plus contractors. This January we had 4,406 servicemembers
and civilians in our Cyber Mission Force, building to a total of 6,187
people. We also have both Guard and Reserve personnel on Active Duty
serving in our forces.
USCYBERCOM comprises a headquarters organization that directs
operations through its components. These include the Cyber National
Mission Force (CNMF); the Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information
Network (JFHQ-DODIN); and Joint Task Force Ares; plus our Joint Force
headquarters elements, each of which is paired with one of the
Services' cyber components. Those Service components are Army Cyber
Command, Marine Forces Cyberspace Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth
Fleet, Air Force Cyber/24th Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard Cyber.
Our efforts and our continued success depend upon the support of
the Congress and of this Committee. Thank you in advance for the
assistance you are providing us in 2019 as we pursue opportunities in
five areas: (1) Supporting strategic competition; (2) Establishing a
warfighting ethos across the Command; (3) Improving the readiness of
our cyber forces; (4) Enhancing partnerships across government, allies,
and the private sector; and (5) Deploying improved operating
infrastructure.
the strategic environment
Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant
contact with adversaries. The nation faces threats from a variety of
malicious cyber actors, including non-state and criminal organizations,
states, and their proxies. We see near-peer competitors conducting
sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American
strength and gain strategic advantage. USCYBERCOM ensures two critical
capabilities against these threats: it enables partners in whole-of-
nation efforts to build resilience, close vulnerabilities, and defend
critical infrastructure; and it acts against adversaries who can
operate across the full spectrum of cyberspace operations and who
possess the capacity and the will to sustain cyber campaigns against
the United States and its allies.
Renewed Strategic Competition. The National Security Strategy
(2017) emphasized the emergence of great-power competition and noted
its spread into cyberspace. In implementing that guidance, the
Department issued the DOD Cyber Strategy, which described the
environment we face:
We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China
and Russia. These States have expanded that competition to
include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that
pose long term strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our
allies and partners. China is eroding United States military
overmatch and the Nation's economic vitality by persistently
exfiltrating sensitive information from U.S. public and private
sector institutions. Russia has used cyber-enabled information
operations to influence our population and challenge our
democratic processes. Other actors, such as North Korea and
Iran, have similarly employed malicious cyber activities to
harm United States citizens and threaten U.S. interests.
Globally, the scope and pace of malicious cyber activity
continue to rise. The United States' growing dependence on the
cyberspace domain for nearly every essential civilian and
military function makes this an urgent and unacceptable risk to
the Nation [emphasis in original].
I assess we are seeing what we term corrosive threats, in which
malicious cyber actors weaponize personal information, steal
intellectual property, and mount influence campaigns. Such measures
have had and will have strategic effects on our Nation and allies.
Changes in Strategic Guidance and Authorities. USCYBERCOM has
recently improved the scope, speed, and effectiveness of its operations
with the help of legal and policy changes. I want to thank Congress for
its support of DOD's cyberspace operations as reflected in provisions
of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that
enhanced our agility to execute missions consistent with law. We also
received updated policy guidance that, in conjunction with the NDAA
provisions, significantly streamlined the interagency process for
approval of cyber operations and thus facilitated recent activities.
The DOD Cyber Strategy asserts that the Department has a
significant role in defending the nation. To be effective in doing so,
the Strategy mandates that DOD components ``defend forward, shape the
day-to-day competition, and prepare for war,'' enabling the Department
``to compete, deter, and win in the cyberspace domain.'' We must be
active because inaction on our part cedes advantage to capable
adversaries willing to flout international law and impose their own
norms of cyber conduct. In keeping with guidance to defend forward, the
Department is aiming to take the initiative against those who act
against us. The DOD Cyber Strategy states that the Department must be
prepared to defend assertively the functioning of even non-DOD critical
infrastructure systems--whether at home or abroad--that are essential
to project, support, and sustain Departmental forces and operations
worldwide. In practice, this means confronting our adversaries from
where they launch cyber attacks and developing robust capabilities that
are responsive to Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)
activities.
A New Operating Construct. We are implementing the DOD Cyber
Strategy through the strategic approach of persistent engagement, which
includes partnering with other U.S. Government elements to build
resilience into U.S. networks and systems, defending against malicious
cyberspace activities as far forward as possible, and contesting
adversary attempts to disrupt our Nation's key government and military
functions.
Our operators, analysts, developers, leaders, and support
personnel, enabled by new and modified policy guidance, are operating
more effectively in coordination and partnership with other agencies,
partners, and allies. Last fall we supported United States European
Command (USEUCOM), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and others to defend the integrity of America's
2018 mid-term elections. Working together under my command, USCYBERCOM
and the National Security Agency (NSA) undertook an initiative known as
the Russia Small Group to protect the elections from foreign
interference and influence. By enabling our fellow combatant commands
and other partners, USCYBERCOM assisted the collective intelligence and
defense effort that demonstrated persistent engagement in practice. The
tight links between USCYBERCOM and NSA created a mutually beneficial,
intelligence-operations cycle that let us rapidly find and follow
leads, discover new information, and create opportunities to act in
conjunction with partners. Additionally, our co-location in the new
Integrated Cyber Center optimized our collaboration for efforts of this
nature. We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor
adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their
efforts. We shared information through DHS with state election
officials to help identify vulnerabilities and improve threat warning.
We also enabled Department of the Treasury and FBI actions in
conjunction with the private sector, for instance by posting foreign
malware for the first time to VirusTotal, a private site for
crowdsourcing analysis of cyber threats. Finally, working with USEUCOM,
and with the consent of several European countries, we sent defensive
teams forward to conduct operations in support of our mission to help
secure the mid-term elections.
opportunities and challenges for u.s. cyber command
I note the progress we have made during the past year and see
opportunities ahead, with corresponding challenges as well. We have
achieved much under the National Defense Strategy's commitment to
prioritize investments in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued
integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military
operations. We must use our recent successes to inform future
activities, ensuring that accomplishments are not isolated events but
parts of a larger trend of improved operational proficiency.
Supporting Strategic Competition. Cyberspace is a domain in which
opponents can attain strategic results without using armed force. Our
adversaries in cyberspace are acting and taking risks in seeking to
gain advantage without escalating to armed conflict; they are
conducting campaigns to gain cumulative advantage (these include theft
of intellectual property and personal information, malign influence and
election interference, efforts to circumvent sanctions, and probes and
positioning to threaten critical infrastructure).
We see evidence of such cyber campaigns in many places, such as the
foreign efforts to find vulnerabilities in the Department of Defense's
Information Network. JFHQ-DODIN used its authorities to direct global
Department of Defense network operations, security, and defense. By
operationalizing the network sensors, they assessed effectiveness and
risk through focused data analysis. This in turn helped improve the
fidelity of our sensors and analytics, showing us the risks and the
requirements for mitigation. The data JFHQ-DODIN collected in this
effort proved that state-sponsored adversaries in cyberspace are
conducting rapidly evolving campaigns to hamper the routine functions
of the DODIN and to find seams in its defenses. DODIN protections are
robust, but we must continue to innovate in our data collection and
analysis to build resilience and counter the dynamic nature of
adversary threats.
In the face of strategic competition in cyberspace, USCYBERCOM
brings unique advantages in planning, deconflicting, executing, and
assessing cyberspace operations at-scale.
Our efforts in defense of the 2018 elections taught us the value of
persistent engagement to contest adversary campaigns, the power of
enabling partners, and the ability to impose costs. The DOD Cyber
Strategy notes we cannot afford inaction--our values, economy, and
society are exposed and we must assertively respond at all levels.
USCYBERCOM is working with the combatant commands, DHS, FBI, across the
Intelligence Community, and in conjunction with private sector and
foreign partners to improve understanding and act to contest and
frustrate adversary cyber activities. Through persistent engagement we
identify and close vulnerabilities in DOD networks, act to contest
threats, and enable partners in building resilience and in the defense
of the nation. These steps complement and support national efforts to
prepare for conflict, to deter adversaries, and to establish cyber
norms while we simultaneously support combatant commanders in
contingency operations.
Supporting the Combatant Commands and Establishing a Warfighting
Ethos. A competitive mindset is needed to prevail in a deeply
competitive domain. Such a mindset also helps us prepare to fight and
win the nation's wars. To support combatant commanders and their
missions we are engaged in a growing variety and number of activities,
from planning to intelligence missions to operations in and through
cyberspace. We bring to the combatant commands a wartime ethos
reinforced by daily contact with cyber adversaries.
Our cyberspace operations support kinetic and information
operations against terrorists across several regions. We are employing
cyber capabilities to improve force protection, bolster intelligence,
understand and shape the information environment, and disrupt the
operations, command and control, and propaganda of several insurgent
and terrorist groups in support of United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM), United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and United
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Cyberspace operations in
places like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan today integrate and
synchronize cyberspace and information operations with kinetic
missions, with each enabling the other for offensive, force protection,
and intelligence purposes. Our persistent engagement with this
adversary for the past several years shows the continuing value of our
command in being able to operate across all of these regions against
the key enablers for these groups (e.g., media, finance, and foreign
fighters). In this context, we have expanded the remit of our Joint
Task Force Ares, and shifted its chain of command from Army Cyber
Command to Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command while maintaining its
principal task of operating against the Islamic State. JTF-Ares has
also embarked on a special mission partnership with NSA to act together
as a hub for whole-of-government cyber planning in the ongoing counter-
terror fight (thus further demonstrating the value of the USCYBERCOM
and NSA partnership).
The maturation of the Cyber Mission Force has increased the number
and proficiency of the cyber units working to protect the networks and
weapons systems that combatant commands rely on to perform their
missions. Each combatant commander controls organic Cyber Protection
Teams (CPTs) that work in conjunction with local and regional
cyberspace security providers and administrators. The expertise and
databases at USCYBERCOM tie these teams together and greatly increase
their collective power. US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and US
Forces Korea have hosted frequent visits of our teams and experts to
assist in surveying and hardening their military critical
infrastructure in advance of any contingencies in East Asia and the
Western Pacific. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has benefitted
from similar assistance in support of its global operations and
commitments. In Europe we assisted USEUCOM, NATO allies, and other
partners to secure their networks from foreign interference. Finally,
our efforts helped US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and USNORTHCOM in
election security, border security, and disaster recovery efforts.
Evolving national and departmental guidance creates opportunity for
timely cyber operations in support of the combatant commands and in our
role in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' global integration efforts.
This includes both planning cyberspace operations support to trans-
regional campaigns and prioritizing the allocation of high-demand, low-
density cyber assets across the commands and in all phases of conflict.
The Department and the Chairman have clarified the command and control
of cyberspace forces, and in accord with this guidance we are building
``cyberspace operations integrated planning elements'' (CO-IPEs) at
each combatant command.
The new, Service-like authorities and responsibilities that
USCYBERCOM gained as result of elevation are similar to those
authorized for USSOCOM on behalf of the nation's Special Operations
Forces. USCYBERCOM is the Department's Joint Force Provider and Joint
Cyberspace Trainer for cyberspace forces. In these roles, we develop
strategy, doctrine, and tactics; prepare and submit program
recommendations and budget proposals; exercise authority, direction,
and control over the expenditure of funds; validate requirements;
establish priorities for requirements for cyberspace capabilities,
forces, training, and operations; and ensure the inter-operability of
equipment and forces. We are working with the Department to build
approaches across the force and leverage these new responsibilities to
better measure, access, and improve the quality and readiness of the
entire cyber force.
Improving Readiness. The rapidly evolving cyber domain makes
achieving and maintaining force readiness a challenge. Similar to other
Department forces, the readiness of our cyber forces can be understood
as a two-part equation. First, we are evaluating the readiness of the
teams that the Services (under their man, train, and equip missions)
present to the Command. Second, we are studying the readiness of those
teams to perform the missions they have been assigned by USCYBERCOM,
something we refer to as ``mission posture.''
The Cyber Mission Force completed its build in May 2018, and we
started formally reporting team readiness in the Defense Readiness
Reporting System (DRRS) shortly afterward. USCYBERCOM is working with
the Services to ensure that they present cyber forces that meet a
common, joint standard so that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines coming to the Command have proficiency with foundational
cyberspace tools, techniques, and procedures. As part of that plan, the
Services recently assumed the training mission for personnel in the CMF
that USCYBERCOM (together with NSA) had overseen during the build. We
are refining training curricula and standards, as well as simplifying
and updating course requirements so we can ensure the right number
complete their training with the appropriate skills.
The second part of the equation--mission posture--is not as
accurately reflected by traditional metrics. Thus we are developing
metrics that go beyond those traditionally used in order to capture
cyber-unique requirements such as authorities, accesses, capabilities,
and intelligence. Such dependencies are not always measured in
conventional DOD readiness reporting, yet they play a critical role in
generating successful cyber operational outcomes. Our goal is to ensure
operational proficiency in our CMF teams by taking an appropriately
holistic view of readiness and applying resources to shortfalls.
Working with the Services and the Department, we will develop and
institutionalize the changes necessary for us to accurately measure and
maintain team and mission readiness across the CMF.
To help sustain an advanced cyber force, all of the Services are
applying hiring and retention incentives (especially for high-demand,
low-density skill sets) as well as utilizing the flexibility in
managing talent that Congress recently granted us by authorizing the
new Cyber Excepted Service. The retention of top talent--particularly
in some critical, high-skill jobs--is a significant concern because it
will be crucial to our continued success. We track attrition closely,
as the competition with the private sector and other government
agencies for talent will be an enduring challenge. An important element
of building certain low-density skill sets, moreover, is outreach to
and utilization of our Reserve Component.
Underpinning our readiness are the operational lessons we learn
from continuous operations in cyberspace. Operations in support of JTF-
Ares and the counter-terrorism fight, the security of the 2018 midterm
elections, and ongoing support to combatant commands across both the
defensive and offensive mission sets, are improving our training,
informing how we structure our teams, and indicating how best to employ
our capabilities and teams.
Enhancing Partnerships. Securing the nation in cyberspace requires
whole-of-nation efforts and effective collaboration with allies. It is
a priority for USCYBERCOM to expand its ability to collaborate
effectively with other government agencies, the private sector,
academia, and allies. We must do this because they directly and
indirectly complement and enhance our warfighting capabilities; indeed,
enabling our partners is a key element of persistent engagement. We are
working with a range of partners who support, enable, and assist our
operations.
The National Security Agency is our most important partner; the
strength of this relationship will remain critical to the defense of
the nation. The Agency's world-class expertise, technical capabilities,
and accesses are crucial to USCYBERCOM's success. The USCYBERCOM-NSA
relationship is proving mutually beneficial as the Command has matured.
Indeed, I believe the speed and agility that USCYBERCOM and NSA
demonstrated in joint operations to defend last fall's elections is
evidence of the mission benefit of unity of effort and direction, the
close proximity between USCYBERCOM and NSA, and our joint focus on
outcomes for the defense of the nation.
USCYBERCOM works daily with partners in DHS, FBI, and other federal
agencies, sharing information and intelligence, as the U.S. Government
furthers efforts to work even more effectively with the private sector.
Since May 2018 we have worked to broaden these ties, both at the
leadership and the action-officer levels. I have mentioned last fall's
whole-of-government effort to defend the mid-term elections, but our
collaboration with interagency partners is continuous and far broader.
We interact constantly with the US Coast Guard's cyber forces and have
Coast Guard senior officers integrated in USCYBERCOM. In addition, the
CYBER GUARD exercise last year included USCYBERCOM, DHS and FBI
elements practicing a whole-of-government response to an incident
involving the nation's critical infrastructure.
We see growing partnerships with industry (particularly in critical
infrastructure sectors like energy and finance) as a natural extension
of such relationships. Working with the DOD-Chief Information Officer
and NSA, USCYBERCOM has developed a Pathfinder program with DHS,
sector-specific agencies, and select critical infrastructure partners
to share threat information, conduct collaborative analysis of
vulnerabilities and threats, and mitigate those risks. This whole-of-
nation collaboration is crucial to our ability to deter or defeat
strategic threats to US national interests and infrastructure. This is
a complex mission in both technical and policy terms, in part because
our work in this field occurs at the request of and in collaboration
with Federal government partners, particularly DHS and FBI. Recent
changes to our policy guidance--especially those crafted in agreements
with these and other agencies--have brought clarity to this process. By
partnering with DHS, FBI, and sector-specific agencies we are building
persistent presence to improve the resilience and the defense of our
Nation's critical infrastructure.
USCYBERCOM has been active with current and prospective foreign
partners, especially countries contemplating or building their own
cyber forces. We have integrees from our ``Five Eyes'' partners
(including a Canadian brigadier general) on the Command staff.
USCYBERCOM in fiscal year 2018 conducted bilateral cyber exercises with
France, Estonia, and Japan, while two dozen countries sent observers to
our annual CYBER FLAG exercise last June. We also provided advanced
training to a FVEY partner via our first Foreign Military Sales case,
and provided defensive operations guidance to Singapore. Lastly, we
maintain robust operational relationships with a variety of
international partners in the continued fight against violent extremist
organizations globally.
We are building strategic depth in our cyber forces with assistance
from the Reserve Component, and in so doing are assisting the whole-of-
nation effort to secure our networks. Reservists serve in positions
across our headquarters staff, the Cyber Mission Force, and our Service
cyber components, as well as playing vital roles in our exercises and
training for defending critical infrastructure. Indeed, our Reserve
strategy seeks innovative ways to utilize the Reserve Component in
unique missions. Finally, Reserve Component personnel not only bring
important skill sets to USCYBERCOM, they also enhance our efforts to
create cybersecurity coalitions of public and private partners,
particularly with industry innovators.
Our engagement with the National Guard Bureau and the 54 state and
territorial Adjutant Generals is continuous. We created a framework for
DOD to sponsor access to classified information for National Guard
personnel supporting local and state election systems while in a State
Active Duty status (this was done in coordination with DHS and the
National Guard Bureau). We are also exploring options with the National
Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), which fosters trust with foreign
militaries through bilateral engagements with roughly 70 partner
nations. While our Command develops our global partnerships in the
cyberspace domain, my intent is to work through the geographic
combatant commands in growing theater security cooperation efforts.
Deploying Infrastructure. The Command depends on innovative cyber
tools and capabilities in crafting strategic and tactical options for
senior leaders. The DOD Chief Information Officer and the Services are
making necessary investments, in both funding and in finding the right
people to develop and maintain cyber tools and capabilities. These
Service investments need to continue and be balanced against global
mission requirements. Such investments feature the right mix of
capabilities for USCYBERCOM to achieve its readiness goals and generate
successful mission outcomes.
Our cyberspace forces require a comprehensive, integrated
cyberspace architecture to achieve and sustain the insight, agility,
and lethality necessary for maintaining competitive advantage against
near-peer adversaries. Over the past year we have developed the Joint
Cyber Warfighting Architecture (JCWA) to guide capability development
priorities to this end. The JCWA has five elements: common firing
platforms at our four cyber operating locations (each operated and
employed by our Service cyber components) using a comprehensive suite
of cyber tools; a ``Unified Platform'' for integrating and analyzing
data from both offensive and defensive operations with intelligence and
partners (including the private sector); joint command and control
mechanisms for situational awareness and battle management at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels; sensors that support
defense of the network and drive operational decisions; and a
Persistent Cyber Training Environment where teams can train and even
rehearse missions under realistic conditions. The JCWA is not a fixed
future state, but rather an adapting set of capabilities continually
evolving along with technological change, operational outcomes, and
shifting threats. The Department has leveraged the architecture to make
critical JCWA program investments that, when realized, will allow us to
not only gain advantage in competition with cyber adversaries, but also
to fight and win in conflict.
Acquisition authorities are also a critical enabler for us. I thank
this Committee and Congress for extending our tailored acquisition
authority through fiscal year 2025, and will work with the Department
to implement and recommend refinements. That extension allows us to
craft more contract actions under our current authorities rather than
having to leverage existing contracts held by other partners. In fiscal
year 2018 we executed 32 contract actions totaling $43 million, and we
could reach as much as $75 million in this fiscal year. Our acquisition
priorities include the geographically distributed set of redundant and
reliable infrastructures noted above as well as a virtual arsenal of
capabilities (comprising both open-source and high-end tools);
implementation of cloud and engineering services in support of a big
data platform; foundational architecture portions of the Command's
continuous monitoring capabilities; and a competitive cyber tool
contract. Cyber tools can be highly perishable, unlike conventional
munitions, but they are also like munitions in that, as they are
expended, we must continuously invest in their development and
procurement.
conclusion
Thank you again for inviting me here today on behalf of U.S. Cyber
Command. Your continued support is vital to the work we do, both to
enable our partners and to act in cyberspace on behalf of our Nation.
USCYBERCOM made significant progress in the past year. We have been
elevated to a combatant command and are maturing in our new
responsibilities. All of our Cyber Mission Force teams are built and,
in conjunction with the Services, we are working to enhance and sustain
their readiness. The Department is investing in essential operational
infrastructure and is committing additional resources to build the
Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture that the Command needs. Enabled by
new law, policy, and mission guidance, we are conducting operations
every day--both to support combatant commands and forces engaged
overseas, and to contest cyber adversaries in defense of the nation.
Persistent engagement initiatives, like the operations conducted in
partnership across government, with allies, and with the private sector
in defense of the 2018 elections, will cumulatively impose cost on our
adversaries and change their risk calculus for future operations.
Looking ahead, the work we have done to date may soon seem both
crucial and preliminary. We are in continuous daily contact in
cyberspace with capable adversaries determined to erode our Nation's
strategic advantages. Our efforts to act against them and to enable our
partner combatant commands, government agencies, and allies have helped
to defend our Nation and its interests. Those efforts, however, must
rapidly become more agile, more capable, and more sustainable. My
vision for the Command encompasses a continuous role for our forces in
making our fellow combatant commands and our whole-of-nation partners
even more effective in competition with adversaries and in preparing
for and acting in conflict.
We have much work ahead, of course, and your continued endorsement
and assistance are both necessary and gratefully appreciated. Our
people are superb. They merit your trust, and, with your support,
USCYBERCOM will continue to meet every challenge, in both competition
and conflict.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Nakasone.
First of all, I think we've all pretty much decided that
this Commission, the National Defense Strategy Commission, is
kind of the blueprint that we are using in this Committee. To
start this off, let me address the two levels of threats that
we're talking about.
First, of course, the level of threat would be the peer
competition that we have out there; then the terrorist element
that's out there. It's very alive today.
So, starting off with, maybe, a response from both Generals
on the first one, how can SOCOM and CYBERCOM most effectively
support our efforts against China and Russia? Talk a little bit
about any deficiencies, in terms of resources, that you would
be suffering in order to carry out these goals.
General Thomas?
General Thomas. Chairman, you highlight, at the outset, the
challenge is to maintain the focus on the counter-violent-
extremist effort while shifting to the focus of the National
Defense Strategy. I would tell you that it's burdensome, in
terms of resources, but something that we can and will manage,
going forward. I'm lucky, on two accounts. One, my predecessors
had already focused on Russia and China as emerging threats,
before the National Defense Strategy, and had already committed
resources to that effort. So, I appreciate the investment that
preceded me. I also appreciate some new authorities that have
developed in this house which have enabled us to approach this
problem differently, but similarly to the way that we
approached the counterterrorism problem. So, resources that
enable some unique, unorthodox approaches to peer competitors,
especially in that space that we call ``competition short of
conflict''--a big arm wave, but arguably, the most important
phase of deterrence.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Thank you.
General Nakasone.
General Nakasone. Chairman, in terms of our ability for
near-peer or peer competitors, our most important thing right
now is to be able to enable our partners, whether or not those
partners are Joint Force commanders in cyberspace or those
partners are other members of the interagency. Our work with
the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is an exemplar, I think, of the enabling aspect
that we will do against near-peer competitors.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
General Nakasone. I would also offer that the Fiscal Year
2019 National Defense Authorization Act was critical for us at
U.S. Cyber Command. It gave us capabilities and authorities
that were important for us as we look to further enable. That
included the ability for us to rapidly deploy elements of our
force to the Department of Homeland Security, the ability for
us to look at networks that are not part of the Department of
Defense network. The other piece of it that was critical, as
Ranking Member Reed mentioned, is the idea of cyber as a
traditional military activity. I think those are areas that are
going to help us immensely with near-peer competitors.
In terms of our shortfalls and our challenges, the areas
that we are very focused on is continuing to ensure that the
force that has been built, the force that is ready, the force
that will operate has the required infrastructure--the sensors,
the locations, the capabilities--to address a number of
different threats to our Nation.
Senator Inhofe. Appreciate that.
I'm going to read a quote from Dan Coats and ask for a
response, Secretary West and General Thomas. He said, ``ISIS
still commands thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and it
maintains eight branches, more than a dozen networks, and
thousands of dispersed supporters around the world, and will
exploit any reduction in CT pressure to rebuild key
capabilities, such as media production and external
operations.'' Do you agree with that? Let's start with you, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary West. Mr. Chairman, I do.
Senator Inhofe. General Thomas?
General Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I do. But, I would add, in
context, we have crushed the physical caliphate, so the terrain
that ISIS formerly maintained a sanctuary from where they drew
their resources--specifically, oil resources--has been badly
diminished, but they continue to be a threat. I agree with the
scope of the assessment, as provided by the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI).
Senator Inhofe. We get a variety of reports, in terms of
the effectiveness of ISIS, al Qaeda, and the various other
terrorist operations. We want to make sure that everyone
understands, yes, that peer competitors are important, but so
is the other.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me join General Thomas in thanking and
commending Command Sergeant Major McCauley for your service.
Thank you. We all recognize the noncommissioned officers in
every service are the backbone and I think, the winning edge
that we have. So, thank you.
Secretary West and General Thomas, if you could elaborate
on the challenges that still face you in implementing section
922, that would be very helpful to us and, if anything that we
can do to help make section 922 the whole issue of creating a
service-like Secretary under the ADS SOLIC.
So, Secretary West, please.
Secretary West. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Well, section 922 has certainly reinvigorated our
relationship, but it's also very timely, because our basic task
is to help institutionalize USSOCOM within the Joint Force and
in the Pentagon while keeping its unique attributes. But, it
also has come along simultaneously with the National Defense
Strategy. This year, General Thomas and I have cosigned four
separate letters, one of which was to align SOCOM's fiscal
strategy to achieve the NDS. This body has been very
supportive. I think we are very adequately supported. I think
the task is really left up to us to slowly build this business
and achieve our objectives.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Thomas, your comments.
General Thomas. Senator Reed, I noted at the outset that
Owen referred to me as his teammate, which I appreciate,
because, technically, he's my boss. In legislation, as you
know, affected by this last year, with one of my hats on for
the man, train, and equip, service-like responsibilities, he is
literally in my chain of command, and we have embraced that,
going away. I think that actually integrates us with the
Department more optimally. Conceptually, we've certainly been
able to drive the relationship, I think, to a much more
enlightened level. I hope that it continues to evolve. I think
ASD SOLIC provides a critical function for us, for integration
with the Department. Again, it's been a pleasure working with
Owen as we've developed out what I think your intent was.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Nakasone, again, thank you for your service,
particularly your great efforts with respect to the last
election and looking forward to the next one. One of the areas
is social media. We've talked about it, and you've talked about
it with the Intelligence Committee. There were two independent
reports commissioned by the Senate Intelligence Committee that
looked at social media, not just particular platforms, but the
cross-movement of information on these platforms. Do you think
it would be helpful having studies like this for your use?
Should we contemplate trying to provide you the authority to do
that?
General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. What we found with
those reports is that they provided a window on the adversary
that we hadn't seen. As you know, our focus on foreign
intelligence is outside the United States, so that we were able
to capture that. But, having the reports that were done, in
terms of what was done within the United States, was very, very
helpful, in terms of being able to understand exactly what our
adversary was trying to do to build dissent within our Nation.
Senator Reed. So, if we could somehow institutionalize
that--maybe the proper format might be through the Intelligence
Committee, but those reports are useful to you and complement
your direct activities.
General Nakasone. Those reports certainly provided a window
on our adversary that was very telling.
Senator Reed. One of the issues that came in the context of
social media is, will they voluntarily take steps that are
appropriate and necessary? Now, my understanding is that they
do take down sites that have been identified. But, I also don't
think they identify to the consumer that these sites were
either fraudulent or malign. Is it something that they should
be doing, in your view?
General Nakasone. Senator, what we were able to do was
declassify information about our adversaries, and pass that
through the National Security Agency to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The FBI specifically worked with those social
media companies. So, I would defer to the Bureau, in terms of
its ability to do what you had stated there.
Senator Reed. Fine.
Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Thomas, thank you for your service to this country,
and congratulations on your retirement.
General Nakasone, thank you for your service to the
country, as well.
Over the years, many have talked about deterring
adversaries in cyberspace, and the broader question of cyber
deterrence is often compared to nuclear deterrence. I've said
this before. I don't think that's a good comparison at all. You
made a similar point in a recent article, where you argued that
deterrence in cyberspace results from the employment of cyber
capabilities, not the threat of employing them, something you
describe as persistent engagement. You mentioned, earlier, that
this Committee and the White House have provided CYBERCOM with
additional authority in the past year. Can you tell us what
impact those changes have had?
General Nakasone. Senator, a year ago, I appeared before
this Committee for my confirmation hearings. In that year, let
me just trace, I think, the major elements that have helped our
Command be able to be more effective.
First of all, our National Strategy on Cyberspace, the
Department's Strategy on Cyber Posture Review. Then, the key
piece that I would offer is the Fiscal Year 2019 National
Defense Authorization Act. That recognized cyber as a
traditional military activity, that provided us the baseline of
being able to operate outside of our Department networks and
the idea that we would enable other elements of our
interagency. Tremendously helpful, and then I would say the
last piece is the work of the President to bring a new policy
to bear, in terms of how we operated offensively in cyberspace.
Senator Fischer. Have you been able to put your theory of
persistent engagement into action?
General Nakasone. Senator, we have. Our number-one priority
was the defense of the midterm elections. We utilized all of
those capabilities, those strategies, and our new operational
concept, persistent engagement, to ensure a secure and safe
election.
Senator Fischer. I appreciated your classified briefing on
that the other day. I think it was very helpful for Members to
hear that.
Is it your view that imposing costs on adversaries through
persistent engagement--is that going to have a deterrence
effect? Or do you think there is any connection between a cyber
deterrent and also a nuclear deterrent? I saw you shake your
head when I mentioned that in my opening to your question.
General Nakasone. Senator, I would offer that my view on
nuclear deterrence is much different than on the idea of cyber
engagement and being able to prevent our adversaries from
accomplishing their goals. As I mentioned, in nuclear
deterrence, the power that a nation-state has is through the
threat of the use of the weapons. What we're seeing in
cyberspace is, our adversaries are operating below a level of
armed conflict every single day to steal our intellectual
property, to leverage our personally identifiable information,
to challenge our institutions. This is where I believe being
able to operate either to enable other elements of the
interagency or operate outside of our national borders against
our adversaries is important.
Senator Fischer. I would say, from your comments, and you
can correct me on this, but that you don't believe, then, that
cyber is a substitution for the deterrence that we achieve
through our nuclear enterprise.
General Nakasone. I believe that cyber is, overall, one
element that our Nation is going to use to achieve deterrent
effects against our adversaries, but there are other elements,
other powers of our Nation that we will also bear on
adversaries that attempt to operate below this level of armed
conflict.
Senator Fischer. Last year, I discussed the adequacy of the
size of the Cyber Mission Force with your predecessor, and he
testified that, ``We're probably going to need some level of
additional capacity over time. That's something I'll be talking
to my successor about. I think that it's going to be a key
thing for him during his time in command.'' So, how adequate do
you believe the size of the force is compared to the threat
that we are seeing today? How do you measure force adequacy?
General Nakasone. Senator, as we measure our readiness
against what we consider a number of different adversaries,
primarily both near-peer and rogue states, we believe that the
teams that we've created right now is the building block for
that. We are also, as you know, building a series of defensive
teams in the Army Reserve and the National Guard that are going
to be a strategic depth for us.
My sense, as we continue to operate more, as our
adversaries continue to improve, is that there will be
requirements that will probably be outside the 133 teams that
we have right now.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Thomas, when we had the new overall National
Defense and Security Strategies that put more focus on near-
peer competitors or peer competitors, there was a implicit
hydraulic effect that efforts were going to go up on the
conventional peer competitor, and down on counter terrorism
(CT). Do you see any reduction in the CT threat around the
world? The hydraulic effect, it seems to me, is not a good
idea, because the CT threat is still there, is it not?
General Thomas. Senator, I think the CT threat is in the
throes of transformation. As I mentioned, this time last year,
we had just taken Raqqa, the capital of the caliphate, but we
still had substantial maneuver operations and challenges to
push through to the destruction and the defeat of the physical
caliphate. We're much closer now. Somebody played it out to me
the other day that if you wanted to put a grasp on it in
physical terms, it's twice the size of the base where I'm
stationed, MacDill Air Force Base, which is tiny. So, they are
down to the last dozens of square kilometers, in terms of
physical----
Senator King. But, the CT threat between 2001 and 2011
wasn't measured in territory, it was in terrorist threat. So,
that's still there, isn't it?
General Thomas. You're correct. I would offer that, in our
efforts to defeat ISIS, we have also greatly diminished their
ability to export the threat to the United States and to our
Western allies. In, though, the throes of this transformation
right now, they still are very dangerous, and I could highlight
the specific groups that we consider to be external threats to
the United States that are truly our focus. We're staying on
them.
Senator King. There is a growing CT threat in Afghanistan,
is there not?
General Thomas. Sir, I wouldn't label it as growing. In
fact, we've made huge progress against the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria-Khorason Province (ISIS-K), which is the primary
external threat in Afghanistan. More regional instability in
Afghanistan is of late, but not in the form of external
threats.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Nakasone, you've described the progress that you've
made in this year. I'm on my way, from here, to a hearing on
the security of the electric grid in the Energy and Natural
Resources Committee. It seems to me this is a classic case of
cross-jurisdiction. Please describe your relationship of
CYBERCOM and NSA to FBI, DHS, and utilities. How do we be sure
that what you know and are able to do is protecting us, because
you don't have jurisdiction within the United States?
General Nakasone. Senator, for the energy sector, the lead
for the securing of that critical infrastructure is the
Department of Homeland Security. They work very, very closely
with the sector-specific lead, which is the Department of
Energy. We tie in on the U.S. Cyber Command side, providing
enabling support to the Department of Energy and the Department
of Homeland Security, if requested. Right now, what we are
doing is sharing information, sharing information very clearly
about what we know about foreign adversaries that may be
attempting to get----
Senator King. Do you share that information with the
utilities or----
General Nakasone. We share that with the Department of
Homeland Security and, specifically, Department of Energy.
Senator King. Let me ask about structure, sharing of
information. Is there a regular structure? Is there an
organizational chart of these relationships, where you meet
regularly, or is it sort of ad hoc?
General Nakasone. We have put into place within the
Department of Defense a pathfinder program to look at this
element. We've established a regular meeting with the sector
security agent, which is the Department of Energy, working with
them and the Department of Homeland Security to share that
information regularly.
Senator King. Finally, you've talked with Senator Fischer
somewhat about deterrence, and you're talking about a
persistent engagement, which is, in effect, telling the
adversary we're there. The question is, how do we change their
calculus? Is your theory of persistent engagement--I think you
used the term ``engagement, presence, and pressure, or
innovation'' intended, and will it change an adversary's
calculus when they come to decide whether to launch a
cyberattack on our electric grid or a financial system or
elections?
General Nakasone. Senator, we think it will, through two
different means. One is through building resilience, in terms
of what we're able to provide to our partners and their
knowledge of our adversaries, but, two, also imposing a cost on
our adversary.
Senator King. That's what I want to hear about.
General Nakasone. Yes. So, the ability either to be able to
identify where they're operating from, the tools that they're
using, to be able to provide that cost that the adversary has
to think twice, in terms of, ``can they conduct and exploit or
attack against our critical infrastructure?
Senator King. But, the calculus is, can they do it? But,
shouldn't there be a calculus, if they do it, they will be
responded to in a forceful way?
General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. I think that comes
not only with cyber, but also all the elements of our Nation
that can be brought to bear on that adversary.
Senator King. I think that's important, and it doesn't have
to be cyber-for-cyber.
General Nakasone. Right.
Senator King. It can be other elements of national power.
Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary West, many of us on the Committee are
working through the President's decision to withdraw forces
from Syria. It appears there's a fair amount of work to be done
there. I'd just like to know, from your perspective and from a
SOF perspective, how would you characterize victory in Syria,
winning in Syria? What does that look like, and what do you
need to get there?
Secretary West. Sir, I'd be cautious to use the word
``victory,'' but I think it's very important not to diminish
what has happened there. As General Thomas said, the physical
caliphate did, at one time, attract over 40,000 foreign
fighters into that territory, from 100 different countries.
They can no longer do that. But, this will be a very long war.
ISIS is quite expansive, in terms of its global territory, but
it now becomes an insurgency.
Senator Hawley. General Thomas, let me just ask you the
same question. What does winning look like in Syria? Have we
won? I mean, are we satisfied with where we are, in terms of
SOF's mission there and what you feel that you've been tasked
to accomplish?
General Thomas. Senator, again, I'd be hesitant to use the
term ``winning,'' as opposed to the objective. I think our
reasonable objective is to reduce the threat in that area, and
to be able to maintain persistent capability so that an
external threat cannot emanate from that area in the future.
Having said that, Syria is perhaps the most complex
battlespace that I've experienced in 40 years. My recent trip
out there had our forces operating in and around Syrian regime
forces, Russian forces, Turks and their surrogates, Iranian
Revolutionary Guard forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and ISIS.
Again, an incredibly complex environment that I think, again,
the objective is to reduce the threat and be able to maintain
some sort of sustainable security there.
Senator Hawley. On that point about reaching a point where
the external threat can't emanate from that region, are you
satisfied, General, that we're at that point, where an external
threat from VEOs cannot emanate from Syria? I mean, do you
think we've accomplished that objective?
General Thomas. I do not think we're there yet. We're on
the verge of diminishing the threat, and then in the process of
determining what residual capability needs to remain in place
in the region to ensure that we're securing that objective.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you, General, about recruiting
and retention. You talk about this in your prepared testimony.
You talk a lot about the significant strain on SOF over the
doubling of the size of the force and the significant
deployment demands. Tell me about where you think we are, in
terms of recruitment, retention, what additional tools or help
that you need to make sure that your force is ready, is rested,
is healthy, and is getting everything they need to be able to
do the very significant and demanding and dangerous work we ask
them to do.
General Thomas. Senator, over the years, we have aspired to
grow the Special Operations Force that the Nation needs, but
have not dropped standards at all, so it's a little bit of a
Catch 22 here. Part of our mantra is, you can't create this in
a hurry, and people are our most important asset. We have had
challenges, of late. I attribute them to a number of causes, as
much the downsizing of the Army, specifically, for recruiting
Special Forces, but there are some very good initiatives in
place to rectify that and to try and address our recruiting
shortcoming. So, I think we're trending in the right direction,
but it has been challenging over the last year to 2 years, in
terms of getting the numbers in that we would like to have, but
cognizant of the fact we're not going to drop standards.
Senator Hawley. Is it your sense, General--and then I'll
put the same question to you, Secretary West--but, starting
with you, General, is it your sense that, under the NDS and the
new reprioritization of great-power conflict, that demands on
SOF will be the same, or will increase? I mean, what's your
sense of it as you think about your posturing and your needs
under the NDS? What do you see about the demands for the forces
that you command?
General Thomas. I think, department-wide, we all can take
away that the NDS highlights there's not going to be a respite,
in terms of national security challenges. You know, we've had
an 18-year ongoing struggle, the longest struggle in the
history of the United States. That has not come to a conclusion
yet. We have some work left to do there. We've had the
reemergence of peer competitors as a priority, an existential
threat and clearly the focus for the Department. So, we share
that across the Department. I get pretty good guidance from the
Department, in terms of where they want me, in terms of
priorities and effects as a part of the Joint Force, and we
manage that. As global combatant commanders that provide forces
to the six geographic combatant commands, Paul's and my daily
challenge, but it's one we embrace.
Senator Hawley. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for being here today.
You oversee a directorate and combatant commands that
operate not in just one geographic area of responsibility
(AOR), but also in the most austere environments around the
world. The men and women you lead are often the first in
battle, and the heroism and dedication are not fully understood
by elected leaders and the American public. So, I'm very
appreciative of the opportunity to hear from each of you about
the state of your Commands and the challenges and opportunities
you face.
So, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank General
Thomas for his 38 years of service as you come to the end of
your time in uniform. I really wish you the best of luck on
your next phase of your career.
Since the Committee began hearing testimony from military
leadership this year, much of the conversation has been about
ensuring that our forces are lethal and agile so that they
provide a credible deterrent, reducing the probability of armed
conflict with our peer adversaries. Yet, Special Operations and
Cyber Forces are uniquely tailored and trained to achieve
effects against our adversaries in a variety of situations that
are just short of war, itself. Could each of you briefly
discuss, conceptually, how Special Operations and Cyber Forces
can exact a toll for malign activities, short of supporting
armed conflict? In your opinion, what kind of restructuring
with the Special Operations and cyber communities will they
need to do in order to dominate these gray-space conflicts?
Secretary West. Thank you, Senator. Certainly, you're
correct, in that the nature of war doesn't change, but its
character has changed radically in the last 15 years. I'll let
General Nakasone take on the cyber portion.
In terms of the Special Operations tactics, where SOF
traditionally thrives, we're also seeing the enemy employ
these. I'll let General Thomas talk specifics on operations.
But, when we talk about competition short of armed conflict,
dealing with partner nations, problems that need to be quickly
and agilely solved in a cheap manner, you're really talking
about SOF. So, there's a real role for that, that General
Thomas will be able to describe.
General Thomas. Thanks, Senator, and thanks for your
service, as well.
Senator, we're actually very excited about the opportunity
that the NDS and the specific subject of competition short of
conflict offers for us and in conjunction with Paul and others,
in terms of winning that critical phase, and winning, in that
case, is not a defeat moniker that applies. It's to disrupt,
deny, and really, ensure that our U.S. policies and objectives
are pursued and successful. We think it's a combination of
information operations, influence operations, partner capacity,
cyber operations, in conjunction with Paul, the whole array of,
nonkinetic activities that are really an art form that we're
excited to employ in the future. We hope to play a substantial
role there.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
General Nakasone, on Tuesday, Admiral Davidson highlighted
to this Committee the need to enhance the cyber defenses of our
logistical networks, which touched the commercial industry that
we help contract for support, both in the United States and
overseas. Can you provide examples of what might be affected
and how we might be able to harden the network when it comes to
organizations such as U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)?
We have this long logistical tail that must support our forces,
no matter where they're operate, and I feel like they are
sometimes the most vulnerable, and we overlook--those
organizations. How does TRANSCOM fit into your priority for
cybersecurity?
General Nakasone. Senator, General Lyons and I have not
only had discussions about this at Transportation Command, but
I've also been out to visit him. We see the ability for us to
project our strategic elements in the world as being something
that's uniquely suited for our Nation and a tremendous
capacity. What we are doing at U.S. Cyber Command is ensuring
that we understand the networks that he has to operate on, the
platforms that he is utilizing, and, most importantly, the
data, because it's that data that we want to make sure that we
can secure.
The challenge you point out is making sure that we have
enabled our partners. These partners are oftentimes private-
sector partners that we work with, the Department of Homeland
Security, and other sectors, to ensure that they have the
information upon which they understand the threats to them and
they can build more resilient networks and protect their own
data.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
here today.
General Thomas, let's start with Syria. We've talked a
little bit about the state of the fight there and the great
advances our troops have made, and a little bit about what will
happen when our troops depart Syria. One thing that's been on
my mind is all the bad guys that are currently being detained
in Syria. Some of your colleagues have testified before the
Committee that that number would go into the hundreds. We don't
have to be any more specific here in this setting. They've also
testified that, while some of those detainees are front-line,
untrained cannon fodder, some of them are also external
operation plotters and master bombmakers and other really bad
guys. Is that your understanding, as well?
General Thomas. Senator, without getting into the specifics
on the numbers, it's actually closer to a thousand than it is
hundreds already in detention, with potentially more to come. A
huge area of concern for us is that they're being maintained by
the non-nation-state that's otherwise known as the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF). So, how we resolve these mostly
foreign-fighter detentions from, I lost count, but it's in the
dozens of countries that have contributed to it--but, how we
reduce this, that threat, and have those people properly
detained and handled over time is of paramount importance right
now for the problem.
Senator Cotton. Yeah, how are we going to do that?
General Thomas. A pretty aggressive action right now,
Senator, ongoing with State Department and with other partner
nations to specifically reduce that threat. I'll give kudos to
some of the countries, a surprising number of countries who
have recently stepped up, some of the smaller countries that
had capacity challenges, but that have, nonetheless assumed the
burden--or started to assume the burden. We, with State
Department, primarily, are trying to assist them in reducing
this problem.
Senator Cotton. I know it's not in your area of operations,
but we have empty beds at Guantanamo Bay, don't we?
General Thomas. Yes, Senator, we still do.
Senator Cotton. Maybe we should consider that for some of
those really bad guys in Syria.
While we're talking about Syria, let's contrast Syria and
Afghanistan, or specifically Afghanistan against some of the
other places where we have a serious terrorism threat. The
President said, a couple of weeks ago, that we're going to have
troops in Iraq for a while, in part because we need to watch
the counterterrorism (CT) threat there and the threat of Iran.
That's right next to Syria, in places like Yemen and Somalia.
We obviously have freedom of action in the seas for a lot of
your troopers. Contrast the CT mission that we have in
Afghanistan, which I think, is 800 or 900 miles from the
nearest sea, and the challenge that we would face there if we
significantly drew down our troop presence in the conventional
forces, for your forces and Special Operations.
General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Truthfully, we look at it
in a global context. So, in Afghanistan, as Senator King
pursued earlier, the external threat adversaries have been
greatly diminished, and we're focused on them specifically.
There's a larger counterinsurgency effort that you know is into
its 18th year, but with a specific focus to support Ambassador
Khalilzad's efforts to drive that into reconciliation. So, a
distinctly different problem, but correlated, in terms of the
global threat and their connectivity.
Senator Cotton. It would be hard to get after those
terrorist organizations, though, in Afghanistan, for your
troops, if we didn't have some kind of physical presence in
Afghanistan, isn't that right?
General Thomas. Senator, access and placement are key, and,
again, something you can't establish in a hurry, necessarily,
if you leave it. I probably failed to answer Senator King's
question earlier. The way we look at the current context is
very similar to 2011. The recent annual assessment we did
reflects upon 2011, when al Qaeda in Iraq was badly down, but
not out, and we pulled out of Iraq at that point. We know that,
in less than 2-years' time, they were ISIS, running the deck
through Nineveh, running the deck through Anbar. So, how we
finish that threat, or at least contain it, going forward, is a
critical concern.
Senator Cotton. What's true of our troops is true of enemy
forces, as well, right? It helps them to have a safe, secure
physical base from which they can carefully plot attacks
outside of that base?
General Thomas. Yes, Senator, they thrive on sanctuary, and
they're actively seeking sanctuary right now if they lose their
toehold in Syria and other places.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General Thomas.
General Nakasone, a quick question about the 5G network.
We've discussed this many times before. What is the status of
your conversations with counterparts around the world to the
threat that Chinese companies, like Huawei and ZTE, pose to our
telecommunications networks?
General Nakasone. Senator, for fifth-generation wireless,
on U.S. Cyber Command, we have certainly talked with our
partners and our allies with that. In terms of the Director of
National Security Agency, of which I am, we have also worked
that to the Department of State as they've made engagements
with our allies throughout the world.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
My time is expired.
General Thomas, I don't think you'll be appearing here
before us again. You are smiling at that, I can tell. I want to
thank you and thank your wife, Barbara, for many years of
carrying the rucksack of responsibility for our Nation. You
have more than earned the opportunity and the privilege to pass
it on to the next man.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to all of you.
General Thomas, I offer my congratulations, as well.
I want to ask you a question--and the others may want to
chime in, too--about an important aspect of our military
operations, which is building partner capacity. As I've
traveled in Armed Service Congressional Delegations (CODELs),
I've often been struck very positively by the response of our
allies to the partner capacity we do with them all over the
globe. There was a CRS study--Congressional Research Service
study--in 2016 that kind of analyzed about 20 instances of
building partner capacity. Its conclusion was that the results
are sort of mixed, in terms of effect. I've always viewed the
partner-capacity issues, whether we're doing work in the field
in other nations, or bringing foreign military leaders here to
go to the Army War College, or other institutions, as it's
great to build strong relationships; you build them with young
officers, and later they might be a Minister of Defense or even
a Prime Minister or President. But, as you are finishing your
time, your lengthy career, what are the sort of metrics we
should be looking at in the build-partner-capacity investments
we make through DOD to see whether they're successful or not?
Just share, kind of, lessons learned on that, please.
General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Great question.
I guess my first point of reflection is how drastically
different the approach to partner capacity and, really,
partners is from when I first started. It had very little to
any contact points. Established relationships were checkered.
Often, when countries were deemed to have behaved badly, the
first point of separation was to separate International
Military Education and Training (IMET) schooling and things
like that. It is of great difficulty to keep partners close and
to work their capacity if you don't have the point of contact.
Over the years, the establishment and the expansion of our
contacts and true partners has been extraordinary, and I tell
our younger officers, ``You're in a period of time of
international relations and partners that I didn't grow up in.
Please don't lose sight of the potential.''
To your point on success, though, we should assess,
constantly, what's the return on investment for these, various
efforts. Again, I think the report card's better than,
probably, the American public knows, and it's both with
established nations, and the Russia threat's a good case in
point. We've had persistent presence in every country in the
European landmass with Russia for the last 5 to 6 years, and
are thriving there. But, even with untraditional partners--I
reflect back on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which
started as seed corn of a couple hundred people and is now
60,000 strong, has done most of the fighting and dying in Syria
in support of that effort, has lost thousands of people, but is
just an extraordinary force that was cobbled together over
time, through a partnering effort. So, I am more inclined to
see the potency and the results than some of the shortcomings
on it.
Senator Kaine. Secretary West.
Secretary West. Senator, the National Defense Strategy
requires us to answer this question.
Senator Kaine. Yeah. Secretary Mattis always says, ``by,
with, and through''--anytime he was with us, ``by, with, and
through other nations.'' I heard him say that many times, and I
know that's an important part of the Strategy.
Secretary West. Since there must be a resource allocation,
we must begin to look at, number one, the nature of the threat.
Local forces who do not demonstrate intent or capability do not
deserve the same resource allocation as do those enemies with
the capability and the public declaration that they'll strike
us. Number two, what are--as General Thomas said, what are the
odds of success of training this force? How long will it take?
How well connected are they to the people and to the
government?
Senator Kaine. General Nakasone, how about in the cyber
realm? Talk a little bit about the partner-capacity issue and
activities that we're engaged in with them.
General Nakasone. I would add to the importance of building
these partners, as our National Defense Strategy has indicated.
My perspective, in terms of what I've seen within the
cyberspace domain, is, it provides us three critical elements.
First of all, intelligence that we may or may not have by
ourselves. Secondly, capabilities that our Nation may or may
not have. Third thing, unique placement, placement around the
world that is really critical for us, that gives us greater
reach as a Nation.
Senator Kaine. I will follow up with this in other
hearings, as well, because I think it's really important. It is
a significant investment. It's a part of the DOD budget. It's
not massive, but I think it has a massive upside if we do it
right. We just want to make sure we're analyzing the metrics
correctly.
I'm going to ask a question, just for the record, General
Nakasone, for you, but let me just preface it. I'm on the
Health, Education, Labor, Pension Committee. We are
reauthorizing the Higher Education Act this year. Part of that
is analyzing workforce and skills gaps and doing things like
public-service loan forgiveness and other programs to fill
gaps. One of the areas that we're looking at significantly is
cyber professionals, whether it's in the DOD side of the house,
the DHS side of the house, or in the private sector. So, the
question I will ask is if you would have any suggestions for
us, as we work on Higher Ed reauthorization, programs that you
think are successful to enable us to train and recruit and
retain the cyber professionals that we need. I'll ask that
question for the record.
General Nakasone. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Thanks, Mr. Chairman
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service.
General Thomas, we most certainly appreciate all of the
hard work that you've put in, and your service to our country.
I'm curious, with regard to the Middle East. We've talked a
lot about Syria and the challenges that we have there. What
about with regard to Iraq at this point? I know that we've
talked about the fact that we're going to have forces remaining
in Iraq in the near future. The President has indicated that
there's the capability to be able to move back into the Syrian
areas. But, within Iraq itself, what is the current state of
play with regard to ISIS, specifically within northern Iraq?
General Thomas. Senator, I would offer that our Iraqi
partners have embraced their sovereign responsibility, in terms
of defending their terrain. We're maintaining, persistent
pressure on ISIS, both where they were and where they are
intending to try and have any sort of resurgence. So, it
continues to be a work in progress, but it's borne primarily
through the Iraqi forces, who we have rekindled our
relationship with.
Senator Rounds. Do you see evidence of their activity in
northern Iraq with regard to any incidences that they appear to
be responsible for?
General Thomas. In terms of the Iraqi forces, sir?
Senator Rounds. In terms of ISIS' impacts within northern
Iraq. Are you seeing evidence of where they're trying to impact
local communities and so forth?
General Thomas. They are attempting to make a resurgence in
various locations. But, again, I believe our forces, with the
Iraqis, are very aware of where they are, and they're
addressing them accordingly.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you.
General Nakasone, I appreciate the way in which you laid
out, today, a little bit about the activity that the men and
women of CYBERCOM, along with their associated forces within
the NSA and so forth, worked very hard with regard to the 2018
election. Would it be fair to say that it is not a coincidence
that this election went off without a hitch, and the fact that
you were actively involved in the protection of this very
important infrastructure that we value?
General Nakasone. Senator, the security of the midterm
election was the number-one priority at U.S. Cyber Command and
the National Security Agency.
Senator Rounds. Can you share a little bit about what the
tools are to protect an election, and the need to protect the
tools and the systems and the processes that are used in order
to protect an election, as an example, and the different types
of threats that you see and that you have to defend against?
Could you share a little bit about that?
General Nakasone. Senator, as part of a whole-of-government
effort, we were looking at three different areas. First, we
were looking to ensure that we prevented interference in the
election. Secondly was to disrupt any attempts by adversaries
to influence that election. Thirdly, to impose cost on any
adversary that decided that they would attempt to interfere
with our democratic processes.
Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there's been
clear evidence in the past--we've seen--with regard to Russia,
who has done propaganda, attempted to manipulate the American
public, tried to pit one side against the other, and so forth.
In this particular case, would it be fair to say that Russia
has, in the past, demonstrated a compatibly in the cyber realm
to use Internet activity, social media, and so forth, as a way
to do exactly the same thing with more sophistication than
perhaps in the past?
General Nakasone. Senator, the Russians are a very
sophisticated adversary in using influence operations that you
described.
Senator Rounds. Would it be fair also to say that there
have been concerns in the past and that the CYBERCOM has worked
very hard to make sure that the elections that have been held
in the United States have not been impacted directly, in terms
of vote counts or anything like that?
General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. Again, working as
part of a broad government team, that was our focus. I give
great credit to Department of Homeland Security, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and other elements of our Government
to work towards this. This was a team effort.
Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you.
In terms of being able to impact social media, we talk
about being able to impact and make sure that folks outside of
the United States coming in are not able to influence public
opinion by providing misinformation. But, there's another piece
of this, as well, and that's to actually be able to defend and
protect the physical infrastructure within the United States.
Would you just simply explain to the public that there is more
to it than just simply stopping bad tweets from going out? It
is a matter of actually protecting critical infrastructure that
it has a real impact on day-to-day lives of American citizens.
General Nakasone. Senator, one of the things that is within
our mission is certainly to protect that critical
infrastructure in the defense of the United States. You
accurately portray, obviously, both the opportunity and the
challenge that we have at our Command in doing that. I would
also offer that one of the things that is so important here is
the partnerships that you've formed. If there's anything that
I've learned over the past several months, these partnerships
give us real strength in being able to do that.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today, and for your service to
our Nation.
General Nakasone, I was grateful to have the briefing that
we did--classified briefing, very recently, which I think was
very illuminating as to the continued threats to our Nation as
a result of cyber, particularly meddling and interference with
our elections. The threat from Russia continues unabated. Can
you say that in public here today?
General Nakasone. Senator, Russia certainly provides a very
sophisticated threat to our Nation, and one that has done over
several years.
Senator Blumenthal. That threat ought to continue to
concern the American people, shouldn't it?
General Nakasone. Yes, Senator, it should.
Senator Blumenthal. I said in that briefing, and I've said
it in numerous such classified briefings, that, really, I
wished that the American people could have heard more of what
you told us. In a sense, the enemies know what they're doing;
we know what they're doing, to some extent; they know we know
what they're doing; the only ones who are in the dark, really,
are the American people. As we enter this next election cycle,
would you agree that we ought to do everything we can to make
the American people aware of that threat?
General Nakasone. Senator, we will, at Cyber Command,
commit to working that. I think your point is a very important
one. Being able to educate the public is critical for us. The
success that we had in 2018, more of our Nation should know
about.
Senator Blumenthal. It was success. I think very few of the
American public know about the successes. They assume that the
meddling and interference in our election system, when it
occurs, simply is undeterred or unstopped. I think--again,
without going into any of the details, there are some successes
that the American people should know happen, but, at the same
time, should know that the threats do continue, not only from
the Russians, but--let me ask you whether you've seen any
indication that China has sought to conduct activities similar
to what we have seen from Russia in 2016, 2018?
General Nakasone. Senator, given the forum that we're in
today, I would offer to broadly state--what we're seeing is
that our adversaries understand how to operate, again, below
this level of armed conflict, and are taking broad lessons
learned, upon which they will attempt to impact our Nation.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that the American
people should know about the threats from, not only Russia, but
other countries, as well, because the tools and means and
techniques are highly asymmetric? That is, they don't need to
invest tens of billions of dollars to disrupt our election
system. Some of it is available with very little such
investment.
General Nakasone. I agree, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas and Mr. Secretary, I
know we have been over this issue, to some extent, but I just
want to be clear. From your standpoint, moving Special
Operators from Syria to Iraq--in other words, withdrawing from
Syria and moving those forces to Iraq--could you say, again,
what the impact is on our operational capability?
General Thomas. Senator, obviously, it's easier to do our
job with access and placement and proximity. We've thrived on
that, being with the Syrian Democratic Forces and enabling them
to do the heavy lifting that I described earlier. It'll
certainly be harder to not have that proximity, make it more
challenging. But, we're working alternate solutions to maintain
some contact and some level of support for them.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that it
will make it harder, but you're trying to overcome those
challenges?
Secretary West. Militarily, it is more difficult, sir, but
we can remotely assist and advise. If Special Operations does
anything, this agile force has already adapted.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Thomas. Senator, I probably would point out, too,
that's how we started the first of it. We were not in Syria for
the first year. I was in the command that was responsible for
that, and we did everything from externally to establish that
force and provide----
Senator Blumenthal. But, there was a reason why you went
into Syria, which is that it enhanced your operational
capability, correct?
General Thomas. It got us the return on investment. I mean,
they maneuvered and destroyed the caliphate, or are on the
verge of destroying the caliphate, so that was that subsequent
phase to play.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing today.
It's public information that China is trying to build a
navy of about 425 ships, within the next decade or so, and
they're accelerating that. It's been reported, in just
December, that Chinese hackers have been breaching Navy
contractors to steal pretty much everything from maintenance
data to missile plans. A particularly egregious report came out
later that one breach was about a supersonic antiship missile
that we were building for our nuclear submarine force. If
they're successful, by 2030, they'll have a navy that's about
100 ships bigger than our Navy has today. The problem is, right
now, that they're accelerating that development through
hacking, not the Navy network of information, but our
contractor network of information.
So, General Nakasone, how do you operate with our
contractors? Should this data be kept on DOD networks? How do
you interface with the FBI, when we get into these commercial
entities out there that seem to be less protected than our
military networks?
General Nakasone. Senator, the example that you cited there
is one that has driven the Department, and we're certainly
working with that Department as one of the lead agents to
ensure that contracts are written right and ensure that our
cleared defense contractors understand the standards that have
to be met, that we test those standards, working with the
services, ensuring that there are proper safeguards in place
that will guarantee that the information that they have that's
critical for our Nation is safeguarded better.
Senator Perdue. Are you optimistic you have everything you
need, from an organization standpoint of funding and so forth,
to help accomplish that?
General Nakasone. Senator, I'm optimistic that if I don't
have what I need, I'm going to come back rapidly to ask for it.
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. You've done a good job of that.
Let me move on to the organization. Right now--in August of
2017, it was announced that the Cyber Command would be elevated
to a unified command, if I'm correct. Today, we're still
operating in a dual-hat structure, and it's been reported that
one of the reasons we still have a dual-hat responsibility is
that there is a concern about the lack of intelligence in a
separate unified command, versus NSA, that you're still getting
a lot of your intelligence through the NSA. How do you equate
this, relative to the long-term plan of having a unified
command? Does that mean we'll have a duplicate capability, in
terms of intelligence, both in the Cyber Command and also in
NSA, or will there always be a close relationship between the
two?
General Nakasone. Senator, the decision on the dual hat
remains with the Secretary. I've commented I need it. During my
first 90 days, I provided my thoughts on it. Whatever the
ultimate decision is, there will always be a very, very close
partnership between NSA and Cyber Command, and so, that's where
I see it right now, Senator.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
General Thomas, first of all, thank you for the leadership,
you're at the tip of the spear.
When we have continuing resolutions, how does it affect
your operation in the field? You've been at war for 17 years,
your troops, and I've been around some of your troops around
the world, and I would have to say, the best and the very best
of what we have in America is in your uniform. But, when we do
a continuing resolution here in Congress, I get the feeling
that it really impacts you guys pretty directly. Is that true?
General Thomas. Senator, that's an accurate statement. It's
disruptive, in terms of programming and just normal operations.
Senator Perdue. Can you describe just a couple of anecdotal
examples of how that really impacts training, refitting,
rotations, all of the above?
General Thomas. Yes, sir. I'd be inclined, because it's
usually played to me, the biggest impact is in the prescription
for new starts. The aspect of a continuing resolution inhibits
our agility to actually adjust to the problems. It's a fluid
and dynamic environment that we live in. More broadly, it's the
aspect that we're stuck in a preceding paradigm and not able to
move on to the newer, better ways of solving problems.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I'll yield my time.
But, General Thomas, I do want to echo my colleagues'
comments about your storied career, but particularly your time
in the 75th Ranger Regiment in Georgia. God bless you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, all of you, for your service.
General Thomas, we wish you well in whatever you do next.
I want to pick up on Senator Perdue's questions about how
vulnerable we are to third-party products and software. So, I
think this is for you, General Nakasone. In 2018, the NDAA
included a provision that would prohibit the use of products
and services developed or provided by Kaspersky Lab in third-
party products. It required a report on DOD's capacity to spot
and address risks. So, can you tell me what the status is of
banning all of those Kaspersky products from third-party
contracts, and also what's the status of the report on what
risks might still be there?
General Nakasone. Senator, I know that we have conducted
the ban, but let me take that for the record to make sure I
have an accurate response to both parts of that question.
Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you very much.
General Thomas, I want to pick up on the questions about
Syria, and particularly on the detainees. As you are probably
aware, two of those detainees are suspected in the murders of
four Americans: James Foley, Steven Sotloff, Peter Kassig, and
Kayla Mueller. I don't know if you have anything that you can
tell us today about what their status is and what the potential
is to make sure that they can be brought back to the United
States to be tried for their crimes, but certainly that's what
the families of those murdered Americans would like to see
happen.
General Thomas. Senator, I don't have an update on the
status, but I would express my appreciation for your personal
interest on the matter. Your visit out there, and your very
public commentary after that, actually helped focus the world
on the problem, and then specifically on the U.S. problem. But,
I don't know the current status. I just know it's in the legal
wrangling of considering how we handle the special cases like
that.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope you and Secretary
West will both take back the interest that the families have in
making sure that they see justice in the United States.
But, General Thomas, I also want to go back to the question
about, How confident are you that, given the estimates on the
number of ISIS fighters who have gone underground, who may be
operating out of Iraq or other places in the Middle East, that
we will be able to contain that threat if we no longer have
operations in Syria, given the complexity there?
General Thomas. Senator, as I mentioned, this has been one
of the most complex challenges that our force has dealt with in
quite a while. I am concerned that we are not overly restricted
in the end state, and I don't honestly know what that is. There
are several planning efforts ongoing, with a focus to
maintaining what we've gained so far, to focus to ensure that
there is no external attack capability coming from a morass of
bad actors--admittedly bad actors, many of whom are just
regional, local types. So, we're in the throes of trying to do
the right planning and preparation to provide the Nation
options to make sure that that's not a shortcoming and we have
a revisit to the 2011 recurrence.
Senator Shaheen. How much of a threat continues from Turkey
to the Syrian Democratic Forces and their continued work on the
ground?
General Thomas. Senator, there has been friction which is
an understatement, right from the very beginning, in terms of
our choice of a partner force. Truthfully, it was a necessary
choice. It was the only force really available, and their
relationship with the Turkish Government--again, I would
commend General Scaparotti and General Votel, the senior
leaders who have been trying to work through that friction and
stay focused on the counter-ISIS effort, which is why we're out
there. It has been a challenge, but, I think we are certainly
addressing Turkish sovereign interests and concerns as we stay
focused on ISIS.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. I hope we're also
continuing to support SDF, who have been such good partners
with us in the arena.
Secretary West, I understand that you're the point person
at DOD for implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act. Is
that correct?
Secretary West. I'm certainly on point, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Okay, good. I wonder if you could give us
an update. I understand that we are expecting the plan, that
it's going through final approvals. Can you tell me when we
might see the final plan for how that's going to get
implemented, and any thoughts you have about the effectiveness
of being able to implement that as we're looking at all of our
operations around the world?
Secretary West. Senator, we're certainly supporting the
interagency plan. As they say in the Green Berets, we're trying
to lead from the back of the front. But, this does establish
the United States as the world leader in ensuring that women
are part of the conflict resolution and prevention process. I
want to thank you personally for the appropriation we have this
year, because the gender advisors, which were already installed
in come COCOMs, now will be permanent.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope, as we're looking
at continued negotiations in Afghanistan, that we will
certainly make sure that women are at the table in any
negotiations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, and, on behalf
of the American public, I would like to say thank you. Because
much of the work that is done within your commands, the
American public will never know about, nor will they be able to
appreciate. So, thank you very much for that.
General Thomas, I'd like to start with you. What I would
like to do is, basically, give you an open floor or a moment to
reflect upon your time in command. There have been many
innovations during your time in command that you have brought
forward for Special Operations Command, and I'd like to give
you the opportunity to talk about some of those innovations,
why they have been so important to our Special Operators, and
if there's anything that is not yet finished, what you would
like to see continue on in your absence.
Sir, please.
General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Dangerous to give me an
open mic, here.
[Laughter.]
General Thomas. I'll try and stay focused.
I joke with contemporaries, whether it's in the Armed
Forces or in the private sector, that the one problem we do not
have in Special Operations Command is to spur innovation. It's
almost runaway innovation and problem-solving every day. As you
know, it's bottom-up-driven. So, the challenge for us, as a
higher headquarters, is to assess and bundle the great ideas
and the solutions that are being forwarded, and put them into
programs of record that drive budget considerations and things
like that. Nice problem to have, I would offer. I can't
recount, the extraordinary number of initiatives and solutions
that the forces provided over the last couple of years, and I'm
incredibly proud of it.
I'm more excited about where it's going in the future. The
Command is truly poised to be even more relevant for the
Department of Defense and for the Nation, in terms of securing
this country, and borne on the back of just the best talent
that the country has to offer, but with the resourcing that you
all provide and the ability to do creative solutions.
The one area that you and I have discussed time and again,
that was probably the best innovation, that I would ascribe to
my predecessors, and addresses directly how we sustain this
force, despite the relentless pace of things, is the initiative
awkwardly named Preservation of the Force and Family----
Senator Ernst. POTFF.
General Thomas.--POTFF, but juxtaposed to our ability to
care for our people with the Care Coalition. Right now, we
have, I think, 15,000 wounded, ill, and injured SOF members,
both currently serving and prior, that are part of our core
focus to take care of the Command. But, the POTFF effort has
been just remarkable, in terms of building in resilience to the
Command. Again, I give all the credit to my predecessors, who
saw that as a needed requirement, and this body, for giving us
the resources to get after it.
Senator Ernst. Well, General Thomas, I thank you so much
for your emphasis on POTFF. I've had the great opportunity to
travel and visit with a number of your operators at Fort Bragg
and Fort Benning, Hunter Army Airfield, Coronado. We've covered
the bases there, and not only in supporting the operators, but
their families, as well, because they truly are such an
important part of the equation on why you are so successful.
So, thank you for addressing that.
We do have a closed hearing this afternoon, so I will save
some of my questions for that time period, but I do want to
take this opportunity to thank both of you, both Generals.
Thank you very much for the command structure that you have
provided, the leadership and guidance.
Secretary West, thanks for taking on this very challenging
position out there with DOD. We know that it's an ever-growing
and -influencing part of the DOD. So, thank you very much for
that.
Just in the very short time that I have remaining, General
Thomas, I want to thank you for your time and service. To you
and Barbara, my best wishes as you move on to retirement. It is
well earned and well deserved. You will be missed. You will
truly be missed. But, thank you for your leadership.
Thank you very much. I'll yield back.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst, and we all agree
with her comments.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to add my thank you, General Thomas, for all of
your work and for your leadership.
Last year's NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to
review whether members of the Armed Forces or coalition
partners of the United States abused or witnessed abuse of
detainees during operations in Yemen. The unclassified summary
of DOD's report to Congress concluded, ``DOD has determined
that DOD personnel have neither observed nor been complicit in
any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in
Yemen,''. So, when I asked General Votel about this last week,
he said DOD's conclusion was based on the discussions and
reports from the people that they have on the ground. General
Thomas, is that your understanding, as well?
General Thomas. Senator, I monitored your conversation with
General Votel, and I am in agreement with that assessment.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, the Associated Press, Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations,
all four, have all conducted their own investigations and come
to a very different conclusion. They determined that our
Emirati partners oversaw a network of detention centers that
regularly engaged in torture and abuse. General Thomas, do you
find these independent investigations credible?
General Thomas. Again, Senator, I monitored General Votel's
answer to the same question, and you'll probably hear some
consistency. Every one of those allegations is taken with the
utmost interest, in terms of poring into them and determining
if they're factual, and we have. In fact, I'm not aware of any
outliers. But, if we observe violations of the Law of Armed
Conflict, it is a break-contact standard along our force, to
address it specifically and/or to break contact with those
partner forces. Again, I would reinforce how General Votel
answered it. It's a high standard.
Senator Warren. So, I appreciate that, and General Votel
said exactly that there--he was very careful about what he
said. I asked him if he'd reached any conclusions about whether
or not our Emirati partners are engaging in detainee abuse when
DOD personnel are not present, and he said he was not aware of
that. The question I was asking, though, General Thomas, do you
find those four investigations credible?
General Thomas. Senator, I find them of sufficient interest
that it's actually been a topic of discussion back with our
Emirati partners. It is hard for us to confirm or deny if it
happened, but not something we just take as something I approve
or disprove. It's the subject of our discussion with the
Emiratis that, if we can prove this, or if there is evidence,
this could be a deal-breaker.
Senator Warren. Okay.
General Thomas. Again, we take it very seriously.
Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that, General Thomas. I
know you work hard to encourage our partner forces to obey the
Laws of Armed Conflict. But, when it comes to whether or not
our partner forces have engaged in abuse of detainees, there
seems to be a really serious disconnect between what DOD
understands to be true and credible independent reports from
journalists and human rights organizations. So, I remain deeply
concerned about whether our partners in Yemen are treating
detainees in ways that are consistent with the Law of Armed
Conflict. As you know, turning a blind eye is not acceptable.
So, I'm going to keep asking questions about this. I appreciate
your answer on this.
If I can just ask one other area quickly in the time left
to me, General Thomas, I'm concerned about the militarization
of our foreign policy. Nowhere is that more evident than in the
use or overuse of our Special Operations Forces. I think
Senator Reed alluded to this earlier. In 2017, Special
Operations Command deployed forces to 149 countries under your
Command, and they launch airstrikes, carry out raids, train
foreign militaries, all in the hope of removing terrorists from
the battlefield. Many of these countries have governance
challenges that allow violent extremist groups to grow. Instead
of treating the causes of violent extremism, we're treating the
symptom.
So, let me just ask. General Thomas, do you think that we
can kill or capture our way out of this problem?
General Thomas. No, Senator, I definitely do not think
that's the solution to most of these problems.
Senator Warren. Do you think that the current pace of
operations for your Command is sustainable?
General Thomas. I do, Senator. We had challenges on
specific parts of our formation and to specifically get to the
Department-directed standard of a one-to-two dwell rate, so for
one cycle of deployment downrange, two parallel cycles back
home--but, we have gotten that back into a very healthy shape,
with a few outliers, and we're intent on getting them healthy,
as well, here.
Senator Warren. I appreciate it. Thank you, General Thomas.
I just want to say, we need to be thinking harder about using
our nonmilitary tools, here, as well. Thank you.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe.Thank you Senator Warren.
Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To each of you, thank you for your service to our country.
We appreciate it.
General Thomas, we do wish you well, and we wish your
family well, and thank you for the service.
I will say, Senator Ernst mentioned some of the posts she's
visited. She also has visited Fort Campbell, and they were, and
still are, a big part of our Tennessee community. I represented
that post during my time in the House, and have enjoyed working
with those military families and looking at the challenges that
are going to be necessary for 21st-century warfare.
General Nakasone cyber is an enormous part of that. I think
it's been really curious to me this week, as we have looked at
the different geographic combatant commanders and those areas
of responsiblitites (AORs), maybe a hesitancy to engage in the
discussion of how our adversaries are using the cyber area to
their advantage, namely China, of course. We've talked some
about the great competitive threat that is there.
So, my question to you, General Nakasone, would be, do you
feel like that your Command, Cyber Command, is being properly
integrated into all of the other commands in those missions?
General Nakasone. Senator, I do feel that Cyber Command is
being integrated properly into the other combatant commands. We
have undertaken a very aggressive approach to engage with the
combatant commands. General Thomas and I have had a long
association, and one of the things that I think that we've been
able to leverage is the close partnership of ensuring that what
we do in cyberspace is supporting his end states and what he
was trying to do, whether in previous commands or at U.S.
Special Operations Command. We are very, very appreciate of the
work that has been done and approved by this Committee to build
cyberspace operational integrated planning elements at each of
our combatant commands. This will allow us to develop the
talent and the planning expertise to ensure that we get to
outcomes.
Senator Blackburn. Okay.
Let's talk about artificial intelligence (AI) for just a
moment, because I think that that strategy--and, of course,
it's been released--highlights a reality that we've known for
some time. I want to quote from that, and then have you
respond. I'm quoting, ``Other nations, particularly China and
Russia, are making significant investments in AI for military
purposes, including applications that raise questions regarding
international norms and human rights. Failure to adopt AI will
result in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our
people eroding cohesion among allies and partners, reduced
access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our
prosperity and standard of living, and growing challenges to
societies that have been built upon individual freedom.'' Now,
that, in my opinion, is a pretty sobering assessment. So, do
each of you agree with that strategy's assessment? Exactly how
do you see the AI strategy informing your Command as we move
forward?
General Nakasone. I agree with the statement that you read,
Senator. I do see artificial intelligence, deep learning,
machine learning, as something that's a critical enabler of
what we're going to need to do at U.S. Cyber Command. We have
already seen the power, at the National Security Agency, of
what artificial intelligence can do for our foreign
intelligence mission, our cybersecurity missions. This is where
the world is headed, in terms of innovation and capability. We,
as the military fighting force, have to ensure that we have
that enabler. One of the things that I do take great credit and
pride in is that U.S. Special Operations Command really has led
a lot of the work in artificial intelligence, in integrating
some of the early thinking into how they become a more powerful
force.
Senator Blackburn. General Thomas?
General Thomas. Senator, great question. We could spend
several hours talking about it. Unfortunately, we don't have
that kind of time. But, agree with the assessment, in terms of
threat. More importantly, am incredibly enthusiastic about the
opportunity.
Anecdotally, 3 years ago, Eric Schmidt visited our Command
as part of the Defense Innovation Group. Quick assessment that
he felt compelled to give me, he said, ``You've got tremendous
people, you prototype pretty effectively, and you're absolutely
terrible''--he had some more colorful words than that--''for
machine learning, applied artificial intelligence.''
Truthfully, it gave me a spark 3 years ago, and turned me into
a zealot on the subject. But, more importantly, it has really
kind of reoriented our Command to embrace this phenomenon and
apply it. It is relevant to everything we do, until it's proven
otherwise. We're taking, not-so-small bites, but some pretty
substantial bites into embracing applied artificial
intelligence, and I'm excited about where we're going in the
future.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you for that. Thank you for your
service.
I yield back.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I apologize for not being here for a lot of the
hearing. We have three committee hearings going on
simultaneously.
General Thomas, I want to thank you for your service and
all the quality time you've spent in North Carolina. I hope, in
retirement, you continue to spend a lot of quality time there.
I'm going to take, probably, the questions a different
direction in my capacity as Personnel Subcommittee chair,
because I know a lot of the other members have covered the
landscape on the extraordinary work you're doing. General,
thank you for the briefing earlier this week. I got a real
sense of progress being made. I think some of that stems from
some of the authorities that you've been granted. You're doing
great work there, so thank you for your leadership.
But, I want to talk more about the personnel aspects.
Number one, when you look at, General Thomas, the very
challenging job of an operator--and how a disturbing percentage
of them are going to get injured in one way or another--what
more do I need to be thinking about, in terms of family
support, for the members, and actually even in dealing with the
wounds of war--what more should we be looking at, as a function
of the Personnel Subcommittee, to send the very clear signal we
understand the dangerous job and the impact it's having on
families?
General Thomas. Senator, thanks for that question, and
thanks for the concern expressed.
I would actually challenge the term ``operator,'' because
therein lies the opportunity for us to do better by our people
in the future. While you highlighted particular career fields
that are inherently dangerous, in terms of jumping and fast-
roping, and things like that, we're as good as our weakest
link. We're as good as our support personnel. We use the term
``enablers,'' which is broadbased, but it's the entire fabric
of the force, and, arguably, we didn't focus sufficiently on
the entirety of the force early on, when we talked about POTFF
and how we sustain it. I think we're much more focused on that,
and we have come to you to ask for additional resources so that
we can be more thorough in the application there. But, again,
thanks for the support we've had so far. Truthfully, the best
comment we can get on it is, the sister services are emulating
what you've allowed us to do as the way they could/should take
care of their people, as well.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Something else that we'll be talking about--I was just
briefly speaking with Senator King about progress that we can
make on procurement. We've taken some steps, in recent NOAAs,
for acquisition and procurement reform. I think we can still
take a few pages from y'all's book, in terms of rapid
prototyping and deployment. So, look forward to that in
subsequent hearings. Mr. Chair, hopefully we can have that as a
subject, some point in this Congress.
General Nakasone, you've got a challenge--you mentioned, in
your opening statements that you're trying to find the
resources. You're competing with the private sector. Again, in
the last NDAA, we made some progress, in terms of being able to
get resources from the private sector into positions. But, what
more do we need to do? I've got to believe you just don't have
enough of what you need, in terms of expertise. What more would
you suggest that we look at, as a matter of policies, going
into this NDAA cycle?
General Nakasone. Senator, I think that we have to come
back to the Committee and identify those critical subsets.
There are people within our force right now that I call ``10-
or-20X'' type of people. That means they're 10 or 20 times
better than the people that they work with, better coders,
better malware analysts, better developers, and so, how do we
ensure that we keep those within our force? The services do a
wonderful job in recruiting. We get great recruits. We do a
very, very good job in training them. Our challenge will be in
retaining the very best--not everyone, but the very best. This
is where I think identifying those categories, coming back to
you to make sure that we have the proper career paths and the
proper enumeration will be very helpful.
Senator Tillis. Well, Senator Rounds and I have talked a
lot about it in his capacity on Cyber, and we need that
information sooner. In the private sector, I led a practice
that had ethical testing in cybersecurity resources. They were
even scarce in the environment where you could pretty much pay
whatever the market rate is, so I can't imagine what you're
going to go through for retention. We just need to think
creatively and recognize that these are hot skills, and you've
got to have the SOF equivalent of cyberwarriors out there. We
need to do everything we can to provide you the authority to do
that. But, as you just said, you've got to differentiate
between that person who has a 20-time multiple on skills, and
just say, we're going to treat you all fairly. We're not going
to treat you equally, because you've got to have those
extraordinary warriors in this domain.
I'm going to follow up with a couple of questions for the
record, but they happen to do with plumbing in business
matters, so I'm going to yield back my remaining 10 seconds.
Thank you all for being here.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
General Thomas, I really wanted to thank you for all you've
done for our Nation. I think I've had a bit of a unique
opportunity to not only get to know you from this position, but
also when I put my Reserve uniform on. As my commander, he's,
like, 17 levels above where I am in the organization chart. So,
you've done a great job, and really appreciate it.
Secretary West, appreciate the job you're doing. You know,
unfortunately, there's a very small number of Harvard marines,
and you're making us proud. Very few.
General Nakasone, I want to ask you, on this issue of
offensive operations--I know you probably can't talk too much,
but you might recall a hearing we had in this Committee a
couple of years ago, where Director Clapper and some other
leaders on the cyber and intelligence front openly admitted
that, after the Chinese hacked the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and stole over 20 million SF-86 forms for all
our top-secret operators, including Members of this Committee,
didn't retaliate against them, which I thought was kind of a
stunning admission. To me, it was part of the problem. Whether
it was North Korea or Iran--I think, a couple of years ago,
China, certainly Russia, we were viewed as kind of the world's
cyber punching bag. Any of these countries could come and do
what they wanted, and we did not retaliate.
Can you tell me, without revealing anything classified, do
you feel you have the authorities to hit back, or maybe even
hit back harder, to make the costs of those kind of operations
against our country, against our democracy, much more
prohibitive? Particularly for a country like North Korea, where
I'm assuming we could just drop their entire electrical grid
and Internet system overnight if we wanted to.
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, 1 year ago I
appeared before the Committee for my confirmation, and you
asked a similar question of me. I think it's important that we
look at what's happened within this past year: a National Cyber
Strategy, signed; a DOD Cyber Strategy, signed; the Fiscal Year
2019 National Defense Authorization Act that provided us
greater capabilities and greater authorities within the law was
signed; a new presidential policy that came out on offensive
cyber; and finally, our ability to have a new construct upon
which we operate, which is persistent presence. All of those
provide a much different environment for our adversaries today
than it did 1 year ago.
Senator Sullivan. So, can you publicly state, in this
hearing--again, without getting in classified information--that
you have the authorities and you are not unwilling to undertake
offensive operations that can help deter, whether it's Chinese
stealing 20 million SF-86 forms or the North Koreans hacking
our companies?
General Nakasone. Senator, I have the authorities to
accomplish my mission.
Senator Sullivan. Or the Russians attacking our election
systems?
General Nakasone. I have the authorities that I need to
accomplish my mission, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Good.
I want to ask Secretary West and General Thomas--you have
taken the lead over the last 2 years on the counter-WMD
mission. SOCOM has that lead. To me, there's probably no more
important mission for the survival of the entire Nation, the
entire Republic. We might have threats that rise--ISIS or al
Qaeda, they might rise and fall, but, as long as we have a
republic to defend, the counter-WMD mission is going to be, in
my view, the most important mission. How is that going? Do you
need more resources on that? Are there any things that we can
do to help you with the authorities, whether it's working with
allies, whether it's more resources to undertake that mission,
in terms of the leadership that you now have with regard to
that mission?
General Thomas. Senator, one, we appreciated the
opportunity to perform this mission. It's a daunting,
critically important mission, as you mentioned. We actually had
John Hyten, from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), visiting,
as well as Paul Nakasone, this past week. I would offer, his
mission is probably the true, primary mission, and this one's
connected just underneath.
The level of cooperation and collaboration that we enjoy
with the community of action is extraordinary. We just hosted
our annual seminar, 2 weeks ago. We're about to produce our
Annual Assessment to the Secretary of Defense. This mission set
and space continues to move in the right direction. I don't
know on resources yet. I daresay we will probably uncover some
gaps, in terms of collection capabilities that we, the Nation,
need, going forward, whether it's Department of Defense or
other entities. But, the mission is going very well for us, and
I'm appreciative of some of the expertise that has been brought
to bear on it.
Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one final
quick question.
The return of great-power competition is spelled out in the
NDS, the National Defense Strategy. How is SOCOM aligning with
regard to that mission? Have we overutilized the SOF community
on low-intensity threats? Are we focused on the new NDS
mission, on the SOF side?
Secretary West. Senator, quickly, from my perspective, SOF
is perfectly well suited to take on this challenge, because
it's cheap, it provides the Nation real leverage. But, the
basic task is resource allocation. As you indicated, we are at
capacity, and demand signal is not shrinking. Then this, in
turn, requires a new assessment of the threat in counter-terror
to repurpose forces.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Nakasone, in February, the Department of Justice
and the Department of Homeland Security sent a joint report to
Congress on 2018 election interference. You testified before a
classified session of this Committee yesterday. But, the
public-specific conclusions of the report of these two
departments was as follows, ``There is no evidence to date that
any identified activities of a foreign government or foreign
agent had any material impact on the integrity or security of
election infrastructure or political campaign infrastructure
used in the 2018 midterm elections.'' I appreciate your
testimony yesterday, and I realize there are things that you
cannot get into today. But, what can you tell us, in this
public setting, about whether or not, based on what you know,
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security were correct in saying there was no such interference?
General Nakasone. Senator, I agree with what you had read
with regards to that report. What I can say, in terms of our
role with that, was, within U.S. Cyber Command, and
specifically the National Security Agency, we took a look at
all the intelligence information we had on our adversaries. We
declassified as much of that information as we could. We shared
that with the Department of Homeland Security, who, in turn,
shared that with the state and local levels so that they had a
very, very good picture of what we knew about adversaries that
might be trying to interfere with our elections.
Senator Wicker. So, to the extent that there were concerns
that a foreign government or agent had an impact on the
election, you concur with the public conclusion of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice
that there was not such interference.
General Nakasone. I concur, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker and all the other
Senators, and certainly for the three witnesses. That was a
very eye-opening and a great presentation. Appreciate your
patience and your thoroughness. Thank you so much.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
special operations forces in great power competition
1. Senator Sullivan. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your
testimony you discussed the Special Operations Forces' (SOF) critical
role in executing the National Defense Strategy both in terms of gray
zone operations below the threshold of conflict and in terms of
deterrence. We didn't hear any discussion of a physical rebalancing of
forces away from the counterterrorism mission and toward great-power
competition, however. In fact, Secretary West, you stated that ``We are
at capacity and demand is not shrinking. So then this in turn requires
a new assessment of the threat in counter-terror, to repurpose
forces.'' How close are you to completing that new assessment, when do
you expect it will be complete, and when and how are you planning to
repurpose your forces toward the NDS' emphasis on great-power
competition?
Secretary West. The Department has been adjusting its focus towards
great-power competition since the NDS was published. SO/LIC, USSOCOM,
and the Joint Staff are actively developing policy concepts for SOF's
role in this new strategic paradigm, which includes ensuring that DOD
has the tools to meet state-based challenges below the level of
traditional armed conflict. This shift has already begun, including the
adjustment of force posture for great-power competition, and will be
continuously adjusted to meet changing demands and requirements. To
ensure we continue to meet enduring CT requirements, we will adopt a
resource-sustainable approach to counter priority violent extremist
organizations. A primary focus for managing global CT challenges will
be to share the burden of responsibility with capable partners who can
manage lesser threats locally. Our willing and capable partners
understand the need for collective security, and we will seek to
support their efforts through various security cooperation efforts.
This, in conjunction with prioritizing VEO threats, will enable our
forces to sustain our posture appropriately. These, and other
terrorist-related assessments, will inform my recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense on priorities for the employment of special
operations forces against all of our Nation's threats, from great
powers to terrorists.
General Thomas. The global and regional challenges that America
faces today are complex, dynamic, and of a long-duration. Unlike
conventional forces, SOF have a small footprint, and simply counting
``boots-on-the-ground'' does not always capture the disproportionate
strategic effects our operators have on the adversary every day. We are
continuously refining our methods of assessing our progress to
achieving our desired conditions that will allow us to deliver the best
return on investment for the American taxpayer. It is also important to
note that while assessments are continuous, it takes time to actually
see tangible results. Specifically, at the end of the 3rd quarter of
this fiscal year we will have the results needed to assist in informing
the Chairman's Annual Joint Assessment and USSOCOM's recommendation to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on force allocation. We
anticipate, at that time, to begin to identify forces that can be
repurposed to meet the challenges posed by great power competition.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
requirements process
2. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, does a
requirements process exist whereby unique U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) capabilities help influence or determine requirements
for DOD-wide conventional forces? If so, what is this process?
Secretary West. The Services and USSOCOM requirements process are
governed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS). Through the governance boards that support the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council validation and approval of requirements,
USSOCOM articulates their unique capabilities that have Joint Force
applications. Some of these capabilities are adopted by the Services,
and the corresponding management of programs of record transitioned
from USSOCOM to one or more Services. ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM
constantly analyze special operations-unique capabilities to identify
programs that can appropriately be transferred to the Services for
conventional forces use.
General Thomas. Yes it does. USSOCOM's Special Operations Forces
Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOFCIDS) process is
nested in and compliant with the Joint Staff's Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS). SOFCIDS is the process used
by USSOCOM to implement JCIDS, by validating special operations-
peculiar capabilities at or below the Joint Staffing Designator of
Joint Capabilities Board Interest. USSOCOM leverages the Services for
Service-common equipment whenever possible. USSOCOM posts its validated
requirement documents in the Joint Staff's Knowledge Management and
Decision Support (KM/DS) depository, to allow the Services to see and
adopt SOF efforts. This benefits the Services by enabling them to adopt
USSOCOM-developed capabilities (without spending Service Research,
Development, Technology and Evaluation (RDT&E) dollars), and USSOCOM
receives the benefit once the Service adopts the solution as Service-
common and provides it to our Components. Additionally, as the
Department's proponent for Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil
Affairs capabilities, USSOCOM now has Service coordination and
validation authority for these types of requirements for conventional
forces. Consequently, when PSYOP and CA interests are coordinated
through the SOFCIDS process, the appropriate Service shall be invited
to participate in that Special Operations Command Requirements
Evaluation Board (SOCREB). We also leverage the Department's Integrated
Priority List (IPL) process to highlight USSOCOM needs for Service
support, as well as the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council for
attempting to solve some of the complex issues that arise between
USSOCOM and the Services.
improving procurement process for allies and partners
3. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, what actions
does SOCOM take to encourage allies and partners to utilize the Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS) program for platforms and capabilities, like
light attack aircraft?
Secretary West. Industry is our ally and partner in enabling the
SOF enterprise with cutting-edge capabilities and also in ensuring we
equip allied and partner forces to meet interoperability requirements.
Industry engages directly with allies and partners through DCS, and DOD
partners with allied and partner countries through the FMS process.
Regardless of mechanism, we are committed to working with allies and
partners to meet their needs.
General Thomas. When an ally or friendly country requests to
procure SOF Peculiar platforms or capabilities, USSOCOM follows
Department of Defense (DOD) policy and is generally neutral regarding
the customer's choice to purchase by means of Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Although most defense items or
services can be purchased through either FMS or DCS, in limited
instances, technology or security concerns may require that sales of
specific items be restricted to FMS-Only.
4. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your
experience, have allies and partners expressed frustration about
navigating the DCS program?
Secretary West. Industry is our ally and partner in enabling the
SOF enterprise with cutting-edge capabilities and also in ensuring we
equip allied and partner forces to meet interoperability requirements.
Industry engages directly with allies and partners through DCS, and DOD
partners with allied and partner countries through the FMS process.
Regardless of mechanism, we are committed to working with allies and
partners to meet their needs.
General Thomas. USSOCOM has no formal or informal record of an ally
or partner expressing frustration with the Direct Commercial Sales
(DCS) process. USSOCOM's role in the DCS process is relatively limited.
We conduct assessments of proposed dual-use and defense related SOF-P
technology, articles, and services transfer cases as requested and
provide coordinated positions to the Director, Defense Technology
Security Agency.
5. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your
opinion, would a streamlined process for procuring non-standard items
through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) be helpful when allies and
partners want to procure weapons/platforms that cannot be acquired
through the DCS process?
Secretary West. We are committed to reforming the way we do
business at DOD in order to support building partnership capacity. This
includes improving contracting timelines and processes. Business
reforms will streamline our ability to deliver capabilities across the
DOD enterprise. USSOCOM, DSCA, the Services, and my team are working
together to support allies and partners.
General Thomas. Building partner capacity is of critical importance
to SOF operations. We would support a tailored OSD approach to FMS of
non-standard items based on technical or performance risks to US
operations.
continuing resolutions
6. Senator Perdue. General Thomas and General Nakasone, in as much
detail as possible, through specific examples, please describe the
operational and financial impact continuing resolutions have on SOCOM/
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
General Thomas. While a Continuing Resolution (CR) continues to
allow mission accomplishment for USSOCOM, it introduces readiness risks
that intensify in direct correlation to CR length, including:
Operationally, CRs negatively affect Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Components' ability to train and equip SOF, both organically and via
Building Partner Capacity engagements. These disruptions potentially
result in mission cancellations or postponements and fluctuations to
deployment timelines. These impacts weaken SOF credibility with foreign
partners, diminishing their view of the U.S. as the ``partner of
choice.'' Inability to execute USSOCOM's new start programs, production
increases, major weapon platform recapitalization, and Military
Construction projects. For example, our PB20 request includes two
fiscal year 2020 classified procurement new starts totaling $45
million, numerous production increases including the MH-47 Renew
Program growing from seven fiscal year 2019 airframes to eight in
fiscal year 2020 at a unit cost of $16 million each, and
recapitalization of one MH-60 and one MH-47 Battle Loss Replacements
for $28 million and $38 million, respectively. Our MILCON PB20 request
includes 15 major construction projects at $494 million. None of these
examples could be executed under a CR. Financially, constrained CR
funding levels, particularly when funds are depleted towards the end of
CR periods, can cause increased contract actions resulting in higher
costs associated with having to restructure contracts, and reduced/
restructured/delayed/deferred non-combat related SOF training and
maintenance/sustainment activities. Overall, USSOCOM is typically able
to manage the impacts of short-term CRs (less than 3 months), assuming
an appropriation follows shortly thereafter. As CRs extend in the 3-6
month timeframe, risk moves from mild to moderate depending on the
specific appropriation, program or capability as new starts and
production increases slip to the right in a direct correlation to CR
length, if not longer. Long-term CRs (6 months or longer) are high risk
and begin to erode combat effectiveness and SOF readiness, training,
and modernization efforts, which negatively impact USSOCOM's ability to
provide timely and essential mission support, eventually elevating risk
levels to deployed operators and bringing the command dangerously close
to sinking below a reasonable degree of risk. Service constraints under
a CR risk exacerbating impacts on USSOCOM as their ability to provide
consistent service support to SOF is jeopardized.
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
artificial intelligence
7. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, given the capabilities
required to meet the 2018 cyber strategy, is a 6,200-person Cyber
Mission Force sufficient?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
8. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, can you rely on artificial
intelligence (AI) to close the capability gap?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what AI programs and
applications offer such potential?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what advancements in
military utilization and deployment of AI by our adversaries, namely
China and Russia, do you find most concerning and why?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
11. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, where are you prioritizing
investment dollars to modernize our enterprises and counter these
capabilities?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
12. Senator Blackburn. General Thomas, what advancements in
military utilization and deployment of AI by our adversaries, namely
China and Russia, do you find most concerning and why?
General Thomas. China and Russia continue to hone and field
artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities and technologies that enable
the near-real time identification and monitoring of our personnel
abroad. Advancements in AI-based biometric systems over the past two
years have significantly improved the ability of both the Chinese and
Russians to clandestinely collect biometrics at greater distances and
with greater accuracy. These advancements present an ever-increasing
force protection and operations security risk to U.S. military
personnel, U.S. Government civilians, and our allies and partners. We
anticipate that vast improvements in autonomous facial/voice-
recognition surveillance will challenge U.S. SOF cover activities and
clandestine operations moving forward. The global proliferation of
Chinese safe-smart city surveillance systems and technology gives
Beijing an advantage in the effort to identify, track, and potentially
threaten Special Operators as they traverse various locations around
the world.
13. Senator Blackburn. General Thomas, where are you prioritizing
investment dollars to modernize our enterprises and counter these
capabilities?
General Thomas. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
information operations capabilities
14. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
Nakasone, SOCOM and CYBERCOM sit at the nexus of the Department's
efforts to address the challenges posed by adversaries' weaponization
of information. SOCOM is the Joint Force Proponent for Military
Information Support Operations (formerly known as ``psychological
operations'') and its forces operate closely with those from CYBERCOM
at the tactical and operational levels. In your view, what are the
policy, resource, and capability gaps that limit the Department of
Defense's (DOD)'s ability to be successful in information operations
mission space?
Secretary West. The complex nature of the information environment
presents challenges and opportunities for DOD's role in that
environment and for DOD's strategic partnerships with other government
agencies. Our strategic competitors and other adversaries increasingly
and aggressively operate in the information environment below the
threshold of armed conflict. The Department is communicating how it is
evolving to conduct operations in the Information Environment through
quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees. The
Department recognized that gaps exist and to address those gaps DOD
began a 2019 revision of the Strategy for Operations in the Information
Environment (SOIE) published in 2016. That revision is guided by a core
of seven Secretary of Defense-approved framing principles, which we are
currently converting into seven Lines of Effort (LOEs). The seven LOEs
are: affecting perceptions, acquiring the right authorities, leveraging
and strengthening partnerships, improving DOD's base of knowledge,
refining how we plan, developing and managing people, and developing
technology for OIE. This revision is being done concurrently with the
development of a companion implementation plan and investment framework
to sharpen the Department's focus on the effort and in recognition of
urgency. Revisions to the SOIE are ongoing, and DOD will report updates
in the quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees
required by Section 1637 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018.
General Thomas. The complex nature of the information operations
environment presents challenges and opportunities for DOD's role in the
information environment and its strategic partnership with other
government agencies. As our competitors increasingly operate in the
information operations realm outside of traditionally declared
hostilities, DOD's role and activities are restricted by extant policy
and legal considerations. The Department is currently working on the
fiscal year 2019 NDAA Section 1065b report to identify and analyze any
doctrine, organization, training, material, leader, personnel, and
facilities gaps in DOD Military Information Support Operations (MISO)
capabilities. The report is due on May 13th.
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
Nakasone, what are the relative roles of SOCOM and CYBERCOM forces in
this mission space?
Secretary West. USSOCOM has specific responsibilities outlined in
the Unified Command Plan and ones inherent in its designation as the
Joint proponent for military information support operations (MISO).
USSOCOM's main role in information operations is to integrate and
coordinate DOD MISO capabilities, and, when directed, execute MISO in
support of combatant commands. The role of MISO is to influence foreign
audience behaviors. USSOCOM is supporting integration of MISO
capabilities by leading the establishment of the Joint MISO Web
Operations Center (JMWC). The Department submitted a report to Congress
on January 4, 2019, that outlined how USSOCOM intends for the JMWC to
consolidate and coordinate combatant commands' Internet-based MISO
capabilities. USCYBERCOM conducts technically focused cyberspace
operations. DOD's Strategy for Operations in the Information
Environment (SOIE) reaffirms that all operations in and through the
information environment must be integrated as part of
institutionalization and operationalization efforts. Revisions to the
SOIE are ongoing, and DOD will report updates in the quarterly reports
to the congressional defense committees required by Section 1637 of the
NDAA for fiscal year 2018.
General Thomas. As the DOD joint proponent for MISO, USSOCOM's role
in the information operations mission space is to integrate and
coordinate DOD MISO capabilities, and when directed, execute MISO in
support of combatant commands. USSOCOM is supporting integration of
MISO capabilities by leading the establishment of the Joint MISO Web
Operations Center (JMWC) that will consolidate and coordinate combatant
commands' internet-based MISO capabilities.
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
16. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
Nakasone, do you believe that a combatant command should be designated
as the global synchronizer or coordinating authority for all DOD
information operations (similar to the responsibilities SOCOM has for
synchronizing counterterrorism and combatting WMD efforts)? If so, what
additional resources do you believe that would require?
Secretary West. SecDef designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as the Global Integrator for Operations. This includes
operations in the information environment. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy remains the principal staff advisor to the Secretary
of Defense for information operations, and is the designated senior
official for the integration of strategic information operations and
cyber-enabled information operations. The Department is examining the
optimal alignment of internal organizations and resources. The
Department will report progress in quarterly reports to the
congressional defense committees required by Section 1637 of the NDAA
for fiscal year 2018.
General Thomas. The complex and pervasive nature of information
operations and the associated mission sets pose a challenge for
designating a single coordinating authority construct for operations.
DOD information operations is an integrating function rather than a
single capability. Adding a coordinating authority role for all IO
capabilities to a single combatant command could increase the
complexity of an already challenging coordination environment. However,
a combatant command could be designated coordination authority for one
or more specific information related capabilities (IRC) as SOCOM has
been for the MISO capability.
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
17. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General
Nakasone, during the hearing, General Nakasone stated ``the Fiscal Year
2019 National Defense Authorization Act was critical for us at U.S.
Cyber Command. It gave us capabilities and authorities that--that were
important for us as we look to further enable. That included the
ability for us to rapidly deploy elements of our force to the
Department of Homeland Security, the ability for us to look at networks
that are not part of the Department of Defense networks. The other
piece of it that was critical is, as Ranking Member Reed mentioned, is
the idea of cyber as a traditional military activity. I think those are
areas that are going to help us immensely with near-peer competitors.''
Do you believe similar reforms are necessary to better enable the
information operations by the Department of Defense against near-peer
competitors?
Secretary West. DOD is revising and updating its 2016 Strategy for
Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) in 2019. That effort
must necessarily address DOD's requirements, capabilities, and capacity
to conduct information operations that would not be attributable to the
United States. At this time, the Department has not identified specific
concerns that could be addressed by legislation. However, operational
concepts and capabilities must and will evolve to address increasingly
sophisticated threats posed by near-peer competitors that are actively
challenging the United States below the threshold of active
hostilities. DOD welcomes further discussions with the Committee as the
strategy develops to ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces are well
positioned to engage in traditional military activities to counter
adversary threats in an information environment that is more complex
and diverse than ever before, when hostile actions by our adversaries
may not be easily recognizable.
General Thomas. Yes, a review and possible reform to 50 USC, 3090
may assist DOD in the information operations mission space with regards
to near-peer competitors. Currently, DOD uses a contextual legal
analysis to determine if an information operations-related activity,
such as MISO, is a traditional military activity (TMA). Such analysis
requires a relationship to an on-going or anticipated hostility
involving US forces. This requirement often restricts some of what DOD
can do in the information operations mission space, especially with our
interagency partners, when our near-peer competitors challenge us in
environments where overt hostilities are not present or easily
recognizable. A Congressional review of the definition of anticipated
hostilities may afford DOD greater flexibility.
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
advise, assist, and accompany report
18. Senator Reed. Secretary West, Section 1212 of the Fiscal Year
2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the General
Counsel of the Department of Defense and the commanders of the
appropriate combatant commands, to conduct a legal and policy review of
advise, assist, and accompany missions to ensure consistency of
authorities, Executive Orders (EXORDs), doctrinal definitions, and
other matters with legal and policy requirements. This report was due
to the congressional defense committees on January 10, 2019. When will
this report be provided to the congressional defense committees?
Secretary West. On March 6, 2019, I sent a letter to the
congressional defense committees indicating that DOD needs additional
time to analyze the data required by the statute and to deliver the
report to the congressional defense committees. We anticipate the
report to be complete by May 15, 2019.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
prohibition on kaspersky lab software
19. Senator Shaheen. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
included a provision that prohibits the use of products and services
developed or provided by the Kaspersky Lab. Can you provide the Federal
Government's progress in banning all Kaspersky hardware, software and
services?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
20. Senator Shaheen. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
provision also required a report that includes procedures for removing
suspect products or services and an assessment of gaps no later than
April 1, 2019. Can you provide a status on the report and whether it is
on track to be completed?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
cyber operations during the 2018 election
21. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, according to your
understanding, did Russia attempt to conduct espionage or engage in
influence campaigns during the last election?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
22. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, we have seen that our
failure to deter Russia has invited others to attempt to interfere.
Recently Facebook and Twitter disclosed Iranian influence operations
targeting Americans. Clearly the threat is growing. What countries have
the capabilities and willingness to meddle in our politics?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you state in your
testimony that with the consent of several European countries, you sent
teams forward to conduct midterm election security operations. How
important was this forward basing to the success of your midterm
security mission?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, is cooperation with
European allies essential to your enduring mission of election
security?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
25. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, the President has raised
the potential of political interference from China on several
occasions. Have you seen any indication that China has sought to
conduct campaigns similar to Russia against the United States?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
26. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, countries such as Taiwan
tend to be the first target of Chinese meddling--are there examples of
tactics and operations used by China against its neighbors that we
should be prepared for?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
talent recruitment in the cyber domain
27. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, as we know, part of the
challenge for the Cyber Mission Force is that the private sector can
provide very attractive offers to our best and brightest. You note that
you track attrition. Can you provide me metrics of attrition for our
CYBERCOM?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, how much higher is this
than other military occupational specialties?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you mentioned in your
testimony the need to utilize the Reserve Component to fill certain
``low-density'' skill sets. Do you have a plan in place to increase our
Reserve components in this mission?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you also note that
CYBERCOM is working with the Services to ensure that there is a joint
common standard and proficiency with foundational cyber tools. Where
are we in that process?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
31. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, when do you expect the
Services will meet the common standard?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, how can this Committee
assist you in this goal to recruit and retain CYBERCOM talent in the
Reserves?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
syria withdrawal
33. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, do you agree with General
Votel that it is always best to operate with your partners? If so, are
we accepting greater risk to force and mission if we leave our partners
in Syria to instead attempt to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) remotely from Iraq?
General Thomas. Absolutely. Fundamentally, the worldwide military
network of Allies and Partners is vital to our success and serves as a
vehicle for the U.S. to achieve national policy objectives. In building
this military network of capable Allies and Partners, SOF demonstrates
U.S. commitment, deters potential adversaries, and creates options and
access for the Joint Force. Additionally, we mature this network
through providing our Allies and Partners equipment, funding, and
training in those locations we operate in. Operating with our partners
in the Defeat-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) campaign in both
Iraq and Syria has been critical to our success. In both countries, we
have relied heavily on our partners to do the fighting. Our job has
been to enable them with fires, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), and advice. Concerning risk to force and mission
in the D-ISIS campaign, I defer to the CENTCOM CDR, as he has
Operational Control of those forces and is ultimately responsible for
determining appropriate risk to force and mission in those areas.
Between our partner forces, our coalition partners, and our operational
capability, we will continue to be successful in suppressing ISIS. This
partnered approach has been successful over the past few years and in
the end, our partners will own what is left behind.
34. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, what are the advantages to
operating from the same geographical location as your partners?
General Thomas. Operating from the same geographical location as
our partners has many advantages, i.e., we can provide timely support
when needed, we can immediately exert direct influence at the point of
friction, and we can effectively plan, coordinate and de-conflict
operations as required. However, the primary advantage is the
relationship of trust that we build with our partners. Our presence
alongside a partner force allows us to directly enable them with
operational support (fires, ISR, and advice), but more importantly, it
demonstrates our commitment to their cause and enables the building of
trust in our partnership.
35. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, what would we lose by
relocating special operators from Syria to Iraq?
General Thomas. While we are adjusting our military posture in
Syria, we are preserving sufficient combat power in the region to
ensure that we can continue to destroy remnants of ISIS fighters and
ensure it does not return.
36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, how have
our Kurdish partners specifically added value to SOCOM forces operating
in Syria?
Secretary West. The SDF have been a reliable partner for USSOF
since 2014, and have suffered thousands of killed and wounded. Their
leadership, sacrifice, and determination to drive ISIS from their
homelands was instrumental in the liberation of the vast majority of
ISIS's physical caliphate.
General Thomas. Our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF), were essential to our operations in Syria. Since 2014, the SDF,
our main indigenous partnered force in Syria, have suffered tens of
thousands of killed and wounded driving ISIS from SDF homelands and
remain instrumental as we conclude the ISIS fight and move forward.
Without the SDF, the physical caliphate would still comprise an area of
34,000 square miles, compared to the less than one single square mile
it tenuously holds today.
operation tempo strains
37. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, can you describe the type
of mental health evaluations your servicemembers receive before and
after deployments?
General Thomas. Servicemembers are required to complete the DOD
deployment health assessment cycle to collect information on physical
and mental health status. DD Form 2795, Pre-Deployment Health
Assessment is mandated within 120 days prior to deployment. DD Form
2796, Post-Deployment Health Assessment, is completed 30 days prior to
or 30 days after redeployment. DD Form 2900, Post-Deployment Health
Reassessment is accomplished between 90 and 180 days post-deployment DD
Form 3024, Periodic Health Assessment (PHA), is completed annually. The
Mental Health Assessment (MHA) is included in the PHA. The MHA is a
screener which must be performed in-person (telephonically or face-to-
face).
38. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, is the evaluation conducted
by a mental health specialist or is it conducted by a general
practitioner?
General Thomas. The DOD-directed evaluations can be conducted by a
variety of medical providers. If mental health issues are noted, the
servicemember is referred to a mental health provider/specialist. The
MHA can be administered by any trained medical professional but must be
performed in-person (telephonically or face-to-face). Referral to a
mental health professional is made if the MHA is positive for MH
issues.
39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, when
servicemembers are on dwell time, how often are they away from their
home base for training?
Secretary West. The amount of time a servicemember may spend away
from his or her home base for training purposes varies significantly by
Service Component, force element, unit, occupational specialty, and
other variables. USSOCOM's personnel tempo policy sets a threshold that
a servicemember may not spend more than 480 days away from his or her
home station in a 24-month period. This includes training, operational
deployments, and performance of other official duties when
circumstances prevent the servicemember from spending off duty-time at
their normal residence.
General Thomas. Deployment-to-Dwell (D2D) and operations tempo
(OPTEMPO) are distinctly different than personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO).
Dwell begins when the unit, detachment or member thereof, arrives at
its homeport/stations/base from an operational deployment. Dwell ends
when the unit, detachment or member thereof, departs on an operational
deployment. A unit is either on operational deployment or in dwell.
PERSTEMPO begins when a member's official duties require them to be at
a location make it infeasible for the member to spend off-duty time in
the housing in which the member resides when on garrison duty at the
member's permanent duty station. The premise for USSOCOM PERSTEMPO
measurement has not changed since the establishment of the policy in
June 2012. Threshold is no more than 480 days away from home (head on
pillow) in a 730 day window (66% at any given time). Dates for
calculating the 24 month PERSTEMPO number are a rolling count of 18
months back and 6 months forward from the current day. The amount of
time a servicemember may spend away from their home base for training
purposes varies significantly by Service Component, unit, occupational
specialty, and other variables. Greater than 99 percent of assigned
forces are within the USSOCOM PERSTEMPO threshold. In 2018, there was
only one waiver submitted to exceed the 480 day threshold; the waiver
was disapproved.
40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, is time
spent training in the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the
continental United States (OCONUS) away from the servicemembers home
base factored into the 1:2 ratio?
Secretary West. DOD policy defines deployment-to-dwell ratio for
active components as the ratio of time a unit, detachment, or
individual is operationally deployed to the time the unit, detachment,
or individual is in dwell. Dwell is the period of time that a unit or
individual is not on an operational deployment. Generally, the time a
servicemember spends training in the continental United States (whether
at or away from his or her permanent duty station or homeport) is not
considered an operational deployment and is therefore factored as dwell
time in the deployment-to-dwell ratio. Certain SOF overseas training
events are considered operational deployments and are factored as
deployment time in the deployment-to-dwell ratio. Time spent training
in the continental United States or outside the continental United
States may be factored into an individual's personnel tempo if it is
infeasible for a servicemember engaged in his or her official duties,
including circumstances such as training as well as operational
deployments, to spend off duty-time in his or her normal residence.
General Thomas. Yes and no. The 1:2 ratio relates to deployment-to-
dwell (D2D) calculations used to ensure individuals are not overly
exposed to combat and operational deployments. Time a servicemember
spends training in the continental United States (whether at or away
from their permanent duty station or homeport) is not considered an
operational deployment and is therefore factored as dwell time in their
deployment-to-dwell ratio. However, certain SOF overseas training
events, due to global force management consideration, (example: Joint
Combined Exchange Training) are considered operational deployments and
are factored as deployment time in their deployment-to-dwell ratio.
Regardless of D2D calculations, time spent training in the continental
United States or outside the continental United States will be factored
into an individual's personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) if it is not feasible
for a servicemember to spend off duty-time in their normal residence.
41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West, your testimony refers to
your plan to improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio for the last 10
percent of your force. Please elaborate on this plan.
Secretary West. Our efforts to improve deployment-to-dwell ratios
begins with continuing to improve our force management practices to
ensure forces are being provided on a sustainable basis as well as
refining our processes to prioritize SOF deployments in support of the
Geographic combatant commands. Additionally, we have programmed
relatively small end-strength growth in Combat Support and Combat
Service Support (CS/CSS) personnel. This targeted growth is vital for
us to alleviate deployment-to-dwell stress for some of our most
strained critical enabler and support communities that are the result
of structural imbalances in the size of our operator and enabler
communities for certain force elements. These high-demand/low-density
enablers perform critical specialized functions such as intelligence,
communications, fire support, medical, maintenance, and other combat
service support roles.
42. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, you state in your testimony
that you have achieved a minimum 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio with the
``exception of a few critical skill sets and career fields.'' What are
those skillsets and career fields, and why are they exceptions?
General Thomas. The majority of career fields that continue to have
a deployment-to-dwell ratio of less than 1:2 are the Special Operations
Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) skill sets. These
high-demand/low-density enablers perform critical specialized functions
such as intelligence, communications, fire support, medical, aircraft
maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and other combat service
support roles. Typically, these skills sets are paired with Special
Operators for deployment rotations. Due to current force generation
cycles and manning issues, CS and CSS routinely experience an
organizational imbalance between the support functions and operators.
To address this issue, we have programmed relatively small end strength
growth in CS and CSS personnel. This targeted growth is vital for us to
alleviate deployment-to-dwell stress for some of our most strained
critical enabler and support communities that are the result of
structural imbalances in the size of our operator and enabler
communities.
43. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, both you and Secretary West
mentioned in your testimony that the Preservation of the Force and
Family (POTFF) program is important to enhance resilience and readiness
through providing support to servicemembers and their families. Gen
Thomas, you state that you have directed mandatory participation in the
program. What are the physical and psychological services you
referenced?
General Thomas. Participation in the POTFF Human Performance
Program is tailored to the requirements of our servicemembers'
occupational specialties. For example, a Navy SEAL and a personnel
clerk have much different needs to prepare for a mission; however, both
share the need to be mission capable. The command is customizing its
training programs to ensure that every member of the formation is
performing at their best and are able to successfully accomplish their
missions. Participation in the Psychological Performance Program will
include periodic comprehensive assessments and specialized training to
enhance cognitive functioning and decision making. We have directed
immediate implementation of the training through the command's suicide
prevention policy, and we are developing the assessment program with
the assistance of the Defense Health Agency. Currently, we are testing
assessment measures and processes at MARSOC units.
44. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, when did you make
participation mandatory?
General Thomas. Participation in the command's human performance
program has been a mandatory requirement since 2014 for all of our
special operations qualified servicemembers, i.e. Special Forces,
SEALs, Special Tactics and Marine Raiders. At a round table meeting
with all of my commanders in August, 2019. I directed that every member
of SOF will participate in the POTFF Human and Psychological
Performance programs.
45. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, did Chief Special Warfare
Operator Gallagher participate in this program?
General Thomas. As a Special Operations qualified sailor, Chief
Gallagher was required to participate in the POTFF's Human Performance
Program. Information as to whether Chief Gallagher participated in the
Psychological Performance component of the POTFF program is protected
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
46. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, does the program require
servicemembers to ``self-report'' mental health issues?
General Thomas. Servicemembers cannot be compelled to self-report
mental health issues; however, the command expects that all of our
teammates will seek to continually improve their mental and physical
performance. We afford every opportunity for our members to access
behavioral healthcare, and have worked hard to normalize care and
eliminate discrimination against those seeking care.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
higher education benefits to cyber workforce.
47. Senator Kaine. General Nakasone, are there additional
incentives Congress could provide you to better address talent and
capacity gaps in our cyber security workforce?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
artificial intelligence technology
48. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, there is a massive amount of
data coming from SOCOM's operations and from broader global
intelligence collection efforts. What efforts is SOCOM taking to
explore AI, and how would AI help SOCOM conduct its mission and
operations?
General Thomas. USSOCOM is pursuing an enterprise solution which
incorporates the collection, storage, and analysis of big data with
machine learning and AI platforms. AI and machine learning affords the
ability to make better use of the massive amounts of data, to guide
decision-makers on prioritization and inform potential future
opportunities. While there is a significant amount of work to be done,
we desire to be on the leading edge of AI capability in the DOD by
partnering with government and non-government agencies to fully utilize
the tremendous capabilities offered by AI. SOCOM established a Chief
Data Office to lead the efforts to develop and apply AI technologies
across the enterprise and recognize the return of increased data from
AI application. SOCOM recognizes the value of AI/ML across the SOF
Enterprise and have six initial focus areas where AI/ML is being
introduced to improve speed, precision, and readiness in combat. These
focus areas are: A. Targeting (kinetic and non-kinetic) B. Maneuver C.
Communication, cyber protection, and reliance D. Recruiting, training,
and talent management E. Predictive maintenance, logistics planning,
and forecasting F. Vendor, contract, and budget management. SOCOM is
finalizing an Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Data Strategy that
will help guide our Enterprise to the leading edge of this technology
by deploying AI at all echelons of the SOF enterprise, developing of an
AI ready workforce, and executing an aggressive outreach program. The
CDO has applied significant resources to ensure our efforts comport
with the new DOD AI strategy, DOD Cloud Strategy, and soon to be
released DOD Data Strategy. We intend to continue embracing the
enterprise enablers being delivered by OSD and the Joint Staff
enterprise enablers being delivered by the Joint Staff and OSD and
intend to be constant partners who are willing to deploy new
technologies into our formation to improve our operations and due to
the nature of AI, improve technologies with every turn.
49. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, does SOCOM see value in AI
for countering weapons of mass destruction globally?
General Thomas. Yes. USSOCOM certainly sees value in AI across
multiple national security threats . . . including countering weapons
of mass destruction. Operationally, the use of AI will be essential for
assisting special operations forces in analyzing and acting on
information that may otherwise be missed due to the massive volume of
data available. AI provides a platform to narrow the focus of our
professionals at speeds that cannot be replicated by human operators
alone. From a strategic perspective, the explosion of unstructured open
source data has created an information challenge for SOCOM in its role
as the Department's Coordinating Authority for CWMD. The SOCOM staff is
exploring optimal employment of AI to ensure collection and assessment
of CWMD critical information requirements. We are hopeful that AI will
eventually aid predictive analysis. AI tools have the potential to
identify and assess threats in a timely--if not real time - manner.
Moreover, AI threat assessments, combined with staff estimates, will
improve and inform our defense posture by enabling a more efficient
allocation of finite defense resources. There remains much work ahead.
50. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, what other mission-sets does
SOCOM see value in AI for?
General Thomas. Artificial Intelligence has many applications
within the Special Operations Enterprise and as we develop our
capability, we will expand the use but initially, SOCOM is focused on
six areas for the initial application of narrowly focused AI projects
that as we learn from their application we will be able to stretch to
transform all warfighting functions in our enterprise. These focus
areas are: A. Targeting (kinetic and non-kinetic) B. Maneuver C.
Communication, cyber protection, and reliance D. Recruiting, training,
and talent management E. Predictive maintenance, logistics planning,
and forecasting F. Vendor, contract, and budget management. The goal is
to increase our effectiveness by transitioning as many singular tasks
to AI/ML as possible thereby freeing our talented workforce to conduct
more complex human tasks and partner with automated machines to improve
our speed, precision, and scale of operations.
51. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, what agencies is SOCOM
partnering with to develop and incorporate AI systems?
General Thomas. USSOCOM is connected to all combat support agencies
and benefits from the shared experience as we all explore ways to
insert this transformational technology into our formations. USSOCOM is
proud to have been an early partner with USDI as Undersecretary Kernan
launched Project Maven at the then-Deputy Secretary of Defenses'
direction. Since then, we've expanded our partnership and have also
embraced the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center's initiatives,
initiatives from the DOD Chief Data Office, and the Joint Enterprise
Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Program as critical enablers to our
way forward. In the last 30-days we've hosted the Directors of all of
the programs at this headquarters and have pledged to embed SOF
professionals in those organizations to both ensure their success and
reinforce SOF's intent to be a living laboratory for the advanced AI
technologies they develop to deploy. We believe a continued SOF to
service model applies with AI and are ready to facilitate the
introduction of any AI technologies the Combat Support Agencies believe
will improve SOF operations.
red team cyber operations
52. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, last month, the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation released his annual report. One of
their observations was that red teams used to assess cyber
vulnerabilities across the military were severely lacking in the
personnel, time, and funding to accomplish their assessments. How
critical is Red Teaming to our cyber security and operations?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
53. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what is CYBERCOM doing to
address this issue?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
54. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, another major concern is
retention of master-level Red Teamers. What is CYBERCOM doing to
recruit and maintain this expertise?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
china and russia--cyber theft
55. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, China's cyber operations
include tapping into our own research and development. What is CYBERCOM
doing to protect against China's access of our emerging technologies?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
56. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what efforts is CYBERCOM
taking to protect major acquisitions projects from foreign espionage?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
57. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, are you working with
defense contractors to help safeguard proprietary information and
prototypes?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
information warfare
58. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, we are all worried about the
weaponization of disinformation, especially with countries like Russia,
who already excel at these malign operations. SOCOM is standing up an
operations center to ``provide global messaging capabilities,''
according to your testimony. Under what principles and guidelines will
SOCOM operate in terms of those global messaging capabilities?
General Thomas. The Joint MISO WebOps Center and partner combatant
commands will support U.S. Government objectives and operate under
approved MISO authorities to detect, deter, and counter as necessary,
inaccurate and untruthful narratives in the information environment.
This is no different than standard MISO activities, except it will
occur on the internet. The principles and guidelines for conducting
Military Information Support Operations will not change.
Cyber Acquisitions
59. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA
extended CYBERCOM's acquisition authority through 2025. What are you
doing to better execute the entirety of your acquisition authority cap?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
60. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what sorts of technology
are you acquiring and looking for?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
61. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, do you have the skills and
resources in place to handle CYBERCOM's contracting needs?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
cyber mission force size and manning
62. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, the current cyber workforce
shortage is estimated at approximately 300,000 jobs in the United
States and almost 3 million jobs worldwide. It took since initiation of
the process in 2013 until this past year to fully man the DOD cyber
mission force of 133 teams. You stated that we would likely need an
increase to this force. How great of an increase do you foresee us
needing given the risk to advanced military capabilities and our
civilian partners?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
63. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, how do you plan on
recruiting and retaining this cyber force given the extensive shortages
already documented and competition from the private sector
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
cyber operations and the national guard
64. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, in 2018 West Virginia
National Guard members were brought on board at Joint Force
Headquarters--Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) to
help lead development of the first Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for
use of National Guard forces to support States' domestic cyber
operations and for cyber defense support to civil authorities. The
CONOPS are most effective with an automated mechanism for information
sharing between States. Where are you currently in the effort to
automate this information sharing process and what else needs to happen
to enable this CONOPS?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
65. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, the National Guard is
quickly becoming a major player in the Cyber Operations fight. Last
year the West Virginia National Guard began sending soldiers to attend
jointly developed courses in cybersecurity at the University of
Charleston to grow capability despite a lack of cyber force structure
in the State. Previous to this the first National Guard cyber battalion
was stood up in 2017 in Virginia. What is the future of force structure
developments for National Guard units and how will National Guard units
be utilized in the future cyber battlespace?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
adversary cyber operations
66. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, we've seen a significant
increase in adversaries operating in the ``gray zone'' short of
outright armed conflict utilizing cyber-attacks and information
operations. Examples include Russian election interference, Chinese
espionage and intellectual property theft, and Iranian and violent
extremist information operations. Where are we seeing the greatest
increase in these ``gray zone'' attacks and where are our associated
greatest vulnerabilities to these attacks?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
u.s. special operations command and the national guard
67. Senator Manchin. General Thomas, the West Virginia National
Guard maintains a robust special operations capability primarily in the
2nd battalion, 19th Special Forces Group of the Army National Guard.
Are you able to effectively utilize National Guard special operations
personnel and training spaces to ease workloads on Active Duty troops
and achieve or attain better than your desired 1:2 deployment ratio?
General Thomas. Yes. USSOCOM consistently utilizes National Guard
Special Operations Forces (SOF) residing in 17 states to augment Active
Duty SOF elements in order to meet directed readiness and 1:2
Deployment to Dwell requirements. National Guard SOF are generated and
managed at a 1:4 Mobilization to Deployment ratio. USSOCOM expects all
Active Duty Special Operations Forces will be at or above the 1:2
Deployment to Dwell Ratio by the start of fiscal year 2021. USSOCOM
could not accomplish this without the effective use of the National
Guard SOF.
u.s. special operations command and artificial intelligence
68. Senator Manchin. General Thomas, the Department just released
the Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy. In the unclassified
summary, it says that it ``is likely that the most transformative AI-
enabled capabilities will arise from experiments at the `forward
edge''', which means that is ``discovered by the users themselves in
contexts far removed from centralized offices and laboratories.'' It
seems clear that the special operations community is going to play a
huge role in the artificial intelligence spaces. How are commanders
embracing AI now and what are some things down the road we can expect
to see our SOF community executing using artificial intelligence.
General Thomas. USSOCOM is finalizing its AI Strategy, which
clearly states it's our intention to be an AI Command accelerating
SOF's ability to produce and use decision grade data at the speed of
computers across every facet of our operations. Through the USSOCOM
CDO, we are embracing an ``applied AI'' model, inspired by industry,
where we focus on rapidly deploying AI technologies from our tactical
elements to strategic headquarters. We are undertaking steps to create
an aggressive workforce that can master the application of AI. As we
improve our understanding of the technology our SOF operators and
professionals will find creative applications for its use and continue
deploying the new technologies increasingly rapid rates. As we build
the team who can help deliver this technology and manage the data
associated with it we've undertaken efforts with Project Maven to
expand the deployment and capability of their technology into our
formation beyond just full motion video but also exploring the
opportunities to leverage smart system technologies to merge
intelligence and operational data layers. We've also made our data,
domain experts, and formation available to deploy new AI technologies
to facilitate the rapid exploitation of captured enemy material.
Further, we partnered with the JAIC to introduce the use of data-
engineering and AI into our rotary wing fleet within the 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment. This initiative provides our maintainers
with the ability to predict engine failures and plan accordingly to
avoid the lack of aircraft during operational peeks. The predictive
model aligns needed maintenance based on data obtained from the
aircraft with operational requirements to ensure peek readiness rates
during mission peeks. Over the coming months we plan to initiate
projects with the JAIC and others to build upon our successful AI
technology integrations but also expand into other areas that include
messaging and counter-messaging, identity protection and management,
human performance, and maneuver.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
recruiting
69. Senator Jones. General Thomas, it's my understanding that the
numbers of women and minorities in the Special Operations Forces are
pretty low. I think we all understand the intrinsic value of a diverse
force, but it seems to me also that recruiting effectively among all
groups can help you reach your recruitment numbers and that diversity
among the force can be very helpful when you are operating in other
cultures and countries, especially in the types of missions Special
Operations Forces undertake. Do you have a handle on the reasons for
the low numbers of women and minority Special Operations Forces members
and are you making efforts to increase those numbers?
General Thomas. Keeping in mind that most in-service recruiting
comes from the combat arms fields in the Army and Marines, the
composition of our Special Operations Forces is highly reflective of
the diversity make up of those forces. As women and minorities increase
in the Army and Marine infantry, the numbers in the Raiders, Rangers
and Special Forces will increase, but it will take time. Likewise, as
the Air Force continues to recruit more diversity into Battlefield
Airmen and as the Navy continues to recruit diversity into the SEALs,
the diversity in SOF will grow. While recruiting is a Service
responsibility, SOCOM is making every effort to offer all qualified
servicemembers the opportunity to assess into special operations. To
this end, we have recently graduated our 25th and 26th women rangers
with numerous additional women currently in the course. As people self-
select into the special operations forces, we do have limited ability
to increase the diversity of the force beyond marketing, recruiting and
mentoring. Nevertheless, special operations will continue to seek
qualified diverse personnel to fill our ranks.
recruiting
70. Senator Jones. General Nakasone, how diverse is the CYBERCOM
force and what efforts are you making to recruit from groups that are
underrepresented?
General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
preservation of the force and family
71. Senator Jones. General Thomas, I think the Preservation of the
Force and Family program is an excellent and creative effort to address
the unique pressures on Special Operations Forces and their families.
In my hometown of Birmingham, Alabama, we are proud to host the 20th
Special Forces Group (Airborne), an Army National Guard unit that has
been regularly actively deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and a number of
other places around the world as part of the Global War on Terror. I
think they could benefit tremendously from the POTFF, as do Active Duty
troops. Although I know there are key differences between Active and
Guard units, are you considering extending the program to Special
Forces Guard members and how would you accomplish that?
General Thomas. We recognize the sacrifices and challenges faced by
our SOF Reserve and National Guard forces and their families and
acknowledge the need for POTFF services similar in scope to those
provided to our Active forces and families. We are exploring
alternatives to deliver POTFF to our SOF Reserve and National Guard
forces. Options being considered include mobile training teams and
remote/virtual instruction. USSOCOM is actively engaged with the DOD
and Military Services to conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA)
of Reserve and National Guard forces as related to the DOD's Total
Force Fitness (TFF) initiative. The CBA is intended to identify
capability gaps, which will lead to programming resources to fulfill
those gaps. In an effort to reach SOF families and remotely located
personnel, including Reserve and National Guard, POTFF is developing a
website to virtually deliver health and fitness material and to better
connect SOF communities. The website will be active by mid-2019.
Reserve and National Guard units that are located in proximity to
active SOF units are welcomed and encouraged to utilize POTFF resources
at those units.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order. The
meeting today is going to receive testimonies from two great
guys, and it is a really good timing for this event to take
place. They are General John Hyten, Commander of the USSTRATCOM
[United States Strategic Command], and General Terry
O'Shaughnessy, Commander of NORTHCOM [United States Northern
Command].
This Committee's top priority is to support the effective
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS
Commission, which we have had a hearing on already--I think it
leads us in the right direction. It is a blueprint that we are
using in this commission. They made it clear that maintaining
and modernizing the nuclear deterrent is required. While we
ignored the nuclear weapons after the Cold War ended, Russia
and China have focused on more and more nuclear programs. We, I
guess, assumed that they were not doing anything because we
were not doing anything at that time. Nonetheless, we have
fallen behind.
Now we need to modernize all three legs with the nuclear
triad, as well as the warheads and infrastructure in the
Department of Energy (DOE). We have some questions about that
because there is a lot of comments around negating the
necessity of the nuclearization modernization that we feel is
necessary.
The President and the Department of Defense (DOD) have also
rightly identified space as a warfighting domain that is
growing more important every day.
General Hyten, you are a career space professional and your
current command both directs and relies upon many space systems
every day. I look forward to hearing your views on establishing
the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) as a full combatant command
and also your thoughts on the new space force. We had a chance
to visit in my office, and I appreciate it. I have heard that
you visited others too. It is kind of a confusing thing when
you talk about a space force and you talk also about the
combatant command and where the two are similar. I have some
questions along that line.
General O'Shaughnessy, you have operational responsibility
for the defense of the United States Homeland. What an awesome
responsibility that is. The Missile Defense Review recently
enumerated a number of challenges to U.S. missile defenses,
including cruise and hypersonic missiles. I am interested in
your views on the most pressing priorities in the missile
defense arena, as well as what we should be doing to address
them.
Lastly, General O'Shaughnessy, I am eager to hear your
assessment of the ongoing southern border deployment and how
that might be affecting our readiness. Some interpretations of
what is happening down there say that that could actually
improve our readiness. I am anxious to hear your views on that.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses, General
Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy. We thank you and your families
and the many men and women who serve with you to serve the
nation and protect the nation. Thank you very much.
General Hyten, first and foremost, we would like to hear
from you about the administration's decision to withdraw from
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with nothing
to replace it. I understand that Russia was in noncompliance
and that China also poses a threat, but I believe a better path
would have been to continue to pressure Russia back into
compliance and ask modifications to the treaty, if necessary.
Treaties are a major component of our security strategy. We
build and modernize nuclear weapons, but we also have treaties
which prescribe numbers and use. Withdrawing from this treaty
puts the extension of New START [New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty] in 2021 on very shaky ground. I am interested in your
views on this matter.
The second issue I am concerned about is Russia's
successful launch of the long-range hypersonic weapon, which I
understand will be nuclear-capable. China also has a multitude
of similar systems although not long-range like those of
Russia. I am interested in hearing your thoughts on the
capabilities of our near-peer competition and what we need to
do to counter these capabilities.
The third issue I would like you to address is the
administration's space force proposal. I understand the
importance of space and the need for additional focus and
resources for that effort. I am also supportive of creating a
full unified command for space. However, I remain dubious of
the need to create an entire new bureaucracy of a separate
service and all that entails. I think it is inevitable that
such a creation will distract rather than provide focus to the
critical mission of space. I know you have studied this issue
closely, and I am interested in your views on the pros and cons
of this proposal.
Finally, General Hyten, you are also responsible for the
synchronization of global missile defense plans and operations.
I would like to hear your thoughts about the recently released
Missile Defense Review and the Department's plans for our
current missile defense systems and how to address future
threats.
General O'Shaughnessy, your mission is to protect the
Homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and
to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of
attacks and natural disasters. We saw this demonstrated in
DOD's support to the States and territories affected by
hurricanes and wildfires this past year, and we thank you and
your command for your significant efforts.
You are also dual-hatted as the Commander of the North
American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, which brings unique
responsibilities and partnering opportunities with Canada to
deter and defend against advancing threats to our nations.
You are also responsible for the operation of our Homeland
ballistic missile defense system. We look forward to hearing
about your priorities for further improvements to the ground-
based missile defense system in the context of the Missile
Defense Review. This is particularly important in light of the
threat from North Korea and potentially Iran.
Lastly, at a time when the National Defense Strategy and
our intelligence community's annual worldwide threat assessment
are stressing the absolute necessity of using scarce resources
to meet the challenge of near-peer adversaries like Russia and
China, the administration is committing significant DOD
resources and attention to what the President has taken to
calling a national emergency at our southern border. In fact,
nowhere in these two documents I have referenced, the National
Defense Strategy particularly, are migrant caravans or drug
traffickers crossing our southern border mentioned as threats
to our national security. Russia, China, cybersecurity, and a
host of other items are in those documents, but nowhere is
there a finding that calls for 4,000 Active Duty troops to be
deployed to the southern border. For comparison's sake, we have
approximately 5,000 troops deployed in Iraq. I have yet to hear
from a witness before this Committee who has not stressed the
real threats we face and the need to restore readiness and
provide modern facilities for our troops and their families.
Instead, DOD is planning to reallocate funding that has been
authorized and appropriated for installation commanders' top
priorities in support of a wall that has no connection to a
military threat and does not support military effectiveness.
I will also add that is the responsibility of the
Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border
Protection, not DOD, to patrol and enforce our borders. If this
administration is serious about dealing with the drug epidemic
in our Nation, then it should properly fund these federal
agencies and other associated federal agencies.
General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, again thank you
for your service, and please pass our regards on to the men and
women that you lead. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Well, General Hyten, we will start with you and then go to
General O'Shaughnessy. Try to keep your statements in the realm
of 5 minutes. Your entire statement will be made a part of the
record. We will start with you, General Hyten.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Hyten. Thank you very much. Chairman Inhofe,
Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee Members, good
morning. It is an honor to be here today alongside my friend,
General O'Shaughnessy, and a continuing privilege to represent
the 162,000 Americans accomplishing the missions of U.S.
Strategic Command each and every day.
This is my third year appearing before this Committee as
the STRATCOM Commander, and I appreciated the opportunities to
meet with many of you one on one and to testify before you. I
want to begin by thanking this Committee for your enduring
support to our national defense.
The last time I testified before the Committee, we had
begun our 10th consecutive year under a continuing resolution.
Not this year, thanks to your leadership. I cannot overstate
the importance of an on-time budget. The stability afforded
with an on-time budget this year came at a critical time for us
and had a positive impact on our modernization efforts and our
overall force readiness.
STRATCOM is a global warfighting command, and as part of
the joint force, we are responsible for strategic deterrence,
nuclear operations, global strike, space operations, joint
electromagnetic spectrum operations, missile defense, and joint
analysis and targeting. That is a big portfolio. To execute our
assigned missions, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
and civilians of my command operate globally across land, sea,
air, space, and cyber. Our forces and the strategic deterrence
they provide underpin and enable all joint force operations and
are the ultimate guarantors of our national and allied
security.
The most important message I want to deliver today is that
I am fully confident in our ability to preserve the peace and
decisively respond in any conflict. We are ready for all
threats that exist on the planet today, and no one should doubt
this.
Strategic deterrence is an active mission. It is not a
passive mission. It is dynamic. Our capabilities must continue
to evolve as the global threat environment changes over time.
With this evolution, the adversary's decision calculus changes,
which drives modification to our own deterrence approach. Today
we are challenged by multiple adversaries with an expanding
range of capabilities, and we must adapt as well. To
effectively deter and respond, if necessary, in this multi-
polar, all-domain world, we must out-think, outmaneuver, out-
partner, out-innovate our adversaries. Deterrence in the 21st
century requires the integration of all our capabilities across
all domains.
For over 2 decades, China and Russia have studied the way
we fight. They study the American way of warfare. They have
watched and learned how we train and fight. They understand the
advantages we gain from integrating capabilities across all
domains to accomplish our strategic objectives. To counter our
long-held advantages, they are actively seeking to exploit
perceived vulnerabilities and are directly challenging us in
areas of long-held strength.
While our advantages are beginning to erode, we have not
yet ceded the advantage. My focus this year is to continue to
focus on the operations and modernization of our nuclear
capabilities, focus first on the nuclear triad of ICBMs
[intercontinental ballistic missiles], submarines, and bombers
to support a seamless transition as the Department stands up a
new space-focused organization and to continue the
implementation of my new responsibilities as the nuclear
command, control, and communications, NC3, enterprise lead and
the operator and architect for this critical capability.
To be successful in everything that we do, we must
recapture our ability to go fast, faster than all our potential
adversaries. That is my biggest concern these days. That means
we must return to the dynamic that made us the strongest, most
technologically advance military in the world. But over my 38
years in military service, I have watched as our Nation has
collectively developed an increasingly unhealthy expectation of
trying to remove all risk from everything that we do. The
challenge I have issued in my command is go break down the
bureaucracy, take some smart risks, informed risks, do this
within the left and right limits that I established in my
commander's intent, and we have to move fast. It is critical if
we are to stay ahead.
I am very grateful for your support in helping us do just
that. I look forward to an on-time budget this upcoming fiscal
year so we can sustain the momentum invigorating this
Department and our best-in-the-world people, our best-in-the-
world commercial sector to go faster and innovate to bring more
timely and affordable solutions to our most pressing deterrence
challenges. It is critical because nuclear war cannot be won
and therefore must never be fought. Therefore, for us to
prevent war, we must be ready for war. Success means we have
lived up to our motto coined over 60 years ago in Strategic Air
Command: Peace is our profession.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:]
Prepared Statement by General John E. Hyten
introduction
USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. This is my third year
testifying in front of this Committee. My command priorities have not
changed. They remain: (1) above all else, provide strategic deterrence
for the Nation and assurance of the same to our allies and partners,
(2) if deterrence fails, be prepared to deliver a decisive response,
and (3) do this with a combat-ready force. The 162,000 men and women
who make up USSTRATCOM are resilient, equipped, and ready thanks to
your continued support. Budget stability over the past year was
extremely important and had a positive impact on both our modernization
efforts and our overall readiness.
As part of the Joint Force, USSTRATCOM is responsible for Strategic
Deterrence, Nuclear Operations, Global Strike, Space Operations, Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Missile Defense, and Analysis &
Targeting. To execute our assigned missions, the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and civilians of the command operate globally across
the land, sea, air, and space. Our forces and the strategic deterrence
they provide underpin and enable all Joint Force operations and are the
ultimate guarantors of national and allied security.
The foundation that enables our strategic deterrence is the triad:
nuclear-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarines,
and Bombers. A powerful, ready triad remains the most effective way to
deter adversaries from conducting strategic attacks against the United
States and allies. Its credibility backstops all U.S. military
operations and diplomacy around the globe and ensures that tensions--
regardless of where or how they arise--do not escalate into large-scale
war.
However, as all the elements of the triad age beyond their planned
service life, we must continue to execute our planned modernization
strategy to maintain an effective deterrent. We require a robust and
ready nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future. This will remain the
case until the myriad of legacy and emerging nuclear threats are
reduced or eliminated. Unfortunately, the opposite is occurring.
Deterrence is created by much more than the 1,550 New START treaty-
accountable deployed nuclear weapons and 700 deployed strategic
delivery platforms. Today, our mission to deter major power conflict
dictates we field ready, capable, and lethal forces, tailored to
adaptive adversaries. Continued success means integrating the full
range of missions in all domains and without geographic boundaries. We
are increasingly integrating our planning and Tier 1 exercises to
remove seams between global and geographic combatant commands. We are
pursuing approaches to enhance real world planning and execution of
globally integrated fires to best deliver the most effective
capabilities and effects when and where needed.
The United States must never put our ability to deter in jeopardy.
Our missions, capabilities, and forces must continue to be an integral
part of our overarching national security posture. Therefore, to
continue to provide the security our Nation deserves, we must clearly
identify the threats we face, develop strategies to deter those
threats, and ensure we have the required capabilities for decisive
response if deterrence fails. Only with continued Congressional
support, can this remain the case.
global security environment
The National Defense Strategy describes the increasingly complex
global security environment in which we live. We characterize today's
environment by the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition
between nations and overt challenges to the free and open international
order. Although an era of great power competition is again a reality,
that does not mean conflict is inevitable. It means we must continue
investing in strength to preserve the peace.
It is increasingly apparent that China and Russia want to shape a
world consistent with their authoritarian models--gaining veto power
over global economic, diplomatic, and security decisions--seeking
dominance within their perceived regional spheres of influence, and
expanding their global reach.
For over two decades, China and Russia have studied the American
way of warfare; observing first-hand how we train and fight. They now
understand the advantages we gain from integrating capabilities across
all domains to accomplish strategic objectives. To counter our
dominance, China and Russia are actively seeking to exploit perceived
vulnerabilities and are directly challenging us in areas of long-held
strength. Their development of asymmetric capabilities across all-
domains is not meant to challenge single aspects of our deterrence
strategy; rather, their advancements in technology, strategy, tactics,
and doctrine aim to invalidate our entire deterrence strategy.
china
China continues to challenge the existing rules-based international
order. It is advancing a comprehensive modernization program aimed at
making the People's Liberation Army a world-class military. This
program includes the continued development and deployment of a nuclear
triad, combined with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and power
projection operations. They are also pursuing advancements in offensive
hypersonic strike weapons, advanced robotics, quantum computing, and
artificial intelligence (AI) through a combination of research and
development, forced transfer of intellectual property, and outright
cyber theft.
Additionally, China's maturing military space capabilities in
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, satellite
communications, satellite navigation, meteorology, and robotic space
exploration present growing challenges in space. With their focus on
counter-space capabilities, China is pursuing a strategy of denying the
United States the advantage of space-based systems during crises and
conflicts.
Once locked away in intelligence channels, news outlets are
beginning to note specific threats to our space systems. January marked
12 years since China publicly tested its direct-ascent system, in which
it destroyed one of its own satellites and created thousands of pieces
of debris. This 2007 test demonstrated to the world that China is
capable of destroying any satellite in low earth orbit, including many
of our intelligence and communications spacecraft. Today, China has an
operational ground-based anti-satellite missile intended to target low-
earth orbit satellites and are pursuing numerous other capabilities.
These developments, coupled with China's lack of transparency on
nuclear policies, force disposition, and weapons and their growing
assertiveness to challenge the existing free and open international
order undermines regional and global stability. Further, these actions
seek to erode the United States standing in Asia.
russia
Russia continues to conduct malign activities that negatively
impact U.S. interests. Their invasion and attempted annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern Ukraine, intervening on behalf
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information
environment to suit Russian interests, pose a major challenge to the
United States and NATO. Russia's military doctrine emphasizes the
potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly
assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of
nuclear weapons would serve to ``de-escalate'' a conflict on terms
favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect
for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.
As far back as 2006, Russia committed to modernizing and adding new
military capabilities to its nuclear forces and upgrading its strategic
nuclear triad. Today, Russia has completed roughly 80 percent of their
modernization goals. As part of this program, Russia is upgrading to
modern road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs, increasing ballistic missile
submarine reliability and stealth, fielding new Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs),
and modernizing its fleet of long-range strategic bombers, to carry
nuclear and conventionally-armed air-launched cruise missiles. Russia
is also developing and intends to deploy novel strategic nuclear
weapons, like its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater unmanned
vehicle and intercontinental-range cruise missile, which Russia seeks
to keep outside of existing arms control agreements.
Russia is also pursuing nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles and
nuclear-capable cruise missiles, which when coupled with their newest
intercontinental range ballistic missiles, improves upon its capability
to attack anywhere on the globe with little or no notice. Additionally,
their production of a new fifth generation bomber expected within the
decade will enhance their ability for long-range deployment.
Russia's material breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
Treaty also remains a significant concern, as demonstrated by their
deployment of a treaty-violating system, the SSC-8 groundlaunched
cruise missile, multiple battalions of which have been fielded as of
late 2018, and illustrates Russia's broader pattern of malign behavior
and willingness to disregard negotiated agreements when they believe it
is in their interest. Finally, Russia has an active stockpile up to
2,000 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs), which are not accountable
under the New START Treaty. These include air-to-surface missiles,
short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for
medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as
anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for
surface ships and submarines, and Moscow's antiballistic missile
system.
Russia's diverse and flexible NSNW capabilities facilitate a
doctrine that envisions the potential coercive use of nuclear weapons.
Combined with its large nuclear weapons infrastructure and ready
production base, this underscores Moscow's commitment to having nuclear
weapon underpin its security and commitment to maintaining its nuclear
forces for the indefinite future. Their doctrine of coercive use
further enhances their ability to challenge the United States and NATO
across the full spectrum of political, diplomatic, military, and
information warfare.
north korea and iran
North Korea and Iran remain threats but not to the same degree as
China and Russia. Both North Korea and Iran retain large arsenals of
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and are threats to regional
stability. North Korea has tested ICBM-class missiles designed to range
the United States. However, the Department of Defense is working
actively to reduce military tensions and remains in full support of our
diplomats as they work to achieve the final, fully verified
denuclearization of the DPRK. Iran remains the world's leading sponsor
of terror and continues its malign influence and destabilizing
activities across the region. None of these activities are helpful or
supportive of peace and stability, and all introduce greater risk to an
already complex and volatile environment. In both instances, we remain
vigilant to the threats they pose to the United States, our allies and
partners, and support the on-going international and whole-of-
government approaches to reduce these threats peacefully.
strategic deterrence
Strategic deterrence has underwritten our Nation's security and
preserved our way of life since the end of World War II. While the
fundamental principles of deterrence remain constant, the 21st century
landscape is profoundly different. We can no longer focus on countering
a single adversary with traditional means. Peer adversaries are
aggressively pursuing outright theft of intellectual property,
demonstrating willingness to corrupt supply chains, and are exploiting
rapid advancements in disruptive technologies in destabilizing ways.
These actions provide China and Russia, in particular, advanced
strategic capabilities to threaten the United States and marginalize
our global influence. This requires us to rethink how we continue to
deter new types of strategic attacks.
The mission of our Nation's strategic forces of the last 73 years
endures: to deter major attacks against the United States and if
necessary employ strategic forces to defeat an ever-changing adversary.
Effective command and control, that supports global integration, is a
necessary and critical element.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy states the Department of Defense
(DOD) ``will modernize the nuclear triad--including Nuclear Command,
Control, and Communications (NC3), and supporting infrastructure.''
Thanks to Congressional support and timely budgets, we are making solid
progress modernizing these weapon systems. However, to fully realize
the capabilities of a modernized triad we require an NC3 architecture
responsive to evolving threats and able to adapt to technology
innovations. Speed is essential. We are beginning to move faster, but
we are still not moving fast enough. Our most critical weapon systems
must deliver on time or early. The Services are making progress and I
appreciate their efforts, but we must continue to strive for more
timely, affordable programs. We must recapture the ability of our
Nation to go fast, faster than all potential adversaries, in order to
maintain an effective deterrent.
Going fast means that we return to the dynamic that made us the
strongest most technologically advanced military in the world. Over my
nearly 38 years of military service I have watched as we collectively
developed an increasingly unhealthy expectation of removing all risk
from everything we do. Admiral Hyman Rickover, the father of the
Nuclear Navy once said, ``Success teaches us nothing, only failure
teaches.'' We seem to have forgotten this principle. Although success
is the ultimate goal, we must accept some healthy failures along the
way. Today, however, we seem to reward and promote people at all levels
for never failing, subconsciously creating a collective mindset to
maintain the status quo at all costs. The best way to never fail is to
never try, or to try only when success is certain--which means we
punish those who aggressively take risks. If we continue this trend, we
will eventually fall behind our competition. In 1991, the United States
had the only superpower-class military, and status quo at that time
favored us greatly. We still have an advantage, but that advantage is
shrinking. I appear before you today fully confident in our ability to
preserve the peace and dominate any conflict. But without change--
unless we recapture the ability to take intelligent risk--a future
USSTRATCOM commander, a decade or so from now, may sit before you and
not be able to make the same statement. This could put our whole nation
at greater risk.
To emphasize that point--today, our forces are still dominant, the
finest in the world, yet they are equipped with many of the exact same
weapon systems fielded during the Cold War, including the triad and our
NC3 capabilities. Moreover, our competitors are moving fast--
particularly in the area of their strategic forces. Status quo no
longer favors us; however, our underlying personnel, budgeting, and
acquisition structures evolved since the end of the Cold War to
preserve the status quo. This must change. We must counter this
situation with ruthless determination to reward and promote thoughtful
risk management aimed at applying innovative technologies and new
business practices. We must improve our ability to protect our Nation's
commercial sector where innovation thrives. We must move fast in space,
in cyber, in all our strategic systems--to once again regain the
advantage.
nuclear command, control, and communications
Our NC3 system is ready, reliable, and effective at meeting today's
strategic deterrence requirements. However, to meet the evolving
threat, advances in technology, and to prepare for a modernized triad
we must update our NC3 system now. Our current legacy system reflects
the needs of the Cold War, focused primarily on Soviet-era ballistic
missile and bomber threats. The next generation NC3 architecture must
maintain and even improve on the readiness and reliability of today
while also dealing with the myriad of new threats from our potential
adversaries. As we transition to a modern threat-based NC3 enterprise
architecture and address the growing cyber, asymmetric, and kinetic
challenges, we must ensure positive command and control of U.S. nuclear
forces at all times, even under the enormous stress of a nuclear
attack. Getting this right and doing so quickly is one of my top
priorities.
The next generation NC3 architecture requires an innovative
approach tightly linking mission needs, requirements, acquisition, and
funding strategies to deliver capability on operational and
threatrelevant timelines. We must transform the enterprise to operate
with speed and agility, fully leveraging rapid prototyping and
experimentation, to innovate and outpace the threat. We must
continually change while maintaining predictability for the user. This
is a challenging task and once defined must be consistently resourced.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified a range of
initiatives to ensure our NC3 capability remains survivable and
effective in crisis. Among these initiatives is reforming NC3
governance due to the broad diffusion of authority and responsibility
within the Department. On 03 Oct 2018, the Secretary of Defense
designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff accountable for all NC3 related activities. Under this
new governance structure, the Commander of USSTRATCOM is the NC3
Enterprise Lead responsible for NC3 enterprise operations,
requirements, and systems engineering and integration, while the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S)) serves
as NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM). We have codified NC3
governance roles and responsibilities, taken concrete steps to sustain
the current NC3 architecture with selective modernization, and are
moving forward to design and field the next generation NC3. This was a
necessary step to place the authorities under one commander, and I am
already moving forward in that role.
To execute these new responsibilities, we are well on our way to
establishing the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) at USSTRATCOM and are on
track to achieve initial operational capability this year. The NEC will
improve mission effectiveness and efficiency while defining future NC3
capability requirements. The NEC will also establish core NC3
operational concepts as the basis for aligning the right mix of multi-
domain capabilities necessary to execute the Nuclear Command and
Control mission and achieve strategic deterrence objectives. Essential
to this work, is the ability to direct enterprise-level systems
engineering and integration activities. Working with the Director,
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the Joint Systems
Engineering and Integration Office is now aligned to the NEC and
receives operational direction and work prioritization from me.
To support the NEC, USD (A&S) as the NC3 CPM will oversee and
advise on NC3 enterprise acquisition and resources. The NEC and USD
(A&S) team will provide comprehensive enterprise-level understanding of
operational risk, margin and investment priorities as we envision,
design and field the next generation NC3 in partnership with our
service and agency leads.
To ensure we remain aligned, responsive and relevant, the NC3
enterprise must have dedicated operational and intelligence resources
to rapidly identify, understand, and anticipate current and future
evolving threats to the NC3 enterprise. To satisfy this need and
concurrently address section 1655 of the Fiscal Year 2018 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), PL 115-91, USSTRATCOM, in
coordination with the Office of the Director for National Intelligence,
is establishing an NC3 Intelligence Fusion Center within the USSTRATCOM
Intelligence Directorate. This initiative will facilitate aligning
operations with intelligence expertise to enhance future NC3
architecture security.
With the governance structure in place to address future needs, we
will concurrently continue sustainment and operation of the existing
NC3 enterprise. We have taken significant steps over the past year to
improve service, agency, and nuclear command and control operations
centers reporting to better understand operational risk and margin.
This data will allow us to continue increasing the analytic rigor in
our assessments and inform sustainment and modernization investment
priorities.
In order to provide the Commander In Chief continuous
communications and control of the nuclear forces, we are improving
communications capabilities across all domains to ensure connectivity,
enhanced conferencing, and decision support tools to the President. In
the space domain, we continue to launch Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) satellites for integration into a combined Milstar/
AEHF communications constellation. The AEHF satellites, using the
eXtended Data Rate (XDR) waveform, coupled with requisite ground node
and airborne platform Family of Advanced Beyond Lineof-Sight terminals
(FAB-T) enable collaboration between the President and senior advisors
under any circumstance and ensure connectivity with the nuclear forces.
In the air domain, the Air Force and Navy are executing an airborne
platform Analysis-of-Alternatives for replacing existing E-4B National
Airborne Operations Center, E-6B Airborne Command Post and Take Charge
And Move Out (TACAMO), and C-32 Executive Transport fleets. Ongoing
communications capability enhancements include Air Force programs to
provide a Very Low Frequency (VLF) receiver for the B-2 bomber in 2020
and a replacement VLF receiver and AEHF-capable terminal for the B-52
bomber. These capabilities will provide resilient and robust worldwide
connectivity lasting well into the next two decades.
Finally, in the land domain, the Air Force Global Aircrew Strategic
Network Terminal program will deploy an AEHF terminal providing Air
Force Wing Command Posts, Munitions Support Squadrons, and Mobile
Support Teams with survivable ground-based communications to receive
Presidential direction for relay to bomber, tanker and reconnaissance
forces. This modernization initiative is essential to completing
transition from legacy Milstar low data rate networks to AEHF extended
data rate networks.
I am confident in the direction the Department has taken and the
priority placed on modernization of the NC3 Enterprise as stated in the
NPR. As the Enterprise lead, my command will aggressively move forward,
ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable architecture is in place for
years to come.
the nuclear triad
Maintaining the planned modernization of our nuclear triad of
ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers with air delivered weapons remains the best
approach to deterring potential adversaries and assuring our allies
that we are committed to their security. Numerous reviews, including
the 2018 NPR, validate the nuclear triad's importance in deterring
Russia and China, providing operational flexibility, and dissuading
other nations from pursuing their own nuclear weapon programs. With a
credible and effective force and a supporting declaratory policy, our
strategic competitors would be hard-pressed to believe they could
attack the United States or our allies and achieve the benefits they
seek.
A modernized triad provides both unique and complementary
capabilities to address current threats and future uncertainty. Alert
and always ready to respond, the ICBM force ensures no adversary,
regardless of size, can be confident in the success of a preemptive
attack. Our ICBMs create enormous targeting problems for our
adversaries, requiring a massive raid that would be impossible to hide
and would guarantee their own demise. With its range, payload,
accuracy, and speed the ICBM is critical to our Nation's deterrent
strategy.
Our strategic bombers provide the President the most visible,
flexible, adaptable, and recallable options to provide strategic
deterrence. Should an emerging crisis arise, we can rapidly deploy our
bombers to clearly communicate our resolve and commitment to our global
security partners. With the ability to provide a conventional or
nuclear strike capability, the bomber force plays an indispensable role
in our overall strategy.
Nuclear powered submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles
patrol the seas and provide a survivable response capable of holding
targets at risk within hours. Their assured, survivable secondstrike
capability means that regardless of any attack, our adversaries will
always face the possibility of a devastating response. The most
survivable leg of the triad, it is also critical to our Nation's
strategic deterrent.
We continue to propose prudent investments in delivery system
modernization programs across the triad. These modernization efforts
improve our readiness, increase safety and security, and enhance our
capabilities/credibility against the threats we face now and in the
near future. Although some might consider these modernization plans
expensive, I believe that America can afford survival. The only way to
change our strategic deterrent is to convince our adversaries to reduce
the threat. This is not occurring. China and Russia, in particular, are
not only modernizing the traditional elements of their own triads, but
are also building a myriad of additional nuclear capabilities to
threaten the United States. Both nations employ and are modernizing
silo-based ballistic missiles, submarines and bombers, and both are
deploying large numbers of mobile ICBMs--which the United States has
chosen not to pursue. China and Russia are pursuing hypersonics as we
are, but, in stark contrast, we have no plans to include them in our
nuclear force structure. Russia is also building new intermediate range
nuclear weapons, new cruise missiles, as well as new nuclear powered
cruise missiles and torpedoes all to threaten the United States.
We continue to monitor and evaluate all these new threats. We did
so in last year's NPR. In the NPR, we evaluated and discarded a course
of action that would match and even exceed the capabilities of these
adversaries. Our analysis showed that we could continue to deter any
and all of these threats with a modernized triad augmented by a small
number of low yield nuclear weapons deployed on our submarines and a
measured sea launched cruise missile capability. Modernization of these
capabilities is critical to our Nation's defense. We don't have to
match all the specific capabilities of our adversaries as long as our
capabilities are robust enough to deter and if needed respond to any
attack; this is why we need a triad augmented by some small numbers of
supplemental capabilities. By pursuing these capabilities, we make sure
that nuclear-armed adversaries do not falsely conclude there are
reasonable benefits and acceptable costs to attacking the United States
and our allies. Sustaining and modernizing the triad requires
investment, but its contribution to peace and stability far outweigh
the projected cost required to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.
land-based strategic deterrent
The Minuteman III has served the country for over 45 years. Its
high availability rate is testament to its robust design and the
diligent efforts of the airmen who operate and maintain the weapon
system. The Air Force is committed, through such efforts as the
Programmed Depot Maintenance and Airborne Launch Control System
Replacement programs, to sustaining the Minuteman III ICBM through
2030. When the Minuteman III finally retires, it will have exceeded its
initial 10-year service life by half a century. While still reliable,
missile component and hardware attrition, coupled with the aging of
1960's era infrastructure, drive the requirement for a comprehensive
weapon system replacement within the next decade. Further Minuteman III
life extension is not cost effective nor will it provide a weapon
system capable of adapting to advancing technology and changing
adversary threats.
To maintain a viable land-based strategic deterrent capability, the
Air Force must begin deploying the replacement Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent (GBSD) by the late 2020s. We are working closely with the Air
Force to ensure the GBSD is fully integrated into our modernized NC3
system and can adapt to an evolving and increasingly dynamic strategic
environment. To ensure this, the Air Force is incorporating modularity
and open system standards enabling future technology insertion.
Additionally, to deliver GBSD on time and on budget, the Air Force is
pursuing mature, low-risk technologies and working with other strategic
partners to leverage investments that eliminate delays and reduce cost.
When fielded, GBSD will be a capable and cost-effective ICBM able to
deter potential adversaries and assure allies of our commitments to
their security.
sea-based strategic deterrent
The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine's stout construction and
pioneering maintenance program allowed it to be life extended from 30
to 42 years into the 2040s, making it the longest serving submarine in
U.S. history. However, with no margin to extend the Ohio-class further,
the Columbia-class SSBN must field on time to avoid a deterrent
capability gap in the triad. It is also essential that we maintain our
technological advantage in this critical mission, and Columbia will do
just that. To this end, the Navy has elevated the Columbia program to
its top shipbuilding priority, leveraging other efforts and
implementing advanced procurement to reduce risk and ensure it is ready
for its first strategic deterrent patrol in 2031. We must continue to
support our industrial partners and give appropriate prioritization to
funding throughout the life of the program.
To avoid complex concurrent strategic weapon modernization
programs, the Navy life extended the Trident II D5 ballistic missile to
transition from Ohio to Columbia. The Navy fielded the Trident II D5
over 25 years ago and is executing a life extension that will allow
service into the early 2040s. In the face of continuously evolving
threats, we must begin the effort of designing a flexible and adaptable
follow-on SLBM that allows rapid and cost effective modifications.
To ensure our nuclear posture is successful in deterring
adversaries, the 2018 NPR directed nearterm fielding of a small number
low-yield ballistic missile (LYBM) warheads and pursuit of a modern
nuclear-armed SLCM. These capabilities are necessary to our strategic
deterrence mission and will serve to disabuse any adversary of the
mistaken perception they can escalate their way to victory.
The LYBM has begun production and will serve to provide a timely
counter to Russia's NSNWs, their doctrine of limited first-use in a
large-scale conflict on Russian territory, and their perceived
advantage in low-level nuclear conflict. The SLCM will help close
deterrence gaps and provide a considerable degree of assurance to
allies.
air-based strategic deterrent
The current bomber fleet and its associated weapon systems have
already exceeded or are rapidly approaching the end of their intended
service life. To preclude a strategic capability gap associated with
these essential nuclear platforms, ongoing sustainment and planned
modernization efforts must continue.
The B-52 remains the backbone of the strategic bomber force today
and well into the future. It is the only platform capable of employing
the nuclear AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) which provides a
standoff capability while providing the President the flexibility to
recall a strike if necessary. B-52s will remain in service until 2050.
Until the B-52 is replaced, the Air Force will continue to upgrade the
aircraft to ensure its long-term viability. Modernization of the
1950's-era engines, avionics, and weapons systems is essential for
continued airborne strategic deterrence.
The B-2, the Nation's only penetrating bomber is also undergoing
several critical modernization programs to maintain its survivability
against advanced air defenses. Similar to the B-52, the B-2 recently
received weapon systems and communication equipment updates to improve
effectiveness and lethality.
The B-21 is the bomber of the future, ensuring we maintain a
technical advantage against planned adversary advancements. Armed with
both direct attack weapons to hold emerging targets at risk and cruise
missiles to deny geographic sanctuaries to any adversary, the B-21 will
deliver the right capabilities based upon the tactical situation. Like
other modernization programs, it is critical the Air Force deliver the
B-21 on time and on budget to assure we can meet deterrence objectives
and global security commitments.
Complementing the Nation's strategic bomber force, the Long Range
Standoff weapon (LRSO) will replace the aging ALCM and maintain a
viable nuclear standoff capability that can hold targets at risk in an
evolving threat environment.
Strategic bombers require reliable and robust tanker support to
execute their strategic deterrence and nuclear operations missions.
While the Air Force is committing significant resources to maintain the
aging KC-135 tanker fleet, it is critical we deliver its replacement on
time. The Air Force remains confident the KC-46 will deliver the
required capabilities to support our strategic forces. It is imperative
that KC-135 sustainment and KC-46 deliveries remain top priorities to
ensure a credible air-delivered strategic deterrent.
Our NATO partners rely on the credible deterrent of deployed F-15,
F-16, and PA-200 Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) to provide regional
assurance against aggression in Europe. The B61 nuclear gravity bombs
deployed to NATO are over 30 years old and will be replaced by the life
extended B61-12. By the mid-2020s, the F-35 will be available in Europe
and capable of delivering the B61-12 into defended areas, maintaining
the credibility of our deterrent capability and of the nuclear
alliance. The ontime delivery of these capabilities and our continued
commitment in support of NATO is a cornerstone of our deterrence and
assurance objectives.
nuclear weapon stockpile and supporting infrastructure
Today, our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, effective, reliable,
and able to meet deterrence mission requirements. Much like the
modernization efforts of our delivery systems, we must also take a hard
look at the components that make up the warheads themselves. Ensuring
the viability of the nuclear deterrent requires continued resourcing
and sustained effort to address the increasing uncertainty and growing
risk in our nuclear stockpile and enterprise.
The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their
intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United
States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while some
potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons
and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities. Potential
adversaries are elevating strategic uncertainty with new capabilities,
escalatory doctrines, and actions threatening our nuclear forces'
effectiveness and credibility.
To address these challenges, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
recently updated its longrange strategic plan to align with the
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, and
implement actions directed in the 2018 NPR. The strategic plan aligns
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) nuclear weapons modernization and infrastructure
recapitalization activities with DOD nuclear delivery system
replacement programs in support of deterrence and military
requirements.
The NNSA recently celebrated important stockpile modernization
milestones by completing the Navy's W76-1 ballistic warhead life
extension program (LEP) and achieving first production of key
components in the Air Force's B61-12 gravity weapon nuclear package.
The Air Force and NNSA are progressing with the LRSO missile and its
associated W80-4 warhead to deliver required capabilities on schedule.
The next significant stockpile effort involves both Air Force and
Navy ballistic missile warheads, the bulk of our deterrent force. While
these weapons will not field until the 2030s, development activities
need to start in earnest now in order to posture the enterprise for
success. Starting now also provides expanded opportunities for the Navy
and Air Force to collaborate and leverage investments to their mutual
benefit.
None of the required stockpile surveillance, sustainment and
modernization efforts will succeed without replacing key facilities and
upgrading our aged nuclear infrastructure. Our present complex
continues to accumulate serious risk due to atrophy and past lack of
timely recapitalization. I visited all the design laboratories and
production plants across the complex last year, and in too many cases
the enterprise is operating at or near capacity or simply lacks the
needed infrastructure. This results in little margin to execute planned
work or respond adequately to an emergent technical issue. Options for
future systems are constrained by design and production limitations. If
not corrected with currently underway or planned investments, the
complex's condition will place us at a strategic disadvantage.
The highest NNSA infrastructure priority is re-establishing a
plutonium pit production and fabrication capacity to meet deterrent
requirements. Our national requirement, supported by numerous studies
and analyses, requires no fewer than 80 war-reserve pits per year by
2030. I support the NNSA plan to achieve this.
Additionally, critical infrastructure investments in uranium and
tritium processing, lithium and non-nuclear component production,
experimental facilities, and general supporting infrastructure are
required. Shortcomings in these areas create operational risks to force
readiness and our surge ability to respond to unforeseen technical
issues or adversary advancements in their capabilities.
Along with recapitalizing our infrastructure, we must also recruit,
train, and retain a qualified workforce to perform the highly
specialized nuclear weapons work. The enterprise must enact a human
resource strategy that identifies qualified candidates, fosters
interest through internships or skilled trade programs, and clears them
for classified work as quickly as possible. The critical nature of our
nuclear deterrent mission should drive us to hire and retain the best
workers our country has to offer.
nuclear weapons safety and security
The Nation's nuclear security standard is absolute denial of
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. We work closely with our Navy
and Air Force partners to assess nuclear security requirements and
adjust our force posture, training, and equipment to address any
threat. While we continue to upgrade and evolve our security
capabilities, there are areas where additional investments are
necessary to maintain the high standards this mission demands.
The proliferation, ease of use, and sophisticated capabilities of
small, unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) represent a growing threat to
our deterrence operations. We rapidly fielded counter sUAS capabilities
and are refining tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the
developing threat. Focused leadership, vigilance, and dedicated
investment are necessary to remain ahead of this threat.
With Congressional support, we recently achieved an important
security milestone with the Air Force awarding a contract to replace
our aged UH-1N helicopter fleet with the new MH-139. The new helicopter
is a critical element in securing our vast ICBM complex and our
security forces eagerly await its deployment. The first production unit
is already well along the production line in Pennsylvania. With this
program moving forward, we can now focus our efforts on replacing
security vehicles and deploying advanced communication systems that
will provide security personnel uninterrupted situational awareness
anywhere they operate.
21st century deterrence
Twenty-first Century deterrence not only requires effective NC3, a
modernized triad of nuclear ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers with air
delivered weapons, and an ability to design and produce modern and more
effective nuclear weapons, it also requires conventional global strike,
space control, control of the electromagnetic spectrum, and missile
defense. When effectively integrated these capabilities provide the
Joint Force the ability to respond to adversary actions in the domain,
location and time of our choosing.
conventional global strike
Bombers are capable of carrying a variety of conventional and
nuclear weapon types with diverse attributes contributing to the
flexibility of the deterrent force. Additionally, bombers are integral
to our international engagements and partnering through our Bomber Task
Force (BTF) missions, and our demonstrated capability to conduct strike
missions originating from the continental United States. BTF
deployments to the Indo-Pacific and European theaters provide an
opportunity to exercise and train with our allies and partners,
demonstrate United States commitment and resolve, and deter potential
adversaries.
The B-1 is the workhorse of the past 17 years of conventional
fighting. The B-1 has had many successes in Iraq, Syria, and
Afghanistan, while providing USSTRATCOM a credible conventional
deterrent against global threats. As the threshold platform for the
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the B-1 will remain a formidable asset
for operations in the Pacific and across the globe. Similar to the
B-52, the Air Force remains committed to maintaining the platform to
ensure its continued operational effectiveness.
Strategic competitors are investing significant resources to
develop offensive and defensive capabilities with the purpose of
countering our entire deterrence strategy. To maintain peace, the
United States must continue to invest in technological innovation and
development of survivable, long-range strike systems able to hold time-
sensitive and high-value targets at risk. Today, the only prompt
longrange strike capabilities are ballistic missile systems armed with
nuclear warheads. We need a conventional prompt global strike
capability. This is the USSTRATCOM requirement. Conventional hypersonic
strike weapons could meet this requirement and provide responsive,
long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-
critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or
not preferred. While conventional hypersonic weapons are not a
replacement for nuclear weapons, their unique attributes will increase
traditional warfighting advantages and bolster conventional and
strategic deterrence.
The DOD identified conventional hypersonic strike as a top research
and development priority and is moving forward with a mix of land, sea,
and air-launched weapon system options to hold high value, heavily
defended and time critical targets at risk. This is a Department-wide,
multi-Service, collaborative effort to provide operational capabilities
as soon as possible. The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)
program spearheads the initiative as the leading technology maturation
effort allowing the Navy to field a submarine/ship launched
intermediate-range CPS weapon system that can be leveraged into Air
Force and Army efforts. The Air Force continues to explore both air-
launched hypersonic boost-glide and cruise missile concepts for
fielding on a variety of strike and bomber aircraft. The Army plans to
incorporate hypersonic strike systems into their traditional long-range
precision fires portfolio to expand the reach of surface-to-surface
engagements. Each of these capabilities have the potential for early
operational fielding within the next few years. This flexible mix of
capabilities will provide combatant commanders persistent, visible and
credible strike options without crossing the nuclear threshold.
space operations
For decades, the United States has enjoyed unimpeded freedom of
action in space. This allows us to deliver space capabilities that
include intelligence collection, missile warning, weather monitoring,
satellite communications as well as precise positioning, navigation,
and timing essential to joint forces operating globally with unmatched
speed, agility and lethality. These same capabilities also contribute
to our economy and support our quality of life.
The President has directed a renewed commitment to space. Our
commitment extends to the integration of space capabilities across
every domain in order to deliver an unmatched global advantage to the
Joint Force. What remains unchanged is the fact that our principal
competitors regard space as a warfighting domain. While the United
States prefers space to remain free of conflict, we are rapidly moving
to meet and overcome challenges impeding our ability to access and
freely operate in space. The best way to deter a war that starts in, or
extends into space, is to be ready to fight and win.
As part of this effort, the President has given direction for a
more cohesive, robust space warfighting organization. In December, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs,
the President directed the establishment of U.S. Space Command
(USSPACECOM) as a unified combatant command to improve joint
warfighting in the space domain. Moving expeditiously to a unified
space command reflects the importance of warfighting in space to the
Joint Force, the value of space-focused deterrence elements, and the
critical need for space-related response options for the Nation.
USSTRATCOM will maintain its focus on this critical mission area until
authorities and responsibilities governing space operations fully, and
successfully, transition to a new combatant command.
In addition to realizing a dedicated unified space command, we are
moving forward on a priority effort executing tasks directed in Space
Policy Directive-3. USSTRATCOM is closely partnering with the
Department of Commerce (DOC) to transition some non-military aspects of
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data publication and space traffic
management-related functions to DOC, while continuing to provide SSA
data to support U.S. Government customers and to advance military-
tomilitary relationships that support worldwide combined military
operations.
USSTRATCOM's new SSA data sharing initiative, executed through the
Joint Force Space Component, releases information about space objects
not previously available outside of DOD channels, to enhance SSA data
sharing, transparency, and spaceflight safety. This initiative is in
line with national policy as part of a larger effort to preserve the
safety of, and accessibility to space, so that our Nation, allies, and
even the rest of the world, can continue to reap the benefits of space.
Exercises and wargames continue to refine how we coordinate today
and how we will work together in the future. This year, Japan
participated in the Schriever Wargame for the first time, joining
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. We also executed Global Sentinel 2018, our fifth annual
operational tabletop experiment for SSA, and increased its
international participation to include Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea. Chile and Norway attended as observers.
USSTRATCOM continues to focus on cultivating a robust international
engagement environment with several ongoing lines of effort. In doing
so, we have generated significant momentum leading to a fully
integrated partnership of nations dedicated to defending the peaceful
use of space.
Improved partnership with allies is paramount for the safety and
security of the space domain. As we continue our Combined Space
Operations (CSpO) initiative with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom, we recently expanded it with the addition of France
and Germany. In July 2018, the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)
transitioned to a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), now the
centralized hub for operational space planning and tasking with
distributed execution through contributing partners. This effort goes
hand in hand with our recent update to Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER to
include international partners and define our operational relationships
and associated authorities as we conduct combined operations in the
space domain.
The National Space Defense Center (NSDC) continues to mature as our
24/7/365 operational center to protect and defend the space domain. The
NSDC remains the focal point for unity of effort across DOD, the
Intelligence Community, and the National Reconnaissance Office for
information sharing and to rapidly detect, warn, characterize,
attribute and defend against threats to our Nation's vital space
systems.
Future satellite communications (SATCOM) systems remain key to our
continued strategic posture in space. We must design and fund
replacement systems and remain on schedule for smooth transition of
operations to these new systems. We must expand international SATCOM
partnerships, strengthen our industrial base response to acquisition
challenges, and integrate commercial opportunities to evolve future
satellite payloads towards commercial solutions wherever possible.
The inclusion of our allies is key to building a robust SATCOM
network that leverages commercial integration, synchronization and
sharing of resources. Multilateral agreements with Canada, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand provide funding for the
operation of Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). Consequently, the department
shares bandwidth proportionally with our partner nations and allocates
bandwidth based on the amount of their financial contribution. The
growth of the WGS constellation continues as we launch WGS-10 in early
2019, and with newly-infused funding authorized in the fiscal year 2018
NDAA, we plan to procure and launch additional WGS capacity.
Addressing the synchronization gap between terminals, ground
infrastructure, and on-orbit satellite capacity remains a significant
concern. The narrowband SATCOM legacy constellation is aging, and we
must continue to make progress transitioning to the Mobile User
Objective System, leveraging commercial capabilities where appropriate.
The fielding of new AEHF Extended Data Rate (XDR) capable satellites
continued with the launch of AEHF-4 in October 2018. That event,
coupled with the anticipated launch of two more AEHF satellites in the
next two years, will cover our near term protected communications
equities.
USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with the Services, continues to pursue
an enterprise approach to fighting SATCOM in a contested domain through
the stand-up of the SATCOM Integrated Operations Environment (SIOE).
The SIOE is designed to leverage key wideband, narrowband, protected
band, and commercial SATCOM enterprise capabilities and expertise to
improve our ability to mitigate and fight through SATCOM degraded
environment. We will also aggressively pursue the integration of
commercial capabilities that have the ability to provide robust,
resilient augmentation of our constellations for a very reasonable
cost.
We must improve how we collectively organize, train, and equip
ourselves for unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space,
providing vital capabilities to joint and coalition forces in peacetime
and across the spectrum of conflict. As potential adversaries continue
to develop, test, and field more threats to our space systems,
USSTRATCOM (and the future USSPACECOM) will benefit from increased
focus on these key areas that enable us to deter aggression and protect
our interests. We must go faster to stay ahead of potential
adversaries, and USSTRATCOM is committed to ensuring sustained space
operations with available forces during this transition period until
USSPACECOM is ready to assume the lead role.
The President has also focused on the benefits of establishing a
sixth branch of the military, the Space Force. The President and Vice
President have been personally involved in developing this new Force
and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan has worked across the
Department to define the proposal. The Space Force will be a separate
service within the Department of the Air Force. I support the creation
of the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force. This will
allow proper focus on the warfighting challenges, effective and aligned
support to the new USSPACECOM, and given the threats and challenges in
the domain, help to build an enduring ``space-minded'' culture in the
department. This effort will not create or require a large, new support
bureaucracy. Someday, the Space Force will be its own department, but
this is not yet the right time. I thank the President and the Vice
President for recognizing that space is a warfighting domain and
proposing a fiscally responsible approach for the organizations needed
to address these critical challenges. I encourage the Congress to
support this proposal.
USSTRATCOM and the future USSPACECOM will directly benefit from the
President's intent to accelerate space acquisition timing. Current 10-
to 15-year cycles from requirement to fielded capability are too long.
Not only do we miss out on application of new technology and field
equipment that is already obsolete on Day 1, but we also need a
systemic change to counter potential adversaries with faster
acquisition cycles. Commercial innovation has already adapted to
exploit faster and faster technology discovery in commercial
competition, and we must change to leverage these accelerating
opportunities not only to defend our Joint Force in space, but also to
protect commercial investments that sustain the global economy.
USSTRATCOM (and the future USSPACECOM) look forward to leveraging the
benefits of the new Space Force as our organizations focus on two
things--defending the space domain and going fast.
joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (jemso)
The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is the one physical maneuver
space shared by all forces in all domains. The EMS is central to the
first strategic goal of organizing forces to achieve Joint Force
commander objectives. The Joint Force operates in the EMS to achieve
superiority at a time and place of our choosing. Our adversaries
recognize the need to decisively achieve EMS control and have developed
and organized their forces accordingly. In recognition, we must
continue to pursue capabilities necessary to maintain EMS superiority.
Achieving EMS superiority early in conflict is critical for effective
U.S. operations in all domains.
USSTRATCOM, in coordination with DOD CIO/DISA, is actively pursuing
development of an Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) system to
enable EMS superiority. We are supporting the EMS Operations governance
study directed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and
coordinating with other combatant commands on the development and
implementation of JEMSO cells and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Additionally, we continue to engage Australia and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization partners to ensure compatible JEMSO doctrine and concepts
of operation, and to lay the groundwork for interoperable EMBM systems.
Section 1053 of the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, PL 115-232, provides
guidance to the Secretary of Defense on electronic warfare and JEMSO to
improve our ability to advocate effectively for requirements.
USSTRATCOM is working closely with the Acting Secretary and Services to
implement measures of the act, the Electronic Warfare Executive
Committee and the previously mandated cross-functional team to identify
requirements and specific plans for addressing personnel, capability
and capacity limitations in order to ensure effective implementation of
DOD's Electronic Warfare Strategy.
the missile defense review
Conducted at the direction of the President, the 2019 Missile
Defense Review (MDR) presents the Administration's missile defense
policy and strategy. The MDR aligns with the National Security
Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the 2018 NPR. The MDR
reinforces the Administration's commitment to defending the United
States and our deployed forces and allies from adversary missile
attacks.
The United States and our allies and partners face potential
adversaries who are increasing existing missile system capability and
capacity; adding new and unprecedented types of armaments to their
arsenals; and integrating offensive capability more thoroughly in their
coercive threats, military strategy, and war planning. Left
unaddressed, this expanding missile threat could embolden our
adversaries into mistakenly believing they can coerce us, inhibit our
freedom of action, or undermine our security alliances. A concerted
U.S. effort is required to expand and improve existing capabilities for
both Homeland and regional missile defense.
As stated in the National Security Strategy, the United States has
a robust and credible layered missile defense system. When paired with
offensive capabilities this combination sends a strong message allowing
the United States to deny benefits and impose costs against any
potential adversary. Although the United States relies on nuclear
capability to dissuade near-peer strategic threats, missile defense
endures as a critical component of comprehensive U.S. strategic and
tailored regional deterrence strategies. Our regional missile defenses
protect against missile attacks on deployed U.S. Forces, allies, and
partners; assists allies and partners in better defending themselves;
preserves freedom of action; and counters adversary anti-access/area
denial tactics. The United States is pursuing new concepts and
technologies to ensure continuing effectiveness against advanced future
threats, including space-based sensors and boost phase intercept. As we
address future threats, we must account for the air and missile defense
assets required to defend the Homeland, while simultaneously improving
our regional security architectures. In this effort, there is no one
silver bullet, but several layered capabilities are in development.
missile defense
The 2019 MDR sets the foundation for the next generation of missile
defense efforts. Of importance to USSTRATCOM, it provides an
opportunity to conduct focused reviews clarifying and optimizing
missile defense roles and responsibilities across the Department. This
includes opportunity to assign responsibility for integrating pre-
launch attack operations with defenses to mitigate missile threats,
ensuring warfighter involvement in our Departmental requirements and
fielding processes, and assessing how to better use missile warning
assets against emerging threats. All of these efforts focus on
reviewing current systems and addressing advanced adversary
capabilities such as hypersonic threats.
U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide
continuing effective protection of the U.S. Homeland against rogue
states' offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear
deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and
Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to
deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing United
States declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.
As the warfighter advocate for Missile Defense, it is imperative
that we focus materiel developers on research, development, testing,
and engineering against advanced threats. Rapidly transitioning ready
systems with identified funding streams to the Services will free up
needed resources for critical research and development efforts such as
continued funding of next generation space systems. Research and
development is key to ensuring we keep pace with evolving adversary
threats across all domains. Space systems provide valuable solutions to
layered tracking and discrimination capability. A space tracking and
discrimination constellation combined with next generation Overhead
Persistent Infrared systems would provide significant improvements
necessary to detect advanced threats. Future space-based sensors may be
able to detect, track, and discriminate hypersonic glide vehicle and
ballistic missile threats globally. These abilities cannot be fully
achieved with the current or any future terrestrial-based radar
architecture due to the constraints of geography and characteristics of
future missile threats.
Boost phase intercept is also showing promise. Increasing the power
and lethality of laser, neutral particle beam, and high power radio
frequency systems for multi-mission applications, along with new
fighter-delivered interceptors, can exponentially enhance our missile
defenses.
assuring allies and partners
USSTRATCOM cannot accomplish its mission without integrating allies
and partners. Allies are critical to responding to mutual threats,
preserving our shared interests, and are the greatest asymmetric
advantage the United States has over potential adversaries. The Command
continues to expand and enhance the viability of our Nation's alliances
and partnerships, setting conditions across the globe to deter our
adversaries.
USSTRATCOM's engagements with allies and partners are critical in
shaping the strategic environment, strengthening relationships, and
building trust. In doing so, we are prepared to act in a combined
manner to deliver a decisive response in crisis or during contingency
operations.
During 2018, our Command conducted over 50 bilateral engagements
with senior leaders from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, the
Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Our 25-nation, multinational missile defense policy campaign of
experimentation, NIMBLE TITAN (NT) 2018, concluded with a senior leader
seminar held at the new NATO headquarters in Brussels, to include
representatives from Europe, the Gulf States, the Indo-Pacific, and
North America. The NT 2020 campaign is just beginning, and continues to
show increased interest by partners and allies.
USSTRATCOM works closely with our allies and partners to enhance
awareness within the space domain, increase the safety of spaceflight
operations, and promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of
space. During 2018, USSTRATCOM signed new national agreements with
Brazil, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Thailand for sharing
SSA services and data. Currently, USSTRATCOM has agreements with 18
nations, two intergovernmental organizations, and over 70 commercial
satellite launchers, owners, and operators.
Our efforts in this area increase military interoperability,
improve alliance capability and capacity, and integrate our critical
defense missions. The Command's engagements assure allies and partners
of the United States' extended deterrence commitments and reinforce
non-proliferation goals and objectives.
conclusion
USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. Success in all of our
missions depend on the Command's greatest strength--our people. The
162,000 men and women stationed around the globe, operating in all
domains, undertake the active defense of our Nation every day. These
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians are warfighters,
dedicated to preserving the peace and when called upon, ready to
dominate and win in conflict. Successful mission execution has the
appearance of ``business as usual'' which belies the effort and impact
of executing at the highest standard every day.
Today, our capabilities are safe, secure, and effective and our
forces are combat-ready. With continued support of the programmed major
investments, our forces will prevent nuclear war and ensure that
regardless of how would-be adversaries might choose to attack the
United States, we will always retain decisive response options, across
the spectrum of conflict, for the President.
We are dominant today. However, advantages we have long-held are
eroding, challenging the Command's ability to deter strategic attack,
engage in active defense, assure our allies and partners, and fight and
win in and across all domains if necessary. We cannot let this erosion
continue. We must maintain our strategic advantage. We must take
calculated, smart risks and move fast once again. With sustained
Congressional support, USSTRATCOM will continue to effectively defend
the nation.
Nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Therefore, to
prevent war we must be ready for war. We must maintain today's triad of
nuclear forces, while simultaneously building the triad of tomorrow. We
must integrate all domains and capabilities together to effectively
deter in the 21st century. If we are successful, we will continue to
live up to our motto, coined over 60 years ago. Peace is our Profession.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, General Hyten. An
excellent statement.
General O'Shaughnessy?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN
AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am
truly honored to appear today as the Commander of the United
States Northern Command and the United States-Canadian bi-
national command, North American Aerospace Defense Command. It
is a pleasure to be testifying today alongside General John
Hyten who is not only my good friend but someone who I have
admired and respected for so many years.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are two complementary but distinct
commands driven by a single unyielding priority: defending the
Homeland from attack. In this era of rapidly evolving
technology and renewed great power competition, the need for an
energized and active defense of the Homeland cannot be
overstated. Revisionist powers, Russia and China, have given
every indication that their own security strategies are based
on holding the United States at risk with both conventional and
nuclear weapons, and they have signaled that we must anticipate
attacks against our civilian and defense infrastructure in the
event of a conflict.
Russia has modernized its aviation and submarine fleets and
fielded long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar
detection. Russia and China continue their efforts to penetrate
our networks while developing and testing hypersonic glide
vehicles. Both have also established a noticeably stronger
foothold in the Arctic along the northern approaches to the
United States and Canada. As a result, the strategic value of
the Arctic as our first line of defense has reemerged, and
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active measures to ensure our
ability to detect, detract, and defeat potential threats in
this region.
Our adversaries have engaged in deliberate, focused efforts
over a number of years to exploit our perceived gaps and erode
many of the advantages previously afforded by our geography and
technological superiority. As a result, it is clear that our
Homeland is not a sanctuary.
Our mission to deter our adversaries is dependent on our
ability to detect and ultimately defeat potential threats to
our Homeland. I am grateful to the Committee for the strong
support of USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities along those lines of
effort. Your support for fielding AESA [Active Electronically
Scanned Array] radars for our aerospace control alert fighters
and improving the capability and capacity of our missile
defense sensors and interceptors clearly demonstrate our shared
sense of urgency and resolve.
In that same spirit, we must take prudent steps now to
ensure our next generation defensive capabilities, to include a
space-sensing layer of space-based missile defense centers are
not late to need. That effort cannot start too soon, given the
fact that our adversaries are already developing and testing
advanced weapons specifically intended to avoid detection in
order to hold targets in the Homeland at constant risk.
I sincerely appreciate the Committee's work to provide much
needed predictability and stability with an on-time budget in
fiscal year 2019. I am also grateful for the Committee's
ongoing efforts to ensure that we avoid the devastating deep-
cutting impacts that a return to sequestration would bring to
the Department of Defense.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD work every day with our partners to
keep our citizens safe while confronting the challenges
emanating from multiple approaches and in all domains. I
especially want to take this opportunity to express my
gratitude to the amazing men and women in the National Guard
who are great partners and critical in our ability to perform
our missions. Whether intercepting Russian bombers off the
coast of Alaska or providing much needed support to our federal
law enforcement partners along the southern border, the airmen,
soldiers, sailors, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians of
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are deeply committed to defending our
Nation, and I am honored to represent them today.
Senators, we have the watch.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, I am honored to appear today as the Commander of United
States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD)--two complementary but distinct commands.
USNORTHCOM is the geographic combatant command laser-focused on
defending our Homeland from an increasingly assertive set of
competitors who are committed to holding the United States at risk in
multiple domains. USNORTHCOM is also responsible for defense support of
civil authorities (DSCA) and theater security cooperation (TSC) within
our area of responsibility. Nested under the broader Homeland defense
mission, DSCA and TSC play a critical and visible role in protecting
our citizens and enhancing security for the United States and our
international partners.
NORAD is the bi-national United States-Canadian command that
deters, detects, and, if necessary, defeats air threats to the United
States and Canada while also providing aerospace warning and maritime
warning. The six decades of NORAD's unmatched experience and shared
history are proving more vital than ever as we face the most complex
security environment in generations. This unique and longstanding
command serves as both a formidable deterrent to our adversaries and a
clear symbol of the unbreakable bond between the United States and
Canada.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority:
defending the Homeland from attack. Revisionist powers Russia and China
have changed global strategic dynamics by fielding advanced long-range
weapons systems and engaging in increasingly aggressive efforts to
expand their global presence and influence, including in the approaches
to the United States and Canada. Our competitors currently hold our
citizens and national interests at risk, and we must anticipate attacks
against our defense and civilian infrastructure in the event of a
conflict. As a result, it is clear that the Homeland is no longer a
sanctuary.
These shifting global military and political dynamics will be with
us for the foreseeable future. Our competitors have fielded weapons
systems and employed new methods in a concerted effort to exploit
perceived vulnerabilities and erode our strategic advantage. The
successful defense of our Homeland today relies more than ever on
constant vigilance by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, tightly coupled with a
reinvigorated emphasis on close integration with our fellow combatant
commands, the intelligence community, and our allies and partners.
Collectively, these dynamics reinforce the importance of nuclear
deterrence to our national security, given that nuclear deterrence
backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy across the globe.
The threats facing our Nation are not hypothetical; our
competitors' reach is now global, and they are conspicuously
undermining international norms and standards of behavior while
possessing the capability to strike targets in North America with both
nuclear and advanced non-nuclear weapons launched from well beyond our
territory. In light of this reality, the Homeland defense mission is
more essential than ever, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD must be energized,
proactive, and determined to actively shape our strategic environment.
Together with our Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and
international partners, we have taken active measures to ensure the
Homeland defense enterprise is globally integrated, well-exercised, and
positioned to take quick, decisive action to protect our interests and
preserve the ability to project all of the elements of our national
power, and, should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always
ready to defeat any threat to our Nations.
Our collective ability to confront these challenges is dependent on
a national commitment to protecting and defending the Homeland. Budget
stability and predictability are essential underpinnings of this
commitment, and I ask for the Committee's support of the President's
budget for fiscal year 2020--and specifically for relief from the
budget caps directed in the Budget Control Act of 2011. A return to
sequestration will devastate total force readiness and delay or
terminate modernization efforts that are necessary to maintaining our
strategic and technological advantage. Simply put, sequestration will
make it impossible for USNORTHCOM and NORAD to advance necessary
Homeland defense efforts and shape our changing national security
environment as articulated in the National Defense Strategy.
threat
Russia:
Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a
century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to
threaten us below the nuclear threshold. Russia continues to hone and
flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation of air-
and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff
ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike
North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.
Since 2015, Russia has employed its new air- and sea-launched
cruise missiles against anti-regime targets in Syria, providing real-
world training for Russian crews and demonstrating its growing
precision-strike capabilities to the West. In a parallel effort, Russia
has implemented a modernization program for its heavy bombers that will
ensure their ability to perform nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and
strike missions in the coming decades.
Russian heavy bombers such as the Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK
continue to conduct regular air patrols in the international airspace
along the coastlines of other countries to underscore Russia's
capabilities. Russian bomber crews are demonstrating increasing
proficiency in their flight activities, developing a new generation of
air crews capable of employing this highly visible implement of Russian
deterrence and messaging in peacetime, crisis, and war.
Patrols by Russian military aircraft off the coasts of the United
States and Canada have grown increasingly complex in recent years.
NORAD fighter aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aviation
missions inside the United States and Canadian Air Defense
Identification Zones, and there is no indication that Russian
leadership intends to reduce the number of these missions in the near
future.
In addition to its highly capable cruise missiles that enable its
anti-ship and land-attack missions, Russia has introduced the
Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarine, which is armed with
advanced land-attack cruise missiles and is much quieter and more
lethal than previous generations of Russian attack submarines. Russia's
growing non-nuclear capabilities provide Moscow a range of options to
dissuade an adversary from escalating and to terminate a conflict on
terms favorable to Moscow, increasing the potential for miscalculation
or opportunistic actions.
Russia has demonstrated a willingness to conduct disruptive
cyberattacks and cyber-enabled influence operations against its
competitors, as it demonstrated during the 2016 election cycle in the
United States. In a crisis or conflict, we would expect Russia to
conduct cyber operations against critical infrastructure in an attempt
to compel de-escalation.
In the Arctic, Moscow is planning to deploy surface vessels armed
with the modular KALIBR-NK cruise missile system that will offer highly
precise land-attack capabilities and introduce a new cruise missile
threat from our northern approaches. Separately, Moscow continues to
bolster its military defenses in the Arctic with the deployment of a K-
300P Bastion coastal defense cruise missile system on the New Siberian
Islands, significantly increasing Russia's ability to defend and
control a large stretch of the Northern Sea Route.
Finally, Russia is developing multiple weapon systems specifically
designed to circumvent United States missile defenses and hold our
Homeland at risk. This includes the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM)-delivered AVANGARD hypersonic glide vehicle, which was
highlighted in a speech by Vladimir Putin in March 2018 and is expected
to become operational in the next few years, complicating our missile
warning mission.
China:
China is pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program
that includes a rapid expansion of its strategic nuclear capabilities
while working to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and
increase their ability to ensure a credible second-strike capability.
Over the last decade, China has supplemented its modest silo-based ICBM
force with dozens of road-mobile ICBMs capable of delivering multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles that could significantly
increase the number of survivable warheads available for a retaliatory
strike. During that same timeframe, China operationalized its first
class of ballistic missile submarines, adding a second leg to its
strategic deterrent. China maintains its longstanding no-first-use
nuclear policy, but its growing nuclear, conventional, and cyber
capabilities are significant.
China's military strategy and ongoing People's Liberation Army
(PLA) reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric
mentality, as evidenced by emerging doctrinal references to strategies
that would move potential conflicts away from Chinese territory,
suggesting that PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role
for their military.
On the economic front, China plans to invest heavily in
infrastructure projects in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative in a major
effort to develop stronger economic ties with other countries and shape
their interests to align with China's, simultaneously seeking to deter
confrontation or international criticism of China's approach to
sensitive issues.
In the cyber domain, Chinese leaders view computer network
operations as a low-cost deterrent that demonstrates capabilities and
resolve to an adversary and allows them to manage the escalation of a
conflict by targeting critical military and civilian infrastructure.
Ongoing military reforms are aimed at accelerating the incorporation of
information systems that enable forces and commanders to carry out
missions and tasks more effectively.
Advanced Threat Technologies:
Defending the United States and Canada against long-range weapons
systems capable of striking targets in the Homeland is a major focus of
both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Russian aircraft and submarines are now
armed with long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar
detection, while both Russia and China are developing and testing
maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. In the cyber domain, our
adversaries continue their non-stop efforts to penetrate defense and
civilian networks. Collectively, these advanced technologies could be
capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear weapons,
potentially affecting national decision making and limiting response
options in both peacetime and crisis.
North Korea:
After decades of research and development activity marked more by
failure than success, North Korea's ICBM program turned the corner in
2017 when North Korea successfully flight-tested multiple ICBMs capable
of ranging the continental United States and detonated a thermonuclear
device, increasing the destructive yield of its weapons by a factor of
ten. Following these successes, Kim Jong-un declared the completion of
his nuclear ICBM research and development program, implying the
production and deployment of these systems would soon follow.
Kim Jong-un developed these strategic weapons to deter the U.S.
from overthrowing his regime, and he almost certainly has plans to use
them against our Homeland should a conflict erupt on the Peninsula.
Meanwhile, North Korea's cyber capabilities continue to grow, as does
the country's willingness to employ them during peacetime, as North
Korea demonstrated by its cyber attacks on Sony Pictures in 2014.
Iran:
Iran is not yet able to strike the United States with strategic
weapons, and its leaders have declared a unilateral 2000 kilometer
range restriction that limits its missile force to threatening only
regional targets in the Near East. Iran's SIMORGH space launch vehicle
has yet to successfully place a satellite in orbit, but its most recent
launch in January 2019 demonstrated continued progress on long-range
missile technologies. Although we have no information to indicate that
Iran intends to test and deploy an ICBM, the SIMORGH would be capable
of ICBM ranges if configured for that purpose, and progress on the
vehicle could enable Iran to field an ICBM in as a little as a few
years if its leaders chose to pursue that objective.
However, Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the
region and has expended significant resources on its space launch and
civil nuclear capabilities that could enable it to develop a nuclear-
armed ICBM relatively quickly if its leaders chose to do so. In the
meantime, Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks abroad via covert
operations, terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber capabilities. Iran
considers disruptive and destructive cyberspace operations as a valid
instrument of statecraft and a means of imposing costs on its
adversaries, even during peacetime.
Violent Extremist Organizations:
The terrorist threat to our Homeland has grown more diffuse,
typified by simple attacks inspired from afar and carried out by
individuals or small networks that are difficult to detect and
interdict. Foreign terrorist groups remain committed to attacking the
United States, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent
extremists to act in their stead. Despite their territorial losses, the
Islamic State and their counterparts in al-Qa'ida remain highly
adaptive foes committed to attacking the United States.
Commercial aviation persists as a preferred target, probably
because of the potential for large numbers of casualties, economic
damage, and widespread media coverage generated by such attacks. I am
concerned that terrorists could also continue to pursue 9/11-style fly-
and-crash attacks or the use of unmanned aerial systems against soft
targets. Meanwhile, terrorists continue to target U.S. military
personnel both on and off base, compounding our force protection
challenges.
defending the homeland
Homeland defense is USNORTHCOM's essential mission and the number
one priority of the DOD per the 2018 National Defense Strategy. In
light of the complex and significant threats to our Homeland,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD take assertive, proactive measures each day to
shape our strategic environment, deter aggression, and ensure that we
are always ready to defeat any adversary should deterrence fail. As the
Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I view everything the commands do
through the lens of Homeland defense, and I am committed to ensuring
that each of our missions help to preserve decision space and maintain
the ability for our national leaders to project power and exert
influence in the best interest of our nations.
In pursuit of their own perceived national and ideological
interests, our competitors have developed advanced capabilities and
demonstrated their intent to hold our Homeland at risk in multiple
domains and along numerous avenues of approach to North America. In
light of that reality, we simply do not have the luxury of waiting for
others to act before we formulate a response. Instead, USNORTHCOM and
NORAD work constantly to shape our theater while making it obvious to
potential adversaries that they will face overlapping dilemmas and
extraordinary costs should they choose to challenge us. This active and
continuous enterprise requires strong relationships and close
coordination with our fellow combatant commands, the military Services,
the U.S. Federal interagency community, and our international allies
and partners.
The diverse threats arrayed against the United States and Canada
challenge our defenses in a number of domains and along multiple
avenues of approach. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD work
around the clock to monitor those approaches and are ready to respond
at a moment's notice should our adversaries chose to challenge our
defenses.
Ballistic Missile Defense:
USNORTHCOM continues to prioritize our mission to defend the United
States against potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
attacks from North Korea and Iran, should Iran develop that capability.
I remain cautiously optimistic that the ongoing negotiations will lead
North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and ICBM programs. But, in
the meantime, I continue to emphasize the necessity of fielding
improved discriminating radars, a more survivable sensor network, and
improving the reliability and lethality of our interceptor fleet in
order to remain well ahead of North Korea or Iran's capability to
strike the defended area.
I am confident in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
System to defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea
or Iran, if Iran develops an ICBM, but that confidence is contingent on
our continued pursuit of system-wide enhancements to outpace our
adversaries' rapid technological advancements.
The success of the Ballistic Missile Defense mission is also
dependent on strong cooperation between USNORTHCOM as the supported
warfighting command and the technical experts of the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA). The MDA Director, Lt Gen Sam Greaves, is an outstanding
partner, and I am grateful to him and the entire MDA team for their
dedicated support of this enormously complex, no-fail mission. I fully
support MDA's plans to field the Long-Range Discriminating Radar,
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, along with the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle and a selectable 2- or 3-stage interceptor
booster. Additionally, I believe we must pursue space-based sensors to
detect and track advanced threats from Russia and China. Each of these
improvements to our sensor network and interceptor fleet will help to
ensure our ability to defend the United States against an ICBM attack
now and into the foreseeable future.
Going forward, advanced technologies such as space-based sensors
and directed-energy missile defense weapons systems show significant
promise--and will, in fact, become a necessity in the foreseeable
future in order to defend the Homeland against a rapidly developing
missile threat. At present, I believe the DOD is striking an effective
balance between ensuring our ability to defend against current and
near-term threats while simultaneously investing in the research and
development of advanced technologies capable of defeating future
threats. This vision for meeting anticipated requirements is well
articulated in the recently published Missile Defense Review, and I
fully support the plan for defending the Homeland.
Arctic Northern Approaches:
It has become clear that defense of the Homeland depends on our
ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in the Arctic and
passing through the Arctic. Russia's fielding of advanced, long-range
cruise missiles capable of flying through the northern approaches and
striking targets in the United States and Canada has emerged as the
dominant military threat in the Arctic, while diminished sea ice and
the potential for competition over resources present overlapping
challenges in this strategically significant region. Meanwhile, China
has declared that it is not content to remain a mere observer in the
Arctic and has taken action to normalize its naval and commercial
presence in the region in order to increase its access to lucrative
resources and shipping routes.
I view the Arctic as the front line in the defense of the United
States and Canada, and as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities and
the combatant commander responsible for defending the approaches to the
Homeland, I constantly assess the changing environmental and strategic
conditions throughout the region--across borders and operational
boundaries--in an ongoing, active, and collaborative effort to mitigate
the risks associated with increased civilian and military presence in
the northern approaches to North America.
The effort to rapidly adapt to the evolving strategic landscape and
associated challenges in the Arctic includes a deliberate and ongoing
effort to fully assess our collective missions and associated
requirements in the region. As one key example of those ongoing
assessments, in 2018, USNORTHCOM planners conducted a Homeland Defense
Mission Analysis for the Arctic Region. This comprehensive, classified
assessment of our capability to operate in the far north revalidated a
number of known capability gaps in the region and provided an updated
overview of current and future requirements.
As confirmed by our Mission Analysis, civil and military operations
in the Arctic continue to be impeded by limited communications
capability, harsh environmental conditions, and vast distances between
population centers. Improving communications and domain awareness in
the region are among my top priorities for the region, and the DOD and
the military Services have demonstrated their support of those
requirements through investment in programs such as the Multi User
Objective System (MUOS)--a satellite-based communications network that
significantly expands the ability of United States and Canadian assets
to operate in the far north.
To detect and track potential airborne threats, to include Russian
long-range bombers and cruise missiles, USNORTHCOM and NORAD both rely
on radar systems such as the North Warning System (NWS), a network of
aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada. In August 2018,
NORAD, working in close coordination with USNORTHCOM, the Canadian
NORAD Region, and the United States Navy's Naval Air Warfare Center,
conducted an operational assessment of the NWS against representative
targets, and the data collected from the test will inform the design
for the air domain defense of the United States and Canada for years to
come.
In recognition that the number of military and civilian activities
in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic will only continue to grow,
USNORTHCOM is working hand-in-glove with the United States Air Force
and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to procure additional Arctic
Sustainment Packages (ASPs) for use by the Alaska National Guard. Each
ASP is a palletized, air-droppable shelter kit that provides shelter,
heat, and other life support capability for several weeks in Arctic
environments in the event that weather or other environmental factors
delay a rescue operation.
The ability of the joint force to fight and win in the extreme cold
and isolation of the far north increasingly depends on placing
specialized technology in the hands of military personnel who routinely
train and operate in the region. Fortunately, there are units and DOD
installations who are already well positioned to share that expertise.
Essential experience resides in the units stationed in the far north--
from the airborne brigade and fighter wings stationed in Alaska to the
LC-130 Skibird pilots and crewmembers of the New York Air National
Guard, we have a solid foundation to build on as we continue to
increase Arctic experience across the force.
The military Services have committed to building on that that
foundational experience and expertise through a number of efforts that
will further the ability of the joint force to operate, fight, and win
in the far north. In a key example, between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel
will participate in the next iteration of USNORTHCOM's premier Arctic
exercise, ARCTIC EDGE 2020, more than doubling the number of troops who
participated in 2018. Arctic Edge 2020 will take advantage of the vast
training area and unmatched training opportunities afforded by the
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and will integrate personnel
and platforms from all four Services--to include ground, air, and cyber
operations. This deliberate evolution sends the clear signal that
USNORTHCOM, strongly supported by the Services, is fundamentally
committed to expanding the ability of the joint force to defend our
Arctic approaches and our vital interests in the region.
Air Domain:
Variants of the advanced cruise missiles that could fly through our
northern approaches also present a threat along our coasts. Russian
Severodvinsk-class submarines are capable of firing low radar cross
section cruise missiles against critical targets along our coasts. This
emerging threat requires advanced capabilities to ensure surveillance,
detection, identification, targeting, and destruction to protect the
Homeland and key strategic targets in the United States and Canada.
The Homeland Defense Design will be a phased approach to employ
advanced detection and tracking technologies to defeat a cruise missile
attack against the Homeland. However, the rapidity of our competitors'
development of advanced cruise missile technology demands a continued,
aggressive, and focused commitment to ensure our ability to defeat a
cruise missile attack.
In addition, small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) continue to
present challenges to safety and security within U.S. airspace. NORAD
has the capability to address larger UAS, but systems that are readily
available in the commercial marketplace are difficult to detect and
track due to their small size and relatively slow speeds. While we work
to enhance our ability to detect, and--if necessary--neutralize
potential threat UAS in the national airspace, the authorities provided
by the fiscal year 2019 Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization
Bill that extend counter-UAS authorities to the Department of Justice
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reflect the need for a
whole-of-government approach to address the potential security
challenges presented by this rapidly emerging technology.
As with emerging military cruise missile technologies, the
proliferation of small UAS requires us to consider new approaches for
how best to defend the Homeland. We cannot address these new
capabilities with outdated technology or with old ways of thinking, and
I look forward to working with the Committee to develop innovative
technology and strategies to ensure that we are capable of outpacing
the threat.
Southern Approaches:
The threats to our Nation from our southern border are not military
in nature, but they are significant and deadly. The flow of illegal
narcotics into the United States continues to inflict a heavy toll on
our citizens, as clearly demonstrated by the 72,000 Americans who were
killed by drug overdoses in 2017. USNORTHCOM is proud of our role in
the counter narcotics fight in support of Federal law enforcement and
our military partners in Mexico and The Bahamas as they battle
transnational criminal organizations that have inflicted such harm on
both sides of the border.
USNORTHCOM personnel actively collaborate with partners throughout
the United States interagency and in Mexico to illuminate the networks
used by the cartels to transport drugs, victims of human trafficking,
and other illicit goods in a strategic effort to strike at the heart of
these massive and well-financed criminal enterprises.
On the U.S. side of our southern border, USNORTHCOM's subordinate
element Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) supports U.S. Federal law
enforcement efforts to interdict narcotics shipments into the United
States. Employing military personnel, unique technologies, and
specialized skill sets developed in contingency operations overseas,
JTF-N provides critical support to Federal law enforcement interdiction
missions operations.
theater security cooperation
USNORTHCOM's theater security cooperation mission pays enormous
dividends for our defense of the Homeland as well as for our
relationships with our international partners. These collaborative
efforts with our international partners seek to sustain our strategic
advantage in the Western Hemisphere while always seeking to strengthen
our regional security and reinforce our defense in depth throughout the
region.
In particular, USNORTHCOM's relationship with the Mexican military
is strong. USNORTHCOM supports Mexico's efforts to expand its role as a
regional defense and security leader. The ties between USNORTHCOM and
our Mexican military partners are close at every level of leadership
and continue to grow thanks to concerted efforts by commanders on both
sides of the border. I am proud of the fact that every Mexican Marine
has trained with a United States Marine, just as I am honored to share
close relationships with the Mexican Secretary of National Defense
(SEDENA), General Luis C. Sandoval Gonzalez, and the Secretary of the
Navy (SEMAR), Admiral Jose Rafael Ojeda Duran. I am proud to work with
partners who share our commitment to regional stability and security
throughout North America.
The Bahamas remains a willing partner with whom the United States
enjoys a deep and long-standing bi-national relationship, and our
shared theater security cooperation focus is improving The Bahamas' air
and maritime domain awareness. In 2018, the United States provided the
first maritime surveillance system to The Bahamas and secured funding
for two more systems that will be networked with existing surveillance
assets, generating a significant increase to The Bahamas' maritime
surveillance capacity. The Bahamas remains a strong partner in the
defense of North America as they invest heavily in new capabilities
that will make them a more significant contributor to our shared
defense and security.
Finally, Canada continues to be our indispensable partner in
reinforcing the defense and security of our countries. USNORTHCOM's
security cooperation activities with Canada are extensive and reflect
many years of shared effort and common cause with our allies to the
North. In June 2017, Canada announced a new approach to defense
investment that will provide significant benefit to the common defense
of our nations. This approach, titled ``Strong, Secure, Engaged,''
acknowledges the significant shifts in the global strategic environment
and commits accordingly to an active and renewed NORAD partnership and
investments that will directly benefit the security of both our
nations.
In a military-to-military context, the tri-command partnership
between USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command is
of tremendous importance to all three commands. The bond between these
organizations reflects the cooperative approach we share with our
Canadian partners as we work together to outpace the threats arrayed
against the United States and Canada, maintain a credible deterrent,
and take steps forward together to ensure the combined defense of our
nations.
defense support of civil authorities
USNORTHCOM's mission to provide defense support of civil
authorities provides military personnel and assets to support Federal
law enforcement and disaster relief agencies in times of need. In the
nine months since I assumed command, USNORTHCOM has supported DHS, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and the National Interagency Firefighting Center during
hurricane relief operations, wildland firefighting missions,
interagency collaboration to ensure that our elections were free from
cyber interference, and presidentially-directed efforts to secure our
southern border. For each of these events, USNORTHCOM rapidly delivered
military-unique capabilities and skilled personnel to augment and
enable our Federal partners.
In September 2018, Hurricane Florence provided USNORTHCOM the first
opportunity to execute the Commander of USNORTHCOM's expanded role as
the DOD Synchronizer for defense support of civil authorities. The
consolidation of the DOD effort under one Synchronizer enabled
significantly improved coordination and collaboration across the entire
spectrum of the DOD response and consolidated the
responsibility for collecting and delivering timely and accurate
information to the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the DOD
Synchronizer role increased the coordination and information exchange
amongst the DOD agencies with major roles in the response, to include
the National Guard Bureau, the Defense Logistics Agency, the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, and United States Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM).
USNORTHCOM support of hurricane relief operations had barely ended
last fall, when, in response to requests for assistance from DHS and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Command was directed by the
Secretary of Defense to deploy Active Duty military personnel and
equipment to support Federal law enforcement operations along the
southern border of the United States. Beginning in October 2018, this
operation has demonstrated the close partnership between USNORTHCOM and
our Federal law enforcement partners, as well as the outstanding
support provided by each of the military Services and the Joint Staff
in response to a USNORTHCOM request for forces.
Within hours of notification, airmen, soldiers, sailors, and
marines from installations across the United States were on the move to
support our DHS partners, and they have performed their assigned tasks
with extraordinary professionalism and skill. From laying over 70 miles
of concertina wire to reinforce existing border obstacles, flying
support missions, delivering medical care, and providing security, the
USNORTHCOM border support mission has improved our Nation's border
security while providing our forces with training and real-world
experience that will serve them well in both peace and conflict.
Every mission presents unique challenges, and each is dependent on
collaboration, strong partnerships, and close relationships throughout
the Federal interagency and between the active and Reserve component.
In a key demonstration of the strong collaboration between the
components in the combined response to Hurricane Florence, North
Carolina and South Carolina established Dual Status Commanders and
successfully integrated National Guard and title 10 personnel and
assets in a wide variety of rescue and recovery operations.
I am proud of the great partnership demonstrated by USNORTHCOM and
the National Guard Bureau before and during each of those responses. My
friend and wingman Gen Joe Lengyel and the citizen airmen and soldiers
he leads are a tremendous group of professionals who proved time and
again their selflessness and readiness to respond whenever and wherever
needed.
While hurricane relief operations may have been the most visible
DSCA mission for the Command over the last several years, USNORTHCOM
serves as the designated DSCA synchronizer for the DOD in a variety of
other efforts. In a notable example of innovative interagency
collaboration, prior to the 2018 midterm election season, USNORTHCOM
partnered with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to determine how best to
provide DOD cyber support to the DHS-led mission to secure the
elections infrastructure. The partnership between USCYBERCOM,
USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and DHS was groundbreaking, and
each of the agencies involved learned a number of important lessons for
future interagency efforts.
Interagency cooperation in the defense of our critical cyber
infrastructure will remain an enduring necessity as networks throughout
the United States continue to weather near-constant attacks and
infiltration attempts. In light of this need, I am grateful to the
Congress for its strong support for the establishment of the DHS Cyber
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Although CISA was only
established in November 2018, it is already clear that we have an
energized, high-level interagency partner dedicated to our shared
mission to address and mitigate cyber threats against civilian networks
and critical infrastructure. Within weeks of its establishment, CISA
assigned a senior liaison officer to the USNORTHCOM headquarters to
work alongside the rest of our whole-of-government team, and I look
forward to many years of close collaboration with our newest partner in
the defense of our Nation's vital interests.
Whenever our assistance is requested by our Federal partners,
USNORTHCOM relies on the military Services to provide trained and ready
personnel and assets whenever and wherever needed. As we saw firsthand
in the days before Hurricane Florence made landfall in September 2018
and in the initial stages of our support to U.S. Customs and Border
Protection along the southern border, the Joint Staff and all four of
the military Services worked around the clock to identify, source, and
deploy the personnel and equipment necessary to fulfill all anticipated
requests for support from our Federal partners.
Due to the unhesitating support of the Joint Staff and each of the
Service Chiefs, the requested forces were on station and ready to
execute their support missions in a matter of hours and days following
notification. In both scenarios, the remarkable men and women of our
armed forces were ready to deploy on short notice and executed their
assigned missions thanks to their training, professionalism, and
discipline. USNORTHCOM will continue to work closely with the Joint
Staff and the Services to exercise our response forces in anticipation
of future needs, and I am grateful to the Committee for your ongoing
support of the Services' modernization and readiness requirements.
united efforts to defend the homeland
USNORTHCOM's defense of the Homeland would not be possible without
cooperation, collaboration, and a fundamental commitment to mission
success across a remarkable interagency and intergovernmental
enterprise. Over 27 unique Federal agencies, from DHS to the Federal
Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have
permanently-assigned liaisons and representatives in our USNORTHCOM and
NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. Nearly 150 Canadian military
personnel are assigned to NORAD billets in our headquarters, and we are
proud to host two permanently assigned Mexican military liaison
officers, along with liaison officers and representatives from a host
of DOD agencies and commands to include the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Strategic
Command. National Guard personnel are also fully integrated into our
headquarters staff and maintain a full-time office specifically
dedicated to coordinating actions between our headquarters and the
National Guard Bureau. The National Guard continues to be an essential
and integral part of our USNORTHCOM and NORAD team.
Our command's integration with the U.S. interagency community is a
requirement for success, which is why those interagency representatives
are not simply assigned to the headquarters; they are truly integrated
members of the USNORTHCOM team. Whenever possible, they are invited to
participate in command briefings and updates, and I rely on their
subject matter expertise and professional judgment on a daily basis as
we work hand in glove to address the challenges and threats facing the
command.
The commitment to cooperation shared by each of our interagency
partners has contributed immeasurably to the broader USNORTHCOM
mission. For example, during the 2018 hurricane season, DTRA provided
around-the-clock modeling support that located all of the hazardous
material production and storage facilities in the storms' paths and
allowed our planners to develop well-researched plans to mitigate
potential impacts if the sites were damaged.
Our collective ability to meet threats head on and to provide a
rapid, effective response in the wake of natural and manmade disasters
is absolutely dependent on constant communication, routine interagency
exercises, and close working relationships between each and every one
of the civilian and military professionals who strive each day to keep
our Nation and our citizens safe from harm.
From USNORTHCOM's components and subordinates to NORAD, which has
served as the absolute gold standard for international collaboration
for over 60 years, and our locktight relationship with FEMA, we work
every day to exercise the interagency and inter-DOD processes required
to ensure that we are always ready to deliver the right assets in the
right place at the right time to meet whatever mission we are assigned.
To ensure USNORTHCOM and our interagency partners are ready at a
moment's notice in the event of a crisis, we conduct regular command-
led exercises in each of our mission sets, such as Ardent Sentry for
DSCA and Vigilant Shield for Homeland defense.
Finally, I would like to make special note of USNORTHCOM's support
to the state funeral of former President George H. W. Bush in December
2018. The men and women of USNORTHCOM's Joint Task Force--National
Capital Region, under the superb leadership of MG Mike Howard,
demonstrated exemplary professionalism and decorum throughout a three-
day program in Texas and Washington, DC. The flawless execution of this
mission was made possible by many months of rigorous planning, close
communication with President Bush and his family, coordination with
dozens of Federal, state, and local agencies, and multiple rehearsals
to ensure no detail was overlooked. USNORTHCOM's support of this
historic event was both a profound honor for all involved and a
conspicuous example of the no-fail nature of all USNORTHCOM missions.
conclusion
Today and every day, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are
standing watch over our Homeland. These dedicated professionals work
around the clock surveilling our skies, monitoring our oceans, and
ensuring that we are always ready to counter a staggering range of
threats to our Homeland, ranging from intercontinental ballistic
missiles and long-range bombers to lethal opioids and cyberattacks. The
strategic and technological innovation that will be required to defend
our Nation in the coming years depends entirely on the quality and
experience of our people.
Today and always, our people are our strength, and I am proud to
lead the outstanding airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and civilians
of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While the threats facing our Nation can be
daunting, I have absolute confidence in our ability to meet any
challenge and defeat any adversary because of the dedicated
professionals I am honored to lead. We Have the Watch.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy.
You know, General Hyten, there are two areas of
disagreement that we have heard among our colleagues in both
the House and in the Senate, and you have heard some this
morning in our opening statements. But one of them is the
significance of nuclear modernization. Now, it is disturbing
when we see some of our adversaries, peer adversaries, China
and Russia, have actually gotten ahead of us in some areas of
artificial intelligence and hypersonics. But in the area of
nuclear modernization, I know that Jim Mattis, Heather Wilson,
and others have said that is the most significant thing that we
could be doing, and yet, some are saying that is an area where
we could be making cuts at this time.
I would like to have you start off by addressing that; do
you agree with those who talk about the significance of that
program and make your comments on that. Then I will get to the
second one.
General Hyten. It is the most important element of our
national defense.
Chairman Inhofe. It is the most important element of our
national defense.
General Hyten. We have to make sure that we are always
ready to respond to any threat. I can do that today because I
have the most powerful triad in the world. I have ICBMs,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers that are
ready to respond to any threat that comes. Because of the
capabilities of each leg of the triad, I have the ability to
respond to any threat. We did a Nuclear Posture Review. It was
released last year. In it, it validated the need for a triad.
Our adversaries have also recognized the need for a triad.
They are beginning modernization of their programs as well. In
fact, Russia started their modernization program in 2006. They
are about 80 percent through completing the modernization of
their triad. They will be pretty close to being through by
about 2020, and in 2020, we will still be starting. That is not
a good place to be from a national security perspective.
Chairman Inhofe. That is right.
You have actually jumped to the second area of
disagreement: the triad. Several people have said that we do
not need a triad, all three legs. It could adequately be
handled without all three. Just specifically on the triad
element of the necessity of the three legs.
General Hyten. When you look at the threat we face, the
threat from the Russian triad, soon the threat from the Chinese
triad, threats from North Korea as well, you have to look at
the three elements of the triad.
The bombers are our most recallable element. They are the
most flexible element of the triad. The bombers can be deployed
and recalled by the President, deployed and recalled, before
they employ their weapons. They are the most flexible element.
We can do almost anything with a bomber.
The submarine is the most survivable element. It allows us
to hide from our adversaries and make sure we can respond to
any surprise attack.
The ICBM is the most ready element to respond to a quick
surprise attack, and it also creates the most significant
targeting problem for an adversary because there are 400
separate targets across the United States. All would have to be
independently targeted by an adversary. That targeting problem
is hugely problematic and creates a significant advantage for
us.
When you put those three together, you get this great
operational capability. But the other thing it provides for us
is the ability to respond to a failure in any one of those
legs. If you have a technical failure or intelligence failure,
I can cover it with another leg, and that has happened during
my tenure. I never have put this nation at risk because I have
the flexibility in the triad.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes. General O'Shaughnessy, that is a big
deal to you too.
We look at what we have done with our aging system. We are
talking about now getting into a modernized ICBM. I do not know
how long that would take. Some people say all the way through
the 20s. At the same time, you have our adversaries who may
have been late in starting, but they are starting in a more
modernized way. Do you agree with that? They become a threat
even though right now today they may not be ahead of us in
these areas.
General O'Shaughnessy: Chairman, I would agree. I think as
the NDS articulates, the security environment has fundamentally
changed and part of it is because of what you alluded to. I
think as we watch both Russia and China create success in some
of their weapons programs and advancing the capabilities that
they have, they are fundamentally changing not just on the
ballistic missile side but, as you mentioned, the hypersonics
and also in the cruise missiles. It is not just the cruise
missiles themselves. It is also the platforms that deliver
those cruise missiles. They have clearly invested very
specifically with the ability to hold our Homeland at risk with
things like submarines and bombers that they have modernized
with the low RCS [Radar Cross Section] cruise missiles that
they can then launch. Therefore, we have to also modernize. We
have to stay ahead of that advancing threat. We cannot expect
to have success with 20th Century technology against 21st
century threats.
Chairman Inhofe. Which is what we have had.
Thank you very much.
Senator Reed?
Let me interrupt, Senator Reed, if I might, because we do
have a quorum now.
I will ask the Committee to consider a list of 1,818
pending military nominations. All the nominations have been
before the Committee the required length of time. Is there a
motion?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Senator Fischer. Second.
Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Inhofe. No?
[No response.]
Chairman Inhofe. It carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 26,
2019.
1. LTG Michael X. Garrett, USA to be general and Commanding
General, U.S. Army Forces Command (Reference No. 24)
2. Col. Timothy J. Donnellan, ANG to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 266)
3. Col. Stephen J. Mallette, ANG to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 267)
4. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Jason D. Hoskins) (Reference No. 268)
5. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Nancy E. Costa) (Reference No. 269)
6. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Saiprasad M. Zemse) (Reference No. 270)
7. In the Air Force Reserve there are 125 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Jeffrey Wayne Akin) (Reference No.
271)
8. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with David C. Salisbury) (Reference No. 272)
9. In the Air Force Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Craig K. Abee) (Reference No. 273)
10. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Michael J. Chung) (Reference No. 274)
11. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Robert T. Hines, Jr.) (Reference No. 275)
12. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Marc A. Banjak) (Reference No. 276)
13. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Dennis M. Britten) (Reference No.
277)
14. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Jason G. Arnold) (Reference No. 278)
15. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with David P. Bailey) (Reference No. 279)
16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Kimberly J. Kloeber) (Reference No. 280)
17. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Joyce C. Beaty) (Reference No. 281)
18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Timothy S. McCarty) (Reference No. 282)
19. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Jennifer J. Archer) (Reference No. 283)
20. In the Air Force there are 61 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Andrew T. Allen) (Reference No. 284)
21. In the Air Force there are 15 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Elham Barani) (Reference No. 285)
22. In the Air Force there are 121 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Homayoun R. Ahmadian) (Reference
No. 286)
23. In the Air Force there are 25 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Francis E. Becker) (Reference No.
287)
24. In the Air Force there are 45 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Margaret E. Abbott) (Reference No. 289)
25. In the Air Force there are 252 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Joseph L. Abrams) (Reference No. 290)
26. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (James B. Flowers) (Reference No. 291)
27. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Dylan T. Randazzo) (Reference No. 292)
28. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Jerry D. Hallman) (Reference No. 293)
29. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Christopher P. Moellering) (Reference No. 294)
30. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Joubert N. Paulino) (Reference No. 295)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Saw
K. San) (Reference No. 296)
32. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Rebecca J. Quackenbush) (Reference No. 297)
33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Stacie L. Kervin) (Reference No. 298)
34. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Brian R. Kossler) (Reference No. 299)
35. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Katherine A. O'Brien) (Reference No. 300)
36. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jessica N. Peralesludemann) (Reference No. 301)
37. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Julia C. Phillips) (Reference No. 302)
38. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Alain M. Alexandre) (Reference No. 303)
39. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Taliat A. Animashaun) (Reference No. 304)
40. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(G010349) (Reference No. 307)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Jordanna M. Hostler) (Reference No. 308)
42. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Elizabeth N. Strickland) (Reference No. 309)
43. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Shawn M.T. May) (Reference No. 310)
44. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Kyle
A. Zahn) (Reference No. 311)
45. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Jessica M.P. Miller) (Reference No. 312)
46. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Rosemary M. Hardesty) (Reference No. 313)
47. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Brett T. Thomas) (Reference No. 314)
48. In the Marine Corps Reserve there is 1 appointment to the
grade of colonel (Matthew T. Coughlin) (Reference No. 317)
49. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Bethanne Canero) (Reference No. 318)
50. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Kevin T. Brownlee) (Reference No. 320)
51. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Kevin F. Champaigne) (Reference No. 321)
52. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Aaron J. Griffus) (Reference No. 322)
53. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel H. Cusinato) (Reference No.
325)
54. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 5 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Armando A. Freire) (Reference No.
329)
55. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Stephen R. Byrnes) (Reference No. 330)
56. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Herman E. Holley) (Reference No.
331)
57. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Darren M. Gallagher) (Reference
No. 332)
58. In the Marine Corps there are 799 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Alexander N. Abate) (Reference No. 333)
59. In the Marine Corps there are 14 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with German Alicealapuerta) (Reference No. 334)
60. In the Marine Corps there are 106 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Eric J. Adams) (Reference No. 335)
61. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Joseph W. Crandall) (Reference No. 336)
62. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Aaron S. Ellis) (Reference No. 338)
63. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Justin D. Mosley) (Reference No. 339)
64. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Andres J. Agramonte) (Reference No. 341)
65. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Katherine R. Morganti) (Reference No. 342)
66. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Scott M. Brown) (Reference No.
360)
67. In the Navy there are 18 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half (list begins with Jeffrey T. Anderson) (Reference
No. 361)
68. LTG VeraLinn Jamieson, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance,
and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (Reference
No. 376)
69. In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Patrick N. Westmoreland)
(Reference No. 379)
70. In the Navy there are 46 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Scott A. Adams) (Reference No.
385)
71. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Bethany S. Peterson) (Reference No. 386)
72. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Tolulope O.A. Aduroja) (Reference No. 394)
73. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Erick L. Jackson) (Reference No. 395)
74. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Joseph J. Fantony) (Reference No. 396)
75. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Chariti D. Paden) (Reference No. 397)
76. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Donald W. Rakes) (Reference No. 398)
77. In the Army Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Ronnie S. Barnes) (Reference No. 399)
78. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Charles A. Riley) (Reference No. 401)
79. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Richard S. McNutt) (Reference No. 402)
80. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Lloyd V. Lozada) (Reference No. 403)
81. In the Army Reserve there are 18 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Julio Acosta) (Reference No. 404)
82. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Peter D. Allen) (Reference No.
405)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 1,818
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General O'Shaughnessy, as I have indicated in my opening
statement, I have concerns about the use of American military
forces along the southern border and a hard time understanding
the nature of an emergency that would require military forces
when nowhere in the National Defense Strategy, the worldwide
threat statement from the intelligence community, nor the
statement from the Commander of SOUTHCOM indicate that migrant
caravans of civilians across the border are a military threat.
In fact, in your opening statement, you say ``the threats to
our Nation from our southern border are not military in
nature.''
Just to be clear, in your professional opinion, does the
illegal crossing of the border by civilians represent a
military threat?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, first, I would say that I
do think a secure border does reduce threats to the Homeland.
Now, specific to your question about is it a military
threat that is coming towards us, it is not a military threat,
but that is slightly [different] than answering whether the
military should be responding to the situation.
Senator Reed. Following up, in your professional opinion
again, would a wall be effective in defending a military attack
on the United States?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I would say that border
security is national security. I do see that any barrier in
place to secure our Nation does have some ramifications to our
ability to defend against a military threat as well. Right now,
there is not a specific military force from the south that we
are trying to take action against.
In this particular case, though, Senator, I would say over
the last 5 months I have spent a tremendous amount of time on
the border, as you would imagine, working with our CBP [United
States Customs and Border Protection] partners. In all of those
trips and discussions, it has been clear to me that the Customs
and Border Protection personnel very much value the border
protection and seeing it, having the awareness, having some
impediments, whether that be a barrier or wall, et cetera, and
then having the ability to respond to it. That has been fairly
universal as I have been doing my trips to the border.
Senator Reed. They are civilian law enforcement officials
who have a law enforcement mission, and the context of their
evaluation is based upon that law enforcement mission.
General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
You have mentioned many real threats that have been
articulated in the National Defense Strategy, Russia and China
in particular. Many of them really are not focused on our
southern border but our northern border, the opening of the
Arctic, the operations by both China and Russia in the Arctic,
and also I think maintaining the capabilities of NORAD. Those
are multibillion dollar tasks. Do you think they are of more
military significance than any operation along the southern
border?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is those
threats are very real. Those threats are what we are focused on
within both NORTHCOM and NORAD because we do see that the
evolving threat, as articulated within the NDS, very much is
trying to take advantage of the northern approach. We have
vulnerabilities there that we need to continue to close the gap
on, and so that is a focus area for us at both NORTHCOM and
NORAD.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Again, thank you
for your service.
General Hyten, I just have a few minutes. But the issue of
hypersonic weapon systems are increasingly critical to us. It
seems from our perspective that our adversaries are shifting
more into the hypersonic realm for many reasons. One reason is
that our defense systems were built for ballistic missiles, not
hypersonic missiles.
Do you feel that in the short run you can deter these
hypersonic vehicles?
General Hyten. Senator, the hypersonic activities in both
China and Russia are not the majority of their activities right
now. The majority are still the traditional ballistic missile,
submarine, bomber threats that we can deter.
I also believe that we have the ability to deter any
adversary that would deploy nuclear weapons against us. My one
concern in this area is that in order to effectively deter, you
have to be able to see, characterize, and attribute where the
threat is coming from. As our adversaries are moving into
cruise missile technology and hypersonic technology, that
challenges our ability to provide those attributes of detection
and characterization. We need to move in that area to sense the
threat so we can effectively deter it.
Senator Reed. Let me ask a couple questions because my time
is running out.
Is your sense that they have, as we have, a legacy system
of missiles, medium-range, long-range, intercontinental, but
they seem to be moving with great energy into hypersonics. That
could be the weapon of choice in the future.
The second part of that is that, as I understand it--you
can clarify it--hypersonics are not governed by the INF Treaty
so that we could develop hypersonics and still remain within
the treaty. Where are they going, and can we do that without
leaving the INF?
General Hyten. They are clearly moving aggressively in the
area of hypersonics. Their testing is fully integrated systems,
long-range and medium-range, as has been well documented, as
opposed to--what was the second part of the question?
Senator Reed. The second part was we can conduct hypersonic
research without violating the INF.
General Hyten. Right. That is correct. The INF Treaty says
that it covers ballistic missiles, and ballistic is defined as
the majority of the trajectory of the missile is ballistic. The
hypersonic missiles that we are talking about, less than half
of that trajectory is ballistic. Therefore, they are not
covered in the INF Treaty.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hyten, in your prepared remarks, you said the only
way to change our strategic deterrent is to convince our
adversaries to reduce the threat and this is not occurring.
China and Russia in particular are not only modernizing the
traditional elements of their own triads, but they are also
building a myriad of additional nuclear capabilities to
threaten the United States.
In your comments to Chairman Inhofe, you explained the
desperate need that we have for modernization and to continue
with our triad, the importance that has for our national
security and for the security of this world.
I would ask you, are you aware of any intelligence or
threat assessment supporting the courses of action that are
called for from some that we need to unilaterally cut our
nuclear forces?
General Hyten. I am not.
Senator Fischer. Is it your view that taking such actions
would make us more vulnerable and reduce our ability to deter
threats?
General Hyten. It would significantly reduce our deterrent.
Senator Fischer. We are looking at a budget in the
Department for nuclear forces and the plan for modernization.
Some people consider it a wish list just to give the Department
everything that they desire, and no effort has been made to
sort through things to look at what we truly need to address
the threats that we have. I am talking about need versus want
here.
That is not an accurate statement, is it, that it is a wish
list?
General Hyten. I look at our nuclear capabilities, our
triad, our modernization program as the minimum essential
capabilities required to defend this nation if we have to
defend against the most existential threat--and Russia and
China and their capabilities are the most existential threat.
To me that is the most minimum essential capabilities that we
have to build, and even at the highest rate, it will still be
just roughly 6 percent of the overall defense budget. I think
we can afford that security.
Senator Fischer. Do you fully support the Nuclear Posture
Review as it was put forward by the Department?
General Hyten. I do, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Do you truly believe it is needed that we
continue on a path forward to reach the goals of that Nuclear
Posture Review?
General Hyten. I think it is essential.
If I could comment on the Nuclear Posture Review, I think
it is very interesting to look at our approach defined in the
Nuclear Posture Review and our adversaries' approach. The
elements in the Nuclear Posture Review that we have put forth
all stay within our treaty responsibilities. We do not
recommend developing new nuclear-powered torpedoes, new
nuclear-powered cruise missiles. We do not look at anything. We
believe that we can secure this nation through the
modernization of the triad and the addition of a couple of
small elements to respond to specific threats. In that case, it
is the low-yield nuclear weapon and the submarine-launched
cruise missile. But that is a very measured response to what
our adversaries are doing.
Senator Fischer. I appreciated your very clear and concise
explanation of the importance and really the mission of each
leg of the triad, and I am very pleased that you made that
clear and concise for the record today. Thank you.
I would like to ask you a little bit about the New START
treaty. In your opening statement, you note that Russia is also
developing and intends to deploy novel strategic nuclear
weapons like its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater,
unmanned vehicle and intercontinental-range cruise missile,
which Russia seeks to keep outside of existing arms control
agreements.
Do you believe that these new systems, if they are
deployed, should be counted under a New START treaty
limitation?
General Hyten. The way the New START treaty is defined is
that the New START treaty only covers existing weapons when it
was put in place in 2011. That means it covers the ballistic
missiles, both submarine- and ground-launched. It covers the
bombers and the cruise missiles on the bombers, and the
platforms that carry them.
There is also a clause in the treaty that says if one of
the parties of the treaty sees the development of new strategic
arms, they can come to the bilateral consultative commission
and bring those things forward. I have not seen that happen.
But we see them developing capabilities outside of that treaty,
which is concerning to me.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe a decision to extend the
treaty should be made on its national security merits and
Russia's behavior figures heavily into that evaluation with
just the example that I gave you, that we need to be looking at
these not just to renew a treaty?
General Hyten. I do, ma'am. I want Russia in every treaty.
I want Russia in the INF Treaty. I want Russia in the New START
treaty. I support those treaties. But they have to be parties
to those treaties. It takes two to participate in a treaty at
least.
Senator Fischer. Russia has not been a party to the INF
Treaty. Is that correct?
General Hyten. Russia has violated the INF Treaty for 5
years now, and despite our best efforts, we have not been able
to bring them into compliance. I have talked about that to the
President. I have talked about New START with the President. We
all want Russia in that treaty. We want them to participate,
but if they will not, we are tying our own hands to deal with
the adversaries in the world, including China, who is not part
of that treaty.
Senator Fischer. It does not help when your partner in a
treaty is not in compliance and we remain in compliance.
General Hyten. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. General Hyten, General O'Shaughnessy,
thank you both for your testimony this morning and for your
service to the country.
I want to begin my questions with you, General
O'Shaughnessy, because I understand that part of your
responsibilities as the leader of a combatant command is to
look at counter-drug operations at our borders. Is that
correct?
General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, what we do is support law
enforcement agencies in a supporting role for some of the
counternarcotics work.
Senator Shaheen. Have you been made aware of any plans that
would take money from what is being proposed already to fund
the President's recent directive to reprogram DOD interdiction
funding to pay for a border wall?
General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, as you know, with a
declaration of a national emergency that is now being
considered, the Secretary of Defense and I, actually together
with the Chairman, went down to the border this weekend on
Saturday in order to see firsthand both what our troops are
doing now, as well as looking at the border and potential
applications of DOD funding for the border, to inform his
decisions. Those decisions--and that is ongoing this week. At
this time, that is work in progress with the Acting Secretary
of Defense.
Senator Shaheen. But do I understand you to say then that
plans are being drawn up that would take money from those drug
interdiction efforts to use for funding a wall?
General O'Shaughnessy. That is one of the options that is
being looked at. It is premature at this time and that work is
being done literally as we speak.
Senator Shaheen. Well, as I am sure you are aware, the
opioid crisis in the United States has taken tens of thousands
of lives. In New Hampshire, we have the second highest opioid
overdose death rate in the country. This is an issue that we
care tremendously about. It is my understanding that most of
the illicit drugs that come into this country come through
ports of entry (POE) as opposed to coming across the border in
other places. Is that what you have seen?
General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, I have seen a little bit of
both. There has recently been a DEA [United States Drug
Enforcement Agency] report that talks about the most common
method of transportation through the borders is, in fact,
through the POEs, but it is most common, not necessarily that
all of it goes through there. It further delineates and talks.
I will give you an example. Just this week, twice I have
been to the border. In one of my trips down there, what they
talked about was the TCOs [Transitional Criminal Organizations]
that run the migrants coming are the same criminals that also
run the narcotics. What we are seeing now is a coordinated
effort, for example, where they will send a large number of
migrants through over the border to take the Border Patrol
agents off of the line, and then they will use that as an
opportunity to bring drugs across the border while the Border
Patrol agency are processing the migrants. It is a coordinated
effort here that brings it all together that is very disturbing
as we go forward.
Senator Shaheen. Do you agree that it is helpful to have
technology and more people at our ports of entry so we can
better interdict drugs coming through there?
General O'Shaughnessy. Absolutely, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. General Hyten, I want to follow up on
Senator Reed's question about hypersonic weapons because I very
much appreciated your strong statement that we are in a
position to defend this country against all threats.
Does that include hypersonic weapons? There have been
public reports that we do not have a defense against those
hypersonic weapons.
General Hyten. Our defense against hypersonics is our
nuclear deterrent. If somebody attacks us with a nuclear
hypersonic capability, we have the ability to respond. Now, it
is important for us to be able to track that to understand
where it comes from.
If you look at the way a hypersonic missile works, the
first phase is ballistic, but it is a fairly short phase. That
phase we will see. We will see the launch. We will be able to
characterize it and understand it came from Russia, it came
from China. But then from our sensor perspective, it basically
disappears and we do not see it until the effect is delivered.
We need to build sensors to be able to understand exactly where
those things are going so we can better defend ourselves. You
cannot defend yourself if you cannot see it.
Senator Shaheen. I am sorry. I did not mean to interrupt.
But do we have any sense about how much time we have from the
point at which those weapons might be launched until when they
might land in the United States?
General Hyten. It is a shorter period of time. The
ballistic missile is roughly 30 minutes. A hypersonic weapon,
depending on the design, could be half of that, depending on
where it is launched from, the platform. It could be even less
than that. There are a lot of variables into that, but it is
more challenging than a ballistic missile.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The United States suspended its obligations under the INF
Treaty. There has been some discussion about that. Can you talk
about what our next steps might be to improve our position and
to strengthen deterrence against Russia, China, and North
Korea?
General Hyten. I think the most important thing we can do
is continue to modernize our nuclear triad. As long as we have
nuclear capabilities that our adversaries cannot attack, they
cannot take out, and they cannot eliminate, we will be able to
prevent the use of nuclear weapons on our Nation. I remember
when I interviewed for this job with President Obama and then I
interviewed with Secretary Mattis after he took over, he asked
me what is the reason we have nuclear weapons. I said the
reason we have nuclear weapons is to prevent people from using
nuclear weapons on us. That is exactly why we have them.
If you do not have a robust capability and our adversaries
do not believe that you are willing to respond, then you run
the risk that somebody will take that step across the line that
nobody ever wants to experience. That is why we have to make
sure we modernize as we go forward.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
I want to follow up a little bit with regard to the nuclear
triad and what makes it as important to us as it does today.
Part of it is the reliability, and when we start talking about
the reliability of the nuclear triad, one of the areas that I
think we have identified as being in need of updating is the
nuclear command and control of the different portions of the
triad.
Could you share with us a little bit about, recognizing the
setting that we are here, the weaknesses that we are trying to
improve upon and include within that a discussion about the
cyber threats that are shortcuts and that really do put our
systems at risk today?
General Hyten. One of the interesting things I have
observed in my 27 months in command now--so that is a long
period of time, 2 years and 3 months. Not one time in that 2
years, 3 months have I lost connectivity with the nuclear
force. Can you imagine any other electronic system in the world
where that has happened? That shows you how resilient,
reliable, and effective the current command and control system
is.
But what concerned me about it is I really cannot
effectively explain that to you because it has been built 50
years ago through different kind of pathways, different kind of
structures. We look at it hard each and every day, and we know
that those things are going to have to be replaced in about a
decade. The big challenges that we have is how are we going to
replace that old, ancient thing that works so well that we know
works, but will not work after about another decade. How do we
replace that with something that works just as well and with
modern technology when we have the cyber threats we have to
look at? One of the great things about being so old is the
cyber threats are actually fairly minimal.
Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there is not
an hour that goes by in which our system of protection of our
communication system is not challenged someplace along the
pathways?
General Hyten. We see literally thousands, if not millions,
of attacks against our systems every day. ``Attacks'' is
defined as an unknown activity trying to get into a network. It
may not be an attack, maybe just a curious person. But
nonetheless, we look at all of those and make sure we defend
those accordingly. We see that broadly on the network side. It
is much more secure on the nuclear side because much of that is
closed off to the world.
Senator Rounds. With regard to both hypersonics and the
item of discussion lately, the torpedo, which has been
discussed in terms of the Russian advancements, in both cases
there is a question as to the vector that we receive them from.
Both are capable of movement, changes in direction, and so
forth, which really changes the way that we defend North
America because in many cases, our defenses have been built on
the closest to the most direct route from our near-peer
adversaries into the North American continent.
Can you share with us a little bit about the needs, first
of all, for the space-based capabilities that we are going to
need in order to determine where hypersonics are at and so
forth?
Second of all, General O'Shaughnessy, I would just ask, can
you share a little bit about the changes within the threats
that a torpedo that could hit along our shorelines could do
with regard to how we have to refocus our North American
defenses as well?
Really two questions, but if you could each.
General Hyten. Real quickly, Senator, when I was a young
officer and the Soviet threat existed, we had big radars on our
southern border. We had a radar in Georgia and a radar in
Texas, Robbins and El Dorado, that were looking south for
threats that we had to worry about.
When the wall came down and Russia became our friend, we
dismantled those radars. We have no radars that look south.
We have built radars and we are building a radar in Hawaii,
built a radar in Alaska to defend against the Korean threat in
particular to make sure we can enable General O'Shaughnessy's
missile defense.
But there are not enough islands in the world to build a
radar to defend every avenue. Therefore, we have to go to
space, and we can go to space now in an affordable way with
distributed constellations that can look down and characterize
that threat in a global perspective so we can see them wherever
they come from. That is the direction we need to go.
Senator Rounds. All at risk of cyber interference.
General Hyten. All at risk of cyber interference, which is
the big challenge of the day.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General O'Shaughnessy?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. As we talked about earlier
with respect to Arctic as the geography is no longer the buffer
that it once was, I would say the same thing from the sea. It
was a time where we for decades actually used the sea as a moat
and really did not have to worry from the threats directly
coming against the Homeland from the sea. That has
fundamentally changed, as you were mentioning relative to the
weapons that are being created.
Therefore, we need to go and invest ourselves in our
ability to have, first, the domain awareness. Just as General
Hyten had mentioned, you have to see it if you are going to be
able to react to it and ultimately defeat it. Right now, we
need to invest in the IUSSS, which is our integrated undersea
surveillance system, which has atrophied as it relates to the
continental United States and our ability to defend there. We
need to invest in that now to be able to defend against these
advanced threats that are coming from the sea.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and for your very
forthright and candid answers at this hearing.
General O'Shaughnessy, is there a national emergency at the
border?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, the President has declared
a national emergency on the border.
Senator Blumenthal. I am asking you in your military
opinion does this nation face a national emergency at the
border.
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, Senator. As the President has
declared that national emergency, he has given guidance and
direction down to the Secretary of Defense and then the Acting
Secretary of Defense. As that has happened, it has been
parlayed to me in the form of an execution order, which makes
it very clear to me of my actions that I need to take as a
result of the guidance from our senior leadership.
Senator Blumenthal. Did you recommend that he declare a
national emergency?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, I did not directly recommend
either way, although I will say----
Senator Blumenthal. Were you consulted before he did it?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will say I have had
multiple conversations, numerous conversations directly with
the President with respect to the border. In addition, I have
had multiple conversations as the Secretary of Defense and
Acting Secretary of Defense has gone over to the White House
for these conversations that have happened. I think I feel very
comfortable that as the operational commander that our
perspective was considered as those decisions were made.
Senator Blumenthal. What is the threat to our national
security that justifies declaring a national emergency,
General?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, what I see from my perspective
is that a secure border will reduce the threats to the
Homeland.
Senator Blumenthal. That is a general statement. But what
is it specifically at this moment in time that justifies
declaring a national emergency?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, again I would say that the
President has made that declaration. We are responsible for
that declaration----
Senator Blumenthal. You are saying in fact--I do not mean
to be disrespectful--that there is a national emergency because
the President has said there is a national emergency.
General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. What I am saying from my
perspective I get my orders from the Secretary of Defense and
the President. Those orders are very clear to me. Just like any
other mission that I am given, when I get that legal order and
I have the troops that are able to enforce that and take those
actions, I do it with the same vigor and professionalism that I
do for my ballistic missile defense, my operational, legal, et
cetera. I take that same look to the----
Senator Blumenthal. I understand that you follow orders and
you do it well and you are proficient and expert in your
duties. I commend you. But you did not recommend that the
President of the United States declare a national emergency,
and you have not given me as yet a specific fact at the border
now that justifies declaring a national emergency.
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I spent a lot of time at
the border over the last 5 months, had very specific
conversation with our lead federal agency, in this case the
Customs and Border Protection, as well as with the Department
of Homeland Security and directly with Secretary Nielsen on a
regular, routine basis. I would defer to them with respect to
the characterization of the threat. I will say we are trying to
be a good partner to another lead federal agency as they take
on this challenge.
Senator Blumenthal. I am concerned, General, very frankly
that this administration is politicizing our military and
militarizing our immigration policy, in effect using the troops
under your command as political props both in terms of
declaring a fake emergency but also compromising our potential
security by diverting them away from other assignments and
missions that are absolutely necessary. My understanding is
that these troops were engaged in various readiness and
training exercises at the time they were deployed. Is that
correct?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, there have been quite a few
different deployments and units within that, but to your point,
some of them would. I will also say that many of the units that
have deployed, especially the initial salvo that went out, are
actually doing exactly what their military skills are. Military
police do a military police business. Engineers do an
engineering business. In fact, many of them come back and
talked about the readiness advantage they have for the way that
they have been deployed.
That said, readiness is a key concern of ours and mine in
particular, and we will continue to look at the impacts to
readiness as we go forward.
Senator Blumenthal. General, recently--I think last week as
a matter of fact--Under Secretary Rood and Vice Admiral Gilday
testified that a minimum of $237 million has been spent so far
on deploying both Active Duty troops and guard personnel at the
border. They were unable to provide a total cost estimate for
fiscal year 2019 even though those deployments have been
extended--correct me if I am wrong--through September of 2019.
Can you give us a cost estimate?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will confirm that the
deployments have been extended through September of 2019.
The cost estimate--specifically on the title X side, which
is the part that is under my command and control--was at $132
million through the 31st of January of this year. We will
continue to work with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
who is ultimately the one who is running the calculations with
respect to the cost.
Senator Blumenthal. In connection with the declaration of
national emergency and the diversion of money that is necessary
to build the wall, have you made a recommendation as to
military construction projects within your command that would
be stripped of funding to fund the wall?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, the actual funding is being
worked by the Secretary of Defense as we speak. I did go down
to the border to the El Paso area with the Secretary just this
last weekend so he would have an understanding both of the
military aspects of what our troops are doing right now, as
well as be able to talk to the Customs and Border Protection
that the folks actually doing the mission there and be able to
take that into his calculations as this week he determines the
funding that might be applied toward resourcing a wall or other
efforts on the border.
Senator Blumenthal. The money that will be taken from
military construction projects under your command has not yet
been determined as to what specifically and where it will come
from.
General O'Shaughnessy. That is a true statement, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We truly do
appreciate it. I appreciate both of your extreme
professionalism in a very difficult time. Thank you very much
for stepping up. I do appreciate it.
General O'Shaughnessy, let us go back and visit a little
bit about the National Guard. You happened to mention it in
your comments. This morning we had our National Guard breakfast
caucus. A lot of our adjutant generals are here in town today
and really excited to be here and speaking with all of their
elected representation.
Can you talk a little bit about how the National Guard fits
into the overall force structure here in the United States and
what type of missions are they engaging in?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the
opportunity to highlight the great partnership we have with the
National Guard. I will say certainly from the NORTHCOM and
NORAD perspective, they are absolutely integral and core to
every single mission that we do within our commands. It goes
all the way from whether it is the aircraft that are sitting,
as we speak right now, across both the CONUS [Continental
United States] as well as in Alaska or whether it goes to the
command and control that is part of that, whether it is the
ballistic missile defense that we have in place. Every mission
set that we have right now the National Guard is actively
employed in doing that. Frankly, I can just tell you plain and
simply we could not do our mission set without the National
Guard and their contributions.
Senator Ernst. We appreciate that very much. We want to
utilize them as much as we can. We do know that there are a
number of troops that have been activated or mobilized for work
down on the southern border. We know that to be true.
I would just state that having served in the National Guard
and responding to a number of different mobilizations, whether
it is hurricane relief, whether it is working in flood
situations, or whether it is down on the border, that our
troops are actively engaging in their MOS [Military
Occupational Specialty] specific skill sets. If you are a heavy
equipment operator, you are out there driving a dozer or you
are operating. If you are a truck driver, you are driving. You
are actually doing those skills that have been assigned to you.
Thank you for highlighting that. I think it is great for our
readiness to actually be able to engage in our MOSs. Thank you
for that.
I also want to go back. We have talked a lot with General
Hyten about modernization and our nuclear capabilities, but let
us focus a little more with you. What do you see the most
pressing modernization requirements for NORTHCOM?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the
opportunity to highlight this. It is actually fairly similar.
The first thing is domain awareness. Over the years, we have
just let atrophy our ability to understand and see what is
happening in and around our Nation. It was done at the time for
the right reasons because we had a sanctuary. We had the
ability to not have more advanced sensors and more advanced
capabilities. But now that it has fundamentally changed based
on the security, based on our potential adversaries, our peer
strategic competitors that now have the ability to reach out
and hold us at risk, we need to fundamentally relook at the way
that we are maintaining our domain awareness. That cannot be
done with one single widget, one single particular program. It
is going to have to be a family of systems. It is going to have
to include both terrestrial based capability and a reassertion
of technology in terrestrial based. It is going to have to
include some air domain advances in technology and capability.
But it is also absolutely going to have to include space. We
really need to accelerate our work to put sensors in space that
can help us understand the domain both on the sea and in the
air of the threats that are coming towards our Homeland.
In particular, the Arctic is an area that we really need to
focus on and really look at investing. That is no longer a
buffer zone. We need to be able to operate there. We need to be
able to communicate there. We need to be able to have a
presence there that we have not invested in in the same way
that our adversaries have. They see that as a vulnerability
from us, whereas it is becoming a strength for them and it is a
weakness for us, and we need to flip that equation.
Senator Ernst. Yes. You mentioned the Arctic, and I am sure
that my colleague, Senator Sullivan, will have a lot of great
questions there.
But when we talk modernization, have we identified a system
to replace the aging northern warning system?
General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, we have a study that is going
on right now. It is a bi-national study. It is being done by
our Air Combat Command within the United States Air Force, as
well as with Canada, that is going to help us. But I will tell
you that north warning system right now--the last hardware
insertion of technology was 1985. That needs to be invested in,
and again, it needs to be part not just of advancing that but
also doing the all-domain awareness in addition to the
terrestrial based.
Senator Ernst. Yes, I appreciate that.
General Hyten, thank you so much for hosting me last year
at STRATCOM. I really appreciated the tour and the time you
took to educate me on your mission set there.
Can you talk a little bit about the move that is ongoing at
Offutt Air Force Base?
General Hyten. Senator, I am glad to be able to sit here
and say we are actually getting ready to move into the
building. It has been a long time. It is a couple years late.
The Guard did an amazing job. We brought in over 20 engineering
and installation squadrons from the Guard to help us recapture
some schedule. They saved over $70 million of the taxpayers'
money, and they saved us probably more than that in schedule.
We are getting ready to move in. I think we will be able to
start next week, and I hope to have the opening ceremonies this
October. That will be a big day because we will be able to do
our mission even better. That will become the hub of nuclear
command and control.
Senator Ernst. Outstanding. Gentlemen, thank you both so
much for your leadership.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. General O'Shaughnessy, forgive me for
jumping back and forth between Intel and this Committee this
morning. There is a little bit of something going on over there
as well.
I wanted to return to something that Senator Blumenthal
came up and just make sure I have the correct information that
you were not consulted by the White House before the decision
to use military construction dollars to pay for the national
emergency.
General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. That was not my response.
Specifically, we have been in dialogue. I have been in dialogue
with the President all the way down for multiple occasions, to
include in coordination with the Secretary of Defense. The
actual decision of how that funding will be placed is actually
what the Secretary of Defense is actually working through
literally right now.
Senator Heinrich. Were you consulted before the
announcement?
General O'Shaughnessy. With multiple dialogues talking
about the border, talking about the situation that we see.
Senator Heinrich. Is that a yes?
General O'Shaughnessy. Our ability to have the operational
perspective known was absolutely present.
Senator Heinrich. My question is were you consulted as to
using military construction dollars as the source of funding to
pay for the national emergency efforts?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, in fact, with the Secretary of
Defense.
Senator Heinrich. That is a decision you support.
General O'Shaughnessy. I gave my best military advice to
the Secretary of Defense, to include going down, physically
going down, with him to the border to make sure he understood
the operational perspective.
Senator Heinrich. If those dollars do flow to that priority
rather than what they were appropriated for and authorized for,
what impact of the cancellation of some of those construction
projects have whether it is for military housing or air traffic
control improvements or even runway upgrades? What impact would
that have on military morale?
General O'Shaughnessy. I think right now, Senator, that is
premature. I think as we look at it, that is exactly the types
of things that the Secretary is looking at. He is looking at it
from what is the right balance, what is the right use of those
funds, and in fact, what would the correct funds be,
appropriate funds, to use given the direction that he has been
given.
Senator Heinrich. Given the Constitution, I would suggest
that is a job for Congress.
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir.
Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, DOD's initial requirements
for plutonium pits are to produce 30 pits per year at Los
Alamos by 2026. Are you and NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] still laser-focused on making that happen?
General Hyten. We are laser-focused on 30 by 2026 and 80 by
2030, and my requirement is that. I never said where they had
to be done, but if we do not get 30 in Los Alamos, we will
never the 80.
Senator Heinrich. If personnel and scientific expertise
were shifted from one place to another during that effort, what
would be the potential impact for the near-term goals?
General Hyten. I have told the Secretary of Energy, as well
as the Administrator of the NNSA, that we cannot move anything
out of Los Alamos into Savannah River that would take our eyes
off of the 30 in 2026. I am going down to Los Alamos and
sending my people down to Los Alamos to make sure that that
focus is always there because, again, if we cannot get to 30 by
2026 at Los Al, we cannot get there at all.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I appreciate your focus on this
effort. It is very welcome, and you are always welcome at Los
Alamos, as you know.
I also understand that the administration, General Hyten,
is currently reviewing whether it will seek to extend the New
START agreement that limits United States and Russian strategic
nuclear weapons to 1,550 treaty-accountable warheads with
additional limits, obviously, on delivery vehicles. Is that
information accurate? Is that correct?
General Hyten. We are looking at that. The President asks
me about that every time I see him. It is high on his mind.
Again, the issue there is the efforts that Russia has going on
right now that are not elements of the New START. The torpedo,
the cruise missile, the hypersonics all are not part of that
treaty. We believe that we would like to have all nuclear
weapons as part of a future strategic arms treaty. That is my
desire. I want Russia in that treaty. I want Russia in the INF
Treaty, but if they will not participate----
Senator Heinrich. I share that sentiment and certainly
hopefully we can move to a world where there is control on more
weapon systems rather than simply getting rid of the tools that
we have to, in theory, get something that is perfect and more
inclusive.
Does New START provide significant benefits to U.S.
national security interests? If so, what would those be?
General Hyten. No treaty is perfect, and New START is
certainly not perfect. But what it gives me at STRATCOM, it
gives me two very important things. Number one, it puts a limit
on the basics of their strategic force. I understand what the
limits are and I can position my force accordingly so I can
always be ready to respond. Maybe as important, it also gives
me insight through the verification process of exactly what
they are doing and what those pieces are. Having that insight
through my forces and our partners is unbelievably important
for me to understand what Russia is doing. But we do not have
insight into all the other things that are going on right now.
That will be the challenge.
Senator Heinrich. If we were to lose that insight without
gaining more global insight, would that be a step forward or a
step back?
General Hyten. That is the balance that will be in the
decision that the country has to make as we go forward on the
benefits of New START. I would like everything on the table.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, General.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thanks for your exceptional service of both of
you and all the hard work you are doing.
I want to talk about the Arctic and missile defense, but I
actually wanted just to add a little bit to the exchange you
had with my colleague, Senator Blumenthal, who I have a lot of
respect for and work with on a lot of issues.
But, General O'Shaughnessy, let me ask. How many Americans
were killed by drug overdoses last year? Do you know?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, Senator, I do. 72,000 in the
last year and 70,000 the year before.
Senator Sullivan. More than all the men and women killed in
the Vietnam War just last year, 72,000 Americans.
General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sullivan. That is opioids, heroin, meth. How much
of the heroin in America comes from Mexico?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, there is a significant portion
that comes up through the southern approaches.
Senator Sullivan. The number I have heard is over 90
percent.
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. If that is not an emergency, 72,000
dead Americans killed by opioids and heroin in 1 year, I have
no freakin' idea what an emergency is. That is just my view on
that. Do you have any comment on that? Is that an emergency,
72,000 dead Americans?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, I would say that clearly this
is a national issue that we have to take on with a whole-of-
government approach.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, okay. Thank you.
Let me talk about the Arctic. By the way, General
O'Shaughnessy, I really want to commend you. You are by far and
away the NORTHCOM Commander who has actually put this on the
radar as a serious issue. Just today in your testimony about so
many of the threats operating both in the Arctic and passing
through I think is a wakeup call. This Committee has been doing
a lot of work in that regard. Let me ask a couple issues with
regard to capabilities.
The Russians have a fleet of polar icebreakers. It is 40.
They are building 14 more, including nuclear-powered
icebreakers, weaponized icebreakers. We are finally getting our
act together on that. Last year's NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] authorized six. This past appropriations
bill recently signed by the President has about close to $700
million on the first one.
But do we have the required capabilities to answer the
Russian and, by the way, Chinese challenge in the Arctic? If
so, what more capabilities do we need?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, you started with
icebreakers, and I will highlight that as well. On paper, we
have four icebreakers. In reality we have one that is actually
a polar level.
Senator Sullivan. We have two and one is broken. Right?
General O'Shaughnessy. Two. They are sister ships. We have
one that is cannibalized and one that is----
Senator Sullivan. They were commissioned in the early
1970s.
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. They are 43 years old.
Senator Sullivan. Have you ever seen those icebreakers?
General O'Shaughnessy. I have been on the Polar Star.
Senator Sullivan. They are a disgrace to the men and women
who wear the uniform of the United States. Are they not?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. Just this year alone, for
example, as the Polar Star was going down to Antarctica, she
had multiple major casualties to include a propeller shaft seal
that went out that ended up in flooding. Its incinerator
actually caught on fire. There was a fire and flooding on that
ship.
Senator Sullivan. Yes. I commend the men and women of the
Coast Guard who try to keep that ship afloat, but it is a
disgrace. You put men and women wearing the uniform of our
Nation on a ship that is that old and dangerous.
But I interrupted you. Please go on.
General O'Shaughnessy. In that regard, we are working
closely with the Coast Guard and, of course, the U.S. Navy who
is helping the Coast Guard get the six icebreakers, at least
three that will be polar-capable icebreakers. Those are
absolutely critical for us even within the Department of
Defense even though it is ultimately for the Coast Guard to be
able to clear the access for us to be able to have operations
in the Arctic. So that is a high priority for us in U.S.
Northern Command.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. Again, this
Committee has focused a lot on the Arctic, which I appreciate
in a bipartisan way. We mandated this strategy that had to come
out of DOD. Two years ago we mandated the concept of a
strategic Arctic port. The Secretary of the Navy recently
testified that we need a strategic Arctic port to protect our
interests in the Arctic. Do you agree with him?
General O'Shaughnessy. I had a conversation with the
Secretary of the Navy just last week on this regard. Clearly
what we need--I will use an example. We have a requirement for
fuel north of Dutch Harbor. Right now we do not have access to
that. Nome, if we were able to make Nome a deepwater port,
would serve that requirement.
Senator Sullivan. You think we need that the way he said
that?
General O'Shaughnessy. I think we need to ultimately have
the ability to have the infrastructure to allow us to do the
operations. A deepwater port would certainly be part of that
going forward.
Senator Sullivan. General Hyten, let me ask you. You have
been a great advocate on missile defense. The Trump
administration recently put out its Missile Defense Review. The
President actually announced it at the Pentagon with the Vice
President and SecDef, the Secretary of Defense.
Again, this Committee has been doing a lot of work in
regard to that.
Do you agree with the priorities outlined in the Missile
Defense Review? Can you just briefly talk about what other
areas we need and how Alaska is the cornerstone of our Nation's
missile defense in terms of LRDR [Long Range Discrimination
Radar] radar, missile fields, and other areas that we need to
continue to build on?
General Hyten. I agree with the findings of the Missile
Defense Review. The thing I liked most about the Missile
Defense Review is that it was not just a ballistic missile
defense review. It was a missile defense review looking at the
entire spectrum of capabilities that we have to have not just
against ballistic missiles but all the missile threats that we
face. It talked about getting left of launch, as well as the
response after the launch.
When you look at Alaska, all you have to do is look at a
globe and look at where Korea is and look at where the United
States is and you understand the importantance of Alaska. That
is why we are putting the long-range discrimination radar in
Alaska. That is why that is going to be a critical portion.
I continue to look at the radar architecture and be
concerned about vulnerabilities in that architecture. That is
why I think we need to augment the ground element, as General
O'Shaughnessy talked about earlier with the space element, and
then defend that space element as well. That will allow us to
see, characterize, and hopefully discriminate the threat so we
can make more efficient use of our interceptors in Alaska.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
I want to pick up on a comment made by my colleague,
Senator Sullivan, about the Coast Guard icebreakers, and I
would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to mention
we have a very aging fleet in the Great Lakes as well. In fact,
I was on a Coast Guard ship earlier last week, and it was well
over 50 years old. You can only keep those things running so
long and you start running out of bubblegum and tape and you
need to have it replaced. Hopefully we will be able to
recapitalize that fleet in a much broader way.
General O'Shaughnessy, you have a very big responsibility
and an important one with a very large AOR [Area of
Responsibility]. I am sure you have a lot of sleepless nights
thinking about various threats. What do you believe is the most
significant threat to your AOR? We have heard a number of
different ones here today, but I am just curious as to the one
that you think most about.
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I think right now it in the
near term is Russia. As we look at the advancement that Russia
has made, it is not only the capability and the capacity that
they have, but it is also the investments they made, the
training they are doing, and the patterns of behavior that
clearly show they intend to not only hold us at risk but in
conflict, they would actually take action on the conventional
side as well as on the nuclear side potentially. It is not just
a cyber threat. This is a kinetic threat with the cruise
missiles that we talked about. We need to invest in our ability
to defend if we are going to be able to maintain our ability to
defend. That is something that I think we need to have a sense
of urgency on.
Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that. That is our number
one threat to the Homeland in your estimation.
However, we just recently deployed troops to our southern
border. As you know, as we have talked about here, we have a
national emergency that was declared on February 15th.
My question to you, General, is we sent troops to the
border last October and into November. Could you tell us how
the threat environment has changed from November to February?
Have you seen an increased threat?
General O'Shaughnessy. Well, first, I would say for the
specific clarification of the threat we rely on our Customs and
Border Protection personnel in close cooperation with them. I
would defer the specifics of that actual threat to them.
What I will say it is a dynamic that we are seeing where
the response that we did in October was to a very large
caravan, and we were tasked to do a request for assistance from
the Department of Homeland Security to respond very rapidly. We
did so. I am very proud of the response that was made with our
military members taking the orders they were given, the mission
that they were given, and executing it with the professionalism
that you would expect of our military members.
Senator Peters. I apologize, General. But just from that
point forward, what has happened since then to now? What have
you seen?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, we have seen the caravans are
not as large, but they are still out there. I would use the
example of a couple weeks ago where we had to respond to Eagle
Pass where we had migrants show up there where the Customs and
Border Protection asked for our assistance again to be able to
harden the port of entry and provide them assistance in their
ability to respond.
Senator Peters. Well, I think we all agree that border
security is incredibly important. I do not think you will find
any disagreement with anybody on this Committee. I sit on the
Homeland Security Committee as well. It is clearly a
nonpartisan issue. We all believe that borders must be secure.
It is a fundamental aspect of our government to keep the
Homeland safe.
The question is usually how do you do that in the most
effective way and understand that we have to do it in a way
that is respectful of taxpayer dollars as well. That I think is
really the crux of what we are deciding right now.
You mentioned that you were part of the consultation with
the administration as to the need for a national emergency. I
would assume, because of your repeated trips down to the
border, you have seen significant gaps from Customs and Border
Patrol. However, as you mentioned earlier in your testimony,
the DEA has come up with a report that shows that most of the
drugs, for example, that are coming across the border are
coming through ports of entry. They are not folks walking
across the open desert, and if they are, there are probably
much more effective ways to track those folks down either with
unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors, National Guard troops. I
understand those National Guard troops use Department of
Defense drug interdiction program money to go down there. Yet
now I hear that that drug interdiction money may be diverted to
something else.
Could you explain why you think drug interdiction money is
simply not an effective way of dealing with drugs coming across
the border and we should look at other avenues?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is that we
have been in consultation with the Secretary of Defense on
exactly these issues. With our role within USNORTHCOM, we have
JTF-North [Joint Task Force North], for example, that is
dedicated to the counternarcotics mission. That gets funding
through the 284 money that you are alluding to. That is
something that we are articulating up to the Secretary of
Defense with the aspect of saying we want to preserve that
ability for that particular program, as just an example of what
inputs the Secretary of Defense is getting as he works through
what is the appropriate way to work the funding and what is the
report and response from the Department of Defense to this
demand signal.
Senator Peters. You are recommending that that money stay
in place. That would not be diverted.
General O'Shaughnessy. I am talking about very specifically
the USNORTHCOM perspective of a very small sliver of the
overall funding piece that needs to be considered within the
broader context of the requirements that the Secretary of
Defense has been given.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Hawley?
Senator Hawley. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy,
thank you for being here. Thank you for your exemplary service,
and thank you for the service of the men and women under your
respective commands.
General Hyten, I want to go back and talk about something
you have touched on several times already this morning, the
need for the modernization of our nuclear arsenal. I want to
focus in on, in particular, one aspect of that as it relates to
low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
We know that Russia and China, our two peer or near-peer
competitors, have been investing significantly in these types
of weapons. Russia, for instance, in anti-ship cruise missiles,
nuclear torpedoes, nuclear depth charges. China, other nuclear
weapons designed for regional conflict like the DF-21, DF-26
ballistic missiles. For these reasons, of course, the Nuclear
Posture Review that was released last February called for us,
the United States, to deploy new low-yield tactical warheads.
Can you explain? Do you agree with that assessment by the
Nuclear Posture Review? Can you explain why this type of weapon
might be important given the strategic choices that we are now
facing?
General Hyten. Senator, I do agree with the Nuclear Posture
Review. I had a lot of input into the creation of those
recommendations. The thing I liked best about the Nuclear
Posture Review and our National Defense Strategy is they are
threat-based documents. When you have a threat specifically in
Russia, which is my biggest concern, with low-yield nuclear
weapons where they have deployed an order of magnitude more of
those than we even have in our inventory, we need to be able to
quickly respond to that and provide the President a spectrum of
options in order to do that. Now, we have low-yield nuclear
weapons in the air leg of our triad, but not in another leg of
our triad. I talked about the attributes before about timely,
responsive. We want to make sure the President always has a
responsive option to respond.
We are recommending that, but it is important to note that
is inside the New START treaty. Russia is building those
outside the New START treaty. We are going to take missiles off
of the submarines, take big weapons off the submarines, put
little weapons on the submarine, put it back on. We will still
have 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons, but the total yield will
be smaller. I do not think that is escalatory in any way. I
think that will allow the President to have options to manage
the threat effectively.
Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
I wonder if you could go on, General Hyten, and just
explain how it is that deploying new low-yield nuclear weapons
can, if we do it effectively, if we do it right, actually
reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.
General Hyten. Because the adversary watches exactly what
we have and then they look for gaps. If they think they can
deploy a nuclear weapon and get away with it, they very well
may do that. The Russian doctrine is escalate to win, and if
they execute that doctrine as they have said--and I have to
believe them at their word--if they execute that doctrine as
they have said and they may consider if something is going bad
on the battlefield somewhere to deploy a low-yield nuclear
weapon and the United States will not respond because if we do
that, we have to respond with a high-yield nuclear weapon, they
might take that chance. But if they see we have a low-yield
nuclear weapon, they will not go that direction. That is the
whole theory of deterrence is if they see an effective response
to that, they will not use that weapon.
Senator Hawley. Given that, General, what place do you
think that the use of these tactical low-yield nuclear weapons
ought to have in our own strategic doctrine? I think you have
touched on it, but explain a little bit more.
General Hyten. The most important thing to realize is they
are deterrent weapons. The first use of a deterrent weapon is
to make sure the weapon is not used against you. Now, in order
for that to happen, the adversary has to look at that and see a
rational response. The second priority is to use that in
response to that option. But the goal of that weapon is to make
sure that weapon is not used on you.
Senator Hawley. This is particularly important, is it not,
General, as we face peer competitors, near-peer competitors who
may well have significantly larger conventional military forces
than we do so that we do not find ourselves in a position where
a disadvantage that we may have with conventional forces tempts
aggression. Is that fair to say?
General Hyten. I never want to be at a disadvantage in any
element of our architecture. I think it was Senator Inhofe,
Senator Reed talked about disadvantages or places our
adversaries are ahead of us. As far as I am concerned, that
should never happen in the United States of America. But it is
happening. I never want to be there.
On the conventional side, we are still the most dominant
conventional force on the planet. If we can move our
capabilities into an operation, we will dominate the
battlefield today. That is where the threat of a low-yield
nuclear weapon becomes at risk because an adversary may see the
opportunity to deploy conventional forces and have that short-
term advantage, but eventually that advantage will turn and
that is where that escalation risk exists and we have to be
able to respond.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you so much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to our witnesses.
I am sorry that Senator Sullivan left. I want to return and
say that 72,000 deaths, overdose deaths, is an emergency.
40,000 people died in 2017 by gun violence in the United
States, murders and suicides. That would seem to me to be an
emergency.
The question is not whether 72,000 drug deaths or 40,000
gun deaths are an emergency. The question is should we allow a
President to unilaterally declare an emergency and to take $6
billion out of the Pentagon's budget to apply to a situation,
General O'Shaughnessy, that you said the threats to our Nation
from our southern border are not military in nature. The
question that Congress and the Senate is going to grapple with
in the next couple weeks is will we allow a President to
declare that drug overdose deaths are an emergency, but the
threat is not military and still will take $6 billion out of
the defense budget to deal with it because if we set that
precedent, I could certainly foresee a day when a President is
going to say 40,000 gun deaths a year are an emergency, and why
do we not take the money out of the Pentagon budget to deal
with that? If we let the President take $6 billion out of the
Pentagon's budget to deal with a non-military threat of drugs,
then you guys are going to see money taken out of your budget
for other emergencies as well. That is the vote that we are all
going to be casting in the next couple of weeks.
General O'Shaughnessy, I applaud the honesty of your
written testimony. It is 23 pages of testimony. The first
section of it is threats, five pages. You identify six threats,
nothing to do with the southern border. The second section is
defending the Homeland, eight pages of testimony, four
different domains. The last is southern approaches, and you
acknowledge that it is not a military threat. You focus in your
three paragraphs of testimony on illegal narcotics.
The question we are going to have to vote on is do we want
the President to take Pentagon money for a threat that you
acknowledge is non-military in nature.
The President proposes $6 billion. The first chunk is $2.5
billion of drug interdiction money. The Pentagon account on
drug interdiction does not have $2.5 billion in it. Right now,
an ABC news this morning article--one of the two Pentagon funds
the Trump administration plans to tap to help secure the
southern border after declaring a national emergency has
nowhere near the $2.5 billion that is projected for use. It has
$85 million, not $2.5 billion. It has $85 million that is
available. The Pentagon is saying that they are going to have
to reprogram or shift money from other accounts into the
account to make the $2.5 billion.
I gather, General O'Shaughnessy, from your testimony
earlier you do not yet know where the Pentagon plans to find
the money to shift into the drug interdiction account to then
take to use for the President's emergency. Is that correct?
General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, Senator. That is
beyond the purview of USNORTHCOM. That is something that OSD is
working with the joint staff.
Senator Kaine. Within the Pentagon but not NORTHCOM.
General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct.
Senator Kaine. Secondly, I want to make sure I understand
your testimony. That is the $2.5 billion. The $2.5 billion to
be taken is a fund that has $85 million in it. There is
apparently an attempt to shift other Pentagon monies into it.
We do not yet know where it will come from.
The second chunk is $3.5 billion out of MILCON, military
construction, projects. General O'Shaughnessy, in NORTHCOM I
gather there are ongoing military construction projects as well
as projects that you would like to do that either are further
out or not yet funded. Correct?
General O'Shaughnessy. That is a true statement, Senator.
Senator Kaine. I gather from your testimony you have not
yet been asked to provide a list of NORTHCOM MILCON projects
that you would propose or you would recommend to be reduced,
eliminated, or delayed. Is that correct?
General O'Shaughnessy. We are actually working very closely
with the Secretary of Defense's office with respect to the
prioritization of that, not necessarily specifically related to
this issue, but we have had communication with them with our
prioritization of those MILCON dollars.
Senator Kaine. I want to make sure I understand this.
Obviously, NORTHCOM is always going to have a list of MILCON
projects because we are working on the NDAA and that will be in
it. You will always have a list. But have you been asked
specifically in connection with this proposal to take $3.5
billion out of MILCON, give us your recommendations as the
NORTHCOM Commander about projects that should be reduced,
eliminated, or delayed?
General O'Shaughnessy. Again, Senator, I believe that is
the process that is actually ongoing this very week, and that
is why I was really pleased that the Acting Secretary of
Defense took the time to go down, see firsthand, and then have
a personal insight as he works through those very difficult
challenges and decisions that he will make as he ultimately
responds to the direction of the President.
Senator Kaine. Have you made recommendations or not? Has
NORTHCOM made recommendations about MILCON projects that should
be reduced, eliminated, or delayed?
General O'Shaughnessy. We have not specifically to this
particular effort as of yet, but it is still premature and pre-
decisional at this point.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Blackburn?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
I know that the hypersonics have been discussed. General
Hyten, I wanted to come back to that issue. It is important to
us in Tennessee because of Arnold Air Force and the work that
has been done there. They have been really a key contributor,
if you will, to our Nation's aerospace program. They are very
important to us in Tennessee, and we are pleased that they are
there. You have discussed some of the program and the advances
there, the operational capabilities.
But I want to come back to one thing that they have
mentioned a couple of times, and it is having both the talent
and the numbers of individuals to really push forward into the
hypersonics and into that capacity and, General O'Shaughnessy,
as you said, 21st century warfare and having what is there. Let
us take just a minute and focus on the talent and the numbers
to deliver on that mission.
General Hyten. Senator, Arnold Air Force Station is a
treasure to this country. The wind tunnel capabilities that
they have there are unique, and they allow us to do things that
we really cannot do anywhere else.
We have a challenge at Arnold and a challenge across our
DOD labs and across our Department of Energy labs in
attracting, recruiting, and retaining the kind of engineering
talent that is required to move these kind of programs forward.
What I have learned, though, is when you can explain to the
youth of America the kind of work that you can do by coming to
places like Arnold, they will come. They will come because they
love to do that kind of fascinating work. That is the same with
Los Alamos or Livermore or Sandia or Rome Labs or any of our
national labs. The key is then to be able to retain them
because they will be trained and they will learn unique skills
and they can go out and do anything. We have to make sure that
we have the compensation that matches their talent, that we
compete with the civilian sector in doing that. But the most
important thing is we can provide them fascinating work.
The one challenge I would say that we have to work at
together--and the Department of Defense is looking at this;
Congress is looking at this--is the time it takes some of these
employees to get their clearances has been very de-motivational
for new employees and it is causing some of them to leave
because it takes years in some cases for them to get the high
level security clearances to work those issues. Now, the
Secretary, Secretary Mattis, now Secretary Shanahan, have
looked at this issue directly, and they are working it directly
with the broader government. But that is an issue that we want
to continue to take on.
Senator Blackburn. Kind of in the same vein, let us talk
about USSPACECOM and that capacity, that mission, the
transition of that mission. How are you approaching this so
that going from STRATCOM to SPACECOM that is a seamless
transition, and that we keep our focus on those threats that
are coming to us that we are going to need to--the adversary
threats we will need to address?
General Hyten. Two pieces of the answer to that question,
Senator, is that, number one, I am still the senior military
person in space still serving Active Duty. So I care
desperately about space. But as the Commander of Strategic
Command, space will never be my number one priority. In fact,
right now it is about number three. The nuclear modernization
and operations is number one. Nuclear command and control is
number two. Space is my third priority. With the importance of
space in today's day and age, that is not good to have that
priority. We need a command that focuses on that and the
commander of that command, whoever that person is, he or she
must have a focus on space 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. That
is why we are standing up a Space Command.
One of the ways we are going to make sure we do that
because I was around when we transitioned the old U.S. Space
Command to U.S. Strategic Command in 2002--now we are kind of
going back the other way. I watched us almost break the space
mission when we did that because we just haphazardly slapped
billets and said these 500-plus billets are going to move from
Colorado to Omaha, and I will just say the people did not come
with them automatically.
We are going to continue to perform a lot of the mission
for Space Command in the STRATCOM headquarters. It will be
Space Command East. Omaha is east in this case if it is in
Colorado. If it is in Florida, it will be Space Command West.
If it is in Alabama, it will be Space Command West. Wherever it
ends up, we are going to continue to support that because we do
not know the final destination of where that is going to be. We
cannot break the mission because we have threats to deal with
today. So we will make sure we cover both of those issues in
dealing with the standup of Space Command.
Senator Blackburn. My time has expired. I am going to
submit for the record a QFR [Questions for the Record] for you
on supply chain integrity dealing with the space systems. I
thank you each for your service and for being here today.
General Hyten. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman Inhofe. Without objection, it will be part of the
record. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today.
Senator Heinrich asked about New START, and I just want to
go back and dig a little deeper, if I can, on that.
General Hyten, in March 2017, you testified in front of the
House Armed Services Committee, and you said ``I have stated
for the record in the past and I will state again that I am a
big supporter of the New START agreement.'' Is that still your
view?
General Hyten. It is still my view. I have said it multiple
times. I am a big supporter of the New START agreement. I want
ideally in my view all nuclear weapons to be part of the next
phase of New START and not just the identified weapons that are
in the New START treaty now.
Senator Warren. I understand you would like to see an
expanded New START. Can you just say a word about why you think
New START is so important?
General Hyten. It gives me two things at STRATCOM. Number
one, it gives a cap on their strategic baseline nuclear weapons
and their ballistic missiles, both submarine and ICBM, as well
as their bombers so I understand what that is. Also, just as
important, it gives me insight through the verification regime
to their real capabilities. The INF Treaty, for example, does
not have a verification regime anymore. The New START treaty
does, which gives me insight into the Russian capabilities.
Those are hugely beneficial to me. They just have to be
balanced against all the other things Russia is doing outside
of the treaty.
Senator Warren. Right.
Actually can you just say a word more about that, about the
inspection process and what benefit that gives to the United
States?
General Hyten. Both Russia and the United States, as party
to that treaty, have the ability to declare a New START
inspection. The Russians can land in our country, and I get a
notification that they landed at a port of entry somewhere. San
Francisco is one that they land at frequently. Once they land
there, they can declare wherever they want to go in this
country to look at our nuclear force. We have the same ability
in Russia to land at a port of entry in Russia and then go
wherever we want to look at their capabilities. They open it up
to verify that the right number of weapons are there, the right
kind of weapons are there. That gives us insight into those
capabilities, gives them insight into our capabilities and
improves our overall strategic stability.
Senator Warren. I presume, based on what you have said,
that if we either lost that capacity or the capacity was
greatly diminished, that you would like to try to find another
way to be able to conduct that same kind of inspection and know
what is going on.
In this setting, how confident are you that we could
replace those inspections, the data exchanges, and the
notifications that are now in New START with other verification
tools in a timely and cost effective manner?
General Hyten. We have very good intelligence capabilities,
but there is really nothing that can replace the eyes-on/hands-
on ability to look at something. We have to do that. But there
are elements that they have that are not elements of the New
START treaty that we do not have this insight into.
Senator Warren. I understand that you want to see this
expanded. I am just trying to hang onto what we have got and
then talk a little bit about the expansion.
Let me just ask, in your view would it be easier or harder
to provide an effective deterrent without a verifiable arms
control agreement such as New START in place?
General Hyten. I believe in any situation I can foresee in
the next 10 years I can provide an effective defense as long as
I have a capable triad with the weapons that we have defined. I
get concerned 10 years and beyond that with torpedoes, with
cruise missiles, with hypersonics that they could go a
completely other direction that we would have difficulty. But I
do not have any problem standing here and saying I can defend
this nation today and I think the commander after me can, but I
worry about the commander after the commander after the next.
Senator Warren. The question I am trying to ask, though, is
it easier or harder when you have got the tools available to
you in New START.
General Hyten. Today it is absolutely easier.
Senator Warren. That is the part I am going for. This is a
part of what you are able to accomplish.
Do you support the extension of New START?
General Hyten. I have stated for the record in the past--I
have not changed my opinion--I support New START, but you have
to have a partner that wants to participate in New START.
Senator Warren. I know.
General Hyten. It is going to be like INF. We have to have
a partner that can participate. It is a two-party treaty. If
the Russians continued to build the capabilities outside the
New START treaty that are not accountable and will not come to
the table under the treaty--there is an element of the treaty
that says if there is a new strategic arm that appears, they
should bring that to the table and discuss it. If they will not
do that, then that causes me to have concerns.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that. I think you are exactly
right when you identify who is going to come to the table. As
you know, New START expires in just 2 years. The administration
has already ripped up another nuclear arms treaty with Russia,
the INF Treaty, and it appears to be running out the clock on
the New START without any plans for a follow-up agreement. If
this happens, this is going to be the first time since 1972
that there are no arms control agreements between the United
States and Russia.
My view is we have a moral and strategic responsibility to
do everything in our power to prevent a new nuclear arms race,
and at a minimum I think that means working with Russia to try
to get back to the negotiating table, try to get them back into
compliance with the INF Treaty and working on a New START
treaty. This just seems to me to be common sense arms control
and to make America safe.
General Hyten. I pay close attention to what the State
Department is doing, and they are reaching out to the Russians
and the Russians are not answering favorably.
Senator Warren. Well, I hope we can get them to the table,
and I am glad to hear that you are in favor of that. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Cramer?
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Generals, both of you, for your service and for
your testimony today.
Since we talked a couple of weeks ago, General Hyten, I
have completed my tour of bases in North Dakota. I went to all
of them. I want you to know that while Minot and Grand Forks
were grateful, the Cavalier was especially grateful that you
asked specifically about them, and it was very encouraging I
will tell you. I am new to this Committee, as you know, and I
have sat through enough briefings that have made me adequately
frightened, but I feel much better having gone to the bases,
including our National Guard ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance] and Global Hawk bases. It is fantastic.
With regard to modernization, General Hyten, I agree with
you, that one of the things that concerns me is not so much a
capability of modernizing, but the speed with which we are able
to do it. When we think about the history of 60 years ago being
able to build in 5 years, not just develop but create, produce
hundreds of ICBMs, I do not even know if we could do that
today. The timeline scares me.
Do you have any specific thoughts on the bureaucracy itself
and how we can improve the bureaucracy and then, as I always
like to say, what we as policymakers can do to help either
knock down the hurdles or send the right signals so that we can
meet the timeline that is facing us?
General Hyten. Senator, thanks for going to Minot, Cav, and
Grand Forks. They are pretty special places. When you see the
people, you should feel very, very good about this country.
They are amazing people.
But when you look at the challenges that we face in the
future, I think Senator Peters asked General O'Shaughnessy what
kept him awake at night, and General O'Shaughnessy answered
Russia. What keeps me awake at night mostly is actually
ourselves because somehow we have lost the ability to go fast.
I do not know where we lost that, but somewhere we lost the
ability to go fast, and we better regain that because right now
we are dominant. I can guarantee you today that STRATCOM can
keep this nation secure, but we have to make sure that is the
case. We have to figure out how to go fast again. I can give
you a lot of recommendations. I will be glad to do it offline,
but I will give you one here.
The one recommendation I have is that we have to, once
again, empower the people that actually build stuff. We have to
empower in the military the 06 program directors. That is
colonels and Navy captains that actually build things. Over the
last 25 years, we have taken all the authorities away from
them, and in many cases, they are not even staying in the
military anymore. They go out to do other things in industry.
But those engineers that want to go build things--that is what
built this amazing force that I get to command today. We have
to go back again and do everything we can to empower the people
down at that level to make the decisions, how to spend the
money, how to deliver the capability, how to test the
capability, all those kind of issues because they will do it
more efficiently than when they have to go through 18 layers of
bureaucracy above them.
Oh, by the way, if they do fail, we will fire them and find
somebody else. That is the other thing that is beneficial about
having the authority in the right place. Now you know who is
responsible. Right now, it is almost impossible to tell who is
even responsible because there are so many layers of
bureaucracy.
Senator Cramer. Can Congress do something about that or is
this----
General Hyten. Congress has started down that path. Your
Committee, as well as the House Armed Services Committee, in
the last 2 years have made significant improvements in moving
things from the Office of the Secretary of Defense back down to
the services. I have now watched the services both on the Air
Force and the Navy side, which are mostly in my command--I do
not watch the Army as close--move things back out again to the
2006's. Continuing that process, continuing to look at that
through this Committee and to push those authorities back
down--I think that is the biggest thing that would help.
Senator Cramer. General O'Shaughnessy, could you comment
on, I guess, the same basic principles within the context of
your command because, again, having been in Grand Forks and
Cavalier and even Fargo, frankly, with the Happy Hooligans and
their ISR work, I find some of the greatest innovators in the
world, and I just want them to be empowered.
General O'Shaughnessy. I absolutely agree with everything
General Hyten said. As you alluded to, I think we have to
change the way that we are thinking about advancing our
capabilities, and we cannot go about it the way that we have in
the past if we are going to keep pace with our adversaries.
Senator Cramer. Maybe in the remaining seconds, General
O'Shaughnessy, I would ask for one clarification with regard to
the debate about the southern border and your role in advising
or in providing consultation to the President. Do you feel like
you and the others, but you specifically, have been adequately
listened to and that the information and intelligence and
insights that you provided to the President and the others
around him have been appropriately taken in and considered
before making this whole-of-government decision?
General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you for asking that, Senator.
Yes, I do I believe for a variety of forums, whether it be
directly with the President or whether it be through the
Secretary of Defense with the Chairman, whether it be actually
going hands-on and actually seeing what is going on there. I
feel very comfortable that the best military advice from
USNORTHCOM has been put forward and has been in the proper
forums.
Senator Cramer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator Duckworth?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time today and your
testimony and your willingness to answer extensive questions.
General Hyten, in your testimony, you discuss the
effectiveness of our legacy nuclear command, control, and
communication systems and the need to pursue updates to meet
evolving needs.
Can you discuss the implications of building a new system
in light of the rapidly changing technologies like AI, quantum
computing, and machine learning? Could you elaborate, to the
extent that you are able to in an open setting? Are we building
an adaptable architecture with the workarounds necessary to
adapt a future tech and modernization?
General Hyten. Senator, over the last 6 months, I have dug
into that very deeply, much deeper than I would ever expect a
combatant commander to have to do that. That is because on the
3rd of October, the Secretary of Defense put me in charge of
the nuclear command and control enterprise. I am responsible
for operations requirements and system engineering of that
enterprise now. I felt the need to go out and look at how we
are doing today, and I understand that pretty well. But then I
have to define now how we are going to do it in the future in
this very challenging cyber threat environment that we are
walking into.
I have some ideas. I have formed those ideas as I have gone
through. Basically the broad-based structure of that idea is to
develop a number of pathways for a message to get through that
is nearly infinite that nobody can ever figure out exactly
where it is or deny the ability for that message to get
through. That is the way to do things in the future, and I
think we will have the means to do that. We would have to talk
about it on a much more classified level to get into the
details.
I have gone out to industry. I have gone out to the
federally funded research and development corporations, and I
have asked them to come in with ideas. Just last week, they
delivered those ideas to me. We are going to now evaluate those
ideas and come up with a broad-based set of mission needs that
we need to explore, and then I will work back with industry to
figure out how to do that. Then the services, the Army and the
Navy in this case, will actually build them.
Senator Duckworth. Have you thought about also going out to
some of our national laboratories? I know they fall under the
DOE, but in Illinois, we have both Fermi Lab and Argonne with
quantum computing capabilities, currently pretty high up on the
spectrum of quantum computing capabilities. But without major
investments, we are going to fall behind in that.
General Hyten. You bet, and I have gone to the national
labs. I went to the national labs, the federally funded
research and development corporations, the university
affiliated research corporations, all those elements looking
for best ideas. I did that individually because I found when I
brought everybody together in a room, the answer ended up
looking like it used to, and when I kept everybody separately
everybody had very, very innovative answers. So now we are
going to have to figure out how to capture this innovation and
move forward effectively. But I had reached out to the DOE
labs, as well as the UARCs [University Affiliated Research
Centers] and FFRDCs [Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers].
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
I also want to delve a little deeper with both of you into
something General O'Shaughnessy mentioned in his written
testimony. General, when discussing the potential cumulative
effects of Chinese and Russian advanced technologies such as
hypersonics and cyber efforts--and you have mentioned them
here--you said ``collectively these advanced technologies could
be capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear
weapons potentially affecting national decision-making and
limiting response options in both peacetime and crisis.''
Now, we are very focused and we have had quite a discussion
today on nuclear strategic deterrence at the moment which, to
be clear, I do not have a problem with that. I, in fact, do
think we need to modernize our nuclear arsenal. But my concern
and question for you both is around our own non-nuclear
strategic deterrence.
Would you increase investments on our end whether in
hypersonics, cyber, conventional prop, global strike weapons,
other new technologies in an effort to reach a level providing
a credible deterrent against Chinese and Russian nuclear
activities as we suggest they may be attempting with us? How do
we balance that with the real need to continue our investments
in the nuclear realm?
General O'Shaughnessy. One, thanks for the opportunity to
respond to that question because I think it is right in line
with the NDS, and as the NDS has articulated, the changing
security environment--one of the things that has really
fundamentally changed is the strategic deterrence as it applies
to the conventional aspect. As we look at that, as General
Hyten mentioned, the cost imposition--in other words, we have
to be able to impose a cost if we are going to be able to
deter. But also especially on the conventional side, you have
to be able to actually deny them their objectives. It is a
combination of both of those together, imposing costs, denying
their objectives, and then be able to credibly communicate that
to them so they understand from a deterrence standpoint that it
absolutely is not even worth going down that path.
In order to do that, though, it is going to take an
investment in just the areas that you mentioned. We have to
have our own hypersonic capability and we also have to have the
ability to defend against those advanced threats.
Senator Duckworth. We are able to reach those capabilities
if we make these investments?
General O'Shaughnessy. If we make those investments is the
key part of your statement. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Duckworth. General Hyten?
General Hyten. I agree with General O'Shaughnessy.
I think one of the most important things you said, though,
is that you recognize that strategic deterrence in the 21st
century is wholly different than it was in the 20th Century. It
is not just about nuclear weapons. It is multi-polar now. It is
not just the Soviet Union. It is Russia, China, North Korea.
You have to worry about all the domains. You have to worry
about nuclear, space, cyber, and conventional. You have to
figure out how to integrate all those together.
At STRATCOM, we formed an academic alliance with 35
different universities to try to get them to start thinking
about what is really needed in order to do this, not just on
the technology side, but a policy and a strategy side as well.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Perdue?
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today.
General Hyten, I love the way you summarize this. Every
time you come before us, you just get right down--you do what
my wife asked us to do when we were raising kids: major on the
majors. Thank you for that. But recap triad, command and
control, Space Command are your top three priorities. I want to
focus on the first one.
You are facing five threats across five domains. I could
not agree more that it is an integrated effort now. It is not
just about the nuclear capability. Given that, though, the most
salient comment I have heard today is we have lost our ability
to go fast. I lived in Asia. I worked in China a good bit in my
career. I can tell you they can beat us to the core on every
single development with our technology, with their technology.
It does not matter.
I want to focus on one part of our nuclear triad. I want to
get to a second question very quickly. The Ohio-class has
served us well for decades, 4 or 5 decades in many cases, but
it is aging. I know we have got the Columbia-class coming.
Secretary of Navy Spencer said recently the Columbia-class
submarine is the most important acquisition program the Navy
has today. Do you agree with that, sir?
General Hyten. I do. I cannot tell you how thankful I am
for Secretary Spencer and CNO [Chief Naval Officer] Richardson
both making that statement and putting that as a priority.
Senator Perdue. We are going to procure, as I understand
the schedule, the first Columbia-class in fiscal year 2021, and
it will take us to fiscal year 2031 before that first delivery
will be taken in the first, I guess, trial will be done on that
boat. Is that right?
General Hyten. Operational capability by then.
Senator Perdue. How long does it take China to do the same
thing?
General Hyten. Actually on the submarine side, it has been
taking about just as long.
Senator Perdue. But that is going to change between that
and 2031.
General Hyten. That will change because you understand that
we are experienced in submarines and China is still fairly new
in developing those capabilities.
Senator Perdue. Can you give us an update on the
development of that Columbia-class effort, and is 2031 still an
appropriate date to expect on that?
General Hyten. I have done a deep dive look into every
element of the triad, again kind of an odd thing for a
combatant commander to do, but it is because I am so concerned
about it I wanted to look in depth into that issue. I have gone
with Admiral Caldwell, the head of Navy nuclear reactors, up to
the shipyard at Electric Boat and done a deep dive.
When I went through that--I have to be honest, Senator--I
was very concerned because there was so little margin in the
overall schedule. Then over the last year, as the Navy has
informed you guys, we have had some issues with welding----
Senator Perdue. The missile silo in particular.
General Hyten. It is the missile tubes, absolutely. Because
of that, a lot of that margin that was not too much before is
even less now. It is still on the positive side, but if you are
10 years away and you are eating margin and not putting margin
in, that causes me concern.
Senator Perdue. Can you take a question away for the record
to help us understand what we could do to shorten that
gestation period?
General Hyten. You bet. I would be glad to come and talk to
you or take it for the record, either one.
Senator Perdue. I would like an update on the Hong 20. This
is the new long-range nuclear bomber which is effectively--we
will go to China now--their first true triad capability, if I
understand that correct.
General Hyten. Absolutely. That discussion is better to
have in a classified setting.
Senator Perdue. I appreciate that and I look forward to
that.
General O'Shaughnessy, I was just at the southern border. I
agree with everything you just said. I know you were just
there. I personally believe that we have got a human tragedy
going on on the border with people coming from all parts of the
world, not just Central America. But the bigger crisis is the
drug traffic that is coming through there.
The first thing I want to get on the record, though, there
have been three places where a wall has been built: California,
Arizona, and Texas. In those areas, the numbers I see is that
human traffic across those borders where that barrier is in
place dropped 95 percent. Do you agree with that?
General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I do. I will just add again
within the last week, I have been twice to El Paso meeting with
the Secretary Chief, meeting with the individual Border Patrol
agents, and they confirm exactly that. When a barrier is in
place, as long as it has cover--in other words, you are
actually having some sensing of it--and you have the ability to
respond to it, it totally changes the flow and they can funnel
it into the areas that they want to. CBP personnel to a person
talked about the effectiveness that is part of their family of
systems.
Senator Perdue. Sir, thank you for your troops' help down
there. I saw some of those troops and the support that they are
giving CBP is really remarkable.
I was in the McAllen sector in Texas. It is the most active
sector we have now. What we are doing is put barriers up. We
pushed the activity to other sectors. I went to what I think is
the most active sector. They were telling me that an individual
coming across--the two cartels in Mexico that are at war
controlling that particular sector are very powerful. They pay
$8,000 per person to the cartel to come through. The people
that were arrested the night I was there--on patrol were the
CBP--had no money in their pocket, not a dime. They each had a
burner phone with one number in it, and it was for a support
person in the United States that was part of the infrastructure
here.
My question for you is, can the U.S. military on the drug
side of this--if it is a $2 billion business with regard to
human traffic, it is more than $30 billion just in that sector
for drugs coming through. There was more fentanyl coming
through that sector last year, enough to kill every man, woman,
and child in America.
My question, sir, is what can the U.S. military do there
that is within the realm of your responsibility as protectors
of our country?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, thank you for the question and
to allow us to highlight some of the efforts that are ongoing
and will continue.
Our JTF-North is actually about 190 individuals that are
focused just exactly 100 percent on this. Some of the things we
are able to provide are--especially important is the intel
aspect, understanding the networks. We understand networks. We
have been doing this for decades overseas. We understand how to
get to the networks and then partner with our law enforcement
agency partners to be able to actually get after those networks
in ways that they may not have worked their way through. It has
been very powerful having our intel folks as part of this.
We also bring unique military capability that we are
applying, whether it is the use of our Fort Huachuca unmanned
aerial systems or whether it is our ground sensor platoons that
deploy in there for training. Those are all additive to the
capability to partner with our law enforcement agencies that
have proven to be quite effective and really from the dollar
perspective of what we spend and what we get out of them, a
very effective use while getting training. Our ground sensor
platoon that deploy there--they are doing exactly what they are
going to be asked to do if they deploy over to the Middle East,
et cetera, and they are doing it in an environment with a
thinking adversary that really allows them to get ready and
increase their readiness in the way that we are currently
applying them.
Senator Perdue. But with all of that activity, CBP and the
military, all of our U.S. activity, with all our technology and
everything else, we are only interdicting about 10 percent of
the drugs coming in. Is that correct, sir?
General O'Shaughnessy. That is roughly correct, and it
obviously depends exactly what you are talking about. Broadly
that is a correct number, sir.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator Jones?
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here today and for your service and for
all of those behind you for their service.
I apologize for not being here as much, but we have several
hearings going on today.
General Hyten, I know there has been a lot of questions and
answers about the INF Treaty and the pullout of the INF Treaty.
I will not kind of rehash all of that.
What I would ask, though, have we done everything that you
would advise in order to bring Russia to the table on the INF
Treaty?
General Hyten. I think that is a very difficult question
for me to ask because I do not have the whole picture. I do not
know everything the State Department has done. I understand my
discussions with the President. I understand that the State
Department has worked that issue. As far as I know, we have
done everything humanly possible to try to bring Russia back
into that. Every time I talk to the President about it, I want
Russia in that treaty, but if they will not comply, then you do
not really have a treaty.
From my perspective, I think we have done everything
humanly possible, but I would say that there is still time that
Russia could come to the table and still participate in that
treaty. I would hope that that would happen, but I do not think
that is very likely right now.
Senator Jones. Do you have any specifics that you would
recommend that have not been tried already?
General Hyten. I was thinking about that as you went
through the question, Senator, and I think you just have to ask
again and again. I think we have shown the intelligence to our
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies. You have seen
the NATO allies come out and understand that that system is in
violation of the treaty. I think all our NATO allies agree with
that. For whatever reason, Russia does not want to play in that
situation, and if they do not want to come to the table, they
are not going to come to the table.
Senator Jones. Thank you for that.
General O'Shaughnessy, obviously there has also been a lot
of questions and answers about the border and the national
emergency. I think you testified earlier that whenever there is
something coming from the President--I think your testimony was
when you get a legal order from the President, you act. My
question is, with regard to the national emergency declaration,
did you or anyone on the staff that you know of evaluate the
legality of the order regarding the national emergency on the
southern border?
General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, that is beyond the purview of
NORTHCOM I would say.
Just for clarity, though, since the actual declaration of a
national emergency, there has been no specific tasking that has
come down to NORTHCOM post that declaration. What we have is we
are actually executing those orders and direction that we were
given prior to that declaration that those troops are now
showing up on the border, but that order was given and the
request for assistance was given from the Department of
Homeland Security to the Department of Defense prior to that
declaration.
Senator Jones. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think that is all I have. Thank you very
much.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
Well, first of all, thank you very much, both of you, for
the very concise way in which you answered some pretty
difficult questions, and I appreciate that very much.
Was there anything else that you would like to bring up
that you did not have the opportunity to do for clarification?
Either one of you.
General Hyten. Senator, you mentioned a few things at the
beginning that you wanted to make sure we address today. I went
down the list just a minute ago. We have talked about
everything on your list except the space force, and I would
just like to make a few comments on that.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I do appreciate that. In fact, both
of you may want to do that because my question was there is
confusion out there when we are talking the space force, where
that fits in all of this. The two of you would be the logical
ones to ask. Thank you very much.
General Hyten. Senator, the space force is structured to be
the organize, train, and equip element for our space
capabilities. Right now, the space capabilities are broadly in
the Air Force, but they are also across the Army, the Navy, and
other defense agencies as well. When we look at the problem,
there are really two issues.
After Goldwater-Nichols, the military services are now
responsible for organizing, training, equipping forces but not
fighting. The fighting is done in the combatant commands.
General O'Shaughnessy and I represent the combatant commands.
We are responsible for fighting. That is why, in response to
the questions earlier, the need to stand up a U.S. Space
Command focused on the warfighting problem in space is what
that command is doing, which leads to the question, are we
properly organized to do the organize, train, and equip mission
for the space mission? The President has said because of the
importance of that warfighting domain, we are not. We should
consolidate all of those capabilities from across the
Department into a single space force.
I give the President and the Vice President big credit for
not creating a department of the space force at this time, but
putting that capability in the Air Force because I was very
concerned about creating excess bureaucracy. So was the
President. So was the Vice President. By creating a department
of the space force, it is just not sized right now in order to
do that. It will be some day, but it has just not reached that
point right now.
But the legislative proposal should come to you shortly.
There will be some issues we will have to work out with you,
and we will work those together. But I just want you to know
that I support the concept of the space force inside the Air
Force that the President is now pushing.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, you are right. I had brought that up
both in my opening statement, as well as initial questions. My
concern was that we wanted two things answered before you
actually get into a new bureaucracy. One is what the costs are
going to be. One would it be more efficient. I think you have
answered both of those. I appreciate that very much.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I apologize for my tardiness. It has been a fun-filled
morning of committee hearings all across the Senate.
General Hyten, each leg of our nuclear triad has its own
value. Is it fair to say that our ballistic missiles have
strength in numbers?
General Hyten. That is one of the big values of our
ballistic missiles. Four hundred ballistic missiles create a
huge targeting problem for the adversary. The only way to get
after 400 hardened nuclear missiles is with a whole bunch of
incoming weapons, and if you decide to attack those, then you
pretty much are guaranteeing that we will attack back. That is
deterrent in a nutshell, and that creates a huge element of our
deterrent process.
Senator Cotton. Sometimes referred to as a missile sink for
the enemy?
General Hyten. It would be a missile sink. It would be a
weapons sink. It would be a very, very difficult target to
impact.
Senator Cotton. I have heard proposals from some in
Congress and Washington suggesting that we ought to eliminate
our Minuteman 3 fleet and cancel the replacement for that
fleet. If we were to take that step to unilaterally cut over
400 ballistic missiles and command centers, would it not be
like giving the Russians and the Chinese 400 free warheads to
target something else in the United States or around the world?
General Hyten. I do not understand how, with the threats
that we face today, which are growing, not shrinking, we would
make a decision today as a nation to lessen our overall
strategic deterrent. That makes no sense to me, and my best
military advice is that we do not do that.
Senator Cotton. One common argument I hear in defense of
that position is why do we spend so much money on weapons we
never use. It is not that much money. It is only 3 to 6 percent
of the defense budget, depending on where we are in the cycle.
Would you not say, though, that we have been using our nuclear
weapons every single day for 74 years?
General Hyten. We use them every day. Senator, the people
that say that--I actually find that a little bit insulting
because the men and women who go to work every day underneath
the water, underneath the ground, in the air that provide that
strategic deterrent--they are doing the mission every day. It
is the most active mission. Strategic deterrence is not a
passive mission. Deterrence does not exist just because you
have 1,550 deployable nuclear weapons under the New START
treaty. You have to do that mission every day, and that is what
the men and women of my command do. They are proud to do it. It
is an active mission, one of the most active missions that we
have. When you send a nuclear submarine out with 160 sailors on
board, do you think they are thinking to themselves this is a
passive functional mission? No. They are an active warfighting
mission.
Senator Cotton. The whole point of our nuclear deterrence,
of the way we use that force is not to launch and detonate
those missiles, but to stop our adversaries from launching and
detonating theirs to begin with.
General Hyten. Secretary Mattis asked me what is the use of
nuclear weapons. Why do we have nuclear weapons? The answer is
to prevent others from using nuclear weapons on us. But in
order to do that, you have to be ready. It is the Washington
analogy. The best way to avoid war is to be prepared for war.
If you are not prepared, you run the risk of an attack.
Senator Cotton. If Russia or China or perhaps Russia and
China combined had clear, demonstrable nuclear overmatch
against the United States, there is no doubt who would win if
there were, in fact, a nuclear exchange. What impact would that
have on the conventional forces and the strategic thinking of
those nations as against the United States and our allies?
General Hyten. You know, in my opening statement for the
record, I said that nuclear war cannot be won. Therefore, it
must never be fought. Therefore, we must be ready to fight it
every day. That is the way I look at it. That is a complicated
thing for some people to understand, but if you are not ready,
somebody could take a step over the line. If there is an
overmatch, somebody could think they could get away with it,
and that could create the worst day in the history of the
world, the worst day in the history of our country. We never
want that to happen. In order to do that, I believe in peace
through strength, not peace through unilateral disarmament.
Senator Cotton. If you were sitting in your position or in
the head of state position in a country like Japan or South
Korea that depends on the extended deterrence of the United
States and the United States weakened its nuclear triad or even
eliminated one of their legs, what kind of influence would that
have on your thinking?
General Hyten. What I would be concerned about from a U.S.
perspective is that would cause some of our allies to decide
they need their own nuclear deterrent. One of the goals we have
as a country is to eliminate the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, not just in our adversaries, but around the world. A
world with fewer nuclear weapons is a better world. But we have
to be able to defend ourselves. We want our allies to
understand that we can defend them too. That is what extended
deterrence is all about, and that means you have to be ready to
support their contingencies as well.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
I understand that some opponents of our nuclear force or
critics of it say that we should not start a new arms race or
be engaged in an arms race. I will simply observe, based on
what you have said here today, that it is much cheaper to win
an arms race than it is to lose a war.
General Hyten. Yes, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
I thank both of you. I will repeat what I said earlier.
This has been a really enlightening session, and you have been
the right ones to be here. Thank you very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
value of thaad [terminal high altitude area defense] for addressing
threats from china and russia
1. Senator Inhofe. General O'Shaughnessy, the National Defense
Strategy [NDS] states, ``the central challenge to United States
prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic
competition by . . . revisionist powers,'' namely China and Russia. Can
you please tell the Committee what you perceive as the most pressing
threat and how NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] and
NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] have adjusted their focus to
counter China and Russia?
General O'Shaughnessy. In the near term, Russia's development of a
preemptive ``active defense'' strategy is the most pressing threat to
the Homeland. This strategy relies on indirect action, cyber, and
advanced, precision-guided conventional air- and sea-launched cruise
missile strikes--each of which is currently capable of reaching targets
in the United States and Canada. Russia's efforts pose significant
detection, warning, intercept, and infrastructure defense challenges to
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
Both Russia and China are actively developing and testing
intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicles. Russian statements
indicate the country's new AVANGARD HGV could begin deployment as early
as this year. If either country successfully fields an ICBM with an HGV
payload, it will pose unique challenges both to NORAD's Integrated
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission as well as
USNORTHCOM's ballistic missile defense mission.
While China does not yet have a conventional capability to strike
Alaska or the continental United States comparable to Russia's, China's
leaders are determined to demonstrate capabilities that could dissuade
or prevent the United States from intervening in any conflict along
China's periphery. Currently, China could employ its world-class cyber
forces to attack our critical infrastructure during a crisis. In the
longer-term, China is likely to develop long-range conventional cruise
missiles and associated platforms that will threaten the Homeland.
In response, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have honed the focus of both
commands to ensure Homeland defense is our absolute priority. Our
mission to deter our adversaries and defend the Homeland in the current
strategic environment requires the commands to maintain a strong
warfighter mindset. Specifically, we are taking active measures to
improve our missile defenses, expand our ability to operate in the
Arctic, improve domain awareness and communications in the far north,
and build a more comprehensive and globally integrated defense
architecture with fellow combatant commands, allies, and interagency
partners.
To ensure our ability to defend the Homeland against threats in all
domains, we continuously advocate for NORAD and USNORTHCOM requirements
to the Services and Missile Defense Agency and push the Services, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff to reduce or
eliminate capability gaps.
2. Senator Inhofe. General O'Shaughnessy, would an additional THAAD
benefit the Homeland defense mission?
General O'Shaughnessy. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) program has not been tested against an intercontinental
ballistic missile threat, but could potentially add to our capacity and
capability to defend the Homeland in the future. THAAD provides a
significant capability, and we are working with the Missile Defense
Agency to explore THAAD's utility for our Homeland defense mission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
no first use
3. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you believe a ``no first
use'' policy improves our ability to deter conflict and would it be
your best military advice to adopt such a policy? If you believe it is
important to maintain the current policy, please explain why.
General Hyten. No, a no first use policy works against the basic
tenets of deterrence, increases the risk of nuclear war by changing how
adversaries and allies view the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent and our resolve to use it when threatened.
Adopting a no first use policy could undermine the U.S. nuclear
umbrella we extend to our allies and signals to potential adversaries
the U.S. may not defend our allies and vital interests with every means
at our disposal. The current policy provides great strategic value by
retaining ambiguity regarding the precise circumstance that might lead
to a U.S. nuclear response. The lack of precision on exactly where the
nuclear threshold is gives adversaries pause and strengthens our
overall deterrent.
low yield ballistic missile warhead
4. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what is your assessment of the
consequences if the Navy is unable to deploy the low-yield submarine-
launched ballistic missile recommended by the NPR [Nuclear Posture
Review]?
General Hyten. There is no technical or operational barrier to
deploying a low yield ballistic missile in our SSBN force. Therefore,
any impediment imposed on the Navy to deploy a low yield warhead would
lessen our ability to most effectively address the strategic threats
identified in the NPR.
nuclear modernization
5. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what is your assessment of the
consequences if the Air Force is denied full funding for the
replacement of the Minuteman III?
General Hyten. Any funding reductions to the GBSD program will
result in a schedule slip. GBSD is a just-in-time replacement for the
Minuteman III, and it must begin deploying in 2028 to avoid a nuclear
deterrence operational capability gap.
6. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you believe the air-leg of
the triad would continue to be viable without an air-launched cruise
missile capability?
General Hyten. No. The continued viability of the air-leg is
dependent upon both a long range air-launched cruise missile and a
penetrating bomber capability to cover operational requirements.
nc3
7. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what will your relationship be
with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, as relates to
NC3 [Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications] programs, under the
new governance structure for NC3 approved in October, 2018?
General Hyten. USD(A&S) serves as the NC3 Capability Portfolio
Manager with increased responsibilities for resources and acquisition.
In this capacity USD(A&S) functions in a supporting role to the NC3
Enterprise Lead (USSTRATCOM) by executing the day-to-day oversight of
the NC3 Portfolio and advising on risk, mitigation options, and
prioritization.
8. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you currently have the
funding and personnel necessary to effectively execute your
responsibilities as the NC3 Enterprise Lead?
General Hyten. The President's Budget request contains the
resources necessary to carry out my responsibilities.
defense of the homeland
9. Senator Fischer. General O'Shaughnessy, the Missile Defense
Review [MDR] states that the United States will continue to rely on
nuclear deterrence to protect the Homeland from large-scale or
sophisticated ballistic missile attack. If the United States did not
replace the aging Minuteman III force with a new ICBM [Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile], do you believe the U.S. Homeland would be as safe
as it is today?
General O'Shaughnessy. No, it would not be as safe as it is today.
I absolutely support the nuclear triad as critical to Homeland defense
and I support the findings in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. I defer
to United States Strategic Command Commander, General Hyten, for
specifics on nuclear deterrence capabilities.
substitution for nuclear capabilities
10. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, those who favor reducing the
size of our nuclear forces often argue that non-nuclear capabilities
can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our ability
to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries, and assure allies.
A report released last September by the Global Zero group repeatedly
argues that ``cyberweapons''--in particular--can be substituted for
nuclear weapons. Do you think cyber capabilities, their effects, and
their ability to deter hostile activity is comparable to nuclear
capabilities to a sufficient degree that one can be directly
substituted for the other?
General Hyten. No other weapon system contains the capabilities or
deterrence effect of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons are the
foundation of strategic deterrence due to these unique characteristics.
It is important to note that other countries are not only modernizing
their existing stockpiles, but also increasing the numbers and
diversity of nuclear weapons.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
third gbi [ground-based interceptors] site and shoot-assess-shoot
capability
11. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what
specific additional capability would a third GBI site provide against a
future ICBM threat?
General Hyten. A new continental United States Ground-Based
Interceptor (GBI) site provides an option for added Homeland defense
against potential future Iranian ICBM capability. In addition, a third
interceptor site would increase our capacity to negate larger raids,
expand engagement windows, and improve survivability of Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) assets through dispersal. However, to be
clear, my first priority is to develop a space-based sensor
architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced
missile threats.
General O'Shaughnessy. A third ground-based interceptor site based
in the continental United States, combined with future technologies,
would increase available interceptor launch window ``battlespace'' for
engagements. It could also provide the opportunity to utilize a shoot-
assess-shoot strategy for future intercontinental ballistic missile
threats from both North Korea and Iran, which could provide us time to
evaluate an engagement and reengage if a threat reentry vehicle
survived our initial salvo.
12. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, does
the United States currently have a shoot-assess-shoot capability if an
ICBM were to be launched from the Middle East toward our east coast?
General Hyten. USSTRATCOM supports USNORTHCOM in the execution of
the Homeland defense mission, but day-to-day operational decisions are
within the purview of USNORTHCOM. As such I would defer to General
O'Shaughnessy for operational details.
General O'Shaughnessy. Currently we do not possess this capability.
13. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, would
a third GBI site in New York, Michigan, or Ohio provide that shoot-
assess-shoot capability?
General Hyten. I defer to General O'Shaughnessy for discussion of
operational issues.
General O'Shaughnessy. A third ground-based interceptor site in New
York, Michigan, or Ohio, combined with future technologies, could
provide a shoot-assess-shoot capability.
14. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, how long would it take
to stand-up a third GBI site?
General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for
specifics on timeline estimates to stand up an additional ground-based
interceptor site.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
norad missions limfacs [limiting factors]
15. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, are our aerospace
warning and missile defense radars along the Alaskan and Canadian
coastlines sufficient for the current threats associated with great
power competition against Russia and if so, in your personal opinion,
if not already, when will these radars become severely limited and what
are their primary limiting factors?
General O'Shaughnessy. These radars represent 1985 technology and
are no longer sufficient due to capability limitations. We need to
modernize the systems that provide surveillance of our northern
approaches in order to defend North America against Russian long-range
bombers, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicle
threats. In August 2018, NORAD conducted an operational assessment of
the North Warning System, and the data collected in that test will
inform the design for the air domain defense of the United States and
Canada. In addition, the United States and Canada are evaluating
alternative options to replace the North Warning System. This new
system will be designed to enhance the capability to maintain effective
air surveillance of threats approaching North America.
16. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, given the rapidly
evolved Russian threat, how critical is it that we upgrade NORAD
terrestrial radars to address long-range missile threats and hypersonic
threats?
General O'Shaughnessy. One of our most urgent requirements is to
upgrade these radars against advanced cruise missile and hypersonic
threats. Simply put, we cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we
cannot defeat what we cannot detect. Our ability to detect threats and
defend North America is challenged by rapidly advancing adversary
capabilities that present significant challenges to our current sensor
architecture. To expand our early detection and identification
capabilities against these threats, the best solution should include a
combination of multi-domain sensors, including terrestrial radars and
space-based assets. We also continue to support ongoing efforts within
the Department of Defense, such as the bi-national Northern Approaches
Surveillance Analysis of Alternatives, to evaluate potential
solutions for modernizing sensor coverage in the northernmost regions
of North America.
17. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, given the increased
capability of Russian long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles--both
nuclear and conventional--how have Russian Tactics Techniques and
Procedures (TTPs) evolved along with their technology? What risks does
this pose for our forces in Alaska and in CONUS [Continental United
States]?
General O'Shaughnessy. The Arctic provides the shortest path
between Russia and the United States. Russia is developing and
practicing the tactics needed to employ the variety of conventionally
armed precision strike weapons they are currently deploying. These
include a long-range ground-launched cruise missile and a very long-
range, stand-off air-launched cruise missile.
Russian heavy bombers frequently conduct air patrols along the
coastlines the United States and Canada, particularly in the Arctic, to
underscore Russia's capabilities. According to their own words, these
patrols are to demonstrate to the United States the continued viability
of Russia's nuclear and more recently, their non-nuclear deterrent.
Since 2015, Russia has employed its new generation of very long-
range, stand-off air-launched cruise missiles against anti-regime
targets in Syria, providing real-world training for Russian crews and
demonstrating its growing precision-strike capabilities to the West.
Moscow continues to bolster its military defenses in the Arctic
with the delivery of coastal defense cruise missiles, modern air
defense sensors and weapons and by constructing airfields on Russian
Islands deep in the Arctic. These weapons are intended to ensure
Russian control of Arctic waters and air space from their northern
coast to the Pole and thereby eliminate threats to egressing Russian
bombers. Once safely away from Russian air space, these bombers are
capable of launching their weapons and striking the Homeland well
outside detection range of current NORAD sensors. We must advance our
capability to detect these threats in order to defend the Homeland; if
we do not, our forces in Alaska and the continental United States will
be held at risk.
18. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, can you clarify what
exactly you mean when you state in your testimony: `` . . . air- and
sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff
ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike
North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage'' and,
specifically, how is this a risk to the U.S. Military in Alaska and in
CONUS?
General O'Shaughnessy. [Deleted.]
space-based sensors
19. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, how
critical is the rapid deployment of space-based sensors to addressing
the long-range cruise and hypersonic missile threats from Russia and
China?
General Hyten. It is essential. We need to move sensors to a space-
based architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced
missile threats, to include hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and cruise
missiles.
In addition, space-based sensors enjoy a measure of flexibility of
movement unimpeded by the constraints geographic limitations impose on
terrestrial sensors and can provide birth-to-death tracking that is
extremely advantageous. Space sensors are also more survivable than
individual, fixed ground sites that can be targeted.
General O'Shaughnessy. Advanced space-based sensors are a critical
step toward providing a more comprehensive capability to detect and
track evolving complex threats, such as long-range cruise and
hypersonic missile threats. Improving our network of missile defense
and early warning terrestrial sensors, coupled with a space-based
sensor layer, would allow us to keep pace with these advancing threats.
20. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, in the
best case scenario, what is a realistic timeline for MDA [Misssile
Defense Agency] to begin deploying space-based sensors?
General Hyten. My best understanding is we could have a capability
by the mid-2020s, but funding is not yet defined or appropriated.
However, the Space Development Agency (SDA) is charged with leading
development of space-based sensors and I defer details on this question
to them.
General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for
specifics on timeline estimates for deploying space-based sensors;
however, it is of the highest urgency to me that we gain space-based
sensing capability as soon as possible to give us the ability to track
advanced complex threats from `birth to defeat.'
21. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what
would be your preferred timeline and would this pose an acceptable
level of risk given the threat?
General Hyten. Deployment of a complete space-based sensor
architecture is already late-to-need. We are increasingly disadvantaged
to find, fix, and track missile threats that risk outpacing our sensor
capabilities, diminishing our missile warning and sub-optimizing the
effectiveness of our missile defense assets.
General O'Shaughnessy. We need space-based sensors to provide a
more comprehensive capability as soon as possible. Until that happens,
we must also balance the move to space with more technologically mature
solutions, such as improving our terrestrial-based radars.
22. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, in
your personal opinion, what type of space-based sensor system would you
prefer 1. A smaller number of more capable and more expensive set of
satellites in GEO; 2. A larger number of slightly less capable but less
expensive satellites in LEO and MEO; 3. A combination of the two?
General Hyten. As a combatant commander, I am orbit agnostic, but I
see potential advantages in a mixed constellation.
General O'Shaughnessy. I place high priority on fielding space-
based sensing capabilities. A combination of space-based platforms in
multiple orbits would provide the most robust tracking capability.
23. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, which
of these space-based sensor solutions do you think we might be able to
build and deploy sooner and how much of a priority factor should there
be in acquiring them?
General Hyten. I don't have enough information today to answer this
question or related questions; which architecture meets my
requirements, maximizes resiliency, does so at an affordable cost, and
at the speed of relevance. Ongoing analysis is working towards
answering these questions.
General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for
specifics on timeline estimates. But to reinforce my thoughts on this
issue, I support development of space-based sensors as soon as possible
to provide a more comprehensive future capability. In the meantime, I
prioritize addressing urgent operational risks with more mature
technologies for ground-based capabilities that can be deployed in the
near term.
missile defense priorities and the mdr
24. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaugnessy, in your
personal opinion, did the Missile Defense Review miss any key
priorities and if so, what are they?
General Hyten. No. USSTRATCOM fully participated in the Missile
Defense Review, and I am pleased with the results.
General O'Shaughnessy. The Missile Defense Review reflects my
warfighter views and priorities across the spectrum of threats. I
especially appreciate the much-needed addition of cruise missile
defense (CMD) into the discussion, although I would have liked to see
more emphasis on CMD due to significant advancements in cruise missile
technology by Russia and China.
25. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaugnessy, can you
discuss the importance of continuing to invest so that we field the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle?
General Hyten. I fully support MDA's efforts to develop the
Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). The RKV is a key component to improving
the effectiveness of the Ground Based Interceptor.
General O'Shaughnessy. The Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) is our
next-generation kill vehicle. It will increase capacity by adding to
our overall interceptor count and also bring added capabilities that
will significantly improve engagement performance and lethality. The
RKV will eventually phase out the older, less capable, Exo-atmospheric
Kill Vehicles, increasing overall reliability of the entire interceptor
fleet. Fielding an additional 20 GBIs in Alaska with RKVs is critical
to keeping pace with the threat.
26. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, can
you discuss the importance of new technologies like Multi-Object Kill
Vehicle (MOKV), directed energy, new boosters, and space-based sensors?
General Hyten. My first priority is to develop sensors in a space-
based architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced
missile threats.
Providing a cost-effective missile defense with sufficient magazine
depth also requires pursuit of next-generation capabilities such as
directed energy, MOKV, boost phase intercept, and non-kinetic
capabilities.
General O'Shaughnessy. Future technologies are critical to
outpacing the ever advancing threat. These technologies, while not yet
mature, will potentially allow for updated tactics, techniques, and
procedures for how we employ interceptors, resulting in greater
capacity to defend the Homeland against advanced threats.
27. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, why
are terrestrial radars like the Long-Range Discriminating Radar (LRDR),
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, important as a
compliment to future space-based sensors?
General Hyten. Terrestrial sensors remain the best viable near-term
solution. Terrestrial sensors have higher power levels and multiple
sophisticated waveforms can exploit different phenomenology enabling
persistent, long-range mid-course tracking, discrimination, and hit
assessment capability against current threats. Terrestrial sensors will
complement future space-based sensors designed to globally detect,
track, and discriminate ballistic missile threats and HGVs.
General O'Shaughnessy. These terrestrial radars are an important
complement to a future space-based sensor layer because they will
provide resiliency and redundancy for in-depth sensor coverage and
persistent discrimination capability against evolving missile threats.
Terrestrial radars, coupled with a space-based sensor layer, will
provide track and discrimination data from multiple phenomenologies to
the Ballistic Missile Defense System, enhancing our ability to defend
the Homeland.
28. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, are
United States missile defense testing timelines progressing fast enough
to stay ahead of the threats from Russia, China and rogue nations?
General Hyten. As stated in the Missile Defense Review, the United
States relies on strategic deterrence to protect against large and
technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental
ballistic missile threats to the United States Homeland.
Although I would like to go faster for many reasons, I am satisfied
the speed of testing is sufficient to pace the threat from rogue
nations such as North Korea and Iran.
General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense
systems were designed and deployed against North Korea and potential
Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic
missile threats. I support the Missile Defense Agency's efforts to
maintain a regular ground-based interceptor flight test cadence. Flight
testing that is conducted at a regular cadence and combined with ground
testing gives me confidence in the system and how we employ it.
polar silk road
29. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, in your personal opinion
given what China has done in the South China Sea, their Belt and Road
Initiative, and their pressing need for resources, how would you
characterize China's interest in the Arctic region?
General O'Shaughnessy. I would characterize China's interest in the
Arctic region as focused and committed. Chinese leaders believe the
Arctic has great reserves of oil, natural gas, and precious metals and
has extended part of their One Belt One Road initiative to Murmansk in
northwestern Russia. China recently declared itself a ``near-Arctic
nation'' which, while having no legal status, clearly indicates its
intent to have Chinese national interests considered in discussions
concerning the future of the Arctic. Last summer, China's icebreaking
research vessel, Xue Long ("Snow Dragon") completed its ninth
expedition to the Arctic, operating in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and
the Canada Basin. Xue Long's expeditions are indicative of China's
increasing interest in the Arctic, and they have enabled China to gain
familiarity and experience operating in the Arctic environment. China
is also building its first open ocean-class icebreaker, which will
enable it to operate surface ships in the Arctic.
30. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, in your personal
opinion, what is China's long-term strategic objective in the Arctic
and does that objective line up with United States/Western objectives?
General O'Shaughnessy. China understands the vast economic value of
the Arctic due to the potential for exploitation of natural resources
and the shorter shipping distances to world markets. China's activities
and objectives in the Arctic conflict with many United States
objectives. For example, China's hydrographic research vessel, Xue
Long, has made nine research expeditions to the Arctic in recent years,
and several of these expeditions have focused primarily on mapping the
ocean's bottom in and around the Bering Sea. The hydrographic surveys
performed by Xue Long are more consistent with preparation for
submarine operations in the high north than scientific monitoring and
environmental research. To be clear, a Chinese military presence in the
Bering Sea would be inconsistent with United States security needs.
On the economic front, China has also extended its One Belt and One
Road initiative into the Arctic, including investments in the Russian
city of Murmansk as part of an ongoing effort to claim that China is
now an interested power in the Arctic. China has also sent merchant
ships from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean through the Arctic
during the summer melt. China has made significant investment in
Greenland's mining industry, and in 2016, China attempted to purchase a
defunct Danish Naval Base at on the southwest tip of Greenland.
Although the government of Denmark blocked the acquisition, China
maintains significant influence as one of the top investors in
Greenland.
Based on recent Chinese behavior and coercive economic practices
employed in other regions, I am concerned that China will continue to
leverage influence and debt trap economic practices in an effort to
gain a strategic presence in the Arctic as competition over resources
increases in the coming years--an effort that risks destablizing a
region long known for cooperation and adherence to international
agreements.
31. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, what is China
specifically doing--in terms of building capability and using monetary
soft power--to assert itself in the Arctic and does this concern you?
General O'Shaughnessy. China has already conducted nine Arctic
expeditions with its research vessel Xue Long and is starting to build
its first open ocean-capable ice breaker. The Chinese are gaining
experience with operating in the Arctic environment, and the
construction of their new ice breaker certainly suggests they intend to
operate there. China is also investing in various projects in most of
the Arctic Council nations in an attempt to build goodwill and thus
influence countries with the most impact over the future of the Arctic.
While China is currently limiting its actions to peaceable economic
competition, I am still concerned from a Homeland defense perspective.
My job is to assume military intent, and therefore United States
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command continue
to remain extremely vigilant for any indications that China is engaging
in military activities in the Arctic.
great power rivalry with russia and china
32. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, Russia poses a
continually increasing threat to the United States from its operations
in the Arctic, and China has expressed, in actions and writing, its
interest in being a ``near-Arctic'' power. What specific capabilities
are most critical for us to field in order to counter both of these
threats from our near-peer competitors in terms of protecting the
Homeland and are there any areas of overlap on which we should
especially focus?
General O'Shaughnessy. To outpace adversaries in the Arctic today
and in the future, we need improved multi-spectrum sensor and domain
awareness capabilities, the ability to effectively communicate in the
northern latitudes, and a visible maritime presence capable of
detecting and defeating multi-domain threats operating in and through
the Arctic. Our ability to defend the Homeland against Russia or China
will require our land, sea, and air components to operate routinely and
effectively in the Arctic. It is essential that they are trained and
equipped to do so.
u.s. arctic naval capability
33. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, do you agree with
Secretary Spencer that we need to execute a Freedom of Navigation
Operation in the Arctic, or at least have the ability to?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. It is long-standing policy of the
United States to challenge the excessive maritime claims of other
nations.
arctic sar [search and rescue]
34. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, does 11th Air Force have
the Search and Rescue forces it requires to meet all of its missions
today, including its NORAD alert responsibilities, the daily F-22
training missions, and rescue triad's tactical training requirements?
General O'Shaughnessy. No. As we expand our Arctic operations to
meet our adversaries' increased Arctic capabilities and presence, the
current search and rescue capabilities will no longer be able to match
our enlarged Arctic footprint.
35. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, what about once two
combat-code squadrons of F-35s arrive beginning in 2020?
General O'Shaughnessy. As the F-35 arrives in Alaska, the increased
footprint will drive a requirement for additional search and rescue
(SAR) capability to support both increased training and exercises.
Additionally, as we start to push fighter aircraft further out in
support of longer-range NORAD intercepts, we will require the ability
to provide a rapid SAR response over a greater area than our current
SAR forces can provide.
strategic arctic port
36. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, Secretary of the Navy
Richard Spencer has talked about the importance of strategic ports.
Right now, the closest strategic port to the Arctic is in Anchorage.
That's the equivalent of the closest port to Maine being in Florida. In
your personal opinion, is it in U.S. strategic interest for the
Arctic's closest strategic port to be essentially the length of the
Eastern seaboard away from the Arctic and what is USNORTHCOM doing to
rectify this gap?
General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
has an articulated requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska.
A deep draft port in the Arctic would contribute to our maritime
Homeland defense mission by providing all-weather, always-available
fuel for naval vessels operating in the North American Arctic. I am
aware that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently
studying the feasibility of improving the Port of Nome and will publish
their draft report in May 2019.
As you know, the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 expanded
the feasibility justification for a potential Arctic deep draft harbor
to include benefits associated with national security and the
protection of the Homeland. In April 2019, I wrote to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to outline USNORTHCOM's
operational requirements in the Arctic and the benefits to our Homeland
defense mission that would result from the development of a deep-draft
port north of Dutch Harbor. In addition, USNORTHCOM staff has been
working closely with USACE to provide detailed information regarding
our mission requirements in the region.
f-35
37. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, last May, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, testified that `` . . . the
F-35 and the Guard will contribute to Homeland security by flying what
we call combat air patrols over the United States to preclude a threat
in any kind of circumstance. So it is very important.'' What do you
believe to be the best fighter to protect and defend the Homeland and,
specifically, what role do you believe the F-35 should have in the
protection of the Homeland?
General O'Shaughnessy. I consider the F-35 critical to defend the
Homeland against the most-advanced and emerging threats to North
America. The F-35 offers unmatched fifth-generation advantages against
the latest weapons fielded by our adversaries and includes improved
detection capabilities and increased levels of situation awareness
enabled by advanced data fusion. The F-35 will provide us with our most
crucial capabilities and form the cornerstone of our ability to defend
the Homeland well into the 21st century.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
columbia-class
38. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, as presented in hearing
testimony, issues with the welding of missile tubes during the
development of the Columbia-class program have led to very little
margin for error remaining for on-time delivery. It is concerning to
have margin for error originally built into this critical program
reduced to such a small level at the front-end of a 10 year project.
What actions can be taken, including by Congress, to ensure the
Columbia-class program remains on schedule for delivery in 2028, and is
operational by 2031?
General Hyten. The Navy is actively pursuing means, to include
advanced procurement, to increase schedule margin and ensure Columbia
is ready for its first strategic deterrent patrol in fiscal year 2031.
I defer to the Navy for any specifics on these measures.
Continued Congressional support of the Columbia program is also
essential, to include full funding and on-time appropriations.
39. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, as discussed in the February 26,
2019, Senate Armed Services Strategic Command hearing, the Chinese are
speeding up their delivery time of submarine technology. Is there a way
to speed up the delivery of the Columbia-class program and is it
necessary?
General Hyten. I defer to the Navy for specific Columbia-class
program questions.
40. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, developing and maintaining a
skilled workforce is essential to submarine production. Would the
potential addition of a new Virginia-class submarine in 2022 and/or
2023 help develop the workforce needed for Columbia-class production or
in some other way affect production?
General Hyten. The shipyards are critical national assets to
America. The skilled workforce is essential to building and overhauling
all ships, particularly nuclear-powered ones like SSBNs, SSNs, and
CVNs. It is all of our responsibility to ensure the workforce, a
strategic asset, is supported across the board.
Regarding the addition of the new Virginia-class submarine in 2022
or 2023 and any effects on the workforce for Columbia, I respectfully
refer you to the Navy for any program acquisition questions.
41. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, because of shared submarine
construction infrastructure, do other acquisition programs (Virginia-
class) affect the Columbia's on time delivery and if so, how?
General Hyten. The Navy has stated that the Columbia-class SSBN
program is their number one shipbuilding priority. I respectfully refer
you to the Navy for any program acquisition questions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
space
42. Senator Blackburn. General Hyten, do you believe U.S. space
assets are most vulnerable to adversary jamming, kinetic attacks,
cyberattacks, or directed energy attacks?
General Hyten. Focusing on one or two avenues of attack is not
prudent. The effectiveness of any attack vector is situation dependent
and it is likely that multiple attack vectors will be employed.
The Administration and DOD are moving rapidly to address the
significant adversary counter-space threat to our critical space assets
through institutional changes (i.e., the standup of USSPACECOM, USSF)
and significant PB space investment.
43. Senator Blackburn. General Hyten, I have concerns regarding the
supply chain integrity supporting space systems. Do you see a path to
resolution among the space defense industry and industrial base?
General Hyten. Yes, but resolution will require a diligent focus on
security and risk-mitigation actions like those recommended in the EO
13806 Report, ``Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and
Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United
States,'' and in other best-practices designed to guarantee supply
chain integrity.
This integrity is vital to establishment and preservation of a
resilient space enterprise industrial base and will enable the
increased capability development/fielding timelines necessary to
outpace our adversaries.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
inf [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty
44. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, as you know, President Trump
recently withdrew from the INF Treaty that Russia has been violating. I
worry that the Trump administration is leaving this treaty in a
reckless manner, gleefully inviting a costly and dangerous arms race
while giving Putin the legal right to deploy an unlimited number of
their previously banned missiles. I led a letter signed by 26
Democratic Senators calling for the Trump administration to do the
hard, if sometimes boring and monotonous work, of finding a diplomatic
solution to this problem. I further co-led a bill that would require
this administration to actually do its homework before proceeding with
any withdrawal. To this end, can the United States counter Russian
violations with INF-compliant missiles, allowing us to simultaneously
counter Russia militarily and punish them diplomatically as violators
of a treaty?
General Hyten. The supplemental capabilities announced in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review would allow us to effectively respond to Russian
violations of the INF Treaty. The Department is developing a small
number of low-yield nuclear weapons and re-introducing a nuclear sea-
launched cruise missile capability, which are both INF Treaty
compliant.
In addition, the Department is pursuing treaty compliant R&D on a
limited conventional Ground Launch Cruise Missile capability.
The strategy is intended to incentivize Russia's return to INF
Treaty objectives while simultaneously enhancing our deterrent posture.
45. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, the basing of INF-type
missiles will require buy-in from allies. I am worried that even if one
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] nation agrees to host these
missiles, it will be over the objections of other allies. This could
act as a wedge in the NATO alliance. Has NATO, as a whole, agreed to
actually host INF-type missiles and has a Pacific ally?
General Hyten. The United States has made no request to deploy
intermediate range missiles on the territory of an ally or partner and
no NATO nor Pacific ally has made this request.
It is important to note the low-yield options the Department is
pursuing are sea-based and do not require host-nation basing. Likewise,
the Administration has not made any determination to move beyond the
treaty-compliant Ground Launch Cruise Missile R&D activities.
new start
46. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, now that the administration
has announced its withdrawal from INF Treaty, the New START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty will soon be the only thing standing in
the way of a world without limits on the United States and Russian
nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972. New START is due to
expire in 2021, but can be extended for five years. Russia has been in
verified compliance with the treaty and is interested in beginning
talks on an extension. Alarmingly, this administration has been
unwilling to begin these talks to continue the decades-long bipartisan
tradition of nuclear arms control. General Hyten, if we were to lose
the New START Treaty and the ability to inspect Russia's nuclear
arsenal, what would that mean for the long-term planning of our nuclear
force structure and how would this affect our current nuclear weapons
modernization program, which is already slated to cost a staggering
$1.7 trillion over the next 30 years?
General Hyten. The impacts from the failure to extend New START are
unlikely to drive significant changes in U.S. Force structure, but are
more geopolitical in nature. My overarching concerns are with the
myriad of nuclear weapons and capabilities that Russia is already
producing and deploying that are not accountable under New START.
Hopefully, we can ultimately conclude an agreement with Russia that
addresses all nuclear weapons. Those details are best addressed by the
Department of State.
However, the comprehensive deterrence strategy as defined in the
NPR includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against
prospective and unanticipated risks. A fully modernized nuclear Triad,
including requisite NC3 capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons,
provides the diversity and flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for
effective deterrence as the geopolitical landscape evolves.
saudi arabia
47. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, it has been revealed
recently that actors in the Trump administration had attempted to
circumvent established protocols to provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear
technology, usurping Congressional authority and possibly risking a
nuclear arms race in the Middle East. If the sale of nuclear technology
were to enable Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons, how would that
undermine international non-proliferation efforts?
General Hyten. Saudi Arabia is a non-nuclear-weapon state-party to
the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). As such they are
legally prohibited from pursuing nuclear weapons development.
Similarly, the NPT also prohibits nuclear weapon states from
transferring nuclear technology that would lead to the development of a
nuclear weapon. It is important to continue to preserve the tenets of
NPT.
homeland security
48. Senator Gillibrand. General O'Shaughnessy, the Eastern Air
Defense Sector, based out of New York, is responsible for detecting,
characterizing, and directing the alert forces that will respond to the
next air attack on America east of the Mississippi. This includes
critical sites like New York City and Washington D.C. However, higher
Air National Guard priorities have prevented the resourcing of 41 full-
time Operations positions necessary to support a 24/7 Homeland defense
mission. Can you commit that you will prioritize the full funding of
the Eastern Air Defense Sector in order to assure our national
security?
General O'Shaughnessy. We have formally advocated for these
positions, and I am committed to working with National Guard Bureau,
U.S. Air Force, and Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS) leadership to
ensure the National Guard provides EADS with the necessary resources
and funding to perform their critical mission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
troops at the border
49. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, do you believe that
the deployment of troops to the southern border--both Active Duty and
National Guard--laid the foundation for a national emergency
declaration?
General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Defense has a long history
of supporting the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) in their mission to secure the U.S. border,
spanning multiple presidential administrations. I believe the recent
deployment of troops to the southern border continues to enhance CBP's
ability to execute its border security mission.
50. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, I understand that
many servicemembers were in the middle of important readiness and
training exercises when they were deployed to the border. What
exercises--and how many exercises--were interrupted and will these
interruptions compromise readiness?
General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. military personnel are supporting the
Department of Homeland Security with the following missions: conducting
contingency planning, assisting with the hardening or reinforcing ports
of entry (POEs), operating Customs and Border Protection (CBP) mobile
surveillance cameras, and placing wire obstacles between POEs. Military
personnel are also providing force protection coverage to U.S. military
and CBP personnel, as well as providing aviation support and medical
assistance efforts to U.S. forces and CBP personnel.
As the Service Chiefs have stated previously, the military units
executing the DOD support to the southern border mission are conducting
operations that enhance their overall military readiness when employed
in line with their military skill sets. I defer to the Service Chiefs
on specific training exercises that may have been impacted by units
conducting operations along the southern border.
51. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, engineering units
have installed concertina wire along the southern border. How long will
this c-wire remain installed?
General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
taken custody of the wire. I defer to CBP regarding their plans for its
disposal.
52. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, when Active Duty
troops eventually--hopefully--leave the border, what will become of the
c-wire?
General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
taken custody of the wire. I defer to CBP regarding their plans for its
disposal.
53. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what are the
environmental impacts of the troop deployments and base camps
established along the border and how does DOD plan to assess the
inevitable environmental degradation?
General O'Shaughnessy. Potential environmental impacts of military
operations are the same as for any human activity on the environment,
including: soil disturbance, fuel spills, solid waste generation, human
waste generation, wastewater generation, vehicle and generator
emissions, increased storm water runoff, and light and noise pollution.
Where operations are planned, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts
a baseline environmental survey to catalog existing conditions. During
the operation, local commanders implement controls to prevent and
mitigate environmental impacts. Upon completion, the DOD conducts an
environmental survey to identify, document, and remediate any residual
problems.
54. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, are you concerned
about a potentially indefinite, domestic deployment of troops within
your command?
General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Defense and United States
Northern Command work to provide capability requested by the Department
of Homeland Security that is approved by the Secretary of Defense. We
will continue to do so as requested and approved by the Acting
Secretary of Defense. We are fully prepared to do what is ordered in
defense of the Homeland.
55. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what is the basis
for the extension of Active Duty deployments through September 2019?
General O'Shaughnessy. In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Requests for Assistance to the Department of Defense, DHS states their
extension requests are based on the current and evolving border
security environment and lack of available support by other federal,
state, and local partners, thereby projecting that the risk to Customs
and Border Protection's ability to carry out its federal functions will
exist through September 2019. The Acting Secretary of Defense has
subsequently approved all requested extensions.
56. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, given the evolving
role of the Active Duty troops deployed at the southern border, what is
your understanding of the limitations of their mission based on Posse
Comitatus?
General O'Shaughnessy. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits title 10
Armed Forces from providing direct support to civilian law enforcement,
except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
U.S. Constitution or an Act of Congress.
57. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what actions or law
enforcement activities would constitute a violation of Posse Comitatus?
General O'Shaughnessy. In accordance with Enclosure 3 of DOD
Instruction 3025.21, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits title 10 DOD
personnel from providing forms of direct civilian law enforcement
assistance such as interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or
other similar activity; search or seizure; arrest; evidence collection;
and forensic investigations or other testing of evidence obtained from
a suspect for use in a civilian law enforcement investigation.
nuclear deterrence
58. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, in your testimony on the
Nuclear Triad, you stated the need to ``support our industrial
partners'' and prioritize funding for these partners throughout the
life of the Columbia-class programs. Do you agree that workforce
development is a vital component of this support?
General Hyten. I defer to the Navy regarding specifics, however the
shipyards, as well as the rest of the industrial base, are strategic
assets, critical to the defense of the Nation. They are one of our
strengths.
It is clear continued and focused support is essential to build the
workforce required to execute construction of the Columbia and Virginia
programs.
59. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, you state in your testimony
that we must field the Columbia-class on time to avoid a deterrent
capability gap in the nuclear triad. What are the strategic
consequences to a gap in our nuclear triad capabilities--particularly
given that nuclear powered submarines are the most survivable leg of
the triad?
General Hyten. Any gap in Triad capability reduces options to the
President in time of need and weakens our overall deterrent posture.
In the event a legacy system's availability is challenged due to
unexpected age-related techinical issues or we experience delyas in
replacement systems, we can intentionally leverage operational
flexibility inherent in the Triad to mitigate short-term shortfalls.
The best way to manage future risk is to ensure current systems are
adequately sustained and replacements fielded on time.
60. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, as you note in your
testimony, we currently have no margin for error in our Columbia
program timeline as the Ohio-class rapidly approach retirement. What
funding streams for the industrial base should Congress prioritize in
this funding cycle to ensure the timely production and delivery of the
Columbia-class?
General Hyten. I defer to the Navy with respect to specific funding
streams. However, full funding and on-time appropriations are critical
to delivering Columbia on schedule.
intermediate range nuclear forces treaty
61. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, if you believe that Russia's
material breach of the INF Treaty is a significant concern, are you
concerned that scrapping the INF entirely will lead to an escalation of
Russian development of its intermediate-range nuclear stockpiles?
General Hyten. Russia has been in material breach of the INF Treaty
for many years and has already fielded multiple battalions of a system
in direct violation of its obligations. The strategy in the NPR is
intended to bring Russia back into the INF Treaty, but if that fails,
make sure we are able to develop capabilities needed to deter and
respond effectively.
62. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, the United States can reach
both Asia and Europe with sea-based and air-delivered missiles, neither
of which violate the INF Treaty. Do you believe ground-based missile
systems are necessary to deter Chinese aggression in the South China
Sea when the United States is already investing in the construction of
Virginia and Columbia-class submarines?
General Hyten. Regarding specifics with respect to the South China
Sea, I would defer to Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command.
From a strategic perspective, the United States is prepared to
respond decisively to Chinese non-nuclear or nuclear aggression. The
United States conducts exercises in the Asia-Pacific region that, among
other things, demonstrate our capabilities and resolve which
contributes to assuring our allies.
Likewise, being forward-deployable, survivable, penetrating, and
responsive, Virginia and Columbia-class submarines will strengthen our
posture and preparedness, and therefore our deterrence vis-a-vis China.
Finally, I support the need for other basing options (including
ground) that can increase our overall capabilities.
63. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, why not continue this
investment in order to maintain our asymmetric advantage in undersea
warfare?
General Hyten. I don't view this as an ``either/or'' proposition.
Investment in the research and development of ground-based missiles
does not detract from planned investments in undersea capabilities.
Diversity in capability and basing is, in fact, key to our strategy.
64. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, many of our allies--
including Japan--oppose withdrawal from the INF. Others, such as South
Korea and Australia, do not want to host United States offensive
missiles. NATO allies also oppose the treaty withdrawal. As STRATCOM
[United States Strategic Command] Commander, how will you manage this
opposition?
General Hyten. In a February 1, 2019 statement, NATO Allies fully
supported the U.S. suspension of its obligations under the INF Treaty
and declaring United States intent to withdraw from the Treaty if
Russian did not return to full and verifiable compliance. In the
statement, the Allies agreed that Russia would bear sole responsibility
for the end of the INF Treaty if Russia did not honor its obligations.
The U.S. is in close dialogue with all our allies, but I defer to
the State Department and the geographic combatant commanders in
managing relations with specific allies and partners.
From a USSTRATCOM perspective, we will continue holding at risk,
under all conditions, any nation that can hold us at risk. This is the
foundation of deterrence. Our strategy and posture will pose
insurmountable difficulties to any Russian strategy of aggression
against the United States, its allies, or partners.
65. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, if regional allies will not
support the deployment of ground-based missiles, how will the INF
withdrawal impact strategic deterrence?
General Hyten. NATO is continuing to assess the consequences of
Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and fielding of multiple
battalions of the SSC-8, and recognizes the need to provide a credible
and effective deterrent.
Per the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is modifying a
small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
warheads to provide a low-yield option. Likewise, in the longer term,
the U.S. will pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile.
These supplements will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and
assurance as well as expand the range of flexible and credible U.S.
options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
missile defense of hawaii
66. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, in your written
statement you said that you are confident in the ability of the Ground-
Based Midcourse Intercept (GBI) defense system to defend the United
States against ICBMs from North Korea. Does that assessment include
ICBMs targeted at Hawaii?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, I am confident we can defend Hawaii
with our ground-based interceptors.
homeland defense radar-hawaii
67. Senator Hirono. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, you
both mentioned your support for the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii and
the Pacific Radar in your written statements. What capability do these
radars add to our current missile defense system?
General Hyten. These sensors represent the near-term solution.
These sensors have higher power levels and multiple sophisticated
waveforms to exploit different phenomenology enabling persistent, long-
range mid-course tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment
capability against current threats. Terrestrial sensors will complement
future space-based sensors designed to globally detect, track, and
discriminate critical missile threats.
General O'Shaughnessy. These two radars, along with the Long Range
Discrimination Radar, will provide much desired `birth-to-death'
discrimination across the entire flight profile of threat missiles. The
capabilities these radars will deliver when fully operational could
potentially allow us to change our shot doctrine, which could increase
capacity to engage threat missiles.
68. Senator Hirono. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, do
these two new radars increase our ability to defend against missile
threats from China and Russia, in addition to North Korea?
General Hyten. These radars support the characterization of all
threats detected in their field of view, but are specifically designed
to counter ballistic missile threats emanating from North Korea. We
have other radars designed to meet the requirements of high-end
competition.
General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense
system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential
Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic
missile threats.
69. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, once operational, will
the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii improve the likelihood of
successfully intercepting an ICBM targeting Hawaii?
General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. The Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii will
provide mid-to-late flight discrimination against intercontinental
ballistic missile threats targeting Hawaii, allowing for more refined
targeting of threat reentry vehicles and effective engagements.
future of deterrence
70. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, you have repeatedly stated that
strategic deterrence is your number one priority. In an era of cyber
threats, misinformation campaigns, hypersonic weapons and space as a
warfighting domain, how has the concept of deterrence evolved in the
first part of the 21st century?
General Hyten. The basic tenets of deterrence have not changed but
the application is much more challenging today. What has changed is the
threat. We face a more diverse threat and the challenge of a more
uncertain, multipolar geopolitical environment. We must enhance our
agility across the spectrum from strategy development to capability
acquisition in order to address this ever more complex environment.
USSTRATCOM, in partnership with the combatant commands, is working
to utilize current capabilities to meet the evolving threat while
shaping strategies and fielding new capabilities for the future. Our
nuclear forces remain the backbone of our deterrence strategy. However,
deterrence must span the entire spectrum of conflict and be supported
by credible U.S. capabilities in all domains.
71. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, what additional tools does the
United States need to develop further to meet an evolving concept of
strategic deterrence?
General Hyten. The U.S. must rediscover the ability to move with
speed and agility across multiple domains in operationally-relevant
timelines. This includes assessing the threat environment, developing
strategy and policy, fielding capabilities and producing plans to
ensure our strategic deterrent remains robust, credible, and relevant.
Our nuclear forces are the backbone of our strategic deterrent, and we
must complete the planned modernization of the force on time, to
include fielding the low-yield capabilities discussed in the Nuclear
Posture Review.
Additionally, we must continue the work of integrating our
capabilities across the combatant commands, all domains, and every
element of national power as well as with our allies and partners in
order to deter potential adversaries.
nuclear command, control and communications (nc3) modernization
72. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, your written statement
appropriately emphasizes the importance of modernizing our NC3 systems.
It seems like there is some overlap between the mission requirements
for nuclear operations and those for missile defense. Will a modernized
NC3 system be equipped to support missile defense operations and
decision making in addition to the nuclear mission?
General Hyten. While both Nuclear and Missile Defense command and
control systems leverage many of the same sensors, communication paths
and data streams, the operational requirements and decision authority
for each mission are different and distinct and drive mission-unique
solutions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
missile defense review
73. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, the
2019 Missile Defense Review acknowledged emerging threats like cruise
missiles and hypersonic weapons, but the report did not propose any new
creative solutions or investment efforts to address them. Do you
believe we are acting with the right sense of urgency to counter these
threats?
General Hyten. The MDR recognizes we are on the wrong side of the
cost curve and directs a comprehensive approach to prevent and defeat
emerging threats, including better integration of offensive and
defensive capabilities.
The President's Budget supports continued investment and
development of game-changing technologies aimed at providing a more
effective and affordable missile defense.
General O'Shaughnessy. I view the cruise missile threat to the
Homeland with an enormous sense of urgency. Simply put, we are behind
and losing ground. Our ability to defend the Homeland against advanced
cruise missiles is USNORTHCOM and NORAD's top capability gap, and I am
equally concerned about the threat presented by our adversaries'
emerging hypersonic capabilities. Our ability to track, defend, and
defeat advanced missile threats is significantly challenged by these
new weapons systems. We require significant, focused investment in
cruise missile defense that incorporates existing and emergent
technologies to counter both current and emerging threats, or we risk
falling further behind.
74. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what
technologies and systems should the Committee be investing in to
address these threats?
General Hyten. My first priority is to move missile warning/missile
defense sensors to a space-based architecture in order to detect, track
and discriminate advanced missile threats.
Providing a cost-effective missile defense with sufficient magazine
depth also requires pursuit of next-generation capabilities such as
directed energy, Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV), boost phase
intercept, and non-kinetic capabilities.
General O'Shaughnessy. I believe we need to take a holistic
approach and fundamentally change our defense against cruise missiles
and hypersonic threats by expanding capabilities and capacity across a
layered defense architecture. This requires building upon our current
capabilities as well as developing new capabilities to address these
complex threats. The solution may include a layered architecture
consisting of capabilities such as sensors, communications, command and
control, airborne early warning, active electronically scanned array
radars, munitions, ground-based air defenses, information operations,
increased research, development, test, and evaluation, Arctic
operations, and logistical support. The bottom line is that our
capability challenges cannot be solved by individual capabilities.
space r&d [research and development]
75. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, the Space Rapid Capabilities
Office is something I've focused on for a number of years. Today, it
serves as the lynchpin of our responsive space strategy. I'm a firm
believer that we have parts in place within the Space R&D enterprise
that are working very well and they should be expanded upon. Moving
pieces around is where we're going to run into trouble in terms of
costs and inefficiencies. How important is it that we don't reinvent
the wheel in areas like Space RCO [Rapid Capabilities Office] and other
research and development entities during the current space
reorganization?
General Hyten. It is vitally important every effort be made to
reduce costs and inefficiencies by linking Space RCO research and
development activities with the Space Development Agency (SDA) and
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to eliminate duplication of
effort, maximize outcomes, and enable a focus on experimentation, rapid
prototyping and accelerated fielding of specific next-generation
capabilities.
nuclear command, control, and communication
76. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, you've mentioned that ``we're
in good shape in the near term'' when it comes to defending our space
assets, but that we need to look to how we will defend those assets in
the future. Can you describe the necessary upgrade to the nuclear
command, control, and communication program and why it is so important
to the STRATCOM mission?
General Hyten. Sustaining a reliable, endurable, and survivable NC3
architecture is foundational to strategic deterrence.
To that end, the Department is moving towards fielding more
resilient satellite architectures for protected communications, missile
warning and responsive counter-space effects.
Understanding space is no longer a ``sanctuary,'' the Department is
also pursuing expanded capabilities in the aerial and terrestrial
domains to provide NC3 resilience and reliability in the event of
degraded or denied space capabilities.
77. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, are you still on track to
produce a concept of operations for space by June?
General Hyten. Yes. We produced a draft concept of operations and
evaluated it during our Global Lightning 20 exercise. My space
component is incorporating lessons learned and refining the document.
We expect to finalize the document in June.
ground based strategic deterrent
78. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, our adversaries are
modernizing and advancing their nuclear weapon systems. Understanding
that stable requirements are essential to the success of nuclear
modernization programs, are you providing input to the Air Force on how
requirements need to be shaped for programs like Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent to stay relevant to a constantly changing threat?
General Hyten. USSTRATCOM has been an active partner with the Air
Force to shape the requirements for the GBSD program from inception.
Our requirements are being met, and I am confident the GBSD weapon
system will be relevant in the face of future threats.
79. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, it is our understanding that
the contract award for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program
will occur in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020. Is it your
understanding that is still the Air Force plan?
General Hyten. I am confident the Air Force will complete Milestone
B and contract award in the fourth quarter fiscal year 2020.
new start
80. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, to the best of your knowledge,
including information you might have provided by the U.S. intelligence
community, are the United States and Russia complying with the treaty?
General Hyten. Yes, but it is important to note the New Start
Treaty does not cover all Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear
weapons.
81. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, does New START provide for
intrusive inspections by both parties, including United States boots on
the ground in Russia inspecting specific Russian nuclear sites, so that
the United States military has a good degree of confidence in Russian
compliance with the treaty?
General Hyten. Yes. The New START Treaty's verification regime
(i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications) provides
transparency into Russian strategic offensive capabilities,
contributing to our understanding of their nuclear force structure and
pace of modernization.
The U.S. State Department is responsible for determining compliance
with United States treaties, and I am confident in the State
Department's and Intelligence Community's efforts to verify and monitor
Russian compliance with the New START Treaty.
82. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, does New START include
notifications about changes and movements in Russian strategic nuclear
weapons systems, notifications that provide valuable information to the
United States intelligence community and the military?
General Hyten. Yes--this is done via Treaty-specific processes
managed by the Department of State's Nuclear Reduction Center. Part
Four of the New START Treaty Protocol stipulates each party shall
notify the other about changes in data (status) pertaining to ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers. These notifications are required to be
submitted within five days after the change in status. Again, many
other types of nuclear weapons are not covered by these protocols.
83. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, are you aware of any estimate
from the U.S. intelligence community or elsewhere that indicates what
it would cost to attempt to replace the data provided under New START
verification provisions, if the treaty did not provide them?
General Hyten. I am not aware of any such estimate and would defer
to the Director of National Intelligence for such information.
84. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, would it not be a very
significant undertaking to try to replace that information?
General Hyten. I would defer to the State Department and Director
of National Intelligence for the scale and scope of replacing
information provided through New STRAT Treaty verification provisions
through alternative means.
microsystems, engineering, science, and applications (mesa)
85. Senator Heinrich. Gen. Hyten, your testimony notes the need to
upgrade key nuclear facilities and infrastructure, including for
production of non-nuclear components. Do you agree that strategic rad-
hard microelectronics at the MESA [Microsystems Engineering, Science
and Applications] Complex are among the key technologies needed to
maintain the nuclear deterrent?
General Hyten. Yes. The trustworthiness of the nuclear weapon
supply chain providing specialized components must be sustained to
protect against the potential for sabotage, malicious introduction of
an unwanted function, or subversion of a function without detection.
NNSA's MESA facility at Sandia National Laboratories is currently 5
years beyond the intended 25-year design life and relies on tools and
capabilities that are no longer supported by manufacturers. Ongoing
investments in infrastructure and tools to support the MESA complex are
required to provide key technologies to meet planned LEPs and evolving
national security needs for strategic radiation-hardened microsystems
beyond 2025. Without sustained investment and eventual large-scale
recapitalization, the MESA complex will experience failures due to
aging and will become obsolete.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
86. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, this Committee, and our
companion committee in the House, heard testimony from many of your
colleagues about the gap between your needs for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and what you receive from
various sources of ISR. Are your needs being met; and if not, are there
alternative sources that you can turn to, such as U.S. commercial
sources or allied partners for the collection of ISR data?
General Hyten. No operational Commander is fully satisfied with the
level of ISR support available to them given the overwhelming
requirements to understand the threat and gain decision advantage in
today's contested global multi-domain environment. That said, I am
pleased with the support I get and agnostic as to the sources of ISR
information as long as they contribute to answering my information
needs in a reliable, timely and secure manner.
artificial intelligence
87. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, is the Department of Defense
fully utilizing commercial artificial intelligence platforms and
algorithms to refine and process the terabytes of ISR data being
collected?
General Hyten. Not fully. However, USSTRATCOM continues to
implement various algorithm-based tools and programs in partnership
with the IC and DOD. These tools use artificial intelligence and
machine learning to help analysts triage large amounts of ISR data. For
more details on DOD's utilization of these types of technologies I
would defer to the USD (I).
88. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, what system or process does
the Department of Defense have in place for commercial industry
providers to pitch artificial intelligence products to military leaders
to help them meet DOD requirements?
General Hyten. Artificial Intelligence is one of DOD's
modernization priorities, and the Department has created a Technical
Director for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to
consolidate the Service and CCMD AI requirements.
In addition, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) website posts DOD
hard problems that need industry involvement to solve, and the Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC) has the CCMD Priorities listed in
the DTIC Classified reading room for industry to review and offer
solutions to solve AI gaps.
Finally, industry providers are encouraged to submit potential
solutions and brief their products via regularly scheduled technical
interchange meetings and conferences.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
f-15c/d fleet
89. Senator Warren. General O'Shaughnessy, the Air Force is
reportedly considering buying new F-15s to refresh the F-15C fleet,
which is nearing the end of its service life. How would a
revitalization of the F-15C/D fleet with advanced F-15s affect your
ability to defend the Homeland in terms of the capacity and
capabilities available to you as NORTHCOM Commander?
General O'Shaughnessy. For our Homeland aerospace defense mission,
we advocate for required capabilities rather than specific platforms.
The Air Force is on record with its requirement to buy 72 new fighter
aircraft per year to implement the National Defense Strategy, and we
understand the Air Force remains fully committed to advanced 5th
generation capabilities and the F-35. However, the decision to refresh
4th generation capability helps mitigate capacity risk while balancing
near term readiness concerns, getting closer to the goal of 72 new
fighter aircraft. Recapitalization of the Air Force fighter force,
including the F-15 variant, will help give us the resources and
flexibility necessary to defend the Homeland.
new start treaty
90. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if New START expires in February
2021 with nothing to replace it and there are no constraints on
Russia's nuclear forces, would that increase or decrease the threat
Russia poses to the United States?
General Hyten. It's difficult to predict with any certainty, but I
doubt Russia would realize any strategic value in increasing the size
of its stockpile and following that course of action would
significantly increase the burden on its economy and society. The more
likely response would be to continue the path the Russians are already
on, which is to increase the capability and diversity of their existing
platforms and stockpile.
91. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if we have less visibility into
Russia's nuclear capabilities, their force structure, and their
modernization plans, which would be the case without New START, what
impact would that have on United States military planning and spending
and what countermeasures would we need to consider and what would be
the cost?
General Hyten. The impacts from not extending the New START Treaty
are unlikely to drive significant changes in United States force
structure, but are more geopolitical in nature. My overarching concerns
are with the myriad of nuclear weapons and capabilities that Russia is
producing and deploying that are not accountable under New START--with
or without an extension.
Hopefully, we can ultimately conclude an agreement with Russia that
addresses all nuclear weapons. Those details are best addressed by the
Department of State.
However, the comprehensive deterrence strategy as defined in the
NPR includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against
prospective and unanticipated risks. A fully modernized nuclear Triad,
including requisite NC3 capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons,
provides the diversity and flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for
effective deterrence as the geopolitical landscape evolves.
92. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if we lose the New START data
exchanges and onsite inspection rights, would the Pentagon and the
intelligence community have to spend more on national technical means
of verification to make up for this loss?
General Hyten. I would defer to the State Department and Director
of National Intelligence for the scale and scope of replacing
information provided through New STRAT Treaty verification provisions
through alternative means.
93. Senator Warren. General Hyten, given the extensive United
States experience in negotiating and pursuing arms control agreements
with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, how do you recommend the
United States pursue arms control agreements with Russia and China in
the years ahead?
General Hyten. My ideas are stated in the answer to Question 91
above. However I defer to the State Department as to the best means to
approach arms control negotiations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
nuclear command, control and communications (nc3)
94. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, the Nuclear Posture Review,
your written testimony and your verbal testimony all highlight the
critical requirement for Nuclear Command, Control and Communications
modernization. Being given the sole responsibility for NC3 as commander
of USSTRATCOM as well as the opening of the new USSTRATCOM headquarters
this year mean a lot of modernization and change occurring rapidly
within your command. Given the cyber warfare and cyber espionage
challenges from adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran,
what measures are you and your team taking to guard against an
aggressive and persistent cyber threat?
General Hyten. USSTRATCOM is engaged with key experts from across
the Department to develop a comprehensive cyber defense plan for the
current NC3 enterprise.
Teams regularly assess individual NC3 systems for vulnerabilities
and build mitigations to address cyber threats to our aging systems.
In addition, the Department is considering and incorporating
information security best practices in all new modernization programs
at the onset of development to ensure fielded systems are capable of
defending against future cyber threats.
95. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, you have two platforms in the
E-4B and E-6B that are critical components of our ability to execute
NC3 operations in both peacetime and war. The last major platform
upgrades were 34 years ago (1985) for the E-4B model and 21 years ago
(1998) for the E-6B model. We spend a lot of time discussing the aging
B-52, ICBM inventory and submarine fleet, but little time discussing
the E-4B and E-6B. Further, the Nuclear Posture Review cites these
platforms as a strength while your written testimony highlights efforts
to find replacements. How survivable and interoperable are these
current platforms in a modern war and when do we need to seriously
consider a replacement or major upgrade to these weapons systems?
General Hyten. Both of these key command and control platforms are
survivable in the most stressed environments and fully interoperable
with all elements of the National Military Command System. The
fundamental challenge facing these platforms is in fully meeting
operational mission availability requirements.
The E-4B is projected to reach end of life in 2032. Operational
availability is negatively impacted by a continuous cycle of
maintenance, major overhauls, and system upgrades that are necessary to
keep the fleet operationally capable.
Likewise the E-6B is challenged to meet operation mission
availability requirements due to a combination of limited fleet size
and increasing depot-level and routine field-level maintenance to
address aging airframe issues.
The Air Force is leading a joint analysis of alternatives to
explore options to recapitalize the E-4B, E-6B, and the VC-32 and is
expected to complete in late fiscal year 2019. We will take this
information and integrate it into our broader NC3 architecture work in
order to define the best way ahead.
space force
96. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, in your testimony you praised
the decision to keep the newly developing Space Force under the
umbrella of the Department of the Air Force. With the development of
the Space Force and a Unified Space Command, what steps are you taking
to ensure USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM and the new U.S. Space Command are all
resourced appropriately and have the appropriate authorities given the
significant interests all three commands have in space capabilities?
General Hyten. My staff is working with the Joint Staff, in concert
with AFSPC and Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC) to identify
the resources and authorities required to establish an effective
USSPACECOM. In the interim, I am committed to ensuring there will be no
operational degradation during the transition and have directed my
staff to provide robust support until USSPACECOM reaches full operating
capability.
97. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, are you concerned about
shortfalls as the Air Force tries to fully support all of the commands?
General Hyten. I fully recognize the challenges the Air Force faces
supporting another combatant command, but the Air Force has been
responsive to the changes directed by the Department. My staff
carefully monitors competing interests to ensure USSTRATCOM and future
USSPACECOM support is properly prioritized.
missile defense
98. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, a December GAO
[Government Accountability Office] report reviewed the Air Force's
position and analysis of the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya island. While
the report did highlight an excellent mission capable rate, it also
listed Air Force and Missile Defense Agency estimates of required
investments of $200 million in operations and maintenance funds and
almost $70 million in upgrade and sustainment costs over the next 5
years to keep the system running. Given existing and future
capabilities such as the Long Range Discriminating Radar, the Space
Fence, the Pacific Radar, the sea based X-band radar and radars in
Japan, is the Cobra Dane still providing such a critical function to
our missile defense that we need to continue to invest large sums of
money into sustaining this aging system?
General O'Shaughnessy. The Cobra Dane radar contributes
significantly to Homeland defense and continues to be the ``backbone''
of the ground-based midcourse defense system. Due to its unique
geographic location, the radar provides engagement quality mid-course
tracking data of missiles threatening CONUS and Alaska. I work closely
with the Missile Defense Agency and the Air Force to ensure Cobra Dane
remains a critical operational element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System architecture until it can be replaced by assets that provide
equal or better capabilities.
99. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, we currently have 44
ground based interceptors in our inventory between Fort Greely, Alaska,
and Vandenberg AFB [Air Force Base], California. You have previously
stated that you do not consider this to be adequate for defense of the
United States and North America as a whole. How many additional GBI do
we need to be adequately prepared for a North Korean or Chinese
ballistic missile threat?
General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense
system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential
Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic
missile threats. I am confident in our ability to defend against the
current North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile threats.
I support the Department of Defense's initiative to field twenty
additional interceptors at Ft Greely, AK that will carry the Redesigned
Kill Vehicles. This effort will provide both capability and capacity
improvements. We will continue to reassess the sufficiency of our
interceptor fleet based on the estimated threat going forward.
100. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you have testified
extensively in writing and verbally that the arctic is quickly becoming
a vulnerable spot in our defenses for North America. What are your
requirements for defense of North America from a northern approach in
the form of radars, interceptors, ships or investment in other
infrastructure such as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System
(IUSS)?
General O'Shaughnessy. The defense of North America requires modern
sensor systems for aerospace surveillance and warning capable of
detecting advanced threats at long ranges. These sensor systems must be
able to detect, characterize, and attribute potential threats from
airborne, surface, and subsurface launch platforms operating in and
through the Arctic and the northern approaches to the Homeland.
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) currently have nine Arctic-related
items on the commands' Integrated Priority List that address air and
cruise missile defense, communications, maritime undersea surveillance,
indications and warning, and Homeland defense. The commands have also
articulated a requirement for ice-strengthened surface vessels capable
of exercising and deploying, positioning, and conducting deterrence and
decisive operations in the ice-diminished waters of the Arctic.
Additionally, USNORTHCOM has a requirement to support those vessels
with fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Finally, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
have stressed the urgency of Integrated Undersea Surveillance System
recapitalization with the United States Navy, as Russia and China have
fielded advanced submarines and missile systems that present
significant threats to the Homeland.
counter terrorism and violent extremist organization
101. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you highlighted in
your written testimony your significant concern over terrorist or
violent extremist attacks on the United States to include another 9/11
style attack on the Homeland. What steps are you taking at USNORTHCOM
either militarily, through interagency or multi-nationally to gather
intelligence and conduct operations to combat the persistent terrorist
threat?
General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
takes a comprehensive approach to countering threats to the Homeland.
We maintain constant awareness of terrorist threats through routine,
daily coordination with the U.S. intelligence community and utilization
of a vast network of liaison officers and interagency partners,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Homeland Security. We have also built strong relationships with other
combatant commands through which we share information and participate
in multi-national forums run by Special Operations Command that focus
on countering violent extremist organizations. In addition, USNORTHCOM
has developed robust counterterrorism plans which we exercise and
rehearse frequently.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
space force and space command
102. Senator Jones. General Hyten, at the hearing, you emphasized
the importance of ``not breaking the mission'' in separating Space from
SRATCOM and re-establishing it as a separate combatant command. Please
be more specific about the steps STRATCOM is taking to ensure a smooth
transition and to avoid overlap, duplication, and inefficiency among
the Space Force, Space Command, the Space Development Agency, the NRO
[National Reconnaissance Office], and the Services.
General Hyten. My chief concern and focus is ensuring there is no
disruption in space operations or support to other commanders, the
Joint Force and DOD/USG agencies.
To facilitate seamless transition, USSTRATCOM in association with
the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and the NRO developed
both a transition Divestiture Plan and Implementation Plan.
These plans are continuously refined, socialized, and coordinated
through exercises in advance of the transition. Additionally, a
Memorandum of Agreement codifies how elements of the USSTRATCOM Staff
will support Commander, USSPACECOM throughout the transfer.
USSPACECOM, at establishment, will be postured to issue orders, as
well as command and control assigned and attached forces, but will not
be fully mission capable.
To that end, I directed my staff to continue providing robust
support to ensure mission success through USSPACECOM declaration of
FOC.
homeland defense design
103. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, your written testimony
briefly references the three-phase Homeland Defense Design. Please
provide an update on that effort and how it's progressing.
General O'Shaughnessy. Our cruise missile defense efforts for the
first two phases of the Homeland Defense Design initiative started in
the National Capital Region (NCR) and are just part of our overall
initial effort encompassing the whole aerospace domain. We are
utilizing lessons learned from point defense against cruise missile
threats in the NCR and broadening our understanding of what is required
to defend critical infrastructure throughout North America.
As we move to Phase III of Homeland Defense Design, it is clear
there is much to be done. From a warfighter perspective, we need to be
able to find, track, and defeat launch platforms and cruise missiles at
greater ranges than we've previously planned for. This will require
changes in our operational approach and investments in advanced
sensors, and weapons, all of which we are addressing with the
Department.
Expanding cruise missile defense beyond the NCR is significantly
more complex. The Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of
Alternatives (NAS AoA) and my Commander's Estimate on Homeland cruise
missile defense are both currently underway, and these two key,
overarching efforts will be crucial to identifying the best way to
defend our Homeland against cruise missile threats.
These studies are critical to our efforts, but we must take action
now to address the threat. As such, we have taken action to address
immediate needs as we continue efforts to identify and implement short,
mid-, and long-term solutions. The immediate includes achieving the
best possible results with the capabilities and capacity available
today. The short-term includes increasing capacity of the systems we
already have and targeting investment in capabilities giving me the
best flexible deterrent options for the available funding. Our mid-term
and long-term efforts are heavily reliant on current and emergent
science and technology and will require significant investment now to
field solutions as soon as possible.
combatting illegal drug trafficking
104. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, in your testimony, you
acknowledged that the majority of illegal drugs are coming through the
ports, not across uncontrolled sections of the border. Could you give
us your best military advice on whether NORTHCOM's forces have an
appropriate role in combatting illegal drug trafficking and if so,
explain what the most appropriate and effective use of NORTHCOM's
forces is in that effort?
General O'Shaughnessy. I believe United States Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM) has an appropriate role in combatting illegal drug
trafficking. USNORTHCOM routinely provides military-unique capabilities
in support of federal civilian law enforcement and participates in
training with both U.S. civilian law enforcement and foreign partners.
As authorized by 10 USC Sec. 124 and 10 USC Sec. 284, USNORTHCOM
contributes to counterdrug efforts by providing maintenance and repair
of equipment, transportation support, engineering, training of law
enforcement agencies, employment of detection and monitoring sensors,
intelligence analysis, and aerial and ground reconnaissance. This
support enables our law enforcement partners to more effectively
interdict drugs and other illicitly trafficked commodities.
emergency declaration
105. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, you testified that you
have not yet received any orders from the Commander in Chief pursuant
to the Emergency Declaration of March 15, 2019. Please explain what
process, if any, you undertake when you do receive an order from the
Commander in Chief to determine the legality of that order and state
whether that process will be followed if you receive an order pursuant
to the March 15, 2019 Emergency Declaration.
General O'Shaughnessy. Orders received by United States Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM) from any source are reviewed by the our command
staff judge advocate and legal staff to determine if there are any
potential legal concerns associated with any given order. If there are
legal concerns, in coordination with Chairman of the Joint Chief of
Staff Legal Counsel and the Department of Defense Office of General
Counsel, our legal team develops recommended courses of action that
resolve or mitigate those concerns for my consideration. Based on this
information, I select a course of action and issue appropriate orders
to our headquarters staff and subordinate commanders. This is the
process I have followed to date, and it is the same process I will
continue to follow for future orders I receive as Commander of
USNORTHCOM.
national guard
106. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, you testified about the
importance of the National Guard to NORAD's missions. We have an Air
Guard unit in Alabama that is scheduled to receive the new F-35 fighter
jets in a couple of years. How will that unit and those capabilities
contribute to the defense of the Homeland?
General O'Shaughnessy. I am absolutely confident the Alabama Air
National Guard, equipped with the new F-35 Lightning II, will be
ideally suited to defend the United States against the most advanced
and emerging threats to North America. The F-35 is unmatched in its
ability to counter and defeat the latest 21st century advanced threats
to the Homeland. In short, the F-35 and the Air National Guard provide
critical combat capability and will be integral to the defense of North
America.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, McSally,
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono,
Kaine, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
The Senate Armed Services Committee today meets to continue
receiving the posture statements from our combatant commands.
Testifying today are General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of
the United States European Command [EUCOM], and General Stephen
Lyons, Commander of the United States Transportation Command
[TRANSCOM]. I welcome both of you here and thank you for your
service.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to
ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense
Strategy [NDS]. That is our blueprint. We pretty much agreed to
that. It means that we need urgent change at a significant
scale to address the challenges of strategic competition with
Russia and China.
I just got back from Munich, Kosovo, Djibouti, Algeria, and
these areas, and that is where Russia and China are. We need to
be aware of the strength and what the competition is. Putin has
demonstrated both the capability and the intent to use force to
achieve his objective, most notably in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Syria. Putin will not hesitate to use other tools in his
arsenal as well, whether it is cyber attacks, election
meddling, or assassinations with chemical weapons. Perceived
weakness will only provoke further aggression from Putin.
That is why efforts such as full support for the European
Deterrence Initiative that is made up of primarily the old
Soviet Union countries provides the defensive lethal assistance
to Ukraine and why they are so important.
Likewise, we need a defense budget that is of sufficient
size and invests in key capabilities we need in Europe, areas
like long-range fires, cruise missile defense, anti-submarine
warfare, and the supporting infrastructure.
I was in Munich 2 weeks ago, and it was clear that we
cannot be successful in the strategic competition with Russia
without a strong, unified NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] alliance. America is safer and stronger because
of our NATO alliance. General Scaparrotti, I look forward to
your thoughts along these issues.
General Lyons, you have had a long history with TRANSCOM
serving as its Deputy Commander for 2 years before assuming
your current role. I look forward to hearing your assessment of
the services and the resources that you have there because I
know that there is some discussion even of some privatization
in that area. We will be anxious to hear your statements.
Before I turn to Senator Reed, I would like to remind all
of our members that we will have a classified, closed, informal
briefing, at 2:30 in the Visitors Center with both of our
witnesses.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning.
General Scaparrotti is returning to testify before the
Committee for the third time on the United States military
posture and programs in Europe. He is dual-hatted as Commander
of United States European Command and NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, or the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe].
Welcome, General Scaparrotti.
General Lyons, I want to welcome you to your first posture
hearing before this Committee.
Let me thank both of you for your many decades of military
service, and please extend our appreciation to the dedicated
men and women serving under your commands. Thank them very much
for us.
Over the last several years, the security challenges in the
United States European Command have grown increasingly complex.
Russia has reemerged as an aggressive opponent of the rules-
based international order, which Russia views as a counter to
its strategic interest in reclaiming great power status. The
National Defense Strategy issued last year highlights the need
to counter a revanchist Russia with a credible military
deterrent that demonstrates that any military aggression
against the sovereignty and integrity of NATO members or threat
of such aggression will not succeed. General Scaparrotti, I am
interested in your assessment of the progress of our force
posture in Europe in meeting NDS requirements.
In addition to its military modernization and aggressive
military posturing, Russia is conducting a campaign of hybrid
warfare, below the level of military conflict, using all tools
of national power to advance its strategic interests. Our
democracy was attacked in 2016, and we have been persistently
under attack ever since, including during last year's midterm
elections. I would be interested in hearing from General
Scaparrotti whether EUCOM is getting the cyber resources and
personnel it needs and whether we are investing in the right
non-military tools of national power to counter this hybrid
warfare.
An additional challenge is the unprecedented strain on
alliance cohesion within NATO. Former Secretary of Defense
Mattis stressed that the United States' strength is
inextricably linked to our systems of alliances and
partnerships. Yet, a recent report from the Harvard Belfer
Center by Ambassador Doug Lute and Ambassador Nicholas Burns
describes a crisis within NATO, which they attribute in large
part to the absence of strong U.S. leadership. The Senate and
Congress as a whole have repeatedly gone on record to reaffirm
our strong commitment to NATO and the transatlantic
relationship as a core element of U.S. national security. There
should be no doubt among our allies or our adversaries
regarding the United States' resolve to meet its NATO
commitments to collective defense.
Turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of TRANSCOM perform
duties that sustain the whole Department of Defense effort in
protecting our Nation's security. With the competitive edge in
its ability to deploy and sustain America's armed forces,
TRANSCOM provides DOD [United States Department of Defense]
with unique capabilities that we have come to expect and
perhaps too frequently take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are
busy supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and
without them, the United States would be at a significant
disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a group of cargo ships
held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, but it is
aging and will need to be modernized over the next decade. Two
years ago, the Committee authorized the Department to start a
program to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force by authorizing
DOD to purchase up to two foreign-built vessels, while the Navy
designed a family of auxiliary vessels for a number of uses,
including recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force. Then last
year, Congress authorized the Department to buy five more
foreign-built vessels as soon as the Department put forward a
funded plan to build new ships for the RRF in U.S. shipyards.
General Lyons, I am interested in the status and the next steps
for RRF recapitalization in fiscal year 2020.
The Defense Department also needs to ensure that the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF, program, which provides as much as
40 percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable after
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and will be able to provide
needed surge capacity in the future. General Lyons, I am
interested in your view on the state of this fleet and if
anything needs to be done to ensure these capabilities and
their readiness.
Our global transportation capability, owned and managed by
TRANSCOM, has been one of our asymmetric advantages for many
years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Last year,
General McDew told the Committee that TRANSCOM has been
conducting analyses to assess requirements for an environment
where our mobility forces would be challenged, and his
assessment was that additional investment in lift would be
needed. However, when we received the report of that analysis
in the Mobility Requirements Study earlier this year, the
study's conclusions differed from General McDew's assessment.
General Lyons, perhaps you could give us an update on why there
was a change.
Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats
because of the command's extensive network with private sector
entities in the transportation and shipping industries. General
Lyons, I would like to get an update from you on progress in
the cybersecurity efforts you have made since last year.
Once again, let me thank the witnesses for their service
and for their testimony.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
You guys know the drill. First, you are going to have 5
minutes. Try not to exceed 5 minutes, but your entire statement
will be made a part of the record. We will start with you,
General Scaparrotti.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
General Scaparrotti. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning and thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today as the
Commander at United States European Command. I am honored to be
here today this morning with General Steve Lyons as well.
First and foremost, I want to thank you for Congress'
support of the servicemembers, civilians, and families in
Europe. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and
dedication to Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is
essential to our national security and to maintaining global
peace and prosperity. We as a nation are blessed by their
voluntary and exceptional service. Thank you again for your
steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.
The threats facing United States interests in the EUCOM
area of responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and
growing. They are complex, trans-regional, all-domain, and
multi-functional. This remains one of the most dynamic periods
in recent history in my view. Russia has continued its
reemergence as a strategic competitor and remains the primary
threat to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment.
While the United States maintains a global military
superiority over Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten
to erode our competitive military advantage, challenge our
ability to operate uncontested in all domains, and diminish our
ability to deter Russian aggression.
In light of Russia's modernizing and increasingly
aggressive force posture, EUCOM recommends augmenting our
assigned and rotational forces to enhance our deterrence
posture. EUCOM also recommends further investments that enhance
European logistical infrastructure and capacity to support
rapid deployment of multi-domain United States Forces in
Europe.
In addition to the threat from Russia, the risk of
terrorism in Europe remains high despite a decline in
fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists
present a clear and present threat to Europe's people and their
infrastructure.
Thankfully, the United States is not alone in facing these
other challenges across the Euro-Atlantic theater. As our
National Defense Strategy states, the NATO alliance deters
Russian adventurism, contributes to the defeat of terrorism,
and addresses instability along NATO's periphery. Our allies
and partners play a vital role in our collective security, and
they have made significant progress in increasing cash
contributions and capabilities that provide our common defense.
For almost 70 years, NATO has been the cornerstone of Euro-
Atlantic security. As NATO adapts to remain relevant and fit
for purpose, we will find, as we always have, that every
challenge is best addressed as an alliance.
Let me close by, again, thanking Congress and this
Committee for your continued support, especially the sustained
funding of the European Deterrence Initiative, EDI. EUCOM's
future success in implementing our National Defense Strategy
and fulfilling our mission is only possible with Congress'
support. Thank you.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is my honor to testify today in
what is likely my final year as Commander of the United States European
Command (USEUCOM). I humbly represent over 68,000 brave and dedicated
men and women who are forward-deployed or stationed in the European
theater of operations. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and
dedication to Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is essential to our
national security and to maintaining global peace and prosperity. We as
a Nation are blessed by their voluntary and exceptional service. Thank
you for your steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.
Europe and the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance remain crucial to our
national security, as clearly stated in the President's 2017 National
Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and
the 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS). USEUCOM's operations,
activities, and investments are aligned with the principles and
guidance provided by these strategic documents. I cannot stress enough
that USEUCOM's ongoing and future success in implementing and executing
these strategies is only possible with Congress' support, especially
the sustained funding of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).
A Dynamic Security Environment
The threats facing United States interests in the USEUCOM area of
responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and growing. They are
complex, trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional. They require
the United States, together with our European allies and partners, to
constantly adapt with forces and concepts that are able to out-pace the
evolution of these threats. A revisionist Russia is the primary threat
to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. Russia has invaded
Ukraine, occupied Crimea, launched cyber-attacks against the Baltic
States and Ukraine, interfered in United States and other Western
elections, and attacked Ukrainian navy vessels attempting to transit
the Kerch Strait to Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. It is also
overhauling its nuclear forces--including those that threaten European
territory, such as the dual-capable, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF)-violating SSC-8/9M729 ground-launched cruise missile. Given
Moscow's demonstrated willingness to violate international law and
legally-binding treaties, and to exercise malign influence, Russia
threatens the United States' vital national interests in preserving a
Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.
We have already made significant strides in adapting our European
force posture to meet these threats. As we continue to adapt, USEUCOM
remains steadfastly committed to fielding a lethal, agile, and
resilient force and to strengthening the NATO Alliance. With continued
investment, innovative use of resources, and the strength of our
Nation's resolve, I am confident that we will continue to meet the
challenges of the dynamic security environment. This includes ensuring
the continued credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which
backstops all U.S. military and diplomatic operations across the globe
and helps ensure that tensions with Russia--no matter where or how they
arise--do not escalate into large-scale war.
risks and challenges in the strategic environment
Russia
Russia is a long-term, strategic competitor that wants to advance
its own objectives at the expense of U.S. prosperity and security and
that sees the United States and the NATO Alliance as the principal
threat to its geopolitical ambitions. In pursuit of its objectives,
Moscow seeks to assert its influence over nations along its periphery,
undermine NATO solidarity, and fracture the rules-based international
order. Russia actively pursues an aggressive foreign policy in
violation of other nations' sovereignty, carrying out subversive and
destabilizing activities in Europe and the United States and exploiting
opportunities to increase its influence and expand its presence in
Afghanistan, Syria, and Asia.
Russia employs a whole-of-society approach through a wide array of
tools to include political provocateurs, information operations,
economic intimidation, cyber operations, religious leverage, proxies,
special operations, conventional military forces, and nuclear forces.
Russia pursues its strategic objectives in Europe, while avoiding
direct military conflict with the United States and NATO, by targeting
countries through indirect action--backed up by the coercive threat of
its conventional and nuclear forces. Such actions include questioning a
government's legitimacy, threatening a country's economic interests,
mobilizing fringe opposition groups, and utilizing proxies or armed
civilians, such as private military contracting companies with opaque
ties to the state.
Russia's military capability improvements are significant. Russia
continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to complete its
broad-based upgrade of its nuclear forces and produce advanced weapons
and capabilities specifically designed to counter United States
military superiority. Russia's nuclear modernization program covers
every leg of its strategic triad and includes advanced modern road-
mobile and silo-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), new
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Long Range Strategic
Bombers. Russia is also developing and deploying new strategic nuclear
delivery platforms, to include its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered
underwater unmanned vehicle, intercontinental-range cruise missile, and
its air-launched ballistic missile, all of which Russia seeks to keep
outside of existing arms control agreements. Additionally, they are
pursuing nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons, which could provide them the
capability to attack anywhere in the globe with little or no notice.
Russia is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-
strategic, dual-capable weapons. It currently has an active stockpile
of approximately 2,000 of these theater-range systems, which are not
subject to the New START Treaty's limitations on deployed warheads.
These systems include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic-
missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges, and Russia's INF-violating
ground-launched cruise missile, among others.
Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile is of concern
because it facilitates Moscow's mistaken belief that limited nuclear
first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia
a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. The
2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for adjustments to U.S. nuclear
forces to close this perceived gap on the escalation ladder and
reinforce deterrence against low-yield nuclear use.
Outside of its nuclear forces, Russia is fielding advanced anti-
access/area denial (A2AD) integrated air defense systems (IADS),
precision guided cruise and ballistic missiles, modern cyber and
electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and counter-space weapons meant
to impede United States power projection in Europe. They have improved
readiness via investments in infrastructure, training, and
compensation, and their exercise program demonstrates increasingly
sophisticated command and control and integration across multiple
warfare areas. In the Arctic, Russia continues to invest in their
forces as environmental changes open up access to the High North.
The Kremlin has also demonstrated the ability and political will to
deploy its modernized military and expand its operational footprint.
Last year we observed a historically high combat maritime presence in
the East Mediterranean along with military deployments and
demonstrations in Syria. Their most advanced and quietest guided
missile submarine, the Severodvinsk, conducted extended deployments in
the northern Atlantic.
Russia seeks advantage over the United States and its European
allies through its non-compliance with long-standing arms control
treaties. Its violations of the INF Treaty allowed Moscow to develop
capabilities that the United States continued to forego. Its
``suspension'' of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty gave
it greater flexibility to posture forces in regions of special interest
to Moscow and to do so with significantly less transparency towards its
neighbors in ways we do not because of our adherence to these treaties.
Its violation of certain provisions of the Open Skies Treaty--as well
as its selective implementation of Vienna Document transparency
measures--poses challenges for ensuring full military transparency.
Our NATO allies supported the U.S. announcement to begin withdrawal
from the INF Treaty because they recognize that Russia's Treaty-banned
systems hold much of Europe at risk and that despite significant
diplomatic efforts--more than 30 engagements over nearly six years--
Russia refuses to return to compliance.
While the United States maintains global military superiority over
Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten to erode our competitive
military advantage, challenge our ability to operate uncontested in all
domains, and diminish our ability to deter Russian aggression.
Ukraine
Moscow persists in its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine
and block Ukraine's democratic choice to align with the West. Following
Russia's purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia's aggressive
activities, including those of Russia-led forces in the Donbas region
in eastern Ukraine, target Ukraine's defense, economic, and political
sectors. Russia has not implemented its commitments in the Minsk
agreements, and Russia continues to arm, train, lean, and fight
alongside antigovernment forces in eastern Ukraine. The conflict in
eastern Ukraine remains hot, with numerous ceasefire violations
reported weekly. The UN reports that approximately 13,000 people have
been killed in the Donbas since Russia instigated the conflict in 2014.
More than 100 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2018 as well as 55
civilians. Due to Russian intransigence, no peacekeeping initiative has
been implemented. Russia's unjustified use of force against Ukrainian
vessels and naval personnel in the Black Sea near the Kerch Strait last
November demonstrated Russia's disregard for Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, denying Ukraine its right of free passage in
accordance with international law. In addition, through its support of
illegitimate elections in the so-called ``Donetsk and Luhansk People's
Republics'', Russia has sought to undermine the government of Ukraine.
Russia will likely attempt to interfere in Ukraine's upcoming
presidential elections, as it did in 2014.
Georgia
After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia stationed 7,000 troops on
sovereign Georgian territory. Russia now occupies approximately 20
percent of Georgian territory and maintains a significant military and
border presence in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has
recognized the two territories as independent, entering into defense
agreements with these territories and incorporating South Ossetian and
Abkhazian ``national military forces'' into Russian Army command
structures. Russia exacerbates tensions by fomenting discord between
these territories and the rest of Georgia. While Georgia supports
confidence building measures, such as granting the EU Monitoring
Mission in Georgia (EUMM) access to the occupied territories in
accordance with its mandate. Russia opposes them.
Balkans
Security in the Balkans, a strategically significant region, is
tenuous, and Balkan nations are a primary target of Russian malign
influence. Negotiations between Kosovo and neighboring Serbia to
normalize their relations and agree on a long-term solution that is
viable for both countries have struggled to make progress for some time
and are currently on hold. Russia fuels regional instability in an
effort to prevent individual Balkan nations from progressing on a path
toward greater Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. Seeking to
maintain its influence in Serbia through political, military, and
economic support, Russia also opposes the recognition of Kosovo as a
sovereign country. NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes over
3,500 troops from both NATO and non-NATO nations, plays an important
role in maintaining security and stability in this region. Bosnia and
Herzegovina also continues to work toward long-term peace and
stability. Despite challenges from Republika Srpska, which is
influenced by Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina partners with the United
States and NATO, supporting the Resolute Support Mission in
Afghanistan.
Baltics and Poland
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are a focal point of United
States and NATO deterrence posture and activities as Russia attempts to
intimidate these nations, both politically and militarily. Russia also
tries to influence ethnic Russian populations, especially in Estonia
and Latvia, and both countries remain mindful that in Crimea, Russia
used these ethnic groups as a justification for intervention. Poland
has offered at least $2 billion towards United States basing in Poland,
and the form of such an increased United States troop posture in Poland
is currently being discussed in Working Groups under the auspices of a
DOD-led Executive Steering Group.
Turkey
Turkey is a strategically important ally facing significant
security challenges, the most pressing of which is the ongoing Syrian
conflict. It must maintain security along its border with Syria, and
within its borders, Turkey hosts over 3.5 million Syrian refugees.
Turkey continues to view the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Syrian
Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) as a single entity, one that
constitutes a greater threat than ISIS. This has complicated United
States-Turkey cooperation on Syria. USEUCOM works closely with Turkey
to help secure its borders, and we have improved our efforts, in
support of Turkey, to counter the PKK and the threats this terrorist
organization poses to Turkish citizens. USEUCOM also supports United
States interagency efforts to effect a deliberate withdrawal of United
States forces from Syria that ensures the enduring defeat of ISIS,
preserves Turkey's security, and keeps faith with United States
partners on the ground. Finally, USEUCOM supported United States
interagency efforts to provide an NATO-interoperable alternative to
avert Turkey's planned purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense system,
which risks triggering the Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Such an opposition puts at risk NATO cohesion
and our longstanding and mutually beneficial United States-Turkish
defense industrial cooperation.
Violent Extremist Networks
The risk of terrorism in Europe remains high, despite a decline in
fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists present a
clear and persistent threat to Europe's people and infrastructure. ISIS
seeks to re-establish itself in Iraq and Syria, expand into new safe
havens, and plan attacks against Western targets. We must remain
vigilant to all jihadist groups trying to extend their operational
networks and radicalize recruits in Europe.
Israel
In the Levant, Israel faces a complex set of security challenges
from numerous actors across multiple domains. Israel must constantly
defend itself from threats posed by Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and
Iran, which has expanded its network of proxies while also pursuing
advancements in its missile program to assert its influence throughout
the Middle East. Israel must also guard against Russia's increased
presence in Syria, its facilitation of Iran's presence, and ISIS
militants along its Syrian border.
Additional European Security Challenges
Several other issues present ongoing challenges to European
security. Though migrant flows slowed in 2018, Europe's migrant crisis
has led to difficult political discussions about demographic
integration and the allocation of resources. Transnational organized
crime and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons, to
include weapons of mass destruction and related materials, can be
linked with terrorism and place an added burden on European security
and police forces. USEUCOM is also monitoring China's activities in
Europe as it seeks to expand its influence and grow its presence. For
example, China is looking to secure access to strategic geographic
locations and economic sectors through financial stakes in ports,
airlines, hotels, and utility providers, while providing a source of
capital for struggling European economies. Russia and China have
increased their transactional collaboration based on some common
objectives and opportunities to increase their power and influence at
the expense of the United States and our allies.
accomplishments and opportunities--``strength and balance''
Strategy Implementation
USEUCOM is confronting the risks and challenges in its area of
responsibility by aggressively adapting our thinking and posture in
accordance with the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), the
Secretary's National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman's
National Military Strategy (NMS). We are particularly focused on
expanding the competitive space with Russia by increasing the lethality
of our forces and strengthening alliances and partnerships. Our forces
demonstrate commitment to the defense of our allies while our execution
of the Dynamic Force Employment concept, along with our operations and
exercises, introduce operational unpredictability to our adversaries.
USEUCOM will help ensure that our Nation successfully competes with
Russia, deters aggression, and if necessary, prevails in conflict.
Supporting NATO
The NSS, NDS, and NMS all emphasize the central role of a
revitalized NATO in securing our vital national interests. NATO allies
help shoulder our common defense burden through cash (defense
spending), contributions (such as troop deployments), and critical
capabilities (e.g., advanced missile defense systems). Allies have made
considerable progress in each of these areas.
Since January 2017, allies have added more than $41 billion in
increased defense spending over the 2016 level; and by the end of 2020,
Allies--according to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg--are on track
to add approximately $100 billion in increased defense spending. In
2018, eight allies spent 2 percent of their GDP on defense and ten more
have presented plans or made political commitments to do so by 2024.
Fifteen allies are already allocating at least 20 percent of their
defense budgets to major new equipment in 2018, and 11 more have
presented plans or commitments to do so by 2024. In addition, all U.S.
EDI-funded military construction is being submitted for consideration
of future funding via recoupment through the NATO Security Investment
Program (NSIP).
At last year's Brussels Summit, NATO Heads of State agreed that
ensuring alliance responsiveness, readiness, and reinforcement are
strategic imperatives for implementing a credible deterrence and
defense posture. There are several distinct elements to this
commitment. Implementation of the NATO Command Structure (NCS)
Adaptation will include a refined Initial State Peacetime Establishment
(ISPE) manning increase, the stand-up of NATO Headquarters Joint Forces
Command--Norfolk (JFCNF) to command and control (C2) operations in the
Atlantic, and the establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling
Command (JSEC) in Ulm, Germany.
NATO allies are also making progress in developing a more capable,
interoperable, and ready alliance force. NATO's Political Guidance for
defense planning (PG19) provides direction for a variety of required
cross-domain capabilities. PG19, discussed at the February 2019 NATO
Defense Ministers conference, is the first step in the process NATO
uses to influence allied nations, develop and deliver interoperable
forces, and ensure the alliance has the required capabilities and
readiness needed to strengthen deterrence and defense. Additionally,
the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), which builds upon the 2014
Readiness Action Plan's comprehensive package of Assurance and
Adaptation Measures, will provide ``4-30s''--30 major naval combatants,
30 medium or heavy maneuver battalions, and 30 air squadrons ready to
fight within 30 days--by the year 2020.
In terms of contributions, allies have stepped up their support for
NATO-led missions. From 2014 to 2017, the number of NATO troops serving
on deployment was up from 18,000 to just under 23,000 (with almost half
of that number, 10,500, from outside the U.S.). In addition to the
United States, Germany, Canada, and the UK serve as Framework Nations
for the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups in the Baltics
and Poland. The UK, Romania, and Croatia all contribute forces to the
United States eFP mission. Germany serves as the Framework Nation for
the 2019 NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) brigade. NATO
allies and partners also contribute forces to NATO's Baltic Air
Policing, enhanced Air Policing in the Black Sea region, Standing
Maritime Group, Resolute Support Mission (RSM), and KFOR.
As directed by the NDS, we will `fortify the Trans-Atlantic
Alliance' in part by increasing our collaboration with our European
allies and partners. With thanks to Congress for its support to our
security cooperation and security assistance initiatives, USEUCOM
continues to bolster our engagement in places like Ukraine, Georgia,
the Balkans, and in other allied and partner nations along Russia's
border. USEUCOM employs programs such as the Ukrainian Security
Assistance Initiative, Section 333 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, and
Title 22 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to build partner capabilities
in key European nations, enhancing their abilities to defend their
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to operate in coalition with
the United States. Additionally, USEUCOM works closely with NATO
planners and forces to integrate our collective capabilities, and we
will regularly test and improve these capabilities through title 10
exercises, our Joint Exercise Program, and through NATO Response Force
(NRF) certification exercises to ensure interoperability on the
battlefield. We will continue to press allies to meet the important 2
percent mark, advocate for individual nation capability targets that
meet their most pressing force requirements, and align with their
assigned NATO capability targets.
NATO is also a key platform for engagement and displaying
solidarity on issues such as Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. The
Alliance unanimously supported our declaration of Russia's material
breach of the INF Treaty in December and our announcement that we were
suspending our legal obligations and initiating withdrawal from the
Treaty in February. We remain engaged on this issue with our NATO
Allies to ensure NATO is postured to defend against Russia's new
intermediate-range capability and to deny Russia any military advantage
from its unlawful conduct.
Working with Non-NATO Partners
Georgia remains a committed partner, especially in Afghanistan,
where it is the largest non-NATO contributor to Resolute Support with
almost 900 troops currently deployed. The United States-Georgia
security relationship has steadily expanded, and the establishment in
2018 of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone
in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a
credible, ready force through training, education, and mentorship. The
program is a centerpiece of Georgia's broad efforts to enhance its
national defense and contribute to the security of the Black Sea
region.
Ukraine seeks to partner more closely with the United States, NATO,
and the European Union (EU), and it has made progress in developing a
capable, sustainable, and professional force. USEUCOM supports
Ukraine's efforts through the Joint Multinational Training Group-
Ukraine (JMTG-U), combined exercises including the annual naval
Exercise Sea Breeze, and other activities. The United States delivered
the Javelin anti-armor capability to Ukraine in April 2018 to deter
Russian aggression against Ukraine. Continued senior-level engagement
and support for Ukrainian self-defense capabilities and institutional
reform will help enhance regional security and demonstrate our
continued commitment to Ukraine's security and territorial integrity,
and a rules-based international order in Europe.
Thanks to the historic agreement this past summer between Greece
and North Macedonia, we are poised to welcome NATO's newest member once
Allied ratifications are complete. North Macedonia is a consistent
contributor to security, regularly deploying forces to Afghanistan and
to other United States and NATO-led exercises, and the Alliance will be
stronger with North Macedonia as a full member.
The EU has moved to enact multiple defense reforms and initiatives
in an attempt to create efficiencies and commonalities in European
defense. These include the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, which
serves as the basis for preparing the EU's long-term Capability
Development Plan and identifying defense and investment capability
shortfalls; the European Defense Fund, which will amplify research and
development undertaken by multiple participants to achieve economies of
scale and free up funds for additional capability development; and
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a legal framework to
cooperate more intensively on defense issues and jointly develop
defense capabilities for EU military operations. NATO continues to work
with the EU to ensure these efforts complement rather than duplicate
NATO initiatives or undermine NATO as the foundation of Euro-Atlantic
security.
Strengthening U.S. Deterrence Posture
A combat-credible United States deterrence posture in Europe means
fielding a force that is lethal, agile, and able to maneuver across the
continent, capable of delivering joint fires, flexible enough to
operate inside a highly contested environment, integrated with multi-
domain capabilities, resilient through redundant systems, protected
through integrated air and missile defense systems, and prepared to
leverage the full power of our allies and partners. Establishing this
force requires us to make resource-informed decisions about the
appropriate combination of persistent forces (assigned, forward
stationed, or persistent heel-to-toe 365 day rotations), and those that
can quickly reach and operate in theater under the Dynamic Force
Employment concept.
Each of USEUCOM's Service Component Commands has strengthened our
deterrence posture. The capability and lethality of United States Army
Europe (USAREUR) forces stationed in Europe were enhanced by persistent
armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB)
rotations. The forward stationing of long-range fires and air defense
units will further improve the lethality and resilience of USAREUR
forces. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) executed a no-notice deployment of
the Harry S. Truman (HST) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the
Mediterranean in the summer 2018 and to the North Atlantic in the fall
2018. As part of its deployment, the CSG participated in Trident
Juncture 18, which had not involved a CSG in over 20 years. In Eastern
Europe, strategic bombers and fourth- and fifth-generation fighters
deployed to support United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)
deterrence missions. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) sustained
rotational elements in both the Black Sea region and Norway. Special
Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provided rotational teams that
helped build the resiliency of allies and partners exposed to Russian
malign influence. In support of the Service components, our Nation's
Reserve component forces continue to play a critical role in supporting
our assurance and deterrence mission, especially through the National
Guard State Partnership Program (SPP).
Enhancing our logistical infrastructure and capacity is another key
element to fielding a combat-credible force. EDI investments in
resilient joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
(JRSOI) have resulted in infrastructure improvements as well as the
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and European Contingency Air Operation
Sets (ECAOS). USEUCOM coordinates with USTRANSCOM in the Joint
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to find integrated
solutions and facilitate strategic movement and maneuver through our
military and commercial partners. The EU is also addressing logistics
through its PESCO project focused on military mobility, with the goal
of partnering with NATO to better facilitate the movement of troops and
equipment across European borders. Furthermore, we are working to
enhance munition stocks and ensure interchangeability with NATO
munitions to allow flexibility within the Alliance.
We have also strengthened our deterrence and defense through the
Joint Force Headquarters Exercise Program, which prepares USEUCOM to
effectively carry out its wartime mission and trains our Component
Commands to assume Joint Force Component Command and Joint Task Force
(JTF) missions. Our exercises maintain and enhance our ability to
jointly operate in a multi-domain and multi-functional environment. We
execute four Tier 1 exercises--Austere Challenge, Juniper Cobra,
Juniper Falcon, and Jackal Stone, along with numerous theater-specific
and global integration exercises.
Although we have increased our forces, improved our infrastructure,
and successfully executed multiple rotations, deployments, and
exercises, a theater not sufficiently set for full-spectrum contingency
operations poses increased risk to our ability to compete, deter
aggression, and prevail in conflict if necessary.
As for our nuclear forces, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
validated the importance of maintaining the nuclear triad for strategic
stability with Russia and China. Great power competition requires that
we maintain a credible strategic deterrence, which includes modernizing
its supporting infrastructure. This underwrites U.S. security,
diplomacy, and our conventional military operations worldwide.
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
USEUCOM works directly with our combatant command counterparts and
our European partners to identify and counter terrorist threats. We are
increasing our intelligence-sharing and strengthening a counter-VEO
network that includes NATO, partner nations, and international
organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL. Our EU, NATO, and USEUCOM-
shared Tri-nodal Community of Action targets existing VEO networks and
facilitates expanded intelligence-sharing with law enforcement.
European allies provide the United States with critical strategic
access for counter-terrorism operations in USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM
theaters, and they also deploy their own forces to support U.S.-led
operations, including Operation Inherent Resolve. Counter VEO efforts
led to a significant decline in directed and enabled attacks across
Europe in 2018.
Competing in Cyberspace
USEUCOM's ongoing efforts to build operational-level cyberspace
capabilities are critical to implementing the NDS. USEUCOM benefits
from resources and authorities that enable us to partner more closely
with USCYBERCOM. We are well-aligned in the planning and conduct of
cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives that include deterring
Russia, countering misinformation, and defending computer networks. Our
Joint Cyber Center (JCC) continues to mature in manning, facilities,
and authorities to actively counter cyber-attacks and help strengthen
ally and partner nation cyber capabilities.
Building Intelligence Capacity
USEUCOM is working alongside our allies and partners to grow our
intelligence and analytical capability in order to meet both steady
state and contingency planning requirements. We are leveraging language
expertise resident in European nations and are utilizing non-
traditional ISR platforms to mitigate the global shortage of high-
demand, low-density assets. In addition, USEUCOM is leveraging the
growing capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in
sourcing intelligence communication and dissemination platforms, such
as the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System (MARS),
Publicly Available Information and Open Source Intelligence (PAI-
OSINT), and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(JWICS).
Countering Russian Malign Influence
As we expand the competitive space with Russia, USEUCOM is working
with the interagency to effectively compete below the level of armed
conflict. A leading effort in this domain of competition is the Russian
Influence Group (RIG), jointly led by USEUCOM and our Statement
Department counterparts in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.
The RIG brings together the interagency to share information and
collaborate in efforts to counter Russian malign activities in Europe.
Separately, United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are also
working with select European allies and partners to enhance their
defense institutions, border security, and resilience to Russian malign
influence. USEUCOM and USSOCOM work together to employ SOF in Europe,
where their unique access and capabilities can be utilized to compete
below the level of armed conflict.
Providing Assistance to Israel
USEUCOM directly supports our Nation's unwavering commitment to the
security of Israel. We meet regularly with senior Israeli military
leaders, coordinate in planning, and regularly participate in combined
exercises. USEUCOM also assists in the defense of Israel through a
continuous missile defense presence in the Mediterranean under
Operation Sharp Sentry. Israel continues to be the largest recipient of
Foreign Military Finance (FMF) funds, and in September 2016, the United
States and Israel signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that
provides $3.8 billion per year in military assistance over the fiscal
year 2019 fiscal year 2028 period, totaling $38 billion, enabling
Israel to maintain a qualitative military edge over its adversaries.
Enabling Global Operations
Strategic geographic access, forward basing, and overflight
permissions within Europe support multiple combatant commands and
enable allied, coalition, and United States operations. European basing
and access remains our strategic military ``high-ground'' for the
United States and a key enabler of our global power projection. The
bilateral agreements that grant the U.S. these permissions are built on
trust and sustained by maintaining relationships with our allies and
partners. Last year's United States-led cruise missile strike in Syria
is the latest in a number of examples in which European access, basing,
and overflight were critical in executing short-notice, contingency
operations.
Fiscal Year 2020 Requests
The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) provides funding to
improve our deterrence posture and execute our deterrent initiatives
and activities. First, EDI ensures that we position the right
capabilities and refine the necessary infrastructure to respond to
adversaries in a timely manner. Second, it underwrites our commitment
to article 5 and to the territorial integrity of all NATO nations.
Third, EDI increases the capability and readiness of U.S. Forces, NATO
allies, and regional partners so we can effectively deter adversary
aggression and adventurism. USEUCOM has remained disciplined in
nominating EDI projects that are consistent with Congressional guidance
and follow five distinct lines of effort: increased presence, exercises
and training, enhanced prepositioning, improved infrastructure, and
building partnership capacity.
In accordance with your Congressional guidance, we plan and execute
EDI as if it were a Future Years Defense Program. This allows us to
maintain fiscal and program discipline and prepares the command for
when EDI transfers from overseas contingency operations (OCO) to base
service budgets.
Our fiscal year 2020 Budget request focuses on: (1) continued
implementation of Enhancing Army Prepositioned Stocks to improve
responsiveness of ground forces and provide rapidly deployable combat
capability in the event of contingencies; (2) continued implementation
of the Air Force Prepositioned Stocks and airfield facilities to
improve flexibility and resilience of air forces and provide rapidly
deployable combat capability in the event of contingencies; (3)
continued enhancement to the Theater's Anti-Submarine Warfare through
the procurement of additional equipment and the improvement to theater
infrastructure; and (4) enhancing other key capabilities and
requirements throughout the theater including, but not limited to: (a)
Naval logistics hubs; (b) Integrated Air and Missile Defense: and (c)
JRSOI.
Conclusion
Given the transformation of the European security environment and
its impact on United States national security, a strong commitment to
the USEUCOM area of responsibility is more important than ever. I would
like to thank Congress for their acknowledgement of these threats and
their continued support of efforts within the USEUCOM theater. Russia
continues to engage in armed aggression in eastern Ukraine, is yet to
fulfill Minsk Agreement obligations, maintains an illegal occupation of
Crimea with reinforced forces, openly violates International law, to
include the Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe, and Open Skies Treaties, and blocks Vienna Document revisions
which are needed to address non-accountability of political-military
realities. As witnessed last March with the Skripal poisoning, the
Kremlin is willing to act boldly, employing banned military-grade nerve
agents against civilian targets on the territory of our ally, contrary
to all international norms, expectations of civilized society, and
their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The
growing capability of Iran and its proxies is challenging Israel's
security. Violent extremists, though slightly abridged in activities
last year, remain intent on destroying a rules-based system of
government and will continue to target United States and European
civilians and infrastructure.
Fortunately, we are not alone in meeting these challenges. As
stated in the NDS, the NATO Alliance will ``deter Russian adventurism,
defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, and address the arc of
instability building on NATO's periphery.'' NATO has been, and will
remain, vital to our national security, and a central element in
addressing the challenges of the 21st century. Our Trans-Atlantic bond
is strengthened by a shared commitment of collective defense,
democratic principles, and mutual respect of national sovereignty.
The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
civilians at USEUCOM continue to display selfless service and
dedication to meet the demands of the European theater. They are the
lethal, agile, and resilient force that will protect and defend the
Homeland and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Scaparrotti.
General Lyons?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Lyons. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Members, it is an honor to testify before you
today and represent the men and women of United States
Transportation Command.
I am pleased to join General Scaparrotti. He is one of
several but very important supported commands of the United
States Transportation Command, and his more than 40 years of
exceptional leadership remains a stellar example for all of us.
I could not be more proud of the more than 120,000
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and coast guardsmen and
civil servants that are assigned to United States
Transportation Command. They project and sustain the joint
force every day.
The Department's global deployment networks, transportation
capacity in air, on land, and over the sea and our global
command and control capabilities combine to provide the United
States with a strategic competitive advantage unmatched around
the world. Somewhere on the globe a TRANSCOM aircraft is
touching down every 3 minutes. TRANSCOM ships are under way.
Aerial refueling missions are orbiting overhead, and planes
converted to intensive care units are moving our Nation's ill
and injured.
I should remind everybody, though, that the key to our
success is global access, and I would like to highlight that
our allies and likeminded partners that provide access to key
regions, support substantial basing, and reinforce DOD's global
reach are critical to our mission.
We know we must never take our success for granted. For
decades, we could generally deploy our forces when we wanted,
assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. With
the rise of great power competition, we can no longer assume
that we can operate with impunity.
Before closing, I would like to acknowledge the letters
that I received from more than a dozen members of Congress
concerning the Defense Personal Property Program, which
relocates the household goods for our servicemembers,
civilians, and their families. Simply put, I agree. We lack the
capacity during peak season, and we lack measures to hold
industry accountable. Our most important resource is our people
and we owe them better. In consultation with the service
secretaries and the service chiefs and on behalf of the
Department, TRANSCOM is leading an initiative to restructure
our relationship with industry in an effort to improve quality,
capacity, and accountability.
In closing, I am proud to support DOD's enduring mission of
providing a combat-credible military force to deter war and
protect the security of our Nation. Our nation relies on United
States Transportation Command to respond with immediate force
on short notice and seamlessly transition to project a decisive
force when needed. I am fully committed to retaining this
strategic competitive advantage.
Thank you for your support to the Department and your
support to United States Transportation Command, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Stephen R. Lyons
united states transportation command 2019
Delivering for our Nation
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is one of ten
warfighting combatant commands (CCMD) in the Department of Defense
(DOD). Our ability to deliver and sustain combat power anywhere in the
world underpins the lethality of the Joint Force. USTRANSCOM's purpose
is to project and sustain military power at a time and place of our
choosing in support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). In doing
so, we advance American interests and provide our Nation's leaders with
strategic flexibility to select from multiple options and create
multiple dilemmas for adversaries. No other country in the world
possesses the capability to deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces across
strategic distances, providing an immediate force and a decisive force
when needed.
With global responsibilities and capabilities that transcend air,
land, and sea, USTRANSCOM is uniquely postured to fulfill five specific
responsibilities within the 2017 Unified Command Plan that include: 1)
the DOD's Single Manager for Transportation, 2) the Mobility Joint
Force Provider, 3) the DOD Single Manager for Global Patient Movement
(GPM), 4) the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator (JDDC) for
the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), and 5)
providing Joint Enabling Capabilities via the Joint Enabling
Capabilities Command (JECC).
USTRANSCOM responsibilities are operationalized and executed
through three component commands; Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command (SDDC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Air
Mobility Command (AMC); and one subordinate command, the Joint Enabling
Capabilities Command (JECC). In addition, the Joint Transportation
Reserve Unit (JTRU) provides critical Reserve manpower augmentation to
USTRANSCOM headquarters. USTRANSCOM also has a strong connection with
commercial industry, sometimes referred to as the `4th Component,'
because they provide important augmentation in day-to-day and surge
operations.
Our Total Force team is comprised of more than 122,000 Active Duty,
National Guard, Reserve, and Civilians that conduct worldwide
operations. In addition, industry partners under contract to the U.S.
Government provide critical transportation capacity, access to global
trade networks, and trained Merchant Mariners to crew U.S. Navy sealift
vessels. On an average day in USTRANSCOM, 115 railcars are moving DOD
equipment, 33 ships are underway, 1,500 trucks are delivering cargo, an
aircraft is taking off or landing around the world every 2.8 minutes
with 455 airlift sorties in motion, 47 tanker sorties are refueling
receiver aircraft, and 13 airborne patients are under expert medical
professionals' care. This activity, although significant, would be
dwarfed by a wartime scenario that requires a fully-mobilized
deployment enterprise.
Strategic Environment
The NDS describes the DOD's response to the most complex security
environment we have experienced in recent memory, and we expect that
power projection will be contested in all domains. For decades, the
U.S. enjoyed dominance in every operating domain; we could generally
deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and
operate how we wanted. China, Russia, and to a lesser extent rogue
regimes now challenge this ability through competition across all
dimensions of power, resulting in long and potentially contested lines
of communication for USTRANSCOM. In this operating environment, focused
DOD effort, complemented by a whole-of-government effort, is necessary
to enable sufficient comparative advantage in mobility and logistics
for USTRANSCOM to project military power decisively when our Nation
calls.
Projecting the Joint Force Globally
USTRANSCOM and the broader JDDE are designed to project and sustain
military forces around the world. We conduct globally integrated
mobility operations through dynamic synchronization of (1) global
deployment networks; (2) a global command & control and integration
construct to dynamically allocate resources for our Nation's strategic
priorities; and (3) transportation and mobility capacity operating
across air, land, and sea.
1. Global Deployment Networks
USTRANSCOM's global networks of nodes and routes provide the Nation
with multiple paths to connect the globe and deliver Joint Force
capability for supported combatant commanders (CCDR). Power projection
capabilities are enabled by en route infrastructure and are metered by
a command's ability to receive the force. Power projection is
underpinned by diplomatic alignment and geopolitical agreements with
allies and partners to enable strategic maneuver of the force and
deliver effects to the point of need.
1a. CONUS Power Projection
CONUS power projection relies upon DOD installations, seaports,
railways, and highways that connect them. USTRANSCOM manages several
programs on behalf of DOD, in coordination with other government
agencies, to ensure our national infrastructure is sufficient to
support military mobilization. The Strategic Seaport Program consists
of 23 primary seaports and multiple alternate ports. The majority of
these ports are active, commercial ports spread across the east, west,
and gulf coasts. The Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET) program
connects rail lines with over 120 defense installations and sites of
military importance.
The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) includes over 62,000 miles
of roadways connecting important military installations to each other
and with strategic seaports to facilitate rapid movement of military
cargo. DOD power projection requires close coordination with other
federal agencies to create a Joint Force conduit from garrison
locations to ports of embarkation.
1b. Geopolitical Access
Assured, international access across air, land, and sea is
underpinned by close coordination with like-minded allies and partners
to obtain and retain sufficient and resilient en route support networks
providing durable comparative advantage that no competitor can match.
Allies and partners provide access to key regions, supporting a
substantial basing and logistics system that reinforces the DOD's
global reach. Without that system, the DOD would lack options in many
contingencies and our responses would require more time to execute at
greater cost. For the past 75 years, our allies and partners have
joined us in defending freedom, deterring war, and maintaining the
rules which underwrite a free and open international order. Strategic
investment in international agreements, defense partnerships, and
infrastructure provide multiple power projection pathways supporting
global deployment.
2. Global Command & Control and Integration
USTRANSCOM's mission transcends traditional geographic combatant
command boundaries, and our ability to integrate global mobility
operations enables the JDDE to dynamically redirect capacity and
operate at the speed of relevance. Global Command and Control allows
USTRANSCOM, in support of Joint Force global integration, to apply
resources consistent with strategic priorities in time and space.
Through global networks and the capability to prioritize across all
missions and modes, USTRANSCOM has the ability to source the optimal
method of transportation to maximize value and responsiveness for
supported commanders.
Ultimately, Global Command & Control and Integration is necessary
for USTRANSCOM to achieve decisive warfighting effects. Our adversaries
intend to disrupt or deny this capability through cyber attacks, which
requires robust defense capabilities for mission assurance.
3. Transportation and Mobility Capacity
Transportation and mobility capacity provides the lift that
operates within the global deployment network. USTRANSCOM's assigned
mobility forces consist of sealift, aerial refueling, inter-theater
airlift, and intra-theater airlift forces. The DOD mobility force mix
is spread across the Total Force with approximately 60 percent of the
capacity retained in the Guard and Reserve. They are integrated into
our day-to-day operations--some as directed through mobilization and
others obtained by volunteerism. Our wartime mission success is
dependent on the mobilized output of our Guard and Reserve partners.
When necessary or when fiscally advantageous, military mobility
capacity is augmented by commercial industry, and during wartime, they
contribute to Joint Force projection through emergency preparedness
programs. The following paragraphs address mission profiles in the
areas of sealift, aerial refueling, airlift, patient movement, and
industry capacity.
3a. Sealift
The DOD's sealift transportation fleet is expected to transport
approximately 90 percent of our military cargo during wartime surge
(primarily for the U.S. Army), and it consists of Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/
RO) ships, prepositioned afloat vessels, specialty ships for heavy
lift, over-the-shore petroleum distribution ships, and crane support
ships. Because the majority of our sealift fleet support is dedicated
to wartime requirements, a significant portion is maintained in a
Reduced Operating Status that is available for tasking five days after
activation. Due to the increased age of the sealift fleet, degraded
fleet readiness, and wartime requirements, sealift is USTRANSCOM's
number one readiness concern. USTRANSCOM needs continued Congressional
support for DOD efforts to improve sealift.
Due to the age of DOD vessels and the level of maintenance funding
in prior years, the overall health of the Surge Sealift Fleet has
deteriorated. The Ready Reserve Force vessels average nearly 44 years
old with the oldest in the fleet being 55 years old. In contrast, the
average age of U.S.-flag, militarily useful vessels in the commercial
sector is approximately 19 years of age, which by international
standards is approaching end of service life. The use of steam-
propulsion has become obsolete across the competitive global shipping
market, however five steam-ships remain in the U.S.-flag commercial
sector, and they are all scheduled to be phased out by 2021. When that
occurs, USTRANSCOM will be the sole U.S. operator of steam-powered
vessels, with 26 vessels, complicating readiness because of the near
extinction of steam-propulsion engineers, parts obsolescence and
unavailability, and increased maintenance costs.
The DOD has not met ship availability goals in recent years, and
the U.S. Navy is addressing this problem by pursuing a three-pronged,
sealift recapitalization strategy through 1) service life extensions
where cost effective, 2) acquiring used vessels with Congressional
approval, and 3) procuring new sealift vessels in the out years. The
fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization
Acts (NDAA) authorized the purchase of seven used vessels, and we
expect to procure the first two vessels in 2021 and 2022.
Commercial industry plays a critical role for DOD sealift by
augmenting capacity, providing access to global trade networks, and
generating a supply of qualified private sector Merchant Mariners
essential to crew every surge sealift ship. Although the U.S. Merchant
Mariner pool is currently sufficient to crew the surge sealift fleet,
long-term, sustained conflicts could overstress the commercial
industry's supply of contract mariners needed for sustainment
operations.
USTRANSCOM utilizes commercial industry during day-to-day
contracted operations, and if needed in contingencies, we can activate
participating companies through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) to gain access to critical sealift and intermodal
capacity. When required, DOD also leverages U.S. commercial industry
and foreign-flag shipping for strategic transport of bulk petroleum.
3b. Aerial Refueling (AR)
The AR fleet provides the backbone of rapid U.S. global operations,
and ``tankers'' are the lifeblood of our Joint Force's ability to
deploy an immediate force supporting all NDS mission areas. AR is
USTRANSCOM's number two readiness concern. Today's AR fleet consists of
the new KC-46 currently being delivered, the 33 year-old KC-10 that is
planned for divestment, and the KC-135 which is a 57-year old airframe
programmed to continue flying through mid-2050. Currently, we must
manage limited AR capacity and globally position/reposition tankers to
meet the highest priority NDS requirements while taking risk in lower
priority missions.
Limited fleet capacity, an aging fleet with degraded readiness, and
non-mobilized operational utilization challenges pose significant risks
to meeting future demands. Approximately 60 percent of the AR force
resides in the Air Reserve Component (ARC), requiring careful
management to satisfy daily operations and enable the crew force to
attain full spectrum readiness. During KC-46 unit conversions, we are
working closely with the U.S. Air Force to retain sufficient AR
capacity and potentially delay the retirement of KC-135 aircraft in
order to maintain sufficient number of aircraft to meet operational
requirements. We strongly advocate for continued Congressional support
to enhance tanker readiness and balance new aircraft fielding with
aging aircraft divestiture in order to retain the necessary number of
accessible AR assets over the next decade to ensure USTRANSCOM can meet
NDS demands.
3c. Airlift
Airlift forces enable rapid power projection and sustainment of
forces around the world. Our strategic airlift force is comprised of C-
5s and C-17s that are designed to carry over-sized and out-sized cargo.
In addition to strategic lift, C-130s provide intra-theater delivery
under austere conditions. USTRANSCOM also enables theater rotary-wing
and fixed-wing contract airlift support where there is a demand and
security conditions permit. For example, USTRANSCOM routinely provides
contracts which support passenger and cargo airlift services, air
ambulance, medical evacuation, sling-load cargo operations, and
delivery of supplies for USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, USSOCOM, and
USINDOPACOM.
Sixty percent of the military airlift fleet resides in the ARC
underscoring our Nation's reliance on Reserve forces and the need to
balance crew tempo in non-mobilized operations. We are at the lowest
non-mobilized airlift capacity for daily activities since 2003. The
military fleet of `gray tails' is reinforced by commercial augmentation
accessed through day-to-day contracts or through the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) emergency preparedness program in times of crisis. We are
increasing the use of commercial augmentation to balance daily airlift
workload with unit readiness and enhance high-end warfighting
proficiency of the Mobility Air Force.
3d. Global Patient Movement
The USTRANSCOM patient movement mission is executed by the U.S. Air
Force aeromedical evacuation (AE) system and is a unique and vital part
of the military mobility enterprise for supported commanders. En route
care is provided by aeromedical professionals across the Total Force
that are specially trained to operate within the AE system and enabled
by nodal staging facilities located at key locations around the globe.
These professionals provide time sensitive, fixed-wing, mission
critical in-flight care to patients in transit for varying levels of
medical care. Highly specialized Critical Care Air Transport Teams
(CCATTs) are capable of providing intensive care while airborne, which
are growing to meet anticipated demands of operational plans. Global
patient movement is a Total Force mission with nearly 90 percent of the
total AE structure in the Reserve component to meet mission
requirements.
3e. Commercial Industry
The JDDE is inextricably linked to commercial industry capacity,
networks, and capabilities to support DOD requirements. From day-to-day
operations through wartime mobilization, commercial nodes, rail
infrastructure, trucks, aviation, and sealift capabilities are integral
to USTRANSCOM's ability to respond and scale to need. In times of
crisis DOD accesses strategic transportation capacity through
designated emergency preparedness programs--VISA and CRAF.
The Maritime Security Program (MSP), authorized by Congress and
administered by MARAD, provides a stipend for 60 U.S.-flag ships that
are contractually committed to be available for national contingencies.
These MSP participants contribute to VISA which enables USTRANSCOM
assured access to shipping services using U.S.-flag ships and their
global transportation networks during contingencies through pre-
approved contingency contracts.
Our CRAF contract providers are essential to meet global airlift
mobility requirements for both cargo and passenger movements in times
of need. This important relationship provides Long-Range International
airlift for approximately 40 percent of DOD air cargo and over 90
percent of passenger movements required in operational plans. To
incentivize support for this essential program, CRAF enrollment is a
prerequisite for U.S. General Services Administration's City Pair
Program, which spends approximately $3 billion annually on government
travel. The CRAF program is fully subscribed and provides DOD with
aircraft from 25 safety certified airline companies to augment the U.S.
Air Force mobility fleet during contingencies and national emergencies.
Cyber Mission Assurance
Cyberspace is a warfighting domain, without sanctuary, in which
capable adversaries continuously attempt to degrade our Nation's
ability to project the Joint Force globally. As in all warfighting
domains, assuring mission capabilities requires resilience and
simultaneous efforts across multiple functions and stakeholders,
including defense, interagency, and industry partners. Our actions are
underscored by the need to understand adversary intentions,
capabilities, and actions targeting the JDDE. USTRANSCOM actively
manages mission risk and advances our cyber domain capabilities by
understanding our large and complex cyber terrain, which is an evolving
endeavor. Defending cyberspace operations, providing for mission
assurance through continuity of operations when degraded, and ensuring
our ability to conduct uninterrupted Global Command & Control and
Integration are paramount to our success.
In addition to operations on Department of Defense Information
Networks (DODIN), USTRANSCOM has special interest and equities in the
mission assurance of industry partners relying on non-DODIN cyber
networks. We are working closely with industry partners and have
mandated contract language to improve cyber hygiene and mandate
contractor compliance with National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171 standards, which contains
110 distinct cybersecurity controls, on commercial networks. Industry
partners are required to conduct annual self-assessments and are
encouraged to share information with associated timelines for
improvement where necessary. NIST controls are just the first step in a
longer journey toward commercial industry's cyber mission assurance.
Industry partners have been responsive to DOD cyber initiatives and
recognize the utility in resilient operations capability in the cyber
domain.
Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS)
At the direction of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA, USTRANSCOM
collaborated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to conduct an MCRS assessing
the force sufficiency of airlift, AR, and sealift capacity to meet the
NDS missions. The study concluded that current, programmed fleets are
sufficiently sized in the near-term to meet combatant commander
mobility requirements, as defined in previously approved war plans,
with elevated risk. The study also highlighted readiness challenges
with the reliability of existing sealift vessels and AR tankers that,
if not addressed, will lead to increased risk in mobility support to
the NDS wartime missions. Specifically, the study reaffirmed the
requirement to recapitalize aging U.S. Navy sealift vessels and U.S.
Air Force AR fleets. Key enablers for network resiliency and protection
of mobility operations were also identified as beneficial to overcome
contested environment challenges. As plans evolve, we will continue to
assess the mobility enterprise's sufficiency against globally
integrated plans to capture the simultaneous demands of future
scenarios.
Joint Enabling Capabilities
The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command provides DOD's mission-
tailored joint communications, planning, and public affairs support
packages for all CCMDs, accelerating the establishment, organization,
and operation of Joint Force headquarters. In fiscal year 2018, the
JECC played a critical role supporting DOD globally integrated
operations through short notice, limited-duration deployments of over
1,000 joint personnel (70 percent were Reserve and National Guard) to
18 countries supporting 14 requests for forces, five Global Response
Force deployments, two Defense Support to Civilian Authorities
assignments, and tailored organic communications networks supporting
simultaneous requirements to multiple CCMDs. The JECC is a key enabler,
which has provided planning support for Joint Staff campaign plan
development, Customs and Border Patrol, Northeast Asia force flow
requirements, Hurricane Florence and Michael support, and multiple
operations and exercises around the world. It would be expensive and
inefficient to embed this level of highly qualified expertise in every
CCMD, so this pool of experts is an economy of force that allows the
CJCS to weight the joint effort to achieve desired mission outcomes.
Keeping Pace: Leveraging the Cloud, Data, and Analytics to Meet
Evolving Requirements
USTRANSCOM is on a path to leverage our Data and Analytics strategy
to generate competitive global planning and decision-making advantage
for the JDDE. Success in this area starts with access to data through
an Enterprise Data Environment coupled with advanced analytics, machine
learning, and artificial intelligence. Our primary goal in leveraging
data and analytics is to enhance our operational insights and
foresights to make better decisions in support of Joint Force power
projection. Our cloud journey embraces a modern, digital infrastructure
which is critical to defend against cyber-attacks as well as provide
greater reliability, adaptability, and scalability of the systems that
support USTRANSCOM and our components. Innovation and critical thinking
are essential at every echelon, and USTRANSCOM will evolve and overcome
emerging threats by being agile in our processes, willing to test,
rapidly adopt or reject new technologies, and make wise investments to
for the future. Leveraging the cloud, data, and analytics is essential
to understand, think, and act at the speed of relevance to out-pace our
adversaries in an increasingly complex and dynamic operating
environment.
The Defense Personal Property Program (DP3)
USTRANSCOM is working with military services and is committed to
improving relocation process for military members and families. We
appreciate Congress's expressed interest in improving the DP3. Each
year, the DOD relocates over 400,000 servicemembers, DOD civilians, and
their families to assignments across the globe. Roughly 40 percent of
these moves occur between May 15 and August 31, which is the period we
refer to as `Peak Season' due to the strain the DOD's assignment cycle
places on commercial capacity. Customer satisfaction survey respondents
rate their personal property relocation as either satisfactory (9
percent), good (18 percent), or excellent (63 percent). However, 10
percent of respondents report unsatisfactory experiences, which usually
correlate with peak seasons.
In response, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment established a joint working group to identify ways in which
DOD could improve moving experience during peak season. As a result,
the Services are attempting to spread military moves to off-peak
timeframes and are issuing PCS orders earlier to facilitate planning.
These are important initiatives that will generate marginal progress to
mitigate stress on the moving industry but will not fundamentally
improve DP3, a program plagued by diffused responsibilities and
accountability, lack of transparency, and insufficient quality capacity
to meet peak requirements. In support of the DOD reform initiative,
USTRANSCOM is exploring a centralized acquisition approach that would
transition DP3 to a single move manager. This concept would improve
capacity and curbside service by incentivizing long-term investment by
industry, reduce barriers to entry into DOD markets, and establish
clear accountability and transparency. If approved, this contract will
be in place by 2021.
Executive Summary
The Nation relies on USTRANSCOM to project an immediate force
tonight and a decisive force when needed and continues to adapt to the
most complex security environment in recent history. JDDE power
projection utilizes the global deployment network; global command &
control and integration; and transportation and mobility capacity, to
include commercial industry, to move Joint Force capability in support
of national priorities. This capability is underwritten by whole-of-
government coordination to secure and sustain access, basing, and
diplomatic agreements. To maintain strategic comparative advantage, we
have three top mobility concerns to fulfill NDS mission requirements:
1) readiness of the U.S. Navy's aging sealift fleet, 2) readiness and
capacity of the U.S. Air Force's air refueling platforms, and 3) cyber
domain mission assurance. We appreciate the exceptional teamwork from
the Services, combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and Congress. USTRANSCOM's ability to project the Joint Force
globally at the time and place of our choosing provides our Nation's
leaders with multiple options while presenting multiple dilemmas for
potential adversaries. I am extremely proud of our soldiers, sailors,
marines, airmen, and coast guardsmen who serve with pride and answer
our Nation's call every day.
Together, We Deliver.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Lyons.
Senator Reed brought up in his opening statement the
question as to whether or not, General Scaparrotti, we have the
right posture and capabilities in EUCOM to handle the credible
deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe. What is your
feeling about that?
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, thank you.
We have clearly made progress in European Command, thanks
to the support of Congress. We have added forces and
capabilities. We have improved the readiness. But I would tell
you in response to your question that I am not comfortable yet
with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe in support of
the National Defense Strategy.
Chairman Inhofe. Where are the shortfalls, as you see them?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I have shortfalls in our land
component and the depth of forces there--I would like to get
into more detail in that in the closed hearing--and in our
maritime component as well, both of those in particular when
you look at both the building capability and the modernization
of the Russian forces that we face there.
Finally of concern is my intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capacity given that increasing and growing
threat of Russia. I need more ISR. Again, in the closed
hearing, I can go into detail.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. You will have that opportunity at
2:30 today.
General Scaparrotti, we keep hearing from sources that
maybe we have some redundancy in our nuclear program. Now, we
have been guilty I think for a long period of time in not
addressing our nuclear modernization. We now are faced with a
situation where we have both Russia and China with what we
would call a triad system. I think that people with your
background need to respond as to why a triad system is not
redundant and is necessary.
General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, first of all, our strategic
nuclear force is critical to our deterrence and our security,
and a triad as a part of that force is important as well. Each
one of those legs of the component gives us specific qualities
that are somewhat different, and we need those differing
qualities just for a safeguard within the component itself, but
also to make it complex for our adversaries to determine or
believe that they have the opportunity to strike and gain
dominance. I think with the triad I am certain that they
cannot. I would note that they also have a triad as well.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, and it needs to be repeated because
the suggestions keep coming on.
In Ukraine, Russia is now in their sixth year at war there.
We have talked about and we have actually had language in our
defense authorization bills to send lethal help to Ukraine, and
to my knowledge, there has only been one case where we actually
were using lethal assistance. That was in the Javelin.
Can you tell us why we have not been able to successfully
do that since the authorization is there?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think as recommendations
for Ukraine, particularly on the lethal side, work its way, it
has to go through the policy deliberations that provide
authority to deploy those kinds of weapon systems. As you
stated, we got the authority with Javelin. The Ukrainians in my
view have trained very well for the use of that. They have been
responsible in the security and the deployment of it, and we
watch that closely. They have handled that well.
There are other systems, sniper systems, ammunition, and
perhaps looking at the Kerch Straits, perhaps consideration for
naval systems as well here in the future as we move forward.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, we have an authorization bill coming
up. Is this something that you think that we might need some
more language on?
General Scaparrotti. Well, as you will see, I will have
recommendations for that.
Chairman Inhofe. Good.
General Scaparrotti. I would like consideration of those
recommendations.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate that.
General Lyons, I know there is a problem in trying to get
all the service materials transported out where they are
needed, and recently there has been some suggestion that maybe
some of that should be contracted out. Now, we have gone
through some problems with the housing program recently on
contracting out.
Do you have any comments to make about that as being one of
the solutions to the problem that we face getting this material
out?
General Lyons. Chairman, if you are referring to the joint
deployment enterprise, we are heavily linked to industry on
multiple levels. If we are referring specifically about the
household good program--I think that is what you are referring
to, sir?
Chairman Inhofe. That is what I am referring to and that is
where the suggestion has come out.
General Lyons. Yes, sir. What I would say on that is that
is 100 percent commercial industry. It is not an effort to
privatize whatsoever, but it is an effort to restructure our
relationship with industry in a way that delivers higher
quality capacity and holds carriers and the government
accountable.
Chairman Inhofe. Good.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service and for your
testimony.
Last March, General Scaparrotti, you testified before the
Committee, I do not believe there is an effective unification
across the interagency with the energy and the focus that we
could attain. Is that still your view?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, it is still my view. We
have improved, and Congress, as you know, has committed funding
to some of the entities in the interagency to help us with
this. But it is still my view.
Senator Reed. I presume, based on your response, that we
need a synchronized campaign prosecuted in a unified manner
across the interagency, which is multiple institutions, to
counter Russian hybrid warfare and to deter anything greater
than that. Is that accurate?
General Scaparrotti. That is correct, Senator. We need a
whole-of-government approach to this.
Senator Reed. Where are the gaps right now? Where is it
that we are not making the investments in your view?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think actually we need to
probably get greater focus and energy into actually a strategy,
a multifaceted strategy, to counter Russia. As you know,
General Gerasimov just made another speech that underscored
their view of indirect activity, the use of whole-of-government
activities as a part of their spectrum of warfare. We have to
approach this in a way that we can counter that and I think
specifically within information operations, challenging their
disinformation, and cyber areas that we need to continue to
press.
Senator Reed. That would presumably require State
Department activity. Again, I am old enough to recall the Voice
of America, which is something that was very pronounced in the
1950s and the 1960s. Those types of very proactive information
campaigns--they are not being conducted at this point. Are
they?
General Scaparrotti. Not in the way that you recall, when I
recall, and I think we have the talent to pursue particularly
when it goes to underscoring our values, which I think is
important.
Senator Reed. All of this is designed, obviously, to deter
and to disrupt Putin's plans or aspirations, and without it, he
has more of an open field. Is that correct?
General Scaparrotti. Well, they have a good deal of
agility, and they seem to have no constraints on what they are
willing to say publicly.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Lyons, thank you for mentioning in your comments
the defense personal property program, DP3. As the Chairman
indicated, we are receiving some comments, and I am going to
follow up with some specific questions for the record because I
think this is an important issue. There is a proposal to move
to a single mover manager. Again, this has some echoes of some
of the discussions we are having currently about housing issues
in the military. We want to be ahead of the game. We will send
those questions to you for your response.
Even before you took charge at TRANSCOM, the command was
concerned about war planning. For many years, we assumed that
we would be operating in a benign atmosphere. We could fly
civilian aircraft unprotected. We could move ships in
unprotected, et cetera.
Last year, General McDew, your predecessor, hinted that,
for example, the KC-46 tanker that we are buying might be too
expensive to purchase because the number we would need in a
challenge situation to replace and to overmatch the adversary
would be significantly more than projected.
As a result, we asked TRANSCOM to produce a mobility
requirements study, and the report essentially came back and
said there is no problem with our ability to support
contingencies, we have got the right mix. It essentially was
disconnected with the comments that I heard, at least my
perception of what General McDew was talking about.
What has changed? We all recognize this is going to be a
much more hostile environment to move equipment in, and we do
not seem to be responding in an appropriate way. Your comments,
sir.
General Lyons. Sir, thanks for the question.
I think you are referring to the Mobility Capabilities
Requirements Study that the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] directed in 2018. That study was directed
between the Department and TRANSCOM to look at force sizing and
sufficiency of the mobility force against the program
essentially out to 2023. We did that and we did that based on a
demand signal from the existing plans that exist on the books
today.
But I would acknowledge to you today--and I think General
McDew was alluding to this--as we emerge our defense planning
scenarios to be more reflective of the defense strategy, as we
emerge and develop globally integrated plans, which are
happening right now in the Joint Staff, we do see the potential
for an increased mobility requirement, particularly in the area
of aerial refuel, which is the lifeblood of the joint force.
Senator Reed. What you sent up to us has been overtaken by
events, more or less.
General Lyons. Sir, I would say we still have work to do on
the plans on which it is based. The demand signal is emerging
right in front of us. We will adapt the study to the plans as
they evolve. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, thank you very much
for your work, and I think it is clear that we have great
leadership in your area of responsibility.
General Scaparrotti, about 3 weeks ago, this Congress sent
five delegations, House and Senate, to the Munich Security
Conference. That show of force was followed on then by a
delegation going to the NATO parliamentary assembly and another
delegation going on a week later to the OSCE [Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe] parliamentary assembly.
Does that volume of participation by House and Senate
members send a positive statement? Is it helpful to you in
dealing with your friends in Europe--with our friends in
Europe?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. First, it is very helpful,
and it is helpful to us as a nation. You know, at Munich, that
was the largest congressional delegation that they have ever
had there. It was noted by everyone. That in and of itself is a
strong message of commitment to our allies in Europe. Then I
would tell you the congressional delegations that traveled
during the year to different spots within European Command have
a very positive influence, again another sign of commitment and
actual discussion about the issues of the day. I routinely get
feedback from the chiefs of defense, ministers of defense, and
others when our congressional delegations visit. I know that it
has an impact.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, I could guess we could have a
debate about whether there is a crisis in NATO. I hope there is
not. But I do hope that the strong statement of wanting to be
involved was heard. I appreciate your comments in that regard.
General Scaparrotti, you are recommending augmenting our
forces in Europe. Specifically with regard to sea power, what
are your suggestions? For example, there are four destroyers in
Rota, Spain now. Do we need six? What else needs to be done?
What specifically can you tell us in an open hearing that would
help with regard to our sea power aspect of helping you?
General Scaparrotti. Well, as you know, specifically for
the maritime component, what we are looking at is an evolving
and modernizing Russian fleet, and in the closed hearing, I
plan to go through just the changes I have seen in the 3 years
that I have been in European Command. If we want to remain
dominant in the maritime domain and particularly under sea,
which we are today, we have got to continue to modernize, and I
think we need to build our capacity.
Specifically for destroyers, yes, I have asked for two more
destroyers within EUCOM. I would like to go into a little more
detail on that in the closed hearing rather than here. But
again, we do need greater capacity, particularly given the
modernization and the growth of the Russian fleets in Europe.
Senator Wicker. In addition to the two destroyers, can you
tell us publicly what else you are asking for in terms of
ships?
General Scaparrotti. Well, this primarily has to do with
capabilities that deal with the numbers of Russian ships that
we see within our theater today and also for anti-submarine
warfare. I would like to go into the more detailed piece in the
closed hearing.
Senator Wicker. Are we going to need more ships or fewer
ships?
General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, that is a service
question as to how they----
Senator Wicker. In your area.
General Scaparrotti. In my area, more. I would like to see
at least the rotation of naval component, carrier strike
groups, amphibious strike groups at a little better pace than I
have seen in the 3 years that I have been in command.
Senator Wicker. General, at the Halifax Security Conference
and at the Munich Security Conference, a number of us met
individually with the defense minister from Turkey. At the
military level, are we doing better with Turkey than it would
appear on the front pages of the newspapers? What is the news
out of Turkey recently, and is there any good news?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I would say, first of all, that
we have a good, very strong mil-to-mil relationship with our
counterparts in Turkey. I know very well their chief of defense
and their minister of defense, who was the chief prior to this,
prior to him becoming the minister. We do have some
differences, as you know and you can see in the paper. But we
have very candid and frank conversations, and we have been very
successful at working through mutual interest to this point.
Our mil-to-mil relationship, as it reflects in the deployment
of our forces, in my view has improved over the past year. That
is what I would hope that our work together will continue to do
here as we look at the tough issues we have got to face within
European Command.
Senator Wicker. In terms of military-to-military, things
are a little better than they were a year ago.
General Scaparrotti. They are. They have improved, and I
think we have a good candid relationship.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, General Lyons, I noted your concern about the
movement of personal items and want to volunteer as a
consultant. Fifty years ago, I worked for Allied Van Lines in
this area moving military families. If you need technical
assistance, it is a lot better, for example, to move a carton,
to pick up a carton of lamp shades than it is books. I learned
that the hard way. Anyway, I could not resist. You brought back
a lot of memories when you talk about moving furniture for
military families.
General Scaparrotti, I know you touched on this, but game
out for me what happens if little green men appear in Lithuania
or Latvia? Have we war-gamed what happened in the Ukraine and
Crimea? How do we respond? It seems to me this is a real
challenge for our whole deterrent posture.
General Scaparrotti. Yes. We have taken a close look at
both what has happened in the past and what we think could
potentially happen here in the future.
The first thing I would say is that as a result of that, we
have worked with our allies in the Baltics, Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria along the eastern border on what we have learned and
also on the capabilities that we think we need as an alliance,
both them and us, in order to deter this. Our first perspective
is what do we do today to ensure that Russia fully understands
the commitment of article 5 for an alliance.
Senator King. But the question is what is the definition of
attack. It seems to me that is the gray area that we are in to
know when and how to respond when it is not clear that tanks
are not rolling across the border.
General Scaparrotti. You have hit it on--I mean, the thing
that I worry about most----
Senator King. You can continue with that, you hit it on the
head, Senator. I like that in the record.
[Laughter.]
General Scaparrotti. Well, you did.
The thing that is difficult is not necessarily an actual
attack that you can see coming. It is actually the kind of
subversive undermining of both the nation's authority, one of
the nations that they are undermining, which is what they do,
and other elements of power that are not necessarily military.
The military would be one of the last that they want to use.
That is the most difficult.
But we also work with our interagency to the point that
Senator Reed made. That is the importance of all of our
elements of power here. When you can combine 29 nations with
their elements of power in response to Russia's, it is a slam
dunk. There is no doubt that we can handle this, and they will
be deterred. But we have got to work together.
Senator King. A question about funding and budgets. We have
not seen a budget yet, but there is talk that there will be a
significant increase in the military budget but primarily in
OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] as opposed to line items.
Give me your thoughts about having money in OCO rather than
allocations and authorizations that you can put to work in your
AOR [Area of Responsibility].
General Scaparrotti. Well, primarily those budgets that
come in within the base budgets itself, laid out in a FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program], give me greater stability and
knowledge of what is coming in the future. Really what we need
is predictability. OCO tends to fluctuate each year. I
personally underscore the greater predictability we have and
stability in our budget as we look forward. Obviously, the more
efficient we can be with our funding and the more sure that
what we need in terms of force capability, readiness, et
cetera, can be planned and we can deliver it.
Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that.
General Lyons, you mentioned in your testimony--and it is
clear--that a large part of your responsibility is met through
civilian enterprises, shipping, airplanes. I know you talked
about this, but please outline for us your level of
satisfaction and confidence in the cybersecurity of the private
sector partners.
General Lyons. Sir, we acknowledge this is a significant
challenge. We work very closely with our industry partners. As
a matter of fact, we have introduced language into our
contracts. We require self-assessments. We do a level of
analysis on that, and we work more closely to ensure that their
resiliency is improving.
However, I would admit to you that if an advanced,
persistent threat actor were on their systems today, it would
be problematic. There is no question about that.
Senator King. Do you red team their systems? Self-analysis
does not make me sleep a lot better at night. Do you have a red
team capacity where you can mock attack them to show them their
vulnerabilities?
General Lyons. No, Senator, we do not.
Senator King. I would urge you to consider that as an
option. In other areas of the government, that has been very
effective. It has a way of waking people up when a skull and
crossbones appears on the CEO's [Chief Executive Officer]'s
computer.
General Lyons. Sir, I agree with that.
Senator King. Thank you, General.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Lyons, as you know, Nebraska is the home of the
155th Air Refueling Wing, and that plays an important role
especially during deployment with your command. I am proud of
those airmen. I just met with them a couple of weeks ago back
in Nebraska.
But my question to you is when we are looking at the
challenges and the risks that we are facing in order to meet
the future demands--you kind of touched on that earlier--what
is the biggest issue you see contributing to the limiting
capacity of the fleet?
General Lyons. Ma'am, specifically in the area of aerial
refueling?
Senator Fischer. Yes.
General Lyons. I think you alluded to this. Aerial
refueling is the lifeblood of the joint force's ability to
project power immediately. There is nothing in the joint force
we can do without that capability. I was very pleased to see
the Air Force accept the KC-46 and begin that modernization
process. I think that is a very important first step.
The other initiatives that the services are working--the
service in this case, the Air Force--is improved readiness
against the KC-135 fleet and the potential deferment of
divestiture of some of those weapon systems so that we do not
have a dip in capability over time.
Senator Fischer. I am happy to hear you say that. As you
know, the KC-46--it is online, but it is going to take quite a
while to make it an important part of the fleet. As we look at
the 135, there are maintenance issues, and we are seeing delays
in that.
Are you confident that there is a good balance between
Active, Reserve, and Guard when it comes to refueling?
General Lyons. Ma'am, I am. I will defer to the service on
the force mix specifically, but I think you know very well we
have guardsmen on alert, 2 hours trip alert today. It is a
total force effort in everything we are doing. Over 60 percent
of our capability does exist in the Guard and Reserve.
Senator Fischer. What would you offer us as suggestions so
that we can mitigate some of the obstacles we are facing with
that limited refueling fleet that we have with their capacity?
Do you have any suggestions for us?
General Lyons. Well, ma'am, in the near term, it is really
about generating higher levels of readiness. In the KC-135
fleet, for example, we are unable to meet that 85 percent goal.
The Air Force is working very, very hard to improve that
readiness. In the near term, that would generate more tails
available for mission.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti, I would like to ask you about some
logistic challenges that I think you face in EUCOM. There have
been quotes in the past, in fact, from you when you said the
expansion of the alliance to include former Eastern Bloc
countries has exacerbated the lack of common transportation
networks between the newer NATO members in the east and the
more established allies in the west. For example, Germany just
allows trucks loaded with tanks to be on their highways at
night on weekdays. The rails on the Baltic railroads--the gauge
is set wider apart than we have in the western standard. It is
my understanding trains have to be unloaded and then reloaded
near Poland's border with Lithuania.
As we are looking at movement of troops and to be able to
respond quickly, to some of the possible challenges that we are
looking at in that area, how serious is this issue today? What
steps have you taken in order to address that?
General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you.
It is true what you stated in terms of the status today in
Europe. It is a serious issue because we need to be able to
move 360 within Europe with our forces and the allies' as well.
If there is good news, the good news is that, as you know,
Congress has supported, particularly through EDI, some of the
key infrastructure improvements that we need, particularly in
the east, to support our movements, reception of our troops,
support of the troops that we put in place there, but also it
helps the allies. The allies, as well, are financing, along
with many of those projects, things that they should do with
regard to airfields, fuel lines, rail, et cetera.
Senator Fischer. I apologize for interrupting you, but are
we trying to facilitate some changes so that our NATO allies
can make those changes? Are they working together as well?
General Scaparrotti. They are. Within NATO and the EU
[European Union] both, NATO had a study of the infrastructure
and logistics support that needed to happen. EUCOM was very
involved in that. We provided help to them, and we also
provided to the EU who did a mobilization study. That has
resulted in about $7 billion the EU is going to invest in
logistics and infrastructure over the next 5 or 6 years. Much
of what we recommended was, in fact, accepted. We now have a
study. We know what our issues are. We have insight within both
EU and NATO on that, and we have got to follow up and make sure
that that investment goes to the right places and actually
makes a difference in military mobility.
Senator Fischer. To be able to have a rapid response.
General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony and your
service over many years.
General Scaparrotti, you are well aware that if there is
ever a major conflict in Europe, the first shots are likely to
be cyber. They are not going to be kinetic. We have to be
prepared for that. I know since the Russian attack against
Estonia in 2007, the Baltic countries have been really leaning
into this in a pretty major way. Estonia created the Cyber
Defense League, established NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense
Center of Excellence, and as you know, Latvia is home to NATO's
Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.
But I would like you to give us an update and share some of
your thoughts on what you are seeing in the Baltic countries,
lessons learned, things that we may want to be replicating in
other places around the world.
General Scaparrotti. Well, you noted the changes that have
taken place. I would add as well that after NATO determined
that cyber was in fact a domain, which needed to happen to give
me as SACEUR authorities, we now have a cyber center that
operates within NATO. It is connected with each of our nations.
Most of them are building a cyber capability. You noted the
Cyber Center of Excellence, for instance, that I think is a
very good one. It is important because it is through that
process--that is one of those nodes that we are able to advance
lessons learned, do training, ensure that we can help with
defense within NATO but also to specific nations.
Like anything in cyber, though, it is a very dynamic world.
We are facing Russia, who is very agile in this and good at it.
We really cannot rest. We have got a lot to do yet in cyber,
particularly capacity. We have to build the skills we need to
man these centers.
Senator Peters. You know, one idea that has come to me--and
I would love to have your comments on it as we try to provide
more resources into that and really leverage some of the State
partnerships we have with the National Guard. For example, we
have a cyber unit in Michigan, but those around the country as
well. I know our partners in the Baltics would love to have
more presence of United States Forces in country there as well.
Talk to me a little bit about whether or not it makes sense
to have rotations of particularly cyber National Guard units. I
mean, this would be good for morale. It would be great for
retention. It would be great for recruiting. It would allow
them to be at the tip of the spear while exchanging great
ideas. Is that something that makes sense to you?
General Scaparrotti. It absolutely makes sense, and it is
something we are already doing particularly where you have
State partnership programs because they have a level of trust
that has been built, some over 25 years, and they have that
expertise. It helps me in EUCOM because otherwise I pull from
my cyber center expertise, and I send that team out to a
nation. Here we can rotate forces through from a State with the
same expertise and ability to build that capacity. We are
actually beginning to do more of that in Europe today.
Senator Peters. I understand there might be some need for
additional funding through the National Guard to do that. Are
there adequate resources for you to conduct that program or
will you need more?
General Scaparrotti. You would have to ask the National
Guard for the specific answer to that, but my general response
is when you pick up an OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo] like that
and you bring them in--generally, for the Guard there is a
funding issue, and one of us has to pick that up.
Senator Peters. We can explore that further because I think
that is necessary for us to do that.
General Lyons, I am a former supply corps officer in the
U.S. Navy Reserve, and so I think there is a lot of truth in
General Omar Bradley's maxim that amateurs talk tactics and
professionals study logistics. It is good to have you here.
I wanted you to comment a little bit about a recent Defense
Science Board Task Force Survivability Logistics Publication
that came out that talked about the decay in logistic readiness
was perhaps a result of insufficient war-gaming that
incorporated logistics. In a lot of war games, they are
typically just wished away. We know professionals cannot wish
away logistics or you are in a world of hurt pretty quickly.
Could you comment on that report and give us an update on
how you are integrating combatant commanders with exercises so
the logistics is an integral part of war-gaming and a real part
of war-gaming, not just wished away?
General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question.
I am familiar with the report. There are efforts actually
ongoing now, given the defense strategy and the security
environment, that will operate in the future to better connect
logistics outcomes, for example, in TRANSCOM's case, mobility
outputs and our ability to generate the force with a campaign
analysis, which is currently disconnected. We are working with
the Department to move in that direction in the future.
Senator Peters. General Scaparrotti, briefly. I know we are
running out of time. But how is that being incorporated in your
war-gaming?
General Scaparrotti. We work very closely here in terms of
our war-gaming and do a transportation feasibility in each one
of those. Our planners in fact work with his, either coming
back or they come when we do our war planning. That is just a
standard part of what we do.
Senator Peters. You do not think it is just being wished
away--the logistics challenges and the war-gaming?
General Scaparrotti. No, I do not. In fact, if anything, we
have leaned into this trying to be very factual about what our
problems will be, particularly with respect to those in Europe,
as we mentioned earlier.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. General Scaparrotti, welcome to your
last hearing and, General Lyons, to your first hearing. I am
sure there were no jokes made at General Lyons' expense before
this hearing began by General Scaparrotti.
General Lyons, with that smile on your face, I would like
to address some issues I have heard from logistics companies,
including some in Arkansas, dealing not just with your command
but with the Federal Government as a whole, but obviously, your
command is one of the largest if not the largest in the entire
government when it comes to moving things and equipment. They
express frustrations with the kind of inscrutability or
perplexed at the bureaucratic challenges of dealing with the
government. A lot of these companies are either run by veterans
or they have a large veteran workforce, given the training that
the military gives its personnel in logistics. They would like
to work more with the government and with TRANSCOM in
particular. They just sometimes find it to be a challenge.
What kind of working groups, if any, does TRANSCOM have
with private industry to try to make what you do more
transparent to them so they can better serve our personnel
through your command?
General Lyons. Senator, it is a great question. We are
inextricably linked in our relationship with industry and their
ability to generate the force.
We have a relationship with our industry partners at
multiple echelons, all the way from action officer to executive
working groups that my three-star deputy leads. I also meet at
least two times a year with the senior executives from our
industry partners.
I acknowledge your point that from time to time, based on
our federal acquisition regulations, it can be a bit of an
obstacle to work with the government. We try to minimize that
as much as possible, and in fact, that is really, Senator, what
is driving some of our restructure initiatives on the household
goods side of the house to open up the market to more capacity.
Senator Cotton. Good. I would just like to encourage that
kind of linkage to continue. As the logistics industry changes
so rapidly through the use of information technology, the more
connections you can have to private sector leaders and to the
people who are out doing this on the front lines I think it
will just be beneficial to the personnel that you are serving
on the front lines, whether it is moving household goods in the
summer months or getting material down range as well. I would
like to have my office continue to work with your command to
try to facilitate some of those conversations.
General Lyons. Sir, that will be great. Thank you.
Senator Cotton. General Scaparrotti, I noted with great
interest that Vladimir Putin yesterday directed Russia to
withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF]
Treaty, which I find somewhat ironic since they have been
violating their commitments under the INF Treaty for the last
10 years. Do you have any thoughts on that news?
General Scaparrotti. It would only be to underscore what
you just suggested and that was the fact that they left the INF
Treaty some time ago, years ago, by very deliberately producing
a weapon in violation, and they have been deploying that
weapon.
Senator Cotton. The United States Government has publicly
recognized these violations under both the Obama
administration, and the Trump administration. We recently
announced our intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty.
Was there any public opposition from a NATO partner or was
it uniform NATO support for the United States' decision to
withdraw from that treaty?
General Scaparrotti. NATO both in December and February
produced very strong statements in support of each step that we
took in terms of our withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
I would say that our NATO allies understand that the INF
[Treaty] is a very important component to European security
from their view. They will emphasize--I am sure you have heard
them--with each step they would hope that we would continue to
work to bring Russia back into compliance before we are fully
out, the 6-month period, or that we would look forward from
that then to perhaps a new treaty that would encompass the new
weapon systems, et cetera. They very much understand the
importance of this, but they did support us strongly--29
nations strongly--in our decision.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Obviously, one reason why it is in our national security
interest to withdraw from the INF Treaty besides Russia's
noncompliance with the treaty is that China has been free to
build intermediate-range missiles at unlimited rates for
decades now. As you know from your time at United States Forces
Korea, that has a significant impact on our security interest
in the Pacific region.
But China is not just limited there. It wants to be a
global player. I noted with interest last year that the
government of Denmark agreed to build some airports at
Greenland, which it controls, not exactly considered a
traditional EUCOM area, but it is within your area of
operations.
What are the implications of Chinese presence if they were
to get a foothold, which they were largely denied in that
airport construction project last year in the high north?
General Scaparrotti. Well, it could have an absolute
impact. I mean, I am concerned personally about the strategic
investments that we see by China throughout Europe in air and
sea ports or vicinities of that in critical technologies and
companies that hold that particularly in the high north where
you note Greenland and Iceland both are important bodies in
that line of communication. I think we need to watch carefully
China's investment in these ports. As you know, many of their
commercial companies are actually state-owned.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Scaparrotti, I want to thank you for your service
to our Nation for over 40 years. I know you have been wearing
that fourth star on your shoulder for longer than anyone else
in the armed forces right now. You have well earned the
retirement that you have ahead of you. But I think I speak for
most members of this Committee when we say that we would like
to see you back in the employ of Uncle Sam sometime in the
future.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here and for your
service to the country.
General Lyons, I want to follow up on some of the concerns
that have been raised by Senators Reed and Fischer about the
phasing out of our KC-135's and when the KC-46's are going to
arrive. It is my understanding that in New Hampshire where we
have the 157th Air Refueling Wing that there will be a period
of months between the time the 135 is phased out and the 46 is
delivered, given that it is already behind schedule.
Can you comment on what we should assume will happen during
those months when there is no refueling capacity and whether
the intent will be to try and keep the 135's around longer
until the delivery of the 46's?
General Lyons. Ma'am, from my perspective, the key issue is
to maintain operational capability throughout the conversion.
The Air Force is working that very issue. In fact, they are
working currently to delay the divestiture of a select number
of KC-135's so that we do not have this exorbitant dip in
capability over time. The service is working that, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Should we assume that that is going to
happen? I appreciate that the service is working it, but does
that mean that we are going to see that extension happen?
General Lyons. Senator, it has been my request. It has been
well received by both the air component and the chief.
Obviously, it is going to cost some money, and when the money
is put into the program, that is when we will know. But the
intent is to retain 28 weapon systems beyond their currently
scheduled retirement.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
In terms of Boeing's delivery of the 46's, I know that they
have accepted or made a commitment to address some of the
concerns that have been expressed about the tankers. Do we know
whether that is going to speed up the further delivery, or
should we assume that we are going to see further delays?
General Lyons. Ma'am, the decision to deliver I think was a
good one. Right now, we are on a pause, as you may know, based
on some Boeing issues with a foreign object. I do not have a
sense, until that is cleared up, for the impact on the program.
But I will talk to the Air Force about that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I am sure
that all of us hope that Boeing will do everything they can to
make sure those deliveries are done to address the concerns
that have been raised.
General Scaparrotti, you mentioned in your testimony the
concern about Turkey acquiring the S-400 at the same time they
are supposed to take delivery of the F-35's. I know that there
has been an effort underway to try and encourage Turkey to look
at other alternatives and that there was an offer made early in
January for the sale of the Patriot system. They have until the
end of March, it is my understanding, to decide whether they
are going to take delivery of that or not.
But the question I have is, if Turkey moves forward with
the agreement with Russia on the S-400, do we assume that they
should receive delivery of F-35's and what does that do to
their accessing that technology?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would say, first of all, if
they accept the S-400 and to establish it within Turkey, there
is, first of all, an issue that it is not interoperable with
NATO systems nor is it interoperable inside of our integrated
air missile defense system. That presents one problem.
The second has to do with the F-35. It presents a problem
to all of our aircraft, but specifically the F-35 I believe. My
best military advice would be that we do not then follow
through with the F-35 flying it or working with an ally that is
working with Russian systems, particularly air defense systems,
with one of our, what I would say, is probably one of our most
advanced technological capabilities.
Senator Shaheen. I am pleased to hear you say that, but the
question I have is I understand that some of the parts for the
F-35 are being made in Turkey and what happens to that assembly
and who picks up that slack if Turkey cannot receive the F-35.
General Scaparrotti. Well, that is one of the issues that
is being considered and will be considered I am sure, as you
know.
But for them, I would just underscore the fact that this is
a huge decision for Turkey. I have talked to them personally as
all of our leadership has. It connects in many different ways
to the employment and the integration that they have within the
system itself, the F-35, but also the FMS [Foreign Military
Sales] and other systems that we sell to Turkey as well. I
would hope that they would reconsider this one decision on S-
400, one system, but potentially forfeit many of the other
systems and one of the most important systems that we can
provide them.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I share that view. I
think Turkey is an important ally, but it is one that we hope
to be able to depend on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Let me inform you that some of the KC-46's have been
delivered. In fact, I flew the right seat of a KC-46 from
Seattle, Washington to Altus. It is running fine.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and your service.
General Scaparrotti, I want to talk about a few things.
First, there is a narrative that I think has played out a lot
in the media that the administration or what you are doing in
your capacity is somehow being weak on Russia and Putin. I just
want to talk about a few actions that under your leadership we
have been taking because is it not true that the one thing that
Putin understands more than anything is power. Right? Would you
agree with that?
General Scaparrotti. I would agree.
Senator Sullivan. Power of military forces, energy
production, not worth by actual power.
Does it help that we have now our forces deployed in
countries like Poland and the Baltics in the European
Reassurance Initiative, which this Committee has supported in a
bipartisan fashion?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, very important.
Senator Sullivan. It does not get a lot of press, but my
colleague, Senator Ernst, was recently in Ukraine. As you know,
the previous administration was reluctant and never helped the
Ukrainians with defensive weapon systems that they could use to
protect themselves. Under Secretary Mattis' leadership when he
got involved, we did provide the Ukrainians the Javelin anti-
tank missile system. How is that working out?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, first of all, as I said
earlier in testimony, they have received the system. I have
been impressed with their training and their preparation to
utilize it.
Senator Sullivan. Do you think that makes Russian T-72 tank
drivers in eastern Ukraine a little more nervous?
General Scaparrotti. I think it does. I think the fact that
they have a Javelin that they can employ and they know how to
employ it is a deterrent.
Senator Sullivan. Are we seeing any force posture
indications that they are taking that into consideration when
they are moving those kind of forces? I am talking about the
Russian forces.
General Scaparrotti. Not directly because we have not
employed them right on the line. The Ukrainians have not. But I
am sure that they are aware of them, and they take that in
consideration in the employment of their forces and where they
put them. They know it is a lethal weapon system.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
I do not know if you mentioned it--I am sorry. I had to
step out prior to your testimony. But could you talk a little
bit about the Vostok 2018 exercise? My understanding was it
involved 300,000 Russian troops, 80 ships, notably 3,200
Chinese troops, including up to as many as 900 Chinese tanks.
Are those reports accurate and should we be concerned about
that?
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, the numbers that
they published are higher than what was factually present. I
can talk in more detail on this in a classified hearing this
afternoon. It was not that large, but it was large. Yes, we
should take notice primarily because it was designed for them
at a very strategic operational level to be able to command and
control large forces in a force-on-force type of exercise
scenario. It connected them with multiple of their regional
commands specifically in order to practice that. It covered
both conventional long-range precision munitions training, as
well as nuclear training offset toward the end. It included
China, as you noted, which is the first time I can recall them
providing forces in a partner training scenario, which is quite
unusual. The size of it, the complexity of it, the
communications that they demonstrated, the fact that it was a
hybrid conventional and nuclear exercise I think is all
important.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you for that.
General Lyons, you and I had a discussion, and the Chairman
I see was just talking about the KC-46 and the deployment of
that. I know that is not ultimately your call, but certainly
you are an advocate and you have a lot of knowledge. I am going
to ask just a couple quick questions that I would just
appreciate quick answers to.
But when you look at the places where you would want to
deploy that, either CONUS [Continental United States] or OCONUS
[Outside Continental United States] decisions, you know, the
National Defense Strategy prioritizes great power competition
with China and Russia, decisive action against North Korea,
would it make sense to place KC-46's in a part of an American
territory, State, or otherwise as closely proximate to those
places?
General Lyons. Senator, just to be clear, Alaska is clearly
a strategic location.
Senator Sullivan. You are getting to my punch line already.
I have not even gone through the list. Let me go through the
list.
We are close to all those places. We are the only State
where you are actually right at the seams of EUCOM, PACOM
[United States Pacific Command], NORTHCOM [United States
Northern Command], STRATCOM. The State of Alaska is in the
seams of every one of those. The OPLANs [Military Operation
Plans] that support contingencies all focus on Alaska. It has
the fourth largest fuel storage area of the Air Force in any
place in the world. It is going to have over 100 fifth
generation fighters in the next 2 years. One hundred. No other
place on planet earth will have 100 combat-coded fifth gen
fighters. It has the existing infrastructure to support aerial
refueling operations. JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaska Range
Complex] will be the best training place for fifth gen aircraft
anywhere in the world.
Is your advocating for the KC-46--I mean, of course, I am
advocating for the State I represent, but I would not do it
unless I thought it made 100 percent strategic sense. Just give
me your thoughts on that very quickly.
General Lyons. Sir, I know the Air Force is still
developing the basing plan. It is not complete yet,
particularly in the future years. I do have confidence that
they will look completely at the operational range and
capability to be able to swing and give us the flexibility in
TRANSCOM to employ that important weapon system. I am sure that
Alaska is part of that discussion. I just do not know the
details, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Duckworth?
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope on that
right-seat ride, you did not try to get them to do a hammerhead
or anything, did you, with any aerobatic maneuvers?
[Laughter.]
Senator Duckworth. Stay within the restrictions.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your participation today.
General Scaparrotti, I want to return to the discussion
about logistics challenges especially in the Eastern European
area. Illinois National Guard has been the sponsor in the State
Partnership for Peace program with the nation of Poland for 28
years now I believe--27-plus years. Through my service, I am
somewhat familiar with the challenges that we face there.
Could you update us on how the establishment of the NATO
Joint Support and Enabling Command [JSEC] is going? Let us
remind us of why it was created and what it will better enable
you to do in theater to respond to Russian aggression. When
will this command be fully operational?
General Scaparrotti. The establishment of JSEC, as you
called it, is moving I think on timeline. It is actually ahead
of pace in my view. The Germans who were the framework nation
for this headquarters in Ulm, Germany have--in my view they
have really leaned into this. They have already got their
commander designated. They have a portion of the staff there.
They have been present in my headquarters in SHAPE [Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] to do the further planning
that needs to take place to ensure that it is right-sized, to
make sure that the planning, the understandings, roles, and
responsibilities are correct. That is really the piece that we
are doing right now, but it is moving along very well.
This fall is IOC [Initial Operational Capability], and it
is another year before it would be fully operational. We have
got some time here before it would be fully operational. But I
would say to you that I think they will be ahead of that in
terms of real output. They are already making a difference in
terms of our logistics planning with other logistics commands
within the headquarters and throughout the component. I think
they will actually be leaning into that before they are
actually fully established, so to speak.
Why did we set that up? Primarily because in a European
environment where we have got to be able to support and move
360, not just to the eastern border, but north to the high
north, south, and west with a threat that is actually 360 and
then we needed to protect the central lines of communication,
critical ports, seaports, and infrastructure in doing that
because as has been testified to here by General Lyons, we are
now in a contested environment. We needed a headquarters that
both looked logistically, as well as protection of those key
assets. That is really why we stood up that command, and it is
well placed being in kind of the heartland of Europe, so to
speak, in Germany.
It is a very important step for NATO to take, and I think
it demonstrates NATO's focus on making sure that it will be
relevant for the environment that we are in today.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
General Lyons, how would TRANSCOM plug into the JSEC, and
has this been tested yet? I mean, how would you plug in during
conflict, for example, and have we tested it?
General Lyons. Senator, first let me tell you thank you for
your understanding of logistics and the importance of logistics
to warfighting. I greatly appreciate that.
I have actually been to Europe several times, and I met
with the leadership that were developing the JSEC and I
understand that concept very well. I think it is a great
initiative that General Scaparrotti and his team are moving out
on.
I do not know that we plug in directly. We plug in directly
to his EUCOM headquarters through a European deployment and
distribution operations center and then across at echelon to
include his headquarters, and we would take the signals that he
would be sending on his priorities for mobility and then meter
them accordingly. Then he would have the role then to integrate
that from a coalition perspective.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
With that, I would like to return, General Scaparrotti to
an understanding of sealift. We had a discussion earlier today.
I understand that recently NATO reactivated its Atlantic
Command to guard the sea lanes of approach into Europe in the
event of war.
Can you describe for me in general terms the amount of
sealift that would be required to move significant United
States Forces to Europe in the event of conflict? Are you
comfortable with the amount of sealift at your disposal right
now in the event of a conflict?
General Scaparrotti. Well, Senator, when we go to the
closed session, I can probably get into more detail on that.
But I would say it is significant. Because of the types of
forces I move--I think Steve would agree that we rely on
sealift largely for a lot of that bulk and heavy movement.
You know, I am aware of the challenges to particularly our
Reserve Force for naval forces and our commercial support. That
is all important if we had a full conflict in Europe. I would
just underscore the importance of funding that and making sure
that we have the readiness in the right place because we will
rely on it heavily for any crisis in Europe.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. We will probably try to
follow up in the session later today. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Let me just, since you brought up the KC-46, remind all of
us here that is replacing eventually the KC-135. The first KC-
135 that was delivered to Altus Air Force Base was in 1959. It
has been operating for 60 years. It gives you an idea of the
significance of the KC-46 to the distant future of that
capability.
Senator Hawley?
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, General Lyons, thank you both for
being here. Thank you for your exemplary service, and thank you
to the men and women under your command.
General Scaparrotti, if I could just start with you, I want
to talk a little bit about the NDS Strategy Commission. The NDS
Commission, various RAND studies, and others have clearly
indicated that we are not optimally postured to deal with a
Russian assault into the Baltics in particular. The NDS clearly
states that the joint force has got to be prepared to blunt
this assault and to prevent a Russian fait accompli.
My question is building on the positive work in the
previous years, the European Defense Initiatives, and other
activities, could you give us a progress report? I understand
you may want to save some of this for the closed session, but
can you give us a progress report on our force posturing
developments to prevent that fait accompli? Where are we on
this in your judgment?
General Scaparrotti. We have made clear progress as I
stated up front in this regard, and largely thankful to the
support of Congress, particularly EDI, in funding the changes
that we need to make. We made progress, I would tell you, in
every domain that is important to that, including cyber in
that, for instance. But we are not postured yet where we need
to be, and as you cited, the studies that have come out
recently have underscored that. In a closed session, I would
like the opportunity to talk to you more specifically about
where we are at and what we are short.
But, for instance, you know, we now have rotational
brigades, an armored brigade, a CAB [Combat Aviation Brigade]
in the east, a battalion task force as a part of NATO. We have
rotational air forces. We have rotational bomber forces. We
have had twice now--well, three times actually--a carrier
strike group once already in the high north for the first time
in 20 years. At the beginning of my time here, 3 years ago, we
were moving one brigade at a time and challenged. A month ago,
I moved four brigades, two armored, two CABs, simultaneously in
Europe. That is the progress. Thanks to TRANSCOM and others
that help us do the work, provide the assets, increase the
infrastructure to make that happen. Clearly progress, but we
are not there yet.
Senator Hawley. Again with the reservation I realize you
wanted to save the specifics for the closed session, I think it
is important to get some of this on the record as we are about
to, as you know, go into the authorization season here and then
the appropriations season where we will be needing to make the
case for authorizing and then spending what is necessary in
order to get you what you need.
Can you give us an overview at least about what more you
think we need, generally speaking, to get you to the posture
that the NDS recommends?
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, we will start with
the cyber domain. There is a plan and an increase in my cyber
capability, and I have been increased by CYBERCOM as a
priority. That has happened. But I still have personnel and
skills in the numbers of around 50 personnel yet. It would be
very helpful to have them in place. That is one of those.
If you go to the land component, I need greater land
component capability not only in armored elements but with my
enablers, and I will go into more detail on that in the other.
I have mentioned maritime, greater capacity there, as well
as specific capabilities to stay ahead of, frankly, the
modernization that we see in Russia's maritime forces.
The Air Force is presently on a rotational basis providing
fifth gen aircraft to me, bomber aircraft, et cetera, which we
need to employ for a deterrent factor and also to ensure our
readiness and capability. I am looking forward to those being
stationed permanently in some numbers within Europe as well.
Senator Hawley. Thank you.
Let me ask you about our European allies. Can you give us a
report--you mentioned some of this in your written testimony.
Can you give us a report on the work with our European allies
especially Germany to ensure that they are meeting their NATO
commitments and have a plan to do so going forward?
General Scaparrotti. Well, as you know, we have been
working with all of our allies, and I mentioned up front the
cash contribution. Since 2016, our allies have put another $41
billion into defense. By 2020, it will be $100 billion based on
the plans that they had to provide here in December. Their
contributions have stepped up. We asked for greater force
structure to assist in Afghanistan. Our allies responded. I
think when you look at that, they are clearly responding, but
we have a ways to go yet.
Germany in particular has responded as well. They plan to
bring their defense investment up to 1.5 percent. That is not 2
percent yet. That is where it needs to be, but they are clearly
refocused on their contribution, as well as their readiness. As
you know, they have got some readiness issues. That has been in
the paper. I believe that is true from what I have seen.
But they are providing the very high joint task force, for
instance, for NATO, and they made sure that they produced a
force that was ready and credible. I have seen it. We operated
with that force in Trident Juncture, for instance. They
understand the issue and they are working hard to get their
readiness up to where it is going to be. But they spent a good
deal of time, in particular, as many of the other--we did as
well, but European nations where they rested and they did not
invest in their defense, and now they are having to invest
heavily to get back up on step.
Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to discuss the national security threat that cannot
be addressed by traditional military power at all, and that is
climate change. The unclassified worldwide threat assessment by
the Director of National Intelligence said--and I am going to
quote here--global environmental and ecological degradation, as
well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for
resources, economic distress, and social discontent through
2019 and beyond. End quote.
That assessment also said, quote, damage to communication,
energy, and transportation infrastructure could affect low-
lying military bases, inflict economic costs, and cause human
displacement and loss of life.
I have asked this question to other combatant commanders,
so I want to make sure that I get this on the record. General
Scaparrotti and General Lyons, do you agree with the
intelligence community's assessment of the climate change
threat?
General Scaparrotti. I do, and I believe that, as you
noted, much of this will be drivers for potential conflict or
at least very difficult situations that nations have to deal
with.
The second, I would point you to the high north and that is
the increasing opening of the northern sea route and the
challenges that presents from a security perspective.
Senator Warren. Yes. Thank you.
General Lyons, do you also agree?
General Lyons. Ma'am, I agree. These are sources of
conflict, and we certainly have to be prepared to respond to
them.
Senator Warren. Good.
Could I then ask each of you very briefly because we have
very limited time just to describe how climate change impacts
your operations in your commands and what you are doing to
adapt to these changes? General Scaparrotti, would you like to
start?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the most apparent to me
is the one that I noted and that is in the Arctic. We already
are seeing longer periods of time that the northern sea route
is open. As a part of that, there is an increased interest in
commercial and resource capabilities there. China, for
instance, is pressing to get into the high north and have some
presence there. That creates competition. Russia, because that
northern sea route is the one that follows most closely to
their borders, has increased--reopened 10 of their airports
there. They now have radar systems up. They have begun to move,
on periodic times, different weapon systems up there for
control of the area. Those are all things----
Senator Warren. That is serious.
General Scaparrotti.--that I have to bring into my
planning.
Senator Warren. What has been your response to that, just
briefly?
General Scaparrotti. Briefly? We have updated our plans as
a result of that. We have had to change the posture of some of
our forces. We have changed our operational patterns so that
we, in fact, deter and we send a signal of the importance of
the Arctic to us. Those are just some of the ways day to day
that we have made changes in our normal routine in order to
demonstrate significance and capability in the Arctic.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
General Lyons?
General Lyons. Ma'am, anything that degrades our ability to
project and sustain power globally at our time and place of
choosing is a concern. We know that we have to operate in any
conditions whatsoever.
Senator Warren. What are you doing by way of response?
General Lyons. Ma'am, in other words, in our planning and
so forth, we consider all environments. But more specific to
General Scap's point about the more scientific piece of it is,
that is a little bit out of my area of expertise.
Senator Warren. Fair enough. I really was not looking for
so much of a scientific answer, but as General Scaparrotti
said, how you have to kind of readjust where you are and what
you are doing.
If I can, I just want to say adapting to climate change
impacts our military readiness, and I am glad you both take
this threat seriously. I appreciate that.
In my remaining time, I just want to ask very briefly, if I
can, about the INF Treaty. We all know this is a landmark arms
control treaty with Russia negotiated in 1987 by President
Ronald Reagan. The treaty prohibits both of our countries from
testing and deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Yes, we know
that Russia is in violation of the treaty since 2014, but
rather than use the mechanisms within the treaty or other tools
available to us to try to get Russia back into compliance, the
administration is abandoning the treaty entirely.
I just want to ask what is our plan to prevent Russia from
building more INF Treaty-prohibited missiles in the absence of
the treaty? Do we have a plan here? General Lyons?
General Lyons. Ma'am, I would have to defer on that. That
is a little bit out of my area of expertise.
Senator Warren. Okay.
General Scaparrotti?
General Scaparrotti. Well, Senator, I think that we are
still in a 6-month period here where we are looking at what our
options are. We, in fact, have told our allies in NATO that we
will do the planning in collaboration with them. We have begun
that. I do not know that we have a plan today. I know that we
are working on what we think that plan might be. I personally
think that it has to be multi-dimensional. It has to be across
all of our domains, and it has to be whole-of-government in
order to respond to that.
I would finally say that from my point of view that when
you have a peer competitor, particularly a modernizing one,
that will be challenging us, such as Russia, that we should
look toward treaty capabilities in order to provide some
stability, to provide signals and communications and limits
that we understand that we can work from.
Senator Warren. Well, I am glad to hear that you are trying
to work with our allies. I think the Polish, for example, have
said that they are concerned about missiles on their land. I
just urge you to think about, instead of withdrawing from the
INF Treaty, whether or not we should be redoubling our efforts
to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty. We know
that Putin cannot be trusted, but we have a responsibility to
prevent a dangerous and expensive arms race in Europe and
without the treaty I am worried that is what we are doing.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. I apologize.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both, gentlemen, for being here.
General Lyons, I was down at Fort Bragg this past Friday
with Secretary Esper, and we were talking with folks there who
are in unacceptable housing conditions.
We also talked a little bit--and I have had a number of
discussions in the past with families about some of their
household belongings being moved, some of the bottlenecks, and
unsatisfactory service.
I like the idea of taking the personal property program
into what I would consider to be one throat to choke sort of
model. But maybe if you could briefly describe where you think
this is going to end up. I really want to make sure that we get
this right in terms of accountability, predictability, and
customer satisfaction so that any relationship we create with
this confederation of movers--I get that you are going to have
a consolidator, but you are still going to have a number of
individual providers. We have got to get the compensation and
accountability models right so that we do not end up here
honestly trying to do a good thing and ending up where we are
with the housing situation.
Can you give me some assurances or briefly describe how
that is going to work?
General Lyons. Senator, I can. This is definitely not a
privatization effort by any stretch of the imagination. As a
matter of fact, what I have offered to the service secretaries
and service chiefs is instead of this completely de-aggregated,
diffuse value chain of very little centralized responsibility
even inside the government, I would look at them and I would
say hold me accountable. Allow me to develop an acquisition
tool to hold industry accountable. We have a track record of
being able to do that, as a matter, in other parts of the
defense personal property program like personal-owned vehicles.
We do this today.
I do know, Senator, that there is some concern in industry.
We get a lot of feedback from industry. Some are very, very
supportive where we are headed. They see opportunities to enter
the market. We want to grow the market. Others are concerned
about potential change. What I tell them and what I have seen
in our past acquisitions that have been similar is that below
the level, we still need the same or greater number of movers
out there who just need a level of quality and accountability
in the system.
Senator Tillis. And some peaking capability.
I would be very interested in maybe having the right people
in your organization meet with my staff to describe what that
really looks like operationally. In a simplistic way, it would
almost be this baseline guarantee of capacity with some peaking
capability that is almost uber-like in terms of having the
household know that they are going to get their things moved at
the appropriate time hopefully to a house that is in much
better condition than some of the ones that I saw down at Fort
Bragg on Friday, a separate issue and not your problem.
General Scaparrotti, I appreciate the time you spent in the
office yesterday. I appreciate your years, decades of service,
and I associate myself with Senator Cotton's comments that if
you take your uniform off, we hope that does not mean that we
will not see you back here serving in some other capacity.
I am going to save a lot of my questions for the classified
briefly, but I do want to highlight my concern with the Turkey
situation, particularly with the S-400's. I know--and you gave
a great briefing on where we are working together on a
legitimate homeland security threat that they are dealing with
with the PKK [Kurdistan Worker's Party]. On the one hand, we
are trying to partner and continue to build on that
relationship.
Turkey is a vitally important NATO partner in the most
complicated part of the world. I understand some of their
behaviors, but I do not understand under any circumstances why
on earth they would be considering purchasing a missile defense
system that would not be interoperable, that would require the
deployment of capabilities on the ground in Turkey that would
threaten the presence of our Joint Strike Fighter, why on earth
they would be considering a decision that would make us have to
rethink whether or not they can actually even be in the supply
chain for the Joint Strike Fighter, let alone deploying assets
that are scheduled to be there in 2020, but even raising doubts
about whether or not we can legitimately manufacture and
distribute parts in the supply chain for the production of
Joint Strike Fighters.
The message that I want to send to the Turkish leadership
is this is an area--Congress got educated quite a bit on the
Joint Strike Fighter and on Turkey last year when we were
dealing with a matter involving a pastor from my State. I think
we are very well briefed on it now and some of the risks there.
I would just encourage the Turkish Government and the
leadership to recognize that they should not have this one
decision put all the other great things that we are doing, that
we will do in the future in the balance and have Congress
potentially in a position where we would have to act.
General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. As you know, we,
the United States, have a team there today talking to the
Turks, and I am sure a very candid conversation about the S-400
and the potential consequences are a part of that conversation.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Lyons, let me first ask you a question about
privatization. As you are familiar, as you know, Army veteran
and military spouse Megan Harless recently wrote an op-ed that
criticized TRANSCOM's plan to privatize the military move
program. She stated that the military move advisory panel
convened by TRANSCOM has not been consulted regarding
privatization, and TRANSCOM also has not solicited feedback
from military families or from the moving industry.
Do military families support privatization? Does industry
support it?
General Lyons. Senator, there is no initiative whatsoever
to privatize the household goods industry. This is a 100
percent--every task inside that value chain is conducted by
commercial industry today.
What we are proposing, however, is a restructure of how the
government approaches this with industry. To be honest with
you, Senator, I have received more letters on this particular
issue in the 6 months that I have been Commander than any other
issue that TRANSCOM deals with. In fact, I agree with the
criticisms of the program. I think we need to take action to
remedy the program as it exists today. We have been studying
this since 1996.
Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to prioritizing the
needs of those military families in any kinds of reforms that
you may consider?
General Lyons. Sir, there is no question about it. This is
all about improving curbside service for military families.
That is our north star. That is the only reason that we are
doing this, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to consulting with the
TRANSCOM advisory panel?
General Lyons. Yes, sir. We consult regularly with
industry. Some very much support where we are headed, and some
are very, very concerned.
I do know, Senator, that the moving associations, for
example, are drafting language to insert in the NDAA that would
delay any kind of progress in this area, perhaps to study it
for 2 more years. I can just say I really think that would be a
gut punch for our military families.
Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, talking about the
Ukraine, is there evidence of the Russians meddling in the
Ukrainian elections that are planned?
General Scaparrotti. Well, in terms of their influence,
they certainly are supporting the parties where they believe
they can have the most influence and those individuals. There
is certainly disinformation as a part of that. They are playing
in that way. I think, for instance, Russia's seizure of their
ships and their 24 sailors and the fact that they have not been
released is likely also another way that they have some
leverage and influence on the outcome of that election.
Senator Blumenthal. Has there been an increase in
disinforma- tion or other Russian interference?
General Scaparrotti. Well, just generally it has been
targeted at undermining the present government and the
president.
Senator Blumenthal. What is your command or other American
resources doing to counter it?
General Scaparrotti. Well, both not only my command--I deal
with the military aspects of this, but there are others
diplomatically, for instance, in State that we are working with
in this regard. But we do have personnel there that support in
military means their defense of disinformation, appropriate
information, and cyber defense as well. In the closed hearing,
I can be more specific about precisely what we are doing.
Senator Blumenthal. Just to reassure the American people--
and that is the purpose of an open hearing really to inform the
American people--can you provide some description of what is
being done in the cyber domain by your command to bolster the
Ukrainian defenses?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I guess I would underscore,
first of all, what we do with the others is just to make sure
that this is a free and fair election. Within the cyber domain,
mine is to help them with their defense of their systems. It is
not selected by any means at all. It is primarily defense and
help them to understand how they ensure that they do, in fact,
have a free and fair election.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blackburn?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will tell you it has been such a pleasure for me to go
through this series of hearings with our different commands in
your area of responsibility and hear repeatedly from you all
some of the needs and stepping up our game, if you will,
dealing with Russia and China and especially with cyber.
General Scaparrotti, I am from Tennessee, and I have got
some National Guardsmen that are under your command at this
point, folks in the Ukraine and Poland. We appreciate their
service, and we appreciate you and the leadership that you have
shown throughout your career to our men and women in uniform
and to those that are currently under your command.
Let me stay with looking at our enemies, Russia, China, the
cyber component, and we will come back to that this afternoon
in the briefing. But what I would like to know, General, as you
look at Europe and as we talk about the rollout of 5G and you
are looking at that European Deterrence Initiative, do you have
what you need? Where do we need to be planning forward on that,
and how are you approaching the integration and the utilization
for really what some of our troops at Fort Campbell--when I
talk to some of our special ops guys, 5th Division, 160th, this
is very important to them, 5G and the utilization of that,
knowing that that is going to help fuel artificial
intelligence, et cetera, knowing they are going to use that
with some of the ISR capabilities. If you will just touch on
that briefly, and then we will explore it a little more this
afternoon.
General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, I will just start
with the 5G part of this. This is a considerably different
capability than what we have today. It is not just a
modernization or an upgrade.
Senator Blackburn. It is a whole new world. It is like
going from analog to digital.
General Scaparrotti. That is right. It is a different
world. What we have to know is that we have a secure 5G
capability. That is one of the reasons that when you now go to
our allies, that we have said they need to be very careful
about Chinese investment----
Senator Blackburn. Yes. No Huawei and no ZTE.
General Scaparrotti.--in their telecommunications
capabilities because we also want to know that we are secure
with our allies that we can act with. There may be an outcome
where we cannot connect with our allies unless they change the
composition of their systems. We are trying to get ahead of
that.
Senator Blackburn. Is this an open discussion that you are
having?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, it is an open discussion.
I would say to you that just to give you an idea of how
this has come along, 2 years this would not have been a topic.
A year ago, it was starting to come in, and now----
Senator Blackburn. It is front and center.
General Scaparrotti. Now it is front and center, and we are
beginning to have the right conversations as a security issue.
Senator Blackburn. Good. That is great.
General Lyons, TRANSCOM has had some problems with some
breaches, and I think it was a couple of years ago, Chinese
hackers got into the network like 20 times. What you do and
with logistics--and we have talked about different points. I
think Chairman Wicker brought up Rota, Spain. As you look at
the integration and all that comes under you, give me an update
on the security of your systems and then how are you dealing
with contractors that are a part of your system.
General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am. As you indicated, this is
an area of concern and it is a high priority for the command. I
tell folks this is a warfighting domain. There is no one thing
that is going to solve this. We have got multiple things going
on, everything from just operator discipline, through cyber
hygiene, through defense, through infrastructure, and a high
level of collaboration with Cyber Command to create conditions
to allow us to operate.
As for our industry partners, we are also upping our game
there through our contractual language and their compliance
with NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology]
standards, basically their assessments and collaboration and
information sharing. But that is a much more complex area
outside of the DODIN
[Department of Defense Information Network] where a level of
protection is lower, and that does become a vulnerability in
the enterprise.
Senator Blackburn. We will talk a little more about that in
this afternoon's hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses for your service and your
testimony.
A House bill to overturn President Trump's emergency
declaration is pending before this Committee and will likely be
voted on on the floor of the Senate within the next 10 days or
so.
There are at least two issues that Senators are grappling
with about the bill: one, the question of whether there is an
emergency. General O'Shaughnessy of NORTHCOM testified before
us last week and said in a very straightforward way there is no
military emergency at the border.
But a second issue we are grappling with is where will the
money come from. The President has proposed to use $6 billion
from the Pentagon to direct toward this non-military emergency:
$3.5 million of MILCON [Military Construction] funding and $2.5
billion of drug interdiction monies within the DOD budget.
I want to ask you about these proposals because we are
trying to get information about exactly how the moving of the
$6 billion is doing to affect military operations.
Have either of you in your commands been asked to provide
lists of MILCON projects that should be either delayed or
reduced or eliminated with respect to this particular $3.5
billion proposal? General Scaparrotti?
General Scaparrotti. Not with respect to this proposal, no,
sir.
Senator Kaine. General Lyons?
General Lyons. No, sir. But it probably would not be
appropriate. TRANSCOM relies on the services for their MILCON.
Senator Kaine. Right, so that you do not have the big
MILCON back list that the others do. I understand.
General Lyons. That is correct.
Senator Kaine. General Scaparrotti, you say not with
respect to this proposal. I gather what you mean by that is you
are often putting together MILCON lists. That would be one of
the things you would do in EUCOM is looking at MILCON needs
within that command. You have been doing that, but you have not
been asked with respect to this proposal what MILCON projects
could be reduced, delayed, or eliminated.
General Scaparrotti. With respect to the budget as a whole,
well prior to this question, we went through the normal process
of our discussion within DOD as to what the priorities were
across the Department with respect to my MILCON.
Senator Kaine. Right.
General Scaparrotti. We had to prioritize. We did delay
some, but that was well before this conversation.
Senator Kaine. Do you know if and when a decision is made
about where the $3.5 billion of MILCON projects, which will be
affected--do you know whether you will be in that decision loop
or whether it will be made by others?
General Scaparrotti. I expect I will be in the decision
loop within the Department. We have a close relationship with
them. We generally would have. No one has discussed it with me,
and I am confident they would when and if that should----
Senator Kaine. The ``they'' would probably be the service
secretaries and the SecDef?
General Scaparrotti. It would be the service secretary or
the SecDef, probably the SecDef as well. I actually talked to
the SecDef personally about the potential delay, et cetera that
I just told you about as we were going through the budget.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask the second half of the question.
The other funding that is suggested could be used is the $2.5
billion drug interdiction account at the Pentagon. Reporting
suggests that there is not $2.5 billion in that account. There
is about $750 million, of which only $85 million is available
for use right now. There is a suggestion that what the Pentagon
would do would be to take monies out of other accounts to fill
up the drug interdiction account to $2.5 billion prior to using
it for the emergency proposal that the President has suggested.
Have either of you been involved in any discussions about
funds within your bailiwick that might be used to pull into the
drug interdiction account?
General Scaparrotti. No, Senator, I have not.
Senator Kaine. General Lyons?
General Lyons. No, sir.
Senator Kaine. General Scaparrotti, let me ask you about
this. The 70th anniversary of NATO is in April, a really
important one. NATO has a headquarters both in Brussels and
also in Virginia in the Hampton Roads area. I have a proposal,
a bill that is a bipartisan bill, that would stipulate that
NATO, a treaty that the Senate ratified--the U.S. should not
unilaterally withdraw from that without either a Senate vote or
an act of Congress. The bill is a bipartisan one, and it is
meant to send a strong signal of congressional support for the
NATO alliance at the 70th anniversary.
Would that message be positively received by our NATO
allies?
General Scaparrotti. Senator, I believe it would. The votes
by Congress that you have taken in the past to reinforce our
commitment to our allies have been helpful as well.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
No further questions. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being
here today and willing to answer questions.
Like so many of my colleagues, I do want to make sure that
you have the tools and resources necessary to enable you in
your missions and make you successful.
As Senator Sullivan mentioned just a little bit earlier, I
did recently return from a trip to Ukraine, and during that
trip, I was able to see firsthand the Russian aggression that
is being exhibited in that region against what is a very
important strategic partner to us. Not only do we want to push
back against Russia because of Ukraine and Europe but, of
course, for many of our other allies around the world as well.
General Scaparrotti, I would like to start with you, sir.
Of course, while I was in Ukraine, the Ukrainians expressed
a very strong desire for military assistance, defensive
assistance and lethal assistance. Senator Sullivan mentioned
that we have provided Javelins to the Ukrainian army.
I met with members of the defense establishment there, as
well as members of the Ukrainian parliament, and those that I
had the opportunity to meet with in Kiev and also the joint
forces headquarters near the eastern front--they really
appreciated that assistance.
What more can we do for the Ukrainians in that regard for
lethal assistance? Is it just simply more Javelins, or is there
additional assistance we can provide?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think personally--and you will
see soon here a list. I think it has already been provided to
Congress. But as you know, we provide that prior to it being
authorized, the actual purchase from the funding that you have
given.
But from my point of view, the things that we need to
continue is to continue their support for counter-battery, Q-
36/37, that they have the assets and the systems that they need
to do that well. They have asked us for help in communication
at an operational level, and they do have a distinct need for
that because while we focus on the line of contact, their chief
of defense is also focused on other areas of the country that
are a threat, that Russia could present a threat as well. He is
trying to determine--he is trying to establish a good
communications system for his entire force, as well as just the
front.
They have asked us specifically for some assistance to help
with sniper proficiency, the right kind of ammo and weapons,
grenade launchers.
Then finally the area that I would say is that we need to
study how we help their maritime component, their navy, which
as you know, is not large to begin with, given the portion of
the fleet that Russia took when it annexed Crimea, and they
just lost a couple of ships as well in the Kerch Strait. I
think there are some areas there that we can help them get this
navy back up and begin to supply it with what they believe they
need to defend themselves and deter Russia's aggressive
actions.
Senator Ernst. I appreciate that very much, sir. Thank you
for bringing up the Kerch Strait incident because they are
still holding those 24 sailors, as you referenced earlier, and
using those sailors as leverage with the elections coming up. I
do appreciate that you think we need to do more on the maritime
front, not only in assisting them with their navy, but is it
possible that we as an American force need to have more of our
naval forces in the Black Sea region?
General Scaparrotti. Both the United States and NATO has
stepped up its presence in the Black Sea. As you know, the
Donald Cook just departed yesterday or the day before, and it
is the second time that we have had a destroyer in the Black
Sea here in the past 2 months. We believe there is a need for
that. We have stepped up and our allies have as well. NATO has
a fleet right now in the Black Sea.
Senator Ernst. Do you think it is sending a clear message
to President Vladimir Putin?
General Scaparrotti. I think it is. I mean, they frankly do
not like us in the Black Sea. It is international waters and we
should sail and fly there.
Senator Ernst. That is a great thing, and I love it. Thank
you, sir.
The presidential elections are coming up. I will just close
with this. I think it was very important that I take this trip
to Ukraine and spend time with the folks within their defense
sector and also spent time with some of their brand new special
operations forces that had just graduated from their Ukrainian
Q Course, which is run by our American special operations
forces. I appreciate what we are doing in that region, sir. I
appreciate your leadership in that region.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Jones?
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today and for your service.
General Scaparrotti, I appreciated you coming by the office the
other day. I enjoyed that very much.
I also appreciated your candid answers concerning climate
change. I think we sometimes get caught up in the political
discussions about climate and not really focus on the real
world consequences that are affecting us today.
Earlier today, you spoke with Senator Cotton about China's
investments in your AOR. If you can, I would like to have you
discuss what, if any, actions EUCOM may be taking to counter
China's activities in Europe today.
General Scaparrotti. Well, most of all, in terms of EUCOM,
it is discussions with our counterparts and leaders about the
concerns of China's what I would say is strategic investments.
Most of this is diplomatic at this point, but we do try to
ensure that we can point out to them not only economic benefits
which China demonstrates and make sure they are aware of, but
also the security aspects of their control of seaports,
airports, critical key terrain, investment in infrastructure
particularly with technology that is critical to security. We
try to emphasize the security aspects of their investments.
Senator Jones. Has the administration's tactics with regard
to the tariffs and European tariffs--have you seen any effect
on that with any of our allies--the economic impact?
General Scaparrotti. Well, it is certainly a point of
discussion among the allies and one of concern because our
country and Europe has a very significant trade and economic
linkage there. But in terms of the direct impact for me, the
mil-to-mil relationships are strong. That essentially is dealt
with on the diplomatic side.
Senator Jones. Thank you, sir.
General Lyons, I want to kind of go back to a conversation
you had with Senator King on cybersecurity. If you can in this
hearing as opposed to the closed hearing, could you please
maybe describe the impact on operations of a nation state cyber
attack on TRANSCOM's networks and how this could impact your
discussions and your ability and interaction with COCOMs [U.S.
Combatant Commands]?
General Lyons. Senator, anything that would degrade our
ability to project power is a concern. Cyber as a warfighting
domain does create an area of vulnerability across what is
largely an unclassified surface of employment. We are working
very, very hard to prioritize and to ensure that we have the
appropriate level of resiliency and to move to an
infrastructure that is more secure. We are moving very, very
rapidly in that area.
Senator Jones. Right.
Just staying with you, General Lyons, you mentioned earlier
that there was a plan to improve the household goods shipment
process using a single contractor to manage transportation
service providers. How will that change improve the process?
What will it cost, and will it increase accountability?
General Lyons. Senator, it will definitely increase
accountability, and I believe it will also increase capacity.
Those are the two major issues. Those are the two major
complaints. The way that enhances capacity is it is a longer-
term investment with our industry partners, and so they are
willing to invest in capacity over time, as well as reducing
barriers to entry into the market that we, unfortunately,
create for ourselves.
There is no question that it will improve accountability.
Today, there are 950 various transportation service providers
that compete for work on a transactional basis. Very, very
difficult across the services and TRANSCOM to maintain
accountability and all that. But the business folks know the
business, and that is the right relationship to have with a
single move manager.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you both for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the remainder of my time.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
Well, it looks like we have run out of members here so we
will close it.
Several people during the course of this hearing, General
Scaparrotti, have speculated this may be your last time that
you attend this hearing. It is also your birthday today. Is
this a birthday present to you?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. It is Congress' birthday
present, I assume. I have enjoyed it.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, we thank you so much for all of the
service. Both of you, but particularly you because you have
appeared so many times, and as has been pointed out by Senator
Reed, you have held the fourth star longer than anybody else in
existence here. You have served your country in a way that many
others have not. Thank you so much for that service.
Anything else?
Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman. Just let me join in
thanking both General Scaparrotti and General Lyons,
particularly General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
ready reserve force
1. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] provided authority to procure
seven used vessels, sufficient to sustain sealift recapitalization
requirements through fiscal year 2025. Based on the Navy's fiscal year
2019 30-year shipbuilding plan, meeting the full sealift
recapitalization requirement would entail procuring 26 used vessels
through fiscal year 2031. Has the Navy developed and shared with you
its acquisition plan to procure the vessels needed to recapitalize the
ready Reserve force?
General Lyons. Yes, the Navy coordinated with USTRANSCOM when it
developed its plan titled, ``Sealift that the Nation Needs,'' which
includes plans for new construction and used ship acquisitions to
recapitalize the sealift fleets. The Navy continues to work with
USTRANSCOM to enhance near-term readiness of strategic sealift
capabilities through an accelerated buy-used acquisition timeline.
ready reserve force
2. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, last year's NDAA authorized the
procurement of seven used vessels to sustain sealift recapitalization
requirements through fiscal year 2025. What is the status of procuring
those new vessels and where are we getting them from?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM established requirements and is
coordinating with the Navy and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to
acquire used vessels and recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force. MARAD
completed a Request For Information (RFI) that identified 78 viable
ships owned by U.S. and international companies. While authority exists
to purchase now, Navy budgeted funds to purchase two vessels in fiscal
year 2021 and fiscal year 2022. USTRANSCOM has submitted an Unfunded
Priority List requesting that funds be appropriated in fiscal year 2020
to purchase the first two vessels. Once funding is available, MARAD
will release a request for proposal (RFP) to initiate the acquisition
process. The source of the ships will be determined through responses
received from the RFP.
sea and air lift
3. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, I read with interest the op-ed in
the Wall Street Journal on March 4, 2019 by Mark Helprin. In
particular, I was concerned with his statement regarding ``America's
inadequate military sea and air lift'' abilities when it comes to
resupplying our forces. As Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, I
worry not only about our Navy fleet but also our commercial maritime
industry, which is critical to our surge abilities during war. What is
TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] doing to work with the
Navy and MARAD [United States Maritime Administration] to ensure both
our military and commercial supply ships can maintain sea lines of
communication to our bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam during a
potential conflict in the Pacific?
General Lyons. Within the DOD, geographic combatant commanders and
fleet commanders are tasked with planning and establishing the
necessary protection and security of USTRANSCOM's military and
commercial assets to ensure their safe transit. To further aid in
assurance, in coordination with Military Sealift Command, we are
reevaluating the strategic posture of strategic sealift assets and how
commercial assets are utilized in the Pacific when operating within a
contested environment. Additionally, we partner with MARAD on improving
civilian mariner manning, training, and the industrial base to support
high-end conflict. Finally, in support of these efforts, we, along with
combatant and fleet commanders, continue to plan and conduct wargames,
multi-faceted experiments, tiered exercises, and innovative proofs of
concept that address the challenges of operating within a contested
environment.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
defense personal property program (dp3)
4. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, broadly speaking, how will
outsourcing the Defense Personal Property Program to a single source
contract improve the current program?
General Lyons. Rather than describing this as `outsourcing,'
USTRANSCOM characterizes this effort as a fundamental restructuring of
DOD's relationship with industry to enhance accountability, stability,
and capacity. Currently 100 percent of servicemembers' movements are
executed by commercial providers. Under a single commercial move
manager construct, 100 percent of the movements will continue to be
performed by commercial providers. Rather than relying on 42 DOD
offices to coordinate the operations of 950+ Transportation Service
Providers on a shipment-by-shipment basis, with no underlying formal
contractual agreement, DOD seeks to award end-to-end transportation and
storage processes to a single commercial move manager to drive
integration and capitalize on the market intelligence of industry.
We seek to evolve beyond the current transactional approach, which
hinders industry's ability to conduct long-term planning and invest in
sustainable relationships. Entering into a multi-year relationship
provides industry with both the confidence and rationale to invest in
capacity and strategic relationships with trusted suppliers to meet
peak demand. DOD will have a single company to engage and hold
accountable when necessary to better meet the needs of military
families.
5. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the
transition to a single-move manager will affect the costs to the
Defense Personal Property Program and what metrics are you using to
measure this effect?
General Lyons. The purpose of transitioning to a single move
manager is to improve access to--and management of--quality capacity to
meet peak demand and enable DOD to affix responsibility and
accountability. DOD will withdraw this recommendation if the formal
acquisition process identifies no viable candidates or if the Military
Services deem the final product is unaffordable.
6. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the
transition to a single-move manager will increase moving capacity and
what metrics are you using to measure this increase?
General Lyons. The fractured nature of the current Defense Personal
Property Program (DP3)--both in terms of the number of Transportation
Service Providers (TSPs) and disparate government offices trying to
manage them--is a root cause of the capacity and quality issues
reported by servicemembers and DOD civilians.
The DOD is the largest single consumer of moving and storage
services, accounting for 20 percent of the domestic household goods
market, yet we still compete with the broader population for assets.
Under our current construct, each of the DOD's 42 regional shipping
offices deals with a pool of TSPs and awards business on a shipment-by-
shipment basis. In day-to-day operations, the transactional nature of
this approach results in inefficient crew and truck utilization. More
broadly, this transactional approach hinders industry's ability to
conduct long-term planning, and with no meaningful forecast of what
they can expect to move--offers no basis to invest in relationships
with agents or assets to respond to DOD's very predictable demand.
Centralizing demand planning with a single entity improves utilization
of available capacity. In addition to better utilizing existing
capacity, I believe this construct will attract new providers. Industry
representatives who are currently unaffiliated with DP3 state that the
programs existing over- engineered rules make DOD an unattractive
partner; while the DOD pays competitive rates, much of industry would
rather serve the 80 percent of the non-DOD domestic moving and storage
market.
Regarding metrics, we will specifically measure on-time pickup and
delivery, counseling, completion, claims settlement, and overall
customer satisfaction.
7. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the
transition to a single-move manager will improve customer service for
our military families and what metrics are you using to measure this
improvement?
General Lyons. The DOD encounters the same set of challenges--and
results--each peak season: quality capacity is lacking, DOD has limited
accountability measures to drive improvements, and DP3 customers do not
know who to call when things go wrong. Restructuring DOD's relationship
with industry promotes long-term stability and investment that
ultimately eliminates unnecessary friction and opacity for DP3 users.
Building relationships with trusted suppliers and increasing
accountability should lead to increased customer satisfaction.
Regarding metrics, we will specifically measure on-time pickup and
delivery, counseling, completion, claims settlement, and overall
customer satisfaction.
8. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how are you working to include
input from industry and servicemembers in your decision to outsource
the DP3 program?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM interacts with industry and
servicemembers in a number of venues. We conduct spring and fall
Personal Property Forums with industry and personal property
professionals representing the Military Services. We conduct monthly
calls with those same professionals during the non-peak season and
weekly during the peak season.
USTRANSCOM conducted two `Industry Day' engagements as part of
ongoing market research, which included the opportunity for industry
personnel to conduct one-on-one meetings with DOD personnel to address
their specific questions and concerns regarding the single move manager
contract. My team has also released a DRAFT RFP to industry for their
review and feedback to improve the final RFP. My Deputy and I have
personally hosted group meetings with industry CEOs, leaders of the
associations that represent them, and accepted numerous requests for
one-on-one phone calls and office calls with CEOs.
We have a monthly Open Discussion Group with industry leaders and
we also conduct a monthly Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel
with some leading spousal advocates from the military services.
Additionally, I have personally engaged each Service Secretary and
Service Chief on this effort.
Each of these engagements leaves me more in tune with industry's
concerns as we develop the path ahead. They have informed how we intend
to structure the program and how we continue to solicit inputs for
program improvement. They have also informed the development of the
acquisition strategy and DRAFT RFP. After every engagement, I am more
convinced that restructuring DOD's relationship with industry and
implementing this single move-manager construct is the right answer for
DOD personnel and their families.
russia/china great-power collaboration
9. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what are the strategic,
operational, and tactical implications of China's involvement in
Russia's exercise Vostok 2018?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, how does China's
investment in the infrastructure of nations like Denmark and Belgium,
especially ports, relate to China's intention to develop a ``blue
economic passage'' connecting China to Europe through the Arctic Ocean?
General Scaparrotti. China is leveraging their growing economic,
diplomatic, and military clout to increase economic, trade, and transit
links to Europe and in the Arctic through projects such as the ``One
Belt, One Road'' Initiative (OBOR).
Since 2013, China has elevated OBOR from a regional infrastructure
project connecting western China with Eurasia to a global foreign
engagement strategy that presents Belt-Road Initiative as a new
platform of international cooperation and showcases China as an
alternative model of economic and political development.
China has increased activities and engagement the Arctic region
since gaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. In January
2018 China published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a Polar
Silk China linked its OBOR initiatives. The strategy identifies China's
interests as access to natural resources, Sea Lines of Communication,
and promoting an image of a responsible major country in Arctic
affairs.
11. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, in your personal
opinion, is there incentive for a resource-producing nation like Russia
and a resource-consuming nation like China to work together?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
eucom [united states european command] & nato [north atlantic treaty
organization] arctic capability
12. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, as Russia dramatically
increases its Arctic capability and capacity, what is the strategic
cost of not increasing United States and NATO activity in the Arctic?
General Scaparrotti. The strategic risk is that we would cede the
Arctic to the Russians. The intent of increasing U.S. and NATO activity
in the Arctic should not be to militarize the Arctic but to ensure that
the region continues to be an area of international cooperation. It
will be important to continue the cooperation and governance that has
historically made the Arctic a region of cooperation, not a zone of
conflict. Having U.S. and NATO assets increase Arctic activity ensures
that no single nation can unilaterally make decisions there that affect
the world.
13. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what specific
capabilities are needed to improve our Arctic posture in EUCOM?
General Scaparrotti. Across the USEUCOM AOR, including the Arctic,
there is a need for domain awareness capabilities (such as
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment) in the
undersea, surface, and air domains. Additional communication
capabilities and infrastructure are also required to facilitate
military activities as well as basic search and rescue operations.
vostok 2018
14. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what are the strategic
implications and messaging of the scale and complexity of Russia's
exercise Vostok 2018 and what should we be doing to respond?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
15. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, in light of Vostok 2018,
what does EUCOM need to do to maintain a credible deterrent to Russian
activity?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
republic of georgia--ascension into nato
16. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in your written testimony,
you said, ``Georgia remains a committed partner, especially in
Afghanistan, where it is the largest non-NATO contributor to Resolute
Support with almost 900 troops currently deployed.'' How important are
non-NATO partners like Georgia for NATO to fulfill its objectives?
General Scaparrotti. The contributions of our non-NATO partners are
critically important to our mission in Afghanistan. Our various
partners, including Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, support
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) objectives by providing critical
functions, including trainers, advisors, planners, and security and
force protection units. These contributions not only allow NATO to make
progress in RSM, but also demonstrate commitment to shared values and
closer relationships.
17. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the United States-Georgia
security relationship has steadily expanded, and the establishment in
2018 of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone
in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a
credible, ready force through training, education, and mentorship. The
program is a centerpiece of Georgia's broad efforts to enhance its
national defense and contribute to the security of the Black Sea
region.'' How important is engagement and security cooperation with
Black Sea countries like Georgia to NATO's posture in the region?
General Scaparrotti. Security cooperation and assistance efforts
with Black Sea countries like Georgia are vitally important to United
States and NATO interests. These efforts promote regional security,
good governance, and democratic principles of civil-military relations,
especially professional service, civilian control of the military,
transparency, and accountability. Additionally, programs such as the
GDRP improve Black Sea nations' ability to generate and sustain their
own military forces, which further strengthens regional security.
18. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
affirmed support for the Open Door policy of NATO, including the
eventual membership of Georgia in NATO?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. Section 1248 of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA
states that in order to strengthen the defense of the United States and
its allies and partners in Europe, the Department of Defense should
affirm its support for the Open Door policy of NATO, including the
eventual membership of Georgia in NATO. This statement is consistent
with the 2008 Bucharest statement and does not dictate a time frame for
Georgia's membership. USEUCOM provides assistance to Georgia that will
help the country's defense establishment prepare for a future political
decision among the NATO allies on Georgia's eventual membership.
19. Senator Perdue. General Scaparroti, how would NATO
strategically benefit from Georgia's ascension into NATO?
General Scaparrotti. With Georgia's ascension to NATO, the Alliance
would benefit from Georgia's geographic position and steadfast support
for NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan. NATO would also
benefit from Georgia's assistance to counter Russia's malign narratives
along their periphery.
joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
20. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in the era of great power
competition, electronic warfare has risen in strategic importance. For
example, Russia demonstrated in its incursion into Ukraine a full range
of capabilities, including communication jamming, message intercepting,
and geolocating units based on the electromagnetic signatures they
emit. Last year's NDAA required a report on the status of
operationalizing the Joint Electromagnetic Operations Cells at the
COCOMS and what resources were needed to do so. The United States Army
fielded Raven Claw, a mobile variant of the their EW Planning and
Management Tool (EWPMT), in Eastern Europe last year, as well. How
important is it to provide our warfighters in the European theater with
the right tools to plan and manage military operations in the face of
sophisticated EW attacks in EUCOM?
General Scaparrotti. It is vitally important that we provide our
forces in Europe the right electromagnetic warfare (EW) equipment and
training as the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a critical
warfighting area that crosses all military domains. Russia is
increasing its EW capabilities and already integrates EW into their
military operations. Our ability to leverage the EMS requires tools
that combine multiple intelligence and operational feeds to quantify EW
threats and electromagnetic interference, while not interfering with
host nation infrastructure. Additionally, effectiveness in this domain
will require the continued coordination with host nation partners to
manage and utilize the electromagnetic spectrum.
21. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in your assessment, how
would the availability of a joint version of EWPMT and the mobile
version, Raven Claw, benefit EUCOM?
General Scaparrotti. A joint version of an Electromagnetic Battle
Management (EMBM) system, similar to EWPMT, would be highly beneficial
as it helps reduce labor-intensive manual processes and enables greater
freedom of action in the electromagnetic environment. Any EMBM system
would require thorough evaluation to ensure it meets current and
emerging needs for USEUCOM forces.
continuing resolutions
22. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, in as
much detail as possible, through specific examples, please describe the
operational and financial impact continuing resolutions have on EUCOM/
TRANSCOM?
General Scaparrotti. Continuing resolutions significantly impact
the operations, training, and readiness of units in our European
footprint and the Atlantic Resolve (AR) assurance and deterrence
mission. Constrained distribution of fiscal resources causes execution
impasses, decreases unit OPTEMPO, and impairs rotations (e.g., ABCT,
CAB, MP/CSSB RFFs, 1ACB) to, from, and within Europe. Additionally, the
investment of resources to improve infrastructure and facilities
throughout the European theater provides our allies, partners, and
potential adversaries a clear indication of the United States' long-
term commitment to Europe. Continuing resolutions limit the capacity to
execute these improvements, compromising our ability to set the theater
for assurance and deterrence. The specifics of these infrastructure and
operational impact can be found in USEUCOM fiscal year 2020 J-book
submission.
General Lyons. As we have seen in the past, a Continuing Resolution
impacts readiness, mission operations and modernization funding when
the Services cannot project funding levels for manning, training, and
equipping mobility forces. In order to maintain readiness, USTRANSCOM
requires a balance between Services having adequately appropriated
funding and workload levels in order to provide the enterprise a
sufficient Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) cash balance. A
Continuing Resolution has some direct, immediate impact to USTRANSCOM's
appropriated workforce such as our Research and Development and new
start projects including Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations;
however, a Continuing Resolution will significantly impact readiness of
our Service Components, who execute our missions, and ultimately
reflect on our overall readiness to conduct global mobility operations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
european energy security (russian coercion)
23. Senator Cramer. General Scaparrotti, Russia currently has
significant leverage over many of our European and NATO allies due to
their reliance on Russian natural gas exports to provide for their
power needs. Last year, General Scaparrotti, you testified before the
HASC [House Armed Services Committee] that ``we [and our allies] are
working toward relieving some of the dependency on Russia . . . [and]
there's facilities being built that will allow us to transport
[liquefied natural gas]'' . You also said ``frankly, I think we should
continue to do that, because, as you know, Russia uses energy to coerce
and compel''. Nord Stream 2 is set to be completed later this year and
would double the amount of gas Russia transports directly to Germany.
Eventually Russia aims to eliminate the movement of Russia gas to the
European Union through Ukraine. Such a development would eliminate 1.5
percent of Ukraine's GDP outright and make Ukraine more vulnerable to
gas cutoffs by Russia, making Ukraine more vulnerable to annexations.
General Scaparrotti, is Russia continuing to use its natural gas
exports to Europe as a weapon against our European allies and NATO
partners?
General Scaparrotti. Russia uses its status as a major energy
exporter as a tool of coercion in Europe. Russia continues to
demonstrate a willingness to use (or threaten to use) energy supply
disruption as a tool of leverage to affect partner and Allied decision-
making, or as a punitive response to decisions viewed as counter to
Russian interests.
24. Senator Cramer. General Scaparrotti, what can we and our NATO
partners do to clear the regulatory roadblocks and make the
infrastructure investments to ensure the United States can prevent
Russia from coercing our European allies by threatening to turn off the
taps to their energy supply?
General Scaparrotti. Since most of the infrastructure and energy
markets in NATO nations are owned and operated by the private sector or
by civilian-managed, government-owned entities, NATO governments are
responsible for addressing any shortfalls and roadblocks to promote
investment and energy supply diversification. USEUCOM, together with
our military counterparts in NATO, are identifying fuel supply-chain
vulnerabilities and providing civilian leadership our best military
advice on energy security risks and infrastructure investments that can
help mitigate Russian coercion. Civilian and military investments in
enhanced energy efficiency, fuel supply diversification, and overall
energy resilience programs and policies will help grow our shared
capabilities to respond to future supply disruptions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
defense personal property program:
25. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, I understand your command is
considering getting out of the personal property moving business by
privatizing the Defense Personal Property Program. But TRANSCOM is in
fact in the business of moving stuff. Watching what has come to light
over the last three weeks with the military's privatized housing
initiative, I have grave concerns with the idea of TRANSCOM handing
this off to the lowest bidder. Could you describe your Command's
deliberations on privatizing the Defense Personal Property Program?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is not taking action to `get out of the
Personal Property moving business,' nor is it `privatization.' In part,
the current DP3 program is prone with problems similar to those
identified with the privatized housing issue. Much like individual
rental contracts for housing without adequate leader oversight each
servicemember arranges household goods shipments one transaction at a
time without accountability provided by leader oversight. Rather,
USTRANSCOM--on behalf of DOD--is taking action to fundamentally
restructure our relationship with industry to improve quality capacity,
stability, and accountability. Ultimately, USTRANSCOM will be
responsible for holding industry accountable. We will never relinquish
this responsibility.
Currently, 100 percent of servicemembers' movements are executed by
commercial providers. Under a single commercial move manager construct,
100 percent of the movements will continue to be done by commercial
providers. Rather than relying on 42 DOD offices to coordinate the
operations of 950+ Transportation Service Providers on a shipment-by-
shipment basis, with no underlying formal contractual agreement, DOD
seeks to award end-to-end transportation and storage processes to a
single commercial move manager to drive integration and capitalize on
the market intelligence of industry.
USTRANSCOM will award this contract based on a ``best value'' basis
that meets the needs of the program. We will not award a contract, and
will withdraw this recommendation if the acquisition process identifies
no viable candidates or if the Services deem the final product
unaffordable.
Restructuring DOD's relationship with industry in this manner will
promote stability and ultimately eliminate some of the most critical
gaps and seams that generate unnecessary friction and opacity for
military families.
26. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, what can you do to assure me
that TRANSCOM will maintain sufficient oversight of any contract that
privatizes the DP3?
General Lyons. Under the single move manager construct, USTRANSCOM
will be the DOD's lead agency for maintaining rigorous centralized
oversight--something today's DP3 lacks in the current construct. The
DOD's 42 regional shipping offices (which are independently managed by
the Military Services) award business on a shipment-by-shipment basis
to a regional pool of Transportation Service Providers. This fractured
nature of operations also stymies accountability. In 2018, the Services
issued over 50,000 letters of warning detailing areas where TSPs were
operating outside the bounds of program guidelines, and issued over
2,000 suspensions when those issues were not addressed; however,
because letters and suspensions are handled by 42 separate offices in
an uncoordinated fashion, these well intended actions do not translate
into meaningful outcomes. Restructuring our relationship with industry
will enhance our ability to provide oversight of this program.
f-15x procurement
27. Senator Hawley. General Scaparrotti, according to public
remarks made by Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein at the Air
Warfare Symposium, the Air Force will include new F-15s in this year's
budget request as part of an effort to refresh the F-15C fleet. What
impact would fielding new, advanced F-15s for the 48th Fighter Wing at
RAF Lakenheath have on your ability to reassure United States allies
and deter Russian aggression?
General Scaparrotti. As the current fleet of F-15Cs continues to
age, the Air Force's initiative to field new, advanced fighters will
help ensure that USEUCOM has the necessary assets to maintain air
superiority, deter Russia, and reassure United States allies and
partners, in part through participation in the NATO Air Policing
mission.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace and security (wps) act and gender roles
28. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, how has United States
European Command (EUCOM) been satisfying the Women, Peace and Security
Act?
General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM's approach to institutionalizing the
Women, Peace, and Security program focuses on formal change management,
establishing internal structures and training, and external capacity
building in partnership with the Department of State, USAID, and the
Department of Justice. USEUCOM has implemented an ``Executive
Coaching'' initiative focused on educating our senior leaders on the
importance of participation by women in conflict prevention, peace
processes, mitigation, and resolution. Additionally, with our Command
Gender Advisor, we mandate training on international human rights law
and protecting civilians from violence, exploitation, and trafficking
in persons.
29. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, how do you view EUCOM's
approach to WPS and the progress that has been made?
General Scaparrotti. In the past year and a half, USEUCOM has made
good progress in operationalizing the WPS program by working with our
Allies and partners to ensure a synchronized effort moving forward.
USEUCOM's approach centers on values-based education and change
management within the command. It nests with NATO's approach to WPS and
reinforces the role of women in conflict prevention, management, and
resolution and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.
30. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, what is EUCOM doing to
get to a place where it can hand over a crisis situation to NATO with a
seamlessly integrated gendered approach?
General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM is mirroring NATO WPS structures as
well as adopting their key terms of reference for WPS. During our last
headquarters exercise, which focused on managing a crisis with NATO,
our Gender Advisor was an active participant in several key decision-
making discussion forums. Additionally, during our everyday steady
state operations, we are actively engaged with the NATO gender network.
31. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, does EUCOM have a full-
time gender advisor?
General Scaparrotti. Yes. USEUCOM has a full-time Gender Advisor
(GENAD).
32. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, if so, what are the
responsibilities of the current gender advisor?
General Scaparrotti. Internally, USEUCOM's Women, Peace, and
Security Program Management and Gender Advisor (GENAD)is responsible
for: strategic document and orders mainstreaming, internal instruction
writing and implementation, education and training for all of USEUCOM
and the component commands, training exercise gender advising, advising
senior interagency representatives from State and USAID, and senior
military leaders' preparation and advising for key leader engagement.
Externally, the GENAD is responsible for capacity building
throughout EUCOM's 51 country AOR to include mainstreaming of
documents, strategy development of national action plan implementation
as well as education and training support, and supporting and advising
the NATO International Military Staff and Allied Command operations
GENAD.
33. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, is he/she exclusively
focused on WPS and what else do they work on?
General Scaparrotti. The USEUCOM Gender Advisor's primary task is
to execute the WPS program. As a member of our Interagency Partnering
Directorate (ECJ9), her additional performance elements are related to
Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) and Interagency Coordination.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
military move system
34. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how would privatizing the
military move process improve transparency and better serve military
families?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is not taking action to `privatize' DP3.
Rather, USTRANSCOM--on behalf of DOD--is taking action to fundamentally
restructure our relationship with industry to improve quality capacity,
stability, and accountability. Currently, 100 percent of
servicemembers' movements are executed by commercial providers. Under a
single commercial move manager construct, 100 percent of the movements
will continue to be done by commercial providers.
The single move manager construct will not only improve
accountability, but will also improve transparency in the program.
Under the single move manager construct, USTRANSCOM will be the DOD's
lead agency for maintaining rigorous centralized oversight--something
today's DP3 lacks. Under the current DP3 construct, the DOD's 42
regional shipping offices (which are independently managed by the
Military Services) award business on a shipment-by-shipment basis to a
regional pool of Transportation Service Providers. This fractured
nature of our operations also stymies accountability. In 2018, the
Services issued over 50,000 letters of warning detailing areas where
TSPs were operating outside the bounds of program guidelines, and
issued over 2,000 suspensions when those issues were not addressed;
however, because letters and suspensions are handled by 42 separate
offices in an uncoordinated fashion, these well intended actions do not
translate into meaningful outcomes. Restructuring our relationship with
industry will enhance our ability to provide oversight of this program.
35. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what oversight and
accountability measures would you implement to ensure we don't make the
same mistakes made when the military housing system was privatized?
General Lyons. The increase in accountability by transitioning to a
single move manager cannot be overstated. In many respects, the
fragmentation and diffused responsibility associated with our current
program mirrors the shortfalls Congress highlighted with DOD's
privatized housing model. As we restructure our relationship with
industry, we will similarly restructure the DOD's management framework
to provide the rigorous, centralized oversight required.
The current lack of accountability in DP3 mirrors the lack of
accountability in housing privatization, reinforcing the need to
fundamentally change our relationship with industry with a single
commercial move manager construct. USTRANSCOM, as DOD's lead agency for
maintaining rigorous centralized oversight, will never relinquish
responsibility for moving military families.
36. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what cost-benefit analysis
have you conducted on privatization?
General Lyons. After conducting an internal program review and a
survey of decades of studies on the topic, three consistent themes
emerge: 1) that DOD's assignment cycle exerts considerable strain on
capacity during the summer months; 2) that the transactional nature of
our relationship with industry prevents us from capitalizing on the
capacity that is available; and 3) that the program is fractured.
The cost of delaying significant action and committing resources to
extended study while preserving the status quo is clear; we will
continue to subject our military families to substandard moves,
something that has been brought to my attention through multiple
discussions with servicemembers, industry, and Congress. In order to
fundamentally improve the program, restructuring our relationship with
industry is necessary to capitalize on the market intelligence and
capability of industry to develop lasting relationships to increase
accountability, stability, and capacity.
37. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what other studies have you
conducted on your proposal to transition to a fully privatized moving
system?
General Lyons. This program has been studied numerous times by OSD,
the Military Services, GAO, DOD IG, and various think tank
organizations. These studies, which are still relevant because they
apply to the same system, reveal the same root causes and repeat the
same recommendations which have led to our intended transition to a
single move manager. Accountability and oversight will be enhanced in
this system and remain under USTRANSCOM's scope of responsibility.
38. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do military families support
privatization?
General Lyons. Military families have spoken out, loud and clear,
that they want improvements in the relocation process. Improving the
process for military families is our North Star and the reason we are
taking action. Military families' concerns, along with surveying
decades of studies on the topic highlighting recurring problems based
on the fractured nature of the current system, have led me to the
decision to restructure our relationship with industry to improve
quality capacity, stability, and accountability.
39. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, does industry support
privatization?
General Lyons. We have a monthly Open Discussion Group with
industry leaders, and we have held multiple industry days to gather
feedback. My Deputy and I have personally hosted group meetings with
industry CEOs, leaders of the associations that represent them, and
accepted numerous requests for one-on-one phone calls and office calls
with CEOs.
Many move managers and larger asset-based providers agree that
DOD's business model is outdated, and recognize the business
opportunities associated with this change. Some of these companies
support the proposal knowing full well that they do not have the
resources to serve as the prime contractor; yet, the opportunity to
engage and invest in longer-term relationships and operate in an
environment with other industry professionals free from DOD's
artificially complex business rules is an attractive prospect.
Each engagement with industry leaves me convinced that
restructuring DOD's relationship with industry and implementing this
single move-manager construct is the right answer for DOD personnel and
their families.
40. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, have you included military
families' input in your plans for privatization?
General Lyons. Yes, improving the relocation process for our
servicemembers and their families is our North Star and the reason we
are taking action. We have received feedback through our monthly
Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel with leading spousal
advocates from the military services.
41. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, will you commit to
prioritizing the needs of military families as you consider reforms to
the personal property program, and reporting back to Congress on how
their input is being implemented?
General Lyons. Yes, I will.
increased military presence in europe
42. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, with a returned focus to
Europe, are you reestablishing routes and connections previously used
during the Cold War?
General Lyons. In coordination with USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM is
consistently reviewing various means of providing efficient and
effective distribution based on the geographic combatant command's
analysis of their requirements. This may include previously used routes
and nodes, as well as newly established locations to meet that
commander's timeline across various OPLANS.
USTRANSCOM is closely coordinating air and sea ports of debarkation
with USEUCOM; some of those are the same as the Cold War and some may
be different based on the nature of the planning as it evolves; the
National Defense Strategy (NDS) mandates strategic predictability with
operational unpredictability and the use of theater nodes will adapt to
the USEUCOM planning.
43. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, are these routes and
connections adequate for the technology, interoperability, and capacity
required by missions?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM continues to analyze the distribution
network for the most effective and efficient means of meeting the
geographic combatant command's requirements. There are identified risk
areas, for which mitigation strategies are being developed. A key
responsibility for USTRANSCOM is to meter the strategic flow of forces
and sustainment in daily competition and under wartime conditions to
ensure onward movement meshes with the capacities planned by USEUCOM.
This is both an operational and information technology challenge that
must be effective at multiple echelons to coordinate end-to-end
movements.
European seaports and airports, for the most part, are very modern
and have robust infrastructure, capacity, and capability. Associated
routes and connections to these entry points will adapt to the plan,
specific USEUCOM concepts of operations, and implementations of Dynamic
Force Employment in accordance with the NDS.
44. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, NATO allies and EU member
states may be moving troops, equipment, and cargo along the same routes
and will use the same platforms, such as railroads, that we use to move
assets. Is there a mutually agreed upon plan in determining which
countries' assets have priority in the various European transportation
modalities?
General Lyons. There is a command and control structure designed to
prioritize transportation movements. If NATO allies are moving assets
during a contingency operation, the USEUCOM Commander will be dual
hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and will make
prioritization decisions.
As far as the strategic network is concerned, there is sufficient
capacity at European seaports which will receive the bulk of military
equipment, and USEUCOM has done considerable coordination with industry
on the availability of railcars and trucks for onward movement. While
USEUCOM is responsible for intra-theater movement coordination with
NATO allies and EU members, USTRANSCOM needs awareness of that movement
in order to meter strategic flow. To that end, USTRANSCOM will be
linked with USEUCOM through the Europe Deployment and Distribution
Operations Center at USEUCOM headquarters.
45. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, what
capabilities does Russia have to interfere with our logistics pipeline
in Europe?
General Scaparrotti. Russia has numerous kinetic and non-kinetic
means of interfering with the United States logistics chain in Europe.
Kinetically, Russia can threaten ports, supply depots, and lines of
communication throughout the European theater with land, sea, and air-
delivered precision-guided munitions, potentially assisted by special
operations forces. In the non-kinetic domain, Russia can use cyber or
electronic warfare attacks against a variety of targets throughout the
supply chain, including factories, sea, rail, and highway
transportation, key nodes such as airports and seaports, and space-
based navigation and communication systems. Russian actions against
logistics nodes and distribution routes would delay and disrupt force
closure and sustainment movements to include commercial commerce.
General Lyons. [Deleted.]
46. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons,
should we be more concerned about physical obstructions, manipulation,
and destruction, or meddling in the cyber realm?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
General Lyons. [Deleted.]
upcoming elections in ukraine
47. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, have you observed any
instances of Russian meddling leading up to Ukraine's presidential
election?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
48. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what is EUCOM doing to
deter and counter Russia's propaganda and misinformation campaigns in
Ukraine's upcoming elections?
General Scaparrotti. Our Military Information Support Team- Ukraine
(MIST-UKR) has and will continue to conduct DOD Military Information
Support Operations (MISO) activities in coordination with the United
States Embassy Kyiv since May 2014 in accordance with a SECDEF approved
EXORD. MIST-UKR focuses its enduring efforts providing alternative,
truthful information, reinforcing the U.S. Commitment to NATO Allies
and Partners, and expressing United States support for Ukraine
sovereignty and self-determination.
49. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, how are you working
with other agency partners, such as the Department of State, to ensure
Russia does not employ covert ways to influence the vote?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
conflict in eastern ukraine
50. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony, you
state that ``the conflict in eastern Ukraine remains hot, with numerous
ceasefire violations reported weekly.'' What progress, if any, has been
made in the last year to counter Russia's aggression and improve the
capabilities of Ukraine's forces?
General Scaparrotti. Through the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative (USAI), over the past year the United States has provided
counter-battery and counter-mortar radars, secure communication
equipment, and night vision devices. This assistance has increased
situational awareness, early warning, and survivability for Ukrainian
units operating in the Joint Forces Operations (JFO) area. The first
$125 million tranche of USAI 2019 is also being contracted to provide
two additional counter-battery systems, sniper rifles, shoulder fired
rocket launchers, and, in response to Russia's actions in the Sea of
Azov, counter-sea-mine equipment, special operations inflatable boats,
and dive equipment.
51. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what more can the
United States do to help Ukraine reestablish sovereignty and
territorial integrity?
General Scaparrotti. The United States must remain committed to the
Multinational Joint Commission (MJC), which is the leading organization
for eight partner nations to determine requirements, identify
shortfalls, and coordinate international assistance efforts to support
Ukraine's sovereignty. We must also continue to leverage the Joint
Multinational Training Group--Ukraine (JMTG-U) mission to help Ukraine
develop a modern and self-sustaining capacity to generate combat units.
Finally, we must sustain funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative (USAI), which helps enable Ukraine to defend itself and
deter further Russian aggression.
52. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what do you see as the
most impactful thing the United States can do to support Ukraine?
General Scaparrotti. Unwavering United States political support to
Ukraine, both bilaterally and through NATO, will have the most
significant impact on Ukraine's efforts to secure its sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
sealift shortfalls
53. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, you state in your testimony
that sealift is TRANSCOM's number one readiness concern. Is DOD [United
States Department of Defense] properly addressing TRANSCOM's readiness
concerns--particularly Sealift--in their budget requests?
General Lyons. Yes, the Navy is in close consultation with
USTRANSCOM, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Military
Sealift Command (MSC) who maintain the government-owned organic sealift
fleets. Through current and future budget cycles, the Navy is reviewing
all parts of the recapitalization strategy, including maintenance and
repair of the current fleets, Service Life Extensions, funding used
acquisitions, and the new construction program.
USTRANSCOM's focus is on improving near-term sealift readiness
which will benefit by accelerating the retirement of aging, difficult-
to-maintain vessels and acquiring more modern, used vessels.
54. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how can Congress assist
TRANSCOM in addressing these concerns?
General Lyons. Congress can assist through continued budget
stability and execution in support of the DOD. Additionally, Congress's
oversight and advocacy for sealift recapitalization requirements as
outlined by the DOD and MARAD will assist greatly in mitigating
USTRANSCOM's #1 readiness concern. Specifically, USTRANSCOM is focused
on the immediate need to improve sealift readiness at an affordable
level. This can be accomplished in part by accelerating the replacement
of aging, difficult-to-maintain vessels and acquiring more modern, used
vessels.
USTRANSCOM, with the Navy, is working to fully employ the
Congressional authorization to acquire seven used vessels with the
understanding that 26 total used vessels are required as part of the
sealift recapitalization effort.
55. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, can the American shipping
industry support recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force, the Maritime
Security Program, and the 355 ship Navy?
General Lyons. Although I cannot speak to the 355 ship Navy, the
American shipping industry will play a significant role in providing
new construction capacity to recapitalize a portion of the organic
sealift fleet. Regarding the Maritime Security Program, the law
requires participants to replace ships in the program upon reaching a
maximum age of 25 years. MSP participants have provided ship
replacements as needed since the program's inception, providing the DOD
with significant capacity and capabilities, although not typically from
U.S.-built sources. However, the refurbishment of these used ship
replacements and the construction of new ships will both occur in U.S.
shipyards.
56. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what is your priority here?
General Lyons. My top priority is maintaining sealift readiness to
meet DOD force deployment and sustainment requirements. Given the
advanced age of the organic sealift fleets, continued Service Life
Extensions on existing ships will not provide readiness outcomes
needed. The acceleration of the acquisition of more modern, used
vessels is the most practical means to alleviate readiness concerns in
the near-term.
57. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what does Congress need to
do to support recapitalization?
General Lyons. Congress can assist through continued oversight and
advocacy for sealift recapitalization requirements as outlined by the
DOD and MARAD. Specifically, USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate
need to improve sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be
accomplished in part by accelerating the replacement of aging,
difficult-to-maintain vessels with more modern, used vessels.
USTRANSCOM, with the Navy, is working to fully employ the congressional
authorization to acquire seven used vessels with the understanding that
26 total used vessels are required as part of the sealift
recapitalization effort.
58. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do you think the Navy has
the capability to escort Sealift ships?
General Lyons. Combatant and fleet commanders are tasked, in
coordination with USTRANSCOM, with planning and establishing the
necessary protection and security of USTRANSCOM's military and
commercial assets to ensure their safe transit within the respective
areas they operate. With any near peer competitor, all the Services
will be challenged to maintain open lines of communication including
from the sea. Defense of the sea lanes is a Navy mission that can be
accomplished by a variety of means, to include escort; however, with an
increased threat level, the Navy may have limited escort capacity
available for sealift at a given time. In that scenario, the Navy may
augment escort with additional measures such as aerial reconnaissance,
patrol or the use of escort support from a coalition partner.
59. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, in your testimony, you state
that ``TRANSCOM will be the sole U.S. operators of steam-powered
vessels.'' Can the American maritime labor force support the operation
of steam vessels?
General Lyons. The steam engineering skill set is eroding in the
commercial maritime sector as commercial fleets rely less on steam
engineering plants. However, mariners with steam credentials and
experience are vital to the continued success of existing steam powered
vessels in the MSC and MARAD Ready Reserve Force Fleets.
This decline in steam ships and steam engineers paints a dire
picture for manning and maintaining steam powered vessels. At the same
time, the American labor force is increasingly unable to support the
operation of steam vessels as the number of steam vessels in the
American Fleet is decreasing. MSC and MARAD are working together on
options to alleviate this potential shortfall in mariners with
experience in steam engineering, to include leveraging military-to-
mariner transition of military personnel with steam experience that are
departing the service and providing opportunities for cross-deck
training of mariners to expand their skill sets. For this reason,
USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve sealift
readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in part by
accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain vessels
with more modern used vessels.
60. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do sailors require
additional training?
General Lyons. The mariners that crew the surge fleet are
commercial contractor mariners who are trained to their respective
commercial standards. There are some unique military training
requirements, and those are generally handled during the activation
period. Under certain conditions, augmentation with government
personnel may be necessary to perform all the necessary tasks in
contested environments. Our mariners and shore staff must be ready for
the threats and complex problems they may encounter. Focusing on ship
and crew readiness is a priority--be it the material condition of our
platforms, training of our shipboard personnel, proper manning of our
ships with qualified mariners, or the resilience of our people and
their families.
61. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, Last year, Department of
Transportation chief Mark Buzby stated in an interview that the Navy
may not have enough ships to escort the sealift fleet during a wartime
surge. This is a vulnerability we must address to ensure our
servicemembers have the resources to defend against an attack on our
vital logistics network. Are you concerned that our logistics network
is vulnerable to attack if we cannot defend our shipping lanes?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM recognized this growing problem a few
years ago and has conducted analysis of operations in a contested
environment and begun to take actions to negate anti-access/area-
denial threats. To increase the resiliency organically within sealift
fleet against potential threats and provide greater confidence in
mission assurance in a contested maritime environment, we have renewed
our focus on operational tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well
as procuring secure communications, navigation, and force tracking
equipment. Naval escort may be one of several means to enhance the
protection of sealift operations. Other means may include maritime
aviation patrols, routing away from engagement zones, and decoy or
masking of vessels. All such protective measures will be considered in
the risk calculus.
The recent Mobility Capability and Requirements Study included
contested environment injects, and we have some initial insights to
build as our understanding of potential effects on force projection and
delivery. We are in coordination with other combatant commands, the
Services, and the Joint Staff on these issues through a variety of DOD
and USTRANSCOM forums. We continue to conduct analysis to determine the
vulnerabilities of greatest impact.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
allocation of naval assets
62. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, recent increases in
Russian naval activity, particularly submarine activity, deserve the
full attention of EUCOM. During the hearing, you mentioned that you
need two additional Destroyers in EUCOM. How many more submarines and
anti-submarine warfare aircraft do you need in EUCOM to maintain
awareness of Russian submarine activities?
General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
63. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, the Navy recently
announced its intent to eliminate the mid-life refueling and overhaul
of the aircraft carrier, USS Harry Truman (CVN 75), effectively
retiring the ship more than two decades before the end of its planned
service life and reducing the inventory of aircraft carriers from 11 to
10 in the near future. What is the impact to the combatant commanders
in general and you specifically in EUCOM of having less aircraft
carriers available?
General Scaparrotti. Increased Carrier Strike Group presence is
essential to expanding the competitive space, especially in the
Northern Atlantic and Eastern Mediterranean, and achieving a combat-
credible posture for deterrence and defense as directed by the 2018
National Defense Strategy. Achieving this increased carrier presence in
the European theater depends not only on the Navy's capacity (in terms
of the number of carriers in the fleet) but also upon how that capacity
is allocated globally through the Department's Global Force Management
process.
russia's goals in the pacific
64. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, Russia remains your
primary threat in EUCOM, but Russia is a power in the increasingly
competitive Pacific as well. What do you assess are Russia's strategy
and goals in the Pacific?
General Scaparrotti. In the Pacific, as in the Euro-Atlantic,
Russia's strategy and goals are to undermine U.S. interests, ensure its
territorial security, and achieve greater influence over its neighbors.
Russia also maintains economic interests throughout the region and
seeks to develop additional markets for military equipment, grain, and
energy exports. Moscow aims to attract more direct investment from
China, Japan, and South Korea for development of the underpopulated,
resource rich Russian Far East.
jones act
65. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, your written testimony describes
the challenges in the Ready Reserve Fleet, both in terms of vessels and
Merchant Marines. The Jones Act helps maintain a critical base of U.S.
Merchant Mariners that the nation will depend on in a crisis. Quite
simply, it is an investment in our national security that will pay huge
dividends in the event of a crisis. Does TRANSCOM continue to affirm
the importance of the Jones Act for our national security?
General Lyons. The domestically trading fleet is a critical
component to the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA),
providing assured access to wartime production capacity, global reach
to intermodal networks, and a pool of trained merchant mariners to
bring our government-owned, organic fleet from reduced to fully
operational status. Additionally, the Jones Act contributes to a robust
domestic maritime industry by helping maintain the U.S. industrial
shipyard base and infrastructure to build, repair, and overhaul U.S.
vessels.
66. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what would be the implications
for the number of U.S. merchant mariners if the Jones Act were
eliminated?
General Lyons. The impact would be significant. Currently there are
30 Jones Act eligible ships committed to VISA. At approximately 40
mariner jobs per ship, the overall mariner pool could decline by
approximately 1200. Recent studies indicate there is already a
shortfall of approximately 1,800 mariners for sustained contingency
operations.
ready reserve fleet
67. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, your written testimony does a
good job of laying out the readiness challenges regarding sealift. Does
your current plan with the Navy to pursue service life extensions and
buying a mix of new and used vessels fully address current readiness
shortfalls?
General Lyons. Service Life Extensions are part of the current plan
as a short-term means to maintain capacity until either new or used
replacement capacity can be acquired; however, extending the life of
aging, difficult-to-maintain ships is not desired and will not fully
address current readiness shortfalls without increasing cost and risk.
For this reason, USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve
sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in
part by accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain
vessels with more modern used vessels.
68. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, based on your strategy with the
Navy for the Ready Reserve Fleet, when will DOD meet its ship
availability goals?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM will continue to have readiness and
availability issues until a substantial portion of the fleet can be
replaced with newer ships. Extending the life of aging ships will not
fully address the current readiness shortfalls without increasing cost
and risk. USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve
sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in
part by accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain
vessels with more modern used vessels. The authority to acquire used
vessels will help to raise fleet readiness and availability as the
newer ships are brought into the fleet.
maritime security program
69. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Maritime Security Program
(MSP) is a critical link in our ability to project military power. Are
the 60 vessels currently contracted in the MSP enough to meet
operational needs?
General Lyons. Yes, MSP's 60 ships and associated 2,400 highly
qualified U.S. Merchant Marines continues to meet USTRANSCOM's
operational requirements. The MSP is an extremely valuable part of
USTRANSCOM's overall sealift portfolio to meet operational needs. MSP
carriers' global networks provide DOD not only with the vessel capacity
committed by participants through VISA but also with access to their
complete intermodal transportation systems and freight management
capabilities around the world. Those intermodal systems--not just the
ships but also the terminals, people, training, facilities, and
information systems provide DOD the global reach it needs for mission
accomplishment.
strategic importance of red hill
70. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage
Facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor/Hickam is a key component of the
Defense Department's operations in the Indo-Pacific, as it provides the
largest source of underground fuel storage in the region. What is the
potential impact to operational plans and logistics if the Navy were no
longer able to use the Red Hill facility?
General Lyons. Defense Fuel Support Point (DFSP) Pearl Harbor
includes war Reserve and day-to-day operational stock fuel storage at
Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hickman Air Force Base, and the Red Hill
storage facility. The fourteen operational tanks at Red Hill provide
storage capacity for up to 175,000,000 gallons of fuel. The primary
fuel products are jet fuel, naval jet fuel, and maritime fuel.
In addition to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickman, DFSP Pearl Harbor
supports Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Army Air Field, Marine Corps Air
Station Kaneohe as well as Sand Island (Honolulu Harbor) and Barber's
Point Coast Guard stations. Red Hill is the largest storage area in the
Pacific and facilitates trans-load, forward deployment, and sustainment
operations in support of various operational plans for the region. I
defer to INDO-PACOM as to potential risks to operational plans and
logistics.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
defense personal property program (dp3)
71. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, in 2017 TRANSCOM took over the
Defense Personal Property Program (DP3). Your command has stated
objectives that attempt to streamline the move process and reduce
backlogs, ultimately aiming for a centralized, or single, move manager.
Despite these actions, there are still numerous stories of damaged
goods, late shipments and overall dissatisfaction with the companies
that are executing the moves. As you prepare for the second ``peak
season'' in charge of the DP3, what actions have you taken or are
undertaking to ensure that this move season is an improvement over last
year?
General Lyons. Improving the overall relocation process requires a
variety of initiatives and investments from the Military Services'
Personnel and Logistics communities. OSD has established a Personnel
and Logistics Cross Functional Team that has the Department properly
aligned and focused on an action plan with near and long-term tasks to
improve many aspects of the overall relocation experience.
The Department of Defense has emphasized a number of improvements
for the 2019 Peak Season. These improvements include: earlier delivery
of permanent change of station orders for servicemembers and civilian
employees, allowing earlier scheduling of transportation and personal
property appointments; more in-person quality assurance inspections on
moving days; and increased claims valuation. In addition USTRANSCOM has
taken steps to add 68 new providers to the program, created new transit
time standards in partnership with industry, and relaxed overly-
engineered and burdensome business rules to allow industry more
flexibility to provide better service.
USTRANSCOM is also fundamentally restructuring DOD's relationship
with industry with a single move manager to achieve the accountability,
stability, and quality capacity required for substantial progress. We
expect to award a contract in January 2020 with performance beginning
in October 2020.
72. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, delays in the move process for
military families have been attributed to the overall housing boom in
the United States taking commercial capacity away as well as an overall
lack of numbers of commercial moving company capacity. Can you describe
what TRANSCOM is doing to incentivize or encourage the growth of
private moving companies required to meet the demands of the Defense
Personal Property Program?
General Lyons. A single move manager contract will provide industry
with both the confidence and rationale to invest in capacity and
strategic relationships with trusted suppliers to meet peak demand. In
turn, that single move manager will have the latitude to partner with
the companies it believes will provide both capacity and quality on the
terms and conditions those companies believe make sense (versus being
bound by the DOD's overly-complicated rule set). In addition to better
utilizing existing capacity, DOD assesses this construct will attract
new providers. Industry representatives who are currently unaffiliated
with DP3 state that the program's existing over- engineered rules make
DOD an unattractive partner; while the DOD pays competitive rates, much
of industry would rather serve the 80 percent of the non-DOD domestic
moving and storage market.
transcom civilian partnerships
73. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, in your testimony you
extensively cover the numerical problems with and ageing of our
mobility assets, especially in the sealift realm. The truth is in a
major conflict we are going to be relying heavily on civilian support
to move our military through both the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) programs. Do you
assess that industry will be able to provide the promised and required
mobility assets to meet our demand in the case of a major conflict in
Europe or the Pacific?
General Lyons. Yes, the Mobility Capability Requirements Study
examined both organic and commercial capacity and concluded the
combined capacities from organic and commercial providers were
sufficient to meet NDS objectives based on current plans. Additionally,
CRAF and VISA providers are committed under contract to provide their
capacity when needed. We have close relationships with our industry
counterparts through the National Defense Transportation Association
and CRAF/VISA Executive Working Groups that meet twice a year and are
chaired by my three-star deputy where we identify and resolve issues on
these programs. One area of focus going forward is the impact of the
contested environment on CRAF/VISA and what that will mean for when,
where, and how we use this vital and required commercial capacity.
However, a fundamental premise for use of commercial CRAF/VISA
capabilities is the necessity to operate in an acceptable operating
environment to minimize risk. This often requires setting conditions to
mitigate threats or conducting trans-load operations at locations
removed from the immediacy of the combat zone which complicates
operations and potentially increases the burden on military
capabilities for subsequent onward movement.
74. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, what quality control mechanisms
do you have in place or are working on to ensure that our industry
capability has not atrophied and remains accountable and able to
deliver on their agreements given the changing international
environment and the concern over a conflict with a major power?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM closely tracks and reports capacity
levels monthly and compares this data to our mobility requirements to
ensure the Command's strategic sealift portfolio is adequately sized
and ready to meet any contingency. VISA and MSP are joint programs
between MARAD and USTRANSCOM in which vessel selections are managed to
ensure they continue to meet national defense needs. Additionally,
regular industry engagements such as the National Defense
Transportation Association Fall Forums, CEO Meetings, and CRAF/VISA
Executive Working Groups pay huge dividends by enhancing relationships
with our commercial partners. These executive sessions, regular
operational wargames, and planning sessions ensure we align the
emerging threat environment with industry capabilities and
expectations.
worldwide logistics
75. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, the only reason we're able to
offer a credible threat to our enemies at any time is TRANSCOM and the
logistical support it provides in moving cargo, personnel and refueling
operations. As the United States continues to expand operations in
foreign countries as we see increased aggressiveness out of Russia and
China, there is concern that logistical networks outside of our country
will be unable to handle the burden if we do go to war. What is
TRANSCOM doing to address the ability to quickly and efficiently move
military equipment through Europe, Japan and Korea given significant
challenges in access to highways, rail and other mass transportation
mediums in these areas?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM participates in integrated planning with
the Joint Staff, Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, and
Combat Support Agencies to address contingency and crisis requirements
for projecting and sustaining the Joint Force. As part of our everyday
activities, USTRANSCOM works with geographic combatant commands'
theater posture efforts to maintain and expand access, basing, and
overflight across the globe. Additionally, we maintain close working
relationships with our commercial partners and components through
various forums to translate required capacity from planning into
capability at the point of need.
76. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, as we expand our operations in
Africa, can you explain logistical issues with a lack of real road or
rail infrastructure or even developed airfields in much of Northern
Africa and the Sahel and what initiatives the command is executing or
advocating for to ensure that we are able to project power or defend
allies whenever and wherever we choose?
General Lyons. With the significant size of the African land mass
and the lack of robust infrastructure, deployment and distribution is
challenging and often resolved via airlift, which is quite expensive.
To mitigate gaps and optimize distribution in the West and Central
regions, we have partnered with United States Africa Command to develop
the West Africa Logistics Network (WALN) designed to reach forces in
these far reaching locations. WALN is structured with a single,
strategic, multi-modal hub with tactical lift to several West and
Central Africa locations. We are considering a similar ``hub and
spoke'' approach in East Africa where we also have regularly scheduled
airlift missions. USTRANSCOM also provides regularly scheduled
strategic airlift missions to Tunisia in North Africa. Russian and
Chinese influence at various ports are growing concerns from an access
perspective. In order to enhance our relationships with partners and
allies, USTRANSCOM holds annual multinational logistics symposium and
explores common avenues for multinational cooperation,
interoperability, and innovation with logistics professionals.
77. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, what are TRANSCOM's priorities
to invest in regarding relationships with allies or infrastructure and
capabilities for airfields or naval facilities to ensure constant
access for our currently deployed forces in support of combat or
security operations?
General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's priorities for infrastructure
investments and capabilities are aligned with the National Defense
Strategy and the combatant commands' planning to conform to that
strategy. USTRANSCOM's Posture Plan, which includes the En Route
Infrastructure Master Plan, provides the basis for responding to a
wide-range of global activities. We seek agreements to ensure constant
access for deployed forces. The Command continually reviews
requirements for infrastructure and agreements, coordinating closely
with the various combatant commands and incorporating their operations
planning mobility needs via various cross-organization collaborations.
eucom and israel
78. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, Israel is the lone
country in your area of responsibility that faces the constant threat
and use of rockets and missiles against their nation. The United
States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on Security Assistance
approved by Congress provides $500 million in funding for annual
missile defense cooperation. How do you asses the effectiveness of
programs and systems that have resulted from this investment such as
Iron Dome, Arrow and David's Sling?
General Scaparrotti. The Iron Dome, Arrow, and David's Sling
systems are highly capable and have demonstrated their effectiveness in
testing and in defending against real-world threats. Nevertheless,
large numbers of rockets and missiles with enhanced capabilities could
overwhelm Israeli defenses.
79. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, what benefit do you see
to see to United States national interests through security cooperation
with Israel and where do we need to increase this cooperation to ensure
we are paying attention to the areas that require the most support?
General Scaparrotti. Israel and the United States share many
regional interests, and Israel supports United States interests in the
Middle East by deterring Syrian aggression, countering Hamas and
Lebanese Hezbollah, combatting the Iranian threat network, fighting
radical Islamic extremist organizations in both Syria and the Egyptian
Sinai, and enabling United States access and presence in the eastern
Mediterranean and Levant. We must continue to strengthen cooperation in
rocket and missile defense, air superiority, cyber capabilities, and
intelligence sharing.
80. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, last month EUCOM
participated with the Israeli Air Force in exercise Juniper Falcon and
with the Israeli defense forces in the Juniper Cobra ballistic missile
defense exercise. What are the benefits to the United States and our
allies of continued bilateral military exercises with the Israelis and
EUCOM, and how are we going to continue to realize these benefits
through future military exercises?
General Scaparrotti. Bilateral exercises with our Israeli partners
are an integral component to one of USEUCOM's core missions--assisting
Israel in its inherent right to self-defense. The Juniper Cobra and
Juniper Falcon exercises not only demonstrates United States commitment
to the defense of Israel, but also enhances our ability to rapidly
deploy, integrate, and conduct military operations with a critical ally
who furthers our objectives and protects our interests in the Middle
East.
Through the Juniper exercise series, United States Forces are
postured and ready to integrate military personnel and combat systems
into a combined architecture for the defense of Israel. As the United
States and Israel both bring new combat systems on line, such as the F-
35 and Israel's Arrow 3 missile defense system, and as we continue to
upgrade existing systems such as the Patriot and Aegis missile defense
systems, future bilateral exercises with Israel will allow the United
States to hone weapons systems, tactics, techniques, procedures,
bolster capabilities, and increase interoperability.
relations and security assistance with turkey
81. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, our relationship with
Turkey has become increasingly strained due to actions taken by their
government and policies regarding their relationship with Russia and
the Kurds in northern Syria. Regarding Russia, Turkey has continue to
pursue the purchase of the S-400 surface to air missile system despite
the United States offering to sell them a Patriot missile system.
Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan said a few days ago that we won't
transfer any F-35's to Turkey if they complete their acquisition of the
S-400. What actions or precautions are you taking in EUCOM to try and
reinforce our alliance with Turkey given the apparent change in
temperature regarding United States-Turkey relations?
General Scaparrotti. Continued efforts to reinforce our bilateral
relationship, in the face of current difficulties, is critical. EUCOM
maintains strong Mil-Mil relations with Turkey through such lines of
effort as intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, military
training, cyber security, and other regional security issues. EUCOM
also participates in land, air, and maritime exercises with the Turkish
Armed Forces. We are also exploring ways we can provide forces to
support Turkey as it leads the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force beginning in 2022.
The United States's extensive security cooperation with Turkey
includes 334 Active Foreign Military Sales cases worth $9.9 Billion and
the participation of 112 Turkish Officers in various International
Military Education and Training opportunities, including participation
at United States War Colleges.
82. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, what actions are you
taking with regard to Turkey and CENTCOM [United States Central
Command] to ensure our Kurdish partners who have fought so hard
alongside us against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] are
protected even as we begin to draw down combat operations in Syria?
General Scaparrotti. The USEUCOM staff has been closely integrated
with the USCENTCOM staff as withdrawal planning is formulated and
executed. Throughout this process, we have reinforced the message with
our Turkish counterparts that the Kurds must be protected.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
BUDGET POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer,
McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
It's nice to have the--Steve Turner, Northeastern State, in
the audience today to advise us along our line.
We're very pleased to have the--Patrick Shanahan, the
Acting Secretary of Defense; General Joseph Dunford, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and David Norquist.
I have to say, David, I enjoyed our breakfast together the
other day. I think--some people think it's pretty outrageous
that we can actually have an audit. I'm glad that you're in
charge of it.
Secretary Norquist. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank the panel for their distinguished
service to the country.
I'm pleased to see that--the Department of Defense budget
request for $718.3 billion and the overall national defense
request of $750 billion. This amount is an increase of less
than 3 percent of real growth. You know, this manual represents
the blueprint that we're following right now. We had a hearing
on this. I think, in all the years I've been here, this is the
most productive hearing that we've had, where we had Democrats
and Republicans alike in agreement on what our needs are to try
to perform this function. Well, one of the things that is in
this book that we all agreed to, and all the uniforms that came
to our hearings agreed with this, was to have an increase while
pulling out of this period of time and rebuilding our military
would be between 3 percent and a 5 percent increase over
inflation. Well, this 750 is actually less than 3 percent over
inflation. So, I just want to remind people of that. We didn't
quite get to that point.
The top line is only part of the story. We must ensure that
we are effectively and efficiently spending the money. That's
why I want to commend you, Secretary Norquist, for all of your
hard work delivering an audit of the Defense Department this
year. It's something we haven't seen. That audit should help us
identify areas that need more attention and hold people
accountable to spend the money more properly.
Despite leadership changes at the Department of Defense, I
believe the implementation of the National Defense Strategy
should continue, without pause. This is the book that we're
referring to, right here. When President Trump came to office,
he inherited an American military in crisis. Meanwhile, China
and Russia were rapidly modernizing their militaries and
actually passing us up in many areas.
America's military advantage has eroded in key warfighting
areas, such as long-range ground-based fires, cyber, space,
electronic warfare, as well as air and missile defense. The
Commission on the National Defense Strategy, a bipartisan,
independent commission, stated, quote, ``Put bluntly, the U.S.
military could lose the next state-versus-state war that it
fights,'' unquote. The conclusion of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy states that we--and I'm quoting again--``need urgent
change, at significant scale, to address strategic competition
with China and Russia.''
I look forward to hearing what the urgent changes are and,
our witnesses, what they recommend. Even the best-prepared
budget request will be meaningless if we don't reach a budget
agreement soon. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy
also stated that there must be--another quote--``There must be
greater urgency and seriousness in funding the national
defense. Without sufficient, sustained, and predictable
funding, we'll squander the progress the military has made over
the past 2 years.'' Improved readiness, increased procurement,
and critical capabilities and investment in future
technologies, I see no bigger imperative than this, to reach a
budget agreement immediately in order to fully fund defense and
to fully implement the National Defense Strategy.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming the witnesses, Secretary
Shanahan and General Dunford and Secretary Norquist.
Before we consider the details of the Defense Department's
budget request, I'd like to address some of the broader fiscal
challenges we face. Once again, we find ourselves in a
situation all too familiar, debating how best to fund the
government under the caps required by the Budget Control Act of
2011, the BCA. There is bipartisan consensus that enforcing
budget discipline through the BCA and sequestration is
ineffective and shortsighted, and that the BCA caps for fiscal
year 2020 will deprive us of the resources needed to
sufficiently meet the needs of our Nation.
Last year, because we had passed the Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2018, and we knew the permitted spending parameters, and
therefore, were able to mark up and pass the fiscal year 2019
defense authorization and appropriations bills before September
30th, this gave the military the funding certainty that it has
lacked for many years. I believe Congress should pass another
2-year budget agreement to provide further relief from the caps
and provide stability for budget planning. Without such an
agreement, we will face great difficulty in crafting a
bipartisan authorization bill and will be hard-pressed to
provide the Defense Department with another on-time
appropriation. Delay will likely lead to recurring continuing
resolutions that disrupt planning and, ironically, add cost and
inhibit readiness and modernization, and, to the Chairman's
point, undermine that sense of certainty that is probably worth
billions of dollars in budget authority. So, I would urge that
we do that.
Today, we consider the fiscal year 2020 budget for the
Department of Defense, which seeks $544.5 billion for the base
budget and $164.6 billion in overseas contingency operations
(OCO), of which $97.9 billion is designated to pay for base
requirements. In addition, there is another $9.2 billion
requested for emergency funding.
In its base budget request, the Defense Department
highlights resources intended to prioritize programs targeted
for the high-end fight against near-peer competitors and to
operationalize the National Defense Strategy, including
investments in the space and cyber domains, larger purchases of
aircraft, ships, and munitions, and increased research-and-
development dollars for unmanned systems, artificial
intelligence, hypersonics, and directed energy. The base budget
request also supports the quality of life of our servicemembers
by sustaining family support initiatives and by authorizing a
3.1 percent pay raise, the largest in 10 years. However, it is
clear that the base budget request will not cover all the
Defense Department's requirements, so we've been presented with
a particularly egregious misuse of the OCO account. I
acknowledge that both Congress and other administrations in the
past have included elements of base funding in OCO accounts,
but overloading the OCO request with $97.9 billion worth of
activities that truly belong in the base budget just to avoid
the threshold of the BCA cap far exceeds any President and
cannot be justified.
Ironically, last year, the President's Acting Chief of
Staff, Nick Mulvaney, called for a, in his words, ``transition
away from using OCO as a gimmick to avoid the sequestration
caps,'' close quote, in his testimony before Congress. Yet,
this defense budget is a prime example of such a use and
undercuts the integrity of the entire request.
I'd also highlight that section 1524 of the Fiscal Year
2018 Defense Authorization Act directed the Defense Department
to update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be
covered by OCO. Neither OMB nor the Defense Department have
updated these guidelines. I hope our witnesses shed some light
on when this will be done and what the details are of this OCO-
for-base request.
I also have serious concerns with the $9.2 billion
requested in emergency funding for unspecified military
construction projects, $3.6 billion of that total is intended
to replenish funds that may be diverted from military
construction projects that Congress already authorized and
appropriated to build a wall on the southern border. Even if
this funding is replenished, these projects could be delayed or
even canceled. I would also like to note that Congress has not
yet been given the list of projects whose funding may be
diverted, and I'm interested if the witnesses can provide some
information on that list.
Moreover, we've learned that an additional $3.6 billion of
emergency funding in Defense Department's budget will be used
to build more of the wall, projects that have not been
identified in any way and arguably have zero military utility.
Much of our witnesses' testimony today describes the $750
billion in investment needed to fulfill the National Defense
Strategy, but the National Defense Strategy Commission, as the
Chairman cites is authoritative in his comments, noted that
comprehensive challenges will require whole-of-government and
even whole-of-Nation cooperation, extending far beyond DOD.
Diplomatic statecraft and other nonmilitary tools will be
critical. So will adequate support for funding for those
elements of American power. With the State Department and other
agencies facing drastic cuts in this budget request, I'm
interesting to know if the Defense Department will truly be
able to realize the National Defense Strategy.
It is a duty of this Committee to ensure the men and women
we send into harm's way have the resources necessary to
complete their mission and return home safely. But, I firmly
believe, if the Senate decides to modify the budget caps for
fiscal year 2020, we must do so in a manner that continues to
provide sufficient funding for both defense and nondefense, as
we have done every other time we've adjusted the caps.
I'm proud that this Committee has always worked in a
bipartisan fashion during this process. I look forward to
working with all the Committees to come to a reasonable
agreement again this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We'll now have opening statements by both the Secretary and
General Dunford. Your entire statement will be made a part of
the record, but, if you can hold it down to around 5 minutes--
we have a full house today, and we want to get to questions by
all of our members on both sides.
So, we'll start with you, Secretary Shanahan.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK M. SHANAHAN, ACTING
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE DAVID L.
NORQUIST, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe and Ranking
Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
for this opportunity to testify in support of the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2020.
I'm joined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Joseph Dunford, and the Department's Comptroller and
Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist.
During my time at the Department of Defense, I've engaged
in substantive discussions with many of you. In our
conversations, there has been an enduring constant. That is,
the bipartisan nature of defense, proved by the sustained
funding increases Congress has provided, the last 2 years. On
behalf of our military's selfless patriots, thank you.
It has been a great privilege and honor to serve alongside
the men and women of the Department of Defense, and it was a
pleasure to work with Secretary Mattis to craft the 2018
National Defense Strategy. Released in January of 2018, that
strategy laid the foundation for restoring military readiness
and modernizing our joint force for an era of great-power
competition.
I now oversee the continued execution of our strategy,
which is the undisputed driver of today's budget request. It
was extremely helpful for the Department to receive the
authorization and appropriation bills on time and at the
requested top line last year. That is equally important this
year, as our competitors have not been complacent. China's
defense spending approaches that of the United States when we
take into account purchasing power and the portion of our
budget going to military pay and benefits. That, coupled with
China's organized approach to steal foreign technology, has
allowed China to modernize its missile, space, and cyber
capabilities, as well as project power far beyond its borders.
Russia, for its part, continues to compete asymmetrically with
the United States, modernizing and developing its own missile,
space, and cyber capabilities. Simultaneously, North Korea's
nuclear weapons and missiles remain a pressing concern. Iran's
missile and cyber threats and malign aggression across the
Middle East and beyond threaten United States national
interests. We know violent extremist organizations like al
Qaeda and ISIS continue to foment instability in vulnerable
areas.
We have seen marked progress in our current operations as
we work by, with, and through an expansive network of allies
and partners across the globe. In Syria, the 79-member Defeat
ISIS Coalition has liberated virtually all of the territory
ISIS once held. As the United States drawdown continues, we
will maintain a presence to prevent ISIS resurgence.
As part of a whole-of-government approach, we fully support
Iraq's fight against terrorism, and we continue to enable the
Iraqi Security Forces' progress in securing liberated areas and
thwarting ISIS's attempts to mount a clandestine insurgency.
In Afghanistan, United States and coalition forces are
training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces to apply
pressure on the Taliban. We support the ongoing negotiations,
the best window for peace there in 40 years, and continue to
stymie terrorist threats to our Homeland.
Defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS
remains the top United States national security interest in
Yemen. At the same time, we fully support UN efforts to bring
all relevant parties of the civil war to the negotiating table.
The $750 billion top line for national defense enables DOD to
maintain irregular warfare as a core competency, yet prioritize
modernization and readiness to compete, deter, and win in any
possible high-end fight of the future.
The budget is critical for continued execution of our
strategy, and reflects difficult but necessary choices that
align finite resources with our strategic priorities. To
highlight some of those choices, this is the largest research,
development, training, and evaluation budget in 70 years. The
budget includes double-digit increases to our investments in
both space and cyber, modernization of our nuclear triad and
missile defense capabilities, and our largest shipbuilding
request in 20 years, when adjusted for inflation. It also
increases our total end strength by roughly 7,700
servicemembers and provides a 3.1 percent pay increase to our
military, the largest in a decade.
Now to the specifics. The top line slates $718 billion for
the Department of Defense. Of that total, the budget includes
$545 billion for base funding and $164 billion for the overseas
contingency operations. Of the overseas contingency operation
funds, $66 billion will go to direct war and enduring
requirements, and $98 billion will fund base requirements. To
round out the numbers, $9.2 billion will fund emergency
construction. That includes an estimated $2 billion to rebuild
facilities damaged by Hurricanes Florence and Michael; up to
$3.6 billion to support military construction projects that
will award in fiscal year 2020 instead of fiscal year 2019 so
we can resource border barrier projects under emergency
declaration this year; and $3.6 billion in case additional
emergency funding is needed for the border. Military
construction on the border will not come at the expense of our
people, our readiness, or our modernization. I caution that no
adversary can be as damaging to our military readiness as
budget instability.
We built this budget to implement the National Defense
Strategy, and I look forward to working with you to ensure
predictability, on-time funding at our requested top line so
our military can remain the most lethal, adaptable, and
resilient fighting force in the world.
I close with the words of William Jennings Bryan etched
into the walls of our Capitol so we may never forget their
meaning, ``Our Government, conceived in freedom and purchased
with blood, can be preserved only by constant vigilance.''
Senators, I appreciate the critical role Congress plays to
ensure our warfighters can succeed on the battlefields of both
today and tomorrow. I thank our servicemembers, their families,
and all those in the Department of Defense for maintaining the
constant vigilance as they stand always ready to protect
freedoms.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Shanahan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan
introduction
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2020. I am joined today by
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, and the
Department's Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David
Norquist.
The size, scale, and importance of collaboration between Congress
and the Department of Defense (DOD) shows we are united in our purpose
to protect and defend our Nation. During my time as Deputy Secretary of
Defense and now as Acting Secretary of Defense, I have engaged in
substantive discussions with many Members of this Committee. I look
forward to continuing our engagements, in this hearing and beyond, with
both long-serving and new members, as the Department drives results
along our strategic priorities.
We in DOD appreciate Congress's partnership in repeatedly
demonstrating the bipartisan nature of defense. I thank Congress for
voting to lift budgetary caps and providing sustained funding increases
over the last two years, which have helped our military meet today's
challenges while preparing for those of tomorrow. Members of this
Committee, the entire Congress, and the American people can rest
assured that DOD has efficiently and effectively invested your money.
Thank you, in particular, for your support of the fiscal year 2019 2.6
percent pay increase for our military personnel.
Our responsibility is to remain responsible stewards of your trust
and the American people's hard-earned tax dollars. DOD has accelerated
necessary changes in how we develop, posture, and employ our Joint
Force. We are taking a clear-eyed approach to the strategic environment
in which we operate and marrying our past experiences to new ideas,
driving progress and fostering innovation in the process.
Our fiscal year 2020 budget reflects the President's vision for
prioritizing the security, prosperity, and interests of the American
people. It also reflects my vision for the future--one marked by a more
lethal, results-oriented Department of Defense with the capabilities
and capacity to ensure national security and implement our National
Defense Strategy (NDS) at the speed of relevance. Today I look forward
to discussing that vision and how it is reflected in DOD's posture and
resourcing decisions.
the 2018 nds: an enduring framework
To provide context for that discussion, I want to take us back in
time: two years ago, our Department had brand new civilian leadership
ready to drive results. With a military enduring the longest continuous
duration of combat in American history, we contended with a host of
challenges, including an increase in North Korean missile testing; an
aggressive Iran; violent extremists in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan;
and growing strategic competition with China and Russia. In addition,
cyber and space emerged as contested, warfighting domains, further
complicating an already complex security environment.
Amidst these challenges, the release of our 2018 NDS last January
provided the strategic unity DOD needed, with clear direction on
restoring military readiness and modernizing the Joint Force to address
great power competition.
The 2018 NDS's unified framework enables a potent combination of
teamwork, resources, and an unmatched network of allies and partners
stepping up to shoulder their share of the burden for international
security. The NDS also fosters alignment within the Department, the
Interagency, industry, and Congress.
Fourteen months after its release, I say with conviction: the NDS
remains the most effective aligning mechanism for the Department. Its
implementation is our most critical mission. Yet, strategy cannot be
static; it must be constantly reevaluated. Last month, my staff
concluded a clear-eyed assessment of our NDS priorities and our
progress in meeting them, highlighting our successes and making clear
we still have more work to do. Most significantly, it reaffirmed that
erosion of our competitive edge against China and Russia continues to
be DOD's most pressing ``central problem.'' Our three primary lines of
effort--increasing our military's lethality, strengthening our network
of alliances and partnerships, and reforming DOD's business practices--
remain the most effective avenues for addressing this challenge.
I thank Congress for its own evaluation via the NDS Commission.
Having reviewed the findings of both our internal DOD assessment and of
the Commission's report, I am confident we are aligned on the most
critical matters. The few areas where we did not agree reflect the
reality that finite resources require tough choices. DOD stands by
these choices as necessary components of our strategic approach.
As our Department has aligned behind our Strategy, our competitors
have not been complacent. They have accelerated their own military
modernization efforts and vigorously pursued the development and
fielding of advanced technologies with a clear intent: create an
asymmetric military advantage against us, our allies, and our partners.
priority threats & policy objectives
The China Threat
As this Committee recognizes, the Chinese Communist Party exports
coercive influence far beyond its borders while internally wielding
authoritarian governance over its own people. To achieve hegemony in
the Indo-Pacific in the near term and shape a world consistent with its
authoritarian model, China is: (1) aggressively modernizing its
military, (2) systematically stealing science and technology and
seeking military advantage through a strategy of Military-Civil fusion;
(3) undermining the rules-based international order, which has
benefited all countries, including China, and (4) building an
international network of coercion to further its economic and security
objectives.
Military Modernization
The trajectory of China's military spending is clear. In just
twenty years, China's official defense budget soared from roughly $20
billion in 1998 to $170 billion in 2018, with actual spending even
higher. Just last week, China announced a projected 7.5 percent
increase in defense spending in 2019. China devotes these funds to
aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development,
from nuclear and missile capabilities to space and cyber. Accounting
for purchasing power and the significant portion of our military budget
going to pay and benefits, today, China's defense spending approaches
that of the United States.
China has made investments specifically intended to offset United
States advantages, including robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
networks, more lethal forces, and new strategic capabilities. If
deployed to overwhelm United States or allied combat power at initial
stages of a conflict, these capabilities could seek to achieve a ``fait
accompli'' that would make reversing Chinese gains more difficult,
militarily and politically. Implementation of our Strategy ensures we
have the capabilities, posture, and employment of forces so this never
comes to pass.
On the nuclear front, China is developing long-range bomber
capabilities that, if successful, would make it one of only three
nations in the world to possess a nuclear triad. In addition, China is
building up its inventory of missiles, focusing on those intended to
circumvent U.S. and allied defenses and deny the United States critical
military access to the Indo-Pacific. Within the past five years alone,
China has successfully tested hypersonic cruise and boost glide weapons
concepts for these purposes.
In 2018, China conducted more space launches than any other nation.
In choosing to develop counterspace and dual-use space capabilities and
enhance space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
China has demonstrated its ability to weaponize space, if desired. We,
in turn, cannot ignore China's ability to target United States and
allied space capabilities. We also cannot ignore China's ambitions in
the cyber domain, which it recognizes as the battlefield's ``nerve
center.'' With all People's Liberation Army (PLA) cyber operations
coordinated under one roof, China can operate in this contested domain
without bureaucratic red tape to slow it down.
Technology Theft
The rate at which China is systematically stealing United States
and allied technology for its own military gain is staggering.
Reversing this dangerous trend--one which could impact our troops on
the battlefield--means acknowledging reality: every Chinese company is
at risk of being either a witting or unwitting accomplice in China's
state-sponsored theft of other nations' military and civilian
technology. To quote China's own cybersecurity law, private companies
are required to ``provide technical support and assistance to public
security organs and national security organs,'' whether they want to or
not. Any United States or allied company that works with Chinese
companies, without proper safeguards, thus opens itself to theft as
well.
To grasp the pervasiveness of the problem, look to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There are open Chinese economic
espionage or technology theft cases in nearly all FBI field offices.
For years, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) has indicted members of
the Chinese state and military for stealing U.S. technology. In
January, DoJ recognized China's escalating tactics and took a step
further, indicting executives of Chinese telecommunications company
Huawei for scheming to steal T-Mobile's trade secrets.
Huawei exemplifies the Chinese Communist Party's systemic,
organized, and state-driven approach to achieve global leadership in
advanced technology. With initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, Made
in China 2025, and Thousand Talents Program in play, which spur
companies and individuals to carry out its bidding, China aims to steal
its way to a China-controlled global technological infrastructure,
including a 5G network. China pursues large-scale acquisition of
foreign companies in sensitive sectors and pressures companies into
transferring technology. Finally, China's Military-Civil Fusion
strategy seeks to translate cutting-edge technology into advanced
weapons.
Here I must note: some United States companies have voiced ethical
qualms about working with DOD to develop advanced technology, in some
cases even terminating relationships--often while continuing to work
with China. DOD takes ethical considerations extremely seriously when
researching and developing emerging technologies, and our efforts
improve performance and allow human beings to make better decisions.
China, on the other hand, repeatedly demonstrates little regard for
international ethical rules and norms.
China's approach to technological advancement matters for our
military advantage, and its ambitions threaten the security of critical
United States capabilities and technological infrastructure, and thus
our military operations, safety, and prosperity.
Let me be perfectly clear: the United States does not oppose
competition, as long as it takes place on a fair and level playing
field. However, we cannot accept the unfair and illegal actions of
others who intend to tilt the playing field through predatory economics
and underhanded tactics.
Undermining the Rules-based International Order
We all know China's population is comparable to the Americas and
Western Europe's combined. But China is also geographically situated
within arm's reach of 2.4 billion people, roughly a third of the
earth's population, across Southeast Asia, Japan, and India. Make no
mistake--China is extending that reach by increasing its overt military
and coercive activities vis-a-vis its neighbors.
China's increasingly provocative behavior in the Indo-Pacific,
particularly the South China Sea (SCS), should concern us all. Between
2013 and 2018, China increased its air and sea incursions into the SCS
twelvefold. Within those five years, it also increased deployments of
offensive and defensive weapons systems to the SCS by the same order of
magnitude.
China's land reclamation and militarization far exceed that of
other claimants combined in the South China Sea. Between 2013 and 2015
alone, China created more than 3,200 acres in the SCS, building
features within its self-proclaimed `nine dash line'--a claim the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 has no legal
basis. These constructed features are almost four times the size of
Central Park in New York City and roughly five times the size of this
Capitol Hill neighborhood. Imagine walking from this hearing room to
the Marine Barracks at 8th and I over what used to be part of the
Pacific Ocean.
Now also picture Chinese interference in freedom of navigation. Yet
for this, we do not have to use our imaginations. China habitually
threatens this freedom, using both conventional military force
projection and ``gray zone'' or irregular warfare activities. For
example, in September, Chinese military vessels came dangerously close
to the USS Decatur off the coast of the Spratly Islands. China's force
projection inside and outside the SCS disrespects and undermines our
rules-based international order and threatens regional stability and
security.
International Network of Coercion
Lastly, China is diligently building an international network of
coercion through predatory economics to expand its sphere of influence.
Sovereign nations around the globe are discovering the hard way that
China's economic ``friendship'' via One Belt, One Road can come at a
steep cost when promises of investment go unfulfilled and international
standards and safeguards are ignored.
Let us look at just a few examples. Saddled with predatory Chinese
loans, Sri Lanka granted China a ninety-nine-year lease and seventy
percent stake in its deep-water port. The Maldives owes China roughly
$1.5 billion in debt--about thirty percent of its GDP--for construction
costs. Pakistan owes China at least $10 billion in debt for the
construction of Gwadar Port and other projects.
In Africa, Djibouti owes China more than eighty percent of its GDP
and, in 2017, became host to China's first overseas military base. In
Latin America, Ecuador agreed to sell eighty to ninety percent of its
exportable crude oil to China through 2024 in exchange for $6.5 billion
in Chinese loans. After leasing land tax-free to China for fifty years,
Argentina is denied access and oversight to a Chinese satellite
tracking station on its sovereign territory, unwittingly allowing the
facility's use for military purposes.
The list of nations entrapped by China's predatory debt tactics
runs long, and some have started to push back. Yet, under the guise of
good-intentioned development, Beijing continues to leverage debt for
economic or political concessions--a practice we expect will intensify
as more nations prove unable to pay China back.
Policy Objectives to Meet the China Threat
Left unaddressed, China's success in unfairly tilting the playing
field in its favor has serious implications for our own military
advantage. While we do not seek to contain China, we expect China to
play by the rules, meeting the same standards to which the United
States and all other nations are held. We will cooperate with China
wherever and whenever possible, but we also stand ready to compete
where we must to ensure our military's competitive advantage for
decades to come.
As German Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen said last month
in Munich, ``our partnerships are not built on domination. They do not
create political and economic dependencies.'' Our pursuit of many belts
and many roads creates alternative options for nations unwilling to
succumb to China's increasingly coercive methods.
As such, DOD's priority policy objectives are to outpace Chinese
military modernization to deter future conflict, or win decisively
should conflict occur; protect United States and partner research and
development of advanced technology from rampant Chinese theft, and;
maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific built on strong alliances and
growing partnerships.
The Russia Threat
China is not the only nation attempting to undermine U.S. interests
and security to alter the international order in its favor. Despite
having an economy smaller than that of the state of Texas, Russia,
against the economic odds, seeks a return to great power status. Though
it has not reached that goal, Russia is playing a weak strategic hand
well by: (1) aggressively modernizing its military; (2) projecting
military might beyond its borders; (3) intimidating its neighbors,
including exploiting their energy dependence for strategic gain, and;
(4) undermining other nations' sovereign democratic processes.
Military Modernization
Russia is aggressively modernizing its military to gain an
asymmetric advantage over the United States and NATO. Russia plans to
spend $28 billion to upgrade and modernize each leg of its strategic
nuclear triad by 2020, and has already spent more than ten percent of
its total military budget every year since 2011 on nuclear
modernization efforts. In March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin
announced Russia's development of six new strategic weapons systems--
five of which are nuclear capable--including hypersonic systems able to
maneuver at ten times the speed of sound and intended to circumvent
U.S. missile defense capabilities. One of those hypersonic systems is
expected to enter service this year.
In addition to modernizing its strategic weapons systems and
delivery platforms, including its submarine fleet, Russia is building a
large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems, including the
dual-capable SSC-8 cruise missile, which clearly violates the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Every NATO Ally agrees
on this point and supports our decision to suspend United States Treaty
obligations in response to Russia's material breach. A treaty not
followed by all parties cannot be an example of effective arms control.
For any who doubt United States efforts to bring Russia back into
compliance with the Treaty, I would emphasize: we held over thirty
meetings with the Russians at every level of government for more than
five years--across two administrations, one Democrat and one
Republican.
Moving to space, Russian systems are intended to disrupt, degrade,
and damage United States satellites in orbit. There is no question:
Russia treats space as a warfighting domain to gain military advantage
over the United States. Moscow has already fielded ground-based
directed energy laser weapons and is developing air-based systems and
additional novel counterspace capabilities to target our space-based
missile defense sensors. Russia now has the third largest collection of
operational satellites in the world, behind only us and China.
Projecting Military Power
On top of modernizing its military capabilities, Russia also
projects its military might around the globe. In 2018, Russia conducted
its largest strategic military exercise since 1981. Today Moscow
deploys a variety of aviation and naval missions to the Pacific, the
Arctic, the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the western
hemisphere, including the Caribbean. In December, Russia conducted
landing and overflight operations in our own front yard, sending
bombers to Venezuela. In the Middle East, it has continued support for
Syria's murderous regime with expeditionary operations and long-range
strikes. These examples make clear Russia's ambitions for a more
globally dominant military footprint.
Strategy of Intimidation
In addition to projecting military power far beyond its borders,
over the last decade Russia has attempted to incrementally push
geographic boundaries with its neighbors. From its 2008 invasion and
continued occupation of twenty percent of Georgian territory to its
2014 invasion and continued occupation of Crimea, Russia demonstrates
blatant disregard for other nations' sovereignty. Lest we forget,
Russia still holds twenty-four Ukrainian crewmembers it captured last
November, when it attacked three Ukrainian ships near the Sea of Azov
in violation of international law.
Russia's escalating intimidation efforts are amplified by irregular
warfare and ``gray zone'' tactics intended to sow confusion, conceal
military movement, and limit accountability. By deploying mercenaries--
like those of the Wagner Group to places like Crimea, Syria, Libya, and
now Venezuela--instead of uniformed soldiers, Russia hopes its use of
proxies will further muddy the already murky waters of conflict and
limit international response to its actions. Russia's attempts at
deception are not fooling anyone.
Undermining Sovereign Processes
Russia's duplicity also extends to the cyber domain, where it
propagates coordinated disinformation campaigns to undermine sovereign
democratic processes. In April 2018, Facebook estimated that roughly
one million users followed a page operated by Russia's Internet
Research Agency (IRA). Last year, Twitter identified more than 3,800
IRA accounts that had generated millions of tweets over a nine-year
span. These accounts are intended to foster divisiveness in the West
and undermine trust in democratic institutions.
Russian efforts extend beyond their bots and internet trolls--they
conduct deliberate cyber operations against the United States and other
sovereign nations. To name a few examples of Russian handiwork: it has
targeted United States Government and critical systems to allow damage
or disruption of U.S. civilian or military infrastructure during a
crisis; launched distributed denial of service attacks against NATO,
Ukraine, and German Government websites, and; released a potent cyber
virus that caused billions of dollars in damage around the world.
In response, we are not complacent. DOD is getting after the
problem, and we are achieving results, most notably in our recent
successful efforts to stymie Russian disruption of our midterm
elections. We are determining what other actions DOD and our
Interagency partners must take to ensure the continued safety and
integrity of our democratic institutions.
Policy Objectives to Meet the Russia Threat
As these examples make clear, Russia is intent on undermining
United States military advantage to alter the existing balance of power
in its favor. In order to thwart Russia's efforts to regain peer
competitor status, DOD is focused on modernizing our military to
enhance deterrence and prevent future conflict, while bolstering burden
sharing to ensure the NATO Alliance remains credible and capable
against Russian aggression.
We are also working diligently with the Interagency, our allies,
and our partners to deter Russia's physical intimidation and contest
its cyber aggression, information warfare, and ``gray zone'' tactics in
Syria and beyond. That includes ensuring Russia does not control the
international narrative, casting its malign intentions and actions
under a cloak of subterfuge, disinformation, and malign propaganda. We
are strengthening our ability to counter this deliberate deceit, both
on our own and with our allies and partners.
Regional Threats: North Korea & Iran
As DOD modernizes to win competition with China and Russia, we also
remain alert to regional threats, like those posed by the Iranian and
North Korean regimes.
While President Trump and our diplomats negotiate for the
denuclearization of North Korea, its collection of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles continues to pose a threat to the United States
Homeland, as well as our allies.
Iran, for its part, relentlessly seeks to expand its malign
influence across the Middle East and beyond. By providing conventional
manpower and support to the Syrian regime and Houthi rebels in Yemen,
and offering support and financing to terrorist groups like Lebanese
Hizbullah, Iran is entrenching and proliferating its clout across the
region. In addition, Iran demonstrates reckless behavior in the
maritime domain. Iranian leaders repeatedly threaten to close the
Strait of Hormuz--the gateway for almost a third of all global sea-
traded oil--to international shipping and allow Iranian-backed Houthis
to conduct attacks on international shipping in the Bab al-Mandab.
Iran has also increased funding for its cyber efforts twelvefold
under President Rouhani, as well as increased espionage and targeting
of United States Government and commercial entities since withdrawing
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. DOD also remains closely
attuned to the threat of Iran pursuing nuclear weapon and advanced
missile capabilities, including Iran's testing of space launch vehicles
with technology virtually identical and interchangeable with that of
ballistic missiles.
Policy Objectives to Meet Regional Threats
In support of the ongoing negotiations for the denuclearization of
North Korea, DOD aims to ensure our diplomats continue to speak from a
position of strength. Our alliances in the region remain ironclad,
including with the Republic of Korea and Japan. Together we deter North
Korean aggression and maintain our ability to protect the Homeland and
win decisively should conflict ever occur.
To counter Iran's destabilizing influence across the Middle East,
DOD seeks to deepen and expand alliances in the region and strengthen
local partners' capabilities and capacity to manage and counteract
threats. We also seek to ensure freedom of navigation for all, bolster
resilience against destructive cyber-attacks, and prevent weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) from falling into the hands of irresponsible
actors.
The Terrorism Threat
Working by, with, and through an expansive network of international
partners, we have made meaningful progress in thwarting terrorist
designs against the U.S. Homeland and interests. Yet we do not discount
the threats that continue to emanate from violent extremist
organizations (VEOs), as they seek to conduct and inspire attacks, gain
legitimacy by exerting control over territory, enjoy safe haven in
under-governed countries, obtain access to WMD material, and
proliferate their ideology to others across the globe.
Taking a step back from our hard-won successes against the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), we also recognize the global fight
against radical Islamist terrorists is not over. From the 1980s to now,
the number of nations, either unwittingly or willingly, providing safe
haven to VEOs has increased eleven-fold. Today, radical Islamist
terrorist movements are organized in more than two dozen countries, and
the globe must contend with more than one hundred VEO-directed,
enabled, or inspired attacks every year. VEOs continue to take
advantage of instability in places like Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq, the
Maghreb, Lake Chad, Somalia, and Afghanistan, preying on the conflict-
ridden to grow their influence.
Policy Objectives to Meet the Terrorism Threat
Recognizing terrorism as a global threat, we must pursue global
solutions that utilize the unique capabilities and capacities of our
allies and partners, in addition to our own. Military might alone will
not eliminate terrorist ideology or the threat of future terrorist
attacks.
However, we can and are reducing the likelihood of an attack on our
Homeland, our troops, and our interests by contributing to a whole-of-
government and coalition approach. Together, we are removing
terrorists' ability to control and hold territory; bolstering the
internal security and stable governance of vulnerable states; ensuring
the proper safeguarding of WMD material from terrorist hands; checking
their ability to exploit emerging technologies, including unmanned
systems; targeting VEO financial networks and countering terrorist
ideology online to limit its spread to the greatest extent possible;
and sharing intelligence to limit the risk of attack around the world.
what dod is doing about it
To meet our policy objectives, DOD cannot simply keep pace with our
competitors as they increase their regional and global influence, grow
their military capabilities, and develop and field advanced
technologies. We must--and will--significantly outpace them.
We have made tough choices that align finite resources with our
strategic priorities, reducing some day-to-day operational requirements
now so we are prepared to deter, compete, and win against strategic
competitors in the future. Our work bringing the NDS to life is far
from over, but we are demonstrating clear progress along our three
lines of effort.
Increasing Lethality
In order to protect the Homeland and remain the most lethal
military in the world, we have begun a paradigm shift towards a more
balanced, distributed, survivable, and cost-imposing Joint Force. In
2018, we closely linked our combatant commands' operations to policy
objectives and our Service plans to capability and capacity, with a
focus on execution and performance. We are adjusting our posture,
increasing lethality, improving operational readiness, and beginning to
modernize and innovate at scale. These efforts allow us to better
exploit adversary weakness, project power in contested environments,
and expand our combat credible forward presence.
We have shifted our posture in key regions, taking initial steps to
economize for sustainable missions in the Middle East and South Asia to
prepare for the possible high-end fight of the future. In doing so, we
maintain strategic predictability and implement operational
unpredictability via the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model. This
approach provides assurance to our allies and partners, while keeping
our competitors and adversaries on their toes. We demonstrated DFE in
action last year, when one of our carrier strike groups returned early
from deployment unannounced and quickly redeployed to the North
Atlantic--the first carrier strike group to conduct operations there
since the 1990s.
We encourage and welcome all individuals who can meet our exacting
requirements to join our military's ranks. A key element of
strengthening our military and increasing lethality is ensuring our
warfighters achieve established physical, mental, and security vetting
standards. War is unforgiving, and our mission demands we remain a
standards-based organization. In upholding systematically applied
standards, we ensure the readiness of our Joint Force and cohesion of
our units. One of those standards is deployability. Since June, we have
lowered the percentage of non-deployable servicemembers from 6.4 to
5.4--that means roughly 21,000 fewer non-deployable servicemembers
today than eight months ago.
DOD has also worked diligently to ensure our personnel have the
capacity, training, and capabilities they need to achieve results. Last
year, we accelerated delivery of more than 14,000 munitions and
precision guidance kits to our warfighters, turned the corner on
replenishing critical munitions stockpiles, and made strides to rapidly
deploy cutting edge equipment to the warfighter. Our Close Combat
Lethality Task Force continues to strengthen our infantry's lethality,
survivability, resiliency, and readiness for close combat. Four out of
five U.S. combat deaths occur in our infantry. Therefore, it is a
strategic imperative to ensure those who confront war's grimmest
realities never enter into a fair fight.
This work on personnel and munitions readiness feeds into
complementary efforts to increase equipment readiness. In October 2018,
we set an eighty percent readiness target for mission critical aviation
platforms. In just a few months, almost every type, model, and series
of aircraft targeted by that memorandum has demonstrated progress. This
year, we will establish similarly ambitious readiness targets across
the DOD enterprise. In addition, our Services have made impactful
readiness gains. As one example, the Air Force's operational squadrons
are twenty-three percent more ready today than in 2017, and we will
have twenty-five percent more pilots able to carry out missions in
fiscal year 2019 than in fiscal year 2016.
On modernization, we remain committed to a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence has kept the peace over
the last seventy years, and its importance has been reaffirmed by every
Congress and every president since Harry Truman. Last year, DOD
released our Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which details the need for
modern and tailored nuclear capabilities and capacity that meet the
realities of our times. We are moving out on those efforts. With fiscal
year 2019 funding, we are recapitalizing and modernizing our aging
legacy forces, including our nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3), while pursuing prudent, modest adjustments to our
arsenal, which will increase the flexibility of our response options.
Here it is worth re-stating--Russia is aggressively developing and
modernizing a suite of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Not
only does this add urgency to the modernization of our legacy forces,
it underscores the importance of the supplemental capabilities called
for in last year's NPR. Both the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) and the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) close what we
believe to be troubling gaps in regional deterrence. These are not
redundant capabilities. The low-yield SLBM, deployed in small numbers,
will provide a highly tailored response to specific developments in
Russia's forces and doctrine that may lead Russia to mistakenly believe
it could potentially use a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons
without risking a United States military response. A nuclear SLCM will
provide a similar capability in response to serious developments and
trends in Russia's nonstrategic nuclear forces. These supplemental
capabilities enhance deterrence and stability.
Turning to emerging technology fields, DOD has identified ten key
areas: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space;
quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning;
microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology.
We have invested in basic research, rapid prototyping, and
experimentation to mature technology that can be used at scale. We are
also updating our warfighting doctrine as the character of warfare
changes. Take AI for example--competitors are investing heavily in this
field, redefining the future of warfare. Last year, DOD established the
Joint AI Center (JAIC), and we released our AI Strategy just last
month. These efforts accelerate DOD's delivery and adoption of AI at
the speed of relevance, while attracting and cultivating the best
global talent.
In pursuit of stronger missile defense, DOD released our Missile
Defense Review (MDR) in January, which recognizes the accelerating
proliferation of advanced offensive missile capabilities around the
world. The MDR articulates a comprehensive approach that combines
deterrence, active and passive missile defense, and attack operations.
We continue to maintain ground- and sea-based missile defenses while
also developing new capabilities to counter new threats.
As the MDR illustrates, our military is not constrained by earth's
geography. We are taking steps to secure unfettered access to and
freedom to operate in space, in accordance with our international
agreements and obligations. Reforming the organization of the military
space enterprise is fundamental for protecting our roughly $19 trillion
economy and our position as the world's strongest military. Earlier
this month, we submitted a legislative proposal to Congress, requesting
authorization for a U.S. Space Force. If authorized, the Force would
transform our approach to space, increasing our responsiveness in this
warfighting domain. Establishing a sixth branch with dedicated military
leadership will unify, focus, and accelerate the development of space
doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future threats,
institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further build space
warfighting culture. I ask for your support of our proposal, so we can
move out in this critical domain.
We recognize restoring military readiness, modernizing our Joint
Force, and increasing lethality will not happen overnight, but as the
above examples demonstrate, we are making meaningful progress.
Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships
Beyond DOD's efforts to improve readiness and lethality, we are
expanding collaboration and cooperation outside the Department. DOD's
participation in combined military exercises has increased by seventeen
percent in the last two years, and our Foreign Military Sales have
increased by more than sixty-five percent in the last three years.
Across the globe, DOD has leveraged opportunities to expand and deepen
our already unmatched network of allies and partners, while making real
progress on burden sharing for international security.
Starting in the Indo-Pacific, our priority theater, we continue to
pursue many belts and many roads by keeping our decades-old alliances
strong and fostering growing partnerships. In all our actions, we
demonstrate our commitment to a free and open region, marked by respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, big and
small.
We are fortifying our bedrock alliances with Australia, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand while growing key
partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. It is worth noting here that four
out of the five nations in our Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network
are also Pacific nations, further emphasizing the region's importance.
In 2018, the United States took historic strides with two key
partners in particular, Vietnam and India. Our Navy conducted the first
United States aircraft carrier visit to Vietnam since the Vietnam War,
and we participated in the inaugural United States-India 2+2 Strategic
Dialogue in New Delhi, showing growing trust between the world's oldest
and largest democracies.
While our diplomats chart a path to the denuclearization of North
Korea, DOD continues to enforce United Nations Security Council
resolution sanctions against North Korean ship-to-ship transfers,
alongside allies and partners. We have also improved integration of our
missile defense assets on the Korean Peninsula to better protect United
States Forces and allies.
In July 2018, we conducted the largest naval exercise in the world,
the Rim of the Pacific or RIMPAC, alongside twenty-five other nations.
That and our Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative have boosted
interoperability and increased our allies and partners' ability to
conduct maritime security and awareness operations on their own. Our
efforts across the region have enabled our allies and partners to take
a tougher stand against Chinese aggression in international waters. For
example, this past year France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand all increased their presence in the East and
South China Seas, reiterating our collective stance to fly, sail, and
operate wherever international law allows.
In Europe, the United States is fortifying relationships, realizing
burden sharing gains, and developing a more lethal, combined
capability. This year, NATO--the most successful Alliance in history--
marks its seventieth anniversary as the bedrock of transatlantic
security. NATO is poised to bolster deterrence through larger and more
frequent exercises, mobility and infrastructure improvements, a
revamped command structure, and increased force presence in territories
most vulnerable to Russian aggression. We are rapidly pursuing our
``Four Thirties Readiness Initiative'' by 2020: thirty mechanized
battalions, thirty air squadrons, and thirty combat vessels ready to
fight within thirty days or less.
Over the last two years, NATO has made significant burden sharing
progress, both financially and operationally. Since 2017, our NATO
Allies have increased their defense spending by $41 billion. The nine
percent increase from 2016-2018 represents the largest in a quarter
century. By 2020, NATO projects Allies will increase defense spending
by $100 billion. These are impressive numbers. Yet NATO contributions
do not all boil down to simple dollar amounts. The Alliance continues
to provide valuable manpower, specialized capabilities, and territory
that no other partnership in the world can match.
I now move to the impactful work we are doing by, with, and through
our allies and partners across the Middle East and South Asia.
In Syria and Iraq, the United States, as part of the seventy-nine-
member Defeat-ISIS Coalition, and our local partners have liberated
more than thirty towns and cities from ISIS control since January
2017--that's virtually all of the territory ISIS once held.
As we look ahead in Syria, we will continue to stand with those who
fought and continue to fight alongside our Coalition, address Turkey's
security concerns along Syria's northeast border, maintain the global
Defeat-ISIS Coalition, and set conditions for continuing United States
counterterrorism operations in the region. We fully support the
government of Iraq in its fight against terrorism and will continue to
enable the Iraqi Security Forces' progress in securing liberated areas
and thwarting ISIS attempts to mount a clandestine insurgency.
In Afghanistan, we are executing President Trump's South Asia
Strategy, R4+S (regionalize, realign, reinforce, reconcile, and
sustain). In applying military pressure on the Taliban, we support
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Secretary Pompeo's ongoing
negotiations, which are Afghanistan's first chance for real peace in
forty years. We are also applying maximum pressure on ISIS-Khorasan
(ISIS-K) and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, to stymie any
threats to the United States Homeland.
Since 2016, our allies and partners have stepped up to create
necessary conditions for negotiations. Afghan forces now lead one
hundred percent of missions, with United States and coalition personnel
performing train, advise, and assist roles. In 2018, international
partners agreed to extend their roughly $1 billion in annual financial
sustainment of Afghan forces through 2024. NATO's fulfillment of
requirements in Afghanistan has increased more than fourteen percent
since the introduction of President Trump's South Asia Strategy, its
highest level in the Mission's history. Since 2016, the number of non-
U.S. Coalition troops to NATO's Resolute Support Mission has increased
by more than thirty-five percent, and two new countries, Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates, are formalizing their status as operational
partners.
Defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS remains
the United States' top national security interest in Yemen. At the same
time, we fully support UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths's efforts to
bring all relevant parties of the civil war to the negotiating table. I
am encouraged by the ceasefire in the strategically-important city and
port of Hudaydah. Though not easy, these are necessary first steps on
the path to lasting peace.
In Africa, we are helping partners build their security forces'
capacity to counter terrorist and other transnational threats,
bolstering relationships to ensure U.S. influence and access against
great power competition, enhancing our ability to conduct crisis
response, and supporting whole-of-government efforts to advance
stability and prosperity.
The last stop in our abbreviated walk around the world is closer to
home--to our allies and partners in the western hemisphere and our
efforts to protect our southern border. Over the last year, we have
fostered strong military-to-military ties with our Canadian and Mexican
neighbors, while bolstering relationships with Brazil, Argentina,
Colombia, and Chile. We appreciate and applaud these nations'
contributions to international security, demonstrated notably last year
when Chile served as the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander
at RIMPAC--the first time in the exercise's history a non-English
speaking nation has done so.
As we continue to monitor the situation in Venezuela, we are
working closely with the Department of State, United States Agency for
International Development, and regional partners to provide
humanitarian assistance, while maintaining our posture to protect our
national interests and citizens abroad.
On the southern border--last month, I visited the El Paso area to
assess the security situation and DOD's role in supporting our
Department of Homeland Security partners.
As these myriad examples illustrate, our thriving, global
constellation of alliances and partnerships provides an asymmetric
advantage no competitor or adversary can match. We take that advantage
seriously, and we continue to foster its growth at every opportunity.
Implementing Reform
Let me now turn inward--to reform of our internal business
practices. Over the last year, we have made marked improvements to our
fiscal transparency, instituting a wide range of reform initiatives
that bolster efficiency, effectiveness, and performance.
We have focused reform in key areas, including healthcare, contract
management, information technology (IT), acquisition, civilian resource
management, and financial management. Let me provide a brief overview
of our progress so far. Over the course of fiscal year 2017 and fiscal
year 2018, we have saved $4.7 billion from reform across our
headquarters' activities--a down payment on more to come.
On healthcare, we realized savings of almost $519 million in
TRICARE reform, with $3.4 billion in savings planned through fiscal
year 2021. Our entire Fourth Estate has now participated in contract
service requirement reviews to eliminate unnecessary contracts,
resulting in $492 million in programmed savings.
Within the IT field, we modernized our defense travel system,
trimming our regulation by almost 1,000 pages. The reform allows for
better industry competition and has saved nearly $160 million to date.
Within acquisition reform, our Services saved more than $550 million in
fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 by selling equipment to foreign
partners and negotiating multi-year procurements over single year
contracts.
Within financial management, DOD completed our first-ever
consolidated financial statement audit in 2018, covering roughly $2.7
trillion in assets. As of February 1, DOD had developed corrective
action plans to address more than thirty-three percent of the total
audit findings and recommendations, with many more corrective actions
to come.
In addition to business reform, the Department has also made
important structural reforms, including elevating U.S. Cyber Command to
full combatant command status, standing up U.S. Army Futures Command,
and finalizing our split of the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
office into two separate offices: Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) and
Research and Engineering (R&E).
The Way Ahead
Our Department has been busy, but we are just getting started. I am
encouraged by our initial progress. Focus and discipline are vital for
our NDS's continued execution.
our fiscal year 2020 request: a strategy-driven budget
Our fiscal year 2018 funding stopped the erosion of our competitive
edge by beginning to restore military readiness. Our fiscal year 2019
funding continued readiness gains and made key down payments on a more
lethal military. Now our Department needs adequate, sustainable, and
predictable funding to maintain momentum and expand our modernization
and readiness efforts. Every line of our fiscal year 2020 request is
designed to implement our Strategy. Therefore, every dollar of it--both
in baseline funding and overseas contingency operations--is critical. I
ask for Congress's support for on-time funding of our $750 billion
topline for National Defense, so we can continue to breathe life into
the NDS.
Our strategy-driven budget drives further progress along our three
lines of effort and brings our military modernization efforts to life
at the speed of relevance. It enables critical shifts to compete,
deter, and win in any high-end fight of the future, while preserving
capabilities to support current operations. With this funding, we
ensure America maintains our asymmetric military advantage with a more
lethal, agile, and innovative Joint Force.
The fiscal year 2020 request includes the largest research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) budget in DOD's history, when
adjusted for inflation. That is $104 billion in total requested funds
for fiscal year 2020--$9 billion more than what we will spend this
fiscal year. We have made strategic choices to prioritize lethality for
the high-end fight.
Across DOD, these choices move our capabilities from cost-accepting
to cost-imposing, from the exquisite and purely survivable to the
affordable and attritable. Through targeted investment, we will replace
a federated approach with an enterprise one, enabling a more
distributed, scaled path to innovation and modernization. This path
prioritizes unmanned and machine capabilities, as well as the ability
to ``fight in the dark'' without network dependency.
With that broader context in mind, I will now focus on four
priority areas: (1) Investing in the contested space and cyber domains;
(2) modernizing in traditional air, maritime, and land domains, as well
as multi-domain enterprises; (3) innovating in emerging technology
fields to strengthen our competitive edge, and; (4) building on
readiness gains to meet requirements for our current operational
commitments and future challenges.
Space and Cyber Investments
Our request recognizes the critically important role space will
play in maintaining military superiority in the future. The $14.1
billion dedicated to space will counteract the erosion of our
competitive advantage by enhancing our existing space-based
capabilities, like GPS, satellite communications, and missile warning,
as well as increasing launch capacities. We will also stand up the U.S.
Space Force Headquarters, U.S. Space Command, and Space Development
Agency to best prepare DOD to assure freedom of operation in space,
deter attacks, and when necessary, defeat space and counter space
threats to the United States, our allies, and our partners.
We also note the cyber domain's crucial role, both now and in
warfare's future. That is why we have requested $9.6 billion to support
offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, shore up network
resiliency against adversaries, and improve our cyber posture. These
efforts help ensure DOD has the information and communications
technology capabilities necessary for implementing our NDS and
realizing our mission.
Traditional and Multi-Domain Investments
The fiscal year 2020 budget will ensure the U.S. military maintains
long-term competitive advantage on land, in the air, and on the sea.
Across these three traditional domains, we are investing a total of
$107 billion for modernization.
In the air domain, this includes $57.7 billion to increase the
procurement and modernization of our fighter force. A balanced mix of
fourth and fifth generation aircraft will effectively and affordably
meet the entire spectrum of NDS missions, providing the stealth needed
to gain air superiority, execute precision strikes, and conduct stand-
in electronic attack against peer competitors in highly-contested
environments, while also providing counter-air and strike in more
permissive environments. We will also purchase additional tankers,
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air missiles, and Joint Air-Surface
extended range missiles.
On land, we will invest $14.6 billion to fund roughly 6,400 combat
and tactical vehicles, including M-1 Abrams upgrades and Amphibious
Combat Vehicles, as well as multiple combat systems that provide
overmatch on the last two hundred meters of the battlefield.
In the maritime domain, we will increase and diversify our strike
options, including offensive-armed unmanned surface and underwater
vessels and advanced long-range missiles. Fiscal year 2020 funds will
also accelerate fleet growth, delivering more ships faster, including
cutting edge unmanned variants.
The fiscal year 2020 request also invests $14 billion in
modernizing and recapitalizing all three legs of our nuclear
capabilities, to include the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent system,
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, Long-Range Standoff Weapon,
B-21 bomber, life-extended Trident SLBM, and the F-35 dual-capable
fighter aircraft; while also enhancing our missile warning and NC3
capabilities.
We also slate $13.6 billion for missile defeat and defense
modernization, increasing the capability and capacity of our ground-
based defenses, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense systems; enhancing our space-based missile
warning and other capabilities to address hypersonic threats; and
developing boost-phase missile defense systems, including directed
energy and air-launched kinetic interceptors.
Also on the multi-domain front, we will invest $3.4 billion for our
Special Operations Forces. The fiscal year 2020 request refocuses on
strategic competition by increasing funding for research and
development, modernization, and expanded capabilities for the high-end
fight, while maintaining irregular warfare as a core competency.
Innovation and Advanced Technology Investments
With more than $7.4 billion directed toward DOD's development and
fielding of technologies focused on the high-end fight, the fiscal year
2020 budget prioritizes funding across four key emerging areas:
autonomy, AI/machine learning, hypersonics, and directed energy.
Let me expand on hypersonics for a moment as one example. Without
the long-range, survivable, and fast strike capability of hypersonic
weapons, it will be difficult for our military to maintain access to
key regions or come to the defense of allies and partners in a crisis
or war. Yet, with the $2.6 billion requested in fiscal year 2020,
projected doubling of funding requests in coming years, and close
inter-service cooperation, we are accelerating pursuit of options
deliverable from land, sea, and air, with some capabilities expected to
deploy to the warfighter three years earlier than previously planned.
Sustainment and Readiness Investments
This budget sustains our Joint Force and builds on critical
readiness gains. We will invest almost $125 billion in operational
readiness and sustainment, including $1.5 billion for advanced training
facilities and ranges, $2.6 billion for improving and expanding cyber
operations training, and $41.2 billion for further improving tactical
aviation readiness.
In addition, the fiscal year 2020 budget will allow an increase to
our total end-strength by roughly 7,700 servicemembers over the
projected fiscal year 2019 level, as well as give our men and women in
uniform a much-deserved 3.1 percent pay raise, the largest in a decade.
In concert with the funding priorities I have just outlined, we
will continue to pursue opportunities that balance capacity and
capability by realizing economies of scale in large equipment
acquisitions, like aircraft carriers and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
As we do so, we will continue to assess the utility of our investments
through a lifecycle lens.
conclusion
With Congress's support and delivery of on-time funding at our
requested topline, this budget ensures our military maintains the
lethality, adaptability, and resiliency necessary to compete, deter,
and win against any adversary in an increasingly dangerous world.
It is a privilege and honor to lead the most lethal military in the
world. I thank those in uniform and their families for all they do,
today and every day, to keep us safe, and I appreciate the critical
role Congress plays to ensure our warfighters are ready to succeed on
the battlefields of today and tomorrow.
The men and women of the Department of Defense stand ready, as
always, to protect liberty and freedom.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Shanahan.
General Dunford.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Dunford. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for
opportunity to join Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary
Norquist here today. It remains my privilege to represent your
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
While much of the discussion this morning is going to focus
on the challenges we face, it's important I begin by assuring
you that your Armed Forces can deter a nuclear attack, defend
the Homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and effectively
respond, should deterrence fail. I believe we have a
competitive advantage against any potential adversary, defined
as the ability to project power to fight and win at the time
and place of our choosing.
But, as Members of this Committee know, 17 years of
continuous combat and fiscal instability have affected our
readiness and eroded our competitive advantage. As the
Secretary highlighted, China and Russia have capitalized on our
distraction and restraints by investing in capabilities
specifically designed to challenge our traditional sources of
strength. After careful study, they deployed capabilities
intended to contest our freedom of movement across all domains
and disrupt our ability to project power. With the help of
Congress, starting in 2017, we began to restore our competitive
advantage. Recent budgets have allowed us to build readiness
and invest in new capabilities while meeting our current
operational commitments. But, I think we all know we can't
reverse decades of erosion in just a few years. This year's
budget submission would allow us to continue restoring our
competitive advantage by improving readiness and developing
capabilities to enhance the lethality. It proposes investments
in advanced capabilities across all domains--sea, air, land,
space, and cyberspace. This year's budget also sustains
investments in our nuclear enterprise to ensure a safe, secure,
and effective strategic deterrent, the highest priority of the
Department of Defense. We've also taken steps to more
effectively employ the force we have today and build the force
we have tomorrow. We've implemented fundamental changes in our
global force management processes to prioritize and allocate
resources in accordance with the National Defense Strategy
while building readiness and the flexibility to respond to
unforeseen contingencies. We've also refined our processes for
developing and designing our future force. A joint, concept-
driven, threat-informed approach, which leverages a wide body
of analytic work, will allow us to deliberately evaluate and
prioritize warfighting requirements. This also enables us to
pair emerging technologies with innovative operating concepts.
In closing, I'd like thank the Committee for all you've
done to support our men and women in uniform and their
families. Together, we've honored our solemn obligation to
never send our sons and daughters into a fair fight. With your
continued support, we never will.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of this
Committee, it is an honor to join Acting Secretary Shanahan and the
Honorable David Norquist in testifying before you today. It remains my
distinct privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines of the United States Armed Forces.
Today, I can assure the Committee that the United States military
can defend the Homeland, meet our Alliance commitments, deter nuclear
attack from any state actor, and effectively respond should deterrence
fail. We have a competitive advantage against any adversary across all
domains--air, sea, land, space, and cyber--and we can project power to
advance the interests of the United States anywhere around the globe.
But that competitive advantage has eroded. This is the result of
seventeen years of continuous combat against transregional violent
extremism and the damaging effects of funding instability. China and
Russia have capitalized on our distraction and our constraints. They
have invested in capabilities specifically designed to challenge our
traditional sources of strength and have sought to undermine the rules-
based international order that brought prosperity and relative peace
for the last seven decades.
With your help, starting in 2017, we arrested the erosion of our
competitive advantage. Appropriations in fiscal years 2017-2019 allowed
us to restore readiness and invest in new capabilities while meeting
our ongoing commitments across the globe. However, we cannot undo
decades of degradation in just a few years. This year's budget allows
us to continue to restore our competitive advantage by enhancing our
readiness and lethality.
strategic environment
Today's strategic environment is extraordinarily complex and
volatile. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) characterizes and
prioritizes our strategic challenges with a ``2+3'' framework that
names China and Russia as the primary challenges with which we must
contend, along with North Korea, Iran, and violent extremism. This
framework provides a benchmark against which we can measure our
capabilities. It is not intended to be predictive of future crises or
armed conflicts; rather, it is an important tool for planning, managing
risk, and developing capabilities. Our assumption is that if we build a
Joint Force with the capabilities and capacities to meet these
challenges, either individually or in some combination, we will be
well-positioned to respond to whatever threats the future holds.
China. China has paired its rapid economic growth with substantial
military investment as it strives for regional hegemony and global
influence. By investing heavily in the space and cyber domains while
expanding air and maritime capacity and militarizing disputed land
formations, they are developing the ability to deny us access to the
East and South China Seas. The intended effect is to weaken our
alliance structure in the Pacific and allow Beijing to rewrite the
norms, standards, and laws in the region. They are also advancing their
interests globally through the One Belt One Road Initiative, creating
exploitive economic relationships across Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. These relationships can be leveraged to reduce our influence
and the access we need to project military power.
Russia. Similarly, Russia has invested in asymmetrical capabilities
where they perceive they have a competitive advantage. They are using
information, cyber, and unconventional operations combined with
economic and political influence to advance their interests while
seeking to undermine the credibility of NATO. We have seen examples of
their revanchist behavior in the invasion of Georgia and Crimea, their
ongoing activity in the Donbas, and the recent seizure of Ukrainian
vessels near the Sea of Azov. We also saw their efforts to undermine
democracy in 2016, both in Europe and the United States.
North Korea. While we remain hopeful for a peaceful
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, after two summits between
President Trump and Kim Jong-Un, it is clear that we must remain ready
for multiple contingencies. We are still dealing with a country that
has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that threaten our Allies in
the region and our Homeland. Regardless of the expressed intent of the
North Korean leader, that capability exists and we must retain the
force posture to deter and defend against the threat.
Iran. Iran continues to project malign influence and present
challenges with missile, cyber, proxy, and maritime capabilities. We
also continue to monitor Iran's nuclear capability. The regime aims to
establish itself as the dominant regional power; their military
development is designed to restrict our access to their sphere of
influence while their activities threaten freedom of navigation along
important commercial routes, destabilize the government of Iraq,
exacerbate civil wars in Yemen and Syria, and support proxies inside of
Lebanon and Syria.
Violent Extremist Organizations. While we have made significant
progress against ISIS, al Qaeda, and affiliated groups, the threats to
the United States and our Allies and partners remain. Violent extremism
is a global, generational, society-level problem of which military
operations can only manage the symptoms. In the meantime, we have
implemented a fiscally, politically, and militarily sustainable
counterterrorism campaign.
Our security, our prosperity, and the international system that
makes them possible are threatened today by actors ranging from
advanced and ascending militaries backed by nuclear arsenals to lone
fighters inspired by radical ideologies. The Joint Force must respond
by balancing the capabilities we need for today's operations with the
depth, flexibility, and advanced technologies required to respond to
the challenges of the future. If approved, the President's Budget 2020
(PB20) request will enable the Department to adapt the force we have
today, while we design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges.
the force we need today
The Joint Military Net Assessment--a rigorous tool we use to
evaluate the Joint Force's ability to meet its strategic objectives--
identified challenges across all domains in the context of our near-
peer competitors. Other assessments and strategic reviews have also
highlighted the sustained investment we need to improve readiness,
capabilities, and capacities in the Joint Force. The fiscal year 2020
budget provides funding for current operations and, building on budgets
of recent years, continues to build readiness and improve lethality by
modernizing existing capabilities and expanding capacity.
Readiness.
We have realized readiness improvements through fundamental changes
in our global force management processes. As directed in the NDS--and
in support of its 2+3 strategy--we have implemented Dynamic Force
Employment (DFE). This is a top-down process of prioritizing and
allocating resources against our strategic priorities with bottom-up
refinement from the geographic combatant commanders.
DFE allows us to position resources globally to mitigate strategic
risk and be operationally unpredictable while remaining strategically
predictable. This improves our ability to respond to unforeseen
crises--as well as opportunities--and provide strategic flexibility for
senior decision makers while maintaining readiness across the Joint
Force.
Within this new framework for global force management, your men and
women in uniform are operating across the globe every day to assure
Allies and partners, deter adversaries, and assist local forces in
combatting violent extremism at its sources. President's Budget 2020
provides them the resources they need to accomplish their missions and
return home safely.
Current Operations.
China. United States Forces conduct freedom of navigation
operations globally to challenge excessive maritime claims--including
those made by China--and demonstrate our determination to operate
wherever international law allows. In the South China Sea and elsewhere
in the region, we also fly bomber missions, demonstrating a resilient
global strike capability that checks Chinese ambition and assures our
regional Allies and partners. Throughout the Pacific, our troops
exercise and engage with partners to signal our commitment and
counterbalance China's challenges to the rules-based order.
Russia. In Europe, the European Defense Initiative and associated
posture adjustments and combined exercise programs represent the
largest reinforcement of NATO's collective defense posture--and the
largest demonstration of its interoperability--since the Cold War.
United States personnel also contribute to NATO's integrated ballistic
missile air defense in Europe. In both the Atlantic and Pacific, we
conduct sustained air and sea operations to monitor Russian activities
and deter any aggression.
North Korea. United States troops on the Korean Peninsula are
postured and trained to deter North Korean aggression, provocation, and
coercion. Their current priority is supporting the State Department-led
maximum pressure campaign to achieve the full, final, and verifiable
denuclearization of the Peninsula. In concert with like-minded nations,
we have expanded our sea and air operations to deter and disrupt
illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum and other materials
restricted by UN Security Council Resolutions.
Iran. United States forces conduct freedom of navigation operations
in the Strait of Hormuz. We continue our commitment to the stability of
the government of Iraq, and our efforts to build the capacity of our
regional partners. In these and other ways, the Joint Force complements
United States diplomatic and economic efforts to counter Iranian malign
influence in the Middle East.
VEOs. The United States has assembled a global coalition to counter
violent extremist organizations--leveraging a relatively small
footprint of U.S. Forces to enable local partners throughout the world.
The immediate priority is achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq
and Syria through Operation Inherent Resolve. We are also working by,
with, and through partners in every region to cut the ``connective
tissue'' of foreign fighters, resources, and the ideological narrative
that enable violent extremists to operate transregionally.
Iraq and Syria. United States troops remain engaged in the D-ISIS
campaign. As the campaign transitions from clearing ISIS-held territory
to a focus on stabilizing the region, activities such as training local
security forces, enabling local governance, and conducting
counterterrorism operations will help prevent a power vacuum in
Northeast Syria and a resurgence of ISIS. We are working with our
Coalition partners to ensure we meet Turkish security concerns as well
as protect those that fought with us against ISIS.
Afghanistan. Along with our Allies and coalition partners, we are
setting the military conditions to fully support an Afghan-led, Afghan-
owned peace process. Coalition forces train, advise, and assist
Afghanistan National Security Forces, as well as provide critical
aviation support, intelligence, and other capabilities to make them a
more effective fighting force.
In addition to readiness gains from improved force management, DOD
budgets in recent years helped arrest the decline of unit readiness
across the Joint Force. In fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019, we
increased the quality and quantity of unit training, improved personnel
deployment availability, increased stocks of key munitions, streamlined
aviation depot processes, and added capacity to address shortfalls in
maintenance and sustainment functions. President's Budget 2020 enables
us to continue on this path, but a decade of neglect will require years
to correct. A full restoration of our readiness will require sustained,
sufficient, and predictable funding into the future.
a modern and more lethal force for tomorrow
The NDS calls for a more lethal force that expands the competitive
space to meet critical challenges and key operational problems. The
President's Budget 2020 request invests in a more lethal force by
funding efforts to modernize current capabilities and expand
warfighting capacity.
A primary modernization priority is our aging nuclear enterprise. A
large-scale nuclear attack poses an existential threat to the United
States. U.S. nuclear forces are the indispensable means of addressing
this threat, making nuclear deterrence the highest priority mission of
the Joint Force. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review established the
elements of the nuclear modernization program--a program that is
necessary, prudent, and affordable given the nature and evolution of
the threats we face. President's Budget 2020 fully funds that program.
President's Budget 2020 also enhances joint warfighting capacity by
fielding the capabilities we need to project power. In the air,
continued procurement of 5th generation fighter aircraft allows us
greater flexibility to respond globally today and in the future. At
sea, recapitalizing the naval fleet with modern and lethal platforms
sustains undersea, surface, naval aviation, and fleet logistic
advantages while increasing investments in unmanned, autonomous
maritime capabilities. On the ground, enhancement of long-range
precision fires, development of the next generation combat vehicle, and
investments in close combat systems ensure our soldiers and marines'
overmatch on the battlefield.
Space continues to be a priority area for modernization and
innovation. In response to the evolution of threats to U.S. assets in
space, we will establish the U.S. Space Force Headquarters, U.S. Space
Command, and Space Development Agency. To deter our adversaries, we are
pursuing organizational constructs, systems, and capabilities that will
produce a more lethal, resilient, and agile Joint Force. Additionally,
this budget request includes substantial investments in Missile
Warning, launch platforms, Space Situational Awareness, Space Control,
and enhancements to Position, Navigation, and Timing.
In the cyber domain, President's Budget 2020 allows the Joint Force
to further develop and employ the necessary tools to defend DOD
infrastructure, compete below the level of armed conflict, and operate
as part of broader joint operations. This budget request increases our
investments in required capabilities to operate effectively in
cyberspace and maintain our competitive advantage against near-peer
adversaries.
While improving lethality in the near term, we will continue to
develop and design a future Joint Force that can fight and win against
any adversary on any battlefield of tomorrow. A joint concept-driven,
threat-informed approach to capability development--leveraging
wargames, exercises, and experimentation--allows us to more
deliberately evaluate needs of the current force and prioritize future
requirements. Our refined approach to Force Development and Design
allows senior leaders to pair emerging technologies with optimal
organizational constructs and innovative operating concepts to plan and
execute joint operations now and in the future.
No investment is more important to the effectiveness of our future
force than the development and education of our future leaders. The
nation's ability to compete, deter, and win requires leaders who have
the vision, intellect, and critical thinking skills to employ, develop,
and design the future Joint Force. With a special emphasis on
revitalization of the War Colleges, our leader development program is
designed to fully support the development of these strategic thinkers
and future senior leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces.
conclusion
This is my fourth and final appearance before this Committee in
support of the Department's annual budget request. I thank you for the
great honor of representing your soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines.
More importantly, I would like to thank the Committee for all you
have done to support our troops, as well as their families. In visits
to the Joint Force at bases and posts, stateside and around the world,
I continue to be amazed by their spirit and dedication to the mission.
Through the support of the Congress and the people you represent, our
servicemembers in uniform will prevail in our current conflicts and be
prepared to confront the threats the United States will surely face in
the future.
Together, we have honored our solemn obligation to never send our
sons and daughters into a fair fight. With your continued support for
sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding, we never will.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you, General.
What we're going to do is have a round of 5-minute
questions. We are very well attended this morning, so I ask
people to try to keep within their time. I will do the same
thing.
To kick it off, we talked about the blueprint that we're
using. I'd like to ask each witness a question about this.
Secretary Shanahan, you said that the Department of Defense
would realign the resources in the budget to implement this
program. Now, in order to do that, can you quickly run over any
of the programs or systems or missions that have been either
reduced or accelerated to accommodate this?
Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
highlight, in this year's budget, three major structural
changes, in terms of being able to accelerate. The first is
space. The Space Force, itself, is intended to accelerate,
dramatically, our capabilities to defend. Second, missiles.
Probably the best characterization of that is our efforts on
hypersonics. Third, a significant investment in cyber
capabilities. When we think about reductions, I think the Army
is the best illustration of that in their modernization plans
as they look to make reductions across their portfolio to, I'll
say, about 100 different programs.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate that.
General Dunford, similar question. The National Defense
Strategy Commission listed several capability gaps, vis-a-vis
China and Russia, such as long-range fires, additional air
defense units, and others that I mentioned in my over
statement. Which of these capability gaps do you think the 2020
budget addresses?
General Dunford. Chairman, thank you.
The budget actually addresses all the challenges you
identified. What I can assure is that the National Defense
Strategy really has been the basis for our prioritization for
capability development. We did careful analysis of China and
Russia, in particular, the capabilities developed over the last
few years to limit our ability to operate freely in space,
cyberspace, land, sea, and air. The capabilities that we have
identified in this year's budget are really designed to allow
us to project power when and where necessary to advance our
interests in that context of that emerging threat from China
and Russia.
Chairman Inhofe. All right. I appreciate that.
Now, I am concerned about one other area. Neither one of
you is personally responsible for this, but I'm a little
disturbed by the idea that we're going to be taking the USS
Truman out of the system and I wonder how this is going to work
in just our sheer numbers. Now, we have a law that says we have
to maintain 11 carriers. We would also look at this and realize
that 10 would equal what's necessary to conduct a major war.
How do we get to the number we're supposed to have if we don't
follow through with the midlife of the Truman? Now, recognizing
that would take up to, I think, 2024. But, nonetheless, it's
going to take longer if we start--depending upon the multiple
buy that we're talking about, particularly of a vehicle that
still--the elevator still doesn't work and carry the ordinance.
So, what's your thought about that? How are we going to,
number one, comply with the law that we have--in fact, Mr.
Norquist, this might be a good question for you, because you're
into these issues, also--and still not follow through with our
original plans with the Harry Truman?
Anybody.
Secretary Shanahan. Why don't I lead off?
First of all, I think the Truman decision represents some
of the strategic choices we've made in this year's budget. It
was a very difficult decision for us. Carriers represent, now
and in the future, critical force structure for the Navy. The
Truman decision was made in concert--it was an integrated
decision with our two-carrier buy. Let me walk through the
benefits of the decision and then potential off-ramps so that
we don't find ourselves in a difficult situation.
So, the first is that, with this decision of the two-
carrier buy and to not refuel the Truman, our lethality of our
carriers and capability increases with the new carriers. The
second is, until mid-2020s, we maintain the level of 11
carriers. The third is--and part of the calculus here--was to
maintain employment. In fact, with this decision, we grow
employment in the industrial base. We needed to make sure, not
only that our shipyards maintained their employment--there's
actually growth--but also the supply chain. The last is that
the funds that we freed up from making these decisions are
invested in the future force. The decision for two carriers
saved $4 billion.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
Secretary Shanahan. Not refueling the Truman saves $3.4
billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)----
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Yeah, we're going to run out of
time, and I'm going to set the example of not allowing us to
run out of time. But, I still am not happy with the results of
that. My mental numbers don't agree with that. I think it's a
very important thing. I personally brought this up before
Wicker gets here.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Chairman Inhofe. All right.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Mr. Secretary, on February 18th, you sent a letter to
Secretary Nielsen stating that you had, in your words, ``not
yet decided whether the use of Section 2808 is necessary.''
That would be the section under the emergency that would
authorize access to military construction (MILCON) funds.
You've asked for information from the Secretary, to include a
list of proposed border construction projects that would
improve the--again, your words--``effectiveness and efficiency
of DOD personnel supporting these Customs and Border Patrol.''
Have you received a response yet from Secretary Nielsen?
Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not. I expect it this week.
Senator Reed. Again, I--in the context of something that is
supposed to be an emergency, this seems to be a pretty casual
sort of approach to the issue. But, beside that, at this point,
then, you don't know what projects Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) is requesting, and whether or not those projects would be
appropriate under 2808.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, the projects we've received, or
the updates from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to date,
are on--with regards to their 2019 appropriations, they're for
the expenditure of forfeiture of Treasury funds and then needs
as they----
Senator Reed. Those are all programs that are automatic.
You've already put those--do--I'm talking about the 2808, which
would require not only the emergency declaration, but also a
judgment whether--of their military utility.
Mr. Chairman--General Dunford, you have the obligation to
advise the Secretary on the military utility of these projects
with--if they're being incorporated. What criteria do you
intend to use?
General Dunford. Thanks, Senator Reed.
The criteria I intend to use is, we'll look carefully at
the mission that our soldiers, sailors, marines have been
assigned, and some airmen, as well. We'll look at how these
projects support, directly, the mission of those individuals.
Senator Reed. Thank you. The Secretary will make the
ultimate decision, but based upon your recommendation.
General Dunford. Senator, I'll be one of the inputs, and
I'll provide military advice to the Secretary on the
relationship between the resources, the projects, and the
mission.
Senator Reed. If it comes to pass, then, you'll have to
delay certain military construction projects we've authorized
and appropriated. Do you have a list of those projects yet, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I don't have a final list of
those projects.
Senator Reed. Well, obviously, I think it would be
important to all of us to understand which projects would be
sacrificed, even in the short run. So, I would encourage you to
get that list.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Shanahan. See Appendix A, fact sheet for the list
of projects.
Senator Reed. In the emergency request, there's $3.6
billion for, essentially, backfilling those projects which have
already been authorized and appropriated, which is, I think, an
unusual way to fund military construction projects. But, then
there's an additional $3.6 billion that's just been set aside
for ``the wall,'' competing with other potential military
projects. That's emergency funding. Do you think that's
appropriate?
Secretary Shanahan. It was appropriate, given the planning,
when we were putting together, to provision for the next year.
I'll ask Secretary Norquist to comment about how we came up
with the planning.
Secretary Norquist. Sure. One of the things we wanted to be
certain to do is to not disrupt future military construction
projects. So, if 2808 extends, which it will, into fiscal year
2020, it just gets--at least it's 12 months. If it's longer, we
don't want that to disrupt other projects. So, we put in
funding so that it would be available and not to be able to--in
order to be able to protect the other military construction
projects.
Senator Reed. But, essentially, what you're doing is
creating appropriations dedicated, at this point, to building a
wall, which has not, I think, been authorized or appropriated
by the Congress. That 3.6 extra funding, you know is going to
the wall. It might be a backfill or a--or a circuitous way, but
it's essentially for the wall. Is that correct?
Secretary Norquist. Right. It's in the request. Therefore,
would need to be both authorized and appropriated to----
Senator Reed. Okay. So----
Secretary Norquist.--take effect. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Reed. So, that, in our process, we are
authorizing--you're asking us literally to authorize funding
for the wall.
Secretary Norquist. Yeah.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Just a quick question, because I want to follow the
Chairman's guidelines. You mentioned $2 billion in the
emergency request for hurricane reconstruction. The Marine
Corps has indicated to me, as late as yesterday, that it's
about $3.7 billion. Tyndall Air Force Base is--$5 billion. So,
it would seem to me, if you're trying to address the real needs
of the Department of Defense, that, instead of using 3.6 or $7
billion for the wall, that could be used immediately for
repairs at Camp Lejeune and Tyndall Air Force Base.
Secretary Norquist. So, what you have is--yes, there are
significant requirements for both of those two bases. One of
the things we're looking at is, particularly, the military
construction projects. The planning and design lead means that
some of them can be executed in 2020, so we have $2 billion in
for that, some of them won't be able to be executed till 2021
or later. We're trying to balance that and address those. But,
we're happy to work with you on those requirements.
Senator Reed. Respecting the Chairman, I----
Chairman Inhofe. Okay, thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Dunford, do you believe a ``no first use'' policy
improves our ability to deter conflict? Would it be your best
military advice to adopt such a policy?
General Dunford. Well, thank you, Senator. I think the
current policy is one that complicates an adversary's
decisionmaking process, and I wouldn't recommend any change to
simplify an adversary's decisionmaking calculus. I also can
envision several circumstances where we would not want to
remove that option from the President in the future. I could
certainly talk about that in a classified venue. But, I
absolutely believe the current policy is the right policy.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
As you know, those who favor reducing the size of our
nuclear forces, they often argue that a non-nuclear capability
can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our
ability to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries,
and assure our allies. A report released last September by the
Global Zero Group repeatedly makes this argument and claims
that cyberweapons, in particular, can be substituted for
nuclear weapons. Do you think cyber operations, their effects
and their ability to deter hostile activity, is comparable to
nuclear weapons, or are these extremely different capabilities?
Is this idea of direct substitution unwise?
General Dunford. Senator, I don't believe that cyber
capabilities can be substituted for nuclear capabilities. I
think we need to be very careful to maintain a safe, effective,
and credible nuclear deterrent on its own.
We, as you know, have looked at this through more than
three or four administrations in a row. We've carefully looked
at, What does the Nation need to do what I described in my
opening statement as the most important mission in the
Department of Defense, and that is to deter a nuclear war?
We've concluded that the current construct of a triad with a
robust nuclear command-and-control capability is the most
effective way to deter a nuclear war. It is also the most
effective way to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear
weapons by any potential adversary.
Senator Fischer. You mentioned that, in order to maintain
that safe deterrent, we must follow the advice of all previous
administrations, both Republican and Democrat, all previous
military leaders, that we maintain that triad?
General Dunford. Yes, Senator. I have participated in two
Nuclear Posture Reviews since I've been in this assignment and
been exposed to the wide body of analytic work that was behind
those two Nuclear Posture Reviews that came to the very same
conclusion in two different administrations. It's very
consistent with the military advice that I provided on both
occasions.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Moving to a different topic. Late last year, General, you
characterized the situation in Afghanistan as a stalemate. In
the time since, we've seen some indications that negotiations
with the Taliban are showing signs of progress. Do you believe
the South Asia Strategy is working? What is your view of the
current security situation?
General Dunford. Oh, thanks, Senator.
First, I think we're all cautiously optimistic that there
is, for the first time, serious inroads made into
reconciliation. Ambassador Zal Khalilzad just completed a round
of negotiations with the Taliban. He's back in Washington, DC.
I'll have an opportunity to speak to him later today, and I
think we'll see him tomorrow morning. We're encouraged. I can
tell you, on behalf of Secretary Shanahan, everything that we
are doing now in the military space, led by General Miller on
the ground, is in support of Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts.
I think, on the ground, by and large, the general strategic
situation has not changed, but General Miller has incorporated
elements of the strategy to increase the pressure on Taliban
leadership. We do believe that some of that pressure has
contributed to the fact that the Taliban are now at the peace
table for the first time since the war began.
Senator Fischer. What conditions on the ground do you
believe are necessary if we're going to be able to see any kind
of progress in discussions that we have with the Taliban? Can
you be specific in this setting?
General Dunford. You know, first, to put pressure on the
Taliban, we need to continue to provide enabling capability to
the Afghan forces. That's been in the form of train, advise,
and assist. We have the right leaders at the right place to
assist the Afghans. We're also providing combat-enabling
capability--aviation, intelligence, logistics support--as well.
Then, most importantly, though, Senator, on the ground is a
counterterrorism capability, remembering that the reason why
we're in Afghanistan is to prevent attacks against the American
people in the Homeland. The combination of support for the
Afghans to allow them to put pressure on the Taliban also
creates the conditions for us to have an effective
counterterrorism presence in South Asia to secure the American
people.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I think it's important to
always consider conditions on the ground and always keep in
mind what our goal and mission is.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Shanahan--I'm sorry----
Senator Shaheen. Shaheen.
Chairman Inhofe.--Shaheen.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. There we go.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been on
this Committee for about 8 years now.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. That's right.
Senator Reed. His Irish----
Senator Shaheen. Yeah, actually--that's right. It's----
Senator Reed. His Irish----
Senator Shaheen.--St. Patrick's Day is coming up, so for
that I'll be ``Shan.''
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Secretary Shanahan, I must say I was quite concerned this
morning when I read The New York Times story that the
Department of Defense is pushing back against the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which is trying to set tougher
standards for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS)
chemicals. I will just show you. The article was in the Times,
and the headline here says, ``Pentagon Pushes for Weaker
Standards on Chemicals Contaminating Drinking Water.'' You and
I first had a chance to talk about PFAS chemicals and how
they're affecting the former Pease Air Force Base in 2017. I
told you about the hundreds of people, children, who had been
drinking water, and those chemicals now have shown up. No one
knows what the long-term health impacts of drinking that water
is.
There are 401 known military facilities in the United
States that the Pentagon has admitted have PFAS contamination.
This Committee worked, 2 years ago, to authorize the first-ever
health study on PFAS chemicals. I'm just--I'm very concerned
about the fact that the Department of Defense would be trying
to reduce the standard that the EPA is setting to try and
ensure that drinking water is safe, not just for the civilians
around our military installations, but also for our members of
the military. I must say, the Air Force has been very
responsive at Pease and Portsmouth. Under the previous
Secretary, Deborah James, and the current Secretary, Heather
Wilson, they have come up, they have put in remediation
efforts. I think this health study that has been started is
going to be critical in answering questions for people. But, I
don't understand how you and the Department of Defense could be
trying to reduce the standards that affect drinking water for
literally millions of people around the country.
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I'm not familiar with the
article this morning. You have my assurance that I'll take a
look at what the actual situation is, in terms of the
standards.
What I am accountable and responsible for is the safety and
security of our men and women. You have my assurance that we
will continue to do that. I will look into this matter. I take
these matters personally, very, very seriously, just as we had
talked before. I am the advocate to take care of those matters,
so let me take that for the record, and I will follow up with
you directly to explain the situation and what we're doing to
take responsibility.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD)
supports the use of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act's (CERCLA) long-established,
risk-based approach to determine when groundwater cleanup is
needed. The Department is not seeking a different or weaker
cleanup standard. Using the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) risk assessment process supporting this statute, the
unacceptable risk to human health for cleanup of groundwater
with perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic
acid (PFOA) is approximately 380 parts per trillion (ppt). DOD
uses EPA's risk assessment guidance to determine whether to add
the concentrations of PFOS and PFOA together to determine
CERCLA responsibilities. Additionally, there is a Lifetime
Health Advisory (LHA) of 70 ppt for PFOS and PFOA. The LHA
applies to drinking water, but also considers all PFOS/PFOA
exposures over a lifetime. Therefore, the LHA is not a cleanup
level.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. Can you confirm
or deny whether DOD has urged a lowering of the standard that
the EPA is trying to put in place?
Secretary Shanahan. I can't speak to that specific. I will,
very quickly, find--get an answer back to you.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. I think that's
something that is important for the entire Committee to know,
because, as you know, installations across the country are
affected, and a lot of people's--and we don't yet really know
what the long-term health impacts are. So, getting those
answers is very important.
Can I ask--and I'm not sure who, quite, to direct this
question to, but, General Dunford, you said that you were going
to be weighing in on any projects that were put on a list--any
MILCON projects put on the list to consider delaying because of
the President's effort to put more money into a border wall.
Can you tell me what objective criteria that you're looking at
in trying to come up with those projects?
General Dunford. Senator, the Secretary will get inputs on
the impact of the projects from the service secretaries and the
service chiefs. What I will do is talk about the
appropriateness of those projects and how they relate to the
performance of our mission along the border so the Secretary
will get a wide variety of inputs. Each of the service
secretaries, I know, will share their assessment of those
impact of those projects to the Secretary.
Senator Shaheen. But, a number of those projects would not
affect the border, would they?
General Dunford. No----
Senator Shaheen. I mean, we have a--MILCON projects at the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard that are very important, I think, to
our national security, that don't affect the border directly.
General Dunford. Yeah, sorry, Senator, if I conflated two
issues. There is the list of projects, and then the service--
that may be used to free money up for projects along the
border--the service secretaries and the service chiefs will
provide input to the Secretary on the impact of those projects
to the services and, as you point out, bases and installations,
maybe, where those projects would have been executed. What I
will do, when the decision is made to support the border with
infrastructure, is assess the relationship of that
infrastructure to the DOD mission. There are two separate
processes that affect----
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Dunford.--infrastructure and projects.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. General Dunford, how many troops, roughly,
do we have on the border today?
General Dunford. Senator, we have approximately 4,000 in a
title 10 status, and we have approximately 2,000 in a title 32
status.
Senator Cotton. How many do we have in the demilitarized
zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula?
General Dunford. We have a total of 28,500 in Korea.
Senator Cotton. They're all pretty close to the DMZ, but we
have a lot that are right up on the DMZ, too, correct?
General Dunford. We do, Senator.
Senator Cotton. How many do we have today in the Baltics
and Poland nations that border Russia?
General Dunford. We have several hundred. Then, of course,
in Poland we have a constant rotational presence that can be up
in the thousands. We have brigade combat teams that rotate into
Poland for training. I was there visiting them in December,
and, at that point, we had probably about 3,000 forces inside
of Poland at that time.
Senator Cotton. Okay. So, we have lots of troops around the
world on other countries' borders. Does it cause you any
disquiet that we have troops on our own border?
General Dunford. It does not cause me disquiet that we have
troops on the border, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Let's turn to the budget. The budget has a very large
request for the overseas contingency fund, $174 billion. I
think that's probably about a hundred-billion more now than
what we've spent this year. That, obviously, is a big patch to
try to get around the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. There's
a lot of people on Capitol Hill who are not going to like that.
But, let's think about it, first, from a military standpoint.
General Dunford, what does it mean for modernization if the
opposition to such a large overseas contingency fund results in
a 1-year continuing resolution?
General Dunford. Well, Senator, my understanding this year
would be that we would not have a continuing resolution, that
we would go back to BCA levels. I'm not given to hyperbole----
Senator Cotton. So, let's say it's a continuing resolution
that suspends the BCA levels. So, because of the dispute over
the overseas contingencies fund, the Congress can't reach a
budget-cap agreement, and therefore, we have to have a 1-year
continuing resolution that suspends the caps.
General Dunford. Yeah, one of the challenges that we've
had, Senator, over the last few years is, the fact that we have
not had a budget--last year, we did, but the fact that we have
routinely not had a budget at the beginning of the year has
delayed new-starts, and it's been incredibly inefficient in how
we prioritize and allocate resources throughout the year. The
three adjectives I use--and I think they're all important--is,
predictable, sustained, and adequate levels of funding. If we
had the entire fiscal year, we can be the good stewards that
you should hold us accountable for being.
Senator Cotton. Secretary Shanahan, is a dollar of spending
in the overseas contingency fund equal to a dollar of spending
in the base budget?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, yes, it is.
Senator Cotton. Could you elaborate on that a little bit
more?
Secretary Shanahan. When I think about the top line and how
we built the top line, it was a requirements-built budget. So,
every dollar in the budget is based off a derived requirement.
So, how we package the money doesn't change how we built the
budget. So, the color is indifferent to what it is we would put
the money towards.
Senator Cotton. If the Congress could reach a budget-cap
deal, though, and have that money in the base budget, would
that be better off for the Department of Defense?
Secretary Shanahan. Be much better off.
Senator Cotton. Can you explain why that would be better
off?
Secretary Shanahan. Well, for a number of reasons. I think
and I'll ask David to comment on this, but it's in the out
years. When the base budget gives us the predictability and the
stability the Chairman just spoke to, that not only gives us,
internally, the stability to do our planning, but also our
partners in the industrial base, their investment and their
planning and their sizing, they have confidence that that
continuity of money will continue. It----
Senator Cotton. Yeah, if we could--that's probably a good
question for the Comptroller. Could you just explain the
efficiency of spending a dollar in the base budget versus a
dollar in the OCO budget, especially in the out years?
Secretary Norquist. So, in the regular year, they follow
the same congressional oversight; they get spent the same way.
It's a presentation difference. To be clear to the members, we
have presented the budget so that that which has historically
been OCO is distinctly presented from the OCO for base, because
we want to understand--to be able to do analysis, you need to
be able to compare. But, when you go to the out years, what
people look at is, What numbers can we expect in the out years?
It is easier to project, and we have done that in the past.
You'll see, in some of our presentations, a different base-and-
OCO mix in the out years when you get to the point where all
that is OCO is the contingency versus the OCO for base and
others. But, it helps with planning.
Senator Cotton. Yeah. I say the reason we're in this bind
is a law against which I have inveighed for many years, the
2011 Budget Control Act. I hope that we can get another, and
final, 2-year cap deal. I do worry, though, that we may be
heading in the direction of a full-year continuing resolution.
I would hate to see that for all our men and women in uniform
out on the front lines.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. I thought Senator Blumenthal was here
before me, so I'll----
Chairman Inhofe. Senator----
Senator Hirono.--defer to him first.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Take the ball and run.
Chairman Inhofe. Go.
Senator Blumenthal. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you very
much for your service. Appreciate your being here, and your
candid and forthright answers.
President Trump's budget has been criticized in many ways.
In my view, it gets a lot wrong, but it got very right the
commitment to undersea warfare and building three submarines,
Virginia-class attack submarines, a year in fiscal year 2020. I
want to thank you and your entire team for their commitment to
that issue of paramount importance to our future Navy and our
national defense. It is an area where we have an asymmetric
advantage that must be preserved. There are others that are
also important, cyber and air superiority and space, for all
the reasons that you know. But, I just want to highlight that
area.
I want to ask a question that is unrelated to the defense
budget, but is very much on the minds of many of us, relating
to the Boeing 737 MAX 8. I know it's not a topic of interest
today before this proceeding, but it is a topic of interest to
work that you've done in the past. I'd like to know whether you
have spoken about the Boeing 737 MAX 8 to anyone in the
administration, in the Department of Transportation, or in the
White House.
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I've not spoken to anyone
regarding the 737 MAX.
Senator Blumenthal. Have you been briefed at all on any of
the problems relating to it?
Secretary Shanahan. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, Are you in favor of an
investigation that would look into why these defects that
caused crashes were not known earlier or were not acted upon
earlier?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I firmly believe we should let
the regulators investigate the incidents. I would just say, my
heart goes out, and my condolences, to the families and the
employees involved in the Lion Air incident and the Ethiopian
Airline incident.
Senator Blumenthal. The independent watchdog, Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, recently asked the
Department of Defense Inspector General to investigate whether
you have broken any ethics rules by promoting Boeing while you
served as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Do you support such an
investigation?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes, I do.
Senator Blumenthal. I welcome your support for that
investigation.
Other government watchdog groups have looked at records
indicating that the Department of Defense spent almost $140,000
at Trump-branded properties in the first 8 months of the Trump
presidency. More than a third of those payments were made at
Mar-a-Lago. Some of the payments overlapped with presidential
trips, but others do not. All the payments--you may be familiar
with the emoluments lawsuit that I and other members of
Congress have brought--would violate that domestic emoluments
clause, potentially, which prevents the President from
receiving money from the Federal Government, or any other
payments and benefits, without consent of Congress. Are you
aware of those expenditures by the Department of Defense?
Secretary Shanahan. No, I'm not, but I'll ask Secretary
Norquist.
Secretary Norquist. I'm not aware of those.
Senator Blumenthal. Could you give us, in writing, a--an
accounting of those expenditures by the Department of Defense
at Trump-branded properties?
Secretary Norquist. I'll take that for the record, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense has spent a
total of $147,607.38 at Trump-branded properties since the
inauguration. These were all government travel credit card
purchases by individual employees and members of the military.
It is not Department of Defense policy to recommend that its
personnel patronize any particular hotel or restaurant.
Individual travelers are largely free market players in
choosing these services. Individual travelers are personally
responsible for paying the amounts due on their government
travel credit cards and are provided a per diem lodging
allotment and a meals and incidentals expense allotment with
which to make these payments.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
As the Acting Secretary of the Department of Defense, I
have been alarmed by reports that indicate a pattern of
retaliation against some of the Pentagon reporters, and
restricted press access to some of the top DOD officials. Are
you aware of those restrictions? Do you think they're
appropriate?
Secretary Shanahan. I'm not aware of any restrictions. In
fact, I think there's probably, since I've assumed these
responsibilities, much more interaction and engagement with the
press.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, if you could--since my time is
expired, if you could let me know of any restrictions that have
been imposed?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Blumenthal. For the record, if you would take that
question.
Thank you.
Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Shanahan. There have been no press restrictions
put in place at the Pentagon and that will not change under my
leadership. My team and I are committed to upholding this
promise.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. President--or, thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. A lot of Irish mistakes going on here
this morning.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sullivan. Maybe we're getting close to St.
Patrick's Day or something.
I want to thank you, all you gentlemen, for your service.
Under Secretary Norquist, I know Senator Perdue's going to
ask a lot about the audit, but I think that was really good
work that you were doing.
General Dunford, I just want to thank you. You know, I know
that there has been an announcement of a new Chairman, but
certainly we view you as the Chairman who's done an exceptional
job, not just as Chairman, but in your entire career. I know
you've got a lot of work to do left, but I do want to do a
shout-out to your exceptional service to our Nation.
Mr. Secretary, I want to ask a couple of questions that
relate to the President's recent visit to Alaska. He was there,
coming back from North Korea. Billy Mitchell, who's the father
of the U.S. Air Force, in a congressional hearing similar to
this right before World War II, called Alaska ``the most
strategic place in the world.'' The President kind of echoed
Billy Mitchell's comments when he was in Alaska visiting with
our troops. He said, ``Since the second World War, our intrepid
servicemembers in Alaska have proudly stood as the top cover
for North America. You are a powerful warning to the world to
never strike American soil. You are a warning that everybody
knows about and nobody wants to mess with.'' He went on to
say--he was at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson (JBER)--``Next
year, the 11th Air Force, headquartered right here at JBER,
will receive the first of 54 brand-new F-35 fighters. You are
getting very special planes, and you're getting a lot of them.
That'll make Alaska the home to very 100 fifth-gen fighters. No
place on the planet Earth will have that much combat fighter
power. It's because of our strategic location.''
The President then went on to talk about Alaska's critical
role in missile defense, ``We are also deploying more than 20
ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, which will further
strengthen our missile defense system. So important. Our
missile defense system is being rebuilt very substantially, and
we're going to have the latest and greatest here very soon.''
So, that was the President, 2 weeks ago, in Alaska.
Do you agree with these statements by the President, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I do.
Senator Sullivan. You called North Korea a pressing
concern. Like the President indicated by his remarks, do you
believe that the rapid deployment of advanced missile defense
for America is critical to our readiness, defending from North
Korea missile attacks?
Secretary Shanahan. Extremely critical.
Senator Sullivan. How about the rapid deployment of 100
fifth-gen fighters that can be defending our troops in Korea,
because of Alaska's strategic location, within 5 hours?
Secretary Shanahan. Deployment and sustainment of them is
vital.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Let me ask, on the issue of allies, Do you agree that China
and Russia have been trying for years to split us from our
traditional allies? NATO, Japan, Korea. Hasn't that been a
strategic goal of them--of those countries?
Secretary Shanahan. Well, China, in particular, but we see
this constantly with Russia and NATO, particularly in the
Balkans. I'd ask the Chairman, maybe, to comment on the recent
activity in the Balkans.
Senator Sullivan. Well, let me just----
General Dunford, do you see that as a strategic goal of the
Chinese and the Russians, to split us from our allies?
General Dunford. It's been a very consistent pattern of
behavior to split us from our allies. More specifically, to
create doubt, in the minds of our allies, that we can meet our
alliance commitments.
Senator Sullivan. So, I appreciate what the President's
been trying to do, particularly to get our NATO allies to 2
percent, but there have been press reports about a cost-plus-
50-percent approach. Mr. Secretary, do you know how much the
Koreans paid for the new Camp Humphreys on the Korean
Peninsula?
Secretary Shanahan. I do. Slightly less than a billion
dollars.
Senator Sullivan. So, they paid $9.8 billion out of a new
facility cost, $10.8 billion. Isn't that correct?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
Senator Sullivan. Ninety-three percent of a U.S. Army base.
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Sullivan. Have you been to Camp Humphreys?
Secretary Shanahan. No, I haven't.
Senator Sullivan. You should go there. It's an outstanding
facility.
I'm sure you've been, General.
General Dunford. I have, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. So, 93 percent, United States Army base
on Korean soil, paid for by the Koreans. Do we really think--
and maybe those statements--maybe the press reports aren't
true--cost-plus-50--are we driving our allies away from us in
the way that Putin and Xi Jinping are probably cheering right
now?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, Senator, we don't do cost-plus-50
percent.
Senator Sullivan. So, those reports in the press, all over
the press----
Secretary Shanahan. They're----
Senator Sullivan.--are incorrect?
Secretary Shanahan. They're erroneous. We're not going to
run a business and we're not going to run a charity. The
important part is that people pay their fair share. Payment
comes in lots of different forms. Could be contributions, like
in Afghanistan. But, at the end of the day, people need to
carry their fair share. Not everyone can contribute. But, it is
not about cost-plus-50 percent.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Shanahan, the recently released Missile Defense
Review (MDR) directed a study on operationalizing the Aegis
Ashore site of the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), on
Kauai. You and I discussed this. I have some significant
concerns about what operationalizing the site would do to PMR's
ability to meet its testing mission, which I assume you agree
is important. You can----
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. No, absolutely, Senator, and----
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Secretary Shanahan. The----
Senator Hirono. I'll get to the question.
Secretary Shanahan. All right.
Senator Hirono.--as well as the impact of removing that
testing capacity from PMRF. So, briefly, could you tell us how
operationalizing the Aegis Ashore site in Kauai would add to
our ability to defend Hawaii from missile threats, especially
as the major missile threat to Hawaii would be an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Aegis Ashore
is not set up to counter ICBMs?
Secretary Shanahan. My understanding of the request in the
MDR is that it's a study to assess taking the test assets and
operationalizing them. As you well point out, the ground-based
midcourse defense system that is resident in Alaska defends
Hawaii. I believe that the study will look at what are other
threats that may be posed to Hawaii, and how there might be a
layered defense. But, as you pointed out, the test range there
is vital capability and capacity for developing our missile
defense systems.
Senator Hirono. So, I want to make sure that my concerns
are in the record. For Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford,
2 weeks ago before this Committee, General O'Shaughnessy, the
Northern Command Commander, testified that the current
situation at our southern border is, to quote him, ``not a
military threat.'' Do you agree, Secretary Shanahan, that the
situation on the southern border is not a military threat?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, you're referring to General
O'Shaughnessy's testimony?
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. What I recall from his testimony
is, he said that it is not a military threat. He said border
security is national security.
Senator Hirono. I understand that. But, he said
specifically that it's not a military threat. I'm asking you
whether you agree with him that----
Secretary Shanahan. I----
Senator Hirono.--it's not a military threat.
Secretary Shanahan. I agree with him.
Senator Hirono. General Dunford?
General Dunford. I agree. It's a security challenge, not a
military threat.
Senator Hirono. So, you testified, Secretary--Mr.
Secretary, that there are 6,000 troops currently deployed at
our southern border. Can you tell us how long they're going to
be there?
Secretary Shanahan. I'd say 30 or 40 percent of them will
be departing in the next month or so when they complete some of
their work. I believe we'll probably draw down to between 3,000
and 4,000.
Senator Hirono. Is this something that the President is
indicating to you, or can he say that, ``I want you all to
remain at the border''?
Secretary Shanahan. No, this was part of the tasking from
the Department of Homeland Security. Based on their request to
us----
Senator Hirono. From the President.
Secretary Shanahan. From the Department.
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Let me get on to a matter that is of great concern to
some--to a lot of us, actually. Secretary Shanahan, in your
response to Senator Inhofe's question about refueling the
Truman, you stated that growing the workforce in the shipyard
is a priority, and the move to not refuel the Truman would save
$3.4 billion over 5 years. How does canceling 3 years of
shipyard work grow the workforce there?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. The workforce--when we look at
what is in the shipyard, so the combination of submarines, new
carriers, and then maintenance, all that is done in the same
shipyards, and that workforce moves from project to project.
So, when we look at the total employment, the actual total
employment goes up over the period of time in which we're
building the two carriers.
Senator Hirono. Frankly, as I talk with some of the people
from the shipyards, I'm not so sure that that is the case.
It'll cost about $3.4 billion to refuel the Truman, which, by
the way, by not refueling, we're only getting about 50 percent
of the Truman's service life. At the same time, there's $3.6
billion in the emergency fund which you acknowledge is going to
be set aside--you want us to authorize setting that aside for
the wall. So, doesn't it make sense--maybe I should ask this of
General Dunford--that we should use the money from the
emergency funding that you're requesting us to set aside for
the wall for something--i.e., the refueling of the Truman--that
actually fits with the NDS and that your combatant commanders
want?
General Dunford, would you like to respond?
General Dunford. Senator, I would. I'm not trying to be
evasive, but I think my responsibility is to identify for the
Secretary the priorities within our top line, not to identify
what the top line is, and not to identify how the money within
the total top line ought to be allocated.
Senator Hirono. Well, I would say probably if you all had
your druthers, if you could get some money to refuel the
Truman, you would do so, wouldn't you?
General Dunford. Again, if I look at it through the
military dimension alone, that would be true, but I have to
acknowledge that the Secretary and the President have broader
responsibilities than I do.
Senator Hirono. Yes, like building a vanity wall.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today.
Mr. Secretary Shanahan, in 1990, Congress passed a law that
required the administration to produce an audit of the
Department of Defense. I want to give you guys kudos for
producing the first-ever audit of the Department of Defense
last year, in November. Thank you for that. Can you give us an
update on that? Give us a little idea of what the Department is
learning from that audit. I know we don't have a clean audit
yet. Secretary Norquist may want to comment on that. But, I'd
like to get a brief update about what we're learning, what kind
of opportunities we have for efficiencies and a better use of
capital in the military.
Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, the audit was to look at $2.7 trillion worth
of assets. So, this was the largest audit ever conducted,
probably in the history of mankind. We were asked, Would we
ever do this? Because it had never been done. We made the
commitment to this Committee that it would be accomplished. We
always knew that there would be discoveries. But, audits really
aren't about doing the audits, it's finding the problems, as
you've pointed out. We specifically focused on identifying
certain problems that are vital to operating the Department.
Some of them are financial in benefit, as you described,
efficiencies, but others are identifying cyber shortfalls. So,
we used the audit to find efficiencies, vulnerabilities from
cyber, as well as where there is noncompliance.
The best part of the audit is, we've identified those
items, and now we're incorporating all the corrective actions,
we're building the muscle movement and the habits to
continuously address those findings and make ourselves better.
Dave, would you like to talk about the efficiencies?
Secretary Norquist. Sure. So, I think one of the things you
point is, before we started the audit, there was sort of two
potential misconceptions. One is, it was going to be a
paperwork exercise, and we'd learn nothing. Or the other is,
we'd open the floors and discover pots of gold hidden
underneath. Of course, part of the value of getting through is,
you move past those to discover the tangible value. Let me just
give a couple of specific examples:
The first is inventory. We discovered there are certain
facilities where what they thought they had in inventory did
not match what they had in inventory. If your responsibility is
spare parts for airplanes, the accuracy of that inventory
matters. So, for example, at Hill Air Force Base, uninstalled
missile motors, they don't just check the quantity, they check
the condition. They were labeled as unserviceable. When you
visit them and look at them, they're actually usable. So, you
wouldn't have needed to order more. That saved us $53 million.
Other places, you go to Osan and Kadina, 14,000 munitions,
$2.2 billion, 100 percent accounted for, not a single
exception.
What we learned is, there are some places that are doing
this quite well, and there are others where we need to either
help them fix their process or give them better attention. But,
the commanders in the field recognize the direct correct--
connection to mission and readiness. So, I had expected a lot
of pushback once the audit findings came in, that this was just
paperwork, but they saw the tangible value. I think, as we move
forward, the accuracy of the data, adopting more businesslike
practices, will be tremendously helpful for the Department.
Senator Perdue. Thank you. How long will it take us to get
a clean audit, in your estimate?
Secretary Norquist. I don't know how long the Department,
because the Department's opinion will be the last of the
organizations. But, I think, over the next couple of years,
you'll see either the working capital fund of the Army or the
Marine Corps start to get to clean opinions, and then you'll be
able to differentiate between which of the organizations
missing progress and who needs an extra hearing.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Chairman Dunford, today we have about 5,000 troops, I
think, directly in Iraq. Is that correct?
General Dunford. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Perdue. So, General Thomas recently before this
Committee--the combatant commander of SOCOM--said, and I quote,
``Our Iraqi partners have embraced their sovereign
responsibility in terms of defending their terrain.'' What are
we doing--and also, we hear about this potential vote in the
Parliament in Iraq about asking United States Forces to leave
Iraq. Then, just this week, we had President Rouhani visiting
Prime Minister Modi. Can you talk to us a little bit about what
assumptions we have in this budget with regard to our presence
in Iraq? How do you see our continuing role there in Iraq?
General Dunford. Senator, this budget includes an enduring
presence in Iraq, slightly less than the forces that are on the
ground right now. What's important is that we do that in
partnership with the Iraqi Government. So, as the Iraqi
Government settles, and they're prepared to enter into a
conversation about what our reliable partnership will be moved
forward, then our Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense
will work out the exact numbers to meet the requirements that
the Iraqi Security Forces will still have to ensure the lasting
defeat of ISIS, which is--of course, our collective focus.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm somewhat saddened to have so much of this hearing taken
up with issues about the wall, because I and all Members of
this Committee have been very bipartisan. We've always been
very supportive of the military. But, there are some questions
I feel that I have to ask.
Secretary Shanahan, you testified earlier, in answer to
Senator Reed's question, that you don't know which military
construction expenditures are going to be canceled in favor of
this $3.6 billion. Is that correct?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, that's correct.
Senator King. Why is that correct? You've had a month. I
find it very hard to believe that there's not a list.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator King. Are you testifying there's no list, there's
no information you can give us about which construction
projects are on the chopping block?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. So, what I can tell you are what
projects aren't on the chopping block. So, for example----
Senator King. Have you assured Members of the Senate--
individual members, that there are not projects in their States
that are under consideration?
Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not.
Senator King. You have not made any assurances to any
member of the Senate.
Secretary Shanahan. I have had questions as to whether
projects--this has been a blanket statement that's been made.
There are no projects in this fiscal year that will be
canceled. That has been a--and anything associated with family
housing or barracks.
Senator King. But, wasn't the appropriations, the $3.6
billion--I mean, that's part of a larger appropriation for
military construction that's been through this Congress, been
through the Appropriation Committee--didn't it list projects?
Secretary Shanahan. No, it doesn't.
David?
Secretary Norquist. So, what he's talking about is--the
projects, when we go to prioritize, when we have the guidance
from DHS's request, and the Secretary makes a decision--we'll
look at those that are unobligated, meaning the contracts
haven't been awarded. If you look at the----
Senator King. But, those are projects that have been
identified. This is----
Secretary Norquist. Absolutely.
Senator King. You weren't just say, ``We'll give you $50
billion for military construction.''
Secretary Norquist. Correct. The projects individually
identified by the Congress and the committees, correct.
Senator King. But, you're telling me that the Department
has not identified which of those projects are going to be
canceled in--or deferred in order to spend this $3.6 billion on
a wall.
Secretary Norquist. We don't know which projects will be
deferred. I don't know if the Secretary's decision will be $3.6
billion. He has to determine that it's relevant----
Senator King. It's your testimony, Mr. Secretary, that you
have not had conversations with Members of the Senate to assure
them about the safety of projects in their States.
Secretary Shanahan. Well, let me be clear on this so it's--
I have told members there are projects and this is writ large--
there are no projects scheduled to be obligated in this fiscal
year that will be canceled. That's the only information I've
shared.
Senator King. Well, I'm confused. I mean, either projects
are going to be canceled to find $3.6 billion, or they're not.
Please explain, Mr. Norquist.
Secretary Norquist. Sure. The projects in military
construction have up to 5 years to be awarded. So, if you
receive funding for a project in 2018 or 2019, it might not get
awarded till 2020 or 2021.
Senator King. So, you're focusing on the word ``awarded,''
but I'm focusing on the fact that these are identified projects
in the appropriation. Are they not?
Secretary Norquist. Correct. But, if----
Senator King. Mr. Chair--Secretary, are you saying that
there are no identified projects in the appropriation for this
year that are going to be defunded or deferred because of this
3.6? I mean, this 3.6 is coming from somewhere.
Secretary Norquist. So, okay--so, I think you're talking
past each other. There's a difference between the 2019
appropriations bill versus projects that are scheduled to be
awarded, meaning the contract is going to be funded and the
construction would begin in 2019. Those projects have up until
the year 2023 or so to be awarded. The reason we put the $3.6
billion in the request is so that money would be available and
allow those projects to continue. In many cases----
Senator King. All right. Let me put it another way. I know
of projects in New England that were funded in this bill. Can I
be assured that they're safe, they're not going to be deferred
or canceled to find this 3.6? I mean, it sounds--something's
not computing here. The 3.6 is coming from somewhere. It's
coming from projects that were authorized and appropriated by
this Congress. You won't tell me what they are.
Secretary Norquist. The 3.6 will come from projects--well,
assuming the Secretary signs off--I don't know the number of
the requirement yet--but, assuming the Secretary signs off, the
3.6 would, in fact, come from projects previously authorized
and appropriated by Congress. We would look to not--we would
not touch those that dealt with family housing or military
construction. We would prioritize----
Senator King. I'm going to ask my question once, Mr.----
Secretary Norquist. Sure.
Senator King.--Secretary. Have you spoken to any Members of
the Senate to assure them that projects in their State are not
going to be affected by this policy?
Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not, Senator.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I'm very concerned about this. I don't think
we're getting full information. I intend to follow up.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator McSally.
Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I do want to follow up on that, as we did have a
conversation, and there are four projects in Arizona that are
appropriated in fiscal year 2019, and you broadly said those
fiscal year 2019 projects, across all the country, will not be
impacted by this, just to be clear. Correct, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Shanahan. That is correct.
Senator McSally. Thank you.
Senator King. How----
Senator McSally. I just wanted to clear that up.
Senator King. How does that square with what he just told
me?
Senator McSally. Well, you rebound if you get more time,
sir, but I've got some other questions to ask. I just wanted to
clear that up, since it seemed that may cause some confusion
about some conversations that we had.
I want to get to a different topic. In 2017, there were
6,769 sexual assaults reported across our entire military,
likely thousands of others that were not reported. These blue-
on-blue crimes are unacceptable. They're harming our warriors,
and they're degrading good order and discipline and military
readiness. Many steps have been taken by the military over the
last years, and this body. Over 100 legislative actions. But,
it's not enough. There are thousands of our warriors in
military readiness that's been harmed by these crimes. I
believe commanders must be educated, equipped, and held
accountable, and still be responsible for the decisions, the
culture, and the discipline regarding sexual assault. However,
something needs to change. ``Insanity'' is doing the same thing
over and over again, expecting a different result. Perhaps we
need to take a fresh look at this issue.
I've spent a lot of time thinking about this, and more so
over the last week. We have weeks, now, before the NDAA will be
marked up before this Committee. I am fully locked on, like a
missile, on this target. I want to be working with you and the
military services to take a fresh look at this. I've asked the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff to start with
a summit with the Air Force. But, it's not just the Air Force,
it's across our military services.
So, can I get your commitment that we are going to partner
on this, and we're going to take a fresh look and tackle this
over the next 45 days together, which includes being responsive
to my questions, maybe forming a team of experts and resources
to be able to really dial in as to what's working, what's not
working, across the spectrum of prevention and response and
prosecution? We can tackle this together, come up with some
ideas, impact on the NDAA, culminating with a tank meeting with
all the leaders there, with myself, and solve this thing
together. Can I get your commitment you'll work me--with me on
that?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, you have my commitment.
Senator McSally. Thank you.
Chairman Dunford?
General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator McSally. Okay, great. Let's follow up immediately
on that. I appreciate it.
I want to shift to a different topic. I was over on the
Korean Peninsula, less than a year ago, visiting the troops,
and I will tell you, I am so proud of them and their ability to
fight tonight, and everything that's been done by our military
and the services to make sure that we were using all elements
of national power to crank up the pressure with a deterrent
capability to keep the pressure on North Korea for the
negotiations and to thwart the threat that they are.
I want to get some clarity, Secretary Shanahan, on
exercises. As we know, military exercises, every single day. I
mean, every day, you--you're going out with your squadron, your
unit, and you are making sure that you're ready to fight
tonight. But, people rotate in and out over there every year.
So, large-scale crisis-response exercises are critical for us
to have that decisionmaking process for key leaders at the
highest level. So, can you just clarify where we are with
military exercises on the Peninsula, and what the
decisionmaking process was on that?
Secretary Shanahan. Right. So, Senator, the exercises that
we have on the Peninsula, which are ongoing as we speak, and
the Minister of Defense for South Korea, ROKs [the Republic of
Korea], will come see me at the end of this month, and we'll
discuss progress and the findings of those exercises. They were
redesigned this year for three things: support the peace
process, the expanded responsibilities of the South Koreans, in
terms of operational control, and to----
Senator McSally. Okay.
Secretary Shanahan.--maintain foundational readiness.
Underlying all of this is maintaining the readiness we need if
we're called to fight tonight.
Senator McSally. Right.
Secretary Shanahan. We've sustained that readiness.
Senator McSally. Okay. So, are you--can you say that, with
the adjustment--I understand turning the volume down so it's
not being so provocative, but those higher-level operational
crisis exercises, the command-post level and beyond,
decisionmaking for new leaders, is really important----
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator McSally.--especially as they rotate so quickly over
there. Are--can you assure us that there will be no degradation
in the readiness----
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator McSally.--to fight tonight, based on adjustments to
the exercises?
Secretary Shanahan. I have had personal conversations with
General Abrams, and I can assure you there will not be
degradation. We will have the capability we need.
Senator McSally. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to our witnesses today.
Before--Assistant--or Secretary Shanahan, before I ask you
a few questions, I just want to go back and get a little bit
more clarification from some of the answers that I've heard to
Senator King and Senator Hirono.
I noticed, in the budget, there is a line for $9.2 billion
for emergency----
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Peters.--for fiscal year 2020. Is that $9.2 billion
that you're asking Congress to appropriate related to the
emergency declaration that the President has made?
Secretary Shanahan. $7.2 billion of it is, and $2 billion
is for hurricane.
Senator Peters. So, you're asking Congress to appoint--or
to appropriate $7 billion to deal with what the President has
declared an emergency. I want to be clear about that.
Secretary Shanahan. Correct.
Senator Peters. So, the Senate, as you know, will be voting
later today on a resolution of disapproval relating to this
emergency declaration. Is it safe to say you would revise the
request for national emergency funding if a majority of the
House and the Senate disapproves of the emergency declaration?
Secretary Shanahan. I will stick to the budget that we've
submitted.
Senator Peters. But, if we don't approve an emergency
declaration, why would you come and ask us for money for an
emergency declaration?
Secretary Shanahan. I will work with this Congress to get
the right top line.
Senator Peters. So, you will look at that and revise it, if
necessary, if we disapprove it.
Secretary Shanahan. I'll work with the Committee and I'll
work with the Congress to get the right top line.
Senator Peters. Could you describe the Department's
response to the request for assistance that DHS sent a few
weeks ago, and perhaps provide some characterization of the
specifics in that request for us? I also serve on the Homeland
Security Committee. I think it would be helpful to know.
Secretary Shanahan. Right. Which request for assistance is
this?
Senator Peters. On the southern border.
Secretary Shanahan. It's just--is this--yeah, there's been
a number of them.
Senator Peters. Could you give me--could you characterize
what the--what they have been asking for and what--your
response?
Secretary Shanahan. Right. I'll--do you want to----
General Dunford. Sure.
Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
General Dunford. Senator, I'll take that, if you don't
mind. The----
Senator Peters. Yes.
General Dunford.--the most recent request requested our
engineers to reinforce some of the infrastructure along the
border. We also have some soldiers that are supporting the
detect-and-monitor mission by manning cameras that allow
Customs and Border Protection to see what activity is ongoing
around the border. Those are the two primary tasks. That's, of
course, in addition to the National Guard sustain mission,
which provides rotary-wing aircraft for surveillance, some
logistics support, some planning support, and some intelligence
along the border.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Secretary Shanahan, at your confirmation hearing for the
position of Deputy Secretary, I asked you about what was
previously known as the ``third offset'' that essentially was
using technology to improve military tactics and strategy. We
had a further conversation about that in my office, and I
appreciate that. Your predecessor as Deputy Secretary, Bob
Work, championed the initiative and sought out ways to use
technology to create and maintain an advantage over our
competitors, very similar to what was envisioned in the
National Defense Strategy.
Well, now that you've been inside the Department, I'm going
to ask this question again. Now, as an insider--before, I asked
that, prior to your appointment--what is your view on how
technology's going to impact warfare? In particular, give me a
sense of how you view the most disruptive technologies to some
of our legacy weapon systems that are pretty much ingrained in
DOD culture, also tend to be incredibly expensive. But, as
we're thinking about this budget going forward, that could
change very dramatically. Give me your sense and how that is
reflected in this budget.
Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely. To Bob Work's credit on the
third offset, that was the underpinning for many of the
concepts that we're requesting funding for this year. So, in
terms of the four major disruptive capabilities, they are
space, missiles, cyber, and autonomy. So, take, for example,
missiles on--in answering your question: low cost, cost-
imposing, and attritable versus very expensive, manned assets.
Same can be said for cyber, all the effects that you can create
with cyber. When we think about the trade in cost, terms of
being able to deploy forces, versus effects--significant cost
imposition. Space, you know, when we think about having
unfettered access to the world, outer space provides us that
environment.
Senator Peters. So, when you're talking about some--I--my
time is running low, but you're talking about some of this
disruptive and autonomy. So, when you think about legacy
systems of pilots and airplanes and aircraft carriers, things
of that nature, all of those things we should be looking at----
Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely. I mean, when we think about
the challenge to find pilots, that challenge goes away. When we
think about surface/subsurface and the capability to build for
lower cost, hide and suspend for longer periods of time, these
are real enablers. The cost to support them is significantly
less.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Blackburn.
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being with us today.
Mr. Shanahan, I want to move a little bit of a different
direction as we talk about budget and priorities. I'm from
Tennessee. I spent 16 years in the House and represented a
district that was home to Fort Campbell and many of the
enlisted men and women that are there, the 101st, 160th, 5th
Division, and have really developed a good working relationship
with those families and the enlisted, and also with command
teams that have been there that have done such a terrific job.
We have some of those that have served at Fort Campbell that
are members of our team. So, we hear a good bit from them, and
hear about their concerns. I join Senator Cotton in being
tremendously concerned about the Budget Control Act from 2011,
with the sequester that was placed on our military. That has
not served us well. My hope is that we're going to be able to
solve that situation and address some of the problems that it
has brought forward.
But, one of the things I hear from, especially, our Special
Operations guys is their desire to make certain that 5G
technologies are available to them, and that those networks are
secure. I appreciate that in your testimony you mentioned three
of your priorities as cyber, hypersonics, and space. We have
had our COCOM [combatant command] hearings and have talked some
about the placement of these technologies so that we're
fighting 21st-century warfare and that we're not just focused
on today.
I'll tell you, one of the things that I've heard a little
bit of scuttlebutt about that causes me some concern is that
maybe some of the fighter pilots from Air Force are not that
excited about having a Space Force that would function there as
Air Force. So, I want to give you a couple of minutes to talk
about Space Force, how you see it standing up, how you expect
to deploy it, how you intend to protect the funding for that so
that we are looking forward as well as tending to today.
Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Senator.
The--with 2 minutes, I'll go as quickly as I can.
Senator Blackburn. Good.
Secretary Shanahan. I'll summarize it this way. Our Nation,
our $19 trillion economy, and our military, we're carrying too
much risk, given the vulnerability we have in space now that
space is a contested domain. The Space Force represents a
chance to accelerate our ability to respond to that threat
environment. The Space Force really gets after three items in
order for us to reduce that risk:
The first is, the assets that are in space were never
designed to be resilient and deal with the threats that exist
today. It's a bit like, ``You can't pick your parents.'' We
need to design new capability and put it up on orbit as quickly
as possible. Space Force recommends a Space Development Agency
(SDA), which really gets at cutting the redtape to do
development and tapping into commercial space technology, save
costs, save time.
The second is, stand up the Space Command, much like we've
done Cyber Command, so that we can focus, have dedicated focus
to provide the rules of engagement, authorities, and the tools
to defend our assets.
The third is, bring together and train. Make space a
dedicated profession, where we can provide this cadre of
professionals the right training so that they have the ability
to have a career that leads to----
Senator Blackburn. Well done in a summary. Now give me 15
seconds on great-power competitiveness with China in this
arena.
Secretary Shanahan. I think we've been ignoring the problem
too long.
Senator Blackburn. Well done.
Yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to our witnesses, for being here.
So, the administration has submitted a national defense
budget request for $750 billion for next year. That is a pretty
big number even by the Department's own standards. In fact, the
budget rules govern how much money is available for defense
spending, is set at $576 billion, which is still a huge sum.
But, you're requesting $174 billion more than the amount that
is allowed by law; $165 billion for the overseas contingency
operations, OCO, and another $9 billion for emergency funds for
the wall. Now, some of the things in the DOD budget request
seem to me to point in the right direction--more investments in
research, for example. We need to have a much larger
conversation about whether these budget caps make sense, and
how defense and nondefense priorities should stack up. But,
right now, I just want to dig into how you got your numbers so
all of the nondefense budget experts out there can understand
the tricks the administration is using to justify skyrocketing
defense spending.
Secretary Shanahan, the Department proposes to get around
the budget rules by requesting that 165 billion extra dollars
in the OCO account. The amount in the OCO account is not
counted toward statutory budget caps. Is that correct?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, let's dig in a bit, then, on OCO.
As the cost to fight the war in Iraq and Afghanistan began to
increase in the early 2000s, Congress had to pass emergency
supplemental appropriations every year. So, in 2009, President
Obama established OCO so that they can set aside funds for this
and other related operations. Because those funds are for
emergencies, they don't count toward the overall limits in
defense spending, as you just said. This year's OCO request is
a 140 percent increase from the $69 billion you requested for
OCO in last year's budget. So, tell me, did the cost of
supporting our overseas operations suddenly increase by 140
percent last year?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, they did not.
Senator Warren. They did not. Okay. In fact, the last time
OCO account was even close to the amount you've proposed for
next year was in 2010, when we had approximately 100,000 troops
deployed in Afghanistan and another 50 to 100,000 troops in
Iraq. Today, we have about 21,000 troops in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Syria, combined, a number that's largely unchanged from
last year. So, let me ask another question. Since last year,
has the Department deployed a large number of troops to fight a
war someplace other than Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan?
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, no, we have not.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, the actual cost of supporting
operations overseas did not increase by 140 percent, and we
haven't launched a war someplace else, triggering that kind of
emergency. Yet, you're asking for $165 billion for, quote,
``overseas contingency operations.'' I just want to be
absolutely clear so the taxpayer understands. You're requesting
funding in OCO to fund activities that have nothing to do with
the reason that OCO was established. Is that correct?
Secretary Shanahan. What we've done this year is, we've
taken our base budget from last year, per the Chairman's
blueprint, grown our budget 3 percent in real growth.
Senator Warren. Okay. I appreciate it. But, you can just
answer my question.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Warren. That is----
Secretary Shanahan. The----
Senator Warren. You're requesting funding in OCO to fund
activities that have nothing to do with the reason that OCO was
established. Is that right?
Secretary Norquist. So, Senator, to make it transparent, if
you go through the budget material, we've got it in two groups.
One is what you think of as traditional OCO, and the other is
clearly labeled ``OCO for base.'' That's the distinction
you're----
Senator Warren. So, I----
Secretary Norquist.--looking for.
Senator Warren. You can call it whatever you want. We know
why OCO was established. My question is, Are you asking for
this increase for the reasons that OCO was originally
established? It's an easy question.
Secretary Shanahan. No----
Senator Warren. Secretary Shanahan?
Secretary Shanahan. No, we're asking for a $750 billion top
line, and we want to work with this Committee to get the
appropriation and authorizations proper.
Senator Warren. You're asking for an increase in OCO for
purposes that OCO was not established. In fact, your own staff
said so yesterday. They said you're asking at least for $98
billion for things that have nothing to do with contingency
operations. I'm not quite sure why you can't say that.
What we're really talking about here is the establishment
of a slush fund to hide what's happening with defense spending
and get it out from underneath the statutory caps. I think it's
time to stop this business of more, more, more----
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Warren.--for the military.
Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
Senator Warren. Establishing a slush fund like this, and
saying, ``Oh, because we put it in two different accounts''----
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Warren.--somehow changes the fact is just not true.
We just need to be honest with the American people about how
much we're spending here.
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, we have provided, in our
justification books, 100-percent transparency. There is no
slush fund. We can take the money and tie it back to the
National Defense Strategy and what we need to defend America.
Senator Warren. I have----
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator----
Senator Warren.--no doubt that you see this----
Chairman Inhofe.--Warren.
Senator Warren.--is more, more, more.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Let me start by saying that--first, a note just about Fort
Leonard Wood. I'm looking forward to seeing the budget
justification books next week so we can see the details here
about the budget, itself. I'm anticipating it will include an
increase for the Army's Chemical School at Fort Leonard Wood,
in Missouri, my home State. These are professional soldiers, of
course, who train and respond to an adversary's use of chemical
weapons on the battlefield. Four of the five threats, I'm
struck, called out in the National Defense Strategy have a
chemical weapons capability. By investing in places like Fort
Leonard Wood, we ultimately, of course, save lives on the
battlefield. So, I'm very proud of the work that they do, and
look forward the Department's continuing support for their
important mission.
Let me just shift and ask about our challenge in emerging
technologies, cyber, and space; in particular, China's
investment in those areas, and our eroding advantage. I was
struck, Mr. Secretary, by a comment that you make in your
written testimony. You say, ``Some U.S. companies have voiced
ethical qualms about working with DOD to develop advanced
technology. In some cases, even terminating relationships,
often while continuing to work with China.'' What are we
talking about, here?
Secretary Shanahan. I think we're talking about Google and
their support to China, and their lack of support to the
Department of Defense.
Senator Hawley. So, Google has refused to work with the
Department of Defense, actually was under contract, weren't
they, with the Department of Defense? Tell us about that.
Secretary Shanahan. Well, they haven't refused, they just
have said they're not going to continue to do business with the
Department of Defense on certain contracts.
Senator Hawley. But, they are doing business in China in a
way that benefits, you're saying, our Chinese competitors.
Secretary Shanahan. Correct.
Senator Hawley. Say more about that.
Secretary Shanahan. Well, the interesting thing--and this
is why China is--this is such an important issue for our
country. You have this--the fusion of commercial business with
military is significant, $5 trillion of their economy is state-
owned enterprises, so the technology that is developed in the
civil world transfers to the military world. It's a direct
pipeline. Not only is there a transfer, there's also systemic
theft of U.S. technology that also facilitates even faster
development of emerging technology.
Senator Hawley. So, I just want to make sure that I
understand exactly what you're saying. You're telling me that
Google, an American company, supposedly, is refusing to work
with the Department of Defense, but is doing work with China,
in China, in a way that at least indirectly benefits the
Chinese Government. Is that correct?
Secretary Shanahan. I haven't heard the word ``refuse,''
but there's a lack of willingness to support DOD programs.
Senator Hawley. General, you're nodding your head. Do you
want to weigh in on this?
General Dunford. No, Senator. I'm nodding a head on exactly
the point that you made, that the work that Google is doing in
China is indirectly benefiting the Chinese military. I've been
very public on this issue, as well. In fact, the way I
described it to our industry partners is, ``Look, we're the
good guys, and the values that we represent, in the system that
we represent, is the one that will allow, and has allowed, you
to thrive.'' That's the way I've characterized it. So, I was
just nodding that what the Secretary was articulating is the
general sense of all of us as leaders. We watch with great
concern when industry partners work in China, knowing that
there is that indirect benefit. Frankly, indirect may be not a
full characterization of the way it really is. It's more of a
direct benefit to the Chinese military.
Senator Hawley. I just want to underscore this for the
record so that we are absolutely, perfectly, 100-percent clear,
here, that Google, an American company based in this country--
again, supposedly an American company--is doing work in China
that directly or indirectly benefits the Chinese Government at
a time of increased peer competition with this country. We are
in a struggle with the Chinese Government over whether or not
they're going to become a regional, and maybe global, hegemon
with values very different from ours, certainly values that do
not favor freedom in the world, and we have an American company
that does not want to do work with our Defense Department,
which is, you know, one thing, but they are happy to help the
Chinese, at least--the Chinese Government, that is--the Chinese
military--at least indirectly. I think that's just
extraordinary.
In my time remaining, Mr. Secretary, tell us what, from
your perspective, we need to do to maintain our competitive
advantage on AI and these emerging technologies. What do we
need to see, going forward?
Secretary Shanahan. We need to--well, two things. One, we
need to continue to invest. This year's budget doubles our
investment in artificial intelligence. Then the string that
you're really pulling on, the talent is in this country. We
need to use the talent in this country. The talent in this
country needs to support our great-power competition.
Senator Hawley. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shanahan, I'd like to follow up with the line of
questioning from my colleague from Arizona, Senator McSally.
You know, I think there's no doubt we'll continue to see
tensions in North Korea, on the Korean Peninsula, after the
latest breakdown in talks between the President and Chairman
Kim. How do you plan to use your position as Acting Secretary
of Defense to reassure our allies in the region? We know our
great friends, the Republic of Korea and Japan, have a much
more tense and complicated relationship with each other. For
example, there were questions about them sharing non-combatant
evacuation plans (NEO) plans with one another. What do you plan
to do to work on bridging that gap?
Secretary Shanahan. Thank you for that question, Senator.
That gap could be bridged at--well, I'll say, at three
different levels. There's a relationship level. I have
relationships with the Defense Minister for Japan as well as
the Republic of Korea. So, it's important that I play a role in
keeping the two countries together there. Exercises that we'll
do together. Technology that we'll develop together,
particularly in the area of missile defense. As you well know,
a sizable investment by the government of Japan is to put Aegis
Ashore as well as develop other, I'll say, defensive
capabilities in the event of an escalating situation on the
Peninsula.
Senator Duckworth. So, you had answered Senator McSally,
saying that there would be--not be any degradation of our
relationship and readiness as it pertains to military
exercises. But, are you changing the nature of those exercises
to, for example, simply being tabletop exercises or just
computer exercises, as opposed to how they've been conducted in
the past?
General Dunford. Senator, if you don't mind me taking that
question.
Senator Duckworth. Yes, of course.
General Dunford. The way I would describe it--and you're
quite familiar with this--what we have changed--and I want to
be clear--is, we've changed the method of training to focus on
the mission-essential tasks that each of the levels of command
needs to be proficient in. What we haven't changed is the
outcome and the readiness to fight tonight. So, the way you
characterize it is, in part, true, that some of our large-scale
exercises are done, now, with simulation Command Post Exercise
(CPX) and so forth. What's really important to highlight is
that, at the battalion and the squadron level and below,
there's been no changes to training and the ability of our men
and women on the Peninsula to train in the integration of
combined arms. We've made adjustments to our large-scale
exercises. What we've done is--very quickly, I'll just try to
highlight--we've shifted from certifying our readiness, based
on the conduct of an exercise, to a much more complex system,
that General Abrams and Admiral Davidson have developed, which
identified all the mission-essential tasks for every level of
command in making sure that we have a proven method of
developing proficiency.
Another thing I can assure you is that, as soon as General
Abrams and Admiral Davidson have any concerns about their
ability to maintain readiness--and right now we're executing
their plan--they know that they come right back to the
Secretary and I, and we will work with the Koreans to make
adjustments. But, I can assure you, from a military perspective
right now, I am quite confident in our 2019 training plan, and
confident that that will deliver the level of readiness that we
have historically done--accomplished in large-scale exercises.
Senator Duckworth. So, you're saying that, for brigade and
below, or battalion and below, there's no change as far as the
leaders that see what's happening?
General Dunford. That is correct. That's an important
point, Senator. That is correct.
Senator Duckworth. So, above brigade, that's where the
changes----
General Dunford. That's where the----
Senator Duckworth.--have taken place.
General Dunford.--changes are. In some cases, it's dialing
down the volume of the exercises. As you know well, those
exercises had two purposes; one was deterrence, one was
proficiency. I'm confident right now that our exercise program
does deliver the latter, proficiency in our mission-essential
tasks.
Senator Duckworth. Have those exercises taken into account
the role of logistics in sustaining any type of a fight that we
would have to engage in? I do think that we focus on what's
happening on the Peninsula, but sustaining that fight long-term
and then getting whatever we need, resources, there is a real
challenge. The Pacific--I don't think people realize how vast
the Pacific Ocean is.
General Dunford. Right.
Senator Duckworth. Can you speak a little bit to the
logistical challenges?
General Dunford. Senator, I can. In fact, this past year,
we did what we call a Korea Readiness Review, and we played out
the first 60 days of a Korean conflict, to include the detailed
logistics planning that was necessary to support operations for
the first 60 days. We, needless to say, learned a lot during
that exercise, but our exercises absolutely include the
logistics factors associated with our ability to conduct
operations.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
Our National Defense Strategy outlines a shift in primary
focus from countering violent extremism to great-power
competition. As Acting Secretary, Mr. Shanahan, what's,
specifically, do you plan to do in areas perhaps less obviously
impacted by either of these priorities? For example, SOUTHCOM
or AFRICOM.
Secretary Shanahan. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM are critical, in
terms of defeating ISIS, dealing with regional threats. The
Chairman, in his role as the integrated global campaign
planner, we make sure that the risk in those areas, and the
resources required to manage, are properly delivered, both to
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, to all of you, for your service and for your candor
today.
Now, as I listened to Senator Fischer talk about and ask
about nuclear modernization, I wanted to follow up on that.
Then I heard Senator Blackburn talk about Space Force, and I
wanted to follow up on that. So, I'm going to try to combine
the two as quickly as I can, because I think there are some
similarities.
I'll start with you, Secretary Shanahan. You know, many of
the critics of nuclear modernization imply or state
emphatically that we can't afford that, that it's unaffordable,
that, in fact, we have to choose, in essence, between nuclear
or conventional modernization. Yet, as I look at the budget,
historically, and as I look at the budget, going forward, I
see, for the most part, a peaking of modernization costs for
the nuclear force at under 6 and a half percent in year 2029.
Can we afford not to do it? I mean, it seems to me that that's
a pretty efficient use of deterrence dollars, and I would just
like to hear you elaborate a little bit on whether we can
afford it.
Secretary Shanahan. I'll ask David to talk about the
affordability, but, as our competitors are building up their
nuclear capabilities--this is setting aside budget--as our
competitors are building up their nuclear capability, or
modernizing, we should not unilaterally disarm. I think we have
to start there.
Terms of timing of the budget, David, maybe you could speak
to that.
Secretary Norquist. Sir, the--Senator, the numbers you used
are correct. The peak is about 6 and a half percent. When you
realize that in--normal maintenance runs 3 percent. Right?
That's--that increase, for the amount of peace and stability
that that deterrent provides us against what is probably the
most catastrophic threat we can face, I think is a reasonable
and sound approach, and something that you'd want to be very
careful about changing, because of the stability that it
provides globally and for the safety of the American people.
Senator Cramer. Okay. So, then let's move to space, because
I think I have a similar line of questioning as it relates to
the affordability of it. I understand concerns. I could--it's
easy to see why somebody that has a particular system within
the Air Force might feel threatened by a competing--you know,
competing for limited dollars. Secretary Shanahan, I think
you've referenced it, at least to some degree, and I'd like to
have you elaborate even a little more on the efficiencies that
can be found. Clearly, space is a realm that we're competing
in. Clearly, you're--we need to probably ramp up some of our
capabilities there. As you pointed out earlier, you know, we
need--we don't--we can't pick our parents. The resiliency isn't
what it needs to be. Yet, maybe you could speak to--and maybe
this would be a good one for the Comptroller, as well--to the
efficiencies that will be found in the process of creating a
Space Force as a sixth branch.
Secretary Shanahan. I think, on the efficiency side--and
I've had conversations with Senator Reed on this subject, and
many in Congress are experts in this area--we can't build a
bureaucracy. In standing up the Space Force, we have a chance
to build it from the bottom up. I think we'll build a
bureaucracy if we build it from the top down. So, it's an
opportunity to build it correctly.
The biggest effort needs to be at retiring the risk. We're
too vulnerable, and, you know, it's a little bit like the
nuclear conversation. I actually think it's going to cost us
less. I mean, we've--I've had lots of arguments about whether
that's true or not. I think, in--at the end of the day--I mean,
what we hear quite a bit is, ``This is change versus the status
quo.'' This is a fundamental structural change. But, in that
structural change, we'll get after reducing our vulnerability,
and I really believe, the end of the day, have more capability
and more money, terms of, we won't have spent as much.
Senator Cramer. Well, and maybe speak a little bit to the
realigning of existing space programs as part of that
efficiency, if that makes sense.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. No, absolutely.
The--you know, when we talk about standing up a new
service--this is a very small service. You know, you think
about 15,000 to, you know, 18,000 people, so it's really not
about a large group being consolidated. This is really talking
about, How do you consolidate development efforts within the
Department? So, how do we take what's being done--you know, the
Army's going to undertake a brand-new modernization program.
How do we combine that with work going on in the Air Force,
with what's going on in the Navy, and then integrate it into
all the combatant commands? This is really about doing it at a
DOD level. These are, like, once-in-a-generation opportunities.
Since we must address the contested environment, and we're
going to make significant changes, why not do it at an
integrated level for the Department instead of, you know, in
each service?
Senator Cramer. Well, your answers were as efficient as I
expect the Space Force to be. Thank you very much.
Secretary Shanahan. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
The Minority Leader had a question, and has a scheduling
problem, so let's go ahead and recognize him----
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe.--and then we'll get to the rest of them,
if that's acceptable.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're very
gracious. I appreciate it.
I'm trying to clarify the debate that Senator King
initiated about projects at risk. I'm going to take the really,
really dangerous path for a social scientist to try to break it
down into simple numbers, particularly dealing with an engineer
and a numbers person. Bear with me.
Let's say X equals the authorized MILCON for the last 5
years. That's the universe. Y equals the unobligated MILCON
projects after September 30th of this year. X minus Y, or Z,
equals those projects that are at risk of being captured for
the wall, with some limited exceptions. No public housing, et
cetera. You know what that Z is right now. You have the list.
Is that correct, Mr. Shanahan? You have the ability to create
the list.
Secretary Shanahan. Let me make sure I understand what Z
is. I'm going to look at my friend, here.
Senator Reed. Okay.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Shanahan. So, Z is----
Senator Reed. Z----
Secretary Shanahan. We know what that universe of projects
is.
Secretary Norquist. The--if the question is, What is the
universe of either unobligated projects or unobligated projects
after a certain date? Those are things that can be generated,
yes.
Senator Reed. Exactly. Those projects, with the exceptions
you've mentioned--family housing and some others--are all
subject to being taken away to fund this wall. They might not
all be taken, but they are the projects at risk, correct?
Secretary Shanahan. That's the pool.
Senator Reed. I would like that list today, Mr. Secretary.
[The information referred to follows:]
See Appendix A on page 560.
Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. So, we'll be waiting. I'll be--my fingers----
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Reed.--and we'll have that list. So we'll--everyone
will know is at--what project they have to worry about----
Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
Senator Reed.--going forward.
Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
Senator Reed. Is that it?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Thank you for the clarification.
Senator Reed. That's a deal?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. That's a deal.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Can I assume that there are
congressionally appropriated fiscal year 2019 projects that
received military construction funding that are going to be in
that list?
Secretary Norquist. Because of 5-year monies, yes.
Senator Heinrich. Yeah. I can't tell you, Mr. Chairman, how
inappropriate I think that is. Congress has the power of the
purse. This is wrong. This is abusive. We should do something
about it, all of us, because I guarantee you, if you let this
happen, it will happen under the next President and the next
President, and you won't always like how this money gets spent.
Acting Secretary, how much do you know about PFAS?
Secretary Shanahan. Well, I understand the nature of the
chemical. So, when we talk about it being a fire retardant and
being used over--extensively and militarily and commercially,
and the issue of it being in the water supply.
Senator Heinrich. So, have you had a chance to read the
article in The New York Times this morning with the headline,
``Pentagon Pushes for Weaker Standards on Chemicals
Contaminating Drinking Water''?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, I haven't had a----
Senator Heinrich. Okay.
Secretary Shanahan.--chance to read the paper.
Senator Heinrich. I would ask that you read that.
Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
Senator Heinrich. I hope it's highly inaccurate.
Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
Senator Heinrich. The second clause in the first sentence
says that the Pentagon is pushing the Trump administration to
adopt a weaker standard for groundwater pollution.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Heinrich. Are you aware of any conversations going
on in the Pentagon that would push for a standard that was not
set by the best-available science?
Secretary Shanahan. Right. I--I'm not aware of any
conversation. I shared with Senator Shaheen that I would follow
up with her, also, on this matter after I have a chance to
investigate. I'll do the same with you.
Senator Heinrich. I would deeply appreciate that.
The right way to do this is to follow the science.
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Heinrich. The right way to do this is not to set a
standard based on trying to limit liability.
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Heinrich. I know that there is--we're going to have
a big pricetag attached to this. There is no question about
that. But, we're also going to have a very big human cost
associated with this. I'll just give you one example.
Highland Dairy Farm was forced to close its doors in New
Mexico after 25 years. That's a local business. For months,
because of this contamination, they had to dump 12,000 to
15,000 gallons of milk per day. That's enough to give a carton
at lunch to 240,000 kids. That is one example of how this is
impacting the communities that have been enthusiastic about
hosting our Air Force and other military establishments.
We are going to need to get in front of this. I don't think
it has received adequate attention from the Pentagon. So, I
look forward to working with you on that. But, we're at the
front end of this, and there's going to be a lot of work that's
going to have to go into trying to make this right for these
communities.
I very much agree that our competitors are rapidly fielding
new capabilities in the space domain, and that we need to move
with a greater sense of urgency. I welcome the increased
prioritization the Department has put on this area, and your
focus on that. In terms of R&D as we stand up a Space
Development Agency, one of the things I want to make sure we're
not doing is reorganizing the existing pieces or reinventing
the wheel. Things like the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the
Space Vehicles Directorate, the Advanced Systems Directorate,
and many others, all are--play a critical role in researching,
developing, and fielding our Nation's space systems. So, I
would just urge you, as you look at that, and urge Secretary
Wilson, Dr. Fred Kennedy, Dr. Mike Griffin, all to fully
utilize the existing R&D assets as you stand up SDA so that
we're not losing a few years of reorganization to make the
whole system work better.
If you have any thoughts on that, I'd love to hear them.
Secretary Shanahan. No, I--when I think of the Space
Development Agency, what I don't want it to be is a
reorganization. The number-one element of the Space Development
Agency that we need to take advantage of is large-scale systems
engineering. How do we put together a national team so that we
can do this at scale? There is incredible technology in the Air
Force. We don't lack for talent. That is not our issue. We
don't lack for money. The architecture that's required to be
able to do this quickly so that we don't have to do it three or
four times is really the problem we have to get after.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today, and for the service
provided to this country, and, to all those behind you, for
their service, as well.
You know, as we approach these hearings, we hear a lot
about the threat assessments and our nuclear capabilities and
our hardware. Often, we overlook, sometimes, the very human
element of this. As you probably are aware, this Committee's
had a couple of hearings about some serious--I think, very
serious ongoing health and safety problems with privatized
housing on our military bases. Some of those have occurred in
my State, at Maxwell Air Force Base and at Fort Rucker. I did
not notice any language in either of your statements on this
particular topic. Not surprising. I'm not criticizing that.
But, I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on these
issues and whether or not any of these issues are going to be
resolved through the budget that you're proposing this year.
I'll ask the--Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford----
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. So, maybe I'll just start out
with--it's an embarrassment where we are, so I'm not going to
defend anything. It's a leadership failure. Once we get past
that, it's, What are we going to do about it? I've had
considerable interactions with the service secretaries, and
they've assured me, for the time being, they'd like to run with
the lead to address the problem. But, the conversations I've
had with them are like this, ``It's okay if we identify the
problem. Let's make sure we put the resources that are required
to be responsive in place.'' That's what I intend to follow up
on. The second piece is, we can't fall into this hole again.
What is the enduring issue? But, for the families that are in
these--the servicemembers and their families, we need to
rapidly address the problem. Let's make sure the resources are
put in place.
Senator Jones. General?
General Dunford. Senator, first, I agree with the
characterization of the problem, the Secretary's comments about
the sense of embarrassment about the conditions that we found
recently in family housing. The Secretary talked about it from
a resource perspective. I can assure you that the leadership in
the Department has gripped this issue, and the services have
done things, like make sure that a leader goes and visits each
and every individual's home so that we have a personal hands-on
view of the conditions under which our men and women are
living.
When the Secretary talks about a leadership challenge, it's
very simple what happened. We contracted out for family
housing, some years ago, and a gap grew between leadership and
the contractor. That should not be the case. Leadership should
be decisively engaged in the overseeing of those contracts,
and, more importantly, should be decisively engaged in the
challenges that our men and women have in family housing.
So, there is a resource issue that you spoke about, there
is a human element to it, which is the men and women in those
houses, but there's also the important leadership point that
the Secretary mentioned, and that is, making sure that our
leaders are, in fact, decisively engaged in all aspects of our
men and women's lives; in particular, the housing.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you both.
The resources--I'm assuming you're talking about our
military and the various leaders on the bases getting to the
bottom of this and trying to correct it. But, I'm hoping that
the resources to actually correct these problems are going to
be borne by these companies who are making the profits.
Secretary Shanahan. That's my concern, is--we'll identify
the issues, and then we'll say we'll fix them, and it'll take
too long. We need to fix them quickly. If it means getting
extra resources, these companies, they need to find a way to do
that.
Senator Jones. All right. Thank you. There's nothing in the
budget, though, that we--that we're looking at to budget to
actually fix the resources, as opposed to first looking to the
contractors. Is that--would that be fair?
Secretary Norquist. We are, first, looking to the
contractors to do it. We have resources in the budget, should
the Committee want to address additional things, but the
contractors are the one responsible for delivering the service
at the rate they were funded.
Senator Jones. All right, great.
Secretary Shanahan, I'm really interested in additional
funding in the budget for hypersonics and directed-energy
programs. A lot of that work is going on in my State, up in
Huntsville. Are you anticipating any new programs or more
funding for existing programs in those areas?
Secretary Shanahan. Well, this budget has a sizable
increase in hypersonics, and then we continue to double down on
directed energy. Most of the focus in directed energy is to get
a form factor so we can operationally deploy these concepts.
But, you'll continue to see more and more funding going towards
these technologies.
Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the time.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
General Dunford, thank you so much for being here, and
thanks for dropping by and chatting with us the other day at my
office.
Let me ask you about LHAs and LPDs. There's pressure to
build a fleet better able to face Chinese and Russian precision
missiles. The Navy, therefore, appears to be reducing its
investment in warships, like LPDs, big-deck amphibs, and
aircraft carriers, to free up money for more offensive weaponry
on smaller surface ships, submarines, and aircraft.
Additionally, moving the build of the new amphibious ships into
the future would likely delay the Navy's ability to reach its
goal of 38 amphibious ships from the current level of 32.
General, does the Marine Corps still have a stated need for
38 amphibious ships, as indicated in the Navy's force-structure
assessment? How many amphibs do we have in the inventory today?
Do you foresee eliminating Marine Corps core mission of
amphibious operations at any point in the near future?
General Dunford. Senator, the requirement you identified,
of 38, is still the requirement. I went back, after our
conversation, to just check to make sure what the facts were.
The requirement is 38. The 355-ship program of record that was
submitted last year, I think they're working minor adjustments,
but there's still a cardinal direction of the Navy. The issue
with the amphib ships inside of this program was an issue of
sequencing. They--the Navy put a higher priority on other
platforms during this period of time, but did not walk away
from the requirement or the long-term plan to have those ships
in place.
Senator Wicker. Now, in terms of facing the Chinese and
Russian threat, just inform the public, through the mechanism
of this hearing, how the amphibs fit into that.
General Dunford. Senator, it's critical for us to be able
to project power in the context of China, and to seize--one of
the traditional missions of the Marine Corps is seizing
advanced naval bases. If you look at the island chains and so
forth in the Pacific as platforms from which we can project
power, that would be a--an historical mission the Marine Corps
has, and one that is very relevant in the China scenario.
Senator Wicker. Projecting power with marines being
transported by these amphibs.
General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Right.
Secretary Shanahan, last year Congress appropriated
considerable funds toward both LHA-9 and LPD-31, yet those two
ships were not funded in this year's budget request. We just
heard General Dunford's answer. So, why did the Department
withhold funding for LHA-9 and LPD-31 in this year's budget? If
both these ships are going to be built at some point, wouldn't
you agree that we should fund them in the most cost-effective
manner? Were both the Navy and Marine Corps in agreement with
this decision to delay funding of the LHA-9 and LPD-31?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Senator, what I recall, in the
development of the plan, there was a--it was a sequencing, not
a requirement, issue, in terms of--General, you know the--in
terms of the--providing the availability. Yeah.
General Dunford. You know, Senator, the issue--when they
looked at all the money that was available to the Navy, and
they looked at the shipbuilding plan, they prioritized other
platforms within this program over those two amphibious ships,
and they moved those two amphibious ships outside the program
without adjusting the requirement.
Senator Wicker. Okay. So, the requirement's there, but the
sub-part of my question about the efficiency of building them
in the most cost-effective and efficient manner, would you--
either of you care to comment on that? Wouldn't it make sense
to do it in the most efficient manner?
Secretary Shanahan. It would.
Senator Wicker. What has been proposed is not necessarily
that, is it?
Secretary Shanahan. I can't speak to the specific----
Senator Wicker. Could you, General Dunford?
General Dunford. Not with regard to what the difference
would be in the cost of the ship or the efficiency within the
program, as opposed to outside the program. I can't talk to
that, Senator. But, we can get back to you on that specific
question.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Dunford. This was answered directly with Senator
Wicker's MLA on 18 March via phone call with CDR Hagerty,
OCJCS/LA.
Senator Wicker. Okay.
Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator--yeah, Senator Manchin. I believe--yeah, he was
here first. Yeah. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you. I'm so sorry. We get--sometimes we get
shortchanged here and we have to go to different meetings. I'm
handling an Energy meeting now. But, I just wanted to thank you
all so much.
So, Secretary Shanahan, as you know, State-owned National
Guard facilities that cause PFAS contamination do not have
access to defense environmental restoration dollars like Active
Duty bases do. Senator Gillibrand had a situation similar to
what I had in Martinsburg. I think you're familiar with both of
those. So, I think my question would be--National Guard units
use the same firefighting foam that the Active components use.
The training is often the same. It makes no sense for the
National Guard to not have access to these dollars. So, would
you be supportive of a similar amendment this year if we could
get access to them?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes, I would.
Senator Manchin. Okay. You've been brought up to speed on
that.
Secretary Shanahan. I'm not totally up to speed on that
particular----
Senator Manchin. We'd love to--if we could--you tell us who
to designate in your--on your staff, and we'd love to bring you
up to speed, because it would be very helpful, because it's
really been detrimental to the community.
The President's budget request is something I wanted to go
over. A combination of emergency funds as well as other budget
shell games. You gave us an $8.6 billion--I think you all might
have touched on this. What we're looking at is a holistic
approach of how we're able to secure our border and, really,
the immigration challenges we have. Do you all know how many of
the--maybe you have this--as far as the DACA--some DACA
children that are involved in military, do you have any idea?
It would be helpful to us if we could find out how many of
these young people are participating in defending our country
that are asking to be considered as being available to be a
citizen of our country. I think it would be quite appropriate
for us to be able to know that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Shanahan. Based on security concerns, the
Department of Defense (DOD) discontinued the MAVNI Pilot
Program in 2016. However, DOD has continued to access existing
MAVNI recruits already in the pipeline determined to be ``vital
to the national interest'' for military service. Under MAVNI
there were approximately 834 Deferred Action Childhood Arrival
(DACA) recipients recruited.
Senator Manchin. Again, a big thing with me, when Senator--
God rest his soul--Senator McCain was here, is the audit. You
might have touched on this, and my question might have been
asked. If there's something on the audit that you can give me
an update on where we are and what your intentions are and how
we can get a complete audit of the Department of Defense, would
be very, very, very helpful.
Secretary Norquist. Senator, I'm always happy to give an
update on the audit for you.
Senator Manchin. Okay.
Secretary Norquist. So, we've started the second. We've
completed the first-year audit. We received over 2,300
findings. We have corrective action plans that each of the
services are developing to address those. The major areas of
focus this year are, particularly, inventory, information
technology, and real property. Those services will be executing
those. The auditors have already started the second audit. They
don't wait. They come right back and begin the next year.
They'll be testing the progress on those and we'll--I think we
do twice-a-year updates to the Committee staff, and we expect
the reports to be completed and delivered to us, on the second-
year audit, on November 15th.
Senator Manchin. The other thing I need to know and have
more information, whoever would be responsible for, is the
procurement, how we are--the procurements we handle, the
changes that have been made in procuring, you know, all the
different types of anecdotes and jokes have been made about how
we buy things and what we pay for things, and things of that
sort. I'd like to be able to go back to the citizens of West
Virginia and say that we are investing the money properly. They
have total support--they have given total support for the
military. They want to make sure that we're using the resources
in the most prudent way.
Secretary Shanahan. Senator, we'd be happy to put together
for you to be able to share: here's how we've been saving
money, here's where we've been saving money, here are our plans
to save even more.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Shanahan. The Department has identified $7.7 billion
within five areas of business operations to include: contract
management, healthcare management, acquisition, information technology
and business systems, and logistics and supply chain management. Reform
efforts within the Department's five areas of business operations are
focused on delivering optimized enterprise business operations to
assure the success of the National Defense Strategy. Reform results
(savings and investments) have been aligned to six reform levers and
discretely accounted for within the budget. These levers are: better
alignment of resources, business process improvements, business system
improvements, divestments, policy reforms, and weapons system
acquisition. The attached table is a summary of the $7.7 billion
savings accounted for in fiscal year 2020, by reform lever.
Senator Manchin. The other thing, Secretary Shanahan, is on
the F-15X, if you could explain to me a little bit about that.
If the experts in air combat in the Air Force identify a need
for the F-15X, then what does OSD know that the Air Force
doesn't about the future threat environment?
Secretary Shanahan. Oh, yeah, let me address that. So, my
responsibility in pulling together the budget is to make sure
we identify what are the threats and campaigns that we need to
structure, develop, do force design and force development. The
services, the joint staff, and the cost assessment and
performance evaluation organizations then do the analysis. So,
I can ask the Chairman on what the recommendation, in terms of
mix of tactical aircraft.
General Dunford. Senator, I spoke at length with the Chief
of Staff of the Air Force and others on this issue. So, I can
give you the framework for making the decision.
Senator Manchin. Sure.
General Dunford. First, the primary aircraft of the future
for the Air Force is the F-35. They're not walking back off
that program or the importance of the F-35 program. But, as
they looked over the next several years, they had two problems.
They had, one, capability represented by the fifth-generation
aircraft, the F-35, and then they had capacity issue, both
numbers of aircraft plus the amount of ordnance that could be
carried by those aircraft. Then they had the F-15C, which was
aging out in the 2027-2028 period. So, within the next 5 or 10
years, the best solution was to go to the F-15--it's called
EX--platform to backfill the F-15. Eventually, we'll get to an
all-F-35 program. But, from both a cost perspective and a
capacity perspective, this particular mix of aircraft, for the
near term, was determined to be the right mix of aircraft. So,
again, not walking off the fifth generation, but the near term,
need that combination of a fourth generation and a fifth
generation to generate capacity. I would add that the F-15X is
slightly less expensive from--for procurement than the F-35,
but it's more than 50 percent cheaper to operate over time, and
it has twice as many hours, in terms of how long it lasts.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, to the witnesses, for your testimony and
service.
I was late to the hearing today because Secretary Esper
asked me to accompany him to Fort Belvoir to visit with
military families about the housing issues. I've got to tell
you, I did a visit on Norfolk Naval Base last Friday, so my
expectations were pretty darn low, but I'm just stunned after
talking to these families. The physical condition of their
units--mold, water damage; poor, shoddy construction; poor,
shoddy repairs--the lack of responsiveness, that they can't get
response from the housing companies, that they're told, when
they go to chain of command, ``We don't do this anymore. We
don't have any responsibility,'' that, when they do get a
response, the quality of the repair work done both by the
maintenance connected with the companies or contractors they
come up with is atrocious.
But, then what I really heard about today was the number of
people who are getting sick. Hospitalizations, families being
forced to move out of units for significant amount of time as
their units are being repaired so that they can be habitable,
carbon monoxide, CO2 monitors going off, and people being told,
``It's fine, you can move back in,'' but not being told what
was wrong that was causing there to be CO2. A 10-year-old girl,
mother just told me this at--within the last hour, missed 45
days of school last year--that's one-quarter of the school
year--because of respiratory problems caused by mold in the
unit.
I know that you're focused on this, but I just got to say,
as the father of a marine, as somebody who is in a State that's
heavily military, it was just absolutely depressing, the
physical conditions. We've got to have both housing companies
that will improve and a military that will fix. I have been
pointing out, nobody enlisted to be a tenant of Lincoln
housing. They enlisted to be a marine or an airman or -woman,
or a solider or a sailor. So, it's the military that's got to
fix it.
I want to focus on the emergency issue. Secretary Shanahan,
my reading of title 10, section 2808, is that the President can
continue to use unobligated MILCON dollars for the duration of
the emergency. So, having declared an emergency, unless
Congress rebuts that, as long as the President says they're in
an emergency, we basically are put--tapping the spigot into the
MILCON budget for this budget year and future budget years
until the emergency is declared over. Is that your
understanding of the section?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, my understanding is, as long a
there's a declaration of emergency, that is an authority that
goes along with the declaration.
Senator Kaine. So, I just want to make plain to everybody
what we're voting on this afternoon. We're voting on an
emergency declaration that, until this President says there's
not an emergency, it is a spigot tapped into the MILCON budget
that can allow not only 2019 funds, but 2020 funds, 2021,
future funds, to be pulled out of the MILCON budget, at the
President's discretion--in my view, counter to the
appropriations powers of Congress.
Secretary Shanahan, I wrote you a letter on February 15
asking you for information about MILCON projects--unobligated
MILCON projects that could be affected by the President's
emergency declaration. My understanding is, the Committee staff
has been repeatedly in contact with your office on the same
thing. I was not here, but I understand that you committed to
Senator Reed that you will get him that list today. Is that
correct?
Secretary Shanahan. That is correct.
Senator Kaine. Okay. I got to tell you, I feel completely
sandbagged.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. The service secretaries have had that list.
They've had the list. The service secretaries have been willing
to share the list of their unobligated MILCON projects. So,
you're going to send it to us today, after the vote on the
emergency declaration?
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. Members of the Senate are entitled to know
from where these MILCON monies will be pulled.
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Kaine. The fact that you come here today and say
you'll now give it to us, right after the vote this afternoon?
Your service secretaries and chiefs have had these lists, and,
when we've asked them to send them to the Committee, they've
said, ``We can't, without the permission of the SECDEF.'' So,
were they only available in the last half-hour?
Secretary Shanahan. No, the--well, first of all, Senator, I
think the situation is being misrepresented. There has not been
a deliberate attempt to withhold any information to this
Committee.
Senator Kaine. Let me state this to you. The staff has been
reaching out to the service secretaries and saying, ``Send us
the list of unobligated MILCON projects.''
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Kaine. They have been told that they cannot do
that----
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Kaine.--it has to come through the OSD.
Secretary Shanahan. Right. Right.
Senator Kaine. You're now going to produce that list today,
after we have a vote at 1:45? This information is highly
relevant to the Senators who are voting on this emergency
declaration, because the question is, Should a President be
able to declare a nonmilitary emergency--that's the what the
military has testified--and then ransack the Pentagon budget
for $6.1 billion? I think we're entitled to know where the
money might come from, especially since you've just said this
is a multiyear declaration that opens up a spigot into the
MILCON budget. I don't think you giving us that list today,
after the vote----
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Kaine.--when we've been asking for it for a month,
is a good-faith response to the requests of this Committee.
Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
Senator Kaine. Now, tell me if I'm misrepresenting what's
going on.
Secretary Shanahan. Throughout this process of the
emergency declaration--and I just have to say, this is not
something we do every day--from the very start, we have worked
to be 100-percent transparent with Congress. 100 percent.
Senator Kaine. I agree you don't do an emergency
declaration every day, but, every day, you have a list of
unobligated MILCON projects, don't you?
Secretary Shanahan. Well, I think the list--we've always
had a list of--that's how we keep book--I mean, it's not like
we don't have a list of projects.
Senator Kaine. But, why wouldn't you--why wouldn't you--why
wouldn't your services share those with the Committee----
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator Kaine.--after continuing requests from the
Committee?
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine, your time is long expired.
I know the passion that you feel right now, but we are
adjourned.
Senator King. Chairman, I had a couple of follow up
questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, I know you did.
Senator King. Are we adjourned?
Chairman Inhofe. You know, I have to say this about Senator
King. I say this in front of all my--well, they're gone now. Of
all the members, Democrat and Republican, you are the one who
has been the most responsible, you've been to every single
meeting. No one else can say that. I--even though it would be a
violation of what we're going to do, if you want to have--I'll
withdraw that just long enough for you to do one question. Only
because it's you. Got it?
[Laughter.]
Senator King. All right. One comment and one question.
The comment is, I want to complement Mr. Norquist for the
work that he's done. I failed to do that before. Doing--working
through the audit process for the Defense Department is a
herculean task, and you were--embarked on it well and truly,
and I compliment you on that. I qualify that a little bit by
the invention of the phrase today ``OCO for base.'' That's like
``rabbit for bicycle.'' I mean, those two things aren't really
consistent.
My followup question, Mr. Secretary. Based upon all this
discussion--and I'm honestly confused. My father used to say,
``You--the Pentagon is the only building in America you can
drive straight toward and it keeps getting further away.''
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I feel a little bit like that today.
Is it your testimony that 2019 military construction
projects that were authorized and appropriated for are off the
table, or are they only off the table if they're obligated
before September 30th?
Secretary Shanahan. Right.
Senator King. Fairly straightforward question.
Mr. Norquist, perhaps you can answer.
Secretary Norquist. Senator, it's the award day. What we
are looking at in prioritizing is contracts that award later.
So, if you----
Senator King. So, if a--there's a project in the 2019 bill
that hasn't been awarded, it's on the--it's potentially on the
chopping block. Is that correct?
Secretary Norquist. That is correct.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
cybercom and nsa ``dual hat'' relationship
1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Shanahan, what are your views about
maintaining or ending the ``dual hat'' relationship whereby the
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command also serves as the director of the
National Security Agency?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department is not at a decision point.
Because of recent election-related operations and the publication of
the new DOD Cyber Strategy, I deferred making a recommendation to the
President in order to ensure operational lessons learned are accounted
for and incorporated into the decision calculus.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
space development agency
2. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, how will the Space
Development Agency perform better than other currently established
organizations?
Secretary Shanahan. Our adversaries are developing and deploying
threats against our legacy space systems faster than we can field new
capabilities. I established the Space Development Agency (SDA) as an
expressly threat-driven organization, intended to define and create the
Department's comprehensive next-generation space architecture. SDA will
not wait for a validated requirement; instead, the agency will work
closely with the warfighter and intelligence communities to quickly
identify and evaluate existing and emerging threats, then proceed to
design, build, and launch an ensemble of space-based capabilities to
address those threats in less than 24 months. To meet such a compressed
development schedule, the SDA will heavily leverage commercial space
technologies and systems (i.e., satellites, payloads, ground control
hardware and software, and user equipment). Additional tranches of
capability will follow on 24-month upgrade cycles. This approach to
rapid, agile acquisition has not been attempted on an architectural
scale and will only be achievable by partnering with, and drawing from,
the burgeoning commercial space sector.
3. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, what special authorities or
exemptions will the Space Development Agency use that other space
acquisition organizations cannot also be provided?
Secretary Shanahan. The Director, Space Development Agency (SDA)
has the delegated authority to act the SDA's Senior Procurement
Executive; is designated the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE)
including exercise of Middle Tier Acquisition authority; has the
authority to enter into transactions other than contracts, cooperative
agreements, and grants carrying out basic, applied, and advanced
research projects as well as certain prototype projects; will exercise
available special hiring authorities including direct hire via limited-
term appointments for highly qualified experts (HQE) and non-
competitive short-term hires; will exercise approval authority over
assignment of military personnel selected for duty at SDA, rate such
personnel, and approve their rating chains; and will exercise original
classification authority. While these authorities can and should be
provided to other agencies (to enhance their operational tempo), the
SDA is unique in that it was established explicitly to build out the
next-generation national security space architecture, rapidly and
efficiently. SDA will work to leverage commercially-derived
capabilities (e.g., launch services, user radios and antennas, mass-
produced satellites and payloads) to disincentive risk aversion and
incorporate innovative upgrades in every generation of new capability.
Legacy organizations have operated in a risk-averse environment for
decades, and their policies reflect this. Starting a new organization,
with a culture dedicated to speed, will drive the development of new
tools on far shorter timelines than would otherwise be possible.
4. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, how does the Space
Development Agency prevent duplication of effort amongst organizations?
Secretary Shanahan. Space Development Agency (SDA) will work with
its partner organizations to ensure that its development efforts are
complementary to their work and not duplicative. SDA will be laser-
focused on building a comprehensive, next-generation space architecture
that addresses the DOD's Space Vision, comprised of eight essential
capabilities described in the Department's August 2018 Report on
Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space
Components of the Department of Defense. These capabilities include:
1. Persistent global surveillance for advanced missile
targeting,
2. Indications, warning, targeting, and tracking for defense
against advanced missile threats,
3. Alternate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) for a
GPS-denied environment,
4. Global and near-real time space situational awareness,
5. Development of deterrent capability,
6. Responsive, resilient, common ground-based space support
infrastructure (e.g., ground stations and launch capability),
7. Cross-domain, networked, node-independent battle management
command, control, and communications (BMC3), including nuclear command,
control, and communications (NC3), and
8. Highly-scaled, low-latency, persistent, artificial-
intelligence-enabled global surveillance.
These are critical, unmet capabilities. Were we to apply historical
practices and procedures, acquiring and fielding space systems to
address these capabilities might require a decade or more, during which
time our adversaries will have developed and deployed new
countermeasures against those systems. We no longer have the luxury to
respond on timelines of this length. SDA will work to develop a unified
architecture comprised of legacy capabilities (servicing primarily
validated requirements) as well as an agile, responsive, next-
generation architecture intended to pivot as necessary to meet new
threats as they arise. This will greatly facilitate our ability to
conduct future military operations against peer competitors at campaign
scale.
5. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, has the DOD Cost Analysis
and Program Evaluation office completed their analyses on whether
projected Space Development Agency projects will be better than current
plans?
Secretary Shanahan. Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has
completed its analysis of Space Development Agency (SDA) projects
funded in Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget Request. CAPE is
analyzing SDA's proposed further projects as part of its broader review
of the Department's portfolio of future space capabilities. This review
will complete this summer, and the results will inform the fiscal year
2021 President's Budget Request.
6. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, who will establish the
priorities of the Space Development Agency?
Secretary Shanahan. Currently, priorities for the Space Development
Agency (SDA) will be established and executed by Director, SDA. These
priorities will be informed by the Space Development Executive Board
(SDEB) for SDA-related strategic policy, plans, program priorities, and
investment areas and by the SDA Warfighter Council (WFC) on current and
assessed multi-domain threats to national security for which next-
generation space capabilities that would support the joint fight and on
architectural vulnerabilities and potential adversarial attack
surfaces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
camp lejeune recovery
7. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how much risk are we
assuming by delaying and under resourcing recovery at Camp Lejeune and
Cherry Point?
Secretary Shanahan. The operational and training impacts from the
initial hurricane damage remain. Projects to repair or replace damaged
headquarters facilities, railroad tracks, beach erosion, and roadways
have been planned and designed. Since there is limited funding, most
facilities scheduled for repair have been dried out, cleaned, and
temporarily re-roofed. Trailers have been provided to house personnel
that were displaced from the severely damaged buildings that could no
longer be occupied. With the 2019 hurricane season starting June 1, the
current conditions of many of the buildings on both bases creates high
risk. Temporary repairs--such as tarps and plastic sheathing--will not
withstand hurricane force winds and rains created throughout the
upcoming seasonal change. Similarly, the temporary trailers are also
not fabricated for these conditions.
8. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how long is it going to take
to rebuild those bases?
Secretary Shanahan. If funded, repair and replacement construction
projects will take approximately three years to fully complete.
9. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, at the start of this
hurricane season on June 1st, will our facilities and assets there be
particularly vulnerable due to the state of reconstruction?
Secretary Shanahan. The buildings that were damaged during
Hurricane Florence and were temporarily repaired (e.g. those that
received a tarp roof) will be the most vulnerable to further damage.
Additionally, Camp Lejeune's Onslow Beach and the roadways and railroad
trestles could be further degraded.
10. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how long are we going to
have to wait until Camp Lejeune regains baseline functionality?
Secretary Shanahan. In order to regain full functionality, all
buildings and infrastructure will need to be either repaired or
replaced. Once funding is provided, it will take approximately three
years to fully complete.
camp lejeune resiliency
11. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how vulnerable are our
Marine Corps facilities and assets in North Carolina to another
disaster such as Hurricane Florence of Hurricane Matthew?
Secretary Shanahan. Most of the newer buildings were not
significantly damaged during Hurricane Florence. Where possible, we are
designing the repair projects to include these new standards and
building materials in order to maximize resilience. Removing and
replacing asphalt shingle roofs with standing seam metal roofs will be
a main design change. The more durable metal roofs last longer and are
able to withstand hurricane force winds and rain.
12. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, what needs to be done to
ensure that those installations are survivable and resilient in the
future?
Secretary Shanahan. In addition to improving design standards and
selecting the most durable building materials, as noted above, it is
also important to fund preventive maintenance and select the best site
to prevent flooding and seismic damage. These important factors are
combined with the Commandant's Infrastructure Reset strategy, which
reduces the facilities footprint and optimizes the resources necessary
to ensure our installations remain a key enabler to generating and
sustaining combat readiness.
As a matter of course, the Department's resilience initiatives
address risks from its ``all hazards'' approach, allowing our
installations to support critical missions regardless of the threat,
including weather, climate, natural events, or direct attack (either
physical or cyber). While climate is often the focus, the reality is
our installations must be resilient in the face of a variety of threats
and conditions. The Department views these threats to installations
holistically and responds with a balanced approach. The Department
considers resilience throughout the installation planning and basing
processes. This includes consideration of resilience risks in
installation master planning, training and exercises, management of
natural resources, design and construction standards, utility systems/
service, emergency management operations, and supporting analytical
tools. DOD is including the forecasts for rising sea levels in planning
future flood zones and elevations along coastal installations, as well
as developing a tool for forecasting changes to major precipitation for
inland areas.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
vulnerable installations--climate change
13. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, the Department ignored a
requirement in law for each service to submit their top ten list of
most vulnerable installations to climate-related events, required by
section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA. Despite the Commandant of the
Marine Corps testifying to this Committee that Camp Lejeune will need
billions of dollars to rebuild in the wake of Hurricane Florence, the
section 335 report that was submitted failed to even mention the Marine
Corps once. It also ignored the billions of dollars likely required to
rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base. Do you commit to sending us the top ten
lists that were required by section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA
within a week?
Secretary Shanahan. The top ten list of most vulnerable mission
assurance priority installations per Military Department is attached.
The Marine Corps has no installations on the Mission Assurance Priority
Installation list for reasons that we can share with Congress on a
classified basis.
General Dunford. I defer to OUSD (A-S) to provide the appropriate
response to this question.
osd personnel caps
Section 143 of title 10, United States Code, limits the number of
military, civilian, and detailed personnel supporting the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to 3,767. According to the report produced
by the National Defense Strategy Commission, ``Civilian voices have
been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and
national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian
control.''
14. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, in your assessment, has the
personnel cap on OSD constrained the ability of your office to execute
its required responsibilities, including those mandated by Congress?
Secretary Shanahan. Secretary Shanahan, the Department is executing
its required responsibilities within the personnel caps set forth in 10
USC 143. The manpower limit does constrain the ability to address new
missions and emerging / expanding requirements in the future.
15. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, would a revision of this
personnel cap facilitate more effective management and oversight of the
Department of Defense?
Secretary Shanahan. The elimination of headquarters manpower caps
in lieu of a more appropriate single constraint (e.g., cost limit)
would greatly improve the flexibility of the Department to manage the
total workforce. The policy of the Department, in line with 10 USC 129
and 129a, is to manage our workforce to requirement and cost. The
constraints imposed by military and civilian limits inadvertently
drives solutions toward contract support which may not be appropriate
or the most cost effective solution. Additionally, any constraining
provision would need to be adjusted periodically to account for
emerging statutory or high priority requirements. However, the most
pressing constraints for Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD)
manpower are the cost limits imposed by section 346(b) of the fiscal
year 2016 NDAA (for fiscal year 2020) and section 931 of the fiscal
year 2019 NDAA (for fiscal year 2021) and the contract support limit
imposed by section 865 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA (for all fiscal
years through fiscal year 2023). These cost limits on OSD are impacting
our ability to address new missions and emerging/expanding
requirements.''
16. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, are there specific OSD
responsibilities that would benefit from an upward adjustment of the
OSD personnel cap? If so, please provide some examples.
Secretary Shanahan. Yes, there are several emerging requirements
that could benefit from an upward adjustment. The Department recently
added resources to the Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) for
establishment of the Secretariat for Special Operations (SSO)
(supporting the Assistant Secreary of Defense (Special Operations &
Low-Intensity Conflict)'s oversight of United States Special Operations
Command), realignment of the Defense Innovation Unit to the USD(R&E),
Military Health System Transformation, establishment of the Personnel
Vetting Transformation Office (PVTO), and establishment of the Joint
Artificial Intelligence Center (among other increases). While these
additions are being managed under the statutory caps (both manpower and
cost), it is coming at a cost to other high priority areas in OSD
because of the need to direct cuts to keep under the limits.
17. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, what other civilian personnel
constraints would you recommend Congress reevaluate so to allow the
Department greater flexibility to recruit, retain, and manage its
civilian workforce more effectively?
Secretary Shanahan. I appreciate Congress' recognition of the
Department of Defense's need for increased flexibilities to attract,
hire, and retain its civilian workforce. The multitude of stand-alone
civilian hiring and pay authorities granted by Congress has been
effective; however, the Department seeks to implement a civilian
personnel system that is simple and streamlined to improve our ability
to focus on strategic workforce needs and efficiently acquire and
retain the right talent. I recommend Congress consider streamlining
existing authorities to reduce complexity and grant additional
flexibility to enable the Department to respond rapidly to meet
emerging mission needs with proven hiring and pay methodologies.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
russian election interference
18. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, is the
Department of Defense looking at potential Russian interference in the
upcoming election in Ukraine and the European Union as a sign of new
innovative techniques they may use toward the United States elections?
Secretary Shanahan. As part of the ``defend forward'' concept
elaborated in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy, the Department of Defense is
paying close attention to democratic elections overseas to monitor for
new techniques that adversaries might utilize in future U.S. elections.
The Department is also working closely with a number of partners and
allies to learn lessons from recent elections, to improve partner's
abilities to defend their own networks, and to conduct combined
Defensive Cyber Operations on partner networks.
General Dunford. [Deleted.]
kc-46
19. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan, General Dunford and
Secretary Norquist, earlier this month, I asked General Lyons,
commander of TRANSCOM, about the delivery delays of the KC-46 and he
expressed concerns about the additional costs to maintain at least 28
KC-135's beyond their currently scheduled retirement. Do you share
General Lyons' concerns about the additional cost these delays will
have on the Air Force?
General Dunford. Any additional cost incurred to maintain legacy
tanker aircraft beyond their planned retirement dates is concerning.
The KC-46A delivery schedule and the Air Force's planned legacy tanker
aircraft retirement dates are coordinated to provide the joint force
with sufficient tanker aircraft capability and capacity throughout the
transition time.
Secretary Shanahan. and Secretary Norquist. Yes. The Department is
concerned about any additional costs that may be incurred to maintain
the legacy tanker aircraft beyond their planned retirement dates. This
includes both the KC-10 aircraft as well as the KC-135 aircraft. The
KC-46A remains a key Departmental acquisition program and delivery of
these aircraft is critical to ensure timely retirements of the legacy
fleet. The Department plans to retire KC-10 aircraft beginning in 2020
with the KC-135 aircraft beginning in 2022 and we will continue to
review the transition from legacy aircraft to KC-46 in order to
minimize the need to sustain legacy platforms.
pfas contamination
20. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan, has is the Department of
Defense advocated for interim actively pursuing groundwater clean-up
recommendations for perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) or
perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) standards substantially higher than
those suggested by the Environmental Protection Agency as suggested by
The New York Times article published on March 14? Does the Department
of Defense support groundwater cleanup recommendations for PFOA and
PFOS higher than EPA's lifetime health advisory levels for these two
chemicals? What is the contamination concentration the Department of
Defense believes to be appropriate to trigger groundwater cleanup and
remediation of PFOA and PFOS? Is it the position of the Department of
Defense that concentration levels of PFOA and PFOS should be counted
separately when determining whether cleanup of these two chemicals
should begin?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD) supports the
use of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act's (CERCLA) long-established, risk-based approach to
determine when groundwater cleanup is needed. Using the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) risk assessment process supporting this
statute, the unacceptable risk to human health for cleanup of
groundwater with perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and
perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) is approximately 380 parts per trillion
(ppt). DOD uses EPA's risk assessment guidance to determine whether to
add the concentrations of PFOS and PFOA together to determine CERCLA
responsibilities. Additionally, there is a Lifetime Health Advisory
(LHA) of 70 ppt for PFOS and PFOA. The LHA applies to drinking water,
but also considers all PFOS/PFOA exposures over a lifetime. Therefore,
the LHA is not a cleanup level.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
ethics
21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, have you ever discussed
any Boeing matters while serving as Deputy Secretary, or Acting
Secretary of Defense?
Secretary Shanahan. I have recused myself for the duration of my
service in the Department of Defense from participating personally and
substantially in matters in which the Boeing Company is a party. I have
provided written guidance to my staff, which is posted on a public
website (https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID/Proactive-Disclosures/), to
ensure my staff identifies matters involving Boeing. My staff and I
consult with and follow the advice of ethics counsel. I remain
committed to abiding by the letter and spirit of my ethics agreement,
and my previous promises to this Committee.
22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, have you ever discussed
the advantages of Boeing products, or disparage Boeing competitors
during your time at the Pentagon?
Secretary Shanahan. I have recused myself for the duration of my
service in the Department of Defense from participating personally and
substantially in matters in which the Boeing Company is a party. I have
provided written guidance to my staff, which is posted on a public
website (https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID/Proactive-Disclosures/), to
ensure my staff identifies matters involving Boeing. My staff and I
consult with and follow the advice of ethics counsel. I remain
committed to abiding by the letter and spirit of my ethics agreement,
and my previous promises to this Committee.
president trump properties
23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how much money has DOD
spent at Trump properties since the inauguration?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense has spent a total of
$147,607.38 at Trump-branded properties since the inauguration. These
were all government travel credit card purchases by individual
employees and members of the military. It is not Department of Defense
policy to recommend that its personnel patronize any particular hotel
or restaurant. Individual travelers are largely free market players in
choosing these services. Individual travelers are personally
responsible for paying the amounts due on their government travel
credit cards and are provided a per diem lodging allotment and a meals
and incidentals expense allotment with which to make these payments.
24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how much money has DOD
spent on military aircraft flights for the President to travel to Mar-
a-Lago and other Trump properties?
Secretary Shanahan. The costs, flying hours and sorties associated
with operating the presidential airplane for President Trump are
comparable to what the program has spent every year for the past 5
years. Air Force financial management does not track the cost of each
trip the President makes and cannot break out trips to Trump properties
versus other presidential trips. The attached spreadsheet details costs
per flying hour and sorties associated with the presidential aircraft
for each calendar year since 2014.
Costs, Flying Hours, and Sorties for Presidential Aircraft
25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, since 2016, have you
personally spent any money at any Trump properties? Have any of your
family members stayed at any Trump hotels?
Secretary Shanahan. I am not immediately aware of any family
business transactions at Trump hotels, but I am confident my financial
disclosures are all in accordance with Office of Government Ethics'
regulations and standards of ethical conduct.
answering to president trump
26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as Acting Secretary of
Defense, do you feel that you are accountable to the President of the
United States, or to the American people?
Secretary Shanahan. As Acting Secretary of Defense, I serve the
American people as the principal assistant to the President in all
matters relating to the Department of Defense and am subject to the
direction of the President in accordance with the law.
27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, Attorney General
Sessions and Secretary of State Tillerson were both fired for not
following the wishes of the President when doing so would run counter
to departmental policy or law. Do you commit to following the law, and
upholding the Constitution, even if doing so would result in your
dismissal?
Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as you are well aware,
Secretary Mattis resigned in a letter to Trump that expressed his
personal disagreement with President Trump's policies. How would you
respond if you are given an order that you felt was not in the best
interests of American national security or military personnel?
Secretary Shanahan. I will endeavor to provide the President the
best advice I can on all matters pertaining to the Department in
accordance with the law.
press access and retaliation against reporters
29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how often do you think
is appropriate for the Pentagon to host a press conference? How often
should the Secretary of Defense address the media?
Secretary Shanahan. I believe it is our duty to provide timely and
accurate information to the American people, and I am committed to
ensuring the Department regularly engages with the press. In addition
to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who
speaks with members of the press daily in both formal and informal
settings, the Department of Defense has a team of public affairs
professionals who are subject matter experts on their portfolios. The
media have direct access to this team and they are available to the
media on a daily basis, including nights, weekends, and holidays. As
issues arrive, I address the media with timely information, and I
frequently engage with the press during my regular activities as well
as on official trips.
30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, do you commit to
ensuring that media outlets will have full access to the Pentagon?
Secretary Shanahan. In keeping with the First Amendment, I am
committed to ensuring that media outlets have and will continue to be
granted full access to the Pentagon. Unlike many government agencies,
the Department of Defense provides media representatives with
unescorted access to our headquarters. We continue to issue Pentagon
press badges that authorize such access, and our press corps has 24-
hour access to our team of public affairs professionals. We respond to
queries posed by members of the press from around the world on a daily
basis. In addition, we continue to develop and publish transcripts for
all public events such as briefings, honor cordons, and other open-
press events involving our senior leaders. Media representatives are
invited to travel with our leadership, including myself, within
logistical limits. This includes my recent trip to the U.S. Central
Command Area of Responsibility. Procedures for media access to the
Pentagon remain the same as previous years. More information can be
found on defense.gov via this direct link: https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/For-the-Media/
31. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, do you commit to
preventing any retaliation against reporters who publish unfavorable
stories?
Secretary Shanahan. My team and I am committed to preventing any
forms of retaliation against reporters.
32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, if you do discover that
press access is being restricted, and reporters are facing retaliation,
what steps will you take to remedy this activity?
Secretary Shanahan. There have been no press restrictions put in
place at the Pentagon and that will not change under my leadership. My
team and I are committed to upholding this promise.
f-35
33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, why does this budget
request cut the Marine Corps F-35Bs?
Secretary Shanahan. In its President's Budget (PB) for Fiscal Year
2020 submission, the Marine Corps chose to rebalance its aviation
portfolio, deferring several F-35B aircraft into future Low Rate
Initial Production contracts in order to balance concurrency management
while taking advantage of emerging future technologies. The Marine
Corps increased its procurement of F-35Cs over the Future Years Defense
Program to 28 F-35Cs (up from 19 F-35s in PB19) to ensure the service
would be able to transition its F-35C squadrons on schedule. This
decision provides the Marine Corps flexibility as it continues to
determine the best mix of tactical aircraft as operational requirements
develop and change.
34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, I understand the budget
request also includes 8 fourth generation F-15X aircraft in fiscal year
2020, and a total of 80 F-15X jets in the Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP) over the next 5 years. Who directed the investment in F-15X, and
when was this decision made? Please elaborate on the reasoning for this
decision.
Secretary Shanahan. The decision to include investment in F-15EX
was the result of deliberations between the Air Force, Joints Chiefs,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the annual Program
and Budget Review. Several studies and analysis dating from 2017 and
2018 have identified an enduring need for the capability and capacity
that fourth generation aircraft provide across the range of military
operations. Similar to the Department of the Navy's continued
investment in the F/A-18E Super Hornet, the United States Air Force has
an enduring need for the improved capability of the F-15EX above the
baseline F-15's. One added factor in the decision was that for the F-
15EX, the Operations and Sustainment costs are significantly less than
that of a fifth generation aircraft.
35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, does your current plan
to purchase F-15EX's effect DOD's previous validate requirement for
2,456 F-35s? If the validate requirement remains unchanged, please
explain how purchasing additional F-15EX's could result in a cost
savings?
Secretary Shanahan. Procuring F-15EX does not affect the F-35
program requirement. Even with the full F-35 program, we have an
emerging capacity shortfall due to an aging 4th Gen fleet. The F-35
will replace aging F-16 and A-10 aircraft as planned. The F-15EX is the
most cost-effective way to replace aging F-15C/D and close the capacity
shortfall because 4th Gen aircraft are cheaper to operate in missions
that do not require 5th Gen aircraft.
uss harry truman retirement and navy interests
36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, what are the risks of
retiring the USS Truman early and reducing our naval carrier fleet from
11 to 10?
Secretary Shanahan. Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA)
increased the requirement from 11 CVNs to 12 CVNs to meet the increased
warfighting response requirements of the Defense Planning Guidance
Defeat/Deny force sizing direction. CVN 75 is planned for retirement to
pursue a more lethal balance of high-end, survivable platforms (e.g.
CVNs) and complementary capabilities from emerging technologies.
Operationally, CVN 75's accelerated retirement is projected to be
balanced with these accelerated portfolio options of distributed
effects.
Persistent threat analysis and ongoing warfighting studies will
continue to inform the requirements for specific battle force ships in
the context of an evolving capability force mix, and the Navy is
postured to respond to these studies. Reducing the naval carrier fleet
without the complementary capabilities could result in reduced
presence, a delayed warfighting response, and/or inability to deter a
second opportunistic aggressor if engaged in a major combat operation.
37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, are you concerned that
our near peer competitors--most notably China--may attempt to exploit
our near-term carrier capability gap?
Secretary Shanahan. I do not foresee a gap in carrier capability or
capacity. CVN 75 is currently scheduled for retirement in fiscal year
(FY) 2024 and the Navy will maintain its capacity of 11 carriers until
then. The $3.4 billion in savings from the decision to cancel the CVN
75 refueling and comprehensive overhaul (RCOH) will be invested to
pursue a more lethal balance of high-end, survivable platforms
(including CVNs) and complementary capabilities leveraging emerging
technologies. Operationally, CVN 75's accelerated retirement is
projected to be offset by this portfolio of accelerated capability
options. If these future force capabilities cannot be developed at a
pace to mitigate the retirement of a carrier in fiscal year 2024, then
we will revisit the decision and adjust accordingly.
38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, if this decision was
made to increase investment, why does this year's budget request for
Science & Technology (S&T) remain stagnant?
Secretary Shanahan. While Navy Science & Technology account
increased only by 1.2 percent from fiscal year 2019, most of the
cutting-edge investments to improve naval lethality are part of either
the Navy RDT&E account, which increased by 9.4 percent, or Procurement
which increased by 7.8 percent. Within that context, the Truman
decision, along with a two-carrier buy, provided funds to heavily
invest in future diversified strike options. Those National Defense
Strategy-driven decisions represent a conscious paradigm shift in naval
force structure procurement for more advanced and distributed naval
strike options to increase lethality and maneuver. To reach that goal,
the Department increased investments in advanced strike options,
including $3.6 billion in large, offensively-armed unmanned surface
vessels; $1 billion in extra-large and large unmanned underwater
vehicles; and $3.5 billion in advanced long range offensive and
defensive munitions.
39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, does the President's
budget require any additional resources to effectively address the
submarine maintenance backlog? What additional funding or authorities
may be necessary to get this timeline back on track? Will the Navy
continue to award submarine maintenance availabilities to the private
sector in order to alleviate these delays?
Secretary Shanahan. As described in the Chief of Naval Operations'
Fiscal Year 2020 Unfunded Priorities List, a number of requirements
have emerged since the President's Budget was formulated. First among
these is $653 million needed for submarine maintenance ($290 million
for USS Boise, $306 million for USS Hartford, and $57 million for USS
Columbus).
The Navy will continue to consider both the public and private
industrial base when scheduling the maintenance and modernization of
its ships and submarines, however no further authorities are needed at
this time to address the submarine maintenance backlog. The Navy is
committed to working with the private shipbuilders to improve private
sector cost and schedule as these are key to the Navy's ability to
outsource future work. The Navy is reviewing contracting strategies,
scheduling tools and better ways to share lessons learned from the
public shipyards with private industry to improve private shipyard
performance. The current plan is to award two SSN 688 class Engineered
Overhauls in the next two fiscal years to the private sector to help
reach the goal of eliminating submarine idle time by 2023.
civilian control of dod
40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as Acting Secretary,
what actions have you taken to ensure DOD is upholding the principle of
civilian control? In your view, has DOD fully addressed the
Commission's concerns regarding the erosion of civilian control?
Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have
exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight
responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and
planning. Civilian oversight of the military will continue to be
vigorously exercised throughout the Office of the Secretary of Defense
as long as I am the Acting Secretary of Defense.
41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, the Commission's report
highlights the importance of civilian participation in discussions
regarding force management and the prioritization of global challenges.
What efforts have you made to identify and address instances where
civilian voices were absent from critical discussions pertaining to
national security strategy development and implementation--particularly
in regards to global force management?
Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have
exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight
responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and
planning. In particular, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Staff work closely together to implement National Defense
Strategy priorities; civilian voices are a key component of this
implementation in global force management.
42. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, what has DOD leadership
done to ensure civilian employees feel empowered to fulfill their
responsibilities?
Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have
exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight
responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and
planning. I expect all Department of Defense civilian leaders to
exercise these responsibilities on a daily basis.
43. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, in November, the
Commission testified that civilian personnel vacancies were a
contributing factor to the imbalance of civilian control. What are you
doing to recruit and retain civilian personnel? What is the current
vacancy rate?
Secretary Shanahan. I am confident in the civilian leaders we have
in the Department of Defense and am proud to serve with them. The White
House Personnel Office handles civilian nominations for the Department
of Defense. My office provides recommendations to the White House to
fill vacancies, but ultimately, key leader personnel decisions reside
in the White House.
44. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, in your view, what are
the long-term consequences of eroding civilian control of the military?
How does an imbalance of civilian and military perspectives impact
national security policy, and frame defense advice provided to the
President?
Secretary Shanahan. If civilian control of the military was eroding
it would have my full attention, but I do not share the perception of
this erosion. The Department has been and is civilian-led and under
that statutory organizational model, I enjoy a close working
relationship with all levels of military command.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
indo-pacific alliances and partnerships
45. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, in your written testimony you
stated that the intended effect of China's efforts to deny access to
the East and South China Seas is to weaken our alliance structure in
the Indo-Pacific. Based on that, what is the current state of our
alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, specifically the
military-to-military relationships?
General Dunford. Senator, in an update to the last 12 months,
overall I assess China's behavior in the East and South China Seas has
actually strengthened alliances and partnerships in the region. For
some of the littoral states, China's militarization of the South China
Sea and its challenges in the East China Sea have actually produced the
opposite of China's intended effect--bringing the threat ``closer to
home'' and hence the stronger mil-mil ties with the United States as a
counterweight. However, those countries which have significant
political and economic ties with China still have to tread carefully to
maintain those interests.
46. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, how resilient are our allies
and partners in the face of China's economic and military growth?
General Dunford. Senator, each of our allies and partners has their
own sovereign decision and interest vis-a-vis China, and each has
varying levels of economic and military capability and capacity to
resist Chinese coercive influence. While some are better positioned
economically and militarily, we cannot take their resilience for
granted because China is actively pulling economic and military levers
to negatively tip the scale towards their favor--interfering in allies
and partners' domestic national choices. One-Belt One-Road is but one
example of this economic-security fusion. We must offer stronger
incentives across all elements of national power, but especially in the
economic realm, to effectively bolster and complement the security
support we provide to allies and partners to resist China's increased
influence. We have to help allies and partners resist this infringement
on their sovereignty and the abuse of the global norms. One example is
strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Defense
Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Over the last
year, we have seen that countries across the region are becoming more
aware of the threat Beijing's economic policies pose. Malaysia
announced the cancellation of three projects worth $22 billion in
August 2018, declaring that it could not afford Beijing's projects,
decrying the corrupt practices associated with the projects, and
criticizing the loans as a ``new version of colonialism.''
47. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, what is the U.S. doing to
support our allies and partners in the region to bolster our alliance
structure?
General Dunford. Senator, we have been, and will continue to resist
coercive behavior and publically condemn maligned activities by all
actors. Our allies and partners are encouraged by U.S. willingness to
``have skin in the game''--that is by sharing mutual risks, our
commitment to support international laws and norms, and our willingness
to speak out against destabilizing behavior. At the strategic level,
the most effective action we can do to support allies and partners is
to let them know that the United States military is combat credible and
is here to stay in the Indo-Pacific. These efforts have provided our
allies and partners the space to push back against this oppressive
influence. At the operational level it is to enhance our
interoperability throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Expanding our
interoperability will ensure our respective defense enterprises can
work together effectively during day-to-day competition, crisis, and
conflict--if it is imposed upon us. Increasing interoperability also
includes ensuring our military hardware and software is able to more
easily integrate with those of our closest allies and partners,
offering financing and sales of cutting-edge U.S. defense equipment to
security partners, and opening up the aperture of United States
professional military education to more Indo-Pacific military officers.
As such, we have strengthened our alliances with Australia, Japan, the
ROK, and the Philippines, while maintaining our long-standing alliance
with Thailand. These alliances are indispensable to peace and security
in the region and our investments in them will continue to pay
dividends far into the future.
military housing and child care
48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Shanahan, as you are aware, there was
recently a tragedy in Hawaii where a 7-month old child passed away at
what appears to be an unlicensed home day care in military family
housing. While there are several investigations ongoing in that
particular case, it raises a broader policy issue. Most enlisted
servicemembers are under the age of 35 and many have families with
young children. Nothing is more nerve-wracking for a parent than having
to find safe, affordable child care for their children, especially when
moving to a new duty station. Yet as the Committee has learned during
the hearings on the privatized housing initiative and the tragedy in
Hawaii, there are far too few child care slots available in military
Child Development Centers (CDCs) for the families who need them. Many
common-sense measures such as constructing new CDCs, streamlining
hiring processes for child care workers, and increasing the
transparency of wait lists have been proposed to address this issue.
Will you commit to working with the Committee to address access to
safe, affordable child care for military families as a readiness and
retention issue?
Secretary Shanahan. We are a young force with young families and we
know that our servicemembers need to rely on safe, quality child care
in order to focus on the mission. The Department of Defense has long
been recognized as a model for child care in the United States; our
programs provide care to more than 160,000 children on a daily basis.
We fully understand that even with these numbers, many military
families are challenged in finding access to child care. Unfortunately,
there is no ``one size fits all solution'' for what is a national
challenge, not just a military challenge. My office and each of the
Military Departments are exploring a number of solutions.
49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Shanahan, does the fiscal year 2020
budget request of over $700 billion for the Defense Department include
appropriate resources to address the lack of sufficient access to this
critical service for our military families?
Secretary Shanahan. The Military Services indicate that they have
reviewed their budgets and adjusted where needed to ensure sufficient
funding for children, youth, and family programs.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
military housing
50. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
service chiefs agreed last week that there is value in having a uniform
building code for military housing. Do you agree?
Secretary Shanahan. To the maximum extent practicable, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has required uniform building codes in the
housing privatization agreements. When the Military Departments
developed their agreements with the housing privatization partners,
they required that the privatized housing adhere to DOD Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) for fire protection and housing space
standards, as well as state and local building codes (unless overridden
by DOD UFCs), in addition to installation or Military Department
specific requirements such as installation architectural standards.
General Dunford. Nothing is more important than taking care of our
members and their families and as such, I agree with the service
chiefs, there is definite value in having a uniform building code for
military housing. My staff and I will continue to work with the
services to ensure our military families receive the housing they
deserve.
hypersonics
51. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, I am
pleased to see $2.6 billion budgeted for hypersonics. Sandia National
Laboratories has played a critical role in developing this technology
over decades. I've heard from our national labs how valuable it is to
co-locate the R&D and manufacturing of these systems. Do you agree?
Secretary Shanahan. The National Labs, Government Labs, Federally-
Funded Research & Development Centers and University Associated
Research Centers have played a critical role in the development and
demonstration of foundational hypersonic concepts and technologies.
Much of the intellectual capital for the vehicle designs, and even some
of the more advanced manufacturing techniques, resides within this
government research and development ecosystem. We need to make sure
that this core intellectual horsepower continues to focus on rapidly
evolving our technology to address our most difficult challenges moving
forward. We must accelerate the rate at which we transition from
technology development and prototype demonstration to production of
weapon systems. We are creating a highly collaborative environment
between industry and government to accomplish this acceleration.
Industry is essential to being able to produce weapon systems with the
complexity and scale necessary to field warfighting capability. We must
capture essential knowledge and transfer it to industry for production
of the first generation of weapons while enabling the Labs to work on
the next generation of capability.
General Dunford. Co-location of research and development with
manufacturing could result in efficiencies when it comes to getting new
technologies into the manufacturing process. This is by no means a
requirement, with today's world of technology and data transfer
capabilities, information can be readily available in just about any
location with Internet access. Contract selection should be based on
considerations for how to develop the most effective systems, while
being good stewards of our budget. It is possible that person to person
contact can provide synergy and efficiencies that are difficult to
quantify. However, it is also possible that a location-centric approach
could increase costs over prioritizing allocation of available funding
towards R&D.
52. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, do
you think it is worth encouraging an ecosystem where the manufacturing
and the core expertise for these systems exist together?
Secretary Shanahan. I do not think that colocation of core
hypersonic technical expertise with manufacturing is necessarily the
most effective or efficient model for accelerating and sustaining the
fielding of warfighting capability enabled by hypersonics. The
expertise associated with some of the more advanced technologies may
reside within our government research and development ecosystem, but
that ecosystem is not as well suited as industry for production of
large quantities of complex weapons systems. As such I think we need to
work across our national infrastructure to optimize our path forward.
General Dunford. I am an advocate of co-locating R&D and
manufacturing facilities when it provides the warfighter an advanced
capability fielded in the shortest amount of time and is also cost
effective. There are potential areas where a geographically co-located
ecosystem could play an important role in the cost, ease of
communications and quality of the manufactured product; however, in
today's highly-connected internet-of-things world geographic
differences within the ecosystem could have less impact than they have
had in the past on collaborations between design, manufacture and
fielding activities, and are best determined on a case by case basis.
53. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
2019 Missile Defense Review acknowledged emerging threats like cruise
missiles and hypersonic weapons, but the report did not propose any new
creative solutions or acceleration of efforts to address them
defensively. Do you believe we are acting with the right sense of
urgency to counter those threats on the defensive side?
Secretary Shanahan. In fiscal year 2020, the Department is
continuing investments in Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defensive
concepts. MDA is identifying the architecture requirements necessary to
design an effective hypersonic missile defense system that can be
integrated into the current ballistic missile defense system.
Attributes of this architecture will be sensors for detection and
track, battle management, command and control systems, and weapons for
hypersonic missile intercept. The department is investing in
technologies to mature promising space and ground sensor concepts and
kinetic and non-kinetic intercept concepts through industry
engagements.
General Dunford. Yes--President's Budget 2020 is consistent with
the National Defense Strategy and the 2019 Missile Defense Review
(MDR). The Missile Defense Defeat Enhancement (MDDE) in 2018 provided
significant investment and the Department is sustaining critical near-
term layered capabilities and initial investment in studies. The MDR
directs researching improvements for timely warnings on hypersonic and
advanced cruise missiles launched at the U.S. Homeland. Future
investment recommendations will be balanced by additional insights
drawn from an MDA Defense Against Hypersonic Threats (DAHT) Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) and an MDR directed follow-on analysis. MDA's DAHT
AoA investigated a wide range of options.
54. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, does
the budget invest in those specific defensive capabilities to counter
these threats? If so, please identify them for the Committee.
Secretary Shanahan. The Missile Defense Agency Budget request for
fiscal year 2020 includes $157.4 million for Hypersonic Defense to
continue to assess architecture alternatives and provide
recommendations for future Ballistic Missile Defense System
configurations to keep pace with this threat. The budget request also
invests $38 million for advanced targets to begin testing against this
threat. The Agency is investing $116 million for Directed Energy to
include a laser scaling effort that will develop scalable, efficient
and compact high energy laser components for integration into high
power systems; and $132 million for Discrimination Sensor Demonstrator
Development to provide an airborne sensor to detect and discriminate
advanced threats. The Space Development Agency (SDA) budget includes
$20 million to foster development of a Department-wide Space Sensor
Layer effort (referred to as Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor (HBTSS)) and $30 million to do an assessment of architectures
for a discriminating space sensor and a Space Based Interceptor.
General Dunford. The Department is requesting $157.4 million in
fiscal year 2020 for hypersonic defense to move from concept
development to technology risk reduction. The fiscal year 2020 plan
includes software modifications to current BMDS assets and further
defines the architecture for future capability demonstrations. In
addition, the Department is requesting $49.8 million in fiscal year
2020 for the Space Development Agency to pursue a proliferated Low
Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellation. One goal of this constellation is to
provide the space sensor capabilities for missile warning and missile
defense.
55. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, what
specific defensive technologies and systems should the Committee be
investing in to help counter cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons?
Secretary Shanahan. Investments in space based sensor technologies;
kinetic interceptor technologies to include advanced sensor,
propulsion, material science and guidance and control technologies;
non-kinetic directed energy defeat concepts to include cyber, high
powered microwave systems, and high energy lasers; artificial
intelligence for advanced command and control in conditions of high
uncertainty, and electronic warfare will be essential technologies for
defeat of advanced cruise and hypersonic missile threats.
General Dunford. The fiscal year 2020 budget submission requests
accelerated funding ($428 million) for the Army's new Patriot radar
(Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS); rapid acquisition
Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) for near-term air and
cruise missile defense, and the restructuring of the Indirect Fire
Capability (IFC). The Navy PB2020 budget invests in SM-6 and Air and
Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The SM-6 RDT&E of $116 million budget
includes initial funding for rapidly developing a new Block 1B
interceptor to extend the range of the current system. This would
increase the SM-6 capabilities to air defense, ballistic missile
defense, and anti-ship strike. In addition, the Department is
requesting $149.8 million in fiscal year 2020 for the Space Development
Agency to pursue a proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellation.
Finally, the Department is developing a Low-Power Laser Demonstrator to
evaluate the technologies necessary for mounting a laser on an unmanned
airborne platform to track and destroy missiles in their boost phase.
artificial intelligence
56. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, part
of the challenge we are going to experience with integrating Artificial
Intelligence into mission sets is that we need a deeper foundation of
people who understand the technology and the importance of good,
useable data. Do you believe DOD recruitment efforts are doing enough
to target individuals with that kind of skill set?
Secretary Shanahan. In both our enlisted and officer corps, the
Services select and train individuals to meet future and current
manning requirements. This includes specialized programs like
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber. Officers are educated from a variety
of outstanding colleges and universities around the country through the
Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps, while others will attend the
Military Service Academies. This education provides new officers with a
solid foundation and the latest information available in these
specialized areas. The Military Services also collaborate with industry
to further develop the required skills of these officers. Our enlisted
force is selected from among the best and the brightest of today's
youth. The Military Services' selection and classification process uses
a number of tools to further identify individuals with the greatest
potential and aptitude to do well in these specialized areas. These
servicemembers are selected and trained to meet the needs of their
respective Military Service. Our civilian workforce also helps to round
out and fill the needs of the Department for such skill sets.
General Dunford. Yes. The Department is not complacent and across
the government we need to synch efforts to attract the right people.
The Services are recruiting skills sets that have the greatest
potential for understanding the Artificial Intelligence (AI)
technology. The military personnel policy changes within the 2019 NDAA
and the service academies commitment to producing future leaders with
computer science and technical education are among the many efforts the
Services are implementing to produce the right skill sets. In addition
to recruiting efforts, Services internally train enlisted personnel who
have demonstrated aptitude in cyber and other technical fields and
endeavor to retain this talent by increasing bonuses in those highly
technical areas. The Services have routinely collaborated with industry
leaders in many technical fields to build critical skills within our
current force. The civilian workforce also helps to meet Department
needs, and I defer to Civilian Personnel leaders to address how the
civilian workforce is employed.
57. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, is
there value in the services assigning someone specifically for
recruiting individuals in this area?
Secretary Shanahan. I believe each Service is best positioned to
make that determination based on its own needs and requirements. The
Military Services currently have the authority and resources to pursue
that effort.
General Dunford. Yes. There is value in assigning specific
individuals to recruit in AI. Services have seen success in using those
already in a particular field to recruit additional talent in that same
field and the Services are best positioned to determine those needs.
For example, the Navy uses nuclear trained sailors and officers to
recruit others into the field of this high demand/low density area.
Special Operations, Cyber, and Linguists have all been used to recruit
personnel within their respective areas of expertise. In this
increasingly challenging recruiting environment, we appreciate the
additional authorities granted in the NDAA as we consider initiatives
to attract and retain the right talent.
breakout of dod ai funding
58. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Norquist, the fiscal year 2020
budget request includes a $927 million investment in Artificial
Intelligence, with money directed toward the Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Advanced Image Recognition (Project
Maven). Can you please provide the breakdown on how the $927 million
will be allocated?
Secretary Norquist. The Department's total Artificial Intelligence
(AI) request is classified and can be provided under separate cover
upon request. The $927 million request highlights three major AI
efforts. The funding allocation is detailed in the table below:
59. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Norquist, one impediment to
accurately evaluating funding levels for AI is the lack of a stand-
alone AI Program Element (PE) in DOD funding tables. As a result, AI
R&D appropriations are spread throughout generally titled PEs and
incorporated into funding for larger systems with AI components. As the
lead coordinating entity for AI, do you have visibility on the
Department of Defense's total investment in AI, including Services and
components, and can you provide that breakdown to the Committee by PE
and amounts?
Secretary Norquist. The Department is working to more rigorously
identify AI funding in its databases for future budget requests. For
fiscal year 2020, the Department's data call likely captured most of
the ongoing AI efforts, but a complete report of funding by program
element is not available. While some AI efforts are large, stand-alone
projects, such as JAIC and Project MAVEN, the vast majority are
embedded in weapons and business systems. Identifying the cost of these
efforts within larger systems will always have an element of
uncertainty.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
defense funding
60. Senator Warren. General Dunford, in the course of your
testimony, you said the following with regard to defense funding: ``We
have routinely not had a budget at the beginning of the year has
delayed new starts and it's been incredibly inefficient in how we
prioritize and allocate resources throughout the year and the three
adjectives I use and I think they are all important is predictable,
sustained and adequate levels of funding and if we had the entire
fiscal year we could be the good stewards that you should hold us
accountable for being.'' With the understanding that predictability,
sustainment, and adequacy are all important, please prioritize among
those. Which one is the most important and why?
General Dunford. Predictable, sustained, and adequate funding are
interdependent variables and are equally necessary to meet NDS
priorities. All three attributes translate to budget stability, which
the Department requires to build a more lethal, resilient, agile, and
ready Joint Force. Predictable funding builds readiness and supports
effective planning--both for the military and the Industrial base.
Sustained funding ensures we can modernize and invest for the future.
Adequate funding ensures the Joint Force can balance building capacity
to ``fight tonight'' while also ensuring the ability to deter, defend,
and, if necessary, defeat future threats posed by near-peer
adversaries.
climate change
61. Senator Warren. General Dunford, the unclassified worldwide
threat assessment by the Director of National Intelligence said:
``Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate
change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic
distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond.'' That
assessment also said: ``Damage to communication, energy, and
transportation infrastructure could affect low-lying military bases,
inflict economic costs, and cause human displacement and loss of
life.'' Do you agree with the Intelligence Community's assessment?
General Dunford. Yes.
62. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that climate
change is a national security threat to the United States?
General Dunford. Climate change is a national security issue. The
effects of climate change such as shortages of water, food, or
migration can be sources of conflict.
63. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that the
Department of Defense can and should be doing more to address the
threat of climate change? Please explain.
General Dunford. The U.S. military is routinely tasked to assist
with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
64. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that the
combatant commands should incorporate climate change into their
operational plans and planning processes?
General Dunford. The joint staff and combatant commands already
take the effects of climate change into account when planning. Climate
change is one of many factors the Joint Force considers when planning
for future military operations.
65. Senator Warren. General Dunford, does adapting to climate
change have any negative impact on the readiness of our military to
address the five challenges (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and
violent extremism)?
General Dunford. Responding to any conflict or unanticipated
requirement impacts readiness and affects our ability to respond to
other challenges.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
pfoa/pfos clean up for national guard
66. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, as you know state-owned
National Guard facilities that are associated with PFAS contamination
of drinking water in their communities do not currently have access to
Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) dollars like their
Active Duty counterparts do. Last year Senator Gillibrand, who had
similar problems with National Guard facilities in her state, proposed
an amendment in the NDAA to change this and allow National Guard
facilities to utilize DERP funds instead of being forced to take from
their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. This amendment was
stripped prior to the final version of the NDAA. Obviously,
environmental cleanup is not the purpose of O&M dollars. Our national
guards units use the same firefighting foam and train the same way as
their Active Duty counterparts for ease of integration and to maximize
the effects of the total force. Would you support the passage of an
amendment proposed again this year to allow National Guard facilities
to access DERP dollars for PFAS and any associated contamination
cleanup?
Secretary Shanahan. We reviewed the authorities for use of Defense
Environmental Restoration Program funds at State Air National Guard
(ANG) facilities for remediating PFOS/PFOA. While these funds are not
available for use at State owned or operated ANG facilities for cleanup
activities, Operation & Maintenance ANG funds are being used, making a
change unnecessary. The Air Force has programmed funds in the Air
National Guard Operation & Maintenance account for the ANG to meet
their Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act responsibility.
f-15ex and f-35
67. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, in February the Secretary
of the Air Force Heather Wilson admitted that the Air Force's 2020
budget submission to the Department of Defense did not include any F-
15EX aircraft procurement. Further, she stated that the F-15EX
procurement was added by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
for the final department budget. Further, recent OSD budget briefs to
Congress have referenced results of a comprehensive study that explains
the requirement for a fourth generation fighter to fill capacity and
operational cost gaps, but they can't share much of the details due to
claims of classification. If the experts in combat aircraft and
associated force presentation, the Air Force, didn't identify a need
for the F-15EX, then what does OSD know that the Air Force doesn't
about the future threat environment or operational needs requiring the
addition of fourth generation aircraft?
Secretary Shanahan. The decision to include investment in F-15EX
was the result of deliberations between the Air Force, Joints Chiefs,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the annual Program
and Budget Review. Several studies and analysis dating from 2017 and
2018 have identified an enduring need for the capability and capacity
that fourth generation aircraft provide across the range of military
operations. Similar to the Department of the Navy's continued
investment in the F/A-18E Super Hornet, the United States Air Force has
an enduring need for the improved capability of the F-15EX. The savings
of F-15EX are not realized in the initial procurement but instead in
the Operations and Sustainment costs that are significantly less than
that of a fifth generation aircraft.
68. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the F-
15EX is a platform that is already largely un-survivable against many
near peer weapon systems. This problem will only get worse over the
expected lifespan of the F-15EX of 15-20 years. What is the long term
intent of acquiring up to 80 F-15EX aircraft that clearly do not align
with the priorities set forth in the National Defense Strategy of
competing with ever advancing technology from our biggest competitors?
Secretary Shanahan. The F-15EX aligns with many portions of the
National Defense Strategy (NDS). Specifically, the capability and
capacity that a modernized and capable 4th generation platform brings
to bear against both state and non-state actors. The NDS highlights
that even non-state actors now have access to increasingly
sophisticated weapons systems. The F-15EX has been continuously
modernized both for the United States fleet as well as over $5 billion
worth of investment by foreign partner nations that continue to procure
the aircraft today. At the opposite end of the spectrum of conflict,
there is still a requirement for fourth generation aircraft even
against a near pear competitor if it is part of an appropriate balance
of capabilities. Not all missions will require the low observability
and advanced systems of 5th generation aircraft. The decision to
procure F-15EX is directed at replacing existing legacy F-15s that are
approaching the end of their lifecycle. The age of legacy F-15s
contributes to increased O&S costs.
General Dunford. The gaps identified in the 2018 Joint Military Net
Assessment led to the Air Superiority Competitive Area Study which
outlined capability, capacity, and readiness issues. The Competitive
Area Study identified materiel and non-materiel recommendations and
investment opportunities that could increase capability and/or
capacity. One of the recommendations was F-15EX. F-15EX supports the
priorities identified in the National Defense Strategy by providing
modernized capacity, teamed with 5th gen capabilities, to contribute to
and enhance lethality and survivability in contested environments.
Short term recapitalization of the aging F-15C with F-15EX provides
increased munitions capacity, advanced sensors, and weapons
capabilities, and improved operational readiness capacity. The F-15EX
replaces the aging F-15C/D fleet which will be retired by the late
2020's.
cybersecurity and defense industrial base
69. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, West
Virginia is home to a number of companies that are a part of the
defense industrial base and we're proud of the work that they do to
ensure that our servicemen and women have the resources it needs. Our
industry partners are just as big of targets, if not more, as the DOD
for cyber theft and espionage. I'm particularly worried about our
smaller subcontractors who do not always have the capital to invest in
robust cybersecurity protection for their networks. What industry best
practices or internally developed actions are you undertaking to better
protect our industry partners who are developing defense capabilities
from being attacked?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) are true partners in addressing the needs of
cybersecurity because every aspect of software and information
technology pervades all aspects of DOD's mission (from business systems
to weapons systems, supporting infrastructure to cybersecurity to
space). Our collective responsibility is to ensure that DOD goods and
services are delivered in conjunction with a strong, unified
cybersecurity standard. We in the department see the need to create a
unified cybersecurity standard, as currently there are several. The
unified standard needs to take all of the controls called out in
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) SP 800-171.1 and
53, as well as International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
27001 and other various standards across the DOD Supply Chain. With our
industry partners we are currently evaluating how to strengthen and
unify these cybersecurity standards in the DOD Supply Chain. We believe
a comprehensive standard, as well as certification, will reduce risk
across the entire DIB. Small businesses are critical to our National
Defense Strategy (NDS) especially for innovation and specialization
within the DIB. We aim to support the unified standard with a third-
party certification process. The certification must be cost effective
enough that small businesses can achieve certification with
commercially available solution sets for those who might not have the
capital to invest to meet certification. This unified standard effort
is supportive of our efforts in regard to the SECURE Technologies Act
of 2018. That Act, among other things, establishes the Federal
Acquisition Security Council. The Department will actively participate
in that Council, which is chaired by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), to develop security standards and metrics for the entire
Federal Acquisition Supply Chain. We are doing this in an open dialogue
with all elements of the industrial base, as we need to be cognizant
that we are just partners in our DIB. This effort is currently
underway, and we will be conducting listening sessions with industry
over the next few months to chart our path forward.
General Dunford. Senator, the Department is gravely concerned over
the illicit transfer of advanced capabilities. As we continue to invest
in next generation technologies, it is critical that we protect each in
the R&D phase and beyond. Just last November, the Department stood up
the Protecting Critical Technologies Task Force which reports directly
to the Vice Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This group is
tasked with integrating, accelerating, scaling and institutionalizing
the Department's efforts to protect critical capabilities. That said,
this issue extends beyond contractors, subcontractors, and
cybersecurity. Our adversaries are acquiring U.S. critical technology
through a variety of licit and illicit means to include cyber theft,
nefarious engagement in our R&D base, investments in acquisitions, and
talent recruitment efforts. Specific to attacks on the defense
industrial base, we are raising cybersecurity standards for new and
existing contracts, moving away from a self-assessment evaluations to a
model where the Department is actually enforcing cybersecurity
compliance, and making cybersecurity part of our source selection and
program evaluation criteria Furthermore, the President's Budget
submission for fiscal year 2020 contains a request for $15 million in
fiscal year 2020 and $10 million in fiscal year 2021 for a ``DIB Cloud
Pilot''. The Department anticipates using these funds to develop a
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) effort and to conduct
a range of other supporting Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cybersecurity
pilots. The objective of the CMMC activity is to accelerate and
validate the adoption of a cybersecurity maturity model for the DIB and
further develop a framework for implementing an independent third party
certification process to assess the commercial sector against the CMMC
standards. The maturity model standards will be tiered and provide a
more cost effective approach for smaller companies by requiring them to
implement the appropriate set of controls based on the information they
need to protect. The additional DIB pilot efforts will assess the
feasibility of smaller DIB companies migrating to more cost effective
secure environments. These combined activities are intended to increase
the overall cyber hygiene of the DIB and help smaller companies better
secure their data. Finally, we are also looking at measures to increase
the integrity of the supply chain so that increased levels of
cybersecurity extend beyond the prime contractors typically associated
with DOD contracts to those subprime contractors as well.
dod budget and border security
70. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, as we have started to dig
into the President's budget request this week, there's a lot of
questions over the DOD portion being requested for border wall funding.
A combination of an emergency fund as well as other budget shell games
give us $8.6 billion in border wall funding for fiscal year 2020. Given
the briefs we've already heard from your office this week, it seems
like a lot of energy is being spent by your department to figure out
how to fund this primarily non-military requirement from the President.
This appears to be taking a large portion of both your time and staff
time to discuss and calculate. Is our attention in the Department of
Defense budget discussion adequately covering the required defense
items given the time and energy senior officials and staff have spent
on figuring out how to carve out pieces of the military budget for a
border wall?
Secretary Shanahan. Preparation of the Department's Fiscal Year
2020 President's Budget request is a comprehensive, deliberative
process involving the Department's senior leadership. The Department of
Defense fiscal year 2020 budget request provides a foundation for
transformational change and implementation of the National Defense
Strategy. Through the strategic reprioritization of resources during
the development of the budget, the Department increased investments in
specific key areas such as cyber and space warfighting domains,
capability modernization, and acceleration of emerging technologies.
The deliberate investment of time in developing this budget will better
enable us to deter and win against adversaries.
critical infrastructure and cyber security
71. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
budget we've been presented lays out $9.6 billion for DOD cyber domain
efforts to include network, infrastructure and offensive and defensive
cyber capabilities. As the Ranking Member of the Cyber Security
Subcommittee and with my work on Energy and Natural Resources I have
become deeply concerned with the vulnerabilities faced by our Nation's
critical infrastructure. How much of the Department's efforts with
these cyber security funds are directed at making sure our critical
infrastructure that is vital to the defense of this country is
protected from cyber-attacks by countries like China, North Korea,
Russia and Iran?
Secretary Shanahan. Defense of national critical infrastructure is
a key area of emphasis for the Department. This emphasis reflects the
fact that competitors are targeting these assets, and that any large-
scale disruption or degradation of national critical infrastructure,
not just Department of Defense (DOD) infrastructure, would be a
national security concern. We seek to preempt, defeat, or deter
significant malicious cyber activity targeting national critical
infrastructure by 1) defending forward to stop threats before they
reach their targets and 2) supporting the Department of Homeland
Security in fulfilling its responsibility to coordinate the overall
Federal effort to promote the security and resilience of the Nation's
critical infrastructure.
Last year, Secretary Mattis and Secretary Nielsen signed a joint
memorandum of understanding (MOU) detailing how our two departments can
cooperate in order to secure and defend the Homeland from cyber
threats. The MOU reiterates Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
primary role as the U.S. Government lead for protection of national
critical infrastructure, and emphasizes DOD's unique mission of
defending forward. These roles are mutually reinforcing; DHS's efforts
at home enable DOD to project power both in cyberspace and in the
physical domains, even as our efforts outside the Homeland help to
secure U.S. infrastructure. As part of the efforts to implement this
MOU fully, DOD and DHS senior leaders recently signed a charter
creating a Cyber Protection and Defense Steering Group. This steering
group provides us with visibility into existing areas of DOD-DHS cyber
cooperation, enabling us to synchronize our efforts more effectively.
By bringing leaders from both departments into the same working group,
we are able to collaborate better, and to ensure that our two
departments are able to address cyber threats synergistically, rather
than work at cross-purposes.
General Dunford. The Department is also deeply concerned about
protecting our Nation's critical infrastructure. Congruent with the
2017 NDAA Section 1650, we have been addressing this issue. The Joint
Staff provided a tiered list of DOD installations based on strategic
importance to global missions and OSD is actively working to conduct
evaluations of cyber vulnerabilities at these locations. We are
currently in a pilot phase of cyber assessments and hope to use these
pilots as a model to conduct full evaluations of all DOD installations
in the near future. Our budget request includes $8 million and 8
manpower positions for this purpose. Once our vulnerabilities are
identified, we will work with Congress to fund mitigations strategies
to maximize security of our infrastructure. DOD keenly understands that
we rely heavily on commercial infrastructure, and particularly, our
Nation's energy grid. To that end, we are actively working with
industry and the Army Cyber Institute to increase DOD participation in
the Jack Voltaic series of research projects, which is an innovative
bottom-up approach to critical infrastructure resilience. This analysis
of strengths and weaknesses, tailored specifically to stress aspects of
the incident response and disaster recovery plans, identifies gaps in
critical infrastructure cybersecurity that directly and indirectly
supports the DOD mission.
state department budget
72. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, the State Department is
seeing a 23 percent decrease in its budget at the same time the
Department of Defense is seeing an increase of approximately 5 percent.
Secretary Mattis famously said that if we cut the State Department we
were going to have to buy him more bullets. The State Department
already traditionally operates on a fraction of the amount that the
Department of Defense receives. I understand that you are not
responsible for them, but do you consider such a drastic cut to the
State Department budget as an overall negative for the Department of
Defense given the additional duties your department will be forced to
execute alongside a weaker State Department?
Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense supports the State
Department's role in U.S. foreign policy. Along with the National
Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security, we have
generated remarkable alignment across the U.S. Government on a range of
defense issues. I am in constant dialogue with Secretary Pompeo, and
will let him address the appropriate level for the State Department
budget. That said, achieving the objectives of the National Defense
Strategy requires a strong, well-resourced interagency partner in the
State Department.
gao high risk list
73. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, this week GAO released its
2019 High Risk List report. There were several DOD items on the list--
for right now, I'd like to focus on Weapons System Acquisition. In
April 2018, GAO reported that the DOD expects to invest $1.66 trillion
in total to develop and procure its portfolio of 86 major defense
acquisition programs. For years, DOD has struggled with cost, schedule,
and performance goals. In fact, this weapons system acquisition was
added to the GAO High Risk List in 1990. While GAO notes there has been
some partial progress, there are still things that need to be done such
as:
Tracking the costs to correct defects after ship delivery to help
determine cases in which warranties could contribute to improvements in
the cost and quality of Navy ships.
Requiring the Missile Defense Agency to make its cost estimates
more comprehensive, to stabilize its element and program baselines by
better understanding requirements before setting a baseline, and--once
a baseline is set--to track revisions to enable meaningful comparisons
over time.
Can you tell me how you and the Department of Defense are
addressing these issues by discussing any meaningful steps being taken
and when we will see or be briefed on the results?
Secretary Shanahan. With regard to cost, schedule, and performance
goals generally, section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by
section 831 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019 (Public Law 115-232),
requires the designated milestone decision authority to establish cost,
fielding, and performance goals (also called targets) before funds are
obligated for technology development, systems development, or
production of a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). Further,
Department of Defense Instructions stipulate that MDAPs are to report
program data including unit cost estimates and Defense Acquisition
Executive Summaries (DAES) on a quarterly basis after submission of the
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). USD(A&S) offices provide analysis of
reported data to USD(A&S), Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) and
Program Offices.
With regard to tracking the costs to correct defects after ship
delivery, the Department of Defense stated in our response to the GAO
recommendation 3 in GAO-16-71 Navy and Coast Guard Shipbuilding: Navy
Should Reconsider Approach to Warranties for Correcting Construction
Defects, the GAO assertion that the Navy is not tracking the costs to
correct defects after ship delivery to help determine cases in which
warranties could contribute to improvements in the cost and quality of
Navy ships is inaccurate. The Navy has been differentiating the
Government's and shipbuilder's responsibility for defects and tracking
the costs to correct all defects after delivery on shipbuilding
contracts. The costs for any shipbuilder responsible corrections are
tracked by the SUPSHIP and the shipbuilding program office.
With regards to the Missile Defense Agency, the Department
partially concurred with the GAO recommendation regarding the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) life cycle costs, agreeing that decision makers
should have insight into the full life cycle costs of programs. The
Department concurred with the recommendation regarding the
stabilization of the MDA acquisition baselines. However, it is
necessary to recognize that Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
baselines change to respond to evolving requirements provided by other
organizations and leaders, from the Warfighter to the President, to
counter changing threats. We also noted that the MDA Director has
authority to make these adjustments within departmental guidelines. The
MDA has enhanced the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
Accountability Report (BAR) format to be able to track revisions.
duty status reform
74. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, Duty
Status reform is a significant concern of mine given the large National
Guard presence in West Virginia. I hope that your proposals are based
on extensive consultation with the states regarding title 32 and other
significant National Guard issues. Can you please share your
discussions with state leadership and the results of those discussions
as far as support or disagreement with your Duty Status Reform
suggestions?
Secretary Shanahan. From the very beginning in developing a Duty
Status Reform proposal, the Department has been open and transparent,
collaborating freely across the entire Department of Defense and
throughout government. Our team has worked tirelessly with leadership
from each Reserve Component and the National Guard Bureau, as well as
with major stakeholders such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs and
Labor, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional
Budget Office, and others. Throughout the entire process, the
Department engaged and solicited feedback from the governors and
adjutants generals of the states through various outreach efforts, to
include briefing the Council of Governors on several occasions. At
numerous points, we received feedback and suggestions and have worked
collaboratively to ensure our proposal addressed the identified issues,
while retaining the integrity and purpose of the reform effort. If the
proposal is cleared by OMB and enacted, we anticipate a significant
period of time will be required to fully implement. The Department will
continue to work with the Congress to make any additional changes that
are required prior to implementation. I commit to continuing to work
with States and other stakeholders as we move forward on this critical
reform effort.
General Dunford. From the very beginning in developing a Duty
Status Reform proposal, the Department has been fully open and
transparent, collaborating freely across the entire Department of
Defense and throughout government. Our team has worked tirelessly with
leadership from each Reserve Component and the National Guard Bureau,
as well as with major stakeholders such as the Departments of Veterans
Affairs and Labor, the Office of Management and Budget, the
Congressional Budget Office, and more. Throughout the entire process,
the Department engaged and solicited feedback from the governors and
adjutants generals of the states through various outreach efforts, to
include briefing the Council of Governors on several occasions. At
numerous points, we received feedback and suggestions and have worked
collaboratively to ensure our proposal addressed these issues, while
retaining the integrity and purpose of the reform effort. If the
proposal is enacted, we anticipate a significant period of time will be
required to implement. We request the support of Congress to support
any legislative adjustments that need to be made to address unforeseen
issues and concerns that may arise post-enactment. We are committed to
continuing to work with the Congress, the states, and others as we move
forward to implement the comprehensive, fundamental reform needed to
support our National Guardsmen and reservists.
75. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the
Governors have been very clear that they do not accept that changes to
the Insurrection Act in title 10, chapter 13 are necessary to complete
the Duty Status Reform. Have any of your Duty Status reforms made
changes to title 10, chapter 13, and if so, what are the impacts and
cost of Duty Status reform?
Secretary Shanahan. Throughout the development of our Duty Status
Reform initiative, the Department has zealously guarded the
prerogatives, responsibilities, and authorities of the governors and
states, including their authorities under the Insurrection Act in
chapter 13 of title 10, United States Code. Today's ``patchwork quilt''
of laws, policies and procedures that govern how leaders utilize and
manage our Reservist components, and how Reservists and National
Guardsmen earn their pay and benefits, is a complex system fraught with
inequities, disparity, and complexity. I recognize some concern has
been expressed that Duty Status Reforms would fundamentally alter the
role of governors as it pertains to the Insurrection Act. I can assure
the Congress that is not our intent.
General Dunford. Throughout the development of our Duty Status
Reform initiative, DOD has zealously guarded the prerogatives,
responsibilities, and authorities of the governors and states,
including their authorities under the Insurrection Act in chapter 13 of
title 10, United States Code. Duty status reform, however, is long
overdue. Today's ``patchwork quilt'' of laws, policies and procedures
that govern how our leaders utilize and manage our Reserve components,
and how Reservists and National Guardsmen earn their pay and benefits,
is a complex system fraught with inequities, disparity, and complexity.
Through adoption of a new Reserve Component duty status structure, our
comprehensive draft legislative proposal simplifies and streamlines the
more than 27 existing Reserve Component duty statuses, improves the
utilization of the Reserve Components, and most importantly, aligns pay
and benefits according to the nature of the work Reserve and National
Guard members perform in service to their country. I recognize some
concern has been expressed that the Department's duty status reform
concept would fundamentally alter the role of governors as it pertains
to the Insurrection Act. I can assure the Congress that was never our
intent, and while it is absolutely necessary to reorganize the
provisions of the Insurrection Act in order to effect the simplified,
streamlined, duty status structure we are proposing, our current
legislative draft proposal does preserve the governor's role and
authority as specified in the Act. To the extent, however, that
specific concerns with the Department's proposal as currently drafted,
have been identified, OSD staff has worked closely with their National
Guard Bureau colleagues and state Adjutants General representatives to
address these concerns. Further, the Department will continue to work
openly and transparently with all stakeholders to ensure any future
concerns are also responsibly and fairly addressed. In terms of the
part of your question that pertains to costs, at this time our proposal
is pending release by the Office of Management and Budget, so the
Department is unable to address the specifics of the budgetary
implications of this proposal. However, throughout the development of
the Duty Status Reform initiative, the Department considered the
potential budgetary implications of this comprehensive, fundamental
reform.
Appendix A
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Cramer, McSally, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
We--as soon as we have a quorum here, we do have some
nominations that have to break into the regular order.
The Committee meets to receive testimony on the posture of
the U.S. Army in fiscal year 2020 budget request.
We welcome Dr. Mark Esper, the Secretary of the Army, and
General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army. We thank both
of you for your years of distinguished service. Look forward to
the upcoming months.
The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military
to prepare for the return of great-power competition. This
means that we've got to be prepared to deter--if necessary,
decisively defeat--potential near-peer adversaries, obviously
referring to China and Russia.
In order for the Army to achieve that goal, our Army must
be manned, trained, and equipped appropriately. The Army has
made significant progress in rebuilding readiness across the
force, but there's still a lot to be done. A high state of
readiness is crucial for our Nation to demonstrate peace
through strength.
With their alarming speed of modernization of both
conventional and nuclear forces, China and Russia now present a
credible threat to America and our allies in their regions, and
an increasing threat around the world. In fact, in some areas
they--they've actually surpassed us. It's a hard thing to
explain to American people. They always assume that we have the
very best of everything. That has been true in the past. It's
not true today.
It's past time for action. You have testified that the Army
is outranged and outgunned, as currently organized and
equipped. The future of our Army readiness and the relevance
requires modernization now. Any successful modernization
strategy must focus on results. Rapid prototyping and realistic
experimentation will be vital to getting modern, reliable,
lethal weapons into the hands of our soldiers, and doing so on
time within allotted budgets. We cannot allow the past
acquisition failures to continue any longer.
The Army undertook a detailed and exhaustive look at every
single program to ensure that each supports the National
Defense Strategy. This National Defense Strategy, which, of
course, we've had two hearings on this, it's a strategy that
was agreed to by both Democrats and Republicans, and we're
trying to use that as our blueprint. These choices will require
an open and transparent dialogue with Congress along the way.
We look forward to working with you to make our shared
modernization vision a reality as the Army reinvests itself to
become a 21st century fighting force prepared for the more
lethal and dynamic battlefields of the future.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Esper and General
Milley to this morning's hearing. This will likely be the last
time that General Milley testifies before the Committee in the
capacity as Chief of Staff of the Army. So, let me thank you,
General, for the leadership of our soldiers, very, very much.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2020
includes $182.3 billion in funding for the Army. Of that
amount, 150.7 billion is for the base budget requirements, and
31.6 billion for overseas contingency operations activities.
This request should be evaluated in the context of the National
Defense Strategy and the national security challenges facing
our country. The renewed focus on strategic competition with
China and Russia will require the Army to train for full-
spectrum operations and to field equipment necessary for a
high-end fight. I commend the Army for recognizing that, while
there is a change in strategy, budgets remain constrained. I
understand that, as this budget was developed, senior Army
leadership scrutinized existing programs to determine which
ones supported the Army's modernization priorities and which
programs should be reduced or canceled so that savings could be
reinvested. While the Committee may not agree with every budget
decision made by the Army, they did make tough decisions to
prioritize funding for the future fight.
In support of the focus on near-peer competition, the Army
has also made major structural changes to expedite
modernization across the force. The Army has established eight
cross-functional teams to demonstrate capabilities through
prototyping and experimentation for major modernization
priorities. The Army is also exercising new acquisition
authorities provided by Congress, while Army Futures Command
was established as the single command for all modernization
efforts. Delivering cutting-edge capabilities to the warfighter
under an expedited acquisition timeline is always a challenge.
To do so while undergoing a major structural and cultural
change with the establishment of the Army Futures Command makes
this process even more complex.
While I applaud the Army for taking a hard look at their
acquisition processes, we do not have a wide margin for
mistakes, given the threats from our adversaries. I asked our
witnesses this morning to share what the Army has learned to
date from these efforts.
While modernizing military platforms and upgraded equipment
are critical for the battlefield, ensuring our soldiers are
ready for the fight remains our highest priority. I commend
Army leadership for their focus on unit readiness and for
submitting a budget proposal that supports 25 Combat Training
Center rotations for brigade combat teams. This budget request
seeks an increase of 2,000 Active Duty soldiers as well as a
slight end-strength increase for the Army National Guard and
Reserve. It is imperative that, as the Army grows, it remains
focused on the quality of our soldiers rather than the
quantity. The Army has acknowledged that they were unable to
meet the recruitment goals last year, and I would like to know
from our witnesses how the Army plans to address this
challenge.
The President's budget also requests an across-the-board
pay raise of 3.1 percent for all military personnel, equal to
the annual increase in the employment cost index. However, once
again, the President has decided not to include in this budget
the funding necessary to support a pay raise for civilian
employees. This budget request also makes reduction to Federal
employee pensions affecting current and future employees.
Civilians working in the Department of the Army are force
multipliers and part of the total force. Unfortunately, by
denying a corresponding pay increase for our civilians and
cutting their pensions, the President's budget request sends
the message that their work and contributions to our national
defense are not as highly valued as they should be, and it
hinders the Army's ability to recruit the very best civilian
workforce we need. I hope to hear from our witnesses their
views on the morale of the Army civilian workforce and their
ability to effectively manage the total force, including
civilian employees.
Finally, I wanted to close on two important issues. First,
this Committee has received the list of military construction
projects that will be targeted in order to resource the
President's proposed wall. Many of these projects are Army
military construction priorities, and they will be at risk for
delay or cancellation. Also, there are concerns that troop
deployments to the southern border may undermine Army readiness
goals. Given the efforts by the Army over the past several
years to rebuild readiness, I would like to hear from our
witnesses today whether moving funds from military construction
projects or deploying soldiers to the border will have a
detrimental impact on readiness.
Second, I want to emphasize the urgency of fixing the
substandard living conditions that are pervasive in privatized
military housing. I appreciate the Army has acknowledged the
enormity of the issue and that they are working to address this
crisis. In the meantime, this Committee will continue our
stringent oversight until every servicemember and their family
has access to the high-quality housing that they have earned
and deserve.
Again, thank you. I look forward to hearing from the
witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Now Carl Doms and your group understand why you're here
today.
Since a quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to
consider a list of 2,743 pending military nominations. All the
nominations have been before the Committee the required length
of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report these----
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman Inhofe.--2,743----
Senator Wicker. Second.
Chairman Inhofe.--pending----
There's a motion. There's a second.
All in favor, say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
[No response.]
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on March 26, 2019.
1. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Leonard F. Anderson IV)
(Reference No. 32)
2. In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel M. Anderson) (Reference No.
288)
3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Matthew D. Colsia) (Reference No. 305)
4. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Deven R. Gaston) (Reference No. 306)
5. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Steven M. Angeline) (Reference No. 319)
6. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with David F. Hunley) (Reference No.
326)
7. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (John C. Jarvis) (Reference No. 328)
8. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Nathaneal J. Hart, Jr.) (Reference No. 337)
9. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Matthew J. Anderson) (Reference No. 340)
10. RADM(lh) Peter G. Stamatopoulos, USN to be rear admiral
(Reference No. 346)
11. RADM(lh) Gayle D. Shaffer, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 347)
12. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Kelly A. Aeschbach) (Reference No. 348)
13. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Blake L. Converse) (Reference No. 349)
14. Capt. Dean A. Vanderley, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 354)
15. Capt. Kenneth W. Epps, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 355)
16. Capt. Timothy H. Weber, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 356)
17. Capt. James L. Hancock, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 357)
18. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Nicholas M. Homan) (Reference
No. 358)
19. Capt. Charles W. Brown, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
(Reference No. 359)
20. In the Army there are 949 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Adrian Acevedo) (Reference No. 380)
21. In the Army there are 556 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Benjamin T. Abel) (Reference No. 381)
22. In the Army there are 555 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Kwansah E. Ackah) (Reference No. 382)
23. In the Army there are 51 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Alan Adame) (Reference No. 383)
24. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Elizabeth A. Fields) (Reference No. 384)
25. RADM John B. Nowell, Jr., USN to be vice admiral and Chief of
Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower,
Personnel, Training, and Education, N1 (Reference No. 393)
26. MG Steven L. Basham, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, US Air Forces Europe and Deputy Commander, US Air Forces
Africa (Reference No. 419)
27. Col. Steven J. Butow, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference
No. 420)
28. MG Karen H. Gibson, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for National Security Partnerships,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Reference No. 421)
29. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with James P. Downey) (Reference No. 422)
30. RADM Ronald A. Boxall, USN to be vice admiral and Director,
Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff (Reference
No. 423)
31. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Thomas D. Crimmins) (Reference No. 425)
32. In the Air Force there are 16 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Shawn C. Bishop) (Reference No.
427)
33. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Michell A. Archebelle) (Reference No. 428)
34. In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Peter N. Fischer) (Reference No. 429)
35. In the Air Force there are 425 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Brian M. Alexander) (Reference No. 430)
36. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (P.J. Fox) (Reference No. 433)
37. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Nathan M. Clayton) (Reference No. 434)
38. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Adam
P. James) (Reference No. 435)
39. In the Army Reserve there are 33 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jason S. Baker) (Reference No. 436)
40. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Shelia R. Day) (Reference No. 437)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Robert D. Cope) (Reference No. 438)
42. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (William C. Mitchell) (Reference No. 439)
43. BG Thomas L. Solhjem, USA to be major general and Chief of
Chaplains, US Army (Reference No. 457)
44. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with Telita Crosland) (Reference No. 458)
45. LTG Daniel R. Hokanson, ARNG to be lieutenant general and
Director, Army National Guard (Reference No. 459)
46. MG Leon N. Thurgood, USA to be lieutenant general and Director
of Hypersonics, Directed Energy, Space and Rapid Acquisition, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and
Technology (Reference No. 461)
47. MG Walter E. Piatt, USA to be lieutenant general and Director
of the Army Staff (Reference No. 463)
48. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Latoya D. Smith) (Reference No. 472)
49. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Lisa Marie Ahaesy) (Reference No. 473)
50. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Rubirosa B. Bago) (Reference No. 474)
51. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Meghan C. Gerrity) (Reference No. 475)
52. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Daniel M. Jansen) (Reference No. 476)
53. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Randolph Powell) (Reference No. 477)
54. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Michael J. Prokos) (Reference No. 478)
55. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Anthony Bellofigueroa) (Reference No. 481)
56. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Sean
R. Richardson) (Reference No. 482)
57. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Kahtonna C. Allen) (Reference No. 483)
58. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Angelo N. Catalano) (Reference No. 484)
59. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Charles J. Calais) (Reference No. 485)
60. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Robert T. Evans) (Reference No. 486)
61. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Edward M. Prendergast) (Reference No. 487)
62. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Thomas L. Hinnant III) (Reference No. 489)
63. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Sanjay Sharma) (Reference No. 490)
64. LTG James C. Slife, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (Reference No. 493)
65. LTG Paul E. Funk II, USA to be general and Commanding General,
US Army Training and Doctrine Command (Reference No. 494)
66. RADM Dee L. Mewbourne, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy
Commander, US Transportation Command (Reference No. 497)
67. RADM Jon A. Hill, USN to be vice admiral and Director, Missile
Defense Agency (Reference No. 498)
68. RADM Stuart B. Munsch, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5
(Reference No. 499)
69. In the Air Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Julie Huygen) (Reference No. 500)
70. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Paula I. Schasberger) (Reference No. 501)
71. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Angela Tang) (Reference No. 502)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 2,743
Chairman Inhofe. The motion carries.
We'll now hear from our two witnesses. It's a pleasure
having both of you here.
We'll start with you, Secretary Esper. Try to keep your
remarks somewhere in the neighborhood of 5 minutes. You're
recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir, I'll watch the clock, here.
So, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I want to, first, thank Congress for helping us reverse the
readiness decline that developed following several years of
budget uncertainty. Because of the strong support provided in
the fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 budgets, we have
increased the number of fully ready brigade combat teams by 55
percent over the past 2 years. However, while I am confident we
would prevail against any foe today, our adversaries are
working hard to contest the outcome of future conflicts. As a
result, the Army stands at a strategic inflection point. If we
fail to modernize the Army now, we risk losing the first
battles of the next war.
For the past 17 years, the Army bore the brunt of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. For over a decade, we postponed
modernization to procure equipment tailored to
counterinsurgency operations. Our legacy combat systems,
designed for high-intensity conflict, entered service when I
joined the Army in the early 1980s. While they dominated in
past conflicts, incremental upgrades for many of them are no
longer adequate for the demands of future battlefield, as
described in the National Defense Strategy. We must build the
next generation of combat systems now, before Russia and China
outpace us with their modernization programs.
Despite Russia's looming economic difficulties, they are
steadily upgrading their military capabilities. In addition to
field testing their next-generation T-14 Armada tank, they
continue to advance the development of their air defense and
artillery systems. When combined with new technologies, such as
drones, cyber, and electronic warfare, Russia has proven its
battlefield prowess.
We have no reason to believe that Moscow's aggressive
behavior will cease in the short term. Russia's blatant
disregard for their neighbors' sovereignty, as demonstrated in
Ukraine and Georgia, is a deliberate strategy meant to
intimidate weaker states and undermine the NATO alliance.
In the long run, China presents an even greater challenge.
They continue to focus their military investments in cutting-
edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence, directed
energy, and hypersonics. Beijing's systematic theft of
intellectual property is also allowing them to develop
capabilities cheaper and faster than ever before. Additionally,
China's coercive economic practices are expanding its sphere of
influence in ways contrary to our Nation's interests.
To deter the growing threat posed by great-power
competitors, and to defeat them in battle if necessary, we must
leap ahead to the next generation of combat systems, and we
must do so now. Over the past year, the Army took a major step
forward in reorganizing its entire modernization enterprise
with the establishment of Futures Command. In doing so, we
stripped away layers of bureaucracy and streamlined our
acquisition process while achieving unity of command and
greater accountability. Guided by our six modernization
priorities, Army Futures Command is hard at work developing the
systems needed to maintain battlefield overmatch in future
conflicts.
When we received our budget this time last year, we felt
that it was unreasonable to ask Congress for the additional 4
to 5 billion dollars needed annually to fund our modernization
without first looking internally to find the necessary
resources. As a result, the Army's senior leaders took an
unprecedented initiative to review every Army program. Our goal
was simple: Find those programs that least contribute to the
Army's lethality, and reallocate those resources into higher-
priority activities. After over 50 hours of painstaking
deliberations, we eliminated, reduced, or delayed nearly 200
programs, freeing up over $30 billion over the next 5 years. We
then reinvested this money into our top priorities, those
systems and initiatives we need to prevail in future wars. The
Army will continue to ruthlessly prioritize our budgets to
provide a clear, predictable path forward that will achieve our
strategic goals. That process is underway now as we develop
next year's budget.
Support for the Army's fiscal year 2020 budget is critical
to building the Army the Nation needs and demands. Those who
are invested in legacy systems will fight to hold on to the
past, while ignoring the billions of dollars in opportunity
created by our investments in new technologies and what it
means for the Army's future readiness. While change will be
hard for some, we can no longer afford to delay the Army's
modernization. We believe we are following the sound guidance
conveyed to us by many of you.
In this era of great-power competition, we cannot risk
falling behind. If left unchecked, Russia and China will
continue to erode the competitive military advantage we have
held for years.
The Army has clear vision--a clear vision, which I ask be
entered into the record--and a sound strategy to maintain
battlefield overmatch. We are making the tough choices. We now
need the support of Congress to modernize the force, and it
starts with the fiscal year 2020 budget. The bottom line is
this: We owe it to our soldiers to provide them the weapons and
equipment they need to win decisively in the future.
Thank you again for your continued support. I look forward
to your questions and appreciate the opportunity to discuss
these important matters with you today.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Excellent
statement. Without objection, the report made part of the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
the army vision
The United States Army is the most lethal and capable ground combat
force in history. It has proven this in multiple conflicts, across a
broad spectrum of operations, in various locations around the world,
defending the Nation and serving the American people well for over 240
years. The key to this success has been the skill and grit of the
American soldier, the quality of its Leaders, the superiority of its
equipment, and the ability of the Army--Regular, National Guard, and
Reserve to adapt to and dominate a complex and continuously changing
environment as a member of the Joint Force.
As we look ahead, near-peer competitors such as China and Russia
will increasingly challenge the United States and our allies in Europe,
the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, we
should expect these countries' arms, equipment, and tactics to be used
against us by others, including threats such as North Korea and Iran,
failed states, and terrorist groups. Our adversaries' ambitions and the
accelerating pace of technological change will create challenges and
opportunities for the Army's battlefield superiority.
Meanwhile, the many demands on the Nation's resources will put
downward pressure on the defense budget in the future, forcing the Army
to continue making difficult choices about how it spends scarce dollars
to meet national objectives and compelling us to become ever more
efficient. A continued commitment to strengthening our alliances and
building partnerships will help offset these challenges.
The Army Mission--our purpose--remains constant: To deploy, fight,
and win our Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained
land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as
part of the Joint Force. The Army mission is vital to the Nation
because we are a Service capable of defeating enemy ground forces and
indefinitely seizing and controlling those things an adversary prizes
most--its land, its resources, and its population.
Given the threats and challenges ahead, it is imperative the Army
have a clear and coherent vision of where we want to be in the coming
years so that we retain our overmatch against all potential adversaries
and remain capable of accomplishing our Mission in the future. As such,
the Army Vision--our future end state--is as follows:
The Army of 2028 will be ready to deploy, fight, and win
decisively against any adversary, anytime and anywhere, in a
joint, multi-domain, high-intensity conflict, while
simultaneously deterring others and maintaining its ability to
conduct irregular warfare. The Army will do this through the
employment of modem manned and unmanned ground combat vehicles,
aircraft, sustainment systems, and weapons, coupled with robust
combined arms formations and tactics based on a modem
warfighting doctrine and centered on exceptional leaders and
soldiers of unmatched lethality.
To achieve our Vision, the Army must meet the following objectives
in the coming years:
Man. Grow the Regular Army above 500,000 soldiers, with
associated growth in the National Guard and Army Reserve, by recruiting
and retaining high quality, physically fit, mentally tough soldiers who
can deploy, fight, and win decisively on any future battlefield.
Organize. Ensure war-fighting formations have sufficient
infantry, armor, engineer, artillery, and air defense assets. Units
from brigade through corps must also have the ability to conduct
sustained ground and air Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance; Electronic Warfare; and cyber operations to shape the
battlefield across all domains. Aviation, additional combat support,
and robust logistical support must be readily available to units.
Train. Focus training on high-intensity conflict, with
emphasis on operating in dense urban terrain, electronically degraded
environments, and under constant surveillance. Training must be tough,
realistic, iterative, and dynamic. Continuous movement, battlefield
innovation, and leverage of combined arms maneuver with the Joint F ,
allies, and partners must be its hallmarks. This training will require
rapid expansion of our training environments and deeper distribution of
simulations capabilities down to the company level to significantly
enhance soldier and team lethality.
Equip. Modernize the force by first reforming the current
acquisition system and unifying the modernization enterprise under a
single command to focus the Amy's efforts on delivering the weapons,
combat vehicles, sustainment systems, and equipment that Solders need
when they need it. This includes experimenting with and developing
autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and robotics to make our
soldiers more effective and our units less logistically dependent.
Lead. Develop smart, thoughtful, and innovative leaders
of character who are comfortable with complexity and capable of
operating from the to the strategic level. We will build a new talent
management-based personnel system that leverages the Knowledge, skills,
behaviors, and preferences of its officers and noncommissioned
officers. This system, when coupled with more flexible career models,
will enable the Army to better attract, identify, develop, and place
these leaders to optimize outcomes for all.
To achieve and sustain these objectives given the uncertainty of
future budgets, the Army must continually assess everything we do,
identifying lower value activities to discontinue and ways to improve
what we must do, in order to free up time, money, and manpower for our
top priorities. Trusting and empowering subordinate leaders will
facilitate both reform and greater performance.
In all these efforts, we will ensure that our soldiers, civilian
workforce, and their families enjoy the professional opportunities and
quality of life they deserve. From the top down we must also remain
committed to the Army Values. The Army is at its best when we wort and
fight as one team, and our Army Values, coupled with our Warrior Ethos,
will guide and serve us well as we face the challenges ahead.
Since 1775, the United States Army has proven itself absolutely
vital to protecting the American people, safeguarding the Nation, and
advancing our Interests abroad. This fact remains true today. Our
ability to do so will be even more in the future as threats continue to
emerge and evolve, becoming ever more dangerous and more complex. To
remain ready to accomplish our Mission of fighting and winning the
Nation's wars, the Army must fulfill the future Army Vision outlined
herein. We are confident that with the right leadership, the proper
focus, sufficient resources, and sustained effort the U.S. Amy will
achieve our Vision, remain the world's premier fighting force, and
serve the Nation welt for decades to come.
Mark A. Milley
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Mark T. Esper
Secretary of the Army
Chairman Inhofe. General Milley.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMY
General Milley. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you again for
the opportunity to join Secretary Esper here today.
It remains an incredible privilege and honor to represent
the million soldiers in uniform in the regular Army, the
National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve, arrayed in 18
divisions, 58 brigade combat teams, with 180,000 of them
tonight deployed on freedom's frontier in 140 countries around
the world.
While much of our testimony today is going to focus on our
challenges and how to make us stronger and more lethal, it's
important to note up front, to you, the Committee, and to the
Congress, to the American people, our allies, and, perhaps most
importantly, to our adversaries, the United States Army is
highly capable, globally deployable on very short notice to
anywhere in the world, and we have the training, equipment,
people, and leaders to prevail in ground combat against anyone,
anywhere, anytime.
I concur with Secretary Esper's comments on the threats
posed by China and Russia. The international order, and, by
extension, United States interests, are under increasingly
dangerous pressure. China is a significant threat to the United
States and our allies in the mid and long terms. They're a
revisionist power seeking to diminish our influence in the
Pacific and establish themselves as the controlling regional
power in Asia, and they are setting conditions to challenge the
United States on a global scale.
Russia seeks to return to global great-power status, and
will continue to challenge the United States, not only in
Europe but also in the Middle East, Asia, the Arctic, Africa,
and the western hemisphere. Russia continues to undermine NATO
as an alliance and to sow dissent throughout the European
continent and in our own Homeland through a variety of means.
Russia remains the only current existential threat to the
United States, and will likely become increasingly
opportunistic in the near term, in my view.
In the last 17 years, our strategic competitors have eroded
our military advantages, as outlined by Secretary Esper. With
your help, starting 2 years ago, we began to restore our
competitive advantage, and our recent budgets have helped
improve readiness and lay the groundwork for future
modernization. We ask, with this budget, that you sustain these
efforts. Our goal remains 66 percent, two-thirds, of the Active
Duty Army brigades at the highest levels of readiness, and 33
percent of the Guard and Reserve also at the highest levels.
Those numbers, those levels of readiness, are what we need to
be able to align with the strategy, as laid out in the National
Defense Strategy. With continued, consistent, predictable
congressional support, we can reach those levels of readiness
sometime in 2022.
Specifically, this budget will fund, in terms of readiness,
58 brigade combat teams, six security force assistance brigades
for the total Army, 32 combat training rotations, to include
four for the National Guard, increase pre-positioned stocks in
both EUCOM [European Command] and INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific
Command]. In terms of modernization, which is really just
another term for future readiness, this budget will improved
capabilities across our six modernization priority areas and
the 31 specific programs that are embedded within that. In
addition to that, it funds 51 other programs that are of
significant importance to the Army. It'll increase the
lethality of munitions across the globe, and it will fill
specific solutions that we have identified, 17 critical gaps
relative to our near-peer competitors that I can brief in
detail in a classified hearing, if you so choose.
Lastly, I want to highlight that this Committee and
Congress as a whole has provided us tremendous support over the
last several years. We recognize that, and we are committed to
applying our resources deliberately and responsibly,
understanding that they've been entrusted to us by Congress and
the American people. We will continue to do that, going
forward, to ensure that our solemn obligation to never send our
sons and daughters into harm's way unless they are properly
trained, fully manned, have the best equipment money can buy,
and are extraordinarily well led.
Thank you again for your continued support to our soldiers
and their families. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Esper and General
Milley follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Mark T. Esper
and
General Mark A. Milley
introduction
America's Army stands ready today to deploy, fight, and win our
Nation's wars. The Army has made great progress in recent years,
recovering from depleted levels of readiness following extended periods
of sustained conflict and reduced defense spending. Our near-peer
competitors, however, capitalized on this period to advance their own
positions by modernizing their militaries and reducing the overmatch we
held for decades. Aligned with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
Army is pursuing a path to ensure we stay ahead of our competitors and
remain ready and lethal into the future.
The Army's Vision and Strategy outline the force needed to prevail
over the threats of the future, along with the plan for building that
Army. To accomplish this, the Army's efforts are focused on three
priority areas: building readiness for high-intensity conflict against
strategic competitors; modernizing our doctrine, equipment, and
formations to conduct multi-domain operations; and reforming our
personnel system, business processes, and fiscal management to ensure
our resources are put towards the highest priority activities.
Additionally, the Army will continue to take care of its people, live
the Army Values, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships to
sustain long-term success in wartime and peace.
We are grateful to Congress for the strong and timely support
provided to the Army in the fiscal year 2019 (FY19) appropriations.
Receiving this funding on time reduced risk to short term readiness and
allowed us to make significant investments towards our six
modernization priorities. In order to achieve the defense objectives in
the NDS and meet our goals as outlined in the Army Vision, we must
receive predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding in the
future. The Army's total fiscal year 2020 budget request is $182.3
billion, consisting of $150.7 billion for base requirements and $31.6
billion for Overseas Contingency Operations requirements. This request
provides the resources the Army needs to build readiness, while
modernizing for the future.
strategic environment
The Army faces a global security environment that continually grows
more competitive and volatile. The challenges are many: the reemergence
of great power competition; a resilient but weakening post-World War II
order; accelerating technological advancements empowering state and
non-state actors; and persistent threats to the Homeland. The Army must
be ready now, and in the future, to confront this challenging strategic
environment. We must have an Army prepared for high-intensity conflict,
modernized to extend overmatch against near-peer adversaries, and
trained to fight as part of the Joint Force alongside our allies and
partners, all while sustaining our ability to conduct irregular
warfare.
The modern battlefield encompasses all domains--air, land, sea,
space, and cyber-space--and is increasing in geographic scale. Near-
peer competitors, like China and Russia, are aggressively pursuing
modernization programs to erode American overmatch. They have developed
sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems, fires,
cyber, electronic warfare, and space-based capabilities that generate
layers of stand-off to disrupt the deployment of military forces, deny
the build-up of combat power, and separate Joint Force capabilities in
time and space. These capabilities may embolden more aggressive
behavior in the conventional realm. China's military modernization
program aims to transform the People's Liberation Army into a modern,
mechanized, Information Age force in the next one to two decades and a
world-class military capable of strategic force projection and
warfighting by mid-century. Their military strategy seeks to protect
Chinese interests outside of Asia and into Europe, the Middle East, and
Africa. Furthermore, Russia is likely to threaten our interests for the
next 20 years as they attempt to regain control of historic spheres of
influence and shape European economic and security structures in their
favor. Although we may not face China and Russia directly, we are
likely to face their systems and methods of warfare as they proliferate
military capabilities to others.
Regional state adversaries, namely North Korea and Iran, also
present significant challenges as they pursue advanced capabilities and
weapons of mass destruction to gain regional influence and ensure
regime survival. Additionally, transnational terrorist organizations
continue to pose a threat to our Homeland and our interests, as well as
our allies and partners. The Army must be prepared to defeat and deter
highly capable adversaries while disrupting violent extremists and
simultaneously defending the Homeland.
Today, the Army contributes to our Nation's efforts to counter
these challenges by providing combatant commanders over 179,000
soldiers in more than 140 countries, including 110,000 soldiers
deployed on a rotational basis. This includes over 30,000 soldiers
supporting operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan; 8,000
soldiers supporting NATO operations and the European Deterrence
Initiative; and over 17,000 soldiers providing a forward American
presence on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, Army forces remain
prepared to respond to other contingency requirements, both abroad and
at home. Concurrently, the Army is investing in the research and
development of the next generation of weapons and equipment needed to
stay ahead of our adversaries. Through a disciplined prioritization of
resources, the Army will remain postured to defend the Nation in an
increasingly dangerous world.
readiness
America's Army stands ready today to defeat any adversary that
threatens our Nation and our national interests. We have made great
progress in rebuilding warfighting readiness, which remains the Army's
number one priority as we increase lethality to prepare for the future.
Ready forces must be organized, trained, and equipped for prompt and
sustained ground combat. This ensures the Army can deploy, fight, and
win decisively in high-intensity conflict against any adversary,
anytime, and anywhere. Over the past year, the Army balanced our force
structure, increased manning in combat units, filled equipment
shortfalls, and improved deployability to build readiness across the
force. From September 2016 to December 2018, we increased the number of
ready Brigade Combat Teams from 18 to 28, and more broadly, increased
readiness across all Army units by nearly 11 percent. We achieved these
readiness gains despite sustained operational demand for Army units.
Our fiscal year 2020 budget request sustains this momentum, so the Army
can achieve our readiness objectives by 2022.
The Army has implemented several readiness initiatives to
reorganize for high-intensity conflict against near-peer competitors.
We are increasing combat readiness by working to fill our operational
units to 100 percent of authorized strength this year and 105 percent
of strength by the end of 2020. Furthermore, we reduced the non-
deployable rates of soldiers from 15 percent in 2015 to six percent
today. We anticipate achieving our goal of five percent non-deployable
soldiers by the end of this year. This equates to thousands more
soldiers ready to deploy in support of global contingency operations.
We also rebalanced our force structure to increase lethality by
initiating the conversion of two Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to
Armored Brigade Combat Teams, our most potent battlefield formation.
Furthermore, we plan to modestly grow the Regular Army to 480,000 with
associated growth in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in
2020. This growth will allow the Army to fill critical gaps in the near
term in cyber, air and missile defense, and fires while we develop the
necessary force structure and end strength needed to execute Multi-
Domain Operations.
Another critical element of readiness is training. We overhauled
Army basic training to develop more lethal, disciplined, and resilient
soldiers. This includes extending Infantry One Station Unit Training
from 14 weeks to 22 weeks. Initial reports show a significant reduction
in attrition and injuries with significant improvements in physical
fitness, land navigation, and marksmanship skills based on the
additional training time and a reduced Drill Sergeant to trainee ratio.
Other branches may see similar adjustments through fiscal year 2024.
Army collective training focuses on high-intensity conflict, with
an emphasis on operating in complex terrain, electronically degraded
environments, and under constant surveillance. Training is tough,
realistic, iterative, and task focused. We eliminated or reduced over
85 individual training requirements to unburden commanders and allow
them to focus on training their units. In the Army National Guard and
the Army Reserve, we increased the training days for select units to
increase the pool of Reserve component units available to support
operational requirements. Additionally, we maximized capacity at our
combat training centers to meet Army force readiness requirements. The
Army will execute 26 Decisive Action Training Environment rotations for
Brigade Combat Teams and six other mission specific rotations for a
total of 32 combat training center rotations in fiscal year 2019.
Moreover, we continue to develop a Synthetic Training Environment which
will integrate live, virtual, constructive, and game-based training
environments into a single platform to increase home station training
repetitions and enhance training realism in a variety of scenarios and
locations.
We also approved the new Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT) to
fundamentally improve our fitness culture, reduce injuries, increase
deployability, and increase the probability that a soldier survives on
the battlefield of the future. We have focused our fitness standards on
the skills needed to fight in sustained close combat where physical
toughness and endurance will be pushed to the extremes of human
capacity. We began field-testing the ACFT in 2018 with 63 units across
the Total Army and will begin full implementation this year. By the end
of fiscal year 2020, the ACFT will be the fitness test of record for
all soldiers.
Increasing readiness is also about improving our equipment. To this
end, Army Materiel Command increased the spare parts inventory and
ammunition stockpiles. The Army also redistributed equipment to Focused
Readiness Units, which remain at higher readiness levels to support
global response. Furthermore, we are making progress towards achieving
ground and aviation equipment readiness goals Army-wide.
To further improve equipment readiness and enhance our power
projection capabilities, the Army uses prepositioned stocks to quickly
execute operational plans and conduct contingency operations. We
budgeted $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 to
improve the readiness of Army Prepositioned Stocks. Additionally, we
initiated a Configured-for-Combat effort to equip Army Prepositioned
Stocks with combat enablers such as communications, modernized weapons,
and counter-measure systems in order to speed our ability to build
combat power. This reduces the time it takes to build combat power by
weeks and significantly reduces the amount of strategic airlift
previously required to deploy early entry Army forces. Follow-on forces
will continue to rely on modern and ready strategic lift assets,
especially sealift, to deliver ready and lethal ground forces in
support of the Joint Force. We must continue to invest in robust power
projection platforms and strategic lift capabilities to ensure we can
rapidly deploy and operate anywhere in the world.
Through these readiness initiatives, the Army is getting stronger
by the month in manning, training, and equipping the force. With
Congressional support, our fiscal year 2020 budget will allow us to
continue to increase readiness and build lethality.
modernization
While we continue to build readiness, the Army must also prepare
for the future. This includes modernizing our doctrine, equipment,
processes, and organizational structures to extend our overmatch
against any competitor on any battlefield. Guiding our modernization
effort is our Multi-Domain Operations concept, which identifies the
threats and challenges we will face in the future. Great power
competitors like China are developing capabilities to create standoff
intended to frustrate our ability to build combat power and maneuver at
will. To counter this, the Army will need to integrate our capabilities
with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines even more in the future. The
Army's new Multi-Domain Operations concept describes how we will
synchronize our capabilities across all domains in support of the Joint
Force.
The Army is using the Multi-Domain Operations concept to inform
future force development through numerous iterations of experimentation
and analysis, including field experimentation with Multi-Domain Task
Force pilots in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. Our future success
depends on modernized equipment, evolving doctrine, and the
organizations essential to ensure overmatch against our competitors.
These elements will work in concert to increase our combat capabilities
across all domains.
As a major step towards developing the capabilities needed for
Multi-Domain Operations, we reorganized our entire modernization
enterprise for greater speed and efficiency. Last year, the Army made
its most significant organizational change in over 40 years by
establishing the Army Futures Command (AFC). We stood up AFC in the
innovation hub of Austin, Texas with a focus on providing unity of
command and unity of effort for the modernization enterprise. For the
first time, one commander is driving concept development, requirements
determination, organizational design, science and technology research,
and solution development. We located AFC outside of a traditional Army
installation to increase their accessibility and ability to collaborate
with industry and academia. Through these partnerships, AFC will
identify and deliver new capabilities with greater speed and more
efficient use of our resources.
To guide AFC, the Army established a clear set of modernization
priorities that emphasize rapid maneuver, overwhelming fires, tactical
innovation, and mission command. Our six modernization priorities will
not change, and they underscore the Army's commitment to innovate for
the future. We have one simple focus--to make soldiers and units more
capable and lethal. Over the last year, we identified $16.1 billion in
legacy equipment programs that we could reinvest towards 31 signature
systems that are critical to realizing Multi-Domain Operations and are
aligned with these priorities. The six Army modernization priorities
are:
Long Range Precision Fires--We will improve the range and
lethality of cannon artillery and increase missile capabilities to
ensure overmatch at each echelon. Army artillery weapons, including
Extended Range Cannon Artillery and the Precision Strike Missile, will
neutralize and dis-integrate adversary A2/AD networks, from extended
ranges, to create windows of opportunity for the Joint Force to
exploit. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery is on schedule for
delivery in fiscal year 2023. It will protect and support maneuver
forces in the close and deep operational maneuver areas with an
extended range out to 70km and increased 6-10 rounds/minute volume of
fire. The Army has requested $1.31 billion for Long Range Precision
Fires in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget to accelerate
prototyping and initial fielding.
Next Generation of Combat Vehicles--The Army will
modernize the next generation of combat vehicles through technology
development, experimentation, and prototyping to ensure overmatch
against near-peer competitors. These vehicles will employ greater
firepower, mobility, and protection to successfully maneuver on more
lethal battlefields. They will have manned and unmanned variants for
combined arms maneuver, and be built with future growth in mind. The
first prototype will arrive in fiscal year 2021 to accelerate
experimentation and initial fielding. We requested $2.0 billion in the
fiscal year 2020 President's Budget to deliver an initial capability.
Future Vertical Lift--We will increase our competitive
aviation advantage with next generation aircraft to penetrate contested
airspace and support independent maneuver from greater distances
through extended range, endurance, and lifting capacity. The most
important FVL investments at the moment are the Army's development of
the Future Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft, designed to address the gap
left by retirement of the Kiowa, and the Future Long Range Assault
Aircraft. An additional investment includes integrating unmanned aerial
systems, which we will prototype in fiscal year 2024, for manned/
unmanned teaming and improved lethality, situational awareness, and
survivability. Over $797.2 million is included in the fiscal year 2020
President's Budget to develop initial designs and unmanned
demonstration systems.
Army Network--The Army Network supports mission command
and the continuous integration of combined arms and Joint capabilities.
We will deliver a resilient and secure tactical communications network
effective in the most challenging contested and congested
electromagnetic spectrum and cyber environments. This network includes
advanced information technology, hardware and software, and a reduced
electromagnetic signature. We have allocated $2.28 billion in the
fiscal year 2020 budget to build our integrated tactical network as
part of our network restructuring.
Air and Missile Defense--Advanced air and missile defense
will protect our forces from adversary aircraft, missiles, and drones
to enable joint operations. This includes both theater systems and
short-range air defense, like the Mobile Short-Range Air Defense with
directed energy technologies. The fiscal year 2020 budget includes $1.4
billion to rapidly deliver an initial capability by fiscal year 2022.
Soldier Lethality--We will equip and train soldiers to
extend overmatch through increased lethality, mobility, and
survivability against emerging threats. This includes improved weapons,
sensors, body armor, and training. The fiscal year 2020 budget includes
$1.18 billion for prototyping, development, and procurement of the Next
Generation Squad Automatic Weapon and Squad Rifle, Enhanced Night
Vision Goggles, Integrated Visual Augmentation System (HUD 3.0), and
Synthetic Training Environment.
Eight Cross Functional Teams (CFTs), aligned under AFC, lead the
development of these modernization priorities. The CFTs streamline Army
acquisition processes to reduce the requirements process, shorten
acquisition time, and, by engaging soldiers early in development,
ensure fielded systems are affordable and meet warfighter needs. This
approach demonstrates our commitment to good stewardship of taxpayer
dollars. In addition to this organizational realignment, we updated
acquisition policies. Our new intellectual property policy will
encourage private industry to work with our CFTs to develop innovative
solutions to maintain technological overmatch.
The Army is taking a holistic approach to modernization so we can
achieve multi-domain dominance by 2028. Next generation equipment,
combined with modern doctrine and formations, will allow the Army to
maintain overmatch on future battlefields.
reform
Over the past year, the Army aggressively pursued reforms to free
up time, money, and manpower for our highest priorities and to empower
subordinate commanders to make more effective and timely decisions. In
addition to our detailed program review process, we are executing the
Army Reform Initiative, instituting fiscal discipline, scrutinizing
contract management and contract services, and working towards
financial auditability. Through these reform efforts, we realigned over
$30 billion across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for higher
priority programs to build readiness and increase lethality.
In our most significant reform effort, Army Senior Leaders
conducted a detailed review of Army equipping programs for the fiscal
year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 budgets. Through this in-depth, time
intensive process, we eliminated, reduced, or consolidated nearly 200
legacy programs to reallocate funding towards our modernization
priorities. While each of these programs had value, we must continue to
make hard choices to ensure we spend each dollar wisely and remain
aligned with Army priorities.
Through the Army Reform Initiative, we garnered over 700 ideas to
eliminate, delegate, consolidate, or streamline Army policies, programs
and practices. Inputs included work efficiencies, business process
improvements, and structural realignments. For example, through our
installation management reform effort, we are realigning Installation
Management Command under Army Materiel Command and consolidating staff
functions to garner personnel savings and improve efficiency. This
integration of sustainment and installation functions provides the
ability to prioritize resources on key requirements for both combat
readiness and soldier and family support. Additionally we have an
ongoing headquarters reduction effort across multiple levels of
command. The goal of the Army Reform Initiative is to eliminate
redundancy and delegate authorities and resources to the lowest
appropriate level of command. This allows for rapid actions and
decisions while simultaneously saving resources for higher priorities.
To improve fiscal discipline, we implemented the Command
Accountability & Execution Review (CAER) to optimize the purchasing
power of the Army's operating budget. This Army-wide program educates
Army leaders on fiscal stewardship, updates policies to increase
purchasing power, and creates a scorecard of key performance indicators
to measure progress. While still early, CAER has generated a marked
improvement in the efficient execution of the Army's budget for fiscal
year 2018 and we anticipate greater success in fiscal year 2019.
In 2018, contract management and contract services reform saved the
Army $1.6 billion across the FYDP by eliminating contract redundancies,
improving contract competition processes, and using data analytics for
contracting decisions. We continue to implement category management and
increased emphasis on the use of strategic sourcing contracts to
improve management of services acquisitions. This year, we found
service acquisition efficiencies in Army rotary-wing aircraft and
ground system maintenance programs, food services, and the use of
advanced data analytics. We saved over $400 million and are on pace to
reach over $1 billion in budget savings from improved contract
management in fiscal year 2019. These savings and their reinvestment
into modernization are crucial to the Army and our progress towards the
force of the future.
The Army completed its first full financial statements audit in
fiscal year 2018, and the audit findings are an important part of our
larger reform effort. We fully support these audits, which help the
Army identify ways to improve resource management and business
practices. We are aggressively implementing corrective action plans and
are on track to achieve auditable financial statements across all
accounts by fiscal year 2022.
Another major area of reform is the directed reorganization of our
medical capabilities across the Army. Readiness is the primary focus
throughout this effort because the Army will continue to be responsible
for a ready medical force trained in clinical skills that are critical
to wartime missions. As we transition medical treatment facilities to
the Defense Health Agency, we are working to ensure we retain the
necessary combat medical support at each echelon to maintain readiness
and deliver premier military health care on the battlefield and in
garrison. This reorganization provides us an opportunity to optimize
the Army medical structure and plan for future medical capabilities.
The Army will continue to pursue savings in time, money, and
manpower that we can reinvest into our top priorities. These aggressive
reform efforts, will sustain our momentum as we build readiness and
increase lethality to prepare for high-intensity conflict against great
power competitors.
allies & partners
America's network of allies and partners is an unrivaled strategic
advantage the Army is actively working to enhance. Every day, the Army
works to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships through
security cooperation and security assistance. A continued commitment to
our allies and partners helps us compete against great power
competitors and bolster deterrence. In support of our allies and
partners we established Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC), which
will consist of six subordinate Security Force Assistance Brigades
(SFABs)--five Regular Army and one Army National Guard. The SFABs are
specialized units whose core mission is to train, advise, assist,
enable and accompany allied and partner nations. SFABs reduce the
demand on conventional Brigade Combat Teams enabling them to focus on
high-intensity conflict against near-peer threats. The Army deployed
its first SFAB to Afghanistan in support of the Afghan National Army to
validate the proof of concept, and we will apply what we learned to the
second SFAB deployment this year.
The Army works with Combatant Commanders to ensure our security
cooperation efforts support their priorities as we work to increase
interoperability and build partner capability. Interoperability ensures
we can train and fight alongside our allies and partners more
effectively and efficiently so we are ready to face any threat
together. In fiscal year 2018, the Army executed $115 million on 58
multinational exercises with 95 allies and partners. In fiscal year
2019, we programmed $165 million for multinational training exercises
to increase interoperability.
In Europe, we are leading a multinational battlegroup in Poland as
part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission to deter Russian
aggression. Last summer, our soldiers participated in Exercise Trident
Juncture alongside forces from every other NATO ally and two of our
closest partners, Sweden and Finland. This was the largest NATO
exercise conducted in recent years, and it demonstrated both the
Alliance's commitment and collective defense capability. We will
continue these efforts as we prepare for the division-level Defender
exercise in 2020, which will exercise the Army's force projection
capabilities. We also maintain close training and exercise
relationships with Ukraine and Georgia, key partners in the region for
promoting peace and security.
Likewise, in the Indo-Pacific region we are deepening cooperation
with our allies to protect our national and shared interests. The
United States Army presence in the Republic of Korea and Japan deters
North Korean aggression and protects United States interests. Assigned
and rotational forces participate in combined training exercises, such
as Yama Sakura in Japan and Yudh Abhyas with the Indian Army. These
exercises strengthen our relationships and build interoperability.
Furthermore, we are testing the Multi-Domain Task Force in exercises
through our Pacific Pathways program to determine the right capability
mix to counter Chinese A2AD capabilities. We will continue to use
regional training and exercises to work with new partners and leverage
multi-component and inter-service integration. This helps us to expand
the competitive space and counter Chinese influence throughout the
region.
We are assisting our partners around the world in building military
capabilities to enhance security. The Army, through its security
assistance enterprise, supports combatant command theater security
cooperation plans. We will continue to prioritize security assistance
programs to counter key threats and achieve shared defense objectives
with our allies and partners.
people & values
The Army's greatest strength is our people--the intelligent,
adaptable, and professional soldiers, civilians, and families who
sacrifice for our Nation. We take care of our people by ensuring our
soldiers are ready for combat with modern doctrine, equipment, and
realistic training while simultaneously providing their families with
the resources they need to thrive at home. Furthermore, our continued
commitment to the Army Values ensures we foster strong and resilient
units built on a foundation of trust.
Comprehensive reform of the Army's personnel management system is a
top initiative for 2019. To remain the most lethal ground combat force
in the world, we must continue to attract, develop, and retain the best
people our Nation has to offer. A competitive labor market for
America's most highly skilled talent complicates this effort. We thank
Congress for the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)
reforms and additional authorities in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, and we
will incorporate these into our new Talent Management Strategy. We are
moving the Army towards a market-based assignment process with more
flexible career models along with updates to our promotion system and
retention incentives.
The Army faced significant challenges in meeting our fiscal year
2018 recruiting goals, however, we remain committed to quality over
quantity. Despite these challenges, we recruited over 70,000 new
soldiers into our ranks, the most in any single year since 2010. To
meet our fiscal year 2019 recruiting goals, we changed our approach to
increase the pool of qualified applicants so we can attract the best
talent and improve diversity in our ranks. We restructured our
accessions enterprise to ensure unity of effort across the Army, manned
our recruiter positions at 100 percent, realigned resources to increase
our recruiting capacity, and improved our use of technology.
Additionally, we centered this recruiting initiative in 22 major
metropolitan areas across the Nation to expand our reach using micro-
targeted web advertising and local marketing. This revised strategy
expands recruiting across the Total Army to increase awareness of the
opportunities for service and to better connect the Army to the
American people.
Taking care of Army families remains a top priority, and we are
taking steps to improve quality of life programs across our
installations. This year we increased staffing rates at Army child care
centers, and we are implementing new policies to improve spouse
employment opportunities. Given recent reports of deficient conditions
in some of our family housing, the Army has taken immediate action to
ensure we are providing safe, high quality family housing. We are
visiting all Army housing and inspecting all barracks to identify
health, life, and safety issues that exist. We will work with the
Residential Communities Initiatives (RCI) companies to remediate these
issues immediately, and over the long term, to improve work order
resolution, customer satisfaction, and communication with residents. We
are also reviewing and standardizing partnership agreements and
incentive structures to ensure we hold the RCI companies accountable
for providing quality housing. The Army is fully committed to providing
a safe and secure environment on all of our installations where our
soldiers and families can thrive.
The Army Values form the bedrock of our profession and guide us in
all that we do. The Army's Senior Leaders have asked everyone to
recommit themselves to these Values, and we demand that every member of
our Army team treat each other with dignity and respect. Across the
Total Army, we continue to focus on eradicating sexual harassment and
sexual assault from our ranks. Over the past several years, we have
placed a high priority on our prevention efforts, and the Army will
continue to improve the effectiveness of our prevention efforts moving
forward. This starts by ensuring that the perpetrators of sexual
assaults are held accountable and that the victims are protected
without fear of retribution. Additionally, we are reinforcing leader
responsibility for building a climate of trust and professionalism that
emphasizes the Army Values. We are taking a similar approach with other
essential programs including Equal Opportunity, Suicide Prevention,
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, and Resilience.
conclusion
The Army mission remains constant: to deploy, fight, and win our
Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance
by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the
Joint Force. Our Army is ready today to win in the unforgiving crucible
of combat. We are supporting the National Defense Strategy and
expanding the competitive space by increasing our lethality through our
modernization effort, strengthening American alliances through combined
operations and training, and reforming our business practices to be the
best stewards of the resources Congress has provided. The Army thanks
Congress and the American people for their continued strong support,
which enables our ability to accomplish our mission. By providing
predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding, Congress will
ensure America's Army remains the most capable and lethal ground combat
force in the world.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Milley.
Both statements were excellent, and I appreciate--and we
appreciate, up here, the time you're devoting to making us
aware, and America aware, of the threats that are out there in
our peer competitors of China and Russia.
Unfortunately, the Army missed our recruiting goals in both
fiscal year 2018 and 2019, coming up short about 9,500 of what
this Committee authorized in fiscal year 2019. So, let's
start--General Milley, what's your assessment of the most
critical manning shortfalls facing the Army as we begin to try
to meet our blueprint, here, with the--what would come to your
mind as the most critical?
General Milley. We did miss the shortfall. I would add that
we did recruit and assess 70,000 soldiers into the United
States Army, which was a 10-year high, which, in combination,
is more soldiers than are in the British and Canadian armies,
combined. So, that's significant, I think. In terms of the
shortages, going forward, what we're asking for this budget is
modest growth of an increase of 2,000, which I think Senator
Reed mentioned in his opening statement. We knew we had a very
significant and high objective on the last years' recruiting,
and we've made a variety of changes inside Recruiting Command,
to include the commander. We're focusing on 22 significant
cities throughout the United States. We're looking at where the
storefronts are. We're looking at redoing the advertising
campaign. There's a variety of other initiatives. We are very
confident--we're on glidepath right now, and we're very
confident that we'll meet the recruiting and accessions
missions for this year.
Chairman Inhofe. What do you think, Secretary?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I agree. Last summer, we actually
turned up the standards. We raised the quality standards,
because quality is more important than quantity. We need to do
that. We need to raise the quality, and we need to continue to
bring more in each year, because we need to fully man the units
exist, we need to put capabilities back into----
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
Secretary Esper.--the units that we lost over the years,
such as EW--electronic warfare--and we need to add new
capabilities to our units, such as cyber. So, this is all
consistent with the vision of where we want to go. The vision
that we outlined says we definitely need to be above 500,000
soldiers by 2028.
Chairman Inhofe. That's good. What we don't want to do,
we've emphasized and you have emphasized in the past, that we
don't want to lower standards in order to increase.
Secretary Esper. Right.
Senator Reed. That's not happening now, and it's not going
to happen.
You addressed this, this goal, General Milley, of 66
percent. It's probably--you don't want to get into any detail
on that, but would you repeat what you did--what you said in
your opening statement? I think you said, in year 2022--what's
going to happen?
General Milley. We think, by our projections, if things in
the international environment remain at a constant and we
continue to get steady budgets at the rates we're getting, we
assess that we'll be at the highest levels of readiness, with
two-thirds, 66 percent, in the regular Army and 33 percent in
the Guard and Reserve, sometime in 2022, which is significant.
When I became the Chief of Staff, 3 years ago--3 and a half
years ago--we had three brigades at the highest level of
readiness. Today, we have--roughly speaking, as of December's
reports, you're looking at about 28. So, that's a significant
increase. But, we have yet to achieve that 66 percent. We are,
essentially, right now, somewhere around the high-water marks
of pre-9/11, but we need--if we're serious about Russia, China,
and what's in the NDS, with North Korea, Iran, and the violent
extremists and terrorist organizations, our assessment is, of
those 58 brigades, 66 percent in the--or 66 percent in the
regular Army, 33 percent in the Guard and Reserve. We'll----
Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
General Milley.---- achieve that in 2022.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Before I run out of time, I do want
to get a comment from each one of you on the budget. You know,
we went through a period of starvation, the last 5 years, of--
between 2010 and 2015--of actually reducing, in constant
dollars, the amount of money that came into our military. We
are now paying for that. Even with the budget increases that we
saw in 2018, 2019, what we're proposing for 2020, it still
doesn't put us where we need to be. When you go back to this
book, you're talking about an increase in--for that 5-year
period, of somewhere between 3 and 5 percent above inflation.
Even the 750 doesn't reach that. It would have to be somewhere
around 757, I think it would be. So, I'd like to have each one
of you comment as to where we are. Do you think that's a figure
that's going to be adequate to take care of the needs that we
have in our assessment?
Secretary Esper. Mr. Chairman, you summed it up well. I
mean, the needs will always exceed the means, but we think, if
Congress passes this budget, we will continue on a good
trajectory with regard to restoring readiness and modernizing
the Army. That's really the key thing right now.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
General Milley. I concur with the Secretary. As you well
know, Chairman, it's all related to the amount of risk we are
willing to take relative----
Chairman Inhofe. Exactly.
General Milley.--to the tasks.
Chairman Inhofe. Exactly.
General Milley. So, it's all about risk.
Chairman Inhofe. We understand that.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General Milley, last night we received
notice that the Department of Defense was reprogramming $1
billion from the Army to support border wall construction. This
is being done without approval by Congress, which is a custom
that both sides have relied upon for many, many, many years to
ensure that our constitutional authority over spending is
maintained. The Army also has a $2.3 billion unfunded
requirements for fiscal year 2020. Does this $1 billion
reprogramming support Army requirements, or could the funds be
spent better elsewhere to improve readiness and maintain the
Army?
Secretary Esper. The funds do not affect our fiscal year
2020 budget, Senator Reed. With regard to fiscal year 2019,
it--those funds came out of our Military Personnel (MILPERS)
wedge, if you will--military personnel--that we could not fill
that end strength. So, that's where those came from. The--
otherwise, the fiscal year 2019 budget approved by this
Congress on time meets our readiness needs.
Senator Reed. You still do have $2.5 billion of unfunded
readiness, including things like aviation readiness----
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed.--whole host of issues that the money could
have been used for.
Secretary Esper. That's true.
Senator Reed. In a sense, you are foregoing at least the
immediate use of those funds for military purposes, like
aviation readiness. Is that correct?
Secretary Esper. Like I said, the fiscal year 2019 budget
was more than adequate for our needs, but, you know, clearly,
with--there--as I said, to--in response to the Chairman, the
needs always exceed the means. So, yes, we could have used that
money for--as the other services, for--to continue to improve
our readiness.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
The Army's unfunded requirements list included $564 million
for key infrastructure projects. As I mentioned in my opening
statement, the Committee has received the list of military
construction projects that will be--or could be included in
order to resource the proposed wall along the southern border.
These will obviously include Army construction projects. Given
the Army has identified more than half a billion in unfunded
infrastructure requirements for the fiscal year 2020 budget,
how detrimental will it be to the Army readiness if we cancel
or delay these projects?
Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, we have to see what
projects will be teed up for repurposing. I think, once we see
those initial requests, we can make a better estimate of what
the impact will be.
Senator Reed. One of the areas, too, that's been identified
are projects overseas, the European Defense Initiative and
other areas. We often rely upon host and partner contributions
to facilitate those constructions. They schedule sometimes on
calendar years or fiscal years. So, what impact would we have
on delaying those projects?
Secretary Esper. Again, I'm familiar with some of those
projects. It includes everything from schools, I think, to
warehouses. We'll have to, again, assess, based on--once DHS,
Department of Homeland Security, makes the request to DOD, and
then, from there, DOD, I assume, will prioritize the projects,
and we will do our own reprioritizing within the Army
submission and assess the impacts at that time.
Senator Reed. Section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA
asked for each military service to submit the top 10 list of
most vulnerable installations to climate change, extreme
weather, or whatever appropriate terminology that you want to
use. Unfortunately, to date, we have not received that letter.
Could you commit to sending us the top 10 list of Army
facilities that are vulnerable to weather effects?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. Pursuant to NDAA 2018 Section 335, the
Army has been evaluating the effect of the six specified
climate impacts: recurrent flooding, drought, desertification,
wildfires, thawing permafrost, and rising sea tides.
The Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory
(CRREL), home of the United States Army Corp of Engineers'
Climate Preparedness and Resilience Community of Practice,
created a model to assess the risk to individual Army
installations. While the work in ongoing, the table below lists
the top ten most at-risk installations in the 50 United States.
Assessment of installations overseas and in U.S. territories is
forthcoming. The analysis is based on climate science only and
is not influenced by strategic or mission considerations.
The Army will continue to work closely with other leaders
throughout the Department of Defense and with Congress to
identify corrective actions and implement steps to enhance our
readiness and capability in the face of climate related
threats. Thank you for your interest in this matter, as well as
your continued support of the Army.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary driver of Secondary driver
Installation State climate effects of climate effects
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yuma Proving Ground....................................... AZ Desertification Drought
Fort Irwin................................................ CA Desertification Drought
Fort Huachuca............................................. AZ Desertification Drought
Fort Bliss................................................ TX Desertification Drought
White Sands Missile Range................................. NM Desertification Drought
Camp Roberts.............................................. CA Desertification Drought
Hawthorne Army Depot...................................... NV Desertification Drought
Tooele Army Depot......................................... UT Desertification Drought
Military Ocean Terminal Concord........................... CA Riverine Flooding Drought
Pueblo Chemical Depot..................................... CO Desertification Drought
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: All of the top ten are subject to riverine flooding
and wildfires. Military Ocean Terminal Concord is also subject
to coastal flooding.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
Gentlemen, appreciate your service.
General Milley, let's talk about Poland. The Army's there
on a rotational basis now. The Government of Poland has asked
us to look seriously at a permanent station there. Section 1280
of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA required a DOD report on the
feasibility and advisability of permanently stationing United
States forces in the Republic of Poland. Do you know the status
of that report? It was due March 1st. What can you tell us
about your opinion as to how that would work, sir?
General Milley. Thank you, Senator. I do not know the
status of the actual report, and I'll have to get back to you
with that. I'm not sure where that's at in the pipeline sort of
thing.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Milley. Given that discussions with the Polish on
the $2 billion offer are still ongoing, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Policy) sent an interim letter to
Congress offering to provide periodic classified updates in
person until discussions have concluded. A physical report will
be provided once discussions are complete.
Senator Wicker. All right. Just----
General Milley. But, as far as personal----
Senator Wicker.--just give us your assessment.
General Milley. Yeah. My assessment, I am in the camp of
recommending rotational forces to Europe, in general, and
Poland, in specific. There are some forces that should and
could be forward-stationed, some enabling-type things, some
infrastructure. But, for the most part, I recommend, and have
recommended, rotational forces, for a couple of reasons. From
the analysis I've seen, rotational forces are more cost-
efficient, cheaper, than permanently-based. Secondly is, you
don't have to build schools and post exchange's (PX's) and all
the infrastructure that goes with permanent-based forces. Third
is, I think you get much more operational flexibility for
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, because he can move
forces around much easier than he can if they're tied down to
bases--permanent bases, with families, et cetera. Fourth is,
you get a strategic benefit from rotating forces, because we
exercise the strategic muscle memory of TRANSCOM
[Transportation Command] to move large-scale forces back and
forth to Europe. There are some other reasons, but bottom line
is, I recommend rotational forces, with some exceptions for
infrastructure and enablers, command and control, some other
things that would be necessary at the higher end. But, for the
most part, most forces, I recommend rotational.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Some of the things we're mindful of with regard to Russia
are Russia rapidly seizing NATO territory, reinforcing it and
presenting it as a fait accompli scenario to the West. Do you
think the rotational idea that you've enunciated is sufficient
to meet those challenges?
General Milley. I do, for a couple of reasons. One is,
depending on how you structure the rotations--in the National
Defense Strategy, we talk about dynamic force employment, so
you want to keep an adversary guessing as to where you're going
to position forces around the globe at a moment in time. By
rotating forces, you can pick and choose your own schedule, you
can do heel-to-toe, so you have the same strategic effect,
operational effect, as permanent-based, or you can have
episodic, where the adversary doesn't necessarily know when and
where you're going to introduce forces of different sizes. I
think, depending on the size of the force, the disposition, and
the rotational schedule, it would be sufficient to enhance the
deterrent effect of United States forces in Europe.
Senator Wicker. Did DOD ask for your input in formulating
the report that is now due?
General Milley. I'll have to go back and check to see if
they specifically asked for Army input. I've given my input on
numerous meetings, numerous occasions, to both DOD, EUCOM, and
the Army. I'm at a loss, Senator, as to the specific report
that you're referring to, whether I inputted that.
Senator Wicker. All right.
General Milley. I input a lot of things, and I'll have to
go back and doublecheck----
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
General Milley.--and see if that specific----
Senator Wicker. Appreciate that. If you'd get back to us.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Milley. The report has not yet been written. When
discussions with the Polish Government have concluded, the Army
will provide input to the report.
Senator Wicker. Let me just ask, then, General, about the
idea of a new rotary wing program called the Future Attack
Reconnaissance aircraft. It is meant to fill the capability gap
in the role of armed reconnaissance and attack in complex,
degraded operation environments. Can you describe, in an
unclassified setting, what type of capabilities we're talking
about there, and how such an aircraft would fare against
Russian and Chinese threats?
General Milley. As Secretary Esper mentioned, in terms of
these six priority areas, one of which is future vertical lift,
and the FAR [future attack reconnaissance] aircraft, which is
the one you're referring to is one of those programs underneath
the future vertical lift. The Apache helicopter is one of the
big five that came in in the 1980s, so it's been in now for 40
years or so. That particular aircraft, although it's deadly--
it's a great weapon system, the Apache--it's going to need to
be replaced in the out years. So, we're looking for an aircraft
that, without going into specific requirements and
classifications, essentially goes further, can see further, can
acquire targets further, and can engage at greater ranges than
currently exists, and has greater legs, can fly further with a
greater payload of weapon systems. A significant improvement
over that which exists today.
Senator Wicker. Can you tell the Committee how soon you
envision moving in that direction?
General Milley. We're already moving in that direction, in
terms of research, development, and the development of the
prototypes. In terms of actually fielding the weapon, or
fielding the helicopter, that, I think, is still a moving
target with industry, because we want to see the prototypes and
we want to do proof of principle on some of the technologies.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Esper and General Milley, for your
testimony this morning.
Secretary Esper, I was pleased to see a story in--a report
this morning that said that the Army had backed down on the
Freedom of Information request relative to contamination from
PFAS components. I just wanted to applaud the fact that you had
decided to waive those fees. We have a significant
contamination from PFOS and PFOA at the former Pease Air Force
Base, and the Air Force has been very responsive to the
community of Portsmouth and New Hampshire on that. I hope the
Army will be as responsive.
I want to go back to pick up on Senator Reed's question
about the $1 billion that is coming for the President's border
wall, because the reports--the news reports have suggested that
that $1 billion is counterdrug money. Can you--you mentioned
that it was coming from a different fund, in your testimony--
can you clarify where, exactly, that billion dollars is coming
from?
Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. My understanding--and I
would obviously defer to OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense], because it's their decision, of course--is, that is
money that was in the fiscal year 2019 budget for the Army for
military personnel. When we adjusted our end-strength number
down, it freed up the 1 billion or so military personnel money,
and that money is now being reprogrammed into what's called the
284 counterdrug account. Then that is the means by which it is
leveraged to build the necessary barriers that were outlined, I
think, in the notification sent to Congress.
Senator Shaheen. So, it's actually being programmed into
the counterdrug account----
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. I'm----
Senator Shaheen.--is what you're saying?
Secretary Esper. I'm not familiar with all the movements.
Again, it's not my decision or action, but, my understanding,
it gets reprogrammed from the DOD account into the 284 account,
and eventually ends up with the Corps of Engineers.
Senator Shaheen. Can you or General Milley speak to the
reports that have suggested that a number of the dollars that
are being talked about to be taken from military construction
are coming from projects in Europe that are going to be needed
for our various activities in defense of Europe and the West?
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. As you know, as you've read,
there are things that, as I understand it, will not be
included, will not be eligible, if you will, that would be--and
it was our recommendation, ``Do not include barracks or
dormitories or housing.'' Then the decision was also made to
not include any fiscal year 2019 projects that aren't awarded,
I think, before the end of this fiscal year. That leaves a
numbers of projects. We would need to take a look at the final
list. Those projects are all over the world and the United
States, of course. Then I'd have to look at the eaches to kind
of--and we--and the Army staff will now have to look at, How do
we prioritize those, based on MILCON thrust typically being--
begins with readiness and power projection.
Senator Shaheen. So, are any of those funds coming from the
European Deterrence Initiative?
Secretary Esper. I don't know, Senator, because I don't
think any decisions have been made yet on how much money needs
to be drawn and, therefore, which projects, because I think OSD
has available to them Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps
projects to choose from in order to fund what they want to do
next.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly hope that none of those
dollars are going to be taken from funds that are needed to
protect the national security of this country.
I understand that there has been a proposal to downsize or
eliminate the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
that's at the Army War College in Carlisle. I wonder if you can
give us the status of that. I'm particularly interested because
they're the entity that's charged with implementing the Women,
Peace, and Security legislation. If that's going to be
downsized or eliminated, what's going to happen to that
initiative?
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. In the context of National
Defense Strategy, we were told that, while we shift to higher-
intensity conflict, we need to maintain proficiency in
irregular warfare. So, the Army decided to stand up what we
don't have, which is an irregular warfare office. In the
context of reform, what we've done is, we looked at a number of
programs throughout TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] and
everywhere else to make sure we moved money and people
internally. The assessment was that we had nearly 50 people at
the Peacekeeping Institute, that we could accomplish the same
mission with fewer people. That's what was done, at the
recommendation of Training and Doctrine Command, is to
reallocate people while preserving the functions, including the
one you mentioned. Further reform also included aligning that
Institute, because peacekeeping is a part of the mission set--
aligning it much more closely with Fort Leavenworth, which is
the home of Army doctrine, so we have a greater connectivity.
We think we've got a more manageable set, more focused and
better connected, both to Army doctrine and while retaining the
connections at Carlisle, if you will, and with the joint
community. We don't see that as degrading their mission, but we
felt 50 people was more than enough, that we could reduce that
some in order to help build the irregular warfare office that
we need for the Army.
Senator Shaheen. So, what's going to happen to the Women,
Peace, and Security Initiative?
Secretary Esper. My understanding is, that is--that
function is being preserved.
Senator Shaheen. Where?
Secretary Esper. At Carlisle, is my understanding. I'll
get--I'll confirm and get back to you, though.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute (PKSOI) will be reorganized and will remain at
Carlisle Barracks, with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort
Leavenworth, KS, taking command of both PKSOI and the newly
established Army Irregular Warfare Proponent Office. The Army
established the Irregular Warfare Proponent Office at Fort
Leavenworth, KS in order to implement the National Defense
Strategy; it will work alongside PKSOI to support Joint
peacekeeping and stability operations issues. No military
members or civilian employees currently at PKSOI will be
directed to move to Fort Leavenworth as part of the
reorganization. Regarding the Army's role and responsibility to
the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) mission, the CAC will
assume all related tasks to WPS at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
With the ongoing transition, CAC and PKSOI are making efforts
to ensure there is minimal reduction in capability to support
WPS during the transition. Both organizational transitions will
take place no later than October 2019.
Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you.
Secretary Esper. There's nothing--my understanding is,
nothing is moving out of Carlisle, but there is a
reorganization of the reporting chain to improve the
connectivity, again, back with Army doctrine at Leavenworth.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you----
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer.
Senator Shaheen.--very much. That makes sense, Secretary.
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General, I have the honor of representing
the men and women of the Nebraska National Guard, and I want to
take a moment to recognize their work. For the past week to 10
days, they've been active across our State, responding to the
catastrophic flooding that Nebraska has experienced. They're
working around the clock to save lives and protect property.
They are truly the best representation of what it means to be a
soldier in the United States Army National Guard, and all of us
in Nebraska are deeply thankful for their efforts.
My question for you is, With the additional funding for
modernization and rebuilding readiness gaps projected for
fiscal year-2020, how will you be working to ensure that
adequate investments are made across the Active, Reserve, and
the Guard components?
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. First of all, our hearts go
out the people of Nebraska for what they're going through right
now. I'm sure it's going to take some time, so we really feel
for them, and, you're right, a lot of kudos to the Nebraska
Guard for what they're doing. It's a tremendous use of our
Guard. I remember my days in the Guard, the same thing. It's a
mission we're very proud of.
Our commitment is to man the total Army and to field the
total Army with the equipment needed to do all the missions.
So, we've made that commitment, particularly with aviation
assets, which are being in heavy--heavily used right now in
Nebraska. That's our commitment.
The Guard is no longer a strategic Reserve. It is an
operational force, and it's proved itself very well over the
past many years, along with the United States Army Reserve.
Senator Fischer. General?
General Milley. If I could just add one comment. The United
States Army's tasked, within the broader national security
establishment, to conduct large-scale ground combat operations,
campaign quality over extended periods of time. The United
States Army cannot execute that mission, that wartime mission,
defense of the United States--cannot do it without the National
Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. We're the only one of the four
services with over 50 percent of the force in the Reserve
component. We have 53 percent in the Guard and U.S. Army
Reserve. Navy has very tiny Reserve. Marines have a tiny
Reserve. The Air Force, about 25 percent are in the National--
Air National Guard. So, the Army is dependent upon the National
Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve to execute our wartime mission.
It cannot be done without it. So, we take that into
consideration, and we ensure that, through the budgeting
process and the prioritization, that the Guard and the U.S.
Army Reserve are carefully considered and they're in all the
meetings. We want to ensure that they are properly manned,
trained, and equipped.
Senator Fischer. Do you see the role of the Guard changing
in any way as we transition to the goals of the National
Defense Strategy? Do you see that component having to change in
any way?
General Milley. Yes.
Senator Fischer. How so?
General Milley. The--I think the OPTEMPO [Operational
Tempo] of the Guard will increase for selected units within the
Guard on our annual basis. We're already designating them with
the head of the Army Guard, Tim--General Kadavy. Those units,
the amount of training time they do per year will increase. We
increased the Combat Training Center rotations from two to
four. We intend to use those National Guard units on rotations
to either Europe, Korea, Kosovo, the Middle East, wherever. So,
fully incorporate the National Guard into the operational
rotations.
Senator Fischer. With that increase in tempo, do you see an
increase needed for personnel, or is recruitment going to have
to increase for the Guard?
General Milley. Yes, for both. Within this budget, as
mentioned, a 2,000 modest increase, rise over run, a few
thousand a year, for the regular Army, 500 a year for the Army
Guard, and 250 for the Army Reserve. So, slight increases over
time until we achieve our end-state objectives sometime in the
2028 period.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Secretary Esper. Senator, I think the other challenge for
the Guard and the Reserve will be in future conflict with
Russia and China, is the ability to mobilize and deploy
quickly, much more quickly than they have, because I don't
believe Russia and China will give us the time to build combat
power in the future.
Senator Fischer. I would assume you have plans on how to
help the Guard do that.
Secretary Esper. We have to work on that. That's--yes,
ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Are you working with General Kadavy? Does
he then work with our local Guard?
Secretary Esper. We----
Senator Fischer. Our State people?
Secretary Esper.--see General Kadavy every day, and----
Senator Fischer. Who is also a Nebraskan.
Secretary Esper. General Kadavy and his counterpart,
General Luckey, of the United States Army Reserve. Again, we
meet as one team, one Army, and they are fully involved in all
of our considerations.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
General Milley, in your opening statement, you mentioned
that the Army is focusing on using directed energy for its
mobile short-range air defense, or MSHORAD, capability. Is the
Army still on track to field battalions of air-defense Strykers
with directed-energy technology?
General Milley. We're on track, in terms of establishing
prototype systems and in the overall program, yes. So, we're on
track, on budget, and we still intend to do that.
Senator Heinrich. What's the timeline look, moving into the
future? How important is continued investment in directed
energy----
Secretary Esper. We're----
Senator Heinrich.--to this project?
Secretary Esper. We're looking at a couple of batteries
deployed to Europe----
Senator Heinrich. Secretary?
Secretary Esper.--in fiscal year 2021, Senator.
Senator Heinrich. Great.
Secretary Esper. I think it's--so, it's very exciting. It
reflects--directed energy is one of our big-five, if you will,
technologies, along with hypersonics and artificial
intelligence and robotics. We're--the Army's doing a lot of
good work, and working with sister services, on directed
energy.
Senator Heinrich. I look forward to continued progress in
that area.
Secretary, I also want to ask you--the Commandant of the
Marine Corps recently warned Pentagon leaders that deployments
to the southwest border and funding transfers under the
President's emergency declaration have posed, quote,
``unacceptable risk to the Marine Corps combat readiness and
solvency,'' end quote. Specifically, he stated that marines
will not participate in planned training and exercises in
Indonesia, in Scotland, in Mongolia, and will reduce their
participation in joint exercises with Australia and South
Korea. Have there been similar impacts to the Army when it
comes to training exercises?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I may defer to the Chief on
this----
Senator Heinrich. Okay.
Secretary Esper.--because he's much more involved, in terms
of watching training and readiness. But, we have spoken with
commanders and with the 2800-or-so title 10 soldiers and 1900-
or-so title 32 soldiers. In the scale of a 1.1-million-man
Army, the impacts on readiness, if there are any, are
negligible, if you will. It's not unlike when we deploy to
tackle Ebola in western Africa or flooding in Puerto Rico. So,
it's part of our mission set that we accept.
But, in terms of specifics, Chief, I don't know if you want
to----
Senator Heinrich. General Milley. Maybe you can speak to
whether any Army units canceled either home-station training
events or overseas participation.
General Milley. Anytime an Army unit goes on an unplanned
contingency operation, whether it's Hurricane Katrina or Puerto
Rico or Ebola or goes to Afghanistan or wherever--doesn't
matter where it is--they're going to cancel whatever they were
doing prior. So, the short answer would be yes, for the
specific units. The larger answer, though--Does it impact the
readiness of the Army? The answer is no, it doesn't have a
significant impact at all. It's a very modest, negligible
impact on the Army as a whole, because of--primarily because of
scale, which is slightly different scale than what the Marines
are talking about in that letter.
So, our assessment is that the units that are going down
there, primarily engineers, MPs, some aviation, transportation,
medical units, they're within their mission profile, in terms
of what the tasks that they're actually doing, so we don't see
a significant degradation in readiness at this time for the
Army.
Senator Heinrich. Can you provide us with just a list of
what exercises may have been impacted, either at home or
abroad?
General Milley. Absolutely. Sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Milley. The Army did not cancel any training
exercises in fiscal year 2019 because of unplanned or
unbudgeted factors.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
Secretary Esper, I know last year you and I worked quite
hard to accelerate a Military Construction (MILCON) project at
White Sands Missile Range, and Congress actually appropriated
$40 million to replace the 57-year-old information facility
that actually recently caught fire; it's so old. That facility
is used in the development and testing of our most advanced
weapon systems, things like the Standard Missile-2, the Patriot
missile systems, and others. In the era of big data, this kind
of technological facility is critical for transmitting the vast
amounts of data generated during military testing. I am raising
this simply because this is just one of the projects we've seen
as potentially on the list for the chopping block to transfer
those funds to the border wall. Do you believe that this is the
kind of project that's at risk?
Secretary Esper. Well, first of all, Senator, thank you. I
did enjoy my visit to White Sands last year, and it was very
helpful, instructive to me. I--thank you for that.
I'd have to look into the details of what you're referring.
I'm sorry to hear about the fire. I was not tracking that. But,
I'd have to get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. I will work to preserve as many Army
projects as possible, with a prioritization on projects that
directly impact Army readiness, our ability to project power,
military housing, and barracks, but ultimately the Army will
follow direction and guidance provided from OSD.
Secretary Esper. As I said up front, once we see the list
of MILCON projects that may be put up for consideration,
that'll be an OSD call. We'll have to assess that, based on the
prioritization we put to them, and then get back with you.
I know one of the things that--in the OSD budget--in the
DOD budget that OSD put in there was a--this $3.6 billion, if
you will, to backfill any type of MILCON that might be used to
mitigate any type of thing--projects like that.
Senator Heinrich. I think the sooner we can get our hands
on what is really on the list, versus off the list, then we can
have a much more informed conversation.
Secretary Esper. Agreed.
Senator Heinrich. I've got one more question on AI, which I
will just submit for the record. But, I look forward to hearing
the Army's plans on that front, as well.
Secretary Esper. I'll just say one thing on Artificial
Intelligence (AI), if I can have 30 seconds. I think the Chief
and I would agree that AI has the promise of maybe
fundamentally changing the character of warfare. Whoever gets
there first will have overmatch for years to come. So, we are
putting significant investments into AI. In fact, I was in
Pittsburgh about 2 months ago, doing both recruiting for the
Army and then also opening up our AI Task Force at Carnegie-
Mellon University, which is pulling in industry and schools
from all across the country. So, AI is very, very important.
Senator Heinrich. I'm glad to hear that.
Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
I particularly want to compliment both of you, as well as
Under Secretary McCarthy, for the very painstaking effort you
put in, in going through the Army budget, line by line, to find
the savings to fund so many of these critical modernization
projects. One doesn't have to agree with every single decision
you made, and I suspect there'll be some Members of this
Committee that won't agree with every single decision, to
realize it was a long overdue project and that it's responding
to Congress's long-stated desire to see that we have that kind
of effort. So, thank you very much for doing that for the Army.
General Milley, maybe you'll have a chance to do that for the
entire Armed Forces a few months from now.
General Milley, I want to return to something that you said
to Senator Wicker. He was asking you about the presence of our
troops in Poland--and, presumably, Baltics, as well--and the
concept of permanent basing versus rotational forces. You made
a pretty strong case for the advantages of rotational forces
over permanent basing. Would that not apply to Germany as well
as Poland?
General Milley. It could. In fact, we are rotating. We're
rotating a brigade right now. There's two brigades in Europe,
as you know, the 173rd, down in Italy, and then the Stryker
Brigade, up in Germany, and we rotate an armored brigade combat
team through Germany right now. What is permanent, the two
brigades plus some infrastructure--artillery, some aviation,
some command and control. That's what's in Germany today.
Compared to, say, the Cold War, where we had 300,000 troops, or
something like that, in Germany. We're sort of doing a
combination of both, rotational for the combat units, and
permanent for the infrastructure. That's something similar to
what I would recommend for any other part of Europe, for that
matter.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Milley. We're doing it----
Senator Cotton. Yeah.
General Milley.--in Korea, as well, by the way.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Just listening to your response to Senator Wicker,
juxtaposed to the announcements in the last few days that
Germany is going to slash its defense budget, I thought was
pretty telling. In the end, I don't think we can expect
Americans and American soldiers to care more about Germany's
security than Germans do. It's troubling that they're going the
opposite direction of so many other of our NATO allies.
Secretary Esper, I want to talk about the THAAD missile
defense system. Is the Army going to take full ownership of
that from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I know that's under
consideration. It's being discussed in great detail. I think we
could, but what's important is that the budget would come with
that if that happens. So, we just can't accept the program
without all the budget authority, to include the research
aspects of it, as well. So, I think that's still being worked.
But, we don't want to get stuck with a bill.
Senator Cotton. Yeah, sure. What's the timeline in which
you think you might make that decision?
Secretary Esper. I don't know, Senator. I think that's--
it's really an OSD decision, if you will. But, we can get back
to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. Recent high-level discussions between the
MDA and the Army have led to a unified position that no
transfer of the THAAD and AN/TPY-2 programs occur. THAAD and
AN/TPY-2 are BMD-purpose built systems that are fully
integrated into the MDA Ballistic Missile Defense System
(BMDS). Transfer would risk disruption to this tightly coupled
integration into the BMDS architecture and MDA-managed
configuration control of THAAD and AN/TPY-2. The THAAD and AN/
TPY-2 programs are jointly managed with the Army and fully
integrated as Army capabilities as demonstrated by multiple
THAAD forward deployments and stationed batteries. MDA has
initiated a modernization program for the AN/TPY-2 radar to
increase the THAAD weapon system capability. If a transfer is
directed, the Army has previously stated that all the upgrades
must be completed prior to transfer and all associated funding
for THAAD would need to be transferred as well. Additionally,
any separation of funds between the MDA RDT&E and Army for
Procurement would result in budgetary and programmatic
inefficiencies for both MDA and the Army putting THAAD
development and the force at risk. Finally, a transfer could
also have adverse effects on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) such
as delays and resultant higher costs which could jeopardize
current and future agreements.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
I'm pleased to see that one of the big modernization
prospectus--or lines of effort is long-range precision fires,
what many just call ``artillery,'' expanding the range and
lethality of artillery. Could you please explain the concept
for the so-called extended-range cannon, what it would mean to
have a gun that has that kind of range, that--those kind of
fire power to it?
Secretary Esper. I'll take the first shot, and then----
Senator Cotton. Sure.
Secretary Esper.--no pun intended--and then let the Chief
talk to it.
But, clearly, as the Chairman said up front, when it comes
to artillery systems--the system, we are outmatched by the
Russians. The extended-range cannon artillery--and I was able
to go to Yuma, Arizona, and see it shoot--provides us
incredible reach. When we talk about deploying to the Baltics
or Poland, when you think about a gun that can shoot around 70-
plus kilometers--and we think we can get further--it can be a
game changer for us, in terms of reach, and, more importantly,
in terms of deterrence, from the get-go. So, this is one of
the--long-range precision fires is the top priority of the six,
and we're moving out at both the tactical, the operational, and
the strategic level.
General Milley. Yeah, I mean, we made it the number-one
priority because fires are fundamental to the American way of
war, which is all about maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is--
fires with movement, in combination, equals maneuver. We have
lost a little bit, relative to some near-peer adversaries--
China, Russia, example--with respect to cannon and rocket
artillery. So, we intend to regain the comparative advantage
that we've had, at least in modern history, in that weapon
system. That's really, really important to us. Extended Range
Cannon Artillery (ERCA) is one of multiple programs in the
entire concept of long-range precision fires that go everywhere
from the tactical, the 30-to-40-kilometer range, the 70 for the
ERCA, and beyond, up to 499, for the limits of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and beyond that for
some other systems. So, it's an entire suite of capabilities to
regain American dominance in the area of long-range fires.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
One final question. Going to have a lot of vehicles, a lot
of aircraft, a lot of guns coming online in the coming years.
General Milley, you and I have discussed this before. No
soldier wants to ride in or shoot an acronym. I hope there's a
plan to come up with good names for all these things, like the
Bradley and the Abrams.
General Milley. We were thinking the Inhofe and the Reed.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. We'll have the----
General Milley. Or maybe the Cotton.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. Have to stick with the Inhofe and the Reed,
but I do hope that there are going to be cool names for our
soldiers to ride in and shoot for many years to come, as
they've had for so long. Not an acronym.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.
I want to follow up on some of the questions related to the
reprogramming of a billion dollars from the personnel accounts.
You know, this is--certainly it was the decision made without
the approval of Congress. As you know, a majority of Congress
has actually voted against the President's national emergency
declaration. So, basically, this is an end-around Congress,
which I think is unacceptable. But, I think it was also
interesting that, as you're moving a billion dollars from
personnel funds to the DHS, the Army, just yesterday, sent the
Congress a list of 2.3 billion in unfunded priorities, included
more than 1 billion for readiness requirements and 247 million
for modernization. So, given you're reprogramming a billion
from personnel and Reserve personnel accounts to DHS
counternarcotics account, just curious, from both of you
gentlemen, how is the southern border a greater priority than
Army readiness and modernization?
Secretary Esper. Senator, on the first part, the billion
dollars from the military personnel was that--again, that delta
of 6500 soldiers that we were unable to fill, along with others
from the end-strength number. That was an amount of money that
we----
Senator Peters. I understand that.
Secretary Esper. Okay.
Senator Peters. I understand where it came from. But,
still, you've reprogrammed that for the southern border. You
haven't come to Congress to ask for it. So, that's an end-
around.
Secretary Esper. We returned it to OSD, and OSD is using it
to meet the requirements set out in the--I think, the national
emergency declaration established by the Commander in Chief.
Senator Peters. That has been rejected by Congress.
Correct?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. You sent a list for 2.3 billion in unfunded
priorities that could have been met with this 1 billion that
originated for the--as you described. So, my question is--you
made that a priority, as opposed to readiness and
modernization, and yet you're here, telling us readiness and
modernization is a priority, and yet it seems as if you've
prioritized the southern border over Army readiness and
modernization. Tell me why.
Secretary Esper. Senator, the fiscal year 2019 budget, even
with--because the money was for the military personnel that we
cannot fill, the fiscal year 2019 budget meets our readiness
and modernization goals. As I said up front, the needs of the
services will always exceed the means. So, that's just a state
of--the state of things. It's always been that way. So, I don't
see it the way you've characterized it, if you will.
Senator Peters. Well, you had a billion dollars you could
have transferred to your list of unfunded priorities that you
submitted to us just yesterday.
Secretary Esper. Yes. Well, that was for fiscal year 2020.
This is fiscal year 2019 money we're talking about. But, you're
correct, that's--as I said----
Senator Peters. I mean, that's your----
Secretary Esper.--as I said to Senator Reed up front, we
could have used that money to continue to improve readiness.
That's fair.
Senator Peters. But, you're saying the southern border is
more important than readiness.
Secretary Esper. I'm not--I'm not saying that. I'm saying
that we--the Department of Defense made decisions based on what
the President set out as priorities, and we are following
through, we are executing.
Senator Peters. General Milley, is readiness and
modernization a priority over the southern border?
General Milley. Readiness is the Army's number-one
priority; and modernization is future readiness, and that's our
number-two priority. But, I--you know, Senator, I'm a soldier.
Priorities and national security priorities are established by
civilian control of the military. We're given those as matters
of policy. When they're given to us, we execute. So, it is not
for me to say one is more important than the other, relative to
the entire national security of the United States. But, within
the Army, we've said priority one is readiness, priority two is
modernization. But, within the Nation, that's not our call.
That's the call of the United States Congress and the
President of the United States. We were told to move that
money. We gave it back to DOD. DOD's applying it in accordance
with presidential priorities.
Senator Peters. Of course, the Congress has spoken on this
issue. We know that.
But, a question in the remaining time, for both the
Secretary and General Milley, deals with the Army's Future
Command. I just want to get a sense--a better sense of how you
see that fitting in with existing Army activities.
Particularly, how does the Future Command work with the Army
science and technology (S&T) community? What do you expect to
see happening, in terms of that Future Command, with what we
have now?
Secretary Esper. Senator, first of all, the acquisition
enterprise, if you will, under Dr. Jette, Army Acquisition,
works hand-in-glove with Army Futures Command. In the Army
Futures Command, what he's given us is unit--what we say, unity
of effort, unity of command. So, in the past, where the
acquisition enterprise was spread out across the Army, with no
clear one person in charge, there were multiple people in
charge, what we've done with Futures Command, by standing it up
last summer, was really unify it under General Murray, in
Austin, and that--what that also did was, we moved out of--we
moved, organizationally, our S&T enterprise under him, as well.
So, now his responsibility is to think about the future,
Futures Command. How will the Russians and Chinese, say, fight
in the year 2035, 20---2045, if you will, and then, how does he
start looking at the capabilities we will need to deter and
defeat them at that point in time? Then he can think--he has
the ability now to direct the S&T side of the house. In this
budget, we shifted 80 percent--we continue to shift of 80
percent of our S&T dollars to those modernization priorities.
That's his call, to make sure that we're all lined up, aligned,
focusing on what the future threats are. That's his--that's a
big part of his job. That eventually turns into requirements.
Senator Peters. Right.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your leadership for our
men and women in the Army. We certainly do appreciate that.
Increasing our warfighting readiness does remain the Army's
number-one priority. Thank you for emphasizing that over and
over again. However, we do understand that sexual assault
within our Army formation is not only a serious criminal
offense, but it also degrades our readiness. It also degrades
discipline, morale, unit cohesiveness, and going back again to
the combat readiness. So, to both of you, please. We'll start
with you, Secretary. What is the Army doing to continue to
combat the problem of sexual assault in the military? Are you
seeing an increase in the leadership in our culture, where we
are addressing the issue of sexual assault?
Secretary Esper. Senator, thank you for that question.
You've hit a number of good points.
Let me say up front, there is no room in the United States
Army for sexual assault and sexual harassment, period. We will
not tolerate it. It's not just a readiness issue. It's contrary
to our values as an institution. We are working very hard to
continue to get the--and we see it, statistically. Prevalence
over the years is coming down, and reporting is going up. Those
are good trend lines. We have another report coming out in a
month or so. We'll see what that looks like. But, what we've
done in the last year is, rather than focus on soldiers doing
online training and sending them off to an auditorium to get a
speech or whatever, we are putting the chain of command back
involved in teaching the importance of dignity and respect for
everybody, and not tolerating sexual assault and harassment.
So, what we want to do is leverage the culture of the Army and
the chain of command to get at this. My experience, my view,
the commanders' view, as well, is, that's the way you get at
this. I think we've set it aside for too long. It's much like
housing. We--the chain of command stepped aside a little bit.
We need to get back in the game. That, on top of all the
education we're doing, the training, the stand-downs, I think
will continue to move the needle on sexual assault and
harassment until we get it down to zero.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I do think that's important. We
do need to focus on those issues. But, active engagement by our
leadership is very, very important. Thank you, Secretary.
General Milley, would you like to make some comments?
General Milley. I would echo the comments of the Secretary,
that it's not tolerated. We are deeply, deeply committed to
that. From a soldier's standpoint, from a commander's
standpoint, this is blue-on-blue. This is a friendly force
inflicting a casualty on a friendly force. There's no room for
that. There's no room for it with bullets on a live-fire range,
there's no room for it with bullets in combat, and there's no
room for it with sexual assault in a barracks or at a party or
wherever.
There are some key things that we are doing. The chain of
command here is absolutely critical. The ownership of the
small-unit leader all the way up to the senior-most leaders of
the Army, chain of command engagement is critical to resolving
this. I know there are people who think the chain of command
should not be involved in this, from a legal standpoint, UCMJ
[Uniform Code of Military Justice]. I disagree 100 percent with
that. The chain of command has got to own it, wrap its arms
around it, and prevent it. Alcohol, we know, is a contributing
factor in almost 50 percent of the cases. We know that almost
all of the cases occur on weekends, Fridays and Saturday
nights, between midnight and 0300. We know that a lot of the
victims, or most of the victims, are young women. There are
male victims, but most of them are young women between 19 and
24 years old, newly assigned to a unit, in the first 60 days.
We know that it normally involves a party and there's alcohol
involvement.
So, there are things that we know we can do. We can control
the barracks, we can control the night, we can ensure the chain
of command are present at various functions--unit functions, et
cetera. We can beat this. It is a cancer within the ranks. It
destroys cohesion and discipline. It must be stamped out in the
military, writ large--not just the Army; military, writ large.
There are TTPs--tactics, techniques, and procedures--to do it,
and we intend to do it.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Going back to something that you
said, General--Secretary Esper, I'd like you to comment on it--
you mentioned the chain of command. Very important. I would
like to discuss section 541 of our fiscal year 2015 NDAA. This
provision required relevant service secretaries to review
sexual assault cases where the staff judge advocate has
recommended referral of charges to a court-martial but where
the commander who serves as the convening authority has refused
to refer the case. To the best of your knowledge, Secretary,
how many cases has the Secretary of the Army reviewed under
this provision between its enactment in 2015 to the present?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I can't speak for my
predecessors. I'd have to go find that information. But, I
don't believe I've reviewed any. I need to dig into this and
come back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. Neither I, nor my predecessors, have been
asked to review any cases under the provisions of section 541
of Fiscal Year 2015 NDAA or section 1744(c) of the Fiscal Year
2014 NDAA.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I believe that you are correct, sir,
that there have been zero. Based on this, is it your assessment
that commanders are following the legal advice provided by
their staff judge advocates with respect to sexual assault
cases?
Secretary Esper. I'd have to check. The expectation is
that, in most cases, they would. I can't speak to them all.
There's--but, I'd have to come back to you with the numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. Yes, it is my assessment that Commanders
are following the legal advice provided by their judge
advocates with respect to all cases, including sexual assault.
Commanders value the advice and counsel of their legal
advisors. It is the Commander, however, who bears ultimate
responsibility for making decisions about the proper
disposition of a case. Legal advisors will often provide a
range of options for the Commander to consider, and the
Commander combines that advice with his or her training and
experience to make a decision in the best interests of justice,
good order, and discipline.
Senator Ernst. Yes. If they are not following, they would
go----
General Milley. Let me----
Senator Ernst.--to you, Secretary Esper.
General Milley. As a commander who's been a general court-
martial convening authority on multiple occasions, I think the
percentage is extremely high, like 99.9 percent, where
commanders are following----
Senator Ernst. Follow----
General Milley.--the advice of their SJA [Staff Judge
Advocate]. It would be a very stupid commander not to do that,
in most cases. That's not--he has the authority not to follow
it, but he--that wouldn't be a very smart commander.
The other thing, in terms of way ahead, we are partnering
with Senator McSally and her initiative with the Department of
Defense. We want to partner closely with that. We think there's
a lot of promise in that initiative that we intend to fully
participate in it over the next 90 to 120 days.
Senator Ernst. Very good. That would be a stupid commander
that does not----
General Milley. It would be a stupid commander.
Senator Ernst.--follow his JAG's advice--his or her JAG's
[Judge Advocate General] advice.
So, thank you. I appreciate that, gentlemen. Thank you very
much for your service.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today. I really appreciate
it. Thanks for your service, to both of you.
General Milley, I'd like to just kind of follow up on a
question that Senator Cotton asked. Earlier, he asked about the
Army taking THAAD over from the MDA, which came as a little bit
of a surprise to me. Can you kind of explain that a little bit
more to us, and what's going on there?
General Milley. I think what he's talking about is the
money and the procurement, acquisition, and the way ahead for
the prototyping, and the force structure of THAAD. I believe
that's what Senator Cotton was talking about.
Senator Jones. All right, sir.
I guess this would be to both of you. I notice, in the--the
requested $63 billion in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO)
funding, which is a pretty big increase--89.8-percent increase
from the amount that we enacted in fiscal year 2019. Going into
that a little bit, I've noticed that a lot of line items in the
budget request is kind of a mix of base and OCO funding, which
really kind of makes it hard to tell what might be affected if
Congress doesn't provide that level of OCO funding. So, how can
we tell anything about your priorities by just digging into the
OCO percentage for a particular item? How can we look and see
what your priorities are and what you might be doing with that
money?
Secretary Esper. Senator, two things. I think the OSD
Comptroller would say that there are two buckets of OCO, one
that he would describe as ``OCO for base,'' which is about 31
billion, and then one is the pure base, which is about 31
billion. So, I think, for us, if you look at the 150 billion or
so that is the base plus the OCO-for-base, in there you will
see the prioritization the Army has placed on, number one,
readiness. It's reflected in the maximization of our CTC
[combat training center] rotations, the flying-hour program for
aviation, et cetera. Then, with regard to modernization, which
is future readiness, you see the early stages of this big shift
from legacy systems into future systems. In fiscal year 2020, I
think it's over $4 billion gets shifted, but, over the FYDP,
over the 5-year period, you will see a 30-plus-billion-dollar
shift, because most of that money is needed in the 2022, 2023,
2024 timeframe, when we start procuring things, as our S&T
ripens into projects ready to harvest.
Senator Jones. All right.
General Milley, you have anything to add to that, or is----
General Milley. For me, as a Chief--and I've said this the
last 3 and a half years, or three--previous three testimonies--
the color of the money, whether it's OCO or base, I know that's
important from a budgeting standpoint, it's important to
Congress, but, as a recipient of the money, what we need is the
money in order to train, man, and equip this Army, in order to
defend the United States of America. However that is
categorized and the color of the money, I won't say it's not
important to me, but it's less important than getting the
money. That is important.
The reason it's being done is because of BCA [Budget
Control Act] and the continuing resolutions (CR) that have been
done over the years. I would caution this Congress that, if we
were to go to BCA levels of funding, we will place the United
States of America at great risk. So, that's why it's being done
the way it is.
Senator Jones. All right. Thank you, sir.
I also want to talk a little bit about the budget that
calls for declines in support for AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM as well
as USFK [United States Forces Korea], but a pretty big
increase, about 35 percent, for EUCOM. I have two questions
about that. One, I'm still a little bit--I am concerned as--
about North Korea. Maybe not as much as Russia and China, but
I'm still pretty concerned about North Korea, which remains
pretty volatile. We've got decreased funding there. I'm
wondering if we should take this as an indication that our
troop levels on the Peninsula are going to be reduced. Also, as
a different part of that question, the operational changes,
what will we see as operational changes at EUCOM with a 35
percent increase?
General Milley. A couple of points. Over the previous, I
guess, it was 18 months or so, the United States military--and
the Army, specifically, as part of a broader effort--did many
things, some in a classified setting, and others were open
knowledge, that shored up military capabilities on the
Peninsula of Korea and in the general western Pacific region.
We think that today the United States Army capabilities that
are forward-deployed in the Pacific are in pretty good shape to
handle whatever might come.
Secondly is, the military's clearly in support of a
diplomatic effort in the Pacific. Although there's various
reporting about North Korean nuclear capabilities, et cetera,
one thing we can say with certainty is, there has not, at least
to date--over the last year, year and a half or so, that there
has not been another nuclear test. There has not been another
missile test. The rhetoric has died down considerably. The
North Koreans are doing various things, along with the South
Koreans, in engaging and interacting with each other. There
have been LPOPs [Listening Post/Observation Post] in towers
that have been brought down along the DMZ [Korean Demiliterized
Zone]. So, the situation today is different. There's been two
meetings, of course, between the President of the United States
and the leader of North Korea.
All of that diplomatic engagement, is pointing in a good
direction. We are not done yet. There's a lot of--a lot yet to
be done on North Korea. But, we're in a different place today
than we were--we think we are in a different place today than
we were, say, 18 months or more before.
The increase in Europe, we think--at least my estimation is
that, as I said in my opening statement, Russia is still the
only country on Earth that is actually an existential threat to
the United States of America, they're the only ones who have
the capability to bring that level of destruction to our
country. They have been very aggressive in the last, call it,
decade or so, in--with Georgia and Ukraine and Middle East and
various other places. They are intentionally, with malfeasance
and forethought, trying to undermine NATO on a daily, weekly,
monthly basis, and with a variety of tactics, techniques, and
procedures that are just below the level of war. They have
clearly done various nefarious activities in the United States,
as well. So, beefing up our capabilities in Europe is important
to the defense of the United States.
Alliances still do matter. NATO is important to the United
States. Our President has said NATO's important to the United
States. We want NATO to belly up to the bar and pay their 2
percent. Clearly, we want that. But, at the same time, we know
that we need to forward-defend in order to defend the United
States, as well. So, there is some additional monies going into
Europe just for the purpose of deterring further aggression by
Russia.
Senator Jones. All right. Thank you General Milley. I
really appreciate those responses.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator McSally.
Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for your leadership for the
men and women in our Army.
You talked, in your testimony on page 7, about the need to
increase unmanned aerial system (UAS) integration was related
to future vertical lift. As you look at modernization,
obviously unmanned aerial systems are going to be more and more
important as to how we fight and integrate both manned and
unmanned. Fort Huachuca houses the unmanned aerial system
training right now, the only solely dedicated UAS training
airspace. Unlike other places in the country, we're actually
increasing that airspace, our 2303; whereas, other places,
airspace is being encroached.
As you know, General Milley--you were down there when I
hosted you--there's over 300 days of sunshine for the training
there. It really is a unique location for this capability for
our Army, never mind all the joint base and airspace and
opportunities for joint training around it in the future, and
it is along the border, so, in defense support to civil
authorities, if they do see something, they can pass that on.
So, I really see this is a national security asset for us.
Do you agree that, as we grow our UAS training
opportunities or grow UAS missions, that Fort Huachuca is a
national asset that needs to have its training protected and
potentially increased?
Secretary Esper, I'd love to host you down there so you can
see that, firsthand.
General Milley. Senator, I--you know, Fort Huachuca is a
great base. Arizona has 300 days of sunshine, as you noted. The
airspace is mostly always clear. So, yes, Fort Huachuca and
other capabilities and bases within Arizona are--and other
States--are national assets. As far as UAS-specific, it's a
great place to fly UAS. There are some other bases around the
U.S. that do that. But, clearly, UAS has a role to play, and it
is an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance asset. You've
got the Intelligence School there. That's why it was there.
Now, we have taken UAS and realigned it with the aviation
community of the United States Army. But, in terms of where it
bases, where it trains, we're taking a look at all of that.
There's a variety of options. Arizona's clearly right on the
top of the list.
Senator McSally. Okay. I appreciate it. Again, if we're
going to expand the capability that, you know, we continue to
preserve that national treasure that we have there.
Secretary Esper, can I host you down at Fort Huachuca
before any decisions might be made in the future?
Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. I think we're planning a
trip for the fall. So, I'd love to----
Senator McSally. Okay.
Secretary Esper.--meet up with you down there and do
soldier meetings and watching training and all those great----
Senator McSally. Outstanding. Thank you.
I know you mentioned, in talking to Senator Cotton, that
you were down at Yuma Proving Group, you know, watching some
fires there. One of the challenges we have with long-range
precision fires being your top priority is the range space that
we have, and the need to modernize it and lengthen it. They
actually have to shut down the road when they do longer-range
fires. So, is part of your budget taking a look at--I know
there's some initiatives in Yuma for land swaps and other
things, but trying to modernize the ranges so that we can
actually test these long-range fires for future?
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. You hit on an important point.
We're looking at all of our training ranges to make sure that
they can accommodate the future systems that we have under--
that we're designing or developing. It's not just the range,
itself, but it's the sensors, it's all the----
Senator McSally. Exactly.
Secretary Esper.--all the stuff you need. So, we're looking
at that for Yuma, I think, White Sands, a number of locations,
for all of these six priorities, as we need them.
Senator McSally. Okay, fantastic. Is there any resources in
this budget related to expansion of those training ranges?
Secretary Esper. I'd have to get back to you and--with a
note and tell you what is or is not. I just--I don't have that
level of detail, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. The Army is currently reviewing whether
expansion is needed at both Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) and White
Sands Missile Range (WSMR) to meet the needs of future weapon
systems. The Army has funds for proposed YPG land expansion in
the fiscal year 2020 budget to safely allow for air drop at
higher altitudes. The Army is continuing to research the
necessity of expansion at WSMR, and won't be in a position to
seek funding for another 1 to 2 years.
Senator McSally. Okay, great.
Another question on the precision-strike missile. Right
now, it's being developed in accordance with the INF Treaty.
We've made a notification to be withdrawing from the INF
Treaty. I think that will happen in August, with a 6-month
notification. Are there any plans to release--remove the
previously imposed range restrictions in the development of
that capability, based on us pulling out of INF?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I've talked with our acquisition
folks, and they've talked with industry. I think there are two
competitors. I think, if and when we exit the treaty, they're
prepared to adjust the ranges above 499 kilometers.
Senator McSally. Great.
Secretary Esper. We've got to see how far. But, that--
clearly, again, long-range precision fires is something that's
important to us, and the ability to do that with conventional
means gives us that reach.
Senator McSally. Great, thanks.
Oh, go ahead, General Milley.
General Milley. Nope.
Senator McSally. Okay.
One last quick question. Nearly 75 percent of young
Americans age 17 to 24 are not fit for military service, for a
variety of reasons. I know you've had some recruiting
challenges. This was already touched on. This is obviously
concerning, if we're coming from such a small pool. Is there
anything else that we can do innovatively to address this issue
to make sure that we've got the best and brightest joining our
military in the Army?
Secretary Esper. Senator, you're right, it's--you know, 29
percent are not qualified, for mental, physical, behavioral
reasons. For--on the physical side, it's mostly obesity. Then
you take a look at that same population of--less than 4 percent
have a proclivity to serve. So, we're trying to go out, by--we
reorganized and overhauled our recruiting organization. One of
the initiatives we have is the Focus 22 cities, where we go
back to America's biggest cities, and we try and talk to kids,
young men and women, where they are, and speak to the
opportunities that the Army provides them. It's different in
each part of the country. I was--I've been in Cleveland and in
Boston and L.A., and I've been all over. But, you have to
appeal to them where they are, and talk to them about what the
Army brings.
The bigger challenge that we face--this is a national
issue--is, fewer and fewer Americans--young Americans
understand the military.
Senator McSally. Right.
Secretary Esper. There's no relationship, whether it's the
Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force. That's--in our own little way,
we're trying to reverse that by getting out and telling our
story.
Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
I'm out of time. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Senator Ernst for focusing on the
continuing scourge of sexual harassment and assault in the
military. In addition, we need to focus on retaliation that
continues. I know that we need to change the culture, which
doesn't happen overnight. It's an ongoing, continuous effort. I
certainly share Senator Ernst's perspective and concerns.
Mr. Chairman, we spend a lot of time on this Committee
talking about China as a near-peer competitor. But, of course,
Russia is also a significant rival, and of--General Milley just
talked about Russia as posing the only existential threat to
the United States, undermining NATO, what they're doing in the
Ukraine, Syria, their nefarious activities in the United
States. So, we learned, Mr. Chairman, that the--President Trump
has invited Putin to the White House. We don't know what they
talked about during their Helsinki meeting. We have no idea
what they will talk about this time. It should concern us that
the Commander in Chief is talking to a near-peer adversary, and
we won't know what they will talk about or what kind of
understanding they may come to. So, I think this Committee
should be seriously concerned.
I have a question for both of you regarding the Army's role
in the Pacific. It is important that the United States projects
strength, reassure our allies, and build partnerships in the
Indo-Pacific, particularly in light of the actions of China and
North Korea. Your fiscal year 2020 budget request specifically
noted the goal of strengthening alliances and partnerships by
funding multilateral exercises. How much money was added for
those exercises in the 2020 budget?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I'll have to get with--back to
you on the exact numbers, but clearly we do want to strengthen
our relationships and exercises. Pacific Pathways has been very
successful. We were actually looking at----
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. In the fiscal year 2020 budget, the Army
allocated approximately $156 million in additional funding for
Defender Pacific and a number of other, smaller, exercises.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, because one of my subquestions
was whether Pacific Pathways will be included in your budget--
--
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono.--request.
Secretary Esper. It is, and it's a very robust series of
exercises. But, we're also looking at doing our own type of
dynamic force employment as part of multidomain operations,
where we do even bigger exercises out in the Pacific to reflect
the shift to the National Defense Strategy.
Senator Hirono. Can you tell me, Mr. Secretary, how many of
these targeted multilateral exercises are in the Pacific?
Secretary Esper. I can't, off the top of my head, Senator.
We can give that to you. But, we've had soldiers, from National
Guard to regular Army, training anywhere from Singapore and
Indonesia to Thailand, all over.
Senator Hirono. So, you'll get back to me.
Secretary Esper. Absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Hirono. I want to know how many of the--how much of
the Army's funding for the exercises goes toward exercises on
the Korean Peninsula, as a subpart.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. There are five multilateral exercises and
23 bilateral exercises regularly conducted with partners and
allies in the Pacific. Approximately $8 million was budgeted in
fiscal year 2020 for exercises on the Korean Peninsula.
Senator Hirono. Has there been a change in the Army's
funding for exercises in Korea, since larger joint and combined
exercises have been canceled or modified, starting last year?
General Milley. Let me----
Senator Hirono. General Milley?
General Milley.--help out a little bit here, Senator, if I
could.
There are dozens of exercises in the Pacific. We'll get you
the exact list. You're familiar with the big ones----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
General Milley.--Corporate Gold, Yama Sakura, Keen Sword,
and so on, so forth.
Senator Hirono. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).
General Milley. Pacific Pathways. We are funding those. We,
years ago--I guess it was 4 or 5 years ago now--made a
commitment to pivot to the Pacific. We, the United States Army,
have about 87-88,000 U.S. soldiers in the Pacific. We've got
the--most of the 28,500 that are on the Korean Peninsula are
Army soldiers. We've got United States Army, Japan. So, as you
are well aware, we're--we, the Army, are very deeply engaged
and very committed to the Pacific. It's not just all about
Russia and Europe. We'll get you the exact number of exercises,
and the money.
General Milley. With respect to the Korean Peninsula, there
was, as you know--I guess it was within the last 30 days, there
was a commitment to go ahead and reduce some of the major
overall exercises, in terms of large-scale CPXs [command post
exercise] and stuff like that. Our estimate is, is that, from
an Army perspective--and I've talked to General Abrams, as
well--that the degree of readiness is modest--the degree of
declining in readiness is modest. We don't think it's going to
have a huge detrimental effect. Anything brigade and below,
where the rubber meets the road, in terms of combat actions,
those guys are still training every single day, and they're
still capable of fighting tonight. So, we're comfortable with
where we are, in terms of our training schedules and our
training plans, on the Korean Peninsula.
Senator Hirono. So, with our training in the Korean
Peninsula, we are doing these in conjunction with the South
Korean military----
General Milley. Absolutely.
Senator Hirono.--are we not? Because we need to----
General Milley. Yeah.
Senator Hirono.--coordinate, if anything----
General Milley. Yes.
Senator Hirono.--happens there.
General Milley. Yes.
Senator Hirono. I want to get to the need for childcare
facilities and capacity, Mr. Secretary. When we met, there was
a 7-month-old infant who passed away, what appears to be an
unlicensed home daycare. I think that we have to pay a lot more
attention to the need for childcare, as we have families now,
more and more, in the military. Is access to safe, affordable
childcare for military families an important readiness issue
for you?
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. I've traveled the Army now for
18 months or so, talking about this. I was at Schofield
Barracks lat year. It's--the challenge is particularly acute in
Hawaii, where we have probably an unmet demand--I'm trying to
recall--anywhere between 20 and 40 percent. So, there are a
number of things we're doing to tackle that. A big part of it
is civilian hiring, spousal hiring----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Secretary Esper.--to fill----
Senator Hirono. We need to make sure that we decrease the
delay in hiring appropriately trained people.
Secretary Esper. So, we've taken about a dozen-plus
initiatives, everything from allowing, after the background
check by the FBI, within 72 hours, line-of-sight access. We see
our numbers going up, which is very good. I can come brief you
on a number of other things. But, we--it's trending in the
right direction. We do need to actually expand authorized in-
home childcare. That's another route. The other thing that I'm
hearing lately that I want to go after is providing hourly
childcare for folks, outside of the daycare centers, because
it's a need for spouses, for moms and dads who need to--you
know, maybe the spouse is on deployment, to be able to do that.
Senator Hirono. So, we'll continue to work with you on
these, thank you for recognizing our reality for many military
families.
Secretary Esper. Very important.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, I'd like to begin with a comment about
something that is a little bit outside the jurisdiction of this
Committee but is not outside your jurisdiction. I'm talking
about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As you know, large
portions of my State is currently--are currently under water,
which is true for other Members of this Committee. I was just
in the State in recent days, surveying the damage from this
historic flooding. It is quite significant. I have to say, I've
heard from my constituents in the State over and over again
that they have had significant trouble in working with the Army
Corps, both in terms of responsiveness, but also in terms of
significant concerns about, perhaps, misplaced priorities by
the Corps and their management of the river systems. So, I look
forward to working with you on this. Like to visit about it
and--whether that's taking a look at the master manual or other
reforms that we need to pursue to make sure, as we face a year
of historic flooding, that this sort of thing does not keep
happening, and that we're able to meet the needs of folks who
live in and make their living along the river.
Secretary Esper. Senator, if I may, first of all----
Senator Hawley. Please.
Secretary Esper. Well, again, our hearts go out for the
folks affected by the flooding, your constituents. What I'd
like to do is get the Corps of Engineers up here today to your
office and find out----
Senator Hawley. Great.
Secretary Esper.--what's going on.
Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much. I appreciate--
--
Secretary Esper. Then we can----
Senator Hawley.--that.
Secretary Esper.--we can tackle it, and then we'll take it
back down to the district level and make sure we get it--get
working on it ASAP.
Senator Hawley. Fantastic. Thank you very much.
I just want to offer a word of praise, Mr. Secretary, both
to you and to you, General, for your leadership in reform,
modernization, pursuit of the NDS priorities, I think, and
really making the Army, perhaps, the leading service, in terms
of pursuing reform and modernization. It's really impressive
what you have done in this most recent budget and your
leadership overall. So, thank you for that.
Let me ask you an NDS-related question. I'm wondering
about--thinking about the Indo-Pacific, does the Army have
plans--what are the Army's plans to contribute with INF-range
conventional missile systems in that theater to restoring our
conventional edge against China?
General, go ahead.
General Milley. The--I don't want to go into classified
briefings, but we've got a variety of capabilities that--
emerging capabilities that we're going to deploy to the Pacific
theater that we think will have significant impact on any
potential conflict that could emerge in that area. We are
experimenting that with what we're calling multidomain task
forces. We're establishing two of those. One of them is in the
Pacific. They are experimenting with the doctrine or the new
concepts of multidomain operations. That task force will be
equipped with a variety of capabilities that'll be able to
establish dominance from the land, in space, cyber, perhaps
maritime, as well--not subsurface, but surface, to be sure--as
well as air. So, there's a variety of capabilities that we're
going to deploy and a variety of cannon, rocket, and missile
capabilities from the land that will have a significant impact.
Just did a secure video tele-conference (SVTC) with--Admiral
Davidson and Under Secretary McCarthy and Vice Chief of Staff
McConville were out there just last week, and we were talking
about that very issue, and we'll be introducing some of that
stuff in exercises over the course of the next 24 months.
Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much.
Let me switch theaters, but a similar set of questions
about the NDS, thinking about, now, the Army in the context of
the Joint Force in the Baltics and this Baltic scenario that
the NDS talks about. How have you made progress on that? Where
do you--what do you still need? What are your plans to get
there?
General Milley. Again, most of those exercises that we've
done, and then the analysis we've done, is classified. We are
keenly aware of Russian capability with respect to the Baltics.
We are shoulder to shoulder with the Baltic nations--Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia--as well as Poland. The rotation of forces,
the European Defense Initiative (EDI), the exercises we're
doing and the capabilities that we're deploying, we think will
be sufficient to cause pause for any further Russian
aggression.
Senator Hawley. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Esper. Senator, you made a very important point.
You said, ``What do you need?'' What we need is this budget.
Because the Russians are building new tanks, the Russians are
modernizing their fighting vehicles, they are modernizing their
air defense systems. Across the board, they are doing things
that we need to get on with doing. This budget, and the
billions of dollars we shift, will get us there so we're
prepared to deter them and, if necessary, defeat them, should
war come.
Senator Hawley. Fantastic. Thank you, again, Mr. Secretary,
General, for your leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, to the witnesses.
I want to start with Secretary Esper, a thank you. Two
Thursdays ago, you hosted Senator Warner and I at Fort Belvoir.
I just want to commend you and the Army in the way that you're
going after this very, very tough challenge on military
housing. Secretary Esper escorted us around to a couple of
homes, where we were able to visit with folks who live there,
but then a roundtable session with many other families. I was
very impressed, because, when problems came up and it seemed
like there was a little bit of, ``Well, that's the housing
company's problem,'' or, ``That's the garrison commander's
problem,'' Secretary Esper was in a ``Well, no, we're going not
fix it'' mode, and you just had a really good assuring demeanor
to the families that were there that I know gave Senator Warner
and I assurance, as well. The Army has also played the lead
role in, I think, doing the initial draft of a Tenant's Bill of
Rights that might be used more systemwide to protect folks who
are living in military housing. So, I'm going to just begin
with that. I know, Secretary Esper, you have a sense of urgency
about this.
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. General Milley, as well. We'll all be after
it, focusing on it during the NDAA.
Secretary Esper. Thank you for going down with me. Having
the support of this Committee makes a big difference. We will
fix it, because there's nothing more important than our
soldiers and their families.
Senator Kaine. Thank you so much for that.
You--your last answer to Senator Hawley was, ``What we need
is this budget.'' I'm going to ask budget questions. So, does
your--does the fiscal year 2020 budget request include any
funding for sustaining support activities on the southern
border past September 30?
Secretary Esper. I don't believe, Senator, but I'd have to
get back with you on that.
Senator Kaine. I think that's an important one, just to--
for my colleagues. So, can you explain what you mean by
``sustaining''----
Secretary Esper. Yeah.
Senator Kaine.--just the current deployment of any, you
know, Army units. General Neller was talking about this
recently with respect to the Marines. The current deployment of
Army units to the border is something that is important, but I
wonder if the budget that we are talking about here assumes
that that will continue past September 30. My sense is, it
doesn't, from looking at it.
Secretary Esper. I don't believe so, but let me come back
to you with a definitive response.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. No, support to Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP) began on October 26, 2018, was first extended through
January 31, 2019, and has since been extended to September 30,
2019. The CBP has not requested and the Army has not been
directed to deploy troops at the border past September 30,
2019. Therefore no funds were requested for the mission in this
budget request.
Senator Kaine. So, I think that's an important one, because
if you're here testifying about the budget, and you say, ``What
we need is this budget,'' but the budget includes nothing for
continued sustainment of these troops at the border, that also
tells us something about what priorities are.
It's more than just priorities. My understanding of the
President's authority under 10 U.S.C. 2808 to reprogram MILCON
monies is that MILCON monies can be reprogrammed, but they have
to be in support of military personnel. So, if we're going to
reprogram $3.6 billion of fiscal year 2019 MILCON monies,
they're not going to be immediately put up. I mean, that's
going to take some time to put things under contract and do
them. If we're not assuming that we're going to be having a
sustained presence of military personnel at the southern
border, sort of raises a question about, ``If we need this
budget, but those who put this budget together did not
determine that that was a priority, then why use U.S.--10
U.S.C. 2808 to reprogram MILCON monies if we're not going to
have a sustained presence of military personnel there?'' You
can understand the question that I'm asking. I think it's
relevant to the vote that the House is going to undertake
today. But, I'm sort of curious and may ask, for the record, Do
you know why there was not a request, as part of this budget
submission, to have sustained activities of the Army at the
border?
Secretary Esper. One of the challenges with the budget
process, Senator--and it involves any number of things, which
is--and it's inevitably why we ask for reprogramming--is, the
budget that you see before you today was developed this time
last year and submitted in June of last year. That's one
explanation, if you will. And----
Senator Kaine. But, it was submitted, but it wasn't like
unamended and unedited and unrevised----
Secretary Esper. That's true. I'm--that's correct. Yes,
sir. I mean, it's--but, pretty much it leaves our hands in June
or July, and then it goes through its various iterations, and
we have a chance every now to make some movements. But,
that's--that is a factor I just wanted to point out. It
involves weapon systems and what we--you know, we gain new
knowledge on things, and that's inevitably why we come back to
you--we, the Army and, I'm sure, the other services--come back
to the Congress to ask for reprogramming----
Senator Kaine. Well, just--at the end of the day, the
budget that gets submitted to us, the final signoff, is by the
President and the Office of Management & Budget (OMB) and the
White House. It's just interesting that they would not have
included funding for sustainment of activities at the border at
the same time as they want to put in MILCON that is supposed to
be in support of that personnel that, apparently, will not be
at the border.
Let me ask you this. The fiscal year 2020 budget asks for
9.2 billion under the Department of Army account for emergency
funding. My understanding is, that's 2 billion for hurricane
relief, 3.6 billion to repay accounts from 2019. I'm assuming
that's the MILCON monies that are being changed. Is that right?
To refill those accounts?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I believe so, but that was an OSD
insert, if you will, on the Army budget for those purposes, as
you outlined.
Senator Kaine. Then, I'll ask that one for the record, just
to confirm that----
Secretary Esper. Sure.
Senator Kaine.--our understanding about that is correct.
Secretary Esper. We'll get back to you on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Esper. The Department requested $9.2 billion in
emergency funding in the Army's Military Construction, Army
(Oversees Contingency Operations account of the 2020
President's Budget request for the following: Reconstruction
from natural disasters ($2.0 billion), restoration of funding
from military construction projects used to support the
declaration of national emergency ($3.6 billion), and emerging
fiscal year 2020 requirements in support of the declaration of
national emergency ($3.6 billion).
Senator Kaine. Thank you much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator--Senator Kaine.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, General Milley, I haven't seen you since the
Patriots won the Super Bowl. As a New Englander, I'm sure you
share my delight that we had to suffer through a 3-month
drought between world championships between the Red Sox and the
Patriots.
Secretary Esper. Don't get--please, Senator, don't get him
going.
General Milley. I'm sitting here next to a guy from
Pittsburgh, but, I agree, it's been 60 days since the world----
Senator King. It was a very tough period----
General Milley. Yes.
Senator King.--for us all.
General Milley. Agonizing.
Senator King. Thank you.
First, I want to commend both of you. Both of you addressed
the sexual assault question several times, and also, General
Milley, your addressing of the--Russia's threat. Those were
excellent statements, the most forthright, succinct, and
powerful statements on those two subjects that I've heard in
this Committee in a long time, and I want to commend you for
making those statements.
Looking at the budget, as I understand it, we're talking
about a total Army budget of 182 billion, of which 33--31 is
what I call traditional OCO, and 31 and a half is OCO-for-base,
a wonderful new phrase. I said, a week ago, that's like
``rabbits-for-bicycles.'' I mean, these are two things that
aren't really related. Wouldn't it be better if we just stepped
up and had an honest budget, and said, ``This is what the base
budget needs to be, and OCO is for OCO, not for ongoing
needs''? Isn't that a more honest way to present this? I'm not
suggesting you're dishonest, but this is a sort of charade that
we do around here instead of saying, ``We need 182 billion for
the Army.''
Secretary?
Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, I've, you know, spent my
share of time on the Hill, as well, on the other side of the
dais, and this is not new, if you will, in many ways, with
regard to OCO and how you fund the base and all that. I think
what's underlying this, too, is--the Chief said it very well
earlier--is, certainly on the defense committees, nobody likes
the Budget Control Act, and it's put us in a bind, where it
impacts the readiness of the services, our modernization
ability, et cetera. Frankly, if it were implemented, it would
severely undermine----
Senator King. Then maybe we ought to admit that----
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--change those caps to reflect the current
reality. Those caps were established, 2011, 8 years ago. The
world has changed dramatically since that----
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--time.
Secretary Esper. Changed, and nobody thought that was ever
going to happen. I remember the time. But, it is what it is.
But, the--as the Chief said so well, all I look at is $182
billion, because I know I have to organize, man, and train,
equip an Army to defend the Nation.
Senator King. I--and I agree with that, but I--but it does
trouble me that 34 percent of that under an 82 billion is
supposedly contingency money, and it really is, and everybody
knows that. I just--truth in budgeting, I think, would be
helpful.
Now, as I understand it--and I think you just testified to
this--the 9.2 billion emergency is storms plus the funding
going out of military construction for the southern border. Is
that correct?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir, that's my understanding. It's--I
think a share of it was for the--what happened at Tyndall and
with the Marine Corps, some damage down there, and then the
MILCON replenishment, if needed.
Senator King. Well, what's troubling is--to us, is that we
go through this process of budgeting and appropriating, and
looking at priorities and everything, and then 3.6 gets pulled
out, and then it gets put back in, the next year. In effect,
the Congress is funding something it refused to fund. I realize
that wasn't your decision or your call, and you've got to abide
by this, but it's a kind of shell game. I mean, we're--we said
we're not going to fund this, the appropriations process didn't
fund it. So, it's coming out as an emergency, and now we're
being asked to, in effect, fund it, in retrospect. I think
that's troubling.
One other question or--before I leave you, on--not on the
budget. I'm concerned about recruitment, and concerned about
not only recruitment in general, but the geography of
recruitment. I'm worried about the military becoming isolated
from the rest of the society and--for example, there are no
significant military bases in the--in New England. We don't--
and I think that's a loss for the country. We don't want the
military to be a separate caste system over--and separate from
the rest of the society. Could you speak to that?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I'm concerned, as well. I think
you heard me say it a few minutes ago. I spoke to this
particular issue, that we risk having a society that's
increasingly--or a military increasingly isolated from the
people it serves. That concerns me. The Army's trying to do its
part. We have, maybe, two dozen initiatives to improve our
recruiting, make sure we can meet our numbers. One of them
includes what we call the Focus 22 cities, so it's 22 of our
biggest cities, many of them in the Northwest and Northeast,
where maybe upper--under-representative--under-represented.
It's our efforts to kind of go to there, go to those cities and
talk to those kids. So, I was in Boston 2 weeks ago, met with
the mayor, met with the Governor. I was in Cleveland last week.
I've been to L.A. I'm going to be going back up to Seattle,
here, soon. But, it's our effort to go out to these cities and
really speak to America's youth and appeal to them in whatever
way resonates most. For many, it's jobs, it's skills, it's
opportunity. For others, it's college money. For others, it's
adventure. It's different, depending on where you go. So, in
Cleveland, for example, it's about learning the trades, getting
skills that you could use elsewhere. If you go to Seattle, it's
about STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering and Math]. They
want to see how it applies. So, I think this is our effort to
go to America's cities where the young men and women are, and
reengage in those places where--like you said, are, maybe,
under-represented.
Senator King. Well, I think part of that is that we also
have to work with the States on credentialing to accept----
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Senator King.--the credentials so a person that has all the
skills in the world coming out of the Army doesn't have to go
back through an apprenticeship program, or whatever is
required. That's a separate issue.
Secretary Esper. As I said, in both Boston and Cleveland,
if you don't want to go regular Army, the Army Reserve and the
Army Guard are great opportunities well--as well, where you can
learn those skills and still stay home, in your local area, and
be with your friends and family, or whatnot. Those are all
great options. If you don't want to go Army, you can go another
service. But, I think reengaging in these areas is very
important to the future of the country.
Senator King. You may want to go back and revise your
testimony, ``If you don't want to go Army, you want to go one
of the other''--I'm--you may not want that on the record.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Esper. Well, they should go--if they want to go
to the best branch, they should go Army, but I think--you
know--and this generation, there is appeal to serving something
bigger than themselves----
Senator King. Thank you.
Secretary Esper.--their communities. I think we should tap
into that.
Senator King. Thank you for that work. It's very important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, I know that you're aware of the crisis in the
military's privatized housing program. The private companies
that were put in charge of managing military housing failed to
provide safe and clean homes to military families. Nonetheless,
they managed to rake in millions of dollars in profits. The
services have fallen short in their oversight responsibilities
by allowing military families to live in hazardous and
unhealthy conditions.
I want to focus, this morning, on just one part of that
problem. When repairs to military housing are either poorly
made or not made at all, it can threaten the health of
servicemembers and their families. We now know that many of
them have developed chronic medical conditions from exposure to
mold, lead paint, and other hazards. So, I want to ask both of
you, as a matter of principle, do you think the United States
Government has the responsibility to cover the lifetime costs
of treating servicemembers and their families for health
problems that are connected to unsafe military housing?
General Milley, maybe I should start with you.
General Milley. Absolutely yes.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Secretary Esper?
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. But, frankly, I'd like to see
the companies pay, first.
Senator Warren. Well, I'm fine with that. But, I want to
know whether or not the military should be on the hook, whether
or not the Federal Government should be on the hook, for its
failure to having supervised those----
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, I agree. For that reason, I
agree.
Senator Warren. Good.
General Milley. To that extent, Senator, we have
established--we are establishing a housing registry to make
sure that, (a) we know all the houses that have had any life,
health, or safety issues--lead, asbestos, or whatever, to
include mold; and we want to make sure that we backtrack, as
many years as it takes----
Senator Warren. Good.
General Milley.--to go back and make sure that we know the
names of all of those inhabitants of those houses, both adults
and children. We want to track them throughout their life. If,
at any point in time in the future, they have a serious health
issue that can be directly related, cause and effect, to having
lived in that house, it is our belief that the Federal
Government and the RCI [Residential Communities Initiative]
partner should be on the hook for the payment of that.
Senator Warren. Good. I'm very glad to hear this. This is
very reassuring. I also want to make sure that we memorialize
this in law. I am introducing a broader military housing reform
bill that will ensure that no member of the military or
military family will have to pay for medical care as a result
of unsafe housing. When a servicemember or that servicemember's
child or spouse gets sick because the military failed to hold
these companies accountable, then it is time for the military
to step up and fix the problem. That means making sure this
never happens again and paying the ongoing medical bills. So,
thank you.
I want to take my remaining time and ask a critical
question about readiness facing the Army. Climate change. The
Defense Department's most recent report on climate change
discussed the impact of this human-caused problem on our
military operations in bases. This report included a statement
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford,
who said--and I'm going to quote, here--``When I look at
climate change, it's in the category of sources of conflict
around the world and things we'd have to respond to.''
General Milley, just a simple yes or no is fine, 'cause
I'll have some followup questions. Do you agree with General
Dunford?
General Milley. I do, Senator.
Senator Warren. Good.
General Milley. If I could just make an additional----
Senator Warren. Sure.
General Milley.--comment. I think what we're talking about
here are the effects--the potential effects of climate change.
Clearly, there'll be military implications as well as other
implications down the road.
Senator Warren. Good. So, is adapting to climate change
necessary for Army readiness?
General Milley. I'm not sure exactly what you mean by
``adapting to climate change.''
Senator Warren. Well, taking this into account, if you're
thinking about----
General Milley. Of course. It's a----
Senator Warren.--readiness.
General Milley.--consideration.
Senator Warren. Good.
General Milley. For example, there could be resource
shortfalls in various parts of the world, which will increase
stress on the society, which could increase insurgency,
revolution, terrorism, or a wide variety of other factors. So--
--
Senator Warren. Well----
General Milley.--there's a variety of effects that we'd
have to take into consideration.
Senator Warren. So, do you think it would be prudent for
the Army to incorporate climate change into operational and
strategic planning?
General Milley. We already do.
Senator Warren. Good. How would you rate Army
installations, as a whole, in terms of their climate-change
resiliency?
General Milley. That is a work in progress. So, we're
evaluating those and coming up with a list. There's some--the
Army is--by its nature, is more inland than on the coast, so
the climate change, as it affects some of the Army
installations, varies. The coastal ones tend to, probably, have
greater impact. But, that doesn't mean the ones on the interior
of the country don't. So, we're evaluating all the variety of
bases we have. We do have a list--that was mentioned earlier by
one of the Senators, but we do have a list, and we'll get that
list promptly to the----
Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that. You know, it's
clear that climate change is a threat to our military's
infrastructure and operations. It's critically important for
the Army and other military services to incorporate climate
change into their operational plans. It's a readiness issue,
and I'm very glad to see that the Army takes this seriously.
Thank you, General.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here, for your service.
General Milley, thank you for rearranging your calendar and
participating in the sensing session we had done at Fort Bragg
on Friday. I think it was illuminating. What I paid particular
attention to is just how many notes you've taken, so I have no
doubt that, in those particular cases, then we're going to make
progress. I think that we still have to take a look at the
broader issue. We've got a footprint out there we haven't yet
figured out.
Secretary Esper, thank you and your wife for coming down
and being a part of a sensing session, about a month ago.
Because I think we're making progress there. The command's
taking it seriously. They've got a good strategy for putting
resources on the ground. We need to make sure we do everything
we can, as members of Congress, to support that.
But, maybe very briefly, could you guys give me an idea of
how the housing issue and--could actually affect--have an
impact on readiness?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I think--if you submit to our
foundational principle that there's--the importance of the
soldier and their family--I think if a soldier is deployed--and
I--you--when we--you and I, I think, have spoken to families--
the last thing you want is a soldier, particularly facing a
lethal situation, to be distracted, worrying about his or her
wife and children being impacted by mold in the house, or
having to--dealing--deal with a broken tub, or whatever the
case may be. So, in that regard, it becomes very acute. Having
done my share of deployments during my Army days, you do worry
about your families. That's--at that point in time, you want
them focused on the mission, focused on being successful and
coming home safe. For that matter, you don't want the
distraction.
Senator Tillis. I--one of the two houses that I visited
last week down on Fort Bragg, the husband's deployed, the
mother is there with two--he's an officer--the mother is there
with two kids. You walk down a fairly narrow hallway, and there
is about a foot reserved for you to walk through, because the
other 2 feet are taken up by an industrial-sized dehumidifier
that is sucking so much moisture out of this particular unit
that they had to run a hose into the tub. I just saw it dump I
don't know how many quarts of water while I was sitting there
talking to them. That's a distraction, when you get on the
phone with a spouse and you're talking about that kind of
environment that they're living in.
So, we're going to continue to focus on it. I'd tell any
military families who may be watching these hearings that we're
not going away until it's fixed. I know that I have you-all's
commitment to be there every step of the way. So, thank you for
that.
Mr. Secretary, when you and I had breakfast several months
ago, you were talking about your top-to-bottom review of
programs that would--you know, that are either critical, nice
to have, or not necessary. Can you give me an idea where you
are on that review now, and what specific actions you've taken?
Secretary Esper. So, the second round of that review--
it's--in layman's terms, it's being called ``Night Court''--is
underway right now for the fiscal year 2021 budget build. The
fiscal year 2020, which was the one that the Chief and I
initiated this time last year, again, has resulted in this
budget. What we did was, we ended up canceling, reducing, or
delaying nearly 200 programs. It began with--we began on the
opposite end of the table. That is, What do we need to
modernize the Army? That began with our 31 cross-functional
team programs that show our six modernization priorities. Then
we knew we had another 50 or 60 programs that were also
critical to readiness. We filled those buckets first. Then,
when you get to the end of the list, there were programs that
we knew--not that they didn't have value, but, relative to
everything else, they just either didn't cut the--didn't make
the cut.
Senator Tillis. General Milley, I was here earlier in the
Committee. I'm sorry I couldn't be here longer. I've got four
committees meeting concurrently. But, you were talking about
the dramatic increase in readiness. I think you said, at one
point, we had three BCTs [Basic Combat Training], and then you
said in the upper 2020s that are at a ready state. You said,
``Provided that we get the resources, we'll continue to build
on that.'' You know, when you get them to the state, though,
there's a certain cost associated with keeping them there. So,
as we move into future budgets, what worries you most about
being able to sustain that level and not see a downward trend
over the near-to-intermediate term?
General Milley. Well, you just said it, Senator. It's the
ability to sustain that. Once we get to the level we want to
get to in--sometime in 2022, which is 66 percent of the regular
Army and 33 percent of the Guard and Reserve, we have to
sustain that. We recognize--we, in the Army, but, more broadly,
in the military--we recognize that we are a very, very
expensive endeavor. We appreciate the support of Congress and
the American people. But, there is one thing that's a lot more
expensive than what we do on a day-to-day basis, and that's
having a war. By funding us, we deter war. By making sure that
we have large, capable, competent, excellent military that is
dominant on any field of battle, that goes a long way towards
telling any potential adversary, ``Don't mess with the United
States.'' If we underfund that in the future years, or if we do
two steps forward, one step back constantly, then that, I
think, provides opportunity and encourages aggression on the
part of any potential adversary.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you. I'll submit some questions
for the record regarding end strength and some of the great
work I think you're doing on modernizing, recruiting. Like to
know how you're doing on hitting the goals this year.
But, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you----
General Milley. We'll make it----
Chairman Inhofe.--Senator Tillis.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to ask about the units in--or the military
construction projects that may be defunded in Puerto Rico. I
think there are ten Army National Guard projects and two Army
Reserve projects in Puerto Rico. The total value of the
projects potentially in jeopardy is about $550 million. I'm
concerned that defunding these projects will detract from the
effort of the island to recover. In this panel, at the time of
the hurricane, we heard very unmistakable commitment to the
recovery efforts. I would like your commitment that these
projects will not be cut and that there will be a continued
commitment to the recovery efforts on the island.
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Esper. Senator, I cannot make that commitment,
because it's not my decision to make. It's going to be made, I
think, by at least the Acting Secretary of Defense.
Senator Blumenthal. Can you commit to encouraging Acting
Secretary Shanahan to avoid selecting any projects in Puerto
Rico to be defunded and diverted to the border wall, given the
natural disaster that happened there and the continuing
disarray on the island?
Secretary Esper. I think what will happen, here, next is,
the Army will look at all that those--all those projects that
are up for consideration, and then I'd--we need to assess each
one of them. Candidly, our prioritization will be readiness and
the ability to project force, going forward. Then we'll
certainly consider other factors, as well, as we build a
prioritization list.
Senator Blumenthal. But, you're aware of the continuing
needs and challenges of recovery on the island, and the very
important role of the National Guard.
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Puerto Rico National Guard does
a great job, and there are a lot of needs out there. I
recognize that. It was--you know, the hurricanes that hit
there, it was tragic what it did to the island.
Senator Blumenthal. I saw firsthand, perhaps you have, the
critical role that the National Guard has played there.
Secretary Esper. They do.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Secretary, I know that Senator
Kaine has asked about the budget item for deployment of troops
at the border if their deployment there is extended. Can you
explain why the budget request does not include funding for
those border deployments?
Secretary Esper. My best explanation, as I said to him, was
that, at the time this budget was built--was last summer. This
was not on anybody's radar screen, so that would be the first
thing I would say. Even going into the fall, where we had a
chance to amend, it just was not on our radar screen.
I don't know if you have anything to add.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you want to amend it now? If so,
for what period of time would you contemplate----
Secretary Esper. I don't think----
Senator Blumenthal.--that deployment?
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I think much more needs to--we
under--we need to understand that--and it's going to be driven
largely by Department of Homeland Security (DHS), because DOD
is in support of Department of Homeland Security, of what they
will need, how long they will need it, and in what numbers. I
think time will tell what that mission looks like.
Senator Blumenthal. How much time will tell?
Secretary Esper. I don't know. That's--we're all waiting, I
think, to understand what DHS will need in the coming weeks and
months.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you have a timeframe for that
decision being made?
Secretary Esper. No, sir, I don't. I'd have to ask the
Acting Secretary of Defense.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you know the factors that will go
into that decision?
Secretary Esper. I don't. I think that they--you know,
they're considering what it takes in order to secure the
border. And----
Senator Blumenthal. Do you know who will make that
decision?
Secretary Esper. I think it's Secretary Nielsen. I think it
begins with her.
Senator Blumenthal. But, the troops are your
responsibility, are they not?
Secretary Esper. So, DHS would make the request of DOD, and
then DOD would have to assess whether it can--can or cannot
meet that request, depending on the law and resources, et
cetera, et cetera. At that point in time--and this works
through Northern Command--eventually, it gets tasked down to
the military to see if we can fill that need. Right now, I
think, on the border, all the services are--it's more than just
the Army on the border, and it--that's the process by which
these taskings happen.
Senator Blumenthal. I know it's more than just the Army,
but right now the Army's budget and its plan for the future is
before us----
Secretary Esper. That's correct.
Senator Blumenthal.--for oversight. We have no idea, as we
sit here----
Secretary Esper. Right.
Senator Blumenthal.--when and how and whether that review
will occur.
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I can't tell you
authoritatively, either, whether or not we would need funding
to sustain forces on the border beyond September 30th, 2019.
Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired. Thank you very
much.
Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Go Army, hooah.
Gentlemen, an interesting find as I examined your budget
request was a $24 million decrease in logistics operations. I--
in my conversations with both of you, I have discussed what I
view as the important role of logistics in any type of future
operations with our Army as well as when it comes to our
positioning for great-power competition. I--my sense was that
you both agreed with me on the role, the importance of
logistics. Yet, I'm left assuming that your analysis now is
that logistics operations from infrastructure to delivery are
resilient against threats posed by great-power competitors and
violent nonstate actors because you think that you can cut 24
million from that budget. Otherwise, you would either request
the same amount as enacted in fiscal year 2019 or you would
increase it. This is in light of the fact that you had the NDS
that came out and you're talking about, you know, we have
increased great-power competitions, we need to spend more money
on these things, and yet, you're cutting logistics. So, that
doesn't seem to make sense to me. I would love for both of you
to respond. You can choose who goes first.
Secretary Esper. So, Senator, in the--we talk a lot about
``Night Court'' and Army's reform efforts with regard to
equipping. But, frankly, this process went through everything.
It went--it included training, it included our manning budgets,
it included our installations. Part and parcel, this was
logistics. We have a great commander at Army Materiel Command,
in General Perna. He proposed a number of things, where he
thought he can accomplish his mission and, in some cases, do it
better, by making adjustments. We've--for example, we've
consolidated all classes of supply underneath him at Army
Materiel Command. We've looked at logistics readiness centers,
how we can improve them.
So, I'm fully confident that we can meet the needs. I
wouldn't infer, necessarily, that, just because we made cuts
here and there, that we lost capability. Like I said, there are
a lot of efficiencies gained. We've reduced headquarters, we've
reduced--we've pushed people out of headquarters, both military
and civilian. We've really devolved operations down to the
brigade and division level and corps level. So, there's a lot
that's going on, where we save money, but yet we're still able
to accomplish the mission. I--again, I think this is what
Congress has asked us to do.
Senator Duckworth. Is it the current mission, or are you
talking about positioning yourself for great-power competition,
though?
Secretary Esper. It's both. So, we have the current
mission. We have to sustain, obviously, operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and we have any number of brigade combat teams
deployed presently, but we're also thinking ahead. So, he's
doing some very innovative things down there as we build our
ammunition stocks, as we think about, in the future, for
example, How do we do additive manufacturing on the
battlefield, behind the forward line of troops, to reduce the
amount of time it takes to reequip heavy vehicles, for example,
or helicopters? So, a lot of innovative things as he looks
forward into the future.
Senator Duckworth. General?
General Milley. I would echo what the Secretary said,
Senator. I don't think the 24 million is--as we look to the
future and the great-power competition, is going to have any
kind of significant negative effect on our logistical
capability to sustain the force. We, through this ``Night
Court'' process, went through a huge amount of due diligence.
Based on the recommendations of General Perna--and that's not
all one type of logistics, that's a wide variety of nickels and
pennies that we've cut in various programs across the Army in
the logistics world. I think it's an acceptable degree of risk,
and I don't think it's going to have any detrimental effect
with respect to great-power competition.
Senator Duckworth. Okay. I tend not to agree with you, but
I would love to take a closer look at how you got to this
number, because I am deeply concerned that we are cutting,
here, and then you're going to be back and saying, ``Now we
need to increase it, and now we're falling behind.'' That's a
real concern.
I want to touch on something that one of my colleagues
talked about a little bit, which was the Army Corps of
Engineers. It now has a 31-percent cut in its budget, as you've
presented. The President says that he is committed to improving
the aging domestic infrastructure, which some say is a national
security risk. As a representative of this administration, can
you explain the discrepancy, Mr. Secretary, between the policy
and statements in this issue, and especially, you know, as--
look at the problems along the locks and dams on the
Mississippi River, as a great example of where we actually
should be putting in more money in order to help the Corps of
Engineers do its job.
Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator, I can. I think there was
some confusion that came out of a press story a few weeks ago
about this, about a 31-percent decrease. I think what it was
is, the story spoke to what was enacted in fiscal year 2019
versus what was requested. So, in fiscal year 2019, the Army,
for civil works, the request was actually 4.785 billion. The
request for 2020 is 4.827 billion. So, you see an increase.
What happened is, last year, in fiscal year 2019, Congress
enacted a $6.9 billion budget. That's not unusual, to see
Congress put more money in for MILCON or civil works--I'm
sorry, for civil works. So, I think what you have to compare
is, not enacted, but you have to compare requested versus
requested. You'll see, frankly, we have a--we have an increase
there.
Senator Duckworth. Barely an increase.
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, barely an increase, but,
again, within a budget constraint, but it doesn't reflect a 31
percent decrease. It's just a difference between what Congress
enacted in 2019 and what we requested in 2019.
Senator Duckworth. Can you explain why, then, there's not
much--barely an increase, then? Let's go with that number.
Because from everything that I've heard from the Corps of
Engineers, what I've heard from the White House is that there's
actually a need for great increase in the Army Corps of
Engineers budget so that they can meet the infrastructure needs
of this Nation.
Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. There's a long list of civil
works projects out there. In the billions, for sure. But, it's
a matter of--as I said, in any number of programs, the needs
and wants seem to always exceed the means. Where do you draw
the line? This is another case.
Senator Duckworth. I think my farmers would disagree with
you. But, thank you.
I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Thank both of our witnesses for your tolerance and your
patience today.
We are adjourned, before someone else shows up.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
future attack reconnaissance aircraft (fara)
1. Senator Wicker. Secretary Esper, we know that the Army is
exploring new rotary wing programs to modernize its aging airframe
fleet. One of those programs, FARA, is meant to fill a capability gap
that the Army has in the role of armed reconnaissance and attack in
complex degraded operation environments. Can you describe what type of
capabilities that FARA will bring to the Army and how such an aircraft
will fare against Russian and Chinese threats?
Secretary Esper. Optimal manning with revolutionary increases in
reach (speed and range), protection, lethality, and agility at the
objective will allow Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) to
fly and fight in any environment leveraging multi-function sensors and
payloads as well as extended range munitions that are affordable and
rapidly tailorable via aircraft agnostic, open mission systems
architectures.
Advanced teaming FARA with next generation unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) delivering lethal and non-lethal air launched effects enables
cross-domain fires to penetrate and dis-integrate enemy A2AD systems
and exploit expanded maneuver to overmatch peer adversaries.
Based on High-Fidelity modeling against peer adversaries in highly
contested environments, FARA will enable the joint force to operate
dispersed over wide areas with the ability to rapidly converge to
penetrate the multiple layers of stand-off employed by the threat,
disintegrate A2/AD systems, and exploit this advantage to achieve
strategic objectives to return to competition.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
improved turbine engine program (itep)
2. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, the Improved Turbine Engine
Program (ITEP) remains the Army's #1 Aviation Modernization priority
program that will save a combined $1 billion per year in reduced fuel,
maintenance and operating costs while increasing the capability of
today's Black Hawk and Apache helicopters and provide engines for the
Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program. On February 1st, the United States
Army awarded an Engineering and Manufacturing Design (EMD) contract for
the ITEP program to the General Electric Company. On February 19th the
Advanced Turbine Engine Company (ATEC) a 50/50 joint venture between
Honeywell and Pratt & Whitney, filed a protest with the General
Accountability Office (GAO) on the award. I understand DOD cannot
comment on the award due to the protest, but I request clarification on
ITEP specifically. What is the purpose of this program?
Secretary Esper. The purpose of the ITEP is to deliver the next
generation turbo-shaft engine for the Black Hawk (H-60), Apache (AH-
64E), and for the future the Army's Future Vertical Lift Future Attack
Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA). Compared to the current H-60 and AH-64
engine, the Improved Turbine Engine will increase operational reach and
lethality and provide increased power, fuel efficiency, and reliability
while fitting in the current engine bays of the Black Hawk and Apache
aircraft.
3. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, will ITEP improve the overall
performance of the Army's Apache and Black Hawk fleets?
Secretary Esper. Yes, the ITEP is expected to improve the overall
performance of the Army's Apache and Black Hawk fleets by regaining
lost capability due to aircraft weight growth, significantly increase
aircraft range, payload, and endurance over the current engine.
4. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how does ITEP impact the Army's
Future Vertical Lift program?
Secretary Esper. The requirement is for Future Attack
Reconnaissance Aircraft to include the ITEP Engine as program efforts
mature.
5. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, were engine power, fuel
consumption, reliability, and maintenance key elements for ITEP?
Secretary Esper. Engine power, engine growth, specific fuel
consumption, reliability, and maintenance were all considered for ITEP.
All technical requirements/key elements were thoroughly evaluated by
the Army and they were included in the System Requirements Document
(SRD) which was attached to the ITEP EMD Request for Proposal (RFP).
6. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, were there any other key
elements?
Secretary Esper. All technical requirements/key elements were
included in the System Requirements Document (SRD).
7. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how were these factors
prioritized?
Secretary Esper. The EMD contract award is currently under a
protest with GAO. Until this is resolved, specifics regarding
evaluation criteria cannot be provided. Engine power, future engine
improvements, fuel consumption, reliability, and maintenance, however,
were all considered for ITEP. The Army evaluated all technical
requirements/key elements and they were included in the System
Requirements Document which was attached to the ITEP EMD Request for
Proposal.
8. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the
Army's turbine engine-manufacturing industrial base, and specifically,
for combat helicopters?
Secretary Esper. The commercial and military rotorcraft turboshaft
engine industrial bases are healthy with no identified lower tier
supply chain risks that are of significant substance to program
execution risk. All identified supply chain risks are being managed
and/or mitigated through normal industrial base surveillance and risk
mitigation techniques. The Army's turbine engine industrial base
consists of turbo shaft engines and does not include turbine fan
engines. For turbo shaft engines, the industrial base includes several
diverse companies.
9. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how does the industrial base
impact innovation and cost?
Secretary Esper. A healthy industrial base, which exists for
turbine shaft engines, will increase competition and drive down costs.
Combat helicopter turboshaft engine innovation and cost are driven by
DOD requirements (e.g., better fuel efficiency, power, etc.) and the
industrial base's ability to meet those requirements. The commercial
sector continuously utilizes advanced manufacturing techniques and
processes, such as additive manufactured parts, ceramic matrix
composites, and other advance materials, to achieve key performance
requirements. While many factors impact cost, key innovation items
mentioned above will reduce piece part count, streamline manufacturing,
and improve performance and reliability, which will have direct impacts
on production and operations and sustainment costs.
10. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, do we have a sufficiently
robust industrial base to meet future turbine engine requirements?
Secretary Esper. The combat helicopter turbine engine industrial
base was examined in-depth in 2012, 2016, and twice in 2018 with focus
on support of the ITEP program and the Future Vertical Lift. Commercial
and military engines are usually very similar in configuration, which
leads to a stronger industrial base as a manufacturer will be
supporting both users at the same time. These examinations consistently
determined that this industrial base segment is healthy and prepared to
support upcoming and emerging Army aircraft programs.
sigint, ew, cyber and ems
11. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what strategy is the Army
implementing to integrate SIGINT, EW, and Cyber and what does that
strategy mean for the development of the EMS?
Secretary Esper. The Army is developing a framework for an
implementation plan that guides the integration and harmonization of
the approved strategies for SIGINT, EW and Cyber Operations
capabilities in support of multi-domain operations. The resulting plan
will describe the actions to accomplish the major objectives from each
strategy. Coordination with the cross-functional teams will ensure the
development of a comprehensive integration plan. The governance plan
for this framework will include (a) assessment during the Army
Cyberspace Council; (b) updates during the intelligence senior
initiatives group, and; (c) updates at the Intelligence Center of
Excellence, Cyber Center of Excellence Home-on-Home series. Employing
cyberspace and EW capabilities under a single planning, integration,
and synchronization methodology increases the operational commander's
ability to understand the environment, project power, and synchronize
multiple operations using the same domain and environment.
Synchronizing offensive and defensive activities allows a faster
response to enemy and adversary actions. The EMS is the common
denominator for both cyberspace and EW operations, and also impacts
every operation in the Army.
12. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what does the Army's new
SIGINT strategy mean for the development of future systems/
capabilities?
Secretary Esper. The SIGINT strategy provides ends, ways, and means
required for U.S. Army SIGINT capabilities to be flexible, agile, and
rapidly adaptable to keep pace with the threat in a multi-domain
operational environment. The strategy describes agile processes
required to acquire and adapt SIGINT equipment to address new threats
leveraging conventional acquisitions processes as well as Army rapid
acquisition approaches (Information Technology Box, Quick Reaction
Capability, Army Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, Rapid
Capability Office.)
The Army's new SIGINT strategy incorporates capabilities pertaining
to the cyberspace domain. This new strategy also improves the rapid
acquisition process to keep better pace with the changes happening with
computing.
The inclusion of the entire electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as part
of SIGINT ensures that Electronic Warfare is integrated into SIGINT
capability design.
13. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, in complex EMS environments,
the legal partition between title 10 and title 50 can generate
inefficiencies in acquisition with respect to combined tactical EW and
SIGINT systems. How are Army acquisition officials managing this divide
and what steps is the Army taking to bridge it?
Secretary Esper. Titles 10 and 50 each have their respective
authorities with regard to command and control of EW and SIGINT
systems. This includes how each system is used, whether it is employed
in support of tactical military operations (title 10) or in support of
national intelligence/covert operations (title 50). The Army builds
materiel solutions to approved requirements. Any issues are worked out
as the Army develops the requirements for each system. Army SIGINT / EW
Program Managers work closely with various intelligence and security
organizations to ensure materiel solutions are accredited by cognizant
authority prior to their employment.
14. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how are the Army's EMS-related
activities (Cyber operations, EW, Spectrum Management, and SIGINT)
aligned?
Secretary Esper. The Army has aligned SIGINT, EW, and CO
capabilities to produce fully integrated staff processes to improve
mission execution at every echelon. This alignment is consistent with
the Joint Cyberspace Concept and the Army Concept Framework. Alignment
concepts are continuously being developed in partnership between the
Intelligence and Cyberspace Centers of Excellence to coordinate and,
where applicable, consolidate force and capability development efforts
with an integrated approach. This will ensure that SIGINT, EW and CO
capabilities are interoperable, deliver more versatility, and are
mutually supporting.
15. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what changes across DOTMLPF-P
is the service pursing to ``Man, Train, and Equip'' our combatant
commanders for modern operations in complex EMS environments?
Secretary Esper. The Army must fight and win in a contested
electromagnetic operational environment. Cyberspace and the EMS will
grow increasingly congested, increasingly contested, and will be
critical to successful multi-domain operations. Success will be
measured by the ability to execute operations freely in cyberspace. On
May 17, 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop a framework focused
on providing increased cyberspace support to corps level and below
commanders titled, ``Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Support to
Corps and Below'' to address specific electronic warfare concerns and
issues. In April 2017, CSA directed Cyber and Intelligence Centers of
Excellence to conduct an assessment to identify gaps and solutions
associated with the integration of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT),
Electronic Warfare (EW), and Cyber capabilities, the findings of which
will be incorporated into a mission strategy.
emergency preparedness
16. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, you previously testified
before the Senate Appropriations Committee (May 5, 2018) that the
Department would place increased emphasis on a range of business
reforms, specifically addressing acquisition reform, contract
management, and budget execution. Private sector solutions have
historically played a critical role in ensuring that the Department has
access to top quality, cost effective products and services. It has
been brought to my attention that the Department is using funds to
research, build and deploy an emergency preparedness and response
technology (the Protection Services Infrastructure Framework (PSIF)
produced by the United States Army Combat Capability Development
Center). This emergency preparedness and response technology already
exists in the market today, and has proven effective in other state,
local and federal agencies that have acquired it. What factors are
considered when the Department evaluates whether to expend these
resources versus deploying a Commercial Off the Shelves (COTS)
technology?
Secretary Esper. Between 2002 and 2010, the Combat Capability
Development Center Armament Center (CCDC AC) adapted its combat
decision aids technologies for dual-use applications to address
situational awareness and emergency management to bridge the
information gap between Defense and Civil agencies. Combat decision
aids allow commanders to identify decisions and solutions to reduce
decision timelines as situations develop in the operational
environment. Following the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, Joint Project
Manager Guardian (JPM GUARDIAN) received a directed requirement from
the working group organized to study what happened during the shooting
to provide an installation common operating picture, mass warning and
notification, and enhanced 911 system. A standalone commercial product
capable of bridging the aforementioned gap in a ``plug-and-play'' open-
architecture framework did not exist at that time. Given this
requirement and knowledge of a separate CCDC AC effort to enable
interagency information sharing at the Port Authority NY/NJ, JPM
Guardian selected CCDC AC in 2010 as the lead system integrator for the
Physical Security Integration Framework--Interconnection Capability
Suite (PSIF ICS).
In accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Title 10
USC Sec. 2377, when the Army evaluates whether to pursue a
developmental program in lieu of a COTS technology, the Army must first
determine if a COTS or non-developmental product exists capable of
satisfying the requirements, or whether the COTS/NDI product could be
modified to meet the requirements, or determine if the COTS/NDI product
could meet the requirements if the requirements were modified to a
reasonable extent. Numerous factors are considered, including:
threshold and objective capability performance specifications, breadth
of capability to meet unique U.S. Army requirements, potential
reasonable modifications to the requirements, open vice closed/
proprietary architectures (to enable interface with multiple COTS/
Government off the Shelf Solutions [GOTS] solutions), performance, and
schedule as well as overall lifecycle sustainment costs. Lifecycle
sustainment costs consist of maintenance, licensing fees, replacement
costs, and technological refresh rates. In addition to the economic and
specification measures noted above, potential COTS/GOTS capabilities
undergo operational and developmental testing and evaluation to
determine optimal functionality, durability, and the ability to meet
operational mission requirements, and possible COTS/NDI modifications
to meet the requirements.
17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, current policies in place
require all federal agencies, including DOD, to comply with the
Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act. The Mutual
Obligations in Statute were specifically designed to allow government
entities to communicate with one another during times of crisis.
Emergency response and preparedness is crucial to our national
security. It's my understanding that most Federal installations,
including the United States Army, are connected to each statewide
system--but there are several that are not. Has the Department made
efforts to close this gap, and ensure that the Army has a technology in
place that allows for the sharing of information and personnel during
times of crisis?
Secretary Esper. The Army has fielded mass warning and
notifications (MWN) systems that are Emergency Planning & Community
Right-to-Know Act compliant at 100 of 144 installations. The Army plans
to field MWN at all installations in early 2020.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
waats/apache pilot throughput
18. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper and General Milley, I
understand Ft. Rucker is having a hard time processing Apache pilots on
schedule. Is the Army is still experiencing a pilot shortage? How is
throughput at Ft. Rucker for attack pilots progressing? For AH-64
pilots specifically? Has the Army considered locating a Mobile Training
Team (MTT) at the Western Army Aviation Training Site as a way to speed
up throughput in the short-term? As part of the replacement for the 24
AH-64 helicopters/Attack Reconnaissance Force Structure lost due to
ARI, Arizona is on track to receive 13 replacement UH-60A/L for an
Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) by the end of the month. Arizona now
has two AHBs in the state (w/ 10 UH-60A/Ls each) and two Med Evac
detachments (w/ 3 UH-60A/Ls each). Arizona has also been identified to
receive an accelerated upgrade of the AHB's UH-60A/Ls to the UH-60M by
August 2020. Is that plan still on track? I also understand these the
Med Evac detachments are scheduled to be upgraded to UH-60V models--
what is the timeframe for delivery of these variants?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army is short 647 Aviation
Warrant Officers (AWO) across all components. The Army under-produced
pilots between the years 2010-2017 due to reduced budgets and
subsequent reductions to force structure. As a result, a shortfall
developed among junior AWOs in those year groups. The Army is
mitigating the shortfall by retaining a surplus of senior-level AWOs.
The Army's strategy to address the shortage is two-fold: incentive
programs to retain pilots beyond their initial Active Duty or Reserve
Service Obligation, and increasing throughput capacity at Fort Rucker.
The Army is not yet meeting its AH-64 pilot training requirements
at Fort Rucker for all components, but AH-64 pilot throughput is
progressing in a positive direction. We have both improved the
maintenance readiness levels of the AH-64s and increased the number of
AH-64s at Fort Rucker, both of which were limiting factors.
Additionally, we are increasing the number of Instructor Pilots and the
amount of funding at Fort Rucker to meet pilot training requirements.
The overall shortage of AH-64 aircraft across the Army will continue to
challenge the training of pilots.
Historical analysis shows that the U.S. Army Aviation Center of
Excellence (USAACE) at Fort Rucker is the most efficient training
location due to economy of scale. USAACE can train over twice as many
pilots per aircraft as compared to the Western Army Aviation Training
Site (WAATS), which has not conducted AH-64 training since 2013.
The current timeline for the Arizona National Guard to receive UH-
60Ms is by 2020. The timeline for UH-60V fielding is being developed.
yuma proving ground (ypg) long range firing expansion:
19. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper, I appreciated our discussion
during the hearing regarding the need to update and expanding our
testing ranges, like the Yuma Proving Ground, to be able to accommodate
Army's top modernization priority of long range precision fires
testing? In your answer, you mentioned there are some specific
resources in the Army's fiscal year 2020 budget regarding these
updates. Are resources to update our testing and training ranges
reflected in Army's fiscal year 2020 budget? If so, how specifically?
Army's Electronic Proving Ground (EPG) @ Ft. Huachuca is looking into
expanding electromagnetic spectrum access in order to allow for
additional military training within channels where adversaries may try
to target government and civilian communications. With modernization a
top priority, is the Army also prioritizing updating and investing in
its electronic testing facilities, like the EPG at Ft. Huachuca? In the
face of growing grey-zone threats, is expanding electromagnetic
spectrum access for more testing and training is a priority for the
Army? If so, how? If not, why not?
Secretary Esper. The Army annually plans and programs investments
in test capability modernization and sustainment for its test ranges
that support the testing required for legacy and modernization
priorities. The fiscal year 2020 budget has targeted investments in
infrastructure and instrumentation at Army test ranges which will
support modernization efforts including Long Range Precision Fires
systems. The Army is investing in test capabilities such as range fiber
optics, radars, telemetry, and support vehicles to support all Yuma
Test Center (YTC) testing efforts including Long Range Precision Fires
at the YTC on U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. In addition, the
Army is leveraging Office of the Secretary of Defense funding to
develop optical instrumentation and autonomous flight safety systems
for future YTC testing needs.
The Army is specifically investing at the U.S. Army Electronic
Proving Ground on Fort Huachuca, Arizona in electronic test
capabilities for Network, Radio, and GPS systems as well as threat
emulation capabilities which include threats typically found in grey
zone conflict.
Department of Defense (DOD) ranges, including those on Fort
Huachuca, are faced with challenges in spectrum access, airspace
restrictions, and land use. For example, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and the Federal Communications Commission have
curtailed DOD's access to the spectrum while the global wireless
broadband industry is seeking to reallocate spectrum from Defense use
to commercial use. The Army is working with the following to address
some of the challenges:
1) DOD to establish provisions for assured and dynamic access to
the spectrum including spectrum that is already in use.
2) Fort Huachuca, other Services, and FAA to convert the Tombstone
Military Operations Airspace into restricted airspace that would better
support DOD training and provide the airspace necessary to test sensing
technologies.
3) Fort Huachuca and its Sentinel Landscapes partners to expand
its Electronic Warfare Test Range to enable electronic testing and
training operations with a brigade size element.
future vertical lift
20. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper and General Milley, I
appreciate the Army's fiscal responsibility in trying to cut less
promising programs in order to pay for its modernization priorities,
including Future Vertical Lift (FVL). However, how you chose pay for
those programs is critically important. I'm concerned that some Army
National Guard (ANG) aviation programs may be seen as a pay-for for
some of these priorities and, as a result, ANG's modernization budget
may be disproportionately affected. When is the Army planning to begin
receiving new rotary-wing aircraft based on your Future Vertical Lift
initiative? Is the Army expecting a top-line budget increase to fund
FVL, or are you planning to cut existing programs to fund FVL
development and procurement? Which programs does the Army plan to cut,
when, and which units (or components) will be affected? (For example,
we understand that UH-60M production from fiscal year 2024-2028 is
planned as one offset for modernization programs, and this
modernization will primarily affect primarily the Guard because if the
Active component is modernized first, UH-60V production/delivery for
the ANG may never occur).
Secretary Esper and General Milley. Regarding whether we expect a
topline budget increase to fund FVL, at this time we do not. We are
planning for defense budgets to stay relatively flat or potentially
decline so we are choosing to reprioritize resources within our
expected topline to pay for near term readiness and future
modernization requirements.
The Army is at an inflection point as procurement of its AH-64 and
UH-60 fleets wind down while developing the Future Vertical Lift (FVL)
acquisition programs: Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft and the
Future Long Range Assault Aircraft. The Army must balance continued
modernization of the current fleets with the requirement to field new,
more advanced aircraft capable of operating effectively on the Multi-
Domain Battlefield against near-peer adversaries to maintain overmatch
in this domain. The Army will not turn to Army National Guard (ANG)
aviation programs to pay for FVL. Additionally, the Army will not
impact ARNG and USAR rotary wing modernization. UH-60M, AH-64E, and UH-
60V programs are currently funded and on schedule.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
peacekeeping and stability operations institute (pksoi)
21. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, I understand that the Army
plans to downsize or eliminate the Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute (PKSOI) located at the Army War College in
Carlisle, Pennsylvania as part of an effort to restructure your over
Irregular Warfare enterprise. I also understand that Assistant
Secretary Owen West has requested that the Army delay any decision
regarding PKSOI until the Irregular Warfare review is complete, but the
Army has not agreed to honor that request. I am particularly concerned
about these changes because PKSOI is currently the Army's lead on
Women, Peace and Security. Can you provide an update as to the Army's
plan for PKSOI and specifically, what does that mean for the Army's
implementation of Women, Peace and Security if it is transferred to the
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas?
Secretary Esper. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute (PKSOI) will be reorganized and will remain at Carlisle
Barracks, with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS,
taking command of both PKSOI and the newly established Army Irregular
Warfare Proponent Office. The Army established the Irregular Warfare
Proponent Office at Fort Leavenworth, KS in order to implement the
National Defense Strategy; it will work alongside PKSOI to support
Joint peacekeeping and stability operations issues. No military members
or civilian employees currently at PKSOI will be directed to move to
Fort Leavenworth as part of the reorganization. Regarding the Army's
role and responsibility to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
mission, the CAC will assume all related tasks to WPS at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. With the ongoing transition, CAC and PKSOI are
making efforts to ensure there is minimal reduction in capability to
support WPS during the transition. Both organizational transitions will
take place no later than October 2019.
precision guidance kit--anti jam (pgk-aj) program
22. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the
threat posed to our armed services in GPS denied environments, the Army
is funding the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the
Precision Guidance Kit--Anti Jam (PGK-AJ) program. The goal of this
program is to bring affordable, degradation resistant precision to our
artillery forces. The funding planned in the latest budget drops
sharply after fiscal year 2020. What is the Army's plan to continue to
fund this critical capability improvement to complete its full
qualification and reach an Initial Operational Capability by 2025 or
sooner?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Precision Guidance Kit--
Anti Jam program is fully funded in fiscal year 2020, and the Army is
committed to funding PGK-Anti Jam development and delivering the
Initial Operational Capability to our Warfighters by fiscal year 2025.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
southern border wall
23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, have you made any
recommendations regarding any Army construction projects that could be
diverted to build the wall?
Secretary Esper. On March 19, 2018, the Department identified a
complete pool of unawarded military construction projects from which
funding could be reallocated to support the construction of a border
barrier should the Secretary of Defense decide to use 10 USC 2808
authority. To support his determination on utilizing this authority,
the Army and the Department are reviewing the pool of unawarded
projects with award dates in fiscal year 2020 or later to minimize
potential impacts of delays of resourcing. No military housing,
barracks, or dormitory projects will be impacted. No definitive date
has been set for the Acting Secretary of Defense's determination on the
use of section 2808 authority or for identifying a final list of
military construction projects that could be deferred.
24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, what is your criteria for
evaluating and prioritizing Army construction projects? How will you
formulate recommendations for projects to be defunded?
Secretary Esper. The Secretary of Defense has not yet decided to
undertake or authorize any barrier construction projects under section
2808. We are carefully considering whether and which MILCON projects
could be deferred, applying these criteria:
No MILCON projects that have already been awarded, and no
MILCON projects with fiscal year 2019 award dates will be impacted;
Only MILCON projects with award dates after September 30,
2019 will be considered;
No military housing, barracks, and dormitory projects
will be impacted; and
MILCON projects would be selected to minimize the impact
on readiness and take into account the National Defense Strategy.
puerto rico
25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will you commit to
encouraging Secretary Shanahan to not select any Army projects in
Puerto Rico to be defunded and diverted to the border wall given the
recent natural disasters and economic disarray?
Secretary Esper. No definitive date has been set for the Acting
Secretary of Defense's determination on the use of section 2808
authority or for identifying a final list of military construction
projects that could be deferred. MILCON projects would be selected to
minimize the impact on readiness
troops at southern border wall
26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will troops be deployed to
the border for as long as it takes to build the wall?
Secretary Esper. The U.S. Army will provide support to U.S.
Northern Command as directed by the Secretary of Defense in response to
requests made by the Department of Homeland Security.
27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, is construction of a
border wall under section 2808 contingent on extending the deployments
of troops at the border, even beyond the current extension through
September 2019?
Secretary Esper. The Secretary of Defense has not yet decided to
undertake or authorize any barrier construction projects under section
2808.
28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, if you anticipate that
deployment orders for troops at the border will be extended, why does
the President's budget request fail to include funding for border
deployments?
Secretary Esper. To date, the Army does not anticipate troop
deployments extending past 30 September 2019. Further, the Acting
Secretary of Defense has not ordered the Army to deploy troops to the
Southwest Border beyond 30 September 2019.
general neller concerns with readiness
29. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you share the concerns
that General Neller articulated? Do you agree that the border
deployments, among other factors, are compromising Army readiness and
solvency?
General Milley. The Army has managed several unplanned and
unbudgeted events, to include support to the Department of Homeland
Security along the Southwest Border, support to hurricane relief
efforts in the Southeast, and support to flooding relief efforts in the
Midwest. From an Army-wide perspective, the readiness impact of these
unplanned and unbudgeted factors has been negligible.
30. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, have you communicated any
concerns to Acting Secretary Shanahan?
General Milley. No.
31. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, in the memos made public,
GEN Neller lists 4 Marine Corps exercises that have been decisively
cancelled or reduced, and 7 potential cancellations. General Milley,
has the Army also been forced to cancel readiness exercises? How many?
General Milley. The Army did not cancel any training exercises in
fiscal year 2019 because of unplanned or unbudgeted factors. There have
been some planned training events, not exercises, disrupted by support
to the border, but all are recoverable after units return to home
station and Commanders reschedule that training. The border commitment
has represented no more than 5,000 soldiers, or 0.5 percent of the
total Army. Additionally, we took mitigating steps to reduce any risk
to readiness such as rotating forces frequently to prevent disruption
in training.
32. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, are you concerned that
these troop deployments will continue indefinitely? If that is the
case, can you estimate the impact on readiness?
General Milley. No. Given the Army's large size in proportion to
the support mission, and our ability to rotate units for the mission,
continuation of deployments at the current level would have a
negligible impact on readiness of the Army.
future vertical lift
33. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, the Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1
Defiant conducted its first flight last week. Can you please provide an
update on how the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program is
progressing?
General Milley. The flight of the Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1 Defiant is
another step in the Joint Multi Role Tech Demonstrator (JMR-TD) process
that is helping us reduce risk. The Future Vertical Lift Cross
Functional Team is on schedule to field both Future Attack
Reconnaissance Aircraft and Future Long Range Assault Aircraft to units
in the 2030 timeframe. We will accomplish fielding by capitalizing on
existing, mature technology and through a modular open systems
architecture (MOSA) enabling Future Vertical Lift to integrate the most
reliable and capable technical solutions available from government
efforts and commercial industry. No later than June 2019, the Army will
award four to six initial Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft design
contracts. No later than March 2020, the Army will select two vendors
for final design and competitive prototypes. November 2022 is the
target date for the prototypes to first take flight followed by a year-
long ``Fly-Off'' competition in 2023. The Army will decide whether or
not to buy one of the prototype designs by 2024.
34. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you believe--as your
Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Team leader BGEN Rugen does--that
the Army is at an inflection point in aviation modernization and should
now pursue a new design or concept for power lift?
General Milley. Yes, I agree with BG Rugen. We had to make a
decision as to whether we keep incrementally upgrading our current
rotary wing fleet that were designed in the 1970s or go with a ``clean
sheet'' design. The current rotary wing fleet is as capable as ever and
now is the time to build an Army aviation force that is optimized for
large-scale combat operations against a peer or near-peer competitor.
35. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, are you satisfied with the
progress Future Vertical Lift Program? How can Congress best support
your aviation modernization efforts?
General Milley. While I am satisfied with where we are with Future
Vertical Lift, we are always looking for opportunities to accelerate
the programs to deliver advanced capabilities to our Army sooner. We've
enjoyed recent successes under the Other Transaction Authorities that
Congress has provided the Services and look to continue to leverage
those authorities to deliver advanced capabilities to our Army.
36. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you believe the Cross
Functional Team organization is effective in leading modernization
efforts in powered lift for the Army? What are the challenges and how
are you addressing them?
General Milley. Yes. The Cross Functional Team construct allows us
to consolidate warfighter, technical, programmatic, and acquisition
communities to fuse time and investment of readiness priorities. The
Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Teams (FVL CFT) are designed to
rapidly integrate and synchronize critical solutions across the
modernization enterprise and deliver timely solutions to the
warfighter. As we have demonstrated in Future Long Range Assault
Aircraft (FLRAA) and Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA)
schedules, the FVL CFT has literally cut years off the normal
procurement schedule by working with the acquisition and contracting
community to maximize the use of Other Transaction Authorities; worked
with the Science and Technology community to capitalize on existing,
mature technology as well as the Joint Multi Role Tech Demonstrator
(JMR-TD) program to reduce risk in the accelerated timeline. The FVL
CFT is working hand in hand with the Program Manager--Unmanned Aerial
Systems and applied the ``Buy, Try, Decide'' method to accelerate the
replacement for the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Systems. Overall, we are
very happy with all of our Cross Functional Teams' performance but we
are always looking for ways to improve and, in turn, accelerate the
process to get the next generation of equipment into our soldiers'
hands as soon as possible.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
department of the army budget review
37. Senator Kaine. Secretary Esper, does your fiscal year 2020
budget request include any funding for sustaining support activities
along the Southern Border?
Secretary Esper. No, support to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
began on October 26, 2018 , was first extended through January 31,
2019, and has since been extended to September 30, 2019. The CBP has
not requested and the Army has not been directed to deploy troops at
the border past September 30th. Therefore, no funds were requested for
the mission in this budget request.
38. Senator Kaine. Secretary Esper, have you been informed that you
will need to sustain your deployment of forces to the southern border
past September 2019?
Secretary Esper. No. the Army has not been informed to sustain
troop deployments to the Southwest Border past September 2019.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
white supremacy
39. Senator Warren. General Milley, white supremacy is rising in
the United States. The Anti-Defamation League found a 182 percent
increase in propaganda efforts by white supremacist groups in the U.S.
in 2018, compared to the previous year. That same group found that
white supremacist murders in the U.S. more than doubled in 2017, with
white supremacists responsible for 53 percent of extremist-related
murders in the United States. A recent Huffington Post investigation
found that two marines, two Army ROTC cadets, an Army physician, a
member of the Texas National Guard and one member of the Air Force
belong to a white supremacist group called Identity Europa. This group
reportedly helped organize the white supremacist rally in 2017 in
Charlottesville, Virginia and spews racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-
immigrant views. I believe that Army values are American values, and
that the vast majority of our soldiers live those values every day and
represent the best of America. I do not blame the Army for every
offensive thought or act by every soldier. How does the Army ensure a
command climate of zero tolerance for white supremacist or white
nationalist views and acts, including how soldiers are disciplined for
such behavior?
General Milley. All soldiers are prohibited from supporting
extremist organizations or extremist activities, and participation in
extremist organizations and activities by Army personnel is
inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Enforcement
of this policy is a responsibility of commanders at all levels, is
vitally important to unit cohesion and morale, and is essential to the
Army's ability to accomplish its mission. Further, Commanders have the
authority to prohibit military personnel from engaging in or
participating in other activities that the commander determines will
adversely affect good order and discipline or morale within the
command.
Commanders have several options for dealing with violations of the
prohibitions, which include punishment under the UCMJ or administrative
actions such as separation for unsatisfactory misconduct, or for
conduct deemed prejudicial to good order and discipline or morale;
reclassification actions; bar to reenlistment; or other administrative
or disciplinary action deemed appropriate by the commander based on the
specific facts and circumstances of the particular case.
40. Senator Warren. General Milley, in recruiting quality soldiers,
how does the Army ensure that recruits do not have an association or
participation with white supremacist or white nationalist groups or
causes of any kind?
General Milley. The Army uses a comprehensive set of policies and
procedures to identify extremism during the accessions process. These
checks include screening with the National Crime Information Center
which checks the Gang File and the Known or Appropriately Suspected
Terrorist File which provide the Army identifying information about
violent criminal gang and terrorist organization members.
Army accessioning agencies complete, for each applicant, tattoo
screening for tattoos or brands that are extremist, indecent, sexist,
or racist; they also require applicants to complete numerous
questionnaires and be subject to interviews with Army leaders in the
accession process, credit checks, and also be subject to a Personnel
Security Investigation (Tier 3 PSI).
Many applicants are also subject to an even more in depth Single
Scope Background Investigation comprised of additional screening
including interviews by security screeners with persons who know the
applicant (neighbors, coworkers or former supervisors or teachers). A
particular area of emphasis in the screening process is to detect and
deter those with a history of gang or extremist activity, which is
often found to be an indicator of racist behavior.
41. Senator Warren. General Milley, Military Times ``conducted a
voluntary, confidential online survey'' of Active Duty U.S.
servicemembers in September 2017, in which ``[t]he questions focused on
President Trump's time in the White House and national security issues
facing American leaders.'' That survey found: ``Nearly one in four
troops polled say they have seen examples of white nationalism among
their fellow servicemembers.'' Furthermore, according the survey,
``When asked whether white nationalists pose a threat to national
security, 30 percent of respondents labeled it a significant danger.''
Has the Army conducted a voluntary, confidential survey of soldiers
regarding the presence of white supremacy or white nationalism in the
ranks, or the threat of white supremacy or white nationalism to the
United States?
General Milley. The U.S. Army has not surveyed soldiers regarding
the presence of white supremacy or white nationalism in the ranks, or
the threat of white supremacy or white nationalism to the United
States. During the 1997 to 2011 timeframe, the U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducted a
biannual survey that contained items asking soldiers about their
experiences with extremist organizations/activities. The survey also
asked soldiers for their perceptions of the seriousness or the extent
of extremist/hate group activities within their unit. In 2013, the
Department of Defense's Office of People Analytics (OPA) also asked
soldiers to what extent racist/extremist organizations or individuals
were a problem at their installation.
Overall, the vast majority of Active Duty soldiers said extremist
activities were not a problem at all or only a slight problem.
42. Senator Warren. General Milley, how many soldiers were
discharged each year for the last 10 years for association or
participation with white supremacist or white nationalist groups or
causes?
General Milley. The Army doesn't track discharges for association
or participation with white supremacy or white nationalist groups or
causes. The Army tracks the overall basis for which a servicemember is
separated (e.g., civil conviction, court-martial conviction,
misconduct, unsatisfactory performance). Army policy prohibits
participation in extremist, terrorist, and criminal gang organizations
and activities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
apache helicopters
43. Senator Manchin. General Milley, after the Aviation Restructure
Initiative the Army National Guard was left with four Apache helicopter
battalions. Each of these battalions is manned by only 18 aircraft
instead of the traditional 24 required aircraft per battalion. This
means that the National Guard units must constantly share aircraft to
ensure adequate training for combat operations or are forced to borrow
aircraft from Active Duty or accept reduced readiness. Is this plan
sustainable for long term readiness of our National Guard Apache fleet
or do we need another restructuring of assets?
General Milley. The four ARNG Attack Reconnaissance Battalions are
scheduled to reach full authorization of 96 total aircraft by the end
of fiscal year 2026. The first battalion will be fielded with 24 AH-
64Es in fiscal year 2022, the second in fiscal year 2023, the third in
fiscal year 2025, and the fourth in fiscal year 2026. All 96 aircraft
are scheduled to be the Version 6, which is the most advanced, capable,
and lethal version of the AH-64E. Regular Army units are also short of
AH-64 aircraft, and must also cross-level them for deployments. Given
the aforementioned plans to field more Apache aircraft in the future to
the National Guard (and the Regular Army), this plan is sustainable and
does not require another restructuring of assets.
44. Senator Manchin. General Milley, after a limited procurement of
new build AH-64E Apache block IIIB helicopters over the last few years,
the service has elected to shift this year's budget for Apaches
entirely into remanufacture of airframes for the Apache block IIIA.
Given the already significant service of some of these Apache
airframes, if we ignore cost numbers which are not significant in the
long term are we making the correct investment now to facilitate long
term reliability of our attack helicopter assets?
General Milley. Yes, we are making the correct investment. The
remanufactured Apache has a new airframe, comes off the production line
as a zero-hour new aircraft, and it costs less than procuring a new
build aircraft. There is no difference between the life or capability
of a REMAN and new build Apache. Both will serve the Army through 2050.
budget priorities
45. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, we are
currently in a period of the highest defense budgets we have ever seen.
Last year's enacted Department of Defense budget was the largest in
history, only beat by this year's request in the President's budget.
This trend of increasingly massive defense budgets is unsustainable. Do
your budget priorities laid out in the request adequately take
advantage of the large budgets now to prepare the force for a likely
time in the future where we will see decreasing budgets and the
inability to fund every project you want?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The fiscal year 2020 budget
resources the Army's essential support of the National Defense
Strategy. It furthers the Army's total readiness recovery goal by 2022
and puts the Army on a path to achieve our modernization objectives by
2028. The Army needs timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained
funding now and in the future to ensure we meet these goals. Any
reduction now or to future budget requests would likely impact the
Army's fiscal year 2022 readiness goals and the fiscal year 2028
modernization goals. The Army has/is taking a holistic approach to
modernization for the future which is demonstrated by the establishment
of AFC and the six modernization priorities--which drive our future
objective of achieving multi-domain dominance by 2028. The Army's six
modernization priorities will not change and they demonstrates the
Army's commitment to innovate for the future.
proportional and concurrent equipment
46. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, a top
priority of the National Guard year in and year out is the acquisitions
of proportional and concurrent equipment. Having the same equipment on
the same timelines as Active Duty massively enhances the total force's
ability to train and fight alongside the Active Duty and overall
enhances our national security. Do your current and future budgets
support National Guard acquisition of items such as Bradley and Abrams
mods, and Joint Lightweight Tactical vehicle in the short term as well
as projects like Future Vertical Lift in the long term?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army National Guard's
equipping focus is on deployability, sustainability, and
interoperability. The Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle is fully
funded through fiscal year 2025 to support Army National Guard
requirements. The Abrams modifications are fully funded through fiscal
year 2025, which supports all Army National Guard requirements. The
potential reduction in Bradley modifications to COMPO 1 would result in
delaying the cascade of the A3 variants to COMPO2. Future Vertical Lift
fielding plans are not developed; however, the Army has an obligation
to ensure soldiers going into harm's way, regardless of component, have
the best equipment available.
weapons of mass destruction civil support teams
47. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper, National Guard Weapons of
Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) are a critical component
of domestic ability to respond to acts of violence here at home.
Congress has made this a priority and our Governors and Adjutant
Generals in the states depend on the funding of these assets to ensure
we maintain this capability. Does the fiscal year 2020 budget request
and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) include the necessary
funding levels and resources to ensure that this capability is fully
sustained?
Secretary Esper. The Department of the Army recognizes the
importance of the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) in supporting civil authorities' efforts to
counter weapons of mass destruction. The Army decided not to pursue
certain upgrades in order to fund more urgent and important
modernization priorities. In coordination with the NGB, the Army is
currently reviewing funding levels for the WMD-CST program in the
fiscal year 2021-2025 POM build.
mq-1c gray eagle procurement
48. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in May
2017 the Army updated its MQ-1C procurement requirement to 204 aircraft
based on the decision to man your brigades with 12 MQ-1C aircraft
versus 9. However, your budget request allots for only six War
Replacement Aircraft in fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, with no
procurements listed In fiscal year 2022, fiscal year 2023 or fiscal
year 2024. This action leaves your force short of the overall 204
aircraft. What is the plan for future requests and utilization of MQ-1C
Gray Eagle aircraft?
Secretary Esper and General Milley. The entire MQ-1C Gray Eagle
Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 204 is procured with the fiscal
year 2019 appropriation. The fiscal year 2020 request is for pre-
planned battle losses which shortens the timeline to acquire
replacement aircraft to reduce risk to the Gray Eagle fleet.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Cramer, Scott,
Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King,
Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. We will come to order. Consistent with our
policy of starting on time, it is now time.
I appreciate your being here. I want to say one thing to
Secretary Perry. You have a lot of fans here that you did not
know you would have because just 28 and a half miles north of
Texas is Fort Sill, and Fort Sill is in Washington this week,
and so we were talking about the fact many of them are going to
come and see. A lot of people are not aware of what the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC) has to do with this whole issue
that we are going to be talking about today. This will be an
opportunity to do that. We thank you for being here and for
your service.
The Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year
2020 budget request of the Department of Energy's (DOE) atomic
energy defense activities.
I would like to welcome our witnesses, Rick Perry, former
Governor of Texas, and Lisa Gordon-Hagerty. Both of you
distinguish yourselves in your fields, and we are very
fortunate to have your service.
The Committee's top priority is to support an effective
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS,
which is this manual right here--the commission that put this
together--just as a reminder, this is equally two Democrat and
Republicans. It is something that is the blueprint for
everything that we are doing in the military right now. That
commission made it clear that maintaining a nuclear deterrence
is required. In recent years, since the Cold War ended, Russia
and China have increasingly prioritized nuclear programs, while
our lack of focus on these programs--we are paying for it now
because they have caught us in many areas.
We heard a few weeks ago from General Hyten at STRATCOM
[U.S. Strategic Command] about the need to modernize our
nuclear triad, and as he mentioned, it includes the Department
of Energy's warheads and infrastructure.
Secretary Perry, about three-quarters of your Department's
fiscal year 2020 budget request is in this Committee's purview
and will help us continue this vital work.
I was pleased to hear that NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] recently assembled the first W76-2 low-yield
warhead, which was recommended by the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) and authorized by Congress last year. This is an
excellent example of how responsive the nuclear enterprise
should be. From a requirement to production, it happened in
just 1 year. You do not see that very often.
But we cannot be responsive when half of our facilities are
more than 40 years old and a quarter of them date back before
World War II. We need to modernize infrastructure across the
complex. I was disappointed to learn that we have workers in
buildings with chunks of concrete falling off the ceiling and
flooding damage--rooms and expensive equipment that cannot be
quickly repaired.
We have some pictures at each of the desks up here and also
with the two of you, who have seen this many times, just to
kind of get a visual of how bad things are.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Inhofe. We are going to have to correct that. We
owe it to the men and women who work across the nuclear
enterprise to provide state-of-the-art 21st century facilities
to work in. I am glad to see that the Department is requesting
substantial funding for infrastructure modernization. I hope
that we are going to be able to maintain the bipartisan
consensus to fund this work in the future.
I look forward to your testimony, and thank you for being
here. Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Perry back to the
Committee, and I also want to welcome Administrator Gordon-
Hagerty who is appearing for the first time. Thank you both for
your service.
The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for
defense-related activities at the Department of Energy is $23
billion. This is a 4.3 percent increase over last year's
enacted level, and it is approximately 73 percent of the entire
$31 billion request for the Department of Energy. The specific
request for the National Nuclear Security Administration, or
NNSA, is $16.5 billion, an increase of $1.2 billion, or an 8.3
percent increase, over last year. Given that defense-related
activities comprise such a large percentage of the Department's
budget and the large proposed increases to the NNSA budget, I
want to particularly thank the Chairman for asking these
witnesses to testify before our Committee today.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the requested $1.2 billion
increase to the NNSA budget is intended to help meet the
requirements of both the 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.
The NNSA's workload is at its highest peak since the 1980s with
plans to overhaul five weapons systems over the next 15 years.
These projects include a cruise missile warhead first built in
1980; the B61 gravity bomb, which first entered production in
1961; and an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] warhead,
which entered service in 1978. All of these programs will
require nuclear and non-nuclear parts from your complex at the
same time. The NNSA is also preparing to product 30 pits per
year at Los Alamos which will require extensive new equipment
while, at the same time, NNSA is building a $6.5 billion
building at Oak Ridge to handle uranium. I am interested in
your approach to ensuring all these projects can be
accomplished on time and on schedule and on budget. It is quite
a challenging list.
Also, in anticipation of this increased workload, the
fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
authorized a cost estimating and program evaluation office to
provide an independent review on programs and their cost
estimates. I am interested in hearing if this office is being
funded and staffed appropriately.
Secretary Perry, your Department recently revised the
environmental cleanup liability of former atomic weapons
production sites from an estimated $163 billion to $377
billion, a jump of $244 billion over the next 30 years. I would
note, for example, at the Hanford Washington Reservation, there
are approximately 55 million gallons of radioactive liquid
sludge in 177 underground storage tanks, some of which are
leaking. I would like to know why the cost of cleanup has grown
so much. In addition, I would like to understand why it is
taking so long to clean out the Hanford underground tanks while
the Savannah River site cleanup of underground storage tanks is
well on its way.
On a final point, Secretary Perry, proposals to sell United
States nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have generated
significant interest and could have broader repercussions for
the Middle East and global nonproliferation efforts.
In May of last year, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
stated that if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow
suit as soon as possible. That statement, combined with
apparent Saudi insistence on the right to produce fissile
material, whether it be enriched uranium or plutonium, requires
that we carefully evaluate whether we could unintentionally
encourage a nuclear arms race in the Middle East by selling
Saudi Arabia nuclear reactors and associated technology.
Since the passage of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the
United States has promoted the peaceful use of atomic energy.
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires the United States
and any country seeking a transfer of nuclear technology to
sign a nonproliferation agreement that is reviewed by Congress.
Part 57b of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that you, Mr.
Secretary, review any transfer of technology that could lead to
the production of special nuclear material outside the United
States. Clearly the intent of Congress for over 70 years has
been to balance the peaceful use of atomic energy against the
possibility it might be used to make a nuclear weapon. We have
serious questions in this regard, Mr. Secretary, and I hope you
will respond to them. We would appreciate your update on this
issue and many more.
Again, let me thank both of you for appearing here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Both of you know what is going on here, what we want to get
to. What we are going to do is start with your opening
statements, and we would like to have you confine that to
around 5 minutes because we have a good attendance up here. We
are going to get all of our questions asked. We will start with
you, Secretary Perry.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. RICHARD PERRY, SECRETARY OF
ENERGY
Secretary Perry. Chairman Inhofe, thank you very much for
the invitation, and to Ranking Member Reed, it is good to be in
your presence, and thanks for allowing us to come earlier in
the year to sit down with you and your staffs to discuss before
we came here. The other members, it is a privilege to be with
each of you, and a number of you who have served as governors,
it has been a great privilege to share that executive spirit
with each of you.
So my work today and discussing the President's fiscal year
2020 budget for the Department of Energy--and I just want to
say it continues to be a great privilege for me. Many of you
have this before, particularly those governors in the audience
there, that this is the coolest job I have ever had before. It
is not the best job I ever had before, but it is the coolest
job.
I am pleased to be joined with the Under Secretary of the
Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty.
Each of you have had the opportunity to work with her, and you
know the incredibly high quality intellect and experienced
individual that we have running that side of the shop.
I am blessed to get to have a front row seat, if you will,
and some of the most remarkable innovations that are bringing
us energy independence, greater prosperity, a more robust
national security position.
The Department's overall budget request of $31.7 billion is
designed to further our progress by providing funding for the
National Nuclear Security Administration. It directly supports
our national security. By funding our Office of Environmental
Management (EM), it helps us clean up the environmental legacy
of the effort dating to the Manhattan Project, and this budget
request seeks to build upon the progress we made in both of
those areas, both NNSA and the EM, over the last year.
Thanks to NNSA's diligent efforts, along with congressional
support, I, along with the Secretary of Defense, was able to
certify to the President once again the reliability of our
nuclear weapons stockpile as we extended the service life of a
key warhead by 30-plus years by completing the W76-1 life
extension program in December of last year.
We continue our regular safe and reliable nuclear
propulsion and naval fleet support, while contributing
expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program,
ensuring sea-based deterrent capabilities for decades to come.
We are also seeking to replace our aging nuclear security
infrastructure. You made mention of that, both Senator Reed and
you, Mr. Chairman, much of it that is older than I am, and so
that is getting a little age on it since even before the 1950s.
Behind all of this is a bedrock belief that we continue to
embrace at DOE. Given the rising threats to our Nation and the
world from both state and non-state actors, we must maintain
our nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, we would like to eliminate
nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, but until that
becomes feasible, we must continue to pursue through strength
that peace that we all desire by keeping nuclear weapons out of
the wrong hands, supporting nonproliferation efforts. Through
NNSA, we seek to minimize the number of states that possess
nuclear weapons; deny nuclear access to terrorists; control
weapons usable material; related technology, and expertise; and
help ensure arms control agreements can be verified and
enforced. As I have said many times, we have a moral obligation
to defend our country by strengthening our nuclear deterrent.
But we have an equal duty to address the environmental
legacy left at the sites that produced the materials that
helped defeat tyranny and secure peace. That is exactly why the
EM program, which marks its 30th anniversary this year, exists.
To date, EM has completed cleanup activities at 91 sites in 30
States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The 16 EM sites in
11 States that remain are home to some of the Nation's toughest
and most complex cleanup challenges. Recently we made
significant progress from coast to coast from the Hanford site,
Jack, that you mentioned, in Washington to the separations
process research unit in New York. We are working to ensure
that EM is prepared to safely and effectively tackle these
challenges in a sustainable manner going forward.
In conclusion, this budget represents a commitment from all
of us at the Department of Energy to serve the American people
with stewardship, accountability, and service. In partnership
with our national labs, we will continue to support the world
class scientists and engineers who ignite America's ingenuity
and drive our competitiveness.
I look forward to working with each of you, your
colleagues, and your excellent staff in the weeks and months
ahead on these important funding details.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with that I will attempt to
answer any questions you have.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Perry and
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Rick Perry and Under Secretary
Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee,
it is an honor to appear before you on behalf of the Administration and
the Department of Energy (``the Department'' or ``DOE''). We appreciate
the Committee's strong support for DOE's environmental management
program and enduring national security missions and the opportunity to
testify in support of the President's budget request for fiscal year
(FY) 2020.
The Department's budget request supports America's continued rise
as an energy independent Nation, and advances U.S. national security by
modernizing our indispensable, yet aging, nuclear deterrent, and
promotes economic growth by making investments in transformative
science and technology innovation to promote affordable and reliable
energy. It also includes funding to meet our national security and
environmental cleanup challenges.
accomplishments in the past year:
Thanks to strong support from the Administration and Congress, over
the past year, DOE has made significant progress in advancing America's
security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and
nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology
solutions.
Last year, the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) continued to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of
nuclear weapons through the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP),
enabling the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to
certify to the President once again the reliability of the nuclear
weapons stockpile. While we are confident in the state and
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent today, we must--as General Hyten
of STRATCOM recently testified--provide sustained and reliable funding
for nuclear modernization so that future Secretaries and commanders can
brief future Congresses with the same confidence. In addition to its
critical role in sustaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear stockpile
and its supporting enterprise, NNSA also continued its important work
to advance U.S. nonproliferation, nuclear security, counterterrorism,
arms control objectives, and naval nuclear propulsion.
In December 2018, NNSA completed the W76-1 Life Extension
Program (LEP), extending the warhead's service life another 30+ years.
The B61-12 LEP, W80-4 LEP, W88 Alteration (Alt) 370, W87-1
Modification, and the W76-2 Modification continue to remain on budget
and on schedule. These achievements are a testament to NNSA's ability
to deliver on commitments we have made to the Department of Defense
(DOD) and Congress.
The highest NNSA infrastructure priority is re-
establishing a robust plutonium pit production capability to meet
military requirements, supported by numerous studies and analyses, of
no fewer than 80 war reserve pits per year by 2030. Last May, the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed NNSA's recommended alternative
calling for plutonium pit production at Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). This two-site approach
bolsters the nuclear security enterprise's responsiveness and
resiliency.
The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project continues
to make timely progress with the recent commencement of the
construction of the main buildings at the Y-12 National Security
Complex (Y-12). UPF will be delivered by the end of 2025 for no more
than $6.5 billion. This project is on budget and on schedule. NNSA also
broke ground on the new Albuquerque Complex in New Mexico, which will
house 1,200 employees when complete.
Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), China, and Nigeria, NNSA was instrumental in the conversion of
a Nigerian research reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This
marks NNSA's 74th research reactor or isotope production facility
conversion, which was followed by the repatriation of the highly
enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to China, making Nigeria the 33rd country,
plus Taiwan, to become HEU free.
NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors continued its record of
safe and reliable nuclear propulsion and nuclear fleet support, while
contributing expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program.
This next generation nuclear-powered submarine will ensure required
sea-based deterrence capabilities for decades to come.
The Office of Environmental Management (EM) broke ground
on a new ventilation system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
facility in New Mexico. WIPP is the lynchpin to the final disposition
of transuranic waste across the cleanup complex and the new ventilation
system will increase airflow in the WIPP underground for simultaneous
mining and waste emplacement operations.
The EM program successfully completed safe demolition of
the 10,000-square-foot vitrification plant at the West Valley
Demonstration Project in New York.
In June 2018, DOE's Office of Science (SC) Oak Ridge
Leadership Computing Facility's Summit system reclaimed the top spot
for the United States in the global ``Top 500'' list of high
performance computing systems and held the top spot in the November
list, which included five DOE systems among the top 10.
The Summit system is also launching the Exascale
computing era by enabling researchers to break the Exascale barrier,
achieving a peak throughput of more than two exaops--faster than any
previously reported science application.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) unveiled
the Sierra supercomputer, ranked the second-fastest in the world
according to the Top 500 list.
In May 2018, the White House's National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC) established an interagency committee on
Artificial Intelligence (AI) to advise the White House on Government-
wide AI research and development priorities and will work to establish
partnerships among government, private sector, and independent
researchers. The DOE serves a leading role on this Committee.
On February 11, 2019, the President signed Executive
Order 13859, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial
Intelligence. The Initiative focuses Federal Government and Department
resources toward developing AI technology, while ensuring that the next
great AI inventions are made in the United States.
In support of the Executive Order and building on our
core competencies in science and technology, DOE is developing a
coherent, long-term strategy to maximize the capabilities and
scientific benefits of transformative AI technologies to all of our
mission, business and operational areas.
Our approach includes development of innovative AI
technologies, aggregation of DOE mission-related data that together can
foster innovative advancement of next generation hardware and software
technologies.
building a strategic capability
The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of our national
strategy to keep the American people safe and secure for more than 70
years and its credibility backstops all U.S. diplomatic and military
activities around the globe.
While the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has been an
aspiration for many for generations, we must recognize the reality that
foreign nuclear threats are growing. Russia and China are investing
massive resources into upgrading and expanding their nuclear arsenals,
all at a time when they seek to challenge United States interests and
unravel U.S. alliances around the world. It is imperative that we
undertake prudent efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear stockpile and
enterprise--ensuring that the United States can continue to speak from
a position of strength and that tensions--regardless of where or how
they arise--do not escalate into all-out war.
DOE is building on the previous year's achievements with new
activities tailored to 21st century threats. In fiscal year 2020 and
beyond, the Department will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary
capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons
infrastructure and the needed skills of the nuclear enterprise
workforce. This includes the ability to produce strategic materials
(uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium) associated with nuclear
weapons, as well as refurbish and manufacture components made from
these materials.
Consistent, robust, and predictable funding and authority from
Congress are essential for the Department's nuclear weapon and
infrastructure modernization efforts. These modernization efforts are
aligned with the needs outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) and approved by the NWC.
modernizing our nuclear forces:
The Department is modernizing our nuclear enterprise to ensure that
we have the scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities
necessary to maintain an effective and safe nuclear triad and respond
to future national security threats.
Unique, state-of-the-art capabilities for research, development,
testing, evaluation, and production enable this critical effort. In
coordination with DOD, we have fully integrated the scope, budgets, and
schedules of the LEPs, infrastructure modernization, and nuclear
delivery systems.
We are making significant progress in the full set of LEPs,
modifications, and alterations while remaining aligned with DOD through
the NWC.
W76-1 LEP: The W76-1 LEP, which directly supports the
sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, completed its last production unit
in December 2018. Close-out activities in fiscal year 2020 include
archiving production tooling and program records, and completing
component overbuilds to support hardware provisioning for the life of
the warhead system.
W76-2 Modification Program: The W76-2 modification is
currently on schedule, on budget, and the program achieved First
Production Unit (FPU) in February 2019. This low-yield option is a
measured way to reinforce deterrence in the face of Russia's large,
diverse, and modern stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which
facilitate Moscow's mistaken belief that limited nuclear first use,
potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia a coercive
advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict.
B61-12 LEP: The oldest weapon system in the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, the B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the B61
gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of that vital weapon
system. Currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, this LEP has
demonstrated system performance in over 60 integrated ground and flight
tests, including eight joint flight test drops with the U.S. Air Force.
The B61-12 LEP will enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2019, following completion of system
qualification and Pantex Plant production readiness activities.
W88 Alt 370: The W88 Alteration 370 is on track for FPU
in fiscal year 2020. This program, which also supports the sea-based
leg of the nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4, Production
Engineering, and will enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in September
2019.
W80-4 LEP: In February 2019, the NWC approved the W80-4
LEP to transition into Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The fiscal
year 2020 request for $898.6 million will allow the W80-4 LEP to remain
on track to achieve FPU in fiscal year 2025 in support of the Air
Force's Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile.
W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 program will
replace the aging W78 warhead, with planned first production in 2030 to
support fielding on the Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
(GBSD) missile system. In September 2018, the NWC authorized restart of
Phase 6.2, Program Feasibility Study, activities on the W78 replacement
warhead and renamed it the W87-1. The W87-1 program will improve safety
and security, addressing antiquated design, material obsolescence,
evolving performance expectations, and emerging survivability threats.
recapitalizing our cold war era infrastructure:
As stated in the 2018 NPR, ``an effective, responsive, and
resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential to the U.S.
capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting requirements. Such an
infrastructure offers tangible evidence to both allies and potential
adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and can help to deter,
assure, hedge against adverse developments, and discourage adversary
interest in arms competition.''
More than a third of NNSA's facilities are over 60 years old. It
will take sustained investments to modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
With Congress' support, NNSA is making these investments,
including:
An enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium
pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. The time to
move forward is now. Repurposing the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication
Facility (MFFF) at SRS to produce 50 war reserve pits per year and
continuing to invest in LANL to produce 30 war reserve pits per year is
the optimal path forward to meet pit production requirements while
managing the risks and costs associated with increasing production
rates and maintaining existing plutonium missions at LANL.
Investing at LANL to provide all the tools necessary for
the enterprise to successfully support an enduring plutonium pit
production mission to produce 30 pits per year by 2026. NNSA
anticipates $3 billion in total funding over the next five years, and
LANL is actively installing pit production equipment and has begun
hiring to meet future work scope. As the nation's plutonium center of
excellence for research and development, LANL plays a critical role in
early design efforts for pit production.
Investing $774 million at SRS in fiscal year 2020, a 75.8
percent increase over fiscal year 2019. NNSA will continue termination
activities of the MFFF project at SRS, continue to pursue a dilute and
dispose strategy to fulfill U.S. commitment to dispose of 34 metric
tons (MT) of plutonium, and modernize SRS infrastructure to support the
tritium supply chain.
Fully funding the Uranium Processing Facility.
Ensuring availability of sufficient unobligated low-
enriched uranium and the necessary reactor capacity to produce an
adequate supply of tritium.
Investing over $900 million in fiscal year 2020 to
sustain and recapitalize NNSA's mission-enabling infrastructure to
support mission needs and improve facility reliability, sustainability,
productivity, and efficiency.
Disposing of several high-risk process-contaminated
excess facilities. Many of NNSA's excess process-contaminated
facilities will ultimately be transferred to the Environmental
Management (EM) program for disposition. In the interim, NNSA is
focusing on reducing risks where possible. For example, NNSA has made
critical investments to stabilize high-risk process-contaminated
facilities until ultimate disposition, including at Y-12's Alpha 5 and
Beta 4 facilities.
Commencing an effort by the EM program to remove Building
280 Pool Type Reactor and ancillary facilities at Lawrence vLivermore
National Laboratory. The Department identified five (including Building
280) of the top ten list of the highest risk excess facilities at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL) EM program has
been able to remove risks and stabilize a portion of the 220 excess,
contaminated, and deteriorating facilities at the Y-12 National
Security Complex (Y-12) and ORNL. While Oak Ridge has more high-risk
excess contaminated facilities than any other site, crews continued
addressing this issue in 2018 by tearing down two high-risk buildings,
preventing more than 6,000 pounds of mercury from entering the
environment, completed characterization for future demolition projects,
and immobilizing contamination in hot cell facilities.
preventing global nuclear threats:
Effective nuclear nonproliferation and arms control measures
support U.S., allied, and partner security by controlling the spread of
nuclear materials and technology; placing limits on the production,
stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; reducing misperception
and miscalculation; and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
competition. The 2018 NPR reiterates the U.S. commitment to effective
nonproliferation and arms control measures, both of which are vital to
our Nation's ability to have a credible deterrent.
In 2018, the U.S. Government interagency coordination on nuclear
nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism programs and strategy
enabled NNSA to:
Remove or confirm the disposition of nearly 352.4
kilograms of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Partner with the U.S. healthcare industry, which resulted
in the first domestic production of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) in 30 years.
Mo-99 is a vital medical radioisotope used in approximately 40,000
patient procedures daily in the United States.
Downblend or ship for downblending, 2.5 MT of surplus
HEU, for a cumulative total of 160.4 MT, which after downblending
cannot be used in a nuclear weapon.
Deploy a total of 48 radiation detection systems to
prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials worldwide.
Secure 87 domestic and international civilian buildings
containing high-priority radioactive material.
Provide technical reviews of 5,973 U.S. export license
applications and 3,053 interdiction cases to facilitate legitimate
nuclear cooperation and prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear and
dual use goods.
Hold over 40 international nuclear safeguards engagements
including training, and technical meetings with foreign partners.
Conduct 84 export control trainings for U.S. enforcement
agencies and foreign partners.
All of the aforementioned work was completed by NNSA's Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). DNN is committed to continuing
its efforts to: (1) minimize the number of nuclear weapons states; (2)
deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials;
(3) strictly control weapons-useable material, related technology, and
expertise; and (4) support the Department of State to make sure arms
control agreements enhance security, and are verifiable and
enforceable.
countering global nuclear threats:
The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or
radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the
unique technical expertise found in NNSA's nuclear security enterprise.
Highly trained personnel with specialized technical equipment maintain
readiness to support lead federal agencies to find and render safe
potential nuclear and radiological threat devices, to effectively
manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, and to
support enhanced security operations at large national public events.
CTCP also maintains operational nuclear forensics capabilities to
enable the attribution of a nuclear attack against the United States.
These capabilities allow the U.S. Government the ability to collect
evidence if a device is rendered safe prior to detonating, or to
characterize and identify the material used if the device detonates,
allowing policymakers to hold those accountable for the attack. CTCP
will also implement the National Nuclear Material Archive program
within NNSA to identify, consolidate, and analyze historical nuclear
material samples of value to the technical nuclear forensics program.
NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), supports render safe teams at FBI field offices in 11 major
American cities that are specially trained and equipped to identify and
mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device. Over the
next few years, CTCP will continue to provide training and conduct
operations in support of these FBI teams and begin transitioning to the
Capability Forward initiative, under which life-saving responses to a
nuclear threat device will be accelerated. As part of this initiative,
NNSA will provide additional training, equipment, and technical support
to the current 11 U.S. cities--eventually growing to 14 cities by
fiscal year 2022--to allow FBI teams to execute render safe operations
more rapidly. CTCP will also improve and expand NNSA training
facilities to accommodate the increased training requirements
associated with regional render safe capabilities.
responsible stewardship of the environment
The government's nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research
programs made significant contributions to our Nation's defense for
decades. The EM program is tasked with the safe disposition of
radioactive wastes; the management of spent nuclear fuel and special
nuclear material; the cleanup of contaminated soil and water; and the
decontamination and decommissioning of thousands of excess facilities.
As DOE continues to open new horizons in innovation, national security
and American energy production, we also remain focused on addressing
the environmental liabilities accrued while ending World War II and
keeping the peace in the Cold War.
This year marks the 30th anniversary of the EM program. DOE is
making great progress toward reducing and eliminating legacy waste in a
safe, efficient and cost-effective manner that is protective of human
health and the environment.
With a track record of demonstrated results, EM has reduced the
footprint of the cleanup program from 107 sites comprising a total of
3,100 square miles to just 16 sites, with an active cleanup footprint
of less than 300 square miles.
Over the past year, EM has made significant progress, including the
following:
At the Hanford site in Washington State, workers are
making real progress towards Direct Feed Low Activity Waste
vitrification of tank waste with a milestone to complete hot
commissioning of the Low Activity Waste facility by December 31, 2023.
Work performed by Oak Ridge's EM program brought the site
closer to its ambitious goal to complete major cleanup at the East
Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in 2020.
EM published the Final Environmental Impact Statement at
Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC).
Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000
cubic yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the SRS. They
completed it safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 million.
The EM Los Alamos (LA) Field Office safely ramped up
operations during the initial months of the new legacy cleanup
contract, and successfully completed 13 milestones under the Consent
Order with the State of New Mexico.
And, project crews at EM's Separations Process Research
Unit (SPRU) in New York completed the last phase of building demolition
with the removal of Building H2. The SPRU facilities were built in the
late 1940s and operated through the early 1950s to conduct pilot tests
for recovery of uranium and plutonium.
The EM sites that remain are home to some of the Nation's toughest
and most complex cleanup challenges. The Department is working to
ensure that EM is prepared to safely and effectively tackle these
challenges in a sustainable manner going forward. To that end, the
Department has reinvigorated the completion mindset that has been the
foundation of EM's greatest successes.
EM is taking lessons learned from three decades of cleanup and
institutionalizing a strengthened and robust results-driven approach
that protects our Nation, continues risk-based cleanup progress and
drives down liabilities to the American people through close
collaboration with regulators and stakeholders.
EM is now managing capital projects and procurements with a greater
degree of rigor and consistency. With billions of dollars in
procurements coming up over the next few years, the Department has the
opportunity to implement improved contracting approaches that ensure
that safety remains paramount, while incentivizing results and allowing
for great flexibility.
As the Department looks to best position EM to meet long-term
challenges, innovative ideas and approaches are necessary. The greatest
incubators of innovation are the DOE National Labs. The Department is
focused on fully utilizing the capabilities of our National Labs to get
cleanup to completion safer, sooner and more efficiently.
recruitment and retention of highly qualified people
Across the Department, our greatest asset will always be our
workforce. DOE's challenging national security missions require it to
recruit, train, and retain highly skilled and dedicated federal
employees and Management and Operating (M&O) contract workforce. DOE
and Congress must continue to provide these highly-talented men and
women with the tools necessary to support their work as they carry out
complex and challenging responsibilities. Funding alone is not the only
thing needed. The Department will also need to have the necessary human
resource authorities to attract and retain the best and brightest
people from around the country. These positions are not just in
science, technology, and engineering but also manufacturing,
maintenance, project and program management, and construction.
A skilled federal workforce is required for appropriate program and
project oversight as the nuclear security enterprise is busier than it
has been since the end of the Cold War. Over the past nine years,
NNSA's program funding has increased 50 percent, while staffing has
decreased 10 percent. Last year the Office of Personnel Management and
NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation both
independently determined the need to significantly increase NNSA
federal staffing. Therefore, for NNSA to meet its growing nuclear
security mission requirements, as described in the 2018 NPR, it will
need the funding to hire aggressively for the next two years.
fiscal year 2020 budget request
The President's Budget for fiscal year 2020 requests $31.7 billion
for DOE to advance U.S. national security and economic growth through
transformative science and technology innovation that promotes
affordable and reliable energy through market solutions and meets our
nuclear security and environmental cleanup challenges. The fiscal year
2020 budget request provides: $16.5 billion to modernize and restore
the nuclear security enterprise and to maintain the safety and
effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile, a $1.3 billion increase over
fiscal year 2019 enacted levels; $6.5 billion to continue our
commitment to cleaning up the Cold War nuclear legacy; $5.5 billion to
conduct cutting-edge, early-stage scientific research and development
(R&D) and build state-of-the-art scientific tools and facilities to
keep U.S. researchers at the forefront of scientific innovation,
including achieving exascale computing in 2021.
This budget request demonstrates the Administration's strong
support for NNSA, EM, and SC. For the Nation to retain a credible
deterrent and prevent, counter, and respond to global nuclear security
threats, NNSA will require significant and sustained investments in its
nuclear security mission.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA's Weapons Activities
account is $12.4 billion, an increase of $1.3 billion or 11.8 percent
over fiscal year 2019 request levels. The programs funded in this
account support the Nation's current and future nuclear defense posture
and the associated nationwide infrastructure of science, technology,
engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities.
The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their
intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United
States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while
potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons
and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities.
The fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA's DNN account is $2
billion, an increase of $63.3 million, or 3.3 percent above the fiscal
year 2019 request. DNN account activities address the entire nuclear
threat spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to
nuclear and radiological incidents around the world.
NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2020 budget request is
$1.65 billion, a decrease of $140.2 million or approximately 7.8
percent below the fiscal year 2019 enacted level.1 The funding supports
Naval Reactors' mission to provide militarily effective nuclear
propulsion plants for Navy vessels and to ensure their safe, reliable
and long-lived operation.
1 Amounts do not reflect the transfer of funds to the Office of
Nuclear Energy for maintenance and operation of the Advanced Test
Reactor in fiscal year 2019.
The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Request includes $71 million in
combined AI funding for SC's Advanced Scientific Computing Research
(ASCR), Basic Energy Sciences (BES), Biological and Environmental
Research (BER), Fusion Energy Sciences (FES), and High Energy Physics
(HEP) programs, and $48 million for NNSA.
The EM program represents one of the top financial liabilities to
the American taxpayer. As EM is put on a sustainable path forward, the
fiscal year 2020 budget request provides the resources necessary to
build upon recent successes, bring a renewed sense of urgency to the
program and enable meaningful, measurable progress to projects and
sites throughout the cleanup complex. Resources provided for in the
fiscal year 2020 budget request will:
Advance construction on the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment
Facility, progress deactivation and demolition of remaining facilities
at the East Tennessee Technology Park, and continue preparation of
Building 2026 to support processing of the remaining uranium-233
material at ORNL in Tennessee.
Initiate two transuranic waste processing lines, complete
characterization of the high explosives plume in Canon de Valle and
implement the full interim measure for the chromium plume at Los Alamos
in New Mexico.
Complete verification of cleanup, site restoration, and
closeout activities at SPRU in New York.
Ramp up efforts to address radioactive tank waste at the
SRS in South Carolina through start-up of the Salt Waste Processing
Facility and continued construction activities for necessary Saltstone
Disposal Units.
Together, these investments for environmental management will make
significant progress in fulfilling our cleanup responsibilities while
also starting to address our high-risk excess facilities at NNSA sites.
project management execution--safe quality construction on budget:
NNSA is driving continued improvement in contract and project
management practices. Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $2
billion in projects under budget--a significant portion of NNSA's total
project portfolio. Some of NNSA's acquisition and project management
achievements include:
Over $500 million in cost savings via M&O contract
competitions.
Small Business Administration score revised from ``F'' to
``A.''
Government Accountability Office narrowed the focus of
its High Risk List to projects greater than $750 million.
Delivered $2 billion project portfolio eight percent
under budget.
U.S. Strategic Command requested NNSA's best practices
for project management.
NNSA is continuing to encourage competition and increase the
universe of qualified contractors by streamlining its major acquisition
processes. NNSA will continue to focus on delivering timely, best-value
acquisition solutions for all programs and projects, by using a
tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that are
appropriate for the special missions and risks at each site.
conclusion
This budget request represents a commitment from all of us at the
Department of Energy to serve the American people with stewardship,
accountability and service. We commit to ensure that DOE performs
efficiently and effectively as we pursue our mission-driven goals.
We are at an extraordinary moment in American energy. In
partnership with our National Laboratories, we will continue to support
the world-class scientists and engineers who ignite American ingenuity
and drive our competitiveness. The President's fiscal year 2020 budget
request for the Department of Energy positions us to seize
opportunities and prioritize investments. We look forward to working
with you and your colleagues in Congress in the coming weeks and months
on these important funding details. Thank you, and we look forward to
answering your questions.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you very much. Excellent
statement.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, we are very pleased to have you
here, and please proceed with your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, UNDER
SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe and
Ranking Member Reed. I have no opening statement this morning.
I defer to Secretary Perry. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. What I want to do is get into a
couple of the things just to kind of set them out because I
know they are going to be covered by questions, general
questions.
Last year, the NNSA proposed to repurpose the half-built
MOX [mixed oxide] building. Of course, that has been the main
discussion for a long period of time and an area of confusion.
That is the one that is located in South Carolina to produce
plutonium pits. Los Alamos National Lab would still operate the
current facility in New Mexico producing 30 pits a year while
South Carolina I think would be in the neighborhood of some 50
more to meet the STRATCOM requirement which is for 80 by what
year, 2030?
Secretary Perry, explain why the Department chose last year
to construct a plutonium pit production facility in South
Carolina and what advantages would this option bring in
addition to the current smaller capability in Los Alamos.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Chairman, I think for so many years,
as you know as well as anyone in this room, the challenge that
we have had with the mixed oxide facility in South Carolina--I
do not want to relitigate that at all. What I would like to do
is say thank you to the Members who agreed that this was not a
program that needed to go forward, and you had the courage to
work with us and others to terminate that and then to
transition that facility.
Chairman Inhofe. Yes, because you are talking about a very
large investment that we have had in the past. We are
interested in seeing what is the most we can get out of it now.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. I think we are on a track that
will take us to a reasonable development there. Los Alamos is
and, as Senator Heinrich knows, will always be the center for
pit production, the center of excellence in the world for
plutonium pit production. Pits 0 through 30 will be done there.
There is an additional $5 billion that is headed towards that
facility in Los Alamos. It will be a substantial buildup. They
are going to continue to play, I will suggest, the lead role in
the immediate out-years. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by
2030, there will be the requirement to do 50 pits. The decision
was investigated, decision made that you could bifurcate that
effort with the continual focus on Los Alamos and have pits 31
through 80 be done at the Savannah River site. We can discuss
further about that decision-making, but both the DOD, those in
the nuclear weapons world agree that that is a legitimate,
thoughtful way to go forward with the pit production.
There are some other potentials at Savannah River, but the
main legacy program that would come out of the repurposing of
the MOX facility will be the development of those pits 31
through 80 at Savannah River.
Chairman Inhofe. I understand that, and I appreciate that
very much.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, there are a lot of people
speculating that we may not be able to reach those goals. In
fact, in NNSA's own analysis, it suggests that reaching the 80
by 2030 is going to be a problem. No matter what the location
of the production, how do you plan to mitigate in the event we
do not make it?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the Secretary said, this is going to be a challenging
undertaking for the NNSA and for our entire nuclear security
enterprise. When the Nuclear Weapons Council determined that
based on STRATCOM requirements, that we needed to produce not
less than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030, it was a
challenge. I need not remind Members of this Committee that the
United States has not had a plutonium pit production capability
since the early 1990s, and it is well past time that we provide
a resilient infrastructure for our nuclear weapon deterrent.
The focus of that is on plutonium pit production now and in the
future. In order to do that, we believed that a two-pronged
strategy is the most affordable and optimal way to get to the
80 pits per year by 2030. Again, it is not less than 80 pits.
We have a lot of challenges ahead of us. We believe that
our two-pronged approach where we are undertaking the
investments, the significant investments, as the Secretary
stated, at Los Alamos which will provide several hundred
million dollars over several years in order to increase the
production capacity, as well as the infrastructure necessary at
Los Alamos, and the facility at South Carolina. We are making
significant investments in that to undertake the preconceptual
design, and we are seeking $410 million to continue that
repurposing of the facility at South Carolina.
Chairman Inhofe. My time has expired, and I want to make
sure that we get everyone here.
But let us do this for the record. When we see a staggering
figure like $677 billion, referring to the Hanford site, that
does not seem achievable to me. Right now, we are in the middle
of a budget, and that is overwhelming.
I would like for the record for each one of you to spend
some time to analyze how that can be diminished. I am talking
about using grout instead of glass or any number of things. For
the record, not at this time. Thank you very much.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Energy continues to thoughtfully and
deliberately work toward determining the best path forward to
safely and successfully treat all of Hanford's tank waste. We
continue to make progress towards commissioning of the direct
feed low-activity waste facility and we recently initiated an
Analysis of Alternatives to evaluate options for the high level
waste fraction of the tank waste. We fully recognize the
challenges we face and we are addressing these challenges head-
on with an eye toward getting waste out of tanks and disposed
of sooner, safely and at a reasonable cost.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, you have undertaken the overhaul of at least five
weapons systems. You are building two multibillion nuclear
facilities, uranium and plutonium. You are employing and
performing inspections of the deployed stockpile with a federal
workforce of about 1,700 people. Are you at all concerned about
too much work and too little capacity?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Reed.
As I mentioned previously, this is a challenge ahead of us,
but we are taking on this challenge throughout our entire
44,000-person workforce and throughout our entire nuclear
security enterprise. We recognize the challenges ahead of us.
When we talk about pit production, that is only 11 years away.
This a major challenge. We have five modernization programs, as
you stated today.
We also have challenges with hiring workforce. Right now,
in the next 5 years, we are expecting 40 percent of our
workforce to be retirement eligible.
So we have got a number of challenges ahead of us, but I
believe we can--with the robust staffing plan and robust
funding that we are seeking from Congress, I believe we can get
through the systems and continue to be on time and on budget,
which we are finding we are in right now, in alignment with the
Department of Defense (DOD).
Senator Reed. Can I ask very quickly, what is the biggest
risk? Is it the pit production at Los Alamos?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The biggest risk right now is
sustained and supported funding to recapitalize and modernize
our infrastructure. In terms of programs, yes, it is plutonium
pit production, but we have our eye on that, and we are focused
specifically on plutonium pit production.
Senator Reed. The first critical point is 30 pits by 2026.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Correct.
Senator Reed. One of the concerns I will put on the table
is that as we start to build up the facility in South Carolina,
there will be at least a temptation to pull resources out of
Los Alamos at a time when that is a critical--the first
critical action will be made there. If we cannot get those 30
pits by 2026, then we have a serious nuclear security problem.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I absolutely agree with you,
Senator Reed. One of our challenges, however, is to put
together what we call integrated product teams in an
implementation strategy across our entire enterprise. So this
does not just involve South Carolina and the facility we are
repurposing there, as well as Los Alamos, but it also affects
all of our other parts of our enterprise whether it is Y-12 for
sub assemblies or the actual production complex at Pantex in
Amarillo, Texas. We are working across our entire enterprise as
an integrated approach.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I mentioned in my opening comments the
ongoing negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a non-
nuclear weapons state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
That is correct. Is it not?
Secretary Perry. That is correct.
Senator Reed. Does it concern you that the Crown Prince has
made statements that they are prepared to obtain an atomic
weapon if Iran particularly gets one? That would violate their
standing under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Secretary Perry. I share your concern with any world leader
that we are doing or we are not doing business with, for that
matter, that would say that their intention was to do that.
Senator Reed. Part of the negotiation involves ensuring
that they are not able to enrich fissile material or keep
fissile material. That seems to be a non-waiverable condition
in any arrangement. Is that correct?
Secretary Perry. That is correct.
Senator Reed. For further depth, we have an arrangement
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They have, indeed, agreed
not to enrich nuclear materials. Is that accurate?
Secretary Perry. That is correct.
Senator Reed. There is a fear that if we did not have the
same arrangement with the Saudis, that the UAE might feel that
they are unconstrained. Is that a concern that you have?
Secretary Perry. I think you would be correct in that
analysis.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Quickly following up, the Chairman made comments about the
significant increase in cost, as I mentioned, at Hanford
particularly. We have a problem and we have a huge increase in
resources we have to devote to it. I would concur with the
Chairman's request that you provide us more information and
more details as we go forward.
Secretary Perry. Coming your way.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator, I am trying to take stock of the progress
that we have made in achieving the goals that were laid out in
the New START's ratification, and the Nuclear Posture Review
makes the point that despite a longstanding goal and one that
was particularly reinforced during the debate on the New START,
quote, the United States has fallen short in sustaining the
modern infrastructure that is resilient and has the capacity to
respond to unforeseen developments.
That treaty was signed in 2010, and since that time, we
expected a pit production facility to be completed by 2023 and
work is just now beginning with the optimistic target, I
believe, of reaching full capacity at 2030.
After years of delay, the uranium production facility is
moving forward, but its scope is reduced to one-third of its
original capacity, and several warhead life extension 16
programs were delayed. Revised schedules appear to be holding,
but the stockpile is older than anticipated.
In my view, we have a lot of work ahead of us if we are
going to achieve the vision that was articulated in 2010 and
really be able to attain a responsive nuclear complex. Would
you agree with that?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
Senator Fischer. Do you see us moving in that direction, a
more positive direction, at this point?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I do, Senator Fischer. I believe
that our entire complex has our eye on our goal, and the goal
is to continue to modernize our five nuclear weapon systems
that we are currently undertaking. I am happy to say that they
are all on schedule and all on budget. However, a minor slip in
any of those could cause a rippling effect across all of the
different modernization programs.
With regard to UPF [Uranium Processing Facility], the
facility to which you alluded, our uranium processing facility,
to date we have spent $2.5 billion in construction activities.
This year, we have undertaken the actual construction of the
main processing building. That building will cost $6.5 billion
and be completed by 2025. Again, I am glad to say that we are
on schedule and on cost for that.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
You and I--we talked a lot about pit production, and the
two questions previous to mine dealt with some pit production
issues as well. NNSA's goal has been to be able to produce
those plutonium pits per year 2030. I know that you do have a
strategy to accomplish this and you are pursuing it.
But it is my understanding that as a result of the years of
delay that this effort has faced, I guess you could say plans
are extremely fragile at this point, and achieving this goal is
going to be challenging for you. I am pleased you are focused
on it.
But my question is, to what extent has NNSA thought about
any contingencies or any supplemental plans should it face
delays or any kind of disruption to your current strategy that
you hold?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We have a number of different
options available to us. We are, obviously, focused on the most
optimal, which is to go with the two-pronged strategy for pit
production, which will be, as the Secretary said, Los Alamos
producing pits 1 through 30, and as we repurpose the former MOX
facility in South Carolina, that we will look to have an
aggressive plan for that.
One of the historical notes about NNSA is that I like to
say we used to do things in serial. Well, now we are doing
things in parallel. We have a lot of work on our plate, but I
am absolutely confident in the men and women of the NNSA
enterprise that we can get this done. We have no further time
to delay.
In addition to everything else we are doing, we have a
massive infrastructure and recapitalization program. As the
Chairman mentioned, more than 30 percent of our facilities were
built during the Manhattan Project, and it is long time past
that we do something to modernize our infrastructure and give
the tools to our workforce that are necessary to maintain our
nuclear deterrent.
Senator Fischer. I know you are trying to do things in
parallel and not step by step, but as you view your next major
strategic materials challenge, what comes after the plutonium
pit production for you?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. High explosives.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses for your service and testimony.
Secretary Perry, Reuters broke a story last night, ``United
States Approves Secret Nuclear Power Work for Saudi Arabia.''
Just to read the opening paragraph, United States Energy
Secretary Rick Perry has approved six secret authorizations by
companies to sell nuclear power technology and assistance to
Saudi Arabia, according to a copy of a document seen by Reuters
on Wednesday.
Is the story accurate?
Secretary Perry. Senator, as you probably know, as well as
any of us, from time to time, the media may get a story wrong.
Senator Kaine. That is why I asked.
Secretary Perry. It is always good to hear in the public,
and I hope that there is some good reporting going to be going
on about this conversation you and I are about to have relative
to that because it is important to have a little understanding
of the history of the part 810.
Senator Kaine. Part 810. These are part 810 authorizations
that we are talking about. Correct?
Secretary Perry. That is correct. These go all the way back
to the 1970s, about the same time that the Department of Energy
was created in 1977.
Frankly, I think the word ``secret'' is what gets everybody
spun up when they see the word ``secret'' in there. What we are
talking about here is something that goes on every day in this
town and across the country.
Senator Kaine. If I can lead the witness a little bit, I do
understand these part 810 authorizations are common. They have
happened for a long time. The Reuters story suggests, though,
that in the past, part 810 authorizations have been publicly
available to be reviewed at the Department of Energy office,
but in this case, these six authorizations have not been
subject to any review by the public.
Secretary Perry. Here is what I will suggest to you, is
that the proprietary information that these companies, these
U.S. companies, that are going to be doing this work want to
keep that proprietary information from being out in the public
domain. I totally understand that. When we were governors, our
business model from time to time--well, not from time to time,
generally speaking, they were not interested in putting out and
having their competitors look at it.
Senator Kaine. Let me not ask anything about any
proprietary information. I do not want to do that.
Is it accurate, though, that six part 810 authorizations
have been issued to American companies to do this prep work for
a potential nuclear power deal with Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Perry. Well, since January of 2017, here is what
I think is really pretty important from my perspective.
Senator Kaine. How about just really quick. Is it true that
six part 810 authorizations have been issued to companies----
Secretary Perry. Here is what is true. Since 2017, there
have been 65 applications for part 810's, and we have issued 37
of them, with nine of them to the Middle East.
Senator Kaine. Okay, and six to Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Perry. That is correct, and two to Jordan.
Senator Kaine. When was the last one issued? Give me the
date. You said since 2017. When was the last one done to Saudi
Arabia?
Secretary Perry. Let me get back with you on that.
Senator Kaine. Do you know whether or not it was done
before or after October 2, 2018?
Secretary Perry. I do not. I do not want to give you a date
specific.
Senator Kaine. That was a date that a constituent of mine,
a Virginia resident, was murdered, Jamal Khashoggi, by the
Saudi Government in a Saudi consulate in Istanbul. I would be
very interested to see whether the United States was signing
deals, part 810 authorizations, to enable nuclear work for
Saudi Arabia after that date.
Secretary Perry. We will get you that specific date.
Senator Kaine. We will ask that for the record, the record
of all six of the authorizations.
[The information referred to follows:]
The international commercial nuclear power industry is a
highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low
number of competitors, even the name of a company and the
market they are competing in can be harmful to an American
company seeking to market their products. Certain companies can
be easily identified by the technology associated with them,
thus revealing the name or technology associated with such a
company would reveal that they were competing in a certain
market.
Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the
information in question, the Department has been working with
Congress to provide access to this information in the
appropriate setting and manner.
Senator Kaine. Let me switch topics quickly.
The Department of the Navy is recommending that the USS
Harry S. Truman be decommissioned rather than overhauled in the
next few years. I serve on the Seapower Subcommittee of this
Committee. We had a hearing about this yesterday. Has the
Department of Energy been given any direction to fund or plan
for the decommissioning of the Truman?
Secretary Perry. Let me let the Administrator have a bite
at that.
Senator Kaine. Indeed.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. What I could say, Senator Kaine,
is that obviously part of that comes under the Office of Naval
Reactors, which falls under NNSA. I can get back to you on that
information to let you know specifically what we are providing.
Senator Kaine. That would be helpful. It would not be
surprising I think. There is just a little bit of an effect in
the SASC budget this year on it, and it may be that the DOE
portion of it would be downstream from fiscal year 2020. I am
just curious to see whether there has been any instruction
given to DOE about potential decommissioning. If so, what
effect would that have on the budget? I will ask that question
for the record.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Scott?
Senator Scott. Secretary Perry and Under Secretary Gordon-
Hagerty, thank you for being here and thank you for your hard
work. I know it is a lot of work to get done, what everyone
expects you to do.
I want to thank Secretary Perry for not running for
reelection in 2014. I was never able to beat you in job
creation in my first 4 years as Governor, but your departure
was welcomed and we were able to beat you for quite a bit. I
hope you appreciated those phone calls every month when I let
you know how we were doing.
Secretary Perry, the National Defense Strategy focused on
our national security efforts, more on the threats of China and
Russia. How does the National Nuclear Security
Administration's--how do you address these threats through your
mission and programs?
Secretary Perry. Senator, thank you.
The NNSA, as I said in my opening remarks, keeping our
nuclear deterrent at a position that clearly modernizes it,
clearly sends the message that the United States is going to
defend itself against any threats. That is one aspect of what
the Department is involved with.
I will suggest to you an equally important part of this is
through some of the work that goes on at our national labs in
the super computing side of things. The ability to protect the
grid against any attacks that could come from a cyber
standpoint--statutorily the Department of Energy is the sector-
specific agency that deals with that. The Idaho National Lab
and the grid, the test grid, that they have there is a great
example of that. Our super computing en route to exoscale
computing, the first exoscale machine will be at the Argonne
Laboratory, up and running by 2021. Then we have the number
one, number two fastest computers in the world, most powerful
computers in the world today at Oak Ridge in Tennessee and at
Lawrence Livermore. When that Argonne facility in Chicago comes
up--its name is Aurora--then we will be at the exoscale level.
Senator Cotton, you know the importance from a cryptology
standpoint, the ability for us to use our super computing
capacity and abilities.
I will suggest to you those are two of the things, Senator
Scott, that DOE is directly involved with. What Lisa has over
on her side of the house is the single most important part of
our deterrent, but also our ability to serve multiple agencies
of government, whether it is the DOD, whether it is the
Secretary of State, whether it is the other three letter
agencies of government, with our cryptology, with our ability
of using the super computers that the Department operate in
that National Security Council (NSC) environment, DOE plays a
monumental role in the acquisition, interpretation, and other
engagements that are very important to sending the message to
those who would not necessarily have America's best interests
in mind, that we are prepared, we are substantially engaged,
and we have both offensive and defensive capabilities to keep
this country free and secure.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
The budget that you propose--is that sufficient for you to
meet your needs?
Secretary Perry. Yes.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary, I would like to ask you about the role of the
Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB). I have to say
that I am hearing from communities in New Mexico that DOE's
unilateral revision of Order 140.1 will significantly affect
the board's ability to meet its statutory oversight
responsibilities at NNSA and the EM facilities, including
obviously the three in New Mexico.
In light of this new order, talk to me about how you can
assure me of your commitment to preserving both the board's
oversight responsibility but, more importantly, to ensure
public health and safety for workers and for local communities
around the complex.
Secretary Perry. Senator Heinrich, thank you.
I do not think there is a more important relationship
between the Department of Energy than through the labs, through
the contractors with the local communities. I will say having
the great privilege over the last year, I think last fall I
visited the 17th of the 17 labs and to be in those communities
to see the great support that comes from the communities to the
labs--and it is one of our goals to make sure that that is the
case, recognizing the highly technical work and sometimes the
contentious public issues that come out of whether it is on the
weapons side or what have you--
Senator Heinrich. Why change the order when you had built
up all that credibility with the local communities?
Secretary Perry. I do not think we have. You know, there
may be certain individuals who think that we like to do it the
way that we have always done it. What I have always found was
that anytime you kind of make a change in the way things have
historically run, somebody is going to go, wait a minute, I am
losing some of my authority, I am losing some of my what have
you.
But what I would like to do is I would like to get Lisa to
weigh in here as well and share with you her aspect of it.
I think it is very healthy to have conversations about here
is why we are going to change this and have that public input,
and I think we are having that. I think we are having some good
back and forth on this and find a reasonable solution.
But if I may, Senator, can I ask Lisa to----
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Senator.
Senator Heinrich. Good morning.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. First of all, let me say that the
DOE order is just updating a 17-year-old order that is, quite
frankly, antiquated. What it does is it more clearly defines
the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Energy
where it is related to the independent oversight of the Defense
Nuclear Facility Safety Board. We enjoy a very strong and solid
relationship and continue to have one with the DNFSB, and we
continue to interact with them.
However, we do need to clearly define and redefine the
responsibilities of Department of Energy because if in fact
health and safety situations do occur, the roles and
responsibilities and the accountability rests solely with the
Department of Energy and NNSA and not with the Defense Board.
So that is what we are looking at.
Senator Heinrich. Administrator, I do not want to cut you
off, but I am really getting short on time here. So I do want
to pivot real quickly and ask the Secretary one more quick
question, which is, Secretary, you mentioned the Manhattan
Project, which is something we are incredibly proud of in New
Mexico and the role that we played in it. But 75 years later,
we still have not cleaned up all the waste. Once again this
year, in the proposed budget, there is a $25 million cut to
that cleanup. Why cut cleanup at Los Alamos?
Secretary Perry. Senator, I will share with you that some
of the reductions on the EM side is because we have
successfully been able to make some cleanups and finish those
and transitioning over to some others.
Senator Heinrich. That is not the case here, though,
because the more we stretch this out, I mean, we could be there
for another 20 years or we could be there for a much shorter
period of time. So I just want you to know that I will work
with Senator Udall to, once again, restore that funding like we
did last year. But we are making good progress. We have a new
contractor on board. This is an opportunity to show to the
State, to whom commitments have been made, that we are going to
keep those commitments. So I would just urge you to look at
that.
Secretary Perry. We will, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Cramer?
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty,
for being with us today and, of course, for your ongoing
access. It is really very helpful.
If there is time at the end, I will maybe get into some
plutonium pit production questions, but it sounds like we have
covered it pretty effectively.
So let me focus, first of all, on something that is very
important specifically to my home State of North Dakota, and
that is warhead modernization efforts. Obviously, it is
important to us in Minot. Our B-52's, of course, carry the
long-range standoff weapons, and then of course, the ICBMs and
whatever might replace them. They are both hosted at Minot.
They really are depending on getting the new warheads on
schedule so that we can continue to provide the strategic
deterrence that our country and our allies need and depend on.
Let me just put it real straightforward. I am going to
maybe ask three questions in one, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, and
then you can answer all of them probably in one breath.
If you were forced to delay, for example, the W84, what
would the impact of the program be--on the program be? Would it
introduce challenges to integration with the LRSO [Long Range
Stand Off]? Likewise, would there be similar concerns with a
delay in the W87-1 as it relates to our Minuteman III's and
future ground-based systems? I will just open the door for you
to walk through that and answer.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. Thank you, Senator
Cramer.
Yes, obviously, our programs are all--all five of our
modernization programs are currently on cost and on schedule,
and they are completely aligned with our customer, the
Department of Defense. If we see any slippage whatsoever in any
of our programs, that could obviously affect or impact and will
impact the LRSO or the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent]
programs--excuse me--the W80-4 or the 78 replacement programs.
Again, we are thoroughly aligned with the Air Force right now
and with the Department of Defense. So we need the additional
funding, the resources necessary to continue those programs so
they are on schedule, on budget so we can deliver them on time
to the Department of Defense.
Senator Cramer. Any chance of doing it faster than that?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We have our challenges, and of
course, as Senator Reed had said, we are busier than we have
been the 1980s. We are working every possible way to slim up
the margins to do whatever we can to move faster, quicker, and
speedier, as General Hyten often likes to say. We are
thoroughly aligned with the Air Force, and where we can make
commitments to improve those processes and those timelines, we
will do so. But we are working as closely as we can with the
Air Force to make sure that we can deliver on our commitments.
Senator Cramer. Secretary Perry, anything you would want to
add to that?
Secretary Perry. Well, I will just say that they restarted
phase 6, which activates the W87-1 modification program. That
obviously supports the ground-based strategic deterrent.
Again, I am comfortable that the funding stream is
appropriate.
Here is my concern, is if the Department gets tasked with
some other areas--and I will make reference to what is going on
in North Korea. Knock on wood, if that goes forward and we get
tasked with verification issues and what have you, DOE would
play a very, very leading role in a verification of the weapons
that are there and then the obvious next steps past that. Were
that to be the case, then I would remind this Committee that
the funding that would be required for DOE to take those
additional duties on would be substantial, and at that
particular point in time, Administrator Gordon-Hagerty's job
becomes incredibly challenging. I have total faith that she can
keep a lot of balls in the air at one time, but just looking
out over the horizon, sir, and saying here is what you need to
be prepared for, something coming out of left field that you
may not have had in your line item that was not funded for,
that is one that I think, Mr. Chairman, we need to kind of just
keep in the back of our mind. If this goes forward, the DOE's
requirement will be substantial, incredibly important, and it
could affect our other programs as we are trying to get those
addressed as well.
Senator Cramer. Secretary Perry, thank you for that
observation and for that warning because would we not all love
to be able to have too much to do with regard to the Korean
Peninsula?
Secretary Perry. It would be a good problem to have.
Senator Cramer. It sure would. But I, like you, am
confident that Secretary Gordon-Hagerty is capable of a lot of
multi-tasking. That has been my observation. I thank you both
for keeping the main thing the main thing. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to you both and thank you for your service.
I want to ask a question about fuel cells. As you know,
they are highly efficient and clean technology that use
domestically available resources to advance our security goals
and efforts to create a more resilient and reliant source of
electricity generation.
In Connecticut, the United States Navy has agreed to
install a 7.5 megawatt fuel cell park on the United States
submarine base in New London, which is home to about 16 fast
attack submarines. This move is going to provide a very cost
effective source of power to the base that will advance long-
term grid independence and power resiliency. As you know, the
solid oxide fuel cell program within the Office of Fossil
Energy at the Department of Energy supports the advancement and
eventual full scale deployment of fuel cell technologies. The
Navy has been a leader in this effort, so has the military in
general, using fuel cells as sources of energy in Afghanistan
and elsewhere.
Could you tell me, Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the
solid oxide fuel cell program at the Department of Energy?
Secretary Perry. Senator, we have got a lot of different
alternative energy programs that we are working on. That is
obviously one of them, and both at PNNL [Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory] and at some of our other labs, we are
doing work on the fuel cell side of things.
Our advanced--I will shift gears on you just a little bit,
but micro-reactors, another area that held some extraordinary
potential for the future. I think it is one of the reasons that
both basic research and applied research----
One of the things that we have done over at the Department
is we have created a chief commercialization officer to be able
to take some of these technologies like you speak about here,
be able to take them from their inception and commercialize
them. It is one of the things that I am proud of although we
have had discussions in this Committee and other committees
about budgetary items over at the Department and what the
priorities are, but from my historic perspective, one of the
great gifts that we have at the Department of Energy is being
able to take the research in many areas and commercialize that
and make it available to the general public and in many cases,
obviously, for our military as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to spending the full
$30 million that the fiscal year 2019 budget appropriated to
fuel cell development, the solid oxide program, for fuel cell
development?
Secretary Perry. That is our intention, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Coming back to the transfer potentially
of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, I think Senator Kaine
asked you whether any part of the 810 authorizations were
signed after October 2, 2018. Would you not know that sitting
here now?
Secretary Perry. No, sir, I would not. We sign a lot of
papers, and I have got a pretty good memory but to remember
every date that I sign a piece of paper might be above my
ability to recall, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Although that is a pretty significant
piece of paper.
Secretary Perry. I understand that. But, again, asking me
to recall when I signed a particular piece of paper, when I
sign literally thousands of pieces of paper, might be just
above my ability to recall, sir.
Here is what I can share with you--I will get it to you and
you will have it post haste, and we can see whether or not it
meets the timeline of what you asked.
Senator Blumenthal. But you are concerned about the
transfer of that technology in light of the Crown Prince's
refusal to agree to any prohibitions on enriching uranium or
reprocessing of spent fuel.
Secretary Perry. What I am concerned about is any country
that is going to not go forward with nonproliferation. Here is
what I am really concerned about, Senator, is that if the
United States is not the partner with Saudi Arabia, for that
matter, Jordan, which is the other country that we have signed
810's with, and they go to Russia and China for their civil
nuclear technology, their civil nuclear partners, I can assure
you that those two countries do not give a tinker's damn about
nonproliferation. That is why we continue to work very, very
diligently to try to bring those countries that want to develop
civil nuclear programs into the sphere of the United States
because we are committed to nonproliferation. We got a history
of nonproliferation, and nobody in the world will do it better
than us. It is very, very important for the world, for the
Middle East, for the United States to be the partner in as many
of these development of civil nuclear energy programs as we can
be.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, we have been promising the American people
for 70 years a solution to the storage problem of high-level
nuclear waste. We have not managed it yet. Governor, perhaps
you want to take this one. But where are we? This is one of the
reservations that people have about the future development of
nuclear power is how do we responsibly tell people that we can
manage this issue without having what amounts to 100 or more
high-level nuclear waste sites scattered all over the country
because that is what we have now.
Secretary Perry. Senator King, thank you.
It does seem to be the issue that has vexed this country
for a long time. There are two different issues here, two
different problems I guess. There is a technical issue with
where are you going to put this high-level waste, and there is
a political challenge.
Senator King. Which is also radioactive.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Perry. My role is to find a solution, and we had
a conversation yesterday with the Senate appropriators in a
public forum about getting together over the course of the next
2 weeks and talk about what some of those options are. If Yucca
is not going to be one of the sites, if WIPP [Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant], which Senator Heinrich represents, is going to
limit, where are the other options? Well, there is a site in
far west Texas that has historically been open and supportive
of waste coming into that part of the State of Texas. That is
an option.
Here is what is important. If we are going to find a
solution for storage, Congress must act. You are going to have
to change the statute. Today the only entity that can take
possession of high-level waste is the Department of Energy. If
you are going to have an option to that, you are going to have
to change the statute. The statute is going to have to allow
for private sector entities to be able to take possession of
that. For instance, if it were to go to a place like Andrews,
Texas waste control specialist, you have to change the law. You
have to continue to fund the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to be able to get those licensings processes forward. You
have a real challenge on your hand.
But let me leave you with this. If you do not act, by not
acting, you are saying that we have permanent high-level waste
repositories in the United States and they are in 39 of your
States.
Senator King. Including one in my State of Maine.
Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. It is a pretty stunning map to
look at, Senator King, when you look at the 39 States that have
high-level waste in them. I will suggest to you we have a moral
responsibility to get that waste out of these States, to get it
to secure, appropriate sites. That is the map. Every one of
those red States has high-level waste. I do not think that is
what the American people want. I do not think what the men and
women sitting around your dais today want. But we have some
hard decisions to make as a country about are we going to go
forward with a high-level waste repository, or are we going to
have interim storage? Hopefully the men and women of Congress
can deal with this and deal with it in a short period of time.
Senator King. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your
commitment to continue working on this problem because it not
only is a commitment based upon existing sites, as you talked
about, but it is impairing the ability to even think about
future nuclear development if we cannot tell our citizens that
the waste problem has been dealt with.
I am running out of time. Madam Secretary, maybe for the
record, you could supply for us some thinking about how we
deter a nuclear attack by a non-state actor. My concern is that
traditional concepts of deterrence work on a nation state, but
they do not necessarily work on a group of 30 people who are
ready to die anyway. Deterrence has been at the core of our
nuclear strategy. How do we cope with the idea of a non-state
group getting the technology from a rogue regime that has it? I
understand we have got to talk about intelligence. We have got
to talk about interdiction. So for the record, my time has
expired. If you would supply a page or so on that, that would
be helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
The U.S. Government's approach to countering nuclear
terrorism recognizes the difficulty of deterring non-state
actors through the means that have traditionally been used to
deter hostile states, that is, threatening overwhelming
reprisal in response to a nuclear attack. The National Strategy
for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, released
by the White House in December 2018, captures this conundrum,
noting that threats of retaliation do not resonate among
fanatics who do not value human life, including their own, who
may lack sanctuary to occupy or destroy, and who may even
welcome retaliation as a means of galvanizing popular support.
Consequently, the U.S. strategy for deterring nuclear terrorism
is comprised of two central elements: (1) attempting to
convince terrorists that a nuclear attack against the United
States would be unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, and (2)
deterring foreign governments from providing support to would-
be nuclear terrorists.
The United States undertakes multiple efforts to persuade
non-state actors that a nuclear attack would be prohibitively
difficult. First, the U.S. Government expends significant
resources around the world consolidating, securing, and when
possible eliminating the nuclear materials necessary to
construct an improvised nuclear device, with priority given to
materials that are at highest risk of acquisition and use by
non-state actors. Similar efforts are undertaken to eliminate
disused radioactive materials or better secure materials still
needed for medical and other applications. In addition to the
intrinsic value of these programs, which have dramatically
improved global nuclear security, a secondary benefit is to
nurture the perception that these materials are simply too
difficult to acquire. This perception may in turn persuade
terrorists to pursue less lethal attack modes.
Second, the United States fields a variety of domestic and
international defenses against nuclear terrorism and actively
messages these capabilities in various media. For example, the
U.S. Government has installed hundreds of radiation portal
monitors at foreign seaports and border crossings around the
world, complicating the ability of illicit smugglers and
terrorists to move nuclear material from its point of origin to
the United States. At home, the U.S. Government also vigorously
scans for radiation at airports, seaports, and other ports of
entry. Additionally, specialized capabilities are maintained to
search for, interdict, characterize, and disable terrorist
nuclear devices. The fact that these assets are strategically
pre-positioned throughout the country to respond to nuclear
incidents is consistently advertised as part of a conscious
strategy to deter non-state actors from attempting a nuclear
attack.
The second pillar of the United States' deterrence strategy
is to dissuade hostile foreign states from providing nuclear
material, equipment, and expertise to would-be nuclear
terrorists. This objective requires advanced nuclear forensics
capabilities to identify the source of material used in a
nuclear device and thereby help attribute state support for an
act of nuclear terrorism. These capabilities may also induce
states to augment their nuclear security practices, lest an
inadvertent loss of material be perceived as an act of willful
assistance to terrorists. Like U.S. defenses, the existence of
nuclear forensics capabilities are actively messaged using a
variety of media platforms.
In tandem with forensics tools, the United States has
consistently issued declaratory policy to identify the severe
consequences that would result if a hostile state facilitated a
terrorist nuclear attack against U.S. interests. To wit, the
2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) pointedly states that the
United States will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist
group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables
terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices. Further
amplifying this message, the NPR notes that our adversaries
must understand that a terrorist nuclear attack against the
United States or its allies and partners would qualify as an
extreme circumstance' under which the United States could
consider the ultimate form of retaliation an unambiguous
reference to the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation
against such states.
Although deterrence of non-state actors and potential
foreign patrons is merely one dimension of the United States'
strategy to counter nuclear terrorism, these efforts represent
an important element of the Nation's defense-in-depth against
this grave threat.
Additional information on the U.S. Government's approach to
deterring nuclear terrorism can be provided in a classified
setting.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Blackburn?
Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Perry, I will begin by saying thank you so much
for the attention you have given to Oak Ridge and to Y-12 and
being on the ground there. It is noted and it is appreciated.
We hope that you will come back often. Good things are
happening there that are important to both our energy and our
military, our complex.
When we were looking at the Nuclear Posture Review, it was
talking about the age of the infrastructure. Forty years old is
primarily the age of the infrastructure, a quarter of which
dates back to the Manhattan Project, and at Y-12 at that
national security complex, in 2014--and I know you have visited
there--chunks of concrete weighing up to 20 pounds fell from
the ceiling of building 9024. Fortunately, no one was injured.
It was good timing, if you will, that left workers not being
injured, which is fortunate. But that is a building that was
built in 1944, still operational today.
Then we had noticed in the annual site environment report a
statement on this building, building 9024, and I am quoting,
that it has degraded to the point that repair is no longer an
option. Other deferred maintenance such as inoperable air
conditioning equipment causing recurrent lost work days and
critical fire and emergency operations crowded into too small
facilities that would be rendered inaccessible in critical
security events are unacceptable.
So you look at this. Should site report on some of our most
critical infrastructure and the national security enterprise
contain the term ``World War II vintage buildings''? I wish
that you would spend a couple of minutes for the benefit of our
Tennessee constituents there working at Oak Ridge and at Y-12.
Talk a little bit about what is needed with the backlog of
maintenance. Have you arrested the growth of deferred
maintenance? Kind of give a little bit of perspective on this.
Then if you will refer to what will be your implementation plan
and how do you intend to ensure that all of these projects are
attended to.
Secretary Perry. Senator, thank you very much. Just for the
record, I will be out at Oak Ridge the first week of May for an
ex-lab.
Senator Blackburn. You are going to be welcomed.
Secretary Perry. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Blackburn. They will look forward to having you
there.
Secretary Perry. It is a great facility. I hope everyone
has the opportunity to go. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I
am remiss in not having tendered an invitation to every Member
of the Committee to come to one of the national labs of their
choice, or if we could pick one for them, it would be an
extraordinary event for them. It is the most enlightening,
exciting thing I have done to go be engaged in these national
labs and none more intriguing, interesting, nor has a greater
history than Oak Ridge National Lab, ``The Girls of Atomic
City,'' the ladies who helped with the Manhattan Project, a
really fascinating book that I know you have.
But let me address directly your question about--in fiscal
year 2016 and 2017, NNSA--they stopped the growth of the
deferred maintenance for the first time in nearly a decade. For
fiscal year 2019 funding and certainly in this budget, 2020
requested, will help NNSA to begin decreasing the deferred
maintenance that you very vividly laid out here. We are
committed to implementing the infrastructure modernization
initiative as directed in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act to reduce NNSA's deferred maintenance backlog
by no less than 30 percent by 2025. So I hope there is some----
Senator Blackburn. So what I am hearing you say is that
NNSA turns the corner on this in 2020.
Secretary Perry. Correct.
Senator Blackburn. Correct, okay. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Warren?
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pick up on a point that Senator Reed raised. Last
month, the House Oversight Committee issued a report detailing
attempts by the Trump Administration officials to fast track
the transfer of sensitive American nuclear technology to Saudi
Arabia. Now, career ethics officials advised against this
transfer, and they said such a transaction would be illegal
without review by Congress. We know this happened because
whistleblowers came forward to sound the alarm.
Secretary Perry, you are referenced nine times in the House
Oversight Committee's report, which describes how you and other
administration officials pushed the Saudi Government to buy
nuclear reactors from American companies, including
Westinghouse by name.
This is a serious matter, and Congress is right to demand
answers here. You lead the Energy Department. So let me ask,
how many documents has your Department provided to the House
Oversight Committee in response to its investigation into this
matter?
Secretary Perry. Senator, let me get back with you on the
information.
Senator Warren. Well, it is a matter actually of public
record. The answer is zero. Your Department has produced zero
documents to the House Oversight Committee and its
investigation.
I think the Energy Department should cooperate fully in
this investigation. So I have a few more questions about it.
Secretary Perry, do you agree that any agreement to
transfer our nuclear materials, facilities, or sensitive
technology to Saudi Arabia requires congressional review?
Secretary Perry. I am going to follow the law, whatever the
law may be.
Senator Warren. Well, I would like to know that you know
what the law is here.
Secretary Perry. I am going to follow the law, Senator.
Senator Warren. The law is it requires congressional
review. Are we clear on that?
Secretary Perry. Then I think you and I both agree.
Senator Warren. Are you just now learning that that is the
law?
Secretary Perry. No, ma'am. I am just agreeing with you,
Senator.
Senator Warren. Okay. So you understand that is the law,
that Congress has to approve before the Saudis can get nuclear
material.
Secretary Perry. Senator, if you have any evidence that the
Department of Energy has not followed that, I would be----
Senator Warren. I just want to make sure that we are clear
going forward here while you are out there pushing this. Under
U.S. law, any civilian nuclear cooperation or 123 agreement
with a foreign country must meet nine specific requirements to
ensure that nuclear material cannot be reprocessed or enriched
to build a bomb. You seem more focused on pushing the Saudi
Government to hire companies like Westinghouse to build
reactors than you do on working with Congress to nail down an
agreement that will prevent the Saudis from developing a
nuclear weapon.
At a committee hearing in the House last May, you said that
you told the Saudi Crown Prince that if he wants the world's
best nuclear reactors, then, quote, you have to use
Westinghouse.
So let me just make sure we are clear on this. Secretary
Perry, do you agree that any agreement to transfer our
sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia should ensure that
they cannot use that technology to develop a nuclear weapon no
matter which company makes the reactors or how high their
profits might be?
Secretary Perry. I agree.
Senator Warren. Okay, good, because at a minimum, I expect
the Trump Administration to follow the law when it comes to any
potential civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi
Arabia. Any agreement must ensure that there can be no
reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear material without our
prior approval.
Frankly, I think it is a bad idea to even consider
transferring our sensitive nuclear technology to the Saudi
Government. This is a government that continues to fuel a
humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The Saudi Crown Prince ordered
the brutal murder of journalist Khashoggi. The last thing we
should be doing is giving the Saudi Government the tools to
produce nuclear weapons.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Perry and Under Secretary, for being
here.
I want to first start off by saying that, of course, we are
very proud that in my home State we are proud of the
partnership we have with the NNSA, Under Secretary, dating
back, of course, to the Second World War, but on display now
with the new Kansas City National Security Campus, which we are
very, very proud of. It employs over 4,000 people in the State
of Missouri, manufactures, assembles, and procures 85 percent
of the non-nuclear parts of the U.S. nuclear weapons. We are
very proud of that. Of course, that is just the tip of the
iceberg in terms of the service that that facility renders to
the United States.
I thank you for your leadership, both of you, on this and
look forward to working together to ensure that that Kansas
City campus continues to have what it needs to advance its
important mission. So thank you for that.
Let me ask you, Under Secretary, talking about research
here for a moment. Given the prior administration, the Obama
Administration's efforts to reduce the nuclear stockpile,
constrain research and development for nuclear weapons, do you
feel that--and nuclear components--do you feel that you have
the resources and the authorities that you need in order to
carry out the research and development that is important as we
make the shifts outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Senator Hawley. It
is nice to hear such complementary words of Kansas City and we
do. KCNSC [Kansas City National Security Campus] is one of the
proud eight locations in the NNSA. So your words resonate with
us and with our entire workforce. So thank you.
With regard to the nuclear stockpile, our research and
development testing, all the programs that we need to underpin
our weapons activities, to modernize our nuclear weapons
stockpile, I believe that the request that we are making in the
fiscal year 2020 budget will certainly support our initiatives
going forward. However, we have more priorities than there are
resources.
We have done considerable work in racking and stacking, if
you will, what the near-term priorities are and also putting us
in a place where we do not find ourselves in the position we
are today where we are focusing strategically on what the tools
are that are necessary to maintain our nuclear deterrent, as
well as plan for the future.
Senator Hawley. Yes. Thank you.
I mentioned the Nuclear Posture Review and let me just stay
with that for a moment. The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes
low-yield capabilities, particularly modifying the small number
of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles and other
low-yield options to ensure that potential adversaries perceive
no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation. That is a
quote.
Do you agree with this assessment on the utility of low-
yield capabilities and the absolutely invaluable deterrent
potential that they provide?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I do.
Senator Hawley. Would you agree that having the flexibility
of these weapons that they provide is essential to keeping this
country safe and strong?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
Senator Hawley. Tell us about what more you need in order
to ensure that, again, the priorities outlined in the NPR go
forward here and that we continue to develop and modernize the
triad to continue to keep this country safe.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We continue to need stable and
predictable funding. That is first and foremost our biggest
requirement.
With that, that does not only just modernize our stockpile.
What it does is it modernizes the infrastructure and do the
recapitalization that has been long necessary. As many people
have noted, more than 30 percent of our entire enterprise is
more than 60 years old. That is clearly unacceptable that we
put our workforce, our very dedicated workforce of 44,000 men
and women across our nuclear security enterprise in a situation
where we might be working eventually in untenable conditions.
We tried to minimize that situation, but with a broad, robust,
and continued support in funding from the Congress, which we
have seen for the last year or 2, that predictable and stable
funding is what we need to continue to ensure that our nuclear
deterrent remains second to none.
Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
Secretary Perry, let me just ask you. As we think about the
priorities outlined in the NPR, we know that Russia, who the
National Defense Strategy identifies as a peer competitor--they
have been investing in lower-yield nuclear weapons and, of
course, their famous escalate to deescalate strategy. Can you
talk a little bit about our cooperation with our NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and how that is going in
aligning our nuclear priorities to ensure that NATO is
resilient and ready to address Russia's advances?
Secretary Perry. Senator, our relationship with our NATO
allies from my perspective as I travel in Europe and I am
generally talking to them about buying American liquefied
natural gas, talking to them about how to have multiple
options, a diversity of fuels, a diversity of suppliers, a
diversity of routes, and as those conversations take place,
what I have observed is that we have a very, very strong
relationship with our NATO allies. They recognize our very
important role, particularly on being able to deliver our
energy to them. There has never been a time in history, or
certainly in my history, that the United States has been in a
stronger position to be able to support our allies with a
source of energy that will give them the option of whether or
not they are required to buy that energy from Russia. That is a
very, very powerful tool and I will suggest to you one of the
most powerful geopolitical tools that we have in our toolbox
today.
So our NATO allies--not only they respect us for whatwe
have done over the last 75 years, but also what we are doing
today. I can assure you that Poland and the work that is being
done in Poland building LNG [liquefied natural gas] import
facilities, buying United States LNG is a powerful deterrent to
Russia, and it is a very comforting work that is being done
that our allies in Europe see and recognize that we are more
than willing to continue to deliver this diversified energy
source to them.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Jones?
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and our witnesses today. I really
appreciate you being here.
Secretary Perry, just a quick question about a GAO
[Government Accountability Office] report that was released in
December of 2018. It laid out some criticism for how the
Department of Energy and NNSA handles recording and sharing of
lessons learned from mainly capital asset projects, claiming
that not all the lessons are documented consistently or shared
in a timely manner, which has led to cost and schedule
inefficiencies. Additionally, the report found that these
lessons were not accessible to other relevant staff.
Have you had a chance to look at that? Do you agree with
that, or can you address whether or not the Department has
taken steps to address those concerns?
Secretary Perry. With your permission, could I ask the
Administrator to address that? That is really more over her
specific shop.
Senator Jones. Absolutely. Wherever we can get the best,
that is fine with me. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Yes, ma'am.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
We are constantly trying to improve our processes and
procedures. We have come off of a number of different places,
off our high-risk list that GAO has put together. We are
undertaking best practices. We are taking that particular issue
about how we can categorize and also codify, if you will, so
that we can share best practices and lessons learned throughout
our entire NNSA, and we are sharing those capabilities with the
rest of the Department. So, yes, we are taking all of those
recommendations under consideration by GAO, and we are finding
ways of putting together and improving our best practices
program so we can share those lessons learned.
There is nothing worse than finding ourselves in a
situation where we are repeating the problems that we have had
in the past. We have got a robust program through our Office of
Acquisition and Project Management that are undertaking those
efforts, and across our entire enterprise, we are undertaking
that effort.
We also have a closer effort at home that we have
undertaken in the last 6 months to capture lessons learned on
very specific projects and see how we can affect the rest of
the complex with those types of improvements that we are making
from the lessons learned of the past.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much for
that.
Either of you can answer this as well. In October, the NNSA
collaborated I think with British, Norwegian, and Chinese
experts to remove highly enriched uranium from a research
reactor in Nigeria that proliferation experts have long warned
could be a target for terrorists.
Can you talk about the impact a little bit about that
operation and if there is potential to do similar type
operations even with folks like China and Russia where we are
not always on the same side?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The example that you cite,
Senator Jones, is a great news story. We have worked with the
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], with Nigeria, and
China to repatriate Chinese origin material. So what we did was
we actually refueled the reactor in Nigeria with low-enriched
uranium, a proliferation-resistant fuel, and repatriated the
material to China. It is a huge success story, and it happened
over a number of years.
I am heartened to say that we have done that and we had
those commitments and have done 33 type of reactors, plus
Taiwan. Thirty-three countries now have low-enriched uranium
fuel reactors where we have repatriated or sent the material to
the origin of the highly enriched uranium. These are great
nonproliferation success stories, and we continue to pursue
opportunities like that throughout the world.
Secretary Perry. Great. Thank you, Senator. If I could just
add, you really make a great point of recognizing that the
United States from time to time work with countries that are
not necessarily our friends or in areas that are in the world's
interest.
The questions that I have been asked today about the work
that we have done with countries who may have historically not
been in our sphere but we would like to have them in our
sphere--I have been asked a number of times about Saudi Arabia
and why you would do business with Saudi Arabia. I think you
make the absolute great point that if it is not the United
States that is trying to create civil nuclear programs in
countries, particularly in the Middle East and in Africa, that
the potential for nonproliferation--it could be expanded by X
factor if it is not the United States. From time to time, these
are countries that do some things that we really are offended
by, but the potential of proliferation of nuclear materials, if
the United States is not involved, will be substantially moved
forward. I think it is our moral responsibility as a country to
be engaged with this every place we can so that that does not
happen, the United States and our ability to make sure that
nonproliferation is being conducted. So thank you.
Senator Jones. Well, thank you. I know my time is out. I am
going to follow up and maybe get some information close to
home. The Bellafont nuclear plant is up for sale, and we have
got an issue. That is a really important issue to the people in
my State, and I would like to maybe get an update from you at
some point----
Secretary Perry. Consider it done.
Senator Jones.--about whatever we can do to help to move
that along. So thank you for that. We will follow up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. We are going to deviate from a policy I do
not like to deviate from, and that is one of our Members has
come back and wanted to ask one more question. We going to make
an exception. Senator Heinrich, you are recognized.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I wanted to ask the Administrator actually, because we ran
short on time, about the Mesa facility at Sandia National Labs,
how we are addressing the long-term need for rad hard
electronics, how we are going to address that in the short
term, but also what the plans are to make sure that sort of
capability is with us in the out-years in or 15 or 20 years as
well.
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. With regard to the Mesa facility
at Sandia, we know that we will be able to provide radiation
hardened electronics for our nuclear weapons stockpile, a
critical component to our stockpile, through 2040. We are now
undertaking a robust plan to consider what, if any, challenges
we will undertake as we look to refurbish, if you will,
recapitalize or actually modernize our Mesa facility. We are
making investments into it to make sure that we can maintain
that facility through 2040, but the time is now to start
thinking about recapitalizing that capability, a critical
component, as we have discussed previously. We are also
speaking with our counterparts in the IC and in the Department
of Defense about what their needs are. Perhaps there are some
common themes there, but certainly this is a critical component
to our stockpile.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Administrator.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you to our witnesses.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
energy infrastructure
1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, it has been brought to the
Committee's attention that New England communities are having to import
natural gas from Russia due to constraints in the northeast. Have
natural gas shortages effected New England?
Secretary Perry. For decades, some of New England's natural gas
demand has been met by liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. Most of
these imports have been into Exelon's Everett LNG receiving terminal
near Boston, Massachusetts, but Repsol's Canaport LNG facility (in New
Brunswick, Canada) and Excelerate's Northeast Gateway Deepwater Port
LNG import terminal (located offshore of Boston) also provide some of
the LNG imports that serve the New England market. The vast majority of
these LNG imports comes from Trinidad and Tobago. In 2018, over 44
billion cubic feet of natural gas was imported from Trinidad. Also in
2018, New England received LNG shipments from the United Kingdom and
France that consisted mostly of re-exported LNG that was produced at
the Yamal LNG export facility in arctic Russia; the total volume of
these shipments was 6 billion cubic feet. Similarly, early in 2019, re-
exports of LNG from France that were initially produced at the Yamal
LNG export facility were imported into the Northeast. The United States
has never received a direct shipment of LNG from Russia.
Domestic natural gas production is at record high levels, and the
U.S. Energy Information Administration projects production to continue
to increase over the coming decades. U.S. natural gas supplies are
ample to meet domestic demand, but there are pipeline constraints in
the Northeast and New England that limit natural gas delivery in the
region. The impacts of these constraints are felt most acutely during
very cold weather events during the winter when natural gas demand
peaks.
The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) examined the
impacts on energy markets of the cold weather event known as the ``Bomb
Cyclone'' that occurred between December 27, 2017, and January 8, 2018.
\1\ The NETL analysis found a lack of sufficient natural gas pipeline
infrastructure and the surge in natural gas demand for heating led to
sharp increases in natural gas spot prices exceeding 300 percent across
the Northeast. The largest price spike occurred in New York with
Transco Zone 6 NY spot prices increasing nearly 700 percent during the
Bomb Cyclone event. \2\ Natural gas spot prices in the independent
system operator New England (ISO-NE) footprint increased 400 percent
during the weather event, peaking at over $80 per million British
thermal units. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Energy Technology Laboratory, ``Reliability,
Resilience and the Oncoming Wave of Retiring Baseload Units,'' March
13, 2018, available at https://www.netl.doe.gov/ projects/ files/
ReliabilityandtheOncomingWaveofRetiringBaseloadUnitsVolumeITheCriticalRo
leof Thermal Units--031318.pdf
\2\ Ibid, page 1.
\3\ Ibid, page 7.
2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, do you believe this a threat to
energy security?
Secretary Perry. Any time we have to rely on imports of energy, it
can be argued our energy security is diminished. The United States is
blessed with plentiful energy resources, including abundant supplies of
coal, oil, and natural gas. Producers in America have demonstrated a
remarkable ability to harness innovation and to cost-effectively unlock
new energy supplies, making our country a dominant energy force. Last
year the United States surpassed production records set nearly 5
decades ago and is in all likelihood now the largest producer of crude
oil in the world. The United States is also the world's leading
producer of natural gas, becoming a net exporter in 2017 for the first
time since 1957. The United States will continue to be the undisputed
global leader in crude oil and natural gas production for the
foreseeable future.
These robust energy supplies present the United States with
tremendous economic opportunities. To fully realize this economic
potential, however, the United States needs infrastructure capable of
safely and efficiently transporting these plentiful resources to end
users. Without it, energy costs will rise and the national energy
market will be stifled, job growth will be hampered, and the
manufacturing and geopolitical advantages of the United States will
erode. As described in the previous answer, natural gas prices spike in
New England during very cold weather events because of the lack of
sufficient infrastructure to deliver natural gas to the region as
demand increases. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ National Energy Technology Laboratory, ``Reliability,
Resilience and the Oncoming Wave of Retiring Baseload Units,'' March
13, 2018, available at https://www.netl.doe.gov/ projects/files/
ReliabilityandtheOncomingWaveofRetiringBaseloadUnitsVolumeITheCriticalRo
leofThermalUnits --031318.pdf
3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, would more natural gas
infrastructure, like pipelines, help get our abundant domestic supply
to New England so they don't turn to Russia?
Secretary Perry. Yes. A number of pipelines have been proposed over
the past several years to deliver natural gas from the prolific
Marcellus and Utica shale plays to the Northeast and New England. These
pipelines have faced challenges in securing state regulatory approvals,
notably the required state certification of water quality under Section
401 of the Clean Water Act.
In his executive order ``Promoting Energy Infrastructure and
Economic Growth,'' President Trump directed the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act and EPA's related regulations and guidance to determine
whether any provisions thereof should be clarified to promote private
investment in the Nation's energy infrastructure. This review will
focus on:
The need to promote timely Federal-State cooperation and
collaboration;
The appropriate scope of water quality reviews;
Types of conditions that may be appropriate to include in
a certification;
Expectations for reasonable review times for various
types of certification requests; and
The nature and scope of information States and authorized
tribes may need in order to substantively act on a certification
request within a prescribed period of time.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
office of cost evaluation and program execution
4. Senator Reed. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, in the Fiscal Year 2016
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] we created an Office of Cost
Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) much like the DOD [Department
of Defense] has with the Office of Cost Analysis and Program Management
(CAPE). This was after years of having programs at the NNSA [National
Nuclear Security Administration] exceed their estimates. Their job is
to be the counter-balance directly to you on the program managers who
might be too optimistic. Are you ensuring they have the proper staff
and resources to carry out their mission?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. A number of pipelines have been
proposed over the past several years to deliver natural gas from the
prolific Marcellus and Utica shale plays to the Northeast and New
England. These pipelines have faced challenges in securing state
regulatory approvals, notably the required state certification of water
quality under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.
In his executive order ``Promoting Energy Infrastructure and
Economic Growth,'' President Trump directed the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act and EPA's related regulations and guidance to determine
whether any provisions thereof should be clarified to promote private
investment in the Nation's energy infrastructure. This review will
focus on:
The need to promote timely Federal-State cooperation and
collaboration;
The appropriate scope of water quality reviews;
Types of conditions that may be appropriate to include in
a certification;
Expectations for reasonable review times for various
types of certification requests; and
The nature and scope of information States and authorized
tribes may need in order to substantively act on a certification
request within a prescribed period of time.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
nuclear sales to saudi arabia
5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, are you concerned about the
potential transfer of sensitive United States nuclear technology to
Saudi Arabia? Do you believe this transfer should continue?
Secretary Perry. The regulations governing the transfer of
unclassified civil nuclear technology abroad are found at 10 CFR Part
810. These regulations define the term sensitive nuclear technology as
any information which is not available to the public and which is
important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or
maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing
facility or a facility for the production of heavy water. I have not
issued any authorizations to U.S. companies to export sensitive nuclear
technology as defined by regulation.
I have issued authorizations, however, for the export of
unclassified civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia that is not
sensitive nuclear technology. The authorizations issued for the export
of unclassified civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have been done
in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810. The
Department of State secured assurances from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
that the transferred technology will be used only for peaceful
purposes, will not be retransferred for any military use, and will not
be retransferred to a third destination without prior United States
consent.
6. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, could the transfer of
sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia contribute to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East and
exacerbate existing regional tensions?
Secretary Perry. I have not authorized any United States company to
transfer ``sensitive nuclear technology'' to Saudi Arabia, nor do I
intend to do so.
Longstanding U.S. policy seeks to prevent the further proliferation
of nuclear weapons to any country and region. For this reason, the
United States seeks to ensure that all countries comply with strict
U.S. nonproliferation requirements, which are the strongest in the
world. One way the United States achieves this goal is by placing
legally binding nonproliferation conditions on U.S. civil nuclear
exports.
7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, should government officials
involved in the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology concurrently advise
private industry interests?
Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy (DOE) has statutory
responsibility for authorizing the transfer of unclassified nuclear
technology and assistance under 10 CFR Part 810. This regulatory
function is performed by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
(DNN) within the National Nuclear Security Administration. DNN
interacts with private interests in the context of its regulatory
function.
Separately, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy works with the U.S.
civil nuclear industry to help develop new and innovative technologies
that will help return the United States to a position of global
leadership in civil nuclear energy.
8. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin
Salman has reportedly refused any prohibitions on enriching uranium or
reprocessing of spent fuel. Can Saudi Arabia can be trusted with this
sensitive technology and what restrictions and safeguards should the
United States require if the transfer continues?
Secretary Perry. All authorizations for the export of unclassified
civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have been issued in accordance
with the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810.
As Under Secretary of State Thompson recently stated, the United
States seeks the highest nonproliferation commitments in all peaceful
nuclear cooperation negotiations, including legally binding commitments
over enrichment and reprocessing. By law, every 123 agreement must
contain all of the security and non-proliferation requirements
specified in section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act.
Additionally, the United States has long-promoted the universal
adherence by all non-nuclear weapon states to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, regardless of the nature of
that State's fuel cycle aspirations. In this context, the United States
encourages Saudi Arabia at every appropriate opportunity to conclude an
Additional Protocol with the IAEA as soon as possible.
9. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, Section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA) stipulates that the U.S. may not transfer nuclear
technology to a foreign country without congressional approval. Do you
agree that the Trump Administration must seek congressional review of
any transfer of United States nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Perry. 10 CFR Part 810 implements AEA section 57 b. (2),
which provides the Department of Energy with statutory responsibility
for authorizing the transfer of unclassified civil nuclear technology
and assistance. The part 810 regulations apply to technology transfers
and assistance related to certain nuclear fuel-cycle activities,
commercial nuclear power plants, and research and test reactors.
Covered transfers include the transfer of physical documents or
electronic media, electronic transfers or the transfer of knowledge and
expertise. A 123 Agreement is not required for the export of the above-
described technology and assistance, and there is no legal requirement
for Congressional approval. The negotiation of a 123 agreement is a
separate and distinct procedure from the part 810 application
authorization review process.
10. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, did you sign any of the
six ``part 810'' authorizations for companies sharing nuclear
technology with Saudi Arabia after the October 2, 2018, murder of Jamal
Khashoggi?
Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy has issued seven part 810
authorizations for the transfer of unclassified civil nuclear
technology to Saudi Arabia to date. There have been two part 810
authorizations issued since October 2, 2018. A part 810 authorization
simply provides United States companies the ability to compete in the
international civil nuclear market.
A part 810 authorization does not authorize the transfer of nuclear
material, equipment or components. The process involves a thorough
interagency review that requires the Department of Energy to secure the
concurrence of the Department of State, and consult with the
Departments of Defense and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
artificial intelligence
11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, do you have any concerns
that private sector partners in Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems
developed with support and funding from your department will sell these
technologies to foreign adversaries or otherwise make such systems
broadly available?
Secretary Perry. No, as the Office of Science (SC) works on basic
research which funds open source proposals.
12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, when you contract on
project with private sector partners like on Project Maven, what
contractual mechanisms do you have in place to ensure that the highly-
accurate and efficient systems that were developed based on sensitive
government datasets and collaboration are not provided to foreign
actors?
Secretary Perry. Technology is a critical part of the DOE's mission
and requires special consideration in identifying and protecting
sensitive technologies and ensuring appropriate protection of DOE
funded intellectual property.
DOE contractors are subject to applicable U.S. export control laws,
regulations and policies when exporting materials and technical
information resulting from the performance of their contracts. Within
the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) there are
contractual requirements related to the protection of the Department
funded technology and information. These contractual requirements put
in place controls requiring: differing levels of review based on the
technology and information; review and approval of all foreign national
visits and assignments; review of all Scientific and Technical
Information generated under the contract to determine appropriate
release and handling; and many additional controls.
13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, what controls do you
recommend the United States put in place on private sector
collaboration to protect U.S. developed AI technologies from getting
into the hands of our strategic competitors?
Secretary Perry. This is an area the United States will need to
continue to monitor. However, at this time we believe the present
controls are adequate.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
u.s. nuclear part 810 authorizations
14. Senator Kaine. Secretary Perry, in your testimony you mentioned
over 37 part 810 authorizations approved since your tenure as Secretary
of Energy, 9 of which were to the Middle East. Provide a list formatted
by Date Issued / Company / Country for every part 810 authorization
made since you were confirmed as Secretary of Energy, to include those
which are not publically available.
Secretary Perry. The international commercial nuclear power
industry is a highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low
number of competitors, even the name of a company and the market they
are competing in can be harmful to an American company seeking to
market their products. Certain companies can be easily identified by
the technology associated with them, thus revealing the name or
technology associated with such a company would reveal that they were
competing in a certain market.
Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the
information in question, the Department has been working with Congress
to provide access to this information in the appropriate setting and
manner.
decommissioning of uss harry s. truman
15. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, have you been given
any direction from the Department of Defense to commence planning or
provide funding for the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier USS
Harry S. Truman?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. No, NNSA has not been given direction by
the Department of Defense related to the decommissioning of the USS
Harry S. Truman. The Department of the Navy is responsible for the
planning and budgeting to support a nuclear ship's refueling complex
overhaul or its inactivation.
16. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what would be the
impact to future DOE [Department of Energy] budgets if the Navy were to
go through with the early decommissioning of the Truman?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. There will be no impact to NNSA's budget
if the USS Harry S. Truman is retired early. The Department of the Navy
is responsible for the planning and budgeting to support a ship's
refueling complex overhaul or its inactivation.
17. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, when would planning
and funding need to commence if the decommissioning were to start in
fiscal year 2024?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The Department of the Navy is responsible
for the planning and budgeting to support a ship's refueling complex
overhaul or its inactivation. The Deputy Administrator for the Office
of Naval Reactors is responsible for ensuring safe and effective
nuclear propulsion plants for the Navy's fleet of submarines and
aircraft carriers, to include the USS Harry S. Truman. Naval Reactors
remains engaged in discussions with the Navy on retaining this aircraft
carrier through its remaining service life based on recent
announcements by the Administration.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
implementation of plutonium strategy at lanl
18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, I appreciate your
reconfirming Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) continuing role as
the Nation's center of excellence for plutonium research and
development. You also stated there is an additional $5 billion that is
headed to Los Alamos to provide the capacity in PF-4 to produce at
least 30 plutonium pits per year by 2026.
Secretary Perry. We are investing approximately $3 billion over
five years in support of pit production at LANL to produce 30 pits per
year beginning in 2026. Funding in fiscal year (FY) 2020 for LANL will
be provided to hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production
personnel; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility
(PF)-4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024;
install pit production equipment in PF-4 to reach 30 war reserve pits
per year beginning in 2026; and support analytical chemistry and
materials characterization equipment scope.
19. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, can you please confirm the
$5 billion in additional funding for LANL and provide the full budget
justification for it and a breakout of how the additional $5 billion
will be used at LANL?
Secretary Perry. We are investing approximately $3 billion over
five years in support of pit production at LANL to produce 30 pits per
year beginning in 2026. Funding in fiscal year 2020 for LANL will be
provided to hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production
personnel; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility
(PF)-4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024;
install pit production equipment in PF-4 to reach 30 war reserve pits
per year beginning in 2026; and support analytical chemistry and
materials characterization equipment scope.
20. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, what portion of the $5
billion in additional funding for LANL will be used to provide
technical support to SRS (Savannah River Site) to establish the
capacity to produce plutonium pits in the repurposed MFFF [MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility]?
Secretary Perry. The funding for Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) includes provision of technical support to the Savannah River
Site (SRS), as the two-site approach allows for complementary training
plans at both sites. NNSA is developing plans for workforce
recruitment, training and sustainment, and pit production knowledge
transfer to the future workforce. NNSA is also evaluating options for
cross training personnel at SRS and LANL. Additionally, a portion of
the funding is provided for and will continue to be provided for LANL
efforts supporting equipment design for the proposed Savannah River
Plutonium Production Facility.
fiscal year 2020 budget request for plutonium sustainment
21. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you please
provide a breakout of proposed scope of work for fiscal year 2020 at
LANL under NNSA's budget request for plutonium sustainment, including
LANL's support for establishing the capacity to produce plutonium pits
at Savannah River Site?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. In the fiscal year (FY) 2020 budget
request for LANL, Plutonium Sustainment Operations provides funding to
hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production personnel at
LANL; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility (PF)-
4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024; and
support production activities. The Savannah River Plutonium Processing
Facility Project element of Plutonium Sustainment Operations in the
fiscal year 2020 budget request invests in completing conceptual design
to repurpose the facility for pit production and supports developing
other project documentation required for Critical Decision-1. LANL is
providing expertise and design support for conceptual design of special
facility equipment for this project.
savannah river plutonium processing facility
22. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you please
provide your current best estimate of the schedule and timeline of the
major milestones, including NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act]
review, to establish the capacity to produce 50 plutonium pits per year
in the re-purposed MFFF?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is currently executing conceptual
design activities for the proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing
Facility (SRPPF) to produce 50 pits per year. An independent cost
estimate for refurbishment of the proposed SRPPF will be done prior to
Critical Decision-1. Consistent with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) and pursuant to 10 CFR 1021.311, NNSA is preparing an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for the proposed action to
repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to produce a
minimum of 50 pits per year at the Savannah River Site (SRS). On June
10, 2019, the Office of the Federal Register published a Notice of
Intent to prepare an EIS on plutonium pit production at SRS. NNSA
expects the draft EIS to be available in 2020.
pit production at lanl
23. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, I understand Los
Alamos has been making steady progress in restoring the capacity to
produce plutonium pits in PF-4. What is the current status of the
effort to produce development W87-like pits are you satisfied with the
progress being made to begin pit production in PF-4?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA remains committed to achieving pit
production requirements established by the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC) to produce the first war reserve (or W87-like) pit in 2023, 10
war reserve pits per year in 2024, 20 war reserve pits per year in
2025, and 30 war reserve pits per year beginning in 2026 at LANL. LANL
has demonstrated progress in meeting these goals and fabricated four
development pits in fiscal year 2018, is fabricating five development
pits in fiscal year 2019, and plans to produce five process prove-in
pits in fiscal year 2020.
doe's order 140.1, interface with dnfsb
24. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, as you know, DOE issued
Order 140.1 without any consultation with either the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) or with the local communities most
impacted by DOE's nuclear facilities. The Chairman and Members of the
DNFSB have been unanimous in their opposition to DOE's unilateral
implementation of order 140.1. In particular, the board takes strong
exception to the order's exemption of some facilities from the board's
oversight, the adoption of a new definition of public health and safety
that exempts onsite individuals and workers from oversight, new
limitations on access to facilities, personnel and information, and
denial of the board's requests related to deliberative and pre-
decisional documents. The board has clearly and repeatedly conveyed to
you its position that DOE's new Order 140.1 is both inconsistent with
the board's statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act and with
DOE's own policy of continuing a strong and productive relationship
with DNFSB as a valued external and independent reviewer. Community
leaders in my state echoed these concerns at the board's recent public
hearing on Order 140.1 in Albuquerque.
To restore credibility with the local communities, will you agree
to collaborate with the DNFSB to try to address the board's specific
concerns with Order 140.1, and to demonstrate again a shared focus on
adequate protection of public health and safety?
Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy (DOE) values the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (DNFSB) advice on our two agencies'
shared focus on protecting public health and safety.
DOE issued Order 140.1, Interface with the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, on May 14, 2018, to update and streamline a
17-year old, out-of-date DOE Manual (Manual 140.1-1B), to make the
Manual compliant with changes made to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as
amended, as well as to clarify DOE personnel roles and responsibilities
in our interface with DNFSB.
Since the issuance of Order 140.1, DOE leadership and senior
managers at Headquarters and Field Offices have participated in three
DNFSB public hearings to discuss compliance with the Atomic Energy Act,
as amended, including a public hearing held in Albuquerque, NM, on
February 21, 2019.
DOE federal and contractor employees are particularly trained to
execute their work in and around the hazards posed by our activities;
their safety is the focus of our training programs and multiple
requirements established by our governing directives, standards, and
procedures. The adequate protection of the public health and safety is
our primary point of interface with the DNFSB, and should be the focus
of our interactions.
upgrade of mesa at sandia labs
25. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, for over 30 years
the MESA [Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications] facility
at Sandia Labs in Albuquerque has been a real workhorse for meeting
NNSA's unique requirements for strategic rad-hard microelectronics. The
aging facility is outdated and unable to support adequately life-
extension programs in the post-2025 timeframe. Upgrading MESA will
require a major infrastructure investment. What is the current strategy
and plan to sustain the unique capabilities of Sandia's MESA Complex to
produce strategic rad-hard microelectronics beyond 2025?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is committed to sustain the MESA
Complex through 2040. Sandia National Laboratories' (SNL) Microsystems
Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) Complex currently is the
only U.S. foundry with the capability to deliver custom strategically
radiation-hardened microelectronic components required to sustain the
Nation's nuclear deterrent. NNSA recognizes the distinguished
capability provided by SNL and, over the last several years, NNSA has
worked to assess the long-term viability of the MESA Complex to provide
war Reserve components that meet system requirements. As the Silicon
Fabrication (SiFab) foundry surpassed its 30-year intended life, NNSA
and SNL contracted Aerospace Corporation and Longenecker Associates to
conduct independent risk assessments. Both concluded that the foundry
can be extended until 2040 with modest upgrades to infrastructure and
equipment.
NNSA and SNL have partnered in the development of an Extended Life
Program (ELP) to understand investments required to sustain the
existing capabilities of the MESA Complex. The ELP plan will provide a
20-year forecast of tools and equipment recapitalization, and
facilities and infrastructure projects.
NNSA and SNL are also partnering in the development of the MESA
Integrated Program Plan, which will provide a 5-year view of
operations, weapons program commitments, and operational costs, to
include the budgeting information for maintenance of capability, R&D
programs, production programs, and technology maturation activities.
26. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what are the
specific milestones you are planning for the upgrade this year and for
fiscal year 2020?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has worked closely with Sandia
National Laboratories to generate a facility project schedule that
poses minimal risk to the Life Extension Programs (LEP) production
schedule. Based on the complexity and age of MESA, facility projects
must be prioritized and executed based on areas of highest need to
avoid extended shutdowns of production fabrication, and with
consideration for the quality of the systems supporting production,
e.g., cleanliness of deionized water, air quality, and regulation of
airflow. fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 maintenance projects and
associated improvements to the MESA facility include enhancements to
the bulk chemical distribution system; Silicon Fabrication Facility
(SiFab) Uninterruptible Power Supply system upgrades; commencing a 3-
year SiFab HEPA filter and bay ceiling replacement project; and
structural upgrades to support packaging equipment for the W80-4 LEP.
lep workload at nnsa labs and plants
27. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the ongoing Life-
Extension Programs (LEP) are essential to assuring the stockpile is
safe, secure and reliable. I believe the LEPs are a top priority. You
currently have four major LEPs underway: B61, W88, W80-4 and W87-1 with
about $2 billion in required work per year. Are you confident that the
NNSA's labs and sites have sufficient capacity needed to perform this
critical work, and stay on the schedule and budget for each LEP?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We are confident that we have sufficient
capacity to execute these modernization activities. However,
significant technical issues can arise that have the potential to
affect LEP schedules and budget. For example, NNSA is assessing the
impacts of a technical component that did not pass qualification
testing and is common to several components on the B61-12 LEP and W88
Alt 370.
future of pulsed power and z machine at sandia national laboratories
28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the Z Machine at
Sandia Labs continues to provide one of the critical pieces of our
stockpile stewardship program by simulating pressures and radiation
environments that previously required underground testing. Do you agree
that pulsed power science is important to NNSA's mission, and what do
you see is the future role of pulsed-power science for mainting the
strategic deterrent?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Pulsed power capabilities are key to
supporting weapon survivability and radiation effects, materials
science, and thermonuclear burn. Given the promise demonstrated by
pulsed power and magnetic drive in recent years, the work at the Z
Pulsed Power Facility has been prioritized within the Inertial
Confinement Fusion Program. NNSA plans continued increases in its
investment in pulsed-power science to capitalize on recent advances in
fusion concepts, which may provide high neutron yields and meet
national security needs without requiring fusion ignition.
29. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, in light of the
recent article in the South China Morning Post concerning China's
future plans for pulsed power, what are your thoughts on the need to
extend the laboratories' capabilities in pulsed power science to
support stockpile stewardship?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The priority for the next fiscal year is
the completion of the Inertial Confinement Fusion 2020 goal, which
includes the development of credible physics scaling to multi-megajoule
fusion yields for each of the ignition approaches. The conclusions of
this study will be used to guide future research and facility
investments. The 5-year experimental plan initiated in fiscal year 2019
includes activities that will explore the mission need for next-
generation facilities and identify the best approaches.
30. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, are there risks to
the U.S. deterrent if adversaries advance major scientific capabilities
in pulsed power beyond what the national labs currently have today?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA continuously assesses and manages
the full breadth of risks to the deterrent, including the impact of new
technical capabilities of our adversaries. As we monitor global
scientific advances, we will continue to use our full suite of tools to
ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal,
including possible investments in new capabilities as appropriate.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
saudi civilian nuclear cooperation
31. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, my understanding is that the
Department of Energy has not produced a single document or made a
single agency official available to respond to the House Oversight
Committee's February 19, 2019, request for documents related to its
ongoing investigation into ``efforts inside the White House to rush the
transfer of highly sensitive U.S. nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia in
potential violation of the Atomic Energy Act and without review by
Congress as required by law.'' Will the Department of Energy commit to
speedily producing documents and any other relevant information and
making Energy Department officials available to the House Oversight
Committee? If not, please explain why your Department is not
cooperating with this investigation.
Secretary Perry. The Department has produced several hundred pages
of documents to the House Oversight Committee. The Department is
continuing to search for and review responsive documents.
32. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, is the Trump Administration
continuing to engage with the government of Saudi Arabia about a
potential civilian nuclear cooperation agreement? If yes, what is the
status of that engagement?
Secretary Perry. Negotiations began in 2012 under the previous
Administration and remain on-going. The United States continues to seek
the strongest possible nonproliferation and security commitments from
Saudi Arabia.
33. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, what other agencies, if any,
is the Department of Energy consulting with regarding a potential
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with government of Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Perry. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act mandates that
the negotiation of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement be led by the
Department of State, with the technical assistance of the Department of
Energy and in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
34. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, you reportedly expressed
interest in the plan to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia,
known as part of a ``Middle East Marshall Plan,'' in a March 2017
National Security Council (NSC) meeting, just two months after
President Trump's inauguration. Why are you interested in transferring
American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Perry. In 2017, Saudi Arabia announced that it is
proceeding with a nuclear power program and requested bids to construct
two large light water reactors. As U.S. companies have requested the
Department's authorization to compete in that tender process, I have
imposed nonproliferation obligations on such exports that comply with
the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810.
Moreover, the Department of Energy has provided technical assistance to
the Department of State in the negotiation of a 123 agreement. If we
are able to conclude such an agreement, it will help ensure that Saudi
Arabia will develop its civil nuclear program in accordance with the
highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation.
35. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, have you received direction
from anyone in the White House to pursue the transfer of American
nuclear technology to government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please list
the names of those White House officials.
Secretary Perry. Private companies apply directly to the Department
for authorization to transfer part 810-covered unclassified civil
nuclear technology and assistance abroad.
36. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
with Jared Kushner about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer
American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes,
please explain the date, location, and outcome of those conversations.
Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
technology issues.
37. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
with Tom Barrack about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer
American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes,
please explain the date, location, and outcome of those conversations.
Secretary Perry. I do not recall any conversations with Tom Barrack
during my time as Secretary.
38. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
with then-National Security Advisor Lieutenant General (ret.) Michael
Flynn about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer American
nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please
explain the date, location, and outcome of any conversation.
Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
technology issues.
39. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
with then-Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland about the
Trump Administration's efforts to transfer American nuclear technology
to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please explain the date,
location, and outcome of any conversation.
Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
technology issues.
40. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
with Derek Harvey, the Senior Director for Middle East and North
African Affairs at the National Security Council about the Trump
Administration's efforts to transfer American nuclear technology to the
government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please explain the date, location,
and outcome of any conversation.
Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear
technology issues.
41. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
with any employee of IP3 International about the Trump Administration's
efforts to transfer American nuclear technology to the government of
Saudi Arabia? If yes, please identify every individual employee with
whom you had a conversation, as well as the date, location, and outcome
of any conversation with that employee.
Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely
interact with industry representatives and other energy stakeholders.
42. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation
with President Trump about the Trump Administration's efforts to
transfer American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia?
If yes, please explain the date, location, and outcome of any
conversation.
Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I regularly
advise the President on matters within the jurisdiction of the
Department, including nuclear technology issues.
43. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, does the Administration intend
to authorize any licenses for the export of nuclear material or
equipment to the government of Saudi Arabia without a nuclear
cooperation agreement (commonly known as a 123 agreement) in force?
Please explain in details.
Secretary Perry. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible
for licensing exports of nuclear material or equipment.
The Department of Energy (DOE) has statutory responsibility for
authorizing the export of unclassified civil nuclear technology and
assistance under 10 CFR Part 810. A 123 agreement is not required for
the export of unclassified civil nuclear technology and assistance. 10
CFR Part 810 authorizations are often the first step in U.S. nuclear
industry engagement with a new foreign partner and often serve as an
indication that the partner is committed to beginning a civil nuclear
program that includes the strongest possible nonproliferation
requirements. The negotiation of a 123 agreement is a separate and
distinct procedure from the part 810 application authorization review
process.
44. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, does the 123 agreement under
negotiation with the government of Saudi Arabia meet all of the
security and non-proliferation requirements specified in Section 123(a)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954? Please explain in details.
Secretary Perry. By law, the Department of State leads in the
negotiations of all 123 agreements. I would refer you to the Department
of State for further information on the status of these negotiations.
45. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, according to a recent Daily
Beast report, the Department of Energy ``has approved six
authorizations for United States companies seeking to conduct nuclear
related work in Saudi Arabia.'' If this is accurate, please list--
without divulging any trade secrets or proprietary information--the
names of the United States companies to which the Department has issued
a Saudi Arabia-related part 810 authorization, which allows for limited
cooperation related to the ``development or production of any special
nuclear material outside of the United States'' if that activity has
been determined by the Secretary that it ``will not be inimical to the
interest of the United States.'' If you will not list the names of
these companies, please explain how refusing to disclose this
information is consistent with the Department's obligation to ``keep
the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives which,
under the rules of the Senate and the House, have jurisdiction over the
functions of the Secretary or the Commission, fully and currently
informed with respect to the activities of the Secretary and the
Commission'' as provided under the Sec. 303 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (emphasis added).
Secretary Perry. The international commercial nuclear power
industry is a highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low
number of competitors, even the name of a company and the market they
are competing in can be harmful to an American company seeking to
market their products. Certain companies can be easily identified by
the technology associated with them, thus revealing the name or
technology associated with such a company would reveal that they were
competing in a certain market.
Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the
information in question, the Department has been working with Congress
to provide access to this information in the appropriate setting and
manner.
46. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, without divulging any trade
secrets or proprietary information, please list the names of any United
States companies that are seeking, but have not yet been issued or
denied, a part 810 authorization to conduct nuclear related work in
Saudi Arabia. If you will not list the names of these companies, please
explain how denying access to this information is consistent with the
Department's obligation to ``keep the committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives which, under the rules of the Senate and the
House, have jurisdiction over the functions of the Secretary or the
Commission, fully and currently informed with respect to the activities
of the Secretary and the Commission'' as provided under the Sec. 303 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (emphasis added).
Secretary Perry. The Department does not comment on applications
that may be in process.
47. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, please provide a brief update,
without divulging any trade secrets or propriety information, on the
status of the part 810 authorizations for the category of United States
companies described in the previous question (i.e., United States
companies that are seeking, but have not yet been issued or denied, a
part 810 authorization to conduct nuclear related work in Saudi
Arabia).
Secretary Perry. The Department does not comment on applications
that may be in process.
48. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, please list any federal
agencies and the names of any White House officials that were involved
in the Department of Energy issuing any current part 810 authorizations
to United States companies seeking to conduct nuclear related work in
Saudi Arabia since January 20, 2017. If you refuse to list such
agencies and officials, please explain how refusing to provide this
information is consistent with the Department's obligation to ``keep
the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives which,
under the rules of the Senate and the House, have jurisdiction over the
functions of the Secretary or the Commission, fully and currently
informed with respect to the activities of the Secretary and the
Commission'' as provided under the Section 303 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (emphasis added).
Secretary Perry. Part 810 authorizations involve a robust intra-
and-interagency review. As required by Section 57 b. (2) of the Atomic
Energy Act, the Department of Energy must obtain the concurrence of the
Department of State and consult with the Departments of Defense and
Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For each of the seven
authorizations for Saudi Arabia, the Department of State concurrence
was obtained following their receipt of government-to-government
nonproliferation assurances from the government of Saudi Arabia. The
Departments of Commerce and Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission were consulted and provided no objection to the approval.
Typically there is no review of part 810 applications by White
House officials.
49. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, do you currently have any
financial interest, or did you formerly have any financial interest, in
any of the following companies: General Electric, Exelon, Nuscale,
TerraPower, Lightbridge, AECOM, BWXT, Centrus Energy Corp., and X-
energy? Please explain in details.
Secretary Perry. No, I do not have any current financial interests
in those companies. I have not had any reportable financial interests
in those companies since December of 2016.
Q50. Secretary Perry, since you assumed your duties as the
Secretary of Energy, have you or your subordinates taken any meetings
with registered lobbyists working on behalf of the Saudi Government to
lobby the Trump Administration to approve a sale of nuclear reactors or
any other nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? Please
explain in details.
50. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, since you assumed your duties
as the Secretary of Energy, have you or your subordinates taken any
meetings with registered lobbyists working on behalf of the Saudi
Government to lobby the Trump Administration to approve a sale of
nuclear reactors or any other nuclear technology to the government of
Saudi Arabia? Please explain in details.
Secretary Perry. As Secretary, I routinely engage with my foreign
counterparts, including at the Saudi Ministry of Energy, Industry and
Mineral Resources.
51. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in a Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) hearing on May 24, 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo
said in reference to a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with
Saudi Arabia: ``[W]e have told them we want a gold standard section 123
agreement from them which would not permit them to enrich.'' Do you
agree with Secretary Pompeo? If not, please explain why it is in the
national security interest of the United States to conclude a 123
agreement that would allow the Saudi Government to enrich or reprocess
nuclear material for the development of a nuclear weapon.
Secretary Perry. Yes. The United States seeks to conclude 123
agreements with foreign partners that legally restrict their ability to
engage in any enrichment and reprocessing activities.
52. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, on May 16, 2008, the United
States and Saudi Arabia reached a ``United States-Saudi Arabia
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Nuclear Energy Cooperation,''
which states: ``Saudi Arabia has stated its intent to rely on
international markets for nuclear fuel and to not pursue sensitive
nuclear technologies, which stands in direct contrast to the actions of
Iran.'' While not legally binding, is this MOU still valid, and if so,
is the Energy Department working to ensure that the Saudi Government
adheres to the commitment it made in this document?
Secretary Perry. The United States-Saudi Arabia Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on Nuclear Energy Cooperation signed in 2008
supported the United States Government's initial engagement with Saudi
Arabia. This engagement was during the height of the nuclear
renaissance when Saudi Arabia, similar to other newcomer countries,
expressed an initial interest in pursuing civil nuclear development.
The MOU provided a framework for cooperation, but none materialized.
Saudi Arabia elected not to conduct any cooperation under the 2008 MOU.
In 2015, the United States and Saudi Arabia concluded a new MOU that is
currently active and covers cooperation in renewable and nuclear
energy. Under the 2015 MOU, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
civil nuclear energy action plan in February 2018, but no substantive
cooperation under the action plan has occurred to date.
53. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, what steps are being taken by
the Energy Department to ensure that the government of Saudi Arabia is
adhering to its current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)?
Secretary Perry. The Department regularly invites officials from
Saudi Arabia to attend DOE-sponsored international and regional
safeguards and safeguards-related workshops and training events.
Additionally, DOE is prepared to engage with Saudi officials on a
bilateral basis to address any safeguards technical or implementation
questions they may have.
54. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in the opinion of the Energy
Department, is the government of Saudi Arabia adhering to its IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)?
Secretary Perry. The Department believes that Saudi Arabia is
adhering to the safeguards agreement that currently is in force between
the IAEA and the Government of Saudi Arabia.
iran nuclear agreement
55. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in an Armed Services Committee
hearing on March 22, 2018, I asked if you agreed with the opinion of
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that the Iran nuclear
agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) ``extended the
amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon from a few months to about 1 year'' and ``has enhanced
the transparency of Iran's nuclear activities.'' You replied, ``I
cannot tell that I do or I do not.'' In a January 29, 2019 Senate
Intelligence Committee hearing, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)
Director said in reference to Iran: ``at the moment, technically they
are in compliance.'' Do you agree with the CIA Director that Iran is
currently complying with the nuclear agreement? If you do not agree,
please provide your evidence of an incurable material breach of the
nuclear agreement by the Government of Iran.
Secretary Perry. We work closely with our colleagues at the U.S.
Department of State and the United States Mission to the United Nations
organizations in Vienna to monitor developments related to Iranian
compliance with commitments made under the JCPOA. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization in charge of verification
and monitoring of these commitments, releases quarterly reports on
Iranian compliance and we would direct your attention to those reports.
DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical expertise, equipment, and
training to support the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran. DOE will
support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities and work closely with
our interagency partners as needed.we would direct your attention to
those reports. DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical expertise,
equipment, and training to support the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran.
DOE will support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities and work
closely with our interagency partners as needed.we would direct your
attention to those reports. DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical
expertise, equipment, and training to support the IAEA's ability to
monitor Iran. DOE will support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities
and work closely with our interagency partners as needed.A\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Since the date of the hearing, the IAEA has reported to its
Board of Governors that Iran has exceeded its JCPOA commitments with
respect to its uranium enrichment levels, low-enriched uranium
stockpile and research and development on advanced centrifuges.
56. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, is the Department of Energy
currently involved in working to negotiate an alternative to the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? If yes, please explain the
objectives of that work. If not, please explain why not.
Secretary Perry. DOE would refer you to the Department of State,
which has the lead on the administration's efforts to secure a
comprehensive agreement with Iran based on the 12 points described by
Secretary Pompeo in May 2018. DOE/NNSA continues to monitor Iran's
nuclear activities and provides critical support to the interagency's
efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If called
upon, we will support interagency discussions to negotiate a new,
comprehensive agreement.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
nuclear material security and theft prevention programs
57. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, under the previous
and current administration's budget requests for NNSA led nuclear theft
prevention programs have been declining over the years as well as
actual funds being appropriated. Current funding levels are at their
lowest since the early 1990s and even after the most recent Nuclear
Posture Review noted that nuclear terrorism is one of ``the most
significant threats to the security of the United States.'' The fiscal
year 2019 and current budget requests have suggested cuts to domestic
and international radiological security, nuclear smuggling and
deterrence, security at nuclear facilities, and efforts to consolidate
and remove nuclear weapons usable materials. Can we count on the NNSA
to partner with the Senate Armed Services Committee and other relevant
committees to identify the risks we face domestically and
internationally so we can correctly allocate resources to the
applicable programs responsible for preventing radiological materials
theft and preventing terrorism incidents?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA values its partnership with the
Senate Armed Services Committee and other committees on nuclear
security. NNSA will continue to work diligently with Congress to ensure
that any and all risks domestically and internationally are identified
and appropriate resources allocated to support our nuclear security
priorities.
58. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what efforts are the
NNSA undertaking with international partners to consolidate nuclear
weapons usable materials to the minimum practical number of locations
to maximize security and effectiveness of resources?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has worked with 48 countries and
Taiwan to minimize the amount of weapons-usable nuclear material at
civilian sites by consolidating these materials at fewer sites and
where possible eliminating them, for example by downblending highly
enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium. Recent and near-term
activities include making Ghana and Nigeria HEU-free by returning
Chinese-origin HEU from these countries to China; eliminating all HEU
from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Alatau, Kazakhstan; and
working with Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and other partners to
eliminate excess HEU from a number of other facilities.
59. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the Department of
Energy's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request suggests cutting the Global
Material Security budget by $65 million. As you are aware, the Global
Material Security plays an important role in permanent threat reduction
and working closely with international partners to interdict illicit
nuclear materials that could be used in a non-state actor attack. Do
you agree that this program is critical for maintaining U.S. nuclear
security leadership and preventing potential theft and illicit use of
such materials?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget
Request supports the Global Material Security mission of preventing
terrorists and other actors from obtaining nuclear and radioactive
material that could be used in an improvised nuclear device or a
radiological dispersal device. This work, which is critical to our
national security and to NNSA's efforts to reduce global nuclear
security threats, is fully supported by the fiscal year 2020 budget.
Fiscal year 2019 appropriations included an increase above the
budget request for Global Material Security. This allowed NNSA to
accelerate a number of activities that had been planned for fiscal year
2020, including procurements to support the replacement of cesium-based
irradiators, the development of transportation containers to remove
disused cesium-based irradiators, and activities to secure buildings
with radioactive material. The increase also allowed for the
acceleration of counter nuclear smuggling efforts near unofficial
border crossings, targeted operations along air traffic and unregulated
maritime pathways, and with interior security services. All of these
important efforts will continue in fiscal year 2020.
nuclear enterprise security
60. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, many U.S. partner
countries have limited experience with vulnerability assessments that
test for areas that an adversary may be able to exploit security
systems and/or testing ``force on force'' exercises at borders or at
facilities that house sensitive materials. What activities or
partnerships is the NNSA leading to ensure our international partners
have the training to properly asses and build awareness around their
security practices?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA works on a bilateral and
multilateral basis with partner countries across the globe to prevent
the theft, sabotage, and diversion of nuclear material. NNSA pursues
this mission in concert with technical experts from the National
Laboratories.
NNSA has extensive experience working with partner countries in
developing vulnerability assessments to ensure the effectiveness of
physical protection systems for nuclear material. Additionally, NNSA
conducts force-on-force trainings for foreign response teams at
domestic and international training facilities and transport security
trainings for foreign police organizations. NNSA also provides physical
protection upgrades on a case-by-case basis, and assists partner
countries in building capacity in critical areas such as cybersecurity
and insider threat mitigation.
61. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the International
Atomic Energy Agency maintains an Incident and Trafficking Database,
which compiles information from participating member states on
incidents such as loss or theft of radioactive materials. Does the NNSA
maintain any a similar database and is it accessible by other agencies
and by international partners?
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA maintains an internal list of
detections of nuclear and radioactive material gathered both from open
source reports, including the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB),
and from our bilateral partnerships with foreign governments.
Information reported to NNSA by international partners is used for
internal project assessment, planning, and prioritization. NNSA also
encourages its partner countries to report incidents to the ITDB. In
addition, NNSA closely collaborates with other appropriate U.S.
interagency partners on detections of concern to ensure a consistent
whole-of-government effort in counter nuclear smuggling.
nuclear enterprise cybersecurity
62. Senator Manchin. Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty,
the budget request you presented shows a 39.9-percent increase in
Information Technology and Cybersecurity funding for the National
Nuclear Security Administration. USSTRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] is
also in the process of modernizing cybersecurity as a part of an
overall effort to modernize nuclear command, control and
communications. Are DOE and DOD engaging in any cooperative efforts
regarding nuclear cybersecurity in order to avoid duplication of
efforts or systems that lack interoperability?
Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, NNSA and DOD are
strategic partners and continuously engage in various activities.
NNSA's Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) currently works
with NNSA's Office of Defense Programs and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy on cybersecurity, information
technology, and operational technology for weapons activities. The
Nuclear Enterprise Assurance Steering Group (NEASG) is the senior DOE/
DOD management body that oversees, coordinates, and shares lessons
learned that will improve the country's ability to prevent adversarial
threats against nuclear weapon systems. This collaboration allows us to
maintain communication and engage in any cooperative efforts regarding
nuclear cybersecurity, where opportunities exist.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters,
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. The Committee meets today to receive
testimonies on the posture of the U.S. Air Force and its fiscal
year (FY) 2020 budget request.
We welcome Dr. Heather Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force,
and General David Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
and thank both of you for your service and all that.
We're all saddened by the decision that's been made by
Secretary Wilson. Your work has just been great, and maybe
there's still--it's still time to change your mind. All right?
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. The National Defense Strategy (NDS)
directs our Nation's military to prepare for the return to
great-power competition. This means that we must be prepared to
deter and, if necessary, defeat potential near-peer
adversaries. Obviously, China and Russia. In order for the Air
Force to achieve that goal, it must properly be manned and
trained and equipped. Unfortunately, as pointed out by the
National Defense Strategy Commission, we are still in a
readiness and modernization crisis. At the end of the Obama
administration, the Air Force was at a historic low in
readiness. Less than 10 percent of combat squadrons were ready
and--to deploy, and even less were prepared for the peer fight.
We have made progress in rebuilding the readiness, but more
needs to be done. A high state of readiness is crucial for our
Nation to demonstrate peace through strength.
While our forces suffered from being ill-prepared, our
adversaries moved out and recapitalized both their conventional
and nuclear forces. So, all the time that we were resting and
we were coasting, China and Russia were not. In spite of the
previous neglect of our military, our men and women have done
outstanding work for our Nation, but it's past time for action.
You have testified that, quote, ``Our Air Force is too small
and too old to do what the Nation asks,'' unquote, and that the
Air Force needs to grow to the 386 squadrons. I agree that it
needs to grow and modernize. The future of our Air Force
readiness and relevance requires both growth and modernization
now.
Any successful modernization strategy must focus on results
and meeting the needs of tomorrow's fight. Fielding relevant
technology fast requires discipline in acquisition strategies.
It also requires rapid prototyping and experimentation in order
to get modern, reliable, and lethal systems into the hands of
our warfighters, and doing so on time and within allotted
budget. So, executing the strategy will require an open and
transparent dialogue with Congress all the way. We look forward
to working with you to make our shared modernization visions a
reality and to ensure the Air Force is a fighting force
prepared for the more lethal and dynamic battlefields of the
future.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Wilson and
General Goldfein to the Committee this morning to testify on
the plans and programs of the Department of the Air Force in
review of the fiscal year 2020 presidential budget. We are
grateful to all the men and women of the Air Force for their
professional service, and to their families for their continued
support.
In preparing this budget request, the Air Force faced
difficult decisions in balancing the need to modernizing and
keep the technological advantage over near-peer competitors and
the need to support ongoing operations and sustain today's
readiness. This budget request proposes funding increases to
address readiness concerns, munitions shortfalls, preparing for
the future fight, and modernizing our strategic deterrent
capability. While each of these issues is important, I'm
concerned that the Air Force may not have taken as thorough a
review of what programs could be cut, delayed, or made more
efficient in order to pay for the proposed increases, so I am
interested in the witnesses' view on what efforts could be
taken to offset current and future costs.
In the near term, the Air Force has money in the disaster
emergency relief supplemental they need by May 1st. If the Air
Force has not received the $1.2 billion funds by this date,
they will be forced to stop all work at Tyndall Air Force Base,
which will, in turn, delay the return of full base operations.
If these funds are delayed past that date, other dire
consequences may result, such as halting recovery operations at
Offutt Air Force Base, stopping maintenance on some aircraft,
and grounding others. I hope we can focus on the potential
consequences and move the disaster emergency relief
supplemental forward very, very quickly.
In addition, because significant levels of funding are
being transferred to build a wall on the southern border, the
amount of reprogramming authority will be limited. Our main
concern is that the Air Force and other services may run short
of head room and reprogram authority, which could lead to
delays in other shortage areas as we approach the end of the
fiscal year.
One of the major issues that will be considered in this
year's NDAA is the Air Force proposal to buy more F-15
aircraft. For years, the Air Force has adamantly opposed buying
any more fourth-generation aircraft. I believe the Committee
needs to understand this reversal. Any Air Force proposal
deserves our careful consideration, but we must consider it
against the recent history of abrupt Air Force changes of
direction on such programs as A-10, U-2, Global Hawk, Compass
Call, C-27 airlift aircraft, and JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack Radar System]. Another area of change is light
attack experimentation program--light attack aircraft
experimentation program. For the past several years, the Air
Force has been conducting experiments with small trainer
aircraft that have been modified to include a modest ground
attack capability. Some expected these experiments would result
in a program that would produce one or two wings of aircraft
for the Air Force. In the fiscal year 2020 budget request, the
Air Force has changed the nature and timing of that effort. The
budget request would defer funding for any light attack
aircraft until fiscal year 2022, at which point the Air Force
would buy roughly 24 aircraft. The aim of this revised program
would be to encourage coalition partners to contribute to the
air campaign effort with such aircraft, and to provide training
support for our partners who wanted to participate in such a
program. I ask that the witnesses explain this change in focus
and clarify the role of proposed light attack aircraft.
In last year's budget request, the Air Force proposed to
truncate the program to modernize the JSTARS, and to replace it
with a combination of other systems, including unmanned systems
and overhead sensors. The Committee supported the Air Force
proposal, and the plan was ultimately adopted in the fiscal
year 2019 NDAA. I understand that the Air Force has continued
this program in the fiscal year 2020 budget, and I look forward
to receiving an update on the progress.
I'm also interested in hearing updates of your continuing
efforts to improve the state of Air Force personnel, including
progress on improving the shortfalls within the remotely-
piloted aircraft operator community, and how the Air Force has
addressed shortfalls within the larger pilot community and
maintenance personnel.
The one major issue I have not mentioned is the proposal
for Space Force. I--discussion of Space Force this morning
because Chairman Inhofe intends, and I heartily concur, to
convene a hearing next Thursday dedicated solely to this issue
with Acting Secretary Shanahan, Chairman Dunford, Secretary
Wilson, and General Hyten as witnesses. With that in mind,
rather, I plan to use the hearing to focus on the issues I've
already discussed.
Once again, Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, thank you
very much.
Secretary Wilson, thank you for your distinguished service
to the Nation. You did an extraordinary job. I wish you well at
University of Texas--El Paso, Madam President.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. It does get pretty hot down there.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Inhofe. Well, it's--anyway, you two have been here
before. You know the drill, and I look forward to hearing your
opening statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of
the record.
We'll start with Secretary Wilson.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HEATHER A. WILSON, SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE
Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With my full
statement in the record, I'll just summarize a few points, and
then ask the Chief to add in.
The budget proposal that we've put forward for fiscal year
2020 is driven by the National Defense Strategy and the five
priority missions in that strategy. There are three things that
I think I'd like to highlight from our testimony in what we're
trying to do.
The first is, we're building a more lethal and ready Air
Force. The Air Force is more ready for major combat operations
today than we were 2 years ago because of the support and the
consistent budgets that have been approved by the United States
Congress. In the first place, that means more people, and
getting the right people, and getting them trained. Two years
ago, we were 4,000 maintainers short in the United States Air
Force. As of December, we are no maintainers short in the
Active Force. Now, that means that our maintainers are young,
and now we have to season them and make sure that they are
fully capable to do the jobs we're asking them to do. Last
year, we stopped the decline in pilots, and we are increasing
pilot training in order to close that gap, as well.
We are building that more lethal and ready force, but we
are also building tomorrow's Air Force faster and smarter. The
United States Congress gave us new authorities in order to buy
equipment in new ways to meet a rapidly innovating adversary.
We cannot win this contest with an acquisition system from the
Cold War. We are taking advantage of the authorities that the
Congress has given us. Delegation works when you do it to
competent people and then monitor results. We are using the
authorities for prototyping and experimentation that you have
given us to start bending metal earlier, finding out what
really works, and then setting requirements. We are also doing
so in a way that is as transparent, or more transparent, than
the traditional acquisition system, by giving reports to the
Congress on our prototyping and experimentation programs three
times a year and setting clear guardrails for when we need to
report to you even more frequently.
The third thing I would say is that we are changing the way
in which we engage small business. Many of you were involved
and helped us get the word out on our first Pitch Day, where we
took in proposals on some of our hardest problems from over 400
companies, narrowed that down to about 60, whom we invited to a
1-day Pitch Day with our program managers in New York City.
Fifty-one companies earned awards on that day. The average time
to complete a contract was 15 minutes, and the contract is one
page long. We have to change the way we engage America's most
innovative businesses in order to have them work with us, the
United States Government. We're showing the way--or leading the
way on how we can do that.
The third thing I would say is that the Air Force we need
is larger and different from the Air Force that we have. This
Committee asked General Goldfein and I, last year at this
time--we have a new National Defense Strategy, and one of you
asked us, ``Well, you know, you always come up here and defend
the budget amount that you've proposed, but what is the Air
Force you need to execute the National Defense Strategy?'' We
didn't know the answer. We should know the answer. So, you
directed us to do a study, which we turned in to you, in
classified form, on the 1st of March, that sets out, after
almost 8 months of study, what is the Air Force we need to
execute the National Defense Strategy. We have 321 squadrons
today. As the Chairman pointed out, our analysis shows that,
for the 2025-2030 timeframe, we need 386 operational squadrons
to accomplish the missions of the National Defense Strategy at
a moderate level of risk.
Finally, I would say this. On-time budgets and certainty
matters a lot. This Congress gave us that certainty this year.
In the first quarter of this year, when we looked at our first-
quarter results, we were able to execute about the first
quarter of our program. We were able to do new-starts and set
priorities and manage appropriately. So, thank you for that
certainty and that on-time budget.
I would also say that one of the most difficult things that
we are facing as a service right now is the results of two
catastrophic storms that hit two of our Air Force bases:
Tyndall Air Force Base, in October; and, most recently, Offutt
Air Force Base, in Nebraska, with flooding. We need the
supplemental to recover from those terrible storms at Tyndall
and Offutt. I look forward to working with you all to achieve
that end.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
General Goldfein.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Goldfein. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee. It's
really an honor once again to represent your Air Force, Active,
Guard, Reserve, civilian airmen who stand the watch and provide
top cover for the Nation and our joint and allied teammates.
This hearing is among the first official forums since
Secretary Wilson announced her pending departure from the Air
Force. I want to say publicly, on behalf of all airmen and
their families, what an honor it's been to work with her every
day to make our Air Force more ready and more lethal. This
budget represents the culmination of our work together to build
the Air Force we need to compete, deter, and, if deterrence
fails, to fight and win. I want to state for the record that
we're a better Air Force because of the leadership and the
vision of our Secretary, Dr. Heather Wilson.
Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman, I went to the war--I went to war for the first
time as a young captain, flying F-16s out of Shaw Air Force
Base in South Carolina just days after Saddam Hussein invaded
his neighbor in Kuwait. At the time, we had 401 operational
squadrons consisting of 945,000 Active, Guard, Reserve, and
civilian airmen, and 8,629 aircraft, with an average age of 17
years, in an Air Force that landed our Nation's initial punch,
401 operational squadrons to defeat a middleweight, non-nuclear
power who threatened his neighbor and the region, but posed
little threat to our Homeland and our way of life. Today, we
have just 312 operational squadrons, down from 401. We have
685,000 airmen, down from 945,000. We have 5,314 aircraft, down
from over 8,600. The average age of our aircraft is 28 years.
Chairman, we are not the Air Force of Desert Storm. When
General McPeak was the Chief of Staff in 1991, he and his
fellow Joint Chiefs were focused on supporting a single
combatant commander, General Norm Schwarzkopf, the Commander of
U.S. Central Command. Today, should deterrence fail and we find
ourselves defending a Nation--our Nation against a major
nuclear power, I expect to get three phone calls simultaneously
on my Red Switch phone. First the geographic combatant
commander will request forces to support his operational plan,
which will include backfill for any fighters, tankers, and
command-and-control (C2) forces he must place on nuclear alert.
The next call will be from the U.S. Strategic Command
Commander, who will tell me how many bombers, tankers, and
command-and-control forces he needs to execute his nuclear
deterrence mission, protecting not only our Homeland, but also
our allies and partners. The third call will come from the
Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD), who will tell me how many fighters,
tankers, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR), and C2
aircraft he will need to execute his operational plan to defend
the United States and Canada. The Air Force will be required to
support these missions simultaneously, not sequentially, while
at the same time, shoulder-to-shoulder with our joint
teammates, maintaining a global presence to deter any rogue
nation while simultaneously maintaining campaign pressure
against violent extremism.
This is the stark difference between fighting a
middleweight rogue nation without nuclear weapons versus
competing, deterring, and, if deterrence fails, fighting and
winning a peer fight. It's why Secretary Wilson and I continue
to articulate in every forum, ``The Air Force is too small for
what the Nation is asking it to do.'' It's why we reported to
this Committee, as the Secretary said in March, that the Air
Force we need to execute the National Defense Strategy requires
386 operational squadrons. It's why the National Defense
Strategy Commission, after their research, stated, ``Regardless
of where the next conflict occurs or which adversary it
features, the Air Force will be at the foresight--at the
forefront.'' With your support of this budget request, we'll
continue to rebuild the readiness and lethality of this force,
which you supported last year with an on-time appropriation
following a damaging sequester and years of budget uncertainty.
For that, we thank you.
Chairman, history doesn't always repeat, but it does rhyme
now and then. My father fought as a young F-4 pilot in Vietnam,
and he and many of his peers stayed in and rebuilt the Air
Force his son needed to fight and win in Desert Storm, which
was followed by 28 years of continual combat operations,
including 10 years of operations Northern and Southern Watch,
air campaigns in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia, and continuing
through the past 17 years fighting violent extremism in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and North Africa. Today, my daughter
and my nephews are young airmen. With your continued support,
with on-time appropriations, we'll build the Air Force they're
going to need to fight and win in this era of great-power
competition.
So, on behalf of every airmen serving today, and their
families, I want to thank this Committee for your unwavering
support. Secretary Wilson and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared combined statement of Secretary Wilson and
General Goldfein follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank both of you.
We'll have a round of--a 5-minute round.
That was a great historic perspective. I appreciate that
very much. It's one that a lot of people have forgotten.
Now, I know that we're all locked into the NDS and the
Commission. They've done a great job. We had two good hearings
here. Everyone believes that we should be following that
blueprint that we've established. While, yeah, we--this is--
we're on the way to recovery right now, we still have problems
out there. I mean, if we were to follow the NDS, that would be
an increase for this 5-year--for the Future Years Defense
Program of between 3 and 5 percent increase over inflation.
This 750 doesn't do that. We're not quite there. So, I think,
when--your discussion, starting with that as something we kind
of agreed on, you had to give in some areas that probably could
have very well produced some risk.
General, during that process, what things did you kind of
either slight or change from what we had thought was going to
be a good model and a blueprint to follow?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I'm aligned with the Chairman,
who's testified, as well, to say that 3 percent allows us to
keep--stay even; 5 percent allows us to improve and modernize
in both capability, capacity, readiness. The trades that we
made----
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, but we didn't do the 3 percent,
even.
General Goldfein. That's right. So, the challenges that we
had--one of the places we didn't take risk was readiness
recovery. What the Secretary talked about, in terms of getting
our maintainer shortage to zero and ensuring that we're
investing in people, we did not take risk. Where we had to take
risk was in areas of--some areas of modernization, some areas
of procurement, and some areas where we'd like to have bought
more to get at that shortfall we have of the aircraft we need--
--
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
General Goldfein.--to go forward.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
Secretary Wilson, someone's got to say this. We're right in
the middle of a budget thing. If something should happen that
we're not able to do this, and we had to go back--keeping in
mind that we went through fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019
as recovery years, and--but if fiscal year 2020 comes up and we
don't do the--if we have to fall back to Budget Control Act
(BCA) and to the--or a CR [continuing resolution], describe to
us what the result of that would be and how this would have
impacted what we've already done in fiscal year 2018 and 2019.
Secretary Wilson. Well, let me give you--with respect to
the Budget Control Act and sequester, for the Air Force that
would be about a $29 billion cut. To put that in context, that
would be four times as large as what happened in sequester the
last time. So, let me give you what that would look like.
Now, a sequester is kind of across the board, but what
would the--what would the magnitude of those choices look like
under the Budget Control Act? Twenty-nine billion dollars. That
would be no F-35s. Cut all of the KC-46s, all--stop the B-21
program. No ground-based strategic deterrent. No research,
development, test, and evaluation for any space system, most of
the fourth- and fifth-generation modifications and all of
science and technology. Or $29 billion means all of weapon
system sustainment, all flying hours, all base operations and
airfield support, and all munitions, together to make $29
billion. I think you can see that that would be absolutely
devastating in scope and scale.
With respect to a continuing resolution, what that would
mean is, we've got 16 new military construction projects that
wouldn't start, and 18, for current missions, military
construction that wouldn't start, and we would also--we've got
89 research, development, test, and evaluation new-starts in
this budget that wouldn't start.
So, either of those would set us back significantly.
Sequester, at this point, would be four times as bad as it was
in the previous time that the Air Force went through it, and we
are still recovering from a sequester that would be just one-
quarter of the impact if we had to go through it again.
Chairman Inhofe. That's a frightening scenario. But, I
would agree with that. You think about the progress that we
made during that period of time, the two fiscal years. You had
mentioned the Tyndall and the Offutt. We do know that there are
some problems. One thing has--that has been discussed is
cutting the 18,000 flight hours. You know, we went through that
once before, and that turned out to be a disaster, and we
changed our situation there. Does that look like one of the
things that you think we might have to do in order to come up
with the results that we're looking for?
Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman, with respect to Tyndall,
last week I had to hold back money for 61 facility
modernization projects in 18 States because we still--we're
cash-flowing the damage to Tyndall. Just this year, the impact
will be about $750 million. As we get further into this year,
my options narrow further and further. If we get into May,
we're probably going to have to stop the recovery at Tyndall,
and that means an impact to flight operations there, as well as
to people who are going to continue to live in--and work in
degraded facilities. We're going to have to, in May sometime,
stop a lot of aircraft repairs. We're going to have to ground
some of our bombers if we don't get the supplemental to
recover----
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
Secretary Wilson.--from Tyndall. If we get towards the end
of the year and we've only got a month or so left, there's very
few options that we have. So, I'm trying to minimize the impact
and give the Congress enough time to pass a supplemental. But,
if I get into that last month and I still haven't balanced,
because of the impact of the storm, and we don't have a
supplemental, yes, it will impact flying hours.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Well, my time's expired, but for the
record, I'm going to ask you a question as to where we are
right now when we're talking about 48 F-35s and eight F-15s. I
mean, it seems to me we're getting back into the fourth
generation that we're hoping to be out of. Then, we remember so
much. Sometimes in history, we forget about the fact that--what
happened to our F-22s. You know, it started out that was going
to be 750, ended up being, what, 187, and we've paid dearly for
that ever since then. That was a huge mistake, should not have
happened. So, I'll be asking those questions for the record.
Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman, an all fifth generation
fleet would be ideal; however it simply isn't a realistic
option given the current budgetary situation. Our analysis
shows in the 2030 timeframe, sufficient fighter capacity is
critical in a fight with a near-peer. A mix of F-15EX with F-35
is our best option given present resources. Additionally, we
will continue to rely heavily on our fourth generation aircraft
for the next 20 years. Unfortunately, some of those aircraft--
most specifically the F-15C/Ds--are rapidly reaching the end of
their service lives. Replacing the F-15C with a modernized
successor such as the F-15EX allows us to benefit from foreign
partner investments and enhance capacity without transition
costs to another platform in the near term.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
So, I'm interested in those topics, too, Mr. Chairman,
since I raised it in my opening statement.
Chairman Inhofe. You did.
Senator Reed. So, General Goldfein, for years the Air Force
has declined to request funding for F-15s or F-16s, and it was
a pretty strong declination. This year, there are eight F-15s
in the budget, 1.1 billion over the FYDP, 7.9 billion for about
80 F-15s. Can you just give us an idea--and I think it touches
upon the Chairman's question, too--based on your personal and
professional judgment, is this a wise acquisition?
General Goldfein. Sir, this is what went into the decision.
It starts with, Chairman Inhofe, your point. If you go back to
the decision when we cut the F-22, a part of that decision was
the program of record. We should have 1100 F-35s today. We have
less than 300. The F-15Cs were supposed to be long gone. So,
first and foremost, as we went into looking at the capacity
challenges we're facing right now, we're absolutely adamant
that the F-35 program, the program of record that we have,
stays absolutely on track, and that we don't take a dime out of
the F-35, because it's not only a game changer for us, it's the
quarterback of the penetrating joint team. So, what you'll see
in our budget is not only maintaining the F-35 program, but
we're actually adding $1.8 billion to the F-35 program to make
sure we stayed on track.
Here's the challenge we faced. We have the capacity--those
missions--those phone calls that I'm going to get, that I laid
out in my opening statement, that are simultaneous--our mission
assessments of the Air Force we need says that we need all of
the capacity of both fifth- and fourth-generation. We've got
four fourth-generation aircraft that have got to fly into the
2030, the F-15C, the F-15E, the F-16, and the A-10. One of them
is not going to make it, and that's the F-15C. So, knowing
that, we had to find a way to refresh the F-15C line only by
keeping the F-35 program on track. We only looked at one
option, which was a F-15 variant to replace an F-15. Because
what that does was, it allows you to use the same hangars, same
construction, same base, same operating equipment, which is 90-
percent common, same maintainers, same operators, and no time
and minimal costs to make a transition. The Saudis and the
Qataris have kept that line open and have invested in making it
a much better airplane. So, we can capture all that, the
business case for being able to refresh that F-15C line only,
on top of the F-15, with the other fourth-generation airplanes,
make--made the most sense to us, and using the CAPE [cost
assessment and program evaluation] estimates.
We are now an Air Force of about 20 percent fifth-
generation, 80 percent fourth-generation. By 2040, our target
is to reverse those numbers: 80 percent fifth-generation, 20
percent fourth-generation. That target has not changed, and we
have not changed our position on the F-35. We've just got a
capacity near-term issue we've got to solve.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Just a quick, almost, footnote on the F-35. One of the
issues you're still dealing with is sustainment costs, which
are much higher than you can manage, frankly, going forward. I
presume both you and the Secretary are committed to getting
those sustainment costs down dramatically. That fair?
General Goldfein. Sir, we are committed to that. We've made
that very clear to the contractor, as the largest customer, I
believe we speak not only on behalf of the Air Force, but also
on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps teammates and all of the
international air chiefs and the international partners who are
in the F-35. The target that we've put out is to get a
procurement cost below 80 million and an average cost per
flying hour of less than 30,000 per flying hour, which puts it
comparable to the high end of a fourth-generation.
Senator Reed. Right.
General Goldfein. If we can hit those targets, then we've
got an affordable airplane that is already a game changer.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, last year's NDAA,
section 335, asked for the list of 10 most vulnerable
installations to weather challenges. We have not yet received
that list from the Air Force. We had the Army here last week.
They committed their leadership to send us this list. Would you
do that? Because, you know, looking at Tyndall, looking at some
of these other bases, it's not a one-off experience. We're
going to have more storm damages and if we don't know where to
start putting our mitigation funding and our sustainability
funding, we'll misspend resources. Can you send us those lists?
Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir, we will.
[The information referred to follows:]
This list was sent to the professional staff members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee on April 30, 2019.
Notes:
LThe list is organized alphabetically by state; it
is not a ranked 1 to 10 list.
LThis list differs from the Office of Secretary
Defense (OSD) list submitted in March 2019 pursuant to Section
335 of the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act.
LThe OSD Report on Effects of a Changing Climate
to the Department of Defense submitted in fulfillment of
Section 335 included Air Force input. The Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD
(A&S)) provided each Service the same list of bases, and the
Air Force noted the presence or not of current and potential
vulnerabilities to each Air Force site to five climate-related
events: recurrent flooding, drought, desertification, wildfires
and thawing permafrost over the next 20 years.
LThe Air Force list is different because we took a
broader look at the full inventory of primary Air Force bases
in the continental United States to determine our exposure to
current and potential severe weather and climate effects. It
also evaluated coastal and inland flooding vulnerabilities
separately, and appropriately weighted flooding, wildfire and
drought vulnerabilities. These factors led to results that were
different from OSD results. Additional similarities and
differences between OSD and Air Force approaches are below.
LThe OUSD (A&S) mission assurance list included 34
active Air Force sites and 2 National Guard sites. The Air
Force list is derived from 74 Active sites, 10 Reserve sites,
and 2 National Guard sites.
LWe analyzed our expanded list of bases with the
same authoritative data used for the OUSD (A&S)-provided list.
LWe separated the OUSD (A&S) `recurrent flooding'
category into coastal and inland flooding to capture those
sites that are, or could be, impacted by multiple flooding
effects.
LWe applied the same weighting methodology used by
OUSD (A&S), which ranked current effects higher than potential
effects, and weighted recurrent flooding (in our case, two
categories of flooding--coastal and inland) and wildfire
vulnerabilities higher than drought, desertification, and
thawing permafrost.
The Air Force analysis that underpins both Air Force-
specific list, and our input to OSD's list, is subject to some
caveats:
LIt reflects an installation's susceptibility to
the consequences of severe weather events, not necessarily 50
to 100 year climatic changes
LIt does not consider any specific critical
mission implications. For example, even if the base is subject
to flooding because a portion is within a 100 year flood plain,
the mission critical facility may not be impacted because of
its location on the base (e.g. STRATCOM HQ Building on high
ground at Offutt)
Moving forward, we plan to conduct a more robust analysis
of Air Force installation vulnerabilities related to mission
criticality and specific locational aspects within the
installation, to include accessibility concerns. Once we have a
better understanding of the linkage to mission, then we can
begin to assess where best to apply resources to improve either
resiliency or adaptability.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, ma'am. Thank you, Madam
Secretary.
One of the other issues that came up last week when we were
speaking to the Army is, they did a deep dive. They looked at
where they could save money to pay for--which we understand are
significant challenges. We're trying to help, but, as the
Chairman and the dialogue here is presented, you know, we're
not up at that 5-percent level. We're probably hovering close
to the 3. So, some of these savings have to be found
internally. Can you give us just a quick sense of what you've
done and what you propose to do?
Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Senator. The Air Force also
conducted what we call the ``zero base review'' of our 1,072
programs in the Air Force. We will do that again for fiscal
year 2021. Our approach was to come up with a balanced budget
that made us as lethal as we possibly could be. We restructured
our next-generation air-dominance program. Of course, last
year, we had proposed, and you all approved, the restructuring,
cancellation of JSTARS and moving to advanced battle
management. We terminated the B-2 high-frequency program. We
put money into readiness and tried to focus that on the
squadrons where it made the most difference, what we call our
``pacing units.'' So, we also--and when we try to do
acquisition faster and smarter, we're trying to bring more
competition into our procurements, because that drives down
cost. In fact, with the four major procurements that we've
announced in the last 7 months, we came in $15 billion below
the independent cost estimate, and were able to take that $15
billion and roll it back into greater readiness and lethality.
So, our approaches have been slightly different than the
way the Army has approached the problem set, but the intent is
the same, to get the most value we can out of every dollar that
we spend.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary and General, I'd like to thank you both for
making visits to Offutt Air Force Base after the flooding that
we saw hit Nebraska a couple of weeks ago. Madam Secretary, it
was a pleasure to be able to have you at office when we were
able to survey the damage together there. I thank you for your
commitment to rebuild Offutt, and I look forward to working
with you on that task.
I have no doubt that this Committee appreciates the
essential value of that installation. I do think it's important
that this Committee also understands the full impact to Offutt
and what will happen if we do not provide supplemental funding.
You mentioned the effects of sequester, a CR, if we do not get
the supplemental funding to Tyndall, with looking at the 61
projects that are out there in 18 states, and the effect that
has, not just on repairs, but on readiness. But, now you add
Offutt into that mix, as well. Can you explain the effect that
that will have if we do not get this supplemental funding done?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me talk a little bit about
that. We have a rough estimate now of what it's going to do--
what we're going to need to just recover from the damage done
at Offutt. So, it wasn't just that a third of the runway was
covered by water, it is that the water came up into a number of
our facilities and buildings there, including some satellite
facilities and other things.
I would say two things first. One is a real thank you to
the people in Nebraska. When the base put the call out for
needing people to help with sandbags to protect the base, the
city of Bellevue showed up with dump trucks' worth of sand. It
was a wonderful partnership, even when they were also
threatened.
The second thing that I would say is that STRATCOM
headquarters was in the middle of an exercise when that flood
hit, and they didn't miss a beat, because there was redundancy
in power, and we worked with the commercial power provider to
make sure that power was shut off in an orderly way and shifted
to the backup systems. Resilience does matter.
The reality is, though, that we're going to probably have
$350 million worth of damages there at Offutt just this year,
and that's not including MILCON [military construction], which
will be further out, to recover and rebuild some of those
facilities. If we don't get the supplemental to recover from
the storm damage, in July we're going to have to start
deferring Offutt recovery other than for matters related to
health and safety. That means the risk of mold and continued
damage to buildings that then cost more to recover will
increase.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
As you both know, the 55th Wing is also at Offutt. It's the
home of the RC-135, which is Air Force's largest manned ISR
platform. Secretary Wilson, last October, you responded to a
question that I submitted for the record on the future of the
RC-135, and you stated, ``The RC-135 family of aircraft will
continue to operate through at least 2040 to 2050''.
General, yesterday, you were at the HASC hearing, and, in
testimony, when discussing the RC-135, you mentioned that the
Air Force is looking at fusing capabilities that are platform-
centric. Can you explain--or can you expand on this and what it
really means for the C-135 family of aircraft? I think there
might have been a little confusion yesterday on that.
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
First of all, let me reinforce Secretary's testimony that,
in fact, the RC-135, which is not only a U.S. platform, but one
that we also do with our U.K. partners. We're partners in that
program. So, our ability to fly that airplane into the 2040s is
going to be absolutely essential.
The Advanced Battle Management System, the debate that we
had last year that this Committee supported, is bigger than
Joint STARS. This is about the future of joint warfighting and
how we move from a platform-centric approach to a network-
centric approach. The visual I would offer you--you know,
sometimes we, I think, are guilty of putting forth PowerPoint
slides that have big, red domes over countries that--as though
we cannot penetrate or get in. A better visual actually is a
block of Swiss cheese, because that's about what any country
can put over the top of them to defend themselves. It's our job
to actually know where the holes are and get in. Once we get
in, then we do the--what I call the ``five Ps'' of air
superiority, right? We've got to penetrate, we've got to
persist when we're inside there, we've got to protect what's in
there, not only on the ground, in the air, at sea, we've got to
proliferate, and we've got to be able to punish by holding
targets at risk.
So, if an adversary actually ever sees an F-35, which is
unlikely, I would like to also send them a message on their
screensavers that says, ``We're here.'' Not ``I'm here,'' but
``We're here.'' Because the visual I would offer you is that,
if the F-35 is inside, it is the quarterback of a penetrating
joint team, and that joint team consists of an F-35, a B-21, an
RQ-170, an X-37 in space, low-Earth orbiting satellites, a
penetrating attack submarine, a small team on the ground. The
key for that penetrating team to operate is to connect every
sensor to every shooter. That's advanced battle management.
This is bigger than the Joint STARS. This is about the
future of joint warfighting and how the entire Department is
shifting to networked warfare of the future.
Senator Fischer. As we move to that future, though, the
135s definitely have a role to play, as the Secretary said,
through 2040 to 2050, because that future is not where we are
at the present. Is that a correct statement?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Where I would give you in the
visual is, every sensor to every shooter, and the RC-135 is a
critical sensor.
Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
Let me add my voice, Madam Secretary, for your service. I
want to particularly thank you for the time that you've spent
with me over the last 15 months as I joined this body. It's
been very, very helpful.
In one of our meetings, in particular, we talked about Air
Force's Junior ROTC program. That program really came to my
attention through a similar program that the Air Guard in
Alabama has. Colonel Sparrow--"Swapper Sparrow'' has a program
to give some scholarships for kids. I notice that, for the Air
Force to grow from, like, 312 operational squadrons to 386,
we're going to need, like, 1,480 pilots for fiscal year 2020. I
am hopeful that, in doing that, we can also increase the number
of female and minority pilots, which I think is really--that
Junior ROTC program is directed to. I'd like for you to just
talk about that program for a minute, and talk about the
success for that program. We have introduced a bill recently to
kind of expand that across the other branches of the services.
So, I think it's a good opportunity for you to talk about the
Air Force's success in that program.
Secretary Wilson. Well, thank you, sir. Thanks for the
opportunity.
We are facing a national shortage of aircrew and pilots.
While we are having plenty of people volunteer to go through
training with us and we don't think we'll have trouble getting
to the 1,480, we need to inspire the next generation of
aviators and cause people to choose to fly. When we look at who
we don't have volunteering in the Air Force and who's not
stepping up in civil aviation, as well, there is a
disproportionately low number of women and minorities who
choose to fly. When we looked at the data, one of the things
that was interesting was that, if you ask an Anglo boy, ``When
did you decide to learn to fly?''--they usually say, ``Fourth,
fifth grade,'' somewhere around there. If you ask girls, women,
or minorities, it's much more common for them to say, ``In high
school'' or ``In college.''
One of the things we looked at was the Junior ROTC program.
Here's an interesting factoid that I didn't know before I
became Secretary. But, our Junior ROTC programs, which we have
in high schools across America, are 58 percent minority. Last
summer, with some of our excess funds, we decided to sponsor
170 high school kids to get their private pilot's license. We
partnered with seven universities around the country. They had
to be in Junior ROTC, which gave us a--you know, we--so, we're
going after the population we were interested in. So, they
showed some interest in the military. There was no requirement
to join the military. But, a full-ride scholarship on a college
campus for 7 weeks in the summer to get their private pilot's
license. So, we're trying to inspire the next generation of
aviators. About 90 percent of them were successful in getting
that private pilot's license, and we hope that we have sparked
a dream.
Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much for that. I
hope we can get that going across the other agencies.
Following up on that a little bit, just, General, about
recruiting, we've heard the challenges, sometimes, of
recruiting, but I notice, you know, in the budget the Air Force
has increased its recruiting goal without really talking about
challenges. Have you experienced challenges? It seems that, to
meet the budget, you are trying to recruit 4,400 new airmen.
What experience have you with challenges? But, more
importantly, what are some of the Air Force's successful
recruiting strategies?
General Goldfein. Thanks, Senator.
We have met our recruiting goals, but, I'll tell you,
what's been interesting is--you know, there's a tradition at
the Recruiting Squadron; when they meet their quota, they ring
a bell. Normally, through most of the year, they ring the bell
about the middle of the month. What we're seeing is that
they're often ringing the bell in the last day or 2 days,
because it's becoming harder and harder. This is a challenge
across--this is--this has to do with, 29 percent of America's
youth that's physically capable of serving and we're all
fishing in that same pool. So, it's a challenge for all
services. We're happy to report that, to date, we've been able
to meet our recruiting goals.
When we looked at the growth and the glide slope that we
could sustain, in terms of increasing our numbers, 4,400 a
year, plus then about 3,000 or so after that, allows us to have
a very steady growth path that allows us to not only go out and
recruit what we need, but also bring them in. We have the right
numbers in basic military training, the right numbers in tech
schools. So, the entire pipeline now has been built to be able
to sustain that growth over time.
Probably the biggest success story, I will tell you, is in
our special warfare business. We stood up a new recruiting
squadron to go after our Special Operators, our young men and
women who are capable of probably the most intense training
pipeline of any of the services, certainly in our--2 years'
pipeline. We're seeing a lot of success with mentors, a
preparatory program, and getting out to high schools and
talking about what an Air Force does on the ground.
Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you all very much. I
appreciate that. I'm looking forward to talking about SPACECOM
next week.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Secretary Wilson, General
Goldfein, for your testimony today.
I know you spoke a little bit earlier about what would
happen if the Air Force returned to sequester-level budgets.
Let's hope that doesn't happen. It usually hasn't happened
since 2013. But, General Goldfein, I'd like for you to address
what would happen under an alternative scenario that some
people in Congress are talking about. Let's suppose you got a
full-year continuing resolution. So, Congress couldn't reach an
agreement to lift the budget caps and pass the normal annual
spending bills, the way we have the last l2 years, so Congress
throws up its hands sometimes later this summer or early fall,
and says, ``You know what? We're just going to have a full-year
continuing resolution for all of fiscal year 2020. You'll get
exactly what you got last year.'' What would that impact be?
General Goldfein. Thanks, sir.
I'll just give you a few examples of what that'll mean for
us, because, of course, a year-long CR, we would assume, would
be to execute, with no new-starts, at the 2019 levels. So, new
mission MILCON, KC-46, F-35, TX would all stop. That would
affect about 16 projects that would stop and, therefore, stop
our ability to bed down, because you have to have the
infrastructure to bed down the weapon systems. We have about 18
current mission MILCON projects that would cease and stop that
would affect our readiness. You know, any procurement,
research, development, training, and evaluation (RDT&E), new-
starts would stop. That would affect over 89 programs, the
United States Air Force, for an Air Force that's working hard
to modernize, that this Committee has supported. If it goes
anything more than 6 months, it would put our end-strength
growth at risk, because we will not be able to bring on the
additional airmen we need, not to have mission growth, but
actually to fill our formations to do the missions that we're
already doing. So, it would have a significantly negative
impact.
Senator Cotton. So, almost the worst thing imaginable.
General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Sequester would be the worst thing, but
it's hard to----
General Goldfein. Yes.
Senator Cotton.--imagine we would go back to the actual
sequester levels. But, a proposal that's being batted around to
have a full-year continuing resolution, almost the worst thing
imaginable.
General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. All right, thank you for that.
Couple of NDAAs ago, the Congress directed the Air Force to
begin to transition a significant number of UAV [unmanned
aerial vehicles] pilots to enlisted ranks, an issue on which
I've worked. Senator King and Senator Jones and I are working
together on this pilot issue. Could you tell us how that's
going, what we've learned about--learned from it?
General Goldfein. Sir, no surprises. As you might imagine,
what we learned is, our enlisted force can do anything we ask
them to do. The enlisted members who have been in the--we put
them in the RQ-4, the Global Hawk program, and they've
performed brilliantly.
We've now expanded the discussion, though, because, as we
work through in space and look at the--building the force we
need to fight and win in a contested environment, today all
constellations are being flown by our young enlisted force. You
know, we have seven members right now who are on duty, who are
running GPS for the globe right now at Schriever Air Force
Base. So, the question we're asking is, What is the future of
the enlisted operator when you look at space transitioning to a
contested domain and high-altitude ISR, going forward? Is there
a broader discussion that we're having about that enlisted
operator in high-altitude ISR when it's above the atmosphere
and below the atmosphere? Is there a career path where someone
can now go into the business of ISR as an enlisted operator and
transition between the two? So, we're taking the lessons we
learned from where we are today, and now expanding that
discussion. That's where I think we're going to land.
Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you.
I'd like to talk about the B-21 budget request. I have
occasional hearings on the B-21 and its progress in a closed
setting so we can ensure that, 20 years from now, people don't
look back on some of the decisions made now, as we do look back
on the F-35. Last year, the budget request was 2.3 billion.
This year, it's 3 billion. Secretary Wilson, in this setting,
could you tell us a little bit more about why we've seen that
increase and what the Department plans to do with it?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, we've got--we're moving forward
with the research, development, test, and evaluation of this
new aircraft. We had the critical design review late last year,
fourth quarter last year. The program is on track and on
schedule.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
General Goldfein, anything to add?
General Goldfein. No, sir. Same.
Senator Cotton. I know we're projected at 100, minimum,
aircraft. Given the threat environment we face and the posture
review that you've undertaken, can you envision a scenario in--
where we need to have more than 100 B-21s?
General Goldfein. I can, sir. Not surprisingly, when we did
our analysis of the Air Force we need, which was over 2,000
computer iterations of different force elements against the
latest combatant commander OPLANs, operational plans, and the
projection of the threat in the 2025 to 2030 timeframe. No
surprise that long-range aviation was in the shortest supply
and in the greatest demand. So, tankers, bombers, long-range
ISR and command and control, those are where you're seeing the
largest amount of growth required for the Air Force we need.
So, I do see an environment where the bombers would be a larger
number required.
Senator Cotton. Over the long run, that would produce a
lower average unit cost, I would assume, right?
General Goldfein. It would.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
Thank you both for your testimony.
Secretary Wilson, thank you for your service. We're sorry
to see you leave. I guess, though, congratulations is in order
to see you leave Washington?
[Laughter.]
Secretary Wilson. I was released early for good behavior.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cotton. Very well.
Thank you all.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here, and also, thank you for your
service.
General Goldfein, you stated that F-35 is the quarterback
of our fighters--fighter aircraft. You also said that, by 2040,
you want a 80-20 percent dominance of the Air Wing by the
fifth-generation fighters, like the F-35. In all my time on
House Armed Services Committee, we had a lot of discussion
about the need to invest in more fifth-generation into our
current fleet, but then also to start investing in sixth-
generation aircraft, certainly because our competitors, on the
global scale, the Chinese, are pushing into the sixth-
generation, themselves. So, I'm a little bit confused. How will
funding the F-15X--EX--affect your goal of this dominance,
given that a sustained defense budget is not guaranteed, moving
into the future?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
First, I'll just--I'll say that the F-35, as I describe it,
is the quarterback of more than the fighter force. It's the
quarterback of the penetrating joint team. When you look at the
investment in--that we are making, in this budget, in
penetrating capability, you'll see $135 billion of investment.
But, the--but, that is F-35, plus B-21, plus other capabilities
that we're--plus space capabilities--that are all required to
penetrate enemy airspace and be able to watch the enemy. So,
first and foremost, the F-35, which is why we are not backing
an inch off of our program of record, and maintaining the F-35,
because it is the quarterback of the joint team that we need.
The challenge we face is a near-term challenge. Our
analysis indicated that, to be able to drive aircraft aged to a
manageable level and to be able to do the missions that we
require, we have to procure 72 aircraft a year to do that.
There's four aircraft that we have to fly in the fourth
generation, capacity-wise, into the 2030s, and that's the F-
15C, the A-10, the F-15E, and the F-16. Three are going to be
capable of flying into the 2030s. One is not going to make it.
So, the F-15 refresh is only to give us the capacity we need as
we make that transition from 20-80 to 80-20. We find ourselves
in this position again, because, as the Chairman mentioned,
when the decision to cancel the F-22 occurred--we're supposed
to have 1100 F-35s right now. We have less than 300. So, we're
faced with the situation we have right now. As the Secretary
and I looked at the cost estimates, an F-15 refresh, using the
investments that the Saudis and the Qataris have put in that
line, to replace the F-15C, as long as we don't impact the F-35
line, was a reasonable choice.
Senator Duckworth. So, you're refreshing the Charlie-model
F-15s, and they're going into the EX. Then you-- what's the
projected lifespan for the refresh model into the future?
You're saying into 2030?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Actually, longer. The model
of--the EX model has got a 20,000-hour service-life expectancy.
Senator Duckworth. Will that affect what your future
requests are going to be for the number F-35s?
General Goldfein. Ma'am, if we ever get to a point where we
are trading F-35s for F-15s, let me tell you, that's a bad
choice. The F-15 is not an F-35. It will never be an F-35. We
are just--you know, in the flying business, we--you know, we
describe things as ``runway behind us and runway ahead of us.''
The run--the decision that was made on the F-22 to put us in
the place we're in is ``runway behind us.'' I can't affect
that. The Secretary and I can only affect ``runway ahead of
us.'' What we need is, we need the capacity, and we've got to
get to 72 aircraft a year. We've got to look at the cost
projections to be able to make an affordable decision, going
forward.
Senator Duckworth. Understood. Also, ``airspace above--
altitude above you and gas on the ground, behind you,'' right?
Last year, it was reported that more than 126 military
installations or sites and their surrounding communities rely
on wells or groundwater sources that contain dangerous levels
of two chemical compounds that are tied to birth defects and
certain cancers, known as PFOS and PFOAs. Secretary Wilson, how
many Air Force military installations may be threatened by
dangerous levels of PFOS and PFOAs? Do you know?
Secretary Wilson. Ma'am, we have done 110 detailed site
inspections. We have looked at 297 total locations. So, we've
done the detail of those. Of the ones we did--so, we did an
initial look, and then--and, in that initial look, we
identified 21 installations where we need to do alternative
water supplies. So, there is, immediately, alternative water
supplies to make sure that people have safe drinking water.
We then go back and do a more detailed site inspection. We
have done 110 detailed site inspections of a total of 189, I
think, active facilities. We also do some on locations that
were BRAC'd [Base Realignment and Closure].
Senator Duckworth. What about the ones that are on Air
Guard locations?
Secretary Wilson. That includes Active, Guard, and Reserve.
Senator Duckworth. Okay. Thank you.
Yield back.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Goldfein, Secretary Wilson, first of all, thank you
both for your service to our country.
Secretary Wilson, we're going to miss you up here, but it
sounds as though you've got an opportunity that--it's clearly
something in your future, and you'll do great.
I do have a question with regard--for Secretary Wilson--
with regard to the DOD's submitted budget of $750 billion this
year. Why is the Air Force unfunded priority list (UPL) over a
billion dollars--a billion dollars greater than your fiscal
year 2019 request, despite the top-line growth in the overall
DOD budget?
General Goldfein. Senator, I'll----
Secretary Wilson. I'll go----
General Goldfein.--answer, if that's----
Secretary Wilson. Sure.
General Goldfein.--okay, just because the----
Secretary Wilson. Sure.
General Goldfein.--the unfunded priority lists normally
comes from the service chiefs.
What you'll see in the unfunded priority list--first of
all, it's always those things that didn't make the cut line
when we were building our budget, and it--the intent is always
to tell you where we would place money if additional money were
available. It's important to note that, in the first--and we
listed ours in priority order, as well, in the UPL--the first
thing we listed was money for MILCON, and those--and if we were
not--to not get a supplemental, we placed in the UPL, in 2020,
money that we would need to recover from the damage done in
2019 if we didn't get a supplemental. Important to note that,
in that money is also adding three to five additional
professionals at 63 bases where we have privatized housing and
identified privatized housing issues, because of that--of
course, that issue came up after we had completed our POM.
What you'll also see there is in money for defendable
space, because we are--we're transitioning from a noncontested
domain to a contested domain. This accelerates things that
we're already doing in the program, but moves them to the left,
and you see that. Then you see money in there for aircraft
procurement so that, again, if there was additional money left,
it gets us to this--to 60 F-35s, which is what we are told,
from the company, they can produce in 2019, and it also adds
KC-46s, which our Air Force We Need Assessment told us long-
range aviation is a high priority.
Senator Rounds. All right. Well, as you both know, we're
very pleased with the bed-down determination, where Ellsworth
Air Force Base will be the first bed-down for the B-21.
Community of Rapid City is very pleased, and I can assure you
that they are prepared and willing to assist any way possible
to make that as workable as possible. But, we're very happy
with that decision, and we look forward to seeing the B-21
being deployed on time and on target with regard to budget.
Based upon the study that you've provided us, which is
``The Air Force We Need,'' the number of required bomber needs
to be increased, according to your assessment. I think
Secretary--or Senator Cotton talked a little bit about it. But,
I want to go into this a little bit. We'd originally talked
about the 100 B-21s as--first it was, that's what we were
looking at, in terms of the budgeted items, but, really, that's
a minimum number. But, there really is no scenario laid out in
which you could get by with just 100.
What I'd like to do is to talk about two items. First of
all, what is that real number? What is the number that we're
really going to need to make this thing work? Second of all,
you've got the F-35s coming in. I agree with you, you've got to
get to the right number of F-35s. But, that's not an air-
dominance system. It's not designed to be the F-22. The F-22 is
now, what, closing in on 40 years in age? So, you're going to
have to be looking at that next-generation air-dominance
system, that platform. What's the plan? How do you fit in
maintaining and moving forward with the required numbers of B-
21s that you're going to need and still allow for us to
maintain the air dominance necessary with that next new
platform or system? How does it fit together?
Secretary Wilson. Sir, I may let the Chief talk a little
bit about the numbers of bombers, but let me talk a little bit
about next-generation. Probably within the next couple of
weeks, we will be releasing the Science and Technology Strategy
for the Air Force. The Air Force does that every 7 to 10 years.
But, one of the things that we are going to do is go back to
what we call vanguard programs, where we use the authorities
you've given us to prototype, to experiment, and to rapidly
innovate. I think there's--if you look back, there's probably a
legitimate criticism of some of our major defense programs,
where, you know, there are multiple miracles required in a
program. That's probably not the way to set yourself up for
success. Rather than looking at a particular platform, our
next-generation air-dominance will identify the technologies
that we need to develop and test, and then make decisions along
the way on how we will deploy those technologies. Beyond that,
I think, probably we should go into--I'll talk to you in a
classified setting, on what we're thinking about.
General Goldfein. Sir, with respect to bombers, the minimum
number we need to be able to meet the current operational plans
of the combatant commanders is 175. That's 100 B-21s and 75 B-
52s. To be able to keep the B-52 flying in the period of time--
and we did a business-case analysis to look at the cost of a
brand-new bomber versus, you know, taking the B-52 and
reengining it and putting new radars in it. What we found is
that the cost alone for a, you know, EMP-hardened new bomber,
to be able to bring that level of payload in a standoff
capacity, is far more significant than the cost of just
upgrading it, because it has good bones and can last for
awhile.
So, it's 175 that is the minimum number in the Air Force we
need. We have--you'll see that that pluses up from a current
squadron number of 9 to 14, with an additional 5 squadrons.
Those 5 squadrons are based on the simultaneous missions and
the simultaneous plans that we're going to have to support, be
that STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, EUCOM, or PACOM.
Senator Rounds. But, the key was, the B-52 was a standoff--
--
General Goldfein. Yes.
Senator Rounds.--weapon system----
General Goldfein. Absolutely.
Senator Rounds.--not a penetrating.
General Goldfein. Not a penetrator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today.
Let me add my voice to the others on the Committee who have
said how much we will--have appreciated your service, Secretary
Wilson, and how much we will miss you.
General Goldfein, we're glad you're staying.
A couple of weeks ago, I had the opportunity to be at the
``Last Plane Out'' ceremony for the KC-135 that left the 157th
Air Refueling Wing at the former Pease Air Force Base. I just
want to share with you one of the things that commander of that
unit, Colonel John Pogorek, said as he was saying goodbye to
the plane. He pointed out that for the third year running, the
157th has flown more sorties, and more sorties per KC-135, than
any other Guard unit, Reserve unit, or Active Duty unit in the
world. So, as you can appreciate, we--and I should point out
that the plane that left was the oldest plane in our inventory.
It wasn't through yet. It was built in 1957, and it was going
to Arizona. So, obviously, we're waiting, with great angst, for
the new tankers to come to Pease. I know there have been some
reports in the news lately indicating that there has been
another discovery of foreign debris found in the aircraft, and
that there has, again, been a halt to delivery of the tankers.
So, I wonder, Secretary Wilson, if you can give us an update on
where we are with this and what you expect to happen with
Boeing and the production of the tankers.
Secretary Wilson. Senator, the production is going forward.
I had the joy of being on the first KC-46 to fly in to
McConnell. Senator Inhofe brought the first one in to Oklahoma,
I believe. We have found some debris on the line. The
inspectors found some debris that shouldn't have been there,
should have been wiped out of some of the compartments on the
KC-46, on the manufacturing line. We have worked with Boeing on
a corrective action plan. It will also require greater
inspection and attention for quality assurance by both the Air
Force and Boeing. But, we expect that they will be able to
implement those quality improvement plans this month so that we
can restart acceptance of the aircraft and the arrival of the
aircraft at Pease will not be affected.
Senator Shaheen. I'm delighted to hear that. Are the issues
that were found with the--as I understood, it was the
electronics that also had some issues with the plane. Has that
been resolved, as well?
Secretary Wilson. There were two issues that we accepted
the plane with, where we had some deficiencies that we had to
work through. One of them is going to be fixed at Boeing's
expense, and that has to do with the remote vision system. So,
in the KC-135, as you know, you kind of look out--you lie down
and look out the back window.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Secretary Wilson. In the KC-46, you look at a video screen
that has cameras on the back, and there's some distortion of
that screen because of the way the cameras are located and so
forth. We have reached agreement with Boeing on how that needs
to be fixed, and that that will be retrofitted into aircraft--
all of the aircraft, and added in on the line, going forward.
That will be done at their expense.
There was one other deficiency that we identified. That had
to do with the stiffness of the boom when refueling an A-10,
which is a very light aircraft. They met the international
standard, so that actually will be a change that the Air Force
will pay for. It's the change of an actuator to affect the
stiffness of the boom.
Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you for the update.
I also should thank you for the responsiveness of the Air
Force to the PFAS issues that we've had at Pease, and your
support for the study that the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry is doing, the first long-term health impact of
PFOA and PFOS that will have been done. So, that should provide
a lot of information that we can use, going forward.
Unfortunately, we've also heard from a number of military
retirees and their families who believe that exposure to a
dozen other known carcinogens at the air base has caused them
health impacts, including a number of cancers, ranging from
prostate to bladder cancer. The National Guard has requested
that the Air Force Medical Support Agency conduct a public
health study for military personnel and civilian individuals
that lived and worked on Pease to determine if there is a
higher-than-expected rate of morbidity and mortality. Can you
tell me if that is a possibility and what would need to happen
in order for us to be able to get that done?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, I don't--the answer--the quick
answer is, I don't know what would have to happen in order to
do that kind of a study. But, of course, we'd have no
objections to that kind of a study being done.
Senator Shaheen. Well, if there's anything that I can do,
and anything that we need, in terms of the upcoming defense
bill, I'm happy to work on that.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and outstanding performance
in the last 2 years.
Two years ago, when you sat before us, you inherited the
smallest and oldest Air Force ever. You reminded us of that.
You also called out, Secretary, that your three priorities were
readiness, recap, and rationalization. I want to thank you both
for what you accomplished in the last year and a half on
readiness. It's remarkable to see what you've done to bring our
force to the current level of readiness. I know we have a lot
of work yet to do, but I want to thank you for that.
Chief, can you just give us an update--you mentioned it
earlier--on ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System]? I have
two questions for both of you, so I'd appreciate some brevity,
here. But, in June of last year, in 2018, the Air Force
announced that Robbins would actually host some of the initial
elements of ABMS. That statement actually said it is a service
transition--and I quote, ``transition to ABMS, the Air Force
will fly the E-8C JSTARS fleet in the mid to late 2020s. The
air and space systems that make up the ABMS network will
include a fusion center and associated supporting activities.''
Can you give us an update on what's happened in the last year,
how that's progressing, and how it's developing, and how you're
managing the gaps from current technology into this model that
you're talking about, in this environment?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Thank you.
You know, the decision that was made to place Air Battle--
Advanced Battle Management System at Robbins was based
primarily on the fact that that's where our Ph.D.'s of battle
management exist. We looked, first and foremost, at that
community, who understands this business better than any other
community. They're the doctors of battle management that we
need to lead us into the future.
There's three increments to this transition. Increment one
is focused on taking the current sensors that we have and
advancing them and connecting them in ways that they're not
currently connected. So, one of the first things we did with
the money that you authorized us to put, is, we bought back E-3
AWACS as they were currently--we were planning to retire, and
we put money into them to be able to bring in feeds that didn't
currently exist. Because this is about current--increment one
is current sensors, and connecting them together. That is on
track.
Increment two is about bringing new sensor capability--many
of those are going to be in space--and bringing that new
capability on, and connecting them together.
The final increment is to connect it all together. We've
just brought on, this year, an architect, Mr. Preston Dunlap,
to lead us through that. His first stop was to meet the doctors
of battle management at Robbins. Matter of fact, I believe he's
still there today. We're on track, and I'm really excited that
Robbins is going to lead the way.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Madam Secretary, in your first testimony here, you talked
about China. We've just received this RAND report. It's an
update on their views of what's going on. My concern about
China was that they were moving out from a defensive posture,
evidenced by publishing the Made in China 2025, along with what
they've known they've been doing with the BRI, Belt-Road
Initiative, along with their port loans in Africa and South
America. The one that really concerns me is that their air
force investments and what they're doing right now looks like
they've been moving more to a strategic posture, certainly over
the next 10 years. So, as you talk about what we need, in terms
of the 386 squadrons and so forth, does that reflect this
change in strategy that you see China moving to right now?
Secretary Wilson. We do see rapid innovation in China, and
a change to their strategic approach to the world from being a
largely--the old PLA was largely internally focused and focused
on internal control. They made a decision to be more of a
regional power and a--they have words for it. I can't remember
them, like, off the top of my head, but there was a very good
Defensive Intelligence Agency unclassified study recently on
this subject, as well, looking outward and developing a
military commensurate with their place in the world, I think is
kind of the way it was. The J-20, which is a--is in service now
in the Chinese air force, and they've just flight-tested the J-
31, so they are moving forward with advanced aircraft, but also
advances across the board in other kinds of capability as air
defense, of course, their surface navy and so forth. So, we're
seeing modernization across the board and in all domains.
Senator Perdue. I'd like to say one last thing, Mr.
Chairman. The greatest threat that these two people have,
certainly General Goldfein as he faces this next year, is, I
think we're staring down the barrel of a CR, September 30th. We
have 39 working days left between now and July 31. If we don't
move this up as a priority, there is no way we're going to get
defense authorization done--HHS, if we have to combine them,
whatever we have to do. This needs to be our Committee's top
priority right now to make sure that, in the remaining few days
we have before that, quote, ``August work period'' comes up
again, that we get this defense budget authorized and
appropriated. Because we're staring down the barrel of another
CR. After 2 years of not having--the number-one thing I've
heard from these guys and others that we've met over the last 2
years is that this is the number-one threat to getting
readiness back and beginning this long haul toward recap. I'll
just close.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your service. You guys have
accomplished great things in the last 2 years under your
leadership, and as ``off you go into the wild blue yonder,'' I
wish you all the best.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Senator Perdue. Let me
assure you, that is our intent, and that's our commitment. I'm
fully aware of the time remaining. I'm also fully aware of the
fact that we've never had to face a China like this before, or,
for that reason, a--also a Russia.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, thank you.
The private companies that were put in charge of managing
military housing failed to provide safe and clean homes to
military families, but they still managed to make millions of
dollars in profits. The services have fallen short in their
oversight responsibilities. Now, many of these families have
developed chronic medical conditions from exposure to mold,
lead paint, and other hazards. Last week, I asked the Army
Chief of Staff, General Milley, whether he believes, as a
matter of principle, that the U.S. Government has the
responsibility to cover the lifetime costs of treating
servicemembers and their families for health problems connected
to unsafe military housing. He said, ``Absolutely yes,''.
General Goldfein, do you agree with him?
General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Secretary Wilson, do you agree?
Secretary Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Good.
One other quick question. I'm concerned that the southern
border deployment is having some negative effects on readiness.
General Neller recently wrote a memoir to the Secretary of the
Navy that listed border deployment among the factors
contributing to readiness challenges. General Goldfein, have
any training exercises or overseas deployments been canceled or
delayed due to units supporting border developments?
General Goldfein. No, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Not----
General Goldfein. Not in the Air Force.
Senator Warren. Not--okay.
I also want to ask another readiness issue facing the Air
Force: climate change. The Defense Department's most recent
report on climate change discussed the impact of this human-
caused problem on our military operations and bases. This
report included a statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Dunford, who said, quote, ``When I look at
climate change, it's in the category of sources of conflicts
around the world and things we have to respond to.''
General Goldfein, just a simple yes or no on this one is
fine, and then I have some followups. Do you agree with General
Dunford?
General Goldfein. I do, ma'am. I do think--if there's time
at the end, I'd like to sort of qualify where I think he was
going with that.
Senator Warren. Sure. But, let me ask, Does adapting
military bases and other infrastructure to climate change
contribute to Air Force readiness?
General Goldfein. It does, ma'am. I think what General
Dunford was referring to, though, is that--I mean, if you go
back--if you take a look at Syria as an example, most don't
remember what caused the Syria conflict to start. It started
because of a 10-year drought----
Senator Warren. Yes. Water.
General Goldfein.--and folks having to move from their
family farms into cities, where they then were not getting any
support and, therefore, a civil war began. I think what
Chairman Dunford was talking about is that we have to respond
militarily, very often, to the effects globally, of climate
change.
Senator Warren. Good.
So, let me ask, Do you think it is prudent for the Air
Force to incorporate climate change when making strategic
decisions, like strategic basing decisions, for example?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me take that one.
Senator Warren. Sure.
Secretary Wilson. We just published an Infrastructure
Investment Strategy, and we also just finished a major piece of
work on weather. Maybe the Air Force looks at these things more
because weather is such a big impact on us for all of our
flying operations every day, and we're the ones responsible for
weather forecasting around the globe. The infrastructure
strategy looks at resilience and, How do we get more out of
every dollar that we spend? So, there's a number of pieces of
that strategy. But, the resilience of our bases is very
important because we fight from our bases. We don't leave our
bases to fight. We fight from our bases. Their resilience is
very important to----
Senator Warren. How would you rate Air Force installations
as a whole, in terms of their climate resilience?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, it probably varies a lot. I
couldn't give you a red, yellow, or green chart on that at this
point, but I know that, overall, we've got significant
infrastructure challenges overall, but from a number of
factors.
Senator Warren. Well, I see that the Air Force is
requesting nearly $5 billion in emergency funds to rebuild Air
Force bases in Florida and Nebraska, alone, that were damaged
by natural disasters. So, I think it's very important that the
Air Force and the other military services continue to
incorporate climate change in their planning so that when
disaster strikes, the impact on operations is minimal. This
clearly is a readiness issue.
So, thank you for your work on this.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you both for being here, and, Secretary Wilson, for
your service. I was also sad when I heard you were moving on,
but I can certainly thank you for everything you've done and
share the Chair's advice to you that it's still not too late to
change your mind.
I think I'll start with General Goldfein. It's on the KC-
46. Specifically, I know that--I believe that Senator Shaheen
asked a question earlier. I'm more interested in our current
plans in the basing in Seymour Johnson, whether or not that's
shifting to the right, or what the current status is.
Secretary Wilson. Senator, we're--I think we're--we are
going to be fine on the basing. We're not seeing an impact
there. We just needed to have Boeing stop, put a corrective
action plan in place, get up to the standards that we expect on
the manufacturing line, and then get the line moving again. You
actually can't fix a manufacturing line while it's stopped. It
has to be flowing. But, they have to put the corrective actions
in place for quality assurance.
Senator Tillis. I also had a question on the talent
marketplace. I think, right now, the--almost all the officer
assignments are in there. Give me an idea of how that's working
and what progress has been made.
General Goldfein. Sir, it's working well. As a matter of
fact, you know, when I travel and talk to, especially, young
officers, you know, what I hear over and over again is the fact
that they want to have a little bit more control over their
future, and they want to have a better visibility on what's out
there. Not only them, but also hiring officials want to know--
get a--have a better sense of who they can look at for hiring
purposes. The fact that we're now connecting them for dialogue
is pretty powerful. Initial rollout's been very--very
successful, and--but, we're not going to slow down. We're going
to continue to listen to the force, screen with our ears, and
modify it to make it better.
Senator Tillis. On a related note, how well are we doing,
or what kind of changes have we put in place to address the
pilot shortage?
General Goldfein. So, this year we were successful at
stopping the reduction. So, it's the first year where we
actually haven't had increasing numbers leave. So, we see that
as----
Senator Tillis. What do you think that could be attributed
to?
General Goldfein. I think it's a combination of things,
sir. I think, you know, what I hear over and over, it's a
combination of quality of service, quality of life. The
financial incentives that Congress has approved, I think, have
been very helpful. But, it's as much quality of service as it
is quality of life. I think the combination--we have, like, 69
different initiatives that we're working on. I don't think
there's one silver bullet. A combination of reducing overseas
deployments, I think, has helped. Putting more white space on
the calendar, we've looked at every one of our exercises and
reduced those that aren't value-added. I think that making
flying in the United States Air Force as rich an experience as
we can make it is going to have the most lasting effect. That's
going to start with inspirational and courageous commanders and
senior NCOs [non commissioned officers], and so, where the
Secretary and I have focused is on where--when we select and
how we develop these young officers to make sure that, when
they are in command, they can build a culture that thrives.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
I share Senator Perdue's concern about where we're headed
with respect to a CR. I see your budget request. I tend to
agree and would support and advocate for it. But, I believe
it's more or less going to be a paper exercise, and that we're
going to be looking at a CR. So, I think one thing that we need
from you, Madam Secretary or General Goldfein, is an
understanding of the consequences of that, because here is a
trajectory to increase readiness capabilities and things that I
think are important. I think we also have to understand the
consequences of our inaction, to go through regular order
appropriations. We'd like to see that so that, when those who
would resist moving through regular-order appropriations
understand the consequences of their actions, we need that. You
can infer it, but I'd like, very specifically, to look at
things that are going to be affected by that.
Secretary Wilson--I mean, we can talk about that now, but I
think I'd--what I'd prefer to do is go, if you don't get this
and you have to deal with the consequences of a CR, what does
that look like in the near term, and how it could potentially
be disruptive to progress that you've made?
Secretary Wilson, you have a comment on that?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, there will be 16 new MILCON
projects for new missions that wouldn't start. That means that
we can't put those aircraft at those bases. There were the 18
MILCON projects for existing missions that would not go
forward, and 89 new-starts for programs where we're trying to
modernize this force and trying to stay--our adversaries don't
have to deal with continuing resolutions or sequester. They
keep going, and so, there is risk in deciding that we're just
going to do a CR.
Senator Tillis. We need to look at that in terms of the
effect that it has on MILCON and then the effect that it has on
what we would flesh out after those MILCON projects are
complete. People really need to understand that, because I
think we're doing you all a disservice. We need to make sure
that those who oppose going through that process understand the
direct consequences of their actions, both in terms of the
opportunities in the communities for these projects to move
forward, but, more important to me, the capabilities and
readiness that we're leaving on the table when we talk, in
every committee, about our great-power competition and the need
to really move forward with these projects. People need to
start taking responsibility for holding up what I think is an
important regular-order process.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, both of you, for your service. I appreciate it very
much.
We're sorry to see you going, Secretary Wilson, but thank
you for what you've done. I've got one last request before you
leave, too. I met with Secretary Shanahan on Tuesday, and he
mentioned, in the city of Martinsburg, that has still not
received their money for PFAS. He agreed we're going to get on
that. So, only thing I'm asking--it's less than $5 million, and
this little city really needs that. It means a lot to them, and
they've put the money out already, and they just don't have the
resources. So, before you depart, if you would check into that.
The city of Martinsburg. It's the National Guard base. Our Air
Base National Guard there in Martinsburg does a great job, and
it would be very much appreciated.
The other thing I want to ask for is, you know right now
statute only allows us to tap operations and maintenance, O&M,
dollars from the Air National Guard. That's what I consider to
be unfair, considering that they are using the same
firefighting foam as the Active component uses. So, my question
would be, Do you agree--or will you agree that we should be
able to use defense environmental restoration dollars for the
National Guard facilities, the same as military does?
Secretary Wilson. I--Senator, whenever I get involved in
the Guard issues, there are different colors of money there,
and I'm going to have to take that question for the record. Our
commitment is to do the cleanup on all of our bases where we've
been responsible for this. I'll have to get back to you on that
specific question about which funds can be used for which kinds
of----
Senator Manchin. Yeah. I don't know why they would be
objectionable, because----
Secretary Wilson. I don't----
Senator Manchin.--in NDAA, we've tried to do this, and got
stripped out. I think every Senator has a Guard component that,
basically, needs to be able to use their money the same as the
branches use theirs. Okay?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, you may well be right. I just
don't know.
Senator Manchin. Okay. I appreciate your--again, that's one
other question before you leave, because I know you will be
diligent about that.
Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Wilson. Defense Environmental Restoration Account
(DERP) funds cannot be used to fund environmental restoration
actions at State-owned and operated facilities where DOD was
not the ``owner'' or ``operator'' at the time of the release of
PFOS/PFOA into the environment. DERP funding is allowed for
initial investigations in order to resolve DERP eligibility or
ineligibility, and for cleanup where the release occurred when
DOD was the ``owner or operator.'' The Air National Guard (ANG)
is in the process of determining DERP eligibility for all its
sites and is now programming for both DERP funding and
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding to address its required
environmental restoration activities.
Senator Manchin. I think this is probably--General
Goldfein, maybe you can help me on this one. The F-15EX--and I
understand the arguments for--procuring capabilities. I
understand all of that. Where I'm unclear about is the plan how
you're going to integrate that. Because I think it's a 4-year
phase-in, and, during that 4-year phase-in, even though it's
the same aircraft, the components are different. So, I'm
understanding that we don't have the ability to train or--or
the simulators that it will take to train them, and won't be
ready in 4 years. How are we going to have our pilots ready and
prepared for the--for that to come onboard in 4 years, and them
not have the proper training?
General Goldfein. Sir, because the F-15EX is only intended
to help us with a short-term capacity shortfall and replace
only the F-15Cs, the----
Senator Manchin. How many aircrafts, General, are we
speaking about?
General Goldfein. Right now, we're looking at 80----
Senator Manchin. Eighty.
General Goldfein.--is what we have laid----
Senator Manchin. That's because the F-35 is not going to be
able to meet the demand.
General Goldfein. It's to supplement the F-35 program to
make sure--and I said before----
Senator Manchin. I understand that, and I'm okay with all
that. I'm----
General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
Senator Manchin.--just understanding--as a pilot, myself,
and you as--having many hours, as you have--there's still some
simulation time it takes to integrate into that.
General Goldfein. It does. The 90 percent of the
architecture--the support equipment for the F-15C is common to
the F-15EX. That's one of the reasons--so, we're not looking
at----
Senator Manchin. You're not concerned about the transition.
General Goldfein. No, sir. Matter of fact, that's one of
the reasons that we only looked at an F-15----
Senator Manchin. Okay.
General Goldfein.--as a replacement.
Senator Manchin. I trust you on that.
Next, my final question is this. This picture here. This
shows the J-31 and the F-35. They kind of look similar, I
think, if you look at it. They're fairly similar, here. I'll
pass just around to my colleagues. I'm not an expert on jet
fighters, but they sure do look like that someone had some
plans. My concern is this. I understand we have the prime
contract, and then it goes from the prime to sub to sub to sub
to sub to sub to sub. This didn't happen by accident. They're
able to--and I'm understanding they're actually able--the
Chinese and Russians, and whoever else, has been able to get up
to speed quicker by being able to access--and maybe it might
not be high priorities or high profiles--they were able to get
into things that weren't classified, and reverse engineer.
We're not holding our subs accountable, and we're not holding
the prime accountable to the subs. Do you all see that as a
tremendous concern? How do we change it? Will you work with us
to change the procurement process, holding the primes--holding
your prime subcontractors totally responsible for the food
chain, if you will, and bringing some of these platforms to
reality?
Madam Secretary?
Secretary Wilson. Sir, very happy to work with you on that.
The intelligence threat, particularly from China, is
significant, and it's----
Senator Manchin. But, I'm saying it's continued. For them
to have the rapid acceleration--and everybody here is concerned
about that--that has to be stopped. We're not doing anything to
stop it. I'm on Cyber Command, I'm concerned about this. So,
I'm just hoping that you all are in total agreement with this.
It needs to be changed. Do you all agree it needs to be
changed?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I'll tell you that we've stood
up a Cybersecurity Task Force, under the leadership of General
Pawlikowski, when she was Air Force Materiel Command. That
Cybersecurity Task Force is designed to do just what you're
talking about, look at every system and subsystem to----
Senator Manchin. Who's heading that up?
General Goldfein. Now it's Colonel--the Commander of Air
Force Materiel Command. If----
Secretary Wilson. McMurray.
General Goldfein. Yeah, thanks. General McMurray.
Senator Manchin. General McMurray, okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, General, for being here. Thank
you, as always, for your exemplary service.
To Secretary Wilson, I was delighted, last week, to get the
news that Whiteman Air Force Base is slated to be the second
location for the B-21 Raider. Of course, I think we ought to be
the first location, but we're delighted to be hosting the B-21.
I just want to say for the record how proud I am of the 509th
Bomb Wing and the work they've done with the B-2 Spirit over
many a year. We stand ready at Whiteman to receive the B-21
when the time comes.
I know Senator Cotton asked you about the schedule and
whether we were on schedule, in terms of production. Let me
ask--and you testified that we are--let me ask you just about
the budget. I know the target price is about 500 million a
piece. Are you confident that we're going to come close to that
number? What's it looking like?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, we don't discuss publicly the B-
21 program costs, and we're--actually would be very happy to
come and talk to you in detail about where we are. But, we are
pleased with the management of the program, thus far, by both
the contractor--and we're doing this one a little bit
differently. We do this through our Rapid Capabilities Office.
It's a small high-performing team, and they're doing a very
good job.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
Let me shift gears just slightly and ask you about a number
that appears a number of times in your written testimony, the
386 number. Let me ask you about the relative importance of
this. The NDS states very clearly that the Joint Force and the
Air Force need to focus on improving in our key warfighting
scenarios against China and Russia while carrying out
operations in the greater Middle East more economically. I'm
wondering, why is purchasing more platforms now better,
relatively speaking, than investing in R&D [research and
development], munitions, base resilience? I mean, can you give
me some sense of why 386 is important, and how you got there?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, the 386 is a size construct, but
the work that we did in this evaluation looked also at
different ways of fighting. It is not just more of the same.
It's not just about capacity. It also looks at, What do we have
as a stand-in force, what do we have as a standoff force, how
do we integrate things so that we get more bang for the buck,
if you will? If you think about this, you know, to--and the
Chief talked about Desert Storm and having 401 operational
squadrons. If we're talking about meeting a near--defeating a--
deterring and defeating a near-peer adversary, a safe, secure
nuclear deterrent, Homeland defense, countering violent
extremism, and deterring rogue states, all at the same time,
with 386 squadrons. They're obviously more capable squadrons
and a different way of fighting. So, it's both.
Senator Hawley. You're satisfied, then, that this budget
advances the NDS priorities, and particularly those on, not
just capacity, but also capability, lethality, resilience.
Secretary Wilson. I am. You know, there are always more
things that we can do, and we're always making tradeoffs. But,
even things like multidomain operations and the need to connect
everything as part of a network, and driving those things
forward. Our science and technology--early-stage science and
technology budget is--you know, combined with research,
development, test, and evaluation, is fairly healthy.
Senator Hawley. General, do you want to comment on any of
this?
General Goldfein. Sir, I'll just tell you that, by the time
Secretary Mattis rolled out the National Defense Strategy, the
last version I saw was version 67. I said that because it was
very inclusive--typical Secretary Mattis--very inclusive. We
had folks that were there, and it allowed us--it allowed
Secretary Wilson and I, actually, to align the 2019 budget,
because we were part of the writing of the National Defense
Strategy, and then 2020, our guidance to the team, and our
scoring of our budget inside was alignment with the National
Defense Strategy. So, that's what this budget submission is all
about.
Senator Hawley. Thanks very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
General Goldfein, I want to ask you a little bit about
artificial intelligence. It is going to be critical, both on
and off the battlefield in the future. As you know, AI is just
not possible without good, high-quality data. AI is only
effective if we have a workforce that really understands how to
take care of that data. Do you think that the Air Force is, at
this point, adequately able to recruit a workforce that is
literate and understands that future?
General Goldfein. Sir, I think we're in the beginning
stages, really----
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
General Goldfein.--of--and the Secretary and I have--maybe
turn it over to the Secretary, because, you know, having a
Secretary that was formerly a president of a STEM [Science,
Technology, Engineering & Math] university, and understanding
how the universities work, and how you bring in young people,
and how you motivate them, and you bring them in as interns. I
think we've done a lot to make sure that we are a--we're an
easy place----
Senator Heinrich. Are you extending her work assignment?
General Goldfein. Would love to.
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
One other thing, and then I do want to get to you,
Secretary. It--is it--is there value to thinking about whether
there should be someone within the services that just has that
responsibility--and maybe this is a good time to pivot to you,
Secretary--for making sure that we're recruiting coders and
data scientists and the folks that we're going to need as we
make this transition into AI? Specifically, I'm curious whether
it might be even worth considering a mission occupational
specialty for that area, to make sure that we do make that
transition quickly.
Secretary Wilson. That's actually an interesting idea. In
the Air Force--you know, the Navy has been talking, I know, to
the Committee about a Chief Information Officer position. In
some ways, the Air Force already has--we've got our Chief
Information Officer, our Chief Data Officer, and our Chief
Management Officer all in the same--all combined and reporting
directly to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. So, we've
got--organizationally, got that. I would say that we've got--AI
is not just about the data, it's about gathering and directing
that data, and analyzing it, at speed. In many cases, it's
about the analysis happening right at the sensor edge and not
as you bring it in. So, for all of us, in the military and in
the wider society, we are probably going to see a significant
shortage of data scientists and analysts over the next couple
of decades. It's a very high priority.
Senator Heinrich. Secretary, I want thank you for your
service, and specifically, as--you know a great deal about what
we now call the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO) and how
much that has contributed to our national security with its
infrastructure and personnel and acquisition authorities. I
just want to thank both of you, really, for your work in
building secure facilities at Kirtland for Space RCO and
enabling that office to really quickly deliver solutions to the
military. I look forward, General, in continuing that progress
with you.
Secretary, one other thing I want to ask you about is--I'm
starting to hear from another of--a number of folks, both in
and outside the services, who have said that if the U.S.
doesn't start to buy the emerging commercial offerings that
we're seeing, in terms of small satellites, small launch
providers, that we could see those things migrate overseas. Is
the Air Force being assertive enough in procuring or even just
experimenting with some of these smaller commercial
capabilities?
Secretary Wilson. I think there's going to be a huge demand
for small commercial capabilities, globally. The Air Force has
funded, through DARPA, an experiment. It's called Black Jack,
and it's looking at a small satellite constellation using
commercial satellites. But, I will say this. We've done a lot
of modeling and simulation. Many of you have participated in a
tabletop exercise that we've done about the shift from an
uncontested environment to a contested environment. What is the
strategy that makes sense in that environment? Then, how do we
develop programs to support that strategy? One of the
challenges with a proliferated low-Earth-orbit satellite system
that's where commercial satellites usually live and operate is,
it's very close to the Earth. That's great to be able to see
things, but it also means that they are vulnerable. The
commercial systems, without any defenses on them, are also
quite vulnerable. So, we need to think about not just how
expensive they are, but, Do they survive in a contested domain?
The way I like to put it is, you know, I drive a Subaru. It's a
great--I love it. It's less expensive than a tank. But, I
wouldn't take it into combat. So, we need to think about it
from a warfighting point of view.
Senator Heinrich. Well, Secretary, I want to thank you
again for your service. I'm out of time, here, but, before you
begin your transition, I would just urge you, on the PFAS issue
that Senator Manchin brought up, whatever we can do to make
these folks, who have been so severely impacted by that, whole,
really through no fault of their own, in all of these cases, I
would just urge you to give that all the attention you can
before you make your transition to El Paso.
Secretary Wilson. Thank you.
Senator Heinrich. Thanks.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Cramer.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, both of you, for appearing again.
Let me add my congratulations and just tell you I agree
with all the accolades you've received today, Secretary Wilson.
I don't think any of them are even a little bit exaggerated.
But, thank you for your service.
To both of you, thank you for your candor. You have spoken
with great clarity, and particularly in differentiating the Air
Force we need from the Air Force that we can afford. More
importantly, thank you for your candor in answering the what-if
questions, the ``What if the worst? What if we don't get our
jobs done as it relates to appropriate appropriations?'' So, we
need that clarity, our constituents need to hear that clarity,
and I thank you for that.
I'm tempted, of course, to ask about plans to modernize two
very important aircraft to me, the Global Hawk in Grand Forks
and the B-52s. I think we've talked a lot about that. But,
before we get to that, I've not heard a lot today about, and
I'm very intrigued with, and interested in, Space Force. I'd
like the--the message that is coming out, I think you have 72
million in this budget for the headquarters. But, I would ask
each of you to, maybe, elaborate a bit, first of all, on the
importance of it--as we look at scarcity of resources, and
we're talking about a sixth branch, there--you know, lots of
people have lots of opinions, and yet this domain seems--well,
I think it seems critically important, and I haven't heard
anybody--any of the combatant commanders or anybody else,
whether related to Space Force or not, say that it's not a good
idea. But, I just would open the floor to let you explain to us
one more time why it's so important, maybe starting with the
Secretary.
Secretary Wilson. You know, Senator, we are the best in the
world at space. Our adversaries know it, and they are seeking
to develop the capability to deny us the use of space in crisis
or in war. In private conversations, as we've received
briefings and so on from combatant commanders--not from the Air
Force, but from combatant commanders and other services--they
understand the importance of space as an enabling capability
for everything they're trying to do. We have made significant
changes in programs, based on threat analysis and strategy, in
fiscal year 2019, which this Committee and others in the
Congress supported, and we propose, in fiscal year 2020,
another boost, a 17-percent increase in our space portfolio in
the fiscal year 2020 budget. So, we're making the financial
investments. We are also buying those capabilities faster and
smarter. In fact, in the space realm, we--you know, we set
ourselves a goal 10 months ago. In some ways, it was a gimmick,
but it got people focused. We wanted to strip 100 years out of
Air Force procurement in 12 months. So, look at every program,
see if we could optimize these in a--you know, not--we're not
skimping on any requirements. We're going to buy a tailored
suit rather than a suit off the rack. We're currently at 78.5
years taken out of Air Force procurement programs. Of that, 21
came from space, alone. So, we are moving forward to buy things
in space faster and smarter. Our policy is to maintain American
dominance in space so that space capabilities are available to
the Joint Force, and so that we deter any attack on the United
States or our allies.
So, the organizational change that was put forward in
parallel with this budget is actually--you know, it's a change
that elevates, that enhances the influence of space and leaders
in the Pentagon. That's in it for the long haul. So, I think
one of the things that--taken all together, the combatant
command, which is being stood up, plus the increases in
spending that all of you have supported, and the shift to a
strategy for a--strategy and the programs to support it for a
contested domain, will keep us dominant in space. That is our
job.
Chief?
General Goldfein. Thanks, ma'am.
You know, I look at it from a warfighter perspective.
Having been the space coordinating authority and component lead
for Central Command for--deployed for 2 years, I've employed
space capabilities against an enemy. I look at it from a
warfighting perspective. I see, given the situation we're in,
and obviously aligned with the Secretary's statement--the
problem statement, that we are the best in the world, we've got
to do three things simultaneously. First, we have to defend
what we have, because it's going to be there for awhile, and we
all rely on it. From the blue dot on our phone to the
indications and warnings of missile launch, I mean, we rely on
space capabilities. So, we have to defend what we have.
But, it's not good enough just to step in the ring and
defend and take punches. At some point, you've got to be able
to punch back. Our adversaries need to know that we can punch
back. It needs to be part of their calculus. So, we have to
develop offensive capabilities.
the third piece we have to do is develop the force that can
fight and win, because this transition from an uncontested
domain to a contested domain requires that force to be
developed for the future.
So, I believe that, as we were in a robust debate about how
to get at the President's guidance, we were debating between a
separate service, separate department, separate Secretary,
separate Chief, to a Med Corps, JAG Corps. Where we landed,
which is a separate service within the Department of the Air
Force, to me, is the most recognizable model from a business of
warfighting. Of all the things that we're doing, going forward,
I would offer, the most important act that I would ask this
Committee to take on this year is to stand up U.S. Space
Command with a commander. Because, in the business of joint
warfighting, that aligns how this entire Department does
business, going forward.
Senator Cramer. Well said. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pursue this question of the Space Force, but I
understand we're having a full hearing next week, so I'll
defer. Put me down as skeptical that an organizational change
costing half a billion dollars a year is going to change our
capacity. So, be prepared to help me through that question. I
look forward to that discussion next week.
Secretary Wilson, everybody's praised you today. I plan to
do something about it. You'd better watch the National Defense
bill. I'm thinking of an amendment prohibiting your retirement.
So, you'd better have that--have your legislative staff scour
that document as it goes forward.
You have done a sensational job. I think a perfect example
is the comment you made a few minutes ago about the amount of
time you've cut out of the procurement process. That's a big
deal. Procurement has two problems, historically, in the
Defense Department. One is money, cost, and the other is time.
You have done something that had needed doing a long time, and
I really want to thank you for that.
A second general comment. I understand neither of you had
anything to do with this, but I just don't like this OCO-for-
base business. Twenty-five percent of your budget is OCO, and
three-quarters of the OCO is OCO-for-base, which is a non
sequitur. If it's base, it's base. If it's OCO, it's OCO.
Again, I realize that you're--this is something that was handed
down from other parts of the government, but it's not honest
government, it's not honest to the Congress or the people of
America. This isn't OCO. Let's get real about what these
numbers are.
General, the light-attack experiment, which is to use
existing platforms, try to develop a new counter-violent-
extremist--I understand the A-10 is--I heard, yesterday, from
people in the maintenance business, that they are hard to
maintain now. They're just wearing out. How's this experiment
going? Where does it stand?
General Goldfein. Sir, let me tell you, first, that light
attack, A-10, two completely separate----
Senator King. Okay.
General Goldfein.--issues, here. Light attack is not
designed to, nor will it ever, replace the A-10. Our intent is
to fly the A-10 as one of the four weapon systems----
Senator King. You can----
General Goldfein.--that we need through the 2030s.
Senator King. Because we've been hearing, for the last 3 or
4 years, about getting rid of the A-10. Are we now back to
maintaining the A-10?
General Goldfein. We are, and--through the 2030s, for the
A-10.
Senator King. So, let's move now to the light attack.
General Goldfein. Light attack. Sir, to understand light
attack and where we're going--and I will tell you that I can't
think of a better example of how we used the authorities you
gave us to accelerate our understanding about a particular
weapon system. You go back to the National Defense Strategy,
the second line of effort is about building allies and
partners. That's what the light attack is all about. The
question--the strategy in the National Defense Strategy is to
drive violent extremism down to the point where it can be
handled inside the borders of governed nations. This is a
global challenge, from the Philippines to Nigeria. So, the
question we asked to ourselves was, How do we build a platform
sensor/weapon combination and an intelligence-gathering and a
network that will allow more allies and partners to join us in
the fight against violent extremism? So, we went out----
Senator King. So, this would be a--an aircraft that could
be utilized by our allies.
General Goldfein. Absolutely. That's been the primary
focus. It remains our focus. So, again, we went out, 5 months
after I signed an initial declaration of an experiment, when it
went out, companies came in, we did an experiment at Holloman
Air Force Base. We went on to a second experiment. What you'll
see in our budget is money to procure three of each kind of
airplane that we've been experimenting with. We're going to put
a detachment at Nellis, where we do our task-level training.
We're going to put a detachment at Hurlburt, where we do
Special Ops. We're going to invite allies and partners. The
most exciting part of this experiment, that we would not have
been able to do without your authorities, is, we have built a
coalition-friendly intelligence-gathering and information-
sharing network that we don't have to tell anybody, ``No, you
can't have this information.'' It's platform-agnostic. By
owning these airplanes, now, as prototypes, we can modify.
We're going to bring industry in, we're going to bring allies
and partners in, and we're trying to solve the math equation
that currently exists in North Africa. One-thousand Americans
plus 4,000 French enables 35,000 fighters that are taking on
violent extremism across North Africa. This is the air-
component contribution to the National Defense Strategy, to do
just that.
Senator King. I take it from your comments that you feel
like this has been a worthwhile experiment, and that we're
making some real progress.
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Not only has it been
worthwhile, but I will tell you that the companies that have
been with us from the beginning have been spectacular. I think
there is no better example I can give you of how we used your
intent for these authorities to advance. We're not even 2
years----
Senator King. You mean you're saying, for the record, that
we did something right?
General Goldfein. Yes, sir. We jumped on it.
Senator King. Thank you.
I'm out of time, but a question for the record. I'm very
interested in maintenance levels and readiness levels of
aircraft, and increasing those levels to, if not duplicate, but
approach commercial availabilities. For the record, if you
could give me some thoughts on where we are, progress made,
perhaps graph where we are. You understand the nature of the
question.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator King. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks, to the witnesses. Secretary Wilson, I'll add my
congratulations. I'll tell you who I'd be--who is really
nervous right now. The individual running Air Force ROTC at
UTEP [University of Texas El Paso], because if that program
isn't the best-performing one in the country, with the former
Secretary of the Air Force as president of the university, that
person's going to have some 'splaining to do, I think. So----
Secretary Wilson. Sadly, there's only Army ROTC at UTEP,
so----
Senator Kaine. Okay, good. All right. They ducked that
bullet. Congratulations to you.
I just want to pick up, first, on comments--a number of
folks on the other side of the dais here have raised the
specter of CR. Folks on this side of the dais aren't talking
about CR. The notion that we're heading toward a CR, I hear
that from one side. I don't know where that's coming from. We
don't want a CR. We want an appropriations bill, and we'll get
one. We got a great appropriations deal at the end of 2018,
with two Republican houses, that Republican colleagues here
voted for. But, then, after the President said he didn't like
it, folks switched their votes, they voted against it, and we
shut the Government down for 35 days. That hurt the military.
Didn't hurt the Air Force directly, but the Coast Guard's part
of the military, even though it's not part of the DOD. They
weren't getting paid for 35 days. So, let's be clear who's
talking about CR, who's expressing worry about CR, who's saying
we might run into a CR. It's not Democrats. We don't want a CR.
We want a budget.
Let me just ask, If there is a CR and sequester kicks back
in, my understanding is, it's not steady-state funding. Am I
correct that funding would start to ratchet down under a CR if
sequester kicks back in?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, if you move to a sequester, the
cut for the Air Force would be about $29 billion. I think you
were at another hearing when I was talking about this, but
that's four times the size of the sequester we had last----
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Secretary Wilson.--time the Air Force went through this,
and just to--so, the choices--I mean, sequester would be across
the side----
Senator Kaine. Right.
Secretary Wilson.--of all program elements. But, if it were
concentrated, the scope of this is--it would be all F-35s, all
KC-46s, all B-21s stopped, ground-based strategic deterrent,
all research, development, test, and procurement of space, and
most fourth- and fifth-generation modifications, all science
and technology. You add all of that together, and you get $29
billion in a single year.
Senator Kaine. Sequester would be foolish. CR would be
foolish. There's nobody on this side of the dais who is talking
about either. We can do an appropriations bill.
Let me move to hurricane relief. I have a publication from
the OSD Comptroller, and I just want to make sure this is
right. The Air Force hurricane recovery estimate--just the Air
Force--is 5 billion--that's my understanding--for Tyndall,
Eglin, Warner Robbins, Goldsboro, Sumter, and Hampton, VA. Is
that 5-billion number accurate, Madam Secretary?
Secretary Wilson. It's 3.7 plus 1.2.
Senator Kaine. Okay. So, 4.9--$4.9 billion. Now, that's the
Air Force number. The--DOD-wide, the hurricane recovery request
is $8.9 billion. That's for Hurricanes Michael and Florence.
Here's the way that we're proposing to deal with that. The DOD
has--they're trying to cobble together 2.4 billion out of the
fiscal year 2019 budget, and they're flexing cash around to be
able to do it. They may need a supplemental of 1.8. They may
not be able to find enough, but they're trying to find 2.4
billion in fiscal year 2019. The Department has, in the
budget--the budget before us--3 billion for fiscal year 2020.
So, that gets to 5.4 out of the 8.9. That leaves 3.5, 3.6
billion unfunded for hurricane relief. Now, I'm struck, when I
saw that the unfunded requirement for hurricane relief is $3.6
billion, that that is exactly the amount that the President is
taking out of the fiscal year 2019 MILCON budget: $3.6 billion.
It's 3.6 billion out of MILCON. It's 2.5 out of the drug
interdiction account.
So, if we were not taking the 3.6 out of MILCON to deal
with what your colleagues have testified here is a nonmilitary
emergency, that $3.6 billion could be used to fill the unfunded
requirements for hurricane relief for the entire DOD. I'm just
putting that on the record, because many of us voted against
the declaration, a few weeks back, because we don't think a
nonmilitary emergency should give the President a license to
ransack the military's budget. The numbers, dollar for dollar,
are the same. That $3.6 billion is the amount of the unfunded
requirement to do the hurricane relief on Tyndall and on other
installations--Lejeune, et cetera--that are outside the Air
Force. That's important.
General Goldfein, the last thing I want to say is this.
Military housing folks have asked you about it. Your statement
in that hearing, where you said, ``I've lived in military
housing most of my life, as a child, as a member in the
military, and my wife and my kids have lived in military
housing.'' I think you said 50 years, plus, in military
housing, or something like that. You said that you have never
worried for your own health, you've never worried for the
health of your spouse, you've never worried for the health of
your kids in military housing. You said that in a very powerful
way to point out that people who are in military housing right
now shouldn't have to, either. That comment gave me a feeling
that there is a command presence here that's going to take this
very, very seriously until we get it right. We'll make sure
that you do. But, I'm given confidence by the way you expressed
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
You know, let me just make one comment, here, and we can
discuss this in a different setting, perhaps. Just keep in mind
that the problem that many on this side of the aisle see is
parity. This is the first time in my memory that we've been in
a situation--and I'm older than you are, I've been around
longer than you have, and I've observed, certainly since World
War II, that we have not been in a situation where defending
America wasn't the number-one priority. It is no longer, as a
result of the last administration.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I know there have been questions about the F-35 and the F-
15. As you well know, prior to the release of the President's
budget request, my Connecticut colleagues and I sent a letter
to Acting Secretary Shanahan expressing concern about the then-
rumored cuts to the F-35 program. I am deeply disappointed,
more so now than then, that these reports proved to be true.
Instead of the robust investment in the fifth-generation F-35
Joint Strike Fighter, this budget request proposes a mix of
fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. This step seems to be a
shift in strategic planning. This shift appears to have been
directed by the Secretary--or, I should say, the Acting
Secretary of Defense, not the Air Force. Is that true?
Secretary Wilson. No, sir. The Secretary of--Acting
Secretary of Defense did not direct us to do that--or did not
direct me to do that.
Senator Blumenthal. Was it your initiative?
Secretary Wilson. I'm sorry, sir, I didn't hear you.
Senator Blumenthal. Was it your initiative?
Secretary Wilson. Sir, when we put together a budget and
make sausage, there's--we put forward ideas, they then go
forward to the OSD level and cost analysis and program
evaluation, and the Comptroller then look at various programs
and how all of this works. In the process of that, we did a
deep dive particularly looking at tactical air and how are we
going to get to where we need to be without our airframes--
we've got some airframes, particularly the F-15C, that's not
going to make it there. You look at the various sand charts and
pieces of analysis and what the combatant commander
requirements are, and we cannot meet their requirements in
capacity, because that F-15C--it's just not going to live long
enough. What should we do about that within the money that we
have? The solution that we came up with, in concert with CAPE
and the Comptroller, was to buy--we're committed to the F-35--
was to buy 48 F-35s and then, instead of trying to extend the
life of those F-15Cs, replace them with an F-15E.
Senator Blumenthal. What was the initial recommendation,
though, that you made before all of the grinders----
Secretary Wilson. Well----
Senator Blumenthal.--then took over?
Secretary Wilson. I can tell you that, when we--what the--
what we could do within the money that we were--the way this
works--and I didn't know it when I was up here on the Hill, but
you--we, basically, are given a top line internal to the Air
Force and try to build the best program we can to achieve the
National Defense Strategy objectives within that top line. That
included a proposal for 48 F-35s. With that, we would see a
decline in the number of fighter squadrons we would have in the
out years, because those F-15Cs weren't going to make it. When
we went forward and said, what does this mean for our ability
to meet combatant commander requirements? The answer was good.
We can't keep declining in the number of fighter squadrons we
have. In cooperation with CAPE and the Comptroller, one of the
ideas was to replace those dying F-15Cs with an F-15EX off the
line. By doing that, the Qataris and the Saudis have kept the
line open, and have invested in modernization there. We
wouldn't have any MILCON cost. We could do local training to
shift from an F-15C to an F-15E. Most of the ground equipment
is the same. Many of the parts are the same. We wouldn't have
to retrain the maintainers. So, when it's a balance of capacity
and capability, given the budget that we have available, that
was what made, we thought, the most sense.
Senator Blumenthal. So--I hate to be simplistic about it--
your initial recommendation, as I understand it, your initial
budget that you submitted to the Secretary of Defense did not
include the F-15s, and then all of these factors were made
aware to you?
Secretary Wilson. Senator, we do the best we can with the
top line we're given internally, and that included 48 F-35s and
a declining size of the number of fighter squadrons. The
question then was, What is the impact of that? When we went
forward with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
CAPE and the Comptroller--and, you know, they never allocate
all the money out when we go through this process, and it was,
``Well, if there were more money available, can we stem that
decline in the number of fighter squadrons we have available?''
The first thing was to keep 48 F-35s. We're committed to that
platform. It's a game changer. How can we reduce the impact of
the loss of the F-15C? This was the answer we came up with.
General Goldfein. Sir, I would just offer that, as part of
the dialogue, one of the things that the Secretary and I made
very clear was that we were not going to take money from the F-
35 and put it into an F-15. This is additive, F-15. We
absolutely have to keep the F-35 program on track, because, as
the largest customer, we speak not only for the United States
Air Force, but also for our teammates in the Navy and the
Marine Corps that are buying the F-35, and all of our
international teammates, because we need our international
allies and partners in the fifth generation with us. To give
you an example, we need Canada, who's going through their
process right now. We need them. They're part of an alliance
that we've worked together in NORAD for 60 years. To defend our
Homeland together, we need them in the fifth-generation. So,
we're not backing an inch off the F-35 as we go forward.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I take it at word, because my
time is expired, that there will be no diminishing of
commitment to the F-35. I think that is certainly the right
goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Let me make one comment about the F-35 that I don't think
was--has been made. Yeah, we have the figure of 1,763--1,763
that's supposed in this timeframe. We are now at 182. We should
be at 1,100. I think you would agree with that figure. So,
that's one of the problems that we have not had a chance to
explore, but it's a problem, certainly not of your doing.
Appreciate very much the great responses that you made to
all these questions.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
bombers
1. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how many
combat coded bombers does the Air Force We Need require?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force We Need
requires a total of 14 bomber squadrons, an increase of 5 bomber
squadrons. The exact number of combat coded bombers is classified but
remains available in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA Section 1064 Report.
2. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how many
penetrating (non-standoff) bombers does the Air Force We Need require?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force We Need
requires a total of 14 bomber squadrons, an increase of 5 bomber
squadrons. To achieve this capacity while reducing overall bomber
operations and sustainment costs, the Air Force plans to keep the
current four B-52 squadrons and transition the rest of the bombers to
B-21 long-term. Therefore, the remaining 10 bomber squadrons would
eventually consist of penetrating bombers. The exact number of
penetrating combat coded bombers is classified but remains available in
the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA Section 1064 Report.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
manned-unmanned teaming
3. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, as we continue to build
readiness and modernize our forces to potentially fight a great power
war, we must contend with issues such as the ongoing pilot shortage.
Part of this can be addressed through recruitment and retention,
however, emerging capabilities provide additional avenues to overcome
this challenge, as well as many others. What initiatives has the Air
Force undertaken in the realm of manned-unmanned teaming to increase
the number of combat aircraft without necessarily requiring as many
pilots?
General Goldfein. The Air Force is continuing to develop,
demonstrate and assess advanced control automation techniques, a key
initiative to make manned-unmanned teaming work. In our budget we are
funding research to continue the development in three areas: 1) mixed
initiative control techniques for teams of remotely piloted aircraft
and/or manned-unmanned teams in contested, dynamic mission
environments; 2) integration of unmanned systems into controlled
airspace and airbase operations; and 3) autonomous behaviors for safe,
loyal wingman that maintain appropriate human control over weapons
employment.
4. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, do you foresee a future in
which a single pilot or pilot-pair could fly while simultaneously
directing autonomous aircraft in combat?
General Goldfein. This is exactly the type of game-changing
capability we envision for future autonomous combat air vehicles.
Manned and unmanned teaming in future operations will require unmanned
platforms to autonomously fly in complex and fluid formations. Manned
and unmanned teaming will also be dependent upon on how well our
systems seamlessly share information.
5. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, what hurdles would need to be
overcome to field these types of formations, and how would emerging
technologies such as artificial intelligence be leveraged to field them
effectively?
General Goldfein. A variety of technologies, including advanced
sensors, flight control systems, artificial intelligence, flight safety
systems, communications capability and others will have to be leveraged
to field these types of formations. As the technology evolves, we will
iteratively hone our thinking on human control, develop employment
concepts, and then the detailed tactics, techniques and procedures
needed to employ these new capabilities.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
f-35 beddown
6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, is the
Air Force's beddown of F-35 aircraft proceeding on schedule?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The beddown of 54 F-35As in
2 Squadrons at Eielson AFB, AK remains on track. The first squadron has
already started receiving F-35 personnel, and is currently planned to
receive F-35s from the spring of 2020 to the spring of 2021. The second
squadron's F-35s are planned to arrive from the spring of 2021 to the
winter 2021/2022.
7. Senator Sullivan. General Goldfein, please describe the
strategic importance of bedding two squadrons of F-35s down at Eielson
AFB.
General Goldfein. F-35 beddown at Eielson AFB adds the newest fifth
generation fighters to our major Air Force command within the Pacific,
adding significant capacity to provide Air Superiority to United States
Indo-Pacific Command's area of responsibility. In accordance with the
National Defense Strategy, they are strategically located there to
deter Russia and China and aid the United States in a time of great
power competition.
8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, are
there any ongoing military construction projects at Eielson AFB that
would affect the F-35 beddown, if the project were to be delayed?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are no ongoing
Military Construction projects at Eielson AFB, AK that, if delayed,
would affect the F-35 beddown.
9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what
are the programmed but not yet awarded military construction projects
at Eielson AFB that would affect the F-35 beddown, if the project were
to be delayed or cancelled?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are no programmed, but
not yet awarded Military Construction projects at Eielson AFB, AK that,
if delayed or cancelled, would affect the F-35 beddown.
kc-46 progress
10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson, what problems and concerns
with KC-46 production and quality control prompted you to halt delivery
of KC-46 aircraft from Boeing twice? What was the timeline for those
problems, concerns, and the Air Force's decision-making process?
Secretary Wilson. On February 28, 2019, the Air Force halted KC-46A
aircraft acceptance after discovering excessive Foreign Object Debris
(FOD) during aircraft acceptance inspections. Deliveries resumed on
March 11, 2019, following Boeing's Corrective Action Plan brief to the
Air Force and successful FOD sweeps of delivering aircraft. Deliveries
were halted a second time on March 23, 2019, after inspections to
selected sealed areas uncovered additional FOD as well as workmanship
and quality issues. On April 5, 2019, the Air Force resumed deliveries
after determining additional corrective actions proposed by Boeing were
sufficient. Delivered aircraft can continue to fly as there is no
immediate safety of flight issue. Inspections to select sealed areas of
delivered aircraft are required and will be accomplished via a Time
Compliance Technical Order in the coming months, at Boeing's expense.
11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson, when will you release the
outcome of the Air Force's Strategic Basing Decision for KC-46 OCONUS
basing?
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force will make future final basing
decisions approximately three years prior to projected first aircraft
delivery. Future KC-46A basing strategies will be made in light of the
National Defense Strategy and combatant commander requirements to
maintain optimum combat capacity during recapitalization. The National
Defense Strategy informs the optimal sequencing of Active Duty,
Reserve, and guard locations for future KC-46A squadrons.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
new air national guard aeromedical evacuation squadron
12. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, this year, the Air Force will
continue with its strategic basing process to establish a new
Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (AES) within the Air National Guard,
including site surveys this spring. Savannah Hilton Head Air Guard
Station is one of fourteen locations being considered. The September
18, 2018, approval of the enterprise definition and criteria emphasizes
the operational, manpower, and capacity requirements of the AES
mission. Within the manpower criteria is an emphasis on recruiting, and
in particular, registered nurses. Georgia Southern University has a top
tier School of Nursing located in Savannah and is uniquely positioned
to offer support in the way of nursing professionals, as well as other
health professional programs. How important is a local, academic
recruiting pipeline to the success of this new AES?
Secretary Wilson. As shown in the basing criteria released to
Congress, registered nurses and the ability to recruit form 70 percent
of the Recruiting score listed under Manpower, which is a Mission
criterion. Recruiting and retention, combined, form over half the
Mission score. Recruiting and retention are primary considerations for
this Air National Guard basing action.
13. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, how important is support from
local academic institutions to ensure there is the required, trained
workforce available to this mission?
Secretary Wilson. The recruiting measure in part includes assessing
the registered nurse population proximate to the installation,
therefore although not directly measured as a part of this basing
action, local academic support may positively impact recruiting pool
and retention levels, which are measured.
14. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, how can academic and
workforce development partners tailor their programs to prepare to
support the Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron?
Secretary Wilson. Academic institutions offering Bachelors of
Science in Nursing programs benefit the Air Force by providing the
basic qualifications needed by flight nurses. Also any partnerships
related to physician training would also apply. Workforce development
partners, with critical care capabilities, should allow Air Force
medics to practice within their facilities through memorandums of
agreements or training affiliation agreements with our Active Duty
medical treatment facilities so our Aeromedical Evacuation medics can
keep their skills up.
jstars/abms
15. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, in February 2019, the Air
Force submitted a report to Congress on the ``Joint Surveillance Target
and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Sustainment and Viability Plan''. The
report states that the E-8C fleet service life projection has been
updated and extended as a result of the wing and fuselage widespread
fatigue damage analyses conducted by Boeing. The report states that
these analyses indicate the ability to operate ``into the 2030s''.
However, the platform's service life may be much greater, with the
potential to operate well into the 2040s. What is the most current
service life projection for the E-8C JSTARS fleet?
Secretary Wilson. The current airframe service life projection is
past 2070, but other critical components begin to limit the E-8C's
service life in the 2030s. The next major limitation is engine
availability, driven by engine depot throughput, a lack of replacement
parts to maintain aging engines. In parallel, multiple communication
and datalink mandates, and aging/Diminishing Manufacturing Sources
(DMS) components all limit the service life.
16. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, the February 2019 JSTARS
Sustainment and Viability Plan states that the System Program Office is
currently executing multiple initiatives to address declining fleet
aircraft availability rates, to include addressing negative non-mission
capable (NMC) drivers. However, the report does not identify which
elements of the aircraft are most responsible for driving NMC rates,
nor does it describe how exactly the Air Force intends to address these
issues. The propulsion system has repeatedly been identified as the
number one non-mission capable driver for the platform, and that it is
also one of the largest time and cost drivers during depot maintenance.
Of the multiple initiatives currently being executed by the System
Program Office, are there any related to the propulsion system, and
what is the Air Force's plan going forward to address issues related to
the propulsion system?
Secretary Wilson. The program office is actively pursuing efforts
to address key non-mission critical drivers such as engine
availability. Efforts include: locking out the engine thrust reversers;
working with Tinker engine depot to improve engine replacement
throughput; and sub-contracting engine maintenance to augment the
Tinker depot. Each will increase engine availability, but not eliminate
all issues completely.
The thrust reversers are the biggest non-mission capable driver for
the JSTARS engines. The thrust reverser lock out project is expected to
begin this summer and last six months. During the six months, engineers
will design a permanent hardware solution, which locks the thrust
reverse in place preventing any movement of the reverse eliminating the
issue. The project is funded.
To address parts limitations, the Air Force will ask for additional
money in fiscal year 2021 to increase depot part throughput and
availability. Right now, the program office is working with Northrop
Grumman to sub-contract an alternative engine depot to augment the
current depot throughput.
17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, the progression of the ABMS
program is now being measured by ``phases'', rather than
``increments.'' What is the rationale for this shift, as well the
impact it will have on formal milestone designations, decision
authority, and progress measurement?
Secretary Wilson. The objective is to field ABMS capabilities as
they are ready and not wait for a specific preconceived date in the
future.
18. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, does the Air Force have an
estimate on when they expect ABMS to deliver a BMC2 and GMTI capability
that is at least comparable to that of the current JSTARS fleet? Please
provide both the timing (fiscal year) and acquisition stage (both phase
and increment).
Secretary Wilson. We are committed to doing ABMS thoughtfully,
prior to the retirement of any legacy systems, to ensure that we have
the right warfighter capabilities. This will enable us to project power
in contested environment, not simply a permissive environment.
19. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, on June 4, 2018, the Air
Force announced that Robins would host the initial elements of ABMS.
The press release specifically said, ``Selecting Robins enables the Air
Force to leverage existing infrastructure and the more than 40 years of
experience resident in the Robins' workforce. There is no intent to
reduce manpower at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS.'' Is
it still the case that the Air Force expects no reduction of manpower
at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS?
Secretary Wilson. Yes. The Air Force still expects no reduction of
manpower at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
support to southern border operations
20. Senator Reed. General Goldfein, in a response to a question
from Sen. Warren, you said there were no training exercises or impacted
deployments based on the Air Force's support of troop deployments to
the southern border with Mexico. Given the news and readiness impacts
General Neller outlined in his memoranda to Secretary Spencer, I wanted
to give you an opportunity to clarify. Have there been any adverse
impacts to unit readiness, any training exercises deferred or missed,
or otherwise any impacts on unit deployments based on Air Force support
to southern border operations?
General Goldfein. General Goldfein's memo dated May 2, 2019
provided amplifying details to answer Senator Warren's questions on the
readiness challenges posed by the deployment of troops to the southern
border. No exercises or deployments were cancelled or delayed due to a
unit supporting a southern border deployment. However, an HH-60G Rescue
Squadron missed an opportunity to attend the Navy's TRIDENT Exercise
from January 14-26, 2019. The exercise would have provided an opportune
platform for deck landings. The Rescue Squadron's inability to attend
the Navy exercise due to southern border deployment had a limited
impact on a training opportunity. There was no impact to long-term
readiness of the squadron due to other training opportunities
throughout the year and deck landings are not required for current
deployments. The HH-60G Rescue Squadron is no longer supporting
southern border operations as of January 31, 2019.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
f-35
21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, with the recent shift in
National Defense Strategy toward great power competition against near
peer threats like Russia and China, isn't having a robust generation 5
tactical fighter aircraft like the F-35 now more important than ever?
What is the value of having stealth fighter in a non-permissive
environment?
Secretary Wilson. The capabilities of the F-35 are crucial for
deterring and prevailing in combat against a peer adversary. The F-35's
stealth capabilities allow it to penetrate enemy advanced air defense
to hold key targets at risk. Additionally, the F-35s Battle Management
Command and Control (BMC2) capabilities are essential for Joint Team
success. The F-35 increases the value of other assets against a peer
threat--it is the centerpiece of achieving air superiority in future
contested environments.
22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, the Air Force unfunded
priority list includes 12 F-35A's. How would the Air Force's benefit
from receiving those additional 12 F-35's in this year's budget
authorization and appropriation from Congress?
Secretary Wilson. The F-35 brings game-changing capabilities to the
fight--it has increased survivability through a number of technologies
including stealth. Its advanced integrated sensors will provide
battlespace awareness to the Joint Team through the resilient network.
The F-35's situational awareness and targeting abilities allow it to
effectively employ our most advanced weapons in a highly contested
environment. Analysis shows that we must procure 72 fighter aircraft a
year to account for aging aircraft retirements and to meet National
Defense Strategy and Operations Plans assigned missions. Appropriating
funding for an additional 12 F-35A's would bring the Air Force closer
to that number.
23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, you have said recently
that F-15s were not in the initial Air Force budget you submitted to
the Secretary of Defense. Why did you decide to reverse course and add
8 F-15EX's to your budget this year? Were you directed to do so?
Secretary Wilson. No. It is true that our initial fiscal year 2020
POM submission did not include the F-15EX; however, several key pieces
of analysis and information became available during Program and Budget
Review (PBR) to support the fiscal year 2020 PB position to procure the
aircraft. We must procure 72 fighter aircraft a year to account for
aging aircraft retirements and to meet the National Defense Strategy.
This requirement, combined with current budget realities and the global
missions of the Air Force demand a mix of 4th and 5th generation force
structure to balance near and mid-term readiness with future needs.
dod resignations
24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, did the abrupt departure
of Secretary Mattis influence your decision to resign? Why did you
decide now is the right time to leave the Air Force?
Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
SecAF resignation.
25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, are you concerned that
your position--like many other administration positions--may remain
unfilled for an extended period of time? What are the potential
negative effects of this void?
Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
SecAF resignation
26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, what qualifications and
experience should this Committee seek in your successor as we vet the
next Air Force Secretary?
Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
SecAF resignation
27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, as you know, Acting
Secretary Shanahan has been serving in a temporary status since January
1st. This is the only time in the last 70 years the Secretary of
Defense position has been vacant for more than two months. How has this
vacancy impacted the Department, and specifically the Air Force? Are
you concerned that Acting Secretary Shanahan appears to be serving
indefinitely, without a confirmation to serve as Secretary of Defense?
Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about
SecAF resignation
c-130h modernization
28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, can you provide any
updates to the approval process since I wrote to you on this issue?
Secretary Wilson. The NP2000 8-bladed propeller is a performance
enhancing modification approved and currently funded for 44 total C-
130H aircraft. Currently, 11 aircraft have had been modified with
NP2000 propellers. The remaining 33 aircraft will begin NP2000
installations in June 2020. Since your letter, we have continued flight
testing of the NP2000 propeller with other C-130H propulsion
modifications all scheduled for completion fall 2019. Data from this
test and the accompanying analysis of performance information will
inform Air Force leadership of composite propeller capabilities as a
baseline for future decisions for the C-130H fleet.
29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, in light of the recent
tragic events and the subsequent revelation of the serious risk to our
Air Force C-130H aircrews while flying the legacy propeller, what is
the proposed timeline for installation of the NP-2000 propeller on the
C-130H's like the ones we have in Connecticut?
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force continues flight tests of the
NP2000 propeller with other C-130H propulsion modifications scheduled
to complete fall 2019. Data from this test and the accompanying
analysis of performance information will inform Air Force leadership of
composite propeller capabilities as a baseline for future decisions for
the C-130H fleet.
30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, I understand that Collins
Aerospace is currently producing enough propellers for two aircraft per
month. Due to the risk associated with the legacy propeller, would you
support an increase to 3-4 aircraft per month if Congress appropriated
additional funding to support the increased production costs?
Secretary Wilson. Our budget request includes a plan for propeller
modifications. Should congress appropriate additional funds, it is
possible the Air Force could accelerate the modification.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
indo-pacific importance
31. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, the U.S. National Security
planning has for several years centered its policies in relation to the
five major threats it faces, four of which are in the Indo-Pacific AOR.
What concerns you most with regard to the Indo-Pacific region as the
Secretary of the Air Force?
Secretary Wilson. There are four main areas of concern, basically
stemming from China's threatening regional posture: 1) Rapid growth of
Chinese ability to attack United States and allied forces throughout
the region and hinder United States entry, 2) Chinese competitive
actions aimed at pushing the United States out of the Western Pacific,
3) Lack of resilient and hardened basing to execute Agile Combat
Employment, and 4) Increasing ops-tempo on USAF and allied air forces
in responding to aggressive Chinese intrusions.
Iran, North Korea, and other violent extremist groups are opponents
we are equipped to manage, but China's large economy has enabled its
huge and often hidden military expenditures. Ironically, we enabled
China's economic growth by welcoming them into the international system
with open arms. Over the last few years, however, it has become
abundantly clear that China fundamentally rejects the equitable
system--the system which has prospered more than any other--and aims to
dominate its own sphere of influence by force, while threatening us in
our own region.
32. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, are additional assets and
investments needed for the Air Force to maintain its competitive
advantage against our adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region? If so, in
what areas?
Secretary Wilson. There are several material steps we can take such
as base hardening/base resiliency, more munitions, more cyber
capability, hypersonics, and resilience in space. But we are only
beginning to invest. Just as important is the time and effort our
leaders put into engaging with our allies and partners, explaining our
commitment to a free and open Indo Pacific, and our willingness to work
cooperatively with all nations who wish to keep it that way.
indo-pacific operations
33. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, last month, B-52H
Stratofortress bombers deployed in support of U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command's Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP). The CBP has been
operational for more than a decade in support of a free and open Indo-
Pacific. The bombers conduct training with NATO allies and partners to
enhance interoperability and readiness. During this operation, one of
the bombers flew over contested islands in the South China Sea for the
first time since November. United States officials recently criticized
China for setting up the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over
the East China Sea in 2013, which does not conform to international law
and overlaps similar zones operated by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
How important are operations such as to show support to United States
partnerships abroad and to communicate our commitment to ensuring the
South China Sea remains open?
Secretary Wilson. Our Air Force's presence, along with our sister
services and civilian counterparts, is critical to maintaining a free
and open Indo-Pacific.
To ensure we balance this critical mission with readiness needs, we
continually evaluate the specific measures we take, such as CBP, for
their effectiveness and efficiency. That means our specific actions can
and will change, but our commitment remains firm.
34. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, how important are these types
of missions in support of Air Force readiness?
Secretary Wilson. Real world missions require a ready and able
force. In some cases, employing that force in critical missions
improves readiness. However, there are some aspects of readiness that
are best done or can only be done, within the United States. There may
come a point when best supporting a particular mission means bringing
forces home, and possibly changing the configuration of forces abroad.
artificial intelligence
35. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, I see that your unfunded
priority list calls for $18 million for further development and
demonstration of cutting-edge technologies like hypersonics and
autonomy. What is the importance of these technologies for the
capabilities of the Air Force to meet our near-peer and peer
adversaries?
Secretary Wilson. In the dynamic battlespace, the Air Force must
gather decision-quality information and act on it faster than our
adversaries can react. Technologies such as autonomy and hypersonics
will give the Air Force advantages over near-peer and peer adversaries
in regards to acquiring information and acting upon it with speed.
Artificial intelligence, aided by machine learning, will play a
critical role in enhancing human-machine teaming, allowing for
collaborative platforms and sensors, predictive analysis, and rapid
decision making. Current autonomy research efforts have demonstrated a
long-range, high subsonic unmanned air vehicle, as well as live mission
exploitation techniques to accelerate analysis of full motion video,
computer assisted detection, characterization, and tracking of humans
in operational surveillance imagery. Current hypersonics research
efforts have demonstrated hypersonic engine performance in ground
testing and physics based simulations for the utilization of hypersonic
weapons. These technology efforts will improve decision-making
processes and advance weaponry that outpaces our adversaries. The
additional funding would accelerate the completion of these technology
efforts.
capability and readiness
36. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
National Defense Strategy clearly articulates a focus on near-peer and
peer competitors such as China and Russia. How does the budget reflect
the requirements of the Air Force to meet the challenges of the Great
Power Competition?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The National Defense
Strategy directs the Air Force to increase lethality, restore
readiness, and prepare for high-end conflict against a near-peer
adversary. We are getting after the challenges of the NDS in our budget
by funding programs that are vital to win in the high-end fight, such
as: hypersonics, F-35, Next Generation Air Dominance, B-21 Raider, KC-
46, T-X, Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, ABMS, and preferred
munitions. However, as our Air Force We Need analysis shows the Air
Force at 312 operational squadrons is too small to meet the demands of
the NDS.
37. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, your
budget calls for increasing the Air Force by 4,400 airmen and 5,143
civilians. What are you doing to ensure that you can get the proper
talent to fill these vital positions?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. In an environment with a
fast growing competition for talent spurred by a robust economy, we are
committed to improving how we recruit and prepare airmen to succeed,
even as we have found success in attracting top talent from across our
Nation. The increased airmen will go to support maintenance of our new
weapon systems as well as increasing requirements in cyber,
intelligence, rated and pilot production, career enlisted aviators and
battlefield airmen. We have found success in recruiting most of these
areas, and to ensure continued success we've adopted a total force
recruiting approach which allows all recruiters to fill positions in
the Active, Guard, Reserve and civil service. This ensures we maximize
the productivity of each recruiter. We've added new recruiters to
markets where we need additional support and focused our advertising
and marketing program. Moreover, we've seen an increase in the number
of leads through online career interest survey, Air Force Work Interest
Navigator (AF-WIN). To date this survey has generated over 141,000
leads--an average of over 400 surveys per day. We also stood up a
squadron that is solely responsible for recruiting battlefield airmen,
as well as a recruiting detachment to focus on engaging the pre-
accessions demographic as part of the Air Force's efforts to improve
outreach to youth, specifically increasing opportunities and awareness
to diverse populations. Using these multiple approaches and tools, we
are confident highly talented and skilled Americans will continue to
find quality of service and quality of life while serving their country
as airmen.
The Air Force instituted numerous improvements to our civilian
hiring and recruitment processes and developed a Comprehensive
Recruiting Strategy in order to increase our applicant pools. We
established a Talent Acquisition Team dedicated to recruiting civilian
talent for mission critical and highly skilled fields. The Talent
Acquisition Team combines workforce planning, forecasting, and analysis
with innovative marketing, acquisition tools, and sourcing strategies
to address both short and long-term hiring needs. The talent
acquisition strategy includes leveraging social media and civilian
sector recruiting sources and technology to improve the speed and
quality of hiring. As one example, from January through March 2019, the
AF conducted 23 outreach and hiring events across the nation at 22
colleges/universities. These efforts increased recruiting by 63 percent
and generated 93,000 primary leads. There are numerous other more
localized programs at our Major Commands and installations throughout
the country. The Air Force also implemented changes to our hiring
processes to reduce time-to-hire in order to ensure we do not lose top
talent through lengthy delays in hiring. We continue to make steady
progress in reducing hiring timelines and are continuing to press for
greater reform to civilian hiring.
military construction funding
38. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, in your
recent MILCON fiscal year 2020 budget request, the Air Force continues
to prioritize critical infrastructure requirements to meet mission
needs and operational timeliness. The request states that its MILCON
investments support the combatant commanders' highest construction
priorities, new weapons system beddowns, and modernization of research,
development and testing. What is the importance of MILCON investments
to improve your capabilities to deter our adversaries in the Indo-
Pacific region?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Military Construction
investments are critical to supporting the operational beddown,
training and employment of our future force. At the same time, Military
Construction is vital to supporting our people and their families.
While we are exploring a variety of different approaches to future
military operations within the Indo-Pacific region, Military
Construction will continue to be a vital part of all approaches.
Air Force Military Construction supports combatant commanders,
beddown of new weapons systems such as the F-35, and recapitalization
of our existing infrastructure. Military Construction investments are
powerful tools in the Indo-Pacific region, as they provide us with
alternative airfields, fuels resiliency, modernized facilities, and
surveillance capabilities in remote and isolated areas. Each completed
project reminds our partners and adversaries of the United States'
commitment to the Indo-Pacific Region.
sexual harassment and retaliation
39. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, annual
reports on sexual assault in the military and annual reports on sexual
harassment and violence at the military service academies consistently
document the direct correlation between incidents of sexual harassment
and incidents of sexual assault. Many past witnesses in Senate Armed
Services Hearings have testified to the seriousness of addressing
sexual harassment and sexual assault in the military. Please provide an
update on what the Air Force is doing on the issue of sexual harassment
and retaliation.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Training: Sexual Harassment
is a topic highlighted during the curriculum for all initial training.
We also reinforce sexual harassment policy at different stages
throughout an Airman's career. Additionally, Sexual Harassment
Awareness Education (SHAE) Training is a tool we provide to Key Leaders
to reiterate sexual harassment policy. SHAE training includes the
following:
Define sexual harassment
Identify behaviors that may constitute sexual harassment
using DOD definition
Identify the effects and describe the impact of sexual
harassment
Prevention strategies
Individual roles and responsibilities when addressing
sexual harassment
Sexual harassment scenarios
Prevention: In addition to training, we utilize organizational
climate assessment tools as a preventive measure for Commanders to
identify and track problematic behavior trends (to include sexual
harassment), and develop action plans to address and counter those
behaviors within their unit.
Complaint Processing Options/Policy: Military sexual harassment
complainants have the option to file informal and formal complaints
through the military equal opportunity process. Civilian complainants
have the option of filing a sexual harassment complaint through the
equal employment opportunity process.
Retaliation: We advise all complainants of their rights in regards
to reprisal and retaliation by equal opportunity practitioners during
initial discussions, and upon any inquiries by customers who contact
the equal opportunity office. Any allegations of reprisal presented to
the EO office by military personnel, including cadets, are referred to
the Inspector General. We are aligning the AF Equal Opportunity
Retaliation Program with DOD's Retaliation Prevention Response Strategy
(RPRS), which is designed to operationalize the following:
Develop and employ a common definition of retaliation to
describe the full spectrum of retaliatory behavior;
Initiate a data-driven approach to inform retaliation
prevention and response mechanisms through a case tracking system;
Hold offenders appropriately accountable;
Facilitate a variety of support resources for sexual
assault victims, sexual harassment complainants, witnesses, bystanders,
and first responders;
Provide leadership with additional education and tools to
promote unit climates intolerant of retaliatory behavior.
space capabilities
40. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, the Maui Space Surveillance
Site provides a space capability combining operational satellite
tracking facilities with a research and development facility. What are
some areas in which we could make greater space investments (e.g.,
cyber)?
General Goldfein. The Air Force is making a number of key
investments in space, consistent with the National Defense Strategy.
First, we are recapitalizing current generation systems with resilient,
defendable capabilities along with the means to defend them. Second, we
are developing capabilities to fight back, if necessary, at a time,
place, and domain of our choosing. Third, we are investing in the
people that will develop, field, operate and support these new
capabilities.
41. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, what is the importance of a
whole-of-government approach when working with our allies in this
integrated and interdependent domain?
General Goldfein. A whole-of-government approach when working with
our allies in an integrated and interdependent space domain is
critically important for ensuring the dominance and lethality to deter,
defend and if necessary fight and win a future war. We are threatened
by economic, military and political aggression, and we need to preserve
the peace through strength. Our strength as a nation, however, is
greatly magnified by embracing allies and partners who share our values
and contribute to our common defense. As part of this approach, the Air
Force is strengthening alliances, establishing new partnerships,
leveraging industry and non-governmental organizations and increasing
information sharing. A prime venue for this was the April 2019 Space
Symposium, which brought together Air Force, other Government entities,
industry, international and commercial leaders in a week-long
conference to collaborate and share best practices across the space
enterprise. Other activities being pursued by the Air Force in support
of a whole-of-government approach include increased international space
training where we consistently review course material for increased
inclusion of allied nations and the participation of allies and
partners in U.S. wargames. The Air Force is also appropriately sharing
more classified information with our allies, and it is integrating more
allies into operations centers such as the Combined Space Operations
Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. This center was
established last year to coordinate space intelligence sharing among
allies and commercial space companies. Current participants include
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
eagle vision
42. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, the fiscal year 2020 Air
Force Budget briefing documentation includes a claim that through the
identification of redundant capabilities, the AF was able to divest all
funding for the Eagle Vision program through an agreement between the
Air Force and a National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. A claim is
also made that the Air Force receives a higher resolution of service at
no cost to the Air Force saving $21 million per year.
Please submit a copy of the referenced agreement between the Air
Force and NGA.
Secretary Wilson. While there is no formal memorandum of agreement
between NGA and the Air Force, NGA's NextView License allows release of
Digital Globe imagery to the Air Force. NGA's NextView License provides
similar services of which some are identical in nature to Eagle Vision.
Please see Appendix A, page 776, ``NextView License Sharing and Release
Guidance.''
43. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does the
agreement take into consideration the fact that Eagle Vision, in
addition to support for domestic operations, also provides support for
natural disasters, humanitarian relief operations, Theater Security
Cooperation, and military missions in partner nations where NGA does
not fully release commercial imagery?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The current NextView License
allows imagery support for domestic operations, support for natural
disasters, humanitarian relief operations, Theater Security
Cooperation, and military missions in partner nations. Imagery released
to combatant commanders can be shared directly with third party users
where the mission is of U.S. interest.
44. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, can
NGA's commercial imagery be released to all coalition and partner
nations? If not, please provide any restrictions to the share-ability
of this imagery.
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. NGA may share imagery with
organizations beyond the USG, such as coalition and partners nations,
provided that it supports a USG purpose with a direct benefit to the
USG. The NextView License allows NGA to disseminate and share
commercial data imagery, imagery services, and imagery derived products
with members of the USG including all branches, departments, agencies,
and offices for U.S. Government purposes. Imagery released to combatant
commanders can be shared directly with third party users where the
mission is of U.S. interest. In addition, NGA may share commercial
imagery directly with the following organizations: State & Local
Governments, Foreign Governments and Intergovernmental agencies, USG
contractors and university researchers supporting USG contracts, and
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Non-profit Organizations.
NGA's corporate dissemination systems limit accesses to commercial
imagery in accordance with intelligence oversight policies. NGA also
provides commercial data to foreign partners in 42 countries across the
globe and now can provide imagery to foreign government in support of
combatant command requests.
45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, please provide a copy of the
analysis used to determine that the NGA could meet the requirements of
the Eagle Vision system to include the need for timely imagery.
Secretary Wilson. It was through a body of evidence that the Air
Force determined NGA could meet the requirements of the Eagle Vision
system. Please see attached Air Force Audit Agency report and Air Force
Requirement Office memorandum.
46. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, without
a Federally declared emergency, does the National Guard have access to
NGA commercial imagery for all domestic response situations, both
archived and new collections?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, as a result of updates
to NGB processes, NGB confirms access to all NGA commercial imagery for
both state declared and federally declared emergencies via the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS).
As a result of the NextView license in 2018, NGA approved ``Limited
Public Release'' of imagery. For example, all commercial imagery
related to Hurricane Matthew was released prior to the storm making
landfall. This approval, along with expedited delivery of commercial
imagery directly to FEMA servers, allowed the widest distribution of
imagery to Federal, State, and Local authorities. Imagery was also
publicly released to assist with storm preparations as well as post-
storm rescues and damage assessments.
47. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does NGA
currently have an unclassified SAR capability or contracts with
commercial vendors to obtain unclassified SAR imagery?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, NGA has a bilateral
agreement with the Canadian government, called the NorthernView
Agreement, which enables NGA and its customers to have access to
unclassified SAR collections world-wide. This capability is comparable
to that of Eagle Vision's TerraSAR-X access.
48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does NGA
have a mobile, direct downlink capability from commercial imaging
satellites?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. [Deleted.]
49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, one of
Eagle Visions' strengths is a robust capability to process and produce
unclassified and sharable imagery products from remote deployed
locations. Does NGA have this mobile capability?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, as mentioned in
question 52, the Domestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial Intelligence
System (DMIGS) units can support domestic remote delivery and
dissemination requirements. NGA does have some small tactical unmanned
imaging systems used to support limited operations.
50. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the Air
Force has other alternative imaging capabilities. What are the costs
associated with utilizing alternative imaging capabilities? For
example, what are the costs for utilizing such platforms as Global Hawk
and U2 for imagery?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There is no cost additive to
the Air Force for utilizing alternative imaging capabilities. As with
Eagle Vision, programs are federally funded for their sharable imaging
capabilities as a part of their missions. However, in situations that
drive addition flying hours or conflicts between title 32 or title 50,
additional cost could be assessed above Air Force programed dollars.
51. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what is
the process the Air Force customer uses to order domestic response
commercial unclassified imagery from NGA? What is process for Eagle
Vision imagery requests? What is the difference in the timeline?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are multiple facets
with respect to the process Air Force customer(s) use to order domestic
response commercial unclassified imagery from NGA and Eagle Vision.
These are broken down into the following:
1) Access to data,
2) When Satellite is Overhead,
3) Customer Order,
4) Satellite Tasking, and
5) Product Delivery.
1) Access to Data--Both NGA and EV users have the ability to
generally quickly access commercial unclassified imagery from their
respective data repositories through web based access.
2) When Satellite is Overhead--When the satellite is overhead of
the target area, both NGA and EV can gain collection of the image and
it can be accessed by users generally on the same timeline.
3) Customer order--NGA can direct and update collection plans up
until 20 minutes prior to satellite uplink and collection over target
area. EV can request collection as late as the satellite rising over
the horizon.
4) Satellite Tasking--NGA customers request their collection needs
through an NGA Source Strategy. Analysts build collection plans that
optimize sensor capabilities and maximize efficiency and effectiveness
of the satellite time while satisfying requirements from across the IC,
DOD, and Fed/Civ communities. These tasking(s) requests are fulfilled
as the next available satellite collects the image request when over
the target site. EV direct tasking can be accomplished by calling the
EV Program Manager to request a collection, who then makes the request
for the user which is met when the next available satellite passes the
target area, including direct tasking as the satellite rises over the
horizon.
5) Product delivery--NGA NextView license is contractually
obligated to deliver 90 percent of their satellite data in under 100
minutes or less. Historically, to date 98 percent of that commercial
data has been delivered in under 50 minutes, as the average delivery
time. EV historically downlinks, processes and is available for
delivery as the satellite sets over the horizon.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
hypersonics
52. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I am
pleased to see the Air Force budget $576 million for hypersonics. As
you know, Sandia National Laboratories has played a critical role in
developing this technology over decades and is the core reason for why
we have a capability ready to prototype. I have spoken to lab directors
who are eager to transition this technology to industry and believe it
is important to co-locate the R&D and the manufacturing of these
systems. Do you agree there is value in ensuring the core talent and
expertise of the technology is nearby production efforts?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Sandia National Laboratories
(SNL) has been instrumental in the technical and design development of
hypersonic system concepts. SNL expertise and technical data continues
to be leveraged by the Air Force as it pursues its hypersonic strike
capability, and in particular its Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon
(HCSW) prototype effort. For specific HCSW milestones, SNL is working
with the Air Force to deliver the first several sets of hypersonic
glide body hardware to Lockheed Martin Space (LMS) for integrated
flight test and technical expertise. SNL will continue to be engaged
for expertise in transitioning this technology to industry.
53. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what
are we doing to co-locate the R&D and manufacturing of these systems?
Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force acquisition
framework recognizes there are many ways to combine technical
expertise, manufacturing capability, and testing infrastructure. The
Air Force acquisition process does not prescribe to industry how they
organize to deliver weapon system capability.
new mexico air national guard
54. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, the Air National Guard
enterprise is based on established Capstone Principles that set the
foundational framework for aircraft in the 54 states and territories.
Specifically, one of those Capstone Principles is to allocate at least
one unit-equipped wing and flying squadron to each state. Yet, the New
Mexico Air National Guard is the only one in the country without an
operational flying mission and one of three states--New Mexico,
Virginia, and Washington--that lack ownership of aircraft. Are states
that are currently unable to align with these core principles due to
divestiture of aircraft in the past given priority for new mission
opportunities?
General Goldfein. While we recognize the value and intent of the
ANG's Capstone Principles, our Strategic Basing Process does not give
specific priority to states based on their alignment with them. We do,
however, work hard to ensure the enterprise we define for each basing
action is as inclusive as possible. The Strategic Basing Process
evaluates candidates through a number of important factors (e.g.,
suitability of existing facilities, capacity to absorb additional
mission, location demographics and environmental factors) and all three
components are fully represented. As mission demands evolve and
resource constraints remain, the Air Force continues to ensure it
leverages the collective talent and experience of the Regular, Guard
and Reserve Forces to compete, deter and win.
55. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, will you commit to working
with the National Guard Bureau to address the lack of a unit-equipped
wing and flying squadron in the New Mexico Air National Guard and to
address aircraft ownership in New Mexico, Virginia, and Washington?
General Goldfein. I look forward to continuing our collaborative
efforts with the National Guard Bureau on building a more lethal and
ready Total Force. The New Mexico Air National Guard represents one of
the many opportunities that can help us accelerate towards the Air
Force We Need and the additional unit-equipped air, space and
cyberspace squadrons that are required. That strategic design effort is
led by the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC), and
the Air National Guard's integration into that office underscores our
commitment to capitalize on the strengths and opportunity in the
Reserve Component.
56. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, considering the mission
growth suggested by the Air Force We Need imperative, will a
substantial proportion of that growth be realized in the Air National
Guard?
General Goldfein. The Air Force will need to grow across all
components--Active, Reserve and Air National Guard. The assumption in
the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA 1064 Study was to maintain the current force
mix ratios across all the mission sets. If the Air Force were to
increase by 25 percent, more analysis would need to be conducted to
determine the optimal growth across components based on operational,
strategic, and cost factors associated with meeting NDS demand across
many mission sets.
57. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, if the Air National Guard
will likely take on additional mission sets in line with the Air Force
We Need guidelines, is it reasonable to expect that locations with
available ramp space, infrastructure, and manpower will be given
priority to maximize budgetary limitations?
General Goldfein. The Air Force strategic basing process considers
existing excess capacity first. Using existing excess capacity results
in judicious use of taxpayer dollars and potentially reduces overall
bed down costs.
58. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, given the recognized
performance enhancements of the CV-22 aircraft for both federal and
state roles, will the airframe be purchased in larger numbers to meet
the increased demands on Special Operations mission sets? If so, will
they be considered for equipping Air National Guard units?
General Goldfein. The Air Force Program of Record for the CV-22 is
54 aircraft; the Air Force has no plans to procure additional aircraft.
Once the 54 aircraft are procured, the Air Force Special Operations
Command's four Attrition Reserve CV-22s will be located where they are
most needed based on CV-22 enterprise requirements. AFSOC has two
associate ANG units.
59. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, the proposed light attack
program for the United States Air Force has gone through multiple
iterations of aircraft competitions, testing issues, extended timelines
and program de-prioritization. What is your current posture to realize
an affordable option that has clear potential to fulfill a niche role
in support of the National Defense Strategy?
General Goldfein. Our current posture is to procure a small number
of aircraft from two vendors for ACC and AFSOC to support continued
experimentation. Beyond just airframe capability, our exploration
efforts include an exportable tactical data network to enhance partner
nation support to this NDS role. If the results of the experimentation
are positive, the budget includes procurement funds in fiscal year
2022-24 to buy aircraft.
kirtland military housing
60. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, Kirtland was one of the
bases affected by issues associated with privatized military housing.
Specifically, the Maxwell development at Kirtland is in disrepair; so
much so that very few military personnel live there. However, the
privatized-housing contractor is leasing the space to civilians. Can
your team report back to me on the current status of this housing
development and when did military personnel stop living there?
Secretary Wilson. The housing units on the Maxwell parcel are
smaller units with older floorplans located off base. As these are
older units, they do require more maintenance than newer housing units.
While this housing neighborhood has more non-military residents than
the main housing area on Kirtland Air Force Base, 37 percent of
residents in the Maxwell neighborhood are military, including military
families and unaccompanied military members.
61. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, it is my understanding
Maxwell Housing is slated for demolition, but that the homes are
currently under a 5-year extension. Why, and under what terms, was the
extension granted; and when can we expect demolition to take place?
Secretary Wilson. The Maxwell homes were extended through April
2024 in order to generate additional revenue for the Kirtland Family
Housing Project and strengthen cash flow available for mid-term
reinvestment. Even with this additional revenue, the project may still
have significant long-term shortages in sustainment and
recapitalization funding, which may drive another extension unless
market conditions change. Currently, the units are slated for
demolition upon the termination of the extension in April 2024.
62. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, are the Maxwell homes still
generating revenue? If so, where does that revenue go?
Secretary Wilson. The 5-year extension of the Maxwell homes is
projected to generate a total of approximately $5.3 million in
additional funding for the Reinvestment Account after debt obligations
and operating expenses are paid. The Air Force has approval authority
for how Reinvestment Account funds are spent, and can direct the
funding to be used for sustainment and reinvestment in any housing
units within the Kirtland Family Housing Project (including homes in
the main housing area on base).
Directed Energy Programs Designated as ``Section 804'' Accelerated
Acquisition Programs
directed energy programs designated as ``section 804'' accelerated
acquisition programs
63. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, to my knowledge there are
no Directed Energy programs currently designated as ``Section 804''
Rapid Prototyping or Rapid Fielding activities, which is different than
many other Air Force acquisition efforts, especially in space and
hypersonics. Why have you not designated any Directed Energy programs
as 804 activities?
Secretary Wilson. We have used similar rapid prototyping activities
for our Directed Energy Experimentation Campaign. In addition, two
prototype High Power Microwave Systems were funded using OSD-level
Rapid Prototyping Funds. We have not specifically designated programs
for 804, because airborne applications are still in the technology
demonstration phase and ground-based applications are undergoing
operational experimentation to assess military utility, concepts of
operations, and policy issues. Once airborne Advanced Technology
Demonstrators are built, current estimate in 2021, we will conduct a
round of experimentation and consider airborne Directed Energy as a
candidate for rapid prototyping. Once our ground-based prototypes
conclude operational experiments later this year, we will consider them
a candidate for 804 activities.
64. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, would the 804 designation
speed the prototyping and fielding of these much needed capabilities?
Secretary Wilson. Once the airborne technology demonstrators are
built and ground-based prototypes complete operational experiments, the
804 designation would absolutely speed the fielding of these
capabilities.
laboratory and test range bureaucracy
65. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, please provide an update on
the use of the streamlining authorities that this Committee authorized
under Section 233 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. These authorities
allows lab directors and range commanders to cut red tape and move
their organizations to embrace the agile and innovative activities that
we all think will be necessary to enhance Air Force research, testing,
and innovation and lead to more efficient deployment of new
capabilities. They will also help make these Air Force institutions
behave more like their private sector counterparts, and make them a
more attractive employer for world class technical and innovative
talent. The Navy, in particular, has aggressively and successfully used
these authorities for its labs and warfare centers.
Secretary Wilson. The AF greatly appreciates the section 233
authority. The Air Force Flight Test Center, which oversees the
developmental test ranges, and the Nevada Test and Training Range have
used the authority resulting in three innovative activities. To date,
the Air Force laboratories have not utilized the authority but plan to
do so in the near future.
66. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what successes has the Air
Force seen from using these authorities?
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force Flight Test Center (AFTC) has
utilized the section 233 authority to update the Center Scheduling
Enterprise software allowing communication between Edwards AFB and
Eglin AFB scheduling centers, improving distributed test operations
efforts. AFTC has also standardized instrumentation tasks for greater
sharing of test instrumentation resources across the 412th Test Wing
and the 96th Test Wing instrumentation groups. Lastly, the Nevada Test
and Training Range (NTTR) has developed a threat simulation capability
that cuts required development time for new or upgraded threats at
reduced cost. The NTTR effort will begin production in June 2019.
67. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what are the plans for the
use of these authorities in the near future?
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force Major Range Test Facility Base
plans to continue to utilize Section 233 authority when and where
applicable while the Air Force Research Laboratory is looking forward
to take full advantage of the authority in the coming year.
68. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what has been the major
challenge in using these authorities to date?
Secretary Wilson. There have not been difficulties in utilizing the
233 authorities.
internal afrl research funding
69. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, I note that the Air Force
has struggled to develop a mechanism to fully use the authorities of 10
USC 2363--which would allow AFRL lab directors the ability to use funds
available to them to fund internal R&D and fund other activities,
including lab construction and workforce development programs. The GAO
noted that the Air Force has not yet developed a mechanism to charge
research laboratory customers a fixed fee for costs that would fund
these activities. Please provide an update and timeline for
implementation relating to Air Force to respond the GAO finding on the
inability to develop this charging mechanism.
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force is continuing to work towards
establishing a special account within the Treasury to properly receive
and expend these fixed percentage fees. Air Force has taken the
necessary steps to request the creation of a Special Fund account
through OUSD(C). Once OMB and Treasury approves and establishes the
account the Air Force will begin collecting fees from Air Force
Research Laboratory's customers. Special Fund account is the existing/
optimal solution where collections can immediately be made available
for execution. Air Force is optimistic a Special Fund account will be
created sometime in fiscal year 2020 and collections will start shortly
after that, but timeline is driven by OUSD(C), OMB, and Treasury as
they control the Special Fund approval process.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
f-15ex
70. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, how does the Air Force intend
to field the new F-15EXs? Will they be fielded across both the Active
and Guard components? Which do you expect to receive aircraft first?
General Goldfein. The F-15EX is intended to replace the Air Force's
oldest F-15C/D aircraft. The decision on fielding locations and
timelines will be made using the Air Force Strategic Basing Process.
71. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, the F-15EX aircraft in this
year's budget are intended to replace legacy F-15C and D Eagles. The F-
15C fleet is flown by Air National Guard units around the country. In
your testimony this week to Congress, you've noted that transitioning
units across ``like-type'' aircraft--in other words, from one model of
F-15 to another--takes advantage of common infrastructure, parts and
equipment. Can you elaborate on this? How do unit readiness and mission
conversion costs and schedules factor into this F-15EX decision?
General Goldfein. The F-15C/D begins to age out between 2023 and
the last aircraft in 2028. The current buy profile is for 80 aircraft
through 2024 and we anticipate replacing F-15Cs one for one with
procured F-15EXs in the FYDP. We estimate that the transition time, to
return to acceptable readiness levels, from F-15s to the F-35
(dissimilar aircraft) will take approximately 18 months for an Active
Duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron. The
transition time is due to aircrew and maintenance personnel training.
Our estimate is it will take 6 months or less to transition from the F-
15C to the F-15EX. The Air Force is still evaluating specific spare
inventory requirements and equipment compatibilities. In terms of
operating costs, we estimate that F-15EX will cost less to operate than
the F-15C fleet; however, the exact operating costs are unknown at this
time.
72. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what is your estimate of the
cost and time required to convert an F-15C unit to F-15EX?
General Goldfein. Our estimate is it will take 6 months or less to
transition from the F-15C to the F-15X.
73. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what is your estimate of the
cost and time required to convert an F-15C unit to an F-35 mission?
General Goldfein. It will take approximately 18 months for an
Active Duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron.
The transition time is due to aircrew and maintenance personnel
training. Based on previous conversion efforts, we estimate cost to be
upwards of $60-$70 million.
74. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, under our current national
defense strategy, it's important that we understand the Air Force's
decision to procure new F-15s from an operational perspective. Can you
clarify how a fifth generation fighter like the F-35 and a fourth-
generation plus platform like the F-15EX would complement each other in
a near peer fight?
General Goldfein. The F-35 and F-15EX bring complementary
capabilities to a peer fight. The F-35 design allows for penetrating
adversary air defense systems to prosecute targets while passing
targeting information back to other assets for additional target
prosecution. F-15EX is an improved model from Boeing, teaming a new
airframe with an improved radar, cockpit, electronic warfare suite and
the ability to carry more missiles than previous F-15 model aircraft in
service. Individually, both are good for what they are designed to do.
The future fight requires more than just individual platforms which are
good. It requires weapon systems working together for the enhanced
capability required to deter and defeat peer adversaries. The F-35 and
F-15EX complement each other and provide that greater capability to the
U.S. in a peer fight environment.
75. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what unique capabilities, if
any, does the F-15EX bring into your tactical fighter inventory,
whether in terms of range or payload or stand-off?
General Goldfein. F-15EX will be able to carry more air-to-air
missiles than any other 4th generation aircraft in the USAF inventory.
Additionally, the F-15EX will be able to employ large munitions in the
above 2,000 pound weapons class. A more detailed discussion of the F-
15EX's unique capabilities is best provided in a classified setting,
which we are ready to provide at your request.
76. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, earlier this year you stated
the following regarding your plan to buy new F-15EX aircraft in fiscal
year 2020: ``We've got to refresh the F-15C fleet because I can't
afford not to have that capacity to do the job and the missions. That's
what this is all about. If we're refreshing the F-15C fleet, as we're
building up the F-35 fleet, this is not about any kind of a trade.'' Is
that still your position?
General Goldfein. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
rc-26b retirement
77. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wilson, I see in the budget the Air
Force is planning on retiring the entire RC-26B fleet. The RC-26B is an
important part of not only the West Virginia National Guard
contribution but also to the security of the United States in its
domestic border surveillance and counterdrug missions. I am concerned
that the Nation will lose a valuable asset and capability if we retire
this aircraft. How is the Air Force going to mitigate the loss of the
RC-26B if you follow through with the plan to retire it?
Secretary Wilson. The Air Force divested the RC-26 program in the
fiscal year 2020 budget because there is no longer a DOD/AF/Title-10
requirement for this platform. There are other existing DOD (MQ-9
remotely-piloted aircraft, MC-12, Satellite imagery, Army Lakota
helicopters) and other Federal agency (NOAA, NASA, DHS, CBP) assets
that provide equivalent or better capability than the RC-26 to support
border security and/or counterdrug missions. Over the past four years,
898 percent of National Guard support to the Counter-Drug missions was
accomplished by assets other than the RC-26 (analysts, linguists,
rotary wing, etc.)
national guard c-130h modernization / recapitalization
78. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wilson, the Air Force still operates
a large number of C-130H aircraft across both the Active Duty and
National Guard. This aircraft, which was first delivered in 1965, is
aging rapidly. This was highlighted by the propeller issues that led to
the grounding of 60 C-130H aircraft in February of this year. I see no
procurement of baseline C-130J aircraft in this year's budget, only the
MC-130J specialized variant. Does the Air Force have a long term plan
for replacing the aging C-130H fleet with C-130J or at a minimum
modernizing all C-130--H aircraft to ensure consistent operations and
readiness across the Total Force?
Secretary Wilson. Given limited Air Force funding and a focus on
the National Defense Strategy priorities, at this time there is no plan
to purchase additional combat delivery C-130Js beyond the current
program.
However, the Air Force continues to program the Avionics
Modernization Program Increment 1 and 2, as well as operational
upgrades for C-130H aircraft to ensure that safety/obsolescence,
airspace compliance, and fleet modernization are priorities.
Additionally, several C-130H aircraft have received a Center Wing
Box upgrade, which extends the service life and equivalent flying hours
of those aircraft.
The Air Force is conducting an Operational Utility Evaluation on
the combination of the NP2000 (eight blade propeller), Electronic
Propeller Control System, and 3.5 engine modifications, all on the C-
130H aircraft.
Appendix A
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2019
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue,
Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono,
Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
We have a number of nominees to confirm, here. Since we now
have a quorum, I would like to move to that.
It is present, and I ask the Committee to consider a list
of 82 pending military nominations. All of these nominations
have been before the Committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report these----
Senator Reed. So move.
Chairman Inhofe.--82 pending military nominations to the
Senate? There's a motion.
A second?
Senator Wicker. Second.
Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
[No response.]
Chairman Inhofe. Ayes have it. That's done.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on April 9, 2019.
1. In the Marine Corps there are 12 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Julian D. Alford) (Reference No. 33)
2. General Stephen J. Townsend, USA to be general and Commander, US
Africa Command (Reference No. 378)
3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jason
A. Anthes) (Reference No. 400)
4. In the Air Force there are 13 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Jeremiah L. Blackburn) (Reference No. 424)
5. LTG Timothy J. Kadavy, ARNG to be lieutenant general and Vice
Chief of the National Guard Bureau (Reference No. 460)
6. RADM James W. Kilby, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, N9
(Reference No. 495)
7. LTG Jeffrey L. Harrigian, USAF to be general and Commander, US
Air Forces Europe; Commander, US Air Forces Africa; Commander, Allied
Air Command; and Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (Reference
No. 517)
8. Gen. Tod D. Wolters, USAF to be general and Commander, US
European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Reference No.
527)
9. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with La Tanya D. Austin) (Reference No. 529)
10. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Michael T. Charlton) (Reference No. 530)
11. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Elissa R. Ballas) (Reference No. 531)
12. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Brian C. Bane) (Reference No. 532)
13. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Robin N. Scott) (Reference No. 535)
14. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Matthew R. Thom) (Reference No. 536)
15. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (David
M. Powell) (Reference No. 537)
16. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Ford
M. Lannan) (Reference No. 538)
17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Luke
A. Randall) (Reference No. 539)
18. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Mark M. Kuba) (Reference No. 540)
19. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Rhana S. Kurdi) (Reference No. 541)
20. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Michael D. Norton) (Reference No. 542)
21. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jason
A. Byers) (Reference No. 543)
22. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Nathaniel C. Curley) (Reference No. 544)
23. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Sewhan Kim) (Reference No. 545)
24. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Early Howard, Jr.) (Reference No. 546)
25. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Isaac L. Henderson) (Reference No. 547)
26. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of commander
and below (list begins with Shawn D. Trulove) (Reference No. 548)
27. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Charles E. Jenkins IV) (Reference No. 551)
28. In the Air Force there are 23 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Christopher P. Azzano) (Reference No.
553)
29. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Benjamin D. Ramos) (Reference No. 554)
30. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Christopher D. Black) (Reference No. 555)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (James
A. Broadie) (Reference No. 556)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Brandon E. Resor) (Reference No. 557)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 82
All right, we have a--let's go ahead on this. I'm going to
just go ahead with opening statements, then we'll have a round
after we hear from our witnesses.
The Committee meets today to receive testimonies on the
posture of the Department of Navy in its fiscal year 2020. We
welcome our witnesses: Richard Spencer, the Secretary of the
Navy; Admiral John Richardson, Chief of the Naval Operations
(CNO); and General Robert Neller, Commandant of the Marine
Corps. We thank you, all three, for your service.
The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military
to prepare for the return of great-power competition. This
means we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary,
decisively defeat, our near-peer adversaries. I think we all
know who we're talking about. It's China and Russia.
In order for the Department of the Navy to achieve that
goal, our Navy and Marine Corps must be manned, trained,
equipped appropriately. Significant progress has been made in
rebuilding the readiness, but, still, there's a lot of work to
be done.
With the alarming speed of modernization that we've
witnessed, both conventional and nuclear forces, China and
Russia now present a credible threat to the United States and
our allies. It's past time for action. However, we must be
smart, not hasty, as we modernize our military. Recently--
recent history should be our guide, because, without better
acquisition performance, we could fall behind, or further
behind, our competitors. For example, the last eight combatant
lead ships cost $8 billion more than their initial budget,
delivery the last 6 months late, with dozens of deficiencies.
Another example is our--the 9 to 11 advanced weapons elevators
on the USS Gerald R. Ford still have not been accepted by the
Navy, nearly 2 years after the ship's delivery, and some other
areas, also, the problems with that.
While the promise of new technology may be alluring, it's
no substitute for demonstrated performance. I'm highly
skeptical of claims by the Department of Defense officials that
early retirement of the USS Harry Truman will result in a more
modern and lethal force as well as increased industrial-base
workload. The reality is, the Ford lacks functional weapons
elevators and has significant reliability problems. No
combination of unmanned systems has been shown to match and
reach the lethality of the aircraft carrier and its Air Wing.
The Truman proposal will result in reductions, not increases,
of highly skilled employees. We'll have some questions and
discussion on the USS Truman during the course of this hearing.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Spencer, Admiral
Richardson, and General Neller to the Committee this morning to
testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the Navy
in our review of the fiscal year 2020 authorization request. We
are grateful to each of you for your service and for the
service of the men and women under your command, and for the
support of all Navy and Marine families. Thank them for us,
please.
I particularly want to thank Admiral Richardson and General
Neller, as this is likely to be their last posture hearing
before the Committee. We thank you for your dedicated years of
service to our Nation. As the leaders of the Navy and the
Marine Corps, you face huge challenges as you strive to balance
the need to support ongoing operations and sustained readiness
with the need to modernize and keep the technological edge so
critical to military success.
In the near term, the Marine Corps has $315 million in the
disaster emergency relief supplemental that they need
relatively quickly. I hope we can focus on the potential
consequences of delaying recovery activities and move the
disaster emergency relief supplemental forward.
In addition, because significant levels of funding are
being transferred to build the wall on the southern border, the
amount of reprogramming authority will be limited this year. I
remain concerned that the Navy, Marine Corps, and other
services may run short of headroom in reprogramming authority,
which could lead to other delays and shortages. In addition,
I'm concerned about the opportunity cost of deployments to the
border.
The Department of the Navy faces serious readiness problems
caused by deferred maintenance, reduced steaming and flying
hours, and canceled training and deployments. We are all keenly
aware of the collisions of the McCain and the Fitzgerald, and
the loss of life that resulted. I'm interested in hearing about
the progress the Navy is making in implementing changes that
will ensure such incidents will not happen in the future.
All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely
high operational tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack
submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and
strike fighter inventories. In addition, the Navy is now in its
seventh year of operating with fewer than the legally required
11 aircraft carriers. The Ford is listed in the Navy inventory,
but that ship, which is more than 4 years behind schedule, will
not be ready to deploy for many more months. In addition,
during the next decade, the Navy will need to buy the new
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines to replace the
Ohio-class submarines. This is an extremely expensive
undertaking that is on a very, very tight schedule.
The Marine Corps continues to make modernization of ground
vehicles a priority, which requires balancing the procurement
of new systems while upgrading existing platforms to meet
current operational needs. The amphibious combat vehicle will
replace the aging inventory of assault amphibious vehicles in
order to provide the Marines with increased force protection
and enhanced lethality. The Marine Corps is also partnering
with the Army to develop the joint light tactical vehicle, or
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), to replace the Humvee.
I will welcome an update from our witnesses on the status of
these programs, particularly in view of Army plans to cut back
on the JLTV program.
Two years ago, Admiral Richardson, you released the Force
Structure Assessment that identified a new force-structure
goal. The Navy's current high level of operations contributed,
in part, to your conclusions in this assessment that the goal
for the Navy fleet needs to increase from 308 ships to 355
ships. I'd like to hear what progress the Navy is making in
filling these needs. I'm also interested in learning how the
plan to retire the USS Harry Truman, rather than refuel her, is
consistent with achieving the 355-ship goal.
I, again, thank the witnesses for their service and their
sacrifice. I look forward to their testimony.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We'll now have our opening remarks by our witnesses. Your
entire statement will be made a part of the record, and so, be
brief, if you'd like.
Senator--or Secretary Spencer.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD V. SPENCER, SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
Secretary Spencer. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Committee Members, on behalf of our sailors,
marines, and civilian teammates, thank you for your bipartisan
efforts to restore funding stability.
I would like to take a moment right now, though, and have
everyone pause for a minute. Yesterday, as you read, we lost
three marines and one civilian in an attack. It is still a very
risk-full world out there.
I would be remiss----
Chairman Inhofe. I would ask, right now, though, that we
bow our heads in silence for the lives of these, and the
families, of these individuals.
[A moment of silence was observed.]
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Spencer.
Secretary Spencer. I'd be remiss, Chairman, if I wasn't to
take a moment right now, since this might be my last time in
front of you all testifying on a budget, to say that, wearing a
businessman's hat, I could not have asked for two better
business partners than in the CNO and the Commandant. I came
into a situation that we are working our way out of. If I,
again, carry the corporate term, it was a turnaround. We've
done some herculean work, and these two gentlemen were side by
side, no light between us as we went forward. I'd like to just
acknowledge that.
The concept of a strategy is the application of limited
resources to attain a goal. Aligned to the National Defense
Strategy (NDS), the Navy strategy for restoring readiness,
strengthening relationships, and reforming our processes has
been set, and we will build on that with a disciplined focus on
our people, capabilities, and processes. This budget
prioritizes a strategy-driven, balanced approach to investment.
It builds on prior investments, sustains the industrial base,
and maintains our competitive advantage, if not expands the
perimeters as we move to a more cost-imposing, survivable, and
affordable future of the--future--force of the future.
Restoration of readiness is underway, and we're seeing
progress, ladies and gentlemen, every day. My analogy is that
the wind vanes are all pointed in the right direction. Although
we might be a little frustrated with the velocity of the wind,
we are moving it continually, day by day. We're building the
strength of our team through hiring in areas of critical need,
such as cybersecurity specialists, aviation technicians,
scientists and engineers, human resource specialists, shipyard
workers, and digital warfare officers. We're aligning and
enhancing our educational institutions' distributed-learning
venues through the Education for Seapower Review. We're taking
aggressive actions to return private military housing to a
premium product, mindful that we recruit the individual, but we
retain the family. All of these actions have one common thread
through them: the goal of increased readiness.
We're building our capabilities through investments in
hypersonics, machine learning, additive manufacturing, quantum
computing, and directed energy. We're building the fleet in
pursuit of a 355-ship Navy, manned and unmanned, to include the
Columbia-class submarine, next-generation frigate, and
remotely-piloted platforms, such as Sea Hunter and Orca. These
efforts are increasing lethality through increased distributed
maritime operations.
To reach the Secretary's goal of 80-percent mission-capable
tactical aircraft, we've realigned investments to spares,
aviation engineering, and logistical support through our newly-
created Navy Sustainment System, which is based upon best
practices from outside the wire, as I say, commercial best
practices. As a pilot program, these activities have moved us
to review our processes in all maintenance areas within the
naval enterprise, to include ship, weapon, and vehicle
maintenance and sustainment. Driven by the Marine Corps Force
2025 Capability Investment Strategy, we're investing in the
amphibious combat vehicle, loitering munitions, and unmanned
logistics systems in order to maintain our competitive
advantage. Exercising the Marine Corps operating concept is
moving us to rapidly progress as a continuous learning
organization as we adapt and experiment in our new competitive
environment.
Yet, while we effect the aforementioned, the Marine Corps
is also contending with unprecedented double impact of
Hurricanes Florence and Matthew, which together damaged or
destroyed more than $3.7 billion of infrastructure across many
of our East Coast installations. Camp Lejeune is a primary
force-generator for the naval services, directly contributing
to the capacity and readiness of our force. That area took the
majority of the blunt impact of those storms.
Over the past year, we have meaningfully increased our
interaction with our allies and friends. Exercises and
education have strengthened our ability to operate; therefore,
increasing the depth of our collective ability to deliver the
resources requested. Compared to a year ago, the increase and
depth of our relationship with our allies and friends has been
the prime contributor to this good outcome.
Our Navy has implemented 91 of the 111 readiness reform and
oversight council recommendations, transforming a culture of
accepting risk to one of understanding and managing risk. We've
reviewed and are in the process of remediating our business
processes following our first top-to-bottom audit. The audit is
now proving to be a tool where we find we can leverage
lethality. We're using this information to streamline
operations and reimagine how support functions can be
modernized in order to drive continued learning and, therefore,
produce ever-increasing efficiencies for the American taxpayer.
We owe it to them to ensure every dollar that we invest--every
dollar--is invested in the most effective manner possible. I am
proud to work with this Committee to keep that promise.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]
Prepared Statement by the Honorable Richard V. Spencer
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee
Members. On behalf of our sailors, marines and civilian teammates,
thank you for your bipartisan efforts to restore funding stability to
the Department of the Navy. The foundation for restoring readiness and
increasing lethality has been set. Now we must build on that foundation
with a sense of urgency. While we have much to do, we are well
underway, and I will highlight some of our progress.
where we were
At my confirmation hearing in July 2017, I stated my intent to
expeditiously assess the current situation, develop the tools needed to
enhance its ability to fight, and to deliver on the title 10
responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary the Navy. My priorities
for accomplishing these goals centered on three key areas: people,
capabilities, and processes.
I expressed my determination to recruit, train and retain the best
of our Nation for our military and civilian ranks, and to create a
flat, lean and agile organization where those who manage critical
situations have the ability to make decisions to solve the problems in
front of them.
I committed to rebuild the readiness and lethality of our
capabilities, citing cumulative effects of 16 years of wartime
operational tempo, unpredictable funding, and challenges to our
warfighting advantage as we return to a geostrategic environment
dominated by great power competition.
As a businessman, I expressed my determination to improve our
processes across the portfolio, analyzing all systems and platforms to
extract additional efficiencies, incorporating private sector best
practices, and migrating to a true continual learning enterprise.
where we are
Over the past year and a half, Admiral Richardson, General Neller
and I have attacked these goals with a sense of urgency by investing in
our people, capabilities and processes.
To build the strength of our people, we've invested in a ready,
relevant and responsive force: A Marine Corps force with 186,200 active
personnel and 38,500 reservists; the Targeted Reentry Program to enable
key former personnel a streamlined return into Active Duty; quality of
life and retention efforts like the MyNavy Career Center, which
provides sailors with human resource services around the clock; and the
military parental leave program. We've used the increased Defense
Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) flexibility from the fiscal
year 2019 NDAA to support dynamic changes and requirements in technical
expertise, agility and innovation in our officers. We've invested in
our civilian workforce, including enhanced hiring and training at our
public shipyards to reach our FY20 goal of 36,100 personnel one year
earlier than originally planned.
We've enhanced our capabilities, through targeted investments in
the lethality and readiness of our weapons platforms and munitions. We
have accomplished this through strengthening our partnerships with the
private sector. We've gleaned commercial best practices to increase
efficiency and flow in our ship, ground and aviation maintenance
facilities. The Navy has added 22 Battle Force Ships over fiscal year
2017 and fiscal year 2018, while decommissioning nine, for a net
addition of 13 ships. The Marine Corps has reset 99 percent of ground
equipment and returned 72 percent of our equipment to the operating
forces. We have also enabled personnel to ``fix it forward'' through
technologies such as additive manufacturing, including the procurement
of 160 3D printers capable of producing over 125 ground and 83 NAVAIR-
approved parts on demand.
We've also significantly improved our operational processes,
through the Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Review
(SRR). Over the past year, the Readiness Reform and Oversight Council
has examined 111 recommendations from the review process. 91 have been
adjudicated and 83 have now been implemented. Business processes were
also reviewed and remediated after our first ever top-to-bottom audit
of the Department of the Navy, and we're using this information to
streamline our operations and reimagine how support functions can be
modernized in real time to drive greater readiness, lethality and
efficiency. Through the development and implementation of the Navy
Business Operations Plan and our Performance to Plan tool, we are
beginning to accurately track the output impacts of our efforts.
It must also be noted that the Marine Corps is contending with the
unprecedented double impact of Hurricanes Florence and Matthew, which
together damaged or destroyed more than $3.7B in infrastructure across
many of our east coast installations. Camp Lejeune is a primary force
generator for the Naval Services, directly contributing to the capacity
and readiness of our force. The Marine Corps continues to feel the
immediate impacts of these storms through lost and delayed training
time; delayed deployments and redeployments; and daily quality of life
challenges including the displacement of thousands of personnel and
their families. Recovering from these disasters will require sustained
investment and the ongoing support of this Committee.
where we are going
Now that the foundation for readiness and lethality has been set,
we continue to move forward with a sense of urgency, continually
thinking of how to deliver the people, capabilities and processes
needed by the Navy-Marine Corps Team. The Naval Services have developed
plans informed by the National Defense Strategy, which mandates
increased lethality, strengthened alliances and partnerships, and
improved business processes. Now we are aligning those plans with the
right leaders, tools, budget and technology advancements.
This budget request invests in our people with the education and
resources necessary to develop and retain the human capital we need to
confront a changing world. We'll expand hiring for areas of critical
need, such as cyber security specialists, aviation technicians,
scientists and engineers, human resource specialists, and digital
warfare officers. We'll add end strength to the Marine Corps Special
Operations Command. We'll complete the rollout of Sailor 2025, updating
policies, procedures and systems to improve retention and readiness.
Education is a key component to developing the warfighter the Navy
and Marine Corps Team needs. We will be effecting the blueprint
developed by the recently released Education for Seapower Review,
aligning and enhancing our educational institutions and distributed
learning venues. And earlier this month, along with Secretary Esper and
Secretary Wilson, I hosted University and College Presidents and other
education leaders from across the country for a summit at the United
States Naval Academy dedicated to eliminating the scourge of campus
sexual assault and sexual harassment.
We are constantly mindful that we recruit the individual, but we
retain the family. And without the family, we are not operating at full
capacity. As I stated before this Committee last month, upon reviewing
the issues surrounding Public-Private Venture (PPV) military housing,
it is clear that in some cases we have fallen woefully short of our
obligations, and there is culpability around the table. We have
identified the problems, and are focusing resources on the solutions.
We will correct bad practices and return private military housing to a
premium product. This budget supports these efforts, with a request of
$21.975 million for the oversight of the Department's PPV housing
worldwide.
As we move from rebuilding readiness to owning the next fight, this
budget prioritizes a balanced and strategy-driven approach, to provide
for a bigger, better trained, and more ready force. It invests in our
Force 2.0 capabilities in emerging areas such as applied artificial
intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, additive
manufacturing, directed energy and more. We will continue to build the
fleet in pursuit of the 355 ship Navy, manned and unmanned, to include
the Columbia-class submarine, Next Generation Frigate, and remotely
piloted platforms such as Sea Hunter and Orca, as well as one Ford-
class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class submarines and three
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
Driven by the Marine Corps Force 2025 capability investment
strategy, we will continue to modernize the Marine Corps with a 21st
century Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) by focusing on six key
priorities:
C2 in a degraded environment;
Long range and precision fires;
Operations in the Information Environment (OIE);
Air defense;
Protected mobility and enhanced maneuver; and
Logistics.
This budget invests in Networking on the Move (NOTM) capabilities,
close combat equipment, loitering munitions, unmanned logistic systems,
ground-based anti-ship missiles, Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/
ATOR), the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle to ensure the Marine Corps continues to adapt to meet the
demands of the future operating environment and maintain our
competitive advantage.
We will operate with data-informed end to end processes and
incorporate leading practices to inform how we fight. To achieve the
goal of 80 percent mission capable aircraft in our Fleet Strike Fighter
squadrons, this budget funds the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) to the
maximum executable levels, realigns investments to spares, aviation
engineering and logistics support, while pursuing reforms such as the
Navy Sustainment System, which incorporates best practices from
commercial airline maintenance leaders. We will also incorporate the
lessons of private industry as we invest in shipyard infrastructure and
training to improve performance and throughput.
These are just a few examples of how General Neller, Admiral
Richardson, the entire Navy Marine Corps Team and I are building on the
foundation of restored readiness and increasing lethality. We will
continue to promote a culture of problem solving at every level,
transform from a culture of risk removal to one of understanding and
managing risk, and hold ourselves accountable for how and where we
invest. Every day, we work with a sense of urgency driven by the
knowledge that the American taxpayers provide us with their hard-earned
treasure, and trust us to protect them from a dangerous world. We owe
it to them to ensure that every dollar is invested in the most
effective manner possible to fulfill our sacred oath. I'm proud to work
with this Committee to ensure that we keep that promise. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Spencer.
Admiral Richardson.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking
Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear here alongside Secretary
Spencer and General Neller to discuss the Navy's fiscal year
2020 budget.
You know, President Thomas Jefferson wrote that,
``Industry, commerce, and security are the surest roads to the
happiness and prosperity of our people.'' And the causal link
between prosperity, order, and security is why he deployed the
United States Navy to combat piracy off the Barbary Coast at
the dawn of the 19th century. And it's why, for over two
centuries, we have helped keep the seas open for all and
opposed those who seek to control the seas at the expense of
America and our allies.
Today, as outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy,
nations like China and Russia are attempting to do just that,
to stem the tide that has steadily lifted all boats by
unilaterally redefining international norms on terms more
favorable only to themselves. Chairman, you mentioned that in
your opening statement. The Navy and the Nation are responding
with more than 60,000 sailors deployed aboard nearly 100 ships
and submarines at this very moment by sustainably operating
around the globe, advocating for our principles, and protecting
our national interests.
To maintain this worldwide posture, the President's FY20
budget offers a strategy-driven, future-leaning, balanced
approach to deliver a naval force up to the task in this era of
great-power competition. The single most effective way to
maintain our strategic momentum is to provide adequate, stable,
and predictable funding. This makes everything possible. It
solidifies strategic planning, incentivizes our commercial
partners, and mitigates operational risk by maximizing our
planning and execution time.
The foundation of naval power is our force of talented and
well-trained sailors. Important to our success, we remain
committed to recruiting and retaining diverse shipmates whose
intelligence, curiosity, energy, different backgrounds, and
varied viewpoints will catalyze the speed and quality of
decisions we need to outperform our adversaries. As well,
working with Congress, we continue to transform our pay and
personnel system to 21st century standards.
This budget also builds a bigger fleet, 54 battle-force
ships over 5 years, preserving our industrial base,
strengthening our ability to prevail in any warfighting
contingency. The budget fully funds the Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarine program, fulfilling our existential
imperative to deter nuclear attack on our Homeland.
The budget builds a better fleet, fielding state-of-the-art
systems that are more agile, networked, resilient, and lethal.
This budget recognizes that aircraft carriers will be central
to winning the future fight, which is why it invests in the
Gerald R. Ford-class, delivering far more combat power for less
cost over their lifetime than their Nimitz-class predecessors.
This budget also builds a ready fleet, steaming days to
exercise at sea, flying hours to train in the air, sufficient
quantities of ammunition and spares, and the resources to
conduct maintenance, today and in the future, as the fleet size
grows.
Meeting the Nation's and the Navy's responsibility is not
easy. It requires us all to work together. But, this is what
great nations, and only great nations, can and must do. At the
dawn of the Cold War, as this Nation took on the challenge to
go to the Moon, President Kennedy, a naval officer, said, ``We
do these things, not because they are easy, but because they
are hard, because that challenge is one that we are willing to
accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to
win.''
I am grateful to this Committee and to your colleagues in
the Congress for continuing this important work. We look
forward to sailing alongside you to build and deliver the
safest navy for our sailors, the strongest partner navy for our
friends and allies, and a navy that is the worst nightmare for
our enemies.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Admiral John M. Richardson
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
Navy's fiscal year 2020 budget.
To place this budget in its appropriate tactical, operational, and
strategic context, we must understand what America stands for in the
world so we don't forget it or, worse, take it for granted; the United
States Navy's unique and historic connection to those core tenets; the
challenges to those principles and our national interests by
competitors like China and Russia--and our Navy's response; and the
investments made in the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget to deliver,
operate, sustain, and maintain a Navy that is bigger, better, and more
ready to sail anywhere and do anything in defense of our country.
we are a maritime nation--we rely on freedom of the seas
Our first President, George Washington, best captured the value a
Navy provides to the American people when he said: ``It follows then as
certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval
force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable
and glorious.''
Over 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors and Navy civilians--
alongside our partners in the Congress, academia, industry, and around
the world--devote much of their lives to designing, producing, and
operating a ``decisive'' naval force. Our decisive naval force operates
around the world, defends our national interests, stands ready to fight
if called upon, and de-escalates tensions on our terms. The President's
Fiscal Year 2020 Budget delivers and sustains this decisive force and
the investments contained therein will keep our Navy on a true course
and making best speed to, as our oath declares, ``support and defend
the Constitution of the United States and the country whose course it
directs.''
Our founding values, as well as our livelihoods and collective
national security, are tied to the world's oceans. The seas are a prime
facilitator of our prosperity as a people. But prosperity does not and
cannot exist in a vacuum. It is the result of secure and orderly
conditions that enable the flow of goods and services, access to
markets via open oceans and critical waterways, and the ability to move
unimpeded across the seas.
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The seas present both challenges and opportunities--and the rapid
changes in the maritime environment are stark and profound. More than
90 percent of all international trade travels by sea--60 percent of
that by value sails in containerized vessels. In recent years,
approximately 735 million containers were shipped worldwide annually.
If placed end-to-end, those containers would encircle the globe at the
Equator more than 11 times. Beyond the numbers on trade, the global
economy's reliance on the seas for resources--rare earth minerals for
advanced technology, energy, or aquaculture--increase their economic
and strategic importance. The seabed also plays host to 287 undersea
fiber-optic cables through which 99 percent of global internet traffic
passes, fueling the modern economy.
Each of these developments serve to make the seas even more
congested--and more vital.
challenges to the united states and the international order
Despite the United States' persistent work over two centuries to
keep the seas open to every nation and every mariner, there are those
who seek to upend this free and open order and stem the tide that has
steadily lifted all boats. As discussed in the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS), China and Russia are deploying all elements of their
national power to achieve their global ambitions. China and Russia seek
to accumulate power at America's expense and may imperil the
diplomatic, economic, and military bonds that link the United States to
its allies and partners. And these actions are not only directed at the
United States: China and Russia are working to redefine the norms of
the entire international system on terms more favorable to themselves.
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China and Russia are determined to replace the current free and
open world order with an insular system. They are attempting to impose
unilateral rules, re-draw territorial boundaries, and redefine
exclusive economic zones so they can regulate who comes and who goes,
who sails through and who sails around. These countries' actions are
undermining international security. This behavior breeds distrust and
harms our most vital national interests.
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China's Belt and Road Initiative in particular is blending
diplomatic, economic, military, and social elements of its national
power in an attempt to create its own globally decisive naval force.
China's modus operandi preys off nations' financial vulnerabilities.
They contract to build commercial ports, promise to upgrade domestic
facilities, and invest in national infrastructure projects. Slowly, as
the belt tightens, these commercial ports transition to dual uses,
doubling as military bases that dot strategic waterways. Then, the belt
is cinched as China leverages debt to gain control and access. In the
final analysis, these unfavorable deals strangle a nation's
sovereignty--like an anaconda enwrapping its next meal. Scenes like
this are expanding westward from China through Sri Lanka, Pakistan,
Djibouti and now to our NATO treaty allies, Greece and Italy.
the u.s. navy responding to challenges around the world
The U.S. Navy is responding to this changing security dynamic by
playing to our strengths: deploying all around the globe, regularly
enforcing common principles, strengthening the conditions that have
enabled mutual prosperity, and protecting our national interests. As
you read these words, more than 60,000 sailors are deployed on board
nearly 100 ships and
submarines to enforce a free and open order that enables this
unprecedented flow of goods and services.
As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, the U.S. Navy will
compete aggressively to shape our modern maritime environment, ensuring
that order and security continue to underpin our prosperity. We do so
by harnessing the myriad forces at play--the increasing use of the
maritime domain; the rise of global information systems and the role of
data-driven decision-making; and the increasing rate of technological
creation and adoption. We remain committed to challenging excessive
maritime claims, strengthening relationships with allies and partners,
and upholding time-tested values.
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How can we maintain this worldwide posture and compete given these
strategic realities? How must we invest in order to build, sustain,
organize, and strengthen ourselves so that we can continue harnessing
the global maneuver power inherent in naval forces? The answers lie in
the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget (PB-20), a submission firmly
rooted in addressing Great Power Competition and moving boldly and
swiftly into the future.
Importantly, the single most effective way to maintain the
strategic momentum started in fiscal year 2017 is to enact the
President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget prior to the start of the fiscal
year. This funding will help us fulfill our responsibilities in the
National Defense Strategy by building the Navy the Nation Needs: a
balanced force that will increase America's naval power and safeguard
our economic, diplomatic, and military interests around the world.
a bigger, better, more ready navy
President's Budget 2020 seeks $160 billion for the U.S. Navy. For
perspective, this request represents approximately three percent of the
federal budget. According to the Congressional Budget Office, this
investment represents approximately half of the amount currently
expended on servicing the national debt and one-third of current
expenditures on Medicaid.
This budget request preserves our industrial base and establishes
an aggressive, forward-looking, competitive posture. Our industrial
partners are counting on us for consistent and continuous commitments.
Absent this behavior, we may perpetuate, rather than end, the ``boom-
and-bust'' cycles we have experienced in the past. Coincident with this
aim to steadily grow the force and preserve our industrial base is the
responsibility to ``own'' the additional inventory when it arrives.
President's Budget 2020 embraces future capabilities while judiciously
stewarding our current force.
The guiding principle of our budget request is to balance naval
power across its many dimensions. Naval power is not a choice between
increased capacity or better capability--it is a combination of both.
Naval power is not a choice between readiness and modernization--it
requires a balance of both. Naval power is not a choice between more
complex stand-alone technologies or networked systems--it is achieved
through both. The talent to operate and sustain a larger and more
lethal force is not a choice between more people or better training--it
must draw from both.
Bigger
An ongoing force structure assessment will conclude by the end of
2019. While data-driven analysis may ultimately change the details of
our long-term fleet architecture, all force structure analyses agree in
one respect: we must build a bigger Navy.
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To increase America's naval power, we will build more platforms
like ships, submarines, and aircraft, and expand our special operations
forces. In 2018, Congress made a 355-ship Navy the law of the land, and
this increased capacity will strengthen our ability to prevail in any
warfighting contingencies, meet demand signals from combatant
commanders, expand global influence, and support American prosperity by
safeguarding access to critical markets, waterways, and chokepoints.
The fiscal year 2020 budget requests nearly $24 billion in ship
construction accounts to fund one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier,
three fast attack submarines, three large surface combatants, one small
surface combatant, two combat logistics force ships, and two auxiliary
support ships. Expanded across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
President's Budget 2020 funds construction of 55 battle force ships to
achieve a 301-ship Navy in fiscal year 2020 and a 314-ship Navy in
fiscal year 2024. Along with class-wide service life extensions, this
puts us on pace to reach a 355-ship Navy in fiscal year 2034
(approximately 20 years sooner than President's Budget 2019). The
Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels (also referred
to as the ``Thirty Year Shipbuilding Plan'') accompanies this budget
request.
There is no more existential imperative than deterring a nuclear
attack on the Homeland. President's Budget 2020 fully funds the
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program to do just that.
Fully funding this request now will ensure that the lead ship's
construction commences on time in fiscal year 2021, delivers in 2028,
and conducts its first alert patrol in CY 2030. The Columbia-class will
guarantee continuity of the most survivable leg of the strategic
deterrent triad into the 2080s. This budget also procures 373 fixed and
rotary wing aircraft (including 84 Block 3 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets),
226 unmanned systems, and over 17,000 weapons and munitions across the
FYDP.
The recently approved block buy of two Gerald R. Ford-class
aircraft carriers (CVNs 80 and 81) saves American taxpayers
approximately $4 billion. It also maintains our trajectory towards the
requirement of 12 more survivable and powerful aircraft carriers, and
it gives our industrial partners much-needed predictability. It also
represents an investment in future technologies that solidifies the
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier as a centerpiece of national defense
through the rest of the century.
Finally, President's Budget 2020 funds an additional 5,100 sailors
in fiscal year 2020 (and 18,600 over the FYDP) on top of fiscal year
2019 end strength levels to recruit, man, maintain, operate, and fight
these added ships, submarines, and aircraft. Filling gapped billets at
sea remains our top manning priority, and we are committed to operating
safely, effectively, and sustainably over time as the battle force
grows.
Better
To increase America's naval power, we will build a better fleet--
one that is more capable, agile, networked, and resilient across all of
our naval platforms. This means fielding state-of-the-art systems and
continually modernizing legacy equipment. In addition to other
modernization efforts, the fiscal year 2020 budget includes $18 billion
for research and development--an increase of $1.4 billion over fiscal
year 2019 enacted levels.
For example, President's Budget 2020 includes $4 billion across the
FYDP to modernize 19 guided missile destroyers. This includes critical
upgrades to AEGIS Baseline 9, enabling them to simultaneously perform
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) operations. As well, improvements to Naval Integrated Fire
Control Counter Air (NIFC-CA) will allow networked ships to share
identification, targeting, and fire control data. President's Budget
2020 funds 160 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Service Life Modifications (SLM)
across the FYDP, equipping these aircraft with more lethality at
greater ranges, improved signatures, and advanced networks.
The budget also increases investments in long-range offensive ship-
, sub-, and air-launched weapon systems, including: Tomahawk Land
Attack and Maritime Strike missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
(LRASM), Standard Missile (SM) 6, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended Range
(JSOW-ER), Harpoon Block II+, as well as investments in Conventional
Prompt Strike hypersonics. The budget augments investments for acoustic
superiority modernization by requesting $93 million in fiscal year 2020
($633 million across the FYDP) to improve submarine quieting and sensor
performance. To deliver capability faster, we are also leveraging
accelerated acquisition and rapid prototyping by investing $1.3 billion
in fiscal year 2020 ($4 billion across the FYDP) for the Navy Laser
family of systems, SM-2/6 weapons, MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based
unmanned aerial system, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles.
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The fiscal year 2020 budget builds on the progress made in fiscal
year 2019 by pursuing near-term Naval Tactical Grid development and
investing $50 million in fiscal year 2020 ($236 million across the
FYDP) for the newly-established Digital Warfare Office to design and
implement a comprehensive operational architecture to support emerging
Distributed Maritime Operations concepts. The Navy will also invest
$440 million in fiscal year 2020 (and more than $2 billion across the
FYDP) to fund Fleet and industrial base cyber security, and hardening
of ship hull, mechanical, and electrical systems among others.
As these investments indicate, the Navy is focused on controlling
the high-end fight. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are, and will
continue to be, central to this effort. Ford was designed to deliver
more capability for today's airwing and to provide growth opportunity
for tomorrow's airwing--more lethal systems, and increased power
generation. Ford is also proving more cost effective with a 30 percent
higher sortie rate with a 20 percent smaller crew than her Nimitz-class
predecessors. This translates into $4 billion savings over the life of
the Ford-class when compared to Nimitz-class: in other words, more
naval power for less cost.
Ford is innovation on a grand scale, offering a host of new
technologies that will greatly improve the combat power of strike
groups. As with naval innovations of the past, we didn't get everything
right on the first try. We have learned with each test and most of the
new systems are now operating. And we will continue to learn, iterate,
and improve: the second Ford-class ship is being built with 18 percent
fewer man hours. Despite this aggressive approach to adopt new
technologies, Ford was delivered with less lead-ship cost growth than
several other ship classes. Ford and her successors will set a new
standard for afloat performance and combat power projection well into
the second half of the century.
We are also making tough calls about the capabilities we need to
tackle future challenges. President's Budget 2020 removes funding for
USS Harry S. Truman's (CVN 75) Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH)--
$3.4 billion over the FYDP. We are applying the funds from the RCOH
decision to field cost-imposing advanced technologies faster. In
parallel, we continue to validate this decision through a rigorous
program of studies, wargames and experimentation to analytically
validate the best way forward. We remain postured to respond to what
our studies show us and to adjust pace in-stride, including reversing
the CVN 75 decision, if needed.
Ready
To increase America's naval power, we will build a ready fleet.
This means steaming days to exercise at sea, flying hours to train in
the air, sufficient quantities of ammunition and spares, and the
resources to conduct emergent and planned maintenance--not only for
today but also for the future as the fleet grows in size. And it's not
just about buying more parts: President's Budget 2020 includes $23
million in fiscal year 2020 ($66 million across the FYDP) to research
and develop additive manufacturing (AM) capabilities. Among other AM
goals--such as expanding this capability at sea to additional ships and
beginning to network AM across the enterprise--we intend to produce
1,000 unique end-use components for fleet installation and operation by
the end of 2019. Readiness--both materiel and training proficiency--
transforms our Navy's potential power into actual power. The knowledge
and efficiency gained from the Department of Defense-wide audit will
ensure that we do so as effectively as possible.
The fiscal year 2020 budget continues the readiness and wholeness
commitments we made in fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2018, and fiscal
year 2019 by funding ship and aviation readiness and enabler accounts.
The fiscal year 2020 budget increases maritime and aviation spares
funding compared to fiscal year 2019. Additionally, the fiscal year
2020 budget stabilizes and incentivizes the industrial base by funding
62 ship availabilities in public and private shipyards, shifting two
attack submarine availabilities to private yards, and infusing $546
million in fiscal year 2020 for naval shipyard infrastructure
optimization. Finally, the budget includes capital investments of 12
percent in public shipyard depot facilities and 10 percent in Fleet
Readiness Centers, exceeding the six percent legislative requirement
and underscoring our commitment to increase our capacity to maintain
and modernize our fleet.
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These investments will help on-time maintenance execution--aircraft
and ship availabilities--which in turn gives our sailors the time they
need at sea to build proficiency and confidence; not simply to operate
safely but to prevail at the high-end of maritime conflict.
Recognizing the inherent link between readiness and lethality, we
continue to modernize our logistics capabilities to better refuel,
rearm, resupply, revive, and repair operational forces. At sea, we are
prioritizing the recapitalization of auxiliaries and sealift
capabilities to sustain the Fleet's enduring global posture and support
mobility of the Joint Force. President's Budget 2020 includes an
initial $8 million research and development investment in the Common
Hull Auxiliary Multi-mission Platform (CHAMP) for concept design.
Ashore, we recognize that readiness is an enabler for force projection;
in addition to investing in our shipyards, President's Budget 2020
increases investment in facilities sustainment, restoration, and
modernization (FSRM) to $3.1 billion (from 80 to 87 percent of the
sustainment requirement).
Of course, ships, aircraft, and weapons are not, by themselves,
sufficient to respond to today's complex challenges. The readiness of
these platforms and systems depends on talented and well-trained
sailors, led by commanders of competence and character. Our sailors are
the glue that binds our Navy team together. This is our Polaris. It is
also why we established the College of Leadership and Ethics at the
U.S. Naval War College in April 2018. Just as we have done throughout
our history, we will continue to develop and empower leaders who are
driven to build winning teams.
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The fiscal year 2020 budget continues our generational
transformation of the Navy's manpower and personnel systems. We are
investing $235 million in a modern cloud-based personnel and pay
system, while creating an expanded assignment marketplace and
increasing career flexibility. For example, we are exercising the
authorities granted to us in the reform of the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) to make better use of investments in
training and increase career opportunities and flexibility for our
officer corps. These initiatives leverage state-of-the art practices to
put more control into the hands of our sailors. This includes more
transparency regarding their career options. The sailor 2025 suite of
programs will make today's burdensome and time-consuming process for
executing orders--from updating pay and benefits to finding new housing
and moving household goods--as easy as scanning a Quick Response (QR)
code on a smartphone. Not only will this make the frequent relocations
associated with military service easier for sailors and their families,
it will minimize distractions so they can focus on warfighting.
And we continue to tackle the recommendations listed in the
Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Review (SRR).
President's Budget 2020 assigns the highest funding priority to CR/SRR-
related investments--$346 million in fiscal year 2020 and $1.1 billion
over the FYDP--including construction of new Mariner Skills Training
Program centers and simulators and programmatic commitments for the
Next Generation Surface Search Radar. Additionally, we remain committed
to assessing our ships and crews, understanding the impact of fatigue
and other human factors, filling personnel gaps for ships on deployment
or in sustainment, and dedicating time to maintain our forward-deployed
Fleet. As of February 2019, 20 of the 111 recommendations remain to be
adjudicated. While we are on track to begin implementation of these
remaining items by the end of the fiscal year, we will continue to
analyze the effectiveness of our new programs and iteratively improve
them over the FYDP.
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Finally, we remain committed to recruiting and retaining diverse
shipmates. In a time when evolving artificial intelligence and machine
learning are factoring into future military capabilities, our sailors
must bring creativity, innovation, and context to tactical and
strategic decisions. This potent combination will make us more
competitive and operationally effective. And it is the diversity of
their backgrounds and viewpoints that will catalyze the speed and
quality of decisions we need to outperform our adversaries.
continuing our budgetary momentum
These realities highlight the importance of partnerships and a
recognition that together we can do so much more. This past year's on-
time budget put our Navy on a steady course making best speed. Prior to
last year, when the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) was enacted on August 13, a defense authorization bill had not
been enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year since fiscal year
1997; the last time a defense appropriation was enacted by October 1
was fiscal year 2009. This meant nine years of continuing resolutions
that averaged one-third of the fiscal year. This uncertain financial
footing resulted in fluctuating toplines and interruptions to
government operations and services.
The Navy looks forward to working with the 116th Congress to
continue the momentum developed in fiscal year 2019. Stable and
predictable funding solidifies strategic planning, incentivizes our
commercial partners, strengthens our industrial base, safeguards our
sailors, and bolsters the interests of your constituents. And most
importantly, stable and predictable funding mitigates operational risk
by maximizing our planning and execution time.
With timely, stable, and predictable investments, the U.S. Navy
will be bigger, better, and more ready to work every day--in every
ocean--to set the conditions that allow Americans and all the citizens
of the world to flourish and prosper.
the navy's connection to american principles and power
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The Navy has always maintained a strong connection to the
flourishing and prosperity of the American people. President
Washington's phrase--``everything honorable and glorious''--hearkens to
American values that are derived from the inalienable rights outlined
in the Declaration of Independence: ``That among these are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.''
This last value has commonly been understood as the right to
materially improve our circumstances. The Navy also maintains a deep
and historic connection to America's economic strength, the engine that
makes our country a global power. The Navy was founded to protect vital
sea lanes like Gibraltar and combat piracy off the North African
coast--a mission to safeguard free movement of trade and free access to
markets that continues in earnest today.
``Honorable and glorious'' also characterizes the mission of the
United States Navy and the selfless service of more than 600,000
sailors and civilians, and their families. The U.S. Navy is a
definitive military force in world events but the Navy also connects
with every other element of our national power. The Navy is the face of
the Nation and often the first point of contact between the United
States and other peoples. U.S. Navy ships have shuttled American
diplomats across all seven seas: think of the paddle-wheeled steam
frigate USS Mississippi transporting Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan
in the early 1850s; the Great White Fleet circumnavigating the globe at
the turn of the Twentieth Century; and the USS Quincy (CA 71) carrying
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Malta in 1945. And our ships have
hosted international events of the highest consequence that have shaped
the global security environment, such as the Japanese surrender aboard
the USS Missouri (BB 63), anchored in Tokyo Bay, which formally ended
the Second World War. The Navy brings sovereign United States territory
to the shores of other nations, fostering connections to extend
American assistance to those who would be our friends and demonstrating
resolve to those who may oppose us.
And ingrained in every mariner is the notion that we will never
sail past another mariner in distress. We will continue to provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to our fellow citizens and
neighbors wherever and whenever they are in need.
conclusion
This hearing comes at a critical time to both our Navy and our
Nation. The challenges we face are varied and are growing more dynamic
by the day. Let there be no doubt: America is a maritime nation and a
maritime power. Our way of life and our economic prosperity have always
been linked to the sea. For 243 years--through war and peace,
uncertainty and stability, turmoil and prosperity--the United States
Navy has validated founding father Thomas Paine's maxim that ``a Navy
when finished is worth more than it cost.''
In the competitive environment we face now and in the future, we
must increase naval power in a balanced approach to meet our national
strategic goals. The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget ensures that
the Navy and the Nation can continue to do everything honorable and
glorious, as Washington intended.
I am grateful to this Committee and to your colleagues in the
Congress for starting this important work, and we look forward to
sailing alongside you to build and deliver the Navy the Nation Needs.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Richardson.
General Neller.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General Neller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm here today to
testify on the posture of your Marine Corps, and I appreciate
the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your
questions.
I know this Committee, the Congress, and the American
people have high expectations for our marines. As our Nation's
expeditionary force in readiness, you expect your marines to be
ready to operate forward with our Navy in the contact and blunt
layers of a global operating model, to assure our partners,
deter our rivals, and respond to crisis across the range of
military operations. And, if deterrence should fail and we are
called to fight, you expect us to fight and win.
As we hold this hearing, approximately 41,000 marines are
forward-deployed or postured in more than 60 countries around
the world, some in harm's way, as we found out all too well
yesterday, all engaged, doing exactly what you expect of them,
throughout our history, if you have called upon your marines to
respond immediately to crisis around the globe, either from the
sea, from forward bases, or from home station. To meet your
intent to be ready to suppress or contain international
disturbances, short of large-scale war, we strive to prevent
war by assuring our allies and deterring rivals with ready,
capable, and persistently present naval expeditionary forces.
Forward-postured naval forces remain critical to that end,
providing the Nation a significant operational advantage
through maneuver access and our presence.
Now, supporting day-to-day operations through theater
security cooperation, building partner capacity, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief, or supporting current global
contingencies requires your expeditionary force in readiness to
be present. We recognize the strategic environment is
constantly changing, requiring adaptations to our organization,
training, equipment, and warfighting concepts in order to
provide our Nation the lethal naval expeditionary force it
demands. Your Marine Corps is committed to building the most
ready, capable, and adaptable force the Nation can afford. This
requires hard choices as we balance commitments to our current
operations, work to rebuild our readiness, and pursue
modernization efforts designed to increase our competitive
advantage over our adversaries. Thanks to your efforts in
Congress to provide increased and on-time funding, you have
made some of our choices far less difficult.
Still, we remain challenged by the lasting effects of
Hurricanes Florence and Michael, both mentioned by Ranking
Member Reed and the Secretary, that hit the East Coast last
fall. The financial cost of these two storms totals around $3.7
billion, but their impacts go deeper. And I look forward to
answering any questions on this issue that you may have.
I do want to thank the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Congress, and the administration for their work and support
in approving $400 million of reprogrammed resources so we can
immediately begin addressing some of the most pressing needs at
Camp Lejeune. The Marine Corps continues to work to address the
remaining shortfall within this fiscal year.
Despite these challenges, the Marine Corps remains on the
right path as we implement the National Defense Strategy. We
continue to develop effective warfighting concepts through
experimentation and invest in the right capabilities while
experimenting ruthlessly to validate our choices in order to
prepare for the future.
Most importantly to the success of your Corps, we continue
to recruit and train the most qualified men and women our
Nation has to offer, men and women who raise their right hand,
yearn to earn the eagle, globe, and anchor, and serve something
greater than themselves, and represent the best our Nation has
to offer around the world.
The Navy/Marine Corps team remains our Nation's naval
expeditionary force in readiness, forward-deployed, forward-
postured, competing every day. And with the Congress's
continued support and commitment, we will ensure that we must
send our sons and daughters--if we must send our sons and
daughters into harm's way, they will have every advantage our
Nation can provide.
Lastly, as mentioned by Ranking Member Reed, this was
likely to be my last appearance in front of this Committee as I
close out 44 years as a marine, the last 4 as the Commandant.
And I want to personally thank this Committee for your support
that you show every day to your marines.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Neller follows:]
Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Neller
marines--ready, expeditionary, and lethal
The purpose of your Marine Corps remains unchanged since mandated
by the 82nd Congress--to be ready. Not just ready to go--but ready to
go now, ready to respond and compete wherever sent, and if necessary--
ready to fight and win. This idea of a ``force-in-readiness,''
reaffirmed by the 114th Congress, requires a Marine Corps that is
``most ready, when the Nation is least ready.'' As a naval service,
marines are soldiers of the sea ready to secure or protect national
policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot.
And if we must engage in the violence of battle to secure our
interests, we stand ready for the violent struggle, and prepared to
impose our will on our enemies. It is this idea of total readiness--a
constant preparedness, expeditionary mindset, and aggressive
warfighting philosophy--that remains the driving force behind your
marines today. Yet we recognize the strategic environment is changing,
requiring adaptations to our organization, training, equipment, and
warfighting concepts in order to rebuild our competitive advantage and
provide our Nation the lethal, expeditionary naval force it demands.
The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready, lethal
force the Nation can afford. Unfortunately, the testimony that follows
is presently a conditional statement as the Marine Corps confronts the
impacts of recent Hurricanes Florence and Michael in the fall of last
year. Hurricane Florence was the wettest tropical storm ever recorded
in the Carolinas, dropping 39 inches of water in less than one week.
Just a few short weeks later we felt the impacts of Hurricane Michael,
the strongest storm in terms of maximum sustained wind speed to hit the
United States since Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The impact of these two
disasters in terms of cost to the Marine Corps is estimated to be $3.7
billion, but their impacts go much deeper and the gravity of these
unforeseen disasters may not be fully known to this Committee:
3,000 military personnel displaced including 1,000 family
members living on base.
North Carolina installations are home to II Marine
Expeditionary Force which comprises 1/3 of the combat power of the
Marine Corps.
North Carolina installations are also home to Marine
Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Fleet Readiness
Center-East, and the Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training.
800 buildings across Marine Corps Base (MCB) Lejeune,
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, and MCAS Cherry Point were
damaged or compromised.
100 structures were damaged at Marine Corps Logistics
Base Albany.
Almost 4,000 of the 6,200 homes across these
installations sustained damage.
Your Marine Corps is feeling the immediate impacts of these storms
through lost and delayed training time; delayed deployments and
redeployments; and daily quality of life challenges. Many of our ranges
and training areas remain degraded. Damaged infrastructure to include
roads, railroad trestles, and beaches have degraded our strategic
capacity to deploy. All of these present an unacceptable challenge to
the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness who must remain ready at
a moment's notice. From a force posture ``risk to force'' and ``risk to
mission'' perspective, we assess our current risk to both as
``moderate.'' Effective 1 June of this year however, we assess our risk
to both moving to ``high'' as we enter the next hurricane season.
Thanks to the hard work and support of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Congress, and the Administration, the Marine Corps recently
received $400 million of reprogrammed resources to immediately begin
addressing our most pressing infrastructure needs. We continue to work
tirelessly to address our remaining $449 million shortfall within
fiscal year 2019, and $2.8 billion required over fiscal year 2020,
fiscal year 2021, and future plans to fully recover. We continue to
make the decisions necessary in the short term to return our personnel,
repair our facilities, and restore our readiness. Funding the remainder
of this requirement internally, however, may jeopardize the readiness
gains made over that last few years through the efforts of Congress and
your Marine Corps. We must continue the hard work described in the
remainder of this testimony to rebuild our readiness and modernize our
Corps to maintain our competitive advantage against rising competitors.
Expeditionary
Throughout our history, marines have been called upon to respond
immediately to crises around the globe either from the sea, forward
bases, or home station. To meet Congress' mandate to be `` . . . ready
to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale
war,'' we strive to prevent war by assuring our allies and deterring
rivals with ready, capable, and persistently present expeditionary
forces. Forward postured naval forces remain critical to that end,
providing the Nation a significant operational advantage through
maneuver and access. Supporting steady state operations through theater
security cooperation (TSC); building partner capacity; supporting
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR); and noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEO); or supporting current global
contingencies, requires your expeditionary force-in-readiness to be
present.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) clearly requires forward-
deployed naval expeditionary forces that can compete, deter, and
provide ``inside'' forces capable of denying adversary freedom of
maneuver as part of our integrated naval defense-in-depth.
``Expeditionary,'' however, is more than a simple definition contained
within joint publications. Marines view the term expeditionary as a
pervasive mindset that is fundamental to our character, and an idea
that shapes all aspects of our organization, training, education,
equipment, and employment. Marines must be able to deploy rapidly,
leverage the sea as maneuver space, enter the objective area,
accomplish a broad range of operations, sustain itself, withdraw
quickly, and rapidly reconstitute while forward deployed to execute
follow-on missions. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)--by design
a tailorable, self-sustaining, and scalable expeditionary unit--
provides our Nation a combined arms force capable of exploiting
advantages over an adversary. Equally important, the MAGTF provides a
forward deployed dynamic force available now. Marines approach this
expeditionary mindset holistically--from our training, capability
development, employment in austere conditions, and Service culture.
Although our warfighting concepts must be continually revised and our
capabilities modernized to sustain our ability to respond when called,
it is our expeditionary nature, forward presence as a naval force, and
preparedness for the violence of combat that define our unique role in
the Nation's defense.
Competition, Lethality, and Deterrence
The strategic environment is complex, informationally and
technologically charged, volatile, and dangerous. The proliferation of
modern conventional weapons and social media capabilities to a broader
range of state and non-state actors, along with the erosion of our
competitive technological advantage in areas where we have long enjoyed
relative superiority, is likely to continue as peer competitors attempt
to contest our influence globally. Competition below the traditional
level of armed conflict and global campaigns such as China's One Belt
One Road initiative, create a wide range of strategic and operational
challenges that underscore the need for a globally responsive naval
force capable of providing an asymmetric maritime advantage.
Threats posed by revisionist powers and rogue states require a
change to how your Marine Corps is organized, trained, equipped,
employed, and integrated with the Navy. We must become a more lethal,
resilient, and capable competitor and deterrent. The Navy-Marine Corps
team no longer relies on concepts and capabilities premised on
uncontested sea control. We must establish a forward deployed defense-
in-depth, anchored on naval ``inside'' forces, capable of Expeditionary
Advance Base Operations (EABO) in support of the naval campaign. Modern
sensors and precision weapons with expanding ranges and lethality are
redefining how we assess our posture and relative combat power.
Advanced adversary defensive networks are forcing us to reconsider
methods of assured access required to compete against rising peers
within a contested maritime space. As naval ``inside'' forces, the
Navy-Marine Corps team must develop complementary capabilities to
compete, deter, and win in all domains and facilitate the maneuver and
projection of Joint Force capabilities. Our warfighting contributions
must help shape the strategic environment to prevent conflict--one of
the original mandates of the 82nd Congress for a ``force-in-
readiness.''
The Marine Corps assures allies and partners and competes globally
every day within the Contact and Blunt Layers articulated in the NDS,
in support of respective Fleet Commanders and Geographic Combatant
Commands (GCC). Your Marine Corps maintains approximately one third of
its operating forces, or roughly 39,500 Active and Reserve component
marines, forward deployed and forward stationed. Amphibious Readiness
Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs), Special Purpose Marine
Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTFs), MARSOC, Marine Expeditionary Force
Information Groups (MIGs), Task Force South West, and allocated forces
are forward-deployed and forward-stationed to contest the malign
behavior of our foes, improve interoperability with our allies and
partners, and prepare to delay, degrade, and deny adversary aggression
should deterrence fail and competition turn to armed conflict. And if
our adversaries mistakenly choose to test our will, we must be capable
of providing a combat credible force ready to absorb the initial blow;
hold the line; contest their advance; facilitate sea control/denial;
win the information operations fight; attrit adversary naval, land, and
air forces; and fight until our allies, partners, and the Joint Force
reinforces.
At home, your Corps is preparing to contribute to the war-winning
Joint Force should deterrence fail. We are preparing to respond to
global contingencies against peer rivals in contested environments; to
rapidly aggregate forces from across the globe to deliver capable mass
to the fight; and prepared and ready to wage violence in all domains--
from degrading and penetrating anti-access area denial (A2/AD)
networks--to assuring access and projecting power with command and
control (C2), fires, maneuver, and logistics. Every Marine throughout
the MAGTF is constantly preparing through training and exercises that
approximate the conditions of war as much as possible, and conducting
training that introduces friction in the form of uncertainty, stress,
disorder, and opposing wills. At the institutional level, we are
testing our concepts and developing new tactics, techniques, and
procedures. At the unit level, we are focusing on our foundational core
competencies, individual discipline, and continuing actions in order to
develop the mindset and skills necessary to prevail in any future
fight. Only through hard, demanding, and realistic preparation can we
achieve total readiness.
We must increase the lethality of our integrated naval forces in
order to deter our adversaries; and if deterrence fails, to win.
Deterrence requires a combat credible force that possesses lethal
capabilities, at sufficient capacities, paired with innovative
operational concepts in order to alter the decision making choices of
our adversaries. Lethality spans the Corps from the tactical to the
operational levels of war, and from small unit formations to scalable
MAGTFs. Ground formations must still locate, close with, and destroy
the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel the enemy's assault by fire
and close combat. The Marine Corps is committed to providing every
lethal advantage available to our tactical warfighting formations to
ensure overmatch against peer threats and improve the lethality of our
close combat squads. No Marine should ever enter into a fair fight.
At the MAGTF level, lethality provides the means by which we alter
the decision making choices of our adversaries. A lethal, integrated
naval force that can deny adversary freedom of maneuver is paramount to
this idea. That said, sea control is more challenging now than in past
decades. Long-range detection and targeting methods possessed by
adversaries, combined with extended ranges of their land-based anti-
ship missiles, is increasing the interaction between land and naval
forces in the littorals, requiring the Marine Corps to further develop
and integrate force capabilities in support of the Navy--``Green in
support of Blue.'' While power projection and forward presence remain
foundational to our naval force, we are developing new concepts and
capabilities for assured access, sea control, and sea denial that
include long-range precision strike, raids, Distributed Maritime
Operations (DMO), Operations in the Information Environment (OIE), and
EABO. The product of those efforts, through speed, lethality, and an
asymmetric competitive advantage, is deterrence. Ships and aircraft
acting within a networked fleet must contribute to the lethality of the
fleet with the ability to protect themselves from air, surface, and
sub-surface attack, while possessing organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-
shore strike weapons required by future naval campaigns. Current
amphibious ships lack these capabilities, and therefore, must rely on
support from other combatants to perform sea control and assured access
missions.
To increase the lethality and deterrent effect of our existing
amphibious fleet, the naval force must upgrade C2 suites; introduce
organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore precision strike weapons;
integrate organic air defense; decrease ship signatures; and launch/
recover the MAGTF's growing fleet of unmanned aerial systems--together,
a more cost-effective approach than seeking a replacement of existing
platforms. An amphibious fleet so equipped is a force multiplier to the
larger naval force. The Marine Corps, in support of the Navy, must
shift from a focus on a near symmetric land-based enemy to an
asymmetric view in which Marine forces, operating from expeditionary
advanced bases, threaten enemy naval, land, air, and unmanned forces.
Marines must be prepared to task organize in support of fleet
operations in highly contested maritime environments; employing mobile,
low-signature, operationally relevant, and survivable expeditionary
forces to mitigate challenges created by adversary advantages in
geographic location, weapons system range, and precision. These are the
capabilities and concepts possessed by an integrated naval force that
offer our adversaries a choice--a choice to de-escalate to a state of
manageable competition, or a choice to escalate and face a lethal naval
force at a time and place of our choosing.
Concepts and Experimentation
Marines continue to innovate to build the 21st century MAGTF--a
lethal, adaptive, and resilient Corps that executes combined arms as a
means to conduct maneuver warfare across all domains. This
transformation began in 2016 with the implementation of the Marine
Corps Operating Concept (MOC). The MOC represents our institutional
vision for how the Marine Corps will operate, fight, and win despite
the challenges of the strategic environment, and like the larger
institution, will continue to be revised as the character of naval
warfare changes. The MOC provides the foundation and context for
subordinate operating and functional concepts--like Littoral Operations
in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and EABO--and it guides our analysis,
wargaming, and experimentation. These concepts, and our associated
thinking on warfighting, are naval concepts which complement broader
visions and conclusions articulated in the Navy's DMO concept.
Whereas the MOC, DMO, and EABO provide the concepts for how marines
will fight and prevail, it is through extensive experimentation and
wargaming that we validate our force development choices, and inform
our resourcing and programming strategies. Our experimentation and
wargaming efforts focus on designing a lethal, agile, and resilient
MAGTF optimized for the future that incorporates marines capable of
integrating cyber, OIE, artificial intelligence, and long range
precision fires capabilities in support of the Navy. As a driver of
innovation, our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab completed the first phase
of our long-range experimentation plan called Sea Dragon, and over the
next five years will focus on MAGTF hybrid logistics, OIE, EABO, DMO,
maritime fires, and maritime C2. Through these efforts, the Marine
Corps continues to adapt and refine our capability development, force
structure, and resourcing decisions that modernize the force.
our 2020 budget
``Competing with a Peer Threat'' is the theme of our President's
Budget 2020 submission, and directly aligns with the Secretary of
Defense's guidance to increase lethality, improve warfighting
readiness, and achieve program balance. This year's budget of $45.9
billion builds on the momentum gained over the previous year and seeks
to further adapt and modernize our Corps by focusing on three key
budget priorities--modernization, readiness, and manpower. Through
programmatic reforms, divestiture of legacy systems, and key
investments in manned / unmanned teaming and autonomous systems, we are
transforming today's Marine Corps into the future force required by our
Nation and building the most ready force our Nation can afford. To
accomplish this goal, we require adequate, sustained, and predictable
funding to properly plan for and resource a ready, capable, lethal
force.
The Marine Corps remains committed to fiscal transparency and
responsible stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars. The results of Full
Financial Statement Audits for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 generated
efficiencies through improvements to financial processes, systems,
internal controls, and accountability of equipment. The Marine Corps
continues to remediate audit findings and remains focused on achieving
a modified opinion by fiscal year 2020. Continued emphasis on executing
corrective action plans, improving information systems, and better
managing funds provided to us by the taxpayer demonstrates our
commitment to achieve and sustain favorable audit opinions.
Marine Corps business reforms identified more than $389 million in
savings and cost avoidance in fiscal year 2020 to reinvest in
modernization and warfighting readiness. When combined with reform
efforts in fiscal year 2019, the cumulative reforms and divestitures
over the past two years total $956 million. Examples of vetted and
approved reform initiatives include:
Multi-Year Procurement for Aircraft
H-1 (Aviation) Program Procurement Savings
Infrastructure Reset
Enterprise Lifecycle Maintenance Program
Legacy Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive
Device (CREW) System Divestment
DoN Under-Execution Review
Marine Corps business reforms enable us to make strategic choices
in the divestiture of certain programs to reinvest our limited
resources toward building a more modern, lethal, expeditionary force.
We are focused on continuing business reforms in fiscal year 2020 that
foster effective resource management, support audit readiness, and
streamline the requirements and acquisition process.
Modernization
Modernization remains critical to meeting the demands of a
strategic environment marked by revisionist and revanchist powers,
long-term strategic competition, and rogue regimes that have immediate
access to advanced, lethal, and disruptive technologies. As part of a
naval expeditionary force, what we desire to achieve is a Corps capable
of denying freedom of maneuver to deter our adversaries, or when
necessary, capable of exploiting, penetrating, and degrading advanced
adversary defenses in all domains in support of Naval and Joint Force
operations. Deterrence is no longer measured solely by the threat of
violence. We require a force capable of operating and winning in the
information environment before the physical fight ever begins. Should
deterrence fail, we require a future force that can deny adversary
freedom of action, impose costs, control key maritime terrain, shape
the operational environment in support of integrated sea control and
maritime power projection operations, and impose our will in all
domains while under attack.
In order to achieve the modern, lethal force required, we must
experiment with new technologies available on the market, determining
what will work best in the future operating environment, and then
deliver those capabilities to the force quickly to mitigate the rapid
rate of technological change. The Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities
Office (MCRCO) makes this possible, seeking emergent and disruptive
technologies to increase our lethality and resiliency. The MCRCO
leverages fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 NDAA provisions and
partnerships to accelerate the requirements development and definition
process--with the consistent and steadfast support of Congress--we will
continue to fund this office. We also embrace the idea of alternative
acquisition pathways. We are using and seeing value in other
transactions authority and intend to apply middle tier rapid fielding
authority at the first appropriate opportunity as a solution to
expedite modernization, where production is achievable within five
years or less. Accelerated modernization is an essential part of the
remedy to our long-term readiness problems and we must not allow
ourselves to bury modernization efforts under cumbersome acquisition
processes.
Modernization investments represent roughly 30 percent, or $13.9
billion of the total President's Budget 2020 budget submission, and are
synchronized with Marine Corps Force 2025 (MCF 2025), the capability
investment strategy which modernizes the force toward implementing MCF
2025, MOC, EABO, and the NDS. The following capability areas support
building a 21st century MAGTF across the Active and Reserve components
of the force, and are prioritized in the following manner:
Command and Control (C2) in a Degraded Environment: The
Marine Corps requires a sustainable, defendable, and resilient C2
network, integrated with Navy and Joint Force networks, which allows
for timely and persistent information exchange while enhancing
battlefield awareness to dispersed tactical units across the MAGTF.
Investments in Networking-on-the-Move (NOTM), Fused Integrated Naval
Network (FINN), Terrestrial Wideband Transmission System (TWTS), MAGTF
Integrated Command and Control (MIC2), and MAGTF Digital
Interoperability upgrades provide significantly increased capabilities
associated with maneuver and fires across the battlespace.
Additionally, in a contested information environment, artificial
boundaries between a ``tactical'' network and a ``garrison'' network
erode; the marines at the tactical edge will need seamless connections
to the marines supporting them further back from the front line. We
have to modernize our enterprise network and move our data stores to
the cloud so that marines can access the information they need any
time, in any place. The Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN)
program and future programs like it are critical to supporting the
warfighter.
Long Range and Precision Fires: The modern day battlefield
requires forces capable of conducting lethal strikes at range, in
depth, and with precision from air, land, and sea. Marine Corps
investments include 5th Generation F-35B/C aircraft, maritime Group 5
MAGTF Expeditionary UAS (MUX) with precision weapons, Guided Multiple
Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternate Warhead (AW), Ground-Based Anti-
Ship Missiles (GB-ASM) as well as ground vehicles and Long Range
Unmanned Surface Vessels (LRUSV) armed with loitering munitions enabled
by Low Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST).
Operations in the Information Environment (OIE): Adversary
use of ``information'' to manipulate facts, mobilize mass perceptions,
and contest our ability to C2 forces undermines our traditional
military advantages. We cannot count on uncontested access to the
electromagnetic spectrum any more than we can count on uncontested
freedom of maneuver on the sea. Establishment of the Deputy Commandant
for Information (DC I) provides headquarters advocacy while the
development of the MEF Information Group (MIG) enables the planning and
integrating of OIE with traditional military activities to enhance
lethality and our competitive advantage.
Air Defense: Forward deployed/stationed marines are
vulnerable to attacks in ways we have not considered for decades. Most
lack protection and sufficient resilience from long-range kinetic
attacks that jeopardize our ability to prepare, project, and sustain
combat power. Expeditionary forces operating away from bases in a
distributed/dispersed manner provide some degree of resilience through
distributed mass and reduced signatures. Investments in Medium-Range
Air Defense Systems, Counter-Cruise Missile, squad-level Counter-UAS,
swarming technologies operating in a networked manner, and the Ground/
Air Task Oriented Radar improve the resilience of our posture and our
air defense capabilities.
Protected Mobility / Enhanced Maneuver: To distribute and
concentrate forces and effects, we must be able to maneuver to
positions of advantage, and engage and defeat threat forces in all
geographic, topographic, and climatic environments from littoral
waterways to urban areas. The Corps prioritizes modernization and
investments in three key vehicle replacement programs required to
improve mobility and increase force protection: Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV), Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and the Armored
Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV). To improve dismounted mobility, we are
investing in lighter, better fitting body armor. Aviation investment
priorities include procurement and Block 4 capability upgrades for F-
35B/C; and the CH-53K which will provide an exponential leap in
vertical heavy lift capability.
Logistics: In a distributed and contested environment,
logistics takes on greater significance as a key enabling function
requiring global logistics awareness, diversifying distribution,
improving sustainment, and optimizing installations to support
sustained operations. This requires innovative methods, the ability to
leverage new technologies, and integration with Navy, Joint, and
Coalition forces. Science and Technology (S&T) efforts in Additive
Manufacturing (AM) drove the procurement of 160 3D printers, with more
than 125 ground and 83 NAVAIR-approved aviation parts; immediately
improving readiness and lethality. Additional investments in developing
enhanced logistics C2 systems, bulk fuel transportation and storage,
unmanned logistics systems--to include quadrotor cargo delivery systems
and littoral connectors--are paving the way in Next Generation
Logistics (NexLog) capabilities.
It is equally important that the Marine Corps provide every lethal,
modern advantage available to our tactical warfighting formations to
make sure our infantry is deadly and protected to the maximum extent
possible. Aligned with the Secretary of Defense's Close Combat
Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) initiative, the Marine Corps continues to
invest heavily in its close combat formation capabilities, including--
enhanced combat helmet; binocular night vision devices; M-27 Infantry
Automatic Rifle; M320 grenade launcher; M38 Squad Designated Marksman
Rifle; and Javelin anti-tank missile. Additional investments include
Squad unmanned aerial systems; MAGTF electronic warfare; Joint Battle
Command Platform; Handheld C2; target hand-off system; adaptive threat
force augmentation; future integration training environment; pattern of
life automated behavior development, and warfighter augmented reality.
These capability investments, combined with demanding unit training and
Service-level force-on-force exercises, provide the path forward to
ensuring close combat superiority against peer competitors.
Readiness
The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready force the
Nation can afford. Readiness, however, is the product of two metrics.
The first is the ability of the force to execute its mission with ready
people, ready equipment, and the right training. The second compares
the force against potential adversaries, the importance of which grows
dramatically in an environment of rising peers and global competition.
If our near-term readiness levels are high and our units are ready,
then by the first metric we are ready. If, however, that force is
outranged or outpaced by potential adversary capabilities, then by the
second metric we are not. This requires an additional long-term view of
readiness through capability modernization, as discussed in the
preceding section of this statement. As a Service, we will take a
deliberate approach to continue the positive trends in our overall
readiness while simultaneously balancing the need to modernize our
current force, satisfying existing GCC demands, and building the force
required by the strategic environment to remain relevant in the future.
Thanks to your efforts in Congress to provide increased funding, you
have made the choices the Marine Corps has to make less difficult. Our
President's Budget 2020 budget provides $14.3 billion, or approximately
31 percent of our total submission towards near-term readiness.
Aviation
While readiness concerns exist across the MAGTF, our most acute
readiness issues are found in aviation units. Recent increases in
funding enabled the Marine Corps to simultaneously invest in both
readiness and modernization, adding capacity to the flight lines by
fully funding readiness enabler accounts, depot and Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA), spares, training, and people. The Marine Corps has been
able to accelerate aviation readiness recovery efforts along four lines
of effort:
1. Depot Readiness Initiative: resources to accomplish certain
unit level maintenance while an aircraft is being re-worked at the
depot, which means aircraft that return from the depot to a squadron
are ready to fly almost immediately.
2. Non-Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM): the qualified
maintenance marines and needed supporting resources (engineers, support
equipment, etc.) are available to fix aircraft without delay.
3. Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS): all parts are available when
needed to prevent extended aircraft down times awaiting parts.
4. In-Service Repair: higher-level maintenance needed at the
squadron is properly resourced to perform these repairs without delay,
avoiding excessive aircraft down time.
Although much work remains to achieve our aviation readiness
recovery goals, we continue to see significant gains realized along
these lines of effort: depot throughput met Service goals, NMCM rates
have decreased, NMCS rates have dropped, and in-service repairs have
reached our Service goal. In short, these gains mean that marines are
able to keep existing aircraft in a mission capable (MC) status for
longer periods, affording aircrew more flying hours and training time.
In addition to our dedication to fully funding aviation readiness
accounts, other readiness recovery initiatives include the CH-53E Reset
program, Depot Readiness Initiative, MV-22 Readiness Program, and
talent retention efforts aimed at retaining experienced maintainers in
operational squadrons. Leading indicators of readiness improvements
resulting from these efforts include: an increase in overall flight
hours, an increase in average monthly flight time for our aircrew, an
increase in MC rates of our aircraft, and an improvement of our
aggregate aviation T-Rating. These gains are a direct result of funding
provided in the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 defense
appropriations bills, which allowed investments in readiness enabler
accounts at maximum executable levels. These investments are now
realizing significant results. Should funding decrease in fiscal year
2020 or beyond--aviation readiness will also likely decrease.
The Secretary of Defense released guidance to the Services
directing accelerated readiness recovery of tactical aviation (TACAIR)
to achieve 80 percent mission capable rates by the end of fiscal year
2019. The Marine Corps is taking action to achieve this goal along five
lines of effort. The Marine Corps is working towards this goal by
increasing the number of aircraft available and operating within
aircraft and maintenance capacity levels. Our investments in fiscal
year 2017, fiscal year 2018, and fiscal year 2019 will produce ready
aircraft from our depots, $1.6 billion in spares from Navy Supply, and
$16 million in additional consumables from DLA. Additional goals from
industry partners include accelerated completion of aircraft
modifications and retrofits, accelerated depot repair capability, and
shifting maintenance to the appropriate levels. Successful
implementation of these efforts will ensure we meet the 80 percent goal
and sustain it in the future.
Ground Equipment
Ground equipment readiness rates continue to show significant gains
after years of focused effort to reset our equipment. As of 1 October
2018, the Marine Corps completed reset of 99 percent of our ground
equipment programs and returned 72 percent of our ground equipment to
the operating forces. The operational readiness of key Principal End
Items (PEI) remains high, and we project to complete our ground
equipment reset efforts in third quarter fiscal year 2019. High
operational readiness rates of key PEIs, however, mask certain
underlying readiness issues. Units preparing to deploy are still
experiencing shortfalls in equipment to train for core mission tasks as
we support global equipment sourcing for forward deployed units such as
Special Purpose MAGTFs. Equipping requirements for these rotational
forces are disproportionally high due to their unique mission sets,
placing high demand on low density equipment that approaches or exceeds
availability. The result is risk in equipment availability to respond
to contingencies and training for non-deployed units. We are addressing
these issues through aggressive acquisition and redistribution actions.
Amphibious Fleet
Use of the sea as maneuver space remains as vital today as any time
in our history. The Joint Force must maintain access to, and the
ability to maneuver through the global commons, assure access, compete
in the maritime domain, and defeat any competitor attempting to deny
our freedom of action. To adequately accomplish these tasks, the naval
force must be distributable, resilient, and tailorable while being
employed in sufficient scale and for ample duration. The amphibious
fleet allows the naval force to do three basic things:
Conduct steady state operations around the world,
including TSC, building partner capacity, HA/DR, and NEO.
Execute a global cost imposition strategy if we have to
fight.
Project and sustain the force in a contested environment.
Due to existing shortfalls and maintenance issues within our
amphibious ship capacity, the naval force currently struggles to
satisfy these basic requirements--an issue that will only grow worse
over time if not properly addressed. The operational availability of
the existing amphibious fleet is insufficient to meet global demands
and negatively impacts the unit training necessary to recover readiness
for major combat operations. Consequently, the strategic risk to the
mission and the larger Joint Force is increased.
The Navy and Marine Corps are currently operating below the minimum
amphibious shipping requirement detailed in the 2016 Force Structure
Assessment and 30-year shipbuilding plan. The stated requirement of 38
amphibious warships is the minimum number required to fulfill our title
10 obligation. Resourcing to a lower number puts contingency response
timelines and the Joint Force at risk. Yet, amphibious readiness is
more than the simple product of capacity and availability; it requires
an amphibious fleet with the right capabilities to remain survivable,
resilient, and lethal in a contested environment. Today's naval
campaigns still demand an amphibious fleet capable of conducting raids,
demonstrations, assaults, withdrawals, and support to other operations
(TSC, HA/DR, NEO, etc.) in both permissive and non-permissive
environments. The naval force must be able to maneuver; gain temporary
lodgments to establish expeditionary advanced bases from which marines
hold adversary naval, land, and air forces at risk; and then withdrawal
quickly as the naval campaign advances. Our amphibious fleet lacks the
ability to protect itself from air, surface, sub-surface, cyber, and
information attack; and absent organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore
strike weapons, must rely on support from other combatants to perform
sea control and assured access missions. To increase the lethality and
readiness of our amphibious fleet, the naval force must:
Upgrade C2 suites, introduce organic ship-to-ship and
ship-to-shore precision strike weapons, organic air defense, and
decrease ship signatures to become less targetable.
Modernize the manned and unmanned surface connector fleet
that, when combined with our aerial connectors, enable the naval force
to establish a web of sensor, strike, decoy, and sustainment locations
based on land and sea that will complicate the strategic and
operational decision making of our most advanced rivals.
Address modernization in our prepositioning program to
ensure persistent forward positioning of our critical equipment and
sustainment supplies in a manner that is scalable, flexible,
expeditionary, and survivable in a contested environment; and that will
further enable our naval expeditionary inside forces to persist inside
the enemy's weapons engagement zone (WEZ).
Continue to explore innovative ways to employ alternative
platforms for amphibious and maritime operations in more permissive
environments in order to compensate for the shortfall of amphibious
warships and provide more global coverage in the most resource-
appropriate manner.
Continue to develop and employ Naval Task Force elements
consisting of multiple ship types for optimal lethality and force
protection; including possible development of more functional and
operationally suitable naval vessels and craft to expand the
competitive space and create an asymmetric maritime advantage globally.
Deployment-to-Dwell
The rate by which marines deploy largely depends upon what unit
they are assigned to and the operational demand for those units. The
majority of Marine units experience a deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio
that is challenging; we confront this daily. While these demands are
clear and unmistakable evidence of the continued relevance of marines,
this tempo is difficult to sustain as it limits our time to train to
our full naval mission sets. Our goal is to return to a 1:3 D2D force,
which would allow us time to train for the high-end fight and achieve
balance for our marines and their families at home.
There are three types of marines in our Corps: those who are
deployed, those getting ready to deploy, and those who just returned
from deployment. President's Budget 2020 supports an 186,200 Active and
38,500 Reserve component end-strength force, maintaining an overall 1:2
D2D ratio. Operating at a 1:2 D2D ratio, although challenging, is a
conscious, short-term decision to balance modernization, meet current
demand, and simultaneously recover our readiness. We owe our marines
and their families the necessary time to reset and train for the next
deployment or contingency. For many decades prior to the attacks of
September 2001, Marines in the operating forces benefited from a 1:3
D2D ratio. The marines that were not deployed had time to prepare, time
to train, and were ready to reinforce their fellow marines if a major
contingency happened. A return to a 1:3 D2D would require a substantive
increase in manpower, or decrease in operational requirements--we do
not seek a significant increase in end-strength in this year's budget
and we continue to experience high operational requirements. Although
we manage the risks associated with a 1:2 D2D in the short-term, our
long-term goal is to return to a 1:3 D2D force.
Infrastructure
The Marine Corps previously accepted risk in facilities funding to
protect near-term readiness and service-level training. Taking risk in
the facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization, and military
construction programs resulted in the degradation of our
infrastructure, which in turn increases lifecycle costs. We must ensure
our infrastructure, both home and abroad, is resilient against attacks,
and long-range precision strikes while modernizing to support future
capability integration and training facilities needed to hone our
warfighting skills. Our Infrastructure Reset Strategy must be a
priority--we must improve infrastructure lifecycle management and
ensure investments are aligned with Marine Corps capability-based
requirements to support our warfighting mission and contribute directly
to current and future force readiness. The state of our facilities is
the single most important investment to support four critical force
enabling functions our installations provide:
Housing for our marines and their families
Deployment platforms from which our expeditionary forces
fight and win our Nation's battles
Training facilities required for our MAGTFs to train and
hone their combat readiness
An organic industrial base for depot-level maintenance,
storage, and prepositioning of war reserve equipment to maximize
readiness and sustain combat operations
As leaders we have fallen short of our full obligation to our
marines and their families with respect to privatized military housing;
we are correcting this shortfall. The Marine Corps has instituted a
voluntary Marine Housing Outreach program aimed at every marine and
sailor residing in government quarters, privatized military housing, or
an off-base civilian rental property. This outreach program is designed
to raise our awareness of the marines' living conditions to ensure it
is safe, secure, and environmentally healthy; identify maintenance or
safety issues affecting the residence, determine any actions taken to
date to remedy them, and determine how the chain of command can assist
in the resolution process; and ensure our marines and their families
are aware of and understand the support processes and programs
available. In concert with the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps
is also reviewing the reporting mechanisms and oversight procedures
that govern the way privatized military housing discrepancies are
reported, remediated, and verified through our Public-Private Venture
partners. The Marine Corps is committed to our marines and families, to
improving the military housing offered aboard our installations, and to
ensuring unit commanders are personally involved in advocating for the
wellbeing of the marines they serve.
The Marine Corps' Infrastructure Reset Strategy ensures every
dollar is targeted and spent on the highest priorities at the lowest
total lifecycle costs, optimizing investment over the long-term to
support our warfighting mission and align investment with our strategic
priorities. These prioritized investments align with NDS guidance to
increase lethality by supporting new capabilities and platforms;
modernizing inadequate and obsolete facilities; relocating and
consolidating forces; and improving quality of life. fiscal year 2020
Military Construction (MILCON) and Facilities Sustainment, Restoration
and Modernization (FSRM) accounts support:
Guam relocation investments: Barracks, central fuel
station, and central issue facility
MCF 2025 initiatives: Consolidated Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) for I MEF MIG and 10th
Marines HIMARs complex
New platform investment: F-35B/C hangar, apron, landing
pads, and training simulator; ACV maintenance facility; and CH-53K
cargo loading trainer
Training: Wargaming Center at MCB Quantico
Quality of Life: Barracks replacement at MCB Hawaii and
mess hall replacement at MCB Camp Pendleton
Recapitalization and replacement of inadequate facilities
Manpower
Our people--marines, civilian marines, and families--are our
institutional center of gravity, and remain fundamental to our ability
to Make Marines and Win Battles. Maintaining the most ready, lethal
Marine Corps possible requires talented and dedicated people. Our
President's Budget 2020 provides $16.1 billion towards manpower
accounts, approximately 35 percent of our total submission, to continue
implementing MCF 2025. The strategic environment our Nation faces
requires a more experienced, better trained, and more capable Corps. It
requires more than just new equipment and technologies, it requires the
right force structure and marines with the right skills to effectively
operate. Modernization priorities require a complementary element of
force structure changes to ensure we have the right people, with the
right skills, for the deployment and employment of new capabilities and
to ensure the future force is compatible and mutually supportive. Our
goal is to provide a more mature, experienced force to leverage
individual skill and professional talent with emerging technology
through select force structure changes that recruits, trains, educates,
and sustains the most lethal force possible.
To achieve our goals, our actions focus personnel growth in the
right areas. Our President's Budget 2020 end strength plans for an
186,200 Active and 38,500 Reserve component force. This limited growth
of 100 marines is targeted in specialized fields such as MARSOC and
several specialties encompassed by OIE: intelligence, electronic
warfare, and cyberspace operations. Equally important, our manpower
efforts are addressing the need for more experienced and better trained
leaders within our infantry formations to ensure the superiority of our
close combat formations. In order to optimize selection of the most
talented infantry squad leaders, we have increased the pool of infantry
Sergeants by 330 marines through realignment efforts within our
internal structure. Everything we do must focus on making marines
better, more resilient, lethal, and capable of outpacing our
adversaries.
Central to our role in providing a lethal force is recruiting the
most qualified men and women within our Nation who are willing to raise
their hand, affirm an oath, and earn the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor. We
must ensure that we recruit the right people, devoted to upholding the
values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. Our new marines must be
provided the highest level of training that not only prepares them for
the rigors of combat, but also successfully transforms and sustains
them in their career paths. As such, a fourth phase has been added to
Recruit Training. This fourth phase focuses on mentorship and leader-
led instruction to better prepare new marines for transition to the
operating forces.
Education and training is continuous for marines. We must ensure we
train to fight, and educate to win. New technologies require smarter,
more mentally agile marines capable of exercising sound judgment and
decision making in uncertain and challenging situations. Professional
Military Education remains essential in developing leaders with the
analytical and critical thinking skills required to adapt in ever
changing environments. To increase the capabilities of our leaders, the
Marine Corps has developed the College of Enlisted Military Education
(CEME), creating a pathway for enlisted leaders to increase skill and
proficiency through continuing education. We have revamped our PME
process, adding new PME courses, and enhancing academic rigor to grow
our force with the intellectual skills and capabilities necessary for
the future.
As a marines, we must hold ourselves to the highest standards of
personal conduct and ensure all marines and family members are treated
with dignity and respect. This requires us to take an introspective
look at our culture to ensure the long-term success of our efforts. To
demonstrate our commitment to strengthening our culture, we created the
Talent Management Oversight Directorate (TMOD). This office supports
the Assistant Commandant in his role as the Talent Management Officer
of the Marine Corps, and addresses all personnel and cultural issues
impacting the Corps' ability to invest in and leverage a diversely
skilled and talented force. The TMOD's mission is to ensure compliance
with all objectives, policies, and directives that supports the Corps'
efforts to recruit, promote, and retain the best talent the Nation has
to offer. Focused on mission readiness, the TMOD helps ensure we
maintain an organization where all members are valued based on their
individual excellence and commitment to warfighting. Treating all
marines and their families with dignity and respect, as well as
fostering a culture of inclusion throughout the service, is central to
our core values.
Taking care of marines and their families is a key element of
overall readiness and combat effectiveness. The adage ``we recruit
marines, we retain families'' remains as true today as ever. Our
comprehensive system of services, to include Sexual Assault Prevention
and Response; Suicide Prevention; Personal and Professional
Development; Drug and Alcohol Abuse Counseling/Prevention; Business and
Recreation Services; and Spouse Employment; seeks to create the
holistic fitness and readiness of our marines and families--body, mind,
spirit, and social. In addition, our Wounded Warrior Regiment continues
to execute our Recovery Coordination Program to ``keep faith'' with
those who have incurred life changing impairments in service to our
Nation.
Our civilian workforce has the leanest civilian-to-military ratio
of all the military services, at a current ratio of one civilian
employee to every ten marines. Approximately 95 percent of our
appropriated funded civilians work outside the Washington, DC beltway
at 57 bases, stations, depots, and installations around the world.
Sixty-nine percent are veterans who have chosen to continue to serve
our Nation; of those, 18 percent are disabled veterans. Civilian
marines perform vital functions at our bases and stations, and are
integral to the daily operations and overall capability of the Marine
Corps. Challenges with recruitment and retention--notably burdens like
the threat of sequestration, possible furloughs, antiquated hiring
processes, and limited pay increases--inhibit our ability to retain top
talent. Thanks to the hard work of Congress in passing a civilian pay
raise this year, we continue to fund these critical members of our
team.
conclusion
The Marine Corps serves as a naval expeditionary ``inside'' force
that is most ready, when the Nation is least ready. We seek a constant
state of readiness--lethal, forward postured, assuring allies,
deterring adversaries, capable of absorbing the initial blow, and
holding the line--and if required, prepared to fight and impose our
will on the enemy. We are an integrated naval force--transiting the
oceans, aggregating at sea, fighting at sea, and coming from the sea.
We are organized, trained, and equipped to operate across the range of
military operations, in every domain, and thrive in uncertainty--
facilitating assured access operations, sea control operations, or
maritime security in support of the fleets. We are self-sustaining for
pre-determined lengths of time, and capable of quickly reconstituting
for follow-on tasking globally to support dynamic force employment. We
continuously live ``with our sea-bags packed'' and remain the most
lethal, credible combat forces available.
However, despite notable improvement in readiness during the past
two year years, the preceding seventeen years of war have perilously
degraded our overall capability and capacity, as those of our
adversaries have increased. We must increase the lethality of our
``inside'' combat credible forces in order to compete with our threats,
deter our adversaries, assure our allies, and if necessary--prevail in
any fight. As the force at the forward edge, the force first to make
contact and hold--we require the most modern, technologically advanced,
capable Marine Corps our resourcing will allow. To achieve this end,
the Marine Corps must evolve from today's ``1.0'' force capable of
addressing our current warfighting needs; to a near-term ``1.1''
modernized force that leverages select, existing platforms to achieve
new warfighting concepts; to a ``2.0'' future force with revolutionized
capabilities and the ability to execute new warfighting concepts.
The Marine Corps is increasing lethality and evolving our force
through prioritized investment in modernization, readiness, and
manpower. This evolution is necessary to ensure we maintain current
operational readiness and address whatever contingencies may arise
today, and anticipate what our force of tomorrow must look like to be
capable of addressing unforeseen threats. But we need Congress'
continued support. To accomplish this goal, adequate, sustained, and
predictable funding is required to properly plan for and resource a
ready, capable force. Our Marine Corps will ensure there will never be
a fair fight . . . our Nation is not afforded that luxury. We will
continue to innovate and build a 21st Century Marine Corps--a lethal,
adaptive, and resilient Corps that can dominate all domains, that is
ready to fight tonight--and win.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Neller.
I've had a couple of systems I've talked about, and we--
that I think are worthy of bringing up in this hearing. First
of all, Admiral Richardson, what is your current requirement
for aircraft carriers?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, the 2016 Force Structure
Assessment lists 12 aircraft.
Chairman Inhofe. I understand that you're now talking
about--giving consideration to taking out the USS Harry Truman.
Now, my question--my first question to you is, Why would you--
it's my understanding that, over the last--for 22 days last
summer, there was not a single aircraft carrier strike group
deployed. Right now, we know that we have a need. And to take
out, I guess, the Truman, you'd--you could characterize that as
being in midlife at this time--to take that out of the system,
will you have something, then, that can actually change our
deficiency from two to one? In other words, come up with 11, as
opposed to 10. So, what would motivate that decision?
Admiral Richardson. Chairman, thanks for that question.
I like to think of the budget submission as a--particularly
with respect to the Truman, as a bit of a discussion centering
around three elements of the budget. One is that we have,
indeed, proposed not refueling the Harry S. Truman at her
midlife so that we can take those funds and invest them into
advanced technologies, all with the idea of increasing naval
power into the future. Our budget, as I said in my opening
statement, is forward-leaning into those technologies.
Chairman Inhofe. But, that would have the result of
bringing our numbers down----
Admiral Richardson. It would, indeed.
Chairman Inhofe.--to buy one additional carrier.
Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. And so, the third leg of that
stool, Chairman, is really important, which is that we've got a
Force Structure Assessment currently underway, and we've--the
combatant commanders are also studying their requirements or
OPLANs [Operational Plans].
Chairman Inhofe. Now, when is that due?
Admiral Richardson. This is due later on this year. And so,
if we need to, it's early enough in the program that we can
reverse this decision. I think it's about $16 million, $17
million in the budget year. We are ready to readdress that. If
these studies show----
Chairman Inhofe. Well, I think that may happen, because
we're going to be--of course, we're going into our
reauthorization, and that would be one thing that's--I've
heard--I'm not the only one who questions that decision, but--
and you'll have a chance to respond more, because I know others
are interested in that.
Let me--I know, Secretary Spencer, the question that--
obviously, our favorite subject is, When do you project that
all 11 weapons elevators on the Ford would be ready to be
accepted by the Navy?
Secretary Spencer. Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is a
subject of great interest to me. What we're looking at right
now is, when she sails from her post-shakedown availability,
right now scheduled to be October. We've taken two deliveries
since we last talked. We're making progress. We're working with
contractors, application and resources are being applied, and,
rest assured, attention is focusing down on it.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Well, let me just be sure that we're
clear, here. There are other areas of underperformance, as you
are fully aware, such as the catapults, the resting gear,
radar, and the propulsion plan. They're going to have to
demonstrate reliability at the same point that we'd be looking
at the weapons elevators, isn't that correct?
Secretary Spencer. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. And that was going to be July the--July of
this year, of 2019.
Secretary Spencer. That is correct. There are other items
that are pushing the availability out, such as the main thrust
bearings, propulsion, and just the whole general PSA [post
shakedown availability] schedule.
Chairman Inhofe. And that now is going out to October? Is
that correct?
Secretary Spencer. That is correct.
Chairman Inhofe. All right. How confident are you that this
is going to take place by October?
Secretary Spencer. I----
Chairman Inhofe. Now's a good time to express that----
Secretary Spencer. It----
Chairman Inhofe.--since----
Secretary Spencer.--certainly is, Chairman. I am fairly
confident. This is new technologies. I don't want to use that
as an excuse, but I will tell you that we're confident, working
with the contractor, that this is the goal that we will get the
Ford out the door----
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
Secretary Spencer.--in October.
Chairman Inhofe. That's a good idea, because we've
scheduled a meeting for October, so we'll have a chance to----
Secretary Spencer. I will----
Chairman Inhofe.--to look at that.
Secretary Spencer. I will call up the CO [commanding
officer], and we'll have lunch----
Chairman Inhofe. All right.
Secretary Spencer.--on the ship.
Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
Now--and one other system, here, because I know there's
some discussion on the CH-53K replacing the CH-53E, and I'd
like to get, kind of, an update on that. It could be from you
or from any of the other witnesses.
Secretary Spencer. Let me start, and I'm more than happy to
have the Commandant weigh in if he has other comments.
I think that you remember this has always been a program,
since I've been onboard, that we've kept an eye on. As of this
winter, it was not progressing to the speed that I thought was
appropriate, nor our acquisition folks. We are having some
negotiations with the prime supplier, Lockheed Martin Sikorsky.
I just most recently, Mr. Chairman, sat down with the
leadership of Lockheed Martin, and we have, ``aligned our
priorities as partners.''
Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I think that's a good idea. You have
new leadership there, you have a different corporate setting
than we did before, and that has to be taken in consideration.
Yeah, we're going to stay with our time--timing on this,
this round.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, we mentioned, several of us, the damage by
Hurricane--several hurricanes to Navy installations. And
Section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA required the services
to send up the top ten installations that are vulnerable to
weather, extreme weather. We have not received that yet. Your
colleagues in the Air Force and Army have committed to do so.
Can we get a commitment for promptly sending up to us the list
of the ten most vulnerable installations?
Secretary Spencer. At 12:01, I will make sure that is
underway, Senator, and I apologize for the delay.
Senator Reed. It's--thank you. It's--you're in good company
with Secretary Wilson and Secretary Esper. So, thank you very
much.
One of the things that we've noticed through the course of
these hearings is that--particularly when talking, again, with
Secretary Esper and his colleagues in the Army--they did a deep
dive into their budget to try to find savings before they asked
for additional resources. Has the Navy, Mr. Secretary and
Admiral Richardson and General Neller, Navy and Marine Corps
made such a deep dive and made proposed cuts?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. A way to look at--I think
you're talking about the Army's Night Court that they were
having, et cetera.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Secretary Spencer. Navy goes through a similar process
every single budget cycle, although this next cycle that we're
doing, we're actually calling it zero-base budgeting, where we
are zeroing everybody out, and everyone has to come in and sing
for their dinner as to their requirements. But, if you look at
our savings--I was talking to Senator Perdue about this--if you
look at our savings from authorities you've given us, whether
it be block buy, multiyear buys, process improvements, from
fiscal year 2017 on, we have about $30 billion worth of
savings, compared to business as usual.
Senator Reed. Your comments, Admiral Richardson?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'd just echo what the
Secretary said. We do this pretty much every year, but we've
really turned up the heat, under the Secretary's leadership,
and those tens of billions of savings are exactly what I'm
tracking, as well.
Senator Reed. And Commandant?
General Neller. Sir, there are specific programs that we
have dropped from the budget that we felt we could accept risk.
There was risk to dropping them, but we did it, because we
wanted to generate resources for other more important things.
And we continue to look at what we call core/non-core actions
that we do and things where we could possibly, maybe, outsource
that or not do it at all in order to generate additional
resources based on the fact that we--as generous as the
Congress has been, we have to be prepared to be able to do with
whatever we receive in the future.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, there is a significant amount of MILCON
[military construction] that has been designated by the White
House to be shifted to the wall. And I presume, simply by the
fact of asking for the MILCON, that these are serious
investments, and that, from a military standpoint, your
position would be, they should be--they should take priority,
perhaps, over other funding, including the wall?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. The process that I've been
made aware of is that the list was going up, then we will be
asked to prioritize, at some point. I will make sure that my
prioritization expressions are given.
Senator Reed. I--the sheer size of the request will limit,
to a significant degree, what you can protect. And I would
presume that there will be projects there that are critical to
the Navy and the Marine Corps that, for the demands of the
southern wall, will be taken away. And from, again, a military
standpoint--there are other factors, I'm sure, but from the
military standpoint, do you think that's a wise diversion?
Secretary Spencer. When asked, Senator, I will give my best
advice to the Secretary.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Neller, I mentioned the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle]. Can you give us an idea how you and the Army are
going to work together if they try to scale this program down,
in terms of putting it in the field?
General Neller. Senator, we have a stated requirement right
now in the acquisition objective. I think it's about 8800. And
we're starting to field, actually, this year, for the first
time. So, I have not heard specifically from the Army that they
are definitely going to reduce their acquisition objective,
because that may have some effect on the unit cost, which will
be passed on to us. So, overall, we have--we've been looking at
ground vehicles, and we're trying to get no more ground
vehicles than we need. And so, I'll have to engage with the
Chief of Staff of the Army on this. But, right now, we're
fielding the vehicle and trying to get rid of our old Humvees
and--the oldest Humvees first, and replace them with JLTVs to
give marines the newest piece of gear that they can get their
hands on.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
And just a final comment, in just seconds left. Admiral
Richardson, again, you mentioned the Columbia-class. It's going
to require a lot of scrutiny, a lot of oversight, and a lot of
collaboration. It's a great challenge, but necessary. We have
to replace the Ohio-class. So, thank you for your work, and I
encourage you to keep a close and sharp eye.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wicker [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Inhofe has stepped out for a few moments and asked
me to preside for a few moments.
General Neller, let me begin with you and, certainly, thank
you for your four decades-plus of service.
Let's talk about amphibious ship procurement and the
current budget proposal. I was heartened to hear Admiral
Richardson say that the budget submission is an opportunity for
a bit of discussion about some of these issues. The Navy
deferred LPD procurement to 2021 and LHA procurement to 2024,
saying that, in pursuing the National Defense Strategy
priorities, it was unable to take advantage of last year's
addition of advanced procurement funding for either fiscal year
2020 LPD or an adjustment to the LHA. Does the Marine Corps
still have a stated need for 38 amphibious ships, as indicated
in the Force Structure Assessment?
General Neller. Yes, Senator.
Senator Wicker. And do we have those 38 ships today?
General Neller. No, we do not.
Senator Wicker. Do you foresee eliminating the Marine
Corps' core mission of amphibious operations at any point in
the future? For example, in a potential conflict with China or
Russia, would our amphibious Marine Corps likely play a key
role?
General Neller. Based on the plans I've seen, I would say
yes, but it's more than that. It--I think we have to look at
the ability to come from the sea with the Navy as part of a
maritime strategy. And I think the CNO and I are aligned with
that. So, yes, they would be part of that planning and in those
operations.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me just ask you, then, how the F-
35 exercise went, recently. The Essex Amphibious Ready Group
and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) recently completed
the first combat deployment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
During this deployment, the F-35 saw action in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Syria. How does the F-35 expand the
effectiveness of U.S. amphibious forces? And what did we learn
about the F-35's logistical and material footprint aboard the
USS Essex that can be applied to future iterations of large-
deck amphibious ships, sir?
General Neller. Senator, I have not received the After
Action from the 13th MEU. I expect to get that within the next
week. I can tell you that the material readiness of the
airplane while they were deployed was--exceeded what I
expected. They averaged above 70-percent readiness at some
point. Actually, in 1 month, they were close to 80. They had
six jets aboard the aircraft. They did operate in the airspace
above Afghanistan and Syria. So, their material readiness was
good. There actually--there are lessons learned, as far as the
aviation maintenance onboard ship and the things you have to
do, but they set themselves for success. They had us--they did
a good job on the parts block, and they did a good job bringing
experienced maintainers. This is a bigger jet than we're used
to, so there are some deck-handling things that have to go. So,
all that stuff will come out. As far as the capability, as far
as information and the passage of information and what they
were able to do or not do, that's what I'm looking forward to
hearing in the After Action Brief.
Senator Wicker. And when do you think----
General Neller. Overall, it was--in the next week. I
believe they will be up on the Hill to brief, also, Senator.
Senator Wicker. But, overall, it's a positive----
General Neller. It was--material readiness was the thing we
were concerned with, being away from a home base. And the
material readiness was excellent.
Senator Wicker. Great.
I think Senator Reed, in his opening statement, mentioned
that he'd like to have a comment, at some point, about how not
refueling the Truman is consistent with our goal of 355 ships.
But, let me ask this question instead, Secretary Spencer. And
it's with regard to the amphibs. Last month, during the
Seapower Subcommittee hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs, I
asked Secretary Geurts if, instead of deferring procurement to
2021 and 2024, could the Navy apply incremental funding to the
LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020? He said the Navy could apply
incremental funding to the LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020, if
authorized to do so by Congress.
I'll ask you the same question. Could the Navy apply
incremental funding to the LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020,
as--if authorized by Congress? And, if Congress approves
incremental funding in the fiscal year 2020 NDAA for the LHA
and LPD, would that allow the Navy to accelerate how it spends
the 350 million that was appropriated in fiscal year 2019?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. If, in fact, you authorize
and appropriate our authorities or--to go forward with the
funding, yes, the answer is, indubitably.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very, very much. Well, we're
certainly going to pursue that. I appreciate the candor of our
witnesses today.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning.
Admiral Richardson and General Neller, thank you both very
much for all of your years of service and the excellent job
that you provided to this country and to the Committee. I'm
sure that the Committee is going to miss you a lot more than
you're going to miss the Committee.
Secretary Spencer, you and I have had the opportunity to
talk about the importance of the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Plan and the commitment that you have to make
progress on that. It calls for $21 billion in investment over
the next 20 years, and a number of needs, one of which is
drydock capitalization--recapitalization. I just wanted to pick
up on Senator Reed's concerns that he expressed about money
being taken from military construction projects, like those
that are laid out in the Shipyard Optimization Plan, because of
their need to address our military needs, going forward. Four
of the projects that are on that list of military construction
projects are at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. At least three
of those are critical to the continued expansion of the drydock
and the ability of the shipyard to continue to work on our
attack submarines that are so critical to maintaining the
defense of this country. So, can you talk about the importance
of these projects to maintain our submarine fleet, and how
delaying or taking money from these projects would impact our
national security?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, you and I have talked before,
and I'm more than happy to present to the whole Committee the
importance of our ability to, not only purchase, but, equally
important, maintain the ships that we have, to get them back
out to the fight. When we score our MILCON projects, there is a
prioritization. This is obviously a very serious
prioritization. As I said earlier, my job, in this case, is to
provide the best advice that I can to the decision process. I
will represent exactly that.
Senator Shaheen. Have you been asked to do that yet? And is
there any new criteria that has been laid out by Secretary
Shanahan in the Department of Defense about how they're going
to determine which projects to take money from?
Secretary Spencer. None of that already has been discussed,
and the timing has not been presented to me as to when he'd
like my opinions.
Senator Shaheen. So, you haven't been told of any
reprioritization that is being done by DOD.
Secretary Spencer. Not as of this date, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General Neller, there's been recent reports, that I know
you're aware of, where you've expressed concern about the
readiness challenges that are presented by taking funding and
troops to address the southwest border. Can you talk a little
bit more about what your concerns are there?
General Neller. Senator, I wrote a memo to the Secretary of
the Navy laying out eight fiscal shortfalls that the Marine
Corps had, one of which was the cost of putting marines on the
border. So, the marines on the border, their readiness, I've
checked--personally checked the readiness of every unit down
there. And, with only one exception, there was no impact to
their actual readiness. In fact, a couple of units improved
their readiness. So, to say that going to the border was
degrading our readiness is not an accurate statement.
That said, there is a cost there, a small cost compared to
the others. And we have a shortfall of just under $300 million,
of which the border mission is less than 2 percent.
So, what I was looking for was some assistance in trying to
get money to reprogram, because we have to pay our bills. And
short of that, we would have to look at other places to get the
resources. So, that was the intent of the memo. But, there are
a number of things out there that we don't have funding for,
some due to other mandates put on us by this body, some by the
Department of Defense. So, my intent was to just simply lay out
for my boss what these were and ask for his support in trying
to figure out how we might fund them.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that
clarification.
One of the concerns, Secretary Spencer, that has been
expressed about our current state of readiness in terms of--is
the industrial base that we have, that we're going to need as
we ramp up our shipbuilding. Can you talk about the efforts
that the Navy's taking to rebuild this industrial base and to
focus on research and development to support shipbuilding
efforts?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. It goes across the board.
Whether it's shipbuilding, aircraft building, weapons building,
we are tremendously focused on the supply chain, because,
beyond the prime, who we interface with directly, is this
underlying matrix of organizations providing parts into the
platforms. It's critical, on many fronts, whether it goes to
the cyber protection of the data that they're holding to
produce the parts to us, all the way to the actual parts.
You're finding that, in the Navy/Marine Corps enterprise, the
acquisition side is going deep, personally, themselves,
alongside contractors to ensure the health and the warning
signs and friction points that we have in the supply chain, and
how we can rectify them. As an example, in certain areas we're
sitting there, going, ``Okay, if, in fact, supplier A is
industrial-capacity-limited, why don't we go to our allies, if,
in fact, it's not a critical, confidential part, and actually
rely more on our allies?'' As you know, we're legally allowed
to, in many cases, include up to 50 percent foreign parts.
We're now flexing that muscle again to make sure that we are
exhausting the whole field of availability.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
I'm out of time, but I'll submit a question for the record
to try and learn a little bit more about exactly what we're
doing.
Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I want to
return--it was touched upon briefly, the collisions of the
Fitzgerald and the McCain. In 2017, after those collisions, you
both initiated a review of the root causes, and arrived at a
number of corrective actions. Our National Defense
Authorization Act last year also included 11 provisions related
to those reviews to improve the readiness of our naval surface
forces. Could you please update the Committee on the current
state of readiness, in light of those corrective actions, and
also tell us what corrective actions have not yet been fully
implemented?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, I'll start and then be more
than happy to turn it over to the CNO.
Out of the 111, 91 we discussed and arbitrated, we have
underway corrective actions, some that were immediate, such as
turning on AIS, which is the identification system, when
transiting busy passages, through our longer-term remediation,
which is the education process, four ships for watch-standing,
and also the equipment and systems that we are putting in place
to enhance the education process.
CNO?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'll just pick up from there.
Every one of the measures that we committed to do, both to
ourselves and with the Congress, are on track or complete. And
we have really moved the discussion from, certainly, regaining
a safe-to-operate perspective to moving through a climate of
compliance into a culture of excellence, which is where your
Navy should always be operating. This included a number of
different measures across a very wide spectrum, including,
first and probably foremost, the return of schedule and
training and certification discipline in the 7th Fleet. And so,
now we are ensuring that we certify all ships to go out and do
the missions that they are assigned, and they have the
requisite maintenance and training time to do those.
We also addressed the surface warfare officer career path.
And so, as I alluded--illuminated in my written statement, the
amount of training throughout that career path, and the amount
of sea time that an officer accrues before he goes to command,
has almost doubled, across the board. And so, there's a lot
more experience being gained.
Finally, in addition to the amount of training, the quality
of that training has increased considerably through the use of
high-fidelity simulators, which are being installed in our
schoolhouses and in our fleet concentration areas. So, to put
it broadly, we're making progress across this entire broad
front to get to that culture of excellence.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, we can send you a little
followup that I know Senator King had asked for. And being a
data-centric person, it's the numbers behind what we just
presented you.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Just to tie a bow on this line of questioning, how
confident are you that we have no more ships in our Navy that
have some of the deficiencies that those After Action Reviews
cited, and that the leaders and sailors on our ships now have
been fully trained and have the skills that they need to avoid
such a terrible tragedy in the future?
Admiral Richardson. I'm confident we're on the right track,
sir.
Secretary Spencer. Ditto.
Senator Cotton. Okay.
Secretary Spencer, let's turn back to the Truman now.
There's always been a few lines of questions here. Could you
tell us, very simply, was the decision about the Truman a
decision driven by budget considerations or by strategic
considerations?
Secretary Spencer. It was a hybrid, Senator. Then-Deputy
Secretary Shanahan, when we were planning budget rollout, the
thinking amongst the Navy that we worked on was, we have three
buckets. We have legacy systems, we modernize legacy systems,
and the third bucket was what we call Funding Force 2.0, which
is what we've referred to as our future warfare systems,
whether that be quantum computing, AI, machine learning, et
cetera. Couple that with the fact that--I want to make sure
everyone understands this--the Ford will work. The Ford is not
a Nimitz. The Ford has 30-percent higher launch capability for
sorties than the Nimitz. It takes 25-percent less people. It is
a more efficient machine. So, as I look at modernizing a fleet,
much like in the commercial world, when organizations modernize
aircraft, modernize trucks, modernize cars, modernize ships,
they will move for 20-percent efficiencies and abandon the
assets that they have. This is not an easy decision whatsoever,
Senator, but, in light of the technologies that we have coming
forward--and I defer to the Chairman that there's still work to
be done, here--the thought process was, we have a much more
capable, much more lethal, much more projecting platform. Three
of those in the fleet will make up on a capacity argument. That
was the primary decision. So, we can take those dollars and
then deploy those into Force 2.0 as the competitive--changes.
Senator Cotton. So, my time's almost expired, but just to--
one final question here. Surely, though, if this Congress
provided you the money necessary for both the Truman refueling
and also the rest of your shipbuilding plan, you wouldn't turn
that money down and say, ``No, we don't need the Truman.''
Secretary Spencer. I would not turn that money down.
Senator Cotton. I didn't think so.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Warren.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, thousands of Active Duty troops and National Guardsmen
are currently deployed on the southern border. This operation
is going to cost at least a half a billion dollars. So, I've
repeatedly written to the Department of Defense, asking whether
the deployment impacts military readiness. Each time, the
answer has been no. General Neller, last month you wrote a memo
to the Navy Secretary identifying nine factors, ``imposing
unacceptable risk to Marine Corps combat readiness and
solvency,''. One was the border deployment, and a second was
the President's plan to take funding away from military
construction for a border wall.
Now, General Neller, I know you did not expect this memo to
become public, you did not release it, you were just doing your
job by assessing risks. Ranking Member Reed and I, along with
several other Committee members, sent another letter to the
Department yesterday, because that's our job as Members of this
Committee, to ask questions about the impact of these risks.
So, let me ask. Have any exercises been canceled, or were any
units sent to the border instead of going to scheduled training
exercises? Just factual questions. General?
General Neller. No exercises, to my knowledge, have been
canceled. There have been some, due to funding.
So, Senator, if I could just embellish for a second. You're
correct, I had a list of eight unresourced requirements, of
which one was the mission to go to the border. And what I tried
to articulate was, if we did not get funding for these, the
total cost of these, about $300 million, of which the border
mission, right now, to date, costing about 6.2--if we didn't
get additional money, then we would have to look at other
sources for money, which could potentially include other
exercises, which would eventually affect the readiness of the
force.
Senator Warren. So, I understand that, but I'm not quite
sure I heard the answer to the question. Are you saying no
exercises were canceled?
General Neller. There was an exercise that we reduced the
number of people that were going there, but we have relooked at
our finances, and we're going to cashflow, at least for this
quarter, those exercises, and we're going to continue to do the
exercises.
Senator Warren. Were any exercises delayed because people
were sent to the border?
General Neller. No.
Senator Warren. Okay. Were any units sent to the border
instead of going to scheduled training exercises?
General Neller. There were some units that went to the
border that were scheduled to participate in exercises, and
they were not able to do so because they were in that mission.
Senator Warren. So, they were diverted to the border
instead of doing their----
General Neller. A small number, yes----
Senator Warren.--their exercises. Okay. Can you just say a
word about what are the opportunity costs of the border
deployment?
General Neller. It depends on the unit. Some of the units
have gone down there, and they have done tasks that are more in
line with their core mission, like engineer units or MP units.
Aviation units that were assigned to that early on have
actually improved their readiness, because they are able to fly
certain profiles. Other units, one particular unit is doing a
mission today that's not part of their core competency, so it--
but, for 60 days, they can handle that, but it will affect
their readiness.
Senator Warren. Okay. So, when I have raised these issues
with DOD officials, they seem to deny disruptions to readiness.
I'm seeing something of a disconnect here.
Secretary Spencer, maybe you can shed some light on this.
DOD officials assured me, in writing, that the President's
southern border deployment and the transfer of military
construction funds for a wall do not present significant
readiness risks. But, we now know that concerns about readiness
have been raised internally. Same question to you. What are the
opportunity costs of the border deployment?
Secretary Spencer. I answered the same as the Commandant,
Senator. There are some that actually benefit from the
deployment, because they can actually do their job that their
core competency is, some not. But, let's bring it up--and the
whole reason that I asked both the CNO and the Commandant for a
memo such as this is, I feel I have to know, being the chief
executive of the service, to know where the stresses are. This
was item G on the whole list. The main stress that we were
dealing with at the time, Senator, was the hurricane, which was
imposing the greatest cost on the Marine Corps. Five-hundred
men for a month at the southern border is $1.25 million. In my
mind, is that affecting my readiness stress? No, it's not.
Senator Warren. All right. I understand that it's in a
context. But, as I said before, part of our job is to explore
where we have valid concerns to military readiness. You're
doing your job when you raise those concerns. We're doing our
job when we ask about them.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has said that border
deployment and the transfer of military construction funds for
a wall contribute to an unacceptable risk to the Marine Corps'
combat readiness and solvency. I think it's time for the
President and Congress to listen to him, and we should keep
asking these questions.
Thank you.
Thank you, both.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service to our
country.
Secretary Spencer, you recently commissioned a report to
review your cyber operations within the Department of Navy. In
it the report was very critical of current naval operations
with regard to cyber operations, and it went to great lengths
to point out some of the failings within the system today. But,
I also found it very refreshing, in that it laid out, for
everyone to see, the challenges that you face, and it clearly
puts a focus on the need to make significant changes. I find
that, if you would have taken out the Department of Navy and
you would have put in any one of our other branches, I suspect,
other than the anecdotal examples, you would have found a
consistency across the entire Department of Defense. So, number
one, I want to thank you for laying this out for everyone to be
able to see and to review, but also for laying out, not just
the challenges, but some solutions that I think are moving in
the right direction.
I'd like you to talk a little bit about one part, in
particular. And that is, as we move to a 355-ship Navy, and as
we talk about the security of every one of those ships and all
of the work that we do to protect each one of those ships,
compare that with what our near-peer and peer competitors are
doing. They're not stealing our ships. They're stealing our
information. And we need to take a change, in terms of the
culture, about how we protect our information, just like we
protect our other assets.
Would you care to comment a little bit about, number one,
where you're going with that? And I've got one other question
I'm going to--I want to ask you about. So, if you could, a
little bit, share where you're going with this, and just how
deep in this went to not just cybersecurity, but to all other
aspects, whether it be acquisitions, logistics, and so forth,
modernization.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, thank you for the question,
because it is timely. This was driven primarily out of some
exfiltrations that happens in our supply system. And that's
where the concern for the study started. Rest assured, when it
comes to classified information within the Navy itself, we are
good at that. Where we're concerned about is out in our
contractor--cleared-contractor relationship base. That's where
it started.
Now, where did it progress from there? One, we need to take
immediate remedial actions, which we are underway right now,
with our supplier base, when it comes to our cyber protection.
You will hear the Navy and ourselves talk about--it's not how
quickly we can get to the fight. One of our battles is going to
be getting off the pier, because cyber is around us
continually, 100 times a minute, a second, whatever analogy you
want to use. It's there, it's present, it's not going away. We
need to up our game, not only on cyber defense, because you
can't have one side of this equation, you have to be
offensively agile as you do defensively agile. They both
complement each other. We have to move into that realm. We're
going to be asking for probably more authorities, in general,
the DOD, when it comes to this, because it's a balanced
equation.
Immediately, in the Navy, we are in the process, right now,
of--underneath Ron Moultrie, who was a primary member of the
team, he is helping us coalesce our business plan to go forward
with our cyber remediation process. That goes from data hygiene
all the way to organizing what the organization would look
like. We're sending a leg prop up to you all to entertain
adding a fifth Assistant Secretary. One of the reasons here is
that we need to get the people of gravitas, who have the
education, who have the experience to deal in cyber, to get
them into a position like that and give them the authority to
organize and effect the solutions that we need.
Senator Rounds. I found one other part of this to be
interesting, in that I think this could be transferred--this
concept of using the outside resources to not only look at the
cyber side, but also on your acquisition side and on your
maintenance side, as well. Last fall, I asked specific
questions about your attack submarines, the numbers that you've
got. You've still got a number of them sitting at dock, because
you're not getting them in to drydock, which means we've got
nuclear attack submarines taxpayers have paid for that can't be
used today. In fact, a number of them, including the USS Boise,
can't dive. You've also got legacy and Super Hornets, of which,
2 years ago, I believe, we were estimating the operational
capability at 40 percent. My understanding is, it's pretty
close to that same level today. Can you share with us a little
bit about the direction that you're going with regard to those,
and whether or not you're making progress on those legacies,
both the Navy and the Marines?
Secretary Spencer. The good news that I'm very happy to
bring to you right now is, our F-18, both Navy and Marine
Corps, the Es and Fs and the legacies are not boasting
somewhere up around 67 percent availability. And this is part
of our Navy sustainment effort that we're focusing in right
now. We have a ways to go when it comes to surface ship and
subsurface ship maintenance. That is apparent. Senator Shaheen
brought it up. We need to do our shipyard modernization. This
is all about flow. We have the fundamental understanding now.
Now we need to apply the resources to get those out into----
Senator Rounds. You need to be at 80 percent, correct, on
the Hornets, to make your mission?
Secretary Spencer. By end of fiscal year, yes, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you. That's good news. I was not
aware that that's where we were right now. Because we were down
as low as 40 percent.
Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Jones.
Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you each for your service.
But, Secretary Spencer, I want to particularly thank you
for the time and--that you've shown me in my first 15 months
here. It's been a really enjoyable and informative experience,
what I've had. So, thank you for that.
You have stated--I guess this would be mainly to Admiral
Richardson and General Neller--that we have increased rates--
we're looking at 5100 sailors and trying to increase the rates.
I'm particularly interested in the pilot ranks. How diverse are
our pilot ranks in the Navy? And what is the Navy doing to kind
of increase the diversity for men, for minorities, as well as
females? Senator Cotton and I have a bill that we introduced to
try to increase Junior ROTC and some other things to try to
increase that diversity. Could you talk about those programs a
little bit, and what you're doing?
Admiral Richardson. So, I'll tell you, in the Navy, and
then I'll turn it over to the Commandant.
Just like you, Senator, we're doing everything we can to
make sure, as I said in my opening statement, that we bring in
a diverse workforce across the entire Navy, not only in our
pilots, but everywhere, in that regard. We've opened up all of
our jobs to women. Certainly, we encourage, you know, a diverse
population across the board, not only in terms of assessing
them, but also--you know, look at that population 25 years
down. Is the leadership retaining that diversity as it gets
more senior? And so, we've got a number of efforts that I'd be
happy to come and brief your--you and your staff on in detail
to get after that. But, suffice it to say that this is the
competitive edge of the future, is diversity, and we take it
very seriously.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
General?
General Neller. Senator, if I look at the gross numbers,
particularly in aviation right now, for pilots, the stats are
not really good. So, it's going to take a concerted long-term
effort to create a better statistical look at--so that we have
more men of color and ethnicity and women across the whole
force, let alone in aviation. But, I can tell you, for the last
4 years, the number of accessions for officers in the Marine
Corps has been 24, 25, 26, and, last year, over 30 percent of
those that accept a commission into the Marine Corps were men
of color and ethnicity and women. A lot of that comes from the
Naval Academy, because we have been able to increase the number
of midshipmen that can join the Marine Corps. Used to be
limited to 16.6 percent. In the last couple of years, it's been
around 25. That's been a great source of us for men and women.
So, it's going to take--it's not going to get fixed in 4
years, because it takes 22 years to make a colonel, to be an
air group commander or be a MEU commander. It takes 15 years to
make a squadron commander. So, we'll continue to track this and
pay attention to it, but anything you or any other of the
Committee Members can do to encourage people to serve in the
military, to be involved in science, technology, and math,
whether it be high school JROTC, although that is, by itself,
not supposed to be a recruiting place; that's just a place to
develop leadership in our high school students. But, anything
you can do in any area to encourage young men and women to join
the military--Army, Air Force, Navy, or the Marine Corps--it
would be appreciated.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you, General.
Secretary Spencer, Admiral Richardson, as you know,
Alabama's had an important role on building of the LCS, and
we're kind of looking forward to the transition to the fast
frigate. Can you tell us, just briefly, about the importance of
the frigate's role in the NDS? And do you see the Navy holding
to the procurement schedule for the frigate?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, we do. It's extremely
important that we make this transition to a--frankly, a more
lethal, small surface combatant as we look at--forward and do
the Force Structure Assessment, as we look at employing the
Navy in a distributed way, using this distributed maritime
operations concept. These fast frigates are going to be an
important part of that. Yes, sir.
Secretary Spencer. Just to add to that, Senator, putting my
business hat on and my title 10 hat on, this is going to be one
of the most robust competitions that we'll have, having five
potential forms being submitted into the competition. It's
quite exciting.
Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
Senator Perdue.
Senator Perdue. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the three of you and all your teams for a
couple of things. One is, last November, we received our first
ever in U.S. history DOD audit. I'm not a beancounter. I don't
think that's what we should be about, but I do think we need to
look at being the most efficient we can be so our men and women
get everything they need. I also want to thank you for the $30
billion of what looked like to me real savings, Mr. Secretary
and the team, in the--just in the last 2 years. So, this is,
directionally, very encouraging.
Admiral Richardson. Billion, sir.
Senator Perdue. I'm sorry. Billion.
Admiral Richardson. Yeah.
Senator Perdue. Thirty billion. Let's put a B in front of
that. Apologize. Thank you.
I have two questions. Mr. Secretary, I'd love for you to
talk to us--you made a quote, 2 years ago now, or in December
of 2017. I'm going to quote you, if that's okay. I think you
won't mind this. ``Continuing Resolutions (CRs) have cost the
Department of the Navy--continuing resolutions have cost the
Department of the Navy roughly $4 billion. Between 2011 we've
put 4--since 2011, we've put 4 billion in a trash can, put
lighter fluid on it, and burned it.'' Do you still stand by
that?
Secretary Spencer. Most definitely, Senator.
Senator Perdue. So, would you also acknowledge that $4
billion--compared to the deployment at the border, $4 billion
would have really materially impacted our readiness, would it
not?
Secretary Spencer. It would, Senator.
Senator Perdue. Sir, would you talk to us just a little bit
about the specific impacts of continuing resolutions? We've
had--in the last 44 or 45 years since the 1974 Budget Act,
we've had 187 continuing resolutions. In the last 10 years
alone, one-third of our time has been, basically, under a CR.
So, I'm very concerned. We're halfway through our fiscal year
right now. We're looking at September 30th this year. Would you
talk to us about what momentum damage that would do to what
we've done in the last 2 years? And then I have one more
question about maintenance, if we can get to it at the end.
Secretary Spencer. I'll be very quick with this, Senator.
The work that you all have done in both this chamber, across
the way at the House, both in authorizations and appropriations
over the last 3 years with the 2017 Regulatory Accountability
Act (RAA), the 2018/2019 budget, is absolutely spectacular.
You've heard me say that it's the foundation of readiness, and
we're building upon it. We are. A CR will knock us off our
game. It'll be the most painful thing we've had. And what's
more bizarre to me is that it would self-induced.
Admiral Richardson. Senator, if I could pile onto that----
Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
Admiral Richardson.--just a little bit. I'll tell you, I
completely agree with the Secretary. This would be like a punch
in the gut. Just some specifics. It would--it looks like it
would be almost 16 billion less than the budget request. Of
course, it's not just the amount, but also the inability to
start new things. And so, there would be no start to the
aircraft carrier refueling, the fast frigate program that we
just discussed, the advanced helo training system, and a number
of others. There would be no quantity increases to the
Virginia-class SSN, the carriers, the oilers, and many other
programs. And so, the list goes on. And we would not be able to
assess the people that we need to fill gaps at sea. And so, it
would be devastating.
Senator Perdue. General Neller, you have a helicopter I
also believe is due for delivery this year that would be
delayed until at least 1 full year. Is that correct?
General Neller. As the CNO and the Secretary said, Senator,
I mean, everything is impacted. You know, we come up with a
program and a plan based on what an anticipated budget number's
going to be. And, although it would be better than the BCA
[Budget Control Act] number, it still would have impact and
cause us to have to go back, and would stall our progress on
readiness and modernization.
Senator Perdue. Thank you.
Admiral, supply chain. We've--other people have talked
about it. You guys have talked about it repeatedly here. After
sequestration years and cutting the military by 25 percent, the
supply chain is totally devastated. I've seen that. I've lived
in the supply chain most of my career, and I've seen that just
in the last week. I was--I visited--you guys were gracious
enough to let me visit the Truman yesterday. I want to thank
you for that.
One of the things I'm concerned about is, at procurement
now, you do have some flexibility over a multiyear facet. I
think it's 3 years. Under maintenance, though, if you don't
spend money in one year, it rolls to the--it doesn't roll to
the next, it basically has to be reappropriated. Would you be
comfortable--or do you see value in a pilot program to test
providing multiyear flexibility in ship--in depot maintenance
appropriations?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, thanks for that question. Thanks
for coming out to Truman yesterday. It was an honor to have you
onboard.
Sir, absolutely is the answer to your question. A pilot
program, I think, would be terrific, because it would match the
funding window to, really, the job at hand. And so, this would
give us flexibility throughout the--before, during, and after a
maintenance. Before, we could get the supply chain, the
material purchased, the planning done, all of that, in order
and in place. During, as adjustments always occur, it would
give us more flexibility to move funds from one project to
another. And then after, it would allow us to recoup funds that
we didn't spend efficiencies and apply them to other projects.
So, across the board, that type of flexibility would be very
helpful. And I'd be happy to participate in a pilot program of
that type.
Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Spencer. It only makes business sense, Senator.
It would be a great pilot to try.
Senator Perdue. Well, that would be a shame, to try
something commonsense that might help you guys, wouldn't it?
In closing, Mr.--General Neller, I just want to thank you.
Forty-four years is a long time to be doing anything, and
America is better off because you were at the--on the wall.
Thank you, sir.
Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join in thanking you, General Neller, for your
service. Forty-four years is a long time, but you have an
extraordinary and distinguished career, and it will be a model
for many of our marines for a long time.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for your service, as
well.
I was encouraged to see, Admiral Richardson, your remarks
about the Virginia-class submarine. I was encouraged that you
agree that we should seize this moment of opportunity to build
at the rate of three per year. I would assume that you also
believe that we need to strengthen our workforce with training
and the capability to build those submarines, correct?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I had the chance to go up to
Groton and visit Electric Boat. And one of my main topics was
exactly that. I'll tell you, this is something that is really
good for the Nation. Electric Boat and Newport News
Shipbuilding, together, the two shipyards that build our
submarines, have reached deep into the community colleges and
high schools to start building skilled workforce at that level,
at that age. All of those folks who would, historically, maybe
go to low-paying service jobs or those sorts of things are now
doing really high-level work--pipefitters, welders,
electricians, et cetera--to meet this workforce demand that's
going to allow us to build these amazing ships.
Senator Blumenthal. They have begun expanded apprenticeship
programs and skill training, on-the-job training that is
building that kind of dedicated workforce in southeastern
Connecticut. Not only there, but throughout the supply chain,
which is critical to the future of our national defense. The
construction of three Virginia-class submarines in fiscal year
2020 is good news for our national security as well as for that
workforce and for Connecticut. I'm going to do everything I can
to support and bolster this effort. I hope it will be a smooth
process in this year's budget cycle. But, I appreciate your
commitment to this effort.
Let me ask you about another area that I think is
tremendously important to our national security. I know that,
Secretary Spencer, you've been asked about the report, which I
think you said is due at noon today.
Secretary Spencer. I said I'd get it underway, sir, at noon
today. I don't know if I can deliver it today.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, we'll anticipate it whenever it's
delivered.
Secretary Spencer. Thank you, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. But, you would agree that climate
change is a national security issue, correct?
Secretary Spencer. Rising waters are a threat to me at all
times, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. The prospect of famine, of flooding,
drought, wildfires, the disruption that climate change causes
around the world is a national security threat, correct?
Secretary Spencer. I would agree with you, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you believe that opinion is shared
throughout the Department of Defense among your fellow service
Secretaries?
Secretary Spencer. I loathe to comment on something I
haven't asked them about, but I know that, in discussions, we
share concerns about the events that you just discussed.
Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that our Department
of Defense is, not only acting, but also planning adequately
into the future for this national security threat?
Secretary Spencer. I do, Senator. And the reason I'm
pausing, I'm thinking about three reports I just read
internally, primarily on how the Navy is hipping into direction
from the Department of Defense and what we're doing in that
regard. So, the answer would be yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Climate change is really a threat
multiplier, because it inflames the global instability, it
exacerbates those floods and food shortages and droughts and
all of the humanitarian crises, which increasingly breed
terrorist threats to this Nation. We live in that world now. I
thank you and your fellow members of the Department of Defense
for your awareness of this issue, no matter what the climate of
opinion is elsewhere in this administration.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service.
I think--Admiral Richardson and General Neller, I think
this is your last posture hearing. So, thanks for your
wonderful service. Forty-four years, General. I'm sure the one
thing you probably won't miss, in terms of your Marine Corps,
is these kind of hearings. So--you don't have to answer that.
I'm also glad to see our colleagues, like Senator Warren,
are raising their concerns about combat readiness for the
military. I think we all share that. What did the 2010 to 2016
25 percent cuts in the DOD budget do to combat--to readiness
for our combat forces? Twenty-five-percent cuts----
Admiral Richardson. I'll----
Senator Sullivan.--from 2010 to 2016. A lot of people don't
remember that, but----
Admiral Richardson. I think that--Senator, I'll just take
the first stab at this, then I'll just--I think it's been said
before, that budget instability and insufficiency has done more
damage to the military than any enemy.
Senator Sullivan. General?
General Neller. Sir, as much as we don't want to admit it,
we need resources to be able to buy gear, train, and maintain
the force. So, when we were in the period of time--the forward-
deployed forces, I believe, we're as ready as we could make
them, but the difference between that and today is that the
folks that were back home and on the bench, their overall
readiness was--is not what it is today.
Senator Sullivan. Just want to talk about an issue--
probably won't surprise you--I want to talk about the Arctic.
You know, China and Russia are making big moves into that part
of the world, because of resources, transportation routes.
We're an Arctic nation because of my State, Alaska. The Russian
buildup has been dramatic. Four new Arctic brigades, a new
Arctic command, 50 airfields by 2020, 30-percent increase in
Russian special forces in the Arctic, 40 icebreakers, 13 more
being built, huge snap exercises, in the tens of thousands.
This Committee, in a bipartisan way--I see Senator King is
here--has been very focused on this issue--new Arctic strategy,
strategic Arctic ports, icebreakers. I want to commend you, the
three of you, on your focus on this issue, as well.
Mr. Secretary, can you talk about some of the Navy's plans,
in terms of freedom of navigation operations, training on Adak,
that you and I have gone out to see that very strategic naval
base that kind of breaks your heart to see that it's been
shuttered, but the opportunities there. Then, General, cold-
weather training and other opportunities in Alaska and other
places. You know, when you look at our military and our
threats, North Korea, Russia, China all present cold-weather,
mountainous threats, in terms of terrain. I think we need to do
more in training in that area.
Can you three gentlemen talk about some of our interests
and what you're doing in that important strategic space for
America?
Secretary Spencer. More than happy to, Senator. Let me lead
off, and I'll be more than happy to hand it over to both the
CNO and the Commandant.
As you and I have discussed and we've presented to this
Committee before, the Arctic is a focus of ours, and we've
never taken our eyes off of it. We've been up there since 1964,
if I'm not mistaken, under sea, making sure our presence was
known under sea, and in the air. But, now we're taking a more
proactive step. We have up to three exercises that you've been
made aware of in Alaska. We have one on Adak that we hope to
have funded. NORTHCOM is the COCOM that is coordinating that.
Senator Sullivan. And that's amphibious operations and----
Secretary Spencer. That is amphibious operations.
Senator Sullivan.--other P-8 sub-hunter ops?
Secretary Spencer. Correct. Exactly. Take the airfield,
then bring in the P-8s, fundamentally.
We have been, in concert with the Coast Guard and you,
looking at the needs and the possibility of a strategic port up
in Alaska. I think this summer----
Senator Sullivan. At this Committee's behest, correct?
Secretary Spencer. That is correct, Senator.
We--the CNO and I have been talking about the possibility
of bringing some ships up, maybe up to Valdez--again, training
north of the Arctic Circle. We learned this in the most recent
Trident Juncture, where we had ships above the Circle. We need
to learn again what we have done in the past, exercise those
muscle movements, get the sets and reps so we're ready to fight
up there, if need be, and/or just to do our freedom of
navigation and/or diligent maneuvers up there.
CNO?
Admiral Richardson. So, I'll just pile on to that, if I
could. Since the last time we testified before this Committee,
I've signed out the Strategy Outlook for the Arctic--I'm happy
to share that with you immediately--which talks about our
strategic objectives to defend United States sovereignty up in
the Arctic--as you said, we are an Arctic nation--to ensure the
Arctic remains stable and conflict-free, protect the freedom of
the seas, and promote partnerships with United States
Government and other Arctic nations.
Since that time, we've been putting our money where our
mouth is, too. You know, we're not just talking about this,
we've done four major exercises up in the Arctic. Arctic Edge,
where more than 1500 military personnel were up in Alaska to
test our ability to operate up there. As the Secretary
mentioned, we did the Ice Ex, with two United States submarines
and one British submarine up there. Trident Juncture, where we
brought a carrier strike group north of the Arctic Circle for
the first time since 1991, in November. I can tell you, much
has changed since 1991, but it's still extremely cold and hard
to operate, up north of the Arctic Circle. We regained some of
those muscles. And then, in February, Arctic Exercise. Then, as
the Secretary mentioned, looking forward to September of this
year, if we can get the environmental clearances and everything
to do a exercise up in the Arctic, amphibious with our Marine
Corps partners, as well, which will include not only a takedown
and a P-8--in Adak, but also the important part of logistics
and refueling ashore, and all of those things.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General, I can get your details from you later on
this.
[The information referred to follows:]
General Neller. The Marine Corps consistent position
regarding the Arctic is that ``the Marine Corps must be
prepared to deploy wherever the Navy (and Coast Guard) deploy.
The Marine Corps maintains capability to support Naval
operations in ``any clime and place,'' including the Arctic.
Depending on seaborne lift, the Service plans for a baseline of
two MEBs that can conduct offensive operations in extreme cold
weather environments. To develop and maintain this capability,
the Marine Corps routinely deploys Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces (MAGTF) of varying sizes to conduct cold weather
training. The units train both in CONUS at the Marine Corps
Mountain Warfare Training Center, and other venues including
Camp Ripley, Minnesota and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The Service
also trains in Alaska, in Exercise ARCTIC EDGE and in Norway,
in exercises such as TRIDENT JUNCTURE as well as winter
training rotations above the Arctic Circle. These training
exercise feature interoperability training with NATO allies
such as the Norwegian Army and the British Royal Marines.
Additionally, the Marine Corps conducts cold weather training
in the Pacific, alongside our Korean allies in the Korea Marine
Exercise Program (KMEP), and in northern Japan, in winter
exercises such as FOREST LIGHT. The Marine Corps has recently
upgraded its Infantry Combat Clothing and Equipment (ICCE) cold
weather inventory. The Service maintains sufficient cold
weather ICCE for the entire Active and Reserve population and
Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECCWCS) ICCE (sufficient
for temperatures to minus 25 degrees F) for 35,000 marines,
with plans to acquire sufficient sets for an additional 4,000
marines when funding becomes available. The resulting ability
to outfit 39,000 marines for extreme cold weather supports the
Arctic-capable two MEB objective. The Service is currently
(May, 2019) undertaking a study to review and update the
requirement to provide increased numbers and capabilities of
cold weather/Arctic-capable units, given the emerging
requirements of potential operations in northwest Europe and
northeast Asia, particularly above the Arctic Circle and north
of the permafrost line.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
Gentlemen, I was very pleased----
Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, let me interrupt for just a moment.
We do have a vote coming up. And so, Senator Reed is going
to go down and vote early, and come up, relieve me, and I'll
vote late, and we'll keep on working through.
Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Chairman.
Gentlemen, I was very pleased to see the focus that the DOD
is now putting on hypersonics, and, in particular, the $2.6
billion request for prototyping across the services. As you
probably know, Sandia National Labs has long played a critical
role in developing this technology, and is the core reason why
we have--we actually have a capability now that's ready to
prototype.
One of the things I've discussed with lab directors, who
are really eager to transition this technology to industry, and
believe it may actually be important to co-locate the R&D and
the manufacturing of these systems. What will the role of the
lab community and industry partners be as we seek rapid
development of this capability? And is there some value in
making sure that the feedback loop between R&D, engineering,
and manufacturing is as tight as possible?
Secretary.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, from day one coming here, one
of my comments was that I have to be able to work, and so does
Navy enterprise, as a partner with our--with industry. This is
a prime example of it. But, what's really exciting about this
project is, not only are we partners with industry, the Navy,
Air Force, and Army are partners, as we signed out a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) to work together across our traditional
stovepipes. So, we're applying combined resources together to
get the goal forward, which is why you're seeing hypersonics
dragged to the earlier dates. It's going to be critical, as we
transition from R&D to manufacturing, that there not be a
stutter-step, there's no light between R&D and the transfer to
actual production. I believe everybody's onboard with that. The
proof will be in the pudding, but you can guarantee that the--
--
Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
Secretary Spencer.--three service Secretaries and their
acquisition arms are looking at it this way.
Senator Heinrich. Well, I really appreciate the joint
approach on this, because we're behind the eight ball, we're a
little late to the party, and we need to speed things up. And I
think making sure that all of those capabilities, the center of
excellence in manufacturing, are as tight as possible. It's
going to be really important.
Admiral Richardson, I was very encouraged by the Navy's
rapid demonstration of laser weapon systems on surface ships.
In a short period of time, the Navy has successfully deployed a
30-kilowatt laser on the USS Ponce, the 150-kilowatt laser on
the USS Portland. You have an $80 million unfunded requirement
in this area. If that were funded, what would it allow the Navy
to do?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, first, let me thank the Committee
and the entire Congress for all the support in this part of our
business. It's really been terrific.
What the--including that on the unfunded priority list does
is allow us to accelerate it even further, right? The budget
moves very aggressively in this area already--the submitted
budget. But, if we got a little bit more money, we could move
even more aggressively, still. And so, I've been, you know,
privileged to kind of visit the direct-energy corridor. I was
just recently out at our labs in California. They're working at
every possible part of this, from the weapon itself, getting
higher and higher powers, and then the integration with the
combat system, shore-based test facilities. We're taking this
very seriously across a full range of powers.
Senator Heinrich. Is the Navy looking at high-powered
microwaves, as well, for----
Admiral Richardson. We are.
Senator Heinrich.--high-velocity threats, like cruise
missiles or hypersonics?
Admiral Richardson. Indeed, we are, sir. And so, we--when
we talk about directed energy or electric weapons, a lot of
times we go right to the lasers, because----
Senator Heinrich. Right.
Admiral Richardson.--that's so exciting, but there's also a
tremendous amount of work being done in high-power microwave.
Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer, I want to sort of
finish up here with a workforce question on artificial
intelligence, and really the need to make sure that we're
building the workforce for these coming changes now. I had a
conversation last week with Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein,
on the idea of potentially--whether it would be beneficial to
create a mission occupational specialty for this type of
workforce. I'd just love to get your input on what you think we
need to be doing now to make sure that we're developing a
workforce that can handle and care for the kind of data that is
going to be required, and whether it would be helpful to
consider a mission occupational speciality for that type of
workforce.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, a very timely question, because
this obviously does feed to Force 2.0, as I just was describing
earlier. When I look at it through Navy lenses, the way that I
view artificial intelligence is, that is the development of an
algorithm that I can take and then apply to my machines so they
can learn. I think, in the clearest path, what I would like to
see is possibly, at the DOD level, have your AI development,
and Navy be able to go up and check that algorithm out of the
locker, out of the development field, and then apply it to the
needs that they have, or amend it to the needs that they have.
That would be the most efficient, I believe, way to go forward.
That being said, we need to ring the bell right now, say,
``Doors are open,'' and bring as many of the great minds to
interact with AI right now.
Senator Heinrich. Great. Thank you, Secretary.
Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here today.
Secretary Spencer, this budget does not request funding for
additional littoral combat ship procurement. I understand that
the Navy plans to shift from buying LCS to the next-generation
frigate, called the FFGX. I know you plan to purchase nine
hulls by fiscal year 2024, with the first purchase coming
fairly quickly, in fiscal year 2020. But, recently, Vice
Admiral Merz, the Deputy Chief, testified to the House that the
Navy will be reevaluating its force structure plan, citing
specifically--and I'm going to quote him right now, ``We know
we are heavy on large surface combatants, and we'd like to
adjust that to a more appropriate mix, especially with the
lethality we're seeing coming along with the frigate.''
My question to you is, How are you approaching the
industrial base, given the potential to increase the Force
Structure Assessment requirement above the current requirement
for 52 small surface combatants?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, you've hit a nail on the head.
The supply chain is absolutely critical in this regard, no
matter which way we move, with what provider. As I said
earlier, the excitement about this program is--as you know,
there are five forms that we're considering, so it's going to
be a very competitive competition. But, we're not just looking
at the ship, per se. One of the things that we have really
moved forward on is, when we look at the acquisition of a
platform, equally important is the sustainment of that
platform. You might have heard us say that, traditionally, if
you look back, 70 cents on the dollar was spent on acquisition,
and 30 on sustainment. We're shifting that model completely
because of what we've, obviously, learned. It's going to be
critical that, in this competition, we understand where the
supply base is, the health of that supply base, and the ability
of that supply base's resiliency.
Senator Peters. Well, do you believe the current budget
request, then, bridges the gap? Because we're going to have a
gap there in funding to make sure the industrial base can
continue to operate.
Secretary Spencer. I believe it does. We're going to listen
to industry. Right now, that has not become an issue, but we
will listen to industry when it comes to that point.
Senator Peters. Very good.
The Navy's budget also--request--includes a request for ten
large unmanned surface vessels across the future years defense
plan, and planned at about two per year, beginning in fiscal
year '20. So, it's clear the Navy is continuing to embrace the
benefits of unmanned platforms, particularly given the
opportunities for low-cost, high-endurance platforms that can
be reconfigured with a variety of payloads and can often serve
as a force multiplier to the manned force out there.
So, my question is to both Secretary Spencer and Admiral
Richardson. Can you provide more detail on how you expect the
Navy's unmanned surface vehicle family of systems to develop?
What are the specific benefits that you hope that these
platforms are going to offer the fleet?
Secretary Spencer. Let me just provide, again, from a title
10 point, buying of these platforms. You all have told us, in
no mixed terms, that we are to move with urgency. That message
is being transferred all the way down throughout the whole
naval enterprise. This is a prime example of where we're going
to acquire these platforms, and we're going to build, you know,
use, break, learn, cycle, continually. This is a prime example
of a platform that we'll do this on.
CNO?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, the benefits of unmanned in this
area almost speak for themselves. We can send a ship out there
for a lot longer. Oftentimes, in terms of endurance, the people
are the limiting factor there. We can send them into higher-
risk areas, you know, so all sorts of benefits. I agree with
you that this large vessel will allow us a diversity of
payloads, from weapons payloads to logistics payloads. The
Commandant and I have been talking about some terrific
opportunities for naval integration using these. The first
couple, we'll be working very closely with the Strategic
Capabilities Office to get those two going, and then we'll
partner very closely with industry. We'll probably use mature
designs for the hull form and those sorts of things. The real
R&D part in this is, you know, what about the unmanned, what
are the autonomy, how do we get into that, particularly when
it--I mean, there's all sorts of dimensions, not only from a
safety dimension, a security dimension, an ethical dimension,
when you start to think about weapons employment. That's why we
have them in the account--the R&D account, where they are right
now.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
General Neller, you--the Marine Corps has been conducting
advanced naval technology exercises with the Navy to leverage
both the industrial and academic intellectual base with
prototypes and get it into the hands of marines as quickly as
possible so that we can be on the cutting edge of new
technologies but learn from our marines in the field. Could you
briefly just tell us and inform us, What lessons did the
marines learn during the technology exercise in 2018, and are
we going to be continuing those kinds of exercises?
General Neller. Well, first, Senator, yes, we will. We just
did another one down at Camp Lejeune, as far as mine
countermeasures, where we have--basically, we invite vendors to
show up for certain technologies. The one in 2018--they're all
kind of running together. We've been doing about one big one a
year, give a certain theme with these surface-to-surface
movement, and they show up with their capabilities, and then--
they talk to the marines, they learn what the marine
requirements are, they make a change to their thing, and the
marines kind of say, ``Hey, we think this has got value, and
this one does not.'' And so, we can narrow it down.
So, we'll continue to do that. We just recently did a big
exercise with the Navy on the West Coast, called Pacific Blitz,
where we had a number of technologies and ideas being
demonstrated, where we looked at expeditionary-based operations
where we would employ a marine force to, as part of the naval
force, control maritime seaspace. So, we'll continue to do
that, and we'll--the ships that you were just talking about
with the CNO and the Secretary are of great interest to us.
They could be platforms, as the CNO said, to carry weapons,
they could carry logistics. We're seeing now that we need to
have some sort of a connector that allows us to move from place
to place. If it's unmanned and it can still do the job, that
just makes it safer and easier, and it reduces our costs and
our risk.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Secretary Spencer, thank you for the work out at Annapolis
last week on sexual assault. I think that it was a great
discussion, great coming together of expertise. And so, it was
a good meeting. A great outcome will be specific proposals that
we can work together on to make sure that we make progress in
this Congress. But, I thank you for being here.
I want to go quickly with limited time, to General Neller.
General Neller, you don't strike me as the sort of person that
gets rattled very easily, but I've seen and had a number of
discussions with you on the MILCON challenges that we have down
at Camp Lejeune. I don't know if it's been covered in any of
the other meetings--I've got two competing meetings going--or
discussions, here--but, can you outline for this Committee your
chief concerns over the billions of dollars of MILCON backlog
that we have at Camp Lejeune, how it affects capabilities,
readiness, and the operations of the base?
General Neller. Senator, it's really not a backlog, it's an
emerging requirement. As you know, Hurricane Florence struck
the Carolina coast in September of last year. Fortunately, the
storm went from a category 4 to a 2, but then, when it did come
ashore, it sat on top of the--that part of North Carolina,
rained for 3 straight days, rained over 30 inches of rain. And
so, when the roofs came off some of these 40-, 50-, 60-, 70-
year-old buildings, and the water went in, we had a lot of
damage. And it's not visible. It's not like down in the
Panhandle, when Michael came across with category-4 winds and
actually leveled buildings. So, it--when you drive around, you
don't see it. It's more inside.
And so, we've gone through. The PPV vendor is working to
fix the housing that was damaged aboard the base. And they're
about a 50-percent improve in their process. That was a painful
thing, to get that going. But, they're working that. But, we've
gone through and looked at all the buildings, and we've
prioritized about 30 buildings we think the costs of repair is
not worth it, that we think they need to be replaced. And the
total bill's about $3.5 billion. The 400 million that we got in
reprogramming last week will be helpful, but--so, we still have
this remaining bill. A lot of this money, the Department says
they're going to put it in fiscal year 2020. And so, we're
hopeful that that will be part of the program. But, we still
have about $450 million we could legitimately apply this fiscal
year if we were to get the money.
Senator Tillis. You tell me what the impact is on--what are
you doing to make do? Some of these buildings, I would assume,
are inhabitable, and you're having to figure out how to
continue to operate. Can you give me an idea of how it's
disrupting the day-to-day operations at Lejeune?
General Neller. We've had to move people around to
different places and spaces. We've had to make adjustments on
some of the communications. And, in some cases, the marines are
just continuing to operate in the building, making the best of
what they have. The buildings are not unsafe, but their ability
to have heating or air-conditioning is limited. And so, it's a
pretty expeditionary environment, which is something we're used
to, but--and you can do that for a limited period of time, but
it would be nice to be able to work in a more normal
environment, in a garrison environment.
So, we're confident that we'll get these things fixed. Some
of the buildings that they're in eventually would be razed and
a new building would be built, because that's what we think
it's going to take. We know for a fact from the storm that all
the new buildings--and the Congress has been very generous with
all the MILCON down at Camp Lejeune and many of our other
bases--all the new buildings suffered very little to no damage.
So, we've got a lot of old buildings down there that we think
we need to replace if we're going to continue to be able to
survive what's likely to be continued storms in the future.
Senator Tillis. Secretary Spencer, I appreciate, also, your
prompt action after a committee where I was a little bit
animated on housing, a month or so ago, and want to continue to
work with the--with all of DOD on what I think are unacceptable
housing conditions. I've gone down to Fort Bragg. I'm going to
be visiting Camp Lejeune, going to spend some time. And you've
got to separate the storm damage from some of the problems that
existed before that. We'll have to sort that out. But, do you
also--and, Admiral Richardson, do you share the Commandant's
view that this military construction recovery down at Camp
Lejeune is a top priority?
Secretary Spencer. Yes.
Senator Tillis. Thank you all.
Last thing I'll leave you with--I left it with Secretary
Wilson in the hearing last week--is that--I understand the
funding request. I tend to support what your priorities are,
and hope to provide the funding. I think that you need to look
ahead and game out what the likelihood is of getting that
funding, versus something less than that, and, you know, worst
case, a sequester, and need to communicate, in very specific
terms, what your Department will have to do to react to that,
not here in the Committee, but there needs to be a very clearly
delineated list of everything that shifts to the right as a
result of Congress's failure to give you all the resources that
I think you need and you deserve.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, I'd like to start my questioning with a plea.
We've had testimony from the SOUTHCOM commanders, over the last
2 or 3 years, that we have intelligence about drug shipments
coming to the United States by sea. Of the 100 percent that we
have intelligence on, we're only able to interdict 25 percent
because of lack of maritime assets. Since this hearing started,
12 Americans have died of overdoses. Our country is under
attack. People are dying. People are dying in my State, one a
day. Please, see if you can find a way to allocate LCS or other
maritime assets to work with the Coast Guard to interdict those
drug shipments. It is inexcusable that we know of a drug
shipment and can't do anything about it because of a lack of
maritime assets. If you want to respond, Mr. Secretary, I'd be
delighted, but, basically, this is a heartfelt request to try
to use--to do something that's within our power to do.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, could not agree more. The CNO
and I have been talking, along with Admiral Faller, down in
SOUTHCOM, exactly about this. This is a mission that fits the
LCS, and I think, this coming quarter or so, you'll see our
response in that regard.
Senator King. Thank you. I'd deeply appreciate that, and
I'll look forward to continue to work with you on that.
To just a somewhat lighter question, a major change is--
you're talking, now, about a large surface combatant. You're in
the early stages. Can we assume that that's going to follow a
similar path of the new frigate program of existing hulls,
working with partners, and that kind of approach to this
project?
Admiral?
Admiral Richardson. If I could, just--the short answer is
yes, we're going to try and really shorten the acquisition
cycle, and we do so by leveraging more advanced and mature
technologies, hull forms all the way up to combat system
sensors, weapons----
Senator King. Good.
Admiral Richardson. And then we take more rapid, shorter
acquisition steps, if you will, to follow that Moore's Law
curve, or that exponential curve, a little bit more closely,
with smaller steps.
Senator King. Appreciate it. Thank you.
And I should have, at the beginning--I've had some
exchanges with naval officers here over the last month or so
about the accidents with the McCain and the Fitzgerald. I've
sought data. I've met with you at the Pentagon. I want to
express my appreciation for the forward-leaning approach that
you've taken, the data you have supplied. That doesn't mean I'm
always going to be happy. So, keep at it. I want to see the
data, on a quarterly basis, specific, ship-by-ship, in terms of
training levels and all of the issues that were identified in
the reviews of those two crashes. I think it's very important.
But--trust, but verify, I guess is what I'm saying. And I
intend to continue to verify. And I--but, I do appreciate what
the Navy has done and the responsiveness that you've shown.
Secretary Spencer, last year we talked about the audit,
what you expected to find. You said you saw 4 to 7 years, I
think, as a ramp-up to get to a clean audit. Now that we've had
a year, any modification of your estimate? And are you
satisfied with the process, thus far?
Secretary Spencer. Senator, no update on the date. I will
say that we've come in a year. I'm not kicking it out one more
year, keeping 4-to-7 being a constant. We learned a tremendous
amount, and we are underway right now, remediating the findings
from the audit itself. But, the remediation is only one of the
steps we're taking. It's what we're learning from the
remediation. As an example, in the way that we monitor our real
estate, in the way that we keep tabs on armaments. We're
finding many different ways to improve the way we do it. Best
practices from both other services, other forms of government,
and outside the----
Senator King. So, your conclusion is that the audit has
certainly performed a useful function.
Secretary Spencer. Its ROI [return on investment] is a
multiple, sir.
Senator King. That's excellent. I appreciate that and look
forward to future progress.
One, just, short comment at the end. You had an exchange--I
believe it was with Senator Rounds--about the cyberthreat. I
deal with cyber in two other committees, and one of the things
that's come out in recent hearings is the threat via subs, that
the major contractors are pretty secure and strong, and our
adversaries are now going through a little six-person
engineering firm that supplies one screw to a major contractor,
and that's how they get into the system. I commend to you that
as a risk factor that I think needs real attention. I also
commend to you the Red Team approach to get their attention.
Secretary Spencer. Senator, you've hit the nail on the
head, and that came out in the review that we just had, our
cybersecurity review. But, I'd like to turn around and say
hat's off to you and Congressman Gallagher for setting up the
Solarium. We look forward to seeing what's going to come out of
your organization in that regard. There is not enough time and
there's not enough resources to be put against this issue right
now. We've got to get the gray matter starting it, and then
we're going to start effecting the remediation.
Senator King. We had our first meeting yesterday. We're on
our way.
Thank you, Mr. Chair--Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Reed has returned. We're under--a vote is underway.
I'm going to go vote, come back. We're going to work through
it.
Senator Hawley.
Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you, as always,
for your exemplary service.
I have heard much praise for your work, as reflected in
this budget in a lot of areas, but particularly in an area I
want to ask you about, in the investments in unmanned,
undersea, and surface platforms. I want to ask you about an
unmanned aerial system, the MQ-25 Stingray. I understand this
is the first of its kind unmanned aerial system that will serve
as a refueling station for other carrier-based aircraft. And
many proud Missourians are working on this program in St.
Louis. Of course, they have my firm support.
Secretary Spencer, can you update the Committee on the
Stingray's progress and when you expect it to enter service?
Secretary Spencer. I'm going to defer to the CNO, here, on
exacts. This is a fast-track acquisition, and it's a large-
platform fast-track acquisition. We are tremendously impressed
with what we've heard coming out of St. Louis on the different
manufacturing style that they're going to use on the MQ-25,
which is--without going into the weeds, is going to actually
speed time dramatically for our receipt of this.
CNO?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, first, let me tell--talk to the
military benefit of this tanker--unmanned tanker, which will be
able to stay in flight for so much longer that a manned tanker
would be. And then, it liberates five F-18 strike fighter
aircraft to do strike fighter missions instead of tanking
missions. So, military utility couldn't be stronger.
As well, the approach to acquisition, as the Secretary
said, has been unique, in that we partnered with industry very,
very early on to define the requirements appropriately, going
back to Senator King's discussion regarding technical maturity,
so that we can get this out into the fleet as quickly as
possible. And so, for a sophisticated aircraft program, we let
the contract for this program in 2018, and we expect this to be
on deck in 2024, 6 years, which is pretty good, by recent
metrics.
Senator Hawley. Yeah, that's outstanding. Thank you.
Admiral, can I just ask you about the--how the Stingray's
deployment will change how air carrier--or carrier air wings
operate? I think you started to gesture towards that just now,
but we'd--if you would say some more about this.
Admiral Richardson. Well, it'll extend the range of the
Strike Fighter Air Wing, right, because we'll be able to go
out--tank those aircraft, and allow them to go out to do their
mission even further. But, I'll tell you what, sir. This is
just the beginning for unmanned for us with the Air Wing. I
think that one of the most exciting parts of this will be to
integrate unmanned with the aircraft carrier crew, in terms of
launching and recovery, and then, of course, integrating it
with the other manned parts of the Air Wing. Lots of lessons
learned as we continue to advanced unmanned aircraft.
Senator Hawley. Yeah. Thank you very much.
Let me just shift to a broader set of questions in the
Indo-Pacific theater. The NDS focuses our attention on the fait
accompli scenarios. Of course, in the Pacific, arguably, the
decisive theater from the NDS standpoint, when it comes to a
fait accompli scenario involving Taiwan, which is one that is
featured prominently, much the focus of our attention and
planning, how are we doing with our current capabilities on our
capacity to prevent a fait accompli scenario in that specific
instance?
Go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll just echo Admiral Davidson's
thoughts. He's the Indo-Pacific commander primarily responsible
for making sure that we are ready, in all respects across the
entire Joint Force and the interagency, for that contingency.
Senator Hawley. Do you feel that we are making progress,
here, from the Navy's point of view, with the capacities, the
capabilities that are required--I mean, are we making progress,
here, in getting to where we need to be to prevent a fait
accompli?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think that one of the major
strategic messages of the budget submission that we're
discussing today is that it looks exactly at that problem. If
you integrate across the size of the force, the capability of
the force, and the readiness of the force, it's focused on our
pacing threat, which is the Indo-Pacific.
Senator Hawley. Can you tell me, there have been--there's
been some discussion, of course, about aircraft carriers today.
But, from a broader point of view, can you tell me how you see
the carriers contributing to our toughest fights in that
theater, with China? I mean, what is it--as we think about
their major investments, obviously----
Admiral Richardson. Right.
Senator Hawley.--what is that, strategically, the carrier--
how does the carrier contribute--how will it contribute in that
theater, in the decisive theater, to that fight with China?
Admiral Richardson. Right. There's been a lot of discussion
about aircraft carriers and their role in the future. So, I
appreciate the question. Once, again, going back to our budget,
the acquisition of another Ford-class aircraft carrier, and the
purchase of two of them at the same time, capturing a $4
billion savings, but is a firm a statement as we can make that
aircraft carriers are a lethal, survivable part of that future.
With respect to the theater that you just described, in a very
high-end fight, the carrier is the most survivable airfield in
the theater, able to move 700 miles a day and really confound
any kind of a targeting problem.
Beyond that, sir, it gets very classified, very quickly,
but suffice it to say that a competently run aircraft carrier,
using distributed maritime operations concepts, can inflict a
tremendous amount of damage against an enemy in that theater.
Senator Hawley. Okay, I'll look forward to an opportunity
to take that up further with you in a classified setting. I do
think you allude to the very significant investment that these
carriers require, and I think it's incumbent upon us to make
sure that it's an investment that meets our strategic
priorities.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thanks, to all the witnesses.
I especially just want to offer my congratulations, Admiral
Richardson, General Neller, for your wonderful service. You
guys each have Virginia ties. Admiral Richardson, a Petersburg
native.
General Neller, congratulations on the UVA [University of
VA] Cavaliers. That was an exciting evening. There are four
Senators who have degrees from the University of Virginia.
Neither of the Virginia Senators had either the talent or
judgment to be in that number. It's King, Whitehouse, Capito,
and Cornyn. But, it was exciting. But, again, I just want to
offer my thanks.
I have two questions that are sort of a followup, not to
repeat other questions that have been asked about the refueling
of the Truman. I associate myself with others' questions on
these. But, one of the references was to this future-force
study that's being done. And I want to ask two questions about
it.
The first one is a broad one. Do you think we're going to
see other surprises when that is done--ship classes that are
being considered for early retirement, or other things like
that? What would you let us know that we ought to be watching
for as that study is being done?
Admiral Richardson. So, I'll tell you that, one, as we've
talked about many times, the security environment has only
become more complex. And so, we would see that the Force
Structure Assessment would address that increasing demand
signal for maritime security. I think that the next 25, 50
years, easy, are going to put a lot of responsibilities on
maritime security, and the U.S. Navy in particular.
There are, additionally, new technologies. And so, we'll
have to see where those new technologies take us. I'm of a mind
that we need to move into that new technology space on an
evidenced-based approach. We can't just take a leap of faith
when our Nation's security is--you know, with the stakes that
we're claiming. And so, we'll look for a lot of experimentation
and evidence on which to base those decisions.
And then there are those sorts of enduring qualities of
payload volume and energy, and those things will allow a
platform from which that innovation can take place. And so,
certainly, as soon as we get any kind of inklings, I would say
that that would be the area that we're moving. If there are
places where legacy types of approaches fail to yield a return
on investment, then we'll be informing you of those, as well.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. We've had a number of classified
briefs about both the Navy and Marine Corps' operating concepts
as we talk about future needs. And one concern I always have is
whether both the Navy and the Marine Corps' operating concepts
are being represented in any future analysis of shipbuilding,
aircraft procurement, force structure. Will both the Navy and
the Marine Corps be signing off on the next iteration of Force
Structure Assessment, shipbuilding plan, aircraft procurement
strategy?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, the Commandant and I share just
about everything. And so, something of this impact, we would
absolutely habitually share them and address every concern that
they would have.
Senator Kaine. General Neller, anything you want to add on
that?
General Neller. On the previous comment you made, Senator,
I think, you know, amphibious capabilities have a--an image in
people's mind that we're going to storm the beach. That's just
one thing that they do, and, quite frankly, 97 percent of the
stuff they do every day is to do the second line of effort in
the National Defense Strategy, which is maintain alliances and
build partnerships, and also create presence out in the contact
zone. We do need to look at the capability of those platforms
to make sure they're more increasingly survivable and
increasingly networked. Those are things that--the CNO and I
sit on a Navy/Marine Corps Board. Our staffs bring us these
issues. We try to stay as linked as we can through naval
integration and make sure that the programmatics are in line
with where we think we need to go. And I think you're going to
see--in training and experimentations, just like we did at
Pacific Blitz, you're going to see more and more U.S. Marine,
U.S. Navy operations, where the two commanders are together. In
fact, at that operation, probably the most unique thing is,
they took their staffs and put them together as one staff. So,
you had a blue-green staff, and so--to try to get rid of any of
the seams or areas where there wasn't complete interoperability
between the two forces. And I think it worked out well.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
Admiral?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could come back just very
quickly, with respect to the shipbuilding program that was
discussed earlier, the enduring need for 38 amphib ships, our
current shipbuilding plan gets us to 36 by fiscal year 2024,
the 5 years.
Senator Kaine. Right.
Admiral Richardson. With this incremental funding authority
that we've been discussing, we might be able to accelerate and
get even closer to 37. And so, we're paying a great deal of
attention to meeting that requirement.
Senator Kaine. Excellent.
Mr. Chair, thank you. Appreciate it.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Admiral Richardson, statements from both the President and
the Secretary of State seem to call into question this
administration's commitment to defend our NATO allies. At the
same time, we're building a new, low-yield nuclear missile so
that we can more easily threaten nuclear war against Russia in
order to protect the very allies that it is clear to me this
administration does not care about. So, what do you think would
make NATO feel safer? Having the United States build a new
nuclear weapon that dangerously lowers the threshold for
nuclear war, or have the United States commit to defending our
allies, which has successfully kept the peace in Europe for
almost 70 years?
Admiral Richardson. Senator, if--ma'am, I'm sorry--if I
could answer that, I would say both----
Senator Gillibrand. Yeah.
Admiral Richardson.--that the Nuclear Posture Review makes
clear that we would enhance our deterrent effect, including
extending that to our allies with the development of these low-
yield nuclear weapons, and that would also help defend our NATO
allies.
Senator Gillibrand. I understand it's the Department of
Defense's position that the low-yield nuclear weapons program
is focused on deterrence. But, does not it also make it more
possible that it could be used?
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, I think that the logic would be
that, if there's an asymmetry in the nuclear arsenal, if you
will, if our opponents have options that they could use that we
have no real deterrent symmetric approach, that this imbalance
is, in fact, the thing that might lower the threshold to use.
And so, that is the theory behind advocating for these new
capabilities.
Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Spencer, we continue to see
significant cyberattacks on the defense industrial base. More
specifically, reports continue to show China's interest and
success in the illicit collection of critical maritime
technology and information through both defense contractors and
universities directly supporting Navy research and development.
I'm alarmed by the persistent vulnerability. What can happen if
China continues to collect maritime information and technology
at this rate?
Secretary Spencer. It's disastrous, Senator.
Senator Gillibrand. What concrete steps has the Navy taken
to mitigate and counter these threats?
Secretary Spencer. That was the reason, Senator, for
setting up the Cybersecurity Review, which was just delivered
to me 3 weeks ago, and we're now rolling out the plan.
Senator Gillibrand. And how is the Navy collaborating with
the intelligence community, academia, and industry to improve
the defense of Navy-affiliated contractors and universities?
Secretary Spencer. That is actually in the plan, Senator,
which--I'm more than happy to brief you and/or this Committee
at any time. That is the key. It's not simply one avenue. It's
the whole universe of players.
Senator Gillibrand. Can you expand a little bit on
potential fixes that can help the Navy more effectively protect
maritime information?
Secretary Spencer. CNO will weigh in, here, for a second.
Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, if I could, just to support the
Secretary, a lot of this has to do with just ensuring that our
contractual arrangements with academia, industry, includes
measures to secure their, you know, cyberspace, if you will,
right? And so, a lot of this is making sure that there's
increasing accountability by prime contractors for their
subcontractors' performance. As Senator King illuminated, a lot
of that vulnerability comes through the subs. Strengthening the
security and oversight by making sure that data is encrypted,
both at rest on those servers and in transit, dual-factor
authentication. Some of this is pretty low-hanging fruit----
Secretary Spencer. Web.
Admiral Richardson.--and well-known things. But, ensuring
that they are contractually required, and that there is a
response mechanism and allowance for oversight there, are some
of the measures we've already taken.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Admiral. And will you please
submit that report to the Committee, and to me particularly, so
I can read it? Thank you.
Admiral Richardson. Most definitely, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Richardson. On May 28, 2019, a copy of the
Secretary of the Navy's Cybersecurity Readiness Review of March
2019 was delivered to your office. The classified addendum has
been provided to the Committee and can be accesses via the
Security Manager.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
General Neller, for a variety of reasons, including current
civilian-sector employment numbers, the military's having a
tough time meeting its own recruiting goals. We've heard, too,
about the portion of young Americans who do not meet medical
fitness and education standards to join the Armed Forces,
shrinking the pool of potential recruits. At the same time, the
President's proposed budget would slash money from domestic
agencies that directly address these challenges, programs to
support childhood nutrition, public education, healthcare for
low-income families, and others. Do you agree it's possible for
cuts to domestic spending to further limit the number of
Americans qualified for military service?
General Neller. Senator, I'd have to speculate on that, but
you know as well as I do that less than 30 percent of the
American youth that are qualified--are qualified to join our
military. Now, you take the propensity of those in that 30
percent, and you get a smaller number. That said, I can only
speak for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has been
successful in making our recruiting goals and maintaining our
quality of those applicants to become marines, since 2006. Our
recruiters work very, very hard, and it's not easy to do. But,
clearly, anything that we can do within the Nation to increase
the health, the educational level of our youth, of our
citizenry, would make it easier and better for us to find more
and more people that were qualified to serve in the military.
Senator Gillibrand. We had hearings--just to close the
loop, Mr. Chairman--in the Ag Committee specifically on this
issue, because obesity just continues to rise. And so, the
importance of Food Stamps became obvious, because if you are a
family on Food Stamps and you cut your nutrition amount, the
last week of every month, they can't get fresh fruits and
vegetables at an affordable price, so they eat high-carb, high-
fat foods that tend to be very inexpensive. And the actual
consequence of hunger is obesity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for--all for your service.
Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
And thank all three witnesses. It's been good. I think
we've accomplished a lot, a lot of interest. And we thank you
for your time and your effort and your service.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
attack submarine maintenance
1. Senator Rounds. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, at the
Seapower Hearing in November, I asked a series of questions about
submarine maintenance, but received no answers then nor when my staff
followed up with your staff. I asked about subs in dry dock and the
queue--and the wait to get into the queue--but the bottom line is that
the Navy has a tremendous submarine maintenance throughput problem. As
a result, you have ``out-sourced'' three and they are over a year late
for completion, with approximately $400 million in cost overruns.
Consequently, a fourth--the Boise - will be delayed another year, which
means it probably won't come out of maintenance until fiscal year
2022--6 to 7 years since its last deployment. With only half of the
INDOPACOM submarine requirement for attack submarines being met and
submarines retiring faster than they can be built through the 2020s, I
view this as an extremely grave matter. What has the Navy planned to
address this situation--and what help do you need from Congress to
solve it?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Thank you for the
questions Senator and for your continued interest in our attack
submarines. In our public yards, overall performance on aircraft
carrier (CVN) and submarine maintenance is improving, with the days of
maintenance delay and the amount of work carried over from year-to-year
dropping each of the past three years from historic highs in 2016. For
example, with the recent early delivery of USS Nimitz (CVN 68) from
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) we have now delivered eight of nine
CVN maintenance availabilities on time including the last seven in a
row at PSNS. In addition, four of nine current attack submarine
availabilities in the Naval Shipyards are tracking to on-time delivery.
One contributing factor for our success includes growing the organic
workforce at the four Naval Shipyards to a total of 36,100. To account
for the less-experienced workforce (i.e., 56 percent of the production
workforce has less than five years of experience), the Naval Shipyards
implemented new training approaches. These approaches included
streamlining training curriculums, adding/improving learning centers to
accelerate proficiency development through modern training techniques
such as virtual reality trainers, and increasing the amount of hands-on
learning. Additional contributing factors include setting more
realistic and achievable resource/overtime strategies, increasing the
discipline and fidelity of our planning processes, and improving our
learning centers and sharing of lessons learned across shipyards.
Despite these recent successes, the Navy shares your concern for
submarine maintenance throughput. We continue working through Naval
Shipyard availabilities with already-incurred maintenance delays,
little margin to accommodate new work, and avoidable performance
issues. Current challenges include: USS Jefferson City (Pearl Harbor)--
283 days late--projected completion date 12/1/19 USS Springfield
(Portsmouth)--217 days late--projected completion date 7/22/19 USS New
Hampshire (Portsmouth)--164 days late--projected completion date 7/15/
19 USS New Mexico (Portsmouth)--92 days late--projected completion date
11/1/19 USS Virginia (Portsmouth)--59 days late--projected completion
date 3/3/21 Further, as you note the two qualified private shipyards
are challenged to execute attack submarine maintenance on time and on
budget. The Navy has taken several actions to improve the situation.
These actions include partnering with Huntington Ingalls Industries and
Electric Boat to learn from these challenges and share lessons learned;
driving USS Helena's (SSN 725) availability to completion by providing
more direct government oversight; and conducting a bottom-up review of
the USS Boise (SSN 764) work package. The Boise work package needs
reassessment given the significant growth experienced on USS Montpelier
(SSN 765), Helena, and USS Columbus (SSN 762) as well as the
anticipated growth due to the extended idle time. Going forward, the
Navy expects improved performance across all of our public shipyard
availabilities based on the actions described above, use of improved
and predictive data analytics, and implementation of the Navy Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP). In February 2018, the Navy
delivered the SIOP to Congress. Since then, we have been executing the
groundwork needed to redesign our Naval Shipyards to improve
productivity by upgrading and repairing dry-docks, replacing obsolete
capital equipment, and improving workflow within the shipyards. This
summer we will receive the first digital twin of a shipyard that will
serve as the springboard to evaluating what we can change to improve
workflow and productivity. Finally, you asked what help Congress could
provide. To start, the Navy has identified additional funding required
for submarine maintenance in the Chief of Naval Operations Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) submitted with the President's fiscal year 2020
budget. This funding supports three attack submarine maintenance
availabilities; Boise, USS Hartford (SSN 768), and Columbus. As the
Navy completes the Boise work package reassessment, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the initial budget estimate was too low. The
Navy will keep Congress informed if/how the Boise reassessment affects
the UPL topline. Additionally, passing the fiscal year 2020 budget on
time, coupled with Congress' continued support for the SIOP and the
Navy's efforts to balance the workload between public and private
sector will help to improve the situation. An on-time budget is very
beneficial as a delay in funding could affect not only maintenance
availabilities, but also a number of SIOP efforts planned for next
year.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
industrial base
2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Spencer, the recently released annual
report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels states that ``over the last 60 years, 14 defense-related
new construction shipyards have closed, 3 have left the defense
industry and one new shipyard has opened.'' Can you elaborate on the
efforts the Navy is taking on to rebuild this industrial base? What is
the timeline for these efforts? What help does the Navy need to
increase the industrial supplier base?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy's current and future approach
recognizes the importance of maintaining stability within the
industrial and supplier base. Historical boom and bust cycles of Navy
ship construction contributed to the 14 shipyard closures over the last
60 years. The Navy is working to preserve our current shipbuilding
capacity through stable shipbuilding procurement profiles that will
foster a healthy and stable industrial base and will allow for
additional growth as required. The current shipbuilders are sufficient
to meet the Navy's demand. The Navy is focused on understanding the
capacity and capability shortfalls at the lower levels of the supply
chain. Consistent annual funding in the shipbuilding account is
foundational to sustaining predictable workload and capacity. Long-term
contracting arrangements, such as Multi Year Procurements, Block Buys,
and serial production support the industrial and supplier base, as
exemplified in Virginia, DDG-51, LCS, CVN, and AOs. The Navy is
partnering with industry to define and establish workable requirements
and is working with Congress to sustain predictable profiles. These
supportive relationships will continue to promote efficiency through
capital improvement and expansion, research and development, and
sustainment of a world-class workforce. We appreciate the congressional
support for industrial base initiatives. Funds appropriated in fiscal
year 2018, $225 million for Virginia-class, and in fiscal year 2019,
$225 million for Columbia-class, will further strengthen the industrial
base.
3. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Spencer, the President's Fiscal Year
2020 Budget update to report to Congress on Submarine Depot Maintenance
released in March 2019 stated that ``Lack of material availability . .
. has contributed to an increased reliance on cannibalization of
material from operational platforms in support of maintenance
schedules. In a typical Virginia-class depot maintenance availability,
over 100 items are acquired through this cannibalization process. This
is unplanned work that adds to the maintenance requirements and
generates a rolling requirement for the follow-on availability.'' The
report goes on to mention a material forecasting tool to be developed
and deployed at all public shipyards that will enable earlier
identification of material, to provide early procurement options and
reduce risk of unavailable material. This tool partially addresses the
problem by providing early procurement options--however, this does not
address the supplier base; what else is the Navy doing to address
limited availability of Virginia-class submarine parts?
Secretary Spencer. In addition to material forecasting, the in-
service Strategic and Attack Submarine Program Office is evaluating
opportunities to leverage material management efforts implemented by
new construction programs for improving original equipment manufacturer
material support to follow-on submarine planned maintenance
availabilities. This evaluation is in an early stage but can
potentially result in better notification to industry of planned
material purchases and address material shortfalls for submarines in
repair.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
virginia-class submarines
4. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, as you know, we have only
a few years until our excess submarine production capacity is primarily
devoted to Columbia-class. Do you agree that it is important to seize
this window of opportunity to boost our fast-attack Submarine inventory
by adding a third submarine in fiscal year 2020?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, attack submarines are critical to the
National Defense Strategy, and adding a third submarine in fiscal year
2020 helps in achieving the 66 submarine requirement sooner. Adding a
third submarine in this fiscal year also demonstrates our commitment to
the industrial base, to expand production, and better balances the
total shipbuilding procurement funding over the next five years as the
Navy begins to build Columbia-class submarines.
5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, does adding this
additional submarine help reduce the risk of an upcoming fast-attack
submarine capability gap as Los Angeles-class submarines reach
retirement?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, it does. The Navy is relying on a steady
state production of at least two attack submarines (SSNs) per year with
Virginia-class submarines (VCS) being delivered within contractual
requirements to reach the force structure requirement of 66 SSNs. The
addition of a third VCS in fiscal year (FY) 2020 takes advantage of the
available labor resources in the industrial base prior to the start of
Columbia-class construction in fiscal year 2021 and gets us to our
inventory requirement of 66 attack submarines sooner.
6. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richardson, I was encouraged by your
statement in written testimony that all force structure analyses agree
we must build a bigger Navy. Is the 3rd Virginia-class submarine in
this year's budget a result of the Navy taking action on this
consensus?
Admiral Richardson. Yes, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and
the Navy Strategy provide the overarching high-level requirements for
all our shipbuilding budget decisions to build the Navy the Nation
Needs, the Navy's enduring plan for building and sustaining a lethal,
resilient force through balanced investments across readiness,
capability, and capacity. Attack submarines are critical enablers of
the NDS and represent one of the Nation's most lethal asymmetric
advantages. Numerically, attack submarines remain the furthest from the
inventory objective. Adding a third submarine in fiscal year 2020 shows
our commitment to the industrial base to expand production, better
balances the total shipbuilding procurement funding over the next five
years as the Navy also begins to build Columbia-class submarines, and
gets us to our inventory requirement of 66 attack submarines sooner.
7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, Do you believe that
industrial base workforce development initiatives are important to meet
the increased demand for submarines over the coming years?
Secretary Spencer. Yes, it is vitally important to develop and
maintain the submarine workforce to meet the demands for the Virginia-
class and the Columbia-class partners. The Navy is collaborating with
our industry partners to ensure we meet the needs of the programs.
ch-53
8. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, given your urgent need
for this aircraft--and the known reality that the industrial base does
not react well to declines in production ramps for new programs--would
you support 2 additional CH-53K's this year to maintain a consistent
annual production rate?
Secretary Spencer. Thank you for your interest. I support the
President's Budget of six aircraft in fiscal year 2020. This budget
provides the best balance of delivering needed capability to the Marine
Corps while ensuring we have an achievable production profile.
9. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is there any heavy lift
helicopter that has the capabilities of the CH-53K King Stallion? Are
you confident that this program will deliver the capabilities the
Marine Corps needs for the heavy lift mission?
General Neller. The CH-53K King Stallion will be capable of
delivering the vertical Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at a range of
110NM from ship to objective. This 110NM metric has been established as
the optimal range of our modern aviation platforms, such as the MV-22,
the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z. Today's legacy CH-53E is limited in its
ability to perform at this range. The enhancement in lift and range
delivered by the CH-53K fully leverages the capability of the Aviation
Combat Element (ACE) and thereby the entire Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF).
10. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, I understand that the King
Stallion has roughly 3 times the lift capability of the legacy CH-
53E's. How will this game-changing upgrade transform the Marine Corp's
operational capability on the battlefield?
General Neller. The CH-53K King Stallion will be capable of
delivering the vertical Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at a range of
110NM from ship to objective. This 110NM metric has been established as
the optimal range of our modern aviation platforms, such as the MV-22,
the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z. Today's legacy CH-53E is limited in its
ability to perform at this range. The enhancement in lift and range
delivered by the CH-53K fully leverages the capability of the Aviation
Combat Element (ACE) and thereby the entire Marine Air-Ground Task
Force (MAGTF).
climate change
11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, I am concerned that top
U.S. military officials have stated publicly that climate change is a
significant security threat, but that President Trump's White House
continues to challenge the scientific consensus that human activity is
the primary driver of climate change. Are you concerned that the Trump
Administration is undermining the military's efforts to address and
respond to the threats of climate change?
Secretary Spencer. The Department of Navy has always considered a
wide-range of risks, including climate change, and has a proven record
of planning and preparing for such threats.
12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, recently, Pentagon
spokesman Johnny Michael said in an email that the Pentagon will
``focus on ensuring it remains ready and able to adapt to a wide
variety of threats--regardless of the source.'' How is the Navy
planning to address the impact of climate change in its worldwide
missions?
Secretary Spencer. Naval missions under the authority of the
geographic combatant commands consider risk assessment and mitigation,
diversity, connectivfity, reserves, and adequate redundancy in all
plans and operations. In support of Arctic operations, the Office of
Naval Research, Arctic and Global Prediction Program, is working to
extend the capability to predict environmental conditions and
disruptive weather events to several weeks and months in advance. The
ability to provide useful forecasts of the operational environment,
such as the location of the sea ice edge, the characteristics and
evolution of sea ice, and the wind and wave conditions will be critical
to reduce operational risk in the Arctic. The Department of the Navy
launches its worldwide missions from installations, where resiliency is
addressed through the integration of weather and climate considerations
into existing plans and processes, using partnerships with other
federal agencies, state governments, local governments, non-
governmental organizations, and local communities to increase
preparedness.
13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, does the Navy's budget
request this year adequately request resources to ensure climate
resilience? Do you require additional resources to effectively combat
the effects of climate change?
Secretary Spencer. Climate and environmental resilience efforts
span all levels and lines of effort, and are not framed as a separate
program. Resources for assessing and responding to climate impacts are
provided within existing Department of the Navy missions, funds, and
capabilities.
14. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, as you are aware,
climate change is a ``threat multiplier'' that inflames global
political instability and exacerbates floods, food shortages, and
droughts--all of which exacerbate humanitarian crises and increase the
likelihood of armed conflict. How will Navy strategy evolve to
incorporate these realities as the impacts of climate change become
more severe?
Secretary Spencer. Climate and environmental resilience efforts
span all levels and lines of effort, and are not framed as a separate
program. Resources for assessing and responding to climate impacts are
provided within existing Department of the Navy (DON) missions, funds,
and capabilities and subsumed under existing risk management processes
consistent with the 2018 National Defense Strategy priorities to build
a more lethal force, strengthen alliances and attract new partners, and
reform the Department's processes. To achieve these goals, DON must be
able to adapt current and future operations to address the impacts of a
variety of threats and conditions, including those from weather and
natural events. To that end, DON factors in the effects of the
environment into its mission planning and execution to build
resilience.
troop deployments to the southern border
15. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, has Acting Secretary
Shanahan provided the assistance you requested to repair structures
compromised by Hurricane Florence?
General Neller. The Marine Corps currently faces unfunded
requirements of $778 million to fully recover from Hurricanes Florence
and Michael. We have worked closely with the Department of the Navy,
Secretary of Defense and Congressional committees to successfully
identify funding solutions that address approximately $3 billion of the
damages. The Marine Corps will continue working with the key
stakeholders to identify additional solutions that address the
remaining unfunded need.
16. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is it fair to say that the
troop deployments to the border are coming at the expense of Marine
Corps training or necessary hurricane repairs at Camp Lejeune?
General Neller. In order to maintain overall readiness, Marine
Corps units require a combination of training exercises and actual
operations. The troop deployments to the border have contributed a
critical portion of this equation, and in some respects have enhanced
the readiness of the participating units by allowing them to perform
their core missions under real-world conditions. Even with the troop
deployments to the border, the Marine Corps has not been forced to
cancel any training exercises. The Commandant personally checked the
readiness of every unit on the border, and with one exception, the
deployment had no impact on their readiness.
17. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, are you concerned that
these troop deployments will continue indefinitely? If that is the
case, can you estimate the impact on readiness if the border
deployments become the status quo?
General Neller. No, although South West Border (SWB) operations
have impacted some of the units providing support to the border, in the
aggregate, the readiness impacts have been manageable. The Service has
been able to mitigate readiness impacts through unit and personnel
rotations. If the requirements to support the mission continue into the
foreseeable future, the Marine Corps will continue to mitigate impacts
to readiness through similar measures. To date, the SWB mission has not
significantly impacted our ability to meet our global commitments.
future marine corps mission
18. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is the Marine Corps
committed to MARSOC longterm?
General Neller. MARSOC is a highly valued capability by both the
Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command. Our investment in
MARSOC, as with all of our supporting capabilities, is limited by the
need to sustain the readiness of our statutorily mandated Marine Air
Ground Task Forces, commensurate with modernizing those MAGTFs for
future conflicts and relative to timely appropriated funding.
19. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, some recently have shared
the view that the Marine Corps needs to focus on coastal operations in
the Indo-Pacific region? What role can MARSOC play in supporting this
mission?
General Neller. MARSOC is already playing a significant role in the
Indo-Pacific region, specifically in the Philippines, while enabling
the partner force to exert their sovereignty. These forces are
supported by capabilities provided from MARFORPAC and III MEF in a
greater joint force effort there. We see the daily access and placement
MARSOC, and SOF writ large, have in the region as a forces in
``contact,'' as greatly assisting in pre-conflict competition short of
armed conflict shaping operations. These forces contribute to the
intelligence picture, cultural understanding, partner force
integration, and bring other specialized skills that can support the
Marine Corps mission in this region. We are also working closely with
MARSOC as we work through concepts like Expeditionary Advance Base
Operations, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Joint
Forcible Entry Operations. SOF, MARSOC in particular, can help prepare
these environments now, hoping to mitigate conflict, but preparing for
larger operations if that becomes necessary.
20. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, what strategic advantage
does MARSOC provide to the geographic combatant commanders that we
would be lost if the Raiders (MARSOC) were disbanded?
General Neller. MARSOC remains a priority effort for the Marine
Corps. The command has played a critical role for both the Marine Corps
and SOCOM. MARSOC is an organization that has come extremely far, in a
relatively short amount of time, regarding the evolution of its
warfighting capabilities. From battlefield small unit tactics,
techniques, and procedures, to the exploration of more effective
equipment for unmanned aerial systems, precision strike capabilities,
advanced communications, small arms capabilities, and intelligence
integration at the lowest levels, MARSOC consistently provides forces
that possess unity of effort driven largely by a coherent picture of
the battlespace. As one would expect because it has a foot in both
camps, MARSOC is a critical enabler of the relationship between the
Marine Corps and SOCOM and has helped bridge capability development
efforts between our two organizations. MARSOC plays a significant role
in migrating capability between SOF and the general purpose forces.
Raiders have consistently demonstrated an adaptability in the face of
changing or ambiguous situations; their ability to leverage emerging
technologies and integrate them has created opportunities for the
larger Service as well. Operationally, I would defer to SOCOM and the
geographic combatant commands to answer with details on this issue, but
would note that Raiders fill approximately 10 percent of their assigned
missions. From a man, train and equip perspective, MARSOC forward
deployed forces bring an organic and fully integrated capability for
operations and all-source intelligence fusion at the lowest levels that
allows a comprehensive and holistic approach to problem solving in all
environments to effectively conduct the whole spectrum of special
operations. These capabilities are extremely effective operating
against both VEO networks, as well as near peer competitors. These
capabilities can be tailored based on the anticipated missions, but the
force can be rapidly altered and specifically organized and trained as
situations and mission sets evolve. Inherent in all MARSOC deployable
formations are an ability to conduct unilateral special operations that
feature special insertion capabilities, precision direct action
operations, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism missions; but
are also well-adept and prefer to work through partner nation forces,
other governmental agencies, and the larger joint force in counter-
insurgency and foreign internal defense conducting advise, assist,
accompany and enable missions in order to build resilient partners in
key areas around the globe. Bringing with them their base culture as
marines, Raiders find a way to be highly successful and effective in
what are often ambiguous environments. Demand for their integrated
capabilities and expertise in these strategic impact operations
continues to increase. From an operational perspective, Raiders have
invariably gravitated toward the highest priority campaign activities
within INDO PACOM, CENTCOM, and AFRICOM - the three regions comprising
MARSOC's current regional orientation. Efforts in these three regions
have helped shape and support larger Joint Force efforts and advance
Service-level opportunities for integration and interoperability in
support of both the Counter VEO mission as well as contributing to
great power competition. One of the best examples of MARSOC's
collaboration with the Service along the lines of Interoperability,
Integration, and Interdependence have been its ongoing efforts in the
Philippines, where Raiders working for SOCPAC are heavily augmented by
MARFORPAC marines to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
defense of their sovereignty. We can address further specific
operational details of MARSOC's current missions via classified medium
if desired.
21. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, how do you see MARSOC's
role in great power competition and the National Defense Strategy?
General Neller. MARSOC Proposed Answer: Understanding that SOF is
not designed to go toe-to-toe with large Armies, there are many ways
MARSOC can support, before and during, potential conflict with near
peer competitors. Just recognizing that we are in constant competition,
albeit short of open warfare, with certain countries, makes us realize
that there are many areas we could be shaping now, with our partners
and the rest of our own government that can have a tremendous effect.
Similar to the greater Marine Corps role in the context of the NDS,
MARSOC is a ``contact force.'' As such, we will be among the first
forces to influence the initial stages in this of this competition,
whether it goes to open conflict or not. MARSOC forward deployed forces
bring an organic and fully integrated capability for operations and
all-source intelligence fusion at the lowest levels that allows a
comprehensive and holistic approach to problem solving in all
environments to effectively conduct the whole spectrum of special
operations. These capabilities are extremely effective operating
against both VEO networks, as well as near peer competitors. These
capabilities can be tailored based on the anticipated missions, but the
force can be rapidly altered and specifically organized and trained as
situations and mission sets evolve. In the future, MARSOC will continue
to develop into a more versatile force that brings highly adaptable,
intelligent, and cognitively gifted individuals to any mission set with
seamlessly integrated capabilities to rapidly understand and impact the
surrounding system. Leveraging small size as a strength, MARSOC can
give a high degree of flexibility to the SOCOM Commander for the
employment against specific mission sets, including in the great power
competition cited in the NDS. 1. MARSOC, along with the greater SOF
enterprise, bridges the gap between covert capabilities from the
interagency and the larger conventional forces. 2. MARSOC enables a
deep understanding of the operational environment across the
interconnected network of transregional threats at all levels of
warfare against global, regional, and local competitors. 3. Raiders are
specifically educated and trained to work with indigenous partners. The
history of great power competition during World War II and the Cold war
indicate that SOF is strategically useful in leveraging these local
partners to strengthen the effort to deter, counter, and defeat malign
influence. 4. MARSOC, and SOF writ large, provides specialized
unilateral capabilities not easily replicable by conventional or other
agencies to deter, counter, and defeat global or regional powers. 5.
MARSOC provide a creative and adaptable perspective and culture to the
joint force to understand and resolve complex, dynamic, and uncertain
challenges.
22. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, you recently stated that
much of what your service does will not be against a near-peer
adversary. Can you explain what you mean by this, and expound on what
you see the Marine Corps' operational role in the next 10-20 years?
General Neller. The Marine Corps will continue to adhere to the
strategic guidance of the National Defense Strategy, National Military
Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance and will orient to the pacing
threats presented by China and Russia. The Corps will not, however,
ignore the various roles and responsibilities espoused by title 10 and
will continue to be America's force-in-readiness that is able to
respond to crises, inside and outside the scope of great power
competition, when the rest of the country is least ready to do so. In
10-20 years, the Marine Corps will be modernized against the pacing
threats and further integrated with the Navy and the other services to
compete in the full spectrum of conflict.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
refueling the uss harry s. truman
23. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I've
seen estimates from the Department of the Navy that refueling the
Truman will cost between three and four billion dollars. It has been
suggested that if Congress were to add that money on top of the
requested budget that the navy could continue to operate the Truman.
But recently I've seen estimates of the rest of the overhaul on the
Truman taking $6.5 billion. With the combined operating costs of around
$1 billion per year this puts the additional cost of operating the
Truman for the second half of its life at over $30 billion. I'm
assuming that these cost not been factored into the long term plans of
the Navy due to the plan to retire the Truman. So, if Congress were to
authorize and appropriate the $3-4 billion and push the Navy to refuel
and continue to operate the Truman, what does this do to your long term
procurement plans and force structure decisions?
Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The Navy is implementing
the President's recent decision to restore the Refueling and Complex
Overhaul (RCOH) for USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), and is updating our
long-term procurement plans and force structure accordingly. With the
President's restoral decision, the Navy is reviewing the required CVN
75 RCOH and airwing funding profile.
columbia-class submarine cost estimates
24. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, on 8 April, 2019, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program detailing how it
believes the Navy has significantly underestimated the costs of the
Columbia program. Specifically GAO highlighted a questionable
assumption of labor hours required for construction as well as no
allowance for cost overruns, which are expected and typically planned
for. GAO assesses that these and other errors could lead to billions
more needing to be invested in the program. Can you address the
concerns raised by this report and detail how the Navy is either
mitigating the concerns of GAO or updating the budget accordingly?
Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy does not agree with
GAO's assessment. Labor hours required to construct the submarines and
allowance for cost overruns were considered by the Navy's Cost Review
Board on September 7, 2016. Neither factor was considered overly
optimistic or unreliable during this assessment. Navy does concur with
GAO's three recommendations to do the following:
Incorporate current cost and program data and an updated
cost risk analysis in its planned update of the Columbia-class lead
submarine cost estimate.
Develop a realistic and well documented estimate of
savings from use of authorities associated with the Fund and
incorporate the savings associated with the lead submarine into the
Columbia lead submarine cost estimate.
Update the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk
analysis prior to requesting funds for lead submarine construction. The
Navy continues to actively manage all Columbia program cost, schedule,
and performance goals including engineering and integration risks and
routinely briefs Navy / DOD leadership, and Congress to ensure risks
are transparent and fully understood.
virginia and columbia-class submarine construction timeline
25. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, the fiscal year 2020 budget
adds another Virginia-class submarine, and subsequently alters the
production timeline for the Virginia-class. Specifically, I am noticing
the addition of a third submarine in 2020. This third Virginia-class,
according to the justification books, will be constructed in 2023,
meaning three Virginia-class submarines will be being built that year.
That is the year before the Navy's second Columbia-class submarine buy.
This, coupled with troubling news reports of a Virginia program that is
4-7 months behind schedule have me concerned that any small slips in
the Virginia-class submarine program will have more significant second
and third order effects in delaying the much needed Columbia-class
submarines. How is the Navy addressing this shift in the current
dynamic schedule environment to ensure that both programs stay on track
despite utilizing many of the same facilities and suppliers?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy continues to work closely with the
nuclear shipbuilding industrial base to simultaneously support the
Columbia-class submarine (CLB) program, and Virginia-class submarines
(VCS). The focus remains on ensuring the nuclear shipbuilding
enterprise's facilities, resources, and supplier base are right-sized
through the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP) efforts to ensure a stable
production cadence for both CLB and VCS submarines and on time
deliveries to the Fleet. Additionally, the CLB program is utilizing
additional authorities to execute advance construction to efficiently
manage transition to submarine production lines for two classes. In
preparation for CLB and VCS, the shipbuilders have invested and will
increase their facilities to accommodate both programs. In April 2018,
the Navy investigated options for increasing VCS production to three
per year during the CLB gap years in response to the Department's 2016
Force Structure Assessment requirement for 66 attack submarines. The
assessment determined the earliest viable option to increase VCS
production to three per year is in fiscal year (FY) 2022, and only by
providing advance procurement funding three years in advance to allow
for an efficient ramp up at both the shipbuilders and their suppliers.
For the third VCS built in any year without a CLB build, manufacturing
of critical long lead time material (LLTM) is required three years in
advance of the third submarine construction start to support normal
construction spans. Therefore, adding the third submarine in FY 2020
enables purchase of LLTM to support a fiscal year 2023 construction
start. Through the addition of a third VCS submarine to the budget in
fiscal year 2020, the Navy is sending a predictable signal of
forecasted workload, allowing the shipbuilders and supplier base to
prepare and invest for the increased production of submarines
highlighted in the FYDP. The third ship would start fabrication of LLTM
and critical shipyard manufactured components in fiscal year 2020 and
the entire module production cadence would be incorporated over a
three-year period to support the added ship entering the module
sequence cadence in fiscal year 2023. This strategy and an additional
year of LLTM ordering will enable the industrial base to better prepare
for the increased workload and continue improvements in capacity,
resources and quality.
defense industrial base
26. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, recent fluctuations in
Virginia-class submarine timelines as well as aircraft carrier
refurbishment and upgrades have raised concerns of consistency from
these valuable defense industrial base partners. Is the Navy
considering the defense industrial base and their need for consistency
and forecasting when adjusting or making changes to your programs?
Secretary Spencer. The Navy continues to work closely with the
industrial base. Congress has been supportive of the Navy's Integrated
Enterprise Plan across the nuclear industrial base, particularly with
components that are common across the submarines and aircraft carriers
with advance procurement and economic order quantity funds. This allows
investment in those suppliers to meet the demand signal. This strategy
is not only critical for today's shipbuilding operations, but also the
Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP) which adds the Columbia-class on top
of attack submarine and aircraft carrier production. The Navy's
objective is to ensure the industrial base is ready to support this
capacity increase, not only to produce more, but to sustain what is in
the fleet. The Navy believes that if the industrial base is provided
with a clear demand signal, they will invest in the planned increased
production of submarines and aircraft carriers highlighted in the FYDP.
By adding a third Virginia-class submarine along with other Navy
shipbuilding to the budget in fiscal year 2020, the Navy is sending a
predictable signal of forecasted workload, allowing vendors to prepare
and level load their workforce.
cybersecurity readiness review
27. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, thank you for the
comprehensive look at Navy Cybersecurity Readiness and the accompanying
report. The report made a number of excellent observations and
recommendations. What is the current plan of attack and timeline for
the Navy to address these recommendations for significantly improving
the cybersecurity readiness of the service and the defense industrial
base?
Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy (DON) is fully
committed to addressing the issues raised in the Navy Cybersecurity
Readiness Review (CRR). The DON is working in parallel across the five
areas highlighted in the CRR (Culture, People, Structure, Process, and
Resources), assigning a priority and accountable organization for each
of the recommendations. The DON is working to strengthen the existing
partnership between the DON and the defense industrial base to mitigate
evolving cyber threats, increase communications, establish processes to
improve information sharing of threat data and cybersecurity best
practices, and encourage efforts to anticipate and develop protective
measures. I am looking forward to finalizing the business plan for the
creation and operation of the DON Cyber Special Assistant to SECNAV.
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