[Senate Hearing 116-508, Part 1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                              S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 1

                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 
                   APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 AND 
                   THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                                   ON

                                S. 1790

     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY 
      ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
      STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
          ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR 
          SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                               ----------                              

                                 PART 1

                          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

             U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

            U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

         U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

            U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

         U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                              ARMY POSTURE

         DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS

                           AIR FORCE POSTURE

                              NAVY POSTURE


                               ----------                              

     FEBRUARY 5, 7, 12, 14, 26; MARCH 5, 14, 26, 28; APRIL 4, 9, 2019
     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]     


         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
         
         
         
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 
         YEAR 2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM--Part 1

      U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  b  U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN 
  COMMAND b  U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA b  U.S. 
  SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND b  U.S. STRATEGIC 
 COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND  b  U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. 
  TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  b  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE  b  
ARMY POSTURE  b  DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS  
                 b  AIR FORCE POSTURE  b  NAVY POSTURE


                                                S. Hrg. 116-508, Pt. 1

                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 
                   APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 AND 
                   THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                                   ON

                                S. 1790

     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 FOR MILITARY 
      ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CON-
      STRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
          ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR 
          SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                               ----------                              

                                 PART 1

                          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

             U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

            U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

         U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CYBER COMMAND

            U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

         U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE

                              ARMY POSTURE

         DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS

                           AIR FORCE POSTURE

                              NAVY POSTURE


                               ----------                              

     FEBRUARY 5, 7, 12, 14, 26; MARCH 5, 14, 26, 28; APRIL 4, 9, 2019   
 

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
         
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]  


                                ________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
46-152 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
               
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                   JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
                   
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas			KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota		ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona			GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida			JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee		TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri                	DOUG JONES, Alabama                                    
                                   
                                     
   		John Bonsell, Staff Director
		Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S
                            
                               __________

                            February 5, 2019

                                                                   Page

United States Central Command....................................     1

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................     1

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................     2

                           Witness Statements

Votel, General Joseph L., USA, Commander, United States Central
  Command........................................................     8

Questions for the Record.........................................    66

                            February 7, 2019

United States Africa Command and United States Southern Command..    71

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator Mike Rounds.................................    71

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................    72

                           Witness Statements

Waldhauser, General Thomas D., USMC, Commander, United States        73
  Africa Command.

Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN, Commander, United States Southern
  Command........................................................    89

Questions for the Record.........................................   145

                           February 12, 2019

United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea   165

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   165

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   166

                           Witness Statements

Davidson, Admiral Philip S., USN, Commander, United States Indo-    168
  Pacific Command.

Abrams, General Robert B., USA Commander, United Nations Command/   188
  Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea.

Questions for the Record.........................................   230

                                 (iii)


                           February 14, 2019

                                                                   Page
United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber    243
  Command.

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   243

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   244

                           Witness Statements

West, The Honorable Owen O., Assistant Secretary of Defense,        246
  Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

Thomas, General Raymond A., III, USA, Commander, United States      250
  Special Operations Command.

Nakasone, General Paul M., USA, Commander, United States Cyber      256
  Command; Director, National Security Agency; Chief, Central 
  Security Service.

Questions for the Record.........................................   293

                           February 26, 2019

United States Strategic Command and United States Northern
  Command........................................................   309

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   309

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   310

                           Witness Statements

Hyten, General John E., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
  Command........................................................   312

O'Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United         327
  States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense 
  Command.

Questions for the Record.........................................   378

                             March 5, 2019

United States European Command and United States Transportation     403
  Command.

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   403

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   404

                           Witness Statements

Scaparrotti, General Curtis M., USA, Commander, United States       406
  European Command/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme 
  Allied Commander Europe.

Lyons, General Stephen R., USA, Commander, United States            415
  Transportation Command.

Questions for the Record.........................................   453

                                  (iv)


                             March 14, 2019

                                                                   Page
Budget Posture...................................................   473

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   473

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   474

                           Witness Statements

Shanahan, The Honorable Patrick M., Acting Secretary of Defense;    476
  Accompanied by The Honorable David L. Norquist, Under Secretary 
  of Defense (Comptroller).

Dunford, General Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman of the Joint        490
  Chiefs of Staff.

Questions for the Record.........................................   538

Appendix A.......................................................   560

                             March 26, 2019

Army Posture.....................................................   581

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   581

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   582

                           Witness Statements

Esper, The Honorable Mark T., Secretary of the Army..............   587

Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army.........   590

Questions for the Record.........................................   639

                             March 28, 2019

The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Programs........   653

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   653

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   656

                           Witness Statements

Perry, The Honorable J. Richard, Secretary of Energy.............   658

Gordon-Hagerty, The Honorable Lisa E., Under Secretary of Energy 
  for
  Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security     667
  Administration.

Questions for the Record.........................................   688

                                  (v)


                             April 4, 2019

                                                                   Page
Air Force Posture................................................   705

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   705

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   706

                           Witness Statements

Wilson, The Honorable Heather A., Secretary of the Air Force.....   708

Goldfein, General David L., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force   709

Questions for the Record.........................................   759

Appendix A.......................................................   776

                             April 9, 2019

Navy Posture.....................................................   779

                           Members Statements

Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe.............................   779

Statement of Senator Jack Reed...................................   782

                           Witness Statements

Spencer, The Honorable Richard V., Secretary of the Navy.........   783

Richardson, Admiral John M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations......   787

Neller, General Robert B., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps..   800

Questions for the Record.........................................   846

                                  (vi)

 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                     UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m. in room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Cotton, 
Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally, 
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, 
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Good morning.
    The Committee today will receive testimony from the United 
States Central Command (CENTCOM).
    I would like to welcome our witness, General Joseph Votel, 
Commander of the United States Central Command. Welcome.
    General Votel will hand over the Central Command at the end 
of March, and I want to thank him for his outstanding service 
to our country over his 38-year career. General, you have had a 
tough job at CENTCOM, and with the rise of ISIS [the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria] and the spread of Iran's proxies and 
the return of Russia to the Middle East, you and the President 
have grappled with some of the very hard decisions. Thank you 
for all you have done to keep America safe.
    The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to 
ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS), which identifies competition with China and 
Russia as, quote, the central challenge to the United States' 
prosperity and security. Clearly, we do not want to be the 
world's policeman, but without any United States presence, our 
strategic competitors will rush to fill the void. We have seen 
this repeatedly in the Middle East. When we step away from 
partners, Russia steps in. When our military pulls back, Russia 
pulls forward. When we do not enforce our redlines, Russia 
tries to create its own.
    The NDS also makes countering terrorist threats a top 
priority. Part of this strategy has been achieved. The ISIS 
caliphate has been defeated, but ISIS and al Qaeda are still 
active in the region and threaten our Homeland.
    Both priorities, competing with Russia and countering 
terrorists, are at stake in Syria. As we draw down in Syria, we 
must continue to support our partners and friends. I am also 
interested in how we are going to prevent ISIS resurging. It is 
one thing to come out, but then, of course, to stop them from 
coming back up. We believe that is going to happen, and the 
right person is here to explain that to us. We welcome you 
General Votel.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Votel, welcome back, which will likely be your last 
hearing before the Committee. Let me thank you for 39 years of 
exemplary service to the Nation. We owe you and your family an 
incredible debt of gratitude for the contributions you have 
made to our national security throughout your career, but 
especially during your leadership of the Joint Special 
Operations Command, the Special Operations Command, and now 
Central Command. We sincerely thank you, General.
    The focus of the National Defense Strategy is, rightly, a 
return to great power competition and a more resource 
sustainable approach to counterterrorism. However, this has led 
to some uncertainty about the United States Military's 
continued role in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. As we 
consider this question, it is important that we remain clear-
eyed about the continued threat to the Homeland posed by ISIS, 
al Qaeda, and other extremist groups; the malign behavior of 
Iran; and the objectives of Russia and China in the region.
    Each of these issues are relevant to current discussions 
about our military presence in Afghanistan and Syria. In 
addition to a complicated military situation, resolutions to 
broader stabilization, diplomatic, and political challenges 
have been far more difficult to come by.
    Bringing our troops home should always be our objective, 
but it must be done in a deliberate and well-thought-out manner 
in concert with our partners and allies. In the case of Syrian 
withdrawal, contradictory statements by the President, his 
National Security Advisor, and other administration officials 
have only served to underscore that this decision was anything 
but thoughtful and deliberate. If public reports are accurate, 
the President may be about to make similar quick decisions with 
respect to Afghanistan.
    The conflict in Afghanistan has occurred at great cost in 
terms of both lives and resources. However, in considering the 
prospect of conflict termination, we must also weigh the cost 
of getting it wrong. ISIS, al Qaeda, and an estimated 18 other 
terrorist groups are still present in the region, and some 
within the intelligence community assess that external plotting 
would surge upon our withdrawal.
    We must also consider our allies and partners that have 
fought alongside us. As former Secretary Mattis said, ``our 
strength as a Nation is inexorably linked to the strength of 
our unique and comprehensive system of alliances and 
partnerships.'' The allies and partners who joined us after 9/
11 and have sacrificed with us in Afghanistan deserve to be 
included in conversations with respect to the future of the 
conflict.
    Regarding the decision in Syria, the President's statement 
that ISIS is defeated may be premature. According to the 
intelligence community assessment released last week, ISIS in 
their words, ``very likely will continue to pursue external 
attacks from Iraq and Syria against regional and Western 
adversaries, including the United States.'' General McKenzie 
made a similar point in December when he said ``ISIS probably 
still is more capable than al Qaeda in Iraq at its peak, 
suggesting it is well positioned to reemerge if pressure on the 
group is relieved.''
    The security and stability of key partners in the region, 
most notably, Iraq, Israel, and Jordan, is bolstered by our 
continued presence. While our deployed forces do not have a 
military mission to counter Iran, I agree with our military 
leaders that there is a derivative benefit associated with 
their presence and the reassurance it provides. We should not 
take these partners for granted. If we were to withdraw 
precipitously from the region, we would risk the reemergence of 
ISIS, squandering gains made in Iraq, destabilizing Jordan and 
increasing the pressure on King Abdullah, and allowing Iran and 
its proxies to become further entrenched, thereby posing a 
greater threat to Israel.
    No one, myself included, is in favor of endless wars or 
indefinite deployments of United States troops to dangerous 
parts of the world. Far too often, we view the use of the 
United States Military as the solution to every problem. I 
share the frustration of Americans that we have, thus far, been 
unable to fully achieve our foreign policy objectives in 
Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere.
    However, just as decisions to employ the U.S. Military must 
be given great consideration, so too must decisions to 
disengage military, with particular attention paid to the 
second and third order effects such a decision will have on our 
security and foreign policy interests. I do not think 
sufficient consideration has been given to these issues to 
date.
    General Votel, we look forward to hearing your views on 
these and other issues.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Now that a quorum is present, I would ask the Committee to 
consider and approve a Senate resolution authorizing funding 
for our Committee from March 1st through February 28th. The 
funding resolution is completely consistent with the minority 
and majority leader in the January 9th agreement.
    Senator Reed. So moved.
    Senator Wicker. Second.
    Chairman Inhofe. I would entertain a motion. Is there a 
motion?
    Senator Reed. So moved, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Wicker. Second.
    Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
    [Chorus of ayes.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Inhofe. The ayes have it.

    [The Senate resolution approved by the Committee follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    All right. General Votel, you are recognized for your 
opening statements.

 STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                     STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

    General Votel. Senator Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning and thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee today. I come before you representing the 
over 80,000 men and women working tirelessly across the Central 
Command area of responsibility. They represent the very best of 
our Nation, and I am proud to stand among them as their 
commander. All of these great Americans have families in 
communities across our country that support their 
servicemembers from near and far, and we are equally proud and 
appreciative of their service and sacrifice.
    I am honored to be joined today by the CENTCOM senior 
enlisted leader, United States Army Command Sergeant Major Bill 
Thetford. Command Sergeant Major Thetford has been with me my 
entire tour at CENTCOM and for the 5 years we served together 
in other commands before that. He is the most experienced 
soldier in our outfit, and his support and steady leadership 
helped us navigate very treacherous waters over the years. He 
is representative of the people we have across this command 
and, indeed, throughout the Armed Forces of our Nation. Command 
Sergeant Major Thetford and his wife Allie will retire after 38 
years of service later this spring, and our Nation owes them an 
incredible debt of gratitude. We could not have been served 
better.
    There is no other region in the world as dynamic, hopeful, 
challenging, and dangerous as the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility, made up of the areas we typically refer to as 
the Levant, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. It is 
an area of great contrast and contradiction. It is an area rich 
in history, culture, and resources, but also an area pulsing 
with sectarianism, violence, poor governance, corruption, 
disenfranchisement, profound human suffering, and economic 
disparity. It is also an area where we retain vital interests, 
preventing the tax on our Homeland, countering malign and 
destabilizing influence, containing the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and ensuring freedom of navigation 
and commerce through critical international waterways. It is 
worth noting that four of the five major competitors or threats 
identified in the National Defense Strategy, China, Russia, 
Iran, and violent extremist organizations, reside or are 
contested in the CENTCOM area of responsibility every day.
    In the final 2 weeks of 2018, CENTCOM supported the UN 
[United Nations] Special Envoy in the establishment of a 
nascent ceasefire in Yemen, enabled the efforts of the United 
States Special Representative for Afghanistan, Reconciliation, 
began planning for the orderly and professional withdrawal 
under pressure of United States Forces in Syria, while 
maintaining our coalition efforts to support the Government of 
Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces in addressing the remnants 
of ISIS in that country. We monitored and mitigated the 
unprofessional acts of Iranian naval forces in international 
waters and observed the professional mature actions of the 
United States-advised Lebanese armed forces as they maintained 
stability along the border with Israel. Those 2 weeks were not 
an aberration for the command. They were business as usual, as 
they have been in CENTCOM nearly every day since its inception 
in the early 1980s.
    Today in Afghanistan, the conditions-based South Asia 
Strategy is working, and we continue to use military ways and 
means to advance our end state of reconciliation. We recognize 
this conflict will not be resolved solely by military force, 
but our military pressure serves as an enabler to a whole-of-
government process and more directly supports diplomatic 
efforts led by Ambassador Khalilzad. While these efforts have 
had recent promise, our mission has not changed. We will 
continue our military pressure in support of our national 
objectives until they are met.
    In Syria and Iraq, the unrelenting work of the 79-member 
Defeat ISIS coalition, the determination and bravery of our 
Iraqi Security Force and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) 
partners, and the support of multiple international government 
organizations has largely liberated the so-called physical 
caliphate of ISIS. An area of 34,000 square miles of territory 
which they once controlled is now reduced to an area less than 
20 square miles. The successful partnership with the Syrian 
Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces was 
instrumental in these gains against ISIS.
    But it is important to understand that even though this 
territory has been reclaimed, the fight against ISIS and 
violent extremists is not over, and our mission has not 
changed. The coalition's hard-won battlefield gains can only be 
secured by maintaining a vigilant offensive against the now 
largely dispersed and disaggregated ISIS that retains leaders, 
fighters, facilitators, resources, and the profane ideology 
that fuels their efforts.
    As the Defeat ISIS campaign in Syria transitions from 
liberating territory to enabling local security and addressing 
the ISIS clandestine insurgency, United States ground forces 
will depart Syria in a deliberate and coordinated manner while 
we concurrently consult with allies and partners to implement 
stabilization efforts. These details are being developed now 
and will ensure campaign continuity and capitalize on the 
contributions of the international community to prevent a 
resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
    Today in Yemen, a fragile ceasefire in the Port of 
Houdeidah is a promising, albeit challenging-to-implement step 
demonstrating the willingness by both sides to negotiate, and 
which will, hopefully, allow the United Nations to expand 
efforts to end this humanitarian disaster. Towards this end, 
CENTCOM supports the international diplomatic efforts and the 
work of the UN Special Envoy to facilitate the peace process by 
providing advice and assistance and serving as an interlocutor 
through our trusted relationships in the region to help ensure 
transparency, cohesion, and positive momentum. We also remain 
steadfast in reminding the Saudi-led coalition partners of 
their obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict and ensuring 
that the fight in Yemen does not spread across the region 
sowing more instability and threatening critical infrastructure 
and United States lives and interests.
    It is in the Central Region today and every day: great 
promise and opportunity mixed with contradiction and conflict.
    Let me conclude my remarks where I started with our people 
and their families. In an era of great change when we 
consistently ask our people to do more with less, the service 
and sacrifice of these men and women and their families in 
support of our Nation is both humbling and inspirational. For 
over 17 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast 
guardsmen, and civilians have answered the call with an 
unwavering commitment and devotion matched only by the families 
who support them. We could not have accomplished what we do 
without all of them, and they deserve the very best 
capabilities and support we can provide from weapons and 
communication systems to health care and housing. I ask for 
continued strong support from Congress and from the American 
people to provide our service men and women everything they 
need to accomplish their vital missions and lead healthy, 
fulfilling lives in continued service to our Nation.
    Thank you again for allowing me to represent the men and 
women of CENTCOM before you today. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Votel follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Joseph L. Votel
                              introduction
    As 2018 came to a close, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was engaged 
in critical events and catalysts for change across its area of 
responsibility (AOR). In the final two weeks of December, CENTCOM 
supported the UN Special Envoy in the establishment of a fragile cease-
fire in Yemen, and enabled the efforts of the United States Special 
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation through military pressure 
on the Taliban. We began planning for the safe, professional withdrawal 
under pressure of United States Forces from Syria, while maintaining 
our Defeat-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) efforts and 
accounting for the formation of a new governmental cabinet in Iraq. We 
monitored and mitigated the unprofessional acts of Iranian naval forces 
in international waters that threaten the global commons; which stood 
in stark contrast to the professional, mature actions of the United 
States-advised Lebanese Armed Forces as it de-escalated tensions along 
the border with Israel. While these events appear unconnected, they 
represent the swirling dynamics of the AOR--each event marking a 
pivotal point with the potential to impact the stability of the entire 
region.
    Since 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, CENTCOM has been charged with 
the responsibility of commanding multiple, often simultaneous combat 
missions in the Central Region. During that time, confronting terrorism 
and defeating violent extremist groups was the primary objective of 
U.S. national military power. Seventeen years later, CENTCOM is still 
the only geographic combatant command conducting multiple, active 
combat operations, but the strategic imperatives of a changing world 
have compelled us to rethink our priorities and assess our readiness 
for new challenges.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly recognized a 
return to competition between the great powers that now poses a greater 
long-term challenge to our Nation than the violence of terrorism. We 
also noted that the National Security Strategy (NSS) directs that ``The 
United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding 
ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to 
the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy 
market,'' and that ``We will retain the necessary American military 
presence in the region to protect the United States and our allies from 
terrorist attacks and preserve a favorable regional balance of power.'' 
We at CENTCOM understand how global disorder has created a security 
environment more complex and volatile than we have faced in our 
Nation's history. This assessment demands a clear-eyed appraisal of the 
threats, an acknowledgement of the changing character of warfare, and 
an understanding that challenges to our national interests will largely 
be transregional versus regional.
    We approach our evolving role at CENTCOM with both humility and 
agility, acknowledging the priorities outlined in the NSS and NDS, and 
the fact that we will not be the main effort of our Nation's scarce 
resources in perpetuity. We must, therefore, posture ourselves as both 
the supported and supporting effort toward securing our national 
interests--many of which are still heavily impacted by activities in 
the CENTCOM AOR. While CENTCOM has been the primary focus of military 
assets for nearly two decades, we recognize maintaining an agile 
posture in the Central Region doesn't necessarily require large 
concentrations of military personnel and equipment. Our strategic 
strength has never rested solely on the volume of materiel we bring to 
the fight, but rather on the partnerships, alliances and whole-of-
government efforts no other country in the world could recreate.
    Looking forward, our challenge will be to secure our hard-fought 
gains, and those of our allies and partners, while posturing for 
continuing change in the Central Region. We must be ready to compete 
with China, Russia, and Iran as they challenge us for regional 
influence and threaten our vital national interests. We must continue 
disrupting violent extremist organizations and preventing the 
acquisition or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction so they 
cannot be used against the U.S. or our allies. Regardless of the 
challenge or level of resources, CENTCOM is committed to defending the 
national interests of the U.S., and those of its partners and allies.
                         operating environment
    Resolute Support (RS). Our current military efforts in Afghanistan 
in support of the South Asia Strategy are conditions-based and focused 
on two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through 
Operation Freedom's Sentinel, United States Forces conduct counter-
terror missions against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-
Khorasan (ISIS-K), and associated groups to prevent their resurgence 
and ability to plan and execute external attacks. Second, in 
partnership with NATO allies and operational partner Nations in the 
Resolute Support Mission, United States Forces advise and assist the 
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight 
against the Taliban. The ANDSF have demonstrated exceptional resilience 
through a difficult and sustained fight.
    The conditions-based South Asia Strategy is working. We continue to 
use military ways and means to achieve our end state of reconciliation, 
recognizing this conflict will not be resolved solely by military 
force. Our military and enabling missions in Afghanistan are designed 
to set conditions that will convince the Taliban to negotiate for a 
lasting peace, and allow Afghans to own the political and diplomatic 
solutions that will eventually bring an end to the conflict. 
Consistent, offensive military pressure helped bring about the first 
cease fires--local and national--between the Taliban and Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in 17 years, illustrating 
the Afghan people's weariness of war, and representing our first real 
opportunity for peace and reconciliation since the war began. While the 
Taliban continue to demonstrate the capability to mount spectacular 
attacks and inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the 2018 
fighting season confirmed that the Taliban cannot win militarily. We 
recognize it will take a combination of sustained military pressure and 
diplomacy to bring an end to the hostilities. Our military pressure 
serves as an enabler to a whole-of-government process, and supports 
diplomatic efforts led by United States Special Representative for 
Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.
    Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The unrelenting work of the 74-
nation D-ISIS Coalition, determination and bravery of our Iraqi 
Security Force (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) partners, and 
support of multiple international governmental organizations has pushed 
the physical caliphate of ISIS to the verge of collapse. As a result, 
we are adjusting our military posture in Syria, planning and executing 
a deliberate, safe, and professional withdrawal of personnel and 
equipment while preserving sufficient power in the region to ensure 
that we can continue to destroy remnants of ISIS fighters and ensure it 
does not return. In Iraq, we work with the ISF to consolidate their 
gains, improve their security capability and help them evolve into the 
professional and representative force that the Iraqi people deserve.
    We are grateful for the partnership of the SDF throughout our D-
ISIS mission. A reliable partner since 2014, the SDF suffered tens of 
thousands of killed and wounded, and its leadership, sacrifice, and 
determination to drive ISIS from SDF homelands was instrumental in the 
liberation of the vast majority of ISIS' so-called physical caliphate. 
Of paramount importance now, the Coalition's hard-won battlefield gains 
must be secured by continued interagency efforts and mobilizing the 
international community to prevent a return of the conditions that 
allowed ISIS to arise.
    Yemen. Conflict between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Republic of 
Yemen Government (ROYG) forces, supported by the Saudi-led Coalition 
(SLC), led to deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen. The UN 
noted in August 2018 that the Houthis--trained, funded and armed in 
part by Iran--exacerbated the crisis by restricting food and aid access 
to civilian populations by controlling or threatening transportation 
and logistical routes to the city of Ta'izz, and the Ports of Aden and 
Hudaydah. The impact of conflict on the country and its people is 
catastrophic, despite best efforts by our own U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and other UN agencies and 
international aid organizations to mitigate humanitarian suffering. UN-
brokered consultations in Sweden in December 2018, and the resulting 
agreement on a prisoner exchange, ceasefire and redeployment of forces 
in the city and port of Hudaydah, and humanitarian access to Taiz 
demonstrated promising steps and a willingness on both sides to seek a 
negotiated settlement. Toward this end, CENTCOM supports the 
international diplomatic efforts and the work of UN Special Envoy 
(UNSE) Martin Griffiths to facilitate an end to the conflict, providing 
knowledge, advice, and serving as an interlocutor through our trusted 
relationships in the region to help ensure transparency, cohesion, and 
positive momentum. We will continue to support our regional partners 
developing processes and procedures to counter ballistic missiles (CBM) 
and counter unmanned armed aerial systems (C-UAS) to help mitigate 
threats to civilian populations and critical infrastructure.
    Iran exerts its malign influence throughout the region, through its 
increased--often unprofessional--activities in the Arabian Gulf and 
Strait of Hormuz, engaging in proxy warfare through its sponsorship of 
violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and proliferating advanced 
conventional weapons, including theater ballistic missiles and 
weaponized unmanned aerial and maritime systems. Operating in the gray 
zone of competition below open conflict, Iran conducts unfettered 
information and cyber campaigns against its adversaries and actively 
attempts to influence or obstruct the mechanisms of effective 
governance and domestic policies of several of its sovereign regional 
neighbors.
    Prolonged conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan have 
produced instability and large-scale humanitarian crises within and 
beyond the CENTCOM AOR, creating millions of displaced persons, 
stressing fragile economies, opening space for the spread of extremism 
among disenfranchised peoples, and providing opportunities for 
adversaries to cultivate influence. Countering instability requires an 
alliance-based and whole-of-government approach that CENTCOM is 
uniquely positioned to support. The Department of State, USAID and 
CENTCOM are partnering to counter the influence of competitors and 
malign actors by addressing the drivers of instability and creating the 
economic, political, and security conditions required to reverse these 
trends. To alleviate suffering, CENTCOM, in partnership with USAID, 
provides targeted foreign humanitarian assistance to internally 
displaced persons using our Overseas Disaster, Humanitarian, and Civic 
Aid appropriated funds. Stabilization and humanitarian assistance 
activities provide a significant tool to reduce human suffering, 
promote stability, sustain fragile governmental institutions, and 
provide critical support countering our competitors' gray zone 
activities.
    While we maintain a strong, cooperative presence with our regional 
partners in the traditional warfighting domains, there is room for 
improvement in cooperative ventures with our regional partners in the 
information and cyber domains. Our competitors do not play by the same 
rules as the U.S. They have developed and employed asymmetric 
strategies to use in the information and cyber environment to weaken 
the U.S. to achieve their strategic objectives. The unconstrained and 
unregulated nature of their capabilities puts the United States at a 
disadvantage, while great power competitors like China and Russia, as 
well as adversarial regimes like Iran, operationalize these 
strategies--including information theft, media manipulation, and cyber-
attack--to strike vulnerable United States assets, disrupt our 
information systems and those of our allies, and undermine the image of 
the U.S. in the region and around the world.
    Our CENTCOM Partner Network, a secure coalition computer network, 
improves our capability to exchange crucial cyberspace threat 
intelligence and operational data with coalition and regional partners. 
We will pursue more opportunities to enable real-time exchanges of 
classified information to meet critical coalition collaboration and 
mission needs. The ability to dynamically share information with 
mission partners at the speed of relevance provides us a greater 
advantage against our adversaries.
    Across the interagency, CENTCOM pursues whole-of-government 
solutions to address transregional threats. CENTCOM places increased 
command emphasis on an organizational approach to ensure interagency 
integration is a high priority in all planning. For example, CENTCOM 
supports National Security Council-convened threat finance fusion cells 
to counter ISIS and Iran. We also provide personnel to support 
interagency efforts in our Regional Narcotics Interagency Fusion Cell.
    The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised 
Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) provides a best-in-class example of a 
successful, nimble, and responsive capability in support of the 
warfighter. CENTCOM relies heavily on the critical, life-saving 
training, technology, and expertise JIDO provides to safeguard U.S. and 
allied forces from many of the most dangerous, emerging threats on the 
battlefield, including improvised explosive devices; unmanned, armed 
aerial and maritime vehicles; and other improvised threats. JIDO's 
functions are not replicated in any of the Services, demonstrate 
enormous value, and are worthy of continued resourcing through DTRA.
                          strategic importance
    The CENTCOM AOR is one of the most complex, diverse regions in the 
world. Composed of nearly 600 million people dispersed among 20 
countries, it is home to three of the world's five major religions, is 
the most energy-rich region in the world, and contains three strategic 
maritime choke points. The Suez Canal, the Bab al Mandeb, and the 
Strait of Hormuz are major transit points for energy and trade; the 
ability of commerce to transit these global commons freely being vital 
for the global economy.
    Much like the rest of the world, almost 90 percent of businesses in 
the Central Region are small-to-medium-size enterprises. They are the 
key drivers of job creation, employ nearly 66 percent of the labor 
force, and help diversify their respective country's economies. 
Contrary to popular belief, not every country in the CENTCOM AOR is 
rich with oil and natural gas resources, and for those that are, their 
economies are highly susceptible to changes in the energy market. 
Strong economies, vibrant commerce, low unemployment rates, and decent 
standards of living are ``must-haves'' to promote and maintain 
stability. Military force cannot create strong economies. It can only 
help provide safe, secure conditions for them to develop.
    There are multiple drivers of instability in the region, ranging 
from the toxic narrative of sectarianism, to brittle political and 
economic systems, to disenfranchised and disillusioned peoples. While 
drivers of instability can be addressed and mitigated through the 
application of elements of national power, many have roots spanning 
several generations. In our strategic approach, it is important to 
acknowledge with a degree of humility that there are some things that 
are beyond our power to change. Despite those challenges, we recognize 
the strategic importance of the Central Region to our national 
interests, and four key reasons why we must remain engaged here to 
preserve them.
    First, we must not allow another attack on our Homeland. The 
CENTCOM AOR is the world's epicenter for terrorism and VEOs. The 9/11 
attacks were based from al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan and served 
as a wake-up call that terrorism could be exported from anywhere in the 
world.
    Second, we cannot allow VEOs or rogue nations to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs). Our active presence in this region prevents 
VEOs from coming together toward that purpose and helps prevent the 
proliferation of WMD materials.
    Third, instability is contagious. It does not respect national 
borders and grows and spreads if left unchecked. A stable Middle East 
underpins a stable world. In an already volatile region, our steady 
commitment to our allies and partners provides a force for stability. 
As the President's National Security Strategy states, we must also 
``work with partners to neutralize Iran's malign activities in the 
region.''
    The fourth is the reemergence of great power competition, the main 
challenge highlighted in the NDS. China and Russia seek to dominate and 
influence not just their own geographic regions, but the Central Region 
as well. Just as great power competitors looked to influence energy and 
trade in the Middle East following the first World War, China and 
Russia are working very hard today to reshuffle the balance of power in 
the CENTCOM AOR, trying to displace the United States from its position 
of influence. The President's National Security Strategy directs that 
the United States seeks a Middle East that is ``not dominated by any 
power hostile to the United States.''
    This is the reality of our world, and of the regional and 
transregional challenges we have to address in CENTCOM. We recognize 
the United States is rightly shifting its resources toward Europe and 
East Asia to balance great power competition, but remain mindful that 
the CENTCOM AOR represents a geopolitical crossroads and a principal 
zone for that competition as well. Of the five major threats identified 
in the NDS, four--competition with China; competition with Russia; 
Iran's rogue, malign activities; and combatting VEOs--reside or are 
contested on a significant scale in the CENTCOM AOR every day.
    Many observers, and many of our partners and allies as well, hold 
misperceptions of the focus on great power competition in the NDS. They 
view the prioritization and alignment of efforts for long-term 
competition with China and Russia as a wholesale shift in emphasis away 
from the Middle East and Central Asia regions. However, that view fails 
to account for the global context of the NDS and how great power 
competition is not isolated to Europe or Asia, but often takes place in 
other strategically important regions like the CENTCOM AOR.
    Currently, CENTCOM is conducting or supporting military operations 
with Coalition partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and limited 
counter-terror operations in Yemen. We represent a United States 
presence with military basing and support in seven countries, have 
bilateral or multilateral military engagements with nearly a dozen 
countries, and security cooperation agreements with 16 countries. 
Across much of the AOR, however, where there is a United States 
presence, there is almost always an existing or developing presence by 
China, Russia, or both.
    China uses its ``One Belt-One Road'' initiative as an economic 
lever to provide access and influence across the Central Region. China 
invested in Suez Canal development, the port of Haifa in Israel, and 
Jordan to provide access, relationships and leverage on the other side 
of the continent. In the United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free 
Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the 
Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of 
Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal, 
and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the 
Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is 
conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and 
energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary 
tool, and while many ``United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free 
Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the 
Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of 
Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal, 
and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the 
Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is 
conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and 
energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary 
tool, and while many ``United Arab Emirates, it invested in the Free 
Trade Zone area and the Khalifa Port to create a regional hub in the 
Arabian Gulf. China built a naval support base in the country of 
Djibouti to expand its presence and access to the Red Sea, Suez Canal, 
and Bab al Mandeb. In Pakistan, China financed and gained access to the 
Gwadar Port enabling access to the Arabian Sea. In Oman, China is 
conducting port negotiations to obtain access to trade routes and 
energy transit corridors. For China, economic power is the primary 
tool, and while many ``
    Russia is focusing increasing attention to the Middle East, in part 
due to its geographical proximity, but also to reestablish its image as 
an influential global power. Russia invests in the Suez Canal 
development and is a co-member with China in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. Russia has increased its engagement with and investment 
in Egypt, including construction of a 48 megawatt nuclear power plant 
in El Dabba, as well as development of a major trade and investment 
zone in east Port Said. Russia conducts bilateral and multilateral 
military exercises and provides economic and security support in more 
than half a dozen countries in the Central and South Asia (CASA) 
region, most of whom were part of the former Soviet Union and who 
remain reliant on Russia for their economic and security needs. Russia 
seeks to increase its own influence while limiting the influence of 
others, monopolize energy transit and pipeline routes, and provide a 
buffer zone against NATO enlargement. In Syria, Russia is establishing 
a permanent military and economic presence, with the goal of dominating 
infrastructure and energy commerce there in the coming years.
    We also note the important role that nuclear deterrence plays 
within U.S. strategy, as the number one priority mission of the 
Department of Defense. It backstops all U.S. military operations and 
diplomacy across the globe. A robust and modern United States nuclear 
deterrent helps ensure competition with Russia and China, regardless of 
where it originates, does not escalate to large-scale war.
    The U.S. is able to exercise a great deal of control over its own 
economy because we exercise a great deal of political, military, and 
economic power around the world. Where we lose that power and 
influence, our competitors gain--and we will be more vulnerable at home 
because of it. Less than 100 years ago the Middle East puzzle came 
together with the United States influencing key pieces. Today, the 
puzzle is being remade and China and Russia are seeking new strategic 
pieces. We must recognize our old pieces may no longer fit, and stay 
engaged and agile enough to maintain our position as the dominant 
influence once this new puzzle comes together. In the CASA region, for 
example, our partner nations lie in close proximity to or share borders 
with Russia or China. We must realistically acknowledge this tyranny of 
distance, but continue to engage and compete in innovative ways that 
help build partnerships, grow our influence, and serve as a balance to 
the other great powers. The bottom line is simple: If left unchecked, 
the expanding global reach of China's economic and military 
initiatives, as well as Russia's objective to weaken or subvert Western 
security structures in the CENTCOM AOR will pose a significant 
challenge to United States prosperity, security, and regional 
stability.
    As long as terrorism is exportable, as long as the Central Region 
remains a global supplier of energy, as long as we have allies and 
partners to whom we are committed, the U.S. cannot afford to cede our 
role as the dominant regional power. Without a continued strong 
presence and consistent engagement in the region, we risk our ability 
to secure the global commons, weaken our network of allies and partners 
necessary to eliminate potential safe havens for jihadist terrorists, 
and diminish our ability to maintain a stable global energy market.
                           strategic approach
    CENTCOM's mission is to direct and enable military operations and 
activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and 
stability in support of enduring U.S. interests. Our strategic approach 
is founded in three principles: Prepare, Pursue, and Prevail. This 
approach drives our thinking, gives direction and intent to every level 
in the command, provides capabilities to our commanders, and creates 
decision space for military and civilian leadership. Each aspect of our 
approach enables the next, and collectively contributes to the 
successful achievement of our goals and objectives. CENTCOM uses these 
aspects as the cornerstone to advance our operational approach of ``by, 
with, and through.''
    We prepare by forming enduring coalitions, cultivating 
relationships with partners and allies, and maintaining security, 
basing, and overflight agreements, or paving the way for those 
agreements to be established. It means we deepen our interoperability 
and expand our regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative 
planning with our partners, so we can increase their capabilities and 
our collective capabilities to operate more effectively in a joint and 
combined environment. We communicate the winning narrative of a free 
and open international order, national sovereignty, individual freedom 
and dignity, and the rule of law. We foster meaningful, sustainable, 
two-way relationships with people who share common interests and common 
values instead of engaging in the transactional relationships and 
predatory economic practices of our great power competitors. The 
alliances and partnerships we forge, rooted in mutual respect, reduce 
the price we pay for our position of leadership, and provide 
significant asymmetrical advantages over our geopolitical rivals. These 
aspects of preparation are crucial, and perhaps even more important 
than maintaining a large military footprint in the region. While 
personnel and equipment can be surged in a time of crisis, one cannot 
surge partnerships, trust, understanding, agreements, and commitment.
    Pursuing opportunities means we are proactive, always alert for 
chances to seize the initiative and dictate events on favorable terms. 
Regardless of whether we are investigating a new partnership or 
considering a different operational approach, pursuing those openings 
requires empowerment at the lowest levels, transparency, flat 
communications, understanding and trust. Surrounding circumstances and 
shortened decision cycles for action may induce greater risk, which we 
must underwrite and manage through strong feedback loops between all 
levels of leadership, including our interagency partners and allies. 
Not every opportunity pans out, but an opportunity not explored is a 
potential advantage lost.
    Prevailing takes on a meaning different than raising a banner or 
marching in a victory parade. It entails consolidating our gains, 
securing and stabilizing what we and our partners have fought for. We 
recognize there are no easy victories to be had in the CENTCOM AOR as 
ours is a region of historical, protracted struggle. In CENTCOM, 
prevailing means retaining flexibility and decision space for our 
leaders, preserving our national interests and those of our allies and 
partners, and maintaining a favorable balance of power for the U.S.
    We operationalize this principle using a ``by, with, and through'' 
approach. We conduct operations primarily by indigenous partner forces, 
with enabling support from the U.S. and our coalition partners, working 
through U.S. and international authorities and partner agreements. 
While not yet a doctrine, a strategy, or a formal military program, it 
is a proven, successful, operational approach that pursues culturally 
acceptable and durable solutions. It is a way of conducting military 
activities and operations with reduced direct combat employment of U.S. 
Forces, while developing and supporting partner capacity and 
participation. While indigenous forces may not conduct operations 
according to U.S. pace and doctrine, they take ownership of the fight. 
Their wins are not only theirs, but ours as well; and fighting for 
those wins builds legitimacy and resiliency. Currently, CENTCOM 
successfully applies the ``by, with and through'' operational approach 
in Operation Inherent Resolve, assisting our partners to defeat ISIS; 
in Yemen, using a multilayered Arab/United States approach to counter 
VEOs; and with Operation Freedom's Sentinel and the NATO-led Resolute 
Support Mission to defeat VEOs and pressure the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
This approach is not limited to combat operations, however, as CENTCOM 
fulfills many peacetime objectives working ``by, with, and through'' 
other partner nations.
    Employing a ``by, with, and through'' operational strategy supports 
the objectives and intent of the NSS and NDS--promoting regional 
stability and security, defeating terrorist threats to the U.S., and 
ensuring that common domains remain free and open--while addressing 
these challenges through a resource-sustainable approach, including 
strengthening the indigenous capacities of, and improving 
interoperability with, our regional partners and allies.
    While this approach provides CENTCOM the ability to do ``more with 
less,'' our ability to act decisively in the region becomes more 
contingent upon the full commitment of regional partners. We must 
therefore ensure transparent and contextual communication across our 
own Government, and among our allies and partners. If we mistakenly or 
inadvertently signal we are ``pulling back'' or ``refocusing'' 
priorities to address great power competition elsewhere in the world, 
we risk undermining our trust and credibility with long-standing 
partners here.
               regional overview--central and south asia
    Afghanistan remains home to numerous terrorist organizations that 
threaten our interests. ISIS-K, in particular, maintains both the 
intent and the capability to inspire, direct, and conduct external 
operations, and if left unchecked, will continue to grow as a threat to 
our Homeland. In support of the South Asia Strategy, Afghanistan became 
CENTCOM's main effort. United States support for the mission in 
Afghanistan evolved into a ``by, with and through'' operational 
approach as recognition of the need for domestic legitimacy and 
ownership increased. This ultimately strengthens the GIROA's 
negotiating position toward reconciliation and reintegration.
    Key Challenges: Years of conflict in Afghanistan have caused large-
scale humanitarian crises exacerbated by porous national borders, and 
provided Iran, Russia, and China opportunities to expand their 
influence in the region. Russia has attempted to challenge United 
States influence in Afghanistan under the false pretense of supporting 
the Taliban's fight against ISIS-K, while Iran continues to use the 
Taliban to secure its own interests and to counter the ANDSF's attempts 
to improve security conditions across the country. Militants operating 
out of Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to threaten Afghan stability 
as well as stoke tensions between Pakistan and India. We look to 
regional actors such as Pakistan to cease behavior undermining regional 
stability and play constructive roles in achieving peace in Afghanistan 
as well as the whole of South Asia. Kabul's uncertain political 
situation remains the greatest risk to stability as the GIROA prepares 
for the 2019 presidential elections, and continues to suffer from weak 
institutions and a political environment marked by a lack of unity on 
core issues.
    Key Opportunities: The potential for a political settlement in 
Afghanistan is promising. In June, following GIROA's call for a 
national ceasefire over Eid al Fitr, the Taliban responded with their 
own ceasefire, giving Afghans a glimpse of a future without conflict. 
October's parliamentary elections were the first run entirely by 
Afghans, with only limited logistical and security support from the 
Coalition. Despite Taliban and ISIS-K threats against voters and 
polling centers, the ANDSF oversaw a significant reduction in violence 
compared to previous election periods, with over 4 million Afghans 
participating in the parliamentary elections. Applying lessons learned 
will be critical to enabling successful presidential elections in 2019.
    The Afghan Security Forces Fund appropriation has enabled us to 
increase the combat capabilities in the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Our 
security cooperation funds are used for procuring aircraft, training 
aircrews and maintainers as the AAF transitions from dated Russian 
platforms to modern United States aircraft. We are assisting the ANDSF 
in doubling the size of the Afghan Army's Special Operations Force, 
currently the most effective combat element against the Taliban and 
terrorist organizations. In an effort to promote responsible 
development, we closely monitor ANDSF capability growth to ensure it is 
necessary, affordable, and sustainable. We continue to pursue 
opportunities to develop bilateral relationships with CASA nations to 
promote regional stability and encourage them, and our NATO allies, to 
contribute financial and advisory support to the GIROA.
    2019 Prognosis: The South Asia Strategy is working. While the 
Taliban continue to demonstrate resilience and the capability to 
inflict significant casualties on the ANDSF, the Coalition's sustained 
military, diplomatic, and social pressure will be instrumental in 
convincing the Taliban that reconciliation is the only path forward.
    Pakistan presents the United States with challenges and 
opportunities in the execution of our South Asia Strategy. As a state 
possessing nuclear weapons that sits at the nexus of Russian, Chinese, 
Indian, Iranian, and United States geopolitical interests, Pakistan 
will always be a country of importance to the United States. However, 
Pakistan's actions are often a source of frustration to United States 
regional efforts in Afghanistan. Our posture with Pakistan involves 
supporting our colleagues at the Department of State as they pursue a 
diplomatic solution with Islamabad to end the conflict in Afghanistan 
while ensuring that Pakistan's equities are acknowledged and addressed 
in any future agreement.
    Key Challenges: Pakistan has not taken concrete actions against the 
safe havens of VEOs inside its borders. Similarly, VEOs located in 
Afghanistan conduct attacks inside Pakistan. This cross-border 
instability and violence generates tension along both sides of the 
border. The suspension of United States security assistance funds to 
Pakistan remains in place. Meanwhile, some United States Pakistan 
military cooperation activities have continued, demonstrating the 
importance of military cooperation, despite challenges in the bilateral 
relationship.
    Key Opportunities: Pakistan has taken positive steps to assist SRAR 
Ambassador Khalilzad in support of Afghanistan reconciliation by 
facilitating talks with the Taliban but has avoided taking any concrete 
or irreversible steps such as arresting or expelling Taliban leaders 
who do not cooperate with reconciliation efforts. With our strategic 
focus on reconciliation and regional security, Pakistan has a unique 
opportunity to make good on its promises of support to United States 
efforts focused on finding a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan 
conflict. If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement 
to the conflict in Afghanistan, the United States will have opportunity 
and motive to help Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region 
is the most important mutual priority for the United States and 
Pakistan.
    2019 Prognosis: A peaceful resolution in Afghanistan and improved 
cross-border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan would strengthen 
the opportunity for mutual trade and increased economic flows not only 
between them, but also potentially with India and the Central Asian 
states. China is already partnering with Pakistan for the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor as a central piece of China's ``One Belt-One 
Road'' initiative. Central and South Asia cooperation between the 
United States and China offers opportunities for peaceful dialogue and 
a chance for the United States to balance China's economic rise and 
reinforce its commitment to global norms for the benefit all.
    Uzbekistan and United States partnerships continue to improve, and 
we are increasingly optimistic that the Government of Uzbekistan is 
promoting a constructive foreign policy, improving relations with its 
neighbors and becoming more involved in multilateral exchanges and 
exercises. Uzbekistan is fully supportive of our South Asia Strategy 
and a constructive partner in the Afghanistan peace process. Given its 
large population, strong security forces, central location, and a 
shared border with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan's willingness to partner 
with us and its neighbors can help promote stability in the region.
    Key Challenges: Russia remains the dominant power in Central Asia, 
and Uzbekistan must balance cooperation with the United States 
carefully to avoid actions Moscow deems provocative. As we strengthen 
our partnership with Uzbekistan we must respect this balance, mindful 
of Uzbekistan's absorptive capacity.
    Key Opportunities: Uzbekistan is hosting the Central and South 
Asian armed forces Chief of Staff conference in February, demonstrating 
its growing role as a regional leader. Our mil-to-mil efforts are 
focused on improving border security capacity, enhancing counter-
narcotic and counter-terrorism capabilities, and assisting the Uzbeks 
with the potential return of domestic terrorist fighters returning from 
Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. The Uzbeks expressed interest in 
diversifying their military equipment and provided lists of U.S. 
systems and equipment they are interested in purchasing. This interest 
represents a unique opportunity to off-ramp Uzbekistan from Russian 
equipment and deepen our relationship as we negotiate increased air and 
land access through the Northern Access corridor.
    2019 Prognosis: Uzbekistan will continue efforts to increase its 
capacity, using United States security assistance to maintain a balance 
between Russian and Chinese influences and to boost its professionalism 
in the areas of border security, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism 
and defense institution building. United States security assistance 
will help maintain and potentially enhance access in support of United 
States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
    Tajikistan remains a target of both Russian and Chinese overtures. 
We continue to build our military relationship with Tajikistan, even as 
Moscow deepens its influence and increases its military posture at its 
base outside the capital. China's increased security cooperation, 
focused on border security, is coupled with an aggressive economic 
lending program. China seeks to minimize instability along their shared 
border, in its eastern provinces, and protect its economic investment 
in Tajikistan.
    Key Challenges: The Government of Tajikistan is concerned with 
stability in northern Afghanistan and security along the mountainous, 
800-mile Afghan border. The inability to secure their border encourages 
smuggling and has a destabilizing effect on both Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan. These border concerns provide a strong nexus of mutual 
interests and we support development of Tajik counter-terrorism, 
counter-narcotics, and border security capabilities. We are also 
assisting Tajikistan to counter trans-national threats that impact both 
Tajikistan and the broader Central Asia region.
    Key Opportunities: Tajikistan is eager for United States assistance 
and its modest funding for security services presents an opportunity 
for CENTCOM to help Tajikistan develop its capabilities and 
relationships to balance Russian influence. Exercise Regional 
Cooperation, a multilateral exercise Tajikistan expressed interest 
hosting in August 2019, will address border security and counter terror 
issues. Moving forward, CENTCOM will assist Tajikistan's efforts to 
counter violent extremism and emphasize the need for building stronger 
defense institutions.
    2019 Prognosis: Economic investment and border security will 
continue to characterize China's relationship with Tajikistan. It is 
likely that both Russia and China will continue to exaggerate the 
terrorist threat to further entrench and justify their respective 
security relationships with Tajikistan. Russia will seek to continue to 
safeguard what it considers its ``sphere of influence'' in the region 
and China will continue to take actions it deems necessary to secure 
its border. United States security assistance for Tajikistan can 
provide a counter to this great power competition by enabling the 
Tajiks to maintain their border integrity with Afghanistan while 
supporting regional stability.
    Kazakhstan and United States relations continue to be the most 
mature and forward-thinking in Central Asia, although Russia's 
proximity influences Kazakhstan's posture. Kazakhstan remains the most 
significant Central Asian contributor to Afghan stability, engaging in 
trade, providing electrical power, donating money to the ANDSF fund, 
providing educational opportunities, supporting programs for Afghan 
women, and offering technical support and services to the Afghans.
    Key Challenges: Kazakhstan, like most CASA nations, must carefully 
balance cooperation with the United States to avoid actions Russia 
interprets as threatening. As we strengthen our partnership with 
Kazakhstan, we must respect this balance. The United States should 
continue assisting the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense as it focuses on 
the necessary institutional reforms of its non-commissioned officer 
corps, training management, human resources administration, and its 
professional military education system. As we look to off-ramp Central 
Asian countries from Russian defense equipment, the higher price of 
United States systems will remain a challenge for nations like 
Kazakhstan.
    Key Opportunities: Kazakhstan has expressed interest in working 
with the United States to improve its logistical, medical, and 
engineering branches. We will also continue our engagement with the 
Kazakhstani Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) training center to improve 
Kazakhstani PKO capabilities and foster regional integration by opening 
the center to Kazakhstan's neighbors. Exercise Steppe Eagle, an annual 
trilateral peacekeeping exercise sponsored by the United States, United 
Kingdom and Kazakhstan, has expanded to include Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. In November 2018, with United States assistance, Kazakhstan 
deployed a company-level unit to Lebanon on a UN peacekeeping 
operations mission--a first for any CASA nation.
    2019 Prognosis: Kazakhstan will continue to use United States 
security assistance to balance Russian and Chinese influences. United 
States security assistance enables access for sustainment of United 
States and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Maintaining mil-to-mil 
programs, with a focus on defense institution building and professional 
military education, will position us to maintain our comparative 
advantage with a country situated on the doorsteps of Russia and China.
    The Kyrgyz Republic and United States' strained bilateral relations 
impede security cooperation that would otherwise further military our 
objectives in Central Asia.
    Key Challenges: The lack of a status of forces agreement with the 
Kyrgyz Republic severely limits CENTCOM's level of engagement. Until 
steps are taken to extend diplomatic protections for United States 
Military operating in the Kyrgyz Republic, mil-mil exchanges and 
training are suspended.
    Key Opportunities: The Office of Military Cooperation in Bishkek 
and the Montana National Guard through the National Guard State 
Partnership Program remain postured to renew programs aimed at 
developing military capabilities specifically in the areas of Field 
Medicine and Disaster Response, and Humanitarian Assistance as soon as 
political conditions permit.
    2019 Prognosis: Any United States security assistance for the 
Kyrgyz Republic will help the Kyrgyz to maintain their national 
sovereignty in the face of Russian and Chinese jockeying for influence.
    Turkmenistan has a UN-recognized policy of ``positive neutrality'' 
by which the government balances the demands of the regional powers by 
not taking sides in international conflict and not entering into 
alliances or economic organizations, necessitating a subtle and agile 
approach to Security Cooperation to be successful.
    Key Challenges: A struggling economy, a rigid political system, and 
the Turkmen policy of positive neutrality largely limits international 
cooperation and Turkmenistan's security services.
    Key Opportunities: We have focused our efforts on English language 
training, medical engagements and the development of Special Forces 
with Turkmenistan Ministry of Defense (MOD). We are encouraged by MOD's 
increased participation in our exchanges and conferences. Turkmenistan 
has expressed interest in enhancing its disaster response capability 
and border security, providing additional opportunities for CENTCOM.
    2019 Prognosis: Turkmenistan remains concerned with the instability 
in Afghanistan and the potential for the flow of foreign terrorist 
fighters, therefore assistance will focus on enhancing border security. 
Maintaining a small, consistent security cooperation portfolio in 
Turkmenistan has outsized impact and will help counter Russian and 
Chinese influence.
                   regional overview--greater levant
    Iraq's mil-to-mil relationship with the United States is as strong 
as it has ever been, and Iraq has both the potential and desire to 
become a formidable ally in combatting terrorism. The Office of 
Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is conducting programs to enhance 
professionalization of the ISF, coupled with prudent implementation and 
oversight of FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Transforming OSC-I 
into a permanent Title 22 Security Cooperation Office is key. Our 
authority for OSC-I to conduct training activities with ISF is more 
important than ever in the evolution of an ISF that is effective, 
inclusive, sustainable, affordable, and cements our long-term bilateral 
partnership.
    Key Challenges: Reform of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to 
achieve the goal of ``One ISF'' remains a challenge. Iraq's Popular 
Mobilization Forces (PMF) are officially part of the ISF, however, the 
forces are comprised of disparate groups, some of which are not totally 
responsive to the direction of the Government of Iraq (GOI), the worst 
of which are affiliated with Shiite militia groups directed by Iran. 
Iraq's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MOPA) is largely treated as a 
less-than-equal organization by the government. While some tensions 
between the Kurdish Regional Government and Baghdad have eased, 
challenges with revenue sharing, disputed territory and control of oil 
resources remain problematic. It is critical the ISF consolidate its 
gains against ISIS and evolve from a war footing to a steady state, 
which must be effective, affordable, and protect Iraqi people and their 
infrastructure from terrorism.
    As ISIS continues to build a clandestine insurgency, the GoI must 
form an effective cabinet and government entities to manage the country 
and improve economic resilience and quality of life for its people. 
This includes meeting the needs of Iraq's youthful population who 
demand better economic opportunities, access to essential services, and 
an end to endemic corruption in the GoI. Failure by the newly formed 
government to address the basic needs of Iraqi citizens may facilitate 
the reemergence of ISIS or other VEOs, which capitalize on public 
dissatisfaction to increase their support. Iran's meddling in the 
selection of Iraqi cabinet members, notably the Minister of Defense and 
the Minister of Interior, has prevented the GoI from addressing 
pressing national security issues.
    Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, through OSC-I, is working with our 
Iraqi partners to re-integrate the GoI with its Arab neighbors. These 
efforts have paid dividends in reinitiating cooperation between Iraq 
and countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and Qatar; 
illustrated by the reopening of shared borders. OSC-I can leverage its 
authorities to support the ISF's evolution into an effective, 
sustainable, and affordable force through mil-to-mil relations, 
security sector reform, security cooperation, while coordinating broad-
based reform with regional partners. Key objectives include the further 
professionalization of the ISF, rebalancing the ISF's force structure 
to meet future threats, and reforming the ISF's human resources and 
professional military education systems with increased emphasis on 
force design, force management, and policy development.
    2019 Prognosis: Iraq's May 2018 elections resulted in the formation 
of a new, generally representative government. Newly elected Prime 
Minister Abd al-Mahdi vowed to improve public services and prioritize 
reconstruction of areas devastated by the conflict with ISIS. It is 
likely that Iraq will retool its budget to focus on government goals 
however, Iraq must also rebuild its security forces, which are 
exhausted by four years of operations against ISIS.
    Syria's President Bashar al Assad remains in power with the 
military support of Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). Despite 
significant advances, the Syrian regime has insufficient forces to 
adequately secure recaptured territory. The United States withdrawal 
from Syria represents the most dynamic shift in the environment since 
ISIS lost its ability to govern major population centers and fight as a 
conventional force and could trigger a renewed race for influence, 
control, and for some, survival. Turkey's strong national security 
concerns in Syria and standing as a NATO ally further complicates the 
battlespace. Israel's legitimate concerns about Iran's increasingly 
provocative actions in Syria, particularly the transshipment of 
advanced weapons systems into and through Syria, are driving 
increasingly forward leaning Israeli military actions. If the major 
actors and their proxies become embroiled in a competition for 
influence in Syria, this may create space for ISIS remnants or other 
terrorist groups to reform or reconstitute. Because the regime was 
incapable or unwilling to fight ISIS, the responsibility for D-ISIS 
fighting has been borne by the Coalition and our partnered force, the 
SDF, whose bravery and determination have been crucial to rolling back 
ISIS. The intervention of the Coalition in the Syrian conflict blocked 
Assad's ability to recapture all of northern Syria. As the United 
States executes a safe, professional withdrawal, we seek to help 
negotiate a secure future for the people of northeast Syria liberated 
from ISIS and our partners in the D-ISIS fight.
    The international humanitarian community has achieved some success, 
but the Syrian regime's resistance to allow aid deliveries is largely 
driven by Assad's use of starvation as a weapon of war. As a result, 
there are more than 13 million Syrians who require humanitarian 
assistance, including 5.7 million internally displaced persons and 5.7 
million refugees in neighboring countries. While United States 
humanitarian assistance reaches four million people throughout Syria 
monthly, security concerns and access constraints limit the reach of 
aid in some locations. Vulnerable populations in Syria will continue to 
require humanitarian aid until parties to the conflict reach a 
political solution.
    Key Challenges: The civil war, combined with ISIS occupation and 
the subsequent fight to displace and destroy ISIS has led to vast 
destruction of infrastructure, degradation of government, lack of basic 
services, and other humanitarian challenges. Assad's reluctance to 
negotiate directly with the Syrian opposition, and Moscow's reluctance 
to force him to do so, indicates significant challenges ahead in 
forging a political resolution to the conflict and ending this 
humanitarian crisis. A political resolution is key to the lasting 
defeat of ISIS, because unless fundamental drivers of domestic 
instability are addressed, conditions will remain for a resurgence of 
ISIS, or ISIS-like VEOs.
    While CENTCOM's ``by, with, and through'' partnership with the SDF 
has been critical to the defeat of ISIS, it has created friction with 
Turkey, which views the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) 
elements within the SDF as a terrorist group. Our assistance to the SDF 
focuses on defeating ISIS, as we have simultaneously sought to include 
measures to reassure our Turkish allies. In October 2018 the United 
States and Turkey began conducting combined joint patrols in key 
locations. CENTCOM will continue to assist the Turkish military in 
countering VEOs that threaten their border, maintaining our emphasis on 
the D-ISIS campaign.
    The repatriation of ISIS foreign fighters to their home countries 
to face justice remains a challenge. Both SDF and Iraqi forces are 
holding hundreds of foreign fighters in prisons or temporary detention 
facilities, with no single process for prosecution or repatriation. 
This requires a concerted international effort involving law 
enforcement, intelligence sharing, and diplomacy.
    Key Opportunities: The conflict in Syria has led to an increased 
demand from our regional allies and partners for improved border 
security as well as improved domestic counter-terrorism capabilities. 
CENTCOM is able to manage the development of these capabilities which 
supports our objectives of promoting stability and countering VEOs in 
the region. The United States withdrawal provides an opportunity to 
reset our relationship with our Turkish allies as well as an 
opportunity for us to focus on reinforcing Iraq's consolidation of its 
gains against ISIS. A strong, enduring partnership with Iraq will serve 
as stabilizing factor, helping mitigate concerns about long-term United 
States intentions in the region.
    Jordan is one of our most committed partners in the Middle East and 
one of the most critical voices of moderate Islam in the region. We 
must be careful to not to take their partnership for granted. Jordan's 
civilian and military leadership exemplifies professionalism and 
modernization within a region in crisis. Jordan is the only country in 
the Levant to provide a platform for operations, in addition to 
unhindered access and overflight essential to United States interests. 
The Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) are a key contributor to the D-ISIS 
Coalition and OIR and is a major contributor to efforts to stabilize 
the region. Continued support to the Government of Jordan (GOJ) and the 
JAF is critical to ongoing D-ISIS efforts, and preventing the spread of 
instability in the region.
    Key Challenges: Jordan currently hosts over 750,000 registered 
refugees from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, straining government 
resources, services, and infrastructure. The GOJ and the JAF have 
effectively balanced legitimate security concerns with the humanitarian 
imperative to care for these refugees, despite the strain on Jordan's 
resources. Simultaneously, regional turmoil, falling remittances, and 
declining tourism have led to rising unemployment and high national 
debt creating a volatile environment that threatens political 
stability.
    Key Opportunities: CENTCOM, in conjunction with interagency 
partners, uses section 333 and other title 10 funds provided by 
Congress to build partner capacity and capability in Jordan. These 
funds and activities are in addition to the total assistance budget of 
$1.275 billion annually from the State Department, as agreed upon with 
the Government of Jordan, that includes at least $750 million dollars 
in Economic Support Funds and $350 million dollars in FMF. In August 
2019, Jordan will host nearly two dozen countries, including regional 
and NATO partners, for exercise Eager Lion, focusing on counter-terror, 
border security and humanitarian assistance missions.
    2019 Prognosis: Jordan will face domestic pressure to move towards 
normalized relations and trade with Syria, but also seeks to avoid the 
risk of triggering the extensive United States sanctions on Syria. 
Russia will likely seek to capitalize on its role as a Syrian 
intermediary to increase its influence in Jordan and the region. Both 
domestic and external VEOs will remain a security threat, but continued 
funding from title 10 programs, in addition to FMF and economic 
support, will enable Jordan to develop critical capabilities and remain 
a key contributor to coalition efforts.
    Egypt lies on the western edge of the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility, an anchor state for the region. The country is an 
important strategic partner whose location, size, enduring peace treaty 
with Israel, control of the Suez Canal, and moderate religious and 
cultural Pan-Arab influences are significant elements that support 
regional stability. Egypt is geographically positioned to counter the 
flow of foreign fighters, materiel, and financial support to extremists 
transiting from Libya through Egypt into the Central Region. The United 
States-Egypt security relationship is resilient and growing, 
exemplified by Egypt's formal request to participate in the National 
Guard State Partnership Program. Egypt supports our overflight 
requests, provides Suez Canal access affording short notice transits, 
and trains and deploys peacekeeping troops worldwide. In the spirit of 
our strong mil-to-mil partnership, in September 2018 we held a joint 
Defense Resourcing Conference to increase the orientation of United 
States security assistance to Egypt toward a counter-terrorism and 
sustainment focus.
    Key Challenges: ISIS-Sinai continues to conduct attacks against the 
Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) to bolster its influence over the local 
populace through intimidation. The EAF has contained most of the 
violence in the northeastern Sinai Peninsula and has begun to address 
societal and economic reforms to defeat ISIS-Sinai and prevent its 
spread to the Nile Valley.
    Key Opportunities: Through our collaborative approach with the EAF 
we continue to see improvement in the security of their maritime and 
land borders. The EAF have improved their efforts to stem the flow of 
fighters and illicit material transiting from Libya through Egypt into 
Israel and the Central Region. Mindful of the complex environment of 
the Sinai, we continue our support to the Multinational Force and 
Observers in order to ensure the safety of these forces, allowing this 
crucial mission in support of the 1979 peace treaty to continue. We see 
the beginnings of improved interoperability between the EAF, United 
States, and other partner nations, exemplified in more Egyptian 
participation in multi-lateral exercises and strategic forums including 
exercise Bright Star 2018, the second joint military exercise held 
since 2009. Egypt has expressed plans to broaden its participation in 
coalition operations and has signed the Communications Interoperability 
and Security Memorandum of Agreement, allowing Egypt improved access to 
interoperability enabling acquisitions. We look to strengthen our 
security cooperation partnership through continued engagement and FMS 
programs.
    2019 Prognosis: Our military assistance ensures that the United 
States remains a military partner of choice and counters Russia's 
efforts to expand its influence in the region. United States Government 
aid and support to Egypt is crucial to our strategic partnership. 
CENTCOM will continue to support the EAF's efforts in the Sinai, and 
assist them with implementing a whole-of-government strategy that 
addresses the underlying political, economic, and social conditions 
that give rise to extremist elements.
    Lebanon is a multi-confessional democracy that occupies a pivotal 
geostrategic position in terms of U.S. national security interests. 
Wedged between a key ally in the region, Israel, and a corridor of 
Iranian influence running from Tehran through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon 
has managed to remain relatively stable. Nevertheless, Hezbollah's 
manipulation of the Lebanese political process thwarts needed reforms 
while exacerbating sectarian tensions inside Lebanon.
    Key Challenges: Lebanon faces a confluence of problems. The 
stagnant economy is worsened by regional conflict and exacerbated by 
the fact that nearly a quarter of the total population are refugees. 
Additionally, both Russia and China are increasing their efforts to 
gain access and influence in the country because of its key location on 
the Mediterranean and proximity to Syria. Hezbollah holds political 
clout which gives it a de-facto veto on Lebanese policy decisions, 
fields an armed militia that does not act on the behest of an elected 
government and builds popular support by acting as a social service 
provider--all undermining the role of the legitimate Lebanese 
Government and armed forces. Hezbollah has also engaged in provocative 
actions with Israel, risking unpredictable escalatory actions that 
threaten Israeli security and could undermine Lebanon's stability. 
Through its Hezbollah proxy, Iran continues to meddle in Lebanon's 
internal affairs. While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were able to 
drive ISIS from all Lebanese territory in 2017, the threat from 
remnants of ISIS and other extremists crossing into Lebanon from Syria 
remains present.
    Key Opportunities: Our efforts to strengthen the LAF are a critical 
aspect of our policy to promote Lebanese sovereignty and security. The 
U.S. is the LAF's top security assistance partner. Our modest, 
consistent, long-term commitment and investments has led to the LAF 
becoming a successfully modernized, legitimate fighting force. The LAF 
is innovative, professional, and have proven their capabilities to 
protect the Lebanese people from internal and external threats through 
successful counter-VEO operations. It established itself as the most 
trusted and respected institution in the country, undercutting 
Hezbollah's claim that its armed militia is necessary to protect 
Lebanon, while providing a mature, apolitical, stabilizing influence. 
The even-handed, professional response of the LAF, assisted by the 
professional mediation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 
was key in de-escalating the Israeli counter-tunnel operation in 
December 2018.
    2019 Prognosis: Successful, consistent partnership with the LAF 
forms the backbone of United States influence in Lebanon, providing a 
bulwark against growing Russian and Chinese interest in the country, a 
reliable partner capable of fighting and defeating remnants of ISIS and 
other extremist groups attempting to regroup in Lebanon. The LAF has 
the potential to eventually form a deterrent to increased Iranian 
activity, and a vital counterbalance to Hezbollah influence. While 
Lebanese security and sovereignty is enhanced every day through our 
robust relationship with the LAF, Hezbollah continues to risk the 
stability and security of Lebanon by maintaining an armed militia and 
advanced weapons outside the authority of the State.
                    regional overview--central gulf
    Iran's unpredictable and reckless behavior remains a threat to our 
partners, global commerce, and United States vital interests in the 
Middle East. While supporting the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, 
Iran foments instability and chaos in the region through the 
proliferation of advanced weapon technology and a destabilizing 
ideology. To conceal its culpability, the Iranian regime masks its 
malign activities through proxies and surrogates enabled by the Iran 
Threat Network (ITN) in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Iran is also 
attempting to build ground lines of communication through Iraq and 
Syria into Lebanon to support its proxy Hezbollah. Iran has gained 
influence within Iraq's armed forces with the formalization of the 
Popular Mobilization Forces, and also exerted influence in Lebanon, 
Iraq, and Yemen, oftentimes affecting established sovereign governance.
    Key Challenges: Iran's military is composed of approximately 
700,000 personnel, the largest in the region. Both of its military 
arms, the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), are improving their abilities to 
quickly mobilize and deploy in response to internal and external 
threats. Iran postures its forces and supports proxies to threaten--or 
be able to threaten--strategic locations like the Bab al Mandeb and the 
Strait of Hormuz. With little warning, Iran could impede commercial 
traffic in these key maritime chokepoints. Iran seeks to gain hegemonic 
influence through the resulting chaos of its proxies and the threat of 
force. Iranian surface to air missiles pose a significant threat to 
United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets 
operating in international airspace. Iran also has the region's largest 
ballistic missile force, which continues to increase in capability, 
range, and lethality. In November 2018, Iran demonstrated its ballistic 
missile capability, striking ISIS targets in Syria and Kurdish militant 
targets in Iraq.
    Key Opportunities: Since the United States withdrawal from the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the subsequent re-
imposition of pre-JCPOA nuclear-related sanctions, Iran has sought to 
demonstrate its resolve and counter United States pressure while trying 
to mitigate the impact of sanctions. However, longstanding 
vulnerabilities in Tehran's fiscal policy are reducing its ability to 
alleviate the impact of United States sanctions and Iran's already 
fragile domestic economy will likely further decline. While Iran's 
strategy is to sow chaos through its malign activities, CENTCOM will 
continue to develop means of maintaining order to combat Iran's chaos. 
Our mil-to-mil relationships help build local credibility in many 
partner nations, while bi- and multi-lateral efforts--such as maritime 
exercises and developing integrated ballistic defense--with our 
regional partners helps create baffles to stifle Iranian ambitions.
    2019 Prognosis: Iran will continue to seek to expand its political 
influence and military presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and 
to threaten international trade and regional stability throughout the 
Central Region. Leaders in the IRGC-Qods Force will continue to use 
surrogates, businesses, and logistics entities to execute direct 
action, intelligence, influence building, terrorism, and cyber 
operations against the United States. and our partner nations. Iran 
intends to expand its regional influence, counter Saudi Arabia, 
threaten Israel, and maintain a capability to threaten strategic 
maritime transit routes. Iran will continue to acquire and develop 
increasingly lethal weapons to raise the cost of direct military 
conflict, and seek to pursue policies that threaten United States 
strategic interests and goals throughout the region.
    The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) suffered challenges to its 
international reputation over the past year but remains a key strategic 
partner. The ambitious reform agenda set forth by Mohammed bin Salman 
is meant to modernize and diversify the Saudi economy and encourage 
foreign direct investment. To date, however, these reforms have met 
with mixed success.
    Key Challenges: The conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya have 
challenged Saudi Arabia's partners in the region, beset by malign 
influence driven by experienced and well-funded Iranian proxies. The 
Gulf Rift, pitting KSA, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain against Qatar, 
complicates unified deterrence to Iranian malign activity. The 
ballistic missile threat and armed UASs emanating from Yemeni territory 
continue to pose a significant risk, as the Houthi's consider civil 
infrastructure as legitimate military targets. High-profile civilian 
casualty incidents on behalf of the Coalition in Yemen and 
international backlash resulting from the murder of Saudi dissident 
Jamal Kashoggi have damaged Saudi Arabia's international standing.
    Key Opportunities: The Yemen conflict provided lessons learned on 
military operations and tactics, adding greater urgency to 
institutional defense transformation efforts. We continue to share our 
own experiences and processes in an effort to improve Saudi Arabia's 
operational performance and reduce civilian casualties. CENTCOM's 
security cooperation with Saudi Arabia remains a critical link in our 
efforts to strengthen partners in the region and meet current and 
future challenges. The work of United States advisors is essential to 
the success of our mission, and Saudi Arabia underwrites the lion's 
share of their presence. Helping build Saudi Arabia's security forces 
reflects our commitment to increase partner capacity, sustain effective 
defense institutions, increase professionalism, interoperability, and 
capability in order to deter aggression in the region and protect 
critical infrastructure.
    2019 Prognosis: Saudi Arabia plays an important role ensuring 
regional stability. Despite recent strains, the United States--Saudi 
Arabia security relationship is resilient and this strategic 
partnership with the Kingdom is a foundational point of CENTCOM's 
ability to execute our national defense strategy. Our ongoing 
relationship with the Kingdom regarding regional basing and access, 
interoperability, freedom of movement--exemplified by Saudi support for 
CENTCOM's expansion of the Trans-Arabian Network as a primary 
distribution route across the Arabian Peninsula--remains critical, and 
our defense institution-building endeavors represents the 
operationalization of our ``by, with, and through'' approach.
    Yemen is beset by strife and riven with internal fractures. The 
civil war continues unabated and the humanitarian crisis worsened in 
the last year. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to lead the coalition 
supporting the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG). While some elements 
of the ROYG are reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG, including 
President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis retain 
control over Yemen'reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG, 
including President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis 
retain control over Yemen'reestablished in Aden, a portion of the ROYG, 
including President Hadi, remains in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Houthis 
retain control over Yemen'
    Key Challenges: Terrorist groups like AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continue 
to maintain a presence in Yemen and focus on attacks against ROYG, SLC, 
and Houthi targets. The conflict in Yemen opened opportunities for 
Iran, which continues to provide support to the Houthis aimed at 
building a proxy force designed to pressure the SLC and expand Iranian 
regional influence. This support enables Houthis to launch missiles at 
its neighbors and target ships in the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea; 
threatening Americans and our partners and raising the risk of broader 
regional conflict. The prolonged conflict deepened the humanitarian 
crisis, and much of the population faces severe food shortages, a 
cholera epidemic and other outbreaks of disease.
    Key Opportunities: Following years of fighting, security sector 
reconstitution will be a priority, and any peace agreement will require 
functioning, unified Yemeni security forces in which both the ROYG and 
Houthis work together to maintain Yemen's stability. Leveraging 
existing mil-to-mil ties with the ROYG and a supportive relationship 
with the UNSE, CENTCOM is positioning itself to provide the necessary 
assistance to conduct security cooperation in Yemen while continuing 
not to engage in hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and the 
Houthis. The Yemeni Coast Guard resumed control of six ports from the 
SLC in late 2018, with training provided through the Department of 
State's Export Controls and Related Border Security program. 
Implementing the existing 505 agreement with Yemen will allow CENTCOM 
to significantly deepen and broaden assistance and training 
opportunities.
    2019 Prognosis: The United States and ROYG will continue to 
maintain a nascent but increasingly productive mil-to-mil relationship 
with the goal of enabling Yemeni security forces to secure national 
borders, defeat VEOs, and respond to existing and emerging threats in 
order to provide an environment that facilitates the reconstruction of 
a stable economy and reconstitution of Yemen's Government institutions 
and civil functions.
    Kuwait is a key strategic partner for regional security, 
indispensable facilitator of the D-ISIS campaign, multinational partner 
on United Nation Security Council, and linchpin of the region in 
humanitarian, diplomatic, and economic stability. The Government of 
Kuwait provides tremendous support for United States and Coalition 
operations. Kuwait hosts the fourth largest presence of United States 
troops overseas--including CENTCOM's army component, U.S. Army Central. 
The United States Military presence is viewed as essential to the 
defense of Kuwait, and Kuwait reimburses the United States for its 
presence.
    Key Challenges: Given the large military United States presence in 
Kuwait, the implementation of the NDS, the evolution of missions in 
Syria and Afghanistan, and the unknown of potential missions to come, 
we must ensure we maintain flexibility and clear communications with 
our strategic Kuwaiti partner.
    Key Opportunities: Vigilant to numerous regional threats, Kuwait 
sought resolution to the Gulf Rift dispute, while promoting a regional 
response to the crises emanating from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Kuwait 
continues to play an important role for Iraq's future. Kuwait hosted 
the International Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq last 
February, raising $30 billion toward Iraq's reconstruction--including 
$2 billion dollars in Kuwaiti loans and investments.
    2019 Prognosis: Kuwait remains a key partner, combat support and 
logistical hub, and enabler for CENTCOM. Our strong mil-mil 
relationships with the Kuwaiti military underscores our commitment to 
the defense of Kuwait. This will also allow United States access to 
Kuwait ranges and training facilities and enable the United States to 
realign to the NDS, while simultaneously providing flexibility to surge 
forces into Kuwait as needed to preserve regional stability and United 
States interests.
    Bahrain is a strong security partner and a major non-NATO ally. The 
Government of Bahrain (GOB) has welcomed the broader effort to confront 
Iran's destabilization activities in the region. Bahrain is a strong 
partner in countering threat financing, especially helping curtail 
Iran's efforts to circumvent financial sanctions. Bahrain has also been 
part of the GCC-wide effort to rebuild ties with Iraq and provide a 
counterweight to Iran's influence. Bahrain's strong partnership with 
the United States is most evident by its hosting of the U.S. Fifth 
Fleet, the only operating U.S. naval base in the Central Region, and 
multiple United States command and control facilities located at the 
Naval Support Activity in Bahrain.
    Key Challenges: Changes in oil prices have posed a formidable 
challenge to Bahrain's economy, as over 75 percent of government 
revenue comes from hydrocarbon sales. Despite the GOB's attempts to 
shore up its fiscal position by cutting public spending and increasing 
non-oil revenues, the country continues to confront significant annual 
fiscal deficits and will consequently continue to rely on its neighbors 
to provide financial lifelines.
    Key Opportunities: Bahrain's access, basing, and overflight support 
to United States and Coalition forces in the region are essential to 
our force posture. Its contribution to regional security, maritime 
patrols, intelligence sharing, counter-mine, and counter-piracy efforts 
are an integral part of the region's overall security. Bahrain 
continues to pursue military modernization initiatives that will result 
in a Bahrain Defense Force more able to contribute to and lead regional 
coalition military operations. Bahraini Land Force, SOF, and Air Force 
support to the SLC campaign in Yemen is providing Bahraini forces with 
experience in expeditionary operations, while ongoing efforts to 
improve the BDF's capabilities will enable Bahrain to play a more 
critical role in regional security.
    2019 Prognosis: The mil-to-mil relationship between Bahrain and the 
United States remains strong.
    Qatar is a critical partner in the Arabian Peninsula, providing 
CENTCOM with invaluable regional access, and hosting approximately 
10,000 United States servicemembers and aircraft, and is home to the 
Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Special Operations Command Central 
Forward Headquarters, and the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters. The access, 
basing, and overflight that Qatar provides would be costly to replicate 
anywhere else in the region. The Gulf Rift has a detrimental effect on 
joint training and interoperability between the U.S. and its Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. Qatar's recent withdrawal from OPEC 
and lower-level attendance at the December 2018 GCC Summit indicate 
Qatar is pursuing economic and political policies more independent of 
Saudi Arabia.
    Key Challenges: While the Gulf Rift had little direct impact on 
CENTCOM operations, it has imposed significant restrictions on Qatar's 
freedom of movement through the closure of land borders and air space. 
It impacted Qatar's participation in GCC-hosted multilateral exercises, 
eroded coalition building efforts, and increased Qatari reliance on 
Iran to overcome the economic and commercial shipping constraints--
specifically, Qatar relies heavily on Iranian land, sea, and airspace 
for transshipment of foodstuffs.
    Key Opportunities: The Gulf Rift reaffirmed Qatar's commitment to 
make the United States its primary defense partner. While Qatar has one 
of the smallest militaries in the region, it is also, per capita, the 
richest country in the world. Despite its relatively small size, Qatar 
has been a major contributor to coalition operations throughout the 
region and against ISIS, and seeks to expand its participation in other 
regional coalitions. Qatar is the second largest FMS customer in the 
world with $26 billion dollars in new cases and is on track to surpass 
$40 billion dollars in the next five years with additional FMS 
purchases. This investment demonstrates a clear desire to partner 
exclusively with U.S. and NATO allies and become a reliable contributor 
to coalition operations.
    2019 Prognosis: Qatar's efforts to expand their military both in 
size and capacity will result in increased bilateral military 
engagements between CENTCOM and the Qatari Armed Forces. This will give 
the U.S. an opportunity to make a positive impact on the military 
development of a key partner in a turbulent region. Qatar will continue 
to play a vital and necessary role in the region and has spent nearly 
$9 billion dollars on United States-led Coalition basing 
infrastructure.
    United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the United States' staunchest 
partners and non-NATO allies in the Central Region. The UAE's strategic 
location, vast natural resources, willingness to engage VEOs, proven 
expeditionary capabilities of its military, and drive to be at the 
forefront of military innovations makes them an ideal partner. The UAE 
has repeatedly supported United States objectives in both Syria and 
Afghanistan and has taken a leading role in the fight against 
terrorism--being among the first countries to join the D-ISIS 
coalition. It remains active in pursuing many of the coalition's lines 
of effort, including D-ISIS messaging, stabilization, and assisting in 
stemming the flow of foreign fighters.
    Key Challenges: Yemen is the UAE's top near-term security concern. 
The UAE sees the Huthis as Iranian proxies, paving the way for a new 
and unwelcome Iranian role in southern Arabia and in the seas 
surrounding the peninsula. The UAE is a key partner in the SLC in 
Yemen, conducting offensive operations in cooperation with Yemeni 
forces around Hudaydah since May 2018.
    Key Opportunities: The United States and UAE cooperate under a 
strong bilateral framework to prevent and respond to conflicts and 
crises, and the UAE has clearly indicated a desire to forge even 
stronger military relationships with the U.S. The UAE is active in an 
operational partnership to disrupt terrorist networks and reduce 
terrorist attacks and is the only member of the Saudi-led Coalition in 
Yemen to expand its military objectives to include counter-terrorism 
alongside the U.S. Robust training and exercise programs with the UAE 
increase the level and quality of cooperation between our nations. The 
UAE also provides substantial access and is willing to burden-share the 
costs of basing and infrastructure.
    2019 Prognosis: The UAE expressed a desire to strengthen our 
relationship through a nine-point Defense Cooperation Roadmap, which 
supports our NDS through increased burden sharing in its own defense. A 
continued robust exercise and engagement program will strengthen our 
military-to-military relationships, and UAE's purchase of U.S. produced 
weapon systems will help secur433iuytrewqe interoperability with U.S. 
units. We expect the UAE to continue their partnership to United States 
efforts in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan, in addition to supporting 
freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
    Oman is a bastion of stability in the Central Region. The long-
standing relationship between the United States and Oman, based on 
shared security and stability interests, remains strong--each Service 
Chief of the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces a graduate of United States 
military schools via our International Military Education and Training 
program. Oman serves as an interlocutor with other GCC members, 
factions in Yemen, and Iran. Oman faces some political and economic 
uncertainty due to the eventual leadership transition from Sultan 
Qaboos, and the continued budgetary dependence on limited hydrocarbon 
revenues to fuel Omani development and employment.
    Key Challenges: Oman's economy continues to experience recurring 
fiscal deficits, growing unemployment, and stagnant growth. Economic 
diversification is increasingly seen as a national security priority 
for Oman, as reliance on the hydrocarbon sector and a growing 
population result in rising unemployment, growing debt, and a 
diminishing capacity to pay for the costly security apparatus that 
keeps Oman safe and secure. Progress toward achieving the goal of 
diversification has been slow. This economic insecurity combined with 
an untested succession plan to follow Sultan Qaboos' decades of stable 
rule represent significant challenges.
    Key Opportunities: Oman's strategic location, outside of the 
maritime chokepoints of the Bab el Mandeb and Straits of Hormuz, 
provides CENTCOM with key logistical, operational, and contingency 
capabilities. The United States and Oman have shared interests in 
allowing increased Untied States access to Oman's military and 
commercial ports and bases as the country looks to modernize its 
infrastructure and diversify from an oil-based economy.
    2019 Prognosis: A stronger economy in the Sultanate of Oman will 
ensure a politically stable country with adequate employment 
opportunities for its citizens. The United States and Oman will 
continue to maintain a strong mil-to-mil relationship and Oman will 
provide crucial access in the form of thousands of aircraft 
overflights, landings, and dozens of port-calls in Oman. Negotiations 
for enhanced access to Duqm port offer the prospect of deeper military 
cooperation. Oman will participate in numerous bi-lateral exercises and 
training events with U.S. Forces. Oman will continue to develop an FMS 
portfolio that already includes over $2.7 billion in open FMS cases, 
though Omani budgetary constraints may significantly slow new 
acquisitions in coming years.
                               conclusion
    Maintaining our competitive advantage in the Central Region relies 
on more than simply overmatching those who would challenge us with a 
higher volume of forces and equipment. CENTCOM's strategic approach has 
never relied on physical overmatch, but on our people, our strategic 
partnerships, and the ability to creatively leverage our combined 
capabilities to achieve our mission. As we operate more and more in the 
gray zone of competition short of combat, our people and partnerships--
based on foundations of respect, trust, and shared values--will 
continue to be our source of strategic strength and key to maintaining 
our edge in the region.
    The CENTCOM team--our component commands, our combined and joint 
task forces, our country teams, and all of our interagency partners--
more than 90,000 uniformed military and civilian strong, is the engine 
that drives everything we do toward securing our national interests. 
They represent America's greatest treasure. In an era of austerity and 
change when we consistently ask our people to do more with less, the 
service and sacrifice of these men and women and their families in 
support of their nation is both humbling and inspirational. For nearly 
18 years of sustained conflict across the CENTCOM AOR, our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians have answered 
the call with an unwavering commitment and devotion matched only by the 
families who support them. We could not accomplish what we do without 
all of them and they deserve the very best capabilities and support we 
can provide them, from weapons and communications systems, to 
healthcare and housing. As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its current 
missions and evolves to face new challenges, we appreciate the efforts 
of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, the 
interagency, and especially Members of Congress and their staffs, who 
work tirelessly to provide our people everything they need to 
accomplish their vital missions and lead healthy, fulfilling lives in 
continued service to our Nation.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much, General Votel.
    I want to bring up three things that have grown into some 
controversy, and they should not have, and just very briefly 
get your opinion on that.
    First of all, as we draw down, I had made some statement 
characterizing what the President's position was in Syria. I 
was challenged by some not too friendly media on this. I would 
like to quote what the President actually said initially. He 
said we will have a slow and highly coordinated drawdown--this 
is all a quote--and we will be leaving at a proper pace while 
at the same time continuing to fight ISIS and doing all else 
that is prudent and necessary. Do you think these are the 
proper conditions and this is your understanding also of his 
position?
    General Votel. In the instructions that I have been given 
and that we issued down to our organizations in Syria, that 
represents our approach, a very deliberate approach to how we 
depart Syria.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes. I think that was certainly our 
understanding.
    Do you believe that the territorial state of ISIS will be 
eliminated by the time the United States withdrawal is done?
    General Votel. I do, Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. What is being done to prevent ISIS from 
reemerging at this time?
    General Votel. Well, we continue to work with our Iraqi 
Security Force partners and international coalition here to 
continue to keep pressure on ISIS, and we continue our efforts 
by, with, and through our partners in Syria and in some cases 
for them to keep pressure on ISIS as they continue to present 
threats to us. We should expect that they will attempt to 
attack us and continue to regenerate themselves, and we will 
continue to put pressure on them to prevent that.
    Chairman Inhofe. Very good.
    The second area that could be subject to some 
misinterpretation has to do with Yemen. I am concerned that 
disengaging our partners in Yemen will undermine Israel, 
bolster Iran, and increase human suffering. In your assessment, 
what are the costs of disengagement from our partners in Yemen?
    General Votel. Certainly it is a very significant 
humanitarian disaster in Yemen. But I do believe departing from 
our partners there removes the leverage that we have to 
continue to influence them, which I think we have used in a 
positive manner, and I think it further endangers Americans in 
the region.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes. I appreciate that.
    Then the third one has to do with the IMET [International 
Military Education and Training] program. I have always been 
very partial to that. Primarily my activity has been in Africa. 
It has been so successful not just in Africa but around the 
world that we see China and Russia both, particularly China, 
trying to beat us to the punch in the IMET program, recognizing 
that some of what are middle officers are getting training in a 
country that they are wed forever. We have seen this happen. 
But the thing that is disturbing right now is China is starting 
to do the same thing. What do you see as far as the benefits of 
IMET? Is China moving in on us?
    General Votel. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I think China is opportunistic, and they are 
going to look for places that they can step in where we or 
others may create voids.
    To your comments on IMET, I think IMET, International 
Military Education Training, funding dollar for dollar is 
perhaps one of the best tools that the Department of Defense, 
Department of State can wield in building our partnerships 
throughout the region. Typically the people who take advantage 
of these resources and come to our schools in the United States 
often rise to positions of leadership in their countries. They 
do not forget the experience they had in our military schools, 
and most importantly, they do not forget the American people. I 
think this is an extraordinarily wise investment for us to 
continue to make.
    Chairman Inhofe. I sure agree with that. You are probably 
aware that in Africa, China has invited at one meeting 50 of 
the leaders of the 52 nations in Africa to China, wining, 
dining, and all this trying to move in on that program. It is 
one we have to all be very sensitive to because they realize 
the benefits that we have received from that program.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    First, General Votel, let me join you in recognizing the 
Sergeant Major. Thank you for your service, Sergeant Major. 
Generals only become generals if they listen to their first 
sergeants and sergeant majors.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Reed. General Votel, thank you again for your 
extraordinary service in so many different ways.
    When General McKenzie was here, he stated that ISIS 
probably still is more capable than al Qaeda in Iraq at its 
peak, suggesting it is well positioned to reemerge if pressure 
on the group is relieved. You point out a staged withdrawal 
from Syria almost, in effect, lessens some of the pressure that 
is on ISIS.
    Do you concur with the General that there will be some 
renewed vigor with respect to ISIS?
    General Votel. I do agree, Senator.
    Senator Reed. We are trying as an alternative approach to 
at least posit the idea that we can conduct air strikes from 
Iraq and we can have forces in Iraq. Is that the fallback 
position?
    General Votel. Senator, right now, we are working through a 
variety of planning scenarios for how we would potentially 
continue to maintain pressure on ISIS as we withdraw out of 
Syria. I think that is probably a discussion more appropriate 
for the closed session, but we certainly are looking at all 
options for how we might do that.
    Senator Reed. Again, this might be something that you can 
touch upon later, but there have been some indications that the 
SDF, given the announcement, which was rather sudden, of our 
plans to pull out, have made approaches to the Assad regime to 
work out kind of an understanding of how they might cooperate 
or at least tolerate each other. Is that something that has 
been----
    General Votel. Senator, I think something we have learned 
in our experience there, certainly in my experience there, that 
all these parties talk to each other all the time. We do expect 
that that is occurring.
    Senator Reed. Turning to Afghanistan, there are two major 
functions. One is train and equip the Afghan forces and 
counterterrorism. If we withdraw, presumably the first elements 
that will go are the train and equip, and the last elements 
would be counterterrorism because we have threats in the 
region. Is that a fair summary of sort of the process?
    General Votel. Senator, again, I think this is probably 
that would be better discussed in a closed session. But I think 
we have a more sophisticated way of looking at that. We 
understand the importance of both of those missions.
    Senator Reed. Turning then to the situation of Afghanistan 
again, if we were to withdraw--and there is mounting pressure 
and mounting evidence that that is a path that might be 
pursued--we still provide the Afghan Security Forces about $4 
billion a year in sustenance. If we were to withdraw our 
forces, we would still have to maintain the $4 billion a year 
contribution or those Afghan forces would disintegrate. Is that 
an accurate assessment?
    General Votel. There certainly would need to be continued 
support to the Afghan forces. The amounts certainly we would 
have to look at. But, yes, I think that is accurate, Senator. 
Again, that money there without us I think does make it 
challenging.
    Senator Reed. Indeed, because I think one of the things we 
provide with the presence is to a degree at least the money is 
being spent appropriately. I think the experience we have had 
elsewhere is if we just send money, it gets to places that we 
do not want it to go. Again, I think as you are withdrawing, 
this has to be a very, very careful thought out second order 
effects, third order effects. Indeed, the issue is such a 
complicated multinational, multifactor and analysis. We have 
not yet gotten the Government of Afghanistan in the 
negotiations. They are still on the sidelines. That is correct?
    General Votel. That is what Ambassador Khalilzad has 
reported, Senator.
    Senator Reed. Long term, I think our instincts--and we have 
been dealing with this for 17 years--is that unless there is 
some type of regional buy-in, which would include Pakistan, 
Iran to a degree, China because of its influence, Russia 
because of its influence, the Stans because of their influence, 
the likelihood of something stable is probably minimal. Is that 
accurate?
    General Votel. Absolutely. A key part of the strategy has 
been the regionalization. I would add, Senator, that Pakistan 
in my estimation has played a more helpful role, a more 
constructive role in helping us move forward towards this 
objective.
    Senator Reed. Just one quick question. We were able to 
identify through great staff work by both sides that the 
Governments of Saudi Arabia and UAE [United Arab Emirates] owe 
the United States $331 million for refueling. Have you received 
a definite commitment that they are going to repay that money 
they owe us?
    General Votel. Senator, we are working through that. Both 
those governments have acknowledged the bills that we have 
provided to them, have indicated to us that they will meet the 
payment schedule in accordance with the ACSA [Acquisition and 
Cross-Serving Agreement], and we have teams from CENTCOM, from 
AFCENT [United States Air Forces Central Comand], from DLA 
[Defense Logistics Agency] that are working to resolve that 
satisfactorily.
    Senator Reed. You have looked at other beneficiaries in 
your command to ensure that there are not other areas where 
they are deficient in paying?
    General Votel. We have, Senator.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Wicker?
    Senator Wicker. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself 
not only with your opening statement but with the very fine 
opening statement of the ranking Democrat on this Committee and 
particularly thank Senator Reed for pointing out the cost of 
getting it wrong as we withdraw from both Syria and 
Afghanistan.
    I want to enter into the record at this point, Mr. 
Chairman, an op-ed that appeared in the ``Washington Post'' on 
January 29 by Ambassador Ryan Crocker, entitled ``I Was 
Ambassador to Afghanistan. This Deal is a Surrender.''
    Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

      ``i was ambassador to afghanistan. this deal is surrender.''
    January 2002. I arrive in Kabul to reopen the United States 
Embassy. Destruction is everywhere. Kabul airport is closed, its 
runways cratered and littered with destroyed aircraft. The drive south 
from the military base at Bagram is through a wasteland. Nothing grows. 
No structures stand. In the city itself, entire blocks have been 
reduced to rubble, recalling images of Berlin in 1945.
    More than two decades of almost constant war left a terrible 
legacy. The damage was not only to the physical infrastructure. The 
Afghan people had suffered enormously through the civil war that began 
in the late 1970s and the tyranny of the Taliban that followed. None 
had suffered more than Afghan women and girls.
    After the United States invasion in October 2001 ousted the Taliban 
for harboring the al Qaeda planners of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the 
human toll from the Taliban rule is why the United States' initial 
assistance efforts focused on people rather than things.
    I remember taking our first congressional visitor, Joe Biden (D-
Del.), who was then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
to visit a girls school that we had helped to open. A first-grade class 
that Biden visited had students in a range of ages, from 6 to 12. The 
older girls had reached school age when the Taliban was in power, so 
they had been denied an education. They weren't embarrassed now to be 
in a class with children half their age--they were just happy to be 
learning.
    At the end of Taliban rule, roughly 900,000 children were in 
school, all of them boys. When I left Afghanistan as ambassador in 
2012, there were 8 million students, 40 percent of them girls.
    We also encouraged Afghan women to play their rightful roles in 
business, in the legislature, elsewhere in government and in the 
military, and they did. The implicit message was that if you step 
forward, we've got your back. It was a time when American interests and 
American values were in harmony. I hosted receptions to recognize 
Afghan women of courage. Through the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, we funded efforts to establish shelters for women fleeing 
spousal or other familial abuse--a reminder that in Afghanistan's male-
dominated society, it wasn't only the Taliban who threatened women's 
safety.
    Now the United States is negotiating directly with the Taliban. A 
framework agreement was announced on Monday calling for a cease-fire 
that could lead to the full withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Taliban 
would commit to not harboring terrorist organizations that could 
threaten United States security. In other words, the Taliban promised 
no 9/11 replay.
    The framework was reached without the involvement of the Afghan 
Government. The Taliban has said all along that it refuses to negotiate 
with the government, considering the government the illegitimate puppet 
of the United States occupation. By acceding to this Taliban demand, we 
have ourselves delegitimized the government we claim to support.
    This current process bears an unfortunate resemblance to the Paris 
peace talks during the Vietnam War. Then, as now, it was clear that by 
going to the table we were surrendering; we were just negotiating the 
terms of our surrender. The Taliban will offer any number of 
commitments, knowing that when we are gone and the Taliban is back, we 
will have no means of enforcing any of them.
    It does not have to go like this. The United States could announce 
that talks won't proceed beyond the framework, to matters of substance, 
without the full inclusion of the Afghan Government. Right now, the 
inclusion of the Afghans is only theoretical. We could also note that 
unless some other solution is found, United States troops will remain 
in Afghanistan as long as the current government wants them, protecting 
the United States' national security interests and defending core 
values, such as women's rights, that we have fostered there since 2001.
    President Barack Obama proved in Iraq that the United States cannot 
end a war by withdrawing its forces--the battle space is simply left to 
our adversaries. In Afghanistan, President Trump has a choice.

    Senator Wicker. General, thank you for your service.
    Just to follow up on a couple points that Senator Reed 
made. With regard to the $4 billion a year contribution, you 
are not quite sure that it would still be that amount, but it 
is close to that amount that we would still be obligated to 
pay. We would still need to contribute, and we would not have 
the oversight on the ground that we have now.
    General Votel. That would be correct if we departed, 
Senator.
    Senator Wicker. I think also Senator Reed pointed out that 
this agreement with regard to the Taliban in Afghanistan has 
been made without the participation of the Government of 
Afghanistan. That is correct. Is it not?
    General Votel. Senator, the work of Ambassador Khalilzad--
first of all, there have been no agreements that have actually 
been finalized.
    Senator Wicker. There has been a framework agreement.
    General Votel. His work is creating a framework for 
continuing discussions moving forward here. Ambassador 
Khalilzad's efforts are done with the knowledge of the 
Government of Afghanistan. They are aware that we are doing 
this, and they have supported our efforts to get this process 
started. Ultimately, we need to get to a Taliban-Afghanistan 
discussion. Only they will be able to resolve the key issues 
involved in the dispute.
    Senator Wicker. In the op-ed that I have entered into the 
record, Ambassador Crocker points out the framework was reached 
without the involvement of the Afghan Government. He goes on to 
say that the Taliban has said all along that it refuses to 
negotiate with the government, considering the government the 
illegitimate puppet of the United States occupation. His 
opinion is by acceding to this Taliban demand, we have 
ourselves de-legitimized the government we claim to support.
    He goes on to say this current process bears an unfortunate 
resemblance to the Paris Peace Talks during the Vietnam War. 
Then, as now, it was clear that by going to the table, we were 
surrendering.
    Further, Ambassador Crocker says the United States could 
announce that talks will not proceed beyond the framework to 
matters of substance without the full inclusion of the Afghan 
Government. Right now, the inclusion of the Afghans is only 
theoretical. I think you have touched on that, General.
    We could also note that unless some other solution is 
found, the United States troops will remain in Afghanistan as 
long as the current government wants them. The current 
Government of Afghanistan wants us to continue our presence 
there. Is that right, General Votel?
    General Votel. That is my understanding, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. Then the Ambassador concludes, President 
Barack Obama proved in Iraq that the United States cannot end a 
war by withdrawing its forces. The battle space is simply left 
to our adversaries.
    I have asked you a question or two about specifics. Have 
you read this op-ed before? I have read to you extensively from 
it. Would you respond to that for the benefit of the Committee?
    General Votel. Senator, I have read Ambassador Crocker's 
editorial. I know Ambassador Crocker. I deeply respect him. He 
is certainly one of our leading experts on the region here and 
a keen observer of what is happening out there.
    From my position as the CENTCOM Commander, in my 
discussions with Ambassador Khalilzad and with General Miller 
on the ground here, I would characterize where we are in the 
process as very, very early in the process. As I said, 
Ambassador Khalilzad has attempted to create a framework by 
which we can move forward with discussions that would certainly 
involve the Government of Afghanistan. We clearly recognize 
that they have to be part of the solution and must be in the 
negotiation aspects of this. We cannot do that on their behalf. 
But, I do recognize also that the Government of Afghanistan is 
being consulted as Ambassador Khalilzad does his work. They are 
being kept informed of this and are aware of the work that we 
are doing to move forward on these talks.
    Senator Wicker. Well, let me just say I appreciate your 
answer. I hope that turns out to be true.
    I just want it to be said that the concerns in this city 
are bipartisan concerns based on advice and counsel that we 
receive from people who have been involved in this for a long, 
long time and who understand how important it is for us to get 
this right.
    Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator Reed is presiding for the next 20 minutes or so.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General Votel, for your many years of service to 
this country.
    I heard former Afghanistan Commander Nicholson being 
interviewed this morning, and he was asked about the 
circumstances under which we should withdraw from Afghanistan. 
He talked about the fact that it should be conditions-based. It 
should not be based on an arbitrary timeline or numbers of 
troops that we want to leave there.
    Have you and General Miller been given conditions whereby 
we should withdraw troops from Afghanistan? If so, what are 
those conditions?
    General Votel. Senator, I think some of that discussion is 
best left for a different forum here. But, certainly General 
Miller and I speak very frequently about the ongoing situation 
in Afghanistan and the circumstances that we are trying to 
create to support Ambassador Khalilzad and to move forward with 
the reconciliation process.
    Senator Shaheen. I share the concerns that have been raised 
by Senators Reed and Wicker about what is happening right now 
in Afghanistan and particularly the framework that is being put 
in place without the engagement of the Afghan Government.
    Can you tell me how the framework addresses the rights of 
women in Afghanistan, given the horrific treatment by the 
Taliban of women during the years in which they were in 
control?
    General Votel. Senator, I think that perhaps is a question 
best posed for Ambassador Khalilzad at this particular point. I 
do agree that the progress that has been made in Afghanistan 
with women and improving their ability to be part of the fabric 
of life in Afghanistan is an important one that has to be 
incorporated in this, and I would envision that this would be 
part of the more detailed discussions that will take place 
between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. But, 
certainly we acknowledge that, and we see the goodness that has 
brought to the country of Afghanistan.
    Senator Shaheen. I would point out that we have actually 
passed legislation in this Congress that says women should be 
at the negotiating table when conflicts are being resolved 
around the world. Is it your understanding that is a basis on 
which we are looking at negotiations?
    General Votel. Certainly, again, as Ambassador Khalilzad 
and our diplomats work with the Government of Afghanistan on 
that, I would imagine they are emphasizing that legislation.
    Senator Shaheen. To move to Syria, there is the report of a 
new DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General report 
relative to ISIS. The report says that the command organization 
for ISIS is intact, and its fighters are battle-hardened. That 
is a quote from the report. It goes on to say that within a 
year, United States military commanders told the IG [Inspector 
General] that ISIS would be resurgent in Syria.
    Can you talk about how we can prevent ISIS from becoming 
resurgent if we have no troops in Syria and if Iran and Russia 
and Assad are in control in Syria?
    General Votel. Well, Senator, as I mentioned in my opening 
comments, that is an aspect of the ongoing planning that we are 
pursuing right now. The answer to the question is that we do 
have to keep pressure on this network. It is a resilient 
network. It does have certain components that are still left in 
it. Although they are dispersed and disaggregated, they have 
the capability of coming back together if we do not. There are 
a variety of different things that I would be happy to talk 
about, some of the things under consideration as we get into 
the closed session here. I will not speculate publicly here 
about things that we might do, but there certainly are 
different ways that we could do this working with partners, 
working with our own capabilities to continue to keep pressure 
on this network, which I think is absolutely vital.
    Senator Shaheen. You do agree with the Inspector General 
that ISIS is a scourge that is latent in both Syria and Iraq 
and it has the potential to resurge if not addressed.
    General Votel. I do agree.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    As I know you are aware, when we provide or sell United 
States weapons to end users, there are requirements which 
prohibit the transfer of any of those weapons to third parties 
without prior authorization from the United States Government. 
In legislation that we passed relative to Yemen, there are 
requirements for us to certify how the Saudis are using 
weapons. So far, we have not gotten authoritative certification 
of how those weapons are being used. There is, again, a recent 
CNN report that suggests that weapons that have been provided 
to UAE and to Saudi Arabia have wound up in the hands of 
Houthis, that they have been traded and been used on both sides 
of that conflict.
    Can you talk about what DOD is doing to address that?
    General Votel. Senator, I am aware of the references that 
you are making to that. We have not authorized Saudi Arabia or 
the Emirates to retransfer any of this equipment to other 
parties on the ground in Yemen. As you are well aware, when we 
do provide equipment, whether it comes government to government 
or commercially provided, that the recipients do have to agree 
to certain stipulations on the use of those. We do have 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that sometimes go through 
the Department of State if it is commercially provided, through 
the Department of Defense if it is government to government 
provided and requires us to conduct surveys. It requires us to 
conduct inventories of this type of equipment so we know where 
it is. There are processes in place with this.
    I would also highlight that in some of these cases, again, 
I think we have to look more closely at the allegations in this 
particular situation to find out what happened. As we have seen 
in Iraq in the past where we saw our partners overrun, we have 
seen American equipment provided to them lost in the course of 
a fight end up in the hands of our adversaries out there. I 
think we will have to examine that better.
    But, to your point of our responsibilities in terms of 
ensuring proper end use of the materials, we absolutely get 
that and emphasize that with our partners all the time.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, let me 
recognize Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, General, for appearing to 
testify one last time. I know it breaks your heart that this 
will be your last time to testify. Most importantly, thank you 
for your many years of service and thanks to your whole team 
for their service as well.
    We have heard a lot about what might happen in the future 
against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, but I do not think 
we have heard yet just a simple answer about how the fight is 
going. Can you tell us how the fight is going against the 
Islamic State right now?
    General Votel. In Syria, as you know, we are focused on 
completing the liberation of the physical caliphate.
    Senator Cotton. Where in Syria are you doing that right 
now?
    General Votel. In the southern Euphrates Valley, up against 
the border with Iraq right now. That fight is progressing as we 
envisioned it. As I mentioned in my opening comments, it is 
limited to a relatively small area. It is very dense. It is 
dense urban terrain. Certainly there is a lot of pressure on 
ISIS in there. The area is laden with extreme explosive hazards 
that pose significant threats to our partners on the ground. 
They are having to proceed very closely.
    I would add, Senator, that there is a civilian component to 
this. There are families of fighters. There are civilians left 
in the town. There are refugees that are attempting to depart 
this area. What we have seen, as we have kind of closed into 
this last area here, is our Syrian Democratic Force partners 
with coalition assistance moving very deliberately, fully 
recognizing the situation on the ground and making sure they do 
not exacerbate this any more than it is. But we remain 
confident that we will finish this aspect of it.
    When we get done with this, we should expect that we will 
do what you would remember as back clearance, going back and 
reclearing areas, removing explosive hazards, instituting local 
security, and then continuing to keep pressure on the remnants 
of the network that have gone to ground and are operating in a 
much more insurgent aspect.
    In Iraq, that is the case. We do see ISIS operating in a 
guerilla or an insurgent fashion. They are at a level where, 
for the most part, the Iraqi Security Forces with the 
assistance of the coalition are able to address those threats. 
That will be important to continue to do that in the future.
    In Iraq and Syria, that is where we are with the current 
fight right now, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. In Syria, I have heard it said that we have 
taken back about 99 percent of what was once the territorial 
caliphate. Is that number correct?
    General Votel. That is right. We are down to about 20 
square miles that they still control.
    Senator Cotton. I have also heard estimates of about 20,000 
to 30,000 Islamic State fighters remain. Do they remain in that 
1 percent of territory, or is that only a fraction----
    General Votel. No. Those fighters are geographically 
dispersed across Syria, across the open areas of----
    Senator Cotton. Just some are dug in in the defense in that 
1 percent. Others, as you say, are spread out conducting 
insurgency or guerilla type attacks.
    General Votel. There are 1,000 to 1,500 fighters that are 
left down in this small area right now that we are fighting 
over, but the remainder have dispersed and are disaggregated in 
a variety of different areas and for the most part have gone to 
ground.
    Senator Cotton. In Iraq and very soon, we hope, throughout 
Syria as well, as you talk about countering that insurgency or 
the guerilla tactics, the back clearance, could you give the 
American people a little bit of a sense of what our troops in 
Iraq are doing? Is it more like the Rangers that you once led, 
kicking down the doors and shooting bad guys? Are we providing 
them intelligence, logistic aerial support?
    General Votel. The technique that we have used in both Iraq 
and Syria is what we refer to as by, with, and through. We have 
relied on our partners, the Iraqi Security Force and the Syrian 
Democratic Force, to do the fighting. Our job has been to 
enable them with our fires, with our ISR [Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], with our advice. Sometimes 
we do employ our fighters in support of them and directly 
engage the enemy, but our people are not actually, as you 
suggest, kicking in doors in this case.
    By, with, and through puts the emphasis on our partners to 
do this, and then we enable them with our capabilities to do 
this. This has been, I think, a very effective approach over 
the last several years. I think in the end, our partners own 
what is left behind. We do not. They own it. They own the 
security. They own the responsibility for this. This has been a 
different approach for us, but it is one that I think has 
worked very well for us.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    One final question about the implications for the future. 
Syrian Democratic Forces currently are detaining several 
hundred ISIS fighters. Is that correct?
    General Votel. That is correct.
    Senator Cotton. We will not get into any more details in 
the open setting here about the exact numbers or locations. But 
is it safe to assume that some of those are what ISIS leaders 
would call just cannon fodder, troops to be thrown into the 
maw, but some are like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, terrorist 
masterminds, or Ibrahim al Asiri, master bomb makers, who pose 
a serious threat to the United States?
    General Votel. I think that is accurate, Senator. They come 
from all aspects of ISIS.
    Senator Cotton. What is going to happen to those detainees, 
especially those extremely dangerous detainees, in the future 
if the United States is not present in Syria?
    General Votel. Well, Senator, for those that we 
characterize as foreign terrorist fighters, our focus needs to 
be on returning them to the countries of origin. That is the 
work of our partners in the Department of State, Department of 
Justice, and others who are working with their counterparts in 
these countries of origin to make sure they have the evidence, 
the details, and we can make arrangements. Our responsibility 
at this time is to make sure that the Syrian Democratic Forces 
continue to treat detainees in accordance with our values, with 
the Law of Armed Conflict, and then to facilitate the movement 
of these fighters back to their countries.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, General. I hope we can do that 
with most of them. I would observe there is a lot of empty bed 
space at Guantanamo Bay.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, let me recognize Senator 
Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Welcome, General Votel.
    A moment ago, in describing by, with, and through, you 
mentioned partners left behind, and I want to ask about one of 
those partners. As our troops withdraw from Syria, what efforts 
are being made to ensure the safety and security of our Kurdish 
allies?
    General Votel. Well, certainly this is a key aspect of the 
ongoing planning right now, Senator. Of the many tasks that we 
have of defeating ISIS and withdrawing our forces, certainly we 
add to that list the protection of Turkey and making sure that 
they do not have threats that would emanate from them and, I 
would say, the added task of making sure that we protect those 
who have fought with us. A key aspect of our ongoing planning 
efforts right now, both at the diplomatic and military level, 
is to address that very issue and make sure that those that 
have fought with us, that have helped us accomplish our mission 
are safeguarded as we depart Syria.
    Senator Heinrich. I agree with you that that should be a 
priority. I am asking what are those specific plans.
    General Votel. Senator, I think it would probably be more 
appropriate for us to talk about what is under consideration in 
a closed session right now. But we certainly are looking at a 
variety of different options.
    Senator Heinrich. I would be happy to do that.
    I worry that there is a lot of lip service right now about 
making good on our promises to the Kurds, and it seems that we 
are short on plans. I hope that that is not accurate. I 
certainly hope that we have a plan for how to deconflict Turkey 
and the Kurds because I think the consequences could be morally 
terrible if we do not.
    Do you believe that currently the efforts in this area are 
adequate?
    General Votel. I do right now. I think we have the 
leadership up and down the chain of command both in the 
Department of Defense and the Department of State fully aligned 
in our approach as we work through what is arguably a very 
complex problem here. But I think we are very well aligned and 
we are very focused on exactly the challenge that you have 
outlined, Senator.
    Senator Heinrich. I look forward to hearing more about that 
in a closed setting.
    General Votel, on February 3rd, President Trump announced 
that we would keep troops in Iraq to, quote, watch over Iran. 
Has our military focus there shifted from ISIS to Iran?
    General Votel. It has not, Senator.
    Senator Heinrich. Glad to hear that.
    I am concerned with the response in Iraq. As you probably 
know, Iraqi President Salih responded very quickly saying that 
the President and the United States did not ask Iraq about 
this. Are you at all concerned that Iraq will now be skeptical 
of our motivations for being there, and how will that 
perception affect our ability to relocate United States troops 
from Syria to Iraq?
    General Votel. Senator, this is not particularly newfound. 
I think the Government of Iraq understands the relationship or 
the view that we have on Iran and understands our concerns with 
Iran and the variety of destabilizing activities that they 
conduct around the region. But having said that, our military 
mission on the ground remains very focused on the reason that 
the Government of Iraq asked us to come there, and that is 
focusing on the defeat of ISIS and now preventing the 
resurgence of that particular organization.
    Senator Heinrich. Let me pivot just a little bit to Russia. 
General Votel, as you know, on January 30th, Russia pledged to 
support Iraq in its fight against ISIS in preparation for the 
United States' withdrawal from Syria. What is your current 
perception of Russian influence in Iraq?
    General Votel. I think right now, Russia has limited 
influence in the country of Iraq.
    Senator Heinrich. Do we have plans or a strategy for 
countering that Russian influence once withdrawal from Syria is 
complete?
    General Votel. Well, I do not have any specific military 
tasks that are related to that, Senator. But what I would 
highlight is that one of the most effective tools that we have 
is being good, reliable partners on the ground, and that is 
what we intend to do and that has always been our approach with 
the country of Iraq, focused on what they have asked us to do 
and then being very reliable partners to them.
    Senator Heinrich. Chairman, I am going to yield the 
remainder of my time.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Scott, please.
    Senator Scott. Thanks for all your hard work. Thank you for 
your service.
    I met the other day with some opposition leaders from 
Syria, and while they expressed some concern about exactly how 
the withdrawal would happen, they did ask what the ability 
would be to do a no-fly zone afterwards which they thought 
would have a positive impact of keeping Turkey in place. Have 
you considered that as a doable?
    General Votel. Again, we are looking at a variety of 
options that I will be happy to talk about in a closed session 
right here. I would not characterize what we are looking at 
right now as a no-fly zone.
    Senator Scott. Why do you believe Russia has continued to 
be involved in Syria? What is their strategic advantage for 
them to be involved? Is it just to cause problems for us, or is 
there a strategic interest they have?
    General Votel. Russia does have some long-term interests 
that they have had in Syria that go back some ways. But 
certainly part of their motivation is by making sure they have 
warm water access into the Mediterranean and the access that 
that provides. They are interested in preserving that. They are 
interested in preserving a regime that is friendly and 
supportive to their motives and interests. I also believe that 
they share an interest in trying to subvert our influence and 
interests in the region. I do think they see that as an 
opportunity for them, and I think they are attempting to 
exploit that.
    Senator Scott. After President Trump made the announcement 
that we would do a withdrawal, have you seen Turkey take 
different action on the ground? Is there anything they are 
doing that causes you concern?
    General Votel. Well, Senator, I think we probably can talk 
a little bit more about that in the closed session. But in 
general, what I would tell you is we have seen all actors begin 
to posture themselves for what might come, and we have seen 
that on all sides.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    I am finished, Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. We are not used to 
such subtle and penetrating questions. Thank you.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Reed. Senator Jones, on behalf of Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Thank you, General, for your service. I echo that and also 
for all of the team that is behind you. I am well aware that 
your success is only as good as the success of those that serve 
with you. I use that term appropriately as opposed to the chain 
of command below you. They serve with you. I appreciate all the 
folks sitting behind you and all of those that are still over 
there.
    I want to follow up briefly with kind of a question that 
Senator Shaheen asked about the CNN report of our military 
equipment somehow getting into the hands of others, but I want 
to come at it in a little bit different way.
    Last year, you stated that due to political considerations, 
cost, or delivery speed, some of our partners are seeking 
alternate sources of military equipment from near-peer 
competitors like Russia and China. When our partners go 
elsewhere, it reduces our interoperability and challenges our 
ability to incorporate their contributions into theater 
efforts.
    I think it is critical that we align our practices with 
what is necessary to achieve these goals, as you alluded to, 
and we want our partners to come to us. Particularly I am 
concerned when they are going to communist China, communist 
Russia to get that because we are seeing around the world the 
influence of those countries.
    My question is, does this challenge persist today, and if 
so, could you please talk a little bit more about those 
challenges or barriers that exist to our partners coming to us 
for equipment and what steps you believe we need to take in 
order to keep them coming to us rather than communist Russia 
and communist China?
    General Votel. Senator, thank you.
    To some extent, they do continue to exist today. I 
certainly recognize that our foreign military sales, foreign 
military funding process must be a deliberative one. We should 
make very deliberate decisions about the things that we sell to 
people, and that has to go through a process.
    I am concerned that the process is lengthy and is not as 
responsive as our partners require on the ground. I am very 
much in support of trying to look at how we make those 
processes more responsive to the needs that they have on the 
ground. I think we should always strive for that. There are a 
lot of steps that we go through to provide equipment to people. 
Some of them are within the Department of Defense, some of them 
within the Department of State, and certainly some over here in 
Congress. To the extent that we can have a more rapid process 
to answer the requirements of our partners, I think that would 
be beneficial. In some cases, if we are not going to provide 
things to them, we should be very honest with them up front and 
tell them we are not going to. I think it is always better to 
give them a yes or a no answer than it is to string them along 
because I think that leads to more frustration for our partners 
and it does cause them to go do other things.
    I also think a key part of this is our work on the ground 
beforehand with our partners. This is within the military here, 
is making sure that the things that they are asking meet the 
needs of each of their countries in their own defense. We 
should try to steer them away from just buying things that they 
cannot maintain, they cannot sustain, they cannot man long 
term, and we should be focused on the equipment that they can 
and equipment that can be integrated with us and other partners 
in the region to provide a more formidable deterrent effect or 
a defense, if needed.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you, sir.
    With regard to the Iran nuclear deal, it looks like we are 
out. How will United States withdrawal from the Iran nuclear 
deal affect our posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?
    General Votel. Well, I do not know that withdrawal from the 
Iran deal will specifically impact our posture. Our posture 
will be more driven by the National Defense Strategy than it 
will be by a decision to depart from the JCPOA [Joint Common 
Plan of Action].
    I would just add that as I look across the region, Iran 
does continue to present concerns to me. It is the major 
destabilizing factor in the region. While the nuclear weapons 
program is one aspect of the threat that they presented, their 
facilitation of ballistic missiles, of unmanned aerial systems, 
of other lethal materials to their proxies in Yemen, in Syria, 
in Iraq, other places here, I think this should give us very, 
very significant cause. Their continued efforts to exercise 
control over critical waterways I think should give us 
continued cause here.
    Iran continues to present threats to us across the region, 
and as we look at implementing the National Defense Strategy--
and I agree with the focus on great power competition--my best 
advice back up through my chain of command will be to ensure 
that we do retain sufficient capabilities and sufficient 
response capabilities to deal with the threats that remain in 
the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you, sir. Thank you very 
much.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Hawley please.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    General, thank you for being here. Thank you again for your 
service.
    I want to stay on that same topic about the National 
Defense Strategy and Iran and just explore some of the tensions 
that the National Defense Strategy creates for your area of 
operation.
    Can I just ask you, in your judgment, are we in a position 
to remove, draw down forces, move forces from your area of 
operation to Asia or Europe in accord with the National Defense 
Strategy's priorities on great power competition with China and 
Russia? Are we in a position to do that and also engage, if 
necessary, Iran should that nation provoke a conflict with us 
or should they continue to accelerate further their uranium 
enrichment program?
    General Votel. Senator, the National Defense Strategy 
necessarily puts focus on the United States regaining its 
competitive advantage against great powers, Russia and China in 
this particular case. I agree with that, and we are absolutely 
supportive of that from a CENTCOM standpoint. We do recognize 
that that will necessitate some change in our posture in the 
region. As we go through the discussions and the planning 
aspects of that with the Joint Staff, with OSD [Office of the 
Secretary of Defense], and certainly with the services, we will 
seek to maintain the capabilities that we need to and then 
ensure that we have the right response capabilities to address 
threats as they present themselves in this area.
    Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you a little bit more about 
that. The National Defense Strategy calls for more efficient 
ways of operating in the greater Middle East, in your area of 
operational authority, the idea being again to enable us to 
maintain the focus on Iran and terrorists there and also to 
shift attention towards a great power conflict.
    Can you tell me about your plans to make operations in your 
area of responsibility more efficient? What does that mean? 
What does that look like? Can you give us a tangible sense of 
it?
    General Votel. Certainly. One of the areas where we can 
continue to be more efficient is how we operate along our 
bureaucratic combatant commander seams. With me, I share a 
boundary with EUCOM to the north. I share one with AFRICOM to 
the west, and with INDOPACOM to the east. I think it is 
extraordinarily important as we look at managing resources that 
we look at positioning and employing these resources in a way 
that they can be of the maximum utility to multiple combatant 
commands. Today we actually do that with some of our resources 
in the region.
    You might be aware, for example, that AFRICOM supports us 
with basing that we require for our activities in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and the resources that we have there benefit both 
General Waldhauser in his command and they benefit me. I think 
there are some smarter ways of doing this.
    Certainly the Department's focus on dynamic force 
employment where we exercise strategic predictability but 
operational unpredictability I think is a good concept of this 
where we are able to move resources in a more agile fashion 
into areas where we see opportunities with this. I think this 
is another area that we need to continue to focus on.
    Senator Hawley. In this same vein, we have heard some and I 
have read some about light attack aircraft and security force 
assistance brigades. Can you give me your sense about the 
progress on those initiatives and what else you might propose 
in that vein?
    General Votel. On both of those initiatives, the security 
force assistance brigades--you know, my service, the Army, I 
think did us a significant service by establishing this 
organization. What this essentially did--we talked about by, 
with, and through, but what this really allowed us to do is it 
gave us a purpose-built organization that was specifically 
focused on this type of advising and the type of relationship 
we wanted to have with our indigenous partners on the ground. 
Over the deployment of the first security force assistance 
brigade last year in Afghanistan, we saw significant 
improvement in our ability to do that, a higher level of 
capability, a much more focused organization, and I think we 
helped the Army preserve its readiness frankly. We did not take 
a brigade, break it apart just to pull the leaders out to do 
advise and assist. We actually had a purpose-built organization 
that did that. I think this is a very positive thing.
    The light attack aircraft. Being able to train our partners 
in terms of employing those things I think reduces the burden 
on us, and it provides self-sufficiency for them. It does it 
without creating a significant logistical burden. Whether it is 
A-29's that we see with the Lebanese armed forces or A-29's we 
see with the Afghan security air force, these I think are good 
investments. In both cases we have seen those resources be 
directly responsible to their forces on the ground. It is 
nascent. It is growing. We have to continue to support this, 
but I think this is exactly the direction we need to go to 
really enable our partners.
    Senator Hawley. Last question. You are satisfied, General. 
I mean, you think that those programs, for example, are on 
track. You think that we are making good progress in both of 
those initiatives.
    General Votel. I do. I think both of those are excellent 
programs.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Peters, please.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Thank you, General Votel. Thank you for your testimony here 
today and your many years of distinguished service.
    General, in your written testimony, you described Jordan 
as, quote, one of our most committed partners in the Middle 
East and one of the most critical voices of moderate Islam in 
the region. Your testimony goes on to discuss the role that 
Jordan plays in hosting over 750,000 refugees from Syria, Iraq, 
and elsewhere and Jordan's contributions to the fight against 
ISIS and Jordan's role in hosting Exercise Eagle Lion, which 
includes nearly 2 dozen countries training in the 
counterterrorism mission.
    Today in the Senate, we are debating S. 1, Strengthening 
America's Security in the Middle East. It includes a United 
States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Extension Act. The premise of 
the legislation is that Jordan is playing a critical role in 
addressing the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the fight 
against ISIS and, therefore, extends our defense cooperation 
agreement.
    Could you describe and talk a little bit more about the 
contributions that Jordan is making, what are some of the 
challenges Jordan faces in making these contributions, and why 
this extension is important?
    General Votel. Thank you, Senator. I would just share 
everything that you just said there about what a great partner 
they are.
    Certainly Jordan is not a rich country. They face economic 
challenges by virtue of where they are. His Majesty is working 
through that aspect with his parliament right now and with the 
international community, and I think we should continue to be 
supportive of that.
    As you have said, given the chance to say no, they say yes 
every time to everything that we seek.
    I would share with you, Senator, the last week I was in 
Jordan. I had an opportunity to visit the border, up along the 
border between Jordan and Syria, and I had an opportunity to 
witness the investments that our country has made in their 
border security initiatives: equipment, training, command and 
control for this. What I witnessed there I think would make any 
Member of Congress or, indeed, any American very proud to see. 
It was extraordinarily professional. It was very effective. 
They had very good situational awareness and understanding of 
what was happening along their border, and everything that they 
were doing was sustainable. They have been doing it for several 
years and with the prospect of continuing to do it in the 
future. These are the kinds of investments that we need to be 
making in these very good partners right here like Jordan.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, General.
    Today in this bill, it also includes the Caesar Syria 
Civilian Protection Act. It is a bill named after a defector 
from the Syrian army who shed light on Assad's atrocities, 
revealing photographs of torture and significant human rights 
abuses that I know you are very aware of. The legislation 
imposes sanctions on individuals who support Assad's regime in 
Syria by providing financial and material or technological 
support. This includes sanctions on those who provide aircraft 
or spare aircraft parts for military purposes, sanctions on 
those who collaborate with mercenaries, military contractors, 
paramilitary forces operating on behalf of Syria, Russia, or 
Iran, and sanctions those who help the Government of Syria 
maintain or expand its production of natural gas and petroleum.
    Your written testimony describes the Assad regime's use of 
starvation as a weapon of war by denying humanitarian aid to be 
delivered where it is critically needed.
    My question to you, General, is to what extent do you 
believe that imposing additional sanctions on the Assad regime, 
including limiting access to aircraft and aircraft spare parts, 
will degrade Assad's ability to attack innocent civilians and 
exert pressure in a positive direction towards improving the 
horrible humanitarian situation that we have there.
    General Votel. Senator, my belief is history speaks for 
itself here with the Assad regime, and we should continue to 
keep the maximum amount of pressure on them to prevent them 
from appropriating the atrocities that they have in the past on 
their own people. I am supportive of all measures in that 
regard.
    Senator Peters. The last question, General. Last week, the 
Committee held a hearing on the threats posed by Russia and 
China. You have answered some questions related to what we 
heard, as to how we need to have more efficient use of 
resources in the Middle East. What came up was the possibility 
of a review of the use of aircraft like the B-1 and the F-22 in 
Afghanistan where those platforms might be better focused on 
dealing with our near-peer competitors.
    My question to you is--I have worked to extend and support 
A-10's operating and to make sure that they have the wing 
replacements so that A-10 aircraft can continue to operate. To 
what extent is the A-10 necessary for you to conduct your 
mission in places particularly if we look at moving B-1's and 
F-22's out of theater?
    General Votel. Well, Senator, I do not think you are going 
to find any Army guys or infantrymen that are going to argue 
against the A-10. It is an incredibly responsive capability 
that has, I think, served us extraordinarily well in the past. 
I know it is an old airplane, and so I share some concerns 
about its sustainability. But certainly it has definitely 
proven its worth to us, and we will continue to require that 
type of support, some type of very responsive, close air 
support capability well into the future.
    Senator Peters. So you believe Congress should continue to 
support that program in your estimation?
    General Votel. I think we should continue to support that 
program, and then we should be looking at other programs that 
would provide those capabilities in the future.
    Senator Peters. Appreciate it. Thank you, General.
    Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Peters.
    Senator Rounds?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, first of all, thank you for your service. Thank 
you to your team as well.
    The National Defense Strategy makes clear that the 
Department's focus is preparing to deter and win, if necessary, 
great power conflict with China and Russia. But we have also 
got several partners in the region as I think Senator Peters 
has just mentioned. Jordan is a great ally. So is Israel.
    Israel has reportedly agreed to allow a Chinese Government-
connected firm, Shanghai International Port Group, to run 
commercial operations at the Israeli Port of Haifa. This port 
reportedly periodically hosts joint United States-Israeli naval 
drills and visits from American vessels. From a U.S. military 
perspective, do you have concerns regarding this deal? If this 
deal goes forward, might it impact decisions to have the U.S. 
Navy vessels visit the port?
    General Votel. Senator, Israel resides outside of the 
CENTCOM area of responsibility. So with regard to that, General 
Scaparrotti would probably be the best one to answer that 
question.
    But I would share with you, as I look at the region in 
which I do have military responsibilities, in the Gulf, in and 
around the straits, particularly the Bab-el-Mandeb and these 
areas, I am concerned about the increasing presence of Chinese 
maritime activity in the region and their continued outreach to 
different partners there to secure military access that is 
likely linked to their economic objectives, their One Belt One 
Road aspects that they propagate around the world but, in 
particular, in the area in which I have military 
responsibility. I deeply share your concern.
    The United States and a number of our partners have long 
provided maritime security in this area. Frankly, I think China 
has been a free rider in this and taken advantage of that, and 
now we see them beginning to develop their own infrastructure 
in here principally for their own purposes, not for the 
purposes of broader regional security in the region. I am 
concerned about that.
    Senator Rounds. In terms of how we separate out the 
different areas of responsibility--and I respect the fact that 
you have specific areas. Most certainly activity communication 
with our ally Israel is a part of that responsibility, though. 
Can you share with regard to how this impacts your ability and 
does it? Or is it simply a matter of we are aware of it and we 
will allow other individuals responsible in other areas of 
responsibility to handle it?
    General Votel. Senator, as I remarked earlier, we pay 
particular attention to our bureaucratic, geographic seams out 
here. General Scaparrotti and myself and our respective staffs 
are very closely aligned with this. With his support, we 
maintain a close relationship with Israel. As we have 
recognized, many of their security threats reside within the 
military area in which I have responsibility. I think this is 
another aspect of how we cooperate across our combatant command 
boundaries here, sharing responsibility. I absolutely 
understand what you are saying, and I am very confident that 
the mechanisms that we have in place are helping us address the 
concerns that all parties have in the region.
    Senator Rounds. Let me go to another area of bureaucracy. 
Much has been written and said about the need to streamline 
DOD's acquisition processes. Can you comment on the process and 
the amount of time that it takes to fill validated requirements 
in the CENTCOM area of operations? Do you believe that we must 
reform the acquisition process to more quickly fill the urgent 
and operational needs of our warfighters?
    General Votel. Senator, I absolutely agree we should 
continue to do everything that we can to address the needs of 
the warfighters and try to do it as fast as we can. I am aware 
of a number of initiatives that are underway to address that, 
whether it is rapid prototyping or other things that we can do. 
Our view in CENTCOM, as we confront emerging threats here, is 
that we have tried to be supportive of the services bringing in 
capabilities, trying them out, recognizing some of these will 
fail. They will not succeed the way they are. But in the hands 
of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the ground, 
they will begin to provide very direct feedback that will help 
these programs move along quicker.
    From a CENTCOM standpoint, what we are principally 
concerned about is making sure that we have a system in place 
where we can bring things forward. We can rapidly test them. We 
can get them in the hands of our people. They can provide 
feedback. That goes back into the commercial or the industrial 
base. They make the improvements and then bring us the improved 
product out there that we can use. That to me is 
extraordinarily important in an area like CENTCOM.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, were you aware of the President's intention to 
order the withdrawal of our troops from Syria before that was 
publicly announced?
    General Votel. I was not aware of the specific 
announcement. Certainly we are aware that he had expressed a 
desire and intent in the past to depart Syria.
    Senator King. You were not consulted before that decision 
was announced.
    General Votel. We were not. I was not consulted.
    Senator King. You mentioned in your testimony that--you 
used the word ``remnant'' with regard to ISIS. Can you give us 
a better number than remnant? What are we talking about here? 
Senator Cotton mentioned 20,000 to 30,000 fighters scattered in 
various places around the world. Is that accurate?
    General Votel. I think that is approximately what the 
intelligence community has estimated that is left behind. I 
think we would generally share with that. That includes people 
of a variety of different characters. It includes fighters. It 
includes supporters. It includes facilitators within that.
    Senator King. How about in Syria and Iraq? What number 
would you put that?
    General Votel. I think in general from what I have seen, 
that is about the number that I have seen.
    Senator King. Twenty to thirty thousand.
    General Votel. Yes, but Senator, this is probably a low to 
moderate confidence number.
    Senator King. Is it a low estimate? I am sorry. You threw 
me with that. Do you think it is a higher number?
    General Votel. I think we do not fully know.
    Senator King. You do not have a precise number.
    General Votel. We do not have it with any specific 
accuracy. It is always going to be a range. The number is 
always going to be a range.
    Senator King. One of my concerns about the withdrawal with 
that many ISIS fighters still in the area is that they will 
just wait us out. The President announces a withdrawal. The 
saying I have heard is the Americans have the watches, but we 
have the time. Are they just going to wait and hunker down for 
a couple years or a couple of months and then resuscitate their 
efforts? If you were their military commander, would that not 
be what you would do, say these guys are leaving, we will just 
bide our time?
    General Votel. Well, certainly, Senator. But our approach 
here, as I mentioned in my opening comments, is as we look to 
withdraw from Syria, we are in a very deliberate planning 
process for how we will work with the international community, 
with our partners on the ground with the rest of the coalition 
to ensure that we can keep pressure on this organization to 
prevent exactly what you are talking about.
    Senator King. I think it is very important. Perhaps you can 
share with the Committee in closed session what the strategy is 
for maintaining that pressure and how success is defined that 
will allow us to withdraw.
    Let me move on with regard to, again, the withdrawal. 
Senator Heinrich mentioned the danger to the Kurds. I sincerely 
hope that in your exit interview with your successor, which 
will take place very soon if not already, that you emphasize 
the importance of protecting the Kurds. If they are slaughtered 
by the Turks within the reasonable proximity of our leaving, it 
will be a stain on the honor of this country that will persist 
not only in terms of honor but also in terms of our ability to 
attract allies to assist us in future projects of this kind. 
That is my biggest fear about what is going on now, and I 
believe the Turks are waiting.
    General Votel. Senator, again, I think this is a key task 
that we are looking at right now and that is the protection of 
those who have fought valiantly with us and ensuring that they 
remain safe as our diplomats and United Nations and others 
pursue a political solution here in Syria.
    Senator King. I certainly hope that is of the highest 
priority.
    You mentioned Iran and listed a whole series of malign 
activities in the region. Which would you prefer? The current 
malign Iran or a malign Iran with nuclear weapons?
    General Votel. Certainly I think an Iran with nuclear 
weapons poses a more enduring and serious threat to us long 
term. Our approach to them does need to make sure that we deny 
all paths for them to get to a nuclear weapon.
    Senator King. Well, unfortunately, we have just abrogated 
an agreement that did just that, but we can discuss that in 
another setting.
    Final question on Afghanistan. I do not understand that we 
are negotiating unilaterally with the Taliban and not involving 
the Government of Afghanistan. I do not understand how that is 
going to get us to a final result of the Government of 
Afghanistan if we give away things they are not willing to give 
away.
    General Votel. Again, Senator, I think the way I would 
characterize Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts is he is at the 
beginning of process here to put together a framework that will 
allow the Afghans and Taliban to come together at some 
particular point to conduct some negotiations. All of this is 
being done with the knowledge of the Government of Afghanistan. 
They understand what he is doing. I cannot speak for the exact 
process itself since that is Ambassador Khalilzad's. But I do 
know that he is in frequent consultation with the Government of 
Afghanistan to ensure that they are best informed on the 
approaches that he is taking to continue to get this framework 
in place.
    Senator King. Good. I hope that is the case. Thank you. I 
appreciate it. Thank you, General.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    As a reminder, you made several references as to a 
different setting for some of the answers to your questions. We 
will be having a closed meeting at 2:15 in the Visitor Center. 
So you have that opportunity.
    Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, good to see you again. I want to thank you and 
Sergeant Major for your outstanding service to our Nation and 
very, very much appreciated.
    I wanted to dive in a little bit more. We have had this 
discussion I think on both sides of this idea as we are 
refining our force posture in the region, this notion of having 
a robust counterterrorism force that can still focus on U.S. 
interests, whether it is the rise of ISIS, whether it is the 
rise again of al Qaeda, whether it is the malign activities of 
Iran. I think, unfortunately, some of my colleagues like to 
look a blind eye. I am going to ask you a couple questions 
about that.
    But what is that concept of--you know, this is something 
the President has talked about, but your predecessor, a general 
who I happen to have a lot of respect for, General Abizaid, has 
talked a lot about this idea of a raid force component, robust 
CT [Counter Terrorism] element in the Middle East that can 
continue to focus on our key strategic interests. How would 
that work, and are you thinking through that, whether it is in 
Iraq, whether it is in other parts of the Middle East? Do we 
have the capability not only to go after our counterterrorism 
goals but, say, for example, control the airspace in northern 
Syria, which a number of us think is important even if we are 
not on the ground there?
    General Votel. Senator, I believe that we do, and we are in 
fact thinking through the different ways that we would continue 
to address our enduring concern about violent extremist 
organizations operating in this region who harbor interests in 
coming against the Homeland.
    Senator Sullivan. That is our overriding national interest.
    General Votel. It is. As we look at all of the activities 
that we are conducting across the region, I think safeguarding 
that particular national interest has to be among the very top 
things that we are doing. There are a variety of different 
approaches that we can take to this. Certainly the by, with, 
and through approach using partners on the ground, enabling 
them to keep pressure on them is one way of doing this. In some 
instances, it may require us to have some of our capabilities 
forward in different locations to ensure that we can do that.
    Senator Sullivan. Are we looking at those options right now 
to make sure----
    General Votel. We actually are looking at a variety of 
different options for how we might address this.
    Senator Sullivan. Are you confident we can address this, 
not only given your role as CENTCOM Commander, but your 
previous role as SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] 
Commander?
    General Votel. I am supremely confident in both our SOF 
[U.S. Special Operations Forces] and conventional forces in the 
ability to meet the missions that our Nation has in this area 
and in others.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me talk about Iran a little bit. You 
know, my colleague from Maine, who I consider a good friend and 
deeply respect--he mentioned the Iran nuclear deal. The Iran 
nuclear deal essentially gave Iran the freedom to be on the 
verge of becoming a nuclear nation within 10 years anyway. We 
always forget that. That is a short time span in the Middle 
East. That was the agreement.
    You know, General Dempsey, when he was Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, testified in front of this Committee that when 
the Iranians were supplying--the Quds Force and others were 
supplying sophisticated IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] to 
the Iraqi Shitte militias, they were responsible for the 
killing and wounding of over 2,000 American soldiers, airmen, 
and marines. Do you agree with that assessment?
    General Votel. I do agree that Iran facilitated equipment 
to organizations that caused casualties on Americans.
    Senator Sullivan. Massive casualties.
    General Votel. Massive casualties.
    Senator Sullivan. It often gets forgotten that Iranians 
were, in my view, directly responsible for killing and wounding 
over 2,000 American soldiers and other military members on the 
ground in Iraq. Is that not correct?
    General Votel. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Sullivan. One of the big selling points of the Iran 
nuclear deal was that it was going to moderate Iranian 
activities. This was sold by Secretary of State John Kerry and 
even President Obama. Have they moderated their malign 
activities in Syria?
    General Votel. Senator, they have not.
    Senator Sullivan. No. It has gotten worse. Is that not 
true, General?
    General Votel. It is my observation that during the time 
that the agreement was in place, we did not see a modification 
to their behavior.
    Senator Sullivan. How about with regard to Yemen? A lot of 
my colleagues on both sides of the aisle forget who started the 
war in Yemen. It was not the Saudis. Was it?
    General Votel. Well----
    Senator Sullivan. The Houthis backed by the Iranians?
    General Votel. The Saudis were concerned about the presence 
of an Iranian-backed organization along their southern border.
    Senator Sullivan. With regard to Israel, they [Iran] 
certainly have not moderated their malign activities. Have 
they? Iran?
    General Votel. I think if you talk to the Israelis, they 
certainly would agree with that.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask one final question with regard 
to--Secretary Pompeo gave a speech in Cairo that was laying out 
what I thought was a very well articulated, robust counter-Iran 
strategy. How are you looking as the CENTCOM Commander to 
execute this strategy, which I think is one of the most 
important things we can be doing in the Middle East?
    General Votel. Well, Senator, I have responsibility for 
helping put together the military global campaign plan for 
Iran. As I look at that, I look at a variety of different 
things that we have to do as part of that. We have to assure 
our partners. We have to challenge Iran in the areas where they 
are trying to exert their malign influence. We have to be 
prepared to deter them. We have to be prepared to delay and 
respond to their activities in the region. As I look at the 
planning that we are doing against that, those are the types of 
things that I am trying to incorporate into a comprehensive 
plan to address the threat of Iran.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Duckworth?
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General, for being here. I also want to 
recognize that your Command Sergeant Major is here. Sergeant 
Major Thetford, thank you for all of your years of work as well 
on behalf of our Nation.
    General, I want to go back to a theme that you have talked 
about a lot in terms of relationship building and setting the 
groundwork with our partners beforehand in the region and the 
like. You and I touched a little bit on some of the programs 
that exist that allow us to do that, to build these habitual 
relationships. I know that the Ranking Member had talked about 
IMET programs.
    I would like to touch on the State Partnership for Peace 
programs. This is a program where, when I was serving, from the 
time I was a second lieutenant, I had a partner nation in 
Illinois' case, Poland, that we trained and worked with. I grew 
up in the military along with my Polish counterpart from being 
young second lieutenants all the way up through our command 
time. That developed a relationship and an understanding of how 
that worked.
    Can you speak a little bit about the different types of 
U.S.-funded military exchange programs that you see implemented 
in the CENTCOM region? Talk about the values of those programs 
contributing to our warfighting capabilities.
    General Votel. Thank you. Senator, let me just start and 
talk about the State Partnership program. This is an excellent 
program. We have four or five States that are partnered with 
countries across our region, and in almost every case, these 
are deeply valued programs by our partners in the region and I 
believe by the States that orchestrate them. We get a lot of 
benefit out of that, not just in the countries in the region, 
but again by people from those countries coming back to America 
to participate in exercises to build the relationships back 
here. I think this is an extraordinary program. It is long-
term. It is enduring, and I think it serves us particularly 
well.
    You have already talked about the impact of IMET. This is 
an extraordinarily important program. I will not belabor that.
    I also think that the program of exercises that we continue 
to orchestrate across the region are extraordinarily important 
in terms of building interoperability, in terms of building 
readiness, and in terms of building reliability in our 
partners. As we have continued to move forward, I think this 
will be again continuing investments that we will want to make.
    For example, with Egypt, we have restarted the Bright Star 
exercise, but we have changed it more to deal with the 
contemporary threats that we are dealing with and that Egypt is 
dealing with in the terrorism realm as opposed to perhaps the 
sweeping tank battles of the past. That is not what we are 
doing.
    I think through our exercise programs, we have the ability 
to make these very specific to the needs of the region and 
address it.
    I would add one final program that I think is 
extraordinarily valuable, and it is our combined maritime force 
where we invite different partners in the region, some from 
outside of the region to come in and participate as part of our 
combined maritime forces operating in the Gulf and in the 
waters of the region. These are extraordinarily important. We 
see countries like Pakistan who step forward, provide 
significant resources in this, and provide leadership to these 
organizations. This allows us to make sure that we share the 
burden, we leverage the capabilities that everybody brings, and 
it adds to a much more collective approach to security in the 
region.
    Those are just four key programs of probably several others 
that could be discussed as well.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
    That last point speaks a little bit to my logistical 
officer heart. When I look at a map of the CENTCOM region, I 
cannot help but wonder how your J-4 is able to transport 
people, equipment, and supplies throughout the theater 
especially in light of great power competition and the changing 
environment as it is. It becomes even more salient when I think 
about the potential for Iranians to close the Strait of Hormuz 
and restrict movement in the Arabian Gulf.
    Going back to the exercises you just mentioned, do you 
regularly exercise against this threat, and how confident are 
you that our logistical supply chain will not be gravely 
impacted, should conflict with the Iranians escalate in the 
region?
    General Votel. Certainly we do. I mean, one of the 
principal concerns we have is the mining of the straits and the 
impact that that would have. We do regular mining exercises and 
counter-mining exercises in the maritime environment here. We 
have a big exercise planned later this fall with a number of 
different countries that will come in. But this is certainly 
something that we are focused on.
    You are really hitting on the resiliency of our logistics 
networks in the region, and I do think that our command, our 
components out there, and our partners have really begun to 
address this. Certainly you are familiar with the northern 
distribution network that kind of goes up through the Central 
Asian states. That has been important for us. We continue to 
exercise that. It certainly does have some influence from 
Russia and that. It is a more difficult network to orchestrate, 
but it is not impossible. We do continue to move materials 
across that area.
    Across the Arabian Peninsula, we have what we refer to as 
the Trans-Arabian Network that links a variety of ports and 
cities and airports not only in the Arabian Gulf but down in 
the Gulf of Oman and over to the Red Sea. It gives us extreme 
resiliency in terms of how we can move material, men, forces 
into the region to respond to capabilities.
    We are very much focused on that. In fact, as we look at 
implementing the National Defense Strategy, what that might 
mean for CENTCOM, our focus on these logistic networks and our 
ability to have agreements, basing, and other things in here I 
think become even more important than they already have. We 
have tried to prioritize that and we will continue to do that 
as we move forward.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Vitally important, indeed.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    First, Sergeant Major, thank you for your wonderful years 
of service and commitment to our great United States. We 
certainly appreciate that.
    Major Votel--Major Votel--many years ago, a number of your 
colleagues and your soldiers believed that you would become a 
great leader. I have to say, General, that they were correct 
all those years ago. Thank you so much for your wonderful 
service. I appreciate that.
    One of our most effective resources for building 
partnerships and capacity, while maintaining the pressure that 
we have on those violent extremist organizations, is done 
obviously through our special operators, and you are intimately 
familiar with that. How do you see the role of our special 
operators evolving across the CENTCOM AOR [Area of 
Responsibility] with regard to counterterrorism and capacity 
building, as well as the role more broadly nested within the 
National Defense Strategy? If you can talk a little bit about 
that role, how we are developing them.
    General Votel. Thank you.
    So, Senator, as you suggest, the special operations forces 
will continue to play a key role in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility as we confront violent extremism here. They have 
developed a level of expertise and proficiency in this that is 
certainly unmatched anywhere else. We will depend on that.
    I would add this, that one of the things I am most proud of 
as CENTCOM Commander and as a former SOCOM Commander, is how 
well our special operations forces and our conventional forces 
are integrated in the areas in which we operate. In many cases, 
it is almost indistinguishable. There is very little concern 
with who gets the credit or who is calling the shots here. It 
is an extraordinarily collaborative environment between all of 
our forces on the ground.
    This will be essential as we move forward. As you know, our 
special operations capabilities are limited. They are in great 
demand not just in CENTCOM but in other areas. That will be 
brought out as we fully implement the National Defense 
Strategy. Reliance on our conventional forces beginning to do 
some of these things and to develop the same methodologies that 
our special operators have developed over the course of many 
years will become very, very important as we move forward.
    Senator Ernst. General, as we are drawing down the number 
of troops that we have, whether it is Syria, Afghanistan, 
elsewhere, we do continue to maintain, train, advise, assist, 
and at times accompany missions. Do you see that continuing 
forward as a force multiplier with partners in that region? 
What more can we do in that area?
    General Votel. I do, Senator. I think this idea, by, with 
and through, and focused on training, advising, assisting, 
enabling our partners is a proven method for us, and I think it 
works extraordinarily well in this particular region. I do see 
that moving forward.
    Going forward, it will be important for us to maintain 
these relationships. The relationships that we depend on in 
this region are not those that can be put together in the 
course of a crisis. They have to be developed and they have to 
be nurtured over time. As Admiral McRaven often reminded us 
when he was the SOCOM Commander, you cannot surge trust in 
times of crisis. That has to be done in advance. I think the 
lifeblood of what we do out here will be the development of 
resilient, trustful relationships across our region.
    Senator Ernst. I appreciate that. I appreciate the comments 
made by my colleagues as well about the State Partnership 
programs, the IMET programs, and so on. Those are very, very 
important in developing that level of trust.
    Just very briefly, because I am running out of time, 
General, of course, we do have some other big players in the 
region. We see Russia, of course, in Syria. We see China's 
investments in Pakistan. Where else do you assess that China 
and Russia are involved in that AOR, and what is the extent of 
that and what are their intentions from your perspective?
    General Votel. Thanks.
    Well, starting with Russia, certainly Russia has 
extraordinary interests in the Central Asian states, these 
being former Soviet republics. They maintain a long-term 
relationship there. This will always continue to be something 
that we will have to contend with in this particular region. We 
have seen in the past Russia working with countries like Egypt 
and others to potentially fill in voids there. We have to be 
mindful of those relationships as well.
    When you look at China, I think their motivations are 
principally driven by their economic objectives, again really 
driven by the One Belt One Road approach that they are taking 
to link trade routes back to China. I think the thing we have 
to continue to be watchful of is their developing relationships 
with other partners across the region, particularly in the 
maritime environment, in the countries that are along the 
waterways in the region, whether they are some of the Gulf 
states or whether they are some that are on the African 
continent, but which certainly give them very good access into 
the CENTCOM waters here. These are the areas I think that we 
will have to pay attention to in the future.
    Senator Ernst. Absolutely. They have a long game, and we do 
need to pay attention.
    My time has expired, but General, my best to you and your 
beautiful family. Thank you so very much.
    General Votel. Thank you, Senator.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I join my colleagues in thanking you for your service and 
thanks for your very forthright and helpful answers today.
    I want to come back to a line of questioning that Senator 
Reed began about the $331 million that we are owed by the 
Saudis for aerial refueling. Have we made a demand to the 
Saudis that they pay that money?
    General Votel. Senator, we have presented all those bills 
to the Saudi-led coalition. They have them there, in receipt of 
them. They acknowledge that. We are working through to ensure 
that the products that we have given to them are--they 
understand what that is and they will be able to respond to us. 
They have given us every indication that they intend to meet 
the requirements for reimbursement that we have asked for.
    Senator Blumenthal. There is no question in your mind, is 
there, that that $331 million is owed to our country?
    General Votel. That is reimbursement for fuel that we have 
provided for them, and it is reimbursement for the flight hours 
associated with the aircraft that provided that fuel.
    Senator Blumenthal. When will they make that payment of 
reimbursement?
    General Votel. We expect that, in terms of the flying 
hours--bills have been presented to both Saudi Arabia and to 
the Emirates--for flying hours we will see responses as early 
as March and then likely for the fuel, by the May time frame. 
The ACSA requires that they provide reimbursement within 90 
days of notification.
    Senator Blumenthal. These are U.S. taxpayer dollars that 
they owe us, to put it most simply. Correct?
    General Votel. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Blumenthal. You mentioned--I may have misheard 
you--that there is the possibility of other instances where 
they or other countries owe us for similar kinds of expenses?
    General Votel. I do not think we have identified any other 
than that. I think the question was have we looked more broadly 
across the region to ensure that we do not have this problem 
with others, and we are in the process of doing that, Senator.
    Senator Blumenthal. You are reviewing----
    General Votel. Exactly to make sure that we have not had an 
oversight on this.
    Senator Blumenthal. Have you found any indications that 
there have been other failures to repay?
    General Votel. I have not been notified of any thus far, 
Senator.
    Senator Blumenthal. I would like to ask you about the 
special operators, and Senator Ernst asked you a number of 
questions. Can they operate as effectively from bases in Iraq 
as they can from where they are located now?
    General Votel. Senator, I think our special operators are 
extraordinarily capable. You know, in the beginning of our 
operations in both Iraq and Syria, there was a time when we did 
not have anybody on the ground, and yet we were able to have a 
relationship with our partners on the ground in Syria and we 
were able to do that from remote locations. We do that in other 
places. They are extraordinarily innovative, and so we will 
look at all options that we can use here.
    Senator Blumenthal. I guess my question, just to rephrase 
it, was not whether they can operate at all, but whether they 
can operate as effectively if they are based remotely. Are they 
not more effective if they are, in effect, in the combat area 
where they are supposed to operate?
    General Votel. Well, Senator, I would agree with you that 
it is always best to be with your partner and to be sharing 
everything that they are experiencing. I think that is optimum. 
But certainly I think we have demonstrated in a variety of 
different areas here that through a remote location, we can 
achieve the objectives that we are focused on.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, knowing how skilled and effective 
our special operators are, I have no doubt that they can 
operate from very remote locations. But I take it you would 
agree with me that the optimum situation, from the standpoint 
of military impact, would be to have them actually on the 
ground where they are supposed to do their work.
    General Votel. Yes, Senator, I would agree. I think it is 
always best to be with your partners.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thanks very much, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Perdue?
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, thank you for your career and dedication and 
sacrifices. Sergeant Major, thank you for 38 years. Do not ever 
think it was ever taken for granted. It will never be 
forgotten. God bless you.
    General, in your AOR, you have all five threats, if you 
assume and believe that North Korea and Iran have a 
particularly good relationship, in across at least three 
domains, probably four domains. The question I have is relative 
to what China and Russia are doing longer term, particularly as 
we think about our future in Afghanistan, what China has done 
in the China-Pakistan economic corridor is basically 
handcuffing Pakistan. As you said earlier, Pakistan is a major 
player in determining the long-term future of Afghanistan. I 
would argue that India, as well as the Stans and other players 
in the region, are because of the Pashtun problem. But this 
debt problem is up to--I think it is $23 billion now. It could 
go to $62 billion, and there are $90 billion committed there in 
that effort. That is huge in terms of Pakistan.
    What I am concerned about is what Pakistan is also 
representing to China with regard to what China has done with 
their BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] across that area. You just 
mentioned the maritime interest with Gwadar and Hambantota. 
Hambantota is just south of Colombo in Sri Lanka, and they have 
already foreclosed on their partner there. It is a proprietary 
debt situation. They have done the same thing in Gwadar and 31 
other places around the coast of Africa. You just mentioned 
that.
    The question is, how are we as a military--I understand 
this is a diplomatic issue as well. How are you in the military 
dealing with China's effort to develop this string of pearls, 
particularly in the perspective that Russia with Vladiky and 
Tartus, with China in Djibouti, in this area as we consider our 
future in both Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan? How are we 
addressing that China and Russia threat relative to their 
permanent strategy in that area as it relates to our NDS?
    General Votel. Thanks, Senator. I think you highlighted a 
real challenge for us. I think as we look at great power 
competition, I think we have to recognize--and I believe we 
do--that the threat of Russia or that China poses to us is not 
limited to a particular geographic area but, in fact, it is 
global with these partners. As we look at our plans to compete 
with these partners to pursue our national interests, we have 
to look in all areas where we do this, to include the CENTCOM 
area of responsibility. There will be things that we can do in 
CENTCOM that can contribute to a broader campaign to compete 
with China and Russia. I think as we look at this, we have to 
look for opportunities where we can do that and how we 
integrate into a broader plan.
    More specifically though, what I would tell you--I think 
one of the most important things--and I mentioned this a little 
bit earlier--for us to do is to continue to be seen by our 
partners in the region as a valued partner. You know, as I look 
at the recent Iraqi elections, I have noted the presence of 
United States and coalition forces on the ground was not an 
election issue there. I think that is because of the manner in 
which we presented ourselves. It was the manner in which we 
conducted our activities there. I think preserving our 
relationships and continuing to be seen as reliable partners is 
perhaps one of the best defenses that we have against the 
influence of great power actors, particularly in the CENTCOM 
region. To the extent that we can continue to do that in the 
future, I think that will continue to be a key factor in 
CENTCOM as we move forward.
    Senator Perdue. Well, I think after 17 years, we have 
certainly earned that right, and I hope we will continue to do 
that relative to getting our allies to help us in that region. 
Specifically, you mentioned the parliament there in Iraq.
    I have a question about a specific garrison, the al-Tanf 
Garrison in southern Syria. We have had a request from Prime 
Minister Netanyahu to consider keeping a permanent presence 
there because of where it is strategically located on the 
supply route between Iran and Hezbollah. There is a 34-mile 
exclusion area there. What are the rules of engagement that we 
currently have with our garrison there, and is this currently 
being considered as a longer-term installation?
    General Votel. Well, this is a key part of the ongoing 
planning that we have going here. I will not comment publicly 
about what we might do there. But we certainly understand the 
impact of that.
    Our reason for being at al-Tanf is principally driven by 
our Defeat ISIS mission. That is what brought us there. That is 
what kept us there. We continue to confront it. It is located 
in an area where we do see routine traffic from ISIS as they 
move from the middle of the Euphrates Valley to the western 
part of the country. It is a very good operational location 
from that standpoint.
    It does have the derivative value of being along a 
principal line of access, line of communication that Iran and 
her proxies would like to exploit. While that is not our 
mission, we do recognize the indirect impact that we have with 
that.
    As we move forward, Senator, the disposition of al-Tanf 
will certainly be something that we will consider very, very 
carefully as we look at our overall withdrawal plans from 
Syria.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    Senator Warren?
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General Votel, for being here. I appreciated the 
chance to meet with you last week.
    As you know, I have serious concerns about our support to 
the Saudi-led coalition and its military campaign in Yemen. At 
a hearing like this last year, I asked you if the United States 
Government knew where the coalition jets went and what targets 
they bombed after receiving fuel from U.S. tankers. You said 
that CENTCOM does not track that information.
    In late December, ``The New York Times'' reported that 
American military personnel assigned to the coalition's 
headquarters in Saudi Arabia readily had access to a, quote, 
database that detailed every air strike, warplane target, 
munitions used, and a brief description of the attack. End 
quote.
    Let me just ask you, does this database exist?
    General Votel. Today we do have a database that does have 
that information, and we have the ability to see that.
    Senator Warren. CENTCOM has access to this database?
    General Votel. We do have access to it today.
    Senator Warren. Okay. You know, this is troubling 
information because it suggests that we could determine 
retroactively if coalition warplanes that bombed civilians did 
so with American assistance. You know, there is clear evidence 
that we enable and support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. 
Until recently, we refueled their jets. We provide military 
advice and intelligence support. We continue to sell them 
American-made bombs, bombs that public reports indicate kill 
Yemeni civilians. We provide their air force with sustainment 
and logistics support for their American-made fighters.
    I am asking you questions. I want to ask some questions 
about the details of the help we give the Saudis because they 
continue to conduct bombing runs. They continue to perpetuate 
one of the worst manmade humanitarian disasters in the modern 
era. During this civil war, more than 85,000 children under the 
age of 5 have starved to death, and tens of thousands of 
civilians have been killed. This military engagement is not 
authorized. We need to end U.S. support for this war now.
    Let me ask you about detainee abuse. Section 1274 of the 
Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to 
review whether members of the armed forces or coalition 
partners of the United States abused or witnessed abuse of 
detainees during operations in Yemen. DOD submitted this report 
to Congress last month and in the unclassified summary 
concluded that, quote, DOD has determined that DOD personnel 
have neither observed nor been complicit in any cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment of detainees in Yemen. End quote.
    Can you just say a brief word--I just have a little bit of 
time--about how DOD reached this conclusion?
    General Votel. We principally derived that based on 
discussions and reports from the people that we do have on the 
ground and what they have seen. We, obviously, take this very 
seriously, Senator, and our individuals that are in positions 
where they might see some of this are under the obligation to 
report this. I do routinely receive reports, many of them 
unsubstantiated, not just linked to Yemen but to other areas in 
which we operate where our people have received a report of 
abuse and we have a reporting mechanism for that. We do take 
that extraordinarily seriously.
    Senator Warren. Okay, but this report says neither observed 
nor been complicit in any cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment.
    The Associated Press, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and the United Nations all conducted their own 
investigations and came to a very different conclusion. They 
determined that our Emirati partners oversaw a network of 
detention centers that regularly engaged in torture and other 
abuse.
    Now, does DOD find these independent investigations 
credible?
    General Votel. Well, we certainly take all of these 
independent investigations seriously, Senator. But I think what 
I am saying to you is that we have no observations of our own 
from our people that have actually seen this.
    Senator Warren. Fair enough. Then let me ask it this way. 
Has DOD reached any conclusions about whether or not our 
Emirati partners are engaging in detainee abuse when DOD 
personnel are not present?
    General Votel. I have not reached any kind of conclusion 
that they are conducting these activities. Certainly in our 
interaction with all of our partners, in this conflict and 
across the region, we continue to emphasize the obligations 
under the Law of Armed Conflict and the proper detention and 
treatment of detainees across the board.
    Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate your walking me through 
your assessment of these independent reports, but I remain very 
concerned about abuses in the region. Turning a blind eye is 
not acceptable, and I am going to keep asking questions on 
this. Thank you.
    General Votel. Senator, I am in receipt of your letter, and 
we will provide a response to you. Thank you.
    Senator Warren. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, General, for your time and to your team who is 
with you. We appreciate your service and your time.
    I do have some questions I want to ask you this afternoon 
when we are in closed session dealing with the NDS and the 
competition with Russia and China and maintaining the right 
balance in the Middle East, but also being aware of the 
competition that is there. I think you are so right. As you 
have said in your comments, this is something we cannot lose 
sight of.
    Let me go to Syria. I will tell you that I think the 
administration really has sent some mixed messages about the 
terms of United States withdrawal from Syria and whether there 
is protection for the Syrian Kurds, whether there is the total 
defeat of ISIS or the establishment of a safe zone with Turkey, 
and what is a prerequisite.
    Senator Duckworth and I just recently sent a letter 
pertaining to the Kurds because Nashville has the largest 
Kurdish population in the United States. It is for this reason, 
in addition to their partnership in the global coalition to 
defeat ISIS, that protection of the Kurds is very important to 
me and to a lot of Tennesseans. I believe that any withdrawal 
from Syria must be conditions-based, and clearly there has to 
be a plan to protect the Kurds. Any plan to protect the Kurds 
must clearly outline our expectations of Turkey.
    I would like to just hear from you. The withdrawal from 
Syria--is it calendar-based? Is it conditions-based? If it is 
conditions-based, what are those conditions going to be there 
on the ground? What has been communicated to the Turks, and 
what has been communicated to the Kurds?
    General Votel. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to 
talking a little bit more about this with you in the closed 
session.
    But I would just say I do not consider this to be either 
time-based or conditions-based. The fact is the President made 
a decision and we are going to execute his orders here to 
withdraw forces from Syria. As we do that, we are going to do 
that in a very deliberate manner. We are going to do that in 
conjunction with our campaign plan, and we are going to 
consider things like protection of our partners, the Kurds. We 
are going to consider the concerns that Turkey has along their 
border. We are going to consider how we keep pressure on ISIS. 
All of that is taking place right now. I am not under pressure 
to be out by a specific date, and I have not had any specific 
conditions put upon me. I look at this as an additional task 
within the confines of the current campaign plan that we are 
operating, and that is how we are approaching it.
    Senator Blackburn. In the January 16th attack, we lost a 
chief warrant officer, Jonathan Farmer, who was a Fort Campbell 
soldier. I will tell you in Montgomery County, Tennessee and 
Clarksville, Fort Campbell, it was noted with great sorrow by 
so many that are there at the post.
    One of the questions that comes up from Tennesseans who are 
involved in defense of our Nation is did we underestimate the 
power and the threat of ISIS in Syria.
    General Votel. Senator, I do not think we do. I think those 
of us who have had the opportunity to be involved in this for a 
long time develop a respect for our enemies. We do not agree 
with the things that they are doing, but we certainly have to 
respect the capabilities that they bring. We have always 
recognized that ISIS is a savvy organization and they will look 
for ways to harm us, to hurt us in the conduct of our normal 
operations or certainly in the conduct of operations that we 
have coming up as we get ready to depart Syria. I do not think 
we underestimate their capabilities to exact a toll against us.
    Senator Blackburn. I appreciate that.
    I have got a couple of questions on Yemen. I will save 
those for the afternoon. I yield back my time.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Chair, am I to interpret after 6 years on the Committee 
anything negative from the fact that I have been moved to a 
chair without my own microphone?
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Kaine. General Votel, thank you for your great 
service. You are a wonderful public servant, and we are going 
to miss you on the Committee.
    I want to ask you about an interview that President Trump 
gave on Face the Nation on February 3rd, a couple of comments 
that he made dealing with Iran. He indicated one of the reasons 
I want to keep it--``it'' referring to an airbase in Iran--is 
because I want to be looking a little bit--I am sorry--an 
airbase in Iraq--is because I want to be looking a little bit 
at Iran because Iran is a real problem. He was asked a question 
by Margaret Brennan. He said, no, because I want to be able to 
watch Iran.
    I am on the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations 
Committee, and I have not had a briefing either in open or 
classified in either committee during my time in the Senate 
suggesting that we are currently in Iraq primarily to watch 
Iran. My understanding is that we are in Iraq right now to help 
Iraq defeat ISIS. Is that your understanding as well?
    General Votel. That is exactly my understanding, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. As far as you know, there is not a change in 
the definition of the mission, at least as far as the Pentagon 
is concerned?
    General Votel. I have no additional tasks that have been 
given to me with regard to that.
    Senator Kaine. If the United States were to change its 
definition of the mission in Iraq to be a mission about 
watching Iran, would it not be pretty important to have Iraq 
agree that that would be the focus of the mission if we were to 
be having troops in their country to carry out such a mission?
    General Votel. Senator, we are in Iraq at the invitation of 
the government. So, yes, I agree.
    Senator Kaine. We were invited in in the summer of 2014 to 
help them defeat ISIS. Correct?
    General Votel. That is right, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, I would like to put into the 
record an article from the ``New York Times'' this morning, 
``Trump's Plan for United States Forces in Iraq Met with 
Unified Rejection in Baghdad.'' General Votel mentioned that 
one of the great things about the recent elections in Iraq was 
United States presence was not a political issue, but the 
recent statements of the President, quote, the problem for Mr. 
Trump was that the unity was a collective rejection of his 
proposal and added momentum to propose legislation that could 
hamper American troops' ability to operate in Iraq. I would 
like to put this in the record.
    Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    trump's plan for united states forces in iraq met with unified 
                          rejection in baghdad
    President Trump's unexpected announcement that he wanted American 
troops in Iraq to stay there to ``watch Iran'' achieved a previously 
unattainable goal on Monday: unity in the Iraqi political 
establishment.
    The problem for Mr. Trump was that the unity was a collective 
rejection of his proposal, and added momentum to proposed legislation 
that could hamper American troops' ability to operate in Iraq. The 
measure, which is now being drafted, would limit American troop 
movements and activities in Iraq.
    Mr. Trump's remarks, made in an interview that aired Sunday on 
CBS's ``Face the Nation,'' reverberated through Iraq late Sunday and 
were rejected by all corners of the government, even by some of the 
United States' staunchest allies, including President Barham Salih, a 
Kurd.
    ``Don't overburden Iraq with your own issues,'' said Mr. Salih, who 
was speaking Monday in Baghdad at the Al Rafidain Forum, which brings 
to get her Iraqis, regional figures and international experts to 
discuss policy challenges.
    ``The U.S. is a major power, but do not pursue your own policy 
priorities, we live here,'' Mr. Salih said, addressing his comments to 
the American administration.
    Mr. Salih's comments were mild compared with those from Iraqi 
Parliament members and political leaders who have long felt that the 
United States has been disrespectful of Iraq's sovereignty.
    On Monday, some called on Parliament to act quickly to push out the 
Americans. One of the more extreme statements came from the military 
spokesman for the Hezbollah Brigades, an Iraqi armed group that now has 
a political arm (and which is not directly connected to Lebanon's 
Hezbollah), who said that Mr. Trump's comments made the ``American 
forces legitimate targets for the Iraqi resistance.'' Over all, the 
incident lays bare that the American presence in Iraq is on thin ice 
and that United States military and political leaders have little room 
to maneuver.
    American diplomats and military officials in Washington and in 
Baghdad scrambled on Monday to contain the political fallout in Iraq 
from Mr. Trump's assertion that American troops would remain there to 
monitor any nefarious activities by neighboring Iran.
    One saving grace that might have helped mitigate the Iraqi outrage, 
one American official said, was that the Iraqi Parliament was not in 
session, perhaps sparing Washington even greater fury.
    ``Our troops are in Iraq to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS,'' a 
senior administration official said on Monday, in a conference call 
with reporters ahead of a meeting this week in Washington with 
representatives of the nearly 80 countries that belong to the coalition 
fighting the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq and several other countries 
where the organization has offshoots.
    Mr. Trump seemed to have stepped on a diplomatic hornet's nest 
inadvertently, American diplomats and military experts said, when he 
discussed the nature of the sprawling Al Asad Air Base in western Iraq, 
which he visited in late December and referred to on Sunday, and where 
American troops operate with Iraqi permission. He suggested Americans 
could use the base to carry out surveillance of Iran.
    ``We have a base in Iraq and the base is a fantastic edifice,'' Mr. 
Trump said in the CBS interview. ``I was there recently, and I couldn't 
believe the money that was spent on these massive runways.''
    American military and intelligence officials expressed bafflement 
at Mr. Trump's claim that United States forces at Al Asad, or at most 
any other Iraqi base, could take a leading role in monitoring Iran's 
nuclear program or other suspicious activities.
    Such intelligence collection is typically conducted by a 
combination of American spy satellites, electronic intercepts collected 
by the National Security Agency and possibly covert operations by 
C.I.A. spies.
    Mr. Trump's visit to Al Asad in December provoked similar anger 
from Iraqi politicians, some of whom called it an arrogant affront that 
recalled American behavior dating back to the 2003 invasion and what 
followed: the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; incidents with civilian 
casualties; and widespread sectarian violence.
    The decision that upset the broadest spectrum of Iraqis was the 
departure of American troops from the country once the status of forces 
agreement, which set the terms for United States forces in Iraq, 
expired in 2011. Although American troops had little choice but to 
leave the country after the expiration--and though Iraq's leaders 
played a large role in their exit--many Iraqis now describe the 
departure as an abandonment and part of what led to the growth of the 
Islamic State and continued fighting on Iraqi soil.
    ``It will not be forgotten what happened after the American 
withdrawal ,'' said Jowad al-Musawi, a member of Parliament from the 
bloc allied with Moktada al-Sadr, a Shiite leader. ``It will not be 
forgotten that America would at any moment leave you alone to confront 
war or terrorism.''
    With the Islamic State's territory in Iraq and Syria dwindling to 
just a sliver, many Iraqis are not sure what American forces are doing 
and where they are now based. They are fearful that Iraq will become 
the turf for a conflict between the United States and Iran, and they 
recognize that many Iraqis rely on Iran, which in recent years has been 
an ally, supplying some of southern Iraq's electricity and supporting 
Iraq when the Islamic State invaded in 2014.
    ``We strongly reject having Iraq be a place for settling regional 
or international scores or a place to provoke neighboring states,'' 
said a Twitter statement from Ammar al-Hakim, a Shiite leader in 
Parliament and part of a revered religious family in Iraq.
    ``Making our land into a place to attack neighboring states is a 
threat to our national interests and our Iraqi security,'' he added. 
``Iraq will not allow this.''
    There are about 5,200 American troops in Iraq, training and 
advising Iraqi troops and helping them carry out counterterrorism 
missions inside the country. But the United States military has a fluid 
number of soldiers and military contractors in the country, and for 
security reasons it does not give exact numbers or acknowledge all the 
locations where those forces are stationed.
    The United States has quietly been negotiating with Iraq for weeks 
to allow American Special Forces and support troops now operating in 
Syria to shift to bases in Iraq and strike the Islamic State from 
there.
    In just the last two weeks, an unverified incident has worsened 
fears of those who would rather not see the American military return to 
Iraq: a Kurdish politician announced he had just come back from a trip 
with an American colonel to see three bases previously used by American 
troops near the Iranian border and that the plan was for troops to 
return to them.
    The Iraqi authorities have not confirmed the politician's story. 
But those close to the Iranians were alarmed and concluded that either 
it was a form of psychological warfare, designed to unnerve Iran, or 
that the Americans really were coming back with the goal of using Iraq 
as a base for monitoring or even attacking Iran.
    Some senior American officers and diplomats expressed fears on 
Monday that Mr. Trump's comments could undercut the delicate 
negotiations in Iraq and weaken the United States' ability to respond 
to the Islamic State's remnants in Syria and Iraq, where they remain a 
dangerous presence--although far smaller and less lethal than in the 
past.
    But other analysts, both Iraqi and Western, said that the often 
tumultuous relationship--between Baghdad and Washington would survive 
this upset.
    ``The Iraqis know that ISIS will take years to defeat, so they also 
know the United States-Iraq military partnership will probably outlast 
this United States presidency,'' said Michael Knights, a senior fellow 
at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
    Wathiq al-Hashimi, head of the Iraqi Strategic Studies Group, a 
think tank in Baghdad, noted that despite all the heated statements, 
``my analysis is that this will not escalate into a confrontation,'' he 
said.
    ``Iran will not risk hitting the American forces and America does 
not want to hit Iran because both sides understand that Iraq's role is 
to calm the situation and bridge relations,'' between the United States 
and Iran, Mr. al-Hashimi added.

    Senator Kaine. Second, General Votel, President Trump said 
as follows: I am going to trust the intelligence that I am 
putting there, but I will say this. My intelligence people, if 
they said, in fact, Iran is a wonderful kindergarten, I 
disagree with them 100 percent.
    Are you aware of a single United States intelligence 
official of any position who has told President Trump that Iran 
is a kindergarten?
    General Votel. No, Senator, I am not aware of that.
    Senator Kaine. Nor am I. I have been, again, on this 
Committee and the Foreign Relations. Over the last years, we 
have heard open and classified testimony again and again and 
again about dangers that Iran poses. We have not heard a single 
intelligence official say Iran is a kindergarten. We have had 
General Dunford and Secretary Mattis before us saying that the 
Iran nuclear deal was in America's national interests and that 
Iran was complying with the deal. The House heard testimony in 
open session last week from a variety of intelligence officials 
saying that Iran was still complying with the nuclear deal that 
the United States unilaterally withdrew from.
    I worry--and I am not asking you this question--that the 
President hears testimony like that and equates it with 
officials saying Iran is like a kindergarten, which I find 
completely illogical.
    Third, President Trump said this. When I came in as 
President of the United States, my first year, I went to the 
Pentagon 2 weeks after I came in, a short time after, because I 
wanted to know what is going on with Iran. We were in so many 
locations in the Middle East in huge difficulty. Every single 
one of them was caused by the number one terrorist nation in 
the world, which is Iran.
    We did not go into Afghanistan with United States military 
forces in 2001 because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
    General Votel. No, Senator, we did not.
    Senator Kaine. We did not go into in Iraq in March of 2002 
because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
    General Votel. We did not, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. We did not go into Iraq in August of 2014 
because of Iran. Did we, General Votel?
    General Votel. We did not, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. In terms of where our troops are positioned 
in the Middle East overwhelming now, there are some in Syria 
also fighting ISIS, not Iran. The places where United States 
troops are in your AOR--we are not there because of Iran.
    When the President says this, we are in the Middle East 
because of Iran, it causes me great concern. Together with 
other statements made by this President, other members of the 
administration, I worry that the President is thinking about 
military action against Iran is something that would be a good 
idea.
    Let me just put this on the record. In the current state of 
affairs, I think it would be a horrible idea. I think it would 
be a horrible idea. In classified, I am going to ask you a few 
questions about, what planning has been done and what could 
potentially be a legal rationale for such a thing. But to think 
that we are in the Middle East because of Iran when in these 
three areas we are clearly not there because of Iran causes me 
grave concern.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Senator McSally?
    Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good to see you, General Votel. Thanks to you for your 
service and your sacrifice over the years.
    A very extensive testimony on a lot of issues. As someone, 
like many of you and those with you today, who has been to your 
region many times, six deployments in my time in uniform, it is 
a very complex region, as you have talked about. I appreciate 
in your testimony with the National Defense Strategy bringing 
us back home as to why are we there and what are our vital 
national interests in the region because our longer-term 
threats per the NDS are more of the great state competition and 
potential conflict.
    But many of us--many of you--we have spent our entire 
military careers deploying to the Middle East. This is all we 
know. Right? This is all we know, is dealing with Desert Storm 
and Northern Watch and Southern Watch and then OEF [Operation 
Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom]. We have 
invested so much into this, as you know, a lot of blood and 
treasure, a lot of sacrifice.
    It is part of our nature I think to just give us a little 
more time, just give us a little more resources and we can fix 
the situation. I am particularly thinking about Afghanistan. It 
is just our nature--right--that we want to just--we are almost 
there. We are almost going to have this where we want it to be.
    But I think it is very important--and I appreciate that the 
administration and as you testified today--we kind of come back 
to what are we doing there. What are our vital national 
interests in the Middle East? There has been tremendous drain 
on our military over the last 30 years in that region, and we 
got to get back to the core of we have to make sure there is no 
safe haven for jihadists and terrorists that are going to kill 
Americans, and we have got to make sure that there is not a 
hostile power in the region. That is in your testimony. Right?
    That is a generational fight against terrorism. It started 
before us. It is going to continue on. We have got to make sure 
there is no safe haven in any of these countries. You squeeze 
them in one place, they will go to another place. We will find 
them in other regions, as you know. Then we want to make sure 
there is not a hostile power, which is Iran right now.
    I just want to bring it kind of back home. I think it is 
hard for us, those who serve, because we are like what are we 
doing there. We want to make sure--we got to build more 
schools. I think there have been a lot of mistakes over the 
years. We got to build more schools in America. We do not 
necessarily need to bring some of these countries to be 
thriving 21st century democracies. We may hope that happens for 
them, but that is not our vital national interest. It is to 
keep America safe.
    As we are thinking of that and as you have testified about 
that, when you look at Afghanistan and when you look at still 
the safe haven they have in Pakistan--last time I was there, 3 
years ago, there were 12 different terrorist organizations 
there. Our military's hands were tied. They were not able to go 
after a lot of the terrorist organizations. How can we now, 
moving forward with everything you have talked about today, in 
accordance with the National Defense Strategy, make sure that 
we achieve that mission in Afghanistan? What does that look 
like to keep America safe and focusing on our drawdown there 
while we still make sure that we keep America safe and it is 
not a safe haven for terrorism?
    General Votel. Senator, thank you very much.
    I think when I look at what winning or what prevailing in 
Afghanistan looks like, it looks like two things to me. It 
looks like a negotiated settlement, and it looks like 
safeguarding our national interests. I think as you have very 
clearly said here, we have to stay focused on those particular 
things. All our efforts at this point need to be focused on 
those particular objectives and passed to those objectives. I 
think that is certainly my approach on this, and I believe it 
is the approach of General Miller, our commander on the ground 
as well, as we try to support this.
    I think the strategy that we have in place is the right one 
focused on this. We have got to stay focused on that. I think 
we will meet our requirements if we can get a negotiated 
settlement that addresses the instability of that region, and 
we can continue to safeguard our national interests.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thanks.
    Then on to Iran, again this is the largest state sponsor of 
terror. This is the one that has malign activity in the region, 
great destabilization, killing of American troops. What is the 
focus there as we are keeping our eye on the ball of this 
region and the National Defense Strategy? Because this is the 
biggest threat. You talked a lot about working with 
partnerships, but what else can we do and what else are you 
doing in order to counter that threat?
    General Votel. Certainly I think one of the most important 
things we do is continue to build partnerships and begin to 
build interoperability across the region. You know, whether we 
look at integrated air and missile defense to ensure that we 
can address the increasing ballistic missile capability that is 
coming out of Iran, that is an important aspect that we do or 
whether we address maritime security issues that allow not just 
the United States but the countries of the region to better 
patrol their own waters and prevent the movement of illicit 
goods and weapons and other things through there, I think these 
are the types of things that we can do. They are very 
attainable to us as we move forward to not only optimize the 
capabilities that we remain in place, but more importantly make 
sure that our partners are bearing the burden and taking 
responsibility for their own security as well.
    Senator McSally. Exactly. Thanks.
    I am out of time. I want to say I am grateful for Senator 
Peters' statements about the A-10 warthog as well. I do not 
think we should be using fifth generation fighters to chase 
around jihadists on Mopeds. We got to make sure that we have 
the right tools for that mission while we are using our next 
generation to deal with the larger threats that are out there. 
I found a new wingman here for fighting for the A-10.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it. I yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    We will recess the meeting till we get back together at 
2:15. That is going to be in the Visitor Center, room 217. 
Thank you very much for a long meeting and for your answers. We 
will reconvene at 2:15 in the Visitor Center, and we will 
recess this meeting. Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                   israel move from eucom to centcom
    1. Senator Cotton. General Votel, what are the possible benefits 
and challenges with a move of Israel from EUCOM AOR to CENTCOM AOR?
    General Votel. Were the Department to review moving Israel from 
EUCOM AOR to CENTCOM AOR, we would DOD need to assess the effect on: 
existing United States-Israel security cooperation architecture; 
adequacy of resources and posture to assist in Israel in Israel 
defense; and opportunities as well challenges in DOD support to 
diplomacy.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
              special federal aviation regulations (sfars)
    2. Senator Rounds. General Votel, has the DOD studied how SFARs 
might be restricting the DOD's ability to acquire qualified aviation 
support services in the CENTCOM AOR?
    General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.

    3. Senator Rounds. General Votel, how do SFAR restrictions affect 
competition for aviation support services contracts within the CENTCOM 
AOR?
    General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.

    4. Senator Rounds. General Votel, does the inability of foreign 
pilots and air crews to obtain security clearances increase the 
operational risk of sensitive DOD missions?
    General Votel. No, our command and control structure has 
flexibility which allows us to compartmentalize sensitive information 
when joint flight operations are required.

    5. Senator Rounds. General Votel, does the DOD have a central point 
of contact to engage with the FAA on the SFAR issue?
    General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.

    6. Senator Rounds. General Votel, what is the current process for 
applying a DOD ``state use'' designation to aircraft operated by 
commercial U.S. air carriers and would applying ``state use'' 
designations more frequently be more advantageous than relying on 
foreign air carriers?
    General Votel. I would defer to United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) to answer this question.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                 yemen
    7. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, exactly what types of support 
are we providing to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]

    8. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, how would you characterize the 
focus of United States intelligence support and military advice? Would 
you characterize that support as defensive in nature?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]

    9. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, if the United States ceased 
providing intelligence support and military advice to the Saudi-led 
coalition, how do you assess that this might affect the Saudi-led 
campaign in Yemen? How do you assess that this would impact Saudi and 
Emirati cooperation against terrorist threats more broadly?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]

    10. Senator Blackburn. General Votel, to what extent have the Saudi 
and Emiratis assisted us against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and 
ISIS in Yemen up until this point? To what extent have the Emiratis 
assisted us in Afghanistan? Can you update us on overall progress?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
           effect of operations in the area of responsibility
    11. Senator Hirono. General Votel, you testified before the SASC in 
2018 regarding the situation in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility and 
stated that ``Our success over the last year is largely due to the 
unyielding support of our allies, tremendous cooperation with our 
interagency partners, provision of additional authorities, and the 
continued faith of the American people in our military. However, 
despite the great strides we have made, there is much work left to 
do.'' At that time, you identified regional challenges to include: 
terrorism, violent conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile threats, 
humanitarian crisis, and radical violent ideologies. Where do you feel 
the U.S. stands today with regards to those ``strides'' and the 
remaining work that you mentioned in your 2018 testimony?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]
                      removal of troops from syria
    12. Senator Hirono. General Votel, on December 18, 2018, President 
Trump ordered the withdrawal of 2,000 American troops from Syria, 
seemingly marking the end of the United States campaign aimed at 
vanquishing the Islamic State (ISIS). This decision has received 
criticism from both parties as well as from many U.S. Military leaders. 
Former Defense Secretary Mattis and other top national security 
officials argued that a withdrawal would, essentially, surrender 
Western influence in Syria to Russia and Iran who are the chief 
benefactors of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. What is your 
assessment of the impact of this decision both currently and in the 
future?
    General Votel. United States military forces in Syria are working 
by, with, and through our coalition and Syrian Democratic Force 
partners to defeat ISIS. The withdrawal of United States Forces does 
not change that mission. We will continue to work with allies and 
partners to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS's so-called physical 
caliphate; however, the decision does create difficulties in 
maintaining our relationship in its current form with the Coalition. 
President Bashar-al Assad will remain in power with the support of 
Russia and Iran but has insufficient forces to secure Syrian territory 
once held by ISIS. As we execute the safe and professional withdrawal 
of United States military forces from Northeast Syria, a multi-lateral 
whole-of-government approach supporting stabilization efforts in 
Northeast Syria will help prevent an ISIS resurgence. We are cognizant 
that military efforts alone are insufficient to enable stabilization, 
but the military does have unique capabilities that can be brought to 
bear during stabilization. Only through the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 process can a political settlement to 
the Syrian Civil War be accomplished, resulting in a Syrian Government 
that is representative of the will of the Syrian people and can address 
the underlying issues that allowed ISIS to rise.

    13. Senator Hirono. General Votel, since President Trump's 
withdrawal announcement, what actions have the Syrian regime, Russian, 
and Iranian-backed forces taken?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]

    14. Senator Hirono. General Votel, what are the strategic 
implications of these moves regarding the stability of Syria and the 
larger Middle East?
    General Votel. Syria is a microcosm of the region where several 
state and non-state actors, with different objectives, are vying for 
access and influence to achieve their desired end states. Without a 
sustained effort put behind United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 2254, there will not be a political resolution to the Syrian 
Civil War and the establishment of a government representative of the 
will of the Syrian people that is able to address the underlying issues 
leading to the rise of violent extremist organizations. Lack of 
security and stability in Syria will result in a safe haven for Violent 
Extremist Organizations like ISIS and al Qaeda, and the continued 
humanitarian crisis that will further impact Syria's neighbors as 
refugees continue to surge across uncontrolled borders, thereby 
stressing their limited resources. Syria as a safe haven for Violent 
Extremist Organizations drives a deeper need for continued support to 
the Iraqi Security Forces to ensure security and stability of Iraq.

    15. Senator Hirono. General Votel, with the President's stated 
objectives of permanently destroying ISIS, ensuring our Kurdish allies 
are protected and containing Iran, what would be an appropriate 
timeline for withdrawal of United States troops from Syria?
    General Votel. The withdrawal of United States Forces must be 
conditions based. We will need to continue providing training and 
advice to our local counterterrorism partners, including the Syrian 
Defense Force/Syrian Arab Coalition (SDF/SAC), as they deal with the 
remnants of ISIS that have organized into smaller cells, as the SDF/SAC 
transitions from the conventional fight to defeat ISIS to one of 
Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorism. There is also the requirement 
for a negotiated policy with Turkey to help prevent North Eastern Syria 
from becoming an ISIS safe haven.
                framework for agreement with the taliban
    16. Senator Hirono. General Votel, in your opinion, has the proper 
groundwork for withdrawal of United States Forces been established in 
Afghanistan to ensure that the gains that have been made in the past 17 
years will not be put in jeopardy?
    General Votel. The Department of State has the lead for 
negotiations with the Taliban. The Department of Defense continues to 
support the United States Special Representative for Afghan 
Reconciliation. USCENTCOM also continues to conduct prudent planning to 
address all eventualities in Afghanistan. That being said, United 
States Force presence remains conditions-based, and no force 
withdrawals will occur until the Government of Afghanistan and the 
Taliban have reconciled and agreed to measurable steps to govern and 
provide security for the Afghan people and are committed to preventing 
attacks against the United States Homeland.
                 effects of the great power competitors
    17. Senator Hirono. General Votel, we continue to hear of the 
resurgence of the great power competition in your area of 
responsibility. Specifically, with China developing long-term, steady 
economic growth and increased military posture and Russia continuing to 
cultivate its relationship with the regime of Syrian President Bashar 
Assad. What are the risks that increased Russian and Chinese investment 
and influence have in your area of responsibility, both in the short- 
and long-term?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]

    18. Senator Hirono. General Votel, last year, President Trump 
suspended nearly $3 billion in security assistance to Pakistan for 
failing to rein in terrorist groups there. As a result, Pakistan has 
turned to China to bolster their Navy and improve local Pakistani 
infrastructure through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 
valued at $62 billion. Has the decision to withdraw United States 
assistance impacted your operations in the region? If so, how?
    General Votel. No, the withdrawal of security assistance money has 
not impacted USCENTCOM's operations in the region.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                            use of 2002 aumf
    19. Senator Kaine. During your testimony you said that United 
States Forces are in Iraq at the ``invitation of the Government of 
Iraq.'' Is the Administration relying upon the 2002 AUMF--which was a 
war declaration against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein--as the sole 
legal authority for any United States Military operations in Iraq or 
elsewhere in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility?
    General Votel. No. The authority for our presence in Iraq and our 
continued military operations against ISIS remains unchanged from that 
as articulated by the previous and current Administration. As we are 
conducting military activities in Iraq with the consent and at the 
invitation of the Government of Iraq and as a matter of domestic law, 
pursuant to the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs (among other authorities).
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                             isis in syria
    20. Senator Jones. Previously, you've stated ``given the many 
forces driving change and uncertainty in the region, United States 
commitment to the CENTCOM area of responsibility is more important now 
than ever. Recent experience has shown that a precipitous withdrawal of 
support, before conditions for stabilization have been set, can lead to 
catastrophic results.'' Do you believe we have definitively defeated 
ISIS in Syria, and how do we go about ensuring that victory over ISIS 
is enduring?
    General Votel. The territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria is a 
significant milestone in the global effort to defeat ISIS, but it does 
not represent the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. 
In Syria, this cannot be achieved unless the underlying conditions that 
allowed ISIS to rise in the first place are addressed and resolved. The 
mechanism to address those issues is United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 2254. This process was designed to bring about a 
political settlement to the Syrian Civil War and establish a government 
that is representative of the will of the Syrian people. Supporting 
local efforts, through a Global Coalition, that sustain the military 
gains and promote regional security and stability is an approach to 
ensuring victory over ISIS is enduring. A sustained relationship with 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and continuing to build up the capacity 
of the Iraqi Security Forces are two ways we can militarily support the 
enduring defeat of ISIS regionally. This cannot be overstated; we must 
address the disposition and de-radicalization of the thousands of ISIS 
fighters in the custody of the SDF and the tens of thousands of 
unrepentant ISIS family members segregated in camps. This massive at-
risk population could easily become the core of a resurgent ISIS or 
other violent extremist organization with global reach. Dealing with 
this industrial-scale issue requires a non-military led interagency 
approach and extensive participation by countries of origin.
                       negotiations with taliban
    21. Senator Jones. Last week, Special Representative for 
Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced an agreement in 
principle with the Taliban on 2 major points; 1) the Taliban promises 
Afghanistan's territory will not be used by international terrorist 
groups, and 2) the United States agrees to withdraw its forces. How do 
you think the Taliban can go about fulfilling this agreement?
    General Votel. [Deleted.]
                       negotiations with taliban
    22. Senator Jones. Do you believe the United States should wait for 
successful negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban 
before withdrawing?
    General Votel. Our primary focus of operations in Afghanistan is to 
support Ambassador Khalizaid's negotiation efforts for a Peace 
Settlement. Therefore, any force withdrawal should support that 
process. The primary objective of the South Asia Strategy is to seek a 
political settlement to the Afghanistan War. The negotiations are in 
the nascent stage of framework development and it is my judgement that 
the U.S. should allow the negotiations to mature before a large-scale 
withdrawal.
                         u.s. weapons tracking
    23. Senator Jones. On February 5, 2019, there was a report that 
American-made weapons have made their way into the hands of al Qaeda-
linked fighters and Iranian-backed rebels in Yemen. It's my 
understanding that legitimate purchasers of United States weapons must 
seek U.S. permission before transferring those weapons to third 
parties. The news report says that there is a Defense Department 
investigation into the issue. When and how did the Defense Department 
learn about this situation and what can you tell us about the status of 
the investigation?
    General Votel. We have seen the news report in question, and we 
take allegations of unauthorized transfers of U.S.-origin military 
equipment seriously. My understanding is that the Department of State 
is leading an investigation to determine whether United States weapons 
or other defense articles have been transferred to unauthorized end 
users in Yemen and has reached out to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 
order to obtain more information regarding these allegations. As such, 
USCENTCOM stands ready to assist, but I would refer you to the State 
Department for the status of their inquiries into the validity of the 
news report's claims.
                           detainees in syria
    24. Senator Jones. On February 5, 2019, it was reported that the 
number of foreign terrorist fighters detained by the Syrian Defense 
Force is now more than 800, and that on February 4 the State Department 
called on other nations to repatriate and prosecute their citizens. So 
far, very few countries have been willing to do so. What is the plan 
for these detainees after the U.S. withdraws, in the event their home 
countries refuse to take them back?
    General Votel. We continue working to support the Department of 
State is lead effort on this difficult challenge. The key to the long 
term stability of the region is ensuring these fighters do not get 
unexpectedly released only to return to the battlefield in Iraq or 
Syria or slip back into their home countries. We are working closely 
with the Syrian Democratic Forces to support their efforts to have 
nations repatriate and prosecute their citizens. While we continue to 
face challenges there has been some progress but more is needed. This 
situation would be further complicated if a military incursion by 
Turkey occurred.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m. in 
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. 
Inhofe (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Cotton, 
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, McSally, Scott, Blackburn, 
Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, 
Peters, Duckworth, and Jones.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS

    Senator Rounds. The Committee will come to order.
    Good morning. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, he has 
indicated that he wants to start these on time, and asked if we 
would begin with opening statements. He should be here shortly.
    The Committee meets today to receive testimony on United 
States Africa Command and Southern Command. I welcome our 
witnesses and thank them for their service: General Thomas 
Waldhauser, Commander, United States Africa Command; Admiral 
Craig Faller, Commander of United States Southern Command.
    General Waldhauser, this is likely your last hearing before 
this Committee. I want to thank you for your nearly 43 years of 
dedicated service to this Nation.
    It's also fitting to note that 12 years ago yesterday, 
February 6th, 2007, President George W. Bush directed the 
creation of United States Africa Command. It was the right 
decision, and AFRICOM continues to play a vital role in the 
defense of our Nation.
    This Committee's top priority is to ensure the effective 
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which 
identifies competition with China and Russia as the central 
challenge to United States prosperity and security. Both 
AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM should be viewed as key fronts in our 
global campaign to compete with China and Russia. In both of 
your areas of responsibility, China and Russia are increasingly 
active, using economic and military means to expand their 
influence and challenge United States interests.
    While, on behalf of the Chairman, we agree with the need to 
prioritize our efforts against China and Russia, we cannot take 
pressure off of terrorist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda. 
Despite operational setbacks, these groups continue to control 
territory in Africa and still pose a very real threat to United 
States interests and our partners.
    Lastly, while the challenges in your areas of 
responsibility are on the rise, both of your commands have long 
suffered from resource shortfalls. We look forward to you to 
explain how these shortfalls increase risk to your forces and 
impact your ability to execute the National Defense Strategy.
    Want to remind our Members that Admiral Faller and General 
Waldhauser will be available at SVC-217, immediately following 
the open hearing that we're in today, to discuss any classified 
matters that may come up today.
    With that, Ranking Member.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
    Let me join you in thanking our witnesses for appearing 
today to provide an update on our security situation and the 
U.S. military activities in your respected areas of 
responsibility. Both of you are leading commands during very 
challenging times, and we thank you for your continued service. 
Please also extend our gratitude to the men and women under 
your command for their outstanding service and dedication. Let 
me join Senator Rounds, General Waldhauser, in thanking you for 
your distinguished service to the Nation in the Marine Corps.
    I'm very concerned about the growing Chinese and Russian 
influence in both Latin America and Africa. China is leveraging 
its economic might and influence to gain access to ports and 
loaning large sums of money for infrastructure projects, many 
of which are not economically viable and will leave these 
countries beholden to Beijing. Russia is engaging in massive 
disinformation campaigns to undermine United States influence 
and propping up authoritarian regimes in both regions. Both of 
you are tasked to counter Russia and Chinese influence with 
limited funds, equipment, and people, as many of the 
Department's resources are being diverted to the INDOPACOM and 
EUCOM AORs [Areas of Responsbility]. I would like to hear how 
this implementation of the National Defense Strategy has 
affected the resources that you have to counter Russian and 
Chinese influence in these critical regions, as well as any 
additional resources you might need for this vital task.
    In Africa, as in South and Central America, we are working 
with local and international partners to advance our shared 
security goals. However, the complex and often interlocking 
challenges to stability will not be solved by military means 
alone. Indeed, many significant issues, including rapid 
population growth, demographic changes, famine, and migration, 
are long term and multidimensional in nature and require whole-
of-government policies that take an equally long-term view of 
investment and engagement in the region.
    In December, the administration announced a new United 
States strategy for Africa that highlighted the importance of 
the region to the United States economic interests and the 
growing competition with China and Russia throughout the 
continent. However, the administration has repeatedly submitted 
budgets that slash critical aid dollars and reduced engagement 
across the AOR. General Waldhauser, I hope you will discuss the 
importance of long-term engagement in Africa and the types of 
investment we should be prioritizing to best position ourselves 
for strategic competition in your AOR.
    Admiral Faller, you also have a difficult problem set. 
Narcotrafficking has flooded central and South America with 
illicit funds that exacerbate rampant corruption, especially 
among police forces. Poor economic conditions and a lack of 
citizen security has led to a humanitarian crisis that forces 
families to flee to look for better living conditions. 
Authoritarian governments propped up with Russian and Chinese 
support are undermining democratic values and destabilizing the 
region.
    Despite all of these problems, I do want to note that there 
are some bright spots. We have several capable partners in the 
region, such as Colombia, Peru, and Argentina, who are willing 
to work with us and are now net exporters of peace and 
security.
    On a final note, Venezuela is an unfolding crisis. I am 
hopeful that there will be a peaceful and democratic transition 
in Venezuela led by the Venezuelan people and supported by the 
international community. It has been terrible to watch the 
starvation of the Venezuelan people and the destruction of the 
Venezuelan economy by Maduro and his regime. Current efforts to 
support interim President Juan Guaido are being led by the 
State Department and Treasury. Congress must be consulted if 
there is any military planning action beyond the current 
planning for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and embassy 
personnel. I know the events on the ground are changing day by 
day, and it is impossible to tell what event or set of events 
will trigger Maduro's departure. I'd like to hear any updates 
you might have on what you expect in the weeks to come.
    Again, thank you, to our witnesses.
    Senator Rounds, thank you.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    General Waldhauser, would you care to begin with your 
opening statement? Your full statement will be made a part of 
the record.

  STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS D. WALDHAUSER, USMC, COMMANDER, 
                  UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

    General Waldhauser. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds. I 
appreciate it.
    Senator Rounds, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members 
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to update you 
on the efforts of United States Africa Command. I am honored to 
be here this morning with Admiral Faller to discuss many of the 
similar challenges we face in both the AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM 
areas of responsibility.
    I would like to begin this morning by remembering the 
soldier we lost on the continent during operations in Somalia 
this past year. I offer my sincere condolences to the family of 
Staff Sergeant Alexander Conrad, United States Army. We honor 
his commitment, service, dedication to duty, and dedication to 
our country.
    We also honor the sacrifice of our African partners, who 
paid the ultimate price across the continent this year, as 
well, to bring security, stability, and prosperity to Africa.
    Additionally this morning, I would like to thank our 
families, servicemembers, and civilian workforce, especially 
those who serve on the continent, oftentimes in remote 
locations, for their professionalism and commitment to 
AFRICOM's mission.
    2019 marks the beginning of AFRICOM's second decade as a 
combatant command. As we enter this period, we have adapted our 
strategy for Africa based on updated national guidance, which 
includes the President's 2017 National Security Strategy and 
the 2018 Secretary of Defense National Defense Strategy. These 
documents have shaped the focus of the armed services, 
outlining broad guidance to enhance readiness for high-end 
combat while instructing the combatant commands, among other 
things, to strengthen alliances and attract new partners.
    The recently released United States Strategy Towards 
Africa, the Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and the 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism refocused our whole-of-
government approach in the era of great-power competition to 
advance United States influence and maintain strategic access 
not only in Africa, but around the globe.
    Taken comprehensively, the overall United States strategic 
interests in Africa are very clear: prevent the undermining of 
our alliances or destabilization of African nations, counter 
violent extremist organizations, decrease the potential for 
Africa to become a failed continent, protect United States 
citizens and the Homeland, and advance American influence, 
including economic opportunities and transactions.
    To underscore the strategy for disrupting extremists, we 
remain committed to synchronizing our kinetic authorities. 
Persistent pressure on al-Shabaab, ISIS, and al Qaeda-
associated groups remains necessary to prevent this 
destabilization of African nations. United States strategic 
interests on the continent cannot be solely advanced through 
the use of military force alone. As such, AFRICOM utilizes the 
military tool, in concert with diplomacy and development 
efforts, to help negate the drivers of conflict and create 
opportunity.
    In Somalia, we work closely with the Ambassador, now 
permanently stationed in Mogadishu alongside with the USAID 
Mission Director, to help the Somalis assume responsibility for 
their own security and own prosperity.
    In Libya, our counterterrorism commitment supports the 
United States Charge, who works closely with the international 
community to prevent civil conflict and facilitate the 
political reconciliation process.
    Additionally, our engagements, exercises, and activities 
throughout Africa are designed to increase United States 
influence, strengthen local security, and ensure our status as 
the preferred security partner. For example, in East Africa, 
our programs continue to modernize partner security forces, as 
in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, who also export security and 
contribute forces to the African Union mission in Somalia.
    In North Africa, we have seen significant return on 
investment with Tunisia and Morocco, demonstrating the capacity 
to absorb advanced United States programs and to lead security-
related exercises and operations.
    In the Western Sahel and Lake Chad region, AFRICOM provides 
training, advice, and assistance to the western African 
nations, which make up the G5 Sahel organization, as well as 
those who make up the Multinational Joint Task Force, working 
to contain violent extremism and secure the borders of the Lake 
Chad Basin countries.
    Our partner networks and influence ensure U.S. access for 
United States Forces in times of crisis to protect our 
personnel and facilities on the continent, such as in Djibouti, 
a location which has strategic significance to multiple 
combatant commands.
    In conclusion, the most important use of the military tool 
on the African continent is where our engagements emphasize 
relationships and capacity-building. I am proud to lead a team 
of professionals who have built a--strong and trusting 
relationships with our African partners, United States 
interagency, and the international community to foster 
security, stability, and prosperity in Africa.
    On behalf of the servicemembers, the civilian employees, 
and families of United States Africa Command, thank you for 
your support. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you here 
this morning. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Waldhauser follows:]

           Prepared Statement by General Thomas D. Waldhauser
                              introduction
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee, I am honored to represent the men and women of United 
States Africa Command and share with you their accomplishments over the 
past year. Since I last updated the Committee, the new National 
Security, Defense, and Military Strategies, the United States Strategy 
Toward Africa, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the 
Department of Defense Strategy for Africa, and a new United States 
Africa Command Strategy and Campaign Plan have shaped our efforts on 
the continent. Each of these foundational documents acknowledges and 
underscores the strategic importance of Africa and the command's 
mission: United States Africa Command, with partners, strengthens 
security forces, counters transnational threats, and conducts crisis 
response in order to advance United States national interests and 
promote security, stability, and prosperity.
    Africa is an enduring interest for the United States, and security 
is a pre-requisite for economic growth and development. As a partner-
based command, United States Africa Command assists African nations in 
building capable and professional militaries subordinate to elected 
civilian authority and respectful of human rights, the laws of armed 
conflict, and international humanitarian law. By making deliberate 
investments in defense institutions, the United States can assist 
African partners in meeting the basic conditions needed for good 
governance, economic development, and stability.
    During 2018, United States Africa Command commemorated its tenth 
year as a geographic combatant command, reaffirming Africa's importance 
to the United States global strategy for defending and ensuring the 
economic well-being of the U.S. Homeland. Our network continues to 
focus on shared goals of a secure, stable, and prosperous Africa, which 
benefits not only our African partners and the United States, but also 
the international community.
    Headquarters United States Africa Command employs a team of 
military, civilian, interagency, and contract professionals to fulfill 
the mission. Moreover, United States Africa Command is supported by 
families who bring with them the spirit of community and teamwork, 
without which the command could not succeed. United States Africa 
Command has partnerships with the Department of State, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), and other interagency 
organizations who all work towards providing stability and prosperity 
on the continent. Globally, we collaborate with our European allies, 
the United Nations, the African Union and regional mechanisms, the 
European Union, non-governmental organizations, and other groups to 
pursue stability and security in Africa.
    By employing a partner-centric approach, United States Africa 
Command complies with the specific direction in the National Defense 
Strategy to ``support relationships to address significant terrorist 
threats in Africa.'' To address this directive, United States Africa 
Command builds on two strategic principles. First, very few, if any, of 
Africa's challenges can be resolved using only military force. 
Consequently, United States Africa Command emphasizes military support 
to diplomacy and development efforts. Our activities directly 
complement Department of State and USAID efforts to reduce the spread 
of harmful ideologies, strengthen governments who protect their 
citizens and foster security and economic successes.
    Second, persistent pressure on terrorist networks--whether it be 
operational, financial, or political--is necessary to prevent the 
destabilization of our African partner nations. Our principal means for 
applying pressure is working through our African and with our 
international partners, increasing their security capabilities and, 
only when necessary, using kinetic force. Ultimately, our use of 
military force in Africa, for example in Libya and Somalia, supports 
the host government's effort to provide the security and economic 
growth required for long-term stability and prosperity.
    By design, United States Africa Command military assistance and 
activities occur in partnership with the host government and within 
overlapping regional and global mandates. In Somalia, the command 
supports the Federal Government of Somalia, while operating in support 
of African Union and United Nations mandates. In the fight against Boko 
Haram and ISIS-West Africa (WA), we operate with partners in the 
African Union-endorsed Multinational Joint Task Force, which was 
established under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. In 
the Sahel, we partner with five national governments and within the 
overlapping mandates of the G-5 Sahel and the United Nations. In Libya, 
our activities support the UN-led political reconciliation process and 
the UN-recognized Government of National Accord. Even when we operate 
unilaterally, those actions are firmly embedded in international law 
and international legitimacy.
    United States Africa Command also plays a significant role in 
advancing the priorities outlined in the National Security and Defense 
Strategies, which emphasize the rise of China and Russia as key 
competitors. United States Africa Command has also observed increased 
engagement of non-traditional security actors, such as Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as both challenges and 
opportunities to our mission. United States Africa Command strives to 
ensure the United States remains the partner of choice, in Africa, by 
maintaining our high standards of professionalism, demonstrating 
commitment to addressing their security needs, and providing high-
quality equipment.
    Targeted investments in innovative, cost-effective, and sustainable 
approaches are common practices within Africa, and United States Africa 
Command endeavors to maximize the returns on our investments. For 
example, our strategy in Somalia features a distinct set of Advise, 
Assist, and Accompany authorities in support of the Federal Government 
of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to provide 
the opportunity for the Somali National Security Forces to successfully 
assume security responsibilities. This carefully tailored level of 
operational support reduces risk to U.S. personnel and is a cost-
effective way to further advance U.S. security interests.
    Each day, we have approximately 7,000 personnel conducting their 
assigned tasks on the African continent. These include U.S. uniformed 
personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors of all 
Services, career fields, and specialties working to address global 
security challenges and maintain strategic access and influence. These 
personnel perform duties in countries such as Cameroon, Djibouti, 
Kenya, Niger, and Somalia. Over the course of 2018, the command and our 
component commands conducted numerous engagements, exercises, security 
cooperation events, and operations across the continent. These 
activities strengthen mutually beneficial networks between the U.S. and 
partners and enhance the capability of partner nation defense forces to 
provide effective and legitimate security.
                         strategic environment
    For scale, Africa is over three times larger than the United States 
The United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility encompasses 53 
countries with a population of 1.3 billion. By 2050, this figure is 
forecasted to almost double to over 2.54 billion, with one out of every 
four people on the planet living on the African continent. 
Additionally, the continent faces a large and growing youth population 
as Africa is home to 21 of the 22 countries in the world with the 
youngest average populations. Forty-one percent of Africans are under 
the age of 15, while 60 percent of the total population is under the 
age of 24. Economic development, leading to employment, is necessary in 
order to assist in preventing conflict, as Africa needs to add 
approximately 20 million jobs each year to keep pace with the growing 
population.
    The lack of economic and educational opportunities, a large, 
disenfranchised youth population, and inadequate natural resources are 
potential drivers of extremism, which, when coupled with authoritarian, 
corrupt, or ineffective governments, contribute to persistent 
instability. According to the Fund For Peace's 2018 Fragility State 
Index, 33 of the 50 countries most at risk of becoming unstable are in 
Africa. This includes seven of the top ten most fragile states. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme's Human 
Development Index, 32 African countries are listed in the ``Low Human 
Development'' categories of health, education, security, and 
employment.
    United States Africa Command employs the broad-reaching Diplomacy, 
Development, and Defense approach to foster interagency efforts and 
help negate the drivers of conflict and extremism. With the Department 
of State and USAID, United States Africa Command supports programs and 
initiatives fostering political reconciliation and elections in 
countries such as Libya. Our diplomatic and development partners work 
with African partners to provide jobs, food, clean water, and 
education, such as in Ethiopia and Nigeria, helping to counter 
incentives offered by violent extremists organizations (VEOs) or 
criminal networks.
    In Africa, VEOs remain a serious threat to the shared interests of 
our partners, allies, and the United States These VEOs and criminal 
networks prey upon disenfranchised populations, creating a cycle of 
recruitment and allowing extremist ideology to fester. Extremist 
networks also exploit criminal networks for the illicit transport of 
narcotics, weapons, and persons. VEOs cultivate and encourage an 
environment of distrust, despair, and hopelessness to undermine 
governments, allowing for the expansion of their radical ideology.
    Over the next decade, Africa will be shaped by the increased 
presence of external actors and the effects of environmental change. 
The United States welcomes those partners pursuing helpful and 
constructive interests in Africa to develop its economic, 
infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors. However, with 
emerging markets and a growing consumer class, external actors often 
employ exploitative tactics and ``debt trap'' diplomacy to garner undue 
influence.
    Over the past decade, China has injected considerable amounts of 
financing into the continent, including offering key loans to 
strategically-located countries, like Djibouti, Senegal, and Angola. 
Chinese interests include gaining greater access to Africa's mineral 
and other natural resources, opening markets, and accessing naval 
ports. In the short term, the complete financial packages can make 
China appear to be an attractive partner for African nations. For 
example, African nations who become signatories to China's Belt and 
Road Initiative (the BRI) receive promises of development, defense, and 
cultural investments in their countries, further enhancing China's 
influence while challenging our own partnerships in Africa.
    African leaders are growing increasingly wary of their business 
ventures with China. For example, the Nairobi-Mombasa Railway in Kenya 
has met with criticism for its high price and the relatively low number 
of African workers in dispatcher and locomotive driver positions, 
relative to Chinese workers. While Chinese officials say their business 
agreements come with no strings attached, construction work on the 
continent is often carried out by Chinese companies and Chinese workers 
failing to boost local employment. African countries, which can access 
financing through China's state-owned banks, often commit to contracts 
that can lead to debt-equity swap arrangements when debt obligations 
are unfulfilled. For Kenya, which financed 90 percent of the total $3.6 
billion railway project from China in 2014, loan repayment rates are 
scheduled to triple in 2019 per the conditions of the loan agreement 
risking this scenario.
    Russia is also a growing challenge and has taken a more 
militaristic approach in Africa. By employing oligarch-funded, quasi-
mercenary military advisors, particularly in countries where leaders 
seek unchallenged autocratic rule, Russian interests gain access to 
natural resources on favorable terms. Some African leaders readily 
embrace this type of support and use it to consolidate their power and 
authority. This is occurring in the Central African Republic where 
elected leaders mortgage mineral rights--for a fraction of their 
worth--to secure Russian weapons. Russia also garners additional 
support at the United Nations and gains more customers for its military 
arms sales.
    Russia is more deliberate in Libya as they invoke Qaddafi-era 
relationships and debts to obtain economic and military contracts. 
These agreements are aimed at accessing Libya's vast oil market, 
reviving arms sales, and gaining access to coastal territories on the 
Mediterranean Sea, providing Russia closer access to Europe's southern 
border.
    Consequently, the cross-border and global nature of Chinese and 
Russian actions and influence in Africa necessitates collaboration 
between United States Africa Command, United States European Command, 
United States Central Command, and United States Indo-Pacific Command, 
amplifying the global complexity of this issue.
    The second emergent challenge in Africa is the effect of 
environmental change on African security. A large number of Africans 
make their living on the land, whether they grow crops or raise 
livestock, and many live at a subsistence level. Settled farmers and 
nomadic herdsmen are increasingly engaged in land-use disputes, which 
are emerging as major driver of conflict in central Mali, through the 
Middle Belt Region of Nigeria, in South Sudan, and into the Central 
African Republic. More people are competing for less arable land, while 
both modern state institutions and customary institutions are failing 
or have failed to regulate this competition.
    Poor land-use policies, changing weather patterns, rising 
temperatures, and dramatic shifts in rainfall contribute to drought, 
famine, migration, and resource competition. In the greater Sahel 
region, the Sahara Desert has expanded southward by over 10 percent 
since the 1920s, reducing the amount of productive land. Due to changes 
in weather patterns aggravated by poor resource management, Lake Chad 
has contracted 90 percent since the 1960s, significantly decreasing the 
region's largest source of fresh water. The reduction in arable land 
for crops and grazing land for livestock has created strong competition 
between the region's farmers and herders who migrate across borders 
searching for usable land. As each group seeks land for its own 
purposes, violent conflict can ensue. Armed groups and criminal 
networks exploit this situation, leading to human trafficking, slavery, 
and more violence.
    Environmental degradation and the overuse of natural resources 
exacerbate weak or ineffective governments who are unable to respond 
and cope with their already serious, on-going political, economic, and 
social challenges. United States Africa Command and our partners are 
investing to build the capability and capacity of governance, 
infrastructure, and defense institutions, so African Governments can 
mitigate the effects of environmental degradation. This can be 
accomplished with, for example, sustainable electric grids, viable 
water treatment facilities, environmentally-sound agricultural 
developments, and professional security forces.
    Despite the challenges on the continent, Africans are eager and 
receptive to work with the United States to advance common strategic 
interests. Africa's future depends on urgent action to address the 
needs of growing populations, mitigate the influence of harmful 
activities, and combat the effects of environmental change. United 
States Africa Command's role within the Diplomacy, Development, and 
Defense construct supports partner efforts to enable economic growth 
and prosperity by providing a stable security environment.
            united states africa command strategic approach
    The successful advancement of United States interests in Africa is 
best achieved with stable nations on the continent. Accountable 
governments, well-trained and disciplined militaries with a respect for 
the rule of law and human rights, and growing economies are 
cornerstones to this stability. Over the past year, consistent with the 
updated national strategies, United States Africa Command revised our 
strategic approach to effectively strengthen our African partners by 
evolving our security cooperation from a focus on crisis response to 
capability and capacity building against our new strategic priorities: 
state fragility, increased involvement of China and Russia, VEO 
expansion, and threats to United States access and influence.
    The United States Africa Command strategy prioritizes five 
objectives: 1) African Partners contribute to regional security, 2) 
threats from VEOs and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are 
reduced to a level manageable by internal security forces, 3) U.S. 
access and influence are ensured, 4) United States Africa Command sets 
the theater by aligning forces, authorities, capabilities, footprints, 
and agreements, and 5) U.S. personnel and facilities are protected. 
These objectives nest within the foundational strategies and provide 
the framework for the revised five-year focus in the United States 
Africa Command Campaign Plan and the United States Africa Command 
Theater Posture Plan.
Foundational Strategies
    For United States Africa Command, the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy underscore the importance of our African Partners, European, 
and international alliances to build partner capabilities and capacity 
in order to create a more secure, stable, and prosperous continent. 
Furthermore, the strategies emphasize the protection of the American 
people, Homeland, and the American way of life.
    The National Defense Strategy focuses on Great Power Competition 
and expanding the use of lethality, partnering, and process reform. 
Additionally, the National Defense Strategy continues to emphasize the 
threat posed by VEOs to the United States Homeland, our allies, and our 
African Partners. Much like the National Defense Strategy, United 
States Africa Command links VEOs to instability in Africa. Hence, the 
importance of alliances and partnerships is amplified in the command's 
strategy and campaign plan and in the command's response to regional 
crises, whether humanitarian or security related.
    Two other key foundational documents provide the policy guidance to 
synchronize United States Africa Command efforts with that of the whole 
of the United States Government. First, the Department of Defense 
Strategy for Africa mandates United States Africa Command strengthen 
African security forces and develop institutions at the national and 
regional levels. United States Africa Command's focus on security 
cooperation is a key component in the United States whole-of-government 
approach. Moreover, by seeking low-cost and resource-sustainable 
security solutions, the Department of Defense Strategy for Africa 
framework sets the conditions for United States Africa Command to adapt 
to current and emergent challenges in Africa.
    Next, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism emphasizes the use 
of all instruments of American power, with a focus on non-military 
capabilities. The strategy's framework encourages working with a wide-
range of partners in both the public and private sectors (e.g., 
technology, financial institutions) and allied governments to encourage 
counterterrorism burden-sharing. Information sharing, counter-finance, 
reintegration of returning foreign fighters, and counter-messaging 
promote positive narratives to increase partner awareness and 
strengthen partner capability to address the broader counterterrorism 
challenges within Africa. These foundational strategies are 
synchronized with the United States Africa Command Strategy and 
Campaign Plan, promoting a consistent approach, over time, to 
strengthen relationships and enhance the capability of our African 
partners.
    In December 2018, the President signed the United States Strategy 
Toward Africa, which focuses on economic partnerships to build self-
reliance among our African partners in the era of great power 
competition with external actors, such as China and Russia. This 
strategy aims to advance trade and commercial ties with key African 
states to increase United States and African prosperity. Doing so helps 
to protect the United States from cross-border health and security 
threats, and supports African states' progress toward stability and 
citizen-responsive governance. The strategy also prioritizes foreign 
assistance to help our African partners achieve sustained economic 
growth and self-reliance to combat transnational threats. Ultimately, 
the United States Africa Command Strategy seeks to strengthen 
partnerships to increase United States influence, protect United States 
personnel and facilities, and ensure access, as specifically directed 
in the United States Strategy Toward Africa.
United States Africa Command Campaign Plan
    Based on the National Security and Defense Strategies, and as 
indicated in our mission statement, the revised United States Africa 
Command Campaign Plan provides the command, and our component commands, 
strategic direction to advance our strategic goals on the continent. It 
does so in a burden-sharing and balanced approach, accounting for the 
increased presence of external actors, namely China and Russia, and the 
continued threat posed by VEOs.
    To achieve the United States Africa Command Campaign Plan 
objectives, the command emphasizes six approaches: 1) Strengthen 
Partner Networks; 2) Enhance Partner Capability; 3) Develop Security in 
Somalia; 4) Contain Instability in Libya; 5) Support Partners in Sahel 
and the Lake Chad Region; and 6) Set the Theater to facilitate United 
States Africa Command day-to-day activities, crisis response, and 
contingency operations.
            Strengthen Partner Networks
    United States Africa Command strives to further United States, 
allied, and partner interests and access to mitigate destabilizing 
influences on the continent. The Strengthen Partner Network approach is 
the primary effort in which the command seeks to establish new 
partnerships with countries and organizations, strengthen existing 
relationships through enhanced communication and synchronization, and 
counter the activities of external actors such as China and Russia. 
This approach focuses on maintaining the United States as the preferred 
security partner in Africa.
    For example, in April 2018, United States Naval Forces Africa 
conducted Exercise Lightning Handshake with the Royal Moroccan Navy and 
Air Force. This was the most sophisticated bilateral exercise the 
United States conducted with an African partner. It included a United 
States Carrier Strike Group executing close air support and naval 
surface fire support missions at the Tan Tan live fire range in 
Morocco.
            Enhance Partner Capability
    This approach is applied continent-wide and includes building 
African partner capability focused on defense institution building, 
countering illicit trafficking, maritime security, counter-improvised 
explosive devices (IED) efforts, humanitarian assistance, infectious 
disease control, and counter-VEO efforts. Engagements and exercises, 
managed by United States Africa Command and its component commands, 
strengthen key partnerships and improve partner capabilities. Since 
challenges in Africa intersect the activities of a multitude of United 
States Government agencies and international organizations, United 
States Africa Command maintains a broad group of federal, allied, and 
partner command liaisons to coordinate our capability-building efforts. 
One of those mechanisms is our Multilateral Planning Group, tri-chaired 
by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, where we are able 
to discuss and synchronize our efforts on the continent.
            Develop Security in Somalia
    This approach supports not only AMISOM and Somali Security Forces, 
but also the United Nations, European Union, African Union, and other 
allies and partners contributing to the international effort to counter 
al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. Anchored by the AMISOM Troop Contributing 
Countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, this 
approach allows for creating the opportunity to build the capability, 
capacity, and willingness of the Somali Security Forces. The approach 
centers on security cooperation, engagements, and exercises, as well as 
Advise, Assist, and Accompany authorities, to strengthen the Somali 
Security Forces. Taken in concert with the Enhance Partner Capability 
approach, the effort also addresses the capacity-building needs of the 
Troop Contributing Countries. The cumulative effects of the two 
approaches aim to support Somalia and the Somali Security Forces as 
they work to achieve regional stability and to support the vision of 
the Federal Government of Somalia.
            Contain Instability in Libya
    This approach guides the command's efforts to contain instability 
brought on by the lack of a unifying government and the presence of 
VEOs in Libya, which include ISIS-Libya and al-Qaeda in the Lands of 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The approach is focused on using the 
military tool to advance diplomacy, conduct operations to degrade VEOs, 
improve the security architecture of the Libyan Government of National 
Accord, and, once a political reconciliation is achieved, strengthen 
the national security forces of a recognized Libyan Government. United 
States Africa Command, working with the Libya External Office of the 
United States Embassy to Libya, conducts engagements with Libyan 
political and military leaders to bolster relationships and maintain 
progress toward reconciliation. United States Africa Command stands 
firmly with and supports the efforts of the United Nations as it leads 
the political reconciliation process, the immediate next step for 
Libyan stability.
            Support Partners in the Sahel and Lake Chad Regions
    In West Africa, roughly the size of the continental United States, 
this approach provides capabilities and support to counter-VEO 
operations, primarily against Boko Haram, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal 
Muslimin (JNIM), ISIS-Greater Sahara, and ISIS-West Africa. The 
command's efforts support the Multinational Joint Task Force countries 
of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and the G5 Sahel Joint 
Force countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. To 
support the Multinational Joint Task Force, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, 
and their individual member states, the command conducts engagements, 
exercises, and limited operations, and provides appropriate security 
assistance to increase the partners' willingness and capabilities in 
counter-VEO efforts.
            Set the Theater
    The logistics challenges of supporting our engagements on the 
continent necessitate the command align with a whole-of-government 
approach to support national security interests. This whole-of-
government approach ensures we have the authorities, capabilities, 
footprint, agreements, and understandings in place to maintain access 
and accomplish our missions. The United States Africa Command Theater 
Posture Plan details the command's footprint of forces and agreements 
on the continent. Posture initiatives focus on expanding strategic 
access to enable day-to-day activities, contingency operations, and 
crisis response. The backbone of access in Africa is our network of 
enduring contingency locations and agreements with key African 
partners, which provides freedom of action and status protection for 
United States personnel.
    Ensuring strategic access requires complementary defense, 
diplomatic, and development efforts across the interagency and with our 
allied and African partners. An enduring mission of the command is to 
support the Department of State-led mission to protect U.S. personnel 
and facilities on the continent. We maintain defense cooperation 
agreements with several African nations allowing for forward staging 
locations to enable more efficient recovery and evacuation. As such, we 
maintain enduring locations and contingency locations throughout 
Africa, which provide a flexible and diverse posture for operational 
needs and the protection of United States personnel and facilities.
    Our capable posture network also allows forward staging of forces 
to provide flexible and timely responses to crises involving U.S. 
personnel or interests. At Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, the only forward 
and enduring United States military installation in Africa, United 
States Forces engaged in security cooperation activities, contingency 
operations, and logistics support to five combatant commands: United 
States Africa Command, United States Central Command, United States 
European Command, United States Special Operations Command, and United 
States Transportation Command. Camp Lemonnier is our hub in East Africa 
and remains a vital link to build stability in this key region.
    One of United States Africa Command's newest and most important 
posture initiatives is the development of the West Africa Logistics 
Network. The West Africa Logistics Network provides and positions 
right-sized aircraft throughout West and Central Africa to facilitate 
the distribution of supplies, personnel, and equipment to support 
locations.
    implementing the united states africa command strategic approach
Achieving and Maintaining Influence
    United States Africa Command continues to advance United States 
strategic objectives through the execution of activities and the 
expenditure of resources to respond to both regional crises and 
instability, while prioritizing Great Power Competition efforts across 
the continent. This approach requires the United States to continue 
with our authorities to counter transnational threats, including 
terrorism and infectious diseases, which threaten African Governments 
and the United States and its interests in Africa. It also strives to 
enhance security cooperation with our African partners, so they may 
become more stable, well-governed, and self-reliant, thereby setting 
the conditions for economic growth and development.
    United States Africa Command aspires to achieve and maintain 
influence with our allies and African partners through security 
cooperation, exercises, engagements, operations, and efforts to mature 
the theater. This requires the synchronization of emerging policy and 
guidance from the National Defense Strategy and other strategic 
documents to drive United States Government activities and engagements 
across Africa, reinforced by the importance of capturing a return on 
investment. As such, the command and its component commands have a firm 
understanding of the necessity to coordinate a whole-of-government 
approach toward strengthening relationships and building partner 
capability in support of national defense objectives.
    Consistency in resources is the most effective method for 
implementing our strategic approach in Africa, as United States Africa 
Command does not have an abundance of dedicated assigned forces. These 
resources include the authorities, capabilities, funding, and allocated 
personnel to further our international and interagency relationships 
and provide appropriate military support and security cooperation to 
diplomatic and development efforts with our African partners. This 
consistency allows for the planned execution and delivery of senior 
leader engagements, security capabilities, and multinational exercises 
necessary to bring about a secure environment for the advancement of 
U.S. national interests and sustainment of military advantages.
    Additionally, various programs and funding allow United States 
Africa Command to further its campaign objectives. At its headquarters, 
United States Africa Command imbeds fifteen military personnel from 
allied and partner nations in the Multinational Coordination Center 
fostering an enduring relationships and increasing interoperability 
with allies and partners. The foreign military personnel do not command 
United States Forces or make final determinations on plans or 
directives but do assist in coordinating military engagement efforts 
and exercises to further U.S. multinational partnerships. Additionally, 
United States Africa Command leads and participates in multilateral 
planning groups for East Africa, North Africa, and the Sahel region. 
Likewise, our component commands host senior leader staff talks with 
their respective component equivalents. The U.S. Army Regionally 
Aligned Force also assists with the United States Africa Command 
mission. Working within the security cooperation framework, the 
Regionally Aligned Force executes a significant share of the military-
to-military activities in Africa. Sustained access to the Regionally 
Aligned Force is critical to mission success.
    The U.S. National Guard's State Partnership Program is by far one 
of United States Africa Command's most valuable implementing programs. 
The State Partnership Program pairs 14 African nations with 11 United 
States states and the District of Columbia and creates enduring 
relationships with their African partners to build and improve 
peacekeeping capacity, disaster management competency, and overall 
partner readiness. United States Africa Command continues to see a 
great return on investment with the State Partnership Program, 
conducting 120 events this past year and engaging over 3,000 partner 
nation personnel at a cost of four million dollars. We look forward to 
expanding this outreach as several more African countries have 
requested partnerships, which are currently under consideration.
    Other programs mitigating the lack of dedicated forces and, in 
turn, building partner capability include the Department of State 
Global Peace Operations Initiative, the African Peacekeeping Rapid 
Response Partnership, and the Women, Peace, and Security Initiative. 
The Department of Defense also coordinates closely with the Department 
of State on programs in Africa including the Partnership for Regional 
East Africa Counterterrorism, Trans Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership, Africa Military Education Program, and Africa Maritime 
Security Initiative to support critical counterterrorism, maritime 
security and overall military professionalization efforts.
    These programs continue to professionalize partner militaries and 
security forces through training and institution building, and their 
concepts are integrated into military-to-military engagements; training 
on human rights, rule of law, and prevention of gender-based violence; 
and exercises.
East Africa
    In 1991, the United States closed the Embassy in Somalia as the 
country descended into rampant violence and insecurity. Al-Shabaab and 
al-Qaeda eventually filled the security vacuum and, with Mogadishu 
firmly under their control, used this safe haven to plan and launch 
terror attacks not only inside Somalia, but also regionally throughout 
East Africa. Since al-Shabaab's first external attack in 2010, the 
group has killed hundreds through external operations, with the most 
lethal attacks occurring in Kenya and Uganda. Somali pirates have also 
disrupted commercial shipping lanes, reaching as far north as the 
Arabian Sea and as far south as Tanzania, while attacking and hijacking 
sea vessels for ransom.
    By 2007, AMISOM was activated in Somalia, with Burundi, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda contributing troops and conducting military 
operations, which eventually led to the return of the capital city to a 
newly formed Somali Federal Government. Today, a United States 
Ambassador is permanently located in Mogadishu and, along with the 
USAID Mission Director, is working with the Federal Government of 
Somalia to improve the security environment and promote stability. As 
such, U.S. military operations and activities are part of a whole-of-
government approach working in support of diplomatic and development 
efforts.
    Somalia remains key to the security environment of East Africa, and 
its long-term stability is important to advancing United States 
interests in the region. When assessing Somalia, it is important to 
understand incremental progress has been made over the last decade as 
the result of a truly international effort inside the country. The 
United States works closely with our international partners, which 
include the United Nations, European Union, African Union, AMISOM and 
the troop contributing countries, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and 
others, on security sector development efforts. Together, we remain 
committed to Somali-led progress on improving conditions for a well-
trained Somali National Security Forces that can assume and sustain 
security within the country.
    The United States also continues to target al-Shabaab and ISIS-
Somalia. United States military activities in Somalia include remote or 
accompanied advise and assist missions, the building, training, and 
equipping of Somali combat units, and when necessary, kinetic action. 
The effects of our kinetic activities serve to disperse al-Shabaab and 
ISIS-Somalia leadership, disrupt how they communicate, and further 
decentralize how they conduct operations. Ultimately, our kinetic 
activities, encouraged and supported by the Federal Government of 
Somalia, create opportunities for governance to take hold.
    Our actions are synchronized with AMISOM's mandate to reduce 
threats and support stabilization, reconciliation, and peacebuilding. 
We are supporting the AMISOM transition plan, which envisions 
conditions for an effective, responsible, and gradual handover of 
security responsibilities from AMISOM by 2021. Recent efforts by Somali 
security forces, working with AMISOM, to stabilize the area in and 
around Merka, is a positive step. However, the Federal Government of 
Somalia must continue to demonstrate sustained progress in implementing 
the federated security model, within its national security 
architecture, and increase coordination and cooperation with the 
Federal Member States.
    The United States brings leadership and influence to Somalia, led 
by the United States Ambassador, to synchronize and support the 
international community's ongoing security and stability efforts. While 
United States military training and operations alone cannot defeat al-
Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, alongside United States diplomatic and 
development efforts, they provide legitimacy to the Federal Government 
of Somalia and create opportunity for political and economic growth, 
and security and stability in the broader region.
    United States Africa Command's security cooperation is closely 
linked with the United States Mission to Somalia's political and 
economic initiatives targeting the root cause of instability. The 
Department of State and USAID provide effective tools to build and 
reinforce stabilization, democratic institution building, education, 
and health development programs. Somalia has held a credible federal 
presidential selection process, and political leaders have formed four 
Federal Member States and selected regional presidents and parliaments. 
While Somalia remains a fragile state, the gross domestic product has 
moderately increased over the past two years and, combined with other 
positive economic indicators, has the potential to lead to debt relief 
and additional international financing and investments.
    While there have been signs of improvement in Somalia, progress is 
not irreversible and sustained international engagement will be 
necessary to keep the country on a positive trajectory. The United 
States, by virtue of our capabilities, influence, and credibility, is 
uniquely postured to support Somali efforts, including to help 
coordinate other international partner engagement. As such, the Federal 
Government of Somalia must now take advantage of the opportunities 
before them, with a clear understanding future assistance will depend 
on demonstrated progress.
    In Djibouti, the United States remains a steadfast partner. In May 
2018, members of the Djiboutian Army's first ever Rapid Intervention 
Battalion graduated from training. The Texas National Guard, assigned 
to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, provided the Rapid 
Intervention Battalion with comprehensive individual and collective 
training in support of the unit's mission as a multi-purpose reaction 
force responsible to the leadership of the Djiboutian Army.
    However, Djibouti's increasing partnership with China across 
defense, trade, and financial sectors encroaches on and, at times, 
diminishes United States access and influence. In 2018, Djibouti 
nationalized the Doraleh Container Port. Despite the increased presence 
of China within the port complex, Djibouti has retained control of the 
container port, increasing shipping volume and through-put since 
removing Dubai Ports World. Our continued access and unimpeded usage to 
this facility is critical to our logistical efforts in East Africa.
    Additionally, China's first overseas naval base in Djibouti, only a 
few miles from Camp Lemonnier, creates air space and coordination 
challenges for all international partners. United States Africa Command 
considers access to Djibouti and to critical global shipping lanes 
through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait an imperative to ensure United States 
strategic interests are not compromised. We work closely with the 
United States Ambassador to Djibouti and his initiative to coordinate 
with the host nation, the Chinese, and other countries based in 
Djibouti to de-conflict operations, ensure the safety of forces, and 
maintain appropriate access for our military activities.
    In Ethiopia last April, Abiy Ahmed Ali became Prime Minister, and 
his commitment to political reform, human rights, and unity has been a 
positive contribution to peace and stability in the region. By June, 
Abiy's Government made significant progress implementing the 2000 
Algiers Accord to end the war with its neighbor, Eritrea. Since then, 
both countries have taken numerous positive actions to conclude 
Africa's longest running border conflict. Commercial flights between 
the capitals of Addis Adaba and Asmara now occur daily, Ethiopian 
commercial vessels operate through Eritrean ports, communication 
channels are open between the populations reuniting families and 
friends, and military forces are withdrawing from contested territory.
    Prime Minister Abiy's reform agenda represents an unprecedented 
attempt to comprehensively reset Ethiopian governance. The Government 
of Ethiopia is working with various ethnic factions inside the country 
to address root causes of conflict and expand the political discourse. 
Prime Minister Abiy restructured his cabinet, establishing a Ministry 
of Peace and appointed women to 50 percent of the positions, to include 
the Minister of Defense, a first for Ethiopia.
    In partnership with the Government of Ethiopia and in support of 
our diplomatic mission, United States Africa Command is developing 
additional support options to improve security cooperation with this 
key partner. Ethiopia is already benefiting from security cooperation 
programs, including intelligence sharing initiatives, and we will 
identify avenues to enroll more personnel in United States military 
education and training programs. In July 2019, Ethiopia will host 
United States Africa Command Exercise Justified Accord in order to 
enhance AMISOM's Troop Contributing Countries' ability to conduct peace 
operations. Ethiopia is the largest contributor of United Nations 
peacekeeping forces and provides approximately 4,200 troops to AMISOM.
    United States Africa Command will seek to expand our military-to-
military relationship in support of Prime Minister Abiy's fast-paced 
internal reform efforts and regional outreach.
North Africa
    Since 2011, with the overthrow of Libyan dictator Muhammar Qaddafi 
and the rise of the Arab Spring, Libya has been in a constant state of 
turmoil. In 2014, Libyan militants began pledging allegiance to the 
Islamic State and its cause. By 2015, the Islamic State had infiltrated 
the coastal city of Sirte, shifted aspirations of the militia members 
there, and declared it a part of the caliphate. Soon militants from 
outside Libya joined the organization, now branded as ISIS-Libya, and 
their numbers swelled into the thousands.
    In 2016, the Libyan Government of National Accord requested 
assistance from the United States and our European allies to rid the 
country of ISIS-Libya. Together, we assisted Libyan forces aligned to 
the Government of National Accord and conducted hundreds of kinetic 
strikes in support of its ground operations in Sirte. Within months, 
Sirte was liberated. Since then, the United States has remained engaged 
in the international efforts to stabilize Libya.
    United States Africa Command focuses on three objectives for Libya. 
First, United States Africa Command assists in degrading terrorist 
groups, such as AQIM and ISIS-Libya, who pose threats to United States 
and Western interests and destabilize Libya and its neighbors. Second, 
every effort is made to prevent widespread civil conflict that would 
threaten security and stability. Finally, United States Africa Command 
supports the political reconciliation process by providing security to 
facilitate diplomatic engagements in Libya.
    United States Africa Command continues to support the United States 
Libya External Office's diplomatic efforts to promote the United 
Nations-facilitated Libyan political reconciliation process. The recent 
return of a former Ambassador to Libya as the Charge d'Affaires of the 
Libya External Office offers a seasoned diplomat, who is familiar with 
the multi-layered problem set. The U.S. is now better positioned to 
manage the diplomatic and counterterrorism strategy. In 2018, United 
States Africa Command conducted kinetic strikes targeting the 
leadership and operational commanders of both ISIS-Libya and AQIM 
providing the opportunity for the Libyan Government of National Accord 
to continue its efforts to improve security and work towards political 
reconciliation.
    Tunisia is one of our most capable and willing partners. In May 
2018, United States Marine Corps Forces Africa conducted Exercise 
African Lion in Tunisia and Morocco. This annual, multinational 
exercise enabled United States Forces and our African partners to 
increase interoperability and further refine tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for countering VEOs.
    Furthermore, United States Africa Command-managed security 
cooperation programs work to develop Tunisian counterterrorism and 
border security capabilities. Through fiscal years 2017 to 2019, over 
$165 million in title 10 and title 22 funding will be invested in 
developing maritime and rotary-wing capabilities to bolster Tunisian 
border control forces. Tunisia is also developing its counter-IED 
awareness program through training provided by United States Army 
Africa and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. With this 
state-of-the-art training, Tunisian special operations forces will be 
better trained and equipped to counter IED attacks.
    Tunisia is also capable of managing more advanced logistics 
training and maintaining increasingly complex intelligence, 
reconnaissance, and surveillance assets. For example, United States Air 
Forces Africa completed proof-of-principle flights with the Tunisian 
Air Force as part of an initiative to leverage their transport 
capability for rapid mobility requirements across the theater. 
Continued flights over time will serve as an opportunity to enhance the 
capability of the Tunisian Air Force, while reducing the stress on U.S. 
airlift assets and personnel. Tunisia remains a political and military 
leader in the region and a net exporter of security.
    The Kingdom of Morocco remains a vital United States security 
partner and ranks in the top five of African countries providing 
peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa. Additionally, Morocco is a key 
exercise integrator serving as the permanent host of Exercise African 
Lion which focuses on counter-VEO, interoperability, and strengthening 
regional relationships. In 2019, Morocco will also host Exercise 
Phoenix Express, the premier United States Naval Forces Africa exercise 
emphasizing maritime security and counter-illicit trafficking.
    Algeria is a capable partner in the fight against extremism. With 
the largest army in Africa, Algeria conducts frequent military-to-
military engagements to build its border protection and 
counterterrorism forces. United States relations with Algeria continue 
to foster cooperation and further regional stability.
Sahel and Lake Chad Regions
    Within the Sahel region of northern and western Africa, dangerous 
pockets of extremists control numerous under-governed spaces. The 
African-led, French-assisted, and United States-supported G5 Sahel 
Joint Force, comprised of forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger, is a successful example of burden sharing. The 
U.S. is providing bilateral security assistance for the countries of 
the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and United States Africa Command contributes 
operational planning support to compliment the funding and operational 
assistance provided by our European allies to the G5 Sahel Joint Force. 
United States Africa Command remains committed to assisting the 
African-led operations to degrade VEOs and to build the defense 
capabilities within the G5 Sahel Joint Force and, in turn, build the 
capabilities of individual countries within the joint force.
    Mali remains the epicenter of instability and a haven for many 
terror groups to stage and launch attacks across the region. The United 
Nations Mission in Mali continues to support the stabilization of the 
country and implementation of the Algiers Accord for Peace and 
Reconciliation in Mali. Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo are the leading African nations contributing to United Nations 
Mission in Mali, which has more than 11,000 military personnel. Our 
European allies provide military education, advice, and training to the 
Malian Armed Forces through the European Training Mission-Mali. This 
mission has trained over 12,000 personnel in an effort to strengthen 
the Malian Armed Forces to defend its territory and protect its people.
    United States Africa Command lends critical support to partner 
counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel. This primarily takes the form of 
providing key enabling capabilities to the French and members of the G5 
Sahel Joint Force. Furthermore, we continue to build military 
operational and defense institutional capabilities through measured 
security cooperation coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies' 
diplomacy and development efforts. Through these actions, we complement 
the international effort to maintain persistent pressure on terror 
networks and increase security and stability in Mali.
    In Burkina Faso, United States Africa Command finds a willing and 
capable partner in West Africa. With almost $40 million in U.S. title 
10 expenditures, the Burkinabe armed forces remain dependable exporters 
of security with trained security forces capable of contributing to the 
G5 Sahel Joint Force. Despite manpower and equipment challenges, the 
Burkinabe security forces continue to conduct counterterrorism 
operations in both the North and Eastern regions.
    In Niger, serious governance and development issues are exacerbated 
by rapid population growth, environmental degradation, economic 
stagnation, and stressed infrastructure. Moreover, regional VEOs, such 
as ISIS-Greater Sahara, JNIM, Boko Haram, and ISIS-West Africa, overlap 
within Niger. As such, our policy goals aim to assist Niger's continued 
development as a stable democracy with accountable governance, become 
an increasingly capable partner against regional threats, and achieve 
social and institutional development and broad-based economic growth, 
which will further strengthen the population against VEO recruitment 
efforts. In spite of these challenges, Niger is an increasingly capable 
regional partner.
    Over a three year period, United States Africa Command-managed 
title 10 support has increased Nigerien counter-IED capability, as well 
as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset sustainment, 
maintenance, and operations. This includes the Government of Niger-
requested development of an expeditionary, contingency support location 
in Agadez, scheduled to be initially operationally capable in the 
summer of 2019.
    In April 2018, Niger hosted Exercise Flintlock, the annual United 
States Special Operations Command-Africa exercise to develop capacity 
and interoperability among African, allied, and United States Forces. 
Exercise Flintlock was entirely facilitated by the special operations 
force units of more than 20 African nations with the support of western 
nations. This successful multilateral event enhances coordination among 
partners and improves special operations force capabilities to combat 
violent extremist organizations.
    Within the Lake Chad Region, the Multinational Joint Task Force 
comprises forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, and 
remains a strategically significant organization in the efforts to 
counter Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Boko Haram and ISIS-West 
Africa attack military and civilian targets throughout Northeast 
Nigeria and the Lake Chad Border areas of Niger, Chad and Cameroon, 
thus dominating large swaths of territory and displacing millions from 
their homes, contributing to a multi-border displaced persons crisis. 
United States Africa Command and USAID work with the Multinational 
Joint Task Force to deliver humanitarian support and facilitate 
international relief efforts to bring basic health care, clean drinking 
water, adequate sanitation, and food supplies to the hardest hit areas. 
However, the persistent violence and the growing number of displaced 
persons impact the ability for organizations to deliver the required 
assistance.
    Nigeria has faced multiple setbacks in the volatile Northeast Borno 
State as ISIS-West Africa has seized military bases and materiel, 
including armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. This series of 
ISIS-West Africa high-profile attacks has placed tremendous strain on 
the Nigerian military's readiness and capabilities. The attacks also 
underscore the need for the contributing countries to the Multinational 
Joint Task Force to increase their commitments, resources, troop 
deployments, and regional operational coordination to counter ISIS-West 
Africa's momentum.
    Nigeria also faces instability over the violent herder-farmer 
conflicts in the middle belt region, as these groups fight over the 
scarcity of resources and usable land required to feed the growing and, 
often due to conflict, displaced and transient population. By 2050, 
Nigeria will overtake the United States as the third most populous 
country in the world, further compounding the strain on natural 
resources and risking the disenfranchisement of a population 
increasingly dissatisfied by the lack of security and basic services.
    United States Africa Command is working to assist the Nigerian 
military through a variety of security cooperation efforts. In April 
2018, forty African senior military leaders represented their countries 
at the sixth annual African Land Forces Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. Co-
hosted by the Nigerian Army and United States Army Africa, the African 
Land Forces Summit provided a forum to develop cooperative solutions 
for improved trans-regional security and stability.
    Over the past year, we have expanded our intelligence support and 
are currently working with the Nigerian Air Force to increase their 
effectiveness in line with international standards. In the upcoming 
years, utilizing title 10 and title 22 funding, United States Africa 
Command will execute tailored programs to expand Nigerian intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; intelligence; counter-IED; and air-
ground integration capabilities. United States Africa Command will 
continue to work with Nigeria and seek additional partnership 
opportunities following Nigeria's planned presidential election in 
early 2019.
    Cameroon has been the focus of long-term United States Department 
of State, U.S. Department of Defense, and United States Africa Command 
security cooperation efforts to boost the country's capacity to counter 
Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa in the Lake Chad region. Cameroon has 
been an effective partner within the Multinational Joint Task Force. 
Cameroon also ensures security in the Gulf of Guinea and in neighboring 
Central African Republic, where it plays a valuable role in the UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central 
African Republic.
    The United States has urged the Cameroonian Government to address 
human rights concerns, investigate allegations thoroughly, hold 
accountable perpetrators of abuse, and disclose the outcome of its 
investigations to the people of Cameroon. In accordance with the Leahy 
law, the U.S. Government does not provide assistance to security force 
units or individuals against whom credible allegations of gross 
violations of human rights have been lodged.
    The crisis and credible allegations of gross violations of human 
rights in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon is 
a concern. The violence stem from a long-term sense of marginalization 
and political disenfranchisement among Anglophone Cameroonians, 
compounded by government suppression of moderates, and the government 
and separatists inability to enter into any constructive dialogue to 
resolve the conflict. The Government of Cameroon has assured the United 
States no security assistance will be diverted from counter-Boko Haram 
and ISIS-WA efforts to the Anglophone regions.
Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa
    In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime security remains crackdown a 
strategic priority due to its role in global oil markets, trade routes, 
and the residence of approximately 75,000 U.S. citizens. Piracy and 
other illicit maritime activities threaten development efforts, weaken 
state security, and rob states of precious resources required for 
greater economic growth and effective governance. In 2018, piracy 
incidents trended lower as cooperation increased among the Gulf of 
Guinea partners.
    For example, last summer, United States Naval Forces Africa 
conducted Operation Junction Rain as part of the African Maritime Law 
Enforcement Partnership Program. Under this framework, United States 
Coast Guard law enforcement personnel partnered with Cabo Verdeans and 
Senegalese on board their naval vessels countering illicit trade and 
criminal activities. Capacity building remains paramount to continue 
the downward trend in piracy and address the growing threat of illicit 
trafficking of drugs, arms, and persons in the region.
    In Central Africa, the most visible nontraditional threat this past 
year was an Ebola outbreak in an unstable region in eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. The outbreak, which began in August 2018, is 
presently the second most lethal in history. Furthermore, the medical 
response has been hampered by armed conflict in the region.
    External actors in Central Africa, such as Russia, have also 
undermined security and countered United States interests. For example, 
in the Central African Republic, Russia has bolstered its influence 
with increased military cooperation including donations of arms, with 
which it has gained access to markets and mineral extraction rights. 
With minimal investment, Russia leverages private military contractors, 
such as the Wagner Group, and in return receive political and economic 
influence beneficial to them.
    Recently, the President of the Central African Republic installed a 
Russian civilian as his National Security Advisor. The President also 
promised the armed forces would be deployed nationwide to return peace 
to the country by forces likely trained, equipped, and in some cases, 
accompanied by Russian military contractors. Russia's ability to import 
harsh security practices, in a region already marred by threats to 
security, while systematically extracting minerals, is concerning. As 
Russia potentially looks to export their security model regionally, 
other African leaders facing similar instability and unrest could find 
the model attractive.
Southern Africa
    In comparison to a large portion of Africa, many countries in 
Southern Africa have suffered fewer consequences from terrorism and 
violent conflict. However, it still struggles with economic, societal, 
governance, and environmental challenges, including poverty, crime, 
social inequality, corruption, and lack of water and is influenced by 
China's growing presence in the region. The majority of United States 
Africa Command's engagements with Southern Africa aim to strengthen 
partnerships and build partner capacity for peacekeeping and crisis 
response, including infectious disease outbreaks.
    We work closely with our diplomatic and development partners to 
support and complement their efforts across Southern Africa. For 
example, the largest exporters of security in the region are Zambia, 
Malawi, and South Africa. Our primary investment in these countries is 
through title 22, through such programs as the International Military 
Education and Training program and Global Peace Operations Initiative, 
which are designed to improve interoperability and develop long-term, 
sustainable peacekeeping capability and capacity.
    Finally, in addition to our title 22 commitments, the South Africa-
New York State Partnership Program is the oldest on the continent and 
offers the most meaningful United States mil-to-mil [military-to-
military] engagements in South Africa. In 2018, South Africa hosted 
Africa's largest air show, the Aerospace and Defense Exposition, and 
the New York Air National Guard supported with two cargo airplanes, an 
unmanned aerial vehicle system, and 38 soldiers and airmen. Such 
engagements offer a low-cost solution to improve U.S. partnerships, 
particularly in a relatively accessible and neutral ground where our 
competitors seek influence in both the military and economic spheres.
Ensuring Strategic Access
    Our efforts to ensure strategic access must also be viewed through 
the lens of competitor influence and coercive activities, which seek to 
gain advantages over the U.S. by moving faster in economic and security 
markets where we are constrained by our values and law. China is a 
strategic competitor which uses economic and security outreach to 
foster investment incentives, jobs, and infrastructure growth in return 
for access to Africa's strategic locations, natural resources, and 
markets. China has most successfully employed this model in Djibouti, 
holding 80 percent of the Government of Djibouti's debt, where access 
through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal 
remains a United States strategic imperative.
    Today, on the African side of the Red Sea and in the Bab-el-Mandeb 
strait, which encompasses Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt, 
the Great Powers and the Gulf States both cooperate and compete for 
real estate and port facilities.
    Along Somalia's northern coast, the semi-autonomous region of 
Somaliland is working with Dubai Ports World on developing its Gulf of 
Aden port city of Berbera. When development is complete, Berbera's 
location, close to the entry and exit point of the Bab-el-Mandeb 
strait, will be strategically valuable for both Somaliland and with 
whomever they choose to partner.
    Djibouti, a nation about the size of New Jersey, remains congested 
with a preponderance of foreign forces from the United States, France, 
Germany, Japan, and China maintaining bases and competing for access 
and airspace. Currently, the Djiboutians operate the Doraleh Port 
facility, through which passes 90 percent of all logistics and materiel 
for United States operations in East Africa. Continued access to the 
Doraleh Port Facility remains a U.S. strategic imperative.
    Just north of Djibouti, other geopolitical developments have had 
ramifications on the future of the Red Sea. With the normalization of 
relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United Nations Security 
Council lifting sanctions on Eritrea, other nations will undoubtedly 
look to Eritrea to unlock its coastline for Red Sea port access.
    Given its strategic location, coupled with its already developed 
infrastructure, Sudan is also looking to develop its Red Sea coast. In 
fact, Sudan recently entered into an agreement to allow Russia to 
explore natural gas fields off Port Sudan.
    Along with U.S. Central Command, the strategic evolution of the Red 
Sea remains a command priority, as we consider how Red Sea access can 
be maintained and expanded on the continent. It is imperative for the 
U.S. to not only maintain our status as the preferred security partner 
of choice, but also look to diversify our strategic access to the Red 
Sea.
    In 2018, United States Naval Forces Africa continued its annual 
exercise series, which consisted of Exercises Phoenix Express, Cutlass 
Express, and Obangame Express. These exercises aim to build the 
maritime capabilities of African partner nations, and Exercise Obangame 
Express this past year included participation from the Somali Maritime 
Police. Their participation marked the first time in nearly 30 years 
Somalia has participated in a security event outside its borders.
    United States Africa Command seeks to build partner networks and 
assist in establishing the security environment required for economic 
opportunity and trade to flourish. Through a whole-of-government 
approach, enhanced security fosters development and investment with 
initiatives such as The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
Development (BUILD) Act. The BUILD Act facilitates private-sector 
investments and institutional engagements with low and lower-middle 
income countries. It also opens the door for United States companies to 
compete overseas and respond to China's increased economic engagement 
in Africa, most notably the $60 billion, largely in loans with some 
security and development funding, recently promised during the 2018 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
    Additionally, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, established by 
the U.S. Congress in 2004 to apply a new philosophy toward foreign aid, 
works with partner nations to promote growth in agriculture and 
irrigation, power and energy, and transportation infrastructure. In 
November 2018, the Millennium Challenge Corporation provided a $550 
million investment into the Senegal Power Compact to increase 
electricity access and reliability for one of Africa's fastest growing 
economies.
    The U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) delivers skills training, 
education, grants, and research through local and international 
partnerships. USIP also serves as a conduit for various non-
governmental organizations to interface with the broader diplomatic and 
development stakeholders in Africa. During 2019, USIP and United States 
Africa Command will host a symposium to discuss how non-governmental 
organizations can support and, when appropriate, integrate into the 
United States whole-of-government approach.
    United States Africa Command's component commands engage every day 
on the continent to enhance partner capability, where an important 
aspect of maintaining relationships is continued engagement between 
senior leaders. In 2018, senior leaders from United States Africa 
Command and its components conducted numerous key leader engagements, 
including visits to Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, and Uganda.
    United States-facilitated exercises and conferences offer the best 
return on investment for our security assistance efforts and provide 
our African partners with access to American values, expertise, and 
professionalism. In October 2018, senior military leaders from 28 
African air forces and United States Air Forces Africa met in Morocco 
for the African Air Chiefs Symposium. This annual symposium provides a 
forum to discuss common defense issues, increase cooperation, and 
improve command and control of air operations.
    Throughout 2018, United States Army Africa continued its annual 
exercise series, which included Exercise Unified Focus in Cameroon, 
Exercise Justified Accord in Uganda, Exercise United Accord in Ghana, 
and Exercise Shared Accord in Rwanda. These exercises provided 
integrated training opportunities, with a focus on respecting the rule 
of law and human rights, integrating women into peacekeeping 
operations, and responding to allegations of abuse.
    Finally, in October 2018, led by the Command Senior Enlisted 
Leader, United States Africa Command hosted its second annual African 
Senior Enlisted Leader Conference with over 50 Africa enlisted leaders 
from 25 countries. African enlisted leaders engaged with senior United 
States and NATO enlisted leaders on professional development, civilian 
control of the military, respect for human rights, and caring for 
soldiers and their families. The conference advanced key 
professionalism concepts and training opportunities vital to sustaining 
African security and peacekeeping forces.
Conclusion
    In summary, United States Africa Command remains poised to meet 
Africa's current and future challenges. The men and women of the 
command, our partners on the continent, and our collection of 
stakeholders understand how important Africa is to the global economy 
and security environments. The National Defense Strategy and its 
supporting foundational documents have outlined the importance of long-
term Great Power Competition with China and Russia and the need to 
limit the harmful influence of non-African powers on the continent.
    As the United States Africa Command Campaign Plan guides the 
command into the next decade, our partner-centric approach remains 
central to advancing United States interests in Africa. Much work 
remains, as United States Africa Command continues to contribute to the 
broad-reaching Diplomacy, Development, and Defense approach for further 
economic growth and prosperity in Africa.
    Finally, it remains an honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
marines, coast guardsmen, civilians, contractors, and families of 
United States Africa Command. Together, their efforts have made the 
United States safer and kept Africa on the road towards prosperity.

    Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Waldhauser.
    Admiral Faller.

 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                    STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

    Admiral Faller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, thank 
you for the opportunity to testify before you today with my 
shipmate, General Waldhauser. Thank you for the steadfast 
support you provide our men and women every day.
    I'm joined today by my wife, Martha, who is passionately 
committed to serving our military families and ensuring their 
readiness and welfare. Also with me are SOUTHCOM's Command 
Sergeant Major Brian Zickefoose, my eyes and ears, representing 
the backbone of our military, our noncommissioned officers, and 
Master Chief Stacie U'Ren, our dedicated gender advisor. 
Sergeant Major, Master Chief, and our human rights team work 
together to build professionalism both within our SOUTHCOM team 
and with our partners. Professional forces have legitimacy 
within their ranks and their populations. Professional ready 
forces build trust.
    The Western Hemisphere is our shared home. It's our 
neighborhood. We're connected to the nations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean by history, culture, and geography. From my 
headquarters in Dural, Florida, it takes me longer to travel to 
DC than it does to many of the countries in our area of 
responsibility. We're connected in every domain: sea, air, 
space, cyber and land. Our security and prosperity are 
inextricably linked. When our neighbors succeed, we succeed. 
When our neighbors are threatened, we are threatened. Our 
partnerships in this region are critical to the layered defense 
of our Homeland and to our collective ability to meet complex 
global challenges. Ultimately, we want enemies to fear us, 
friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to shine 
as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.
    To ensure the security of the Homeland, SOUTHCOM works 
closely with interagency teammates: the Department of State, 
USAID, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of 
Justice. Teamwork within the Defense Department, especially 
with Northern Command and the U.S. Coast Guard, is also 
critical to mission accomplishment.
    Over the past 2 months, I've traveled to Colombia, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to get a 
firsthand view of the opportunities and challenges that 
directly impact the security of this Hemisphere. Criminal 
organizations, narcotraffickers, illegal immigration, violent 
extremists, corruption, and weak governments are principal 
among those challenges.
    The most disturbing insight, however, has been the degree 
to which external state actors, especially Russia, China, and 
Iran, are expanding their influence in the Western Hemisphere. 
Russia, in particular, enables actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, 
and Cuba that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity. As 
a leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, Iran's 
activities in this hemisphere are concerning.
    Venezuela. The situation in Venezuela is dire. Maduro's 
illegitimate government starves its people by using food as a 
weapon, while corrupt generals are rewarded with money from 
illegal drug trafficking, oil profits, and businesses, all at 
the expense of the population and other--and the rank-and-file 
military. Migration out of Venezuela is now over 300 million, 
creating a crisis for our friends in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, 
and Peru. While Russia and Cuba and China prop up the Maduro 
dictatorship, the remainder of the world has united. SOUTHCOM 
is supporting diplomatic efforts, and we are prepared to 
protect U.S. personnel and diplomatic facilities, if necessary.
    I saw, firsthand, the impacts of this humanitarian crisis 
in Venezuela when I visited the United States naval ship 
Comfort. The solidarity and compassion displayed by Comfort's 
international medical team made a lasting difference in the 
lives of thousands. The United States of America provided 
Comfort as part of our enduring promise to the Hemisphere, 
while Russia flew nuclear-capable bombers. Who would you want 
as your friend? Who would you trust?
    Building strong partnerships is the best way to counter 
threats and turn the challenges of our hemisphere into 
opportunities. In this hemisphere, our neighborhood, a little 
goes a long way. We need the right, focused, consistent 
military, education, and presence. We cannot achieve positive 
results and influence outcomes without being on the playing 
field.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you again for the 
opportunity to testify today. SOUTHCOM team--our civilians, 
military members, and our families--appreciate the support 
Congress has provided us. We will continue to honor the trust 
you and our fellow citizens have placed in us. I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Admiral Craig S. Faller
                              introduction
    I want to thank the Congress, and especially this Committee, for 
your support to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The men 
and women of our team work every day to earn the trust of partners in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. We are friends and neighbors, bound 
together by shared values and a shared stake in our common future. The 
nations of this neighborhood are connected in every domain--sea, air, 
land, space, and cyberspace. Our partnerships are vital to security and 
prosperity in this hemisphere, and to our collective ability to meet 
complex global challenges. We recognize that the success and security 
of future generations depend on how effectively we build trust with 
allies and partners in the hemisphere today, working with and through 
interagency partners like the Department of State, U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Ultimately, we want enemies to 
fear us, friends to partner with us, and the Western Hemisphere to 
shine as a beacon of peace, prosperity, and potential.
    The strengths and opportunities of our hemisphere--democracy, 
respect for human rights and rule of law, and military-to-military 
relationships rooted in education, culture, and values--are matched 
with a troubling array of challenges and threats to global security and 
to our Homeland. These include natural and man-made disasters, weak 
government institutions, corruption, under-resourced security 
organizations, violent crime, criminal organizations, and violent 
extremist cells. China has accelerated expansion of its Belt and Road 
Initiative at a pace that may one day overshadow its expansion in 
Southeast Asia and Africa. Russia supports multiple information outlets 
spreading its false narrative of world events and United States 
intentions. Iran has deepened its anti-United States Spanish language 
media coverage and has exported its state support for terrorism into 
our hemisphere. Russia and China also support the autocratic regimes in 
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, which are counter to democracy and 
United States interests. We are monitoring the latest events in 
Venezuela and look forward to welcoming that country back into the 
hemisphere's community of democracies. Where threats are transregional, 
multi-domain, and global, the United States must renew focus on our 
neighbors and our shared Western Hemisphere neighborhood.
                              partnerships
    Modest, smart, and focused investments in U.S. Forces and security 
assistance continue to yield meaningful returns in the form of partners 
who are ready to address threats shoulder-to-shoulder with us. 
Strengthening partnerships is at the heart of everything we do. 
USSOUTHCOM's mission is about the smart, focused use of force--not 
economy of force.
    Working from a foundation of mutual respect and shared interests in 
regional cooperation and interoperability, we are enhancing our 
partnerships with Brazil, Colombia, and Chile, which are forces for 
regional and global security. Argentina has reinvigorated military-to-
military interaction, and co-hosted our annual South American Defense 
Conference. Peru continues a tradition of strong liaison officer 
exchanges with USSOUTHCOM and recently conducted training with a 
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF). We reinitiated 
security cooperation with Ecuador, and are moving forward with a 
renewed military-to-military partnership.
    In Central America, partners like El Salvador and Panama have 
stepped up cooperation in the area of counter-narcotics (CN); in 
addition, El Salvador co-hosted our Central American Security 
Conference last year. Honduras hosts our Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo 
at Soto Cano, providing a regionally-based security cooperation 
platform, the presence of which allows a rapid response capability. Our 
support to Guatemala's defense institution building efforts has helped 
its Ministry of Defense increase efficiency, transparency, and 
sustainability of its investments.
    Across the Caribbean, our partners continue to look at USSOUTHCOM 
as their security partner of choice. Trinidad and Tobago co-hosted our 
annual Caribbean Nations Security Conference, and thwarted a terror 
attack with the support of United States special operations forces 
(USSOF). Jamaica has stepped up its CN efforts, recently purchasing a 
maritime patrol aircraft that will support regional drug interdiction 
operations.
    We continue to expand our cooperation with allies and partners in 
humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) missions and counter-
threat efforts, such as drug detection and monitoring, and support to 
interdiction operations in Central America and the Caribbean. Allies 
and partners contributed to nearly half of the successful drug seizures 
credited to Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) last year. In 
addition to continuing cooperation in traditional areas like 
peacekeeping and drug interdiction, we are building interoperability 
for high-end expeditionary operations and in the space and cyber 
mission sets. In the past year, Brazil became the first Latin American 
country to sign a Space Situational Awareness Agreement, Colombia 
became NATO's first global partner in Latin America, and Chile led the 
maritime component of the world's largest international naval exercise, 
Rim of the Pacific--a first for a Latin American sea power. Later this 
year, Brazil will send a Major General to serve as United States Army 
South's next Deputy Commander for Interoperability, the first Brazilian 
officer to serve in this role.
    The majority of nations in this hemisphere share democratic 
values--including respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of 
law--and interests in advancing democracy and countering radical 
ideologies. These shared values and interests are the foundation of our 
military-to-military relationships. We reinforce and build on these 
shared values and interests through institutional capacity building 
efforts, information and intelligence sharing, education, personnel 
exchanges, and exercises. In the past year, we have improved the 
quality, depth, and frequency of information and intelligence exchanges 
with partners, producing joint products on transnational issues of 
mutual concern.
    We also build on those shared values by working with our partners 
to elevate and integrate all elements of professionalism as a 
foundational component of every security conference we conduct. The 
professionalism of U.S. Armed Forces is the bedrock of our legitimacy, 
both as a fighting force and in our ability to build trust with our own 
people. Professionalism encompasses human rights, jointness, gender 
integration, and non-commissioned officer development.
    Education and training--funded by the Department of Defense's 
William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and the 
Department of State's International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) program--and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases made 
possible by Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants are force 
multipliers. Our partners prefer U.S. education and training, and these 
exchanges facilitate mutual understanding of values, doctrine, and 
culture that enable us to operate together more effectively. Our 
participation in multinational exercises like UNITAS (a naval 
integration exercise), PANAMAX (defense of the Panama Canal), and 
Brazil's CRUZEIRO DO SUL (regional air exercise) is another important 
way we increase mutual understanding, interoperability, and collective 
readiness.
    In the absence of an enduring United States military presence in 
most of Latin America and the Caribbean, recurring rotations of small 
teams of USSOF, soldiers, marines, and National Guard personnel \1\ 
play central roles in building trust and enabling the exchange of 
critical expertise. By carefully tailoring these rotations, we ensure 
they build the readiness of U.S. Forces as well as building partner 
nations' capabilities. On any given day, small USSOF teams conduct over 
30 missions in support of about 12 partner nations throughout Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Many live and work alongside regional 
forces, building the trust, confidence, and lasting relationships that 
reinforce our status as the partner of choice and enhance our ability 
to respond quickly to contingencies.
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    \1\ The State Partnership Program (SPP) links a unique component of 
the Department of Defense--a state's National Guard--with the armed 
forces or equivalent of a partner nation, leveraging National Guard 
capabilities for engagements that build enduring relationships and 
advance mutual defense and security goals. Twenty-four of the SPP's 75 
partnerships worldwide are in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility, 
including a partnership with Venezuela that is currently inactive.
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    Humanitarian support efforts like medical engagements, civil 
affairs activities, and the recent deployment of the hospital ship USNS 
Comfort demonstrate our enduring solidarity and friendship with 
neighbors, while countering negative messaging by adversarial nations. 
The international medical team aboard Comfort treated more than 26,000 
patients in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras. This team conducted 
more than 100 training engagements, relieving pressure on regional 
health systems caused by the Venezuelan migration crisis and giving 
local medical providers more flexibility to deliver care. The 
integration of more than 100 military and non-governmental organization 
(NGO) personnel from 10 other nations helped us build trust, tell our 
story effectively, and enhance regional perceptions of the United 
States. The U.S. military medical and command staff also returned from 
the deployment more ready, able to operate with foreign partners, and 
prepared to provide critical care to U.S. warfighters. These impacts 
will far outlast Comfort's 70-day deployment.
    Strengthening our partnerships is our best bid for addressing 
regional and global threats. We work by, with, and through partners to 
enhance the security of both the United States and our partners, and to 
help grow bilateral security relationships into regional and global 
security initiatives. Our networked approach to countering threats 
recognizes that nothing happens without robust and enduring 
partnerships across the U.S. interagency, region, and civil society. 
Our ultimate advantage is using the power of our ideals, ideas, and 
people to build trust with friends and create dilemmas for competitor 
nations. This is the primary dimension in which we expand the 
competitive space.
                                threats
    Six state actors (Russia, China, Iran, and their authoritarian 
allies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) and a system of interrelated 
threats challenge the security of our partners and the region. Threats 
like natural and man-made disasters and criminal networks feed and fuel 
drivers of instability, including weak institutions, poverty, 
corruption, and violent crime. Addressing these challenges requires 
whole-of-government efforts, led by partner nations at a pace they can 
sustain, to strengthen democratic institutions and expand economic 
opportunity. Often, improving security is the first step.
Nation State Competition and Malign Actors.
    Russia and China are expanding their influence in the Western 
Hemisphere, often at the expense of United States interests. Both 
enable--and are enabled by--actions in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba 
that threaten hemispheric security and prosperity, and the actions of 
those three states in turn damage the stability and democratic progress 
across the region. As the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the 
world, Iran's activities in the region are also concerning.
    Russia continues to use Latin America and the Caribbean to spread 
disinformation, collect intelligence on the United States, and project 
power. Russia's deployment of two nuclear capable bombers to the 
Western Hemisphere was intended as a demonstration of support for the 
Maduro regime and as a show of force to the United States. Russia has 
also deployed intelligence collection ships to the region, as well as 
an underwater research ship to Latin America capable of mapping 
undersea cables--information it could use to cut critical lines of 
communication during a future crisis. Additionally, Russia is 
establishing joint space projects with partners in the region, which it 
could eventually leverage for counter-space purposes in the event of a 
global conflict.
    China utilizes the same predatory, non-transparent foreign lending 
practices it has implemented around the world to exert political and 
economic leverage in certain countries. China has pledged at least $150 
billion in loans to countries in the hemisphere, \2\ and 16 nations now 
participate in the Belt and Road Initiative. However, many countries 
are beginning to recognize the long-term consequences of mortgaging 
their future to China, as we've seen in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Sierra 
Leone, Djibouti, and the Maldives. In the future, China could use its 
control of deep water ports in the Western Hemisphere to enhance its 
global operational posture. Particularly concerning is China's effort 
to exert control over key infrastructure associated with the Panama 
Canal.
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    \2\ Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2017) ``China-Latin 
America Finance Database.'' Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue
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    China's presence and activities at Argentina's deep space tracking 
facility is also concerning. Beijing could be in violation of the terms 
of its agreement with Argentina to only conduct civilian activities, 
and may have the ability to monitor and potentially target United 
States, Allied, and partner space activities. Additionally, Chinese 
firms like Huawei and ZTE have aggressively penetrated the region, 
placing intellectual property, private data, and government secrets at 
risk. If governments in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to 
gravitate toward using Chinese information systems, our ability and 
willingness to share information over compromised networks is likely to 
suffer.
    Russia and China aggressively court students from Latin America and 
the Caribbean to attend their military schools, offering free training 
in cyber, policing, and CN. Since 2012, security officials from nearly 
all Central American countries and nearly half of South American 
countries have received Russian CN training. These engagements, 
combined with Russia's Counter Transnational Organized Crime Training 
Center (CTOC) in Nicaragua, potentially provide Moscow with a regional 
platform to recruit intelligence sources and collect information.
    Russia and China also support their authoritarian partners in Cuba, 
Venezuela, and Nicaragua, often through propaganda and other 
information-related tools. Moscow, for example, provides positive media 
coverage of its authoritarian allies, papering over repression and 
socioeconomic inequity in Nicaragua. Moscow also seeks to undercut 
United States policies and regional relationships through information 
operations and intelligence collection, and by influencing political 
systems, public opinion, and decision makers. Russia published hundreds 
of articles last year in its Spanish and Portuguese-language media that 
deliberately distorted our defense engagements.
    The linkages between these malign actors are negatively 
reinforcing. Emboldened by Russian and Chinese \3\ support, Venezuela 
is engaging in increasingly provocative actions, threatening Guyana's 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction and providing sanctuary for National 
Liberation Army (ELN) fighters that threaten Colombian stability. 
Russia and Cuba are both complicit in Venezuela's descent into 
dictatorship, but Cuba is particularly influential in supporting 
Maduro. Following the Cuban Government's advice and assisted by its 
intelligence machinery, Maduro is adhering to the autocratic blueprint 
Cuban leaders have ruthlessly executed for over six decades. Nicaragua 
appears to be going down a similar path following Cuba's playbook, with 
Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela enabling President Ortega's repression of 
his political opposition. These relationships give Russia, in 
particular, a foothold close to our Homeland. As tensions increase with 
Russia in Europe, Moscow may leverage these longstanding regional 
partners to maintain asymmetric options, to include forward deploying 
military personnel or assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ For example, China is Venezuela's single largest state 
creditor, saddling the Venezuelan people with more than $50 billion in 
debt, even as their democracy vanishes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Iran is also looking to reenergize its outreach after reducing its 
efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. It has 
deepened its anti-United States influence campaign in Spanish-language 
media, and its proxy Lebanese Hezbollah maintains facilitation networks 
throughout the region that cache weapons and raise funds, often via 
drug trafficking and money laundering. Last September, Brazil arrested 
a Hezbollah financier in the tri-border area near Paraguay and 
Argentina, and in recent years Paraguay, Peru, and Bolivia have 
arrested multiple Hezbollah-linked suspects.
What we're doing.
    We are increasing cooperation with partners to better understand, 
expose, and counter the malign activities of Russia, China, and their 
authoritarian allies. We are also working more closely with other U.S. 
combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure that globally 
integrated plans and operations are informed by threats and 
opportunities in this hemisphere. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff's globally integrated planning is exactly the right approach for 
addressing the transregional, transnational nature of today's threat 
environment.
    Within the region, we have to be on the playing field to compete. 
The same presence that strengthens our partnerships sends a powerful 
signal to Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua (the six 
negative state actors) that the United States is committed to the 
region and to the security of our neighborhood.
    Strong partnerships--founded in effective and transparent 
institutions, intelligence and information exchanges, institutional 
capacity building, education, exercises, and presence--are our primary 
bulwark against the influence of malign actors in the hemisphere and 
are bolstered by our work together on military professionalism. Our 
work with partners to reinforce the hemisphere's substantial, but 
incomplete, progress in human rights is even more critical in light of 
Russia and China's own disregard for human rights. USSOUTHCOM's Human 
Rights Initiative--which just celebrated its 20th anniversary--has 
conducted more than 200 human rights engagements that have enhanced the 
ability of partner nations to build professional forces that have 
legitimacy in the eyes of their populations.
    As I told this Committee during my confirmation hearing, the 
Department of State's security assistance programs--like IMET and FMF--
are strategic game changers. Since 2009, IMET has provided 
opportunities for over 55,000 students from the region to attend 
schools like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 
(WHINSEC), the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA), and the Inter-
American Defense College (IADC). These numbers aren't just seats in a 
classroom. They represent lifelong relationships with future leaders 
\4\ who trust us, understand our culture and doctrine, and are prepared 
to work with us on a range of challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ IMET has trained numerous individuals who have gone onto serve 
in key leadership positions, including the former President of Chile, 
Trinidad and Tobago's Chief of the Defense Staff, and Argentina's 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who helped foster our 
reengagement with the Argentine military after the political dynamics 
changed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to strengthening partnerships, we support interagency 
efforts to hold individuals accountable for supporting the activities 
of negative actors. For example, in collaboration with the Department 
of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), we provided 
information that supported the development of sanctions against 
Venezuelan Government officials involved in drug smuggling, money 
laundering, corruption, and serious human rights abuses.
Drugs and Transnational Criminal Organizations.
    Drug trafficking threatens our national security and that of our 
regional partners. Drug overdoses killed more than 70,000 Americans 
last year, and nearly half a million people across the world in 2017. 
\5\ Fueled by drug demand--especially ours--drug traffickers 
transported enough metric tons of cocaine (that we know of) from South 
America by air, land, and sea last year to cover four football fields--
and the majority of it was headed for our streets. Upon landfall, this 
bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller loads and smuggled 
into the United States, making large interdictions exponentially more 
difficult. In addition to cocaine, traffickers also transport heroin, 
synthetic opioids like fentanyl, and precursor chemicals from China. 
While Mexico remains the primary source for heroin smuggled into the 
United States (and China the prime source of fentanyl), the Dominican 
Republic is emerging as a regional transit point for opioid trafficking 
into major United States cities like Philadelphia, Boston, and Miami.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Centers for Disease Control, National Health Statistics; United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2018 World Drug Report. 
Geneva.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Established drug trafficking routes and techniques provide 
opportunities for the illegal movement of other commodities and 
people--including terrorists. Several years ago, the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dedicated an article to a scenario in which its 
followers could leverage established trafficking networks to make their 
way to our border. This remains a potential vulnerability we watch as 
closely as we can.
    Drug trafficking comes with significant costs, in more ways than 
one. After marijuana, cocaine remains the second most valuable 
commodity in the global drug trade, \6\ generating dirty money that 
flows directly into the hands of criminal groups. In many cases, these 
groups are better funded than the security organizations confronting 
them. Dirty money fosters corruption and insecurity that tear at the 
fabric of communities, erode institutions of governance, and drain the 
region's potential. The vicious side effects of illicit trade also cost 
American taxpayers billions of dollars every year. This is more than a 
national security threat; it's also an economic one that affects every 
nation in our neighborhood.
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    \6\ Global Financial Integrity, ``Transnational Crime and the 
Developing World.'' March 2017.
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What we're doing.
    Leveraging capabilities like information-sharing, network analysis, 
and the Department of Defense Rewards Program, we support operations by 
DHS and the DOJ's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) 
and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to interdict drug shipments 
and disrupt transnational criminal networks. For example, our 
intelligence support--enabled by our Army Military Intelligence 
Brigade--to operations by Homeland Security Investigations and other 
interagency partners helped dismantle one of the largest maritime 
illicit smuggling networks in Central America last year.
    At the tactical level, JIATF-S continues to deliver steady returns 
on investment and improve its efficiency in targeting drug movements. 
Last year, it helped keep the equivalent of 600 minivans full of 
cocaine off U.S. streets. But even this isn't enough to keep pace with 
the increasing demand and the volume of drugs flowing north through the 
Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. While improving efficiency, we still 
only successfully interdicted about six percent of known drug 
movements. \7\ Doing more would require additional ships and maritime 
patrol aircraft and greater participation by interagency and 
international partners that form the backbone of JIATF-S. The U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provide 
the bulk of JIATF-S's maritime and air capabilities. The United 
Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Netherlands lead multiple interdiction 
operations in the Caribbean, while we focus U.S. assets on the Eastern 
Pacific. Last year, 17 international partners conducted nearly half of 
the interdictions supported by JIATF-S. U.S. Northern Command remains 
our closest and best Department of Defense partner and we continuously 
look for ways to enhance our teamwork, recognizing that threats exploit 
our geographic combatant command boundaries.
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    \7\ Figure based on JIATF South utilization of Consolidated 
Counterdrug DataBase (CCDB) data.
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    Our capacity-building activities, whether at the tactical, 
operational, or institutional level, play a key role in this fight. For 
example, after years of USSOF training, Guatemala's Fuerzas Especiales 
Navales (FEN) is now among Central America's most competent and 
responsive maritime interdiction units. U.S. training, equipment, and 
interagency teamwork have also enabled Costa Rican and Panamanian 
forces to partner seamlessly with the USCG in interdiction operations. 
Partners are also working with us to address their ability to sustain 
capabilities that we have developed together. For example, Colombia has 
increased its eradication and interdiction efforts while also 
conducting increased operations against the ELN.
Drivers of Migration.
    Violence, unemployment, corruption, poverty, and impunity for gangs 
and transnational criminal organizations are some of the main drivers 
of insecurity that fuel migration to our southern border. Fourteen of 
the top 20 most violent countries in the world are in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. \8\ Migration challenges are exacerbated by weak 
institutions, corruption, violence and instability wrought by 
authoritarian governments. Migration from Venezuela is on track to 
approach the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis, straining the capacity 
and resources of its neighbors. The United Nations estimates that 5.3 
million Venezuelans will have fled their country by the end of 2019--
with over 2 million leaving this year alone. \9\ Last year, thousands 
of Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica and other neighboring countries to 
seek protection, a number that will likely grow as President Ortega 
keeps a tight grip on power. Many Haitians continue to leave their 
country in hopes of finding economic opportunity elsewhere.
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    \8\ Igarape Institute (Regional think tank), ``The World's Most 
Dangerous Cities.'' March 31, 2017 (available at https://
igarape.org.br/en/the-worlds-most-dangerous-cities/)
    \9\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), December 14, 2018.
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What we're doing.
    We are working closely with Central American and other partners to 
share information and provide training and equipment that enhance their 
ability to secure their borders. We assist partners in developing 
strong institutional foundations needed for legitimate, effective, and 
sustainable defense sectors through organizations like the William J. 
Perry Center, \10\ the Center for Civil Military Relations, and the 
Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, which help our 
partners build trust and confidence with their citizens. Through 
collaboration with the Department of State, USAID, and non-governmental 
partners, our civil affairs teams execute low cost, high impact civic 
action projects that help partner nations and extend governance to 
vulnerable communities.
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    \10\ The Washington, DC-based William J. Perry Center for 
Hemispheric Defense Studies, one of DOD's five regional centers, 
develops and engages the Western Hemisphere's community of defense and 
security professionals to seek mutually supportive approaches to common 
challenges in order to develop effective and sustainable institutional 
capacity, and promote a greater understanding of U.S. regional policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               terrorism.
    As Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan recently noted, 
transnational terrorism poses an immediate threat to the Western 
Hemisphere. \11\ Groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, ISIS, and al-Qaida 
operate wherever they can garner support, raise funds, and pursue their 
terrorist agendas. ISIS and other groups have demonstrated their 
ability to inspire and recruit violent extremists to plan attacks in 
South America and the Caribbean. While the travel of foreign fighters 
from Latin America and the Caribbean to Iraq and Syria has diminished, 
the potential return of battle-trained extremists remains a threat. 
Another potential threat is posed by smuggling networks that move 
Special Interest Aliens from East Africa, the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia through the hemisphere to attempt entry into the United 
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Remarks at the Western Hemisphere Ministerial on 
Counterterrorism, December 11, 2018.
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What we're doing.
    USSOUTHCOM leads several annual exercises with interagency partners 
and partner nations to improve interoperability, preparedness, and 
response for a possible terrorist attack. Our neighbors are taking 
increasing steps to address the threat of terrorism in the hemisphere, 
as evidenced by the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) development of a 
regional counter terrorism strategy in collaboration with the United 
States Department of State and USSOUTHCOM. In addition to these 
efforts, we work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to help 
regional partners build their capacity to combat weapons of mass 
destruction, another issue of growing interest to several partners.
    We work closely with lead federal agencies and regional partners to 
detect and disrupt terrorist activity and strengthen counter-terrorism 
(CT) legislation. Trinidad and Tobago recently strengthened its CT 
legislation (including the creation of several new terrorism-related 
criminal offenses), and other countries are also updating theirs. In 
collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and 
other interagency partners, we work with Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
Chile, and others to share information and strengthen regional capacity 
to manage extremist threats. United States training and biometrics 
equipment are improving the ability of partners to control their 
borders, and in the past two years, we've helped interagency partners 
stop individuals with known or suspected ties to terrorism. 
Additionally, our small civil affairs teams work closely with U.S. 
embassies and USAID to counter radicalization and recruitment and 
amplify moderate voices in local communities.
    Detention operations also play an important role in the global 
fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the 
battlefield. The medical and guard teams at Joint Task Force Guantanamo 
(JTF-GTMO) continue to conduct safe, legal, and humane detention 
operations. In line with Executive Order 13823, we are examining ways 
to address medical support, capacity, and infrastructure issues 
associated with continued detention operations.
Natural disasters.
    Our ability to respond rapidly in crisis is an important aspect of 
USSOUTHCOM's mission. Our neighborhood experiences approximately 50 
natural disasters every year, of almost every type--from hurricanes to 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, mudslides, and more. 
Protecting citizens before and after disaster strikes is a core mission 
for every military in our hemisphere. The question is not whether, but 
when, we will face the next disaster, and we must be ready.
What we're doing.
    Last October at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas 
in Cancun, Mexico, the United States Secretary of Defense and his 
counterparts from across the hemisphere committed to strengthening 
regional military cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief in support of lead civilian agencies. In support, USSOUTHCOM 
works closely with partner nations, Department of State, USAID, NGOs, 
and multinational organizations like CARICOM's Caribbean Disaster 
Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and the Regional Security System 
(RSS) to build national and regional response capacities. Our training, 
exercises, and low-cost humanitarian projects have helped our partners 
to be more prepared to respond to emergencies in their own countries, 
and more able to assist their neighbors in crisis. As an example, last 
year the Jamaican Defense Force deployed a team to Dominica for 60 days 
to provide medical aid and other emergency assistance in the wake of 
Hurricane Maria. We are assessing our authorities to ensure we can 
provide the necessary support for our partners to take on increasing 
responsibility for disaster responses.
    When United States military support is required, our forward-
deployed JTF-Bravo in Honduras, along with our annual SPMAGTF 
deployment, provide operational flexibility and agility. I'm proud to 
note that last year we integrated Chilean and Colombian officers into 
the SPMAGTF leadership team for the first time. Brazil will join the 
SPMAGTF this year, in addition to co-leading our UNITAS AMPHIB 
multinational naval exercise. This iteration of UNITAS will practice 
the establishment of a multinational task force to support humanitarian 
response, a capability we haven't employed since the Haiti earthquake 
in 2010. Building on this initiative, we are working with allies and 
partners to develop a concept for a scalable multinational task force 
that works within existing security cooperation frameworks to enhance 
our collective ability to respond rapidly to crises.
 congressional support for ussouthcom's mission and this neighborhood.
    I invite you to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that 
we value this region--the only region that is tied to our Homeland by 
all domains--and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood 
safe.
    I also thank the Congress for providing the Department's fiscal 
year 2019 appropriations prior to the start of fiscal year 2019, which 
minimized the impacts of the current partial government shutdown to the 
Department of Defense. As we look ahead, confidence in stable budgets 
and ensuring all of our U.S. Government security partners, like our 
USCG, are open for business will reassure friendly nations that we are 
reliable security partners.
Support for our people.
    After several years of running the detention facility at JTF-GTMO 
as a temporary mission, we have been directed to keep the facility 
open. Much of the current infrastructure used by the JTF has long 
outlived its useful lifespan. We are undertaking a comprehensive review 
of the existing facilities to determine requirements for mission 
success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency. Closer 
to home, we are working to find ways to better support our personnel, 
including exploring ways to mitigate the limited military support 
services in the Miami area. I will keep this Committee informed of our 
progress.
Capabilities to defend our Homeland.
    We appreciate the support of the Congress to ensure the continued 
operations of the USCG, which provides the majority of U.S. maritime 
assets supporting JIATF-S operations. The new National Security Cutters 
have proven very effective in the drug detection and monitoring 
mission, leveraging increased intelligence collection capability and 
on-scene endurance. Maritime patrol aircraft are also crucial to 
detection, monitoring, and interdiction by the USCG and partner 
nations. Continued congressional support for the new Offshore Patrol 
Cutter will enable the USCG to maintain its capacity in the hemisphere. 
While those new ships are beginning construction, maintenance funding 
is essential to keep the aging Medium Endurance Cutters--some of which 
are close to doubling their planned 30-year service lives--hard at work 
supporting JIATF-S. We also appreciate the support of the Congress to 
resource our intelligence capabilities like human intelligence (HUMINT) 
and innovative analytic tools utilized by the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency's (DTRA) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) that 
allow us to exploit publicly available information and intelligence.
    Thanks to congressional support, we contracted a Multi Mission 
Support Vessel (MMSV) to help fill capability gaps. True to its name, 
the MMSV was used for SOF training exercises and will now be employed 
to support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement in CN and CT 
operations. Increased U.S. joint and naval presence in regional 
operations and exercises will encourage partner forces, to include 
navies, to participate in regional security efforts such as HA/DR, CN, 
and CT. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is mission fit for this region 
and we welcome its deployment this year. We are also leveraging our 
growing science and technology portfolio--including innovative projects 
like small-satellite and aerostat surveillance programs--to mitigate 
our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance gaps, and help the 
Services to test new capabilities that hone the U.S. military's 
technological advantage.
Capabilities to strengthen our partnerships.
    We appreciate congressional support for initiatives that streamline 
security cooperation processes and help ensure we remain the security 
partner of choice. Your continued support to programs and capabilities 
that help build trust and long-term relationships with partners 
enhances our ability to defend the Homeland by providing more capacity 
for defeating threats and sending a visible signal to our partners (and 
our competitors) about the depth of our commitment.
                              conclusion.
    Partnership goes a long way in this part of the world. The right 
focused and modest investments in this hemisphere yield a solid rate of 
return for the United States and our partners. Our competitors benefit 
when we don't invest in our neighborhood.
    Our partners share our vision of a hemisphere that is a beacon of 
peace, prosperity, and opportunity. They want to work with us to 
achieve this vision. It is in our national interest to work with them. 
Thank you.

    Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. All right. Thank you very 
much.
    First of all, let me apologize for being late. I had a very 
small part to play in the National Prayer Breakfast, so I had 
to choose Jesus over you guys.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. But, that's behind us now, so we're ready 
to get back to work.
    First of all, let me just go ahead and--with the areas that 
you're working so hard in. I've been concerned about China for 
a long time, because we saw it coming. In fact, in Djibouti, 
that was the first time--it's my information, anyway--that 
China actually did devote its attention to starting a function 
in a country outside its city limits. That happened in 
Djibouti. Now they're as far south in Africa as Tanzania. 
They're making things happen. I mean, everywhere you go, the 
same thing, they say, ``America tells us what we need, and 
they--China--gives us what we need.'' They have also--you know, 
I--we're all committed to the IMET program. They actually, in 
China, as you and I discussed in my office, for the first time, 
they've invited 50--50 of their leaders showed up in China, in 
Beijing, out of 52 nations, talking about--how close they want 
to be with them and trying--what they're trying to do is expand 
the IMET program, that we've been so successful in, into China. 
So, anyway, that's something that is there, and I'm sure you're 
feeling some of the effects of that.
    I'd ask both of you--because it's happening also in 
SOUTHCOM, what are the effects right now that you're seeing 
from China that weren't there until recently? Starting with 
you, General.
    General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    You know, it's interesting about Djibouti. It is the first 
overseas base that China has developed.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, the first one. Now, people are not 
aware of that, that this is the first base that they've 
established outside of their city limits.
    General Waldhauser. That's correct. You know, it puts us in 
a very unique position, because we have a Chinese base roughly 
several miles from the front gate of our location in Djibouti. 
We have some interesting engagements with safety flight, 
weapons training on the ranges, and so forth. We have a 
requirement to work with them to work through some of those 
issues.
    But, that said, overall on the continent, China has been 
there for quite some time, and they have worked at this 
relationship. What we try to do, from the AFRICOM or DOD 
perspective, is try to show that we are the best partner--the 
type of training we give them, the weapons, perhaps, that are 
sold by the United States of high quality--and try to make sure 
that our influence remains. It's a difficult task.
    You mentioned the issue of all the security chiefs into 
Beijing. You know, as an anecdote--I have no way to prove this, 
but in April of 2017, we, in AFRICOM, invited all the chiefs of 
defense to Stuttgart for a conference. We had about 40 or so 
turn up. I believe the Chinese read our playbook, and I 
believe, after that particular engagement, they saw it, and 
they wanted to make sure that they were on the same playing 
field as we were.
    But, moreover, I would say that, in addition to the Chinese 
defense--or their defense group, in September of this year, 
China had a forum for cooperation between China and Africa, 
where over 50 of the heads of state of Africa went to Beijing, 
and where President Xi rolled out $60 billion or so of loans 
and grants and programs.
    The Chinese work at the relationship, and that's one of the 
things that we try to combat in AFRICOM by just being good 
partners.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. It's been my experience in the 
continent that China never comes in unless there's something 
they can gain from it. Of course, they use their own labor, and 
they're not doing that much of a benefit. Nonetheless, they 
have resources. I can't figure out where it all comes from, but 
much more than we seem to.
    The same thing, you don't hear so much in SOUTHCOM about 
the activity of China. Briefly, what are your thoughts on that?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, in SOUTHCOM, they're invested in 
over 56 ports. I recently returned from a trip to Central 
America, and my small team, the entire hotel floor right below 
ours was completely booked by Chinese people. They're offering 
schools, all expense paid, 13 days for a half-day school, no 
strings attached, and cash for the countries to do what they 
want. Again, they're there, and they're there in force, and 
they have a long-term vision, economically and militarily. Our 
best counter is education and being there. The IMET program is 
huge for our partners. They want to come to the United States. 
They want to go to our schools. Our schools remain the world's 
best and something to emulate.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. This is my own opinion, but I think 
some up here agrees with this. Of all the coms [combatant 
commanders] that we have, AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM are the two that 
are the most under-resourced. I'd like to have you be very 
blunt--just very briefly--do you agree with that? What do we 
need to do to correct it?
    General Waldhauser. Senator Inhofe, I do agree that we're 
under-resourced. However, we do make the best and the most of 
what we have.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, I know that.
    General Waldhauser. Certainly, with reconnaissance assets, 
ISR assets, Medevac assets, and also non-episodic, but where we 
can count on----
    Chairman Inhofe. Of those you just named, which are the 
least resourced right now? ISR----
    General Waldhauser. As any COCOM would say here, we would 
prefer more ISR for our counter-VEO [violent extremist 
organizations] fight.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Yeah.
    Do you agree with that, Admiral?
    Admiral Faller. I would agree with that. We could also use 
some naval assets, as well, Senator. I know our Navy needs a 
bigger navy. We need some of that.
    Chairman Inhofe. I understand that. You're doing great 
work.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
    Admiral Faller, with respect to Venezuela, your views would 
be very much appreciated, but there's a presumption that the 
military, at this point, is the key, sort of, power base for 
Maduro, and that, as long as they stay with him, he will be 
incentivized to stay in Venezuela. Is that accurate, from your 
perspective? What are we doing to try--and what are the 
Venezuelans--the legitimate President, what is he trying to do 
to pull the military away?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, Venezuela has about 2,000 
generals, more than all of NATO combined. A majority of them 
are on the payroll of Maduro via illicit drug trafficking and 
corrupt businesses. That's what he's using to buy their loyalty 
and their protection. In addition, Cuba, as I mentioned in my 
opening statement, pretty much owns the security around Maduro, 
and is deeply entrenched in the intelligence service. We can go 
into more detail in closed session. That remains the center of 
gravity for Maduro.
    The legitimate government of President Guaido has offered 
amnesty and a place for the military forces, most of which we 
think would be loyal to the constitution, not to a dictator, a 
place to go. I think the diplomacy path is that path that we're 
trying to support.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Over many, many years, I have had complaints about the 
human rights abuses in America--Honduras and Guatemala, 
particularly. In fact, there's a report, regionally, that--
provided by the Sisters of Mercy, that a former member of the 
Honduran Congress who's been in prison for suggesting in a 
press conference, who might have been involved in the killing 
of Berta Caseras, who was a prominent environmentalist in 
Honduras. This is one example. How are we conditioning our 
security assistance and our human rights training in these 
countries to promote the rule of law?
    Admiral Faller. During my recent trip, Senator, I 
emphasized professionalism as the key to being a legitimate 
force. Professionalism, a big part of that is human rights. 
It's like blood running through your veins. If you're not 
legitimate to your people, you're not going to have a force 
that is going to, ultimately, secure that population. We had 
those discussions with all the leaders of those countries, the 
chiefs of their defense. We have a human rights team that goes 
in there and performs workshops. Part of the steps that must be 
taken by the embassy and our country teams to certify the 
deliverance of those aides includes a certification that 
they're going to go to vetted forces and forces that have 
complied. We're looking at that every day, Senator. It's very 
important to our efforts.
    Senator Reed. Let me turn to General Waldhauser. But, 
there's a--I think, an issue that both of your AORs share. It's 
under-resourcing, both military, but also on the--the AID, 
State Department, et cetera. When you talk about capacity-
building, both of you are very eloquent and very focused, but 
I've traveled through AFRICOM, as you know, General Waldhauser. 
You were hosted when I returned. In Somalia, one of the reasons 
al-Shabaab is so influential is that they're able to collect 
taxes, administer justice, provide basic public services, the 
civilian capacity. The question here now is even with all the 
military effort we put in, if we don't have the civilian 
capacity component, I don't think your mission is going to 
succeed. Can--you can start and--you have similar problems, I 
think, in South America, also.
    General Waldhauser. Senator, thank you.
    To just provide some context, you know, today, the first 
time since 1991, we have a USAID Mission Director in Mogadishu 
with the Ambassador. Now, this is a very important step, 
because, in December of 2017, USAID signed a--over $300 million 
compact with the country of Djibouti. This is very significant. 
There are issues of education, agriculture, of government 
business, and so forth. It's very important now that we have an 
Ambassador in the country, alongside with a senior USAID rep, 
who can oversee and synchronize those development efforts and 
make sure that the return on investment of that $300 million is 
well spent.
    Senator Reed. But, that is a good example of how it's 
working, but there are many more examples where we don't have 
the resources, we don't have Ambassadors. The Ambassador in 
Mogadishu arrived, what, a few months ago, finally, after 
years? So, I mean, there is this complementary civilian-
capacity issue that, if we don't get right, you can do your 
jobs very well, and we will not succeed.
    Admiral Faller, your points? Because there are many of the 
same situations in South America and Latin America.
    Admiral Faller. Exactly the same situation. The military 
needs to be the small ``m'' in support of the big diplomacy and 
the big economic ``e.'' I see that, where it's working. An 
example would be in El Salvador. We've made some significant 
progress in the reduction of violence. This has been done by 
targeting in really bad neighborhoods, some 50 locations, where 
USAID comes in with public and private partnerships and 
partnership with the Government. We're there in small presence 
to connect those vetted police force with the military.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    I think we're all aware that we're going to have a closed 
session after this. Anything that gets into an area that's more 
appropriate in a closed session, you can pass that on to that 
one.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Waldhauser, I'm just curious. In your opening 
statement for the record regarding Djibouti, you note that our 
continued access and the ability to use, in an unimpeded basis, 
the Doraleh Container Port is critical to our logistical 
efforts in and around East Africa. Given China's increased 
presence within the port complex, do you have any concerns that 
our access and usage could be at risk, short or long term?
    General Waldhauser. Senator Rounds, thank you.
    You know, last year at this time when I testified, Djibouti 
had just taken that port over from the UAE. Now, there's been 
some international court issues of adjudication. I won't get 
into that today. But, the Djiboutians have run that port now 
for over a year. Based on data that we get from the Embassy, 
the Djiboutians have, quite frankly, done a better job, been 
more efficient and have had better throughput than when the 
Emirates ran the port. I have spent time directly with 
President Guelleh, talked with him and with the Ambassador--our 
Ambassador there, and spoke with him about our concern that we 
need unimpeded access. Because it's no secret that roughly 98 
percent of the logistics support for Djibouti, as well as 
Somalia and East Africa, come through that port. That port is 
one of five entities in the overall Djiboutian port. Our access 
there is necessary and required.
    We have the word from President Guelleh that we will always 
have access there. They have no intention of selling out to 
China. Those are his words. His actions, thus far, have backed 
that up, so I have no reason not to believe that.
    But, the bottom line is, I still remain concerned about our 
access there, because if we were denied access or had limited 
access, it would have a significant impact on our activities in 
East Africa.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    I'm also curious. I want to just change subjects a little 
bit. You made a comment in your statement for the record 
pertaining to Algeria. You note that United States relations 
with Algeria continue to foster cooperation and further 
regional stability. Can you give us some examples of what 
AFRICOM can do to foster the United States-Algerian security 
relationship?
    I just want your thoughts, also, with regard to the 
security implications of the Tindouf refugee camps for Algeria. 
That refugee camp has been there for 40 years, and there 
clearly is an issue there. I've been there once, and I plan on 
being there again. I'm just curious, what are your thoughts 
about that situation? How big of an issue is that for security 
for Algeria, who is clearly allowing these folks to be there, 
and they're providing humanitarian aid at this time? I'm 
presuming that we're offering some assistance there, as well.
    General Waldhauser. Let me start by talking a little bit 
about our relationship with Algeria. First of all, I would say 
that the Russians' weapon sales on the continent, that's one of 
their number-one customers. They sell high-end weapons to 
them--ships, submarines, that type of thing. The Russians, who 
sell the majority of equipment on the continent, Algeria 
remains a big partner of theirs.
    That said, I've personally visited Algeria, met with senior 
officials there, and the AFRICOM relationship is one that is--a 
crawl-walk-run stage. We have limited engagements, but we work 
some issues with equipment and repairs, we have visits 
periodically. We've participated in some of these D-Day 
activities, and so forth. So, although it's an arm's-length 
relationship, we do all we can to continue to foster that.
    Now, with regard to the refugee camps, you know, there are 
12.3 million internally displaced people all over the 
continent. This has a lot to do with conflict, it has a lot to 
do with famine, drought, and the like. All these particular 
camps require a lot of care and the ability for our 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to work there freely. 
This has been a significant issue over the last few years, 
because some of the terrorist groups don't adhere to the rules 
of war or the laws of war with regards to NGOs. So, these 
camps, they're perpetuated all over the continent, and the one 
in Algeria, though, I'm not directly familiar with.
    Senator Rounds. Okay. Well, I understand that it has to do 
with relationships between Algeria and Morocco, challenges for 
the group of people that have been literally out of their--what 
they consider to be--their homeland for nearly 40 years now. It 
seems to me that, at some stage of the game, some additional 
attention to that would be appropriate. I'm not sure whether it 
starts with you or with the State Department, but most 
certainly it's an item that I think should be of interest.
    Admiral Faller, I'm just curious. You mentioned that, most 
certainly, the U.S. Navy could use some additional assets. On 
your wish list, if you were to request additional resources, 
specifically what would be the resource that would be number 
one on your list of requested items or equipment?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, the additional ISR, maritime 
patrol aircraft, helicopters, coupled with ships. The Navy 
plans to deploy a littoral combat ship later this year. That's 
mission fit for the kind of missions that we'd have down there, 
which would involve partnering with nations, training, 
humanitarian assistance, possibly, but also the drug 
interdiction. So, that would be number one, top of my list, 
sir.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both very much for your many years of service.
    General Waldhauser, we will miss you. I'm sure you won't 
necessarily miss coming before this Committee, however.
    You reference, in your written statement, General 
Waldhauser, the Women, Peace, and Security Initiative. In the 
2019 Defense budget, we included $4 million in funding for 
full-time gender advisors. I was pleased, Admiral Faller, that 
you introduced your gender advisor, who is here this morning. 
AFRICOM has been commended as a leader in implementing the 
Woman, Peace, and Security Initiative. Can you talk about what 
you have seen, and the success of this initiative, and how 
you've seen it be helpful in Africa?
    General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator Shaheen--I think the 
strategy we've applied over the last few years is just: take 
little things and keep moving forward. For example, out of the 
AFRICOM headquarters, we run a program every year where we 
bring about 15 to 20 females from the African continent and 
take them all over the United States to talk to various 
military leaders, and so forth, to give them, basically, a 
leadership seminar. We also have seen growth--for example, we 
run communications seminars in Capo Verde, which is an island 
off of western Africa. The number of females who have come to 
those particular engagements has increased significantly over 
the last few years.
    You also have an example of--we have a Flintlock Operation, 
which is a Special Operations main exercise of the year, which, 
by the way, will start here later this month in Burkina Faso. 
Last year, when it was in Niger, USAID was able to bring 
together leaders--women leaders, business leaders, bring them 
to this exercise, and have a discussion, in a forum with 
military members, about women and peace and what women can 
contribute.
    The bottom line is, we kept chipping away at small 
programs. We think they're having an impact. We're pretty proud 
of how well we do.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I agree. I think you're to be 
commended. Can you talk about what kind of impact you see? Why 
does this make a difference?
    General Waldhauser. Well, I think, first of all, it's just 
exposure. I mean, to see that, you know, a mixed-gender 
military is a better military. With various--you know, we have 
a large continent, with different countries and different 
cultures, and so forth, and it exposes them to our leadership, 
it exposes the African military male leaders to what the female 
can bring, if you will, to the military. So, I think, from that 
perspective--it's really a bottoms-up approach.
    Senator Shaheen. Great.
    Admiral Faller, I want to switch topics, because we are 
still struggling with the opioid epidemic here in America. New 
Hampshire has had, consistently, unfortunately, one of the 
highest overdose death rates in the country from opioids. Much 
of what we're seeing in New Hampshire is heroin that has been 
produced in Mexico, but also in a number of Central American 
countries. It comes in by boat and by air into the United 
States. At one point, we had a--before you became the head of 
SOUTHCOM, we had a briefing with then-head of SOUTHCOM, who 
said that we interdict a very small percentage--my recollection 
was about 20 percent of what we see that we could interdict--
because we are lacking in resources. Can you update us on 
whether you're seeing an improvement in those numbers and what 
you need to have in order for us to do a better job with 
interdicting those drugs coming into the country?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, it's a national security crisis. 
Over 70,000 deaths, as you're well aware, from your home State. 
While I'd say we've made progress--2017-2018 were record 
interdiction years--we've got a lot of work to do. We're not 
there. We're focused on our partners. El Salvador stepped up. 
Guatemala, Panama. But, there are other partners that need to 
do more. We need some additional assets--some ships, some 
force--we call them force packages from the ISR that we would 
need to detect what you'd need to interdict. More work to be 
done, for sure, in this problem, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I'm glad you mentioned El 
Salvador, because New Hampshire's National Guard has a State 
Partnership Program with El Salvador. Can you talk about the 
difference that those partnership programs make in a country 
like El Salvador?
    Admiral Faller. It's one of our main efforts. They bring a 
lasting, long relationship to the State. Before I went to El 
Salvador, I had a videoconference with your general, and we 
shared--he shared more with me than I was able to share with 
him. I sent him my trip report afterwards. It really helps us 
build capacity. They go in there, and they work on that 
military-to-military engagement. They also work on civil 
affairs projects, where they'll go out, build a school, dig a 
well, and other things that we need to help stabilize the 
conditions for the citizens. It's very important, Senator. 
Thank you for the support.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    I'm out of time, but, General Waldhauser, the last time you 
were here, I asked you about the girls who had been kidnapped 
by Boko Haram, and what we're doing in AFRICOM to help the 
Nigerians, in particular, address that issue. Do you have any 
update for us?
    General Waldhauser. Ma'am, I really have no update. I would 
just tell you that, of the 276 girls who were kidnapped in 
April of 2014, I think the number of 163 have been recovered. 
There's 113, or thereabouts that still are unaccounted for. I 
could talk in more detail in a classified session. But, the 
bottom line is----
    Senator Shaheen. Okay.
    General Waldhauser.--there has not been much progress, from 
what I can see, in terms of getting any of those remainder 
back.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator McSally.
    Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks, gentlemen, for your leadership.
    General Waldhauser, it was about 12 years ago that I was 
sent to Stuttgart as part of the AFRICOM transition team to 
stand up your Command. We had just a handful of us, no 
resources, no facilities, no assets at the time. We were going 
to be the kinder, gentler command, without a whole lot of 
operational focus. I was the J-33, Chief of Current Operations. 
We very quickly realized, you know, Africa continues to be a 
potential hotspot for terrorist activity, both on the east 
coast and the west coast and other areas in ungoverned spaces. 
We had to ramp up very fast to be able to take on that task. 
However, you know--and I see, in your testimony, you're talking 
about al-Shabaab and the challenges in Somalia. At the time, 
when we were running the time-sensitive targeting operations, 
we watched--literally watched, with our ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance], hundreds and hundreds and 
hundreds of al-Shabaab-trained militants out there in the 
middle of nowhere, with no collateral-damage concerns, being 
trained at training camps, and then being released, because 
the--at the time, the civilian political leadership in our 
country didn't want to--didn't feel needed to do anything about 
it. Like a cancer growing and metastasizing, we continued to 
see their strength grow, and their capabilities grow, but we 
just didn't do anything about it. Do you have the authorities 
you need to address the terrorist threat in your area of 
responsibility now, unlike back when I was there? I've got bad 
memories about all that. Also, you know, how does that fit 
within our vital national interests and the National Defense 
Strategy?
    General Waldhauser. Thank you, Senator. There's a lot 
there, and I hope we are living up to your expectations of how 
AFRICOM is performing. It's a little bit better than when you 
were there, starting things up.
    Senator McSally. I know.
    General Waldhauser. Look, let me just take the strikes on. 
I'll try to be brief, but I think it's important to provide 
some context.
    In April of 2017 we were given authorities, from the 
national security apparatus, to initiate, to be able to have 
offensive capabilities inside of Somalia. That, combined with 
the legitimacy of a federal government there, our strikes are 
tied to their strategy. Our legitimacy comes from our 
authorities as well as the Federal Government that we're tied 
in with. We had strikes for 7 months in the year of 2017, where 
we had 35 strikes. Last year, in 2018, we had 47 strikes for 
the overall 12-month period. Thus far this year, we've had, I 
think, 12, so far. The point I want to make is that the strikes 
are tied to the transition strategy that the federal government 
of Somalia and the Somalian National Army are trying to 
execute. In other words, we're trying to support their plan.
    Senator McSally. Right.
    General Waldhauser. President Farmajo has indicated that 
his main effort for security is Mogadishu. His transitional 
strategy has that in mind.
    Finally, I would just say that, at the end of the day, 
these strikes are not going to defeat al-Shabaab, but they're 
going to provide the opportunity for the Federal Government and 
the Somali National Army to grow and assume the security of 
that country.
    I would just say that my bottom line is, the strikes won't 
defeat. We know that they are causing problems. We know that 
they are deterring. It's an open question as to how much, but 
we know it's causing al-Shabaab problems, giving this 
opportunity for the government. But, the bottom line is that 
the Somali National Army needs to grow, it needs to step up, 
and it needs to take responsibility for their own security, not 
only for our strikes, but the overall international community 
that's tied there. We're talking about the European Union, 
we're talking about the United Nations, the U.K., Turkey. We 
all have pieces of the puzzle down there, and one of our pieces 
is the strike aspect.
    The bottom line is, the Somali National Army needs to grow, 
needs to step up. We have made this point very clear, both the 
new Ambassador and myself, on numerous occasions to President 
Farmajo and Prime Minister Khayre. They know this. They've got 
to step up. It's up to them to take advantage of the 
opportunity that they have right now.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller, I just have a little bit of time left, but 
I want to get back on to the counterdrug and the drug flow in 
your AOR. I know you're short of resources that you need. What 
are you seeing, as far as the trends of the cartel activity 
over water, over land, submarines, light aircraft? I mean, 
they're nimble, and they're innovative. What are the trends? 
Are they still going, kind of, over water, up until then--over 
land, from Mexico up, or, like, what are you seeing the trends, 
and what else do we need to combat it?
    Admiral Faller. They are very nimble, and they're agile and 
in many cases, better funded than the security forces they 
face. They adapt. We're seeing them go further out to sea, as 
far out into the Pacific as around the Galapagos and up. We're 
seeing them integrate with fishing vessels in a different 
manner. We're seeing them with lower-profile vessels, including 
some submerged vessels. In the air, we're seeing them use 
Venezuela as a launch point to fly out of Venezuela. Cross-
border traffic, if you will, using Venezuela's current state as 
a launch point up through the middle of the Caribbean and then 
into remote airfields throughout Central America. As they 
adapt, we adapt. But, they adapt faster, and they have more 
flexible resources. We're trying to get after it. But, it's a 
challenge.
    Senator McSally. Thanks.
    I'm out of time. I appreciate it.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator McSally.
    Senator Peters.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today and your 
distinguished service over many years.
    Admiral Faller, last year, I asked Admiral Tidd about the 
situation in Venezuela, including the role of military advisors 
from Cuba. Certainly, a lot has changed since that meeting. I 
want to follow up on the question that Senator Reed asked that, 
basically, related to the military. Your response was that 
there are more generals in Venezuela than there are in NATO. My 
question is: If Maduro's going to be really relying on this 
military to prop him up, what is the extent, to the everyday 
soldiers, the enlisted folks, the discipline in the military? 
Do those generals really have command over that military?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, the leaders, including the Cuban 
guards that completely surround the illegitimate Government of 
Maduro, seem to have a grip on the top level. What we read in--
at this level, that we can talk about more in a classified 
session--that the rank-and-file are starving, just like their 
population. I had the opportunity to go on the Colombian-
Venezuela border to one of our medical camps--that was 
operating off the Comfort, and see some of these kids that had 
lost 25-30 pounds in a year. They were stick thin. They had 
never had medical attention. We think that condition affects a 
large swath of the population. We think that that population is 
ready for a new leader, Senator.
    Senator Peters. Admiral Faller, you also mentioned some of 
the additional assets that you need: ISR and ships. You 
mentioned the littoral combat ship coming online, and how 
that's going to contribute to the fulfillment of your mission. 
Could you give us some sense of the status and timing of that, 
and how you see that being fully developed in the months and 
years ahead?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, we expect to have a littoral 
combat ship this year, and that will be a big benefit for our 
exercise program, for our engagement with partners, and because 
of the flexibility it brings for counternarcotic interdiction. 
Counternarcotic will be its first mission. Then we forward to 
continuous presence, moving forward.
    We're working with our Navy. They have readiness 
challenges, and they don't have enough ships. I think that's 
been discussed well before this Committee. We have the support 
we need. We look forward to the assets.
    Senator Peters. In addition to those assets, I know your 
predecessors have talked about the fact that the Navy and the 
Southern Command has white hulls. That's the U.S. Coast Guard. 
That performs brilliantly in those counternarcotics missions, 
as well as other missions related to your task. You know, I 
visited Coast Guard units in Michigan who were incredibly 
stressed as a result of the Government shutdown. They're 
concerned about their families, particularly junior enlisted, 
that were living on the edge. You have men and women in the 
Coast Guard being deployed away from home, worrying about their 
families. Could you talk a little bit about the impact of the 
shutdown on morale and the ability to execute the mission?
    Admiral Faller. Sir, Monday morning, I had the opportunity 
to stand on the deck of the Coast Guard cutter Ford with 
Admiral Schultz, the Commandant of the Coast Guard. This crew 
of 110 of America's finest had deployed over Christmas with 
record-number seizures. Seventeen metric tons of cocaine, which 
is hundreds of lives saved in the U.S. They did that deployment 
in large part, without pay and without adequate parts, because 
that was affected by contracting. It was difficult for Admiral 
Schultz and I to address some of their questions. They had 
remarkable resiliency and a remarkable attitude. They are our 
main battery. During that period, there was nine Coast Guard 
cutters deployed, counternarcotics missions, some 1600 Coast 
Guard men and women working for United States Southern Command, 
and it did have an impact. We're thankful that the shutdown's 
over, Senator.
    Senator Peters. That's why we can't have any more 
shutdowns, for that very reason, to make sure that our men and 
women of the Coast Guard are getting paid, like every other 
member of the military out there defending us. I appreciate 
those comments.
    General Waldhauser, we have talked in this Committee quite 
a bit about China's influence in Africa and how it continues to 
increase. You mentioned, in your opening comments, that Russia 
is also increasing its involvement. Would you please elaborate 
on that involvement to the Committee, and why we should be 
concerned about Russian involvement on the continent?
    General Waldhauser. Senator, I think the issue with Russia 
has to do with influence. I think, in recent months over the 
past year, they perhaps got more involved in mineral 
extraction, but, to a large degree, it's still a matter of 
influence, especially in areas we're not or especially in areas 
where they can say that the United States or the U.K. or 
Western partners are perhaps backing away from Africa. It's, I 
think, clear that their strategy along the northern part of 
Africa, southern part of NATO, if you will, in the 
Mediterranean, to have influence inside Libya, for example, the 
relationships across that country, they want to have--across 
the continent--they want to have influence on the continent.
    I would just point to the Central African Republic right 
now, where the Wagner group has about 175 trainers, where some 
individuals are actually in the President's cabinet, and 
they're influencing the training, as well as, at the same time, 
having access to minerals in that part of the country. We're 
concerned that that model might be looked at or viewed 
positively by other countries, in terms of their ability to 
train and their ability to influence the government at the 
presidential level, as well as then getting involved in 
extraction of minerals.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
    Senator Scott.
    Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Faller, can you talk about Cuba's intelligence, 
security, military influence in Latin America, and what they're 
doing, and how we can combat it?
    Admiral Faller. I Can't talk about Cuba without talking 
about Russia. Russia is entrenched in Cuba, weapons systems and 
support. Looking across Latin America, we see Cuba 
inextricably, intertwined in all elements of Venezuela. In 
fact, the National Security Advisor called it ``Cubazuela'' 
yesterday. I would agree with that characterization. We see 
that in Nicaragua, as well. It's not helpful to democracy, and 
it's an autocratic way of life that runs counter to, really, 
the principles of the hemisphere, which are very much a 
democratic hemisphere.
    Senator Scott. The sanctions that we've imposed on 
nationals in both Cuba and Venezuela, have you seen them have 
any impact? Have you seen anybody change their action as a 
result of them?
    Admiral Faller. We're watching that closely. We're watching 
the intelligence. There's a discussion of the impact. We are 
seeing impacts. But, we haven't seen the desired result, which 
is a peaceful, democratic transition to a legitimate 
government, yet, Senator.
    Senator Scott. The sanctions we've done against individuals 
in Cuba--and we've done that over a period of time. Have you 
seen--has anything happened?
    Admiral Faller. It doesn't seem to have affected the 
overall calculus of the Cuban regime, other than harden it, 
solidify it, and tie it more closely to Russia. But, I think 
it's almost like deterrence: you don't know what happens when 
you don't have them, Senator. It probably has an impact. We 
don't see it. I would recommend--full-court pressure works.
    Senator Scott. Okay. In the Venezuelan military, have you 
seen any cracking, from the standpoint of what we've been doing 
over the last--especially the last 2 weeks? Has anything 
changed?
    Admiral Faller. Certainly, there's been readiness aspects 
of their military that we've watched very closely. It's a 
degraded force. But, it's still a force that remains loyal to 
Maduro, and that makes it dangerous. We're looking for signs of 
those cracking, and we can talk, in the closed session, on some 
more details and trends we're seeing.
    Senator Scott. Okay.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, I'd like to ask you about a question----
    Well, first of all, thank you both for not only your--being 
here today, but for your service and all you do for this 
country.
    General, I'd like to ask you about an article yesterday by 
Reuters concerning the cutoff of assistance to Cameroon because 
of concerns about human rights abuses by the Cameroon 
Government. That program halted--included C-130 aircraft, a 
number of different things. That report indicated there was a 
2017 report by the U.S. State Department that listed a number 
of significant human rights violations and abuses that were 
observed in the Cameroon Government. Could you comment on what 
we're doing there, other than just this halt? Are we making 
progress on trying to get that government to stem the tide of 
their human rights violations?
    [The article referred to follows:]

    U.S. Halts Some Cameroon Military Assistance Over Human Rights: 
                                Official

Lesley Wroughton

    WASHINGTON (Reuters)--The United States said on Wednesday 
it was halting some military assistance to Cameroon over 
allegations of gross human rights violations by its security 
forces in the northwest, southwest and far north regions.
    A State Department official said the United States had 
terminated a C-130 aircraft training program, and halted 
deliveries of four defender boats, nine armored vehicles and an 
upgrade of a Cessna aircraft for Cameroon's rapid intervention 
battalion.
    Furthermore, the United States had withdrawn its offer for 
Cameroon to be part of the State Partnership Program, a 
military cooperation program, the official said.
    ``We do not take these measures lightly, but we will not 
shirk from reducing assistance further if evolving conditions 
require it,'' the official said. ``For the time being, other 
programs will continue.''
    Cameroon has cooperated closely with the United States in 
the fight against Islamist militant group Boko Haram in West 
and Central Africa. But rights groups have accused authorities 
of using the fight against Boko Haram to crack down on 
political opponents, and make arbitrary arrests and torture 
people.
    Authorities arrested opposition leader Maurice Kamto in 
January, accusing him of mobilizing dissent against President 
Paul Biya, who has ruled the country since 1982.
    Biya has been accused by the opposition and rights groups 
of cracking down in the Anglophone Southwest region to root out 
armed separatists trying to end his grip on power.
    Tens of thousands of people have been displaced in Nigeria 
and neighboring Chad, Niger and Cameroon during Boko Haram's 
campaign to carve out an Islamic caliphate in northeast 
Nigeria.
    ``We emphasize that it is in Cameroon's interest to show 
greater transparency in investigating credible allegations of 
gross violations of human rights security forces,'' the State 
Department official said.

    Admiral Faller. Senator, thank you. Let me try to explain 
this. I'll start by why we're in Cameroon and what we're doing 
there.
    We talked this morning about the Chibok girls from a couple 
of years ago, but Boko Haram is the issue there. In 2015, they 
were the number-one terrorist group on the planet. Depending on 
what you read, they have killed over 20,000 people, some 
estimates quite higher than that, over this timeframe, the 
Chibok-girls issue, all kind of atrocities. They are an 
extremely volatile group that needs to be dealt with. So, in 
that region, our mission is to train the counterterrorism 
forces in northern Cameroon that deal with Boko Haram. We have 
been doing that for several years, and, quite frankly, the BIR, 
the brigade of rapid intervention, is the top-shelf 
counterterrorism unit inside Cameroon. They have performed 
well, and they--and that training, by the way, has, certainly, 
law-of-war and battlefield ethics. So, that's why we're there.
    The issue on the Anglophone piece, I won't go into detail 
on that. I think the article, plus the video this morning, did 
a very good job of explaining the history of how it got to the 
point where we are today. In October of 2017, when it came, 
kind of, to a head, the Anglophone states said, ``We want to 
actually form our own state, the Ambazonia state.'' There have 
been issues there with atrocities, issues with allegations of 
law-of-war issues. This is something that brings all this to a 
head.
    Over the last several months or so, the State Department 
has put on hold several security force assistance programs. 
Right before the election in October, I, with the Ambassador, 
went and paid a visit with President Biya, and we had a very 
direct conversation with him with regards to investigation into 
these atrocities, transparencies of these atrocities, and 
appropriate battlefield behavior. Since that time, the State 
Department has made the decision not to allocate significant 
money, but, at the same time, they've released some money 
that's been on hold to things like ScanEagle and Cessna 
aircraft that assist in the Boko Haram fight in the north. We 
still have programs that we continue with them, all kind of 
small engagements, as well as exercises. We did have the--we 
talked about the State Partnership Program with Nebraska. We 
put that on hold. In conjunction with the Ambassador, AFRICOM, 
we decided not to pursue that, because it wouldn't have been a 
good place for that particular group to be, so we put a halt to 
that.
    The bottom line is, right now in Cameroon, they have been a 
good partner with us, counterterrorism-wise, but you can't 
neglect the fact that they have--there are alleged atrocities 
in what's going on there. We continue to take our cues from the 
State Department and from the Ambassador, and our level of 
engagement will continue, but not get out ahead of what the 
State Department would say if we have to take other actions. We 
were very emphatic with President Biya that the behavior of his 
troops, the lack of transparency, could have a significant 
impact on our ability to work with them.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much for that.
    Admiral, I was struck by a couple of things with your 
testimony. Number one, I was struck by the charts that you 
provided. Because I think people are not paying as much 
attention. We've always heard of--since the Cold War--the 
influence of Russia, but the Chinese influence in our backyard 
is just incredible to me. I was struck by your initial comments 
about our shared responsibilities, our shared security with our 
neighbors, and how we share so many things together. I'm new to 
this Committee, and so I've been reading a lot, and I've seen 
that there are initiatives for the Pacific and in Europe. Would 
some similar initiative to that be appropriate for Central 
America or for SOUTHCOM?
    [The charts provided to follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	
    
    Admiral Faller. Senator, I think a big idea, an initiative 
that recognizes the importance of our neighborhood, recognizes 
what goes on right here in areas connected by sea, land, air, 
space, cyber, is important to our shared security and our 
future, would be of great benefit. I worry, Senator, that we're 
not going to be present on the field in enough numbers to play 
the game. We've got to be there to influence the outcome and 
the results.
    Senator Jones. All right. Well, thank you, sir. We'll send 
you some more Mobile-built LCSs.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance 
today and your service to our Nation, for all those men and 
women who serve underneath you in Africa Command and Southern 
Command.
    Admiral Faller, I want to return to your comments about the 
presence of Cuba and Russia in Venezuela. You said, earlier, 
Cuban guards completely surround the Maduro Government. Does 
that mean that Maduro is dependent on the Cuban security and 
intelligence forces for his continuation in office?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, I think it's a good sense of where 
the loyalty of the Venezuelan people are that his immediate 
security force is made up of Cubans.
    Senator Cotton. So, the men that surround Maduro, like our 
Secret Service, are Cubans, not Venezuelans.
    Admiral Faller. That is my understanding and assessment of 
the situation.
    Senator Cotton. So, Venezuela's intelligence security 
services are so corrupt, so incompetent, so disloyal, so 
sclerotic that Maduro cannot even count on his own personal 
safety in his bed at night, on his own people.
    Admiral Faller. That's a fair assessment, as I understand, 
Senator.
    Senator Cotton. How far does that go throughout the 
Venezuelan security and intelligence services? Does Nicolas 
Maduro have to depend on Cubans and Russians on the streets to 
beat his own people to keep them in line?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, I'm not--beyond the--what I 
characterize--I'm not aware of the details, but we watch that 
closely. We've seen reporting of Russian security forces being 
flown in. We're looking for evidence of how that will play out. 
Certainly this is an area that has our focus, as well as all 
our partners in the interagency.
    Senator Cotton. That was another point. You mentioned 
that--you said you can't speak of Cuba's presence in 
Venezuela--let me stop myself.
    Can you estimate, in this setting, how many Cuban security 
and intelligence officers there are in Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Sir, I don't have that number. I'd take 
that for the record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    We estimate the number of Cuban security and intelligence 
personnel in Venezuela is somewhere in the thousands; this 
number is in addition to the over 20,000 medical personnel Cuba 
provides to Venezuela.]

    Senator Cotton. Is it fair to----
    Admiral Faller. I'm----
    Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say there are lots?
    Admiral Faller. I'd say there's--there are many, sir.
    Senator Cotton. And----
    Admiral Faller. I also would mention, Senator, the presence 
of China has not been helpful in a diplomatic way. I'll leave 
that to the diplomats. China's in there, and they're involved 
in cyber in ways that are absolutely not helpful to a 
democratic outcome.
    Senator Cotton. You talk about Russians traveling into the 
country. Have we seen an increase in Russian presence in 
Venezuela in the last 2 months as the National Assembly began 
to take its seat and President Guaido declared himself as 
interim President, and the United States and so many other 
nations around the world have recognized his legitimacy?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, it's hard, with Russia, to figure 
out what they're really up to. I----
    Senator Cotton. You don't say.
    Senator Cotton. There was reports last week by Russian 
official TASS news agency that I was actually on the Colombian-
Venezuela border, and they rolled that with B-roll footage of 
amphibious landings and helicopter assaults. I was actually 
walking out of Senator Rubio's office at the time. I don't 
think the truth goes very far when it comes to their media, 
sir.
    Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you for those comments, Admiral 
Faller, about Venezuela.
    You mentioned China's activity in Venezuela in the cyber 
domain. They obviously are very active, as well, in what you 
might call debt diplomacy through their Belt and Road 
Initiative. Secretary of State Pompeo was in Panama last 
October cautioning that nation, and all nations who are 
participants in China's Belt and Road Initiative, about what it 
could mean for their sovereignty. Obviously, China has 
foreclosed in the port outside Colombo, in Sri Lanka. Malaysia 
recently left the Initiative because of China trying to throw 
its weight around. What's been the results of Secretary 
Pompeo's visit in the region? What feedback are you getting 
from some of these Belt and Road Initiative members?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, the states in the region, the 
countries, they want to continue to partner us, but I've 
cautioned the leaders that I've met with that, ``While you 
might want to do that, if you leverage your ports and many of 
your businesses, including your IT infrastructure, to Chinese 
companies, with no strings attached and limited understanding 
of what the internal workings are, that you've actually put 
yourself in jeopardy of having a meaningful security 
relationship with us. It gets to a point where I won't be 
allowed or authorized to share information, because I just 
don't know where that information is going.'' So, I've been 
very emphatic about that, in terms of how it would affect us 
being a partner of choice. This is my concern to other 
questions that have been asked about what this hemisphere looks 
like, 10, 15, 25 years from now, and who the partner of choice 
is. We've got to be present, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Admiral Faller.
    General Waldhauser, one question for Africa. This is a 
little bit outside the warfighting domain, but the American 
military is called upon to do a lot outside that domain around 
the world, especially in your area of operations. Nigeria has 
its elections next weekend. Nigeria is the seventh-largest 
country in the world, way larger than Russia or Mexico or 
Japan. An important ally of ours. What are the prospects for 
that election? Does it appear that it will be free and fair, 
and that either party, should they win, will continue to be a 
partner of the United States?
    General Waldhauser. Senator, we're very much aware of the 
elections on February 16th. From the military perspective, we 
will watch that from the standpoint of actions leading up to 
and what will happen afterwards. We are--on the intelligence 
reports, we hope it'll be a peaceful election, but I think our 
sights are set on forward, and not in the rearview mirror, 
meaning that whoever would win, that now, okay, let's sit down 
and talk about where we are and how we can best help, whether 
it be the displaced people and the issues with--humanitarian 
issues in northern Nigeria, whether it's their army and their 
work against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. So, my answer to 
that question is, let's get the election over. They're watching 
this today, by the way. I mean, my comments are going to be 
watched in Nigeria, and it's very important that I don't sway, 
either way.
    Senator Cotton. Sure. Well----
    General Waldhauser. The bottom line is, whoever wins, we 
want to sit down with them and now, how do we move forward and 
improve the situation?
    Senator Cotton. Good. Well, I appreciate that answer. Of 
course, their election is a choice for the Nigerian people, and 
we want to have a good, stable relationship with whoever wins, 
to help continue that partnership.
    Thank you, General.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
    We've already discussed and gotten a good idea of how 
complex your missions are in both of your areas of operation. 
Our own vital national interests are threatened by violent 
extremists, by great-power competition, and all of multifaceted 
challenges that you face. As I looked at recent reporting on 
SOUTHCOM, much attention has been on the dictator's effort to 
cling to power; in AFRICOM, the persistent presence of violent 
extremists. Are these events merely symptoms of a larger 
systemic problem in both regions? What, in your assessment, are 
the prime drivers of instability in SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM? How 
are your commands postured to deal with the root causes? It's 
one thing to deal with the symptoms, but what are we doing to 
really get to the root causes that are occurring in both of 
your regions?
    General Waldhauser. I'll go first, Senator. Thank you very 
much.
    I'll use Niger as an example. Niger has a population of 
about 19 million. About 50 percent of those are under the age 
of 15. They certainly are in a very difficult area of Africa, 
meaning that they have a pressing from all sides, whether it be 
ISIS-West Africa, JNIM [Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin], in 
the west; whether it be AQ [al Qaeda] coming down through the 
Algeria-Nigerian border on the way to Mali; they have ISIS-West 
Africa on their eastern flank. They're in a tough situation. 
What goes unnoticed sometimes is the whole-of-government 
approach that is used in Niger. For example, USAID has about 
$150 million a year that they use for things like education, 
especially for young girls, for government, and--government 
infrastructure, and so forth. Moreover, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation--they're on the--I think, second year of 
a 5-year compact down there which has to do with agriculture, 
watering crops, and so forth. If you look at the security 
assistance that we're providing, and you add to that USAID's 
effort and the Millennium Challenge compact, that's, I think, a 
good example of a whole-of-government approach of how we're 
trying to deal with a country that has some very significant 
security challenges.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller?
    Admiral Faller. We do have some bright spots. I'd like to 
point out, Brazil has been a exporter of security in our 
history, same with Colombia. The trajectory of both our mil-to-
mil relations with those countries is very positive. In the 
current Venezuela situation, we're sharing a lot of 
information, we're looking at this as a regional solution. 
Chile commanded, in our largest exercise, the Rim of the 
Pacific. But, around the region, corruption, weak governance, 
lack of jobs, these are things that are of effect. The military 
is a part of this whole government solution.
    I saw this in Honduras. I was in an outreach center run by 
USAID. It was right next to a partnered police station. We had 
a few Army civil affairs people there meeting with some young 
men and women that had been supplied jobs. I asked the one 
individual--he had gone all the way to the United States-Mexico 
border, and turned around and came all the way back. He walked, 
as part of the caravan, but he came back. I said, ``Well, why 
did you come back?'' He said, ``It was pretty scary for me. I 
felt that I should come home.'' I said, ``Well, why did you 
go?'' He goes, ``The family next to us was starving--or we were 
starving, and the family next to them was starving, but across 
the street, they had some food because their father had made it 
to the United States and was sending remittance back.'' So, at 
the heart of this is the want of a better life and economy, and 
the want to have your kids go to school. All citizens of all 
the world deserve that.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Looking at this whole-of-government approach, how easy has 
it been--or, for you each, to work with other executive branch 
agencies to provide a coordinated whole-of-government approach? 
Is this happening--for example, you may be happening in Niger, 
but is it happening in other parts of Africa? How are we--are 
we consistent in applying this approach? What can we do to 
really help you be part of this, this team, so that we can get 
at the root causes?
    General Waldhauser. Well, Senator, I would say that the 
AFRICOM staff has individuals from those agencies that work 
very closely with us on a daily basis. Moreover, as dollars 
become tight, our return on investment needs to be 
demonstrated. As a consequence, we have to be better stewards 
of our efforts, in terms of where we want to place our 
emphasis. We need to coordinate that and synchronize that with 
this agency, because, really, it gets, I think, to the larger 
issue of influence, and the China influence, as well. We need 
to demonstrate that we can compete with them. We may not be 
building soccer stadiums or government buildings, but, at the 
same time, we're teaching them how to be better farmers, we're 
showing them what education can do for them. So, the bottom 
line for us is, we need to continue to work with our partners, 
which we have good relationships with, by the way. This 
development, diplomacy, and defense effort in the AFRICOM--at 
State Department and with AFRICOM is very, very positive 
experience.
    Senator Duckworth. Admiral?
    Admiral Faller. We have representatives from every 
interagency at my headquarters, and they sit in at every 
meeting. We're working this problem set hard, and we're work it 
in conjunction with country teams in the Embassy. A consistent 
level of resourcing is important, and recognizing this is a 
problem that will take years to solve, not months or days.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Ernst.
    Senator Ernst. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and, of course, 
to the men and women in your commands. We thank them for what 
they do for all of us. To the family members that are here, 
thank you so much for the support that you give to your loved 
one. So, thank you.
    Admiral Faller, I'll start with you. We've talked about a 
lot of different groups that are engaged in SOUTHCOM, but what 
I'd like to do is dive in a little bit to Hezbollah. They do 
have a notable presence in South America. As we saw last year, 
Argentina and Brazil, they both took action against Hezbollah 
assets in their respective countries. We've heard, from 
regional authorities, that they are aware of Hezbollah's 
presence in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and 
Paraguay. Can you go a bit further into the threat that 
Hezbollah presents in SOUTHCOM? What are our interests in 
making sure that they are not affecting us? What are those 
national security interests for us and our partners?
    Admiral Faller. Hezbollah is present. We watch them 
closely. It points to the importance of partnerships in the 
intelligence-sharing relationships that we are keen to develop 
and strengthen even further, because a lot of what's required 
to monitor them is human intelligence, and those nations know 
their terrain best.
    Hezbollah's connection to Iran can never be understated. 
Iran is the largest sponsor of state terrorism in the world. 
There is a nexus there that goes back. We watch that working, 
in partnership with the other combatant commands, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, very, very closely. We look for trends, 
indications, and warnings. A terror threat anywhere around the 
world could be a threat of our Homeland.
    Senator Ernst. I appreciate you highlighting how Iran is 
interconnected here. We talk about some of those near-peer 
threats with China and Russia in the SOUTHCOM AOR, but we also 
need to recognize that Iran is a player, as well. So, thank you 
for making that connection.
    Do we have sufficient information-sharing authorities in 
place, then? You've mentioned the need to communicate with 
friends and allies. Do we have the right authorities available?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, we have to work that on a country-
by-country basis. It's a key thing that we look at when we do 
our country engagements. So, the answer is, we never have 
enough. We have countries where we want to sign additional 
agreements. We have to get assurances with them about what 
they'll share and who they'll share it with. It goes back to my 
concern about who owns the IT infrastructure in a given city or 
a given fusion center. We're constantly looking at this. I fly, 
Sunday, to Brazil for my meeting with their new military 
leadership. This will be one of our top areas of discussion. I 
would say that's a very healthy intel-sharing relationship 
that's growing, and we've been able to really work with our 
partners, because sharing information intelligence builds 
trust, frankly. Building trust is what is going to ensure our 
long-term interests in this hemisphere are safeguarded.
    Senator Ernst. That is very good. We've also talked about 
the role that Special Operations plays in achieving your 
objectives in SOUTHCOM. Part of that ties back into Hezbollah 
and others. What are some of the biggest challenges that you'll 
face with regard to resources or authorities when it comes to 
our Special Operations and how we employ them in SOUTHCOM?
    Admiral Faller. We have very small numbers of Special 
Operations teams that are engaged with partners, building their 
security forces, and building it very effectively. Those need 
to be habitual relationships that are keyed off of what the 
partner needs. It's also good for our training, as well, as our 
partners train in jungles and a tough kind of terrain.
    I would say our challenge is maintaining that. Our SOF 
forces are under pressure worldwide. As we look at what their 
deployment ratio is, the amount of time they're spending away 
from home to the time they spend at home, making certain that 
we get that balance right, making certain that we don't 
decremate the small presence that we have, which would break 
trust and really break the training and stability of our 
partner nation security forces.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you. Yes, our dwell time is very 
small. We need to work on that.
    Before I move on to the General, we have also talked about 
GITMO, Guantanamo Bay. Right now, we do have Iowa National 
Guard soldiers deployed there as a security force. What can we 
do to ensure that the troops we have that are stationed or a 
rotational force at GITMO, that they are being cared for, that 
they are safe? Not only do we want to make sure that those that 
are held there are kept in a safe environment, but also for our 
troops. What more can we be doing? Can you explain some of the 
challenges that we have at Guantanamo Bay right now?
    Admiral Faller. I had the honor to visit with some of your 
Iowa Guard prisoner guards, detainee guards----
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller.--just last weekend, Senator. They're doing 
fabulous work. So, thanks----
    Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you.
    Admiral Faller.--for the--to the State for that.
    The facilities were built with about a 5-year lifespan, and 
that's been 15-20 years ago. Our responsibility is the safe, 
humane treatment of the detainees, but also the safety of that 
Guard force. We have facilities that were beyond the ability to 
repair the roofs, where the alarm systems are questionable, 
based on the water intrusion. When the President's budget is 
released, I expect it to include money that would be put for 
some long-term facility upgrades in development. We need that 
for the safety of the Guard force and for the future of safe 
detainees.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    In the few seconds I have remaining, General, as well, 
Special Operations Forces in Africa, do we need to maintain our 
Special Operators in Africa and the work that they are doing?
    General Waldhauser. Well, we certainly need to maintain 
them, and we certainly have to take a close look at how we 
employ and deploy them, and what their schedules are. We do--we 
continually reevaluate that all the time. The bottom line is, 
yes. But, I would say, what we really need in AFRICOM are some 
predictable general-purpose forces that can do things with 
regular armies on a somewhat episodic, but yet predictable, 
basis.
    Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you, General. I appreciate 
it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, to our witnesses.
    The Chair and Ranking indicated that a unifier in your two 
regions is that you're under-resourced. I think another unifier 
is, in both your regions, you have a real cross-disciplinary, 
non-siloed focus, not just military assets, but the entire 
spectrum of what the U.S. can do. I think that's a--something 
about SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM that I really appreciate.
    Admiral Faller, let me start with you. The discussion about 
Venezuela is a really important one. If the world wants to see 
a democracy-versus-dictatorship challenge, Venezuela is just, 
like, the perfect test case for circa 2019. What do democracies 
care for, and what do dictatorship care for? The Venezuelan 
Government of Maduro is supported by Russia, Cuba, and Iran. 
They're enabling him to do all kinds of horrible things, 
economically and in violation of human rights, et cetera. The 
Guaido interim government, which has a constitutional claim 
that, in the vacancy of a President, the Speaker of the 
legislative assembly becomes an interim President, is supported 
by the United States and the EU. You really can see what the 
difference between democracy and the aspirations of democratic 
governments and dictatorships, and what they care about, writ 
very clearly in the Venezuelan circumstance now.
    But, here's a reality. We're dealing with regional 
institutions, like the Organization of American States (OAS), 
for example. In the OAS, every nation has one vote. The United 
States has a hard time getting the OAS to firmly come out 
against the Maduro Government, because many Caribbean nations 
still support the Maduro Government. They have been bribed to 
do so, with low-price oil. It's very hard for us to do 
something like this on our own. When a principal regional 
institution like the OAS isn't completely with us, it's hard to 
put the appropriate pressure on.
    I guess the point that I want to make is: Hard to beat 
something with nothing. The Chinese and Russians have been 
investing so heavily in Venezuela, tens of billions of dollars, 
over and over and over again. These Caribbean nations, they 
might feel culturally closer to the United States, but they're 
getting something from Venezuela that they need.
    Your point about ``We need to be on the field'' is really, 
really, important. As I talk to leaders in this region, they 
say, ``We would so much more like to do work with you guys. We 
are culturally connected, and we're all Americans, you know, 
but the other guys are there and present and investing. Even if 
we have suspicions, they're there with resources, and you 
aren't.'' I think that's an important lesson.
    Want to ask about the Northern Triangle. It's a resource 
question, as well. The Alliance for Progress has been an 
initiative in the last few years to invest money and security 
and economic development assistance in the three nations in the 
Northern Triangle. Would it be your recommendation--so long as 
we can make those investments smart, would it be your 
recommendation that, if we can improve the security and 
economic development arc in those three countries, that that 
would help us deal with some of the challenges that SOUTHCOM 
has to deal with?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, the week before last, I visited 
projects, in all three countries, that were a direct result of 
the investments that you just cited. Those projects were USAID, 
State, INL, and a small footprint of Department of Defense 
working side by side to bring security, with local policing, 
and jobs, and host-nation investment in a way that stabilized 
some of the worst neighborhoods and showed hope. We talked to 
citizens that live there. We saw the results. I think 
consistent investment, in accordance with our laws, is a good 
thing in that area. Investment, a dollar there is going to save 
lives and result in better security here at home.
    Senator Kaine. That's really important. The funds for those 
initiatives have been pretty dramatically slashed, the last 2 
years. We don't know what the budget submission will be that 
we'll get, hopefully, by the end of the month. But, I think 
it's penny wise and pound foolish to cut development and 
security assistance and then complain about people coming to 
our border. We need to help build and support economies there, 
and security there, if we want people to not leave their own 
countries.
    Let me quickly--General Waldhauser, to you--on page 5 of 
your submitted statement, you write, ``In the fight against 
Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, we operate with partners in 
the Africa Union-enforced Multinational Task Force.'' The 
fiscal year '18 NDAA included a provision, in section 1264, 
that required the administration to provide an initial report 
and subsequent updates on the legal and policy frameworks for 
use of military force. I'm interested in the initial report, 
which was submitted in March of 2018. I'd like to put that in 
the record, if I could. It makes no----
    Chairman Inhofe. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]
      
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	
      
    Senator Kaine. It makes no mention of ISIS-West Africa or 
Boko Haram as an associated force. As far as I know, there's 
not been an updated report submitted to this Committee, as 
would be required if any new determination were made. Has Boko 
Haram or ISIS-West Africa been determined to be an associated 
force within the--either the 2001 or 2002 AUMF?
    General Waldhauser. Senator, first of all, we do not have 
offensive strike capabilities or authorities in those 
countries. So, we can't strike. We can strike in Somalia, we 
can strike in Libya, but not in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and 
the like. We don't have authorities there.
    Now, ISIS-West Africa has grown--they go by different names 
every once in a while, but they have grown in numbers. They're 
now probably in the neighborhood of around 3 to 4,000. That's 
the best estimate that we have. They have been very aggressive 
over the summer, into this year. They now have taken large 
pieces of real estate in northern Nigeria. I think, of the two, 
right now they're the one that we have the most concern about, 
because we're not sure what their intentions would be with 
regards to outside the region. Boko Haram, probably around 
1,000. Bottom line, though, Senator, I can't say for sure 
whether they have been designated or not. I know that we don't 
strike them.
    Senator Kaine. When you say you ``don't strike,'' you also 
include don't strike under a collective self-defense doctrine?
    General Waldhauser. No. Collective--we--if we are 
accompanying--that's the whole key here, now--if we are 
accompanying, we have the right of self-defense and collective 
self-defense. If we are not accompanying, which we have not 
done at all in Nigeria, and we haven't accompanied inside other 
places for quite some time--we do not have collective self-
defense, because I haven't designated it, and we don't use it.
    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being 
here. Thank you again for your exemplary service, and for all 
those under your command.
    General, let me start with you. The National Defense 
Strategy, of course, reemphasizes great-power competition that 
we've talked a lot about today and you mentioned, to great 
degree, in your testimony. I want to ask you about China, in 
particular, in your AOR. What could you tell us--to what degree 
and in what ways are we continuing to shift focus and resources 
to engage in this great-power competition and counter Chinese 
influence in your AOR? I'm thinking, in particular, of China's 
growing influence. Its base in Djibouti. I've seen estimates 
that there may be as many as 25-27 Chinese bases across the 
continent. What can you tell us about that and what we're doing 
to counter this growing influence there?
    General Waldhauser. Well, thank you, Senator. Let me try to 
take that from the 50,000-foot level. First of all, just to 
emphasize, China has one overseas base in Djibouti. They 
participate in UN peacekeeping operations, places like Mali, 
places like Sudan, but they do not have other bases. Is that in 
their future? That's perhaps.
    What I would say is--from the African perspective, is, 
China has been there for quite some time. They're in the 
process of building over 300 miles worth of railroads, 
railroads tied primarily to areas of mineral extraction, which, 
again, then take this goods to a port somewhere. So, they're 
heavily invested and heavily involved.
    From the African perspective, they, the Africans, do not 
want to be in the middle of this. They don't view it as, ``We 
either choose the United States or we choose China.'' They 
don't want to be in the middle of that particular engagement.
    I think that one of the things that we do, from the DOD 
perspective, is, we try to just show--just be good partners. 
When Secretary Tillerson was there, a year or so ago--or 
whenever the visit took place, I believe it was a year or so 
ago--you know, he talked about, ``We need to work with the 
governments of those countries to make sure the arrangements 
they make are in their best interests.'' You had leaders from 
the African Union, you've had--Paul Kagame is another one 
that--you know, that--the African Governments will make their 
decisions based on their best interests, and they're capable of 
doing that.
    On the other hand, Chinese efforts, in terms of selling of 
equipment and some of the arrangements that have been made, 
there has been some blowback from various countries. Sierra 
Leone, for example, is walking away from an airport agreement 
that was supposed to be built by the Chinese. The Kenyans, for 
example, have problems with the Chinese equipment that's been 
sent to them. So, again, the bottom line is, in the AFRICOM 
AOR, China is there.
    The final thing I would say, in order that--this issue of 
influence and how we want to be the best partners--the Chinese 
work hard at developing and maintaining the relationship with 
the senior officials of the governments inside the African 
continent. We are very grateful, for example, of Senator Inhofe 
and his team and his visits that they make there, but I read an 
article the other day that talked about, in the last decade, 80 
senior-level--we're talking Minister and above, to include the 
President of China--visits on the African continent. That's a 
lot. Moreover, since 1990, their Foreign Minister, his first 
trip is--every year, in January, is to a country in Africa, 
just to see how they're doing.
    So, I would just say, the whole-of-government approach, if 
we want to maintain influence, we have to kind of up our 
engagement, and develop and work at the relationship part of 
this.
    Senator Hawley. You testified, I think, last March--to a 
House committee, March of 2018--that you expected China would--
we should expect an increasing number of bases--outright 
military bases. Is that still your assessment?
    General Waldhauser. Well, I think first of all, the Belt 
and Road Initiative is what is driving all of this. I think 
what the Chinese are doing is, they're taking a lot of lessons 
learned, and they are learning a lot from their first overseas 
base that they have in Djibouti. This is not an easy thing to 
do. The United States is very good at it. They watch what we 
do. But, they're learning this. They certainly have their eyes 
on other facilities. Ports, for example, are a key to what 
would facilitate their, not only mineral extraction, but their 
markets for their goods to come into the continent, as well. I 
mean, they view this large youth bulge, the population 
demographics, which we haven't talked about today, but it's in 
the testimony--they view a large consumer class as a place 
where they can sell their goods sometime in the future. So, 
although Djibouti is the only base, they certainly are looking 
at other options.
    Senator Hawley. Let me just ask you, more generally, about 
our European allies and their help, or lack thereof, in your 
AOR. What things should we be doing in order to encourage our 
European allies to--in this era of renewed great-power 
competition, to be helping us with our strategic objectives in 
your--in the area under your command?
    General Waldhauser. From the AFRICOM perspective, the 
European Union does a lot on the continent with regards to 
training, so there are European Union training missions in 
Mali, there are European training missions inside Somalia. 
Those are just two examples. We work closely with them, because 
we are one--for example, I've indicated, in Somalia, we are one 
of a group of in--of organizations and countries that is trying 
to, you know, make things right there. The European Union is a 
big player, and we coordinate with them. I talk with their 
leadership all the time. Our effort to coordinate the training 
activities in a place like Somalia, the European Union is a big 
player. They do a lot. They, by the way, are the ones who pay 
the stipends for the Somali National Army. They've put a lot of 
money into Somalia, no doubt about it.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    It's Senator Reed, presiding.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your service and for being here today in 
critical commands that are perhaps less in the spotlight, but 
no less important than any of the others that we oversee, both 
of them absolutely critical to our national security. Thank you 
and the men and women who serve with you, for your service to 
our Nation.
    I want to begin on the topic of military partnership 
programs, also perhaps less visible to the public, but very 
important. Both of you, I think, have endorsed the State 
Partnership Programs. The International Military Education and 
Training Program, as General Votel testified on Tuesday, are, 
he said, ``dollar for dollar, the most effective funding that 
CENTCOM receives, from a strategic perspective.'' The 
Connecticut National Guard, as a matter of fact, is an active 
participant in the State Partnership Program, and currently 
partners with Uruguay. Next year is the 20th anniversary of 
this partnership. To date, the Connecticut National Guard has 
conducted over 110 mutually beneficial exchanges with their 
Uruguayan partners. In April, the Connecticut National Guard 
will send 40 soldiers and airmen on a Connecticut Air National 
Guard C-130H to Uruguay, marking our last--largest contingent 
to Uruguay to date. This is an enormously educational, 
beneficial experience for them, for the Uruguayans, and it is 
repeated again and again and again all around the world. This 
kind of relationship, I think, is extremely important to both 
countries, to us and other countries around the world. So, 
thank you for your support. General Evon, our TAG, was here 
this morning, and we had a chance to meet with him.
    I want to ask you, General Waldhauser. I was searching for 
the exact statement you made, about a year before the Niger 
tragedy, if I may put it that way, about the lack of sufficient 
intelligence resources devoted to your command, particularly to 
that area of your command. I note, in your testimony, you say, 
``Over a 3-year period, United States Africa Command has 
increased Nigerian counter-IED capability, as well as 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, 
sustainment maintenance, and operation.'' Your estimate as to 
the dearth and deficit of intelligence in that part of the 
world was striking to me before the Niger incident. How much 
improvement has there been in the investment in intelligence in 
that part of the world?
    General Waldhauser. Senator, I think the best way to answer 
that question is, you know, our mission there really is to work 
with our partners. In this case, it's the French. I would say, 
over the last year, that our relationship with the French, to 
include intelligence-sharing, has really gone to as good as 
I've seen it. The French have the lead in that area. We support 
partners, and, in that particular case, in the Sahel area of 
northern Mali, Niger area, they have the lead, and it's our job 
to support them. So, we kind of use the phrase, ``It's African-
led, French-assisted, and United States-supported.'' What I 
would say is that our intelligence professionals, as they 
synchronize what we bring and what they bring, is something 
that has really added to our ability to understand the 
situation there over the last year.
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you think, now, that it is 
satisfactory? Adequate? Excellent? How would you characterize 
it? You said ``as good as you've seen,'' but that was not very 
good in the year before the Niger incident.
    General Waldhauser. So, I would use the words, as you said, 
``satisfactory and adequate.'' We're never going to have the 
ISR total that we need, to include the human intelligence that 
goes into places like that, but, for our support and for what 
our mission is, it's adequate ISR now as we utilize our 
partners, and how we train and how we assist the Nigerian 
forces, as well.
    Senator Blumenthal. Would you say, Admiral Faller, that 
that's true in your command, as well, that you're satisfied 
that there are sufficient ISR--intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance--resources devoted?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, we're constantly looking at this. 
I think we do have gaps. We mitigate those gaps with different 
sources of intelligence. We are deficient in our ISR for the 
counternarcotics mission.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, 
Senator Blackburn, please.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you for being here today. We look 
forward to a closed session with you.
    I want to come back to something each of you have mentioned 
but we've really not talked that much about, and that is the 
telcom issues that are in each of your AOR, and the 
participation of China--Huawei, ZTE--and their relationship 
with the Russians. The Chairman mentioned, earlier, his concern 
about how China is putting their fingers into every area when 
it comes to not only the ISR, but the communications component, 
building out these networks. He mentioned he didn't know where 
the money came from. General, I'd be interested to hear from 
you. When you talk about China and how they are advancing, how 
much of the bankrolling of this comes from Russia? Or do you 
all know?
    General Waldhauser. Well, ma'am, the best way to answer 
that is, I think that when the Chinese come to a country with a 
plan, whether it's to build railroad, infrastructure, bridges, 
and the like, they come with a full plan. They come with the 
charts to do it, they come with the money to do it, they'll 
bring the workers to do it. It's just kind of a one-stop-one---
--
    Senator Blackburn. Does the money come from Russia, 
primarily?
    General Waldhauser. This is Chinese, now. I would--in fact, 
how I would answer that is, in kind of a--not to be--in a kind 
of anecdotal way, but recently in the elections in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Joseph Kabila just 
was--went out of office, one of his opponents said that the 
Chinese bring the money, and the Russians bring the muscle.
    Senator Blackburn. Got it.
    General Waldhauser. So, I think that's a good way to try to 
illustrate, kind of, where these two different countries are 
when it comes to their engagement.
    Senator Blackburn. Okay.
    Let me ask you this. When we look at what has happened with 
the Chinese and with their access into the telcom area, and as 
we look at artificial intelligence and 5G, how do you see 
Huawei and their participation? How is that going to affect the 
buildout in your AORs?
    Admiral, if you want to go at it first, and then the 
General.
    Admiral Faller. It's concerning. The extent to which China 
would own the IT infrastructure of a country, their 
intelligence or fusion centers would affect our relationship 
and our ability to----
    Senator Blackburn. Do they understand that you will not 
share information with them if it is going over Huawei or ZTE? 
Or----
    Admiral Faller. We've had frank discussions----
    Senator Blackburn. Very frank discussions.
    Admiral Faller.--Senator, about this.
    Senator Blackburn. Okay.
    General Waldhauser. Senator, the way I would answer that 
is, we obviously have some unique challenges in Djibouti. I 
mean, the Chinese bases have several miles away from where 
we're located. The Djibouti base services not only AFRICOM, but 
it does CENTCOM and SOCOM, I believe, as General Votel 
testified the other day. We'd be naive to think that the 
counterintelligence and the communication issues, and the fact 
that they have actually built the system inside Djibouti, 
they're not trying to get after what we're trying to do.
    Senator Blackburn. Okay. How do you make certain--what is 
your best effort in making certain that we remain the partner 
of choice?
    General Waldhauser. Well, again, as I said several times 
this morning, from our military perspective, we want to be 
sincere in our efforts, we want to deliver what we say we can 
do, we want to be role models when our troops train with 
African troops, we want our equipment to be quality equipment, 
and we just--we, essentially, want to be good partners. I think 
that, when you bring in the agencies that we talked about--
USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and so forth, their 
projects--I mean, we've got to make sure we elevate those, 
because, in places like Senegal, for example, they're--the 
Chinese will build a wrestling stadium, but, at the same time, 
we have all kind of compacts ongoing that don't get the 
publicity that some of these things do. So, it's--bottom line 
for us is, we have to make sure that we're really doing an--
overall whole-of-government approach, and we're synchronizing 
our efforts, and we make sure that--we take credit for some of 
these programs that may not get the visibility that a brand-new 
infrastructure would.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you for the comments. We hope that 
that whole-of-government approach continues to include making 
certain that we're paying attention to those telcom and 
wireless networks.
    Yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
    Let me just announce--it looks like we're down to the most 
important one, of course--last, we say for--we are going to 
have--I say to the staff of those who are not here right now, 
we're going to have a closed session immediately following 
this, in S---in Visitors Center, 217, for those who would like 
to come and ask some of the questions that were not appropriate 
to be asked in an open session.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Faller, you're not going to be surprised by this 
question. The question is, interdiction of drug shipments--and 
I understand it's already been discussed, to some extent--what 
do you need? If you were given a blank sheet of paper--or not 
a--what do you--what does the Coast Guard need? What do you 
need? What do we need to do a better job of interdicting those 
drug shipments that we know about? I just--it just is in--it's 
so frustrating that we are only interdicting about 25 percent 
of what we know about. So, do we need 18 more cutters, 12 more 
Zodiacs? What's on your list of assets?
    Admiral Faller. It's all of our responsibility, and we've 
got to start at the source. So, very encouraged by the 
Colombian Government getting back into--seriously back into the 
eradication game. They've met their goals for 2018, and we're 
seeing progress in 2019. So, record cocaine is going to mean 
record drug flows, and we've got to stop it along the way. That 
requires ISR, intelligence and surveillance assets, maritime 
patrol aircraft, helicopters----
    Senator King. No, I understand that, but I'm asking you for 
some specifics. Do we need eight more Global Hawks? Do we need 
14 more cutters? What is it we need?
    Admiral Faller. We need more Navy ships.
    Senator King. Okay.
    Admiral Faller. More U.S. Navy----
    Senator King. Of what nature?
    Admiral Faller. Sir, the littoral combat ship is fit for 
purpose for this type a mission, Senator. We need multiple 
force packages. We need the Coast Guard, a sustained presence. 
They've stepped up in a big way, from five to eight cutters 
over the holiday. Then we need the partners in the game. We're 
seeing improvements in some of the partners. I'll credit El 
Salvador, Guatemala. We need others to step up. That requires 
pressure from our government and myself to get that to happen. 
So, a lot of work to be done, Senator.
    Senator King. Do you feel we are moving the needle? Are we 
moving forward on these multiple fronts?
    Admiral Faller. We had record interdiction in 2017, 2018, 
but it's insufficient. We're nudging, but we're not moving the 
needle enough, Senator. One of the areas you asked me to look 
at previously, I need to get back to you on, is the authority 
piece and whether we have artificial seams between the air-land 
boundary, and how we can better utilize and work across that 
boundary. We've stepped up our partnership, within the last 
year, with Drug Enforcement Agency and fusion centers here in 
the United States. Again, more needs to be done to stay ahead 
of the threat.
    Senator King. I just hope, if there are assets, in terms of 
either budgetary resources, authorities, you will let us know, 
because these drugs are killing our people, and--one a day, in 
Maine. This is a--it seems to me, a high-return opportunity, 
here, given the fact that we know of the shipments that we 
can't interdict.
    Admiral Faller. Senator, I agree 100 percent. It's a threat 
to our Nation, killing our citizens. It's killing citizens of 
our partner nations, as well. The money from this is fueling 
those drug and criminal organizations, which is driving 
instability, it's contributing to the other factors we see, 
like the illegal migration. So, it's important, for many 
reasons, that we have to get after this.
    Senator King. Well, keep--stay with us on this, Admiral. 
Thank you.
    On the issue of--and you mentioned in your testimony, I 
think, in answer to Senator Kaine, about progress you're seeing 
in the northern triangle countries based upon American 
investments. I would point out that there was a huge refugee 
problem in the world in 1945. There were about 10 million 
refugees in western Europe after World War II. One of the 
responses of this country was the Marshall Plan, which was 
designed to stabilize the economies of those of that region. It 
was very controversial at the time, but it--I think all would 
agree now, it was immensely successful. I think we need a 
similar kind of approach to stabilizing those countries so 
people don't have to flee. The best way to stop someone coming 
to our border is that they never start on the journey. That 
means--I believe you agree that that means work, AID, 
agriculture, all of those programs in those countries, again, 
dealing with the issue of corruption, but to try to do that 
effectively. Do you agree that that's a--should be a priority?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, I agree. That should be a 
priority.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Quick question, General. By the way, these graphics are 
terrific on the--on Chinese and Russian influence in Latin 
America. I compliment your staff, whoever presented them. 
They're very dramatic and sobering.
    General, in Africa, China's doing similar kinds of things: 
investing, blending, developing infrastructure, all those 
things. Is there a concern that this is a precursor to a 
military presence? I mean, is Djibouti a beginning of a 
militarization process that presents a kind of global threat or 
an expansion of a threat from China?
    General Waldhauser. Senator, I think, at this point in 
time, it's too early to make that leap at this point. I mean, 
they obviously want to--one of the reasons for their engagement 
there is, they've got, you know, 2,000 or so peacekeepers, 
they've got 300,000 or so civilians there. They want to be able 
to protect their interests in their projects that they're 
working on. So, whether that leads to a militarization of the 
continent, it's still early to tell. But, I would say that one 
of the areas of concern that we have there is, in the 
Djibouti--the Straits of Bab al-Mandab area, where the Red Sea 
comes down, where we've had really open access for quite some 
time, that is an area of concern, because not only the Chinese, 
but the Russians, the Emiratis, the Saudis are all interested 
in real estate on the Red Sea, on the African side--Sudan, 
Eritrea----
    Senator King. They're using an interesting technique of 
lending money and then calling it. It's a kind of debt 
colonialism.
    General Waldhauser. Well, they have leverage in some--in 
many of their situations. As I said, I mean, the--these are 
decisions these governments have to make, but Djibouti's a--
really a classic example, where the Chinese own over 80 percent 
of their overseas debt. This is a--certainly a concern.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Before Senator Perdue is recognized, I want to repeat to 
the staff that's here that there will a closed session after 
this. Hate to ask you to go over, because there may be nobody 
there when you get there. But, nonetheless, there will be this 
opportunity. All right?
    Senator Perdue.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you both for your careers and for being here today.
    I want to beat a dead horse, because I don't think we've 
gotten to the essence of the issue yet. We're all concerned 
about what China and Russia are doing in your AORs. General 
Votel was in this week. We had the same conversation about 
China's Belt-Road Initiative in harbors like Hambantota, in Sri 
Lanka, Gwadar, in Pakistan. We've just seen the first 
foreclosure in Sri Lanka, obviously, but what Russia is also 
doing in Kaliningrad and Sebastopol and Latakia and Tartus--
Americans have always projected power based on our Navy and 
based on our allies, who allow us to service our military 
through their geography. Russia and China are both now--because 
we have such an advantage on--in the sea, it seems to me that 
they are setting the stage across three continents that are of 
tremendous strategic importance. I'd like us to talk about what 
the NDS does or doesn't do, and what you both need in your AORs 
to deal with what we naturally have to assume is an effort that 
is an economic, if not military, involvement that is beyond 
anybody's expectation 5 years ago. When I look at what Huawei 
is doing in some of these Latin American cities, I'm very 
concerned. So, I'd love both of you to address the question 
specifically.
    Before I ask you both--General, first of all, in Africa, we 
know now--Admiral, you've just told us--there are 56 port 
investments in South America. In Africa, General, do we have a 
similar estimate of the ports that they've made these--what I 
call ``debt-trap diplomacy loans'' in the specific port 
infrastructure?
    General Waldhauser. Senator, I'm not an expert in that 
area, and we can take that for the record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Waldhauser. China has invested in ports in 23 of 
Africa's 33 coastal nations. We currently have no indications 
Beijing made these investments with the prior intent to create 
leverage over the host nation or port operators. However, it is 
possible China could use these investments in the future to 
apply pressure to those African states or seize port control.

    General Waldhauser. But, what I will say, the Chinese are 
involved in port operations all around the world.
    Senator Perdue. Yeah.
    General Waldhauser. So, it's not unique that perhaps you 
have a Chinese company that has equities in a port on the 
African continent.
    Senator Perdue. Right. So, what we saw in the South China 
Sea, though, is where they had, quote, ``nonmilitary 
interests'' have now--we've got plenty of evidence that they've 
converted those to military bases. I have no doubt that they're 
going to have some of the same interests in--particularly in 
Hambantota, right there. That's such a strategic thing--
location.
    The question I have is--I don't think the NDS actually 
addresses this growing potential threat, because we haven't 
been able to confirm it, as you just said, General. So, my 
concern is--in these two AORs, you and General Votel are three 
guys that sit right in the middle of what China and Russia are 
both doing. I'm worried, because of the effort and the focus we 
have on the current crisis today around the world, where we're 
taking our assets and spreading them very, very thinly, what 
are we doing now to preclude the potential that we won't be 
able to show up, it'll be too late once we recognize that 
they've actually done what we were worried they were going to 
do? Would you both address that in--as it relates to the NDS?
    General Waldhauser. Well, Senator, let me just kind of 
clarify. You know, I don't have a crystal ball to predict what 
the Chinese will do militarily on----
    Senator Perdue. Understood.
    General Waldhauser.--African continent. But, what I do know 
is that they've made a conscious decision to put their military 
on the world stage in an area where the United States is not 
necessarily engaged to a large degree.
    Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
    General Waldhauser. So, they work in areas where they don't 
really have any competition from us. We're not in countries 
where they are. We're not at places where ports on the western 
side of Africa, which is my big concern, by the way--on the 
western side of Africa, we're not really located there. So, 
there's no doubt about the fact that they have long---a long-
term vision, and, by 2049, the 100-year anniversary, part of 
this Belt and Road Initiative, this is not--Djibouti is not the 
first, and it won't be the last port. The growth of their 
military on the continent, I don't know what it'll turn out to 
be, but I do know that the Chinese--they made a conscious 
decision to start there, and they're not going to get smaller.
    Senator Perdue. Other than Djibouti, do we have any other 
access ports in Africa?
    General Waldhauser. Well, I think I would say Capo Verde, 
Senegal. These are places that we've talked about before that 
are--you know, they're good locations for the Chinese. They 
want to have a government that's relatively stable. They don't 
want to have to deal with problems and so forth. You look where 
you--where the military geography--meaning deepwater ports are 
there. So, I mean, they certainly want other ports on the 
eastern--and I could--you know, there's all kind of speculation 
about what those other ports might be on the eastern side. But, 
I do know they're looking on the western side, and that's a 
concern for us, because----
    Senator Perdue. Yes.
    General Waldhauser.--they can be in the Atlantic Ocean 
rather quickly.
    Senator Perdue. Admiral, the Ambassador in El Salvador 
actually warned, last August, about what the Chinese military 
is planning to do in La Union, that commercial port, where they 
do have a proprietary loan there. Can you speak to how the NDS 
will affect this in your AOR?
    Admiral Faller. Senator, I think the NDS rightly shined a 
light on this as a biggest challenge that will confront us 
perhaps in the next generation----
    Senator Perdue. But, we haven't resourced it yet.
    Admiral Faller. We're working on the resourcing. It's not--
as I've mentioned in previous questions, we need that 
consistent level of resourcing in this AOR. In addition to the 
ports you mentioned, I will also point out the space stations 
that the Chinese are investing in and partnering in in this 
AOR. They--and again, back to the education, some of the basic 
military building blocks, they're taking a page from our 
playbook. The Peace Ark deployed to South America and the 
Caribbean this past year, they're trying to replicate our 
playbook to win both access and influence, and our counter has 
to be to remain present. We have the ability to have the 
winning hand, based on our values, our democratic principles, 
and the shared interests that we have in this hemisphere.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you both.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    All right. It seems this has come to a conclusion.
    We appreciate your attention very much. It has been very 
significant. Also appreciate the time both of you have spent 
with me and other Members of this Committee.
    If it's not an inconvenience to do so, we will now go to 
the Senate Visitors, number 217, and we'll see how many people 
want to conclude this with some questions that may not have 
been appropriate for open session.
    So, with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
                                colombia
    1. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, with the re-emergence of the 
FARC and the net production of drugs still rising, do you foresee the 
reduction in United States monetary support to Colombia (counter-
terrorism, counter-narcotics and counter-transnational organized crime) 
causing any issue for the SOUTHCOM mission?
    Admiral Faller. A reduction in United States monetary support to 
Colombia would negatively impact the SOUTHCOM mission. The United 
States funding that goes to Colombia is not only used for 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism within Colombia, but it also 
partly funds the United States-Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), in which 
Colombia exports security throughout the region by training other 
partner nations to address these challenges to regional security. As an 
example, in 2019 the Colombian Military will train over 2,100 security 
force personnel from Central America and the Caribbean to strengthen 
their capability to provide security, support the rule of law, and 
enhance their ability to participate in regional security and 
humanitarian response operations. The Colombian Military and Police 
exporting security capacity under USCAP is a shining example of the 
return on investment from the United States support to Plan Colombia. 
It shows that the U.S. military can rely on its partners to share their 
expertise to address common regional security challenges. In addition, 
the Colombian Military is currently providing extensive support in 
responding to the Venezuelan migration crisis requiring them to divert 
funding and manpower from security operations. Any cuts in U.S. funds 
would further strain their national security budget.
                     foreign influence in venezuela
    2. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, Cuba has sent military envoys 
Venezuela since early 2000's. As early as 2010, Iranian Quz force were 
patriated as Cuban citizens and joined these military envoys. In recent 
years, Russia has continued this trend both overtly and covertly. How 
many Cuban, Russian and Iranian actors are currently in Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. We have limited information on the number of Cuban, 
Russian, and Iranian security personnel supporting the Maduro regime. 
We estimate the number of Cuban security personnel in Venezuela is 
somewhere in the thousands; this number is in addition to the over 
20,000 medical personnel Cuba provides to Venezuela. Russia maintains a 
diplomatic defense presence in Venezuela, and at times likely sends 
teams of military technical experts to guide Venezuela in the use and 
maintenance of acquired weapons systems. Iranian entities maintain a 
small, limited presence in Venezuela, but we remain concerned that the 
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism could take advantage of 
turmoil in Venezuela to expand its presence.

    3. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, what are their roles in 
security?
    Admiral Faller. Cuba: Cuban military personnel serve as security 
and military advisors who assist Venezuelan security services' 
monitoring of both the population and military for signs of dissent, 
are part of Maduro's personal security detail, and help collect 
intelligence. Russia: Moscow provides the Maduro regime with security 
materiel, training, and disinformation assistance. Russia is 
Venezuela's largest supplier of weapons to include surface- to-air 
missile systems, combat and fixed wing aircraft, tanks, and artillery, 
with Moscow selling Caracas $9 billion in military equipment from 2008 
to 2018. The two countries regularly conduct combined military 
exercises; their most recent exercise in December 2018 included the 
deployment of two long-range bombers (Tu-160 Blackjacks) capable of 
carrying nuclear weapons. Also, in mid-March, two Russian aircraft 
arrived in Venezuela carrying a reported 100 Russian military personnel 
that Moscow officially said were in Venezuela to fulfill existing 
military contracts. Separate, Maduro-affiliated Venezuelan sources said 
the troops would assist with cyber security and air defenses. Iran: 
While Iran's relationship with Caracas in the past few years has 
largely centered on economic cooperation, Iran and Venezuela have 
officially been cooperating on defense issues for almost a decade. 
Given this longstanding relationship, it is possible that Tehran may be 
providing the Maduro regime with security advice, and potentially 
assisting with military equipment maintenance. Last year, the Iranian 
naval deputy commander, Rear Admiral Touraj Hassani Moqaddam, relayed 
Iran's intent to deploy naval vessels with helicopters to Venezuela. 
China: Additionally, China remains the top provider of sovereign loans 
to Venezuela, with Caracas owing $20 billion. Beijing also has sold 
Venezuela over $1 billion in military equipment, including assorted 
missile variants, fixed wing transport and combat aircraft, light 
tanks, mortar systems, and radars.

    4. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, what are their roles in 
controlling or influencing Policy?
    Admiral Faller. Cuba: Havana is the Maduro regime's principal 
foreign supporter, and is the external actor with the most influence 
over Maduro's decision-making. Cuba helps to prop up the regime by 
backing Maduro in international forums, helping to rally support for 
the regime, and supporting information operations to discredit the U.S. 
It is likely that Maduro is turning to Havana for advice on how to 
handle mounting social unrest and an emboldened opposition. Russia: 
Moscow plays a key role in providing financial support and access to 
the Maduro regime, probably affording Russia some sway over Venezuela's 
policy decisions. Venezuela is likely to increasingly rely on Russian 
banks to move financial assets in ways that skirt sanctions and secure 
cash flow. Additionally, Russia is one of the top providers of 
Venezuela's sovereign loans, with Caracas owing Moscow over $3 billion. 
Iran: We assess Iran holds less influence over the Maduro regime's 
policies, given that Caracas's relationship with Tehran has not been as 
essential to the regime's survival. China: Separately, China remains a 
key financial backer of the Maduro regime, and appears to be supporting 
the regime's efforts to monitor the population. Beijing is the top 
provider of sovereign loans to Venezuela, with Caracas owning $20 
billion. Since 2016, Chinese telecommunications company ZTE embedded a 
special unit within Venezuela's telecommunication company to support 
national ID cards that have the potential to monitor citizens' 
behavior. Beijing also has sold Venezuela over $1 billion in military 
equipment, including assorted missile variants, fixed wing transport 
and combat aircraft, light tanks, mortar systems, and radars.
                    venezuelan military composition
    5. Senator Cotton. Admiral Faller, Venezuela has more Generals than 
the United States and NATO combined. Additionally, Maduro's regime, 
described as a mafia state, retains only 20-25 percent support across 
the nation. What is the actual composition and force structure of the 
military, loyal to Maduro?
    Admiral Faller. Venezuelan armed forces branches include the 
Bolivarian Air Force, Navy, Army, and National Guard. The commanders 
and top-ranking military officers in each of these services remain 
loyal to the Maduro regime. Of the over 1,000 defections since Interim 
President Guaido took office, only two of the defectors have been 
general officers, indicative of senior military leaders' commitment to 
the regime and the benefits they receive. The President is the 
commander-in-chief of the Bolivarian Armed Forces, and appoints the 
Minister of Defense, Commander of the Operational Strategic Command 
(akin to the U.S. Joint Staff), and the commanders of each of the 
services. The Maduro regime also relies on the National Militia and 
armed gangs, known as colectivos, as force multipliers for conventional 
forces.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
            threats posed by african terrorist organizations
    6. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, you stated that Boko Haram 
and ISIS-West Africa focus on attacking military and civilian targets 
throughout numerous areas in Africa and contribute to a multi-border 
displaced persons crisis. Can you expand on your assessment of the 
global threat posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-West? Do they currently pose 
a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland? If so, to what extent? If not, 
when are they expected to pose a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland?
    General Waldhauser. We do not currently assess Boko Haram and ISIS-
West Africa are threats to the Homeland. Africa-based ISIS groups and 
Boko Haram have neither conducted nor inspired external attacks against 
the United States Homeland. However, their diffuse extremist networks 
enable or inspire attacks against United States and other Western 
interests in Africa and in Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al Qaeda safe 
havens in North Africa, the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring 
threat to stability, and United States, allied, and host-nation 
interests within those regions.

    7. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, what do you see as the 
greatest threat Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa poses to the United 
States Homeland in the near-term, mid-term, and long-term?
    General Waldhauser. Africa-based ISIS groups and Boko Haram have 
neither conducted nor inspired external attacks against the United 
States Homeland, and are not projected to pose a threat to the Homeland 
in the mid or long term. Due to their diffuse extremist networks Boko 
Haram and ISIS-West Africa are capable of enabling or inspiring attacks 
against United States and other Western interests in Africa and in 
Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al-Qaeda safe havens in North Africa, 
the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring threat to stability, and 
United States, allied, and host-nation interests within those regions.
         sof's role in supporting the national defense strategy
    8. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, the recently released 
National Defense Strategy clearly identifies great power competition 
between the United States and China and Russia as the highest priority 
threats to our national security. Are we over-utilizing out elite 
special operations forces on low-intensity threats in AFRICOM?
    General Waldhauser. Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) possess 
unique capabilities and we continue to evaluate how we employ and 
deploy them. USAFRICOM aligns forces and resources on the continent to 
best support the National Defense Strategy. In addition to SOF that 
provide heightened capability, USAFRICOM also needs predictable general 
purpose forces that can conduct those missions that do not require SOF 
unique capabilities.

    9. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, how do you intend to 
balance the competing requirements of continuing the counterterrorism 
fight while also supporting the new primary lines of effort in 
countering China and Russia? Are security force assistance brigades 
(SFABs) the right solution?
    General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM is currently in our first year of a 
five-year campaign plan specifically designed to balance requirements 
that address VEOs and global competitors. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 
applies a balanced approach to account for the increased presence of 
external actors, namely China and Russia, and the continued threat 
posed by VEOs. Our ability to balance efforts to address those 
challenges relies on our ability to effectively work with a wide range 
of able and willing partners-United States interagency partners, other 
combatant commands, European allies, the United Nations, European 
Union, the African Union, and most importantly African partners. 
USAFRICOM would make full use of the range of organic capabilities 
within a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), as that unit is 
specifically designed with many of our partner-centric objectives in 
mind. We would welcome the assignment of an SFAB to USAFRICOM.

    10. Senator Sullivan. General Waldhauser, how does AFRICOM envision 
supporting an enduring counter-Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) 
effort while supporting efforts to deter Russian and Chinese aggression 
in other theaters?
    General Waldhauser. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan applies a balanced 
approach to account for the increased presence of external actors, 
namely China and Russia, and the continued threat posed by VEOs. Our 
ability to balance efforts to address those challenges relies on our 
ability to effectively work with a wide range of able and willing 
partners-United States interagency partners, other combatant commands, 
European allies, the United Nations, the European Union, the African 
Union, and African partners. The United States Security Force 
Assistance (SFA) programs to African partners also increase our ability 
not only to counter violent extremist groups but also influence great 
power competitors. Through Sec 333 authorities, many of our SFA 
programs enhance our relationships with partners while improving their 
ability to conduct their own C-VEO operations. These SFA programs are 
fundamental to our effort to remain the partner of choice by 
reinforcing the sincerity of our partnerships and the high quality of 
our products, which African nations largely view as superior to those 
offered by the Chinese and Russians. Our efforts to foster positive 
relationships further support our goal of ensuring a stable and 
prosperous Africa, which inherently-assists to deter Chinese and 
Russian malign action. To the extent that we enable deterrence of China 
and Russia in the USAFRICOM AOR, we are engaged with USINDOPACOM and 
USEUCOM Globally Integrated Planning efforts in their capacity as 
Coordinating Authorities to the China and Russia global campaign plans.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                      russian influence in africa
    11. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, you state in your 
testimony that the Central African Republic has recently installed a 
Russian civilian as the country's national security advisor. What does 
this appointment signal in terms of Russian influence in the Central 
African Republic? How does this further Russian strategic interests?
    General Waldhauser. As of this time this individual has stepped 
down as the national security advisor. Should this individual remain 
involved in Central African Republic (CAR) policy-making, he would be 
able to facilitate agreements between the CAR and Russia. We are unware 
of efforts to replace him, or to leverage his relationship to CAR for 
future Russian efforts. CAR provides Russia three key opportunities: 
First, it is a chance for Russia to publically supplant French and 
Western influence with Bangui's support. Second, CAR represents an 
opportunity for the Russian Oligarchs (including those the United 
States has sanctioned) to generate profit by exchanging security 
services for mining contracts, demonstrate private military 
capabilities, and supplement limited Russian state resources. Lastly, 
CAR provides an operating environment with little to no governmental 
oversight, considerable freedom of movement to militarily strong 
actors, and limited regulation or Rule of Law that could inhibit 
unilateral action.

    12. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, you mention that Russia 
is importing ``harsh security practices'' into the Central African 
Republic. In addition to the murder of Russian journalists, what other 
harsh security practices are being employed?
    General Waldhauser. Russian private military contractors (PMC) are 
reportedly abusing locals who approach Russian mining interests, 
investigating crimes committed against Russian personnel or property, 
physically abusing host nation security trainees, and intimidating 
foreign and local travelers. The Russian contractors also reportedly 
cooperate with local armed militias and turn a blind eye to human 
rights violations committed by those groups. The UN is currently 
investigating at least one alleged incident of abuse and has asked the 
CAR government to take actions against the PMCs. In 2018 three 
independent Russian journalists were murdered in the CAR while 
investigating the activities of the Russian PMCs.

    13. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, in your testimony, you 
also state that other countries could find the Russian model of harsh 
security practices attractive. What countries in the African 
subcontinent are you concerned about being most susceptible to Russian 
influence, and what can AFRICOM do to thwart Russian efforts?
    General Waldhauser. Several African nations are susceptible to 
continued or increasing Russian influence, particularly where Russia 
already has extensive ties. Russia's influence in Algeria and Angola 
stems from legacy Soviet relationships, though Algeria has largely 
restricted the relationship to arms sales transactions. Russia is 
providing support to the Libyan National Army (LNA), who is increasing 
pressure on Tripoli. Russia already has extensive influence in CAR, 
embedding private military contractors in the country in return for 
mining rights and influencing the government. Mauritania's and 
Tunisia's nascent economies and desire to improve defense capabilities 
may provide Moscow with opportunities to expand its influence there. 
Russia is increasing its influence in Sudan; the Sudanese Parliament 
recently advanced plans to create a Russian military base in the 
country, and Russian private military contractors are reportedly 
operating in the Darfur region. In West Africa, Mali, Guinea, and 
Guinea-Bissau are probably most susceptible to Russian influence, due 
to longstanding Russian military sales and training programs. Russia 
has economic interests in these countries, usually centered on mining, 
and the local leaders are likely interested in military aid, without 
preconditions, that would help them to remain in power. To thwart 
Russian exploitative efforts, USAFRICOM continues to work with a host 
of partners to be the military partner of choice in Africa and advance 
our shared values.
                               hezbollah
    14. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, how would you characterize 
the threat from Hezbollah in your area of operation? Which countries 
are most susceptible to influence from Hezbollah?
    Admiral Faller. Hezbollah is the most capable Violent Extremist 
Organization (VEO) in the region. Since 1992, LH has successfully 
conducted three major terrorist attacks in Central and South America, 
killing 135 people and wounding hundreds more. The majority of 
countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR do not recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist 
organization, which enables Hezbollah to maintain an operational 
presence in the area. This operational presence includes well-developed 
networks of businesses owned and operated by Hezbollah associates and 
networks that are used to facilitate criminal activities, conduct 
fundraising in support of Hezbollah, and perform international 
financial remittances. Through a vast array of political, religious, 
and social networks, Hezbollah leverages influence over vulnerable 
populations in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Brazil, Paraguay and 
Argentina. Most of this influence is political and social in nature, 
with some loosely affiliated elements engaged in criminal and illicit 
activities, primarily in the TBA and other Free Trade Zones in Central 
and South America. Countries such as Venezuela and Paraguay, with high 
levels of institutional corruption, insufficient Anti-Money Laundering 
regulations, and unproven judicial ability to prosecute individuals 
involved in the facilitation of terrorism, or narcotics are most 
susceptible to influence from Hezbollah.

    15. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, what are you doing to 
address the threat--including Hezbollah's terrorist activities, money 
laundering, and drug trafficking?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM collaborates with the Interagency and Law 
Enforcement to share intelligence and information and support 
operations and activities to degrade Hezbollah's ability to conduct 
illicit activities throughout the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, 
ultimately denying funds to Hezbollah. Our analytical and operational 
support to Department of Treasury sanctions, Law Enforcement 
investigations, and the detection and monitoring mission are at the 
forefront of our efforts to address the Hezbollah threat.

    16. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, your predecessor, ADM Tidd, 
has testified that Venezuela has long provided a haven for narco-
terrorist groups and Lebanese Hezbollah supporters. What is your 
understanding of the current links between Hezbollah and the Government 
of Venezuela? What support, if any, is Hezbollah providing the Maduro 
regime in Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Venezuela is home to well over a million people of 
Lebanese ancestry. Some of the members of the Lebanese diaspora 
community in Venezuela have been linked to illicit business, money 
laundering, narcotic sales, and document forgery. The Government of 
Venezuela has been employing and providing safe haven to Hezbollah 
associated facilitators and financiers since at the least the mid-
2000's. There have been multiple reported links between prominent 
Venezuelan businessmen and politicians and Hezbollah-associated 
individuals. Most notably, former Venezuelan Vice President and current 
Minister of Industries and National Production, Tarek El Aissami, may 
have been involved in a number of illicit financial transactions and 
been leveraged by other corrupt Venezuelan officials to provide travel 
documentation to benefit associates of Hezbollah over a period of 
years. Hezbollah openly expresses support for the Maduro regime. 
Hezbollah likely wants Maduro to remain in place, as Hezbollah has 
operated throughout Venezuela with minimal scrutiny during Maduro's 
regime. Hezbollah likely perceives that the United States-recognized 
president, Juan Guaido will work to deter Hezbollah-associated activity 
within the country.

    17. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, are you working to build 
the capacity of regional allies to address Hezbollah's malign 
activities? How can Congress support SOUTHCOM in this effort?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM routinely engages with partner nations to 
share information, provide training, and encourage actions to counter 
threat networks throughout the region. Our staff coordinates with 
Interagency, Law Enforcement and Global Organizations, such as the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to enable operations by 
Partner Nation Law Enforcement to disrupt, degrade, and deny Hezbollah 
activities. Congressional support over the years has enabled SOUTHCOM 
to build our partners' capacity to counter Hezbollah's malign 
activities. Continued support of the Department's security cooperation 
activities in this region, as well as programs throughout the 
Interagency that strengthen our relationships with our partner nations, 
such as State Department's International Military Education and 
Training program, would be helpful.

    18. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Faller, in your testimony, you note 
that groups like Hezbollah operate wherever they can garner support and 
raise funds to pursue their agendas. Where do you see them gaining 
support and funding, and how is SOUTHCOM confronting them?
    Admiral Faller. Hezbollah receives significant and continuous 
financial support from the Lebanese expatriate, Shi'a Muslim diaspora 
in Latin America. Lebanese expatriate remittances are a pillar of the 
Lebanese economy--their familial and sustainable structure makes them 
an economic and social services backstop in the absence of a state 
entity capable of providing basic security and social services. Free 
Trade Zones provide illicit financial networks with plentiful 
opportunities to leverage existing conditions to enable money 
laundering activities and the import/export of illicit goods. 
Characteristics of Free Trade Zones that enable these activities 
include: high volume of goods being imported/exported through the area, 
the high use of cash, and greater profitability due to tax benefits.
                            africom mission
    19. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, in your written 
testimony, you justify the current AFRICOM posture by emphasizing the 
need to ``address significant terrorist threats and apply persistent 
pressure on terrorist networks.'' Based on your testimony and the 
current force posture, is it fair to say the primary mission in Africa 
is defeating Violent Extremist Organizations?
    General Waldhauser. The USAFRICOM Campaign Plan applies a balanced 
approach that accounts for the increased presence of external actors, 
namely China and Russia, and the continued threat faced by VEOs. Our 
ability to balance efforts to address those challenges relies on our 
ability to effectively work with a wide range of able and willing 
partners; United States interagency partners, other combatant commands, 
European allies, the United Nations, European Union, the African Union, 
and African partners. The USAFRICOM mission strikes a balance between 
countering VEOs and great power competition. The three mission areas 
called out in our mission statement are strengthen security forces, 
counter transnational threats, and conduct crisis response.

    20. Senator Blumenthal. . General Waldhauser, do you think that the 
National Defense Strategy appropriately prioritizes the threats to 
American interests that we face in your area of operations?
    General Waldhauser. From a USAFRICOM perspective, the NDS 
accurately characterizes the global challenges and threats. We are in a 
dynamic environment with great power competitors, constant competition, 
and an array of state and non-state actors. All five threats detailed 
in the NDS manifest in Africa to varying degrees, representing an 
important cross section in a globalized world.

    21. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, despite the apparent 
focus on counterterrorism efforts in Africa, in your testimony, you 
state AFRICOM plays a ``significant role'' in fulfilling National 
Defense Strategy priorities towards Russia and China. Why is your role 
in great power competition so significant and how are you fulfilling 
this role?
    General Waldhauser. Great Power competitors, China and Russia, are 
increasing engagements in Africa and enhancing their access and 
influence. China's expanding engagements in Africa are probably 
intended to protect China's citizens and investments, and project the 
image of being a responsible global power while growing its influence 
on the continent and internationally. For its part, Russia seeks to 
counter United States influence and interests while bolstering its own 
influence through security cooperation, arms sales, and energy 
partnerships. Our proximity to Chinese forces in Djibouti offers us a 
unique opportunity to demonstrate our resolve to counter China outside 
of Asia. Our interaction with key partners such as Morocco, Tunisia, 
Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia help secure geostrategic locations 
necessary for stability on the continent. Working in close cooperation 
with nations such as Ghana and Senegal, we help to ensure Chinese 
compliance with international norms by exposing illicit activity such 
as illegal fishing or other resource extraction sanctioned by the 
Chinese Government. By working with other nations such as Uganda, Cabo 
Verde, Seychelles, Botswana and Gabon, we may be able to ensure that 
when China or Russia do gain military access to ports, bases or 
airspace, that they are unable to take full advantage of that access to 
threaten United States freedom of maneuver in and around Africa.

    22. Senator Blumenthal. General Waldhauser, the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF) of 2018 lists two known African terrorist 
organizations, al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb and Al Shabaab as 
``associated forces'' included in the authorization. Have you, or will 
you, use military force against any other Violent Extremist 
Organizations in your area of operation?
    General Waldhauser. Under my authority, as directed by the 
Secretary of Defense, we have used military force against violent 
extremist organizations, in the USAFRICOM AOR, associated with those 
included in the 2001 AUMF. The Secretary based that direction on a 
thorough vetting of their function, connection to the organizations 
included in the 2001 AUMF, and threat to the United States. In the 
future, we will continue to target violent extremist organizations 
using this authority. These designated organizations remain classified 
and the information can be provided to your staff. Additionally, we 
have used military force under our collective self-defense authorities 
to defend our designated partners, and we will continue to use force to 
defend ourselves, regardless of who is attacking us. If attacked, we 
will defend ourselves and our partners.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                   political uncertainty in venezuela
    23. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, on January 23, 2019, the 
elected leader of Venezuela's National Assembly, Juan Gerardo Guaido, 
declared his position as the interim president of Venezuela based on 
constitutional authority. He has since been internationally recognized 
as the true President of Venezuela by Spain, France, Germany, the UN, 
Kosovo and the United States. From your perspective, what effect have 
the sanctions established by the United States had on Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
has aggressively employed its Venezuela sanctions authorities to target 
nearly 150 individuals and entities, including regime insiders and 
their support networks involved in corrupt activities, in an effort to 
hold the Maduro regime accountable. As a result of OFAC actions, all 
property and interests in property of these entities and individuals, 
and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent 
or more by these blocked entities and individuals that are in the 
United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are 
blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC's regulations generally 
prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the 
United States that involve any property or interests in property of 
blocked or designated persons. These actions furthered international 
efforts to deny Maduro and his supporters of their revenue sources and 
continue pressure on the regime. For additional insights into the 
effect of United States sanctions on Venezuela, I defer to the 
Department of State and the Department of the Treasury.

    24. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, we have heard of the grave 
humanitarian crisis in the area with the displacement of more than 3.3 
million people. What impact will this have in your AOR and what role, 
if any, does CENTCOM have in mitigating this crisis?
    Admiral Faller. The current number of Venezuelan migrants since 
2014 is 3.4 million, or over 10 percent of Venezuela's population. The 
UN is projecting 2 million more Venezuelans will emigrate in 2019, with 
most of these migrants staying in Latin America. Most Venezuelan 
migrants have settled in Colombia, with over one million migrants in 
Colombia so far. The second-largest Venezuelan migrant recipient is 
Peru, which hosts about 500,000 migrants, followed by Chile with over 
280,000 and Ecuador with over 200,000 migrants. The displacement of 
millions of Venezuelans has had a profound effect throughout the region 
across nearly every spectrum of society. In the area of defense, 
neighboring countries like Colombia and Peru have had to divert 
resources that were otherwise appropriated for important security 
initiatives. In Colombia for example, resources that could have been 
used to fund peace accord consolidation efforts have been diverted to 
help ease the suffering of Venezuelan migrants. We are also seeing some 
transnational organized crime groups, such as Colombia's National 
Liberation Army (ELN), are taking advantage of these conditions to 
recruit desperate Venezuelan migrants, increasing criminality along the 
border between the two countries. SOUTHCOM certainly has played a role 
in mitigating the crisis. We have provided direct support with air lift 
to deliver humanitarian assistance supplies on behalf of USAID. We also 
deployed the USNS Comfort to the region, providing medical care to over 
26,000 patients--relieving some of the burden placed on these 
neighboring countries to provide medical care. In addition to direct 
support, SOUTHCOM plays an important role in reducing tensions and 
encouraging collaboration among regional military leaders.
                great power players and influence in aor
    25. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, China is 
making aggressive investments in both of your areas of responsibility 
with the ``Belt and Road Initiative'' (BRI). At the Senate Intelligence 
Committees' worldwide threats hearing, the Director of National 
Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated that ``Traditional adversaries will 
continue to attempt to gain and assert influence, taking advantage of 
changing conditions in the international environment increasingly 
isolationist tendencies in the West, and shifts in the global 
economy.'' With the increased economic competition with the United 
States from China, have you experienced, or do you expect to 
experience, deterioration of United States partnerships in your area of 
responsibility?
    General Waldhauser. This is probably our biggest challenge in 
Africa, because Africa's issues will not be solved militarily. Although 
security is important, it will not ultimately be the deciding factor in 
how Africans choose to partner with the United States. African states 
are seeking to diversify economic and security relationships in order 
to bolster development, investment, and economic growth. China 
understands this and is using its investment in infrastructure and 
other development programs to buy leverage with African countries. We 
have seen this pattern play out in Asia and are now seeing it begin to 
play out in Africa. China increasingly funds both incumbent politicians 
and opposition leaders within our AOR, as well as decision makers 
within ministries related to their commercial or posture objectives. 
This illicit individual funding, combined with legitimate investment 
that nevertheless causes heavy debt burdens, has slowed and complicated 
governance reform and our engagement in some partner states. 
Additionally, we have seen China adopt tactics of political involvement 
where their economic interests are concerned. To counter China's 
advance, both Department of State and Department of Defense have 
invested in programs such Defense Institution Building and the Security 
Governance Initiative as ways to deepen long standing United States 
support to security sector reform, governance, and rule of law within 
our AOR. As we encourage governments to become more transparent and 
provide them the means to fight corruption, we can then potentially 
ensure that Chinese investment on the continent complies with 
international norms and does not provide China undue influence.
    Admiral Faller. Latin America and the Caribbean is our neighborhood 
and we do have very strong partnerships in this region. However, China 
is seeking to inch out the United States as the preferred partner. 
China uses predatory economic policies to exert political leverage and 
gain access to key infrastructure, ranging from ports to 
telecommunications architecture. Greater Chinese involvement in 
regional governments' IT and telecommunications will limit our ability 
to share information with them given the ensuing counterintelligence 
concerns. For example, Chinese telecommunications firms, such as Huawei 
and ZTE, as of 2014 were the purveyors of 32 percent of all phone 
connections in Latin America, and are expected to reach 68 percent or 
605 million smartphones by the year 2020. China also has increased the 
tempo of its key leader engagements in the region, and frequently 
provides all-expenses paid security training as a way to further 
ingratiate itself with partners. While most countries in the region 
continue to view the United States as their preferred partner, we 
remain concerned that China's charm offensive and the accompanying 
indebtedness it promotes could increase countries' exposure to Chinese 
coercion.

    26. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how are 
you working with the Department of State, other government entities and 
our allies within your AOR? Are there areas of improvement that should 
be examined? If so, what are these areas?
    General Waldhauser. We work very closely together with the 
Department of State (DOS) and USAID on these issues daily and at many 
levels. In what we refer to as a 3D approach: Diplomacy, Development, 
and Defense. DOS political advisors, USAID development advisors, and 
representatives from other government agencies are embedded throughout 
USAFRICOM, and we have regular synchronization meetings with both our 
United States Embassies and DOS. USAFRICOM also hosts an annual Africa 
Strategic Dialogue, which brings together senior stakeholders from the 
Departments of State, Defense, and USAID to coordinate strategic 
approaches and harmonize guidance for Africa. In addition, the Africa 
Strategic Integration Conference brings together officials from across 
the United States Government, including many from Africa, to discuss 
regional issues facing the United States in Africa and to help us to 
develop unified responses. Our allies are integrated into our work in 
similar ways. Through our Multinational Coordination Cell, we host 
Liaison Officers from 17 partners and jointly plan our assistance and 
operations through regionally-focused multinational working groups.
    Admiral Faller. We have a robust relationship with the Department 
of State positioning the U.S. as the partner of choice throughout the 
region with very few exceptions. It starts at the ground level in the 
embassies where DOD members form an important part of the country 
teams. We integrate our operational and capacity building activities in 
the region in direct support of--and aligned with--Department of State 
Integrated Country Strategies. SOUTHCOM implements several key State 
security assistance programs such as International Military Education 
and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and the Global Peacekeeping 
Operations Initiative to build our partners' capacity to counter mutual 
threats and enhance global security in a way that other powers cannot. 
The gold standard for Interagency cooperation and coordination is the 
Joint Interagency Task Force-South where DOD, as the lead federal 
agency for detection and monitoring of air and maritime narcotics 
trafficking, provides a vital coordination link for alignment with the 
various federal agencies that carry out the other phases of the 
interdiction continuum. The close coordination between SOUTHCOM and our 
State and USAID partners manifests itself nearly every year during 
hurricane season and for other disasters that strike. Also, we work 
closely with regional partners to expose Chinese malign influence, 
ensure our partners understand the dangers of China's predatory 
financial practices, and have the complete picture concerning so-called 
promises of Chinese IT and cyber cooperation. Given their bleak fiscal 
outlook, most countries in the region feel pressure to pursue economic 
cooperation with Beijing. Many of these countries lack the expertise 
and experience to scrutinize fully Chinese bids and safeguard against 
unfavorable terms; our regional partners would likely benefit from 
access to experts who can help them discern bad deals.
                             climate change
    27. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, while 
some dispute the existence of climate change and the extent of its 
global impact, climate-related events provide a significant risk to our 
national security and that of our allies. What steps are you taking 
within your areas of responsibility to address the security risks 
associated with climate change?
    General Waldhauser. In addition to complying with responsibilities 
set forth in DOD Directive 4715.21, ``Climate Change Adaptation and 
Resilience'', USAFRICOM supports environmental security engagements 
with partner nations, interagency, and non-governmental organizations 
across the area of responsibility. The effects of climate change 
threaten environmental security by degrading natural resources and the 
environment. Environmental issues can easily manifest into human 
conflict, increasing competition and tension between populations. 
Environmental security engagements are a tool in abating these concerns 
- advancing cooperation amongst nations and regions while promoting 
security and stability. Some examples of these engagements are water 
security initiatives and mangrove forest management. Ultimately, 
solutions to climate change and environmental problems contribute to 
national security objectives.
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM does consider climate change in its 
strategic planning. During environmental compliance and assessments, 
climate change is incorporated into learning objectives in order to 
mitigate impacts of natural disasters to include frequency and 
severity. Additionally, to ensure our own personnel and families are 
ready, SOUTHCOM conducts annual hurricane preparedness training for all 
personnel assigned to our headquarters. The threat of instability 
caused by climate change has led to the inclusion of climate change 
scenarios in some of SOUTHCOM's major exercise scenarios like 
TRADEWINDS. During the TRADEWINDS annual exercise, national agencies 
and partner agencies practice collaboration and coordination to limit 
the impacts and severity of the weather systems often attributed to 
climate change. These efforts attempt to reduce the risks of local, 
regional, and international instability during crisis and disasters in 
our AOR. The associated risks include, but are not limited to, 
immigration, cultural property protection, and environmental impacts. 
Lastly, we conduct environmental subject matter expert engagements that 
are often related to pre- and post-natural disaster planning, such as a 
recent engagement on post disaster waste management.

    28. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how have 
United States Forces been trained and equipped to respond to natural 
disasters in your AOR?
    General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM routinely conducts deliberate 
planning to prepare for contingencies to respond to crises which may 
result from natural disasters including, instability, pandemic 
influenza/infectious disease, and non-combatant evacuation. Currently, 
we are conducting disaster relief support in response to the flooding 
in Mozambique. These efforts take into account a whole-of-government 
approach to include how we will coordinate with and support interagency 
partners such as DOS and USAID. In addition, we provide guidance to 
USAFRICOM service components, so they can forecast necessary recourses 
and training to support mission requirements. For example, United 
States Army Africa developed and approved a plan to support Foreign 
Humanitarian Assistance which involved its Headquarters and staff 
working with both DOS and USAID. Along with service components, 
USAFRICOM relies heavily on other capabilities like the State 
Partnership Program to increase partner readiness. Currently, Africa 
has 14 State Partnership Programs. These programs bring unique 
capabilities as many of the National Guard units consist of first 
responders and emergency personnel who bring this expertise when they 
conduct emergency management and natural disaster response training and 
exercises.
    Admiral Faller. The Services are responsible for training and 
equipping forces, providing ready forces for the combatant commands. At 
the combatant command level, we help the Services maintain and build 
readiness by tailoring bilateral and regional exercises and training 
events to increase the readiness of U.S. Forces for a range of 
missions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The 
countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR experience approximately 50 natural 
disasters every year ranging from wild fires, to volcanic erruptions, 
to hurricanes, and earthquakes. We work closely with our partner 
nations and regional coordination mechanisms such as the Caribbean 
Disaster Emergency Management Agency and the Coordination Center for 
the Prevention of Natural Disaster in Central America to build our 
collective capacity to respond to and/or coordinate disaster relief 
efforts. We've seen a decrease in requests for assistance following 
these disasters because our partners are increasingly prepared to 
handle the responses themselves.

    29. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, how have 
United States Forces been equipped and prepared to help address the 
growing health crises associated with climate change?
    General Waldhauser. Climate change creates a number of challenges 
within the USAFRICOM operational environment. Increasing spread of 
infectious diseases (e.g. malaria and cholera), fresh water loss (e.g. 
Lake Chad Basin), desertification, sea level change, and extreme 
weather (e.g. flooding and heat waves) are significant concerns. These 
issues lead to increasing risks for complex humanitarian disasters, 
exacerbation of conflicts, and instability in fragile states. Although 
primary responsibility for training and equipping United States Forces 
lies with each individual service, USAFRICOM supplements the services 
in multiple ways. First, we educate our forces on the health threats 
posed by climate change through programs such as the Africa Today 
course, the USAFRICOM Newcomer's Course, and the Joint Humanitarian 
Operations Course. Second, we execute several health engagement 
programs designed to build the capability of our African Partners to 
manage health risks worsened by climate change. Two examples are the 
Africa Malaria Task Force (AMTF) and the African Partner Outbreak 
Response Alliance (APORA). Finally, the USAFRICOM Campaign Plan 
includes objectives focused on preparation to respond to all types of 
disaster as well as increasing African Partner capability to prevent 
and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. Numerous humanitarian and 
security force assistance activities support these objectives and 
ultimately build awareness and preparation for both the United States 
and our African Partners.
    Admiral Faller. United States Forces have expeditionary units with 
capabilities in disease surveillance, vector control, preventative 
medicine services, dental services, damage control resuscitation and 
surgery, as well as veterinary services and medical logistics 
capabilities. These capabilities are primarily designed to support 
organic DOD forces to allow DOD security forces, engineers, and 
logisticians to bolster State and local government response 
capabilities. Historically, the DOD has supported USAID's Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance in responding to natural disasters, 
including extreme weather events. Often, this support includes 
capabilities that account for adverse health outcomes that may result 
from a natural disaster. To illustrate this, in 2010 SOUTHCOM stood up 
a joint task force to assist in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. 
SOUTHCOM, in support of USAID, conducted Foreign Disaster Relief 
operations in support of the Government of Haiti and the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) by providing localized 
security, facilitating the distribution and restoration of basic human 
services, providing medical support, and conducting critical 
engineering operations in order to alleviate human suffering and 
provide the foundation for the long term recovery of Haiti.
   withdrawal of united states troops and the war in the middle east
    30. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, despite 
the announcement of the defeat of ISIS and the immediate withdrawal of 
troops from Syria and the framework for peace with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, ISIS continues to be an active and legitimate threat that 
is likely to pursue external attacks. What kind of threat does the 
Islamic State pose in your Areas of Responsibility?
    General Waldhauser. Africa-based ISIS groups have neither conducted 
nor inspired external attacks against the United States Homeland. 
However, their diffuse extremist networks allow enabled or inspired 
attacks against United States and other Western interests in Africa and 
in Europe. Additionally, ISIS and al Qaeda safe havens in North Africa, 
the Sahel, and East Africa pose an enduring threat to regional 
stability and a continued threat to United States, allied, and host-
nation interests within those regions.
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM views self-radicalizing individuals 
responding to ISIS's messaging as one of the principal violent 
extremist organization threats in the region. Currently, ISIS lacks 
operational capacity in the AOR, but does have many sympathizers who 
have left this region to fight on behalf of ISIS. ISIS has used the 
story of a Trinidadian fighter in their magazine Dabiq to recruit and 
radicalize other westerners. An alleged terrorist plot in Trinidad was 
thwarted in early 2018 with the help of United States authorities. The 
disruption led to the arrests of 14 Trinidadian ISIS sympathizers who 
were subsequently released. SOUTHCOM is concerned with the possible 
return of many Trinidadians and other South Americans who may possess 
combat experience in Iraq and Syria.

    31. Senator Hirono. General Waldhauser and Admiral Faller, what 
concerns do you have in terms of the withdrawal of troops from Syria as 
well as the potential agreement with the Taliban?
    General Waldhauser. Both the withdrawal of troops from Syria and 
the potential agreement with the Taliban could provide propaganda 
fodder for both the Islamic State and al Qaida to rally extremist 
support within Africa. The narrative that the Taliban 'won' a 
protracted war against the United States and its allies would very 
likely be used in extremist circles to recruit new members and garner 
materiel or financial support for Islamic State or al Qaida networks on 
the continent. The withdrawal of troops from Syria could also allow 
remnant ISIS networks to rebuild connectivity with its provinces or 
aspiring networks in Africa, although are currently not seeing this at 
this time.
    Admiral Faller. ISIS remains a resilient enemy with many loyal 
fighters and supporters throughout the world including Latin America 
and the Caribbean. I defer to OSD and United States Central Command on 
the specific implications of the withdrawal from Syria and the 
potential agreement with the Taliban.
                     operations of u.s. coast guard
    32. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, the Joint Interagency Task 
Force South (JIATF-S) executes detection and monitoring of illicit 
trafficking across all domains, and facilitates international and 
interagency interdiction to enable the disruption and dismantlement of 
illicit and converging threat networks in support of national and 
regional security. Despite its effectiveness, last year, only 6 percent 
of known drug movements were interdicted. What would you require in 
your AOR to increase the overall effectiveness of the Joint Interagency 
Task Force South (JIATF-S)?
    Admiral Faller. More Maritime Patrol Aircraft to detect drug 
trafficking movements and provide overwatch in support of interdiction 
operations would enable our partners to increase drug seizures. 
Currently, partners conduct nearly 40 percent of interdictions 
supported by JIATF-South. To increase the effectiveness of United 
States interdiction operations, JIATF-S requires integrated force 
packages that include a ship with an on board Law Enforcement 
Detachment (LEDET), helicopters (with airborne use of force 
capability), small boats for boardings, and supporting maritime patrol 
aircraft (MPA). Annually, every additional force package allotted to 
JIATF-S projects to seize and/or disrupt 33 metric tons (MT) of 
cocaine. The greater the number of fully integrated packages--the more 
drugs can be taken off the high seas.

    33. Senator Hirono. Admiral Faller, what effect, if any, did the 
recent government shutdown have on the readiness of the U.S. Coast 
Guard and their effectiveness to perform these essential operations in 
your AOR?
    Admiral Faller. While operations continued during the lapse in 
appropriations, the Coast Guard was forced to defer or delay 
maintenance on 75 cutters, many of which routinely deploy in support of 
SOUTHCOM counter-narcotics missions. Similarly, deferred aviation 
maintenance and a shortage of nearly 500 spare parts caused by the 
lapse in appropriations will impact the availability of armed Coast 
Guard helicopters crucial to drug interdiction efforts in the Western 
Hemisphere. In spite of not being paid during the partial government 
shutdown, approximately 1600 Coast Guard personnel deployed throughout 
the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility continued to protect the Homeland 
from drug traffickers and provide force protection to our personnel at 
JTF-Guantanamo. This is the first time on record that members of the 
U.S. military were not paid during a lapse in appropriations. Finally, 
and most importantly, the shutdown had a detrimental effect on the 
morale of these servicemembers and placed an undue burden on their 
families. The professionalism and resiliency shown by our Coast Guard 
brothers and sisters and their families during this time was truly 
impressive.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                           associated forces
    34. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, during testimony you stated 
that you could not say for sure whether Boko Haram or ISIS-West Africa 
had been designated an Associated Force pursuant to the 2001 AUMF. 
Could you provide me a list of what groups have been deemed Associated 
Forces under the 2001 AUMF within the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility?
    General Waldhauser. The names of groups in the USAFRICOM AOR 
designated as associated forces under the 2001 AUMF are classified. 
Those designated organizations were thoroughly vetted by the Secretary 
of Defense, connected to the organizations listed in the AUMF, and 
demonstrated a threat to the U.S. This classified information can be 
provided to your staff.
                        collective self defense
    35. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, in response to my question 
about collective self-defense you stated ``if we are not accompanying . 
. . we do not have collective self-defense because I haven't designated 
it and we don't use it.'' While you may have applied restrictions to 
accompany missions and the use of collective self-defense, do you have 
the legal authority to use collective self-defense for a partner force 
when U.S. Forces are not present or threatened themselves?
    General Waldhauser. Let me clarify the remarks I made during 
testimony. While I have, in certain situations, applied restrictions to 
accompany missions in the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility, I do have 
the legal authority to use collective self-defense for a designated 
partner force when U.S. Forces are not present or threatened 
themselves. Under authorities granted to CDR USAFRICOM by the Secretary 
of Defense, transmitted in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Execution Orders, we retain the ability to provide assistance to 
designated partner forces during counterterrorism operations where we 
do not accompany them on the mission. Through our remote advise and 
assist efforts, we observe the partner force and enemy activity through 
visual means, typically the employment of Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Achieving this visual perspective 
enables the conduct-based characterization of the enemy activity, 
meaning that once the attacking force has committed a hostile act or 
has demonstrated hostile intent towards the designated partner force 
our use of lethal force may be authorized.

    36. Senator Kaine. General Waldhauser, has the Department of 
Defense provided you any legal framework regarding the use of 
collective self-defense? If so, could you please provide us a copy of 
that framework? If not, what are the standing guidelines and Rules of 
Engagement you have disseminated to your commanders regarding the legal 
use of collective self-defense?
    General Waldhauser. The collective self-defense authority is 
discussed in the Chairman's Directive on the Standing Rules of 
Engagement and, in some cases, within operational orders provided by 
the Secretary to CDR USAFRICOM. These resources do not specifically 
discuss the legal framework surrounding the collective self-defense 
authority. USAFRICOM executes its collective self-defense authorities 
in compliance with domestic and international law as articulated in 
orders issued by the Joint Staff and USAFRICOM. Additionally, although 
classified, CDR USAFRICOM has provided restrictions and standing 
guidelines on the use of collective self-defense, which are also 
outlined in USAFRICOM orders.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                          military defections
    37. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, on February 2, 2019, Air 
Force General Francisco Yanez announced his departure from Mr. Maduro's 
military and declared his support for Mr. Guaido. He is the highest-
ranking military officer to defect, thus far. Do you know how many 
troops have defected?
    Admiral Faller. We assess based on regional partners' migration 
figures that over 1000 Venezuelan troops have defected between mid-
January and mid-March 2019. Most defectors are junior officers and 
enlisted personnel. Only two general officers have defected, and they 
lack the sufficient influence to cause a groundswell of high-ranking 
officials to defect.

    38. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, is there any safe haven for 
troops once they defect?
    Admiral Faller. Most Venezuelan military defectors seek refuge in 
Colombia and Brazil after pledging their allegiance to Guaido. Both of 
these partners are playing pivotal roles in resettling the defectors 
and their families. Interim President Guaido has publicly promised to 
extend amnesty to members of the armed forces who assist in reinstating 
the constitutional order. To date, most high-ranking officials appear 
to remain skeptical of the amnesty offer.

    39. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, if Guaido succeeds, what 
would the Venezuelan military look like, and what do you envision would 
be the role of the United States?
    Admiral Faller. While Venezuela has a longstanding military 
culture, we assess it will take some time for Interim President Guaido 
to rebuild the military to eliminate longstanding corruption; root out 
officials who remain loyal to the ideology of Chavismo (which is the 
only ideology many of the junior officers and enlisted have ever 
known), Cuba and other external state actors; and regain military 
interoperability with West. There are many military officials who under 
Maduro have used their position to profit from the drug trade, and have 
allowed transnational criminal groups access to Venezuelan air space. 
Cuba, in particularly, has deep inroads into Venezuela's military and 
overall security apparatus, and it will take some time to undo that 
influence. Additionally, for almost 20 years, the Venezuelan military 
has been more aligned with Russia and China, receiving military 
training from those nations and using their equipment and weapons. 
Further, criticism of Maduro often stems from the rank-and-file 
believing he has betrayed Chavismo, and the prevalence of true 
believers within the military's ranks will complicate Guaido's efforts 
to build a cohesive, unified military. The Venezuelan military's senior 
ranks will probably suffer the greatest reductions due to the 
predominance of corrupt supporters of Chavez and their close 
relationship with Cuba and Russia. This will leave a critical gap in 
leadership. SOUTHCOM engagement will depend on policy decisions that 
must explore funding from Department of Defense and Department of State 
for areas such as military professionalization and institution 
building. A security cooperation relationship will need to be rebuilt 
from the ground up following years of severed ties.
                       blinding lasers--djibouti
    40. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, there have been reports 
of China using blinding lasers against our pilots in Djibouti. Have you 
raised this issue with your Chinese counterparts?
    General Waldhauser. In this particular incident, the United States 
has made it clear to the Chinese that we will not tolerate any 
deliberate act to harm United States servicemembers. United States 
responses have included: issuing a demarche on April 16, 2018 that 
outlined the violation of the United States-China Memorandum of 
Understanding regarding air and maritime safety; raising the issue 
through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism; 
requesting the results of an internal People's Liberation Army 
investigation into the event; and publicly naming China as responsible 
for the incident. To date, we have not had another such incident. 
USAFRICOM has a policy in place directing aircrews to utilize laser eye 
protection in Djibouti. USAFRICOM and CJTF-HOA track and report 
suspected lasing incidents; certain lasing events have been assessed as 
originating from the Chinese People's Liberation Army Naval facility in 
Djibouti. USAFRICOM works closely with our Department of State 
counterparts to ensure that China is aware of the hazard these lasers 
present and the specific threat it poses to pilots flying in Djiboutian 
air space pursuant to the permission of the Djiboutian Government.

    41. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, do you believe there has 
been sufficient consequences for China's breach of the Protocol on 
Blinding Laser Weapons in Djibouti?
    General Waldhauser. It remains in our interest to deter aggressive 
acts that violate international safety conventions by raising the costs 
of such behavior. Actions like the lasing incident are part of China's 
strategy of operating below the United States threshold for military 
engagement and in a protracted state of hostility attempting to weaken 
U.S. Forces in incremental steps. In this particular incident, the 
United States has made it clear to the Chinese that we will not 
tolerate any deliberate act to harm United States servicemembers. Our 
responses have included issuing a demarche on April 16, 2018 that 
outlined the violation of the United States-China Memorandum of 
Understanding regarding air and maritime safety; raising the issue 
through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Mechanism; 
requesting the results of an internal People's Liberation Army 
investigation into the event; and publicly naming China as responsible 
for the incident. We believe China has gotten the message. To date, we 
have not had another such incident.
                       china and russia in africa
    42. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, in 2018, the Trump 
Administration signaled plans to reduce forces in Africa by nearly 10 
percent over the next several years, citing the need for greater 
emphasis on China and Russia. You are saying that China and Russia are 
threatening our influence in Africa. Is a drawdown of resources in 
Africa appropriate, given what you describe?
    General Waldhauser. The ten percent reduction of forces in Africa 
only applies to counter-VEO Special Operations Forces. As a result, the 
reductions USAFRICOM has proposed to meet the Administration's guidance 
will not adversely affect USAFRICOM's ability to counter China or 
Russia in Africa. This is because we have carefully chosen the 
reductions so as to minimize its impact on missions outside of the 
counter-VEO fight. For example, we will continue a robust exercise 
program and significant Security Force assistance with our African 
partners.

    43. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, would a drawdown of 
resources in Africa threaten United States interests, and allow for 
unchecked Chinese and Russian influence?
    General Waldhauser. Yes, a further reduction of resources in Africa 
carries increased risk that our African partners may begin to view us 
as a less reliable partner. Should this occur African nations are 
likely to turn to those whom they perceive as most capable of meeting 
their needs. A successful approach to protecting United States 
interests in Africa against Chinese and Russian expansion requires a 
whole-of-government response. DOD plays a unique role within that 
response and a reduction of already sparse resources allocated to the 
USAFRICOM AOR would ignore the importance of Africa's role in China's 
global ambitions and Russia's desire to enhance their access and 
influence. If ordered to further reduce our forces and funding for 
activities in Africa, we will work to minimize the potential impact to 
our counter-China and counter-Russia efforts.
                    debt diplomacy in latin america
    44. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, more and more countries are 
discovering the pitfalls of signing onto China's investment strategy. 
Are you taking any efforts to warn countries in Latin America against 
accepting financial assistance from China? If so, how?
    Admiral Faller. We work closely with partners in the region to 
expose Chinese malign influence and ensure they understand the dangers 
of China's predatory, opaque, and corrupt financial practices and 
promises of IT and cyber cooperation. This includes sharing case 
studies of China's activities in other regions, including China's 
efforts to purchase long term control of strategic infrastructure, such 
as in Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. There are security considerations 
to allowing the Chinese to build and operate infrastructure with little 
host nation oversight such as the satellite facility in Argentina. 
Highlighting the inherent danger in these agreements is a consistent 
focus area for myself as well as SOUTHCOM component commanders and 
senior staff during engagements with partner nation leadership. We 
closely coordinate with interagency partners to ensure messaging 
alignment and consistency.

    45. Senator Heinrich. General Waldhauser, are you taking any 
efforts to warn countries in Africa against accepting financial 
assistance from China? If so, how?
    General Waldhauser. United States Africa Command follows the lead 
of the Departments of State and Commerce for debt issues in Africa and 
respects our African partners' rights to manage their political, 
military, and economic relations according to their interests. The 
Departments of State and Commerce, with the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, and broader international community, may advise 
countries in Africa on the perils--and benefits--of Chinese financial 
assistance. United States Africa Command advocates for the United 
States to remain the partner of choice by maintaining our high 
standards of professionalism, demonstrating our commitment to 
addressing partner security needs, and providing high-quality 
equipment, in comparison to peer and near-peer competitors. Further, we 
offer comprehensive training and equipping programs to meet the long-
term military requirements of our partners, under conditions 
sustainable by the partner's budget and resource availability.
                     russian influence in venezuela
    46. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, Russia just sent 400 military 
contractors to Venezuela, in support of Mr. Maduro. This is on top of 
Russian-made surface-to-air-missiles, and periodic visits of nuclear 
capable aircraft. What other Russian assets are in Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Russia is Venezuela's top arms supplier. From 2008 
to 2018, Moscow sold to Caracas over $9 billion in military equipment 
to include combat aircraft, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launch systems, artillery, 
mortar systems, and assorted missile variants. It is likely that 
technicians, training personnel, and other associated materials/
equipment are provided through provisions negotiated during these 
sales. We have no information to corroborate the claim that 400 Russian 
private military contractors arrived in Venezuela in January 2019. 
Additionally, Russia will periodically deploy naval assets to 
Venezuela, such as naval surface actions groups.
                          venezuela and turkey
    47. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, President Trump signed an 
executive order banning United States persons from engaging in 
Venezuela's gold trade. That could be extended to third parties such as 
Turkey, who imported roughly 23 tons last year. What is your 
understanding of this trade relationship?
    Admiral Faller. Turkey's relationship with Venezuela has deepened 
in part by an affinity between the two presidents. In the past two 
years, Ankara has expanded its trade with Venezuela, importing about 
$900 million in gold in 2018. The Maduro regime last year began 
refining its gold in Turkey as a way to bypass United States sanctions.

    48. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Faller, are you monitoring movement 
of gold outside of Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. Yes, we are monitoring movement of gold outside of 
Venezuela and collaborate closely with interagency partners to 
determine the effect these gold movements are having on internal and 
regional security. The Maduro regime continues to avoid penalty from 
United States sanctions, pursuant to E.O. 13850, by selling gold to 
African and Middle Eastern countries such as Uganda and United Arab 
Emirates, respectively. Russia remains Maduro's principle partner in 
helping move the gold via a Boeing 777 belonging to Russian-airline 
Norwind.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                      venezuelan refugee situation
    49. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, according to the United 
Nations, over 3 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants have already 
fled their homes. A Brookings study published in December estimates 
that this number could grow to 8 million people if economic conditions 
remain dire, which would be even larger than number of persons 
displaced by the Syria crisis. In an interview with the Miami Herald, 
the study's author said the number could grow this large within only 2-
3 years. What is your assessment of the consequences of millions of 
people leaving Venezuela?
    Admiral Faller. The UN projects that by the end of 2019 
approximately 5 million Venezuelans will have left the country since 
2014. Most Venezuelan migrants resettle within Latin America, taxing 
regional partners' social, humanitarian, and security services, 
particularly in towns along the border with Venezuela. Every country in 
South America and parts of Central America and the Caribbean are 
hosting Venezuelan migrants. Some of the notable figures are: over one 
million Venezuelan migrants have relocated to Colombia; 700,000 to 
Peru; over 280,000 to Chile; 200,000 to Ecuador; 130,000 to Argentina; 
and close to 100,000 in both Brazil and Panama. The sudden influx of 
Venezuelan migrants has strained health and education services and has 
outpaced the ability of some governments, such as Colombia, to provide 
shelter and resources. Along the border between Colombia and Venezuela, 
the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) dissidents, and other Colombian criminal organizations 
exploit Venezuelan migrants crossing the border. For example, the ELN 
has recruited Venezuelans as young as 15 to join their ranks for 
unspecified illegal activities, according to the Colombian Army and 
local non-governmental organizations. Finally as this tragedy grows, 
the neighboring countries, especially Colombia, will have fewer and 
fewer security forces to devote to counterdrugs missions as they shift 
forces to help refugees in dire need of food and medical care.

    50. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, are Venezuela's neighbors 
prepared to deal with a crisis of this magnitude?
    Admiral Faller. The exodus from Venezuela is producing the largest 
mass migration in Latin American history with an estimated 2.7 million 
migrants and refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean and 3.4 
million globally as of February 2019. Neighbors, particularly those 
sharing borders or close to Venezuela are experiencing severe strains 
on social services, including their ability to provide sanitation, 
housing, feeding, and dealing with outbreaks of infectious disease. 
Both Brazil with 96,000 and Colombia 1.1 million have well organized 
governmental responses to deal with border crossings, but Colombia's 
challenge is complicated but much larger numbers of migrants and 
increased violence, primarily from terrorist activity by the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) which uses Venezuela as a safe haven and is 
taking advantage of the Colombian military being stretched thin to 
support the humanitarian effort. Although all of South America and the 
small neighboring Caribbean Islands such as Trinidad and Tobago, 
Curacao, and Aruba are particularly short of resources to handle the 
influx of migrants, other more distant, larger countries are also 
significantly impacted with over 700,000 in Peru, 288,000 in Chile, and 
130,000 in Argentina which is simultaneously in the throes of a 
significant financial crisis undermining its ability to deal with a 
large influx of migrants. With the outpouring into the region expected 
to continue unabated, most of the impacted countries will require 
significant international assistance to avoid a greater catastrophe 
than it currently is. Relief supplies are currently staged in both 
Colombia and Brazil, ready to distribute within Venezuelan as soon as 
the Venezuelan military will allow it.

    51. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, what, if anything, is SOUTHCOM 
or your partner agencies doing to assist Venezuela's neighbors and 
these refugees?
    Admiral Faller. SOUTHCOM's assistance to the Venezuelan migrants 
and those neighboring countries impacted by the crisis has largely been 
the support provided by the deployment of the USNS Comfort in the fall 
of 2018 and the air lift used to deliver humanitarian aid to the region 
this year. From October to December 2018, the USNS Comfort visited 
Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras. The Comfort deployment improved 
interoperability with partner nation, non-governmental organization, 
and U.S. medical providers. The physicians from the USNS Comfort 
treated 14,554 medical patients, 3203 dental patients, 8335 optometry 
patients, and conducted 599 surgeries. They conducted 53 tours and 
engagements and 120 subject matter exchanges. Comfort had an engagement 
with the Ecuadorian President, Peruvian Congress, and Honduran 
President. The deployment of the Comfort highlighted the Venezuelan 
migrant crisis, with news coverage reached an estimated 222 million 
people. In February and March, DOD transported over 126 metric tons of 
USAID-provided humanitarian relief commodities, including water 
treatment equipment, hygiene kits, non-pharmaceutical medical supplies, 
ready-to-use supplementary food, and bulk rice, on 7 United States 
military flights to Cucuta, Colombia.
                    drug smuggling and interdiction
    52. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, Southern Command works hard 
every day to deter criminal networks that try to smuggle drugs into the 
United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are devastating the 
health and safety of Americans across our country. The United States 
Customs and Border Protection recently seized over 250 pounds of 
fentanyl at a legal port of entry on our border with Mexico. It was the 
largest bust ever of this opioid. Where do most of the illegal drugs 
shipped from your area of responsibility enter the United States?
    Admiral Faller. The majority of illegal drugs shipped from the 
SOUTHCOM area of responsibility enter the United States through Mexico. 
More than 80 percent of United States-bound cocaine shipments departing 
South America transited the eastern Pacific Ocean last year, mostly 
aboard noncommercial maritime vessels. The vast majority of cocaine 
seizures occur on the high seas, or in South America, before the drug 
ever reaches Central America, Mexico, or the Caribbean Islands. 
Colombia remains the primary source for the majority of cocaine seized 
and tested in the United States. In 2018, at least 84 percent of the 
documented cocaine departing South America transited the Eastern 
Pacific and 9 percent through the Western Caribbean, totaling 93 
percent of the known flow through the Central American corridor to 
Mexico.

    53. Senator Warren. Admiral Faller, of the drugs that are 
interdicted, how many of these are intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard?
    Admiral Faller. In fiscal year 2018, the Joint Interagency Task 
Force-South (JIATF-S) supported the interdiction of 273 metric tons of 
cocaine in 287 maritime events. The U.S. Coast Guard played a critical 
role in those interdictions, participating in 171 events (60 percent). 
Also note that our partner nations play a critical role in maritime 
interdictions, participating in 116 events (40 percent). JIATF-S does 
not execute actual law enforcement interdiction but directly supports 
the U.S. Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies, and partner 
nations.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                               venezuela
    54. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, with the increased complexity 
of foreign defense partnerships within the Venezuelan Government such 
as Russian bomber visits and military equipment sales, Cuban 
intelligence and security forces, and the presence of Hezbollah, do you 
foresee dangers in an open conflict with Venezuela bleeding over into 
direct conflict with another foreign power or of a conflict in 
Venezuela devolving into a proxy war?
    Admiral Faller. Although Russia, Cuba, and Hezbollah do have 
varying degrees of presence and involvement in Venezuela, at this time, 
there is no indication that any open conflict would occur nor that it 
would devolve into a proxy war.
                     chinese investment in soutchom
    55. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, base on continuing Chinese 
investment in multiple areas such as infrastructure, port projects, and 
canal construction, are we as the United States at risk of losing 
access or influence with our allies either through physical barriers to 
operation or through risk of compromise of information networks?
    Admiral Faller. China is seeking to inch out the United States as 
the preferred partner in the region. China uses predatory economic 
policies to exert political leverage and gain access to key 
infrastructure, ranging from ports to telecommunications architecture. 
For example, Beijing's offers to Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El 
Salvador of greater economic engagement likely played a key role in 
these countries' decisions to diplomatically recognize China. Shortly 
after El Salvador recognized China, Beijing tried to develop a 
commercial port there (La Union), a move the United States ambassador 
said demonstrated China's intentions to turn the port into a military 
base. Greater Chinese involvement in regional security services' IT and 
telecommunications may mean we need to reassess how we share 
information with them given the ensuing counterintelligence concerns. A 
reduced ability to share information with these partners likely would 
affect our ability to pass actionable intelligence that allows partners 
to detect, monitor, and disrupt narcotraffickers.
                             guantanamo bay
    56. Senator Manchin. Admiral Faller, if the requested funds are 
authorized and appropriated for recapitalization of Joint Task Force 
Guantanamo Bay facilities, how long until additional funds will be 
required for further repairs or updates? What is the long term cost 
estimate of housing the 40 current detainees indefinitely?
    Admiral Faller. Recapitalizing the infrastructure at Joint Task 
Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) will require a phased approach. The 
majority of facilities at JTF-GTMO were designed to expeditionary (one 
year design life) or temporary standards (five year design life) and 
constructed between 2004 and 2008, putting them long past their life 
spans. Not only is the infrastructure failing, but the various systems 
within those buildings are also starting to fail, such as plumbing, 
electrical, and IT systems. With the signing of Executive Order 13823 
and subsequent policy guidance, the JTF has been directed to plan for 
continued operations for at least 25 years. The JTF is currently 
assessing all of its infrastructure requirements to meet this mission 
and I will be reviewing it carefully to ensure a balance of troop 
safety, security of detainees, and good stewardship of taxpayer funds.
          combatting violent extremist organizations in africa
    57. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, with the limited ability 
to conduct kinetic strikes with United States assets against militants 
and extremist organizations in many regions of Africa, what efforts are 
currently being undertaken on the security cooperation and governance 
fronts to contain or combat the rapidly growing extremist threats in 
many of Africa's ungoverned areas?
    General Waldhauser. USAFRICOM has a limited authority to conduct 
kinetic strikes with United States assets; however, the USAFRICOM 
Campaign Plan (ACP) supports the broader U.S. whole-of-government 
policy and strategy implementation to defeat priority VEOs globally. 
Defeating VEOs in Africa requires a synchronized, sustained, and multi-
year regional campaign that leverages African, international, and 
interagency partners. In East Africa, USAFRICOM continues to build upon 
the focus and of over a decade of investments, both directly with the 
Somalis as well as with the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
troop contributing countries (TCCs), Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Uganda, to consolidate gains and accelerate towards long-
term recovery and stability in Somalia. These efforts allow our 
partners in Somalia to collaborate on C-VEO efforts with the United 
States and other regional partners and international organizations. 
USAFRICOM achieves USAFRICOM Campaign Plan North African Counter-VEO 
(C-VEO) Build Partner Capacity (BPC) effects and fulfills its security 
cooperation obligations by engaging with key partner nations to develop 
capabilities to detect/disrupt/degrade VEO operations, lines of 
communication, and safe havens. These BPC efforts allow our partners in 
the Maghreb to collaborate on C-VEO efforts with the United States and 
other regional partners and international organizations. The two 
primary countries USAFRICOM partners with in the North African region 
are Morocco and Tunisia. USAFRICOM supports and executes operations and 
activities in the West African Sahel Region to enable French counter-
terrorism operations, enable the African led GS Sahel Joint Force to 
execute independent C-VEO operations, and assist Sahel partner forces 
to execute independent operations that apply pressure to VEO networks 
in West Africa. In the Lake Chad Region (LCR), USAFRICOM supports and 
executes operations and activities to assist partner forces in applying 
pressure to the Baka Haram and ISIS-West Africa (WA) networks and 
enable local LCR Government officials to promote and process defectors 
from Baka Haram and ISIS-WA. USAFRICOM's defense efforts must be 
executed in parallel with comprehensive diplomacy and development 
measures to address the underlying political, societal, and development 
grievances that often contribute to violent extremism in Africa. To 
address these issues, the United States Government (USG) and 
international partners conduct diplomatic and development engagements 
with African partners to underscore the importance of human rights 
standards and civilian control of the military. These efforts, which 
will strengthen the perceived legitimacy of our African partner 
governments and militaries, are essential to long-term prosperity and 
stability on the continent.
                      chinese expansion in africom
    58. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, does Chinese military 
expansion in Africa such as their naval base in Djibouti and security 
cooperation efforts tied to their investments currently have the 
potential to inhibit our operations to secure a more stable African 
continent?
    General Waldhauser. Current Chinese military efforts in Africa are 
unlikely to inhibit our operations and access in the region. However, 
if current trends continue, China could gain that capability within the 
next decade. China is actively working with African partners to open 
new bases in several locations across the continent. Additionally, 
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) links existing and planned dual-
use ports across the continent to Chinese facilities in Asia. Some of 
these ports are entirely operated by Chinese commercial entities and 
other ports only have a section controlled by Chinese firms. These 
ports are often connected to BRI rail, road, and pipeline 
infrastructure built with Chinese loans. We have seen instances in 
which China has leveraged infrastructure debt to pressure Africa 
leaders to take actions against American interests. If Chinese control 
over African infrastructure continues to expand, our operations will 
likely start to encounter reduced access in several theaters.
                     russian involvement in africom
    59. Senator Manchin. General Waldhauser, what efforts or strategy 
are we currently undertaking to combat or counterbalance the 
destabilizing effects of Russian sanctioned and supported arms sales 
and quasi-military personnel support to autocratic regimes in Africa 
such as the government in the Central African Republic?
    General Waldhauser. Our efforts across Africa are designed to 
demonstrate that the United States and its Allies are superior security 
partners. Our military to military engagements throughout the region 
support broader U.S. Government objectives of fostering more 
transparent and responsive governments, which in turn leads to more 
resilient government institutions. As governments become more 
resilient, they are able to withstand Russian coercive actions that 
could lead to instability. In addition to supporting other government 
agencies in their mission of helping Africans develop more resilient 
governments, USAFRICOM is also working with our Allies to directly 
address specific Russian actions in countries where our Allies have 
shared interest with us such as in CAR. Due to long-standing and deep 
ties our Allies have with many African nations, it may be more 
appropriate for them to take the lead in countering Russian 
destabilizing activities.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                                cameroon
    60. Senator Jones. General Waldhauser, in response to my question 
regarding Cameroon you testified that: `` they have been a good partner 
with us counterterrorism wise, but you can't neglect the fact that they 
have--there are alleged atrocities and what's going on there. We 
continue to take our cues from the State Department and from the 
ambassador and our level of engagement will continue but not get out 
ahead of what they do State Department would say is if we have to take 
other actions. We were very emphatic with President Biya that the 
behavior of his troops, the lack of transparency could have a 
significant impact on our ability to work with them.'' In your written 
testimony you said ``The government of Cameroon has assured the United 
States no security assistance will be diverted from counter-Boko Haram 
and ISIS-WA efforts to the Anglophone regions.'' Has the Cameroonian 
Government shown a willingness to hold human rights violators within 
their military accountable?
    General Waldhauser. Cameroonian officials have stated they have 
taken steps to investigate allegations of human rights violations by 
the security forces. We continue to urge the government to share 
information with us about military prosecutions and have informed the 
government that lack of progress and clarity on this issue could result 
in a broader suspension of U.S. assistance.

    61. Senator Jones. General Waldhauser, what type of assurances have 
we received from the Cameroonian Government and, considering what you 
referred to as a ``lack of transparency'' what type of monitoring and 
verification regime to we have in place to ensure our aid is not 
diverted to the Anglophone states where these atrocities are alleged to 
have taken place?
    General Waldhauser. We have expressed grave concern over the crisis 
in Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest Anglophone regions and have urged 
the Cameroonian government and the separatists to end the violence. In 
accordance with the Leahy law, assistance to those Cameroonian security 
force units that are credibly accused of committing gross human rights 
violations has been suspended. In addition, separate cuts have been 
made to our security assistance to Cameroon to reflect our concern. 
Also, we have requested Cameroon to be more transparent about 
investigating credible allegations of human rights abuse. We have made 
it clear to the government of Cameroon that our security assistance is 
only to reinforce their capability to fight against Boko Haram and 
ISIS-WA, ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea, and help secure 
neighboring Central African Republic through participation in the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Central Africa.


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

   UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, 
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Manchin, 
Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. The Committee meets today to receive 
testimony on the posture of United States Indo-Pacific Command 
(INDOPACOM) and United States Forces Korea. I'd like to welcome 
our witnesses, Admiral Phil Davidson and General Robert Abrams.
    The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to 
ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS). That means we need urgent change at a 
significant scale to address the challenges of strategic 
competition with China. Our military advantage and deterrent 
edge in the Indo-Pacific is eroding. The Chinese Communist 
Party leadership in Beijing senses weaknesses. They are testing 
our resolve, and if we do not act urgently, they may soon 
conclude that they can achieve their goals through force. We 
can't take peace for granted.
    Admiral Davidson, I look forward to hearing from you about 
the strengthening of the deterrence in the Indo-Pacific; in 
other words, how we and our allies can achieve the 
capabilities, capacity, and posture necessary to prevent a war 
by convincing Beijing that it cannot win.
    General Abrams, as another United States-North Korea summit 
approaches, I look forward to hearing from you on how we ensure 
that our military is prepared to add strength to our diplomacy 
to deter conflict and win, if necessary.
    Finally, I hope today's hearing will serve as a reminder 
that the greatest sources of American power are our alliances 
and our partnerships. Whether it's strategic competition with 
China or addressing the threat posed by North Korea, America 
cannot do this alone. Strategic success in the Indo-Pacific 
simply is not possible without allies who share our values and 
our interests and who share our burden of our common security. 
I think those of us that are together in the South China Sea 
know exactly what this means.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join 
you in welcoming our witnesses today and thank them for their 
distinguished service to the Nation. You are both leading 
commands during very challenging times. We thank you for your 
continued service, and also, we would ask that you'd extend our 
thanks and gratitude to the men and women under your commands 
who each day sacrifice and serve the Nation, and their 
families, also.
    I'd first like to address the current situation on the 
Korean Peninsula. General Abrams, you've been in command now 
for approximately 90 days. I look forward to hearing from you 
about the readiness of our forces and how you are mitigating 
the effects of the modification and suspension and cancellation 
of our joint exercises with the Republic of Korea's forces. I 
am concerned that if we continue in this vein, we will begin to 
experience a serious deterioration of the readiness of the 
joint forces. While I acknowledge the suspension of exercises 
has created diplomatic space for negotiations with North Korea, 
I do not believe there has been sufficient progress on the 
denuclearization front to justify the reduction in readiness.
    I'm also not optimistic that the upcoming second summit 
between President Trump and Kim Jong-un will yield substantial 
gains in the denuclearization of North Korea. For example, 
without a declaration of all nuclear and missile sites and 
programs, I do not think there will be a sufficient roadmap to 
move toward complete and verifiable, irreversible 
denuclearization.
    I'm also concerned that President Trump may consider 
withdrawing troops on the Korean Peninsula as a result of some 
agreement he reaches with North Korea. That action would 
significantly undermine regional security and our ability to 
fulfill our treaty obligations to South Korea.
    The United States and South Korea (ROK) recently concluded 
negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement in which South 
Korea agreed to substantially increase its financial support 
for our troops. The Special Measures Agreement reflects how 
much of a share South Korea pays for the burden of housing our 
troops on the peninsula. In addition to the Special Measures 
Agreement, South Korea has also spent approximately $10 billion 
to build Camp Humphreys, the largest overseas United States 
military base. We need to acknowledge the extraordinary 
financial support South Korea provides to the alliance and 
continue to recognize that our alliances with Japan and South 
Korea are the cornerstone of regional security in the INDOPACOM 
region. At the end of the day, the preservation of our 
alliances is critical in countering the very real threats that 
we face from North Korea and to counter Chinese coercive 
activities in the region.
    Now, Admiral Davidson, while North Korea presents the 
immediate challenge to our forces in the region, China presents 
the most significant long-term strategic threat that this 
country has faced in many, many years. China's Belt and Road 
Initiative has left several countries, notably Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia, severely indebted to China. Beijing often targets 
corrupt local governments that personally profit from inflated 
loans but leave their state treasuries bankrupt and beholden to 
President Xi's administration. It is an economic initiative 
with significant national security implications for the United 
States.
    Countering Chinese aggression globally will require us to 
rely on our partners and allies to a greater degree in the 
decades to come. Funding for programs like International 
Military Education and Training, or IMET, and Foreign Military 
Finance, or FMF, are crucial in the INDOPACOM area. Bolstering 
the ability of team partners like Vietnam and the Philippines 
to monitor and defend their territorial waters through funding 
from the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative will create 
more regional security and stability and protect freedom of 
navigation for all nations in the region, regardless of size.
    The United States needs to recognize the work of allies 
like Australia who are enabling small Pacific nation states in 
Oceania so they can counter China's predatory economic 
behavior. The United States must also continue its support of 
the states represented in the Compact of Free Association 
(COFA) between United States and Micronesia, Palau, and the 
Marshall Islands. It's clear that China is targeting these 
Pacific islands in an effort to increase its influence and 
diminish ours.
    Admiral Davidson, we have not yet seen the President's 
budget request, but I hope that it will align with the National 
Defense Strategy and reflect real DOD [Department of Defense] 
investments in the Indo-Pacific region. I also hope it reflects 
the resources needed for the whole-of-government approach that 
we need to counter China in the long run. As the Commission on 
the National Defense Strategy noted, if we don't ensure 
adequate funding for critical national security functions 
beyond the Department of Defense, in their words the ``United 
States will be at a competitive disadvantage and will remain 
ill-equipped to preserve its security and its global interests 
amid intensifying challenges.''
    One other point I'd like to make is that we're all, I 
think, alarmed by President Xi's brutal crackdown on the 
Uighurs in the west and the bellicose statements about Taiwan. 
These present serious human rights problems for the 
international community, and as a global leader for human 
rights, we have to call out China on these issues. We must also 
never lose focus on the fact that it is our values, especially 
our devotion to human rights and democratic principles, that 
resonates so well around the globe and enhances our military 
power.
    Again, thank you to our witnesses for their service. I look 
forward to your testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Admiral Davidson, we'll start with you for an opening 
statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of the 
record, but give us your overview.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILIP S. DAVIDSON, USN COMMANDER, UNITED 
                  STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

    Admiral Davidson. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking 
Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to appear with General Abrams before 
you today to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. I am joined by 
Sergeant Major Anthony Spadaro, my senior enlisted advisor who 
represents the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the 
Indo-Pacific area of operations. I'm most grateful for his 
service in the headquarters.
    First, let me say thank you for the significant support we 
have received from Congress over the last 2 years. The 
temporary relief from the Budget Control Act (BCA) and an on-
time fiscal year 2019 budget has helped to relieve pressure to 
military readiness and has added to the lethality necessary to 
safeguard United States vital national interests in the Indo-
Pacific. But there is indeed more work to do.
    When I took command of INDOPACOM nearly 9 months ago, I 
said that for more than 70 years the Indo-Pacific has been 
largely peaceful. This was made possible by two things: the 
willingness and commitment of free nations to work together for 
a free and open Indo-Pacific and the credibility of the combat 
power within United States Indo-Pacific Command. This 
commitment and this credibility have worked to liberate 
hundreds of millions of people and lift billions out of poverty 
in those seven decades, all to a level of prosperity previously 
unseen in human history. Today, the concept of a free and open 
Indo-Pacific resonates with our allies and partners across the 
region and includes economic, political, and security 
dimensions, and it demonstrates our commitment to a safe, 
secure, and prosperous region that benefits all nations, large 
and small.
    As the primary military component of the United States' 
efforts to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific, USINDOPACOM 
works with the rest of the United States Government and a 
constellation of like-minded allies and partners to advance our 
shared vision. When we say ``free,'' we mean free both in terms 
of security--free from coercion by other nations and in terms 
of values and political systems. Free to choose trading 
partners. Free to exercise sovereignty.
    An open Indo-Pacific means we believe all nations should 
enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which all 
nations' economies depend. Open includes open investment 
environments, transparent agreements between nations, 
protection of intellectual property rights, and fair and 
reciprocal trade, all of which are essential for people, goods, 
and capital to move across borders for the benefit of all.
    While the term ``free and open Indo-Pacific'' is new, the 
underlying values and principles to which the vision speaks to 
are not. In fact, this is how the United States has approached 
the region throughout our 240-plus-year history. But there are 
indeed challenges to this shared vision of a free and open 
Indo-Pacific. There are five key challenges that I believe 
challenge our national interest and the rules-based 
international order.
    While we have made significant progress over the past year, 
North Korea remains the most immediate challenge. I'm 
optimistic about the upcoming United States-North Korea summit 
later this month as we work toward identifying the path to 
final, fully-verifiable denuclearization as agreed upon by 
President Trump and Chairman Kim at their 2018 Singapore 
summit.
    Our military combat readiness and combined lethality are 
the best deterrents against any threat from North Korea, so I 
will continue to emphasize military readiness while 
simultaneously supporting the United States Department of 
State-led pressure campaign. I should add, the United States 
and Republic of Korea alliance has become the linchpin of peace 
and security in Northeast Asia and for the long-term in the 
Pacific region and demonstrates what great democracies can 
accomplish when we work together.
    Back to our challenges. China represents our greatest long-
term strategic threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific and to 
the United States. Those who believe this is reflective of an 
intensifying competition between an established power in the 
United States and a rising power in China are not seeing the 
whole picture. Rather, I believe we are facing something even 
more serious: a fundamental divergence in values that leads to 
two incompatible visions of the future. Through fear and 
coercion, Beijing is working to expand its form of ideology in 
order to bend, break, and replace the existing rules-based 
international order. In its place, Beijing seeks to create a 
new order, one with Chinese characteristics, led by China, an 
outcome that displaces the stability and peace of the Indo-
Pacific that has endured for over 70 years.
    I'm also concerned about the growing malign influence of 
Russia throughout the region. Moscow regularly plays the role 
of spoiler, seeking to undermine United States interests and 
impose additional costs on the United States and our allies 
whenever and wherever possible. Terrorism and other non-state 
actors also pose threats to our vision of a free and open Indo-
Pacific as they seek to impose their views and radicalize 
people across the region, as evidenced in 2017 when ISIS 
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] captured the southern 
Philippine city of Marawi, a city of more than 200,000 people.
    Lastly, the Indo-Pacific remains the most disaster-prone 
region in the world. It contains 75 percent of the Earth's 
volcanoes, and 90 percent of earthquakes occur in the Ring of 
Fire that surround the Pacific Basin. The UN [United Nations] 
estimates economic losses in the region due to disasters could 
exceed $160 billion annually by 2030, and many countries across 
the region lack sufficient capability and the capacity to 
manage natural and man-made disasters.
    To address all of the challenges I mentioned, USINDOPACOM 
is focused on regaining our competitive military advantage over 
the short- and long-term. We must field and sustain a joint 
force that is postured for two distinct security rules: to win 
before fighting and, if necessary, to be ready to fight and 
win. USINDOPACOM's ability to prevail in armed conflict is the 
foundation of combat-credible deterrence. By fielding and 
maintaining a joint force ready to fight and win, we reduce the 
likelihood that any adversary will resort to military 
aggression to challenge or undermine the rules-based 
international order.
    This deterrence is absolutely necessary to prevent 
conflict, but deterrence alone cannot ensure a free and open 
Indo-Pacific. Our adversaries are pursuing their objectives in 
the space between peace and war, using fear and coercive 
actions across all of their instruments of national power to 
revise the rules-based international order without resorting to 
armed conflict. Alongside like-minded allies and partners, 
USINDOPACOM, and the whole of the United States Government, we 
must compete in the gray zone between peace and war to win 
before fighting. These deliberate actions will ensure a free 
and open Indo-Pacific against those malign actors that seek to 
accomplish their political objectives short of armed conflict.
    I want to thank this Committee for your continued support 
of the men and women of USINDOPACOM and for your efforts in 
helping us ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Thank you, and 
I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Davidson follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Admiral Philip S. Davidson
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 
to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. First, let me say thank you for the 
significant support we have received from Congress over the last two 
years. The temporary relief from the Budget Control Act and an on-time 
fiscal year 2019 budget helped to restore the military readiness and 
lethality necessary to safeguard U.S. vital national interests in the 
Indo-Pacific.
                                overview
    For more than 70 years the Indo-Pacific has been largely peaceful. 
This was made possible by three things: the willingness and commitment 
of free nations to work together for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific; the 
credibility of the combat power of United States Indo-Pacific Command; 
and a robust and modern United States nuclear deterrent. This 
commitment, and this credibility, have worked to liberate hundreds of 
millions of people, as well as lift billions out of poverty, all to a 
level of prosperity previously unseen in human history. It has also 
ensured that tensions, regardless of how or where they arise, do not 
escalate into large-scale war.
    Our nation's vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, announced in 
2017 at the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) summit in Vietnam, 
demonstrates our commitment to a safe, secure, and prosperous region 
that benefits all nations, large and small. The concept of a Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific resonates with our allies and partners across the 
region and includes economic, governance, and security dimensions. The 
vast majority of nations across the region share similar values, 
including the core beliefs that governments should be accountable to 
their people. We must stand together in support of our shared values 
and be unambiguous in condemning those who attempt to undermine those 
values.
    USINDOPACOM is the primary military component of our government's 
efforts to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Every day we work with 
a constellation of like-minded allies and partners and the rest of the 
United States Government to advance our shared vision for a Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific.
    When we say Free we mean Free both in terms of security--free from 
coercion by other nations--and in terms of values and political 
systems. Free to choose trading partners. Free to exercise sovereignty.
    An Open Indo-Pacific means we believe all nations should enjoy 
unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which all nations' 
economies depend. Open includes open investment environments, 
transparent agreements between nations, protection of intellectual 
property rights, and fair and reciprocal trade--all of which are 
essential for people, goods, and capital to move across borders for the 
benefit of all.
    While the term ``Free and Open Indo-Pacific'' is new, the 
underlying values and principles to which the vision speaks are not. In 
fact, this is how the United States has approached the region 
throughout our 240-plus year history. We are now seeing a general 
convergence around the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific 
across the region--as Japan, Australia, France, New Zealand, and India 
have all put forth similar concepts or visions.
    The United States is an enduring Pacific power. Our historical, 
structural, economic, and institutional ties to the Indo-Pacific are 
indelible.
    U.S. power underpins the post-WWII international system that helps 
strengthen the essential foundation of a rules-based international 
order for economic growth and prosperity in the region for everyone. 
Furthermore, USINDOPACOM's role as a guarantor of security in the 
region has enabled our economic power and allowed our partners and 
allies to focus on their economic development, which in turn has 
increased opportunities for U.S. economic engagement and prevented 
costly conflict. A peaceful, free, and open Indo-Pacific is especially 
vital to our economy in the 21st century when you consider the 
following:

      The United States conducted more than $1.8 trillion in 
two-way goods trade with Indo-Pacific nations in 2017, and more than 
$1.3 trillion by the third quarter of 2018.

      In 2017, U.S. foreign direct investment in the region 
reached $940 billion--more than doubling since 2007.

      The Indo-Pacific is home to half of the 20 fastest 
growing economies.

      The Indo-Pacific currently contains over a third of 
global GDP and 60 percent of the global GDP growth.

      By 2030, 65 percent of the world's middle class will 
reside in the Indo-Pacific, representing an unrivaled amount of 
purchasing power.

    As the above statistics portend, this dynamic and economically 
robust region will continue to play a vital role in our economic future 
throughout the 21st century.
                          five key challenges
    In my view, five key challenges threaten our vital national 
interest in ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. While we have made 
significant progress over the last year, North Korea will remain the 
most immediate challenge until we achieve the final, fully verifiable 
denuclearization as committed to by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the summit 
in June 2018. China, however, represents the greatest long-term 
strategic threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to the United 
States. Through fear and economic pressure, Beijing is working to 
expand its form of Communist-Socialist ideology in order to bend, 
break, and replace the existing rules-based international order. In its 
place, Beijing seeks to create a new international order led by China 
and with ``Chinese characteristics''--an outcome that displaces the 
stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific that has endured for over 70 
years. Russia is also active throughout the region. Moscow regularly 
plays the role of a spoiler, seeking to undermine United States 
interests and impose additional costs on the United States and our 
allies whenever and wherever possible. I am also concerned about the 
threat posed by non-state actors. Violent Extremist Organizations 
(VEOs) seek to impose their views and radicalize people across the 
region, as evidenced by the capture of Marawi City in the southern 
Philippines in 2017--a city of over 200,000 people--by ISIS extremists. 
Lastly, natural and manmade disasters are an ever present danger in the 
region. Let me describe these five key challenges in more detail.
North Korea:
    Denuclearization. USINDOPACOM's assessment on North Korean 
denuclearization is consistent with the Intelligence Community 
position. That is, we think it is unlikely that North Korea will give 
up all of its nuclear weapons or production capabilities, but seeks to 
negotiate partial denuclearization in exchange for United States and 
international concessions.
    Following a rapid series of nuclear and missile tests into 2017, 
tensions declined; North Korea halted nuclear testing in September 2017 
and ICBM testing in November 2017. President Trump's meeting with 
Chairman Kim in Singapore in June 2018 was a significant milestone, and 
I am optimistic about another United States-North Korea summit. North 
Korea has taken some steps in the direction of denuclearization, most 
notably the reversible dismantlement of tunnels at the Punggye nuclear 
test site, yet much needs to be done to make meaningful progress.
    In early 2018, the two Koreas initiated a season of rapprochement, 
beginning with the Winter Olympics in February 2018, and continuing 
through three subsequent Korean summits between President Moon and 
Chairman Kim and multiple lower-level meetings. More recently, North 
Korea has undertaken measures in accordance with the Comprehensive 
Military Agreement it signed with South Korea in September 2018, to 
include dismantling guard posts within the demilitarized zone and 
removing land mines near Panmunjom. North Korea also returned remains 
of United States servicemembers from the Korean War, which provided 
great comfort to mourning families.
    I welcome these steps, but we must remain vigilant to the threat 
North Korea still poses to the United States and the international 
community. North Korea has demanded ``corresponding measures'' from the 
United States in return for these above actions. Kim warned in his 2019 
New Year's speech of a potential ``new path,'' which could indicate an 
eventual return to missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
testing if he is not satisfied with the pace of negotiations and 
potential benefits. Our military combat readiness and combined 
lethality remain the best deterrent and the best leverage against any 
threat from North Korea.
    Sanctions. North Korea is continuing efforts to mitigate the 
effects of international sanctions and the United States-led pressure 
campaign through diplomatic engagement, counter pressure against the 
sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion. USINDOPACOM will 
continue to support the President's pressure campaign by ensuring the 
military readiness of the combined force and supporting sanctions 
enforcement as directed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCR). UNSCR sanctions resulted in a decline in North Korea's export 
earnings and cut off key cash flow sources. However, recent calls from 
Russia and China to change the sanctions against North Korea threaten 
to undo these positive developments.
    Additionally, North Korea has a long history of flouting 
international sanctions, and Pyongyang regularly attempts to circumvent 
them. Early in 2018, North Korea exceeded its sanctioned limit on 
refined petroleum imports through illicit ship-to-ship transfers. 
USINDOPACOM is working with partners and allies to disrupt illicit 
ship-to-ship transfers that occur primarily in the East China Sea, 
often near or in Chinese territorial waters, and in the Yellow Sea. 
North Korea is also engaged in cross-border smuggling operations and 
cyber-enabled theft to generate revenue, while simultaneously 
circumventing United Nations Security Council prohibitions on coal 
exports.
China:
    Military Modernization. Over the last 20 years, Beijing has 
undertaken a massive effort to grow and modernize the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA is the principal threat to U.S. 
interests, United States citizens, and our allies inside the First 
Island Chain--a term that refers to the islands that run from northern 
Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia--and the PLA is 
quickly increasing its ability to project power and influence beyond 
the First Island Chain. Beijing pursues both qualitative and 
quantitative efforts to transform its military, modernizing its 
military platforms while simultaneously increasing the number of 
platforms in service. Newly-fielded systems include:

      Beijing's first aircraft carrier group, centered around 
its refurbished Soviet-built carrier, reached initial operational 
capability in mid-2018.

      Beijing's first domestically-built aircraft carrier, has 
completed four sets of sea trials since May 2018 and will likely join 
the PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet in 2019.

      The Renhai-class guided missile cruiser, was launched in 
2017; three additional vessels were added to the PLA Navy's inventory 
in 2018. This class of vessels will be a key component of PLA Navy 
carrier strike groups.

      The Fuyu-class fast combat support ship, developed 
specifically to support aircraft carrier task group operations, was 
commissioned less than a year ago.

      The J-20, the PLA's first 5th-generation stealth fighter, 
entered service in February 2018; plans are underway to research a 
sixth-generation fighter.

      The Y-20, a domestically-produced heavy-lift aircraft, 
entered military service in 2016; the Y-20 has a significantly larger 
payload capacity and range than the PLA's previous heavy and medium-
lift aircraft, which advances Beijing's strategic airlift capability.

      The S-400 advanced surface-to-air missile system, 
received from Russia in April, 2018; the S-400 has a 250-mile range, 
which could expand the PLA's air coverage over the Taiwan Strait and 
other high priority facilities.

    The PLA maintains a high operations tempo, primarily in and near 
China, but is quickly expanding its operating areas beyond the region. 
The PLA's Naval Escort Task Force (NETF)--now in its 31st iteration--
follows its anti-piracy missions off the Horn of Africa by conducting 
naval diplomacy deployments to Europe, Africa, and the South Pacific. 
From May-July 2018, the 28th NETF completed a three-month naval 
diplomacy tour conducting port visits and bilateral exercises in Spain, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Gabon, South Africa, and Indonesia before 
returning to China. Beijing regularly conducts joint military exercises 
across its ground, sea, air, and space forces, including amphibious 
assault training that is designed and specifically timed to intimidate 
Taiwan. This spring, approximately 10,000 PLA marines traveled more 
than 1,200 miles as part of a large-scale exercise designed to improve 
long-range maneuverability. In April, Beijing conducted a live-fire 
exercise into the Taiwan Strait with coastal artillery, and PLA Air 
Force (PLAAF) bombers regularly circumnavigate Taiwan.
    Beijing continues pursuing next-generation technologies and 
advanced weapons systems, including hypersonic glide vehicles, directed 
energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, and 
unmanned and artificial intelligence-equipped weapons. The PLA has also 
made significant technological, game-changing developments in its 
ability to defeat, or drastically reduce, the effectiveness of U.S. 
sensors and defensive weapons. The PLA has tested hypersonic missiles 
since 2014, including the WU-14, with speeds approaching Mach 10. In 
August 2018, Beijing claimed to have successfully tested its first 
hypersonic aircraft.
    Beijing is also modernizing and adding new capabilities across its 
nuclear forces. China's third generation Type 096 nuclear-powered 
Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) will be armed with JL-3 sea-launched 
ballistic missiles and will likely begin construction in the early-
2020s. In April, Beijing confirmed the DF-26 entered service--a road-
mobile, nuclear, and conventional capable Intermediate-Range Ballistic 
Missile (IRBM), expanding Beijing's near-precision strike capability as 
far as the Second Island Chain (a term that refers to the southern part 
of the Aleutian Islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, 
Guam, the Republic of Palau, and northern Papua New Guinea). Beijing 
continues testing its DF-41 road-mobile Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM), which carries multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles and has a range of up to 9,300 miles.
    South China Sea. Beijing maintains maritime claims in the South 
China Sea that are contrary to international law and pose a substantial 
long-term threat to the rules-based international order. Beijing 
ignored the 2016 ruling of an Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex 
VII of the Law of the Sea Convention, which concluded that China's 
claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, 
with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed 
by the ``nine-dash line'' are contrary to UNCLOS and without legal 
effect. In April 2018, Beijing continued militarizing outposts by 
deploying advanced military systems that further enhance the PLA's 
power projection capabilities, including missiles and electronic 
jammers. These actions run directly counter to President Xi's 2015 
commitment not to militarize these features. On multiple occasions, 
Beijing has landed military transport aircraft on the Spratly Islands 
and long-range bombers on the Paracel Islands. Additionally, Chinese 
Coast Guard vessels now fall under the command of the Central Military 
Commission and regularly harass and intimidate fishing vessels from our 
treaty ally, the Philippines, operating near Scarborough Reef, as well 
as the fishing fleets of other regional nations.
    East China Sea. Beijing continues using its military forces to 
advance its territorial claims in the East China Sea. Beijing maintains 
a high level of surface combat patrols in the East China Sea. 
Additionally, Chinese Coast Guard vessels frequently enter the 
territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, which the United States 
recognizes as being under the administrative control of the Japanese. 
In 2017, these incursions occurred on an average of once every ten 
days, and continued in 2018 at about two per month. Additionally, while 
Beijing mostly implements United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
against North Korea, in a number of cases, illicit ship to ship 
transfers continue to occur within Chinese territorial waters.
    Economic Pressure. While the United States strives to promote a 
Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Beijing is leveraging its economic 
instrument of power in ways that can undermine the autonomy of 
countries across the region. Beijing offers easy money in the short 
term, but these funds come with strings attached: unsustainable debt, 
decreased transparency, restrictions on market economies, and the 
potential loss of control of natural resources. Beijing's actions in 
this regard have potential military ramifications as well. Beijing 
touts its need to safeguard its citizens abroad and defend its 
expanding global interests in order to justify increased permanent PLA 
overseas basing and presence. Beijing is also exploiting growing debt 
burdens to access strategic infrastructure in the region. In December 
2017, Sri Lanka handed over control of the newly-built Hambantota 
seaport to Beijing with a 99-year lease because Sri Lanka could no 
longer afford its debt payments to China.
    Over the last year, we have seen that countries across the region 
are becoming more aware of the threat Beijing's economic policies pose. 
Malaysia announced the cancellation of three projects worth $22 billion 
in August 2018, declaring that it could not afford Beijing's projects, 
decrying the corrupt practices associated with the projects, and 
criticizing the loans as a ``new version of colonialism.'' The 
Maldives' former president described Beijing's investments as a ``land 
grab'' under the guise of development. In contrast, the United States' 
vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strives to preserve the 
autonomy of independent nations in the Indo-Pacific region. We must 
continue to support countries that stand up to Beijing's coercive 
economic policies whenever possible and help those countries offset any 
economic blowback from Beijing. Our engagement in the Indo-Pacific must 
truly be a whole-of-government undertaking, in partnership with the 
private sector and civil society, to counter China's economic coercion.
    Arctic and Antarctic. Beijing recognizes the growing strategic 
significance of the Arctic and Antarctic and has signaled its plans to 
assert a greater role in these regions. Despite not being an Arctic 
nation, Beijing published its first Arctic policy paper in 2018, which 
defends Beijing's role in the region and outlines Beijing's vision of a 
``Polar Silk Road'' to complement its other economic initiatives. 
Beijing launched its first domestically built icebreaking research 
vessel in September 2018, and Beijing plans to launch its second in 
2019. Beijing also opened bidding for construction of its first 
nuclear-powered icebreaker. Beijing wants to boost its polar research 
and expedition capabilities and recently announced plans to double the 
frequency of its Arctic expeditions to once a year. Beijing has also 
expressed increasing interest in Antarctic operations and establishing 
logistics stations to supply them. This is of increasing concern to our 
ally Australia, as well as New Zealand, as Beijing seeks positional 
advantage and control of territory and natural resources in these vital 
regions.
    Fentanyl and Pre-Cursors Chemicals. Another challenge that affects 
the security environment indirectly is the continuing fentanyl and 
opioid crisis in the United States. Illicit fentanyl, as well as legal 
pre-cursor chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs primarily 
originate from China. Moreover, technological advancements in e-
commerce and commercial shipping present a different business model 
from the traditional methods used by transnational criminal 
organizations for drug trafficking. These innovations represent a new 
level of complexity for U.S. law enforcement agencies and policymakers 
alike. I welcome the PRC's decision to designate and regulate fentanyl 
as a controlled substance after President Xi's meeting with President 
Trump in Argentina in December of last year, and we look forward to 
seeing tangible progress.
Russia:
    Military modernization. Moscow continues to modernize its military 
forces, viewing military power as critical to achieving key strategic 
objectives and global influence. Nuclear weapons remain an important 
component of Russia's power projection and deterrence capabilities, and 
the Russian military conducts regular nuclear-capable Tu-95 Bear bomber 
long-range aviation flights off the coasts of Japan, Korea, Canada, and 
Alaska. For the past decade Russian military planning has emphasized 
the development of modernized platforms and weapons systems, and Moscow 
is pushing these platforms to the Indo-Pacific region. In recent years, 
the Eastern Military District has become increasingly important for 
Russian security interests. Russia has invested in military 
infrastructure, improved its command-and-control capabilities, deployed 
anti-ship missile systems, and modernized its anti-air capabilities in 
the region. For example, Russian units in the Eastern Military District 
expect to take delivery of thirty-seven new vessels by 2024, which is a 
major increase compared to the twenty-eight new units received in the 
region over the last decade. Moscow recently announced plans to expand 
its combat forces in the Eastern Military District and to substantially 
reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Despite the threat of U.S. sanctions 
through the 2017 Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
(CAATSA), Russia continues to export weapons to the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    Furthermore, Russia hosted its largest military exercise since 
1981, Exercise VOSTOK 2018, simulating land, sea, and air operations in 
the Eastern Military District and mobilizing forces from across Russia 
to engage in multiple live-fire missile launches. Of note, Chinese 
forces participated in Exercise VOSTOK for the first time. While 
Beijing's military cooperation was largely symbolic, because the forces 
remained segregated with separate command posts, Vostok 2018 was still 
a significant first step in forging a closer military partnership.
    Japan-Russia Relations. Japan and Russia have a long-standing 
territorial dispute since the Second World War over the Northern 
Territories/Kuril Islands, which are strategically important for 
Russia's access to the Pacific Ocean. Russia has further entrenched 
itself in this contested territory by reestablishing an airfield on 
Matua Island, located in what it calls the central Kuril Islands, to 
accommodate light military transport aircraft and helicopters. Russia 
has also deployed coastal defense cruise missile systems and SU-35 
multirole fighters to the islands and also announced plans to build a 
naval base. This more assertive approach to its eastern front reflects 
growing focus in Moscow of the vital importance of the broader Indo-
Pacific for Russia's long-term security. Although Prime Minister Abe 
and President Putin have met on several occasions to negotiate a peace 
treaty that could, in part, resolve this territorial dispute, they have 
not reached an agreement. Russia remains concerned that the United 
States could establish military facilities under Article VI of the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the Northern Territories 
if they are returned to Japan
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs):
    In the wake of the 2017 siege of the southern Philippine city of 
Marawi, Philippine security forces have maintained consistent pressure 
on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) networks in the Philippines, 
conducting a number of arrests in 2018. Additionally, counterterrorism 
operations on the Philippine island of Jolo against ISIS-supporting 
elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group succeeded in disrupting kidnap-for-
ransom operations. ISIS claimed credit for multiple small-scale attacks 
in the Philippines, including a mid-2018 vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive device attack at a military checkpoint in the southern 
Philippines. Outside of the Philippines, we saw a number of small-scale 
attacks in 2018, and I remain concerned about the growth of ISIS in the 
region. Over 1,000 foreign terrorist fighters have traveled to Iraq and 
Syria from the Indo-Pacific region, and at least 170 have returned. We 
expect the number of returnees to increase with the persistent loss of 
ISIS-held territory. ISIS' Amaq News claimed responsibility for a 
series of mid-May 2018 bombings against churches and a police 
headquarters in Surabaya, Indonesia. Other countries across the region 
remain concerned about the potential for disenfranchised and vulnerable 
populations to become recruitment targets. Self-radicalized violent 
extremists who are influenced or inspired by ISIS or other extremists 
are another cause for concern. The recent attack on a local Catholic 
parish in Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago is evidence of continued 
concern.
Natural and Man-made Disasters:
    The Indo-Pacific remains the most disaster-prone region in the 
world. It contains 75 percent of the earth's volcanoes and 90 percent 
of earthquakes occur in the ``Ring of Fire'' surrounding the Pacific 
Basin. Since 2008 the Indo-Pacific has lost half a million lives and 
suffered over $500 million in damages, with over one and a half billion 
people affected by natural and manmade disasters overall. The UN 
estimates that economic losses in the region due to disasters could 
exceed $160 billion annually by 2030. Many countries across the region 
lack sufficient capability and capacity to manage natural and man-made 
disasters.
    A key element of USINDOPACOM's engagement strategy in the region is 
building capacity with our allies, partners, and friends to improve 
their resilience and capability to conduct their own humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).
    USINDOPACOM directly supports HA/DR efforts across the region, as 
well. In July 2018, we sent special operations forces to help the 
international effort to rescue twelve Thai boys and their coach from a 
flooded cave. USINDOPACOM also assisted relief efforts in Sulawesi, 
Indonesia last year with sixty-four personnel and three C-130 aircraft 
after an earthquake and tsunami hit the country. Another recent example 
of USINDOPACOM's support continues today after the Super Typhoon Yutu 
hit Tinian and Saipan. USINDOPACOM responded quickly by providing joint 
forces, equipment, and fresh drinking water, and by building temporary 
shelters and assisting with clearing debris from roads and homes.
            usindopacom's security role in the indo-pacific
    The most important security development in the Indo-Pacific has 
been the rapid modernization of the PLA. The scope and scale of that 
modernization has caused USINDOPACOM's relative competitive military 
advantage to erode in recent years. With the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy as a guide, USINDOPACOM is focused on regaining our 
competitive military advantage and ensuring a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific over the short- and long-term.
    My strategy centers around fielding and sustaining a force capable 
of combat-credible deterrence that is postured for two distinct 
security roles: to win before fighting and, if necessary, be ready to 
fight and win.
    Ready to Fight and Win. USINDOPACOM's ability to prevail in armed 
conflict is the foundation of combat credible deterrence. By fielding 
and maintaining a joint force ready to fight and win, USINDOPACOM 
reduces the likelihood that any adversary will resort to military 
aggression to challenge or undermine the rules-based international 
order.
    Win Before Fighting. Deterrence is necessary to prevent conflict, 
but deterrence alone cannot ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Our 
adversaries are pursuing their objectives in the space between peace 
and war, using fear and coercive actions across the instruments of 
national power to revise the rules-based international order and 
without resorting to armed conflict. Alongside like-minded allies and 
partners, USINDOPACOM must compete in the ``gray zone'' between peace 
and war. These deliberate actions will ensure a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific against those malign actors that seek to accomplish their 
political objectives short of armed conflict.
                        usindopacom focus areas
    Given the challenges in the region, ensuring a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific requires that USINDOPACOM remain ready to execute high-end/
high-tech wartime missions on short notice. USINDOPACOM must be 
postured to achieve a more advantageous security environment without 
the lethal use of military force. The following four focus areas guide 
the command's efforts toward meeting both of the aforementioned 
security roles:

      Focus Area 1. Increase joint force lethality. We must 
continue to develop and field capabilities necessary to deter 
aggression and prevail in armed conflict should deterrence fail.

      Focus Area 2. Enhance our design and posture. We will 
adapt from our historic service-centric focus on Northeast Asia only to 
a more integrated joint force blueprint that is informed by the 
changing threat environment and challenges of the 21st century across 
the entire Indo-Pacific region.

      Focus Area 3. Exercise, experiment, innovate. Targeted 
innovation and experimentation will evolve the joint force while 
developing asymmetric capability to counter adversary capabilities.

      Focus Area 4. Strengthen our allies and partners. Through 
increased interoperability, information-sharing, and expanded access 
across the region, we will present a compatible and interoperable 
coalition to our adversaries in crisis and armed conflict.
Focus Area 1: Increase Joint Force Lethality
    Over the last two decades, adversaries have rapidly closed the gap 
in many of the areas that used to be clear asymmetric advantages for 
the United States, encroaching upon USINDOPACOM's ability to deter 
conflict or prevail in armed conflict should deterrence fail. Our 
adversaries are fielding advanced Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) 
systems, advanced aircraft, ships, space, and cyber capabilities that 
threaten the U.S. ability to project power and influence into the 
region. Increasing joint force lethality means developing and fielding 
systems and capabilities to preserve our key asymmetric advantages in 
order to prevent any potential adversary from thinking it can achieve 
its political or military objectives through armed conflict. Increasing 
our joint force lethality means joint and combined interoperability, an 
integrated fires network that enables long-range strike, and advanced 
missile defense systems capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging 
advanced air, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats from all 
azimuths. In short, we must be able to defend our forces and project 
power so that no adversary can achieve sustained dominance in the Indo-
Pacific and threaten our key allies and partners.
    Air Superiority. The United States cannot assume that it will have 
air superiority in the Indo-Pacific. For over fifteen years, the 
predominant employment of United States armed forces has been in the 
ongoing fight against terrorism in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan where 
our ability to dominate in the air domain was unchallenged. In 
contrast, the United States faces peer competitors in the Indo-Pacific. 
Beijing has invested heavily in systems that challenge the United 
States' ability to achieve air superiority. The U.S. Government must 
continue to pursue multi-domain capabilities to counter anti-air 
capabilities and we continue to prioritize 5th generation fighter 
capabilities to the Indo-Pacific.
    Undersea Warfare. The United States must maintain its advantage in 
undersea warfare--an asymmetric advantage that our adversaries are 
focused on eroding. There are four-hundred foreign submarines in the 
world, of which roughly 75 percent reside in the Indo-Pacific region. 
One-hundred and sixty of these submarines belong to China, Russia, and 
North Korea. While these three countries increase their capacity, the 
United States retires attack submarines (SSNs) faster than they are 
replaced. USINDOPACOM must maintain its asymmetric advantage in 
undersea warfare capability, which includes not just attack submarines, 
but also munitions and other anti-submarine warfare systems such as the 
P-8 Poseidon and ship-borne anti-submarine systems. Potential adversary 
submarine activity has tripled from 2008 levels, which requires at 
least a corresponding increase on the part of the United States to 
maintain superiority.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The Indo-Pacific's 
dynamic security environment requires persistent and intrusive 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to provide 
indications, warning, and situational awareness across over half the 
world. USINDOPACOM supports a re-allocation of DOD ISR assets to better 
satisfy intelligence needs in line with National Defense Strategy-
priorities. USINDOPACOM relies on a mix of Airborne ISR (AISR) assets 
to provide a dedicated and flexible ISR capability across the entire 
region.
    USINDOPACOM supports efforts to re-capitalize critical AISR 
capabilities and the continued development of future ISR platforms, 
such as the MQ-4C Triton, as well as our interoperable Processing, 
Exploitation, and Dissemination architectures.
    Space. Space is a vital strategic domain. U.S. adversaries are 
militarizing space; USINDOPACOM must have access to resilient and 
defensible space systems that can operate in a contested environment. 
USINDOPACOM relies on space-based assets for satellite communications 
(SATCOM), ISR, missile warning, and Positioning, Navigation, Timing 
(PNT) capabilities, which support missions across the range of military 
operations. The command's vast geographic expanse increases the strain 
on USINDOPACOM's requirements and our reliance on low-density space-
based assets that are in high-demand.
    As Beijing's and Moscow's military modernization continues, they 
are pursuing broad and robust counter-space capabilities. While not as 
advanced, North Korea remains a threat through its employment of SATCOM 
and PNT jammers. The threat to the electromagnetic spectrum continues 
as our adversaries develop means to deny our space-enabled 
capabilities. As Space Command (SPACECOM) transitions responsibilities 
from United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) into the future Space 
Force, USINDOPACOM looks forward to continued collaboration in this 
critical domain as we work to further integrate space-based 
capabilities into our daily operations and contingency planning.
    Cyber. USINDOPACOM is heavily reliant on cyber capabilities and 
faces increasing threats in the cyber domain from both state and non-
state actors, such as Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and criminal actors. 
The United States must ensure it has a robust and capable cyber force 
with all required equipment and a common network operational structure 
necessary to ensure command and control. Moreover, USINDOPACOM requires 
an agile and defensible mission command network infrastructure to 
ensure adequate command and control, and enable interoperability with 
our allies and partners to fully leverage our combined capacities. 
Furthermore, the DOD must prevent and, if necessary, respond to cyber-
attacks against non-military critical infrastructure in both Homeland 
defense and in support of civil authorities.
    The U.S. military's offensive cyber capabilities provide additional 
tools to leverage as part of multi-domain operations to compete and 
win, but these tools must become more responsive to the operational 
requirements of the combatant commands. The growth in these offensive 
capabilities is not limited to equipment--we need talent and 
innovation. The development and retention of personnel with subject-
matter expertise is a critical component for our Nation's success.
    My staff coordinates extensively with USCYBERCOM to integrate 
effective offensive, defensive, and network operations into my multi-
domain plans and operations. Our staffs collaborate daily on current 
operations through our respective operations centers, at least weekly 
on future operations planning, and at least quarterly on future 
capability requirements.
    Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations. As adversary military 
forces grow in both quantity and quality, USINDOPACOM must integrate 
operations in all domains to be successful in the 21st century. The 
Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations concepts of the services 
incorporate the capabilities of the physical domains and place greater 
emphasis on space, cyberspace, and other contested areas including the 
electromagnetic spectrum, the information environment, and the 
cognitive dimension of warfare. Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations 
allow U.S. Forces to outmaneuver adversaries physically and 
cognitively, advancing the 20th Century concept of combined arms into 
the 21st century's requirement to operate across all domains, at all 
times.
    I fully support all services and functional commands efforts to 
operationalize Multi-Domain and Distributed Operations concepts. In 
2018, USINDOPACOM successfully demonstrated Multi-Domain and 
Distributed Operations capabilities in major exercises while also 
integrating new technologies and approaches across the joint force. In 
the years ahead, USINDOPACOM will progress from experimentation to 
validation of concepts, culminating in an overall increase in the 
lethality of the joint force.
    Advanced Munitions. Developing and fielding advanced munitions is a 
critical component to increasing joint force lethality. The following 
are some of the more pressing munitions upgrades based on the 
challenges we face in the region:

      Improvements to Missile Defense--Patriot Missile Segment 
Enhanced (MSE), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) upgrades, 
and other capabilities to defend against maneuvering and hypersonic 
missiles.

      Innovations in heavy weight torpedo technology provide 
force-multiplying effects that currently do not exist, including long 
range in-port or at-sea attack and shallow water covert mine laying.

      The immediate resourcing and integration of ATACMS system 
and/or the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile with HIMARS/MLRS to support 
Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) units conducting Multi-
Domain Operations and sea control missions.

      Continued investments in Hard Target Munitions (HTM). 
There is a significant increase in the number of hard and deeply buried 
targets in the theater requiring HTM.

      Hypersonic long-range strike (H-LRS)--these emerging 
weapons dramatically improve probability of engaging time sensitive 
targets and have increased survivability and thus higher probability of 
success.

      Effective counters to the expanding asymmetric unmanned 
aerial system (UAS) threat including potential for multiple swarms of 
small UAS.
Focus Area 2: Enhance Design and Posture
    To effectively defend U.S. interests, USINDOPACOM must update its 
existing design and posture to compete with our adversaries across the 
entire Indo-Pacific. At present, USINDOPACOM forces west of the 
International Date Line are focused in Northeast Asia--an historical 
legacy of the Second World War and Korean War. We must update our 
design and posture to preserve strength in this key region, but also 
ensure that the United States is ready to compete and win before 
fighting across all of the Indo-Pacific. By recalibrating theater 
posture to balance capabilities across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
Oceania, USINDOPACOM will be able to respond to aggression more 
effectively throughout the Indo-Pacific.
    Similarly, the USINDOPACOM Joint Logistics Enterprise must be 
capable of supporting joint warfighting requirements across the entire 
theater in a more dynamic and distributed posture. Posture and pre-
positioning are essential to overcome the region's tyranny of distance. 
Ship sailing times are upwards of ten days from the U.S. west coast, 
and it takes significant lead-time to reposition strategic airlift and 
tanker support to enable major force flow.
    The speed of war has changed, and the nature of these changes makes 
the global security environment even more unpredictable. It's dangerous 
and unforgiving. Time and decision space have collapsed, so our 
approach to warfare must adapt to keep pace; with the speed and 
multiple avenues that our adversaries are able to pursue. We require a 
force posture that enables the United States to undertake a spectrum of 
missions. These missions include: capacity building for partners that 
face internal and external vulnerabilities, cooperation on 
transnational threats, and joint and combined training. Our 
enhancements to interoperability make for more effective coalitions in 
crisis.
    USINDOPACOM will ``regain the advantage'' by positioning theater 
infrastructure that supports:

      Expeditionary capability that is agile and resilient.

      Dynamic basing for our maritime and air forces.


      Special operations forces capable of irregular and 
unconventional warfare.

      Anti-submarine warfare capabilities unmatched by any 
adversary.

      Land forces equipped with weapons systems that hold an 
adversary's air, sea, and land forces at risk.

      Cyber and space teams integrated into Multi-Domain and 
Distributed Operations.

      Unique intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities.

    Global Force Management (GFM) and Posture. The Indo-Pacific is a 
theater that requires short response timelines across a vast region. 
Regional threats require U.S. Forces to maintain a high level of 
readiness to respond rapidly to crises. USINDOPACOM's readiness is 
evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency 
plans. The plans place a premium on ready and immediately responsive 
forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations' 
militaries. Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date 
Line decrease response times, bolster the confidence of allies and 
partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential 
adversaries. Contingency response times require that I have the 
essential conventional and strategic forces assigned to USINDOPACOM.
    In line with the National Defense Strategy, USINDOPACOM prioritizes 
stationing and deployment of 5th generation aircraft in the Indo-
Pacific. Additionally, the United States has deployed some of our 
newest and most advanced aviation platforms to the region, such as the 
P-8 Poseidon, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MV-22 Osprey, EA-18G Growler, E-2D 
Hawkeye, and C-130J Super Hercules.
    In addition to forward stationed forces, the ability of the United 
States to surge, rotate, and globally maneuver ready forces is an 
asymmetric advantage that must be maintained. The high operational 
demands, delayed maintenance, training pipeline shortfalls, and 
shortage of ready surge forces limit USINDOPACOM's responsiveness to 
emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk. The challenges grow 
each year as our forces continue to deploy at unprecedented rates while 
the DOD grapples with fiscal uncertainty.
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense. USINDOPACOM faces unique 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) challenges in the Indo-
Pacific to protect our forces and allies. Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific 
Territories are part of our Homeland and must be defended. Hawaii is 
currently protected from North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBMs) by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. This 
system includes Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California; 
ground, sea, and space-based sensors; and redundant command, control, 
and communications systems.
    For the defense of Hawaii, the planned Homeland Defense Radar 
Hawaii (HDRH) will improve U.S. capabilities. A Notice of Intent to 
Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement was released in June 2018, 
and the radar is projected to be operational by late 2023. The HDRH 
will provide an enhanced ballistic missile sensing and discrimination 
capability in the Indo-Pacific, and it increases the capability of the 
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System to defend Hawaii.
    Meanwhile, our adversaries continue to improve their capabilities 
in ways that challenge the United States' strategic, operational, and 
tactical freedom of movement and maneuver. Beijing and Moscow continue 
to develop and field advanced counter-intervention technologies, which 
include highly maneuverable reentry vehicle and warheads (hypersonic 
weapons). Beijing and Russia possess cruise missiles and small-unmanned 
aerial systems (sUAS) that fly different trajectories, making them hard 
to detect, acquire, track, and intercept due to unpredictable low-
flight profiles and sophisticated countermeasures. North Korea retains 
its nuclear and ICBM capabilities.
    USINDOPACOM's IAMD priority is to establish a persistent, credible, 
and sustainable ballistic missile defense by forward deploying the 
latest missile defense technologies to the Indo-Pacific. Through 
forward and persistent presence, these active missile defense 
capabilities would help mitigate the risk to missile threats faced in 
the region and to the Homeland. USINDOPACOM addresses this IAMD 
priority in the following ways:

      USINDOPACOM works with the DOD, Missile Defense Agency, 
the services, academic institutions, and industry to deploy 
capabilities that counter the advanced missile threats in the region.

      USINDOPACOM maintains an active Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) battery on Guam to protect United States citizens 
and strategic military capabilities from North Korean intermediate-
range ballistic missiles (KN-17 and MUSUDAN).

      USINDOPACOM employs additional radars across the theater 
supporting Homeland and regional missile defense, as well as continued 
testing of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

      In 2017, USINDOPACOM and USFK, with support from the MDA 
and the DOD, deployed a THAAD battery to the Korean Peninsula that is 
fully operational. The MDA and the services deliver improved BMDS 
capability to the Korean Peninsula, including integration of existing 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) assets to improve engagement options 
and coverage area.

      The United States Navy completed its forward deployment 
of the USS Milius from San Diego, CA to Yokosuka, Japan in Spring 2018. 
This port shift provides the U.S. Seventh Fleet improved capability to 
support the United States-Japan Alliance.

      USINDOPACOM continues working with Japan, South Korea, 
and Australia toward creating a fully-integrated BMD architecture that 
addresses the increasing cruise missile threat.

      USINDOPACOM supports MDA and the services to develop and 
test emerging missile and counter-small UAS defense capabilities 
through modeling and simulation, as well as live-fire testing conducted 
at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, the Ronald Reagan Test Center at 
Kwajalein Island, Point Mugu, and other testing ranges located in the 
continental United States and Alaska.

    I support all efforts that improve the capability and capacity of 
ballistic missile, cruise missile, and UAS defense technologies to 
further enhance Homeland defense capabilities and protect key regional 
locations. The development of a credible and effective defense against 
advanced and future missile and UAS threats remains vital to our 
operational plans and critical to the continued defense of the United 
States.
    Logistics and Supply. Driven by budgetary pressure, our logistics 
system has become a more efficient business process, and a less 
effective warfighting function over the last 20 years. Efficiency has 
come at the cost of increased vulnerability and decreased redundancy. 
While this arrangement is sufficient for peacetime operations, it is 
insufficient for combat. Congress' Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative 
could significantly help reverse the current trend toward a less 
resilient Joint Logistics Enterprise in the Pacific.
    As adversary capabilities improve, joint operations will 
increasingly rely on distributed supply chains in order to fight and 
win against a peer adversary. The joint logistics enterprise must be 
postured with the right capability and capacity at the right locations 
in order to effectively support multi-domain and distributed 
operations. This means developing infrastructure at both enduring and 
contingency operating locations; identifying and sourcing 
transportation, distribution, and maintenance requirements; and 
developing the processes to enable logistics decisions at the speed of 
war. USINDOPACOM is critically dependent on tactical airlift and sea 
lift capacity, which expands options for force design and maneuver. 
Increased tactical airlift and sealift capacity further increase 
survivability as it becomes more difficult for an adversary to counter 
a highly maneuverable joint force. These tactical lift assets play just 
as important a role as strategic lift assets in ensuring our ability to 
create a resilient and agile logistics network.
    Significant and sustained investment in munitions is needed to 
reduce risk to current and future strategic readiness. Services must 
fund and continue investment in munitions research and development, 
while setting relatively steady requirements to maintain a healthy 
production capability for current and new munitions. I appreciate 
Congress' action to enhance munitions funding in fiscal year 2018 and 
fiscal year 2019, but shortfalls remain. USINDOPACOM's top priorities 
for increased procurement are Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles, SM-6, MK-
48 torpedoes, AIM-9X, BGM-109 Block IV (Maritime Strike Tomahawk), and 
AIM-120D. The Services must also upgrade storage facilities and 
reassess prepositioning based on the new security environment.
    Fuel supply agility and resilience are central to our success in 
being competitive, responsive, and lethal. The changing threat 
environment, energy security risks, and adversarial geopolitical and 
economic influences are driving longer supply lines, necessitating a 
flexible resupply chain and more resilient, agile, and interoperable 
petroleum distribution capabilities. Continued investment in next 
generation petroleum distribution systems is required to mitigate 
sustainment risk in austere, contested, and denied environments. Access 
and positioning of fuel remains a key pillar of our logistics posture 
and is vital to USINDOPACOM's ability to ensure operational freedom of 
maneuver throughout the theater.
Focus Area 3: Exercise, Experimentation, and Innovation
    Our exercise, experimentation and innovation program is key to 
maintaining readiness while also developing and integrating new 
capabilities and concepts. This program also highlights our 
capabilities and capacity to deter competitors while simultaneously 
reassuring allies, partners, and friends.
    Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability 
(PMTEC) Initiative. USINDOPACOM's Joint Exercise Program has 
traditionally monitored the operational and warfighting readiness of 
assigned theater and partner nation forces for crises, contingency 
operations, and HA/DR. Exercises have advanced key objectives including 
strengthening regional alliances and partnerships, while deepening 
interoperability through combined training. The current Joint Exercise 
Program has been useful for enhancing the readiness of USINDOPACOM's 
assigned forward deployed forces; I am now looking to move to the next 
level of integration.
    Scarce resources have reinforced the need to integrate all major 
test and training ranges in the Pacific region through a Pacific Multi-
Domain Training and Experimentation Capability (PMTEC) initiative. This 
USINDOPACOM initiative combines the existing Air Force Joint Pacific 
Alaska Range Complex (JPARC), the Navy's Pacific Missile Range Facility 
(PMRF) and the Army's Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA) in Hawaii, the 
Delamere Air Weapons Range in Northern Australia, and the Marine Corps' 
future Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military 
Training (CJMT) range into a fully networked and integrated training 
constellation that supports joint, combined, multi-domain training. 
PMTEC will also ensure USINDOPACOM has the ability to prioritize 
training, readiness, and experimentation to achieve a more integrated 
and lethal joint force that can both deter and when necessary, fight 
and win. As the next layer of integration, PMTEC will also link test-
ranges (e.g., the Ronald Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein) to enable 
experimentation with developing technologies to create new, more 
effective, joint operating concepts that will ensure future warfighting 
success.
    The PMTEC initiative also integrates cyber and space capabilities 
to enable joint and combined experimentation and testing that is truly 
multi-domain. Currently, many of these ranges restrict operations to 
just air and land capabilities or just air, land, and maritime 
capabilities. As a result, our forces often have to simulate or provide 
exercise injects that replicate space and cyber effects. We are working 
to fully incorporate space and cyber into our exercises.
    Experimentation and Innovation. USINDOPACOM relies on innovation 
and experimentation, underpinned by strong partnerships, to address our 
capability gaps in the region. This includes testing and integrating 
new technologies, developing new capabilities, and exploring new 
concepts of operation and employment. USINDOPACOM makes extensive use 
of OSD's Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, Coalition Warfare 
Program, and other rapid prototyping programs to focus cutting edge 
technology-based capabilities and innovation to enhance our readiness.
    Innovation is crucial to increasing logistics agility and 
resilience. USINDOPACOM will continue utilizing the Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration program to identify technological solutions to 
our critical logistics capability gaps. To facilitate greater 
resilience, USINDOPACOM will protect and harden our critical logistics 
infrastructure, information systems, and enablers. For example, 
USINDOPACOM is developing the capability to rapidly repair damage to 
critical seaports and airfields.
    As part of our innovation and experimentation efforts, USINDOPACOM 
maintains robust engagement with a variety of partners to identify, 
promote, and incorporate research and development to address key 
capability gaps. USINDOPACOM has worked with some of the best DOD 
industry partners on advancing man and machine teaming, artificial 
intelligence, machine-learning, hypersonic technology, autonomy, 
command and control, and block chain technology. USINDOPACOM benefits 
from engineers, operations analysts, and theater-experienced operators 
from Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) and 
University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) partners. These partners 
perform robust military utility assessments of emerging technology in 
the context of theater plans. The ability to harness the knowledge and 
experience of the individuals from these organizations is vital to 
advancing key capabilities for targeting, cyberspace operations, 
undersea warfare, electronic warfare, and ISR.
Focus Area 4: Strengthen Allies and Partners:
    The United States' network of allies and partners is our principal 
advantage against any adversary. USINDOPACOM depends upon the 
collective capabilities of our allies and partners to address the 
challenges to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The most obvious point--one 
made abundantly clear in the National Security Strategy--is that 
whatever we do, we must do it with our allies and partners. The keys to 
our bilateral and multilateral relationships are communication, 
information-sharing, and interoperability.
    Agile Communications. Agile communications are crucial--not only 
for our readiness, but for our relationships in the region. USINDOPACOM 
works with allies and partners in order to enhance our interoperability 
throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Currently, USINDOPACOM is not fully 
postured with the latest technology to operate in cyberspace with 
dynamic multiple-partner combinations in all phases of military 
operations. Furthermore, our Nation is still developing the 
communication capacity and sharable encryption capability necessary to 
support most modern warfighting platforms and weapon systems with our 
allies and partners. Although USINDOPACOM does not have formal 
agreements for exchanging information with many of the nations or 
organizations within the region, there is continued progress. The 
recently concluded Communications, Compatibility, and Security 
Agreement (COMCASA) with India is a step in the right direction. 
COMCASA is a bilateral agreement that allows the Indian military to 
procure United States cryptological equipment to enable secure voice 
and data exchange for enhanced interoperability. There will be similar 
efforts undertaken with others in the Indo-Pacific. As we continue to 
improve our agility in coalition information-sharing environments, our 
future capabilities will allow ally and partner forces alongside of our 
forces to adequately respond to natural disasters and contingencies. We 
will have agile, secure, dynamic information technology capabilities to 
support the full spectrum of military operations with our partners and 
allies in order to enhance interoperability.
    Security Cooperation and Capacity Building. Security cooperation 
and capacity-building engagements in the region help build ally and 
partner capabilities, information-sharing, and interoperability. 
Addressing maritime security and maritime domain awareness challenges 
remains a key priority for nations across the region. The 2019 National 
Defense Authorization Act extended the fiscal year 2016 NDAA section 
1263 ``Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)'' for another 
five years (fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025), and expanded 
MSI to encompass portions of South Asia. The MSI authority, along with 
other DOD authorities such as the title 10 section 333 Global Train and 
Equip, and Department of State authorities such as Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET), in addition to the new Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, 
represent weighty tools available for building partner readiness, 
reducing capability gaps, and building capacity. The Department of 
State's one-time reprogramming of $290.5 million of FMF to the Indo-
Pacific in 2018 is a clear effort to assist our region, for which 
USINDOPACOM is grateful.
 addressing the indo-pacific together: enhancing partnerships with our 
                          allies and partners
    The Indo-Pacific is one of the largest and most diverse regions on 
earth. These differences are our strength, and the thousands of miles 
of ocean and sky between us do not divide us, they are the connective 
elements that bind us together. As I look at the depth and breadth of 
the Indo-Pacific, I see opportunities in each of the regions to advance 
our shared values in ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Throughout 
the Indo-Pacific, the most effective way to address the challenges I 
have described is through collective action of multiple nations.
    The security landscape mirrors the diversity of the Indo-Pacific. 
In Northeast Asia, the security environment where our strong alliances 
with Japan and South Korea dominate, I am focused on the immediate 
threat presented by North Korea and the long-term threat posed by 
Beijing's and Moscow's aggressive policies. In Southeast Asia, I am 
focused on working with our allies, Thailand and the Philippines, and 
our strong partners, Singapore and Vietnam, to strengthen ASEAN, expand 
multilateralism, and improve their combined capacity to stand up to the 
malign influence of state and non-state actors, especially in the South 
China Sea. In South Asia, I am focused on expanding cooperation with 
the world's largest democracy, India, and working with all South Asia 
countries to increase air and maritime domain awareness across the 
Indian Ocean. Finally, in Oceania, I am encouraged by the opportunities 
to partner with our strong allies, Australia and France, and strong 
friend, New Zealand, to improve information sharing and maritime 
cooperation as the Pacific Island Countries address the challenges 
associated with Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, 
natural disasters, narcotics trafficking, and economic coercion from 
Beijing.
    Northeast Asia. The command's goal is to stabilize Northeast Asia 
and leverage our strong alliances with Japan and South Korea to improve 
stability across the broader Indo-Pacific. In order to achieve this, 
USINDOPACOM needs a security environment that is secure from coercion 
from Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow. As the region becomes more stable, 
we will encourage Japan and South Korea to take a greater role in the 
alliances related to their own security and contribute to security in 
the broader Indo-Pacific region.
    Japan. The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of our 
efforts to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The government of Japan 
released its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2017, and Japan 
is looking to become more involved across the broader Indo-Pacific 
region. Additionally, Japan is a key supporter of UNSCR enforcement 
operations and hosts the Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) in 
Yokosuka, Japan. Tokyo intends to procure high-tech United States 
platforms that will increase interoperability, including F-35A, E-2D 
Hawkeye, Global Hawk UAS, MV-22, and Advanced Electronic Guides 
Interceptor System (AEGIS) Ashore. Furthermore, Japan's 2018 National 
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) call for strengthening the United 
States-Japan alliance, and expanding their international security 
cooperation with like-minded partners in the region. They also 
prioritize advancements in Japan's space, cyberspace, and electro-
magnetic capabilities.
    USINDOPACOM and Japan's Self Defense Force have transformed the way 
military alliances plan and campaign together. Our approaches for a 
Free and Open Indo-Pacific are synchronized in our national policies 
and defense strategies, and communication mechanisms exist at every 
level of our governments to ensure we are synchronized on key issues. 
The United States-Japan alliance is committed to supporting countries 
that respect and adhere to the rule-of-law, and our alliance seeks to 
enable opportunities for economic prosperity throughout the region.
    South Korea. The United States-South Korea alliance remains 
ironclad, and we are both committed to the final, fully verified 
denuclearization of North Korea. South Korea is also a key supporter of 
UNSCR Enforcement activities against North Korea. USINDOPACOM works 
closely with Seoul in obtaining capabilities required under the 
Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP)--the 
ongoing plan to transfer Combined Forces Command (CFC) to South Korean 
leadership. Seoul has future procurement plans for the P-8, advanced 
munitions, upgrades to PAC-3 missiles, and F-16 fighters. All these 
assets will increase interoperability with the United States.
    Taiwan. In accordance with our One China Policy, based on the 
Taiwan Relations Act and three United States-China Joint Communiques, 
the United States and Taipei maintain a substantive and robust 
unofficial relationship with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA). Taiwan's values reflect our own--it features an open economy 
with a free and democratic society that respects human rights and the 
rule of law. The United States opposes any unilateral change to the 
status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The United States continues to support 
the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and 
pace acceptable to the people on both sides. USINDOPACOM's engagement 
focuses on improving joint interoperability within Taiwan's military, 
improving Taiwan training and readiness, and supporting Taiwan's 
military and professional development.
    Beijing is pushing across the globe to diplomatically isolate and 
economically constrain Taiwan. Taiwan has only seventeen diplomatic 
partners left after losing El Salvador, Burkina Faso, and the Dominican 
Republic as diplomatic partners in 2018. Beijing continues to press the 
international community and private businesses to remove or modify any 
references to Taiwan on websites and publications and is attempting to 
deny Taiwan's participation in international fora.
    As evidenced in President Xi Jinping's New Year's speech, China is 
focused on achieving reunification as a part of the PRC's national plan 
of rejuvenation by ``reserving the option of taking all necessary 
measures and not renouncing the use of force.'' We continue to be 
concerned with China's military buildup across the Strait, Beijing's 
opaqueness about its military capability and capacity, and its 
unwillingness to preclude the use of force to resolve the cross-strait 
issue. The United States has a deep and abiding interest in peace and 
stability in the Taiwan Strait and welcomes steps by both sides to 
reduce tensions and improve cross-Strait relations. President Xi's 
solution of a one country, two systems approach to reunification does 
not reflect the wishes of both sides. We hope that there will be 
continued high-level communications and interactions going forward 
through which both sides can continue their constructive dialogue on 
the basis of dignity and respect. Although President Tsai and her 
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have committed to 
``avoid confrontation and prevent surprises'' with China, the cross-
Strait situation is of increasing concern given the harsh rhetoric from 
Beijing toward the leadership in Taipei.
    Taiwan recently passed its 2019 defense budget, which will fund 
foreign and indigenous acquisition programs as well as near-term 
training and readiness. Consistent with the TRA, USINDOPACOM engages 
with the Taiwan military to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 
self-defense capability that is credible, resilient, and cost-
effective.
    Mongolia. Mongolia is a strong partner and contributor to the 
United States' regional and global policy objectives. Mongolia supports 
missions in Afghanistan and United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, 
making Mongolia a model for emerging democratic countries that want to 
be more active globally. Ulaanbaatar's ``Third Neighbor Policy'' 
intends to balance Russian and Chinese influence by developing 
relationships with the United States and other like-minded countries. 
USINDOPACOM and Mongolia have had inaugural land forces talks, 
developed a five-year security cooperation plan, and laid the 
groundwork for Airman-to-Airman Talks. The United States is helping 
Mongolia improve their special operations forces, peacekeeping 
operations, and Air Forces.
    Southeast Asia. USINDOPACOM's objective in Southeast Asia is to 
strengthen the sub-region's ability to deny adversaries' attempts to 
dominate or disrupt the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
while enabling the region to promote their sovereign interests, resist 
economic pressure from others, and preserve conditions for continued 
economic growth. USINDOPACOM is setting conditions in the security 
environment that support this goal, which ensures that all nations can 
freely access shared domains. Adversary militaries will be unable to 
dominate the global commons that enable trade and the global economy. 
The command's efforts will improve the region's awareness and 
capability to enforce their borders, territorial waters, and exclusive 
economic zones. USINDOPACOM will advocate for multilateral venues like 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to advance 
collaboration, settle disputes equitably, and strengthen resolve 
against the malign influence of state and non-state actors. We are very 
grateful to Congress for its continued support for the $425 million 
Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia which enables Thailand, 
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and India to increase their capability 
and capacity in continued maritime domain awareness over the next five 
years.
    ASEAN. The United States and ASEAN share the common principles of a 
rules-based international order, respect for international law, and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. The ten ASEAN member states, under the 
chairmanship of Singapore in 2018 and Thailand in 2019, continue to 
seek ways to improve multilateral security engagements and advance 
stability in the Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM is committed to 
strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Defense 
Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. USINDOPACOM 
participates in ASEAN exercises, key leader engagements, and 
multilateral cooperation on a number of shared transnational 
challenges, and will host an ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise in 2019. 
USINDOPACOM co-chairs the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus 
Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
with Malaysia through the end of 2019. USINDOPACOM's engagements with 
ASEAN, and with the respective ASEAN member states, build and 
strengthen relationships, and convey the United States' steadfast 
commitment to the region.
    Cambodia. USINDOPACOM reduced the number of engagements with 
Cambodia. During these limited engagements the command reaffirms the 
importance of strengthening democratic institutions and maintaining an 
independent foreign policy. The United States and other countries in 
the region are concerned about the possible construction by a Chinese 
state-owned enterprise of a facility in Cambodia. USINDOPACOM 
appreciates the statements by the Prime Minister noting that foreign 
military facilities are prohibited under their constitution. However, 
the command remains concerned about the possible militarization of 
Cambodia's coast including the prepositioning of military equipment, 
the stationing of military units on long term rotations, and the 
construction of dual use facilities.
    Indonesia. This year, the United States and Indonesia celebrate our 
70th anniversary of bilateral relations, which provides an opportunity 
to highlight our growing strategic relationship. USINDOPACOM is 
committed to a strategic partnership with Indonesia. Indonesia's 
strategic location, its status as the third largest democracy, fourth 
most populous country, and its expanding economy all underscore its 
essential role in the regional security architecture. Indonesia is the 
largest recipient of United States training and education programs in 
the region. We continue to support the Indonesian military's focus on 
external threats and national defense, particularly maritime domain 
awareness and maritime security.
    Laos. After decades of stagnation in the United States-Lao 
relationship following the Vietnam War, we have seen some significant 
advancements over the last two years. In 2016, the United States and 
the Lao People's Democratic Republic signed a Comprehensive Partnership 
that resulted in a surge of bilateral military engagements. The 
command's engagement goals are to partner and assist Laos in becoming a 
stable, prosperous, and independent member of ASEAN that is willing and 
able to promote its sovereign interests and respect international law. 
These engagements focus around unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance, 
POW/MIA recovery, and military medicine. Laos actively supports the 
Defense Personnel Accounting Agency (DPAA) in the search for 290 
missing United States servicemembers with an aim to honorably conclude 
war legacy issues (UXO and POW/MIA recovery missions) by 2030. 
USINDOPACOM is expanding engagements with the Lao military.
    Malaysia. Malaysia remains a critical partner of increasing 
importance in the region ever since the United States elevated the 
relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership in 2014. USINDOPACOM is 
exploring expanded collaboration in the areas of maritime security, 
counterterrorism, information-sharing, and defense institutional 
reform. Malaysian Armed Forces have demonstrated the professionalism, 
capacity, and resolve to contribute to regional security, and we 
continue to evolve our defense relationship on mutual areas of 
interest.
    Philippines. The Philippines is a treaty ally and a partner in 
preserving a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and our military-to-military 
relationship has never been stronger. USINDOAPCOM has increased the 
number and scope of exercises in recent years, to include the 
resumption of live-fire exercises. Terrorism continues to pose a 
security challenge in the Philippines, and USINDOPACOM is committed to 
helping the Philippines ensure that the southern Philippines does not 
become a safe-haven for terrorists that would threaten the entire 
region. I am also focused on helping to develop the territorial defense 
capability of the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) and look forward to 
re-engaging with the Philippines National Police Maritime Group to 
continue improving their ability to protect their sovereign interests.
    Singapore. Singapore remains a steadfast security cooperation 
partner in Southeast Asia with a strong commitment to promoting a Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific. Though not a formal ally, Singapore provides 
valuable access to the strategically-located entrance of the Malacca 
Straits and South China Sea. Singapore supports a strong United States 
presence in the region as well as a deep and broad defense relationship 
between our two countries. Singapore supports our objectives on North 
Korea, and in 2018, Singapore hosted the historic United States-North 
Korea summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. 
Singapore also hosted the transit and rotational deployment of more 
than 1,500 U.S. military aircraft and vessels (2015-2018), making the 
United States the heaviest foreign user of Singapore's facilities at 
Sembawang Port, Paya Lebar Air Base, and Changi Naval Base. Singapore 
maintains training facilities at Luke Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona (F-
16); Mountain Home AFB, Idaho (F-15SG); Marana, Arizona (Apache AH-
64D); and Fort Sill, Oklahoma (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS). Moreover, USINDOPACOM and Singapore steadily increased 
interoperability through increasingly complex exercises, and we 
continue to strengthen cooperation in counterterrorism and maritime 
security. Singapore annually sends 1000 students to training and 
education courses in the United States, representing the largest 
training presence in the United States from any foreign military.
    Thailand. Last year marked 200 years of friendly United States-Thai 
relations, and Thailand remains a key ally and security partner. In 
2019, I am focused on advancing our alliance and restoring elements of 
our military-to-military relationship following the restoration of a 
democratic government after elections in March. Thai facilities provide 
vital training opportunities for USINDOPACOM personnel, and logistical 
nodes that are essential to operate throughout the Indo-Pacific region. 
Thailand assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2019 and continues to 
play a vital leadership role in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Vietnam. Vietnam has emerged as a key partner in promoting a secure 
and rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region. 
USINDOPACOM's defense partnership with the Vietnamese military is among 
the strongest aspects of our growing bilateral relationship. As a 
symbol of closer ties between the United States and Vietnam, the 
aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made a port call in March 2018 to 
Vietnam, the first of its kind since the end of the war in 1975. 
Vietnam shares many of the United States' principles on issues such as 
international rule of law and freedom of navigation, and Vietnam is one 
of the loudest voices on South China Sea disputes. USINDOPACOM's and 
the Vietnamese military's military-to-military engagements prioritize 
enhancing Vietnam's maritime capacity, which will be bolstered by 
Vietnam's acquisition of Scan Eagle UAVs, T-6 trainer aircraft, and a 
second U.S. Coast Guard cutter. I look forward to Vietnam assuming the 
ASEAN Chairmanship in 2020 and increasing its leadership across the 
region.
    Burma (Myanmar). Ongoing human rights abuses, including growing 
restrictions on freedom of expression, including for members of the 
press, and atrocities [including ethnic cleansing], and instability in 
some ethnic minority areas comprise threats to Burma's democratic 
transition. Due to credible information of serious human rights 
violations and abuses, especially in relation to Rohingya, as well as 
restrictions that remain in place based on decades of military rule, 
United States-Burma security cooperation is minimal. The United States-
Burma security relationship is limited to lower-level engagements at 
select regional security events and conferences, and participation in 
multilateral exercises focused on HA/DR. Burma military personnel are 
not attending academic exchanges, including at the region's DOD 
academic institute, despite the importance of engaging the next 
generation of officers.
    South Asia. USINDOPACOM's goal in South Asia is to create and seize 
opportunities to broaden critical partnerships to ensure shared domains 
remain open to all. In conjunction with India's contributions to 
regional security, these actions will prevent adversaries from 
establishing an effective military presence in the Indian Ocean that 
threaten the security of vital commerce and continued economic growth 
and development. As a result, the regional states will be able to 
reduce internal conflicts, respond to regional security challenges, and 
resist adversaries' military and economic coercion.
    India. The United States-India strategic partnership continues to 
advance at an historic pace as we continue to increase our 
interoperability and information-sharing capabilities. The inaugural 
2+2 Ministerial and signing of the COMCASA in 2018 were pivotal moments 
in our relationship. USINDOPACOM expects this trajectory to continue 
and that 2019 will be a significant year in bilateral relations. The 
United States and India are natural partners on a range of political, 
economic, and security issues. With a mutual desire for global 
stability, support for the rules-based international order, and a Free-
and-Open Indo-Pacific region, the United States and India have an 
increased agreement on interests, including maritime security and 
maritime domain awareness, counter-piracy, counterterrorism, 
humanitarian assistance, and coordinated responses to natural disasters 
and transnational threats. Over the past year, the United States and 
Indian militaries participated in five major exercises, executed more 
than fifty other military exchanges, and further operationalized the 
2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). The LEMOA 
enables the United States Navy to replenish supplies from Indian navy 
logistics platforms. USINDOPACOM is working with the Indian military to 
operationalize the COMCASA, which will boost interoperability between 
our militaries. Defense sales are at an all-time high, with India 
operating United States sourced platforms such as P-8s, C-130Js, C-17s, 
AH-64s, CH-47s, and M777 howitzers. Additionally, India recently agreed 
to a $2.1-billion purchase of MH-60R multi-role sea-based helicopters 
and is considering a number of additional U.S. systems for purchase. 
USINDOPACOM fully supports the purchase of U.S. systems, F-16 and F/A-
18E aircraft, a reorder of 12-15 P-8Is, and a potential purchase of Sea 
Guardian UASs.
    Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an important security partner with strong 
potential to enhance regional stability and advance United States 
interests in South Asia on counter-terrorism, Muslim outreach, 
countering violent extremism, supporting humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief, and supporting United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNPKO). The humanitarian crisis caused by the presence of more than 
700,000 Rohingya refugees from Burma (Myanmar) in Bangladesh has 
strained the government of Bangladesh. Bangladesh's December 30 
elections point to concerning trend of consolidation of power by the 
ruling Awami League and raise fears that PM Hasina is aiming to achieve 
a de facto one-party state. Military-to-military engagement with 
Bangladesh fits into a broader strategy and commitment to uphold an 
international, rules-based order in the vital Indo-Pacific region and 
contributes to building a regional security framework.
    Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka remains a significant strategic opportunity in 
the Indian Ocean, and our military-to-military relationship continues 
to strengthen. However, political turmoil and ethnic tension between 
the Tamil and Sinhalese populations remain drivers of instability and 
potential obstacles to continued growth in our partnership. Moreover, 
Sri Lanka has handed over the deep water port of Hambantota to China on 
a 99-year lease due to its mounting debts to China, which has caused 
international concern. Despite the political upheaval, it is in our 
interests to continue military collaboration and cooperation with Sri 
Lankan Forces. USINDOPACOM cooperation with the Sri Lankan Military 
centers on building capacity in maritime security and maritime domain 
awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as 
humanitarian de-mining, medical assistance, and peacekeeping 
operations. Increasing navy-to-navy engagement with Sri Lanka will be a 
USINDOPACOM focus in 2019. The Sri Lankan Navy is a well-trained and 
professional force with the potential to contribute to multi-lateral 
maritime interoperability in the Indian Ocean. The recent transfer of 
an excess United States Coast Guard cutter to Sri Lanka in August 2018, 
along with additional platforms from Japan and India, provide the Sri 
Lankan Navy greater capabilities to contribute to regional maritime 
domain awareness initiatives. Going forward, it is necessary to sustain 
engagement with Sri Lanka, particularly the navy, and construct a 
multi-lateral approach to capacity building with like-minded partners 
to rapidly enhance the Sri Lankan Navy's capabilities.
    Oceania. USINDOPACOM is deepening engagement with the Pacific 
Island Countries (PICs) of Oceania to preserve a Free and Open Indo-
Pacific region, and we are committed to strengthening the region's 
future security and prosperity with our partners and allies. In close 
coordination with Australia, Japan, France, and New Zealand, 
USINDOPACOM is working to strengthen the resilience of the PICs by 
tackling common challenges: drug trafficking; Illegal, Unreported, 
Unregulated (IUU) fishing; the existential threat of rising ocean 
levels; natural disasters; and the heavy debt burdens that threaten 
their sovereign interests.
    Australia. Our alliance with Australia underpins our relations 
across Oceania, and Canberra plays a leading role in regional security 
and capacity-building efforts for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. 
Australia is increasing its diplomatic presence, military and economic 
assistance, and infrastructure investments in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
and the other PICs to enhance security in the region. Australia is a 
key supporter of UNSCR enforcement operations against North Korea as 
well. The U.S. Marine Corps completed its sixth successful Marine 
Rotational Force-Darwin deployment, and we expect to reach the full 
authorized strength of 2,500 marines later this year. These deployments 
maintain significant combat power west of the International Date Line 
with an ally. Moreover, Australia is procuring high-tech United States 
platforms, such as the F-35, that will increase interoperability.
    Compact of Free Association (COFA) States. The Republic of Palau, 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI), collectively referred to as the ``Compact'' states, are 
threatened by external pressures including the pernicious use of 
Beijing's economic leverage. The Republic of Palau, FSM, and RMI 
entered into a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United 
States more than 25 years ago, allowing the United States to foreclose 
access or use of those countries by third-country militaries. Under the 
COFAs, the Compact States receive economic assistance, including 
grants, access to various U.S. Federal programs, and for many citizens 
of the Compact States, visa-free travel to the United States. U.S. 
contributions to the trust funds established by the COFA are scheduled 
to end after 2023. Moreover, these island nations are under increasing 
pressure from Beijing's economic strategy. Additionally, the changing 
climate represents an existential threat to these nations as they 
urgently seek to mitigate damage from higher tides and rising sea 
levels, shifting patterns of fishing populations essential to economic 
livelihood, and greater intensity of natural disasters such as tropical 
storms and droughts. The continued support that the COFA has engendered 
also benefits the United States. We provide support to these countries 
and they support the United States. The patriotic citizens of these 
nations join the U.S. Armed Forces in larger numbers per capita than 
most U.S. states, and I value their service. The Compact states rely on 
continued support from the United States to mitigate these threats and 
the United States would like to continue to benefit from the good will 
of these Pacific Island Countries to further our strategic interests in 
Indo-Pacific region.
    Fiji. USINDOPACOM's relationship with the Republic of Fiji is 
thriving and robust, and we were pleased to see a credible election 
process there in 2018. Australia's decision to invest in the Black Rock 
International Peacekeeping Center was welcomed, and will ensure that 
Fiji continues to play an important role in peacekeeping missions 
around the world. USINDOPACOM is postured to provide engineering 
support for improvements and new construction to the Ground Forces 
Training Center and to assist Australian engineers with the Black Rock 
International Peacekeeping Center. In 2018, Fiji signed a United States 
ship-rider agreement, opening up new opportunities for maritime 
security cooperation between our two countries. Additionally, the 
establishment of Fiji as a partner in the National Guard's State 
Partnership Program opens up another door for our two militaries to 
train and work together. The $5 million plus-up in foreign military 
sales (FMS) allows USINDOPACOM to deepen our military relationship with 
the Fijian military.
    France. France, a NATO ally with significant territory in the Indo-
Pacific, is increasing its operational activities in the region and is 
a key contributor to the multilateral efforts. The United States, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and France coordinate operational 
support and capacity-building with the PICs. The primary operational 
engagement provides support to the Forum Fisheries Agency to address 
IUU fishing. France is also becoming increasingly active across the 
broader Indo-Pacific region, and I welcome both French support to UNSCR 
sanction enforcement activities against North Korea, and increased 
French activity in the South China Sea.
    New Zealand. New Zealand remains a steadfast and key partner who, 
in 2018, increased investment, foreign assistance, and infrastructure 
support to the South Pacific. USINDOPACOM greatly appreciates this 
commitment of additional resources to the PICs. For the last six years, 
the United States and New Zealand, through bilateral defense dialogues, 
have increased interoperability collaboration headlined in 2018 by New 
Zealand's purchase of P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to replace 
aging P-3 Orion aircraft. Additionally, New Zealand has provided key 
support to UNSCR sanctions enforcement against North Korea.
    Papua New Guinea (PNG). USINDOPACOM's engagement with PNG improves 
regional posture and demonstrates the U.S. commitment to the region. 
With security support from Australia and the United States, PNG hosted 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2018. During 
APEC, Vice President Pence announced that Australia and the United 
States would partner with Papua New Guinea to develop the Lombrum Naval 
Base on Manus Island in the northern part of PNG. USINDOPACOM looks 
forward to assisting Australia and PNG in developing options for this 
base.
Additional Allies
    Canada. Like the United States, Canada is a member of NATO and a 
Pacific nation. Canadian policy in the Indo-Pacific focuses on 
cooperation and building partnerships as they increase operational 
activities in the region. By focusing on consistent engagement with all 
willing parties, Canada hopes to deepen its relationship with 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Canada wants to provide 
a continued presence in the Pacific to enhance regional stability, 
specifically citing tensions on the Korean Peninsula in their National 
Defence Policy. Ottawa provides support to ongoing North Korea UNSCR 
sanctions enforcement as well.
    United Kingdom (UK). The UK, another NATO ally, remains one of the 
strongest defenders of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and sees 
prosperity and security in the Indo-Pacific as an essential driver of 
global economic growth. The UK recently established three new 
diplomatic posts in the Pacific and increased foreign aid to the 
Pacific by 6 percent in 2018. The recently concluded cooperative 
deployment with the HMS Argyll and USS McCampbell in the South China 
Sea highlights the value of multinational operations and, more 
importantly, the international message to those who seek to infringe on 
the ability to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law 
allows.
                               conclusion
    In the 21st century, U.S. security and prosperity will increasingly 
depend upon a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region--one that 
features respect for states' sovereignty, freedom of the seas and 
skies, and adherence to international norms, rules, and behavior. In 
short, it is in our vital national interests to ensure a Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific over the short- and long-term. As the Commander of 
USINDOPACOM, my focus is first and foremost on preserving and advancing 
the security and stability of the region, over the short- and long-
term.
    I will ensure the 375,000 men and women of USINDOPACOM remain ready 
to fight and win, if necessary, while also focusing on competing and 
winning below the level of armed conflict. It is in this so-called 
``gray zone'' between peace and war where many of our adversaries 
currently operate, and we must be equally prepared to compete with our 
adversaries before and after the initiation of hostilities. To do this, 
we need a comprehensive approach across multiple U.S. Governmental 
departments, and partnerships with civil society and the private 
sector, to engage in areas that transcend traditional military core 
competencies. Our armed services must be manned, trained, and equipped 
to overcome the full spectrum of challenges presented by state and non-
state actors. With the continued support of Congress, and together with 
our allies and partners, I believe we will be successful at this 
important mission.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Davidson.
    General Abrams.

 STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. ABRAMS, USA COMMANDER, UNITED 
 NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES 
                             KOREA

    General Abrams. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this 
opportunity to appear before you today.
    I've had the privilege to serve in this position for just 
over 90 days. In that short time, I have assessed the ROK-
United States military alliance to be stronger than ever. Our 
combined force is a strategic deterrent, postured to respond to 
potential crisis or provocation and, if called upon, ready to 
defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in the region.
    Today in Korea, we have tremendous opportunities before us 
as well as some great challenges. Ongoing diplomatic engagement 
between the Republic of Korea, the DPRK, and the United States 
has led to a significant reduction in tension compared to the 
recent past marked by missile launches and nuclear tests. 
Diplomacy is creating the opportunity for North Korea to choose 
the path of denuclearization, forge a lasting peace, and build 
a better future for its people.
    The first steps towards realizing that future have already 
begun. We have witnessed multiple presidential summits, inter-
Korean dialogue, and international support to sanctions. The 
steps agreed to at Panmunjom and specified in the Comprehensive 
Military Agreement, combined with the aforementioned diplomatic 
efforts, have all contributed to a marked reduction in tensions 
on the peninsula and created mechanisms for the development of 
cooperation and confidence building, central ingredients to the 
incremental process of making history on the peninsula.
    Still, I remain clear-eyed about the fact that, despite a 
reduction in tensions along the DMZ [Korean Demilitarized Zone] 
and a cessation of strategic provocations, coupled with public 
statements of intent to denuclearize, little to no verifiable 
change has occurred in North Korea's military capabilities.
    For instance, we are watching the ongoing Korean People's 
Army Winter Training Cycle, including a slate of full-spectrum 
exercises, which is progressing along at historic norms, 
meaning that we have observed no significant changes to size, 
scope, or timing of their ongoing exercises compared to the 
same time period over the last 4 years. Further, North Korea's 
conventional and asymmetric military capabilities, along with 
their continued development of advanced conventional systems, 
remains unchecked. These capabilities continue to hold the 
United States, the Republic of Korea, and our regional allies 
at risk. As such, I believe it is necessary to maintain a 
postured and ready force to deter any possible aggressive 
actions.
    Fielding our force in Korea requires a foundation of 
support and sustainment to meet our war-fighters' needs. Today, 
that foundation is sound. It serves as the bedrock from which 
we deter aggression and ensure stability, not only on the 
Korean Peninsula, but in Northeast Asia. Our posture allows our 
diplomats to speak from a position of unquestioned strength as 
they work to achieve enduring peace and final full 
denuclearization of the DPRK.
    I want to thank you for the support we have received from 
the Congress over the last 2 years, as we have significantly 
improved the posture and readiness of our forces on the 
peninsula, from munition stocks to additional ballistic missile 
defense capabilities and more. I can't underscore enough the 
importance of the on-time appropriation in 2019, as it has 
enabled us for the first time in many years to make smarter 
investments, improve our planning, and provide predictability 
to our commanders in the field so they can sustain the hard-
earned readiness that is essential to being a fight tonight 
force.
    The readiness required to be a credible deterrent is 
perishable. We must continue to exercise the core competencies 
necessary to the planning and execution of joint and combined 
operations under the strain of crisis. However, we must also 
strike a balance between the need to train and the requirement 
to create space for diplomacy to flourish. As such, we are 
innovating our approach to training and exercises by tuning 
four dials that modify exercise design and conduct: size, 
scope, volume, and timing. Adjustments to these dials enable us 
to remain in harmony with diplomatic and political requirements 
without sacrificing war-fighting readiness to unacceptable 
levels.
    Our combined forces, the Republic of Korea and United 
States, continue to train using this new construct so they can 
be ready should the call come for them to respond to crisis, 
defend the Republic of Korea, and prevail against any threat. 
The ROK-United States alliance remains ironclad. It has been 
tested multiple times over the last 65 years and has only 
become stronger. Our military partnership continues to deepen 
and broaden the long-standing relationships that exist at every 
echelon. On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians, 
contractors, and their families on the peninsula, we thank you 
for your unwavering support. I am extremely proud to be their 
commander and to work hand-in-hand with the Republic of Korea 
to protect our great nations. I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Abrams follows:]
             Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Abrams
                              introduction
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Senators of 
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the posture 
and readiness of our forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Thank you 
as well to the Congress, and in particular this Committee's leadership, 
for delivering the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act 
and related Appropriations on time. Predictable, stable resourcing, 
more than any other factor, allows us to sustain the military readiness 
we have rebuilt over the last few years. In 2018, the Services, under 
the leadership of Chairman Dunford and former Secretary Mattis, made 
significant strides to improve the overall readiness posture of Unites 
States Forces Korea (USFK) and our ability to ``fight tonight.'' We are 
grateful for their continued support.
    I have had the distinct honor to command the United Nations Command 
(UNC), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and USFK for nearly 90 days. 
During that short time, I have prioritized firsthand visits and a 
personal review of the posture, readiness, and character of the 
warriors and organizations of these three commands. My assessment is 
that the ROK-United States military Alliance is stronger than ever, and 
that our combined force stands as a strategic deterrent, postured to 
respond to potential crisis or provocation and, if called upon, ready 
to ``fight tonight'' in the defense of the Republic of Korea. The 
alliance between South Korean and American forces is ironclad--forged 
in blood, shaped over 65 years of combined military operations and 
training, and hardened by the crucible of war. Shared sacrifice and 
mutually agreed principles underpin our Alliance and ensure it endures 
the winds of change.
    This posture statement, along with my testimony before the 
Committee in open and closed session, is my first opportunity to 
provide you my personal assessment and measurement of progress within 
our four enduring priorities: sustain and strengthen the Alliance, 
maintain the armistice, transform the Alliance, and sustain the force. 
To that end, this statement provides a summary of the changes in our 
operating environment, an assessment of our posture and readiness, an 
overview of our exercise planning and conduct, a discussion of how we 
take care of our warriors and their families, and a review of our 
current resourcing priorities. The continued support of this Committee 
for the incredible men and women of UNC/CFC/USFK is appreciated. We are 
a better postured force because of your unwavering commitment to 
military readiness on the Korean peninsula.
                         operating environment
    Ongoing diplomatic engagement and summitry among the leaders of the 
ROK, United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
in 2018 led to a palpable reduction in tension when compared to the 
recent years of missile launches and nuclear tests. The inter-Korean 
Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) has produced a number of nascent 
confidence-building measures: demilitarization of the Joint Security 
Area (JSA), demining small areas of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in 
preparation for ROK-DPRK joint remains recovery operations this spring, 
mutually-verified removal of select guard posts along the DMZ, and 
increased interaction between UNC forces and Korean People's Army (KPA) 
forces operating within the JSA. All of these measures support improved 
military-to-military communications among the ROK, DPRK, and UNC, and 
some have sparked limited cooperation. These steps, regardless of size 
or scope, are positive indicators of the impact sustained diplomatic 
efforts have begun to bring about. Current modifications in 
atmospherics, however, do not represent a substantive change in North 
Korea's military posture or readiness. The North Korean military 
remains formidable and dangerous, with no discernable differences in 
the assessed force structure, readiness, or lethality my predecessor 
reported in 2018.
    While Kim Jong-un's (KJU) 2019 New Year's speech called for South 
Korea to halt joint military exercises with the United States, the 
KPA's Winter Training Cycle this year commenced as it has for the past 
five years--with a force of over one million engaged in individual and 
unit-level training throughout the country. Notably, the size, scope, 
and timing of training events are consistent with recent years. The 
only observable change has been a reduction in the attention and 
bellicosity the regime layers onto its military activities. Since the 
end of 2017, Pyongyang has reduced its hostile rhetoric and halted 
media coverage of KJU attending capstone events such as large-scale, 
live-fire training or special operations raids on mock-up Alliance 
targets. It is, however, too soon to conclude that a lower profile is 
indicative of lesser risk.
    The hard work of diplomacy continues to reduce tensions and create 
the environment necessary for North Korea to choose the path of 
denuclearization, forge a lasting peace, and create a brighter future 
for its people. Still, I am clear-eyed about the fact that little to no 
verifiable change has occurred in North Korea's conventional and 
asymmetric capabilities that continue to hold the United States, South 
Korea, and our regional allies at risk. For these reasons, the security 
situation continues to demand an appropriately postured and ready 
force.
    Amid shifting atmospherics, 2018 was also a seminal period for all 
three commands as initiatives for setting the force matured, 
dramatically changing the geography of three headquarters. The USFK and 
UNC Headquarters relocated to Camp Humphreys, joining Eighth Army and 
2nd Infantry Division in new state-of-the-art facilities on the largest 
U.S. Army facility outside of continental United States. The 
headquarters for CFC remains in Seoul at Yongsan and the combined ROK-
United States staff is redefining normal operations based upon this 
change in geography. While distance will not erode the strength of the 
Alliance, it has forced, and will continue to require, deeper thought 
about how to sustain operational readiness across the components and at 
each echelon. For any member of Congress who has not been to Korea in 
the past 24 months, we have reset the force significantly and 
consolidated tremendous capability in Pyeongtaek--the conditions for 
the development and sustainment of combat readiness have changed.
The Armistice Agreement and United Nations Command
    The significantly changing environment along the DMZ, and within 
the JSA specifically, is proving the inherent utility, adaptability, 
and importance of the UNC. Over the past 14 months, we have evolved as 
the CMA and inter-Korean dialogue birthed several of the confidence-
building measures summarized above. CMA-related activities are 
important to the development of the confidence and trust necessary to 
diplomatic progress and are proving to be value-added reinforcements to 
the tools which have helped ensure the security of Korean peninsula for 
the last 65 years--the 1953 Armistice Agreement and the command that 
fulfills it. UNC was formed to organize and operationalize the 
international community's defense of South Korea during the war and 
has, since 1978 when South Korea assumed armistice operational control, 
endured as the body explicitly tasked with ``ensur[ing] a complete 
cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until 
a final peace settlement is achieved.'' The events of 2018 highlight 
UNC's critical role as the home for international commitments on the 
Korean peninsula while simultaneously driving the command toward a 
marked increase in activity, exposure, and international engagement.
    While enforcing the Armistice Agreement, securing the JSA as a 
place for diplomacy, and acting as a principal partner with ROK and KPA 
in the trilateral military talks, the UNC Military Armistice Commission 
(UNCMAC) approved 13,066 border crossings in 2018 (compared with five 
in 2017), passed 152 official messages (56 in 2017), and participated 
in several staff-level and General Officer-level negotiations. UNC 
staff met the dramatic increase in requirements while simultaneously 
continuing the work of evolving the command by increasing UN Sending 
State staff and senior officers and simultaneously executing the move 
from the legacy facilities at Yongsan to a new facility on Camp 
Humphreys. Today, UNCMAC is a vital participant in the ongoing 
negotiations and it provides international legitimacy and validation to 
all of the ongoing confidence building measures. UNCMAC has adapted to 
new conditions and remains the vital tool envisioned in the 1953 
agreement. UNC as a command, enabled during armistice by the UNCMAC, 
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and UNC-Rear in Japan, also 
remains prepared to be the critical link between the international 
community and the other two commands during periods of crisis or 
contingency as the home for Sending State force contributions.
                 posturing and sustaining a ready force
    Fielding a ready force requires establishing a foundation of 
support and sustainment capable of meeting the warfighters' needs in 
the dynamic and uncertain environment of the 21st century. On the 
Korean peninsula, we operate at the distant edge of our military's 
global logistics chain. Our position requires tight integration with 
our South Korean ally, meticulous planning, and organized efforts to 
forward-position adequate capabilities and the materiel essential to 
power projection and contingency response. Today, that foundation is 
sound and serves as the bedrock from which we deter aggression and are 
prepared to defeat, if necessary, any adversary. Moreover, our posture 
supports this period of detente and negotiation by permitting our 
diplomats to speak from a position of unquestioned strength and 
capability.
    Sustaining a combat-ready force requires focused investments, and 
South Korea is an exemplary ally in that regard. President Moon's 
administration is committed to resourcing the Republic of Korea's 
defense and has increased annual spending by bringing total outlays to 
2.7 percent of GDP. Further, the Moon administration has pledged to 
raise ROK defense spending to 2.9 percent of its GDP by 2022. South 
Korea's 2019 Defense Budget increased 8.2 percent from the previous 
year and it apportions funds to programs necessary to advance the 
Conditions-Based OPCON Transition Plan and the Defense Reform 2.0 
initiative. The ROK has invested more in its defense over the past 15 
years than it had in the previous 50, increasing foreign military 
procurements from the United States such as the KF-16 and PATRIOT 
battery upgrades, AH-64E Apaches, the F-15K, RQ-4 Global Hawk variants, 
and the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. This level of investment funding 
traditionally exceeds the commitment of other allies and regional 
partners. In 2018 alone, the ROK signed $2.160 billion in Foreign 
Military Sales cases (including a purchase of P-8A aircraft) in support 
of our shared security commitments as allies.
    Since 1991, a key element of sustaining the force has been the 
Special Measures Agreement (SMA), whereby the South Korean Government 
shares the cost of sustaining the USFK force posture. The SMA assures 
essential readiness-related personnel and activities, such as the 
contributions of 9,000 Korean National employees serving in crucial 
roles of public safety, health care, emergency response, and quality-
of-life delivery operations. The most current SMA expired on December 
31, 2018; as of this writing, the United States and the Republic of 
Korea have reached an agreement, in principle, on a new SMA. Both sides 
are committed to resolving remaining technical issues as quickly as 
possible. The United States appreciates the considerable resources our 
ROK ally provides, including SMA contributions toward the cost of 
maintaining United States Forces in Korea.
    Similarly, South Korea's continued investment in military 
construction and modernization helps ensure our forces are postured, 
prepared, and properly set for the future. The Land Partnership Plan 
(LPP) and the associated Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) are two 
bilateral agreements that provide the foundation for streamlining 
USFK's footprint while returning facilities and valuable land to the 
South Korean Government for future development. USFK and UNC took a 
major step forward in 2018 by relocating both commands from United 
States Army Garrison Yongsan, a legacy cantonment in the heart of 
Seoul, to Camp Humphreys, a large, modern base, which serves as the 
fulcrum for the enduring United States presence in Korea. In total, 
USFK has returned 49 sites to the ROK since 2003 while simultaneously 
moving the majority of our forces and families away from the DMZ and 
closer to centralized support hubs located near major air and sea 
ports.
    With the support of this Committee, the Secretary of Defense, and 
INDOPACOM, in 2018, USFK improved its posture by forward-locating onto 
the peninsula certain capabilities, improving others, and increasing 
the capacity of the most crucial warfighting functions. Significant 
gains in posture during 2018 include essential munitions, ballistic 
missile defense systems, and pre-positioned wartime stocks. Our 
efforts, with assistance from the Services, have reduced stocks of 
forward-positioned, outdated munitions by over 214,000 tons. We are on 
track to complete the required retrograde by December 2019. The 
Department continues to apply the $784 million appropriated since 2017 
towards resolving our joint emergent operational need statement related 
to improving the posture, sustainment, and integration of our missile 
defense systems. The recent draw, operational testing, and turn-in of 
14 M1A2 tanks from our prepositioned stocks was the first in a series 
of exercises validating the concept and improving our preparedness to 
rapidly execute similar activities during contingency conditions. 
Additionally, rotational forces augment the 28,500 member baseline, 
bringing with them high-end systems and leaving with invaluable 
experience in the theater operating environment and combined 
interoperability.
    The aggregate result of seven decades of committed partnership 
under our Mutual Defense Treaty is our ironclad Alliance and capable 
forward presence, the elements directly responsible for creating and 
sustaining an environment conducive to both deterrence and diplomacy. 
As we sustain readiness for any potential provocation or conflict, we 
support those working toward enduring peace and denuclearization.
         exercising the force for joint and combined competency
    Last year we commemorated the 40th Anniversary of the establishment 
of the CFC, which has played a central role in deterring war on the 
Korean peninsula and defending the ROK since November 7, 1978. During 
2018, the CFC made significant advances to ensure the long term 
relevance of our combined warfighting capability. The Alliance Guiding 
Principles, a framework to ensure a unified, ready defense posture 
following OPCON transition, was bilaterally developed and endorsed by 
our two governments. Progress in operational concept refinement, 
military plans, and strategic documents has further enhanced our 
combined defense capabilities. Advances across CFC, the heart of the 
ROK-United States Alliance, serve as evidence of the ironclad nature of 
the ROK-United States Alliance and reinforce my view that our combined 
force relationship is stronger than ever.
    Planning is regarded as an indispensable element of military 
readiness, and in 2018 the Joint Staff and INDOPACOM worked diligently 
with USFK to assess and refine plans for potential contingency 
operations on the Korean Peninsula. A bottom-up review of force 
requirements, unit-level readiness, and global mission impact has been 
accomplished. In accordance with the National Defense Strategy, we 
stand prepared to rapidly receive and integrate the personnel and 
materiel necessary to buttress the forward-deployed force in Korea 
during periods of crisis or conflict.
    Combat readiness is perishable. This fact is especially true of 
forces in Korea due to the high-turnover among our servicemembers, 
American and Korean alike, across the spectrum of missions and roles. 
The benchmark for readiness is demonstrating the competencies necessary 
to plan and execute joint and combined operations under the strain of 
crisis or wartime conditions. Tactical training sharpens the baseline 
skills essential to success on the modern battlefield for our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines. Exercises provide the venue to coordinate 
and synchronize operational-level headquarters like CFC (the 
warfighting command on the peninsula) and the service Components across 
time and space in a dynamic environment--a critical operational 
competency during times of crisis. This is true for militaries the 
world over, all of whom strive to exercise under conditions anticipated 
in potential conflict. To succeed in war, we must train hard in peace. 
To succeed in Korea, we must train the CFC in the essential tasks 
necessary to credibly deter aggression and readily deliver victory if 
challenged.
    However, we must continuously strike a balance between the clear 
need to train and exercise military capability and the requirement to 
create space for and support strategic diplomacy. To help achieve this 
equilibrium, we are innovating and evolving our approach by tuning 4 
dials that adjust exercise design and conduct--size, scope, volume, and 
timing. Adjustments to these dials allows exercise design to remain in 
tune with diplomatic and political requirements without sacrificing the 
training of essential tasks. Additionally, such fine tuning allows for 
the mitigation of impacts inherent to rapidly switching from our 
traditional large-scale exercise program to one of more targeted 
events.
    USFK and CFC are working closely with our South Korean partners and 
INDOPACOM to conduct exercises routinely, both joint and combined, to 
test the preparedness and resiliency of our foundation, refine 
operational concepts, and sustain proficiency of mission essential 
tasks. Recent examples include Combined Staff Training (CST) and the 
on-going Korean Marine Exercise Program (KMEP). CST stresses the CFC 
and USFK headquarters and networks to respond to crisis by effectively 
coordinating and communicating activities from the tactical to the 
strategic level. The KMEP series puts combined marines through their 
paces in simulated wartime conditions testing a full spectrum of 
essential tasks and core competencies. Since October 2018, we have 
conducted dozens of small-scale exercises among the components--our 
air, ground, naval, and marine forces train habitually with their ROK 
counterparts on the fundamentals of warfighting.
    Together, these exercises provide the benchmark from which we are 
evolving our program and mitigating the near-term effects of recently 
suspended traditional, large-scale training events. We continue to 
aggressively pursue innovative approaches to joint and combined 
training and are committed to demonstrating that creating space for 
diplomacy need not impede military readiness.
Taking Care of our Warriors and their Families
    Servicemembers, civilians, and families are our most precious 
resource, and I am committed to providing the best possible quality of 
life for them as they serve their nation while stationed in South 
Korea. Among my priorities of effort are sexual assault prevention and 
response, command sponsorship, and high quality medical care.
    United States Forces Korea is committed to strict compliance with 
all Secretary of Defense and Service Chief Requirements and is working 
toward the goal of eliminating sexual assault by fostering a culture of 
dignity and respect across the Command. Our approach is prevention-
focused with an uncompromising adherence to commander involvement and 
victim assistance guided by five critical focus areas: prevention, 
victim assistance, investigation, accountability, and assessment.
    My personal philosophy is ensuring personnel understand they are 
responsible for fostering a climate where sexist behavior, harassment, 
and assault are not tolerated. Additionally, victims' reports are to be 
treated with the utmost seriousness and bystanders are expected to 
intervene--offensive or criminal conduct is neither tolerated nor 
condoned.
    I continually assess the wellbeing of the 7,600 Department of 
Defense dependents living in Korea. The Command Sponsorship Program 
enables 24-36 months accompanied tours for servicemembers. These tour 
lengths are far superior to 12-month unaccompanied tours and benefit 
our warriors, our families, and the commands. Serving in Korea 
accompanied by one's family improves quality of life and morale while 
simultaneously increasing continuity and heightened levels of theater-
specific competency. I fully support our Command Sponsorship Program 
and assess South Korea to be among the safest locations for 
servicemembers and their families to serve abroad.
    Among the most important quality of life issues in South Korea is 
access to high quality medical care for servicemembers and their 
families. TRICARE beneficiaries in South Korea have access to the 
entire spectrum of healthcare services through Department of Defense 
hospitals and clinics plus a TRICARE network of 30 first-class host 
nation hospitals. In addition, the construction, validation and 
certification of the new, state-of-the-art Brian Allgood Army Community 
Hospital at Camp Humphreys, once delayed by as much as 8-months, has 
now been placed on track for completion by November 2019. Before year's 
end, we will deliver a new facility for our families, one that meets or 
exceeds all U.S. medical requirements and standards.
                          resourcing readiness
    I wish to thank the Committee for their continued commitment to the 
readiness of UNC/CFC/USFK and for supporting the development and 
fielding of capabilities critical to sustaining our edge and mitigating 
asymmetric threats. To further harden our posture and improve our 
readiness to act, my prioritized areas of concentration for future 
investment are: the network, situational awareness, lethality, and 
interoperability.
    The dynamic nature of conflict, particularly in a combined setting, 
applies unique stress on the networks upon which command and control, 
communication, computers, and intelligence rely. Our networks must 
remain impervious to cyber intrusion or effect; the DPRK demonstrates 
increasing cyber capacity that must be matched and thwarted. 
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets along with 
sensors capable of detecting a broad array of threats and activities 
provide the situational awareness that informs decision-making during 
both armistice conditions and crisis. We require persistent ISR that 
overcomes the inherent challenges of geography and allows for reliable 
operational indications and warning that prevents strategic 
miscalculation. Increasingly lethal capabilities, from the tactical to 
operational, are required for unquestioned power projection in a region 
with rapidly advancing competitors and adversaries. Our superiority in 
the air remains vitally important; our ability to rapidly counter 
aggression and defend South Korea relies upon dominant air power. 
Lastly, interoperability remains essential if we are to derive the 
benefits of joint and combined warfighting.
    We are making progress in each of these areas by working in close 
coordination with the Department of Defense, INDOPACOM, our South 
Korean ally, UN Sending States, the interagency, industry, and academic 
partners. I look forward to answering your questions concerning these 
initiatives and providing you with all relevant information required to 
inform this Committee's work.
                               conclusion
    I remain confident that our four enduring priorities are correct in 
the short term: sustain and strengthen the Alliance, maintain the 
armistice, transform the Alliance, and sustain the force. The central 
themes of my 90-day personal assessment will underpin my continued 
review of readiness in an ever-changing strategic environment and will 
help us remain focused on these priorities.
    The men and women, military and civilian alike, who serve within 
the UNC, CFC, and USFK have the tools required for success. They are 
highly motivated, capably armed, and well supported by their parent 
service, the Department of Defense, and this Committee. The force is 
sufficiently postured to deter aggression and defeat any adversary, if 
necessary. We continue to train at echelon to maintain the readiness 
required to translate a strong military posture into decisive victory 
on short notice.
    Our Alliance with the Republic of Korea remains ironclad and stands 
as a testament to our shared history of service and sacrifice. The 
combined strength of that alliance is formidable as our warriors embody 
our slogan--Katchi Kapshida (We go together)! As soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and marines of both nations make the daily sacrifices inherent 
to uniformed service, we strive to ensure we provide for them and their 
families. A well postured, ready, and nurtured force strikes fear in 
the heart of those who would challenge it.
    We are in a historic period on the Korean Peninsula. While the 
near-term future is unclear, the significance of this moment cannot be 
overstated. In the midst of dynamic change, UNC/CFC/USFK stands as a 
steadfast, stabilizing presence in the region. This has been the case 
for over 65 years and will continue into the decades ahead. I am proud 
to lead the men and women who carry on the noble work of generations 
past. I am confident that our actions--our readiness--directly 
contributes to the defense of the United States and the security of 
South Korea, while providing the credible military strength from which 
our distinguished diplomats can negotiate and advance lasting peace for 
the Korean peninsula and the region.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General. Let me first of all 
mention something that we've talked about quite a bit of times.
    You know, the American people are not really aware of the 
threats that we face. I think we all understand that. The 
problem with this is for us to have the proper priorities for 
our military, I think it's necessary for the American people to 
understand why we're having to do all of this. You still see 
things that are happening, that they still believe that we have 
the best of everything and nothing to worry about because 
that's how it's always been and so forth, but they don't 
realize how fast China has modernized and the problems that 
we're facing out there.
    Admiral Davidson, what do you think can be done? Our 
military has come forth--General Dunford, when he said, ``We 
have lost our qualitative and quantitative edge over the 
adversaries.'' Milley said, ``In terms of artillery, the Army 
is outranged and outgunned by our adversaries.''
    Same thing was true with Moran in talking about the Hornet 
Fleet. You know, I've been on the Senate and the House Armed 
Services Committee for many, many years. I don't ever remember 
a time when the military has come forth with the shot of 
realism like they have recently. I'd like to know, what can you 
guys do more to make the American people more aware of the 
threats that we face?
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator, for your 
question. The advances made by China, especially, but the other 
threats I articulated in the region, Russia specifically in the 
21st century, have really been profound. While our Nation has 
been focused on the efforts of land wars in Southeast Asia, 
these advances have been basically unchecked with the economic 
power that China has brought to bear, and they have greatly 
advanced their capability truly in all domains.
    You mentioned space. What was essentially a handful of 
satellites at the turn of the century has now become hundreds 
of satellites--capabilities and communications and surveillance 
and reconnaissance and other capabilities in space. If I move 
it all the way down through air, they've now got fourth- and 
fifth-generation fighters, which were not there at the 
beginning of the century, and they have now advanced surface 
and submarine assets that they also did not enjoy at the turn 
of the century.
    The time to invest in these things is now. I'm quite 
encouraged by all the concepts that you've seen come forward 
from the services, from Multi-Domain Task Force to the 
distributed maritime operations, as well as the commitments and 
the profiles that the services have begun to make and being 
able to operate in these multi-domains where these advances 
have taken place.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, I think you're right on that, but 
we're also seeing them rubbing our noses in it. We've not seen 
this before. Admiral Greenert wrote a recent paper that his 
Chinese counterpart, the head of the PLA [Chinese People's 
Liberation Army] Navy, was surprised that ``the United States 
did not have a more''--and I'm quoting now--``a more forceful 
reaction'' when China began its island building in 2013.
    They're actually talking about us. Where this is reflected 
is with our allies. Several of us on this Committee were in the 
South China Seas just a short while ago, and our allies, you 
know, they're almost looking at what's happening in the South 
China Seas, with the island building and all of that, as the 
Chinese preparing for World War III and, you know, which side 
are we going to be on?
    That's something that does bother me. I think, also, it's 
affecting a lot of the attitudes. I know that Xi Jinping said 
that he would not--and this is his quote--``abandon the use of 
force as a potential means of achieving the unification of 
Taiwan.''
    Now, what more can we do to try to overcome this attitude 
that's out there and is having an adverse effect on our allies? 
Any thoughts on that?
    Admiral Davidson. In the operational space, one of the 
things we've been able to do in just the last 5 months, 
Senator, is get our allies and partners to join us in the South 
China Sea. Not all of their operations are defined as freedom 
of navigation operations as we would define them, but their 
willingness to sail independently in there, to work with us on 
exercises demonstrates the international commitment to 
maintaining the freedom of those seas and airways. I think it's 
critically important to message China that it's not just the 
United States that is concerned about the freedom of the South 
China Seas, but indeed all nations. I expect allies and 
partners to continue to help here in the months ahead, both 
with some combined operations that we'll be executing, as well 
as some individual operations as well.
    One of the other factors that we're working on in the 
diplomatic space is to help ASEAN [Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations] in this discussion about Code of Conduct 
negotiations with China. China has essentially delivered a 
draft that dictates to those ASEAN nations when and where and 
who they would sail with in the South China Sea. Helping them 
protect the international freedoms of the seas and airspace 
that have been long established in maritime law that the United 
States and others have fought for over the centuries is quite 
important.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, well that's good.
    My time is expired, General Abrams, but I will have a 
question for the record having to do with South Korea and 
what's going on.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Abrams, there's been discussions about the cost of 
our forces on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump suggested a 
few times that it's expensive. These negotiations with the 
Special Measures Agreement seem to be more controversial than 
previous years and, interestingly enough, it's just for a term 
of 1 year, where typically it's a 5-year term, so we're going 
to be right back in the saddle of talking about supporting 
forces and the South Korean support for our forces on the 
peninsula.
    Can you talk about the significance of maintaining our 
force presence there? Is it critical or can we afford to draw 
down?
    General Abrams. Senator, our presence and our posture is 
appropriate in terms of providing an adequate deterrent against 
the DPRK. It provides a force structure in numbers and 
capability that's capable of responding to hostilities and 
provocations and prepared to defend the Republic of Korea if 
they are called upon. Our posture there also serves as a 
stabilizing factor, stability in Northeast Asia. It provides 
reassurance to not only the Republic of Korea, but to Japan and 
other partners in the region, and serves as a bulwark against 
the expansion of China, as Admiral Davidson just outlined. Our 
presence there serves multiple purposes.
    Senator Reed. One purpose I suspect also, too, is to give 
confidence to our allies, the South Koreans and the Japanese 
particularly. Would they be concerned if we drew down our 
forces in any way?
    General Abrams. Senator, I hesitate to speak on behalf of 
the Republic of Korea or Japan, but in my dealings with both of 
them I would say yes, they would be concerned if we were to do 
that.
    Senator Reed. One of the other aspects in this relationship 
between the South Koreans and Japanese is there is a long, long 
history there. There are at times some difficulties between 
that relationship. Can you characterize the relationship? I 
think many people assume it's just completely harmonious, but 
I've observed comments and issues in which there was some 
friction. Is that still the case?
    General Abrams. Senator, as you stated, there are long-term 
items of friction between those two countries. In my 
experience, it's difficult for Westerners to appreciate the 
breadth and depth of some of that tension as these are very old 
countries, ancient societies, and many of their tensions go 
back hundreds and hundreds of years. Occasionally, it flares up 
with misunderstandings between the two that are exacerbated by 
topics of the current day. Those only serve to re-inflame those 
old grievances.
    Having said that, militarily we continue to see cooperation 
and commitment on both sides because they both understand that 
there are much bigger concerns for them to worry about than 
some of their long-term friction points. They've got some 
mutual goals that they've got to work together on.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
    Admiral Davidson, again, thank you for your service, too. 
One of the proposals consistent with the National Defense 
Strategy that the Marine Corps is advancing is to occupy 
islands forward of their present position and use them not only 
to protect them from seizure by anyone, but also to help defend 
the fleets and our air forces operating in the region. Is that 
a concept that you support?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, all the services have put forth 
expeditionary concepts like that. They all have slightly 
different names--the EABO [Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations] concept, the Multi-Domain Task Force--but those are 
capabilities that I think serve a deterrent basis in the region 
and they're also fight-and-win capabilities that we may have to 
utilize in the future.
    Senator Reed. Let me just, in general, are you satisfied in 
terms of the weapons systems that you have available given what 
the Chinese, in particular, are developing so quickly? You 
alluded to them in your comments repeatedly--new generations of 
fighters, long-range precision missiles that threaten our 
carriers that 10, 15 years ago were not even on the--certainly 
not deployed. Are you satisfied you're getting kind of the 
weapons that can counter those weapons?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, we speak frequently about the 
erosion of our advantage in the theater, which is really the 
case here. China has seriously eroded that quantitative 
advantage--the number of assets that they have--but they're 
also eroding that qualitative advantage is what I'm talking to 
you about fourth- and fifth-generation. Are we now making 
progress, I think, in that budget? Yes. We do have the roots of 
some capabilities, many capabilities, that would be applicable 
in any warfare scenario as I see the future play out. But the 
investments, I think, need to come more rapidly, and we need to 
be willing to innovate to get there as well.
    There is much to be done in this space. I don't want to 
give the impression that last year's budget necessarily is 
putting us on the track to regain that advantage. On-time 
budgets and the kind of investments that we've been talking 
about in the Department for the 2020 and 2021 budget to come, 
which I haven't seen the final 2020 budget, I think are 
critically important to regaining that advantage.
    Senator Reed. Just a final comment. If there is a 
particular system that is being developed that you think that 
would be very applicable, but it's not being adapted by the 
services from your standpoint, both of you as combat 
commanders/field commanders, please let us know. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    During the course of this hearing, we are going to have 
some subjects come up that would be better addressed in a 
closed session. There will be a closed session at 2:30 this 
afternoon.
    Senator Wicker.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed has touched on an issue that is surprising to 
many of us and I believe that needs some more attention. He 
asked General Abrams about the worsening relations between two 
of our great allies, the Republic of Korea--South Korea, and 
Japan. I would submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, two 
articles; one from the February 9th Washington Post entitled 
``Japan-South Korea ties worst in five decades as United States 
leaves alliance untended'' and also a February 10 article from 
The Nelson Report entitled ``Japan, ROK crisis gets worse.''
    [The information referred to follows:]

japan-south korea ties `worst in five decades' as united states leaves 
                           alliance untended
By Simon Denyer
February 9

    TOKYO--Leaders have turned their backs on each other. They have 
traded barbs. Military and business ties are fraying, and the media is 
up in arms.
    Relations between Japan and South Korea, the most important United 
States allies in the Asia-Pacific region, are unraveling fast. And 
while the leaders of both countries share the blame, the Trump 
administration has taken its eye off the ball, experts say. This has 
allowed spats to grow that could undermine United States efforts to 
sustain a coalition of Asian democracies and contain China.
    Japan ruled over South Korea from the beginning of the 20th Century 
until the end of World War II, and Seoul and Tokyo's complicated 
history has always loomed large in the background.
    But the rancor that has soured relations lately is among the worst 
in generations.
    ``The relationship between South Korea and Japan is suffering a 
compound fracture unprecedented in the five decades since the two 
countries established diplomatic relations,'' said Shin Kak-soo, a 
former South Korean ambassador to Japan.He added, ``The Trump 
administration did not pay attention to the alliance.''
    The rift came after a South Korean Supreme Court decision in 
October ordering a Japanese steel producer to compensate Korean workers 
forced into labor during Japanese colonial rule, but the root of the 
crisis runs much deeper and its effects have reverberated in all 
directions since.
    In November, South Korea shut down a foundation established to help 
care for the Korean women--more commonly known as ``comfort women''--
who were forced into sexual slavery in Japanese military brothels 
during World War II. The foundation was funded by Japan as part of a 
2015 deal intended to put the issue to rest.
    [Japan's Abe stakes out new regional identity]
    Then Tokyo went public with accusations that a South Korean warship 
had locked its fire-control radar onto a Japanese patrol plane, a move 
seen as a precursor to actually firing.
    Seoul denied the accusation and countered with the charge that the 
Japanese plane had been flying dangerously low. Japan's conservative 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korea's liberal President Moon Jae-
in come from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.
    In South Korea, Abe is an unpopular figure, seen as reluctant to 
express genuine remorse for Japan's behavior during its colonial rule 
over the peninsula.
    In Japan, Moon is seen as the latest in a long line of South Korean 
leaders who have exploited popular resentment of Japan to shore up 
their own flagging popularity and reneged on agreements reached by 
previous governments.
    Tokyo says the Supreme Court decision violates a 1965 deal 
establishing diplomatic relations, under which Japan gave South Korea 
much-needed economic aid as compensation for forced labor. But if Japan 
takes a legalistic position, then many South Koreans are more concerned 
with what they see as justice, said Shin. Moon himself was a human 
rights lawyer who once represented claimants in a case against 
Mitsubishi over forced labor.
    Liberals in South Korea tend to see the 1965 agreement as an 
unequal treaty imposed by Japan on a weak country still recovering from 
the ravages of war, led by military strongman Park Chung-hee, who 
trained in the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria during the final 
stages of World War II.
    To outsiders, the antipathy between the two countries--both free 
market democracies with close relationships to the West--can come as a 
surprise.
    But the tragedy of the current crisis, according to Yasushi Kudo of 
the Japanese think tank Genron NPO, is that this antipathy had been 
gradually subsiding, especially among young people, thanks in part to 
booming tourism and a mutual affinity for the other country's popular 
culture.
    A territorial dispute over a group of small islands, administered 
by South Korea but claimed by Japan, has also inflamed passions, 
notably when then-President Lee Myung-bak visited the islands in 2012.
    But the relationship is also complicated by the immense changes 
that have swept through South Korea over the past five decades, as the 
country has emerged from Japan's shadow to become a thriving democracy 
and economic powerhouse in its own right.
    South Korea grew up, and Japan never really accepted that, 
according to Koichi Nakano, a political science professor at Tokyo's 
Sophia University.
    ``Many Japanese leaders are still caught up with a condescending, 
or even perhaps bordering on a racist, attitude toward South Korea as a 
smaller and less developed country,'' he said. ``There is this attitude 
among conservatives that, at the end of the day, we can bully Korea 
into submission.''
    South Korea, fiercely nationalistic in its own right, is far from 
overawed. In fact, it's preoccupied with other issues--its 
relationships with North Korea, the United States and China are today 
seen as more important than its relationship with Japan.
    Liberals in Seoul tend to place less value than conservatives on 
the alliance with the United States, and so less value on the 
triangular relationship with Japan, said Junya Nishino, director of 
contemporary Korean studies at Keio University in Tokyo.
    At home, though, both leaders are playing populist tunes, and the 
media in both countries is dancing to it.
    Nishino fears the situation is about to get worse. Despite 
tensions, the relationship was founded on strong ties between the two 
militaries, civil society contacts and extensive business and trade 
links.
    All three have suffered in the latest dispute.
    Former U.S. president Barack Obama played an important role in 
mending ties between the two countries earlier in the decade, arranging 
a trilateral summit in 2014 and brokering the comfort women agreement 
the following year. By contrast, Trump has shown much less interest in 
or affinity for America's Asian allies, experts in both countries said. 
The crisis is bad news for the United States, experts say, and 
undermines United States efforts to gather like-minded nations under 
the banner of a free and open Indo-Pacific and counter China's rising 
influence.
    However, it also undermines Japan's ``brand'' in Asia, Nakano said, 
with its ability to play a leading role in the region hobbled by its 
failure to resolve disputes over its wartime past, especially with a 
fellow democracy.
    ``Japan can't continue to have the influence it used to have in the 
region without getting along with Korea,'' he said. ``As a democracy, 
we were supposedly at the forefront of progress in Asia in the postwar 
period, but we are becoming more and more reactionary, a declining 
power.''

    Admiral Davidson, I don't want to spend the whole time on 
this, but General Abrams commented on it. This is a serious 
problem which potentially affects our ability to gain 
cooperation between our allies; is that correct?
    Admiral Davidson. I think both nations recognize, Senator, 
that the future in the Indo-Pacific is going to require great 
democracies like Korea, Japan, the United States and others to 
work together here for the very long term.
    I can tell you, to the point about whether the alliance is 
being tended to, I've spoken to both the chiefs of defense in 
Korea and Japan in the last week. I will return a call to the 
chief of defense in Korea later this week. I've talked to both 
our ambassadors in the last week there, met with one of them--
both of them, actually--personally. Much is going on to help 
facilitate our mutual concerns in the region and our alliances.
    Senator Wicker. Does State and DOD, do they both understand 
the seriousness of this deterioration, and are they both 
tending to it?
    Admiral Davidson. I would say the answer to that is yes, 
sir.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you. Very good. That's, I think, 
surprising to hear and good to know there are efforts made.
    Now, after the USS Fitzgerald and McCain, tragic collisions 
resulting in fatalities and the loss of hundreds of millions of 
dollars, there were two investigations. Senator McCain and I 
introduced the Surface Warfare Enhancement Act asking that many 
of the recommendations of these investigations be implemented. 
This led to inclusion of most of our legislation in the Fiscal 
Year 2019 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
    Are we on track to fully implement the Surface Warfare 
Enhancement Act? The reviews that caused so much concern were 
that demand for naval power was far outstripping the supply of 
ships and submarines. That was what led in part to these 
collisions and tragedies. What's the state of that imbalance 
today,
    Admiral Davidson, and what do you need compared to what you 
have now?
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. I have been quite 
pleased with the progress that Navy has made on the 
recommendations that I made in the Comprehensive Review. I'll 
be watching the 2020 budget when it comes together. There are a 
couple of items in there, investment in schoolhouses, that I 
want to make sure are followed through on.
    I'm quite confident in Admiral Aquilino's approach to the 
OPTEMPO [Operating Tempo] out in Seventh Fleet right now. We've 
had the good fortune of being able to relieve some of the 
responsiveness based on the easing of some of the tensions on 
the peninsula, as well as reshuffling some of the priorities 
there in the region. He continues remediation efforts of the 
Seventh Fleet in terms of training and maintenance there in 
Yokosuka, particularly in the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, and so 
I'm quite pleased with how he's managing that force.
    Senator Wicker. Just to make sure, the previous NDAA placed 
a 355-ship requirement that the Navy had established as a 
statutory policy of the United States. Are you still committed 
to that 355-ship Navy and do you still view it as the statutory 
law of the land?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, in the Indo-Pacific region, I think 
we need more capacity in the maritime, to be sure. The Navy is 
undergoing another force structure review I think to look at 
that number again and affirm that for the Department.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
both for being here today and for your service to our country.
    General Abrams, North Korea transferred 55 boxes of remains 
of missing United States servicemen from the Korean War after 
the last summit between the President and Kim Jong-un. Can you 
tell me if we're still cooperating with the North Koreans on 
trying to return more missing servicemen? My understanding is 
we think about 5300 of the 7700 soldiers who are missing are 
believed to have died someplace in North Korea.
    General Abrams. Senator, the short answer is yes, we are. I 
am aware of the DPAA's [Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in 
Action Accounting Agency] efforts to continue dialogue with 
North Korea to move forward in execution of our solemn 
responsibility to do everything that we can to bring home our 
missing in action.
    Senator Shaheen. Do you know if that's on the agenda for 
the President's upcoming summit?
    General Abrams. Senator, I'm not aware specifically. I am 
aware that there is a commitment to continuing that dialogue 
that came out of the June summit, but I have not seen the 
specific agenda for this upcoming summit yet.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Admiral Davidson, our office was contacted by several 
United States employees who had been stationed at our embassy 
in China who have medical documentation to indicate that they 
are suffering from traumatic brain injury and the same symptoms 
that we saw from embassy personnel who were evacuated from 
Havana, Cuba.
    Are you aware of any Americans in China who have been 
affected by those same symptoms, and are you aware of any DOD 
personnel who have experienced the symptoms?
    Admiral Davidson. No, Senator, I am not.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    General Abrams, you talked about the DPRK currently 
engaging in very extensive military exercises and also about 
what we continue to do to train with the Republic of Korea. Do 
you believe it would be helpful to resume military exercises 
with the Republic of Korea?
    General Abrams. Senator, to be clear, there have been 
cancellations of some exercises that have been well publicized. 
But as I mentioned in my opening statement, at least since I've 
been there in November, we are continuing to train, conducting 
combined training and exercise, with our ROK counterparts. That 
is continuing unabated. But it's adjusted in accordance with 
some innovative things that we've done by adjusting size, 
scope, volume, and the timing so that we can continue to 
preserve space for Mr. Biegun and the Department of State to do 
their job.
    Senator Shaheen. Again, do you believe it would be helpful, 
in terms of our readiness, to resume the previous kinds of 
exercises?
    General Abrams. Senator, I have been given authority to 
continue planning for those type exercises typically 
characterized as large-scale exercises. Historically, we've 
conducted one in the spring and one in the summer, and I have 
continued planning for execution of one in the spring. I worked 
very closely with the ROK JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the 
ROK chairman himself in that new construct and have forwarded 
that up to the Department of Defense and received full support 
to continue with our planning.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Admiral Davidson, you talked about Russian influence in the 
Indo-Pacific area in your testimony, and you lay out some 
pretty extensive activities that the Russians are doing in your 
written testimony. Are we seeing the kind of cyber intrusions 
and disinformation from Russia in this area of operation that 
we've seen in Europe?
    Admiral Davidson. They are on the same scale, yes, ma'am. I 
would say though that their conventional activities, their air 
and maritime activities especially, are a little less than 
what's been going on in Europe.
    Senator Shaheen. Are we seeing any kind of an effort to 
destabilize the democracies, some of which are fragile, in that 
region?
    Admiral Davidson. Using cyber means?
    Senator Shaheen. Or disinformation, using whatever means 
they have available. Do we expect any kind of gray zone issues 
like we've seen in Ukraine and other parts of Eastern Europe?
    Admiral Davidson. Russia is maneuvering in the region, and 
I think globally, using information to subvert the 
international rules-based order and our objectives in the 
region.
    Senator Shaheen. Do we have a response to that in the same 
way that we have a response to what's going on in Europe?
    Admiral Davidson. I think, ma'am, that when we talk about 
an information campaign that's global, it is a global response 
that it takes, and the United States Indo-Pacific Command is a 
part of that global response, yes.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance 
and your continued service.
    General Abrams, let's dig down a little bit deeper into 
this training question. At what level would your troopers 
recognize a difference from what was happening, say, a year 
ago, to what's happening now? Would a new rifleman in his first 
tour on the Korean Peninsula notice a difference in his 
training level or the training exercises he conducts?
    General Abrams. No.
    Senator Cotton. A squad leader?
    General Abrams. No.
    Senator Cotton. Platoon leader?
    General Abrams. No.
    Senator Cotton. Company commander?
    General Abrams. No.
    Senator Cotton. Battalion commander?
    General Abrams. Senator, he has not noticed a difference 
yet, but he might in the upcoming months.
    Senator Cotton. Then, presumably, the command levels above 
battalion might notice a difference in the kind of exercises 
they conduct?
    General Abrams. Yes, within those four dials. They would--
at that echelon, they would notice it.
    Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say that the commanders at 
that level, the full bird colonel level up to the General 
Abrams level, are pretty well versed in the demands of their 
job from their previous levels of command?
    Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
    Senator Cotton. That's good to know.
    Admiral Davidson, the INDOPACOM is characterized by the 
longest distances in any of our combatant commands. I presume 
that places a premium on long-range precision strike for you 
and your forces?
    Admiral Davidson. It does, absolutely. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cotton. Currently, those are predominantly maritime 
and air based systems?
    Admiral Davidson. That's correct.
    Senator Cotton. There's been a lot of news coverage 
recently about the President's decision--long overdue, in my 
opinion--to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty [INF Treaty], and it's focused, understandably, on what 
it means for Europe and Russia since that was a treaty between 
the United States and Russia back when it was the Soviet Union. 
But what does it mean for you and your theater to have the 
prospect of intermediate-range missiles available for ground 
basing.
    Admiral Davidson. China, since they are not party to the 
INF Treaty, has been investing in the kind of weapons that 
create a serious challenge to us. Over 95 percent of their 
ballistic missiles would not be permitted under the INF Treaty. 
For us to have a land-based component with that kind of 
capability restores maneuver to the force, meaning it'll make 
the air, the maritime, and the land component much more viable 
in any warfare scenario and present a much greater challenge 
for our adversaries to threaten.
    Senator Cotton. All those land-based systems are presumably 
cheaper, easier to operate since they just sit there on land, 
they don't have to move around on a ship or an aircraft all the 
time?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, one of the things that will be 
required, Senator, is mobility out of those assets. I think 
land-based assets will be that way. In this day and age, if it 
is fixed on the planet, it is dead. You don't even need space 
assets to support that. The globe has been mapped and a 
ballistic missile can find its way there based on its own 
internal targeting. We would have to have some mobility in 
those land-based assets.
    Senator Cotton. Your counterparts sitting in the People's 
Liberation Army, do you think it makes them happy that you may 
soon have land-based missiles that can reach intermediate 
ranges?
    Admiral Davidson. No, I think it makes them unhappy.
    Senator Cotton. General Abrams, what about your 
counterparts in North Korea; do you think they're happy or 
unhappy that they may soon face land-based intermediate-range 
missiles?
    General Abrams. I can't characterize whether they're happy 
or not, but I'm certain that it makes them very nervous and it 
is certainly changing their calculus.
    Senator Cotton. Complicates their planning.
    General Abrams. Absolutely.
    Senator Cotton. Okay. Gentlemen--well, I'll address this to 
Admiral Davidson. You can reserve specific details for our 
closed session, but one point of criticism we've heard is that 
we may not have places to base these systems. As you point out, 
they're mobile, they're not often much bigger than a tractor-
trailer. Do you think we'll be able to identify places in the 
INDOPACOM where we can base land-based intermediate-range 
missiles?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir, I think they'll be viable 
assets for us, but it's probably a conversation better to have 
in closed session.
    Senator Cotton. We'll talk about that in greater detail 
this afternoon. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the 
witnesses.
    I want to ask a question about North Korea and then about 
China. On North Korea, I'm struck by the fact that as a member 
of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, we have 
still not had a briefing about any details about commitments 
that were made in the Singapore summit, which was nearly a year 
ago, in either of the Committees.
    I note, General Abrams, your testimony, and I just want to 
read it, ``I am clear-eyed about the fact that little to no 
verifiable change has occurred in North Korea's conventional 
and asymmetric capabilities that continue to hold the United 
States, South Korea, and our regional allies at risk.''
    What I'm looking for is what real evidence is there of any 
changed trajectory on behalf of North Korea? I applaud the 
President, actually, for having the dialogue with North Korea 
leadership. Dialogue guarantees nothing, but the absence of 
dialogue often guarantees a bad outcome. I appreciate dialogue. 
But what I'm looking for is what is the evidence that we would 
want to see to determine that North Korea is serious about 
denuclearization?
    In the Foreign Relations Committee, the testimony we've 
received pretty consistently is the evidence that shows they're 
serious is if they agree to provide some kind of inventory of 
their nuclear assets. Until there is transparency and 
disclosure, we have no reason to believe they're serious. If 
there is transparency and disclosure, they might be serious. 
That would be sort of the first step to show they're serious; 
more work to be done, obviously.
    To this point, February 12, 2019, are you aware of any 
commitment that North Korea has made to provide an inventory of 
nuclear infrastructure or assets that they have?
    General Abrams. Senator, I am not aware of that.
    Senator Kaine. Admiral Davidson, are you aware of any?
    Admiral Davidson. No, I'm not.
    Senator Kaine. That's what we really need to see coming out 
of a next summit in Vietnam, or hopefully soon. Until we see 
it, I think this issue about no verifiable progress, we have to 
be skeptical. North Korea has made promises in the past, 
they've been willing to talk in the past, but the question of 
what shows progress, we've got to see some willingness to 
disclose. Let me move to China.
    Admiral Davidson, you talked a little bit about, in your 
testimony and in response to some of the questions, that some 
nations are starting to realize that China may seem friendly up 
front, they may have assets and resources to offer up front, 
but the terms kind of overly debt-burdening. Nations like Sri 
Lanka and others have started to appear very onerous. Malaysia 
has canceled projects and basically has criticized China's way 
of dealing with them as sort of a new form of colonialism.
    We hear this all over the world, not just in Asia--we hear 
it in South America, we hear it in Africa--that the strings 
attached to Chinese assistance, up front they may seem fine, 
but they start to really chafe, and nations are starting to be 
wary. But you can't fight something with nothing. If China is 
there promising resources, a lot of the military posture of the 
United States does also involve what soft power we bring to the 
table to try to encourage nations to not accept the sugar-high 
promise up front only to regret it later.
    What would your advice to us be, not just as Armed Services 
Members, but we're on all kinds of other committees as well, 
what would your advice to us be in terms of the kinds of 
additional focus the United States should be offering in the 
INDOPACOM area to try to wean nations away from over-reliance 
on this dangerous Chinese strategy of kind of getting claws in 
other nations?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, I think when we look back in 
history, I think it will look very kindly on the passage of the 
BUILD [Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
Development] Act here last fall. The transition from OPIC 
[Overseas Private Investment Corporation] to the Development 
Finance Corporation, the consolidation of some independent 
foreign financing mechanisms in the country, the doubling of 
the investment, the freeing of private investment, these are 
critically important efforts. When we talk about whole-of-
government, that's the kind of thing that we're talking about.
    The other key factor is----
    Senator Kaine. Just, BUILD Act, if anybody wonders if 
Congress can do things bipartisan, very bipartisan, really was 
to try to amass the governmental resources but also enable them 
to better attract private resources so if we go into nations in 
your or any part of the world, we have more to offer to counter 
the Chinese strategy.
    Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. We're also working quite 
closely with allies and partners in the region--Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, especially--particularly in some of the areas 
that are in key competition with China. Leveraging their 
investments and their interests, I think, on this will be 
critically important for the free and open Indo-Pacific as 
well.
    Then I'd say lastly, right now, the Indo-Pacific Command 
gets just a small portion of the foreign military financing; 
really, less than 5 percent of that overall. We need to take a 
look at where we can better port that money in the region to 
help compete in this whole-of-government environs that we're 
talking about.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you both for your service to our country.
    Admiral Davidson, you indicated in your opening statement 
that there was not just China as a threat or the Republic of 
North Korea, but you also indicated that Russia was playing a 
role. Could you expand on that just a little bit and explain to 
us where you see them and what their role is today and how they 
make an impact?
    Admiral Davidson. It's not unlike what's happening in the 
Atlantic in Europe. They're certainly engaging in the region 
diplomatically and in the information space to act as a 
spoiler, really to undermine the rules-based international 
order. They're doing almost nothing to help sanctions with 
North Korea. I can't say that they're specifically opposed to 
them in this forum, I mean actively opposing them, but they are 
doing little to help there.
    One of the key things that occurred last fall is they ran a 
combined portion of their very major exercise, Vostok, in 2018. 
They invited the Chinese to attend that as well, which I think 
is also problematic in signaling to the region.
    Senator Rounds. If you were to look at their activity 
within the cyber realm, within the domain, are they active with 
regard to cyber activity, actively involved in cyber activity 
in the Indo-Pacific region?
    Admiral Davidson. You know, that capability that Russia has 
is a global threat, sir.
    Senator Rounds. With regard to ISR [Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], you have some resources. I 
would assume, as all commanders would suggest, you could use a 
lot more. Do you see any activity or improvements, and can you 
expand a little bit on the discussion of ISR threats to our 
well-being and to the safety and security of our forces in your 
region by all three--Korea, China, and Russia?
    Admiral Davidson. ISR is a critical need in the region, 
sir. Less than half of my requirements are served by the ISR 
that's available the region. Some of that will be investment 
over time. Some of it is the balance globally between the 
combatant commanders, what's required to facilitate our overall 
interests in those regions. I'm thankful for some of the tools 
that Congress has given. There is a contracting tool that was 
activated last year and I'm in conversation with the Department 
of Defense to see if I can gain some of those assets, and I'm 
grateful for that.
    Senator Rounds. General Abrams, same question with regard 
to ISR. How do you see your ISR capabilities as compared with 
that of the anticipated adversary in this particular case?
    General Abrams. Senator, our ISR capability--well first 
off, it outpaces the DPRK's. But that should not change our own 
commitment in terms of calculus because our ISR is what gives 
us not just intelligence, but really, early warning. It 
provides us clarity so that we can begin to see early and with 
some clarity and conciseness so we can prevent miscalculation 
on either our part or their part. That's really the importance 
behind the ISR requirements that we have on the peninsula.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Admiral Davidson, with regard to our allies in the region, 
and we have a number of them there, could you sum up for us, if 
they were expressing concerns to you about our commitment to 
the region, could you share with us what you believe their 
thoughts are with regard to our commitment to the Indo-Pacific 
region?
    Admiral Davidson. I think certainly in conversations with 
my counterparts, sir, there's been a general convergence around 
the idea that a free and open Indo-Pacific is going to take all 
of our efforts working together. I think the United States' 
commitment in a variety of operations, whether it's our freedom 
of navigation operations in the South China Sea, our total 
totality of the exercise program in the United States, the 
assistance that we provide to partners in addition to allies, 
and then the commitment that our allies understand in the basis 
of our treaty alliances and our support to those treaties, I 
think, is unquestioned.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Manchin.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all 
for your service.
    General Abrams, the United States-Republic of Korea 
military exercises, they've been scaled back or canceled as 
part of a wider diplomatic effort to ease tensions with North 
Korea and push them towards denuclearization. What is your 
confidence level that the talks with North Koreans over 
denuclearization will make any improvements?
    General Abrams. Senator, a couple of data points.
    First off, today is day 440 since the last strategic 
provocation from the DPRK, the last time since we've had a 
missile flight test or a nuclear weapons test. As I mentioned 
in my opening statement, the reduction in the tension on the 
peninsula, it's palpable. If you have not been on the peninsula 
in a while, along the DMZ there has been significant reduction 
that has enabled nation confidence-building measures, it has 
increased prevention--I should say it's decreased the chance of 
mistakes, miscalculation, and it's continued to preserve space 
for the main effort, the Department of State to continue along 
this road of negotiations and discussion with the DPRK.
    I think my personal opinion is the announcement of a second 
summit between President Trump and the supreme leader Kim is a 
positive sign of continued dialogue because it certainly beats 
the alternative of what we were living with in 2017.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
    Admiral Davidson, you stated in your confirmation hearing 
that China is already capable of controlling the South China 
Sea in any scenario short of war with the United States. So my 
question would be what's stopping them right now from 
exercising this capability whenever they feel like it, and what 
are we as the United States or our allies in the region doing 
to continually discourage them from exercising this power?
    Admiral Davidson. One of the things that I think has set 
them back was the international community coming together in 
the South China Sea here in about the beginning of September 
time frame. We've had allies and partners in the region, the 
UK, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, all in one 
form or another step up their operations in the South China 
Sea, and I think that shows the international community's 
willingness to push back.
    Senator Manchin. Sir, do we currently have the logistical 
capability to surge necessary combat power to the Indo-Pacific 
region if needed to combat Chinese aggression?
    Admiral Davidson. Any discussion of the logistics and 
sustainment that's required depends on the total scale and 
scope of what might be happening. That's true both in our 
ability to defend it from sabotage, special operations attacks, 
you know, conventional maritime and air attacks, as well as 
cyber attacks that might disrupt our logistics networks and 
prevent all those assets from arriving.
    One of the other key needs for the region, sir, is--and 
you're hearing this from other combat commanders as well as the 
services--is the need to recapitalize our sealift fleet. It is 
decades old now and needs to be replaced nearly desperately.
    Senator Manchin. Also, according to the World Economic 
Forum, by 2030, your AOR [Area of Responsibility] will be home 
to many of the world's mega-cities. This will continue to 
present vast complicated governance issues, and my fear is that 
these governments will look to an authoritarian China as a 
model over the United States.
    The question would be, from the military perspective, what 
are some meaningful steps that can be taken to help leaders in 
India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines so that they don't 
start looking at authoritarianism as the way to go?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, I think one of the things that we 
can do is to continue our whole-of-government approach on a 
free and open Indo-Pacific. We have a burgeoning relationship 
with India. We've made significant defense progress on that 
relationship just in the last year with the cosigning of the 
COMCASA [Communications, Compatability and Security Agreement]. 
We are working to operationalize that--it's essentially an IT 
[Information Technology]-sharing agreement--in a way that shows 
India the power of being able to link with us in a tactical 
sense and an operational sense as well.
    Committing to that rules-based international order and 
working to that free and open Indo-Pacific ends will attract 
these nations along with us. I can't imagine any country would 
be willing to have an international order led by a nation that 
has a closed and authoritarian internal order. It's just not to 
the benefit of any of us.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
    Senator Ernst.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, 
for being here today.
    We've seen a lot of discussion about China, North Korea, a 
revisionist China, and a nuclear North Korea. We also have 
extremist groups that exist within your regions, as well, with 
ties to ISIS and other types of terrorist groups.
    Admiral Davidson, I'd like to start with you. I understand 
that there are a couple of countries or a few countries out 
there, like Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, that operate 
under Compacts of Free Association. We have financial 
assistance that's provided through that, and we've talked about 
a number of different ways that we're cooperating with various 
countries, allies in the region.
    These Compacts of Free Association, some of them will be 
expiring in four to five years. Can you maybe talk us through 
why those are so important? What do we realize out of those 
types of compacts and should they be funded or should we allow 
them to expire?
    Admiral Davidson. In short, Senator, those compacts are the 
connective tissue between the United States and the physical 
air and maritime and terrestrial space to 60 percent of the 
world's economy. The compacts obligate us to defend those 
nations as we would defend ourselves. It also gives them some 
financial assurances and the ability to participate and work in 
our countries without immigrant classifications.
    I can tell you that these nations contribute way out of 
proportion to their population in our defense. I meet 
servicemembers from Palau and the Marshall Islands, all over 
the Indo-Pacific, and they have served quite bravely and 
honorably, in the last 15 years in Southwest Asia.
    Those compact agreements are going to expire in--at least 
the financial mechanism is going to expire in 2023, and 2024 
for Palau. I think the need for us to sustain those obligations 
is important because of the freedoms that it gives us. It 
allows us to keep any third-party nation from taking military, 
from occupying it, from them making a military agreement with 
them. It gives us the strategic flexibility to block that.
    The financial mechanisms are going to expire in the 2023/
2024 time frame. But the fact of the matter is these nations 
are at risk from the very pernicious approach that China has 
taken with their economic vehicles in the region. To prevent 
that from happening, we should look at the long-term need on 
those COFA states, what the financial mechanisms are that 
retain this strategic alliance for us and the benefits that it 
accrues to the United States military and, truly, the defense 
to the United States. Without those three countries and our 
strategic alliance, the logistics and sustainment of our 
operations in the Western Pacific would be severed.
    Senator Ernst. So bottom line, those agreements are very 
important, correct?
    Admiral Davidson. Absolutely, ma'am.
    Senator Ernst. Outstanding. That's a great explanation. I 
appreciate that very much.
    General Abrams, in looking at the threat that's been talked 
about with North Korea, I also want to talk about North Korea's 
special forces, their special operations forces. They presented 
a tactical operational threat to South Korea and the role of 
our own special operators in countering that threat. Could you 
maybe just briefly describe the threat that is being posed by 
North Korean special operators?
    General Abrams. Senator, thank you. In this unclassified 
setting, here's what I can say. Since Kim Jong-un assumed 
responsibility for leading his regime, this has been one of his 
specific investments in terms of increasing the size and 
capability of his special operations forces, and secondly, they 
spend a considerable amount of time doing training. I'm happy 
to give you more detail in the classified session.
    Senator Ernst. We can talk about that later, and I 
appreciate that very much. Are we integrating our own special 
operators to specifically train to push back on the North 
Korean special operators?
    General Abrams. Senator, we are. We have a very small 
Special Operations Command Korea, but extraordinarily capable. 
They punch way above their weight class. We're lucky; we're 
fortunate enough to have a rotational U.S. Army Special Forces 
ODB [Operational Detachment-Bravo]. So for instance, today on 
the peninsula, we have five ODAs' [Operational Detachment 
Alpha] persistent presence embedded with ROK-SOF [Republic of 
Korea Special Operations Forces] training and partnering every 
single day.
    Senator Ernst. That's outstanding. My time has expired.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We hear a lot of testimony in this Committee about the 
threats posed by China, Russia, rogue states, transnational 
terrorist groups. A strong military is critical to addressing 
those challenges, but there's some threats that can't be solved 
by traditional military power at all. One of those is climate 
change.
    The unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment by the 
director of national intelligence said, and I'm going to quote 
here, ``Global environmental and ecological degradation, as 
well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for 
resources, economic distress, and social discontent through 
2019 and beyond.'' That assessment also said, ``Damage to 
communication, energy, and transportation infrastructure could 
affect low-lying military bases, inflict economic costs, and 
cause human displacement and loss of life.''
    Admiral Davidson, do you agree with the intelligence 
community's assessment of the climate change threat?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Warren. How does climate change impact operations 
in your area of responsibility and what are you doing to 
prepare for climate change?
    Admiral Davidson. Well, the immediate manifestation, ma'am, 
is the number of ecological disaster events that are happening. 
I've just wrapped up after some 3\1/2\-months of assistance in 
Tinian and Saipan, a contribution of title 10 forces in 
significant numbers, to help clear debris, to help fix roofs, 
to help restore the infrastructure there writ large.
    I've also been called to respond and assist in Indonesia in 
the wake of the earthquake and the tsunami that happened last 
year. A little separate from climate change. But our assistance 
in terms of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, our 
ability to command and control, to marshal troops, to deliver 
logistics is important training for the region and something 
that they all need. One of the things that my headquarters does 
is we run a center for excellence in disaster management. That 
training is available not just to the title 10 folks but also 
our interagency here in the United States, and we export those 
courses, as well, to countries throughout the Indo-Pacific and, 
really, globally, to help assist them in these matters.
    Senator Warren. Thank you. You know, adapting to climate 
change impacts our military readiness. I'm glad that our 
military commanders take the threat of climate change 
seriously. I think we, your civilian leaders, owe it to you to 
enact policies here in Congress that recognize that climate 
change is happening and that we need to do more to stop it. So 
thank you. I appreciate it, Admiral.
    I want to, in my remaining time, ask about one other area. 
In this Committee, we also talk a lot about strategic 
competition between the United States, China, and Russia. I 
want to focus on China for just a minute.
    China is challenging the United States and our interests in 
a variety of domains. Our intelligence community's unclassified 
Worldwide Threat Assessment said, and I'm going to quote again, 
``China's leaders will try to extend the country's global, 
economic, political, and military reach while using China's 
military capabilities and overseas infrastructure and energy 
investments to diminish United States influence.''
    Admiral Davidson, do you agree with the intelligence 
community's assessment on this?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am, I do.
    Senator Warren. Well, in a recent hearing, a former deputy 
of national security advisor and State Department official 
responsible for China policy, Ely Ratner, told this Committee 
that regardless of whether we're talking about Chinese economic 
coercion, human rights, or the South China Sea, the United 
States needs a comprehensive strategy that enhances all aspects 
of our competitiveness. We can't pick just one strategy--
military or economics or technology or diplomacy--and hope that 
that's going to be the silver bullet.
    Admiral Davidson, do you agree with that?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, I do. It's going to take a whole-of-
government approach.
    Senator Warren. Can you just say a word more about that 
quickly--we're about to run out of time--about why it's 
important to use all of our tools of national power and not 
just military power?
    Admiral Davidson. I speak quite frequently in the region 
about this, madam, and one of the things that competes so 
strongly for the United States in the region is our values. 
Whether they're allies, partners, or nations that merely aspire 
to have the values that we have, they compete in a more 
pronounced manner than any handful of dollars ever could. But 
it has to be proactive, and we have to move out in the 
diplomatic and the information space, as well as the economic 
space, quite briskly because China is spreading dollars around 
very perniciously through corruption, through the mechanisms 
that you talked about earlier, and we've got to be willing to 
work in these other realms.
    Senator Warren. Yes, and to project our power abroad, we 
have to be strong here at home. Military power is important, 
but we need strong, sustained investments in education, in 
research, and other domestic priorities if we are going to 
maintain a competitive advantage.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Senator Scott.
    Senator Scott. Could each of you give us your thoughts on 
what the Congress could do to help you better fulfill your 
missions? What do you need from us?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, the support we've had the last 2 
years have been incredible. Having those budgets administered 
on the 1st of October so they can be executed is critically 
important to the efficiency of the Department of Defense and 
the execution of all the things that we do, from contracting to 
steaming on a day-to-day basis, to use my Navy parlance.
    The other thing we can do is lift the BCA caps. The threats 
that are out there challenge the sovereignty of the United 
States in a way that has not existed since the Cold War. The 
investments that are going to be required to do that, I think, 
are going to be significant.
    General Abrams. Senator, I'd like the opportunity to foot-
stomp. In my view, the single most important thing is a timely 
appropriation. In my previous assignment as the Army's force 
provider for 3 years, I can't overstate the impact of a 
continuing resolution at every level. Most importantly, those 
that should have to worry about it least, we put it on their 
backs, and that's on soldiers and families, because we did not 
have a timely, on-time appropriation. That would be point 
number one.
    Point number two, I'd say for those programs that we have 
that have reached furthest along in their development and we 
have committed to them, that we have worked on for multiple 
years and are testing shows that it is capable and it's meeting 
those key requirements, continued support of those so that we 
can see them through. One in particular for me is in the 
missile-defense business, and this is one we are keen to. It's 
a key capability. We're grateful for the support of this 
Committee and the Congress. We just need to see it through.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Admiral Davidson, China has been a big supporter and a big, 
I guess lender, to Venezuela. Why is Venezuela of any strategic 
interest to China, and how is that helping them?
    Admiral Davidson. China is challenging and threatening the 
rules-based international order. It's not a regional thing for 
China; it's a global approach. Anywhere that they can make 
inroads on that international order, they will take it. They've 
been moving quite rapidly. I think as Admiral Faller indicated 
last week, in Southern Command as well.
    Senator Scott. Do you anticipate that they would use any 
military resources in Venezuela?
    Admiral Davidson. In the very near term, I don't think 
China would, no.
    Senator Scott. How reliable a partner do most of the 
democracies in Asia perceive America right now?
    Admiral Davidson. I think in our alliances, I think they're 
quite confident in those five treaty allies that we have there 
in the region. This is another area, though, that's under 
threat from China. China maneuvers in the information space in 
a way that undermines everything we do; factually, 
informationally, everywhere.
    Sir, when we all used to read newspapers every Sunday, you 
used to get up and you used to have the Parade magazine as a 
Sunday insert. Throughout the region, there is a China daily 
insert which is Chinese propaganda appearing in newspapers, 
over more than half the population of the globe. It's quite 
pernicious.
    Senator Scott. Are we doing anything to counteract that?
    Admiral Davidson. I would say in the information space we 
do more. We've talked about the BUILD Act, what we are doing in 
the military space. One of the key factors here is the fact 
that we're working with allies and partners in key areas of the 
region.
    You've seen Australia step up, and Papua-New Guinea 
recently, Fiji. New Zealand has made it clear that their very 
near-abroad is going to take some investment. We are working on 
an Indo-Pacific strategy with Japan and looking for 
opportunities of where our economic investments can cooperate 
and collaborate. In just my space alone, just last week we had 
a trilateral at the planning level between Japan, the 
Philippines, and the United States. These are all constructs 
that will help combat China's influence. Senator Scott. Thank 
you, and thanks for your service.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
gentlemen, both for being here today and for your service.
    Admiral Davidson, I'd like to ask you a little bit about 
the freedom of navigation operations that we have in the South 
China Sea. I know that there were some that occurred back in 
January and even, if I'm not mistaken, this past Sunday there 
was a couple of our fleet near the Spratly Islands. In 
response, the Chinese foreign minister has accused the United 
States of trespassing, infringing on China's sovereignty, and 
damaging regional peace, security, and order, even though it is 
my understanding these operations are going on in international 
waters.
    With that, I think it's important that we continue these. 
But what's not clear to me is how we're resolving the conflict 
between China's stance on these, on our operations, and the 
international community. Are you aware of any conversations or 
discussions that are taking place on this specific issue, and, 
you know, can you talk about contingency plans? Obviously a lot 
of saber rattling can lead to some bad consequences. Are there 
contingency plans if the impasse continues this way?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, to your last point about contingency 
plans, I'd rather hold that for the closed hearing, if I could.
    Senator Jones. Certainly.
    Admiral Davidson. To be clear, not all our freedom of 
navigation operations happen in international waters. Sometimes 
they happen in disputed waters, which was the case this past 
weekend--I won't comment on every one--but was the case this 
past weekend. Other nations lay claim to those waters. Then the 
legal construct of what those features are dictate as to 
whether we can operate and how close we can operate them and in 
what mode, whether it's solely innocent passage, which is the 
way any ship would move through the region, or whether normal 
operations that military assets could use would be effective.
    I'd also like to hold off on a discussion about the 
rhetoric that China responds with in the wake of these 
operations. But I will say this. The vast, vast majority of 
interactions in the South China Sea, that China responds 
professionally and safely.
    These operations are critically important, not for the 
United States, and they're not about two destroyers passing 
safely in this region. This is about the free flow of 
communications. That's oil. That's trade. That's economic 
means. It means the cyber connectivities on the cables that 
travel under the South China Sea, which are deep and profound, 
coming out of Singapore. It includes the free passage of 
citizens between all the great nations of the world.
    If you're taking a flight from Singapore to San Francisco, 
from Sydney to Seoul, from Manila to Tokyo, you are flying over 
the South China Sea. Each time that happens, there is somebody 
with a surface-to-air missile and a Chinese soldier evaluating 
whether that traffic can go on a day-to-day basis. It's quite 
hazardous to the global security, and I think it's quite 
pernicious that China would take such action.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Admiral.
    General Abrams, let me ask you about, there's been a lot of 
discussion over the years and more recently about the transfer 
of the Combined Forces Command to the ROK. That's been 
discussed a lot. There are conditions, I think, that are out 
there. Can you talk a little bit about the transfer of command, 
what it might mean to the United States presence on the 
peninsula, and specifically, what it would mean to the forces, 
the manning levels that we have on the peninsula?
    General Abrams. Senator, we refer to it as conditions-based 
OPCON [Operational Control] transition. It was most recently 
ratified again in 2015 with the specific conditions that you 
outlined--there's three key areas. The Republic of Korea is 
making good progress towards meeting those conditions.
    This last set of consultative meetings that we had in 
October, there was a reaffirmation from then-Secretary Mattis 
and our brand new minister of defense for the Republic of Korea 
to look for opportunities to accelerate the conditions-based 
OPCON transition. I'm working very closely with the ROK 
chairman, General Park Han-ki, to do just that, look for 
opportunities, understanding that the conditions will have to 
be met. We're working on ways to ensure that we have a shared 
vision as to the way ahead.
    To your specific question about what is the potential 
impact to troop presence, that is not part of the equation for 
conditions-based OPCON transition. This is merely about putting 
a ROK commander, a Republic of Korea commander, in command of 
Combined Forces Command, that position that I currently serve 
in in one of my three positions on the peninsula.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
    Back to you, Admiral Davidson. You mentioned in your 
testimony some sanctions against North Korea, and there's some 
ongoing ship-to-ship transfers that take place primarily in the 
East China Sea. Can you tell me what's the biggest challenge 
that you have in investigating these ship-to-ship transfers, 
what have we done to maybe stop these, and particularly, is 
China involved? What role might China be playing in these 
transfers?
    Admiral Davidson. I should say to your last point, Senator, 
that China is neither helping nor hurting the effort at least 
in the maritime space.
    We have an ongoing multinational ISR and ship effort to 
disrupt refined oil that's going in by sea into North Korea. 
This requires a significant amount of network work to cut it 
off at the supply. The fact of the matter is that you're not 
going to deter the DPRK from pursuing fuel. They have to have 
it. They've been adapting their tactics as we've been adapting 
ours--adding ships, doing transfers in their own territorial 
waters or near their own shores and, occasionally, there have 
been some transfers in Chinese territorial waters.
    We are going to have to go after these things at the 
source. I've got partnership across the DOD, with cyber 
command, especially, to make sure that we understand what's 
happening so that we can disrupt these things at the source, 
refer providers, whether it's shippers, whether it's oil 
brokers, whether it's the oil companies themselves, notify the 
United Nations of those contributions, and then have them 
pursued both by State demarche and Treasury action to prevent 
their future transfers.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you both.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
    Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you for your 
exemplary service and for the service under your command. 
Admiral, it's a particular privilege to welcome you here as a 
native Missourian. We're very proud of you and very proud of 
your service. Thank you for what you do.
    You have a tough job, Admiral, as the commander of what the 
National Defense Strategy tells us is perhaps the decisive 
theater in our current set of priorities that we have, 
strategic priorities as a nation. I want to ask about some of 
the challenges that we're facing. Help us think, if you could, 
about the forward defense posture that the NDS tells us is 
absolutely critical for this AOR, and, if you could, tell us 
what you need from this Committee in order to ensure that we 
have the forward defense posture that is necessary in order to 
prevent a fait accompli in the South China Sea or in Taiwan.
    I just want to pick up on--Senator Manchin mentioned a 
little earlier about surging into the region, but of course we 
know from the NDS that our ability to surge into the region 
after aggression by China is difficult given China's A2/AD 
[Anti Access/Area Denial] capacities and capabilities. Could 
you tell us what is our progress in adopting that offense 
posture that we need in order to prevent a fait accompli and 
what you need from us to ensure that we get there?
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Some of what we need to talk about I'd like to do in the 
closed hearing this afternoon. But in an unclassified sense, 
the NDS really asked me to lift my eyes and take a longer view 
of the region and how it's evolving. So much of our basing and 
rotation has been focused on what's been transpiring in 
Northeast Asia, not just in the last couple of years, but 
really over the last several decades.
    This is going to require us to revisit some of the places 
in which we operate and rotate forces, absolutely. It's going 
to require us to think about some places, if not bases in 
areas. We are in conversations with partners and allies about 
what some of the opportunities might be there. But it also 
speaks to concepts, the kind of capabilities that we can bring 
forth, and what you're seeing, new concepts from the services, 
Multi-Domain Task Force operations, distributed maritime 
operations, and the logistics that are going to be required to 
supply that. There is going to be requirements for investments 
across all domains, from the bottom of the sea to space. We 
have to accept the fact that the environment is changing so 
drastically in the South China Sea that it's going to require 
new approaches in many cases and not just iterative ones.
    Senator Hawley. Just to be clear, the level of investment 
that we have seen in these force capabilities and technologies 
over the past 5 years has not been adequate to the challenges 
that we face; is that fair to say?
    Admiral Davidson. I think that's correct.
    Senator Hawley. Let me ask you in the time I have 
remaining, and I want to come back to the subject, the subject 
we were just talking about, in a closed session, but let me ask 
about the Philippines, if I could. Given, again, our unique 
strategic challenges in your AOR and the significance of the 
Philippines to us in order to meet those strategic challenges, 
let me ask you just about your sense of our relationship there.
    I know that last fall, I think it was, we announced a new 
agreement to hold an increased number of exercises this year in 
2019 instead of 2018, but President Duterte has also announced 
plans for joint oil and gas exploration with China and has made 
other entrees to China. Can you give us an assessment of the 
state of the bilateral relationship and what direction you 
think it's heading for this critical ally in this region?
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, I think the relationship is trending 
in a positive direction. I can tell you in the military space, 
since 2017 when we were able to manifest some of our indirect 
assistance to their fight in Marawi, it has restored the 
military relationship in a way we haven't seen in a couple of 
decades. It has led, in fact, to things like the EDCA [Enhanced 
Defense Cooperation Agreement] as well as the advancement in 
the exercises here in 2018 and 2019.
    There is no doubt that at the political level, some of the 
relationship has been politically fractious. But I take as a 
positive sign the vagueness of the agreements that President 
Duterte signed with President Xi last fall. I think we should 
take a little bit of comfort in that, that we can continue to 
advance this relationship moving forward. Senator Hawley. Let 
me just ask you one other question about that in my time 
remaining. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is a 
flashpoint, as it has been for some time, but political 
leadership in the Philippines has been talking about it a lot 
more it seems recently, including saying that they may need to 
review it and consider leaving it if the United States does not 
make various security commitments related to the South China 
Sea.
    Can I just ask you what a review by the Philippines and 
potential departure of the MDT might mean for us and our 
relationship with them and our strategic posture in your AOR?
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you, Senator. That's been reported 
pretty widely. I think what's been absent from that discussion 
is some of the context in which the Philippine defense minister 
responded to some questions. But to me, the Mutual Defense 
Treaty is quite clear. It says that an armed attack on either 
of us, on the metropolitan territory or on the island 
territories under Philippine jurisdiction in the Pacific, where 
it's armed forces, our public vessels, or our aircraft, 
activates Article 5 of that treaty.
    I think the Philippines should be quite confident in our 
support and our alliance. I'll tell you, I'm quite confident in 
Philippine support, which--and frankly, in our defense, that 
support begins in the Philippines.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your service and also to the men and 
women under your command, and thank you for your clear-eyed 
testimony today, if I may use the word that you did, General 
Abrams, in describing what I view to be a stark and stunning 
lack of any action, any progress, any steps to slow or suspend 
the North Korean nuclear program. Would you agree with me that 
they are proceeding full pace with their nuclear program?
    General Abrams. Sir, I'd say two things. First, as I said 
earlier, it's been 440 days since the last strategic 
provocation from the DPRK, so since a missile test or a nuclear 
weapons explosion or test. The reduction in tensions and 
nascent confidence-building measures along the demilitarized 
zone and across that part of the Korean Peninsula, those 
reductions are palpable, they're real, and they are having a 
significant positive effect to begin to prevent additional low-
level--additional confidence-building measures.
    Senator Blumenthal. But do you----
    General Abrams. Having said all that, we have not observed 
activity that's consistent with a full-court press on 
denuclearization.
    Senator Blumenthal. Or any slowing of the nuclear program. 
You said no verifiable progress, I believe.
    General Abrams. I'd say the activity we see is inconsistent 
with that. Senator, we can talk about that in detail during the 
closed session.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, let me ask you this. Because 
Admiral Davidson, you state, ``North Korea is continuing 
efforts to mitigate the effects of international sanctions and 
the United States-led pressure campaign.''
    I assume you would agree that sanctions are important in 
bringing pressure to bear on North Korea?
    Admiral Davidson. Absolutely.
    Senator Blumenthal. Has there been a reduction in the 
effect of those sanctions so far as you know?
    Admiral Davidson. In many aspects, yes.
    Senator Blumenthal. Why is that?
    Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, can you restate your question?
    Senator Blumenthal. Yeah, I apologize for interrupting.
    Admiral Davidson. I want to make sure I understand the 
question you're asking me. Have sanctions taken some effect? 
Yes.
    Senator Blumenthal. That's a good question.
    Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, sir. It has. We do observe 
raised fuel prices in Korea. That's been evident really since 
before sanctions. The prices have gone up. There have been some 
restrictions on luxury goods and some other things in there. 
The impact and its ability to force them to denuclearize, it's 
tough to say whether that's making any progress.
    Senator Blumenthal. Has there been a reduction in the 
effects of sanctions because of lack of consistent application 
of them, either by ourselves or by our allies or others?
    Admiral Davidson. No, we're on a sustained level of effort 
just on the ship-to-ship transfers realm. I stepped it up in 
the September time frame and expanded the concept of 
operations. We've had a number of allies come alongside to 
help--Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. Japan and 
Korea are sitting side-by-side with us in Yokosuka right now, 
working on this effort. I'm quite grateful for all the 
contributions they've made. I should add that UK has been there 
as well.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. In terms of our capabilities 
in that part of the world, I note that your testimony focuses 
on our undersea warfare advantages. Do you see those advantages 
are eroding, and how important is it that we continue to build 
submarines?
    Admiral Davidson. I think continuing to build submarines is 
critically important, sir. Our most significant advantage in 
all domains right now is in the subsurface. But some of those 
diversions I'd rather discuss in closed hearing, if you don't 
mind.
    Senator Blumenthal. Sure, and again, maybe more 
appropriately for a closed setting, although I think, really, 
the American people need to know answers to a lot of these 
questions. Our adversaries know the answers. We know the 
answers after we're briefed in closed sessions. The only ones 
who don't know the answers to many of these questions are the 
American people.
    I regret that so much has been kept from public view. Not 
to be critical at all of you or the Pentagon in that respect. I 
recognize that you operate under rules that may constrain you 
from talking publicly. But I hope we'll have an opportunity to 
explore in greater detail these questions and also the 
vulnerability of our aircraft carriers.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General, 
Admiral, good to see you. Thanks for your great service and 
thanks for being here today.
    Admiral Davidson, I wanted to begin just kind of making 
sure we have very, very clear understanding of what's going on 
in the South China Sea. I think it's pretty obvious, but just 
having you state this to the American people, to our allies in 
the Asia-Pacific.
    Standing next to President Obama in the Rose Garden in 
2015, President Xi Jinping said, ``China does not intend to 
pursue militarization of the South China Sea.'' That was a 
quote from the president of China next to the president of the 
United States.
    Just a few months ago in January, China's major state-run 
newspaper, the People's Daily, stated, ``As China's military 
size and quality improve, so does its control of the South 
China Sea. China is able to send more naval vessels as a 
response and can take steps like militarizing the islands.'' 
This is the mouthpiece of the Communist Party.
    President Xi, obviously he didn't keep his word when he 
made that statement in the Rose Garden next to President Obama; 
is that correct?
    Admiral Davidson. That's correct, sir. In the most liberal 
interpretation of militarizing those islands, China in April of 
2018 populated those islands with antiship cruise missiles, 
with surface-to-air missiles, and electronic jammers.
    Senator Sullivan. Ten-thousand-foot runways?
    Admiral Davidson. Those were already there. But now they 
have the weapons, they've got sufficient military cadre, and 
they've stepped up their operations both in the maritime and 
with bomber sorties and fighter sorties in a way that makes it 
clear that those islands are to support them militarily.
    Senator Sullivan. Just to be clear, 2015, two presidents, 
Rose Garden, and President Xi obviously didn't keep his word on 
that issue.
    Admiral Davidson. I agree with that. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, I appreciate what you're doing in 
terms of regular FONOPs [Freedom of Navigation Operations] our 
allies. The more we can do, the more regular--the previous 
administration seemed to be a little reluctant to do these. I 
think you guys are doing a much better job, so I commend you 
for continuing to do that. The more we can bring our allies--a 
lot of talk about allies here--with regard to those FONOPs or 
some of the operations you described, the better.
    General Abrams, I wanted to turn to the issue that Senator 
Reed raised and just get your professional military views on 
what would be the tactical effects of removing a large portion, 
or all, of United States Forces from the Korean Peninsula?
    General Abrams. Senator, just for clarity, under the 
current set by the DPRK?
    Senator Sullivan. I'm talking about our forces----
    General Abrams. No, I understand. But nothing's changed on 
the North side of the MDL [Military Demarcation Line]?
    Senator Sullivan. Correct. Correct.
    General Abrams. It would impose significant tactical and 
operational risk if there's no change on the other side of the 
MDL.
    Senator Sullivan. Strategically, hasn't Russia and China 
sought the removal of United States Forces from the Korean 
Peninsula for decades as a core strategic goal of theirs?
    General Abrams. Yes.
    Senator Sullivan. China and Russia and North Korea would be 
pleased by such a withdrawal?
    General Abrams. Again----
    Senator Sullivan. If, say, it happened tomorrow?
    General Abrams. There's actually some debate. You know----
    Senator Sullivan. Really?
    General Abrams. Yeah.
    Senator Sullivan. There's debate?
    General Abrams. There is some debate----
    Senator Sullivan. China wouldn't be happy that----
    General Abrams. No, sir; it's on the DPRK. There's some 
mixed views on whether the DPRK really wants us down.
    Senator Sullivan. How about China and Russia?
    General Abrams. Absolutely.
    Senator Sullivan. You might recall we passed a law, the 
NDAA last year, that actually states that the significant 
removal of United States military forces from the Korean 
Peninsula will not be supported in terms of authorized 
appropriated funds by the Congress below 22,000 troops unless 
the secretary of defense first certifies to this Committee that 
it would be in the national interest of the United States to do 
so.
    I just want you to remind everybody who's working on that 
that that's actually in the law right now.
    Senator Sullivan. Finally, Admiral, I just wanted to touch 
base, and I think we can do it in a better sense in a 
classified setting this afternoon, but there is, I think, a lot 
of concern, and a lot of concern on this Committee, on the 
force posture of how our forces are deployed throughout the 
region to be ready for what is really kind of the big strategic 
challenge facing the United States, which is the rise of China 
over the next 50 to 100 years.
    I'll be interested in going into a lot more detail on the 
force posture issues, but I think there's a lot of good work 
that's been going on, but some of it seems to get stuck in the 
Pentagon. I would welcome your views on that. But I think we 
need to be a little bit more creative on how we're looking at 
force posture.
    I would want to remind you, and I know you know it, but 
Alaska is not necessarily in your AOR, but the forces there, 
which are significant, your Reserve forces, for example, 
General, on the Korean Peninsula, our OPCON to PACOM, and a lot 
of those forces are actually closer to the Korean Peninsula and 
other places than forces, say, in Australia. Thank you very 
much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Davidson, are you familiar with the ProPublica 
publication this past week on the analysis of the 
accountability for the collisions with the McCain and the 
Fitzgerald?
    Admiral Davidson. I saw the first article, Senator.
    Senator King. There's, I believe, a second one. I commend 
it to you. It's one of the most sobering analyses of a disaster 
that I've ever seen. It takes responsibility all the way up 
through the very top of the Navy to this Congress, I should 
say. Sequestration in 2013 was one of the contributors.
    But I would like, if you could--and perhaps I'll prepare a 
question for the record--I would like to see specific data on 
where we stand with issues like certification of sailors and 
personnel on the ships, maintenance status of the ships, 
training rules, staffing levels. I want real numbers. I don't 
want general ``we're working on staffing'' or ``we're working 
on more training.'' Because these were avoidable tragedies. I 
would like to drill down on the specific data points that 
indicate the level of readiness for these, for our fleet 
generally, the Seventh Fleet and other naval assets in the 
region.
    Is that something that you can do? You're the handiest, 
highest naval officer I have here today. I don't mean to say 
that you have to be the specific one to respond, but I would 
like to see specific responses from the Navy, not promises and 
not good feelings. This was a--this story is terrible.
    Admiral Davidson. Sir, if I could, a couple of points. One, 
there's a quarterly review that was provided over here to the 
professional staff members by the Vice Chief, Admiral Moran. 
All those numbers are available.
    The idea that there's not transparency in this readiness I 
think is appalling, or that it was some kind of secret or that 
only a few knew about it in the Navy is incorrect. I personally 
testified before the House Seapower and Personnel Subcommittees 
with Chairman Thornberry there in 2016 on the kind of things 
that it took, you know, to keep the fleet going.
    We can't forget one other thing. These two collisions were 
a tragedy. There's no doubt about it. All the senior leadership 
of the Navy feels an immense amount of accountability for that, 
and I'll come back to it. But the fact of the matter is 280-odd 
other ships weren't having collisions. More than a dozen of 
those ships were performing exceptionally well----
    Senator King. I'm sorry, that doesn't----
    Admiral Davidson. Excuse me, Senator.
    Senator King. Airplanes are landing all over America, and 
just because they aren't all crashing doesn't mean they don't 
need a high level of maintenance. To tell me that isn't very 
convincing. I think it was 40 years since we've had collisions 
of this nature. Are you saying that there were no failures that 
led to these collisions because there were 280 ships that 
didn't have collisions? Isn't that the standard, no collisions?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, sir. No collisions is the standard. 
Certainly it's been 40 years since we had lost life to that 
extent, but there had been collisions in the recent past.
    The other thing that we have to remark upon is the combat 
performance. We've had ships in the Red Sea shooting down 
antiship cruise missiles, we've had extraordinary Tomahawk 
performance in this time frame, we had aviation squadrons shoot 
down a MiG aircraft from Syria. You know, these units have been 
tested in combat and doing quite well.
    Senator King. I'm not suggesting otherwise. What I'm 
suggesting is--and I urge you to read that study--I'm 
suggesting that we had a preventable problem; there were 
multiple warnings, it wasn't acted upon, and I want to be 
reassured that it is being acted upon, and I'll be glad to 
review those reports.
    Admiral Davidson. But sir, this is why I'm saying the Navy 
feels a huge amount of accountability for this. They tasked me 
to review those two collisions, I produced a 170-page report 
with 58 recommendations, and the Navy has been moving out on 
those recommendations to provide the kind of unit personnel 
training, to provide advice and resources to the type 
commanders, the fleet commanders, the Naval Systems Command, 
all with recommendations to improve this situation in a way 
that eliminates the variance that I'm talking about.
    Senator King. I'm delighted to know that, and I've heard 
that before. I just want to see the data that backs up the fact 
that these recommendations are in fact being executed.
    Admiral Davidson. Okay. All right. I'll be sure to do it. I 
mentioned earlier in testimony, there are some recommendations 
in the Comprehensive Review that I made that I'm watching 
closely for the 2020 budget to make sure that they're 
accommodated as well.
    Senator King. I don't mean to imply--I said in my opening 
that the responsibility goes all the way up to this Congress. 
Continuing resolutions, which you talked about, are pointed out 
to be part of the problem, and the sequester was part of the 
problem. There's responsibility to go around. But I just, as I 
say, want to see where we are in terms of the data on executing 
on those recommendations. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
to each of you for being here today, for your service to our 
country, for the testimony that you've prepared and presented 
to us, and for taking the time to take our questions here and 
again as we go into a closed session this afternoon.
    I thought it was so interesting this morning reading Wall 
Street Journal; there is a book review in the opinion section 
and it's on the future of Asia: ``The Future is Asian.'' It 
made me think a little bit about something we talked some about 
in this Committee. It is how the commercial complex and the 
military complex in China have a tendency to be one and the 
same. You see this reflected in their Belt and Road Initiative, 
the Thousand Talents Program, things of that. They even talk a 
little bit about building that dual-use sectors. This is 
something that is going to have an impact on their power in the 
coming years.
    There will be some of this that you can answer now and some 
we'll need to take up in a closed session, but one of the 
things, Admiral Davidson, that I think as you look at this from 
where you sit and you hear the term ``expanding the competitive 
space'' for China, how do you interpret that to your mission? I 
know Senator Hawley asked what your needs are going to be, what 
changes you need to see in the force.
    Then for you, and also, General Abrams, for you, when you 
look at the cyber capabilities that they are using to push 
themselves to information dominance, which would be a goal for 
them, how do you see that slowing our warfare activities and 
how would they use that as a force-multiplier for their 
conventional capabilities and use it to target the links and 
nodes in our mobility system?
    With that, I will give you the time, and thank you for 
your----
    Admiral Davidson. Quickly, ma'am, it is going to take a 
whole-of-government approach on our behalf as well. We talked a 
little bit earlier today about the kind of tools like the BUILD 
Act provides in this whole-of-government approach. I'm quite 
encouraged by all the concepts that are coming forth from those 
services. It's our obligation to knit that together in a war-
fighting concept out there in the Indo-Pacific.
    It's going to require some investments and some 
capabilities that are, I would say, nascent in our country 
right now, and it's also going to require us to invest in a way 
across the region, the posture of how we are situated, and then 
some of the capabilities from the training apparatus and how 
that might support all this new capability that's coming 
online, as well as the way in which we share and collaborate 
with information with our allies and partners in the region to 
make this whole. But some of the specifics of all of this is 
better discussed in closed hearing.
    Senator Blackburn. Correct.
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you.
    General Abrams. Senator, I'd just like to talk a little bit 
specifics about cyber. As you mentioned, it's one of the key 
components in our interest of achieving information dominance.
    First and foremost, I'll tell you that the creation of U.S. 
Cyber Command has given us now the right level of command 
integration. He is a supporting commander to all of the 
combatant commands, and General Nakasone's done a fantastic job 
and I'm personally appreciative of all the efforts that he's 
done to support our efforts to integrate cyber as part of our 
holistic campaign on the peninsula.
    It is a critical capability. We're still working on getting 
the appropriate authorities delegated to the right level should 
we need them in a period of hostilities, and we can probably 
talk about that in greater detail during the closed session.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
both of you. General Abrams, good to see you again.
    Just as a mention, Senator Wicker asked you, Admiral, about 
the 355-ship Navy, and as you undergo a review of the 
appropriate number of ships for our Navy, I hope that that will 
be a continuing commitment for that number of ships at least, 
and also that we have the resources necessary to repair and 
maintain the ships we already have.
    The Defense Department recently released a 2019 Missile 
Defense Review, which, among other items, noted the 
installation of a Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, very 
important to us as a way to improve the performance of our 
current missile defense system and increase the protection of 
Hawaii.
    Admiral Davidson, are you satisfied that with the 
installation of the Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii, the 
defense of Hawaii is optimized for the current and near-term 
threats?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. It fills in a gap in our 
detectability that I think is critically important not only to 
the defense of Hawaii, but really, the defense of all the 
continental United States as well, and Alaska.
    Senator Hirono. Of course I'd ask you to continue to pay 
attention to the timing of when the installation will occur. I 
think it's set for 2023 or somewhere in there.
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. That's correct.
    Senator Hirono. General Abrams, do you believe that our 
current missile defense system in place in and around the 
Korean Peninsula serves as an effective deterrent against North 
Korean ballistic missile threat?
    General Abrams. Yes, I do.
    Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, you noted in the 
testimony that your command only gets 5 percent of foreign 
military funds. What command gets the largest percentage of 
these funds?
    Admiral Davidson. I would say Central Command.
    Senator Hirono. Central Command?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Hirono. When you get only 5 percent of these funds, 
how do you prioritize with the small amount of funding, how do 
you prioritize where the funding goes in a region as large as 
your AOR?
    Admiral Davidson. My own approach is to make sure that 
where we're investing is complementary to our capability and 
also advances the capability of the countries in which we're 
providing this assistance.
    Senator Hirono. Getting only 5 percent of these funds in an 
area as large as yours seems like an underinvestment to me. 
Does this kind of underinvestment in a partner or potential 
partner with these funds provide an opportunity for China to 
increase its influence in these nations?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, ma'am. Both China and Russia.
    Senator Hirono. Who makes the decision as to the percentage 
of these funds that goes to all of our commands?
    Admiral Davidson. It's an interagency decision the way all 
these things come together, between Defense recommendations, 
State disbursements at the end of the day. I think as you 
examine the budgets that will be coming in the next few years, 
you'll see a shift in priority for Pacific Command.
    Senator Hirono. That's good news. Thank you.
    I'm glad that Senator Ernst asked you, Admiral Davidson, 
about the importance of our COFA and the fact that China is 
very much in these nations, Oceanic nations, to widen their 
influence and certainly their economic activities in this area. 
What more can we do as a whole-of-government approach to 
counter China's influence in Oceania?
    Admiral Davidson. We're continuing to work along those ends 
already, ma'am. I can tell you we're partnered with Australia, 
New Zealand, certainly on what I would call their very nearest-
abroad. I think the United States feels an immense amount of 
responsibility for the COFA states themselves. You know, Japan 
has done a lot across Oceania. In just the last 3 months, 
France has made it clear that their interests--New Caledonia to 
Polynesia, the two bookends there, they want to be part of this 
conversation to make sure that our efforts are all working 
collaboratively and cooperatively.
    We've also stepped up our engagements, not just from Indo-
Pacific Command, my own visits to the region, but we've helped 
to facilitate visits by the Department of Interior and attended 
some forums like the Pacific Island Forum on providing some 
assistance to make sure that the security in Palau for the 
Oceans Conference in 2020 is going to be sound as well. We have 
to step those things up additionally.
    Senator Hirono. I agree, because these are very small 
nation states. As you mentioned that the citizens of these 
compact nations can travel to our country to any state without 
a visa requirement, and they mainly come to Hawaii and they go 
to Guam. Whatever we can do to provide the kind of support for 
these citizens I think will be very much appreciated because I 
know they feel that we have not done quite what we should be 
doing with regard to their needs.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
    Senator Tillis.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here. General Abrams, it's 
great to see you again. I appreciated all your hospitality and 
time that we spent together back when you were down at Fort 
Bragg.
    Admiral Davidson, I'll start with you because the subject 
of the 355-ship Navy has come up. To be honest with you, I'm 
not obsessed with a set number. In fact, I think it could be 
dangerous for us to say you've just got to check off until you 
get to 355 because I'm more concerned with capabilities. It 
would seem to me that over time, you're going to determine that 
we need more or less, depending upon how we match up against 
the increasing capabilities.
    Could you talk a little bit about how you could get to a 
point where you start describing the aggregate capacity of a 
355-ship Navy and that that may ultimately manifest itself in a 
very different footprint over the period of time that you could 
actually get to 355?
    Admiral Davidson. As I mentioned earlier, Senator, the 
chief of naval operations and the Navy, they've undertaken 
another force structure assessment, I think to get after 
precisely what you're talking about, make sure that they 
understand not only the capability mix of platforms themselves, 
but what the opportunity is for autonomous and unmanned 
vehicles as they come into this as well, and then how that 
might adjust those numbers going forward.
    Senator Tillis. Well I would think so, because I think if 
you take a look at the inherent cost and survivability with 
manned vessels versus unmanned vessels, the multiplier that you 
could get through relying on different platforms is something 
we should all look at. I get that there are supply chain issues 
and there are shipyards across the country that can see and 
touch and feel a target number for the number of ships that are 
going to be built in a given place, but I don't care about 
that. What I care about is projecting the maximum capabilities 
for the minimum cost based on what the experts believe is the 
best way to match up against the adversary.
    One other question for you. It has to do with the 58 
recommendations and the exchange that you had with Senator 
King. I'd be very curious when you respond to that, in terms of 
progress, the ones that require statutory action. I'd also be 
very curious to see, of the 58 recommendations, maybe why they 
were necessary based on a lack of funding or other factors that 
are clearly the responsibility of Congress at the end of the 
day, I believe rooted, and much of the problems are really 
congressional inaction or inconsistency with funding, being 
able to do something I know is very important to General 
Abrams, readiness, and I don't know how many times you chanted 
the mantra of readiness when you were down at Forces Com. But 
most of that's rooted in inaction or inconsistency on our part. 
We need to put a mirror down there when we're looking at those 
recommendations and recognizing the folks in suits caused a lot 
of those problems.
    General Abrams, you mentioned 440 days with respect to 
Korea in terms of any--we were at a point to where it seemed 
like every week we were watching a missile get launched or some 
sort of test being executed. On the one hand, we'll say that 
they're moving at the current pace and speed, but isn't it fair 
to say that if they're no longer launching missiles, some of 
which failed and they learn a lot from failed tests, they can 
accelerate their program; isn't it fair to say that just that 
lack of activity has had some impact on their rate of growth?
    I know we'll go in the closed session for specifics, but it 
just seems logical from the outside observer, not something we 
would discuss in the closed hearing, that that lack of outward 
activity, that data collection that comes from missile launches 
and tests, has to have some dampening effect on their rate of 
growth unless they've figured out how to do something in a test 
tube versus these ``when we test, it has to be perfect, we 
don't like to test and learn from failure, we want all of our 
tests to succeed.''
    There's an inherent cost in that. But it would seem to me 
that some of the benefit that North Korea was getting from that 
pace that they had up until about 440 days ago has diminished 
now that they're changing their approach. Would you agree with 
that?
    General Abrams. Senator, I'm not the expert on missile 
flight tests nor on nuclear weapons testing, but I have spoken 
to a number of them. It gets to a point in programs, and we can 
talk more about it this afternoon, that when you get to a 
certain point in that volume of testing that they did, and it's 
that point where the mature programs, if they are mature, then 
they can transition to simulation and modeling.
    Senator Tillis. They've captured enough to actually go to 
simulation.
    General Abrams. There's potential of that, Senator, and we 
can talk more about it this afternoon.
    Senator Tillis. Fair enough.
    Last thing. If you could tell me the progress you're 
making, we're talking about more extended deployments in Korea 
to create a work-life balance versus the 1-year iterations that 
we typically have. Have you made any progress on that?
    General Abrams. Senator, we have, and we're working very 
closely with the services to find the right balance so that we 
can do just that. We're looking at different force mixes as a 
possibility in the future to do exactly what you're talking 
about.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, we've already discussed throughout this hearing 
today the tyranny of distance in the Pacific and some of the 
challenges that we face. I myself grew up in Southeast Asia, 
living in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, so I am personally 
familiar with the tyranny of distances.
    You talked a little bit to, Admiral, the need for 
increasing our sealift capabilities. Could you discuss a little 
bit other requirements, such as airlift, heavy lift aircraft, 
that sort of thing, that we might need to plus up in order for 
you to be able to more efficiently and able to react more 
quickly to any type of changes in the situation in the pacific?
    Admiral Davidson. Thank you, ma'am. I would just add, you 
know, one of the key areas we need to do is better cyber 
defenses of our logistics networks, which touch commercial 
industry so profoundly, both in terms that the people that we 
help contract for their support both in the United States, but 
overseas as well. Some of the inroads with ZTE and Huawei in 
some of these other countries are going to challenge our 
ability to use our existing logistics network without adapting 
it in a cyber sense moving forward.
    Senator Duckworth. Are you speaking to upgrading and 
improving the capabilities of organizations like TRANSCOM 
[United States Transportation Command] in addition to the cyber 
capabilities itself?
    Admiral Davidson. Absolutely. TRANSCOM bears some 
responsibility for those networks that support their logistics 
operations; that's absolutely one of them. As you mentioned 
earlier, airlift is going to be critically important out there 
in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    General Abrams, can you expand a little bit on the work 
we've done and the work that still needs to be done to ensure 
we have the necessary logistical tail to support United States 
Forces Korea in any contingency?
    General Abrams. Senator, there's been extensive investment 
by the services over the last couple years under the leadership 
of Chairman Dunford and then-Secretary Mattis to properly not 
only posture the force to improve our posture in terms of 
munitions and other key supplies to appropriate levels based on 
where we were in 2017, but also made the right investments now 
in the supply chains to be able to sustain that if we ever had 
to get to a point of hostilities.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Can both of you give me your brief assessments of how the 
recently-passed Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (AKIA) will 
affect our relationship in the region and what more needs to be 
done to make sure it's effectively implemented?
    Admiral Davidson. I'm sorry, Senator, could you repeat 
that? I apologize.
    Senator Duckworth. Sure, no worries. I'm the last 
questioner, so totally understandable.
    Can you speak a little bit about the recently-passed Asia 
Reassurance Initiative Act and how that will affect our 
relationships within the region? You know, the importance of 
our alliances in INDOPACOM, particularly Republic of Korea and 
Japan. I don't think it's something we stress enough.
    I think that the successes that we're having in the region 
diplomatically and politically really also stems from the fact 
that we have a solid alliance militarily between United States, 
Korea, and Japan, and that must remain strong in order for us 
to move forward on the other fronts.
    Admiral Davidson. I couldn't agree more, ma'am. We've 
talked frequently about the whole-of-government approach in the 
region, it can't just be in the military space, that we're 
competing out there. The ARIA Act is going to be one of the key 
vehicles in which to advance these relationships going forward.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. General?
    General Abrams. Senator, the only thing I'd add to that, 
specifically in Northeast Asia: no stronger allies than the 
Republic of Korea and Japan. So I absolutely agree with what 
Admiral Davidson said in terms of it's a whole-of-government 
approach that can only serve to strengthen those two great 
democracies as well as our own.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Finally, my last question. Admiral, could you speak a 
little bit to the role of the State Partnership Programs in 
terms of the forces and the work that you do in countries like 
the Philippines and the like and the availability of those 
troops to augment your Active Duty forces?
    Admiral Davidson. The State Partnership Programs not only 
in the Indo-Pacific Command region, but speaking for the other 
combatant commanders----
    Chairman Inhofe. Excuse me, Admiral. Before you answer, 
Senator Reed presiding. Go ahead.
    Admiral Davidson. Have been quite important to us building 
military-to-military relationships. The frequency at which 
those State Partnership Programs can touch some of these other 
nations is quite good, and we've been able in just the last few 
months to expand one of those State Partnership Programs in the 
Oceania region. I don't want to say where and who just yet 
because we haven't announced the final selection of who the 
State partner will be. But it's an area in which I'm looking to 
expand some relationships in the region as well.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Senator Reed. [Presiding] Chairman Inhofe indicated that 
Senator King requested another question.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    General Abrams, in thinking about Korea and the history, 
we're currently focused on the nuclear threat of course, but we 
had troops there, a substantial troop commitment, for 50 years 
before the nuclear threat became what it is today. What I'm 
getting at is will we necessarily be able to remove those 
troops if the nuclear threat is reduced or eliminated given the 
conventional power that the North Koreans have, the array of 
artillery along the border, the threat to Seoul, and all of 
that? I want to try to put this discussion into some historical 
perspective.
    Admiral Davidson. Senator, no, you're absolutely right. Our 
troop posture----
    Senator King. Could you say that again? I like hearing 
that.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. I'm just teasing.
    Admiral Davidson. Our troop posture, you know, it's been 
modulated since the armistice in July of 1953, and it's been 
modulated based on that conventional threat that you're talking 
about as well as other commitments that we had. For instance, 
we had a reduction in forces on the peninsula during the 
Vietnam era, and in fact, the Republic of Korea, really as a 
sign of solidarity to the United States committed two ROK 
divisions to South Vietnam in that conflict.
    So it has, but our conventional capability on the peninsula 
is essentially, as I said earlier, the deterrent against the 
DPRK's conventional threat and their asymmetric threat.
    Senator King. Which may well be necessary even with the 
elimination of the nuclear threat or the reduction of the 
nuclear threat unless there is a concomitant reduction in the 
conventional threat.
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, Senator, and until there is a peace 
treaty. Because we still remain in a state of armistice, a 
cessation of hostilities, until such time that there is a peace 
treaty between all the parties.
    Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen, and thank you 
for your testimony.
    On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, I will adjourn the hearing 
and see you later at the closed session.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

                     OKINAWA STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT

    1. Senator Wicker. Admiral Davidson, the United States and 
Japan are working together to complete the strategic 
realignment of United States Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam 
and other locations. Okinawa has historically hosted a large 
share of United States servicemembers deployed to Japan 
including about 19,000 marines. Please provide the Committee 
with a detailed update on the progress on the realignment of 
Marine forces.
    Admiral Davidson. Relocation of U.S. marines from Okinawa 
to Guam remains an INDOPACOM area of emphasis. Over the past 
few years with Congress' help, we have made notable progress in 
this strategic realignment. On Okinawa, the pace of 
construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp 
Schwab increased over the last year with steady progress made 
on the seawall and the start of landfill work in December 2018. 
Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly reaffirmed his strong 
commitment to FRF. Guam's main cantonment construction has 
commenced following a favorable report from the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service to protect newly identified endangered 
species. Clearing work is underway in support of utilities and 
site improvements. The fiscal year 2018 NDAA included several 
projects for the Guam relocation, including Marine Aviation 
Logistics Squadron facilities, a corrosion control hangar, and 
a second aircraft maintenance hangar at Naval Support Activity 
Andersen; a water well field to feed the new Marine Corps Base 
Guam; and a medical clinic at Apra Harbor Naval Station. Also, 
the fiscal year 2019 NDAA includes ordnance operations, a 
machine gun range, and a combination high intensity tactical 
training facility and dining hall for the air component all 
located on Naval Support Activity Andersen. The Commonwealth of 
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military Training (CJMT) 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is under revision due to 
comments received during the public comment period in 2015. As 
you will recall, CJMT will provide for large scale U.S. Marine 
Corps forces training. The new CJMT Revised Draft EIS will go 
through another comment period after public release of the 
draft. Due to competing interests with the USAF divert program 
on the island of Tinian--and at the request of the Governor of 
CNMI--we paused engagement with CNMI officials and agencies, 
causing progress on the CJMT EIS to slow. In late February 
2019, INDOPACOM met with the CNMI Governor to set the 
conditions for re-engagement on CJMT.

              UNACCOMPANIED TOUR HOUSING AT OSAN AIR BASE

    2. Senator Wicker. General Abrams, the vast majority of 
servicemembers deploy to Osan Air Base on an unaccompanied 1-
year assignment. Osan has the largest dormitory inventory in 
the operational Air Force. Please provide the Committee an 
update on unaccompanied tour housing for servicemembers 
stationed at Osan Air Base. What are your specific plans to 
improve the quality of housing?
    General Abrams. There are approximately 4,547 unaccompanied 
airmen assigned to Osan with 3,228 residing on-base and 1,319 
off-base. Osan Air Base currently has 37 dormitories consisting 
of 4,711 rooms, including two dorms ready for demolition and 
two unoccupied dorms under renovation. The average age of Osan 
dormitories is 24 years with the oldest being 34 years old and 
the newest built 5 years ago. In the last 10 years, 2 new dorms 
valued at $42 million were funded with Military Construction 
funding (MILCON) and 1 new $67 million dorm was built with 
Republic of Korea (ROK) funds. In the last 10 years there have 
also been 71 United States-funded projects using Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) funding valued at $52 million and 14 ROK 
funded ``O&M'' projects valued at $4 million. The overall 
quality of Osan dorm rooms is good, and the average facility 
condition index of the dorms is 80 (on a scale of 0-100, worst 
to best). However, the average condition of the HVAC systems 
for the dorms is 60, and the majority of problems that exist in 
Osan's dorms relate to aging infrastructure, particularly when 
it comes to boilers and HVAC systems. This drives the engineers 
at Osan to work around the clock responding to routine and 
emergency work orders (e.g. completing 14,050 corrective 
maintenance tasks between 1 Mar 2018 and 1 Mar 2019). Due to 
the aging infrastructure in Osan's dorms and ongoing HVAC 
issues, the base will continue to rely on portable chillers, 
space heaters and small A/C units to assist with Quality of 
Life standards until all programmed projects are funded and 
complete. Osan wing leadership has consistently focused on 
maintaining suitable living conditions for all base residents 
and they will continue to pursue initiatives to ensure quality 
housing for our airmen, soldiers, and marines into the future.

    3. Senator Wicker. General Abrams, what resources are 
required and are those resources accounted for in your budget 
plans?
    General Abrams. Osan Air Base currently has 6 Facility 
Sustainment Restoration & Modernization (FSRM) projects for 
dorms in active construction or design valued at $24 million 
(2x FY16, 2x FY17, 2x FY20). These projects are in-depth 
repairs targeting a broad array of issues, such as electrical 
and mechanical systems. An additional 35 projects valued at $69 
million are planned and programmed for future years and will 
compete with other AF priorities for funding. Four of the 35 
FSRM projects, valued at $11.9 million, were programmed for 
fiscal year 2019 execution and have currently been placed in 
the fiscal year 2020 program due to higher priorities in the 
fiscal year 2019 Air Force budget. A new Military Construction 
project for a 528 room, $71 million dormitory is programmed and 
has been submitted through the Air Force MILCON process 
annually since 2012. This new construction is much needed and 
would replace six aging facilities. It is currently the base's 
second MILCON priority and twenty-sixth in Pacific Air Forces' 
(PACAF's) fiscal year 2021 MILCON program. Osan continues to 
mitigate issues as it competes for AF MILCON funding.
                              ----------                              


               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds

   TERRAIN SHAPING OBSTACLES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND WITHIN THE 
                        INDPACOM AOR IN GENERAL

    4. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, I'd like to discuss your 
perspective of the importance of terrain shaping on ground 
maneuver on the Korean peninsula. As a commander, you possess 
the last stock of landmines in the U.S. inventory--a capability 
that has renewed relevance in a fight with peer competitors. 
Can you comment on the importance of these capabilities to 
provide standoff for United States ground forces in a 
conventional war on the Korean peninsula, both to allow 
maneuver and protect soldiers on the battlefield--especially in 
light of USFK's [United States Forces Korea] priority to ``be 
ready to fight tonight''?
    General Abrams. USFK and CFC's continued use of land mines 
as part of our arsenal of terrain shaping measures is 
critically important to our defensive posture. Depite the ROK-
United States Alliance qualitative military advantage, DPRK 
maintains a quantitative lead in fielded land forces of nearly 
two to one. Terrain shaping munitions, such as land mines, 
mitigates the challenge presented by DPRK's force posture by 
permitting Alliance forces to create operational dilemmas for 
the enemy by restricting their maneuverability while increasing 
the targeting opportunities of our more lethal systems. It must 
be noted, the aging arsenal of scatterable mine delivery 
systems (e.g. Gator and Volcano) leave the joint and combined 
force insufficient munition capacity to cover a doctrinal 
division front or shape the deep fight.

    5. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, in your professional 
military opinion, how important is it for the Army to field 
terrain shaping obstacles to enable maneuver, protect friendly 
forces, and ultimately require less of a prohibitively 
expensive force structure?
    General Abrams. Fielding terrain shaping obstacles, to 
include land mines, is critically important in Korea. The 
quantitative advantage held by DPRK land forces creates both 
risk to force and risk to mission. These risks are mitigated 
through the collective use of terrain shaping obstacles and 
combined fires. The continued use of land mines as part of our 
arsenal of terrain shaping measures also contributes to near-
term cost savings. However, of concern is the modernization 
efforts on the part of near-peer competitors in the area of 
mines, munitions, and breaching capabilities, while we continue 
to operate with 1980s technology. Existing non-materiel 
solutions to mitigate this growing capability gap have been 
evaluated and determined to be impractical. Ceding the 
qualitative advantage in any area increases underlying risk to 
force and risk to mission.

    6. Senator Rounds. Admiral Davidson, can you comment on the 
need for these capabilities in other places in your area of 
responsibility?
    Admiral Davidson. United States policy prohibits the use of 
anti-personnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and I 
support this policy. However, another subset of terrain shaping 
obstacles, anti-vehicular mines, could improve joint force 
lethality and agility in the region. With the Indo-Pacific home 
to seven of the world's ten largest armies and significant 
time-distance challenges, anti-vehicular mines could provide 
advantages by facilitating effective maneuver for forces even 
when outnumbered. Further, these will also help to enhance the 
protection of bases and other critical infrastructure.

    7. Senator Rounds. Admiral Davidson, are you concerned with 
the United States capability gap in this area, which has grown 
exponentially since 2001?
    Admiral Davidson. Yes, I am concerned about growing terrain 
shaping obstacle capability gaps particularly with China, 
Russia, and North Korea. I support service efforts to develop 
the next generation of mine capability--particularly ``man-in-
the-loop ``discriminatory systems--which could help close the 
advantage held by other countries in this area.

               TACTICAL EXERCISES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

    8. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, during the hearing, 
multiple Senators addressed the impact of the cancellation of 
military exercises in the Republic of Korea [ROK], especially 
Ulchi Freedom Guardian and other command post exercises. I, 
too, believe those exercises are critical to maintaining 
readiness, building relationships, and integrating friends and 
allies, but I am also very concerned about the cancellation of 
tactical exercises. Can you comment on the overall impact that 
the cancellation of tactical exercises in the Republic of Korea 
has on the readiness of USFK/ROK-United States Combined Forces 
Command?
    General Abrams. The suspension of large-scale exercises 
coincident with senior-leader engagements in 2018 was a prudent 
action in support of diplomacy. Following those suspensions, 
and in accordance with guidance provided by the Secretary of 
Defense, we have worked to modify our exercise design and 
execution to maintain readiness through combined training and 
exercises while preserving space for ongoing diplomacy. To 
achieve this balance, we have adjusted four dials--size, scope, 
volume, and timing. Adjustments to volume (projecting exercise 
details and atmospherics into the information domain for 
effect) have been key as the design of legacy Key Resolve, Foal 
Eagle, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian purposefully maximized volume 
in order to leverage combined exercises as an element of our 
military deterrence strategy. As we have moved from an 
environment of provocation to detente, it is appropriate to 
change our active messaging posture to achieve the same 
deterrent effect. What is unchanged is the readiness and 
posture of our forces to act as a strategic deterrent postured 
to respond to potential crisis or provocation, and if called 
upon, ready to defend the Republic of Korea and our allies in 
the region. This ``Fight Tonight'' posture is maintained 
through the regular conduct of tactical and operational 
combined Field Training Exercises paired with two Command Post 
Exercises. These training and exercise events focus on ensuring 
operational and support units, staff, and senior leaders are 
well trained in their core competencies and are prepared to 
conduct the planning and execution of joint and combined 
operations under the strain of crisis.

    9. Senator Rounds. General Abrams, can you also comment on 
the specific impact the cancellation of tactical exercises has 
on individual soldiers, leaders, and units from squad to 
brigade level, especially on gaining/maintaining detailed 
knowledge of the terrain they would potentially be fighting on 
and integration into combat-effective combined arms task 
forces?
    General Abrams. We continue to conduct combined and 
unilateral tactical and operational training at the unit and 
component command level. In some cases, we have actually 
increased this level of training (e.g. combined Marine training 
has increased 20 percent over the last six months) and I am 
comfortable with the state of core competency and warfighting 
readiness among our joint and combined force. Additionally, we 
continue to rotate Brigade Combat Teams through nine-month 
rotations, thereby creating a depth of experience across our 
formations.
                              ----------                              


            Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn

                             CHINA / CYBER

    10. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, how does 
INDOPACOM's concept of operations need to change in order to 
account for Chinese electronic warfare and cyber capabilities?
    Admiral Davidson. Beijing has developed significant 
electronic warfare and cyberspace capabilities. In the event of 
armed conflict, the PRC will employ these capabilities to 
create a degraded and contested operational environment-
something the U.S. has not had to persistently contend with for 
over 25 years. INDOPACOM 's concept of operations must 
emphasize agility and resilience across all domains of 
operations to enable the Joint Force to operate effectively in 
this kind of environment. Below the threshold of armed 
conflict, China continuously operates in and through cyberspace 
to achieve strategic advantage. INDOPACOM must collaborate and 
share information with a broad array of partners in order to 
build situational awareness and enable a proactive posture to 
defeat malicious cyber activity at the source.

    11. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, could you expand 
on your statement that INDOPACOM is exploring ``capabilities 
that are nascent''?
    Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM in coordination with 
USCYBERCOM has changed our approach to countering Chinese 
actions in cyberspace. This new approach emphasizes stopping 
attacks before they penetrate our cyber defenses, taking 
actions that influence adversary behavior, and introducing 
uncertainty into competitor or adversary calculations. Full 
implementation of the approach requires innovative thinking 
about and experimentation with promising, though nascent, 
tactical, technical, and procedural cyberspace capabilities.

    12. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what is your 
assessment of China's capabilities in electronic attack or 
electronic warfare?
    Admiral Davidson. China considers electronic warfare (EW 
[of which electronic attack is a component]) an integral 
component of modem warfare. The PLA has fielded an impressive 
array of ground-, sea-, and air-based EW systems that are 
capable of operating against a wide swath of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. As part of the late 2015-early 2016 
force-wide reorganization, the PLA created the Strategic 
Support Force to command, operate, and synchronize space, 
cyber, and electronic warfare elements. PLA EW units routinely 
train to improve their technical proficiency. More importantly, 
they are integrated into most major PLA training events, both 
supporting friendly forces with EW capabilities and acting as 
adversaries I opposing forces, creating a complex 
electromagnetic environment within which PLA forces must 
operate. PLA capabilities include the ability to impact 
adversary systems operating in radio, radar, microwave, 
infrared, and optical frequency ranges, as well as computer and 
information systems. Like all PLA capabilities, their EW force 
is progressing rapidly but still faces challenges effectively 
integrating into complex, modern combat operations.

    13. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what practical 
operational implications does this have for U.S. military 
forces in a potential conflict?
    Admiral Davidson. In the South China Sea, the PLA has 
constructed a variety of radar, electronic attack, and defense 
capabilities on the disputed Spratly Islands, to include: 
Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, 
Johnson Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef. These facilities 
significantly expand the real-time domain awareness, ISR, and 
jamming capabilities of the PLA over a large portion of the 
South China Sea, presenting a substantial challenge to United 
States military operations in this region.

    14. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, what is your 
assessment of China's capabilities in cyber and space?
    Admiral Davidson. China is developing cyber reconnaissance 
and cyberattack capabilities to support a range of objectives, 
from collecting intelligence and stealing intellectual property 
to manipulating data and posturing for destructive actions. 
China has targeted United States DOD networks to fill gaps in 
its research programs and to gather intelligence on our 
strategies and plans. In addition, China is suspected of 
targeting neighboring countries--particularly in Southeast 
Asia--focusing on political, military, and economic issues--as 
well as on disputed territories, and media organizations and 
journalists. China continues to strengthen its military space 
and counterspace capabilities--including space-based 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, 
satellite jammers, antisatellite missiles, and directed-energy 
weapons--despite its public comments against the militarization 
of space. China's national policymakers emphasize the 
importance of its space program in bolstering the country's 
scientific and technological modernization and growing its 
high-technology industrial base. China has increasingly sought 
to integrate its civil and military space efforts to streamline 
research and development processes and develop dual-use 
technologies. The consolidation of space, cyber, and other 
capabilities under the Strategic Support Force is probably 
intended to generate synergies between these capabilities to 
make each more effective.

    15. Senator Blackburn. Admiral Davidson, how would you 
characterize the level of risk to U.S. space-based assets?
    Admiral Davidson. China's space surveillance sensors are 
capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing United 
States satellites. China has already demonstrated ground-
launched weapons capable of destroying satellites in orbit. 
Additionally, China is developing satellite jamming 
capabilities, directed-energy weapons, and offensive 
cyberattack capabilities, all of which could be used to support 
military operations against United States space-based assets. 
The vast geographic expanse of the Indo-Pacific AOR, makes 
INDOPACOM highly reliant on the global coverage provided by 
space services to accomplish our mission. China recognizes our 
dependence on space and has fielded these counter-space systems 
to hold the majority of United States and allied satellite 
systems at risk. U.S. assets at risk include critical 
communications networks, navigation, weather and intelligence 
sources vital to steady state and contingency operations.

    16. Senator Blackburn. General Abrams, could you expand on 
your statements about command and integration of Cyber Command 
on the peninsula, including delegation of authority?
    General Abrams. USCYBERCOM is fully integrated into USFK 
and provides Direct Support to the USFK and the Joint Cyber 
Center. USCYBERCOM provided personnel as part of the Cyberspace 
Operations--Integrated Planning Element (CO-IPE). USCYBERCOM 
provides tremendous cyber capability to USFK and as the 
supporting command to USINDOPACOM, the USCYBERCOM CDR is on 
record as having all the required authorities to carry out 
their mission in support of USFK and USINDOPACOM.
                              ----------                              


                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                                CLIMATE

    17. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, the 
most recent Worldwide Threat Assessment from the DNI [Director 
of National Intelligence] states that ``Extreme weather events, 
many worsened by accelerating sea level rise, will particularly 
affect urban coastal areas in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
the Western Hemisphere. Damage to communication, energy, and 
transportation infrastructure could affect low-lying military 
bases, inflict economic costs, and cause human displacement and 
loss of life.'' Please comment on our preparedness to respond 
to future extreme weather events in South Asia, Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific Islands.
    Admiral Davidson. USINDOPACOM stands ready to support 
partner nations, in coordination with the lead federal agency 
USAID/OFDA, in response to future extreme weather events. I 
would note that the number of times we have responded to these 
events have declined in recent years because of increased 
partner nation resiliency and capacity. However, for the most 
extreme events, we are typically the only entity with the 
resources and capabilities to respond quickly in order to 
minimize loss of life and suffering.
    General Abrams. USFK works closely with our ROK and 
regional allies and partners, USINDOPACOM, and the interagency 
to maintain the posture and readiness necessary to surge the 
operational and logistic capabilitiy and capacity necessary to 
contend with a an extreme weather event. The same posture and 
readiness essential to our ability to deter aggression and 
defend South Korea prepares us for the challenges of 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions. 
Further, USFK participates in regional training and exercise 
events which focus on that mission set and the core 
competencies required for rapid and in-depth response. Of note, 
USFK recently provided support to fighting wildfires in 
northeastern province of Gangwon-do. The training and 
capabilities which facilitated that response are an example of 
the ability to conduct rapid response resident throughout the 
combined ROK-United States readiness posture. Additionally, 
USFK serves as a forward postured arm of USINDOPACOM in the 
event of regional humanitarian assistance/disaster response 
missions.

    18. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, what 
are some of the risks to regional stability that such extreme 
weather events might pose and can you comment on the demands 
that such events have placed on U.S. Forces over the last few 
years?
    Admiral Davidson. In general, the frequency, timing, and 
severity of extreme weather events all factor into the impact a 
disaster might have locally and regionally. Mega-earthquakes, 
mega-tsunamis, and super-typhoons hold the potential to cause 
massive casualties and damage. The resulting widespread human 
suffering, food and water shortages, and extensive power 
outages could serve as precipitating events for regional 
instability, if not properly managed. Over the past several 
years, U.S. Forces have been called upon and less and less for 
assistance because our partners and allies have, with our help, 
built up their own capabilities to respond to these kinds of 
events.
    General Abrams. Extreme weather events threatening 
stability on the Korean peninsula, and in the broader NE Asia 
region, include tropical storms and typhoons but also periods 
of sustained drought. The storm surge and torrential rains 
associated with tropical storms and typhoons are particularly 
impactful to South Korea given the topography of the peninsula 
and the associated high population density in low-lying and 
coastal areas. Critical infrastructure and sources of food and 
commerce such as fisheries, crops, and livestock are all 
vulnerable in the event an extreme storm overwhelms existing 
waterways and containment systems. Likewise, communities in the 
heavily forested and mountainous central and northeastern 
highlands are at risk from wildfires fueled by dry, windy 
conditions and localized drought. Recently, USFK provided 
support to fighting wildfires in northeastern province of 
Gangwon-do. While episodes such as this have been limited, USFK 
exercises its ability to rapidly deliver operational and 
logistic support to humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response missions. Training and exercising to conduct rapid 
response impoves the combined ROK-United States readiness 
posture to provide relief in the event of a natural disaster. 
Additionally, USFK serves as a forward postured arm of 
USINDOPACOM in the event of regional humanitarian assistance/
disaster response missions.

    19. Senator Reed. Admiral Davidson and General Abrams, the 
recently published Worldwide Threat Assessment from the DNI 
indicates that: ``Global environmental and ecological 
degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel 
competition for resources, economic distress, and social 
discontent through 2019 and beyond.'' For example, there are 
indications water shortages will induce stress in South Asia, 
especially given the rapid decrease in Himalayan glaciers. What 
is your assessment and the extent to which decreasing water 
resources could inflame tensions within INDOPACOM, USFK, and 
the surrounding regions?
    Admiral Davidson. I believe the availability of fresh water 
is, and will continue to be, one of the largest threats to 
stability in SE Asia and beyond. Wars have and will be fought 
over fresh water. The potential for supply side decreases at 
the same time as potential increases in demand would make this 
issue more challenging. Additionally, there are pressures being 
placed on countries downstream who are often denied access to 
clean water through upstream activities increasing pollution 
and/or flow control for hydroelectric, agricultural or other 
purposes. The nation that controls the water flow might use 
that to control the countries who require access to that water. 
Decreasing water resources could have significant economic and 
food security implications. For example, the area of Kashmir 
sits in a geographic location highly susceptible to climate-
change induced drought. Climactic instability there could 
trigger conflict between nuclear-armed countries over water 
rights. Urbanization likewise is changing risk profiles for 
millions in this AOR, compounded by uncertainty due to climate 
change.
    General Abrams. Given the availability of fresh water 
stores and the plentiful rainfall in much of Korea, the 
competition over water is unlikely to be a significant driver 
of tension in the near future. Instead, based on its unique 
topography and extensive coastline, South Korea's exposure to 
rising sea levels and increased annual coastal rainfall is 
placing at risk the housing and infrastructure throughout the 
eastern and southern lowlands. This creates the potential for 
internal socio-economic and political disruptions should there 
be an extreme environmental event which leads to excessive 
flooding and the inundation of either or both agricultural land 
and metropolitan areas.
                              ----------                              


           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal

                        PACIFIC FLEET COLLISIONS

    20. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, recommendations 
that you helped author in the Comprehensive Review of Surface 
Force Incidents included enhanced reporting processes to share 
lessons across the surface force, improved safety programs 
across the Navy, and enriched individual navigation skills and 
training opportunities. Last April, you testified that the Vice 
Chief and the Under Secretary of the Navy were leading an 
oversight council to ensure that these recommendations are 
appropriately implemented. Is the Navy implementing the review 
recommendations in a timely manner? Please share any updates 
you have.
    Admiral Davidson. In incorporating the CR/SRR 
recommendations, the Navy is implementing and 
institutionalizing the lessons learned in 2017. To date, the 
Navy has implemented 91 of 111 CR/SR actions and there are 
clear paths forward for the remaining items.

    21. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the collisions of 
the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain were both deemed 
avoidable, for several reasons. Are you confident that 
implementing the recommendations will prevent future unforced 
errors that lead to tragic collisions?
    Admiral Davidson. I am confident that these measures will 
minimize the risk of these types of errors in the future. 
However, due to the nature of the mission and operations in the 
Indo-Pacific, the element of risk cannot be completely 
eliminated.

    22. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, are there any 
additional measures or investments that Congress should 
consider during this year's budget cycle to address the 
recommendations of this report and support naval operations 
throughout INDOPACOM?
    Admiral Davidson. The Navy's fiscal year 2020 budget 
request includes funding to establish Maritime Skills Training 
Centers in the fleet concentration areas in San Diego, CA and 
Norfolk, VA. I ask Congress to support this initiative which 
implements specific recommendations from the Comprehensive 
Review.

                INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

    23. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the United States 
can reach both Asia and Europe with sea-based and air-delivered 
missiles, neither of which violate the INF [Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces] Treaty. You noted in your testimony that ground 
based systems must remain mobile to be a viable military 
option. Why are ground-based missile systems necessary to 
counter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea when the 
United States is already investing in the construction of 
Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines that are mobile by 
nature?
    Admiral Davidson. Land-based precision fires would 
complement sea and air based systems but not replace them. 
These systems would provide the following military advantages: 
increase our deterrence posture with respect to Beijing and 
improve regional security present a persistent, credible threat 
to the PRC forcing PRC investment in costly defensive systems, 
provide a relatively inexpensive augmentation to air and 
maritime strike platforms, helping to restore their freedom of 
action, create a multi-domain targeting dilemma for Chinese 
planners, further demonstrate United States resolve against PRC 
military coercion.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, why not continue 
this investment in order to maintain our asymmetric advantage 
in undersea warfare?
    Admiral Davidson. I fully support continued investment in 
undersea capabilities and do not view this issue as an 
``either/or'' proposition between ground- and sea-based 
systems. We must have sufficient numbers of technically 
advanced, reliable, and integrated air-, sea-, and land-based 
systems available to add depth to our defenses and to counter 
the increasingly sophisticated threats we face.

    25. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, many of our 
allies--including Japan--oppose withdrawal from the INF. 
Others, such as South Korea and Australia, do not want to host 
United States offensive missiles. NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] allies also oppose the treaty withdrawal. How is 
INDOPACOM managing this opposition?
    Admiral Davidson. Many of our allies, Japan included, would 
optimally like to see a multi-lateral treaty with China 
involved and also for Russia to return to INF compliance. 
Pragmatically the prospects for this seem slim. In my view, 
land-based precision fires would increase our deterrence 
posture with respect to Beijing and improve regional security 
and safety of all people. We believe that, through dialogue, 
our allies and partners will see this, too.

    26. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, if regional 
allies will not support the deployment of ground-based 
missiles, how will INF withdrawal impact regional stability?
    Admiral Davidson. If regional allies are unwilling to host 
ground-based missiles then the Chinese military (PLA) might 
continue to enjoy the unchallenged advantage they have gained 
by not being an INF signatory China has never been restricted 
by the treaty and has fielded approximately 1900 land-based 
missiles with ranges between 500-5500 km; we have none. 
Deploying land-based missiles would increase our deterrence 
posture with respect to Beijing and improve regional security.

    27. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, given the 
significant United States military presence on Guam, the island 
is already deeply vulnerable during any conflict with China. If 
the United States deploys land-based missiles on Guam upon 
withdrawal from the INF treaty, how will this compromise 
regional security and the safety of United States 
servicemembers stationed on the island?
    Admiral Davidson. Guam is already at risk to PRC 
intermediate range missiles. Deploying land-based missiles to 
Guam would increase our deterrence posture with respect to 
Beijing, improving regional security and the safety of all 
people on Guam.

    28. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, how do you 
anticipate that China would react to the deployment of ground-
based missiles in your command?
    Admiral Davidson. I suspect China would protest loudly and 
stridently. They would be losing a significant military 
advantage and would do everything in their power to try to 
maintain that edge. This includes exerting diplomatic and 
economic pressure--Including veiled and overt threats--against 
our regional allies and partners to attempt to force them to 
deny our access.

                             CLIMATE CHANGE

    29. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, DOD's [Department 
of Defense] Climate Change report mentioned that ``at Naval 
Base Guam, recurrent flooding limits capacity for a number of 
operations and activities . . . that support mission 
execution.'' How does this flooding jeopardize INDOPACOM 
operations?
    Admiral Davidson. Specific operational impacts from 
flooding on Naval Base Guam are currently limited, and in 
general, present a low impact to operations and activities that 
support mission execution. Those impacts are primarily the 
result of a slightly wetter climate compared to historical 
standards and recently, an increase in tropical storms. 
Overall, major impacts to operations on Guam result from 
tropical storms and typhoons. Guam lies in one of the world's 
most active regions for tropical storms. In addition to the 
destructive nature of these storms, they often force the 
dispersal of aircraft and ships from the island, resulting in 
lost training opportunities and follow-on operational impacts.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, do you require 
additional resources to effectively combat the effects of 
climate change?
    Admiral Davidson. No, we do not require additional 
resources to effectively combat the effects of climate change 
at this time.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the DOD Climate 
Change report failed to list the 10 most vulnerable military 
installations for each service, and did not list a single 
United States military installation outside the United States. 
In addition to Naval Base Guam, which military bases throughout 
INDOPACOM are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change?
    Admiral Davidson. I have concerns about the vulnerability 
of military installations on Guam, Kwajalein Atoll in the 
Republic of Marshall Islands, and Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii to the 
impacts of climate change. At this time, DOD lacks sufficient 
data to identify installations as more vulnerable to climate 
change than others. Working with the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the DOD expects to complete 
a study in the next two years that will help us better 
understand how to analyze the vulnerabilities of military 
installations to climate change.

    32. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, the Pentagon's 
climate change report briefly mentioned that flooding and 
earthquake-induced tsunamis in Indonesia contribute to 
instability throughout INDOPACOM. How does this instability 
impact your mission?
    Admiral Davidson. In general, the frequency, timing, and 
severity of these types of disasters may impact our overall 
mission. However, humanitarian assistance and disaster response 
(HADR) missions have a positive impact on our strategic 
relationships with allies and partners. Our HADR efforts are a 
visible, tangible demonstration of America 's goodwill in the 
region and come with no strings attached, putting us in stark 
contrast with China. Additionally, we have expended a lot of 
effort toward helping our allies and partners build their own 
capability and capacity to effectively respond to disasters, 
lessening their dependence on U.S. assistance. Indonesia is a 
key partner in the region and sits at the center of vital 
transportation routes susceptible to many types of significant 
natural disasters. In the last fifteen years, Indonesia has 
made significant progress in developing the capabilities to 
mitigate these kinds of disasters. For example, the two 2018 
tsunamis that the country faced--one from tectonic activity and 
the other from an underwater landslide--required minimal U.S. 
Government/military assistance.

      NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION, SANCTIONS, AND CYBERSECURITY

    33. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General 
Abrams, do you think there is a common definition for 
denuclearization and how would you define a denuclearized North 
Korean peninsula?
    Admiral Davidson. The United States and the international 
community have a shared understanding of what final, fully 
verified denuclearization--or FFVD--entails. FFVD means the 
removal of all key components of North Korea's nuclear fuel 
cycle, removal of all fissile material, removal of North 
Korea's nuclear warheads, removal or destruction of all 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and permanently freezing 
any other weapons of mass destruction programs.
    General Abrams. The definition of denuclearization, as 
noted by our State Department, is nothing short of the final 
and fully verified dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear 
program. Shortly after his July 2018 visit Pyongyang, Secretary 
Pompeo in responding to a similar question said that he had 
``lengthy discussions about the scope of what complete 
denuclearization means'' during his visit, and that 
denuclearization is broad in nature: ``weapons systems to 
fissile material to the production facilities, enrichment 
facilities, across the range of weapons and missiles.'' Again, 
Secretary Pompeo noted that ``The North Koreans understand that 
and have not challenged that,'' and also that ``they also 
understand that denuclearization makes no sense absent 
verification, and they acknowledge that as well. There will be 
a verification connected to the complete denuclearization.''

    34. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson, in your 
testimony, you state: ``North Korea is continuing efforts to 
mitigate the effects of international sanctions and the United 
States-led pressure campaign.'' What indicators would you look 
for in North Korean progress toward denuclearization to 
determine that the United States could responsibly consider 
lifting the current comprehensive sanctions on North Korea?
    Admiral Davidson. As our diplomats have stated following 
the Hanoi summit, our position remains that we expect final, 
fully verified denuclearization before sanctions relief.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. General Abrams, in your testimony, 
you state that North Korea ``demonstrates increasing cyber 
capacity that must be matched and thwarted.'' Do United States 
Forces-Korea possess matching cyber capacity to thwart attacks?
    General Abrams. Yes. USFK and USINDOPACOM work closely with 
USCYBERCOM to ensure we are postured to match and thwart the 
cyber threats posed by the DPRK. Our activities and current 
posture are much improved thanks to the development and 
implementation of the National Cyber Strategy, the DOD Cyber 
Strategy, the certainty and resourcing provided by Congress 
over the last two years, and as a result of changes in 
Presidential Policy providing increased latitude for USCYBERCOM 
to prepare and act.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. General Abrams, do you require any 
additional investment in intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance assets in order to inform decision-making and 
military strategy on the Korean Peninsula?
    General Abrams. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and United 
States Forces Korea (USFK) require increased, multi-discipline, 
persistent ISR capability and associated exploitation support 
to lengthen the warning time necessary to provide adequate 
decision space. The requirement for collection capabilities and 
capacity is shaped, in part, by North Korea's behavior. If we 
see a return to demonstrations of threatening military 
capability and associated increase in military tensions, 
collection requirements will be greater. Additionally, 
collection requirements change as the target evolves 
capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Additional 
information is provided in a classified response.

    37. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General 
Abrams, last year, the United States suspended several combined 
military exercises with South Korea, purportedly to increase 
the potential success of nuclear negotiations. Did the 
suspension and scaling back of recent military exercises make a 
tangible impact on diplomacy?
    Admiral Davidson. In my view, the suspension of certain 
military exercises with South Korea created space for 
diplomacy. While we have not yet reached an agreement with 
North Korea, the President's initiative to engage North Korea 
directly has reduced tension on the Korean peninsula and 
provided the possibility for an escape from the long-running 
cycle of North Korean escalation and de-escalation.
    General Abrams. The suspension of exercises in 2018, 
combined with the modifications to training and exercises going 
forward, have been instrumental to creating the necessary space 
for diplomacy by effectively turning down the volume on the 
regional military tensions that escalated throughout 2017. That 
reduction in military tensions has continued through the 
efforts of South Korean, North Korea, and the United Nations 
Command to coordinate, plan, and implement the slate of 
confidence-building measures reducing military activity along 
the DMZ. The outcome of these activities is the sustained 
reduction in military tensions throughout 2018 and into 2019 
which supports our ongoing period of detente and its continued 
diplomacy.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Davidson and General 
Abrams, did these suspensions negatively impact military 
readiness?
    Admiral Davidson. At the battalion level and below, we had 
no change in exercises or military readiness. I believe we 
accepted some prudent risk to military readiness at the 
operational headquarters level last summer to create space for 
diplomacy, but have made adjustments beginning in 2019 to 
account for and mitigate any previous readiness impact at the 
headquarters level.
    General Abrams. The 12 June 2018 Summit presented a 
historic occasion to re-shape strategic settings and relations 
on the Korean peninsula. The United States and South Korea have 
spent almost seven decades refining strategic, operational and 
tactical readiness to defend the Republic of Korea and deter 
aggression. The suspension of certain exercises during the 
spring and summer of 2018 was a prudent step which created 
additional space for diplomacy. Negotiations with the DPRK are 
difficult and require continuous patience, but they provide an 
important mechanism for the development of confidence building 
measures and other steps that have reduced military tensions on 
the Korean Peninsula. Within the resulting period of detente, 
the DPRK has suspended nuclear and ballistic missile testing, a 
development which represents a significant improvement since 
the apex of tensions in late 2017. The center of gravity for 
our military readiness in Korea is the ROK-United States 
Alliance. We have worked to proactively modify our exercise 
design and conduct to maintain that diplomatic space while 
allowing our negotiators to operate from a position of 
strength. During our spring exercise, DONG MAENG 19-1 (DM 19-
1), we adjusted four dials--size, scope, volume, and timing--in 
order to balance readiness with diplomatic requirements. CFC/
USFK effectively used DM 19-1 to train 14 of 14 warfighting 
Mission Essential Tasks, validate our C4I and Alliance 
decision-making processes under the stress of simulated crisis 
and hostilities, and demonstrate our Alliance commitment to 
combined readiness.
                              ----------                              


             Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono

                  FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

    39. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, you have spoken at 
length about your command's goal to maintain a Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific. What does China perceive as the likely effects of 
this strategy?
    Admiral Davidson. China probably perceives the strategy as 
constricting its ability to impose a China-centric system on 
the region. Chinese leaders increasingly seek to assert China's 
model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative development 
path. Many in Beijing view nearly every United States action as 
part of a larger containment strategy and have chosen to frame 
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific as an integral part of that 
approach. It is not. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific is exactly 
what its name suggests, an environment that allows all nations 
to freely choose with whom to associate or trade; an 
environment where all nations have free and unfettered access 
to the air, sea, space, and cyber domains; an environment in 
which all nations can flourish free from coercion or threats.

    40. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, does China view the 
Free and Open-Indo Pacific strategy as a threat?
    Admiral Davidson. The Free and Open lndo-Pacific presents a 
viable, time-tested, and successful model for international 
relations. As noted in my response to question 39, Beijing is 
trying to present its model as a better alternative. China's 
model is many things, but certainly not ``free'' or ``open.''

    41. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, should the United 
States ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) as a step to promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific?
    Admiral Davidson. I continue to strongly support accession 
to UNCLOS and believe such a step would reinforce U.S. 
commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Accession would 
express formal U.S. commitment to the rights and freedoms 
reflected in UNCLOS as shared values with our allies and 
partners. It would also strengthen our position vis-a-vis China 
by improving our ability to call out China's actions that are 
contrary to the treaty.

    42. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, beyond some of the 
actions we have already seen in the South China Sea, what is 
the likely next step in escalation China might take to counter 
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy?
    Admiral Davidson. Chinese leaders are likely to do many 
things to challenge the tenets and principles of the Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific strategy through their counter-framework of 
Community of Shared Future for Mankind. China will almost 
certainly continue to pursue efforts to upend the global 
governance system by proliferating its anti-United States 
messaging through targeted investments and propaganda. China 
may also choose to challenge unfettered access to the seas and 
airways by deploying additional air defense or anti-ship 
missiles or other capabilities to strategic locations. China 
already challenges free transit by erroneously claiming 
international space in the South China Sea is ``indisputable 
Chinese sovereign territory,'' a claim specifically not upheld 
by the Hague's Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016. China 
may challenge basic human rights by proliferating to other 
nations the intrusive monitoring technologies they're using 
against their own citizens. Or China may challenge the 
transparency of trade agreements or protection of intellectual 
property rights by expanding the already large number of unfair 
and non-competitive regulations imposed on those firms that do 
business in or with China.

    43. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, how likely is China 
to undertake any escalatory actions in the next 2 to 3 years?
    Admiral Davidson. Chinese leaders have been--and will 
certainly remain--committed to aggressively changing the status 
quo in many areas through economic, diplomatic, military, and 
informational activities, which unfortunately can include 
coercion and/or threats. I think we should expect China will 
engage in many activities, that depending on the circumstances 
and location could be considered ``escalatory.'' A few examples 
might be deploying to and operating combat aircraft from the 
three Spratly Island airfields; pressuring Taiwan's diplomatic 
partners to switch formal recognition to Beijing by economic or 
diplomatic means; establishing additional overseas bases by 
exploiting host nation debt to China; or fielding potentially 
destabilizing military capabilities (such as space-based 
weapons).

                   RUSSIA'S GOALS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

    44. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, while much of the 
public focus regarding the Indo-Pacific focuses on China and 
North Korea, you noted in your written testimony that Russia 
remains a power in the Indo-Pacific. What are Russia's goals in 
the Indo-Pacific?
    Admiral Davidson. Russia's strategic goals in the Indo-
Pacific are consistent with its aspirations as a global power--
namely, to protect its sovereignty, strengthen its economic 
relationships, project a powerful military deterrent, and 
expand its regional influence while simultaneously offsetting 
United States influence. Moscow views the Indo-Pacific region 
as key to its prosperity and great power status, particularly 
as it seeks to overcome diplomatic isolation and mitigate the 
effect of Western economic sanctions.

    45. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, what is Russia's 
strategy to realize their goals in the Indo-Pacific?
    Admiral Davidson. Russia pursues activities across the 
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spectrums to 
further its goals in the region. In military activity, Russia 
uses long-range bomber patrols, naval diplomacy, exercises with 
Indo-Pacific nations, and foreign military sales to advance its 
interests. Additionally, Russia is modernizing its Far East 
military capabilities across the services. More capable 
aircraft, surface ships, and submarines will be operational in 
the Pacific in the months ahead, while infrastructure 
improvements are also made to improve airfields and bases in 
the Arctic and Kuril Islands. On the diplomatic front, Russian 
leaders are increasingly engaging regional counterparts--
whether bilaterally or through multilateral institutions such 
as ASEAN--In an effort to expand Moscow's political and 
economic influence.

    46. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, what are Russia's goals 
specific to the Korean Peninsula?
    General Abrams. Russia's strategic objective on the Korean 
Peninsula is to maintain the status quo of two separate Korean 
political entities. Russia shares a border with the DPRK, and 
has an interest in ensuring potential DPRK internal instability 
does not cross the border via refugees or a humanitarian 
crisis. Russia also has an interest in undermining the U.S. 
alliance network and the current rules-based international 
order. Historically, Russia has been an active actor in 
diplomatic efforts to achieve the denuclearization of North 
Korea going back to the Six-Party Talks era. Additionally, 
Russia is seen as enforcing elements of standing sanctions on 
North Korea, but could do more to prevent North Korea's efforts 
to circumvent those sanctions.

    47. Senator Hirono. Admiral Davidson, what are some 
specific steps the United States can take in the Indo-Pacific 
to ensure that Russia's goals, where they run counter to the 
interests of the United States and the broader international 
community, are not realized?
    Admiral Davidson. We must continue to conduct consistent, 
persistent operations throughout the Indo-Pacific as a 
deterrent, demonstrating the readiness, modernity, and 
lethality of all of our capability and capacity. To the extent 
we do this with Allies and Partners, the outcomes are more 
substantive. Every action we take with Allies and Partners--
especially our suite of bilateral and multi-lateral exercises--
provides a meaningful check against Russian influence. As with 
China, one area where we possess a distinct advantage against 
Russia is with our values. The region desires a Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific, the region knows that we are a reliable ally and 
that China and Russia are the greatest threats to a free and 
open lndo-Pacific. All of our messaging should incorporate this 
theme.

                       SPECIAL MEASURES AGREEMENT

    48. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, the week of the hearing 
the United States and South Korea signed a new Special Measures 
Agreement that increased the share of the cost paid by South 
Korea to keep United States troops on the peninsula. The 
agreement is only for 1 year, instead of the 5-year deal that 
has traditionally been agreed to by the United States and South 
Korea. Does the inability to reach a 5-year deal create a point 
of conflict in the overall relationship between the United 
States and Korea?
    General Abrams. The ROK began its direct monetary 
contribution to the Alliance in 1991. The 10th Special Measures 
Agreement (SMA) was signed on March 8th. Once ratified by the 
ROK National Assembly, this agreement will provide the 
framework for ROK support for the next year. The SMAs have 
varied in length over the past three decades. This is the first 
one-year agreement, and while a longer-duration agreement may 
bring more stability and predictability to our fiscal budgeting 
processes, the period it covers does not negatively impact the 
ROK-United States Alliance. The Alliance will remain strong 
under the 2019 SMA, and will build on this strength with the 
next SMA in 2020.

    49. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, does the inability to 
reach a 5-year deal on the Special Measures Agreement disrupt 
or impede the military relationship you and your forces have 
with the South Korean military?
    General Abrams. The ROK-United States military Alliance is 
stronger than ever and is grounded in decades of shared 
sacrifice and a foundation of shared values. The Alliance 
recently conducted the first of our new DONG MAENG exercises. 
The combined command post exercise provided an outstanding 
opportunity for ROK-United States senior leaders and staff 
members to come together to solve problems under the simulated 
stresses and challenges of crisis and contingency conditions. 
Additionally, our combined force continue to train and exercise 
during numerous unit and component-level events throughout the 
year. Close and frequent combined interactions assure that our 
Alliance remains ironclad and will continue to do so under the 
2019 SMA, and will build on this strength as our Department of 
State negotiates the next SMA in 2020.

    50. Senator Hirono. General Abrams, would a new 5-year 
agreement negotiated by the end of this year improve the United 
States-South Korean relationship, both diplomatic and military?
    General Abrams. The Special Measures Agreements (SMAs) have 
varied in length over the past three decades. While a longer-
duration agreement may bring more stability and predictability 
to our fiscal budgeting processes, the period it covers does 
not negatively impact the ROK-United States Alliance. 
Regardless of the length of the agreement, the Alliance will 
remain strong and the ROK and United States will continue the 
critical work of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2019

                      United States Senate,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

   UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND UNITED STATES CYBER 
                                COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Kaine, 
King, Heinrich, Warren, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Senator Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
    The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the 
posture of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
and the United States Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
    I'd like to welcome our witnesses: The Honorable Owen West, 
whom I met for the first time today; General Tony Thomas, who 
is planning to retire, somebody told me--and I think you're far 
too young to retire, but that's up to you, and particularly, 
you have two sons that are West Point graduates. You don't need 
to cut them loose that soon, and then General Nakasone. I 
appreciate very much the fact that, in the last couple of days, 
we've had both open and closed meetings because of the 
seriousness of the thing we'll be addressing this morning.
    The Senate Armed Service Committee's top priority is to 
support the effective implementation of the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS). Central to the NDS is a growing focus on 
competition with China and Russia, our peer competitors. Of 
course, we also, at the same time, don't want to forget about 
the threat that's posed to us from the terrorist organizations.
    Our Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven remarkably 
effective in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups over the last 17 
years. However, these groups remain resilient and continue to 
pose a real threat to the United States and our allies. At the 
same time, the military advancements by China and Russia pose 
new and increasingly complex challenges to our national 
security.
    When you talk to people out in the real world in America, 
there's this assumption that we have the best of everything. 
It's hard to explain, sometimes, that we don't. When we have 
our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) talking about 
how we are actually outranged and outgunned by our adversaries 
in artillery we are advancing, and are ahead of us in some 
areas.
    Another critical component of implementing the NDS is 
developing robust capabilities to counter growing threats in 
cyberspace. The Department of Defense (DOD) is making important 
progress, including the elevation of the Cyber Command to a 
fully combatant command and the Cyber Mission Forces (CMF) 
achieving full operational capability. Additionally, DOD 
released a new Cyber Strategy last year that provides a roadmap 
over how we will operate in the cyber domain. I look to our 
witnesses to describe what investments will be needed to meet 
these objectives.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 
me join you in welcoming our witnesses for this update on the 
readiness and the posture of U.S. Special Operations and U.S. 
Cyber Command.
    General Thomas, I'd also like to thank you for your 
extraordinary service and your coming retirement after 39 years 
in service. You've ably led SOCOM during difficult times. 
You've done it with great energy, great foresight, and great 
dedication to the men and women you lead. I thank you for that. 
I also want to thank your family, because they served alongside 
you, and they continue to serve with you. Nice to see that your 
sons got good educations, also. So, thank you.
    General Nakasone, this is your first time to appear before 
the Committee since Cyber Command's been elevated to a unified 
command. Congratulations on this. Also congratulations on your 
accomplishments, in partnership with National Security Agency 
(NSA) and other agencies recently, in combating some of our 
adversaries in the cyber sphere. Thank you very much, sir.
    SOCOM is unique within the Department of Defense as the 
only functional combatant command with service-like 
responsibilities for the training, equipping, organizing, and 
readiness of Special Operations Forces. For that reason, it's 
appropriate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Long-Intensity Conflict, the ASD SOLIC, Owen 
West joins us today in his role as the Service Secretary-like 
official responsible for oversight. So, welcome, Mr. Secretary. 
Thank you.
    Since passage of the ASD SOLIC reforms contained in the 
2017 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD has made important 
progress, including hiring additional personnel and more 
effectively integrating the ASD SOLIC into departmental 
processes related to budgeting, acquisition, readiness, and 
personnel management. These efforts are necessary, but not 
sufficient, to fulfill the intent of the SOLIC reforms. 
Secretary West and General Thomas, I hope you will provide your 
assessment of what more needs to be done and how this Committee 
can continue to support your efforts.
    SOCOM, as a microcosm of the broader Department and Joint 
Force, continues to adjust the complex security environment and 
the focus of the National Defense Strategy on great-power 
competition. This change will have implications for the 
Department's management of SOF forces, their readiness, 
capabilities, and development, and the operational authority 
that they have to undertake. As the demand for SOF continues to 
grow, we must also keep in mind that there are limits to the 
hardships we can ask Special Operations Forces and their 
families to endure. The United States, along with our allies 
and partners, face an urgent and continuing threat from 
information warfare attacks by Russia and other foreign 
adversaries. Russia attacked our democracy in 2016, and we must 
view these attacks with the same level of seriousness and 
resolve as a military attack.
    While we appear to have had some success in countering 
Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections, we should 
not take this as a sign that we can let our guard down. We must 
do more to anticipate and counter these increasingly 
sophisticated attacks, including by ensuring we are properly 
organized across the U.S. Government and inside the Department 
of Defense. General Thomas and General Nakasone, your commands 
sit at the nexus of DOD efforts to operate more effectively in 
the information environment, and I hope you will give a full 
assessment of what has been accomplished to integrate 
capabilities and authorities in this arena, and what gaps 
remain.
    With respect to CYBERCOM, while much progress has been made 
in the last year, many serious challenges remain. DOD has 
developed what appears to be a viable cyber strategy and has 
conducted a serious cyber posture review. This posture review 
identified gaps in capabilities across the enterprise, and the 
principal cyber advisor's (PCAs) cross-functional team is 
defining objectives, specific tasks, resources, and timetables 
to correct them. When completed, these activities should 
greatly increase the Department's cybersecurity and the 
effectiveness of Cyber Command.
    The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) explicitly established that unacknowledged activities in 
cyberspace conducted below the level of armed conflict are a 
legal form of so-called traditional military activities. The 
NDAA also provided authority to the President to take action 
against sustained campaigns of specific adversaries against the 
United States, including Russia's malign influence campaign. 
This legislation, along with a recent presidential directive, 
provided DOD and Cyber Command with the needed authority to 
plan and conduct more vigorous actions in cyberspace to defend 
the country.
    To support such operations, Cyber Command has developed an 
operational concept to employ so-called persistent engagement, 
in line with the National Defense Strategy. This is an 
important milestone, which I hope will provide an even more 
effective model for engaging our adversaries without undue risk 
of escalation. General Nakasone, I look forward to hearing more 
about this operational concept.
    We have come a long way, but we have a long way to go 
further. I know, with General Nakasone's leadership, General 
Thomas's leadership, and soon-to-be-General Clark's leadership, 
and with Secretary West, we'll continue forward.
    Thank you very much, gentlemen.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We'd now have opening statements. We're going to try to 
confine our remarks to 5 minutes.
    We'll start with you, General Thomas, and work across to 
General Nakasone.
    Okay. All right, I've just been corrected. We're going to 
start with Secretary West.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE OWEN O. WEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
     DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

    Secretary West. Thank you, Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Everyone's pointing at you, anyway, so----
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary West. Senator Reed, Chairman Inhofe, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify alongside my partner, General Tony 
Thomas, on our global posture for our Nation's Special 
Operations enterprise. Tony's command of SOCOM has safeguarded 
the Nation for 3 years. I look forward to continued progress, 
working with Richard Clark, when he assumes command next month.
    We're honored today to team with General Paul Nakasone, 
whose command defends the Nation at the leading edge of the 
modern battlefield.
    The breadth and capability of our Special Operations Force 
is astonishing. In over 80 countries, this vanguard force 
tackles our most pressing challenges in the most hostile 
environments. In the past 2 years, 23 SOF personnel have been 
killed in action, and many more have sustained life-altering 
injuries. Representing just 3 percent of the Joint Force, SOF 
have absorbed over 40 percent of U.S. casualties in this time. 
This sacrifice serves as a powerful reminder that special 
operators are in the risk business. Their families carry the 
burden of individual tragedy so that we might prevent a 
national tragedy.
    This is a unique time to serve the SOF enterprise, because 
it is at an inflection point. First, the section 922 
legislation has reinvigorated the partnership between my office 
and SOCOM. Second, the National Defense Strategy has challenged 
all of DOD to increase focus on long-term strategic competition 
with Russia and China.
    The SOF enterprise is in the midst of transformation, 
something special operators have always done very well. Any 
transformation starts with people. In November, General Thomas 
and I issued the first-ever joint vision for the SOF 
enterprise, challenging professionals to innovate relentlessly 
in pursuit of decisive competitive advantage. Special 
Operations should be viewed as an integral point of the Joint 
Force, designed to quickly and cost-effectively solve risky 
problems that do not lend themselves to mass or scale.
    General Thomas has made tremendous progress in reducing the 
strain caused by the high operational tempo and demand. At the 
height of the wars, a large proportion of the force was 
spending as much time overseas as in the United States. This 
year, over 90 percent of the force will spend at least twice as 
much time in the United States as they will on deployment. I'm 
proud to report to you that our Special Operations Force is 
neither overstretched nor breaking, but very healthy, poised 
and eager to defend the Nation against increasingly adaptive 
foes.
    Despite this clear progress, General Thomas and I are 
concerned about serious ethical failings by some members of our 
SOF community. These incidents have our full attention. They 
are totally unacceptable and do not reflect the true nature of 
the SOF professional.
    Finally, I would like to thank General Thomas for 39 years 
of service, much of it in combat. From 2001 to 2013, he 
deployed to Afghanistan every year, except for one in which he 
was wounded in Iraq. His relentless desire to defend the Nation 
is an inspiration to us all. He epitomizes quiet 
professionalism as a public official, but, in leading his 
troops and behind Pentagon doors, he is not shy. He 
consistently demonstrates blunt intellectual integrity that has 
personally inspired me. Our Nation will miss him. His wife, 
Barbara, less so now, and probably less in a year.
    Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to testify 
today, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary West follows:]

             Prepared Statement by The Honorable Owen West
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished 
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on 
our global posture for the Department of Defense's Special Operations 
Enterprise. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), my remarks will focus 
on my statutory authority within the administrative chain of command 
for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) overseeing the Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) Enterprise. Today, the SOF Enterprise is 
prepared to address the most pressing security challenges our Nation 
faces. I'm honored to have General Tony Thomas as a partner. His 
command has safeguarded this Nation for the past three years. I look 
forward to continued progress working with General Richard Clarke when 
he assumes command next month.
    Having served in this capacity for the past year, I am humbled by 
the daily service and sacrifice of the over 70,000 soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, marines, and civil servants who comprise the SOF Enterprise. 
Its breadth and capability is astonishing. In over 80 countries, this 
vanguard force tackles our Nation's most pressing national security 
challenges, from Salafi Jihadism to great power competition. These 
guardians often serve in hostile environments. In the past two years, 
23 SOF personnel have been killed in action, while many more have 
sustained life-altering injuries. Special operations personnel, just 
three percent of the Joint Force, have absorbed over 40 percent percent 
of the total U.S. casualties. This sacrifice serves as a powerful 
reminder that special operators are in the risk business. Their 
families carry the burden of individual tragedy so that we might 
prevent a national tragedy.
    This is a unique time to serve the SOF Enterprise because it is an 
inflection point. First, the section 922 legislation has reinvigorated 
my office's role in overseeing and advocating for the SOF Enterprise. 
Second, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) has challenged all of 
DOD to deter rogue regimes and defeat terrorist networks while placing 
new focus on the long-term strategic competition with Russia and China. 
The SOF Enterprise is in the midst of transformation, something special 
operators have always done very well.
            alignment of sof capabilities to nds objectives
    The NDS calls on us to ensure our special operations capabilities 
will compete--and win--in today's complex national security 
environment. The NDS emphasizes the importance of counterterrorism in 
protecting our Homeland from threats to our core national interests, 
while prioritizing investments that restore a decisive competitive 
advantage with our principal strategic competitors. In November, 
General Thomas and I issued the first-ever joint vision for the SOF 
Enterprise. We challenged our SOF professionals to innovate 
relentlessly in pursuit of decisive competitive advantage. Our enemies 
have scattered from the conventional battlefield. SOF is a fast-
adapting, full-spectrum force, uniquely capable of imposing costs on 
our adversaries wherever their threat resides and whatever form it 
takes.
    As the Department implements the NDS's vision for strategic 
competition, the SOF Enterprise must adapt to meet the demands of our 
modern security environment. In this environment, both state and non-
state actors threaten our national security interests with increasingly 
sophisticated and asymmetric capabilities below the level that would 
provoke a U.S. conventional response. SOF's unique capabilities, 
understanding of the threat environment, and interagency and 
international partnerships are critically important in addressing these 
challenges.
    My team, in coordination with USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, the 
Services, and combatant commands, is working to institutionalize our 
approach to irregular warfare across the Department to meet the demands 
of an evolving and increasingly complex security environment. Although 
irregular warfare remains a core SOF competency, successful irregular 
warfare in competition short of armed conflict and against high-threat 
violent extremist organizations will continue to require support across 
the entire Joint Force and close cooperation with our interagency 
partners.
    Even as we and international partners eliminate ISIS's physical 
caliphate, the threat from international terrorists to our interests at 
home and abroad persists. SOF are essential to direct action against 
high-value targets, supporting key allies and partners, and deterring 
state and non-state actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using 
weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, Southwest Asia and the 
Middle East will continue to be the focus of these efforts, but, 
because these transnational threat networks operate globally, USSOCOM's 
worldwide reach will be essential to confronting them.
    Enabling free peoples to fight for mutually shared interests is the 
original core competency of SOF. Reassuring allies and building and 
sustaining partnerships remain critical to accomplishing our national 
security objectives. Along with general purpose forces' increasing role 
in security cooperation, SOF provide the Joint Force with deep 
cultural, linguistic, stabilization, and operational expertise to build 
the capacity of our partners and allies and develop lasting 
relationships. SOF also provide critical stabilization expertise and 
capability, assisting the interagency in addressing instability across 
much of Africa and the Middle East. From Eastern Europe to South Korea 
and from Colombia to North Africa, SOF presence and partnerships 
support United States national security interests in key regions.
    As the NDS notes, the surest way to prevent a war is to be prepared 
to win one. In this strategic context, SOF personnel, capabilities, 
agility, and technological advantages help enable decisive combat power 
as an integral part of the Joint Force. We have long recognized that 
the vast majority of special operations depend upon a broad array of 
Service-provided capabilities. At the same time, SOF's role as part of 
the Joint Force in a traditional wartime construct is critically 
important in disrupting our adversaries' operations, creating complex 
dilemmas and imposing asymmetric costs. Special Operations should not 
be viewed as distinct but an integral part of the force with a unique 
role derived from its basic value proposition: quickly and cost-
effectively solving risky problems that do not lend to mass or scale. 
Within this strategic partnership with the Services, SOF capabilities 
serve as a fulcrum that help maximize the effectiveness of the Joint 
Force.
    USSOCOM is an exceptional National investment. Representing 
approximately two percent of the overall Defense budget, USSOCOM 
provides extraordinary leverage to national security. In a 
transformative era, our basic obligation is to tie USSOCOM's fiscal 
strategy with its future operating concept, driving budget discipline 
and delivering downstream performance. The section 922 reforms have 
bolstered this effort. To optimize the efficiency and performance of 
every dollar spent, we foster a culture of performance, accountability, 
and innovation, and the section 922 reforms have strengthened our 
oversight to better inform budgetary and programmatic decision-making. 
As a starting point, the SOF Enterprise capability and program guidance 
is now jointly issued by the Commander, USSOCOM and myself. My office 
is now responsible for approving USSSOCOM's Program Objective 
Memorandum five-year budget plan and is also now authorized to approve 
and submit program and budget review issue papers on behalf of the SOF 
Enterprise.
    With fiscal strategy aligned with future concepts, the SOF value 
proposition as an integral part of the Joint Force is reinforced. Over 
the years, SOF has also developed a culture of innovation, driving a 
battlefield technical revolution in developing a surveillance-strike 
capability that no competitor can quickly replicate. Protecting the 
nation against a terrorist attack remains our enduring task. 
Additionally, we must meet the challenge as a vanguard force in great 
power competition.
                 readiness and resilience of the force
    The SOF Enterprise has enhanced its readiness by balancing 
deployments and dwell-time for strained units, modernizing equipment 
and capabilities, aligning our efforts with NDS priorities, and 
investing in the well-being of SOF members and their families.
    Since 2001, SOF has expanded from approximately 45,000 to over 
70,000 personnel. As we focus on our core tasks and responsibilities in 
implementing the NDS, today's SOF is ready and capable to conduct major 
contingency operations with the Joint Force, conduct and respond to 
irregular warfare, and provide national leadership with options for 
responses to high-priority crises. We have prioritized investments in 
technologies to enhance lethality and effectiveness of the force, 
focusing our modernization on precision strike, directed energy, 
artificial intelligence, close-combat lethality, cyber and space 
operations.
    To improve its readiness for contingencies across the vast spectrum 
of warfare, General Thomas has made tremendous progress in reducing the 
strain caused by the high operational tempo of certain SOF units. Not 
long ago, it was common for many SOF units and personnel to operate on 
a 1:1 deployment-to-dwell ratio. For example, a typical Green Beret 
could have expected to spend six months deployed followed by only six 
months in the U.S. before redeploying. This high tempo strained our 
personnel and their families and eroded our long-term readiness. Given 
that the demand for SOF from the geographic combatant commands will 
likely remain high, we must ensure that these forces are provided on a 
sustainable basis. I am proud to report that SOF is a healthy force, 
and the men and women who comprise this force are prepared to deploy to 
combat at a moment's notice in defense of our Nation.
    Through General Thomas's leadership, we continue to make progress 
toward our 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio target for the Enterprise, 
and, today, 90 percent of our deployed forces are at or above this 
target, allowing more time to train for the full spectrum of special 
operations missions and increasing the time our people spend at home 
with their families. However, we still have more progress to make. 
Approximately 10 percent of our force remains below a 1:2 deployment-
to-dwell ratio. Many of these personnel are high-demand/low-density 
specialists performing crucial functions. Thanks to the support of 
Congress and the Department, we have plans in place for small and 
targeted end-strength growth that will reduce the strain on these 
essential skillsets.
    My primary concern regarding SOF readiness is our ability to 
continue to attract top talent and retain our high-quality personnel. 
While the challenges SOF face in this area generally mirror those of 
the Services overall, our challenges will likely be magnified given the 
necessary experience levels of our people and our generally lengthy 
training pipelines. We are addressing current and projected shortfalls 
by offering special pay and incentives for high-demand career fields, 
improving recruitment and marketing practices, and optimizing our 
training pipelines.
    Through efforts such as Preservation of the Force and Family 
(POTFF), as well as Service-specific programs and activities, we are 
enhancing the resilience of SOF personnel and their families. As a 
community, we are only as good as our people, and that includes the 
well-being of our families. Programs and resources like these help 
families overcome significant physical, mental, and emotional 
difficulties that accompany deployments. POTFF resources help shorten 
recovery time toward healthy and productive lives, in and out of 
service.
                       culture and accountability
    Despite this clear progress, General Thomas and I are concerned 
about serious ethical failings by some members of our SOF community. 
Such incidents erode morale of our force, confidence of our allies and 
partners, and the moral authority of American values. In other words, 
moral failings are not individual but can impact our large-scale 
mission. While these specific incidents are being addressed by 
appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, General Thomas and I are working 
to identify any potential systemic problems and to enhance policies 
that hold leaders and individuals accountable. Because SOF operate at 
the forefront of highly complex military operations in remote and high-
threat environments, we must maintain the highest standards of personal 
conduct, and the recent joint guidance General Thomas and I have issued 
emphasizes the standards of trustworthiness and accountability we 
expect from our SOF community. SOF is a mature and elite force and it 
will be held to the highest standards--and those standards include 
professionalism, ethics, and accountability. My office is currently 
conducting a review of SOF professionalism and ethics, as required by 
the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, which is due to Congress next month.
    These incidents have our full attention. We also recognize that 
they do not reflect the true nature of the SOF professional. When I 
visit with our SOF servicemembers at home and in the field, their 
selfless energy and devotion to mission are clearly evident, and they 
are exemplars of American values when deployed overseas.
                               conclusion
    Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by, again, thanking the Committee for 
supporting SOF with the legislation and appropriations essential to 
combating terrorists, building critical partnerships, and enabling the 
Joint Force. Finally, I would like to thank General Thomas for 39 years 
of distinguished Military Service and for his partnership in leading 
our Nation's Special Operations Enterprise. General Thomas has been an 
inspiration to me and countless others in the SOF formation. From 2001 
to 2013, he deployed to Afghanistan every year but one in which he 
deployed to Iraq, where he was wounded in combat. I have been 
particularly impressed with his dedication to ensuring the well-being 
of SOF servicemembers and their families. Under his command over the 
past three years, USSOCOM continues to field the most professional, 
most highly trained, best equipped, and most effective special 
operations warriors in the world.

    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Now General Thomas.

  STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND A. THOMAS III, USA, COMMANDER, 
            UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

    General Thomas. Chairman Inhofe, Senator Reed, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm grateful for the 
opportunity to speak to you today on the posture of United 
States Special Operations Command.
    I'm privileged to be here today with Assistant Secretary 
Owen West as well as my friend and teammate, General Paul 
Nakasone, from CYBERCOM. Since its inception, we have enjoyed a 
tremendous relationship with the world-class team at U.S. Cyber 
Command and have forged the type of partnership, reinforced in 
combat, that ensures our absolute collaboration and cooperation 
in our shared mission of defending the Nation.
    USSOCOM continues to field the world's most capable Special 
Operations Forces. We are an integral part of the Joint Force 
and integrated into every facet of the National Defense 
Strategy. Our numerous successes over the past years would not 
have been possible without the support and resources provided 
by the Congress. For that, I thank you.
    For the last 18 years, our number-one priority has been the 
effort against violent extremist organizations (VEOs). As part 
of the Joint Force, we continue to be the main effort, or major 
supporting effort, in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, 
Libya, the Sahel, the Maghreb, Lake Chad Basin, and the 
Philippines. Everywhere ISIS and al Qaeda and affiliated 
organizations are, we are relentlessly pursuing them to ensure 
this country never, ever endures another 9/11. We remain 
focused on finishing this effort by, with, and through our many 
coalition partners.
    At the same time, again, as part of the Joint Force, we are 
endeavoring to provide a more lethal and capable Special 
Operations Force to confront peer competitors. USSOCOM is 
already well-oriented to the challenges of great-power 
competition, particularly in the competition space short of 
armed conflict. Our SOF network, integrated with interagency 
and international partners, is focused on producing unorthodox, 
yet complementary, capabilities and solutions in support of 
U.S. policies and objectives. We continue to maintain strong, 
enduring international partnerships while leveraging 
authorities in core expertise to convert indigenous mass into 
combat power to deter, deny, disrupt, and ultimately defeat our 
adversaries.
    To build a more lethal force, strengthen our alliances and 
partnerships, and reform for greater performance and 
efficiency, we are reshaping and focusing our current forces 
and capabilities while simultaneously developing new 
technological and tactical approaches to accomplish the diverse 
missions that SOF will face in the future. The joint SOLIC-
USSOCOM SOF vision that Assistant Secretary West mentioned is 
our guide to move us forward. The emerging security challenges 
will require SOCOM to be an organization of empowered SOF 
professionals, globally networked, partnered, and integrated, 
and relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain for the 
Joint Force and the Nation.
    In addition to our service-like responsibility to man, 
train, and equip the world's most capable Special Operations 
Forces, over the past few years USSOCOM has experienced 
considerable development in our other legislative role as a 
combatant command. We are currently assigned the role as the 
coordinating authority for three major global mission sets: 
counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
and, recently, messaging/countermessaging. These roles require 
us to lead planning efforts, continually assess Joint Force 
progress towards campaign objectives, and recommend 
improvements or modifications to our campaign approach to the 
Secretary of Defense. In parallel, USSOCOM has begun pursuing 
an aggressive partnership with the other combatant commands 
with global portfolios--CYBERCOM, here today, Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. Space 
Command (SPACECOM)--designed to leverage our respective 
capabilities towards providing more agile solutions to the 
Department of Defense.
    SOF has a long tradition of solving hard problems, adapting 
to changing conditions, and fielding innovative technology and 
tactics to give us the decisive advantage in combat. We believe 
that this tradition will continue to serve us well in the 
future. We are increasing our investments in a wide spectrum of 
emerging technologies, to include artificial intelligence (AI) 
and machine learning, automated systems, advanced robotics, 
augmented reality, biomedical monitoring, and advanced armor 
and munitions development, just to name a few.
    We are in the formative stages of establishing an 
experimental force, which will more coherently focus and 
integrate our future force development in the pursuit of the 
required peer-competitor capabilities. Leveraging our proven 
ability to rapidly develop and field cutting-edge technology 
flowing from our focus on the tactical edge of combat, this 
joint experimentation initiative will bring together innovative 
efforts from across our Special Operations Force tactical 
formations to ensure that commanders' combat requirements are 
addressed with the most advanced concepts and equipment 
available.
    Finally, in 44 days, I'm scheduled to relinquish command of 
the greatest Special Operations Force in history. I know that 
sounds a bit haughty, but the men and women of USSOCOM back 
that statement up every day. They represent the best that 
America has to offer, an exceptionally dedicated, effective, 
and resilient group of warriors and problem-solvers. I'd like 
to publicly thank them for the opportunity to be their 
teammate. It has been an incredible privilege to serve with 
them over the course of 39 years of service.
    I'd like to also personally thank Command Sergeant Major 
Pat McCauley, our SOCOM Senior Enlisted Advisor, appearing with 
me again today, for his service as a critical member of the 
SOCOM command team. Pat is the epitome of the best that USSOF 
has to offer, and, in a few short months, will conclude 30 
years of faithful and devoted service to the United States 
Army, United States Special Operations Command, and the Nation. 
During his distinguished career, he's inspired many by his 
personal courage on the battlefield, his sage counsel to 
commanders and leaders at every level of command, and his moral 
and physical leadership. He represents everything that is great 
about this Command--most importantly, our people.
    Thanks again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Thomas follows:]

          Prepared Statement by General Raymond A. Thomas, III
                              introduction
    Chairman Inhofe, Senator Reed, and distinguished Members of the 
Committee, thank you for this opportunity to inform you on the posture 
of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and your Special 
Operations Forces (SOF). USSOCOM continues to field ready and capable 
SOF to conduct global operations as an integral part of the Joint Force 
against state and non-state threats to America and its interests, and 
to advance U.S. policy objectives. We greatly appreciate the consistent 
support of the Congress in this endeavor.
    Since my last address, USSOCOM has focused its efforts on 
addressing the defense and security threats and challenges from near-
peer competitors as well as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) 
identified in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) along the directed 
lines of effort: building a more lethal force, strengthening 
relationships, and reforming our institution for more efficient 
performance. Consequently, we are re-shaping our current forces and 
capabilities even as we develop new technological and tactical 
approaches for our diverse missions. Toward this end, Assistant 
Secretary West and I co-authored a shared US SOF vision to guide us 
into the future. In short, it directs that USSOCOM must be an 
organization of empowered SOF professionals, who are globally 
networked, partnered and integrated, and relentlessly seek advantage in 
every domain for the Joint Force and the Nation. To achieve this 
vision, we are embarking on a path I will outline for you today.
           sof vision--``empowered sof professionals . . . ''
    Our vision recognizes the enduring truth that ``humans are more 
important than hardware'' by emphasizing that our people--more than 
platforms--are the source of our decisive advantage. To that end, we 
continue to recruit, assess, select and retain the Nation's finest 
human potential. We empower them with training, technology and 
authorities to solve some of the most complex and dangerous mission 
challenges. We steward people throughout their careers and their 
transition out of service, placing a special emphasis on resiliency by 
providing exceptional care to them and their families.
    We appreciate your support of SOCOM's Preservation of the Force and 
Family (POTFF) programs through the authorities and funding provided. 
Over the past seven years we have made substantial improvements in the 
readiness and resilience of our force and their families.
    As we address core issues of high operations tempo and personnel 
tempo, we are better suited to holistically address their impacts on 
our people. Last year, I referred to POTFF as ``our stay well plan.'' 
This year I would go further and echo the sentiment of my commanders 
across the SOF enterprise and say that it is our lifeblood. POTFF 
resources fuel our ability to continue meeting today's operational 
demands and enables longer, more productive careers in SOF. I am more 
convinced than ever that this is the right thing to do, and that the 
embedded, multidisciplinary model of POTFF is the right way to do it. 
So strong is my conviction, that I have directed mandatory 
participation in the physical and psychological services of POTFF for 
all SOF members.
    In order to execute this program in all of its aspects, we plan to 
add additional behavioral health and psychological performance 
resources. We also plan to expand our Human Performance efforts to 
address rehabilitative needs. Our POTFF programs must be agile and 
innovative, taking advantage of advancements in medicine, psychology 
and data science. I hope we can rely on your continued support as SOCOM 
moves forward with these program improvements.
    USSOCOM is appreciative of Congress' sustained support for our 
Warrior Care Program. Wounds, injury, and illness threaten the ability 
of our SOF personnel and their families to continue to serve. Our 
Warrior Care Program--the largest in the Department of Defense with 
over 15,000 participants--contributes to the resiliency of our force by 
providing advocacy and care coordination through the recovery and 
rehabilitation process, returning SOF professionals to the fight, and 
restoring their families' footing as rapidly as possible.
    We continue to make strides in managing the Deployment-to-Dwell 
(D2D) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) of our personnel. Based on 
updated Department guidance, SOF formations are now focused on 
achieving a minimum of a 1:2 ratio and with the exception of a select 
few critical skill sets and career fields, the vast majority of SOF 
deploy at or above the deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:2. This guidance 
is driving ongoing efforts to optimize our current force generation 
models to ensure SOF will continue to provide ready forces at a 
consistent and sustainable rate to meet the NDS and National Military 
Strategy (NMS) objectives. A planned increase of personnel in fiscal 
year 2019-2020 will help close current gaps among our enabler forces. 
These additional support personnel, and adherence to a 1:2 rate for 
Active and 1:5 for Reserve Forces, will ensure SOF can sustain our 
support to future geographic combatant commander requirements with the 
capabilities they require.
    The nature of our special operations missions brings a high 
expectation that USSOF will operate with the highest standards of 
ethics and honor. We are working closely with ASD West to complete the 
assessment of culture and accountability within the USSOCOM enterprise 
mandated by Congress. On January 1st of this year, we began a 90-day 
internal focus on core values. Commands are reviewing programs of 
instruction for opportunities to address SOF culture and implement 
values-based decision making to reinforce moral courage. Command teams 
at the battalion/squadron level and above will conduct direct 
engagements with their personnel on the cultural climate of their 
units. Our goal is that all of our special operations teammates operate 
in a culture that is mission-focused and undistracted by misconduct, 
harassment, or abuse. 99.9% of the USSOCOM teammates continue to serve 
with honor and distinction as our ethos demands. That is 0.1% short of 
our goal. We will not be complacent and will push forward our efforts 
to inculcate and reinforce our core values.
  sof vision--``globally networked, partnered and integrated . . . ''
    SOF is an integral part of the Joint Force and the whole-of-
government effort that must successfully compete on a global scale. 
USSOCOM provides critical coordination and assessment functions for the 
Department's operations and activities against VEOs and WMD threats. 
And SOF's worldwide access and placement and our networks and 
partnerships enable the Department to understand adversary actions and 
intent and to respond across the spectrum of competition, especially 
beneath the threshold of conflict where our competitors such as Russia 
and China continue to hone their skills and advance their strategic 
objectives.
    As the Coordinating Authority (CA) for the C-VEO mission, USSOCOM 
collaboratively works with geographic and global functional combatant 
commands on the Global Campaign Plan for counter-VEO operations (GCP-
V). USSOCOM provides an annual assessment on VEO trends--which we have 
just completed--and the Joint Force's progress towards campaign 
objectives. Along with this assessment, we make recommendations on 
campaign adjustments to the Secretary of Defense. To facilitate GCP-V 
execution, USSOCOM integrates Joint Force, Interagency, and partner 
nations' activities into a unified effort, the Transregional 
Synchronization Forum (TRSF). Current campaign efforts are focused on 
disrupting the financial, messaging, and foreign terrorist fighter 
networks that enable and sustain VEOs. Severing these conduits will 
degrade and disrupt VEO attacks against the U.S. Homeland, our 
interests, and against our allies and partners.
    Similarly, as the CA for countering weapons of mass destruction 
(CWMD), we continue to develop and refine our capabilities to execute 
CWMD campaigns. We completed and signed the DOD Functional Campaign 
Plan to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction last November. This 
campaign nests under, cross-cuts, and complements the NDS, the NMS, and 
global and other functional campaigns across the Department. Our 
USSOCOM CWMD Fusion Cell guides and coordinates the planning and 
assessments of CWMD campaign execution, and makes recommendations to 
the Chairman and Secretary of Defense on actions to disrupt and deter 
adversary WMD programs.
    USSOCOM also now has the mission to field a transregional Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO) capability to address the 
opportunities and risks of the global information space--one of the 
domains that challenges the Department's command and control 
boundaries. By April of this year, the Joint MISO WebOps Center (JMWC) 
will be operating in close coordination with the interagency and 
alongside combatant command teams to provide global messaging 
capabilities to a broader portion of the Joint Force and beyond CVEO 
themes. The JMWC will support the combatant commands with improved 
messaging and assessment capabilities, shared situational awareness of 
adversary influence activities, and the capability to coordinate 
internet-based MISO globally. We remain on track to achieve Initial 
Operating Capability in a new temporary facility by the end of fiscal 
year 2019.
    To help the Joint Force address the complexity of networked, 
globalized threats and great power competition, USSOCOM has begun 
collaboration with other global-reach combatant commands to provide 
integrated options to address these challenges. USSOCOM, Cyber
    Command (CYBERCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)--combatant commands whose global 
presence and responsibilities shape our perceptions and the 
capabilities we provide to the Joint Force--are working toward a model 
for integrating our global capabilities more effectively into the 
Department's efforts. Our goal is to help close the seams created by 
our post-WWII (1946) geographic combatant command framework--seams that 
are currently exploited by adversaries who act globally, unencumbered 
by similar regional frameworks.
    We continue to work with and rely extensively upon the capabilities 
provided by DOD. These include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA). I want to draw particular attention to the work of the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for their exceptional work in 
CWMD and counter-proliferation (CP). DTRA plays an integral role in 
creating shared awareness of the threat that supports our campaign 
planning. We are also working closely with them on the very pressing 
and expanding asymmetric threat of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 
by VEOs and state actors is a significant concern to the Joint Force. 
USSOCOM fully endorses DTRA's initiatives to understand and counter 
this threat and is working with them on several fronts toward this end.
    Beyond our national collaborative efforts, USSOCOM also extends its 
network abroad to engage willing international partners, as well. 
USSOCOM hosts highly qualified and talented Special Operations officers 
and Non-Commissioned Officers from 24 nations with established SOF 
capability, many of whom are contributing combat forces to today's CVEO 
efforts. We also maintain US Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLOs) 
in 21 countries. These liaison relationships provide agility to a 
global network that creates a common understanding of threats, develop 
response options, and--in some cases--to develop technology, tactics 
and equipment for mutual benefit to our forces.
    For developing countries, security cooperation activities are a key 
tool for enabling them to tackle threats and challenges of common 
concern. USSOCOM appreciates Congressional consolidation of security 
cooperation authorities in 10 USC 333. USSOCOM and GCCs have leveraged 
this authority to provide partner nations the necessary skills and 
equipment to conduct security operations in their own self-defense and 
to become more capable partners.
    SOF continues to use section 1202 to work by, with, and through 
partners, and in support of the geographic combatant commands. This 
authority fills a gap in our arsenal at a critical juncture for USSOF, 
and as the Joint Force re-orients on NDS threats beyond VEOs. Through 
these authorities, we will operationalize select regular and irregular 
forces possessing unique access and capabilities to confront peer 
competitors--at an appropriate level below armed conflict. Recognizing 
the strategic implications of great power competition, we will move 
forward deliberately, coordinated with interagency partners, while 
providing full transparency to Congress.
sof vision--``relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain to compete 
                            and win . . . ''
    In addition to geographic domains, we must fight and win enabled by 
the latest technological advancements. The increasingly data-driven, 
networked, miniaturized, and automated world where goods, information, 
and people move across the globe at a furious pace significantly 
impacts virtually every aspect of SOF operations. We need to understand 
this impact and embrace and harness the opportunities offered by 
technology. Data science, artificial intelligence, automated systems, 
and cryptography are no longer restricted or isolated products 
available to select powers. They are commodities accessible to all. 
Social media and publicly available information presents us with a 
world of far fewer shadows for concealment and yet opportunities for 
understanding heretofore unseen indicators of adversarial intent or 
action. For this reason, to achieve our mission we cannot relent in our 
pursuit of capabilities that will sustain and increase our advantage 
along the entire spectrum of conflict.
    To address these challenges and to seize these opportunities, 
USSOCOM is sustaining previous efforts that are proving impactful, 
establishing new efforts to provoke change in our workforce culture and 
mindset, and intent on confirming our results and findings through an 
experimentation force that will ensure that our pursuits remain solidly 
in support of our operational success on the battlefield.
    In 2018, USSOCOM established the position of Chief Data Officer 
(CDO) to lead the integration of artificial intelligence and machine 
learning (AI/ML) across the enterprise and create a culture of data-
driven decision making. Our CDO is guiding data governance efforts and 
leading engagement with the Defense Digital Service, the Joint 
Artificial Intelligence Center, Project Maven, and related activities. 
Under the direction of the CDO, USSOCOM is also building a data 
engineering lab and operationalizing a Development Operations (DevOps) 
environment that enables world-class talent to collaborate and deliver 
technical solutions for the SOF enterprise.
    Embracing these technologies will allow our workforce to consume 
and process data in ways that exceed basic human cognitive capabilities 
and reserve our valuable manpower for the tasks that are the 
exceptional domain of the human. To maximize the effectiveness of 
available technology, we must also address data architecture and data 
management as priorities. We will transition to cloud-based data 
services and treat our data as a critical, strategic asset. We will 
ensure that data is defended from our adversaries while remaining 
usable and accessible to those who need it.
    To ensure that these changes are rooted in SOF unique requirements 
and relevant to our special operations missions and tasks, USSOCOM will 
expand the use of wargames, and establish a joint SOF Experimental 
Force (EXFOR) within our force structure. The EXFOR will test concepts 
developed in our SOF Future Operating Concept alongside technology and 
equipment developed from our innovation efforts. The EXFOR will consist 
of existing units and personnel from our SOF service components and 
operational commands and will serve as the pacing element for the 
development and fielding of innovative concepts, equipment, and 
tactics.
    USSOCOM values its acquisition authority and welcomes recent 
legislative acquisition reforms such as expanded authority under 
section 2371b and section 803 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority. These 
initiatives enable our SOF acquisitions personnel to leverage non-
traditional DOD and commercial markets for emerging technologies and 
capabilities. We are also in our fourth year of leveraging the 
authority to enter into a Partnership Intermediary Agreement to manage 
our SOFWERX efforts. SOFWERX connects a growing ecosystem of over 
40,000 traditional, non-traditional, large and small companies, 
individuals, academia, and government labs to address capabilities 
across SOF mission areas. SOFWERX has conducted over 2,000 events to 
include collaborations, hackathons, rapid prototyping, and 
experimentation to drive speed and efficiency into our acquisition 
processes. We have completed over 96 projects in support of our 
Component and Theater Commands. SOFWERX is currently growing its 
strategic partnerships across the Services' Rapid Acquisition Offices 
and with Other Government Agencies to mitigate redundancy and increase 
the speed of delivery of capabilities to DOD.
    We are enthusiastically supportive of the initiatives of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) to 
streamline policies and procedures within the Department and fully 
support her efforts to minimize constraints and promote a more agile 
process. We also support her call for improvements in DOD software 
development, specifically through increasing the number of program 
managers and contracting officers who are conversant in the commercial 
processes of this domain. USSOCOM engagements with the Defense Digital 
Service has helped us in this regard and we will continue to bring in 
``digitally native'' talent for the SOF acquisition workforce. We are 
heavily involved with the USD(A&S) effort to increase the use of Other 
Transactional Authorities (OTAs), enabling us to interact with non-
traditional vendors in a far more commercial format. In the last year 
we have exercised 10 OTAs and will benefit from Defense Acquisition 
University's increased emphasis on OTA training.
    In the push by USD(A&S) towards increased prototyping under Middle 
Tier Acquisition (MTA) rules, USSOCOM comprises 20 percent of the 
Department's total MTA effort. We expect this number to increase 
substantially in fiscal year 2019. MTAs allow for abbreviated 
requirements approval and tailored acquisition approaches. As we move 
forward, we are closely adhering to reporting requirements in order to 
ensure compliance with the statute.
                               conclusion
    Before I conclude my update, I would like to highlight that USSOCOM 
will host the 2019 DOD Warrior Games in Tampa, Florida from June 21st 
through June 30th. Approximately 300 wounded, ill and injured 
servicemembers and veterans will participate in 11 sporting events. The 
Warrior Games were established in 2010 to enhance the recovery and 
rehabilitation of our personnel with health challenges. The athletes 
will represent the United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, 
and Special Operations Command. Additionally, allied athletes from the
    United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands will 
compete. A large contingent of these athletes' families will also 
attend. I invite all of you to attend these games, and join us in 
cheering alongside them and honoring their courage and perseverance.
    Before I conclude, I want to take a moment to remember the long and 
dedicated service of the late Senator John McCain, who chaired this 
hearing just over a year ago. Senator McCain was a consummate servant 
leader to his Nation--a true statesman and hero who put the interests 
of his fellow citizens ahead of his own. His presence is missed but his 
impact on our command will never be forgotten.
    In closing, I thank the Congress for the steadfast support for 
USSOCOM. We are already competing with adversaries and adapting to 
complex challenges facing our country and will continue to do so now 
and into future.

    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Thomas.
    General Nakasone.

 STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
   STATES CYBER COMMAND; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; 
                CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

    General Nakasone. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for your 
enduring support and the opportunity to testify today about the 
hard-working men and women of United States Cyber Command. I'm 
honored to lead them.
    I'm also honored to sit alongside these great leaders, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense West and General Tony Thomas.
    For Tony, my congratulations to you and Barb for your 
steadfast service to our Nation. It's been a tremendous journey 
for you, and I've enjoyed our close partnership and friendship. 
My personal best wishes to you, Tony, and your family.
    As the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, I'm responsible for 
conducting full-spectrum cyberspace operations supporting three 
mission areas: defend the Nation against cyberattacks, defend 
the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN), and 
enable our Joint Force commanders in pursuit of their mission 
objectives.
    In the cyber domain, we are in constant contact with our 
adversaries, who continue to increase in sophistication, 
magnitude, intensity, volume, and velocity, and remain a threat 
to our national security interests and economic well-being. The 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense 
Strategy highlight the return of great-power competition. 
Beyond near-peer competitors, China and Russia, rogue regimes, 
like Iran and North Korea, continue to grow their capabilities. 
Using aggressive methods to conduct malicious cyberspace 
activities, adversaries have, until recently, acted with little 
concern for consequences.
    The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy identifies the 
need to defend forward during day-to-day competition with our 
adversaries. This strategy aims to maintain our superiority in 
cyberspace through protection of our critical infrastructure 
and networks. At U.S. Cyber Command, we implement the DOD 
strategy by adopting an approach of persistent engagement, 
persistent presence, and persistent innovation. This past year 
witnessed the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to combatant 
command status, the opening of our Integrated Cyber Center, and 
our shift from building the force to the readiness of that 
force. This progress ensures our ability to execute our mission 
requirements for the Department in defense of our Nation.
    The defense of the 2018 midterm elections posed a 
significant strategic challenge to our Nation. Ensuring a safe 
and secure election was our number-one priority and drove me to 
establish a joint United States Cyber Command/National Security 
Agency effort we called the Russia Small Group (RSG). The 
Russia Small Group tested our new operational approach. With 
the organization and direction from the President and Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF), the Russia Small Group enabled 
partnerships and action across the government to counter a 
strategic threat. Our response demonstrated the value of a 
tightknit relationship between United States Cyber Command and 
the National Security Agency, bringing together intelligence, 
cyber capabilities, interagency partnerships, and the 
willingness to act.
    Through persistent engagement, we enabled critical 
interagency partners to act with unparalleled coordination and 
cooperation. Through persistent presence, U.S. Cyber Command 
and the National Security Agency contested adversarial actions, 
improving early warning and threat identification, in support 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others.
    Beyond the interagency, we partnered and engaged with 
allies and public and private sectors to build resiliency. For 
the first time, we sent our cyberwarriors abroad to secure 
networks outside the DOD Information Network. Our operations 
allowed us to identify and counter threats as they emerged to 
secure our own elections and prevent similar threats 
interfering in those of our partners and allies.
    The Russia Small Group effort demonstrated that persistent 
engagement, persistent presence, and persistent innovation 
enable success. Effective cyberdefense requires a whole-of-
nation effort. Information-sharing plays a vital role in 
enabling everyone, including government agencies, to defend 
their networks. Therefore, we are now sharing computer malware 
we find during our routine operations with the private sector 
and the broader cybersecurity community. We have posted 
numerous malware samples for crowd-sourcing analysis. We 
believe our actions will have a positive impact on improving 
cybersecurity globally.
    Our actions are impacting our adversaries. Our shift in 
approach allows us to sustain key competitive advantages while 
increasing our cyber capabilities. As we review lessons learned 
from securing the midterm elections, we are now focused on 
potential threats we could certainly face in 2020.
    Looking forward, we need to continue building a warrior 
ethos similar to our other warfighting domains. Cyberwarriors 
are, and will continue to be, in constant contact with our 
adversaries. There are no operational pauses or sanctuaries. We 
must ensure sufficient capability and capacity, people, 
technology, and infrastructure, which we are decisively focused 
on now.
    Through persistent presence, we are building a team of 
partners that enable us and them to act more effectively. The 
complex and rapid pace of change in this environment requires 
us to leverage cyber expertise broadly across public and 
private sectors, academia, and industry. Therefore, we aspire 
to increase our effectiveness and capabilities through 
persistent innovation across these partnerships.
    Cyberdefense is a team effort. Critical teammates, such as 
the National Guard and Reserve, are integral parts of our 
cyberforce. They provide strategic depth and provide the Nation 
a Reserve capacity of capable cyberwarriors.
    Finally, improving readiness continues to be one of my key 
focus areas. I continue to work with the services and 
Department to actively measure and maintain readiness, manning, 
training, and equipping, and certainly an ability to perform 
the mission.
    After a year of change and progress, we see 2019 as a year 
of opportunity. We have much work ahead as CYBERCOM matures. We 
assure you that our people merit the trust you have placed in 
them and that, with your support, they will accomplish the 
tasks that our Nation expects.
    Thank you again for inviting me here today on behalf of 
U.S. Cyber Command, and for your continued support. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Paul M. Nakasone
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee, thank you for inviting me to represent the men and women 
of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). I am honored to lead them, 
and grateful for the opportunity to highlight their accomplishments. 
Our Command has seen a year of change and progress, featuring the 
elevation of USCYBERCOM to a unified combatant command with an expanded 
mission and additional authorities and responsibilities, and the 
completion of the build of 133 teams in our Cyber Mission Force (CMF). 
We have transitioned from building the force to ensuring its mission 
readiness, and in 2018 we enhanced that by opening our new, state-of-
the-art Integrated Cyber Center. Enabled by changes in law and policy, 
we have produced defensive and offensive operational successes. My 
testimony will summarize threats and opportunities in our strategic 
environment, explain how we prepared ourselves to meet them and what we 
did, and explain our priorities for the future of a USCYBERCOM that 
enables our partners and acts in cyberspace to defend the nation.
    USCYBERCOM's task is to plan and execute global cyberspace 
operations, activities and missions to defend and advance national 
interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners 
across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. Our 
responsibilities include providing mission assurance for the Department 
of Defense by directing the operation and defense of the Department's 
information systems (what we call the DODIN); deterring or defeating 
strategic threats to national interests and infrastructure; and helping 
the combatant commanders achieve their missions in and through 
cyberspace. This fiscal year we are executing a budget totaling roughly 
$610 million. Our full-time personnel amount to 1,520 military and 
civilians, plus contractors. This January we had 4,406 servicemembers 
and civilians in our Cyber Mission Force, building to a total of 6,187 
people. We also have both Guard and Reserve personnel on Active Duty 
serving in our forces.
    USCYBERCOM comprises a headquarters organization that directs 
operations through its components. These include the Cyber National 
Mission Force (CNMF); the Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information 
Network (JFHQ-DODIN); and Joint Task Force Ares; plus our Joint Force 
headquarters elements, each of which is paired with one of the 
Services' cyber components. Those Service components are Army Cyber 
Command, Marine Forces Cyberspace Command, Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth 
Fleet, Air Force Cyber/24th Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard Cyber.
    Our efforts and our continued success depend upon the support of 
the Congress and of this Committee. Thank you in advance for the 
assistance you are providing us in 2019 as we pursue opportunities in 
five areas: (1) Supporting strategic competition; (2) Establishing a 
warfighting ethos across the Command; (3) Improving the readiness of 
our cyber forces; (4) Enhancing partnerships across government, allies, 
and the private sector; and (5) Deploying improved operating 
infrastructure.
                       the strategic environment
    Cyberspace is a contested environment where we are in constant 
contact with adversaries. The nation faces threats from a variety of 
malicious cyber actors, including non-state and criminal organizations, 
states, and their proxies. We see near-peer competitors conducting 
sustained campaigns below the level of armed conflict to erode American 
strength and gain strategic advantage. USCYBERCOM ensures two critical 
capabilities against these threats: it enables partners in whole-of-
nation efforts to build resilience, close vulnerabilities, and defend 
critical infrastructure; and it acts against adversaries who can 
operate across the full spectrum of cyberspace operations and who 
possess the capacity and the will to sustain cyber campaigns against 
the United States and its allies.
    Renewed Strategic Competition. The National Security Strategy 
(2017) emphasized the emergence of great-power competition and noted 
its spread into cyberspace. In implementing that guidance, the 
Department issued the DOD Cyber Strategy, which described the 
environment we face:

        We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China 
        and Russia. These States have expanded that competition to 
        include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that 
        pose long term strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our 
        allies and partners. China is eroding United States military 
        overmatch and the Nation's economic vitality by persistently 
        exfiltrating sensitive information from U.S. public and private 
        sector institutions. Russia has used cyber-enabled information 
        operations to influence our population and challenge our 
        democratic processes. Other actors, such as North Korea and 
        Iran, have similarly employed malicious cyber activities to 
        harm United States citizens and threaten U.S. interests. 
        Globally, the scope and pace of malicious cyber activity 
        continue to rise. The United States' growing dependence on the 
        cyberspace domain for nearly every essential civilian and 
        military function makes this an urgent and unacceptable risk to 
        the Nation [emphasis in original].

    I assess we are seeing what we term corrosive threats, in which 
malicious cyber actors weaponize personal information, steal 
intellectual property, and mount influence campaigns. Such measures 
have had and will have strategic effects on our Nation and allies.
    Changes in Strategic Guidance and Authorities. USCYBERCOM has 
recently improved the scope, speed, and effectiveness of its operations 
with the help of legal and policy changes. I want to thank Congress for 
its support of DOD's cyberspace operations as reflected in provisions 
of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that 
enhanced our agility to execute missions consistent with law. We also 
received updated policy guidance that, in conjunction with the NDAA 
provisions, significantly streamlined the interagency process for 
approval of cyber operations and thus facilitated recent activities.
    The DOD Cyber Strategy asserts that the Department has a 
significant role in defending the nation. To be effective in doing so, 
the Strategy mandates that DOD components ``defend forward, shape the 
day-to-day competition, and prepare for war,'' enabling the Department 
``to compete, deter, and win in the cyberspace domain.'' We must be 
active because inaction on our part cedes advantage to capable 
adversaries willing to flout international law and impose their own 
norms of cyber conduct. In keeping with guidance to defend forward, the 
Department is aiming to take the initiative against those who act 
against us. The DOD Cyber Strategy states that the Department must be 
prepared to defend assertively the functioning of even non-DOD critical 
infrastructure systems--whether at home or abroad--that are essential 
to project, support, and sustain Departmental forces and operations 
worldwide. In practice, this means confronting our adversaries from 
where they launch cyber attacks and developing robust capabilities that 
are responsive to Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) 
activities.
    A New Operating Construct. We are implementing the DOD Cyber 
Strategy through the strategic approach of persistent engagement, which 
includes partnering with other U.S. Government elements to build 
resilience into U.S. networks and systems, defending against malicious 
cyberspace activities as far forward as possible, and contesting 
adversary attempts to disrupt our Nation's key government and military 
functions.
    Our operators, analysts, developers, leaders, and support 
personnel, enabled by new and modified policy guidance, are operating 
more effectively in coordination and partnership with other agencies, 
partners, and allies. Last fall we supported United States European 
Command (USEUCOM), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and others to defend the integrity of America's 
2018 mid-term elections. Working together under my command, USCYBERCOM 
and the National Security Agency (NSA) undertook an initiative known as 
the Russia Small Group to protect the elections from foreign 
interference and influence. By enabling our fellow combatant commands 
and other partners, USCYBERCOM assisted the collective intelligence and 
defense effort that demonstrated persistent engagement in practice. The 
tight links between USCYBERCOM and NSA created a mutually beneficial, 
intelligence-operations cycle that let us rapidly find and follow 
leads, discover new information, and create opportunities to act in 
conjunction with partners. Additionally, our co-location in the new 
Integrated Cyber Center optimized our collaboration for efforts of this 
nature. We created a persistent presence in cyberspace to monitor 
adversary actions and crafted tools and tactics to frustrate their 
efforts. We shared information through DHS with state election 
officials to help identify vulnerabilities and improve threat warning. 
We also enabled Department of the Treasury and FBI actions in 
conjunction with the private sector, for instance by posting foreign 
malware for the first time to VirusTotal, a private site for 
crowdsourcing analysis of cyber threats. Finally, working with USEUCOM, 
and with the consent of several European countries, we sent defensive 
teams forward to conduct operations in support of our mission to help 
secure the mid-term elections.
          opportunities and challenges for u.s. cyber command
    I note the progress we have made during the past year and see 
opportunities ahead, with corresponding challenges as well. We have 
achieved much under the National Defense Strategy's commitment to 
prioritize investments in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued 
integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military 
operations. We must use our recent successes to inform future 
activities, ensuring that accomplishments are not isolated events but 
parts of a larger trend of improved operational proficiency.
    Supporting Strategic Competition. Cyberspace is a domain in which 
opponents can attain strategic results without using armed force. Our 
adversaries in cyberspace are acting and taking risks in seeking to 
gain advantage without escalating to armed conflict; they are 
conducting campaigns to gain cumulative advantage (these include theft 
of intellectual property and personal information, malign influence and 
election interference, efforts to circumvent sanctions, and probes and 
positioning to threaten critical infrastructure).
    We see evidence of such cyber campaigns in many places, such as the 
foreign efforts to find vulnerabilities in the Department of Defense's 
Information Network. JFHQ-DODIN used its authorities to direct global 
Department of Defense network operations, security, and defense. By 
operationalizing the network sensors, they assessed effectiveness and 
risk through focused data analysis. This in turn helped improve the 
fidelity of our sensors and analytics, showing us the risks and the 
requirements for mitigation. The data JFHQ-DODIN collected in this 
effort proved that state-sponsored adversaries in cyberspace are 
conducting rapidly evolving campaigns to hamper the routine functions 
of the DODIN and to find seams in its defenses. DODIN protections are 
robust, but we must continue to innovate in our data collection and 
analysis to build resilience and counter the dynamic nature of 
adversary threats.
    In the face of strategic competition in cyberspace, USCYBERCOM 
brings unique advantages in planning, deconflicting, executing, and 
assessing cyberspace operations at-scale.
    Our efforts in defense of the 2018 elections taught us the value of 
persistent engagement to contest adversary campaigns, the power of 
enabling partners, and the ability to impose costs. The DOD Cyber 
Strategy notes we cannot afford inaction--our values, economy, and 
society are exposed and we must assertively respond at all levels. 
USCYBERCOM is working with the combatant commands, DHS, FBI, across the 
Intelligence Community, and in conjunction with private sector and 
foreign partners to improve understanding and act to contest and 
frustrate adversary cyber activities. Through persistent engagement we 
identify and close vulnerabilities in DOD networks, act to contest 
threats, and enable partners in building resilience and in the defense 
of the nation. These steps complement and support national efforts to 
prepare for conflict, to deter adversaries, and to establish cyber 
norms while we simultaneously support combatant commanders in 
contingency operations.
    Supporting the Combatant Commands and Establishing a Warfighting 
Ethos. A competitive mindset is needed to prevail in a deeply 
competitive domain. Such a mindset also helps us prepare to fight and 
win the nation's wars. To support combatant commanders and their 
missions we are engaged in a growing variety and number of activities, 
from planning to intelligence missions to operations in and through 
cyberspace. We bring to the combatant commands a wartime ethos 
reinforced by daily contact with cyber adversaries.
    Our cyberspace operations support kinetic and information 
operations against terrorists across several regions. We are employing 
cyber capabilities to improve force protection, bolster intelligence, 
understand and shape the information environment, and disrupt the 
operations, command and control, and propaganda of several insurgent 
and terrorist groups in support of United States Central Command 
(USCENTCOM), United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Cyberspace operations in 
places like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan today integrate and 
synchronize cyberspace and information operations with kinetic 
missions, with each enabling the other for offensive, force protection, 
and intelligence purposes. Our persistent engagement with this 
adversary for the past several years shows the continuing value of our 
command in being able to operate across all of these regions against 
the key enablers for these groups (e.g., media, finance, and foreign 
fighters). In this context, we have expanded the remit of our Joint 
Task Force Ares, and shifted its chain of command from Army Cyber 
Command to Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command while maintaining its 
principal task of operating against the Islamic State. JTF-Ares has 
also embarked on a special mission partnership with NSA to act together 
as a hub for whole-of-government cyber planning in the ongoing counter-
terror fight (thus further demonstrating the value of the USCYBERCOM 
and NSA partnership).
    The maturation of the Cyber Mission Force has increased the number 
and proficiency of the cyber units working to protect the networks and 
weapons systems that combatant commands rely on to perform their 
missions. Each combatant commander controls organic Cyber Protection 
Teams (CPTs) that work in conjunction with local and regional 
cyberspace security providers and administrators. The expertise and 
databases at USCYBERCOM tie these teams together and greatly increase 
their collective power. US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and US 
Forces Korea have hosted frequent visits of our teams and experts to 
assist in surveying and hardening their military critical 
infrastructure in advance of any contingencies in East Asia and the 
Western Pacific. US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has benefitted 
from similar assistance in support of its global operations and 
commitments. In Europe we assisted USEUCOM, NATO allies, and other 
partners to secure their networks from foreign interference. Finally, 
our efforts helped US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and USNORTHCOM in 
election security, border security, and disaster recovery efforts.
    Evolving national and departmental guidance creates opportunity for 
timely cyber operations in support of the combatant commands and in our 
role in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' global integration efforts. 
This includes both planning cyberspace operations support to trans-
regional campaigns and prioritizing the allocation of high-demand, low-
density cyber assets across the commands and in all phases of conflict. 
The Department and the Chairman have clarified the command and control 
of cyberspace forces, and in accord with this guidance we are building 
``cyberspace operations integrated planning elements'' (CO-IPEs) at 
each combatant command.
    The new, Service-like authorities and responsibilities that 
USCYBERCOM gained as result of elevation are similar to those 
authorized for USSOCOM on behalf of the nation's Special Operations 
Forces. USCYBERCOM is the Department's Joint Force Provider and Joint 
Cyberspace Trainer for cyberspace forces. In these roles, we develop 
strategy, doctrine, and tactics; prepare and submit program 
recommendations and budget proposals; exercise authority, direction, 
and control over the expenditure of funds; validate requirements; 
establish priorities for requirements for cyberspace capabilities, 
forces, training, and operations; and ensure the inter-operability of 
equipment and forces. We are working with the Department to build 
approaches across the force and leverage these new responsibilities to 
better measure, access, and improve the quality and readiness of the 
entire cyber force.
    Improving Readiness. The rapidly evolving cyber domain makes 
achieving and maintaining force readiness a challenge. Similar to other 
Department forces, the readiness of our cyber forces can be understood 
as a two-part equation. First, we are evaluating the readiness of the 
teams that the Services (under their man, train, and equip missions) 
present to the Command. Second, we are studying the readiness of those 
teams to perform the missions they have been assigned by USCYBERCOM, 
something we refer to as ``mission posture.''
    The Cyber Mission Force completed its build in May 2018, and we 
started formally reporting team readiness in the Defense Readiness 
Reporting System (DRRS) shortly afterward. USCYBERCOM is working with 
the Services to ensure that they present cyber forces that meet a 
common, joint standard so that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines coming to the Command have proficiency with foundational 
cyberspace tools, techniques, and procedures. As part of that plan, the 
Services recently assumed the training mission for personnel in the CMF 
that USCYBERCOM (together with NSA) had overseen during the build. We 
are refining training curricula and standards, as well as simplifying 
and updating course requirements so we can ensure the right number 
complete their training with the appropriate skills.
    The second part of the equation--mission posture--is not as 
accurately reflected by traditional metrics. Thus we are developing 
metrics that go beyond those traditionally used in order to capture 
cyber-unique requirements such as authorities, accesses, capabilities, 
and intelligence. Such dependencies are not always measured in 
conventional DOD readiness reporting, yet they play a critical role in 
generating successful cyber operational outcomes. Our goal is to ensure 
operational proficiency in our CMF teams by taking an appropriately 
holistic view of readiness and applying resources to shortfalls. 
Working with the Services and the Department, we will develop and 
institutionalize the changes necessary for us to accurately measure and 
maintain team and mission readiness across the CMF.
    To help sustain an advanced cyber force, all of the Services are 
applying hiring and retention incentives (especially for high-demand, 
low-density skill sets) as well as utilizing the flexibility in 
managing talent that Congress recently granted us by authorizing the 
new Cyber Excepted Service. The retention of top talent--particularly 
in some critical, high-skill jobs--is a significant concern because it 
will be crucial to our continued success. We track attrition closely, 
as the competition with the private sector and other government 
agencies for talent will be an enduring challenge. An important element 
of building certain low-density skill sets, moreover, is outreach to 
and utilization of our Reserve Component.
    Underpinning our readiness are the operational lessons we learn 
from continuous operations in cyberspace. Operations in support of JTF-
Ares and the counter-terrorism fight, the security of the 2018 midterm 
elections, and ongoing support to combatant commands across both the 
defensive and offensive mission sets, are improving our training, 
informing how we structure our teams, and indicating how best to employ 
our capabilities and teams.
    Enhancing Partnerships. Securing the nation in cyberspace requires 
whole-of-nation efforts and effective collaboration with allies. It is 
a priority for USCYBERCOM to expand its ability to collaborate 
effectively with other government agencies, the private sector, 
academia, and allies. We must do this because they directly and 
indirectly complement and enhance our warfighting capabilities; indeed, 
enabling our partners is a key element of persistent engagement. We are 
working with a range of partners who support, enable, and assist our 
operations.
    The National Security Agency is our most important partner; the 
strength of this relationship will remain critical to the defense of 
the nation. The Agency's world-class expertise, technical capabilities, 
and accesses are crucial to USCYBERCOM's success. The USCYBERCOM-NSA 
relationship is proving mutually beneficial as the Command has matured. 
Indeed, I believe the speed and agility that USCYBERCOM and NSA 
demonstrated in joint operations to defend last fall's elections is 
evidence of the mission benefit of unity of effort and direction, the 
close proximity between USCYBERCOM and NSA, and our joint focus on 
outcomes for the defense of the nation.
    USCYBERCOM works daily with partners in DHS, FBI, and other federal 
agencies, sharing information and intelligence, as the U.S. Government 
furthers efforts to work even more effectively with the private sector. 
Since May 2018 we have worked to broaden these ties, both at the 
leadership and the action-officer levels. I have mentioned last fall's 
whole-of-government effort to defend the mid-term elections, but our 
collaboration with interagency partners is continuous and far broader. 
We interact constantly with the US Coast Guard's cyber forces and have 
Coast Guard senior officers integrated in USCYBERCOM. In addition, the 
CYBER GUARD exercise last year included USCYBERCOM, DHS and FBI 
elements practicing a whole-of-government response to an incident 
involving the nation's critical infrastructure.
    We see growing partnerships with industry (particularly in critical 
infrastructure sectors like energy and finance) as a natural extension 
of such relationships. Working with the DOD-Chief Information Officer 
and NSA, USCYBERCOM has developed a Pathfinder program with DHS, 
sector-specific agencies, and select critical infrastructure partners 
to share threat information, conduct collaborative analysis of 
vulnerabilities and threats, and mitigate those risks. This whole-of-
nation collaboration is crucial to our ability to deter or defeat 
strategic threats to US national interests and infrastructure. This is 
a complex mission in both technical and policy terms, in part because 
our work in this field occurs at the request of and in collaboration 
with Federal government partners, particularly DHS and FBI. Recent 
changes to our policy guidance--especially those crafted in agreements 
with these and other agencies--have brought clarity to this process. By 
partnering with DHS, FBI, and sector-specific agencies we are building 
persistent presence to improve the resilience and the defense of our 
Nation's critical infrastructure.
    USCYBERCOM has been active with current and prospective foreign 
partners, especially countries contemplating or building their own 
cyber forces. We have integrees from our ``Five Eyes'' partners 
(including a Canadian brigadier general) on the Command staff. 
USCYBERCOM in fiscal year 2018 conducted bilateral cyber exercises with 
France, Estonia, and Japan, while two dozen countries sent observers to 
our annual CYBER FLAG exercise last June. We also provided advanced 
training to a FVEY partner via our first Foreign Military Sales case, 
and provided defensive operations guidance to Singapore. Lastly, we 
maintain robust operational relationships with a variety of 
international partners in the continued fight against violent extremist 
organizations globally.
    We are building strategic depth in our cyber forces with assistance 
from the Reserve Component, and in so doing are assisting the whole-of-
nation effort to secure our networks. Reservists serve in positions 
across our headquarters staff, the Cyber Mission Force, and our Service 
cyber components, as well as playing vital roles in our exercises and 
training for defending critical infrastructure. Indeed, our Reserve 
strategy seeks innovative ways to utilize the Reserve Component in 
unique missions. Finally, Reserve Component personnel not only bring 
important skill sets to USCYBERCOM, they also enhance our efforts to 
create cybersecurity coalitions of public and private partners, 
particularly with industry innovators.
    Our engagement with the National Guard Bureau and the 54 state and 
territorial Adjutant Generals is continuous. We created a framework for 
DOD to sponsor access to classified information for National Guard 
personnel supporting local and state election systems while in a State 
Active Duty status (this was done in coordination with DHS and the 
National Guard Bureau). We are also exploring options with the National 
Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), which fosters trust with foreign 
militaries through bilateral engagements with roughly 70 partner 
nations. While our Command develops our global partnerships in the 
cyberspace domain, my intent is to work through the geographic 
combatant commands in growing theater security cooperation efforts.
    Deploying Infrastructure. The Command depends on innovative cyber 
tools and capabilities in crafting strategic and tactical options for 
senior leaders. The DOD Chief Information Officer and the Services are 
making necessary investments, in both funding and in finding the right 
people to develop and maintain cyber tools and capabilities. These 
Service investments need to continue and be balanced against global 
mission requirements. Such investments feature the right mix of 
capabilities for USCYBERCOM to achieve its readiness goals and generate 
successful mission outcomes.
    Our cyberspace forces require a comprehensive, integrated 
cyberspace architecture to achieve and sustain the insight, agility, 
and lethality necessary for maintaining competitive advantage against 
near-peer adversaries. Over the past year we have developed the Joint 
Cyber Warfighting Architecture (JCWA) to guide capability development 
priorities to this end. The JCWA has five elements: common firing 
platforms at our four cyber operating locations (each operated and 
employed by our Service cyber components) using a comprehensive suite 
of cyber tools; a ``Unified Platform'' for integrating and analyzing 
data from both offensive and defensive operations with intelligence and 
partners (including the private sector); joint command and control 
mechanisms for situational awareness and battle management at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels; sensors that support 
defense of the network and drive operational decisions; and a 
Persistent Cyber Training Environment where teams can train and even 
rehearse missions under realistic conditions. The JCWA is not a fixed 
future state, but rather an adapting set of capabilities continually 
evolving along with technological change, operational outcomes, and 
shifting threats. The Department has leveraged the architecture to make 
critical JCWA program investments that, when realized, will allow us to 
not only gain advantage in competition with cyber adversaries, but also 
to fight and win in conflict.
    Acquisition authorities are also a critical enabler for us. I thank 
this Committee and Congress for extending our tailored acquisition 
authority through fiscal year 2025, and will work with the Department 
to implement and recommend refinements. That extension allows us to 
craft more contract actions under our current authorities rather than 
having to leverage existing contracts held by other partners. In fiscal 
year 2018 we executed 32 contract actions totaling $43 million, and we 
could reach as much as $75 million in this fiscal year. Our acquisition 
priorities include the geographically distributed set of redundant and 
reliable infrastructures noted above as well as a virtual arsenal of 
capabilities (comprising both open-source and high-end tools); 
implementation of cloud and engineering services in support of a big 
data platform; foundational architecture portions of the Command's 
continuous monitoring capabilities; and a competitive cyber tool 
contract. Cyber tools can be highly perishable, unlike conventional 
munitions, but they are also like munitions in that, as they are 
expended, we must continuously invest in their development and 
procurement.
                               conclusion
    Thank you again for inviting me here today on behalf of U.S. Cyber 
Command. Your continued support is vital to the work we do, both to 
enable our partners and to act in cyberspace on behalf of our Nation. 
USCYBERCOM made significant progress in the past year. We have been 
elevated to a combatant command and are maturing in our new 
responsibilities. All of our Cyber Mission Force teams are built and, 
in conjunction with the Services, we are working to enhance and sustain 
their readiness. The Department is investing in essential operational 
infrastructure and is committing additional resources to build the 
Joint Cyber Warfighting Architecture that the Command needs. Enabled by 
new law, policy, and mission guidance, we are conducting operations 
every day--both to support combatant commands and forces engaged 
overseas, and to contest cyber adversaries in defense of the nation. 
Persistent engagement initiatives, like the operations conducted in 
partnership across government, with allies, and with the private sector 
in defense of the 2018 elections, will cumulatively impose cost on our 
adversaries and change their risk calculus for future operations.
    Looking ahead, the work we have done to date may soon seem both 
crucial and preliminary. We are in continuous daily contact in 
cyberspace with capable adversaries determined to erode our Nation's 
strategic advantages. Our efforts to act against them and to enable our 
partner combatant commands, government agencies, and allies have helped 
to defend our Nation and its interests. Those efforts, however, must 
rapidly become more agile, more capable, and more sustainable. My 
vision for the Command encompasses a continuous role for our forces in 
making our fellow combatant commands and our whole-of-nation partners 
even more effective in competition with adversaries and in preparing 
for and acting in conflict.
    We have much work ahead, of course, and your continued endorsement 
and assistance are both necessary and gratefully appreciated. Our 
people are superb. They merit your trust, and, with your support, 
USCYBERCOM will continue to meet every challenge, in both competition 
and conflict.

    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Nakasone.
    First of all, I think we've all pretty much decided that 
this Commission, the National Defense Strategy Commission, is 
kind of the blueprint that we are using in this Committee. To 
start this off, let me address the two levels of threats that 
we're talking about.
    First, of course, the level of threat would be the peer 
competition that we have out there; then the terrorist element 
that's out there. It's very alive today.
    So, starting off with, maybe, a response from both Generals 
on the first one, how can SOCOM and CYBERCOM most effectively 
support our efforts against China and Russia? Talk a little bit 
about any deficiencies, in terms of resources, that you would 
be suffering in order to carry out these goals.
    General Thomas?
    General Thomas. Chairman, you highlight, at the outset, the 
challenge is to maintain the focus on the counter-violent-
extremist effort while shifting to the focus of the National 
Defense Strategy. I would tell you that it's burdensome, in 
terms of resources, but something that we can and will manage, 
going forward. I'm lucky, on two accounts. One, my predecessors 
had already focused on Russia and China as emerging threats, 
before the National Defense Strategy, and had already committed 
resources to that effort. So, I appreciate the investment that 
preceded me. I also appreciate some new authorities that have 
developed in this house which have enabled us to approach this 
problem differently, but similarly to the way that we 
approached the counterterrorism problem. So, resources that 
enable some unique, unorthodox approaches to peer competitors, 
especially in that space that we call ``competition short of 
conflict''--a big arm wave, but arguably, the most important 
phase of deterrence.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes. Thank you.
    General Nakasone.
    General Nakasone. Chairman, in terms of our ability for 
near-peer or peer competitors, our most important thing right 
now is to be able to enable our partners, whether or not those 
partners are Joint Force commanders in cyberspace or those 
partners are other members of the interagency. Our work with 
the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation is an exemplar, I think, of the enabling aspect 
that we will do against near-peer competitors.
    Senator Inhofe. Yeah.
    General Nakasone. I would also offer that the Fiscal Year 
2019 National Defense Authorization Act was critical for us at 
U.S. Cyber Command. It gave us capabilities and authorities 
that were important for us as we look to further enable. That 
included the ability for us to rapidly deploy elements of our 
force to the Department of Homeland Security, the ability for 
us to look at networks that are not part of the Department of 
Defense network. The other piece of it that was critical, as 
Ranking Member Reed mentioned, is the idea of cyber as a 
traditional military activity. I think those are areas that are 
going to help us immensely with near-peer competitors.
    In terms of our shortfalls and our challenges, the areas 
that we are very focused on is continuing to ensure that the 
force that has been built, the force that is ready, the force 
that will operate has the required infrastructure--the sensors, 
the locations, the capabilities--to address a number of 
different threats to our Nation.
    Senator Inhofe. Appreciate that.
    I'm going to read a quote from Dan Coats and ask for a 
response, Secretary West and General Thomas. He said, ``ISIS 
still commands thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria, and it 
maintains eight branches, more than a dozen networks, and 
thousands of dispersed supporters around the world, and will 
exploit any reduction in CT pressure to rebuild key 
capabilities, such as media production and external 
operations.'' Do you agree with that? Let's start with you, Mr. 
Secretary.
    Secretary West. Mr. Chairman, I do.
    Senator Inhofe. General Thomas?
    General Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I do. But, I would add, in 
context, we have crushed the physical caliphate, so the terrain 
that ISIS formerly maintained a sanctuary from where they drew 
their resources--specifically, oil resources--has been badly 
diminished, but they continue to be a threat. I agree with the 
scope of the assessment, as provided by the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI).
    Senator Inhofe. We get a variety of reports, in terms of 
the effectiveness of ISIS, al Qaeda, and the various other 
terrorist operations. We want to make sure that everyone 
understands, yes, that peer competitors are important, but so 
is the other.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    First, let me join General Thomas in thanking and 
commending Command Sergeant Major McCauley for your service. 
Thank you. We all recognize the noncommissioned officers in 
every service are the backbone and I think, the winning edge 
that we have. So, thank you.
    Secretary West and General Thomas, if you could elaborate 
on the challenges that still face you in implementing section 
922, that would be very helpful to us and, if anything that we 
can do to help make section 922 the whole issue of creating a 
service-like Secretary under the ADS SOLIC.
    So, Secretary West, please.
    Secretary West. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Well, section 922 has certainly reinvigorated our 
relationship, but it's also very timely, because our basic task 
is to help institutionalize USSOCOM within the Joint Force and 
in the Pentagon while keeping its unique attributes. But, it 
also has come along simultaneously with the National Defense 
Strategy. This year, General Thomas and I have cosigned four 
separate letters, one of which was to align SOCOM's fiscal 
strategy to achieve the NDS. This body has been very 
supportive. I think we are very adequately supported. I think 
the task is really left up to us to slowly build this business 
and achieve our objectives.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    General Thomas, your comments.
    General Thomas. Senator Reed, I noted at the outset that 
Owen referred to me as his teammate, which I appreciate, 
because, technically, he's my boss. In legislation, as you 
know, affected by this last year, with one of my hats on for 
the man, train, and equip, service-like responsibilities, he is 
literally in my chain of command, and we have embraced that, 
going away. I think that actually integrates us with the 
Department more optimally. Conceptually, we've certainly been 
able to drive the relationship, I think, to a much more 
enlightened level. I hope that it continues to evolve. I think 
ASD SOLIC provides a critical function for us, for integration 
with the Department. Again, it's been a pleasure working with 
Owen as we've developed out what I think your intent was.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    General Nakasone, again, thank you for your service, 
particularly your great efforts with respect to the last 
election and looking forward to the next one. One of the areas 
is social media. We've talked about it, and you've talked about 
it with the Intelligence Committee. There were two independent 
reports commissioned by the Senate Intelligence Committee that 
looked at social media, not just particular platforms, but the 
cross-movement of information on these platforms. Do you think 
it would be helpful having studies like this for your use? 
Should we contemplate trying to provide you the authority to do 
that?
    General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. What we found with 
those reports is that they provided a window on the adversary 
that we hadn't seen. As you know, our focus on foreign 
intelligence is outside the United States, so that we were able 
to capture that. But, having the reports that were done, in 
terms of what was done within the United States, was very, very 
helpful, in terms of being able to understand exactly what our 
adversary was trying to do to build dissent within our Nation.
    Senator Reed. So, if we could somehow institutionalize 
that--maybe the proper format might be through the Intelligence 
Committee, but those reports are useful to you and complement 
your direct activities.
    General Nakasone. Those reports certainly provided a window 
on our adversary that was very telling.
    Senator Reed. One of the issues that came in the context of 
social media is, will they voluntarily take steps that are 
appropriate and necessary? Now, my understanding is that they 
do take down sites that have been identified. But, I also don't 
think they identify to the consumer that these sites were 
either fraudulent or malign. Is it something that they should 
be doing, in your view?
    General Nakasone. Senator, what we were able to do was 
declassify information about our adversaries, and pass that 
through the National Security Agency to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. The FBI specifically worked with those social 
media companies. So, I would defer to the Bureau, in terms of 
its ability to do what you had stated there.
    Senator Reed. Fine.
    Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
    Thank you very much.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Fischer.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Thomas, thank you for your service to this country, 
and congratulations on your retirement.
    General Nakasone, thank you for your service to the 
country, as well.
    Over the years, many have talked about deterring 
adversaries in cyberspace, and the broader question of cyber 
deterrence is often compared to nuclear deterrence. I've said 
this before. I don't think that's a good comparison at all. You 
made a similar point in a recent article, where you argued that 
deterrence in cyberspace results from the employment of cyber 
capabilities, not the threat of employing them, something you 
describe as persistent engagement. You mentioned, earlier, that 
this Committee and the White House have provided CYBERCOM with 
additional authority in the past year. Can you tell us what 
impact those changes have had?
    General Nakasone. Senator, a year ago, I appeared before 
this Committee for my confirmation hearings. In that year, let 
me just trace, I think, the major elements that have helped our 
Command be able to be more effective.
    First of all, our National Strategy on Cyberspace, the 
Department's Strategy on Cyber Posture Review. Then, the key 
piece that I would offer is the Fiscal Year 2019 National 
Defense Authorization Act. That recognized cyber as a 
traditional military activity, that provided us the baseline of 
being able to operate outside of our Department networks and 
the idea that we would enable other elements of our 
interagency. Tremendously helpful, and then I would say the 
last piece is the work of the President to bring a new policy 
to bear, in terms of how we operated offensively in cyberspace.
    Senator Fischer. Have you been able to put your theory of 
persistent engagement into action?
    General Nakasone. Senator, we have. Our number-one priority 
was the defense of the midterm elections. We utilized all of 
those capabilities, those strategies, and our new operational 
concept, persistent engagement, to ensure a secure and safe 
election.
    Senator Fischer. I appreciated your classified briefing on 
that the other day. I think it was very helpful for Members to 
hear that.
    Is it your view that imposing costs on adversaries through 
persistent engagement--is that going to have a deterrence 
effect? Or do you think there is any connection between a cyber 
deterrent and also a nuclear deterrent? I saw you shake your 
head when I mentioned that in my opening to your question.
    General Nakasone. Senator, I would offer that my view on 
nuclear deterrence is much different than on the idea of cyber 
engagement and being able to prevent our adversaries from 
accomplishing their goals. As I mentioned, in nuclear 
deterrence, the power that a nation-state has is through the 
threat of the use of the weapons. What we're seeing in 
cyberspace is, our adversaries are operating below a level of 
armed conflict every single day to steal our intellectual 
property, to leverage our personally identifiable information, 
to challenge our institutions. This is where I believe being 
able to operate either to enable other elements of the 
interagency or operate outside of our national borders against 
our adversaries is important.
    Senator Fischer. I would say, from your comments, and you 
can correct me on this, but that you don't believe, then, that 
cyber is a substitution for the deterrence that we achieve 
through our nuclear enterprise.
    General Nakasone. I believe that cyber is, overall, one 
element that our Nation is going to use to achieve deterrent 
effects against our adversaries, but there are other elements, 
other powers of our Nation that we will also bear on 
adversaries that attempt to operate below this level of armed 
conflict.
    Senator Fischer. Last year, I discussed the adequacy of the 
size of the Cyber Mission Force with your predecessor, and he 
testified that, ``We're probably going to need some level of 
additional capacity over time. That's something I'll be talking 
to my successor about. I think that it's going to be a key 
thing for him during his time in command.'' So, how adequate do 
you believe the size of the force is compared to the threat 
that we are seeing today? How do you measure force adequacy?
    General Nakasone. Senator, as we measure our readiness 
against what we consider a number of different adversaries, 
primarily both near-peer and rogue states, we believe that the 
teams that we've created right now is the building block for 
that. We are also, as you know, building a series of defensive 
teams in the Army Reserve and the National Guard that are going 
to be a strategic depth for us.
    My sense, as we continue to operate more, as our 
adversaries continue to improve, is that there will be 
requirements that will probably be outside the 133 teams that 
we have right now.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Thomas, when we had the new overall National 
Defense and Security Strategies that put more focus on near-
peer competitors or peer competitors, there was a implicit 
hydraulic effect that efforts were going to go up on the 
conventional peer competitor, and down on counter terrorism 
(CT). Do you see any reduction in the CT threat around the 
world? The hydraulic effect, it seems to me, is not a good 
idea, because the CT threat is still there, is it not?
    General Thomas. Senator, I think the CT threat is in the 
throes of transformation. As I mentioned, this time last year, 
we had just taken Raqqa, the capital of the caliphate, but we 
still had substantial maneuver operations and challenges to 
push through to the destruction and the defeat of the physical 
caliphate. We're much closer now. Somebody played it out to me 
the other day that if you wanted to put a grasp on it in 
physical terms, it's twice the size of the base where I'm 
stationed, MacDill Air Force Base, which is tiny. So, they are 
down to the last dozens of square kilometers, in terms of 
physical----
    Senator King. But, the CT threat between 2001 and 2011 
wasn't measured in territory, it was in terrorist threat. So, 
that's still there, isn't it?
    General Thomas. You're correct. I would offer that, in our 
efforts to defeat ISIS, we have also greatly diminished their 
ability to export the threat to the United States and to our 
Western allies. In, though, the throes of this transformation 
right now, they still are very dangerous, and I could highlight 
the specific groups that we consider to be external threats to 
the United States that are truly our focus. We're staying on 
them.
    Senator King. There is a growing CT threat in Afghanistan, 
is there not?
    General Thomas. Sir, I wouldn't label it as growing. In 
fact, we've made huge progress against the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria-Khorason Province (ISIS-K), which is the primary 
external threat in Afghanistan. More regional instability in 
Afghanistan is of late, but not in the form of external 
threats.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    General Nakasone, you've described the progress that you've 
made in this year. I'm on my way, from here, to a hearing on 
the security of the electric grid in the Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee. It seems to me this is a classic case of 
cross-jurisdiction. Please describe your relationship of 
CYBERCOM and NSA to FBI, DHS, and utilities. How do we be sure 
that what you know and are able to do is protecting us, because 
you don't have jurisdiction within the United States?
    General Nakasone. Senator, for the energy sector, the lead 
for the securing of that critical infrastructure is the 
Department of Homeland Security. They work very, very closely 
with the sector-specific lead, which is the Department of 
Energy. We tie in on the U.S. Cyber Command side, providing 
enabling support to the Department of Energy and the Department 
of Homeland Security, if requested. Right now, what we are 
doing is sharing information, sharing information very clearly 
about what we know about foreign adversaries that may be 
attempting to get----
    Senator King. Do you share that information with the 
utilities or----
    General Nakasone. We share that with the Department of 
Homeland Security and, specifically, Department of Energy.
    Senator King. Let me ask about structure, sharing of 
information. Is there a regular structure? Is there an 
organizational chart of these relationships, where you meet 
regularly, or is it sort of ad hoc?
    General Nakasone. We have put into place within the 
Department of Defense a pathfinder program to look at this 
element. We've established a regular meeting with the sector 
security agent, which is the Department of Energy, working with 
them and the Department of Homeland Security to share that 
information regularly.
    Senator King. Finally, you've talked with Senator Fischer 
somewhat about deterrence, and you're talking about a 
persistent engagement, which is, in effect, telling the 
adversary we're there. The question is, how do we change their 
calculus? Is your theory of persistent engagement--I think you 
used the term ``engagement, presence, and pressure, or 
innovation'' intended, and will it change an adversary's 
calculus when they come to decide whether to launch a 
cyberattack on our electric grid or a financial system or 
elections?
    General Nakasone. Senator, we think it will, through two 
different means. One is through building resilience, in terms 
of what we're able to provide to our partners and their 
knowledge of our adversaries, but, two, also imposing a cost on 
our adversary.
    Senator King. That's what I want to hear about.
    General Nakasone. Yes. So, the ability either to be able to 
identify where they're operating from, the tools that they're 
using, to be able to provide that cost that the adversary has 
to think twice, in terms of, ``can they conduct and exploit or 
attack against our critical infrastructure?
    Senator King. But, the calculus is, can they do it? But, 
shouldn't there be a calculus, if they do it, they will be 
responded to in a forceful way?
    General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. I think that comes 
not only with cyber, but also all the elements of our Nation 
that can be brought to bear on that adversary.
    Senator King. I think that's important, and it doesn't have 
to be cyber-for-cyber.
    General Nakasone. Right.
    Senator King. It can be other elements of national power.
    Thank you very much, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Assistant Secretary West, many of us on the Committee are 
working through the President's decision to withdraw forces 
from Syria. It appears there's a fair amount of work to be done 
there. I'd just like to know, from your perspective and from a 
SOF perspective, how would you characterize victory in Syria, 
winning in Syria? What does that look like, and what do you 
need to get there?
    Secretary West. Sir, I'd be cautious to use the word 
``victory,'' but I think it's very important not to diminish 
what has happened there. As General Thomas said, the physical 
caliphate did, at one time, attract over 40,000 foreign 
fighters into that territory, from 100 different countries. 
They can no longer do that. But, this will be a very long war. 
ISIS is quite expansive, in terms of its global territory, but 
it now becomes an insurgency.
    Senator Hawley. General Thomas, let me just ask you the 
same question. What does winning look like in Syria? Have we 
won? I mean, are we satisfied with where we are, in terms of 
SOF's mission there and what you feel that you've been tasked 
to accomplish?
    General Thomas. Senator, again, I'd be hesitant to use the 
term ``winning,'' as opposed to the objective. I think our 
reasonable objective is to reduce the threat in that area, and 
to be able to maintain persistent capability so that an 
external threat cannot emanate from that area in the future.
    Having said that, Syria is perhaps the most complex 
battlespace that I've experienced in 40 years. My recent trip 
out there had our forces operating in and around Syrian regime 
forces, Russian forces, Turks and their surrogates, Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and ISIS. 
Again, an incredibly complex environment that I think, again, 
the objective is to reduce the threat and be able to maintain 
some sort of sustainable security there.
    Senator Hawley. On that point about reaching a point where 
the external threat can't emanate from that region, are you 
satisfied, General, that we're at that point, where an external 
threat from VEOs cannot emanate from Syria? I mean, do you 
think we've accomplished that objective?
    General Thomas. I do not think we're there yet. We're on 
the verge of diminishing the threat, and then in the process of 
determining what residual capability needs to remain in place 
in the region to ensure that we're securing that objective.
    Senator Hawley. Let me ask you, General, about recruiting 
and retention. You talk about this in your prepared testimony. 
You talk a lot about the significant strain on SOF over the 
doubling of the size of the force and the significant 
deployment demands. Tell me about where you think we are, in 
terms of recruitment, retention, what additional tools or help 
that you need to make sure that your force is ready, is rested, 
is healthy, and is getting everything they need to be able to 
do the very significant and demanding and dangerous work we ask 
them to do.
    General Thomas. Senator, over the years, we have aspired to 
grow the Special Operations Force that the Nation needs, but 
have not dropped standards at all, so it's a little bit of a 
Catch 22 here. Part of our mantra is, you can't create this in 
a hurry, and people are our most important asset. We have had 
challenges, of late. I attribute them to a number of causes, as 
much the downsizing of the Army, specifically, for recruiting 
Special Forces, but there are some very good initiatives in 
place to rectify that and to try and address our recruiting 
shortcoming. So, I think we're trending in the right direction, 
but it has been challenging over the last year to 2 years, in 
terms of getting the numbers in that we would like to have, but 
cognizant of the fact we're not going to drop standards.
    Senator Hawley. Is it your sense, General--and then I'll 
put the same question to you, Secretary West--but, starting 
with you, General, is it your sense that, under the NDS and the 
new reprioritization of great-power conflict, that demands on 
SOF will be the same, or will increase? I mean, what's your 
sense of it as you think about your posturing and your needs 
under the NDS? What do you see about the demands for the forces 
that you command?
    General Thomas. I think, department-wide, we all can take 
away that the NDS highlights there's not going to be a respite, 
in terms of national security challenges. You know, we've had 
an 18-year ongoing struggle, the longest struggle in the 
history of the United States. That has not come to a conclusion 
yet. We have some work left to do there. We've had the 
reemergence of peer competitors as a priority, an existential 
threat and clearly the focus for the Department. So, we share 
that across the Department. I get pretty good guidance from the 
Department, in terms of where they want me, in terms of 
priorities and effects as a part of the Joint Force, and we 
manage that. As global combatant commanders that provide forces 
to the six geographic combatant commands, Paul's and my daily 
challenge, but it's one we embrace.
    Senator Hawley. Very good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you so much for being here today.
    You oversee a directorate and combatant commands that 
operate not in just one geographic area of responsibility 
(AOR), but also in the most austere environments around the 
world. The men and women you lead are often the first in 
battle, and the heroism and dedication are not fully understood 
by elected leaders and the American public. So, I'm very 
appreciative of the opportunity to hear from each of you about 
the state of your Commands and the challenges and opportunities 
you face.
    So, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank General 
Thomas for his 38 years of service as you come to the end of 
your time in uniform. I really wish you the best of luck on 
your next phase of your career.
    Since the Committee began hearing testimony from military 
leadership this year, much of the conversation has been about 
ensuring that our forces are lethal and agile so that they 
provide a credible deterrent, reducing the probability of armed 
conflict with our peer adversaries. Yet, Special Operations and 
Cyber Forces are uniquely tailored and trained to achieve 
effects against our adversaries in a variety of situations that 
are just short of war, itself. Could each of you briefly 
discuss, conceptually, how Special Operations and Cyber Forces 
can exact a toll for malign activities, short of supporting 
armed conflict? In your opinion, what kind of restructuring 
with the Special Operations and cyber communities will they 
need to do in order to dominate these gray-space conflicts?
    Secretary West. Thank you, Senator. Certainly, you're 
correct, in that the nature of war doesn't change, but its 
character has changed radically in the last 15 years. I'll let 
General Nakasone take on the cyber portion.
    In terms of the Special Operations tactics, where SOF 
traditionally thrives, we're also seeing the enemy employ 
these. I'll let General Thomas talk specifics on operations. 
But, when we talk about competition short of armed conflict, 
dealing with partner nations, problems that need to be quickly 
and agilely solved in a cheap manner, you're really talking 
about SOF. So, there's a real role for that, that General 
Thomas will be able to describe.
    General Thomas. Thanks, Senator, and thanks for your 
service, as well.
    Senator, we're actually very excited about the opportunity 
that the NDS and the specific subject of competition short of 
conflict offers for us and in conjunction with Paul and others, 
in terms of winning that critical phase, and winning, in that 
case, is not a defeat moniker that applies. It's to disrupt, 
deny, and really, ensure that our U.S. policies and objectives 
are pursued and successful. We think it's a combination of 
information operations, influence operations, partner capacity, 
cyber operations, in conjunction with Paul, the whole array of, 
nonkinetic activities that are really an art form that we're 
excited to employ in the future. We hope to play a substantial 
role there.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    General Nakasone, on Tuesday, Admiral Davidson highlighted 
to this Committee the need to enhance the cyber defenses of our 
logistical networks, which touched the commercial industry that 
we help contract for support, both in the United States and 
overseas. Can you provide examples of what might be affected 
and how we might be able to harden the network when it comes to 
organizations such as U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)? 
We have this long logistical tail that must support our forces, 
no matter where they're operate, and I feel like they are 
sometimes the most vulnerable, and we overlook--those 
organizations. How does TRANSCOM fit into your priority for 
cybersecurity?
    General Nakasone. Senator, General Lyons and I have not 
only had discussions about this at Transportation Command, but 
I've also been out to visit him. We see the ability for us to 
project our strategic elements in the world as being something 
that's uniquely suited for our Nation and a tremendous 
capacity. What we are doing at U.S. Cyber Command is ensuring 
that we understand the networks that he has to operate on, the 
platforms that he is utilizing, and, most importantly, the 
data, because it's that data that we want to make sure that we 
can secure.
    The challenge you point out is making sure that we have 
enabled our partners. These partners are oftentimes private-
sector partners that we work with, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and other sectors, to ensure that they have the 
information upon which they understand the threats to them and 
they can build more resilient networks and protect their own 
data.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance 
here today.
    General Thomas, let's start with Syria. We've talked a 
little bit about the state of the fight there and the great 
advances our troops have made, and a little bit about what will 
happen when our troops depart Syria. One thing that's been on 
my mind is all the bad guys that are currently being detained 
in Syria. Some of your colleagues have testified before the 
Committee that that number would go into the hundreds. We don't 
have to be any more specific here in this setting. They've also 
testified that, while some of those detainees are front-line, 
untrained cannon fodder, some of them are also external 
operation plotters and master bombmakers and other really bad 
guys. Is that your understanding, as well?
    General Thomas. Senator, without getting into the specifics 
on the numbers, it's actually closer to a thousand than it is 
hundreds already in detention, with potentially more to come. A 
huge area of concern for us is that they're being maintained by 
the non-nation-state that's otherwise known as the Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF). So, how we resolve these mostly 
foreign-fighter detentions from, I lost count, but it's in the 
dozens of countries that have contributed to it--but, how we 
reduce this, that threat, and have those people properly 
detained and handled over time is of paramount importance right 
now for the problem.
    Senator Cotton. Yeah, how are we going to do that?
    General Thomas. A pretty aggressive action right now, 
Senator, ongoing with State Department and with other partner 
nations to specifically reduce that threat. I'll give kudos to 
some of the countries, a surprising number of countries who 
have recently stepped up, some of the smaller countries that 
had capacity challenges, but that have, nonetheless assumed the 
burden--or started to assume the burden. We, with State 
Department, primarily, are trying to assist them in reducing 
this problem.
    Senator Cotton. I know it's not in your area of operations, 
but we have empty beds at Guantanamo Bay, don't we?
    General Thomas. Yes, Senator, we still do.
    Senator Cotton. Maybe we should consider that for some of 
those really bad guys in Syria.
    While we're talking about Syria, let's contrast Syria and 
Afghanistan, or specifically Afghanistan against some of the 
other places where we have a serious terrorism threat. The 
President said, a couple of weeks ago, that we're going to have 
troops in Iraq for a while, in part because we need to watch 
the counterterrorism (CT) threat there and the threat of Iran. 
That's right next to Syria, in places like Yemen and Somalia. 
We obviously have freedom of action in the seas for a lot of 
your troopers. Contrast the CT mission that we have in 
Afghanistan, which I think, is 800 or 900 miles from the 
nearest sea, and the challenge that we would face there if we 
significantly drew down our troop presence in the conventional 
forces, for your forces and Special Operations.
    General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Truthfully, we look at it 
in a global context. So, in Afghanistan, as Senator King 
pursued earlier, the external threat adversaries have been 
greatly diminished, and we're focused on them specifically. 
There's a larger counterinsurgency effort that you know is into 
its 18th year, but with a specific focus to support Ambassador 
Khalilzad's efforts to drive that into reconciliation. So, a 
distinctly different problem, but correlated, in terms of the 
global threat and their connectivity.
    Senator Cotton. It would be hard to get after those 
terrorist organizations, though, in Afghanistan, for your 
troops, if we didn't have some kind of physical presence in 
Afghanistan, isn't that right?
    General Thomas. Senator, access and placement are key, and, 
again, something you can't establish in a hurry, necessarily, 
if you leave it. I probably failed to answer Senator King's 
question earlier. The way we look at the current context is 
very similar to 2011. The recent annual assessment we did 
reflects upon 2011, when al Qaeda in Iraq was badly down, but 
not out, and we pulled out of Iraq at that point. We know that, 
in less than 2-years' time, they were ISIS, running the deck 
through Nineveh, running the deck through Anbar. So, how we 
finish that threat, or at least contain it, going forward, is a 
critical concern.
    Senator Cotton. What's true of our troops is true of enemy 
forces, as well, right? It helps them to have a safe, secure 
physical base from which they can carefully plot attacks 
outside of that base?
    General Thomas. Yes, Senator, they thrive on sanctuary, and 
they're actively seeking sanctuary right now if they lose their 
toehold in Syria and other places.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, General Thomas.
    General Nakasone, a quick question about the 5G network. 
We've discussed this many times before. What is the status of 
your conversations with counterparts around the world to the 
threat that Chinese companies, like Huawei and ZTE, pose to our 
telecommunications networks?
    General Nakasone. Senator, for fifth-generation wireless, 
on U.S. Cyber Command, we have certainly talked with our 
partners and our allies with that. In terms of the Director of 
National Security Agency, of which I am, we have also worked 
that to the Department of State as they've made engagements 
with our allies throughout the world.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    My time is expired.
    General Thomas, I don't think you'll be appearing here 
before us again. You are smiling at that, I can tell. I want to 
thank you and thank your wife, Barbara, for many years of 
carrying the rucksack of responsibility for our Nation. You 
have more than earned the opportunity and the privilege to pass 
it on to the next man.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks, to all of you.
    General Thomas, I offer my congratulations, as well.
    I want to ask you a question--and the others may want to 
chime in, too--about an important aspect of our military 
operations, which is building partner capacity. As I've 
traveled in Armed Service Congressional Delegations (CODELs), 
I've often been struck very positively by the response of our 
allies to the partner capacity we do with them all over the 
globe. There was a CRS study--Congressional Research Service 
study--in 2016 that kind of analyzed about 20 instances of 
building partner capacity. Its conclusion was that the results 
are sort of mixed, in terms of effect. I've always viewed the 
partner-capacity issues, whether we're doing work in the field 
in other nations, or bringing foreign military leaders here to 
go to the Army War College, or other institutions, as it's 
great to build strong relationships; you build them with young 
officers, and later they might be a Minister of Defense or even 
a Prime Minister or President. But, as you are finishing your 
time, your lengthy career, what are the sort of metrics we 
should be looking at in the build-partner-capacity investments 
we make through DOD to see whether they're successful or not? 
Just share, kind of, lessons learned on that, please.
    General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Great question.
    I guess my first point of reflection is how drastically 
different the approach to partner capacity and, really, 
partners is from when I first started. It had very little to 
any contact points. Established relationships were checkered. 
Often, when countries were deemed to have behaved badly, the 
first point of separation was to separate International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) schooling and things 
like that. It is of great difficulty to keep partners close and 
to work their capacity if you don't have the point of contact.
    Over the years, the establishment and the expansion of our 
contacts and true partners has been extraordinary, and I tell 
our younger officers, ``You're in a period of time of 
international relations and partners that I didn't grow up in. 
Please don't lose sight of the potential.''
    To your point on success, though, we should assess, 
constantly, what's the return on investment for these, various 
efforts. Again, I think the report card's better than, 
probably, the American public knows, and it's both with 
established nations, and the Russia threat's a good case in 
point. We've had persistent presence in every country in the 
European landmass with Russia for the last 5 to 6 years, and 
are thriving there. But, even with untraditional partners--I 
reflect back on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which 
started as seed corn of a couple hundred people and is now 
60,000 strong, has done most of the fighting and dying in Syria 
in support of that effort, has lost thousands of people, but is 
just an extraordinary force that was cobbled together over 
time, through a partnering effort. So, I am more inclined to 
see the potency and the results than some of the shortcomings 
on it.
    Senator Kaine. Secretary West.
    Secretary West. Senator, the National Defense Strategy 
requires us to answer this question.
    Senator Kaine. Yeah. Secretary Mattis always says, ``by, 
with, and through''--anytime he was with us, ``by, with, and 
through other nations.'' I heard him say that many times, and I 
know that's an important part of the Strategy.
    Secretary West. Since there must be a resource allocation, 
we must begin to look at, number one, the nature of the threat. 
Local forces who do not demonstrate intent or capability do not 
deserve the same resource allocation as do those enemies with 
the capability and the public declaration that they'll strike 
us. Number two, what are--as General Thomas said, what are the 
odds of success of training this force? How long will it take? 
How well connected are they to the people and to the 
government?
    Senator Kaine. General Nakasone, how about in the cyber 
realm? Talk a little bit about the partner-capacity issue and 
activities that we're engaged in with them.
    General Nakasone. I would add to the importance of building 
these partners, as our National Defense Strategy has indicated. 
My perspective, in terms of what I've seen within the 
cyberspace domain, is, it provides us three critical elements. 
First of all, intelligence that we may or may not have by 
ourselves. Secondly, capabilities that our Nation may or may 
not have. Third thing, unique placement, placement around the 
world that is really critical for us, that gives us greater 
reach as a Nation.
    Senator Kaine. I will follow up with this in other 
hearings, as well, because I think it's really important. It is 
a significant investment. It's a part of the DOD budget. It's 
not massive, but I think it has a massive upside if we do it 
right. We just want to make sure we're analyzing the metrics 
correctly.
    I'm going to ask a question, just for the record, General 
Nakasone, for you, but let me just preface it. I'm on the 
Health, Education, Labor, Pension Committee. We are 
reauthorizing the Higher Education Act this year. Part of that 
is analyzing workforce and skills gaps and doing things like 
public-service loan forgiveness and other programs to fill 
gaps. One of the areas that we're looking at significantly is 
cyber professionals, whether it's in the DOD side of the house, 
the DHS side of the house, or in the private sector. So, the 
question I will ask is if you would have any suggestions for 
us, as we work on Higher Ed reauthorization, programs that you 
think are successful to enable us to train and recruit and 
retain the cyber professionals that we need. I'll ask that 
question for the record.
    General Nakasone. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Thanks, Mr. Chairman
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service.
    General Thomas, we most certainly appreciate all of the 
hard work that you've put in, and your service to our country.
    I'm curious, with regard to the Middle East. We've talked a 
lot about Syria and the challenges that we have there. What 
about with regard to Iraq at this point? I know that we've 
talked about the fact that we're going to have forces remaining 
in Iraq in the near future. The President has indicated that 
there's the capability to be able to move back into the Syrian 
areas. But, within Iraq itself, what is the current state of 
play with regard to ISIS, specifically within northern Iraq?
    General Thomas. Senator, I would offer that our Iraqi 
partners have embraced their sovereign responsibility, in terms 
of defending their terrain. We're maintaining, persistent 
pressure on ISIS, both where they were and where they are 
intending to try and have any sort of resurgence. So, it 
continues to be a work in progress, but it's borne primarily 
through the Iraqi forces, who we have rekindled our 
relationship with.
    Senator Rounds. Do you see evidence of their activity in 
northern Iraq with regard to any incidences that they appear to 
be responsible for?
    General Thomas. In terms of the Iraqi forces, sir?
    Senator Rounds. In terms of ISIS' impacts within northern 
Iraq. Are you seeing evidence of where they're trying to impact 
local communities and so forth?
    General Thomas. They are attempting to make a resurgence in 
various locations. But, again, I believe our forces, with the 
Iraqis, are very aware of where they are, and they're 
addressing them accordingly.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you.
    General Nakasone, I appreciate the way in which you laid 
out, today, a little bit about the activity that the men and 
women of CYBERCOM, along with their associated forces within 
the NSA and so forth, worked very hard with regard to the 2018 
election. Would it be fair to say that it is not a coincidence 
that this election went off without a hitch, and the fact that 
you were actively involved in the protection of this very 
important infrastructure that we value?
    General Nakasone. Senator, the security of the midterm 
election was the number-one priority at U.S. Cyber Command and 
the National Security Agency.
    Senator Rounds. Can you share a little bit about what the 
tools are to protect an election, and the need to protect the 
tools and the systems and the processes that are used in order 
to protect an election, as an example, and the different types 
of threats that you see and that you have to defend against? 
Could you share a little bit about that?
    General Nakasone. Senator, as part of a whole-of-government 
effort, we were looking at three different areas. First, we 
were looking to ensure that we prevented interference in the 
election. Secondly was to disrupt any attempts by adversaries 
to influence that election. Thirdly, to impose cost on any 
adversary that decided that they would attempt to interfere 
with our democratic processes.
    Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there's been 
clear evidence in the past--we've seen--with regard to Russia, 
who has done propaganda, attempted to manipulate the American 
public, tried to pit one side against the other, and so forth. 
In this particular case, would it be fair to say that Russia 
has, in the past, demonstrated a compatibly in the cyber realm 
to use Internet activity, social media, and so forth, as a way 
to do exactly the same thing with more sophistication than 
perhaps in the past?
    General Nakasone. Senator, the Russians are a very 
sophisticated adversary in using influence operations that you 
described.
    Senator Rounds. Would it be fair also to say that there 
have been concerns in the past and that the CYBERCOM has worked 
very hard to make sure that the elections that have been held 
in the United States have not been impacted directly, in terms 
of vote counts or anything like that?
    General Nakasone. Certainly, Senator. Again, working as 
part of a broad government team, that was our focus. I give 
great credit to Department of Homeland Security, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and other elements of our Government 
to work towards this. This was a team effort.
    Senator Rounds. Very good. Thank you.
    In terms of being able to impact social media, we talk 
about being able to impact and make sure that folks outside of 
the United States coming in are not able to influence public 
opinion by providing misinformation. But, there's another piece 
of this, as well, and that's to actually be able to defend and 
protect the physical infrastructure within the United States. 
Would you just simply explain to the public that there is more 
to it than just simply stopping bad tweets from going out? It 
is a matter of actually protecting critical infrastructure that 
it has a real impact on day-to-day lives of American citizens.
    General Nakasone. Senator, one of the things that is within 
our mission is certainly to protect that critical 
infrastructure in the defense of the United States. You 
accurately portray, obviously, both the opportunity and the 
challenge that we have at our Command in doing that. I would 
also offer that one of the things that is so important here is 
the partnerships that you've formed. If there's anything that 
I've learned over the past several months, these partnerships 
give us real strength in being able to do that.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today, and for your service to 
our Nation.
    General Nakasone, I was grateful to have the briefing that 
we did--classified briefing, very recently, which I think was 
very illuminating as to the continued threats to our Nation as 
a result of cyber, particularly meddling and interference with 
our elections. The threat from Russia continues unabated. Can 
you say that in public here today?
    General Nakasone. Senator, Russia certainly provides a very 
sophisticated threat to our Nation, and one that has done over 
several years.
    Senator Blumenthal. That threat ought to continue to 
concern the American people, shouldn't it?
    General Nakasone. Yes, Senator, it should.
    Senator Blumenthal. I said in that briefing, and I've said 
it in numerous such classified briefings, that, really, I 
wished that the American people could have heard more of what 
you told us. In a sense, the enemies know what they're doing; 
we know what they're doing, to some extent; they know we know 
what they're doing; the only ones who are in the dark, really, 
are the American people. As we enter this next election cycle, 
would you agree that we ought to do everything we can to make 
the American people aware of that threat?
    General Nakasone. Senator, we will, at Cyber Command, 
commit to working that. I think your point is a very important 
one. Being able to educate the public is critical for us. The 
success that we had in 2018, more of our Nation should know 
about.
    Senator Blumenthal. It was success. I think very few of the 
American public know about the successes. They assume that the 
meddling and interference in our election system, when it 
occurs, simply is undeterred or unstopped. I think--again, 
without going into any of the details, there are some successes 
that the American people should know happen, but, at the same 
time, should know that the threats do continue, not only from 
the Russians, but--let me ask you whether you've seen any 
indication that China has sought to conduct activities similar 
to what we have seen from Russia in 2016, 2018?
    General Nakasone. Senator, given the forum that we're in 
today, I would offer to broadly state--what we're seeing is 
that our adversaries understand how to operate, again, below 
this level of armed conflict, and are taking broad lessons 
learned, upon which they will attempt to impact our Nation.
    Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that the American 
people should know about the threats from, not only Russia, but 
other countries, as well, because the tools and means and 
techniques are highly asymmetric? That is, they don't need to 
invest tens of billions of dollars to disrupt our election 
system. Some of it is available with very little such 
investment.
    General Nakasone. I agree, Senator.
    Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas and Mr. Secretary, I 
know we have been over this issue, to some extent, but I just 
want to be clear. From your standpoint, moving Special 
Operators from Syria to Iraq--in other words, withdrawing from 
Syria and moving those forces to Iraq--could you say, again, 
what the impact is on our operational capability?
    General Thomas. Senator, obviously, it's easier to do our 
job with access and placement and proximity. We've thrived on 
that, being with the Syrian Democratic Forces and enabling them 
to do the heavy lifting that I described earlier. It'll 
certainly be harder to not have that proximity, make it more 
challenging. But, we're working alternate solutions to maintain 
some contact and some level of support for them.
    Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that it 
will make it harder, but you're trying to overcome those 
challenges?
    Secretary West. Militarily, it is more difficult, sir, but 
we can remotely assist and advise. If Special Operations does 
anything, this agile force has already adapted.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Thomas. Senator, I probably would point out, too, 
that's how we started the first of it. We were not in Syria for 
the first year. I was in the command that was responsible for 
that, and we did everything from externally to establish that 
force and provide----
    Senator Blumenthal. But, there was a reason why you went 
into Syria, which is that it enhanced your operational 
capability, correct?
    General Thomas. It got us the return on investment. I mean, 
they maneuvered and destroyed the caliphate, or are on the 
verge of destroying the caliphate, so that was that subsequent 
phase to play.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Perdue.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing today.
    It's public information that China is trying to build a 
navy of about 425 ships, within the next decade or so, and 
they're accelerating that. It's been reported, in just 
December, that Chinese hackers have been breaching Navy 
contractors to steal pretty much everything from maintenance 
data to missile plans. A particularly egregious report came out 
later that one breach was about a supersonic antiship missile 
that we were building for our nuclear submarine force. If 
they're successful, by 2030, they'll have a navy that's about 
100 ships bigger than our Navy has today. The problem is, right 
now, that they're accelerating that development through 
hacking, not the Navy network of information, but our 
contractor network of information.
    So, General Nakasone, how do you operate with our 
contractors? Should this data be kept on DOD networks? How do 
you interface with the FBI, when we get into these commercial 
entities out there that seem to be less protected than our 
military networks?
    General Nakasone. Senator, the example that you cited there 
is one that has driven the Department, and we're certainly 
working with that Department as one of the lead agents to 
ensure that contracts are written right and ensure that our 
cleared defense contractors understand the standards that have 
to be met, that we test those standards, working with the 
services, ensuring that there are proper safeguards in place 
that will guarantee that the information that they have that's 
critical for our Nation is safeguarded better.
    Senator Perdue. Are you optimistic you have everything you 
need, from an organization standpoint of funding and so forth, 
to help accomplish that?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I'm optimistic that if I don't 
have what I need, I'm going to come back rapidly to ask for it.
    Senator Perdue. Yes, sir. You've done a good job of that.
    Let me move on to the organization. Right now--in August of 
2017, it was announced that the Cyber Command would be elevated 
to a unified command, if I'm correct. Today, we're still 
operating in a dual-hat structure, and it's been reported that 
one of the reasons we still have a dual-hat responsibility is 
that there is a concern about the lack of intelligence in a 
separate unified command, versus NSA, that you're still getting 
a lot of your intelligence through the NSA. How do you equate 
this, relative to the long-term plan of having a unified 
command? Does that mean we'll have a duplicate capability, in 
terms of intelligence, both in the Cyber Command and also in 
NSA, or will there always be a close relationship between the 
two?
    General Nakasone. Senator, the decision on the dual hat 
remains with the Secretary. I've commented I need it. During my 
first 90 days, I provided my thoughts on it. Whatever the 
ultimate decision is, there will always be a very, very close 
partnership between NSA and Cyber Command, and so, that's where 
I see it right now, Senator.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you.
    General Thomas, first of all, thank you for the leadership, 
you're at the tip of the spear.
    When we have continuing resolutions, how does it affect 
your operation in the field? You've been at war for 17 years, 
your troops, and I've been around some of your troops around 
the world, and I would have to say, the best and the very best 
of what we have in America is in your uniform. But, when we do 
a continuing resolution here in Congress, I get the feeling 
that it really impacts you guys pretty directly. Is that true?
    General Thomas. Senator, that's an accurate statement. It's 
disruptive, in terms of programming and just normal operations.
    Senator Perdue. Can you describe just a couple of anecdotal 
examples of how that really impacts training, refitting, 
rotations, all of the above?
    General Thomas. Yes, sir. I'd be inclined, because it's 
usually played to me, the biggest impact is in the prescription 
for new starts. The aspect of a continuing resolution inhibits 
our agility to actually adjust to the problems. It's a fluid 
and dynamic environment that we live in. More broadly, it's the 
aspect that we're stuck in a preceding paradigm and not able to 
move on to the newer, better ways of solving problems.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, I'll yield my time.
    But, General Thomas, I do want to echo my colleagues' 
comments about your storied career, but particularly your time 
in the 75th Ranger Regiment in Georgia. God bless you.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, all of you, for your service.
    General Thomas, we wish you well in whatever you do next.
    I want to pick up on Senator Perdue's questions about how 
vulnerable we are to third-party products and software. So, I 
think this is for you, General Nakasone. In 2018, the NDAA 
included a provision that would prohibit the use of products 
and services developed or provided by Kaspersky Lab in third-
party products. It required a report on DOD's capacity to spot 
and address risks. So, can you tell me what the status is of 
banning all of those Kaspersky products from third-party 
contracts, and also what's the status of the report on what 
risks might still be there?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I know that we have conducted 
the ban, but let me take that for the record to make sure I 
have an accurate response to both parts of that question.
    Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you very much.
    General Thomas, I want to pick up on the questions about 
Syria, and particularly on the detainees. As you are probably 
aware, two of those detainees are suspected in the murders of 
four Americans: James Foley, Steven Sotloff, Peter Kassig, and 
Kayla Mueller. I don't know if you have anything that you can 
tell us today about what their status is and what the potential 
is to make sure that they can be brought back to the United 
States to be tried for their crimes, but certainly that's what 
the families of those murdered Americans would like to see 
happen.
    General Thomas. Senator, I don't have an update on the 
status, but I would express my appreciation for your personal 
interest on the matter. Your visit out there, and your very 
public commentary after that, actually helped focus the world 
on the problem, and then specifically on the U.S. problem. But, 
I don't know the current status. I just know it's in the legal 
wrangling of considering how we handle the special cases like 
that.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope you and Secretary 
West will both take back the interest that the families have in 
making sure that they see justice in the United States.
    But, General Thomas, I also want to go back to the question 
about, How confident are you that, given the estimates on the 
number of ISIS fighters who have gone underground, who may be 
operating out of Iraq or other places in the Middle East, that 
we will be able to contain that threat if we no longer have 
operations in Syria, given the complexity there?
    General Thomas. Senator, as I mentioned, this has been one 
of the most complex challenges that our force has dealt with in 
quite a while. I am concerned that we are not overly restricted 
in the end state, and I don't honestly know what that is. There 
are several planning efforts ongoing, with a focus to 
maintaining what we've gained so far, to focus to ensure that 
there is no external attack capability coming from a morass of 
bad actors--admittedly bad actors, many of whom are just 
regional, local types. So, we're in the throes of trying to do 
the right planning and preparation to provide the Nation 
options to make sure that that's not a shortcoming and we have 
a revisit to the 2011 recurrence.
    Senator Shaheen. How much of a threat continues from Turkey 
to the Syrian Democratic Forces and their continued work on the 
ground?
    General Thomas. Senator, there has been friction which is 
an understatement, right from the very beginning, in terms of 
our choice of a partner force. Truthfully, it was a necessary 
choice. It was the only force really available, and their 
relationship with the Turkish Government--again, I would 
commend General Scaparotti and General Votel, the senior 
leaders who have been trying to work through that friction and 
stay focused on the counter-ISIS effort, which is why we're out 
there. It has been a challenge, but, I think we are certainly 
addressing Turkish sovereign interests and concerns as we stay 
focused on ISIS.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. I hope we're also 
continuing to support SDF, who have been such good partners 
with us in the arena.
    Secretary West, I understand that you're the point person 
at DOD for implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act. Is 
that correct?
    Secretary West. I'm certainly on point, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Okay, good. I wonder if you could give us 
an update. I understand that we are expecting the plan, that 
it's going through final approvals. Can you tell me when we 
might see the final plan for how that's going to get 
implemented, and any thoughts you have about the effectiveness 
of being able to implement that as we're looking at all of our 
operations around the world?
    Secretary West. Senator, we're certainly supporting the 
interagency plan. As they say in the Green Berets, we're trying 
to lead from the back of the front. But, this does establish 
the United States as the world leader in ensuring that women 
are part of the conflict resolution and prevention process. I 
want to thank you personally for the appropriation we have this 
year, because the gender advisors, which were already installed 
in come COCOMs, now will be permanent.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope, as we're looking 
at continued negotiations in Afghanistan, that we will 
certainly make sure that women are at the table in any 
negotiations.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Ernst.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, and, on behalf 
of the American public, I would like to say thank you. Because 
much of the work that is done within your commands, the 
American public will never know about, nor will they be able to 
appreciate. So, thank you very much for that.
    General Thomas, I'd like to start with you. What I would 
like to do is, basically, give you an open floor or a moment to 
reflect upon your time in command. There have been many 
innovations during your time in command that you have brought 
forward for Special Operations Command, and I'd like to give 
you the opportunity to talk about some of those innovations, 
why they have been so important to our Special Operators, and 
if there's anything that is not yet finished, what you would 
like to see continue on in your absence.
    Sir, please.
    General Thomas. Thanks, Senator. Dangerous to give me an 
open mic, here.
    [Laughter.]
    General Thomas. I'll try and stay focused.
    I joke with contemporaries, whether it's in the Armed 
Forces or in the private sector, that the one problem we do not 
have in Special Operations Command is to spur innovation. It's 
almost runaway innovation and problem-solving every day. As you 
know, it's bottom-up-driven. So, the challenge for us, as a 
higher headquarters, is to assess and bundle the great ideas 
and the solutions that are being forwarded, and put them into 
programs of record that drive budget considerations and things 
like that. Nice problem to have, I would offer. I can't 
recount, the extraordinary number of initiatives and solutions 
that the forces provided over the last couple of years, and I'm 
incredibly proud of it.
    I'm more excited about where it's going in the future. The 
Command is truly poised to be even more relevant for the 
Department of Defense and for the Nation, in terms of securing 
this country, and borne on the back of just the best talent 
that the country has to offer, but with the resourcing that you 
all provide and the ability to do creative solutions.
    The one area that you and I have discussed time and again, 
that was probably the best innovation, that I would ascribe to 
my predecessors, and addresses directly how we sustain this 
force, despite the relentless pace of things, is the initiative 
awkwardly named Preservation of the Force and Family----
    Senator Ernst. POTFF.
    General Thomas.--POTFF, but juxtaposed to our ability to 
care for our people with the Care Coalition. Right now, we 
have, I think, 15,000 wounded, ill, and injured SOF members, 
both currently serving and prior, that are part of our core 
focus to take care of the Command. But, the POTFF effort has 
been just remarkable, in terms of building in resilience to the 
Command. Again, I give all the credit to my predecessors, who 
saw that as a needed requirement, and this body, for giving us 
the resources to get after it.
    Senator Ernst. Well, General Thomas, I thank you so much 
for your emphasis on POTFF. I've had the great opportunity to 
travel and visit with a number of your operators at Fort Bragg 
and Fort Benning, Hunter Army Airfield, Coronado. We've covered 
the bases there, and not only in supporting the operators, but 
their families, as well, because they truly are such an 
important part of the equation on why you are so successful. 
So, thank you for addressing that.
    We do have a closed hearing this afternoon, so I will save 
some of my questions for that time period, but I do want to 
take this opportunity to thank both of you, both Generals. 
Thank you very much for the command structure that you have 
provided, the leadership and guidance.
    Secretary West, thanks for taking on this very challenging 
position out there with DOD. We know that it's an ever-growing 
and -influencing part of the DOD. So, thank you very much for 
that.
    Just in the very short time that I have remaining, General 
Thomas, I want to thank you for your time and service. To you 
and Barbara, my best wishes as you move on to retirement. It is 
well earned and well deserved. You will be missed. You will 
truly be missed. But, thank you for your leadership.
    Thank you very much. I'll yield back.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst, and we all agree 
with her comments.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I also want to add my thank you, General Thomas, for all of 
your work and for your leadership.
    Last year's NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to 
review whether members of the Armed Forces or coalition 
partners of the United States abused or witnessed abuse of 
detainees during operations in Yemen. The unclassified summary 
of DOD's report to Congress concluded, ``DOD has determined 
that DOD personnel have neither observed nor been complicit in 
any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees in 
Yemen,''. So, when I asked General Votel about this last week, 
he said DOD's conclusion was based on the discussions and 
reports from the people that they have on the ground. General 
Thomas, is that your understanding, as well?
    General Thomas. Senator, I monitored your conversation with 
General Votel, and I am in agreement with that assessment.
    Senator Warren. Okay. So, the Associated Press, Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations, 
all four, have all conducted their own investigations and come 
to a very different conclusion. They determined that our 
Emirati partners oversaw a network of detention centers that 
regularly engaged in torture and abuse. General Thomas, do you 
find these independent investigations credible?
    General Thomas. Again, Senator, I monitored General Votel's 
answer to the same question, and you'll probably hear some 
consistency. Every one of those allegations is taken with the 
utmost interest, in terms of poring into them and determining 
if they're factual, and we have. In fact, I'm not aware of any 
outliers. But, if we observe violations of the Law of Armed 
Conflict, it is a break-contact standard along our force, to 
address it specifically and/or to break contact with those 
partner forces. Again, I would reinforce how General Votel 
answered it. It's a high standard.
    Senator Warren. So, I appreciate that, and General Votel 
said exactly that there--he was very careful about what he 
said. I asked him if he'd reached any conclusions about whether 
or not our Emirati partners are engaging in detainee abuse when 
DOD personnel are not present, and he said he was not aware of 
that. The question I was asking, though, General Thomas, do you 
find those four investigations credible?
    General Thomas. Senator, I find them of sufficient interest 
that it's actually been a topic of discussion back with our 
Emirati partners. It is hard for us to confirm or deny if it 
happened, but not something we just take as something I approve 
or disprove. It's the subject of our discussion with the 
Emiratis that, if we can prove this, or if there is evidence, 
this could be a deal-breaker.
    Senator Warren. Okay.
    General Thomas. Again, we take it very seriously.
    Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that, General Thomas. I 
know you work hard to encourage our partner forces to obey the 
Laws of Armed Conflict. But, when it comes to whether or not 
our partner forces have engaged in abuse of detainees, there 
seems to be a really serious disconnect between what DOD 
understands to be true and credible independent reports from 
journalists and human rights organizations. So, I remain deeply 
concerned about whether our partners in Yemen are treating 
detainees in ways that are consistent with the Law of Armed 
Conflict. As you know, turning a blind eye is not acceptable. 
So, I'm going to keep asking questions about this. I appreciate 
your answer on this.
    If I can just ask one other area quickly in the time left 
to me, General Thomas, I'm concerned about the militarization 
of our foreign policy. Nowhere is that more evident than in the 
use or overuse of our Special Operations Forces. I think 
Senator Reed alluded to this earlier. In 2017, Special 
Operations Command deployed forces to 149 countries under your 
Command, and they launch airstrikes, carry out raids, train 
foreign militaries, all in the hope of removing terrorists from 
the battlefield. Many of these countries have governance 
challenges that allow violent extremist groups to grow. Instead 
of treating the causes of violent extremism, we're treating the 
symptom.
    So, let me just ask. General Thomas, do you think that we 
can kill or capture our way out of this problem?
    General Thomas. No, Senator, I definitely do not think 
that's the solution to most of these problems.
    Senator Warren. Do you think that the current pace of 
operations for your Command is sustainable?
    General Thomas. I do, Senator. We had challenges on 
specific parts of our formation and to specifically get to the 
Department-directed standard of a one-to-two dwell rate, so for 
one cycle of deployment downrange, two parallel cycles back 
home--but, we have gotten that back into a very healthy shape, 
with a few outliers, and we're intent on getting them healthy, 
as well, here.
    Senator Warren. I appreciate it. Thank you, General Thomas. 
I just want to say, we need to be thinking harder about using 
our nonmilitary tools, here, as well. Thank you.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe.Thank you Senator Warren.
    Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    To each of you, thank you for your service to our country. 
We appreciate it.
    General Thomas, we do wish you well, and we wish your 
family well, and thank you for the service.
    I will say, Senator Ernst mentioned some of the posts she's 
visited. She also has visited Fort Campbell, and they were, and 
still are, a big part of our Tennessee community. I represented 
that post during my time in the House, and have enjoyed working 
with those military families and looking at the challenges that 
are going to be necessary for 21st-century warfare.
    General Nakasone cyber is an enormous part of that. I think 
it's been really curious to me this week, as we have looked at 
the different geographic combatant commanders and those areas 
of responsiblitites (AORs), maybe a hesitancy to engage in the 
discussion of how our adversaries are using the cyber area to 
their advantage, namely China, of course. We've talked some 
about the great competitive threat that is there.
    So, my question to you, General Nakasone, would be, do you 
feel like that your Command, Cyber Command, is being properly 
integrated into all of the other commands in those missions?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I do feel that Cyber Command is 
being integrated properly into the other combatant commands. We 
have undertaken a very aggressive approach to engage with the 
combatant commands. General Thomas and I have had a long 
association, and one of the things that I think that we've been 
able to leverage is the close partnership of ensuring that what 
we do in cyberspace is supporting his end states and what he 
was trying to do, whether in previous commands or at U.S. 
Special Operations Command. We are very, very appreciate of the 
work that has been done and approved by this Committee to build 
cyberspace operational integrated planning elements at each of 
our combatant commands. This will allow us to develop the 
talent and the planning expertise to ensure that we get to 
outcomes.
    Senator Blackburn. Okay.
    Let's talk about artificial intelligence (AI) for just a 
moment, because I think that that strategy--and, of course, 
it's been released--highlights a reality that we've known for 
some time. I want to quote from that, and then have you 
respond. I'm quoting, ``Other nations, particularly China and 
Russia, are making significant investments in AI for military 
purposes, including applications that raise questions regarding 
international norms and human rights. Failure to adopt AI will 
result in legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our 
people eroding cohesion among allies and partners, reduced 
access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our 
prosperity and standard of living, and growing challenges to 
societies that have been built upon individual freedom.'' Now, 
that, in my opinion, is a pretty sobering assessment. So, do 
each of you agree with that strategy's assessment? Exactly how 
do you see the AI strategy informing your Command as we move 
forward?
    General Nakasone. I agree with the statement that you read, 
Senator. I do see artificial intelligence, deep learning, 
machine learning, as something that's a critical enabler of 
what we're going to need to do at U.S. Cyber Command. We have 
already seen the power, at the National Security Agency, of 
what artificial intelligence can do for our foreign 
intelligence mission, our cybersecurity missions. This is where 
the world is headed, in terms of innovation and capability. We, 
as the military fighting force, have to ensure that we have 
that enabler. One of the things that I do take great credit and 
pride in is that U.S. Special Operations Command really has led 
a lot of the work in artificial intelligence, in integrating 
some of the early thinking into how they become a more powerful 
force.
    Senator Blackburn. General Thomas?
    General Thomas. Senator, great question. We could spend 
several hours talking about it. Unfortunately, we don't have 
that kind of time. But, agree with the assessment, in terms of 
threat. More importantly, am incredibly enthusiastic about the 
opportunity.
    Anecdotally, 3 years ago, Eric Schmidt visited our Command 
as part of the Defense Innovation Group. Quick assessment that 
he felt compelled to give me, he said, ``You've got tremendous 
people, you prototype pretty effectively, and you're absolutely 
terrible''--he had some more colorful words than that--''for 
machine learning, applied artificial intelligence.'' 
Truthfully, it gave me a spark 3 years ago, and turned me into 
a zealot on the subject. But, more importantly, it has really 
kind of reoriented our Command to embrace this phenomenon and 
apply it. It is relevant to everything we do, until it's proven 
otherwise. We're taking, not-so-small bites, but some pretty 
substantial bites into embracing applied artificial 
intelligence, and I'm excited about where we're going in the 
future.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you for that. Thank you for your 
service.
    I yield back.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Tillis.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, I apologize for not being here for a lot of the 
hearing. We have three committee hearings going on 
simultaneously.
    General Thomas, I want to thank you for your service and 
all the quality time you've spent in North Carolina. I hope, in 
retirement, you continue to spend a lot of quality time there.
    I'm going to take, probably, the questions a different 
direction in my capacity as Personnel Subcommittee chair, 
because I know a lot of the other members have covered the 
landscape on the extraordinary work you're doing. General, 
thank you for the briefing earlier this week. I got a real 
sense of progress being made. I think some of that stems from 
some of the authorities that you've been granted. You're doing 
great work there, so thank you for your leadership.
    But, I want to talk more about the personnel aspects. 
Number one, when you look at, General Thomas, the very 
challenging job of an operator--and how a disturbing percentage 
of them are going to get injured in one way or another--what 
more do I need to be thinking about, in terms of family 
support, for the members, and actually even in dealing with the 
wounds of war--what more should we be looking at, as a function 
of the Personnel Subcommittee, to send the very clear signal we 
understand the dangerous job and the impact it's having on 
families?
    General Thomas. Senator, thanks for that question, and 
thanks for the concern expressed.
    I would actually challenge the term ``operator,'' because 
therein lies the opportunity for us to do better by our people 
in the future. While you highlighted particular career fields 
that are inherently dangerous, in terms of jumping and fast-
roping, and things like that, we're as good as our weakest 
link. We're as good as our support personnel. We use the term 
``enablers,'' which is broadbased, but it's the entire fabric 
of the force, and, arguably, we didn't focus sufficiently on 
the entirety of the force early on, when we talked about POTFF 
and how we sustain it. I think we're much more focused on that, 
and we have come to you to ask for additional resources so that 
we can be more thorough in the application there. But, again, 
thanks for the support we've had so far. Truthfully, the best 
comment we can get on it is, the sister services are emulating 
what you've allowed us to do as the way they could/should take 
care of their people, as well.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    Something else that we'll be talking about--I was just 
briefly speaking with Senator King about progress that we can 
make on procurement. We've taken some steps, in recent NOAAs, 
for acquisition and procurement reform. I think we can still 
take a few pages from y'all's book, in terms of rapid 
prototyping and deployment. So, look forward to that in 
subsequent hearings. Mr. Chair, hopefully we can have that as a 
subject, some point in this Congress.
    General Nakasone, you've got a challenge--you mentioned, in 
your opening statements that you're trying to find the 
resources. You're competing with the private sector. Again, in 
the last NDAA, we made some progress, in terms of being able to 
get resources from the private sector into positions. But, what 
more do we need to do? I've got to believe you just don't have 
enough of what you need, in terms of expertise. What more would 
you suggest that we look at, as a matter of policies, going 
into this NDAA cycle?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I think that we have to come 
back to the Committee and identify those critical subsets. 
There are people within our force right now that I call ``10-
or-20X'' type of people. That means they're 10 or 20 times 
better than the people that they work with, better coders, 
better malware analysts, better developers, and so, how do we 
ensure that we keep those within our force? The services do a 
wonderful job in recruiting. We get great recruits. We do a 
very, very good job in training them. Our challenge will be in 
retaining the very best--not everyone, but the very best. This 
is where I think identifying those categories, coming back to 
you to make sure that we have the proper career paths and the 
proper enumeration will be very helpful.
    Senator Tillis. Well, Senator Rounds and I have talked a 
lot about it in his capacity on Cyber, and we need that 
information sooner. In the private sector, I led a practice 
that had ethical testing in cybersecurity resources. They were 
even scarce in the environment where you could pretty much pay 
whatever the market rate is, so I can't imagine what you're 
going to go through for retention. We just need to think 
creatively and recognize that these are hot skills, and you've 
got to have the SOF equivalent of cyberwarriors out there. We 
need to do everything we can to provide you the authority to do 
that. But, as you just said, you've got to differentiate 
between that person who has a 20-time multiple on skills, and 
just say, we're going to treat you all fairly. We're not going 
to treat you equally, because you've got to have those 
extraordinary warriors in this domain.
    I'm going to follow up with a couple of questions for the 
record, but they happen to do with plumbing in business 
matters, so I'm going to yield back my remaining 10 seconds.
    Thank you all for being here.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
    Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
    General Thomas, I really wanted to thank you for all you've 
done for our Nation. I think I've had a bit of a unique 
opportunity to not only get to know you from this position, but 
also when I put my Reserve uniform on. As my commander, he's, 
like, 17 levels above where I am in the organization chart. So, 
you've done a great job, and really appreciate it.
    Secretary West, appreciate the job you're doing. You know, 
unfortunately, there's a very small number of Harvard marines, 
and you're making us proud. Very few.
    General Nakasone, I want to ask you, on this issue of 
offensive operations--I know you probably can't talk too much, 
but you might recall a hearing we had in this Committee a 
couple of years ago, where Director Clapper and some other 
leaders on the cyber and intelligence front openly admitted 
that, after the Chinese hacked the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) and stole over 20 million SF-86 forms for all 
our top-secret operators, including Members of this Committee, 
didn't retaliate against them, which I thought was kind of a 
stunning admission. To me, it was part of the problem. Whether 
it was North Korea or Iran--I think, a couple of years ago, 
China, certainly Russia, we were viewed as kind of the world's 
cyber punching bag. Any of these countries could come and do 
what they wanted, and we did not retaliate.
    Can you tell me, without revealing anything classified, do 
you feel you have the authorities to hit back, or maybe even 
hit back harder, to make the costs of those kind of operations 
against our country, against our democracy, much more 
prohibitive? Particularly for a country like North Korea, where 
I'm assuming we could just drop their entire electrical grid 
and Internet system overnight if we wanted to.
    General Nakasone. Senator, if I might, 1 year ago I 
appeared before the Committee for my confirmation, and you 
asked a similar question of me. I think it's important that we 
look at what's happened within this past year: a National Cyber 
Strategy, signed; a DOD Cyber Strategy, signed; the Fiscal Year 
2019 National Defense Authorization Act that provided us 
greater capabilities and greater authorities within the law was 
signed; a new presidential policy that came out on offensive 
cyber; and finally, our ability to have a new construct upon 
which we operate, which is persistent presence. All of those 
provide a much different environment for our adversaries today 
than it did 1 year ago.
    Senator Sullivan. So, can you publicly state, in this 
hearing--again, without getting in classified information--that 
you have the authorities and you are not unwilling to undertake 
offensive operations that can help deter, whether it's Chinese 
stealing 20 million SF-86 forms or the North Koreans hacking 
our companies?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I have the authorities to 
accomplish my mission.
    Senator Sullivan. Or the Russians attacking our election 
systems?
    General Nakasone. I have the authorities that I need to 
accomplish my mission, Senator.
    Senator Sullivan. Good.
    I want to ask Secretary West and General Thomas--you have 
taken the lead over the last 2 years on the counter-WMD 
mission. SOCOM has that lead. To me, there's probably no more 
important mission for the survival of the entire Nation, the 
entire Republic. We might have threats that rise--ISIS or al 
Qaeda, they might rise and fall, but, as long as we have a 
republic to defend, the counter-WMD mission is going to be, in 
my view, the most important mission. How is that going? Do you 
need more resources on that? Are there any things that we can 
do to help you with the authorities, whether it's working with 
allies, whether it's more resources to undertake that mission, 
in terms of the leadership that you now have with regard to 
that mission?
    General Thomas. Senator, one, we appreciated the 
opportunity to perform this mission. It's a daunting, 
critically important mission, as you mentioned. We actually had 
John Hyten, from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), visiting, 
as well as Paul Nakasone, this past week. I would offer, his 
mission is probably the true, primary mission, and this one's 
connected just underneath.
    The level of cooperation and collaboration that we enjoy 
with the community of action is extraordinary. We just hosted 
our annual seminar, 2 weeks ago. We're about to produce our 
Annual Assessment to the Secretary of Defense. This mission set 
and space continues to move in the right direction. I don't 
know on resources yet. I daresay we will probably uncover some 
gaps, in terms of collection capabilities that we, the Nation, 
need, going forward, whether it's Department of Defense or 
other entities. But, the mission is going very well for us, and 
I'm appreciative of some of the expertise that has been brought 
to bear on it.
    Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one final 
quick question.
    The return of great-power competition is spelled out in the 
NDS, the National Defense Strategy. How is SOCOM aligning with 
regard to that mission? Have we overutilized the SOF community 
on low-intensity threats? Are we focused on the new NDS 
mission, on the SOF side?
    Secretary West. Senator, quickly, from my perspective, SOF 
is perfectly well suited to take on this challenge, because 
it's cheap, it provides the Nation real leverage. But, the 
basic task is resource allocation. As you indicated, we are at 
capacity, and demand signal is not shrinking. Then this, in 
turn, requires a new assessment of the threat in counter-terror 
to repurpose forces.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Wicker.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Nakasone, in February, the Department of Justice 
and the Department of Homeland Security sent a joint report to 
Congress on 2018 election interference. You testified before a 
classified session of this Committee yesterday. But, the 
public-specific conclusions of the report of these two 
departments was as follows, ``There is no evidence to date that 
any identified activities of a foreign government or foreign 
agent had any material impact on the integrity or security of 
election infrastructure or political campaign infrastructure 
used in the 2018 midterm elections.'' I appreciate your 
testimony yesterday, and I realize there are things that you 
cannot get into today. But, what can you tell us, in this 
public setting, about whether or not, based on what you know, 
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland 
Security were correct in saying there was no such interference?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I agree with what you had read 
with regards to that report. What I can say, in terms of our 
role with that, was, within U.S. Cyber Command, and 
specifically the National Security Agency, we took a look at 
all the intelligence information we had on our adversaries. We 
declassified as much of that information as we could. We shared 
that with the Department of Homeland Security, who, in turn, 
shared that with the state and local levels so that they had a 
very, very good picture of what we knew about adversaries that 
might be trying to interfere with our elections.
    Senator Wicker. So, to the extent that there were concerns 
that a foreign government or agent had an impact on the 
election, you concur with the public conclusion of the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice 
that there was not such interference.
    General Nakasone. I concur, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
    I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker and all the other 
Senators, and certainly for the three witnesses. That was a 
very eye-opening and a great presentation. Appreciate your 
patience and your thoroughness. Thank you so much.
    We're adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
          special operations forces in great power competition
    1. Senator Sullivan. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your 
testimony you discussed the Special Operations Forces' (SOF) critical 
role in executing the National Defense Strategy both in terms of gray 
zone operations below the threshold of conflict and in terms of 
deterrence. We didn't hear any discussion of a physical rebalancing of 
forces away from the counterterrorism mission and toward great-power 
competition, however. In fact, Secretary West, you stated that ``We are 
at capacity and demand is not shrinking. So then this in turn requires 
a new assessment of the threat in counter-terror, to repurpose 
forces.'' How close are you to completing that new assessment, when do 
you expect it will be complete, and when and how are you planning to 
repurpose your forces toward the NDS' emphasis on great-power 
competition?
    Secretary West. The Department has been adjusting its focus towards 
great-power competition since the NDS was published. SO/LIC, USSOCOM, 
and the Joint Staff are actively developing policy concepts for SOF's 
role in this new strategic paradigm, which includes ensuring that DOD 
has the tools to meet state-based challenges below the level of 
traditional armed conflict. This shift has already begun, including the 
adjustment of force posture for great-power competition, and will be 
continuously adjusted to meet changing demands and requirements. To 
ensure we continue to meet enduring CT requirements, we will adopt a 
resource-sustainable approach to counter priority violent extremist 
organizations. A primary focus for managing global CT challenges will 
be to share the burden of responsibility with capable partners who can 
manage lesser threats locally. Our willing and capable partners 
understand the need for collective security, and we will seek to 
support their efforts through various security cooperation efforts. 
This, in conjunction with prioritizing VEO threats, will enable our 
forces to sustain our posture appropriately. These, and other 
terrorist-related assessments, will inform my recommendations to the 
Secretary of Defense on priorities for the employment of special 
operations forces against all of our Nation's threats, from great 
powers to terrorists.
    General Thomas. The global and regional challenges that America 
faces today are complex, dynamic, and of a long-duration. Unlike 
conventional forces, SOF have a small footprint, and simply counting 
``boots-on-the-ground'' does not always capture the disproportionate 
strategic effects our operators have on the adversary every day. We are 
continuously refining our methods of assessing our progress to 
achieving our desired conditions that will allow us to deliver the best 
return on investment for the American taxpayer. It is also important to 
note that while assessments are continuous, it takes time to actually 
see tangible results. Specifically, at the end of the 3rd quarter of 
this fiscal year we will have the results needed to assist in informing 
the Chairman's Annual Joint Assessment and USSOCOM's recommendation to 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on force allocation. We 
anticipate, at that time, to begin to identify forces that can be 
repurposed to meet the challenges posed by great power competition.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                          requirements process
    2. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, does a 
requirements process exist whereby unique U.S. Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) capabilities help influence or determine requirements 
for DOD-wide conventional forces? If so, what is this process?
    Secretary West. The Services and USSOCOM requirements process are 
governed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS). Through the governance boards that support the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council validation and approval of requirements, 
USSOCOM articulates their unique capabilities that have Joint Force 
applications. Some of these capabilities are adopted by the Services, 
and the corresponding management of programs of record transitioned 
from USSOCOM to one or more Services. ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM 
constantly analyze special operations-unique capabilities to identify 
programs that can appropriately be transferred to the Services for 
conventional forces use.
    General Thomas. Yes it does. USSOCOM's Special Operations Forces 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOFCIDS) process is 
nested in and compliant with the Joint Staff's Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS). SOFCIDS is the process used 
by USSOCOM to implement JCIDS, by validating special operations-
peculiar capabilities at or below the Joint Staffing Designator of 
Joint Capabilities Board Interest. USSOCOM leverages the Services for 
Service-common equipment whenever possible. USSOCOM posts its validated 
requirement documents in the Joint Staff's Knowledge Management and 
Decision Support (KM/DS) depository, to allow the Services to see and 
adopt SOF efforts. This benefits the Services by enabling them to adopt 
USSOCOM-developed capabilities (without spending Service Research, 
Development, Technology and Evaluation (RDT&E) dollars), and USSOCOM 
receives the benefit once the Service adopts the solution as Service-
common and provides it to our Components. Additionally, as the 
Department's proponent for Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil 
Affairs capabilities, USSOCOM now has Service coordination and 
validation authority for these types of requirements for conventional 
forces. Consequently, when PSYOP and CA interests are coordinated 
through the SOFCIDS process, the appropriate Service shall be invited 
to participate in that Special Operations Command Requirements 
Evaluation Board (SOCREB). We also leverage the Department's Integrated 
Priority List (IPL) process to highlight USSOCOM needs for Service 
support, as well as the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council for 
attempting to solve some of the complex issues that arise between 
USSOCOM and the Services.
         improving procurement process for allies and partners
    3. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, what actions 
does SOCOM take to encourage allies and partners to utilize the Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS) program for platforms and capabilities, like 
light attack aircraft?
    Secretary West. Industry is our ally and partner in enabling the 
SOF enterprise with cutting-edge capabilities and also in ensuring we 
equip allied and partner forces to meet interoperability requirements. 
Industry engages directly with allies and partners through DCS, and DOD 
partners with allied and partner countries through the FMS process. 
Regardless of mechanism, we are committed to working with allies and 
partners to meet their needs.
    General Thomas. When an ally or friendly country requests to 
procure SOF Peculiar platforms or capabilities, USSOCOM follows 
Department of Defense (DOD) policy and is generally neutral regarding 
the customer's choice to purchase by means of Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) or Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Although most defense items or 
services can be purchased through either FMS or DCS, in limited 
instances, technology or security concerns may require that sales of 
specific items be restricted to FMS-Only.

    4. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your 
experience, have allies and partners expressed frustration about 
navigating the DCS program?
    Secretary West. Industry is our ally and partner in enabling the 
SOF enterprise with cutting-edge capabilities and also in ensuring we 
equip allied and partner forces to meet interoperability requirements. 
Industry engages directly with allies and partners through DCS, and DOD 
partners with allied and partner countries through the FMS process. 
Regardless of mechanism, we are committed to working with allies and 
partners to meet their needs.
    General Thomas. USSOCOM has no formal or informal record of an ally 
or partner expressing frustration with the Direct Commercial Sales 
(DCS) process. USSOCOM's role in the DCS process is relatively limited. 
We conduct assessments of proposed dual-use and defense related SOF-P 
technology, articles, and services transfer cases as requested and 
provide coordinated positions to the Director, Defense Technology 
Security Agency.

    5. Senator Perdue. Secretary West and General Thomas, in your 
opinion, would a streamlined process for procuring non-standard items 
through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) be helpful when allies and 
partners want to procure weapons/platforms that cannot be acquired 
through the DCS process?
    Secretary West. We are committed to reforming the way we do 
business at DOD in order to support building partnership capacity. This 
includes improving contracting timelines and processes. Business 
reforms will streamline our ability to deliver capabilities across the 
DOD enterprise. USSOCOM, DSCA, the Services, and my team are working 
together to support allies and partners.
    General Thomas. Building partner capacity is of critical importance 
to SOF operations. We would support a tailored OSD approach to FMS of 
non-standard items based on technical or performance risks to US 
operations.
                         continuing resolutions
    6. Senator Perdue. General Thomas and General Nakasone, in as much 
detail as possible, through specific examples, please describe the 
operational and financial impact continuing resolutions have on SOCOM/
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
    General Thomas. While a Continuing Resolution (CR) continues to 
allow mission accomplishment for USSOCOM, it introduces readiness risks 
that intensify in direct correlation to CR length, including: 
Operationally, CRs negatively affect Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Components' ability to train and equip SOF, both organically and via 
Building Partner Capacity engagements. These disruptions potentially 
result in mission cancellations or postponements and fluctuations to 
deployment timelines. These impacts weaken SOF credibility with foreign 
partners, diminishing their view of the U.S. as the ``partner of 
choice.'' Inability to execute USSOCOM's new start programs, production 
increases, major weapon platform recapitalization, and Military 
Construction projects. For example, our PB20 request includes two 
fiscal year 2020 classified procurement new starts totaling $45 
million, numerous production increases including the MH-47 Renew 
Program growing from seven fiscal year 2019 airframes to eight in 
fiscal year 2020 at a unit cost of $16 million each, and 
recapitalization of one MH-60 and one MH-47 Battle Loss Replacements 
for $28 million and $38 million, respectively. Our MILCON PB20 request 
includes 15 major construction projects at $494 million. None of these 
examples could be executed under a CR. Financially, constrained CR 
funding levels, particularly when funds are depleted towards the end of 
CR periods, can cause increased contract actions resulting in higher 
costs associated with having to restructure contracts, and reduced/
restructured/delayed/deferred non-combat related SOF training and 
maintenance/sustainment activities. Overall, USSOCOM is typically able 
to manage the impacts of short-term CRs (less than 3 months), assuming 
an appropriation follows shortly thereafter. As CRs extend in the 3-6 
month timeframe, risk moves from mild to moderate depending on the 
specific appropriation, program or capability as new starts and 
production increases slip to the right in a direct correlation to CR 
length, if not longer. Long-term CRs (6 months or longer) are high risk 
and begin to erode combat effectiveness and SOF readiness, training, 
and modernization efforts, which negatively impact USSOCOM's ability to 
provide timely and essential mission support, eventually elevating risk 
levels to deployed operators and bringing the command dangerously close 
to sinking below a reasonable degree of risk. Service constraints under 
a CR risk exacerbating impacts on USSOCOM as their ability to provide 
consistent service support to SOF is jeopardized.
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                        artificial intelligence
    7. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, given the capabilities 
required to meet the 2018 cyber strategy, is a 6,200-person Cyber 
Mission Force sufficient?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    8. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, can you rely on artificial 
intelligence (AI) to close the capability gap?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    9. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what AI programs and 
applications offer such potential?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    10. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, what advancements in 
military utilization and deployment of AI by our adversaries, namely 
China and Russia, do you find most concerning and why?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    11. Senator Blackburn. General Nakasone, where are you prioritizing 
investment dollars to modernize our enterprises and counter these 
capabilities?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    12. Senator Blackburn. General Thomas, what advancements in 
military utilization and deployment of AI by our adversaries, namely 
China and Russia, do you find most concerning and why?
    General Thomas. China and Russia continue to hone and field 
artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities and technologies that enable 
the near-real time identification and monitoring of our personnel 
abroad. Advancements in AI-based biometric systems over the past two 
years have significantly improved the ability of both the Chinese and 
Russians to clandestinely collect biometrics at greater distances and 
with greater accuracy. These advancements present an ever-increasing 
force protection and operations security risk to U.S. military 
personnel, U.S. Government civilians, and our allies and partners. We 
anticipate that vast improvements in autonomous facial/voice-
recognition surveillance will challenge U.S. SOF cover activities and 
clandestine operations moving forward. The global proliferation of 
Chinese safe-smart city surveillance systems and technology gives 
Beijing an advantage in the effort to identify, track, and potentially 
threaten Special Operators as they traverse various locations around 
the world.

    13. Senator Blackburn. General Thomas, where are you prioritizing 
investment dollars to modernize our enterprises and counter these 
capabilities?
    General Thomas. [Deleted.]
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                  information operations capabilities
    14. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General 
Nakasone, SOCOM and CYBERCOM sit at the nexus of the Department's 
efforts to address the challenges posed by adversaries' weaponization 
of information. SOCOM is the Joint Force Proponent for Military 
Information Support Operations (formerly known as ``psychological 
operations'') and its forces operate closely with those from CYBERCOM 
at the tactical and operational levels. In your view, what are the 
policy, resource, and capability gaps that limit the Department of 
Defense's (DOD)'s ability to be successful in information operations 
mission space?
    Secretary West. The complex nature of the information environment 
presents challenges and opportunities for DOD's role in that 
environment and for DOD's strategic partnerships with other government 
agencies. Our strategic competitors and other adversaries increasingly 
and aggressively operate in the information environment below the 
threshold of armed conflict. The Department is communicating how it is 
evolving to conduct operations in the Information Environment through 
quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees. The 
Department recognized that gaps exist and to address those gaps DOD 
began a 2019 revision of the Strategy for Operations in the Information 
Environment (SOIE) published in 2016. That revision is guided by a core 
of seven Secretary of Defense-approved framing principles, which we are 
currently converting into seven Lines of Effort (LOEs). The seven LOEs 
are: affecting perceptions, acquiring the right authorities, leveraging 
and strengthening partnerships, improving DOD's base of knowledge, 
refining how we plan, developing and managing people, and developing 
technology for OIE. This revision is being done concurrently with the 
development of a companion implementation plan and investment framework 
to sharpen the Department's focus on the effort and in recognition of 
urgency. Revisions to the SOIE are ongoing, and DOD will report updates 
in the quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees 
required by Section 1637 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2018.
    General Thomas. The complex nature of the information operations 
environment presents challenges and opportunities for DOD's role in the 
information environment and its strategic partnership with other 
government agencies. As our competitors increasingly operate in the 
information operations realm outside of traditionally declared 
hostilities, DOD's role and activities are restricted by extant policy 
and legal considerations. The Department is currently working on the 
fiscal year 2019 NDAA Section 1065b report to identify and analyze any 
doctrine, organization, training, material, leader, personnel, and 
facilities gaps in DOD Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
capabilities. The report is due on May 13th.
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    15. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General 
Nakasone, what are the relative roles of SOCOM and CYBERCOM forces in 
this mission space?
    Secretary West. USSOCOM has specific responsibilities outlined in 
the Unified Command Plan and ones inherent in its designation as the 
Joint proponent for military information support operations (MISO). 
USSOCOM's main role in information operations is to integrate and 
coordinate DOD MISO capabilities, and, when directed, execute MISO in 
support of combatant commands. The role of MISO is to influence foreign 
audience behaviors. USSOCOM is supporting integration of MISO 
capabilities by leading the establishment of the Joint MISO Web 
Operations Center (JMWC). The Department submitted a report to Congress 
on January 4, 2019, that outlined how USSOCOM intends for the JMWC to 
consolidate and coordinate combatant commands' Internet-based MISO 
capabilities. USCYBERCOM conducts technically focused cyberspace 
operations. DOD's Strategy for Operations in the Information 
Environment (SOIE) reaffirms that all operations in and through the 
information environment must be integrated as part of 
institutionalization and operationalization efforts. Revisions to the 
SOIE are ongoing, and DOD will report updates in the quarterly reports 
to the congressional defense committees required by Section 1637 of the 
NDAA for fiscal year 2018.
    General Thomas. As the DOD joint proponent for MISO, USSOCOM's role 
in the information operations mission space is to integrate and 
coordinate DOD MISO capabilities, and when directed, execute MISO in 
support of combatant commands. USSOCOM is supporting integration of 
MISO capabilities by leading the establishment of the Joint MISO Web 
Operations Center (JMWC) that will consolidate and coordinate combatant 
commands' internet-based MISO capabilities.
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    16. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General 
Nakasone, do you believe that a combatant command should be designated 
as the global synchronizer or coordinating authority for all DOD 
information operations (similar to the responsibilities SOCOM has for 
synchronizing counterterrorism and combatting WMD efforts)? If so, what 
additional resources do you believe that would require?
    Secretary West. SecDef designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff as the Global Integrator for Operations. This includes 
operations in the information environment. The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy remains the principal staff advisor to the Secretary 
of Defense for information operations, and is the designated senior 
official for the integration of strategic information operations and 
cyber-enabled information operations. The Department is examining the 
optimal alignment of internal organizations and resources. The 
Department will report progress in quarterly reports to the 
congressional defense committees required by Section 1637 of the NDAA 
for fiscal year 2018.
    General Thomas. The complex and pervasive nature of information 
operations and the associated mission sets pose a challenge for 
designating a single coordinating authority construct for operations. 
DOD information operations is an integrating function rather than a 
single capability. Adding a coordinating authority role for all IO 
capabilities to a single combatant command could increase the 
complexity of an already challenging coordination environment. However, 
a combatant command could be designated coordination authority for one 
or more specific information related capabilities (IRC) as SOCOM has 
been for the MISO capability.
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    17. Senator Reed. Secretary West, General Thomas, and General 
Nakasone, during the hearing, General Nakasone stated ``the Fiscal Year 
2019 National Defense Authorization Act was critical for us at U.S. 
Cyber Command. It gave us capabilities and authorities that--that were 
important for us as we look to further enable. That included the 
ability for us to rapidly deploy elements of our force to the 
Department of Homeland Security, the ability for us to look at networks 
that are not part of the Department of Defense networks. The other 
piece of it that was critical is, as Ranking Member Reed mentioned, is 
the idea of cyber as a traditional military activity. I think those are 
areas that are going to help us immensely with near-peer competitors.'' 
Do you believe similar reforms are necessary to better enable the 
information operations by the Department of Defense against near-peer 
competitors?
    Secretary West. DOD is revising and updating its 2016 Strategy for 
Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) in 2019. That effort 
must necessarily address DOD's requirements, capabilities, and capacity 
to conduct information operations that would not be attributable to the 
United States. At this time, the Department has not identified specific 
concerns that could be addressed by legislation. However, operational 
concepts and capabilities must and will evolve to address increasingly 
sophisticated threats posed by near-peer competitors that are actively 
challenging the United States below the threshold of active 
hostilities. DOD welcomes further discussions with the Committee as the 
strategy develops to ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces are well 
positioned to engage in traditional military activities to counter 
adversary threats in an information environment that is more complex 
and diverse than ever before, when hostile actions by our adversaries 
may not be easily recognizable.
    General Thomas. Yes, a review and possible reform to 50 USC, 3090 
may assist DOD in the information operations mission space with regards 
to near-peer competitors. Currently, DOD uses a contextual legal 
analysis to determine if an information operations-related activity, 
such as MISO, is a traditional military activity (TMA). Such analysis 
requires a relationship to an on-going or anticipated hostility 
involving US forces. This requirement often restricts some of what DOD 
can do in the information operations mission space, especially with our 
interagency partners, when our near-peer competitors challenge us in 
environments where overt hostilities are not present or easily 
recognizable. A Congressional review of the definition of anticipated 
hostilities may afford DOD greater flexibility.
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                  advise, assist, and accompany report
    18. Senator Reed. Secretary West, Section 1212 of the Fiscal Year 
2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense and the commanders of the 
appropriate combatant commands, to conduct a legal and policy review of 
advise, assist, and accompany missions to ensure consistency of 
authorities, Executive Orders (EXORDs), doctrinal definitions, and 
other matters with legal and policy requirements. This report was due 
to the congressional defense committees on January 10, 2019. When will 
this report be provided to the congressional defense committees?
    Secretary West. On March 6, 2019, I sent a letter to the 
congressional defense committees indicating that DOD needs additional 
time to analyze the data required by the statute and to deliver the 
report to the congressional defense committees. We anticipate the 
report to be complete by May 15, 2019.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                 prohibition on kaspersky lab software
    19. Senator Shaheen. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA 
included a provision that prohibits the use of products and services 
developed or provided by the Kaspersky Lab. Can you provide the Federal 
Government's progress in banning all Kaspersky hardware, software and 
services?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    20. Senator Shaheen. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA 
provision also required a report that includes procedures for removing 
suspect products or services and an assessment of gaps no later than 
April 1, 2019. Can you provide a status on the report and whether it is 
on track to be completed?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
               cyber operations during the 2018 election
    21. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, according to your 
understanding, did Russia attempt to conduct espionage or engage in 
influence campaigns during the last election?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    22. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, we have seen that our 
failure to deter Russia has invited others to attempt to interfere. 
Recently Facebook and Twitter disclosed Iranian influence operations 
targeting Americans. Clearly the threat is growing. What countries have 
the capabilities and willingness to meddle in our politics?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    23. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you state in your 
testimony that with the consent of several European countries, you sent 
teams forward to conduct midterm election security operations. How 
important was this forward basing to the success of your midterm 
security mission?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    24. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, is cooperation with 
European allies essential to your enduring mission of election 
security?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    25. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, the President has raised 
the potential of political interference from China on several 
occasions. Have you seen any indication that China has sought to 
conduct campaigns similar to Russia against the United States?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    26. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, countries such as Taiwan 
tend to be the first target of Chinese meddling--are there examples of 
tactics and operations used by China against its neighbors that we 
should be prepared for?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                 talent recruitment in the cyber domain
    27. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, as we know, part of the 
challenge for the Cyber Mission Force is that the private sector can 
provide very attractive offers to our best and brightest. You note that 
you track attrition. Can you provide me metrics of attrition for our 
CYBERCOM?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    28. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, how much higher is this 
than other military occupational specialties?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    29. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you mentioned in your 
testimony the need to utilize the Reserve Component to fill certain 
``low-density'' skill sets. Do you have a plan in place to increase our 
Reserve components in this mission?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    30. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, you also note that 
CYBERCOM is working with the Services to ensure that there is a joint 
common standard and proficiency with foundational cyber tools. Where 
are we in that process?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    31. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, when do you expect the 
Services will meet the common standard?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    32. Senator Blumenthal. General Nakasone, how can this Committee 
assist you in this goal to recruit and retain CYBERCOM talent in the 
Reserves?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                            syria withdrawal
    33. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, do you agree with General 
Votel that it is always best to operate with your partners? If so, are 
we accepting greater risk to force and mission if we leave our partners 
in Syria to instead attempt to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) remotely from Iraq?
    General Thomas. Absolutely. Fundamentally, the worldwide military 
network of Allies and Partners is vital to our success and serves as a 
vehicle for the U.S. to achieve national policy objectives. In building 
this military network of capable Allies and Partners, SOF demonstrates 
U.S. commitment, deters potential adversaries, and creates options and 
access for the Joint Force. Additionally, we mature this network 
through providing our Allies and Partners equipment, funding, and 
training in those locations we operate in. Operating with our partners 
in the Defeat-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (D-ISIS) campaign in both 
Iraq and Syria has been critical to our success. In both countries, we 
have relied heavily on our partners to do the fighting. Our job has 
been to enable them with fires, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR), and advice. Concerning risk to force and mission 
in the D-ISIS campaign, I defer to the CENTCOM CDR, as he has 
Operational Control of those forces and is ultimately responsible for 
determining appropriate risk to force and mission in those areas. 
Between our partner forces, our coalition partners, and our operational 
capability, we will continue to be successful in suppressing ISIS. This 
partnered approach has been successful over the past few years and in 
the end, our partners will own what is left behind.

    34. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, what are the advantages to 
operating from the same geographical location as your partners?
    General Thomas. Operating from the same geographical location as 
our partners has many advantages, i.e., we can provide timely support 
when needed, we can immediately exert direct influence at the point of 
friction, and we can effectively plan, coordinate and de-conflict 
operations as required. However, the primary advantage is the 
relationship of trust that we build with our partners. Our presence 
alongside a partner force allows us to directly enable them with 
operational support (fires, ISR, and advice), but more importantly, it 
demonstrates our commitment to their cause and enables the building of 
trust in our partnership.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, what would we lose by 
relocating special operators from Syria to Iraq?
    General Thomas. While we are adjusting our military posture in 
Syria, we are preserving sufficient combat power in the region to 
ensure that we can continue to destroy remnants of ISIS fighters and 
ensure it does not return.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, how have 
our Kurdish partners specifically added value to SOCOM forces operating 
in Syria?
    Secretary West. The SDF have been a reliable partner for USSOF 
since 2014, and have suffered thousands of killed and wounded. Their 
leadership, sacrifice, and determination to drive ISIS from their 
homelands was instrumental in the liberation of the vast majority of 
ISIS's physical caliphate.
    General Thomas. Our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF), were essential to our operations in Syria. Since 2014, the SDF, 
our main indigenous partnered force in Syria, have suffered tens of 
thousands of killed and wounded driving ISIS from SDF homelands and 
remain instrumental as we conclude the ISIS fight and move forward. 
Without the SDF, the physical caliphate would still comprise an area of 
34,000 square miles, compared to the less than one single square mile 
it tenuously holds today.
                        operation tempo strains
    37. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, can you describe the type 
of mental health evaluations your servicemembers receive before and 
after deployments?
    General Thomas. Servicemembers are required to complete the DOD 
deployment health assessment cycle to collect information on physical 
and mental health status. DD Form 2795, Pre-Deployment Health 
Assessment is mandated within 120 days prior to deployment. DD Form 
2796, Post-Deployment Health Assessment, is completed 30 days prior to 
or 30 days after redeployment. DD Form 2900, Post-Deployment Health 
Reassessment is accomplished between 90 and 180 days post-deployment DD 
Form 3024, Periodic Health Assessment (PHA), is completed annually. The 
Mental Health Assessment (MHA) is included in the PHA. The MHA is a 
screener which must be performed in-person (telephonically or face-to-
face).

    38. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, is the evaluation conducted 
by a mental health specialist or is it conducted by a general 
practitioner?
    General Thomas. The DOD-directed evaluations can be conducted by a 
variety of medical providers. If mental health issues are noted, the 
servicemember is referred to a mental health provider/specialist. The 
MHA can be administered by any trained medical professional but must be 
performed in-person (telephonically or face-to-face). Referral to a 
mental health professional is made if the MHA is positive for MH 
issues.

    39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, when 
servicemembers are on dwell time, how often are they away from their 
home base for training?
    Secretary West. The amount of time a servicemember may spend away 
from his or her home base for training purposes varies significantly by 
Service Component, force element, unit, occupational specialty, and 
other variables. USSOCOM's personnel tempo policy sets a threshold that 
a servicemember may not spend more than 480 days away from his or her 
home station in a 24-month period. This includes training, operational 
deployments, and performance of other official duties when 
circumstances prevent the servicemember from spending off duty-time at 
their normal residence.
    General Thomas. Deployment-to-Dwell (D2D) and operations tempo 
(OPTEMPO) are distinctly different than personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). 
Dwell begins when the unit, detachment or member thereof, arrives at 
its homeport/stations/base from an operational deployment. Dwell ends 
when the unit, detachment or member thereof, departs on an operational 
deployment. A unit is either on operational deployment or in dwell. 
PERSTEMPO begins when a member's official duties require them to be at 
a location make it infeasible for the member to spend off-duty time in 
the housing in which the member resides when on garrison duty at the 
member's permanent duty station. The premise for USSOCOM PERSTEMPO 
measurement has not changed since the establishment of the policy in 
June 2012. Threshold is no more than 480 days away from home (head on 
pillow) in a 730 day window (66% at any given time). Dates for 
calculating the 24 month PERSTEMPO number are a rolling count of 18 
months back and 6 months forward from the current day. The amount of 
time a servicemember may spend away from their home base for training 
purposes varies significantly by Service Component, unit, occupational 
specialty, and other variables. Greater than 99 percent of assigned 
forces are within the USSOCOM PERSTEMPO threshold. In 2018, there was 
only one waiver submitted to exceed the 480 day threshold; the waiver 
was disapproved.

    40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West and General Thomas, is time 
spent training in the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the 
continental United States (OCONUS) away from the servicemembers home 
base factored into the 1:2 ratio?
    Secretary West. DOD policy defines deployment-to-dwell ratio for 
active components as the ratio of time a unit, detachment, or 
individual is operationally deployed to the time the unit, detachment, 
or individual is in dwell. Dwell is the period of time that a unit or 
individual is not on an operational deployment. Generally, the time a 
servicemember spends training in the continental United States (whether 
at or away from his or her permanent duty station or homeport) is not 
considered an operational deployment and is therefore factored as dwell 
time in the deployment-to-dwell ratio. Certain SOF overseas training 
events are considered operational deployments and are factored as 
deployment time in the deployment-to-dwell ratio. Time spent training 
in the continental United States or outside the continental United 
States may be factored into an individual's personnel tempo if it is 
infeasible for a servicemember engaged in his or her official duties, 
including circumstances such as training as well as operational 
deployments, to spend off duty-time in his or her normal residence.
    General Thomas. Yes and no. The 1:2 ratio relates to deployment-to-
dwell (D2D) calculations used to ensure individuals are not overly 
exposed to combat and operational deployments. Time a servicemember 
spends training in the continental United States (whether at or away 
from their permanent duty station or homeport) is not considered an 
operational deployment and is therefore factored as dwell time in their 
deployment-to-dwell ratio. However, certain SOF overseas training 
events, due to global force management consideration, (example: Joint 
Combined Exchange Training) are considered operational deployments and 
are factored as deployment time in their deployment-to-dwell ratio. 
Regardless of D2D calculations, time spent training in the continental 
United States or outside the continental United States will be factored 
into an individual's personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) if it is not feasible 
for a servicemember to spend off duty-time in their normal residence.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary West, your testimony refers to 
your plan to improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio for the last 10 
percent of your force. Please elaborate on this plan.
    Secretary West. Our efforts to improve deployment-to-dwell ratios 
begins with continuing to improve our force management practices to 
ensure forces are being provided on a sustainable basis as well as 
refining our processes to prioritize SOF deployments in support of the 
Geographic combatant commands. Additionally, we have programmed 
relatively small end-strength growth in Combat Support and Combat 
Service Support (CS/CSS) personnel. This targeted growth is vital for 
us to alleviate deployment-to-dwell stress for some of our most 
strained critical enabler and support communities that are the result 
of structural imbalances in the size of our operator and enabler 
communities for certain force elements. These high-demand/low-density 
enablers perform critical specialized functions such as intelligence, 
communications, fire support, medical, maintenance, and other combat 
service support roles.

    42. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, you state in your testimony 
that you have achieved a minimum 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio with the 
``exception of a few critical skill sets and career fields.'' What are 
those skillsets and career fields, and why are they exceptions?
    General Thomas. The majority of career fields that continue to have 
a deployment-to-dwell ratio of less than 1:2 are the Special Operations 
Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) skill sets. These 
high-demand/low-density enablers perform critical specialized functions 
such as intelligence, communications, fire support, medical, aircraft 
maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and other combat service 
support roles. Typically, these skills sets are paired with Special 
Operators for deployment rotations. Due to current force generation 
cycles and manning issues, CS and CSS routinely experience an 
organizational imbalance between the support functions and operators. 
To address this issue, we have programmed relatively small end strength 
growth in CS and CSS personnel. This targeted growth is vital for us to 
alleviate deployment-to-dwell stress for some of our most strained 
critical enabler and support communities that are the result of 
structural imbalances in the size of our operator and enabler 
communities.

    43. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, both you and Secretary West 
mentioned in your testimony that the Preservation of the Force and 
Family (POTFF) program is important to enhance resilience and readiness 
through providing support to servicemembers and their families. Gen 
Thomas, you state that you have directed mandatory participation in the 
program. What are the physical and psychological services you 
referenced?
    General Thomas. Participation in the POTFF Human Performance 
Program is tailored to the requirements of our servicemembers' 
occupational specialties. For example, a Navy SEAL and a personnel 
clerk have much different needs to prepare for a mission; however, both 
share the need to be mission capable. The command is customizing its 
training programs to ensure that every member of the formation is 
performing at their best and are able to successfully accomplish their 
missions. Participation in the Psychological Performance Program will 
include periodic comprehensive assessments and specialized training to 
enhance cognitive functioning and decision making. We have directed 
immediate implementation of the training through the command's suicide 
prevention policy, and we are developing the assessment program with 
the assistance of the Defense Health Agency. Currently, we are testing 
assessment measures and processes at MARSOC units.

    44. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, when did you make 
participation mandatory?
    General Thomas. Participation in the command's human performance 
program has been a mandatory requirement since 2014 for all of our 
special operations qualified servicemembers, i.e. Special Forces, 
SEALs, Special Tactics and Marine Raiders. At a round table meeting 
with all of my commanders in August, 2019. I directed that every member 
of SOF will participate in the POTFF Human and Psychological 
Performance programs.

    45. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, did Chief Special Warfare 
Operator Gallagher participate in this program?
    General Thomas. As a Special Operations qualified sailor, Chief 
Gallagher was required to participate in the POTFF's Human Performance 
Program. Information as to whether Chief Gallagher participated in the 
Psychological Performance component of the POTFF program is protected 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

    46. Senator Blumenthal. General Thomas, does the program require 
servicemembers to ``self-report'' mental health issues?
    General Thomas. Servicemembers cannot be compelled to self-report 
mental health issues; however, the command expects that all of our 
teammates will seek to continually improve their mental and physical 
performance. We afford every opportunity for our members to access 
behavioral healthcare, and have worked hard to normalize care and 
eliminate discrimination against those seeking care.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
             higher education benefits to cyber workforce.
    47. Senator Kaine. General Nakasone, are there additional 
incentives Congress could provide you to better address talent and 
capacity gaps in our cyber security workforce?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                   artificial intelligence technology
    48. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, there is a massive amount of 
data coming from SOCOM's operations and from broader global 
intelligence collection efforts. What efforts is SOCOM taking to 
explore AI, and how would AI help SOCOM conduct its mission and 
operations?
    General Thomas. USSOCOM is pursuing an enterprise solution which 
incorporates the collection, storage, and analysis of big data with 
machine learning and AI platforms. AI and machine learning affords the 
ability to make better use of the massive amounts of data, to guide 
decision-makers on prioritization and inform potential future 
opportunities. While there is a significant amount of work to be done, 
we desire to be on the leading edge of AI capability in the DOD by 
partnering with government and non-government agencies to fully utilize 
the tremendous capabilities offered by AI. SOCOM established a Chief 
Data Office to lead the efforts to develop and apply AI technologies 
across the enterprise and recognize the return of increased data from 
AI application. SOCOM recognizes the value of AI/ML across the SOF 
Enterprise and have six initial focus areas where AI/ML is being 
introduced to improve speed, precision, and readiness in combat. These 
focus areas are: A. Targeting (kinetic and non-kinetic) B. Maneuver C. 
Communication, cyber protection, and reliance D. Recruiting, training, 
and talent management E. Predictive maintenance, logistics planning, 
and forecasting F. Vendor, contract, and budget management. SOCOM is 
finalizing an Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Data Strategy that 
will help guide our Enterprise to the leading edge of this technology 
by deploying AI at all echelons of the SOF enterprise, developing of an 
AI ready workforce, and executing an aggressive outreach program. The 
CDO has applied significant resources to ensure our efforts comport 
with the new DOD AI strategy, DOD Cloud Strategy, and soon to be 
released DOD Data Strategy. We intend to continue embracing the 
enterprise enablers being delivered by OSD and the Joint Staff 
enterprise enablers being delivered by the Joint Staff and OSD and 
intend to be constant partners who are willing to deploy new 
technologies into our formation to improve our operations and due to 
the nature of AI, improve technologies with every turn.

    49. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, does SOCOM see value in AI 
for countering weapons of mass destruction globally?
    General Thomas. Yes. USSOCOM certainly sees value in AI across 
multiple national security threats . . . including countering weapons 
of mass destruction. Operationally, the use of AI will be essential for 
assisting special operations forces in analyzing and acting on 
information that may otherwise be missed due to the massive volume of 
data available. AI provides a platform to narrow the focus of our 
professionals at speeds that cannot be replicated by human operators 
alone. From a strategic perspective, the explosion of unstructured open 
source data has created an information challenge for SOCOM in its role 
as the Department's Coordinating Authority for CWMD. The SOCOM staff is 
exploring optimal employment of AI to ensure collection and assessment 
of CWMD critical information requirements. We are hopeful that AI will 
eventually aid predictive analysis. AI tools have the potential to 
identify and assess threats in a timely--if not real time - manner. 
Moreover, AI threat assessments, combined with staff estimates, will 
improve and inform our defense posture by enabling a more efficient 
allocation of finite defense resources. There remains much work ahead.

    50. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, what other mission-sets does 
SOCOM see value in AI for?
    General Thomas. Artificial Intelligence has many applications 
within the Special Operations Enterprise and as we develop our 
capability, we will expand the use but initially, SOCOM is focused on 
six areas for the initial application of narrowly focused AI projects 
that as we learn from their application we will be able to stretch to 
transform all warfighting functions in our enterprise. These focus 
areas are: A. Targeting (kinetic and non-kinetic) B. Maneuver C. 
Communication, cyber protection, and reliance D. Recruiting, training, 
and talent management E. Predictive maintenance, logistics planning, 
and forecasting F. Vendor, contract, and budget management. The goal is 
to increase our effectiveness by transitioning as many singular tasks 
to AI/ML as possible thereby freeing our talented workforce to conduct 
more complex human tasks and partner with automated machines to improve 
our speed, precision, and scale of operations.

    51. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, what agencies is SOCOM 
partnering with to develop and incorporate AI systems?
    General Thomas. USSOCOM is connected to all combat support agencies 
and benefits from the shared experience as we all explore ways to 
insert this transformational technology into our formations. USSOCOM is 
proud to have been an early partner with USDI as Undersecretary Kernan 
launched Project Maven at the then-Deputy Secretary of Defenses' 
direction. Since then, we've expanded our partnership and have also 
embraced the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center's initiatives, 
initiatives from the DOD Chief Data Office, and the Joint Enterprise 
Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Program as critical enablers to our 
way forward. In the last 30-days we've hosted the Directors of all of 
the programs at this headquarters and have pledged to embed SOF 
professionals in those organizations to both ensure their success and 
reinforce SOF's intent to be a living laboratory for the advanced AI 
technologies they develop to deploy. We believe a continued SOF to 
service model applies with AI and are ready to facilitate the 
introduction of any AI technologies the Combat Support Agencies believe 
will improve SOF operations.
                       red team cyber operations
    52. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, last month, the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation released his annual report. One of 
their observations was that red teams used to assess cyber 
vulnerabilities across the military were severely lacking in the 
personnel, time, and funding to accomplish their assessments. How 
critical is Red Teaming to our cyber security and operations?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    53. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what is CYBERCOM doing to 
address this issue?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    54. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, another major concern is 
retention of master-level Red Teamers. What is CYBERCOM doing to 
recruit and maintain this expertise?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                     china and russia--cyber theft
    55. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, China's cyber operations 
include tapping into our own research and development. What is CYBERCOM 
doing to protect against China's access of our emerging technologies?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    56. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what efforts is CYBERCOM 
taking to protect major acquisitions projects from foreign espionage?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    57. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, are you working with 
defense contractors to help safeguard proprietary information and 
prototypes?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                          information warfare
    58. Senator Heinrich. General Thomas, we are all worried about the 
weaponization of disinformation, especially with countries like Russia, 
who already excel at these malign operations. SOCOM is standing up an 
operations center to ``provide global messaging capabilities,'' 
according to your testimony. Under what principles and guidelines will 
SOCOM operate in terms of those global messaging capabilities?
    General Thomas. The Joint MISO WebOps Center and partner combatant 
commands will support U.S. Government objectives and operate under 
approved MISO authorities to detect, deter, and counter as necessary, 
inaccurate and untruthful narratives in the information environment. 
This is no different than standard MISO activities, except it will 
occur on the internet. The principles and guidelines for conducting 
Military Information Support Operations will not change.
    Cyber Acquisitions
    59. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA 
extended CYBERCOM's acquisition authority through 2025. What are you 
doing to better execute the entirety of your acquisition authority cap?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    60. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, what sorts of technology 
are you acquiring and looking for?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    61. Senator Heinrich. General Nakasone, do you have the skills and 
resources in place to handle CYBERCOM's contracting needs?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                  cyber mission force size and manning
    62. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, the current cyber workforce 
shortage is estimated at approximately 300,000 jobs in the United 
States and almost 3 million jobs worldwide. It took since initiation of 
the process in 2013 until this past year to fully man the DOD cyber 
mission force of 133 teams. You stated that we would likely need an 
increase to this force. How great of an increase do you foresee us 
needing given the risk to advanced military capabilities and our 
civilian partners?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    63. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, how do you plan on 
recruiting and retaining this cyber force given the extensive shortages 
already documented and competition from the private sector
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                cyber operations and the national guard
    64. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, in 2018 West Virginia 
National Guard members were brought on board at Joint Force 
Headquarters--Department of Defense Information Network (JFHQ-DODIN) to 
help lead development of the first Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for 
use of National Guard forces to support States' domestic cyber 
operations and for cyber defense support to civil authorities. The 
CONOPS are most effective with an automated mechanism for information 
sharing between States. Where are you currently in the effort to 
automate this information sharing process and what else needs to happen 
to enable this CONOPS?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]

    65. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, the National Guard is 
quickly becoming a major player in the Cyber Operations fight. Last 
year the West Virginia National Guard began sending soldiers to attend 
jointly developed courses in cybersecurity at the University of 
Charleston to grow capability despite a lack of cyber force structure 
in the State. Previous to this the first National Guard cyber battalion 
was stood up in 2017 in Virginia. What is the future of force structure 
developments for National Guard units and how will National Guard units 
be utilized in the future cyber battlespace?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                       adversary cyber operations
    66. Senator Manchin. General Nakasone, we've seen a significant 
increase in adversaries operating in the ``gray zone'' short of 
outright armed conflict utilizing cyber-attacks and information 
operations. Examples include Russian election interference, Chinese 
espionage and intellectual property theft, and Iranian and violent 
extremist information operations. Where are we seeing the greatest 
increase in these ``gray zone'' attacks and where are our associated 
greatest vulnerabilities to these attacks?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
         u.s. special operations command and the national guard
    67. Senator Manchin. General Thomas, the West Virginia National 
Guard maintains a robust special operations capability primarily in the 
2nd battalion, 19th Special Forces Group of the Army National Guard. 
Are you able to effectively utilize National Guard special operations 
personnel and training spaces to ease workloads on Active Duty troops 
and achieve or attain better than your desired 1:2 deployment ratio?
    General Thomas. Yes. USSOCOM consistently utilizes National Guard 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) residing in 17 states to augment Active 
Duty SOF elements in order to meet directed readiness and 1:2 
Deployment to Dwell requirements. National Guard SOF are generated and 
managed at a 1:4 Mobilization to Deployment ratio. USSOCOM expects all 
Active Duty Special Operations Forces will be at or above the 1:2 
Deployment to Dwell Ratio by the start of fiscal year 2021. USSOCOM 
could not accomplish this without the effective use of the National 
Guard SOF.
      u.s. special operations command and artificial intelligence
    68. Senator Manchin. General Thomas, the Department just released 
the Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy. In the unclassified 
summary, it says that it ``is likely that the most transformative AI-
enabled capabilities will arise from experiments at the `forward 
edge''', which means that is ``discovered by the users themselves in 
contexts far removed from centralized offices and laboratories.'' It 
seems clear that the special operations community is going to play a 
huge role in the artificial intelligence spaces. How are commanders 
embracing AI now and what are some things down the road we can expect 
to see our SOF community executing using artificial intelligence.
    General Thomas. USSOCOM is finalizing its AI Strategy, which 
clearly states it's our intention to be an AI Command accelerating 
SOF's ability to produce and use decision grade data at the speed of 
computers across every facet of our operations. Through the USSOCOM 
CDO, we are embracing an ``applied AI'' model, inspired by industry, 
where we focus on rapidly deploying AI technologies from our tactical 
elements to strategic headquarters. We are undertaking steps to create 
an aggressive workforce that can master the application of AI. As we 
improve our understanding of the technology our SOF operators and 
professionals will find creative applications for its use and continue 
deploying the new technologies increasingly rapid rates. As we build 
the team who can help deliver this technology and manage the data 
associated with it we've undertaken efforts with Project Maven to 
expand the deployment and capability of their technology into our 
formation beyond just full motion video but also exploring the 
opportunities to leverage smart system technologies to merge 
intelligence and operational data layers. We've also made our data, 
domain experts, and formation available to deploy new AI technologies 
to facilitate the rapid exploitation of captured enemy material. 
Further, we partnered with the JAIC to introduce the use of data-
engineering and AI into our rotary wing fleet within the 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment. This initiative provides our maintainers 
with the ability to predict engine failures and plan accordingly to 
avoid the lack of aircraft during operational peeks. The predictive 
model aligns needed maintenance based on data obtained from the 
aircraft with operational requirements to ensure peek readiness rates 
during mission peeks. Over the coming months we plan to initiate 
projects with the JAIC and others to build upon our successful AI 
technology integrations but also expand into other areas that include 
messaging and counter-messaging, identity protection and management, 
human performance, and maneuver.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                               recruiting
    69. Senator Jones. General Thomas, it's my understanding that the 
numbers of women and minorities in the Special Operations Forces are 
pretty low. I think we all understand the intrinsic value of a diverse 
force, but it seems to me also that recruiting effectively among all 
groups can help you reach your recruitment numbers and that diversity 
among the force can be very helpful when you are operating in other 
cultures and countries, especially in the types of missions Special 
Operations Forces undertake. Do you have a handle on the reasons for 
the low numbers of women and minority Special Operations Forces members 
and are you making efforts to increase those numbers?
    General Thomas. Keeping in mind that most in-service recruiting 
comes from the combat arms fields in the Army and Marines, the 
composition of our Special Operations Forces is highly reflective of 
the diversity make up of those forces. As women and minorities increase 
in the Army and Marine infantry, the numbers in the Raiders, Rangers 
and Special Forces will increase, but it will take time. Likewise, as 
the Air Force continues to recruit more diversity into Battlefield 
Airmen and as the Navy continues to recruit diversity into the SEALs, 
the diversity in SOF will grow. While recruiting is a Service 
responsibility, SOCOM is making every effort to offer all qualified 
servicemembers the opportunity to assess into special operations. To 
this end, we have recently graduated our 25th and 26th women rangers 
with numerous additional women currently in the course. As people self-
select into the special operations forces, we do have limited ability 
to increase the diversity of the force beyond marketing, recruiting and 
mentoring. Nevertheless, special operations will continue to seek 
qualified diverse personnel to fill our ranks.
                               recruiting
    70. Senator Jones. General Nakasone, how diverse is the CYBERCOM 
force and what efforts are you making to recruit from groups that are 
underrepresented?
    General Nakasone. [Deleted.]
                  preservation of the force and family
    71. Senator Jones. General Thomas, I think the Preservation of the 
Force and Family program is an excellent and creative effort to address 
the unique pressures on Special Operations Forces and their families. 
In my hometown of Birmingham, Alabama, we are proud to host the 20th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne), an Army National Guard unit that has 
been regularly actively deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and a number of 
other places around the world as part of the Global War on Terror. I 
think they could benefit tremendously from the POTFF, as do Active Duty 
troops. Although I know there are key differences between Active and 
Guard units, are you considering extending the program to Special 
Forces Guard members and how would you accomplish that?
    General Thomas. We recognize the sacrifices and challenges faced by 
our SOF Reserve and National Guard forces and their families and 
acknowledge the need for POTFF services similar in scope to those 
provided to our Active forces and families. We are exploring 
alternatives to deliver POTFF to our SOF Reserve and National Guard 
forces. Options being considered include mobile training teams and 
remote/virtual instruction. USSOCOM is actively engaged with the DOD 
and Military Services to conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) 
of Reserve and National Guard forces as related to the DOD's Total 
Force Fitness (TFF) initiative. The CBA is intended to identify 
capability gaps, which will lead to programming resources to fulfill 
those gaps. In an effort to reach SOF families and remotely located 
personnel, including Reserve and National Guard, POTFF is developing a 
website to virtually deliver health and fitness material and to better 
connect SOF communities. The website will be active by mid-2019. 
Reserve and National Guard units that are located in proximity to 
active SOF units are welcomed and encouraged to utilize POTFF resources 
at those units.


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

   UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, 
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, 
Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order. The 
meeting today is going to receive testimonies from two great 
guys, and it is a really good timing for this event to take 
place. They are General John Hyten, Commander of the USSTRATCOM 
[United States Strategic Command], and General Terry 
O'Shaughnessy, Commander of NORTHCOM [United States Northern 
Command].
    This Committee's top priority is to support the effective 
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS 
Commission, which we have had a hearing on already--I think it 
leads us in the right direction. It is a blueprint that we are 
using in this commission. They made it clear that maintaining 
and modernizing the nuclear deterrent is required. While we 
ignored the nuclear weapons after the Cold War ended, Russia 
and China have focused on more and more nuclear programs. We, I 
guess, assumed that they were not doing anything because we 
were not doing anything at that time. Nonetheless, we have 
fallen behind.
    Now we need to modernize all three legs with the nuclear 
triad, as well as the warheads and infrastructure in the 
Department of Energy (DOE). We have some questions about that 
because there is a lot of comments around negating the 
necessity of the nuclearization modernization that we feel is 
necessary.
    The President and the Department of Defense (DOD) have also 
rightly identified space as a warfighting domain that is 
growing more important every day.
    General Hyten, you are a career space professional and your 
current command both directs and relies upon many space systems 
every day. I look forward to hearing your views on establishing 
the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) as a full combatant command 
and also your thoughts on the new space force. We had a chance 
to visit in my office, and I appreciate it. I have heard that 
you visited others too. It is kind of a confusing thing when 
you talk about a space force and you talk also about the 
combatant command and where the two are similar. I have some 
questions along that line.
    General O'Shaughnessy, you have operational responsibility 
for the defense of the United States Homeland. What an awesome 
responsibility that is. The Missile Defense Review recently 
enumerated a number of challenges to U.S. missile defenses, 
including cruise and hypersonic missiles. I am interested in 
your views on the most pressing priorities in the missile 
defense arena, as well as what we should be doing to address 
them.
    Lastly, General O'Shaughnessy, I am eager to hear your 
assessment of the ongoing southern border deployment and how 
that might be affecting our readiness. Some interpretations of 
what is happening down there say that that could actually 
improve our readiness. I am anxious to hear your views on that.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses, General 
Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy. We thank you and your families 
and the many men and women who serve with you to serve the 
nation and protect the nation. Thank you very much.
    General Hyten, first and foremost, we would like to hear 
from you about the administration's decision to withdraw from 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with nothing 
to replace it. I understand that Russia was in noncompliance 
and that China also poses a threat, but I believe a better path 
would have been to continue to pressure Russia back into 
compliance and ask modifications to the treaty, if necessary.
    Treaties are a major component of our security strategy. We 
build and modernize nuclear weapons, but we also have treaties 
which prescribe numbers and use. Withdrawing from this treaty 
puts the extension of New START [New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty] in 2021 on very shaky ground. I am interested in your 
views on this matter.
    The second issue I am concerned about is Russia's 
successful launch of the long-range hypersonic weapon, which I 
understand will be nuclear-capable. China also has a multitude 
of similar systems although not long-range like those of 
Russia. I am interested in hearing your thoughts on the 
capabilities of our near-peer competition and what we need to 
do to counter these capabilities.
    The third issue I would like you to address is the 
administration's space force proposal. I understand the 
importance of space and the need for additional focus and 
resources for that effort. I am also supportive of creating a 
full unified command for space. However, I remain dubious of 
the need to create an entire new bureaucracy of a separate 
service and all that entails. I think it is inevitable that 
such a creation will distract rather than provide focus to the 
critical mission of space. I know you have studied this issue 
closely, and I am interested in your views on the pros and cons 
of this proposal.
    Finally, General Hyten, you are also responsible for the 
synchronization of global missile defense plans and operations. 
I would like to hear your thoughts about the recently released 
Missile Defense Review and the Department's plans for our 
current missile defense systems and how to address future 
threats.
    General O'Shaughnessy, your mission is to protect the 
Homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and 
to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of 
attacks and natural disasters. We saw this demonstrated in 
DOD's support to the States and territories affected by 
hurricanes and wildfires this past year, and we thank you and 
your command for your significant efforts.
    You are also dual-hatted as the Commander of the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, which brings unique 
responsibilities and partnering opportunities with Canada to 
deter and defend against advancing threats to our nations.
    You are also responsible for the operation of our Homeland 
ballistic missile defense system. We look forward to hearing 
about your priorities for further improvements to the ground-
based missile defense system in the context of the Missile 
Defense Review. This is particularly important in light of the 
threat from North Korea and potentially Iran.
    Lastly, at a time when the National Defense Strategy and 
our intelligence community's annual worldwide threat assessment 
are stressing the absolute necessity of using scarce resources 
to meet the challenge of near-peer adversaries like Russia and 
China, the administration is committing significant DOD 
resources and attention to what the President has taken to 
calling a national emergency at our southern border. In fact, 
nowhere in these two documents I have referenced, the National 
Defense Strategy particularly, are migrant caravans or drug 
traffickers crossing our southern border mentioned as threats 
to our national security. Russia, China, cybersecurity, and a 
host of other items are in those documents, but nowhere is 
there a finding that calls for 4,000 Active Duty troops to be 
deployed to the southern border. For comparison's sake, we have 
approximately 5,000 troops deployed in Iraq. I have yet to hear 
from a witness before this Committee who has not stressed the 
real threats we face and the need to restore readiness and 
provide modern facilities for our troops and their families. 
Instead, DOD is planning to reallocate funding that has been 
authorized and appropriated for installation commanders' top 
priorities in support of a wall that has no connection to a 
military threat and does not support military effectiveness.
    I will also add that is the responsibility of the 
Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border 
Protection, not DOD, to patrol and enforce our borders. If this 
administration is serious about dealing with the drug epidemic 
in our Nation, then it should properly fund these federal 
agencies and other associated federal agencies.
    General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, again thank you 
for your service, and please pass our regards on to the men and 
women that you lead. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Well, General Hyten, we will start with you and then go to 
General O'Shaughnessy. Try to keep your statements in the realm 
of 5 minutes. Your entire statement will be made a part of the 
record. We will start with you, General Hyten.

  STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                    STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    General Hyten. Thank you very much. Chairman Inhofe, 
Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee Members, good 
morning. It is an honor to be here today alongside my friend, 
General O'Shaughnessy, and a continuing privilege to represent 
the 162,000 Americans accomplishing the missions of U.S. 
Strategic Command each and every day.
    This is my third year appearing before this Committee as 
the STRATCOM Commander, and I appreciated the opportunities to 
meet with many of you one on one and to testify before you. I 
want to begin by thanking this Committee for your enduring 
support to our national defense.
    The last time I testified before the Committee, we had 
begun our 10th consecutive year under a continuing resolution. 
Not this year, thanks to your leadership. I cannot overstate 
the importance of an on-time budget. The stability afforded 
with an on-time budget this year came at a critical time for us 
and had a positive impact on our modernization efforts and our 
overall force readiness.
    STRATCOM is a global warfighting command, and as part of 
the joint force, we are responsible for strategic deterrence, 
nuclear operations, global strike, space operations, joint 
electromagnetic spectrum operations, missile defense, and joint 
analysis and targeting. That is a big portfolio. To execute our 
assigned missions, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 
and civilians of my command operate globally across land, sea, 
air, space, and cyber. Our forces and the strategic deterrence 
they provide underpin and enable all joint force operations and 
are the ultimate guarantors of our national and allied 
security.
    The most important message I want to deliver today is that 
I am fully confident in our ability to preserve the peace and 
decisively respond in any conflict. We are ready for all 
threats that exist on the planet today, and no one should doubt 
this.
    Strategic deterrence is an active mission. It is not a 
passive mission. It is dynamic. Our capabilities must continue 
to evolve as the global threat environment changes over time. 
With this evolution, the adversary's decision calculus changes, 
which drives modification to our own deterrence approach. Today 
we are challenged by multiple adversaries with an expanding 
range of capabilities, and we must adapt as well. To 
effectively deter and respond, if necessary, in this multi-
polar, all-domain world, we must out-think, outmaneuver, out-
partner, out-innovate our adversaries. Deterrence in the 21st 
century requires the integration of all our capabilities across 
all domains.
    For over 2 decades, China and Russia have studied the way 
we fight. They study the American way of warfare. They have 
watched and learned how we train and fight. They understand the 
advantages we gain from integrating capabilities across all 
domains to accomplish our strategic objectives. To counter our 
long-held advantages, they are actively seeking to exploit 
perceived vulnerabilities and are directly challenging us in 
areas of long-held strength.
    While our advantages are beginning to erode, we have not 
yet ceded the advantage. My focus this year is to continue to 
focus on the operations and modernization of our nuclear 
capabilities, focus first on the nuclear triad of ICBMs 
[intercontinental ballistic missiles], submarines, and bombers 
to support a seamless transition as the Department stands up a 
new space-focused organization and to continue the 
implementation of my new responsibilities as the nuclear 
command, control, and communications, NC3, enterprise lead and 
the operator and architect for this critical capability.
    To be successful in everything that we do, we must 
recapture our ability to go fast, faster than all our potential 
adversaries. That is my biggest concern these days. That means 
we must return to the dynamic that made us the strongest, most 
technologically advance military in the world. But over my 38 
years in military service, I have watched as our Nation has 
collectively developed an increasingly unhealthy expectation of 
trying to remove all risk from everything that we do. The 
challenge I have issued in my command is go break down the 
bureaucracy, take some smart risks, informed risks, do this 
within the left and right limits that I established in my 
commander's intent, and we have to move fast. It is critical if 
we are to stay ahead.
    I am very grateful for your support in helping us do just 
that. I look forward to an on-time budget this upcoming fiscal 
year so we can sustain the momentum invigorating this 
Department and our best-in-the-world people, our best-in-the-
world commercial sector to go faster and innovate to bring more 
timely and affordable solutions to our most pressing deterrence 
challenges. It is critical because nuclear war cannot be won 
and therefore must never be fought. Therefore, for us to 
prevent war, we must be ready for war. Success means we have 
lived up to our motto coined over 60 years ago in Strategic Air 
Command: Peace is our profession.
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:]

              Prepared Statement by General John E. Hyten
                              introduction
    USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. This is my third year 
testifying in front of this Committee. My command priorities have not 
changed. They remain: (1) above all else, provide strategic deterrence 
for the Nation and assurance of the same to our allies and partners, 
(2) if deterrence fails, be prepared to deliver a decisive response, 
and (3) do this with a combat-ready force. The 162,000 men and women 
who make up USSTRATCOM are resilient, equipped, and ready thanks to 
your continued support. Budget stability over the past year was 
extremely important and had a positive impact on both our modernization 
efforts and our overall readiness.
    As part of the Joint Force, USSTRATCOM is responsible for Strategic 
Deterrence, Nuclear Operations, Global Strike, Space Operations, Joint 
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, Missile Defense, and Analysis & 
Targeting. To execute our assigned missions, the soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, marines, and civilians of the command operate globally across 
the land, sea, air, and space. Our forces and the strategic deterrence 
they provide underpin and enable all Joint Force operations and are the 
ultimate guarantors of national and allied security.
    The foundation that enables our strategic deterrence is the triad: 
nuclear-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarines, 
and Bombers. A powerful, ready triad remains the most effective way to 
deter adversaries from conducting strategic attacks against the United 
States and allies. Its credibility backstops all U.S. military 
operations and diplomacy around the globe and ensures that tensions--
regardless of where or how they arise--do not escalate into large-scale 
war.
    However, as all the elements of the triad age beyond their planned 
service life, we must continue to execute our planned modernization 
strategy to maintain an effective deterrent. We require a robust and 
ready nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future. This will remain the 
case until the myriad of legacy and emerging nuclear threats are 
reduced or eliminated. Unfortunately, the opposite is occurring.
    Deterrence is created by much more than the 1,550 New START treaty-
accountable deployed nuclear weapons and 700 deployed strategic 
delivery platforms. Today, our mission to deter major power conflict 
dictates we field ready, capable, and lethal forces, tailored to 
adaptive adversaries. Continued success means integrating the full 
range of missions in all domains and without geographic boundaries. We 
are increasingly integrating our planning and Tier 1 exercises to 
remove seams between global and geographic combatant commands. We are 
pursuing approaches to enhance real world planning and execution of 
globally integrated fires to best deliver the most effective 
capabilities and effects when and where needed.
    The United States must never put our ability to deter in jeopardy. 
Our missions, capabilities, and forces must continue to be an integral 
part of our overarching national security posture. Therefore, to 
continue to provide the security our Nation deserves, we must clearly 
identify the threats we face, develop strategies to deter those 
threats, and ensure we have the required capabilities for decisive 
response if deterrence fails. Only with continued Congressional 
support, can this remain the case.
                      global security environment
    The National Defense Strategy describes the increasingly complex 
global security environment in which we live. We characterize today's 
environment by the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition 
between nations and overt challenges to the free and open international 
order. Although an era of great power competition is again a reality, 
that does not mean conflict is inevitable. It means we must continue 
investing in strength to preserve the peace.
    It is increasingly apparent that China and Russia want to shape a 
world consistent with their authoritarian models--gaining veto power 
over global economic, diplomatic, and security decisions--seeking 
dominance within their perceived regional spheres of influence, and 
expanding their global reach.
    For over two decades, China and Russia have studied the American 
way of warfare; observing first-hand how we train and fight. They now 
understand the advantages we gain from integrating capabilities across 
all domains to accomplish strategic objectives. To counter our 
dominance, China and Russia are actively seeking to exploit perceived 
vulnerabilities and are directly challenging us in areas of long-held 
strength. Their development of asymmetric capabilities across all-
domains is not meant to challenge single aspects of our deterrence 
strategy; rather, their advancements in technology, strategy, tactics, 
and doctrine aim to invalidate our entire deterrence strategy.
                                 china
    China continues to challenge the existing rules-based international 
order. It is advancing a comprehensive modernization program aimed at 
making the People's Liberation Army a world-class military. This 
program includes the continued development and deployment of a nuclear 
triad, combined with anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and power 
projection operations. They are also pursuing advancements in offensive 
hypersonic strike weapons, advanced robotics, quantum computing, and 
artificial intelligence (AI) through a combination of research and 
development, forced transfer of intellectual property, and outright 
cyber theft.
    Additionally, China's maturing military space capabilities in 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, satellite 
communications, satellite navigation, meteorology, and robotic space 
exploration present growing challenges in space. With their focus on 
counter-space capabilities, China is pursuing a strategy of denying the 
United States the advantage of space-based systems during crises and 
conflicts.
    Once locked away in intelligence channels, news outlets are 
beginning to note specific threats to our space systems. January marked 
12 years since China publicly tested its direct-ascent system, in which 
it destroyed one of its own satellites and created thousands of pieces 
of debris. This 2007 test demonstrated to the world that China is 
capable of destroying any satellite in low earth orbit, including many 
of our intelligence and communications spacecraft. Today, China has an 
operational ground-based anti-satellite missile intended to target low-
earth orbit satellites and are pursuing numerous other capabilities. 
These developments, coupled with China's lack of transparency on 
nuclear policies, force disposition, and weapons and their growing 
assertiveness to challenge the existing free and open international 
order undermines regional and global stability. Further, these actions 
seek to erode the United States standing in Asia.
                                 russia
    Russia continues to conduct malign activities that negatively 
impact U.S. interests. Their invasion and attempted annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern Ukraine, intervening on behalf 
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information 
environment to suit Russian interests, pose a major challenge to the 
United States and NATO. Russia's military doctrine emphasizes the 
potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly 
assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of 
nuclear weapons would serve to ``de-escalate'' a conflict on terms 
favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect 
for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.
    As far back as 2006, Russia committed to modernizing and adding new 
military capabilities to its nuclear forces and upgrading its strategic 
nuclear triad. Today, Russia has completed roughly 80 percent of their 
modernization goals. As part of this program, Russia is upgrading to 
modern road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs, increasing ballistic missile 
submarine reliability and stealth, fielding new Submarine Launched 
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs), 
and modernizing its fleet of long-range strategic bombers, to carry 
nuclear and conventionally-armed air-launched cruise missiles. Russia 
is also developing and intends to deploy novel strategic nuclear 
weapons, like its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater unmanned 
vehicle and intercontinental-range cruise missile, which Russia seeks 
to keep outside of existing arms control agreements.
    Russia is also pursuing nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles and 
nuclear-capable cruise missiles, which when coupled with their newest 
intercontinental range ballistic missiles, improves upon its capability 
to attack anywhere on the globe with little or no notice. Additionally, 
their production of a new fifth generation bomber expected within the 
decade will enhance their ability for long-range deployment.
    Russia's material breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty also remains a significant concern, as demonstrated by their 
deployment of a treaty-violating system, the SSC-8 groundlaunched 
cruise missile, multiple battalions of which have been fielded as of 
late 2018, and illustrates Russia's broader pattern of malign behavior 
and willingness to disregard negotiated agreements when they believe it 
is in their interest. Finally, Russia has an active stockpile up to 
2,000 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNWs), which are not accountable 
under the New START Treaty. These include air-to-surface missiles, 
short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for 
medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as 
anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for 
surface ships and submarines, and Moscow's antiballistic missile 
system.
    Russia's diverse and flexible NSNW capabilities facilitate a 
doctrine that envisions the potential coercive use of nuclear weapons. 
Combined with its large nuclear weapons infrastructure and ready 
production base, this underscores Moscow's commitment to having nuclear 
weapon underpin its security and commitment to maintaining its nuclear 
forces for the indefinite future. Their doctrine of coercive use 
further enhances their ability to challenge the United States and NATO 
across the full spectrum of political, diplomatic, military, and 
information warfare.
                          north korea and iran
    North Korea and Iran remain threats but not to the same degree as 
China and Russia. Both North Korea and Iran retain large arsenals of 
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and are threats to regional 
stability. North Korea has tested ICBM-class missiles designed to range 
the United States. However, the Department of Defense is working 
actively to reduce military tensions and remains in full support of our 
diplomats as they work to achieve the final, fully verified 
denuclearization of the DPRK. Iran remains the world's leading sponsor 
of terror and continues its malign influence and destabilizing 
activities across the region. None of these activities are helpful or 
supportive of peace and stability, and all introduce greater risk to an 
already complex and volatile environment. In both instances, we remain 
vigilant to the threats they pose to the United States, our allies and 
partners, and support the on-going international and whole-of-
government approaches to reduce these threats peacefully.
                          strategic deterrence
    Strategic deterrence has underwritten our Nation's security and 
preserved our way of life since the end of World War II. While the 
fundamental principles of deterrence remain constant, the 21st century 
landscape is profoundly different. We can no longer focus on countering 
a single adversary with traditional means. Peer adversaries are 
aggressively pursuing outright theft of intellectual property, 
demonstrating willingness to corrupt supply chains, and are exploiting 
rapid advancements in disruptive technologies in destabilizing ways. 
These actions provide China and Russia, in particular, advanced 
strategic capabilities to threaten the United States and marginalize 
our global influence. This requires us to rethink how we continue to 
deter new types of strategic attacks.
    The mission of our Nation's strategic forces of the last 73 years 
endures: to deter major attacks against the United States and if 
necessary employ strategic forces to defeat an ever-changing adversary. 
Effective command and control, that supports global integration, is a 
necessary and critical element.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy states the Department of Defense 
(DOD) ``will modernize the nuclear triad--including Nuclear Command, 
Control, and Communications (NC3), and supporting infrastructure.'' 
Thanks to Congressional support and timely budgets, we are making solid 
progress modernizing these weapon systems. However, to fully realize 
the capabilities of a modernized triad we require an NC3 architecture 
responsive to evolving threats and able to adapt to technology 
innovations. Speed is essential. We are beginning to move faster, but 
we are still not moving fast enough. Our most critical weapon systems 
must deliver on time or early. The Services are making progress and I 
appreciate their efforts, but we must continue to strive for more 
timely, affordable programs. We must recapture the ability of our 
Nation to go fast, faster than all potential adversaries, in order to 
maintain an effective deterrent.
    Going fast means that we return to the dynamic that made us the 
strongest most technologically advanced military in the world. Over my 
nearly 38 years of military service I have watched as we collectively 
developed an increasingly unhealthy expectation of removing all risk 
from everything we do. Admiral Hyman Rickover, the father of the 
Nuclear Navy once said, ``Success teaches us nothing, only failure 
teaches.'' We seem to have forgotten this principle. Although success 
is the ultimate goal, we must accept some healthy failures along the 
way. Today, however, we seem to reward and promote people at all levels 
for never failing, subconsciously creating a collective mindset to 
maintain the status quo at all costs. The best way to never fail is to 
never try, or to try only when success is certain--which means we 
punish those who aggressively take risks. If we continue this trend, we 
will eventually fall behind our competition. In 1991, the United States 
had the only superpower-class military, and status quo at that time 
favored us greatly. We still have an advantage, but that advantage is 
shrinking. I appear before you today fully confident in our ability to 
preserve the peace and dominate any conflict. But without change--
unless we recapture the ability to take intelligent risk--a future 
USSTRATCOM commander, a decade or so from now, may sit before you and 
not be able to make the same statement. This could put our whole nation 
at greater risk.
    To emphasize that point--today, our forces are still dominant, the 
finest in the world, yet they are equipped with many of the exact same 
weapon systems fielded during the Cold War, including the triad and our 
NC3 capabilities. Moreover, our competitors are moving fast--
particularly in the area of their strategic forces. Status quo no 
longer favors us; however, our underlying personnel, budgeting, and 
acquisition structures evolved since the end of the Cold War to 
preserve the status quo. This must change. We must counter this 
situation with ruthless determination to reward and promote thoughtful 
risk management aimed at applying innovative technologies and new 
business practices. We must improve our ability to protect our Nation's 
commercial sector where innovation thrives. We must move fast in space, 
in cyber, in all our strategic systems--to once again regain the 
advantage.
              nuclear command, control, and communications
    Our NC3 system is ready, reliable, and effective at meeting today's 
strategic deterrence requirements. However, to meet the evolving 
threat, advances in technology, and to prepare for a modernized triad 
we must update our NC3 system now. Our current legacy system reflects 
the needs of the Cold War, focused primarily on Soviet-era ballistic 
missile and bomber threats. The next generation NC3 architecture must 
maintain and even improve on the readiness and reliability of today 
while also dealing with the myriad of new threats from our potential 
adversaries. As we transition to a modern threat-based NC3 enterprise 
architecture and address the growing cyber, asymmetric, and kinetic 
challenges, we must ensure positive command and control of U.S. nuclear 
forces at all times, even under the enormous stress of a nuclear 
attack. Getting this right and doing so quickly is one of my top 
priorities.
    The next generation NC3 architecture requires an innovative 
approach tightly linking mission needs, requirements, acquisition, and 
funding strategies to deliver capability on operational and 
threatrelevant timelines. We must transform the enterprise to operate 
with speed and agility, fully leveraging rapid prototyping and 
experimentation, to innovate and outpace the threat. We must 
continually change while maintaining predictability for the user. This 
is a challenging task and once defined must be consistently resourced.
    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified a range of 
initiatives to ensure our NC3 capability remains survivable and 
effective in crisis. Among these initiatives is reforming NC3 
governance due to the broad diffusion of authority and responsibility 
within the Department. On 03 Oct 2018, the Secretary of Defense 
designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff accountable for all NC3 related activities. Under this 
new governance structure, the Commander of USSTRATCOM is the NC3 
Enterprise Lead responsible for NC3 enterprise operations, 
requirements, and systems engineering and integration, while the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S)) serves 
as NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM). We have codified NC3 
governance roles and responsibilities, taken concrete steps to sustain 
the current NC3 architecture with selective modernization, and are 
moving forward to design and field the next generation NC3. This was a 
necessary step to place the authorities under one commander, and I am 
already moving forward in that role.
    To execute these new responsibilities, we are well on our way to 
establishing the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) at USSTRATCOM and are on 
track to achieve initial operational capability this year. The NEC will 
improve mission effectiveness and efficiency while defining future NC3 
capability requirements. The NEC will also establish core NC3 
operational concepts as the basis for aligning the right mix of multi-
domain capabilities necessary to execute the Nuclear Command and 
Control mission and achieve strategic deterrence objectives. Essential 
to this work, is the ability to direct enterprise-level systems 
engineering and integration activities. Working with the Director, 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the Joint Systems 
Engineering and Integration Office is now aligned to the NEC and 
receives operational direction and work prioritization from me.
    To support the NEC, USD (A&S) as the NC3 CPM will oversee and 
advise on NC3 enterprise acquisition and resources. The NEC and USD 
(A&S) team will provide comprehensive enterprise-level understanding of 
operational risk, margin and investment priorities as we envision, 
design and field the next generation NC3 in partnership with our 
service and agency leads.
    To ensure we remain aligned, responsive and relevant, the NC3 
enterprise must have dedicated operational and intelligence resources 
to rapidly identify, understand, and anticipate current and future 
evolving threats to the NC3 enterprise. To satisfy this need and 
concurrently address section 1655 of the Fiscal Year 2018 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), PL 115-91, USSTRATCOM, in 
coordination with the Office of the Director for National Intelligence, 
is establishing an NC3 Intelligence Fusion Center within the USSTRATCOM 
Intelligence Directorate. This initiative will facilitate aligning 
operations with intelligence expertise to enhance future NC3 
architecture security.
    With the governance structure in place to address future needs, we 
will concurrently continue sustainment and operation of the existing 
NC3 enterprise. We have taken significant steps over the past year to 
improve service, agency, and nuclear command and control operations 
centers reporting to better understand operational risk and margin. 
This data will allow us to continue increasing the analytic rigor in 
our assessments and inform sustainment and modernization investment 
priorities.
    In order to provide the Commander In Chief continuous 
communications and control of the nuclear forces, we are improving 
communications capabilities across all domains to ensure connectivity, 
enhanced conferencing, and decision support tools to the President. In 
the space domain, we continue to launch Advanced Extremely High 
Frequency (AEHF) satellites for integration into a combined Milstar/
AEHF communications constellation. The AEHF satellites, using the 
eXtended Data Rate (XDR) waveform, coupled with requisite ground node 
and airborne platform Family of Advanced Beyond Lineof-Sight terminals 
(FAB-T) enable collaboration between the President and senior advisors 
under any circumstance and ensure connectivity with the nuclear forces.
    In the air domain, the Air Force and Navy are executing an airborne 
platform Analysis-of-Alternatives for replacing existing E-4B National 
Airborne Operations Center, E-6B Airborne Command Post and Take Charge 
And Move Out (TACAMO), and C-32 Executive Transport fleets. Ongoing 
communications capability enhancements include Air Force programs to 
provide a Very Low Frequency (VLF) receiver for the B-2 bomber in 2020 
and a replacement VLF receiver and AEHF-capable terminal for the B-52 
bomber. These capabilities will provide resilient and robust worldwide 
connectivity lasting well into the next two decades.
    Finally, in the land domain, the Air Force Global Aircrew Strategic 
Network Terminal program will deploy an AEHF terminal providing Air 
Force Wing Command Posts, Munitions Support Squadrons, and Mobile 
Support Teams with survivable ground-based communications to receive 
Presidential direction for relay to bomber, tanker and reconnaissance 
forces. This modernization initiative is essential to completing 
transition from legacy Milstar low data rate networks to AEHF extended 
data rate networks.
    I am confident in the direction the Department has taken and the 
priority placed on modernization of the NC3 Enterprise as stated in the 
NPR. As the Enterprise lead, my command will aggressively move forward, 
ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable architecture is in place for 
years to come.
                           the nuclear triad
    Maintaining the planned modernization of our nuclear triad of 
ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers with air delivered weapons remains the best 
approach to deterring potential adversaries and assuring our allies 
that we are committed to their security. Numerous reviews, including 
the 2018 NPR, validate the nuclear triad's importance in deterring 
Russia and China, providing operational flexibility, and dissuading 
other nations from pursuing their own nuclear weapon programs. With a 
credible and effective force and a supporting declaratory policy, our 
strategic competitors would be hard-pressed to believe they could 
attack the United States or our allies and achieve the benefits they 
seek.
    A modernized triad provides both unique and complementary 
capabilities to address current threats and future uncertainty. Alert 
and always ready to respond, the ICBM force ensures no adversary, 
regardless of size, can be confident in the success of a preemptive 
attack. Our ICBMs create enormous targeting problems for our 
adversaries, requiring a massive raid that would be impossible to hide 
and would guarantee their own demise. With its range, payload, 
accuracy, and speed the ICBM is critical to our Nation's deterrent 
strategy.
    Our strategic bombers provide the President the most visible, 
flexible, adaptable, and recallable options to provide strategic 
deterrence. Should an emerging crisis arise, we can rapidly deploy our 
bombers to clearly communicate our resolve and commitment to our global 
security partners. With the ability to provide a conventional or 
nuclear strike capability, the bomber force plays an indispensable role 
in our overall strategy.
    Nuclear powered submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles 
patrol the seas and provide a survivable response capable of holding 
targets at risk within hours. Their assured, survivable secondstrike 
capability means that regardless of any attack, our adversaries will 
always face the possibility of a devastating response. The most 
survivable leg of the triad, it is also critical to our Nation's 
strategic deterrent.
    We continue to propose prudent investments in delivery system 
modernization programs across the triad. These modernization efforts 
improve our readiness, increase safety and security, and enhance our 
capabilities/credibility against the threats we face now and in the 
near future. Although some might consider these modernization plans 
expensive, I believe that America can afford survival. The only way to 
change our strategic deterrent is to convince our adversaries to reduce 
the threat. This is not occurring. China and Russia, in particular, are 
not only modernizing the traditional elements of their own triads, but 
are also building a myriad of additional nuclear capabilities to 
threaten the United States. Both nations employ and are modernizing 
silo-based ballistic missiles, submarines and bombers, and both are 
deploying large numbers of mobile ICBMs--which the United States has 
chosen not to pursue. China and Russia are pursuing hypersonics as we 
are, but, in stark contrast, we have no plans to include them in our 
nuclear force structure. Russia is also building new intermediate range 
nuclear weapons, new cruise missiles, as well as new nuclear powered 
cruise missiles and torpedoes all to threaten the United States.
    We continue to monitor and evaluate all these new threats. We did 
so in last year's NPR. In the NPR, we evaluated and discarded a course 
of action that would match and even exceed the capabilities of these 
adversaries. Our analysis showed that we could continue to deter any 
and all of these threats with a modernized triad augmented by a small 
number of low yield nuclear weapons deployed on our submarines and a 
measured sea launched cruise missile capability. Modernization of these 
capabilities is critical to our Nation's defense. We don't have to 
match all the specific capabilities of our adversaries as long as our 
capabilities are robust enough to deter and if needed respond to any 
attack; this is why we need a triad augmented by some small numbers of 
supplemental capabilities. By pursuing these capabilities, we make sure 
that nuclear-armed adversaries do not falsely conclude there are 
reasonable benefits and acceptable costs to attacking the United States 
and our allies. Sustaining and modernizing the triad requires 
investment, but its contribution to peace and stability far outweigh 
the projected cost required to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.
                     land-based strategic deterrent
    The Minuteman III has served the country for over 45 years. Its 
high availability rate is testament to its robust design and the 
diligent efforts of the airmen who operate and maintain the weapon 
system. The Air Force is committed, through such efforts as the 
Programmed Depot Maintenance and Airborne Launch Control System 
Replacement programs, to sustaining the Minuteman III ICBM through 
2030. When the Minuteman III finally retires, it will have exceeded its 
initial 10-year service life by half a century. While still reliable, 
missile component and hardware attrition, coupled with the aging of 
1960's era infrastructure, drive the requirement for a comprehensive 
weapon system replacement within the next decade. Further Minuteman III 
life extension is not cost effective nor will it provide a weapon 
system capable of adapting to advancing technology and changing 
adversary threats.
    To maintain a viable land-based strategic deterrent capability, the 
Air Force must begin deploying the replacement Ground Based Strategic 
Deterrent (GBSD) by the late 2020s. We are working closely with the Air 
Force to ensure the GBSD is fully integrated into our modernized NC3 
system and can adapt to an evolving and increasingly dynamic strategic 
environment. To ensure this, the Air Force is incorporating modularity 
and open system standards enabling future technology insertion. 
Additionally, to deliver GBSD on time and on budget, the Air Force is 
pursuing mature, low-risk technologies and working with other strategic 
partners to leverage investments that eliminate delays and reduce cost. 
When fielded, GBSD will be a capable and cost-effective ICBM able to 
deter potential adversaries and assure allies of our commitments to 
their security.
                     sea-based strategic deterrent
    The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine's stout construction and 
pioneering maintenance program allowed it to be life extended from 30 
to 42 years into the 2040s, making it the longest serving submarine in 
U.S. history. However, with no margin to extend the Ohio-class further, 
the Columbia-class SSBN must field on time to avoid a deterrent 
capability gap in the triad. It is also essential that we maintain our 
technological advantage in this critical mission, and Columbia will do 
just that. To this end, the Navy has elevated the Columbia program to 
its top shipbuilding priority, leveraging other efforts and 
implementing advanced procurement to reduce risk and ensure it is ready 
for its first strategic deterrent patrol in 2031. We must continue to 
support our industrial partners and give appropriate prioritization to 
funding throughout the life of the program.
    To avoid complex concurrent strategic weapon modernization 
programs, the Navy life extended the Trident II D5 ballistic missile to 
transition from Ohio to Columbia. The Navy fielded the Trident II D5 
over 25 years ago and is executing a life extension that will allow 
service into the early 2040s. In the face of continuously evolving 
threats, we must begin the effort of designing a flexible and adaptable 
follow-on SLBM that allows rapid and cost effective modifications.
    To ensure our nuclear posture is successful in deterring 
adversaries, the 2018 NPR directed nearterm fielding of a small number 
low-yield ballistic missile (LYBM) warheads and pursuit of a modern 
nuclear-armed SLCM. These capabilities are necessary to our strategic 
deterrence mission and will serve to disabuse any adversary of the 
mistaken perception they can escalate their way to victory.
    The LYBM has begun production and will serve to provide a timely 
counter to Russia's NSNWs, their doctrine of limited first-use in a 
large-scale conflict on Russian territory, and their perceived 
advantage in low-level nuclear conflict. The SLCM will help close 
deterrence gaps and provide a considerable degree of assurance to 
allies.
                     air-based strategic deterrent
    The current bomber fleet and its associated weapon systems have 
already exceeded or are rapidly approaching the end of their intended 
service life. To preclude a strategic capability gap associated with 
these essential nuclear platforms, ongoing sustainment and planned 
modernization efforts must continue.
    The B-52 remains the backbone of the strategic bomber force today 
and well into the future. It is the only platform capable of employing 
the nuclear AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) which provides a 
standoff capability while providing the President the flexibility to 
recall a strike if necessary. B-52s will remain in service until 2050. 
Until the B-52 is replaced, the Air Force will continue to upgrade the 
aircraft to ensure its long-term viability. Modernization of the 
1950's-era engines, avionics, and weapons systems is essential for 
continued airborne strategic deterrence.
    The B-2, the Nation's only penetrating bomber is also undergoing 
several critical modernization programs to maintain its survivability 
against advanced air defenses. Similar to the B-52, the B-2 recently 
received weapon systems and communication equipment updates to improve 
effectiveness and lethality.
    The B-21 is the bomber of the future, ensuring we maintain a 
technical advantage against planned adversary advancements. Armed with 
both direct attack weapons to hold emerging targets at risk and cruise 
missiles to deny geographic sanctuaries to any adversary, the B-21 will 
deliver the right capabilities based upon the tactical situation. Like 
other modernization programs, it is critical the Air Force deliver the 
B-21 on time and on budget to assure we can meet deterrence objectives 
and global security commitments.
    Complementing the Nation's strategic bomber force, the Long Range 
Standoff weapon (LRSO) will replace the aging ALCM and maintain a 
viable nuclear standoff capability that can hold targets at risk in an 
evolving threat environment.
    Strategic bombers require reliable and robust tanker support to 
execute their strategic deterrence and nuclear operations missions. 
While the Air Force is committing significant resources to maintain the 
aging KC-135 tanker fleet, it is critical we deliver its replacement on 
time. The Air Force remains confident the KC-46 will deliver the 
required capabilities to support our strategic forces. It is imperative 
that KC-135 sustainment and KC-46 deliveries remain top priorities to 
ensure a credible air-delivered strategic deterrent.
    Our NATO partners rely on the credible deterrent of deployed F-15, 
F-16, and PA-200 Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) to provide regional 
assurance against aggression in Europe. The B61 nuclear gravity bombs 
deployed to NATO are over 30 years old and will be replaced by the life 
extended B61-12. By the mid-2020s, the F-35 will be available in Europe 
and capable of delivering the B61-12 into defended areas, maintaining 
the credibility of our deterrent capability and of the nuclear 
alliance. The ontime delivery of these capabilities and our continued 
commitment in support of NATO is a cornerstone of our deterrence and 
assurance objectives.
         nuclear weapon stockpile and supporting infrastructure
    Today, our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, effective, reliable, 
and able to meet deterrence mission requirements. Much like the 
modernization efforts of our delivery systems, we must also take a hard 
look at the components that make up the warheads themselves. Ensuring 
the viability of the nuclear deterrent requires continued resourcing 
and sustained effort to address the increasing uncertainty and growing 
risk in our nuclear stockpile and enterprise.
    The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their 
intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United 
States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while some 
potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons 
and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities. Potential 
adversaries are elevating strategic uncertainty with new capabilities, 
escalatory doctrines, and actions threatening our nuclear forces' 
effectiveness and credibility.
    To address these challenges, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) 
recently updated its longrange strategic plan to align with the 
National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, and 
implement actions directed in the 2018 NPR. The strategic plan aligns 
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) nuclear weapons modernization and infrastructure 
recapitalization activities with DOD nuclear delivery system 
replacement programs in support of deterrence and military 
requirements.
    The NNSA recently celebrated important stockpile modernization 
milestones by completing the Navy's W76-1 ballistic warhead life 
extension program (LEP) and achieving first production of key 
components in the Air Force's B61-12 gravity weapon nuclear package. 
The Air Force and NNSA are progressing with the LRSO missile and its 
associated W80-4 warhead to deliver required capabilities on schedule.
    The next significant stockpile effort involves both Air Force and 
Navy ballistic missile warheads, the bulk of our deterrent force. While 
these weapons will not field until the 2030s, development activities 
need to start in earnest now in order to posture the enterprise for 
success. Starting now also provides expanded opportunities for the Navy 
and Air Force to collaborate and leverage investments to their mutual 
benefit.
    None of the required stockpile surveillance, sustainment and 
modernization efforts will succeed without replacing key facilities and 
upgrading our aged nuclear infrastructure. Our present complex 
continues to accumulate serious risk due to atrophy and past lack of 
timely recapitalization. I visited all the design laboratories and 
production plants across the complex last year, and in too many cases 
the enterprise is operating at or near capacity or simply lacks the 
needed infrastructure. This results in little margin to execute planned 
work or respond adequately to an emergent technical issue. Options for 
future systems are constrained by design and production limitations. If 
not corrected with currently underway or planned investments, the 
complex's condition will place us at a strategic disadvantage.
    The highest NNSA infrastructure priority is re-establishing a 
plutonium pit production and fabrication capacity to meet deterrent 
requirements. Our national requirement, supported by numerous studies 
and analyses, requires no fewer than 80 war-reserve pits per year by 
2030. I support the NNSA plan to achieve this.
    Additionally, critical infrastructure investments in uranium and 
tritium processing, lithium and non-nuclear component production, 
experimental facilities, and general supporting infrastructure are 
required. Shortcomings in these areas create operational risks to force 
readiness and our surge ability to respond to unforeseen technical 
issues or adversary advancements in their capabilities.
    Along with recapitalizing our infrastructure, we must also recruit, 
train, and retain a qualified workforce to perform the highly 
specialized nuclear weapons work. The enterprise must enact a human 
resource strategy that identifies qualified candidates, fosters 
interest through internships or skilled trade programs, and clears them 
for classified work as quickly as possible. The critical nature of our 
nuclear deterrent mission should drive us to hire and retain the best 
workers our country has to offer.
                  nuclear weapons safety and security
    The Nation's nuclear security standard is absolute denial of 
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. We work closely with our Navy 
and Air Force partners to assess nuclear security requirements and 
adjust our force posture, training, and equipment to address any 
threat. While we continue to upgrade and evolve our security 
capabilities, there are areas where additional investments are 
necessary to maintain the high standards this mission demands.
    The proliferation, ease of use, and sophisticated capabilities of 
small, unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) represent a growing threat to 
our deterrence operations. We rapidly fielded counter sUAS capabilities 
and are refining tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the 
developing threat. Focused leadership, vigilance, and dedicated 
investment are necessary to remain ahead of this threat.
    With Congressional support, we recently achieved an important 
security milestone with the Air Force awarding a contract to replace 
our aged UH-1N helicopter fleet with the new MH-139. The new helicopter 
is a critical element in securing our vast ICBM complex and our 
security forces eagerly await its deployment. The first production unit 
is already well along the production line in Pennsylvania. With this 
program moving forward, we can now focus our efforts on replacing 
security vehicles and deploying advanced communication systems that 
will provide security personnel uninterrupted situational awareness 
anywhere they operate.
                        21st century deterrence
    Twenty-first Century deterrence not only requires effective NC3, a 
modernized triad of nuclear ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers with air 
delivered weapons, and an ability to design and produce modern and more 
effective nuclear weapons, it also requires conventional global strike, 
space control, control of the electromagnetic spectrum, and missile 
defense. When effectively integrated these capabilities provide the 
Joint Force the ability to respond to adversary actions in the domain, 
location and time of our choosing.
                       conventional global strike
    Bombers are capable of carrying a variety of conventional and 
nuclear weapon types with diverse attributes contributing to the 
flexibility of the deterrent force. Additionally, bombers are integral 
to our international engagements and partnering through our Bomber Task 
Force (BTF) missions, and our demonstrated capability to conduct strike 
missions originating from the continental United States. BTF 
deployments to the Indo-Pacific and European theaters provide an 
opportunity to exercise and train with our allies and partners, 
demonstrate United States commitment and resolve, and deter potential 
adversaries.
    The B-1 is the workhorse of the past 17 years of conventional 
fighting. The B-1 has had many successes in Iraq, Syria, and 
Afghanistan, while providing USSTRATCOM a credible conventional 
deterrent against global threats. As the threshold platform for the 
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the B-1 will remain a formidable asset 
for operations in the Pacific and across the globe. Similar to the
B-52, the Air Force remains committed to maintaining the platform to 
ensure its continued operational effectiveness.
    Strategic competitors are investing significant resources to 
develop offensive and defensive capabilities with the purpose of 
countering our entire deterrence strategy. To maintain peace, the 
United States must continue to invest in technological innovation and 
development of survivable, long-range strike systems able to hold time-
sensitive and high-value targets at risk. Today, the only prompt 
longrange strike capabilities are ballistic missile systems armed with 
nuclear warheads. We need a conventional prompt global strike 
capability. This is the USSTRATCOM requirement. Conventional hypersonic 
strike weapons could meet this requirement and provide responsive, 
long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-
critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or 
not preferred. While conventional hypersonic weapons are not a 
replacement for nuclear weapons, their unique attributes will increase 
traditional warfighting advantages and bolster conventional and 
strategic deterrence.
    The DOD identified conventional hypersonic strike as a top research 
and development priority and is moving forward with a mix of land, sea, 
and air-launched weapon system options to hold high value, heavily 
defended and time critical targets at risk. This is a Department-wide, 
multi-Service, collaborative effort to provide operational capabilities 
as soon as possible. The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) 
program spearheads the initiative as the leading technology maturation 
effort allowing the Navy to field a submarine/ship launched 
intermediate-range CPS weapon system that can be leveraged into Air 
Force and Army efforts. The Air Force continues to explore both air-
launched hypersonic boost-glide and cruise missile concepts for 
fielding on a variety of strike and bomber aircraft. The Army plans to 
incorporate hypersonic strike systems into their traditional long-range 
precision fires portfolio to expand the reach of surface-to-surface 
engagements. Each of these capabilities have the potential for early 
operational fielding within the next few years. This flexible mix of 
capabilities will provide combatant commanders persistent, visible and 
credible strike options without crossing the nuclear threshold.
                            space operations
    For decades, the United States has enjoyed unimpeded freedom of 
action in space. This allows us to deliver space capabilities that 
include intelligence collection, missile warning, weather monitoring, 
satellite communications as well as precise positioning, navigation, 
and timing essential to joint forces operating globally with unmatched 
speed, agility and lethality. These same capabilities also contribute 
to our economy and support our quality of life.
    The President has directed a renewed commitment to space. Our 
commitment extends to the integration of space capabilities across 
every domain in order to deliver an unmatched global advantage to the 
Joint Force. What remains unchanged is the fact that our principal 
competitors regard space as a warfighting domain. While the United 
States prefers space to remain free of conflict, we are rapidly moving 
to meet and overcome challenges impeding our ability to access and 
freely operate in space. The best way to deter a war that starts in, or 
extends into space, is to be ready to fight and win.
    As part of this effort, the President has given direction for a 
more cohesive, robust space warfighting organization. In December, upon 
the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs, 
the President directed the establishment of U.S. Space Command 
(USSPACECOM) as a unified combatant command to improve joint 
warfighting in the space domain. Moving expeditiously to a unified 
space command reflects the importance of warfighting in space to the 
Joint Force, the value of space-focused deterrence elements, and the 
critical need for space-related response options for the Nation. 
USSTRATCOM will maintain its focus on this critical mission area until 
authorities and responsibilities governing space operations fully, and 
successfully, transition to a new combatant command.
    In addition to realizing a dedicated unified space command, we are 
moving forward on a priority effort executing tasks directed in Space 
Policy Directive-3. USSTRATCOM is closely partnering with the 
Department of Commerce (DOC) to transition some non-military aspects of 
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data publication and space traffic 
management-related functions to DOC, while continuing to provide SSA 
data to support U.S. Government customers and to advance military-
tomilitary relationships that support worldwide combined military 
operations.
    USSTRATCOM's new SSA data sharing initiative, executed through the 
Joint Force Space Component, releases information about space objects 
not previously available outside of DOD channels, to enhance SSA data 
sharing, transparency, and spaceflight safety. This initiative is in 
line with national policy as part of a larger effort to preserve the 
safety of, and accessibility to space, so that our Nation, allies, and 
even the rest of the world, can continue to reap the benefits of space.
    Exercises and wargames continue to refine how we coordinate today 
and how we will work together in the future. This year, Japan 
participated in the Schriever Wargame for the first time, joining 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom. We also executed Global Sentinel 2018, our fifth annual 
operational tabletop experiment for SSA, and increased its 
international participation to include Australia, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea. Chile and Norway attended as observers.
    USSTRATCOM continues to focus on cultivating a robust international 
engagement environment with several ongoing lines of effort. In doing 
so, we have generated significant momentum leading to a fully 
integrated partnership of nations dedicated to defending the peaceful 
use of space.
    Improved partnership with allies is paramount for the safety and 
security of the space domain. As we continue our Combined Space 
Operations (CSpO) initiative with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom, we recently expanded it with the addition of France 
and Germany. In July 2018, the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 
transitioned to a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), now the 
centralized hub for operational space planning and tasking with 
distributed execution through contributing partners. This effort goes 
hand in hand with our recent update to Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER to 
include international partners and define our operational relationships 
and associated authorities as we conduct combined operations in the 
space domain.
    The National Space Defense Center (NSDC) continues to mature as our 
24/7/365 operational center to protect and defend the space domain. The 
NSDC remains the focal point for unity of effort across DOD, the 
Intelligence Community, and the National Reconnaissance Office for 
information sharing and to rapidly detect, warn, characterize, 
attribute and defend against threats to our Nation's vital space 
systems.
    Future satellite communications (SATCOM) systems remain key to our 
continued strategic posture in space. We must design and fund 
replacement systems and remain on schedule for smooth transition of 
operations to these new systems. We must expand international SATCOM 
partnerships, strengthen our industrial base response to acquisition 
challenges, and integrate commercial opportunities to evolve future 
satellite payloads towards commercial solutions wherever possible.
    The inclusion of our allies is key to building a robust SATCOM 
network that leverages commercial integration, synchronization and 
sharing of resources. Multilateral agreements with Canada, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand provide funding for the 
operation of Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). Consequently, the department 
shares bandwidth proportionally with our partner nations and allocates 
bandwidth based on the amount of their financial contribution. The 
growth of the WGS constellation continues as we launch WGS-10 in early 
2019, and with newly-infused funding authorized in the fiscal year 2018 
NDAA, we plan to procure and launch additional WGS capacity.
    Addressing the synchronization gap between terminals, ground 
infrastructure, and on-orbit satellite capacity remains a significant 
concern. The narrowband SATCOM legacy constellation is aging, and we 
must continue to make progress transitioning to the Mobile User 
Objective System, leveraging commercial capabilities where appropriate. 
The fielding of new AEHF Extended Data Rate (XDR) capable satellites 
continued with the launch of AEHF-4 in October 2018. That event, 
coupled with the anticipated launch of two more AEHF satellites in the 
next two years, will cover our near term protected communications 
equities.
    USSTRATCOM, in conjunction with the Services, continues to pursue 
an enterprise approach to fighting SATCOM in a contested domain through 
the stand-up of the SATCOM Integrated Operations Environment (SIOE). 
The SIOE is designed to leverage key wideband, narrowband, protected 
band, and commercial SATCOM enterprise capabilities and expertise to 
improve our ability to mitigate and fight through SATCOM degraded 
environment. We will also aggressively pursue the integration of 
commercial capabilities that have the ability to provide robust, 
resilient augmentation of our constellations for a very reasonable 
cost.
    We must improve how we collectively organize, train, and equip 
ourselves for unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space, 
providing vital capabilities to joint and coalition forces in peacetime 
and across the spectrum of conflict. As potential adversaries continue 
to develop, test, and field more threats to our space systems, 
USSTRATCOM (and the future USSPACECOM) will benefit from increased 
focus on these key areas that enable us to deter aggression and protect 
our interests. We must go faster to stay ahead of potential 
adversaries, and USSTRATCOM is committed to ensuring sustained space 
operations with available forces during this transition period until 
USSPACECOM is ready to assume the lead role.
    The President has also focused on the benefits of establishing a 
sixth branch of the military, the Space Force. The President and Vice 
President have been personally involved in developing this new Force 
and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan has worked across the 
Department to define the proposal. The Space Force will be a separate 
service within the Department of the Air Force. I support the creation 
of the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force. This will 
allow proper focus on the warfighting challenges, effective and aligned 
support to the new USSPACECOM, and given the threats and challenges in 
the domain, help to build an enduring ``space-minded'' culture in the 
department. This effort will not create or require a large, new support 
bureaucracy. Someday, the Space Force will be its own department, but 
this is not yet the right time. I thank the President and the Vice 
President for recognizing that space is a warfighting domain and 
proposing a fiscally responsible approach for the organizations needed 
to address these critical challenges. I encourage the Congress to 
support this proposal.
    USSTRATCOM and the future USSPACECOM will directly benefit from the 
President's intent to accelerate space acquisition timing. Current 10- 
to 15-year cycles from requirement to fielded capability are too long. 
Not only do we miss out on application of new technology and field 
equipment that is already obsolete on Day 1, but we also need a 
systemic change to counter potential adversaries with faster 
acquisition cycles. Commercial innovation has already adapted to 
exploit faster and faster technology discovery in commercial 
competition, and we must change to leverage these accelerating 
opportunities not only to defend our Joint Force in space, but also to 
protect commercial investments that sustain the global economy. 
USSTRATCOM (and the future USSPACECOM) look forward to leveraging the 
benefits of the new Space Force as our organizations focus on two 
things--defending the space domain and going fast.
           joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (jemso)
    The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) is the one physical maneuver 
space shared by all forces in all domains. The EMS is central to the 
first strategic goal of organizing forces to achieve Joint Force 
commander objectives. The Joint Force operates in the EMS to achieve 
superiority at a time and place of our choosing. Our adversaries 
recognize the need to decisively achieve EMS control and have developed 
and organized their forces accordingly. In recognition, we must 
continue to pursue capabilities necessary to maintain EMS superiority. 
Achieving EMS superiority early in conflict is critical for effective 
U.S. operations in all domains.
    USSTRATCOM, in coordination with DOD CIO/DISA, is actively pursuing 
development of an Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) system to 
enable EMS superiority. We are supporting the EMS Operations governance 
study directed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and 
coordinating with other combatant commands on the development and 
implementation of JEMSO cells and tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
Additionally, we continue to engage Australia and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization partners to ensure compatible JEMSO doctrine and concepts 
of operation, and to lay the groundwork for interoperable EMBM systems.
    Section 1053 of the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, PL 115-232, provides 
guidance to the Secretary of Defense on electronic warfare and JEMSO to 
improve our ability to advocate effectively for requirements. 
USSTRATCOM is working closely with the Acting Secretary and Services to 
implement measures of the act, the Electronic Warfare Executive 
Committee and the previously mandated cross-functional team to identify 
requirements and specific plans for addressing personnel, capability 
and capacity limitations in order to ensure effective implementation of 
DOD's Electronic Warfare Strategy.
                       the missile defense review
    Conducted at the direction of the President, the 2019 Missile 
Defense Review (MDR) presents the Administration's missile defense 
policy and strategy. The MDR aligns with the National Security 
Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the 2018 NPR. The MDR 
reinforces the Administration's commitment to defending the United 
States and our deployed forces and allies from adversary missile 
attacks.
    The United States and our allies and partners face potential 
adversaries who are increasing existing missile system capability and 
capacity; adding new and unprecedented types of armaments to their 
arsenals; and integrating offensive capability more thoroughly in their 
coercive threats, military strategy, and war planning. Left 
unaddressed, this expanding missile threat could embolden our 
adversaries into mistakenly believing they can coerce us, inhibit our 
freedom of action, or undermine our security alliances. A concerted 
U.S. effort is required to expand and improve existing capabilities for 
both Homeland and regional missile defense.
    As stated in the National Security Strategy, the United States has 
a robust and credible layered missile defense system. When paired with 
offensive capabilities this combination sends a strong message allowing 
the United States to deny benefits and impose costs against any 
potential adversary. Although the United States relies on nuclear 
capability to dissuade near-peer strategic threats, missile defense 
endures as a critical component of comprehensive U.S. strategic and 
tailored regional deterrence strategies. Our regional missile defenses 
protect against missile attacks on deployed U.S. Forces, allies, and 
partners; assists allies and partners in better defending themselves; 
preserves freedom of action; and counters adversary anti-access/area 
denial tactics. The United States is pursuing new concepts and 
technologies to ensure continuing effectiveness against advanced future 
threats, including space-based sensors and boost phase intercept. As we 
address future threats, we must account for the air and missile defense 
assets required to defend the Homeland, while simultaneously improving 
our regional security architectures. In this effort, there is no one 
silver bullet, but several layered capabilities are in development.
                            missile defense
    The 2019 MDR sets the foundation for the next generation of missile 
defense efforts. Of importance to USSTRATCOM, it provides an 
opportunity to conduct focused reviews clarifying and optimizing 
missile defense roles and responsibilities across the Department. This 
includes opportunity to assign responsibility for integrating pre-
launch attack operations with defenses to mitigate missile threats, 
ensuring warfighter involvement in our Departmental requirements and 
fielding processes, and assessing how to better use missile warning 
assets against emerging threats. All of these efforts focus on 
reviewing current systems and addressing advanced adversary 
capabilities such as hypersonic threats.
    U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide 
continuing effective protection of the U.S. Homeland against rogue 
states' offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear 
deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and 
Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to 
deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing United 
States declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.
    As the warfighter advocate for Missile Defense, it is imperative 
that we focus materiel developers on research, development, testing, 
and engineering against advanced threats. Rapidly transitioning ready 
systems with identified funding streams to the Services will free up 
needed resources for critical research and development efforts such as 
continued funding of next generation space systems. Research and 
development is key to ensuring we keep pace with evolving adversary 
threats across all domains. Space systems provide valuable solutions to 
layered tracking and discrimination capability. A space tracking and 
discrimination constellation combined with next generation Overhead 
Persistent Infrared systems would provide significant improvements 
necessary to detect advanced threats. Future space-based sensors may be 
able to detect, track, and discriminate hypersonic glide vehicle and 
ballistic missile threats globally. These abilities cannot be fully 
achieved with the current or any future terrestrial-based radar 
architecture due to the constraints of geography and characteristics of 
future missile threats.
    Boost phase intercept is also showing promise. Increasing the power 
and lethality of laser, neutral particle beam, and high power radio 
frequency systems for multi-mission applications, along with new 
fighter-delivered interceptors, can exponentially enhance our missile 
defenses.
                      assuring allies and partners
    USSTRATCOM cannot accomplish its mission without integrating allies 
and partners. Allies are critical to responding to mutual threats, 
preserving our shared interests, and are the greatest asymmetric 
advantage the United States has over potential adversaries. The Command 
continues to expand and enhance the viability of our Nation's alliances 
and partnerships, setting conditions across the globe to deter our 
adversaries.
    USSTRATCOM's engagements with allies and partners are critical in 
shaping the strategic environment, strengthening relationships, and 
building trust. In doing so, we are prepared to act in a combined 
manner to deliver a decisive response in crisis or during contingency 
operations.
    During 2018, our Command conducted over 50 bilateral engagements 
with senior leaders from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
    Our 25-nation, multinational missile defense policy campaign of 
experimentation, NIMBLE TITAN (NT) 2018, concluded with a senior leader 
seminar held at the new NATO headquarters in Brussels, to include 
representatives from Europe, the Gulf States, the Indo-Pacific, and 
North America. The NT 2020 campaign is just beginning, and continues to 
show increased interest by partners and allies.
    USSTRATCOM works closely with our allies and partners to enhance 
awareness within the space domain, increase the safety of spaceflight 
operations, and promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of 
space. During 2018, USSTRATCOM signed new national agreements with 
Brazil, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Thailand for sharing 
SSA services and data. Currently, USSTRATCOM has agreements with 18 
nations, two intergovernmental organizations, and over 70 commercial 
satellite launchers, owners, and operators.
    Our efforts in this area increase military interoperability, 
improve alliance capability and capacity, and integrate our critical 
defense missions. The Command's engagements assure allies and partners 
of the United States' extended deterrence commitments and reinforce 
non-proliferation goals and objectives.
                               conclusion
    USSTRATCOM is a global warfighting command. Success in all of our 
missions depend on the Command's greatest strength--our people. The 
162,000 men and women stationed around the globe, operating in all 
domains, undertake the active defense of our Nation every day. These 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians are warfighters, 
dedicated to preserving the peace and when called upon, ready to 
dominate and win in conflict. Successful mission execution has the 
appearance of ``business as usual'' which belies the effort and impact 
of executing at the highest standard every day.
    Today, our capabilities are safe, secure, and effective and our 
forces are combat-ready. With continued support of the programmed major 
investments, our forces will prevent nuclear war and ensure that 
regardless of how would-be adversaries might choose to attack the 
United States, we will always retain decisive response options, across 
the spectrum of conflict, for the President.
    We are dominant today. However, advantages we have long-held are 
eroding, challenging the Command's ability to deter strategic attack, 
engage in active defense, assure our allies and partners, and fight and 
win in and across all domains if necessary. We cannot let this erosion 
continue. We must maintain our strategic advantage. We must take 
calculated, smart risks and move fast once again. With sustained 
Congressional support, USSTRATCOM will continue to effectively defend 
the nation.
    Nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Therefore, to 
prevent war we must be ready for war. We must maintain today's triad of 
nuclear forces, while simultaneously building the triad of tomorrow. We 
must integrate all domains and capabilities together to effectively 
deter in the 21st century. If we are successful, we will continue to 
live up to our motto, coined over 60 years ago. Peace is our Profession. 


    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, General Hyten. An 
excellent statement.
    General O'Shaughnessy?

     STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J. O'SHAUGHNESSY, USAF, 
 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN 
                   AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking 
Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am 
truly honored to appear today as the Commander of the United 
States Northern Command and the United States-Canadian bi-
national command, North American Aerospace Defense Command. It 
is a pleasure to be testifying today alongside General John 
Hyten who is not only my good friend but someone who I have 
admired and respected for so many years.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are two complementary but distinct 
commands driven by a single unyielding priority: defending the 
Homeland from attack. In this era of rapidly evolving 
technology and renewed great power competition, the need for an 
energized and active defense of the Homeland cannot be 
overstated. Revisionist powers, Russia and China, have given 
every indication that their own security strategies are based 
on holding the United States at risk with both conventional and 
nuclear weapons, and they have signaled that we must anticipate 
attacks against our civilian and defense infrastructure in the 
event of a conflict.
    Russia has modernized its aviation and submarine fleets and 
fielded long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar 
detection. Russia and China continue their efforts to penetrate 
our networks while developing and testing hypersonic glide 
vehicles. Both have also established a noticeably stronger 
foothold in the Arctic along the northern approaches to the 
United States and Canada. As a result, the strategic value of 
the Arctic as our first line of defense has reemerged, and 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are taking active measures to ensure our 
ability to detect, detract, and defeat potential threats in 
this region.
    Our adversaries have engaged in deliberate, focused efforts 
over a number of years to exploit our perceived gaps and erode 
many of the advantages previously afforded by our geography and 
technological superiority. As a result, it is clear that our 
Homeland is not a sanctuary.
    Our mission to deter our adversaries is dependent on our 
ability to detect and ultimately defeat potential threats to 
our Homeland. I am grateful to the Committee for the strong 
support of USNORTHCOM and NORAD priorities along those lines of 
effort. Your support for fielding AESA [Active Electronically 
Scanned Array] radars for our aerospace control alert fighters 
and improving the capability and capacity of our missile 
defense sensors and interceptors clearly demonstrate our shared 
sense of urgency and resolve.
    In that same spirit, we must take prudent steps now to 
ensure our next generation defensive capabilities, to include a 
space-sensing layer of space-based missile defense centers are 
not late to need. That effort cannot start too soon, given the 
fact that our adversaries are already developing and testing 
advanced weapons specifically intended to avoid detection in 
order to hold targets in the Homeland at constant risk.
    I sincerely appreciate the Committee's work to provide much 
needed predictability and stability with an on-time budget in 
fiscal year 2019. I am also grateful for the Committee's 
ongoing efforts to ensure that we avoid the devastating deep-
cutting impacts that a return to sequestration would bring to 
the Department of Defense.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD work every day with our partners to 
keep our citizens safe while confronting the challenges 
emanating from multiple approaches and in all domains. I 
especially want to take this opportunity to express my 
gratitude to the amazing men and women in the National Guard 
who are great partners and critical in our ability to perform 
our missions. Whether intercepting Russian bombers off the 
coast of Alaska or providing much needed support to our federal 
law enforcement partners along the southern border, the airmen, 
soldiers, sailors, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians of 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are deeply committed to defending our 
Nation, and I am honored to represent them today.
    Senators, we have the watch.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General O'Shaughnessy follows:]

        Prepared Statement by General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee, I am honored to appear today as the Commander of United 
States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD)--two complementary but distinct commands.
    USNORTHCOM is the geographic combatant command laser-focused on 
defending our Homeland from an increasingly assertive set of 
competitors who are committed to holding the United States at risk in 
multiple domains. USNORTHCOM is also responsible for defense support of 
civil authorities (DSCA) and theater security cooperation (TSC) within 
our area of responsibility. Nested under the broader Homeland defense 
mission, DSCA and TSC play a critical and visible role in protecting 
our citizens and enhancing security for the United States and our 
international partners.
    NORAD is the bi-national United States-Canadian command that 
deters, detects, and, if necessary, defeats air threats to the United 
States and Canada while also providing aerospace warning and maritime 
warning. The six decades of NORAD's unmatched experience and shared 
history are proving more vital than ever as we face the most complex 
security environment in generations. This unique and longstanding 
command serves as both a formidable deterrent to our adversaries and a 
clear symbol of the unbreakable bond between the United States and 
Canada.
    USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single unyielding priority: 
defending the Homeland from attack. Revisionist powers Russia and China 
have changed global strategic dynamics by fielding advanced long-range 
weapons systems and engaging in increasingly aggressive efforts to 
expand their global presence and influence, including in the approaches 
to the United States and Canada. Our competitors currently hold our 
citizens and national interests at risk, and we must anticipate attacks 
against our defense and civilian infrastructure in the event of a 
conflict. As a result, it is clear that the Homeland is no longer a 
sanctuary.
    These shifting global military and political dynamics will be with 
us for the foreseeable future. Our competitors have fielded weapons 
systems and employed new methods in a concerted effort to exploit 
perceived vulnerabilities and erode our strategic advantage. The 
successful defense of our Homeland today relies more than ever on 
constant vigilance by USNORTHCOM and NORAD, tightly coupled with a 
reinvigorated emphasis on close integration with our fellow combatant 
commands, the intelligence community, and our allies and partners. 
Collectively, these dynamics reinforce the importance of nuclear 
deterrence to our national security, given that nuclear deterrence 
backstops all U.S. military operations and diplomacy across the globe.
    The threats facing our Nation are not hypothetical; our 
competitors' reach is now global, and they are conspicuously 
undermining international norms and standards of behavior while 
possessing the capability to strike targets in North America with both 
nuclear and advanced non-nuclear weapons launched from well beyond our 
territory. In light of this reality, the Homeland defense mission is 
more essential than ever, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD must be energized, 
proactive, and determined to actively shape our strategic environment. 
Together with our Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and 
international partners, we have taken active measures to ensure the 
Homeland defense enterprise is globally integrated, well-exercised, and 
positioned to take quick, decisive action to protect our interests and 
preserve the ability to project all of the elements of our national 
power, and, should deterrence fail, USNORTHCOM and NORAD stand always 
ready to defeat any threat to our Nations.
    Our collective ability to confront these challenges is dependent on 
a national commitment to protecting and defending the Homeland. Budget 
stability and predictability are essential underpinnings of this 
commitment, and I ask for the Committee's support of the President's 
budget for fiscal year 2020--and specifically for relief from the 
budget caps directed in the Budget Control Act of 2011. A return to 
sequestration will devastate total force readiness and delay or 
terminate modernization efforts that are necessary to maintaining our 
strategic and technological advantage. Simply put, sequestration will 
make it impossible for USNORTHCOM and NORAD to advance necessary 
Homeland defense efforts and shape our changing national security 
environment as articulated in the National Defense Strategy.
                                 threat
Russia:
    Russia has posed a nuclear threat to North America for over half a 
century, but has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to 
threaten us below the nuclear threshold. Russia continues to hone and 
flex its offensive cyber capabilities, and its new generation of air- 
and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff 
ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike 
North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.
    Since 2015, Russia has employed its new air- and sea-launched 
cruise missiles against anti-regime targets in Syria, providing real-
world training for Russian crews and demonstrating its growing 
precision-strike capabilities to the West. In a parallel effort, Russia 
has implemented a modernization program for its heavy bombers that will 
ensure their ability to perform nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence and 
strike missions in the coming decades.
    Russian heavy bombers such as the Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK 
continue to conduct regular air patrols in the international airspace 
along the coastlines of other countries to underscore Russia's 
capabilities. Russian bomber crews are demonstrating increasing 
proficiency in their flight activities, developing a new generation of 
air crews capable of employing this highly visible implement of Russian 
deterrence and messaging in peacetime, crisis, and war.
    Patrols by Russian military aircraft off the coasts of the United 
States and Canada have grown increasingly complex in recent years. 
NORAD fighter aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aviation 
missions inside the United States and Canadian Air Defense 
Identification Zones, and there is no indication that Russian 
leadership intends to reduce the number of these missions in the near 
future.
    In addition to its highly capable cruise missiles that enable its 
anti-ship and land-attack missions, Russia has introduced the 
Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarine, which is armed with 
advanced land-attack cruise missiles and is much quieter and more 
lethal than previous generations of Russian attack submarines. Russia's 
growing non-nuclear capabilities provide Moscow a range of options to 
dissuade an adversary from escalating and to terminate a conflict on 
terms favorable to Moscow, increasing the potential for miscalculation 
or opportunistic actions.
    Russia has demonstrated a willingness to conduct disruptive 
cyberattacks and cyber-enabled influence operations against its 
competitors, as it demonstrated during the 2016 election cycle in the 
United States. In a crisis or conflict, we would expect Russia to 
conduct cyber operations against critical infrastructure in an attempt 
to compel de-escalation.
    In the Arctic, Moscow is planning to deploy surface vessels armed 
with the modular KALIBR-NK cruise missile system that will offer highly 
precise land-attack capabilities and introduce a new cruise missile 
threat from our northern approaches. Separately, Moscow continues to 
bolster its military defenses in the Arctic with the deployment of a K-
300P Bastion coastal defense cruise missile system on the New Siberian 
Islands, significantly increasing Russia's ability to defend and 
control a large stretch of the Northern Sea Route.
    Finally, Russia is developing multiple weapon systems specifically 
designed to circumvent United States missile defenses and hold our 
Homeland at risk. This includes the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM)-delivered AVANGARD hypersonic glide vehicle, which was 
highlighted in a speech by Vladimir Putin in March 2018 and is expected 
to become operational in the next few years, complicating our missile 
warning mission.
China:
    China is pursuing a comprehensive military modernization program 
that includes a rapid expansion of its strategic nuclear capabilities 
while working to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and 
increase their ability to ensure a credible second-strike capability. 
Over the last decade, China has supplemented its modest silo-based ICBM 
force with dozens of road-mobile ICBMs capable of delivering multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles that could significantly 
increase the number of survivable warheads available for a retaliatory 
strike. During that same timeframe, China operationalized its first 
class of ballistic missile submarines, adding a second leg to its 
strategic deterrent. China maintains its longstanding no-first-use 
nuclear policy, but its growing nuclear, conventional, and cyber 
capabilities are significant.
    China's military strategy and ongoing People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) reforms reflect the abandonment of its historically land-centric 
mentality, as evidenced by emerging doctrinal references to strategies 
that would move potential conflicts away from Chinese territory, 
suggesting that PLA strategists envision an increasingly global role 
for their military.
    On the economic front, China plans to invest heavily in 
infrastructure projects in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Africa through its Belt and Road Initiative in a major 
effort to develop stronger economic ties with other countries and shape 
their interests to align with China's, simultaneously seeking to deter 
confrontation or international criticism of China's approach to 
sensitive issues.
    In the cyber domain, Chinese leaders view computer network 
operations as a low-cost deterrent that demonstrates capabilities and 
resolve to an adversary and allows them to manage the escalation of a 
conflict by targeting critical military and civilian infrastructure. 
Ongoing military reforms are aimed at accelerating the incorporation of 
information systems that enable forces and commanders to carry out 
missions and tasks more effectively.
Advanced Threat Technologies:
    Defending the United States and Canada against long-range weapons 
systems capable of striking targets in the Homeland is a major focus of 
both USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Russian aircraft and submarines are now 
armed with long-range cruise missiles designed to evade radar 
detection, while both Russia and China are developing and testing 
maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. In the cyber domain, our 
adversaries continue their non-stop efforts to penetrate defense and 
civilian networks. Collectively, these advanced technologies could be 
capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear weapons, 
potentially affecting national decision making and limiting response 
options in both peacetime and crisis.
North Korea:
    After decades of research and development activity marked more by 
failure than success, North Korea's ICBM program turned the corner in 
2017 when North Korea successfully flight-tested multiple ICBMs capable 
of ranging the continental United States and detonated a thermonuclear 
device, increasing the destructive yield of its weapons by a factor of 
ten. Following these successes, Kim Jong-un declared the completion of 
his nuclear ICBM research and development program, implying the 
production and deployment of these systems would soon follow.
    Kim Jong-un developed these strategic weapons to deter the U.S. 
from overthrowing his regime, and he almost certainly has plans to use 
them against our Homeland should a conflict erupt on the Peninsula. 
Meanwhile, North Korea's cyber capabilities continue to grow, as does 
the country's willingness to employ them during peacetime, as North 
Korea demonstrated by its cyber attacks on Sony Pictures in 2014.
Iran:
    Iran is not yet able to strike the United States with strategic 
weapons, and its leaders have declared a unilateral 2000 kilometer 
range restriction that limits its missile force to threatening only 
regional targets in the Near East. Iran's SIMORGH space launch vehicle 
has yet to successfully place a satellite in orbit, but its most recent 
launch in January 2019 demonstrated continued progress on long-range 
missile technologies. Although we have no information to indicate that 
Iran intends to test and deploy an ICBM, the SIMORGH would be capable 
of ICBM ranges if configured for that purpose, and progress on the 
vehicle could enable Iran to field an ICBM in as a little as a few 
years if its leaders chose to pursue that objective.
    However, Iran has the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the 
region and has expended significant resources on its space launch and 
civil nuclear capabilities that could enable it to develop a nuclear-
armed ICBM relatively quickly if its leaders chose to do so. In the 
meantime, Iran retains the ability to conduct attacks abroad via covert 
operations, terrorist proxies, and its growing cyber capabilities. Iran 
considers disruptive and destructive cyberspace operations as a valid 
instrument of statecraft and a means of imposing costs on its 
adversaries, even during peacetime.
Violent Extremist Organizations:
    The terrorist threat to our Homeland has grown more diffuse, 
typified by simple attacks inspired from afar and carried out by 
individuals or small networks that are difficult to detect and 
interdict. Foreign terrorist groups remain committed to attacking the 
United States, either directly or by inspiring homegrown violent 
extremists to act in their stead. Despite their territorial losses, the 
Islamic State and their counterparts in al-Qa'ida remain highly 
adaptive foes committed to attacking the United States.
    Commercial aviation persists as a preferred target, probably 
because of the potential for large numbers of casualties, economic 
damage, and widespread media coverage generated by such attacks. I am 
concerned that terrorists could also continue to pursue 9/11-style fly-
and-crash attacks or the use of unmanned aerial systems against soft 
targets. Meanwhile, terrorists continue to target U.S. military 
personnel both on and off base, compounding our force protection 
challenges.
                         defending the homeland
    Homeland defense is USNORTHCOM's essential mission and the number 
one priority of the DOD per the 2018 National Defense Strategy. In 
light of the complex and significant threats to our Homeland, 
USNORTHCOM and NORAD take assertive, proactive measures each day to 
shape our strategic environment, deter aggression, and ensure that we 
are always ready to defeat any adversary should deterrence fail. As the 
Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I view everything the commands do 
through the lens of Homeland defense, and I am committed to ensuring 
that each of our missions help to preserve decision space and maintain 
the ability for our national leaders to project power and exert 
influence in the best interest of our nations.
    In pursuit of their own perceived national and ideological 
interests, our competitors have developed advanced capabilities and 
demonstrated their intent to hold our Homeland at risk in multiple 
domains and along numerous avenues of approach to North America. In 
light of that reality, we simply do not have the luxury of waiting for 
others to act before we formulate a response. Instead, USNORTHCOM and 
NORAD work constantly to shape our theater while making it obvious to 
potential adversaries that they will face overlapping dilemmas and 
extraordinary costs should they choose to challenge us. This active and 
continuous enterprise requires strong relationships and close 
coordination with our fellow combatant commands, the military Services, 
the U.S. Federal interagency community, and our international allies 
and partners.
    The diverse threats arrayed against the United States and Canada 
challenge our defenses in a number of domains and along multiple 
avenues of approach. The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD work 
around the clock to monitor those approaches and are ready to respond 
at a moment's notice should our adversaries chose to challenge our 
defenses.
Ballistic Missile Defense:
    USNORTHCOM continues to prioritize our mission to defend the United 
States against potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
attacks from North Korea and Iran, should Iran develop that capability. 
I remain cautiously optimistic that the ongoing negotiations will lead 
North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and ICBM programs. But, in 
the meantime, I continue to emphasize the necessity of fielding 
improved discriminating radars, a more survivable sensor network, and 
improving the reliability and lethality of our interceptor fleet in 
order to remain well ahead of North Korea or Iran's capability to 
strike the defended area.
    I am confident in the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
System to defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North Korea 
or Iran, if Iran develops an ICBM, but that confidence is contingent on 
our continued pursuit of system-wide enhancements to outpace our 
adversaries' rapid technological advancements.
    The success of the Ballistic Missile Defense mission is also 
dependent on strong cooperation between USNORTHCOM as the supported 
warfighting command and the technical experts of the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA). The MDA Director, Lt Gen Sam Greaves, is an outstanding 
partner, and I am grateful to him and the entire MDA team for their 
dedicated support of this enormously complex, no-fail mission. I fully 
support MDA's plans to field the Long-Range Discriminating Radar, 
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, along with the 
Redesigned Kill Vehicle and a selectable 2- or 3-stage interceptor 
booster. Additionally, I believe we must pursue space-based sensors to 
detect and track advanced threats from Russia and China. Each of these 
improvements to our sensor network and interceptor fleet will help to 
ensure our ability to defend the United States against an ICBM attack 
now and into the foreseeable future.
    Going forward, advanced technologies such as space-based sensors 
and directed-energy missile defense weapons systems show significant 
promise--and will, in fact, become a necessity in the foreseeable 
future in order to defend the Homeland against a rapidly developing 
missile threat. At present, I believe the DOD is striking an effective 
balance between ensuring our ability to defend against current and 
near-term threats while simultaneously investing in the research and 
development of advanced technologies capable of defeating future 
threats. This vision for meeting anticipated requirements is well 
articulated in the recently published Missile Defense Review, and I 
fully support the plan for defending the Homeland.
Arctic Northern Approaches:
    It has become clear that defense of the Homeland depends on our 
ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in the Arctic and 
passing through the Arctic. Russia's fielding of advanced, long-range 
cruise missiles capable of flying through the northern approaches and 
striking targets in the United States and Canada has emerged as the 
dominant military threat in the Arctic, while diminished sea ice and 
the potential for competition over resources present overlapping 
challenges in this strategically significant region. Meanwhile, China 
has declared that it is not content to remain a mere observer in the 
Arctic and has taken action to normalize its naval and commercial 
presence in the region in order to increase its access to lucrative 
resources and shipping routes.
    I view the Arctic as the front line in the defense of the United 
States and Canada, and as the DOD Advocate for Arctic Capabilities and 
the combatant commander responsible for defending the approaches to the 
Homeland, I constantly assess the changing environmental and strategic 
conditions throughout the region--across borders and operational 
boundaries--in an ongoing, active, and collaborative effort to mitigate 
the risks associated with increased civilian and military presence in 
the northern approaches to North America.
    The effort to rapidly adapt to the evolving strategic landscape and 
associated challenges in the Arctic includes a deliberate and ongoing 
effort to fully assess our collective missions and associated 
requirements in the region. As one key example of those ongoing 
assessments, in 2018, USNORTHCOM planners conducted a Homeland Defense 
Mission Analysis for the Arctic Region. This comprehensive, classified 
assessment of our capability to operate in the far north revalidated a 
number of known capability gaps in the region and provided an updated 
overview of current and future requirements.
    As confirmed by our Mission Analysis, civil and military operations 
in the Arctic continue to be impeded by limited communications 
capability, harsh environmental conditions, and vast distances between 
population centers. Improving communications and domain awareness in 
the region are among my top priorities for the region, and the DOD and 
the military Services have demonstrated their support of those 
requirements through investment in programs such as the Multi User 
Objective System (MUOS)--a satellite-based communications network that 
significantly expands the ability of United States and Canadian assets 
to operate in the far north.
    To detect and track potential airborne threats, to include Russian 
long-range bombers and cruise missiles, USNORTHCOM and NORAD both rely 
on radar systems such as the North Warning System (NWS), a network of 
aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada. In August 2018, 
NORAD, working in close coordination with USNORTHCOM, the Canadian 
NORAD Region, and the United States Navy's Naval Air Warfare Center, 
conducted an operational assessment of the NWS against representative 
targets, and the data collected from the test will inform the design 
for the air domain defense of the United States and Canada for years to 
come.
    In recognition that the number of military and civilian activities 
in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic will only continue to grow, 
USNORTHCOM is working hand-in-glove with the United States Air Force 
and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to procure additional Arctic 
Sustainment Packages (ASPs) for use by the Alaska National Guard. Each 
ASP is a palletized, air-droppable shelter kit that provides shelter, 
heat, and other life support capability for several weeks in Arctic 
environments in the event that weather or other environmental factors 
delay a rescue operation.
    The ability of the joint force to fight and win in the extreme cold 
and isolation of the far north increasingly depends on placing 
specialized technology in the hands of military personnel who routinely 
train and operate in the region. Fortunately, there are units and DOD 
installations who are already well positioned to share that expertise. 
Essential experience resides in the units stationed in the far north--
from the airborne brigade and fighter wings stationed in Alaska to the 
LC-130 Skibird pilots and crewmembers of the New York Air National 
Guard, we have a solid foundation to build on as we continue to 
increase Arctic experience across the force.
    The military Services have committed to building on that that 
foundational experience and expertise through a number of efforts that 
will further the ability of the joint force to operate, fight, and win 
in the far north. In a key example, between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel 
will participate in the next iteration of USNORTHCOM's premier Arctic 
exercise, ARCTIC EDGE 2020, more than doubling the number of troops who 
participated in 2018. Arctic Edge 2020 will take advantage of the vast 
training area and unmatched training opportunities afforded by the 
Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) and will integrate personnel 
and platforms from all four Services--to include ground, air, and cyber 
operations. This deliberate evolution sends the clear signal that 
USNORTHCOM, strongly supported by the Services, is fundamentally 
committed to expanding the ability of the joint force to defend our 
Arctic approaches and our vital interests in the region.
Air Domain:
    Variants of the advanced cruise missiles that could fly through our 
northern approaches also present a threat along our coasts. Russian 
Severodvinsk-class submarines are capable of firing low radar cross 
section cruise missiles against critical targets along our coasts. This 
emerging threat requires advanced capabilities to ensure surveillance, 
detection, identification, targeting, and destruction to protect the 
Homeland and key strategic targets in the United States and Canada.
    The Homeland Defense Design will be a phased approach to employ 
advanced detection and tracking technologies to defeat a cruise missile 
attack against the Homeland. However, the rapidity of our competitors' 
development of advanced cruise missile technology demands a continued, 
aggressive, and focused commitment to ensure our ability to defeat a 
cruise missile attack.
    In addition, small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) continue to 
present challenges to safety and security within U.S. airspace. NORAD 
has the capability to address larger UAS, but systems that are readily 
available in the commercial marketplace are difficult to detect and 
track due to their small size and relatively slow speeds. While we work 
to enhance our ability to detect, and--if necessary--neutralize 
potential threat UAS in the national airspace, the authorities provided 
by the fiscal year 2019 Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization 
Bill that extend counter-UAS authorities to the Department of Justice 
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reflect the need for a 
whole-of-government approach to address the potential security 
challenges presented by this rapidly emerging technology.
    As with emerging military cruise missile technologies, the 
proliferation of small UAS requires us to consider new approaches for 
how best to defend the Homeland. We cannot address these new 
capabilities with outdated technology or with old ways of thinking, and 
I look forward to working with the Committee to develop innovative 
technology and strategies to ensure that we are capable of outpacing 
the threat.
Southern Approaches:
    The threats to our Nation from our southern border are not military 
in nature, but they are significant and deadly. The flow of illegal 
narcotics into the United States continues to inflict a heavy toll on 
our citizens, as clearly demonstrated by the 72,000 Americans who were 
killed by drug overdoses in 2017. USNORTHCOM is proud of our role in 
the counter narcotics fight in support of Federal law enforcement and 
our military partners in Mexico and The Bahamas as they battle 
transnational criminal organizations that have inflicted such harm on 
both sides of the border.
    USNORTHCOM personnel actively collaborate with partners throughout 
the United States interagency and in Mexico to illuminate the networks 
used by the cartels to transport drugs, victims of human trafficking, 
and other illicit goods in a strategic effort to strike at the heart of 
these massive and well-financed criminal enterprises.
    On the U.S. side of our southern border, USNORTHCOM's subordinate 
element Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) supports U.S. Federal law 
enforcement efforts to interdict narcotics shipments into the United 
States. Employing military personnel, unique technologies, and 
specialized skill sets developed in contingency operations overseas, 
JTF-N provides critical support to Federal law enforcement interdiction 
missions operations.
                      theater security cooperation
    USNORTHCOM's theater security cooperation mission pays enormous 
dividends for our defense of the Homeland as well as for our 
relationships with our international partners. These collaborative 
efforts with our international partners seek to sustain our strategic 
advantage in the Western Hemisphere while always seeking to strengthen 
our regional security and reinforce our defense in depth throughout the 
region.
    In particular, USNORTHCOM's relationship with the Mexican military 
is strong. USNORTHCOM supports Mexico's efforts to expand its role as a 
regional defense and security leader. The ties between USNORTHCOM and 
our Mexican military partners are close at every level of leadership 
and continue to grow thanks to concerted efforts by commanders on both 
sides of the border. I am proud of the fact that every Mexican Marine 
has trained with a United States Marine, just as I am honored to share 
close relationships with the Mexican Secretary of National Defense 
(SEDENA), General Luis C. Sandoval Gonzalez, and the Secretary of the 
Navy (SEMAR), Admiral Jose Rafael Ojeda Duran. I am proud to work with 
partners who share our commitment to regional stability and security 
throughout North America.
    The Bahamas remains a willing partner with whom the United States 
enjoys a deep and long-standing bi-national relationship, and our 
shared theater security cooperation focus is improving The Bahamas' air 
and maritime domain awareness. In 2018, the United States provided the 
first maritime surveillance system to The Bahamas and secured funding 
for two more systems that will be networked with existing surveillance 
assets, generating a significant increase to The Bahamas' maritime 
surveillance capacity. The Bahamas remains a strong partner in the 
defense of North America as they invest heavily in new capabilities 
that will make them a more significant contributor to our shared 
defense and security.
    Finally, Canada continues to be our indispensable partner in 
reinforcing the defense and security of our countries. USNORTHCOM's 
security cooperation activities with Canada are extensive and reflect 
many years of shared effort and common cause with our allies to the 
North. In June 2017, Canada announced a new approach to defense 
investment that will provide significant benefit to the common defense 
of our nations. This approach, titled ``Strong, Secure, Engaged,'' 
acknowledges the significant shifts in the global strategic environment 
and commits accordingly to an active and renewed NORAD partnership and 
investments that will directly benefit the security of both our 
nations.
    In a military-to-military context, the tri-command partnership 
between USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and the Canadian Joint Operations Command is 
of tremendous importance to all three commands. The bond between these 
organizations reflects the cooperative approach we share with our 
Canadian partners as we work together to outpace the threats arrayed 
against the United States and Canada, maintain a credible deterrent, 
and take steps forward together to ensure the combined defense of our 
nations.
                  defense support of civil authorities
    USNORTHCOM's mission to provide defense support of civil 
authorities provides military personnel and assets to support Federal 
law enforcement and disaster relief agencies in times of need. In the 
nine months since I assumed command, USNORTHCOM has supported DHS, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, and the National Interagency Firefighting Center during 
hurricane relief operations, wildland firefighting missions, 
interagency collaboration to ensure that our elections were free from 
cyber interference, and presidentially-directed efforts to secure our 
southern border. For each of these events, USNORTHCOM rapidly delivered 
military-unique capabilities and skilled personnel to augment and 
enable our Federal partners.
    In September 2018, Hurricane Florence provided USNORTHCOM the first 
opportunity to execute the Commander of USNORTHCOM's expanded role as 
the DOD Synchronizer for defense support of civil authorities. The 
consolidation of the DOD effort under one Synchronizer enabled 
significantly improved coordination and collaboration across the entire 
spectrum of the DOD response and consolidated the
responsibility for collecting and delivering timely and accurate 
information to the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the DOD 
Synchronizer role increased the coordination and information exchange 
amongst the DOD agencies with major roles in the response, to include 
the National Guard Bureau, the Defense Logistics Agency, the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, and United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM).
    USNORTHCOM support of hurricane relief operations had barely ended 
last fall, when, in response to requests for assistance from DHS and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Command was directed by the 
Secretary of Defense to deploy Active Duty military personnel and 
equipment to support Federal law enforcement operations along the 
southern border of the United States. Beginning in October 2018, this 
operation has demonstrated the close partnership between USNORTHCOM and 
our Federal law enforcement partners, as well as the outstanding 
support provided by each of the military Services and the Joint Staff 
in response to a USNORTHCOM request for forces.
    Within hours of notification, airmen, soldiers, sailors, and 
marines from installations across the United States were on the move to 
support our DHS partners, and they have performed their assigned tasks 
with extraordinary professionalism and skill. From laying over 70 miles 
of concertina wire to reinforce existing border obstacles, flying 
support missions, delivering medical care, and providing security, the 
USNORTHCOM border support mission has improved our Nation's border 
security while providing our forces with training and real-world 
experience that will serve them well in both peace and conflict.
    Every mission presents unique challenges, and each is dependent on 
collaboration, strong partnerships, and close relationships throughout 
the Federal interagency and between the active and Reserve component. 
In a key demonstration of the strong collaboration between the 
components in the combined response to Hurricane Florence, North 
Carolina and South Carolina established Dual Status Commanders and 
successfully integrated National Guard and title 10 personnel and 
assets in a wide variety of rescue and recovery operations.
    I am proud of the great partnership demonstrated by USNORTHCOM and 
the National Guard Bureau before and during each of those responses. My 
friend and wingman Gen Joe Lengyel and the citizen airmen and soldiers 
he leads are a tremendous group of professionals who proved time and 
again their selflessness and readiness to respond whenever and wherever 
needed.
    While hurricane relief operations may have been the most visible 
DSCA mission for the Command over the last several years, USNORTHCOM 
serves as the designated DSCA synchronizer for the DOD in a variety of 
other efforts. In a notable example of innovative interagency 
collaboration, prior to the 2018 midterm election season, USNORTHCOM 
partnered with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to determine how best to 
provide DOD cyber support to the DHS-led mission to secure the 
elections infrastructure. The partnership between USCYBERCOM, 
USNORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and DHS was groundbreaking, and 
each of the agencies involved learned a number of important lessons for 
future interagency efforts.
    Interagency cooperation in the defense of our critical cyber 
infrastructure will remain an enduring necessity as networks throughout 
the United States continue to weather near-constant attacks and 
infiltration attempts. In light of this need, I am grateful to the 
Congress for its strong support for the establishment of the DHS Cyber 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Although CISA was only 
established in November 2018, it is already clear that we have an 
energized, high-level interagency partner dedicated to our shared 
mission to address and mitigate cyber threats against civilian networks 
and critical infrastructure. Within weeks of its establishment, CISA 
assigned a senior liaison officer to the USNORTHCOM headquarters to 
work alongside the rest of our whole-of-government team, and I look 
forward to many years of close collaboration with our newest partner in 
the defense of our Nation's vital interests.
    Whenever our assistance is requested by our Federal partners, 
USNORTHCOM relies on the military Services to provide trained and ready 
personnel and assets whenever and wherever needed. As we saw firsthand 
in the days before Hurricane Florence made landfall in September 2018 
and in the initial stages of our support to U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection along the southern border, the Joint Staff and all four of 
the military Services worked around the clock to identify, source, and 
deploy the personnel and equipment necessary to fulfill all anticipated 
requests for support from our Federal partners.
    Due to the unhesitating support of the Joint Staff and each of the 
Service Chiefs, the requested forces were on station and ready to 
execute their support missions in a matter of hours and days following 
notification. In both scenarios, the remarkable men and women of our 
armed forces were ready to deploy on short notice and executed their 
assigned missions thanks to their training, professionalism, and 
discipline. USNORTHCOM will continue to work closely with the Joint 
Staff and the Services to exercise our response forces in anticipation 
of future needs, and I am grateful to the Committee for your ongoing 
support of the Services' modernization and readiness requirements.
                 united efforts to defend the homeland
    USNORTHCOM's defense of the Homeland would not be possible without 
cooperation, collaboration, and a fundamental commitment to mission 
success across a remarkable interagency and intergovernmental 
enterprise. Over 27 unique Federal agencies, from DHS to the Federal 
Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have 
permanently-assigned liaisons and representatives in our USNORTHCOM and 
NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs. Nearly 150 Canadian military 
personnel are assigned to NORAD billets in our headquarters, and we are 
proud to host two permanently assigned Mexican military liaison 
officers, along with liaison officers and representatives from a host 
of DOD agencies and commands to include the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Strategic 
Command. National Guard personnel are also fully integrated into our 
headquarters staff and maintain a full-time office specifically 
dedicated to coordinating actions between our headquarters and the 
National Guard Bureau. The National Guard continues to be an essential 
and integral part of our USNORTHCOM and NORAD team.
    Our command's integration with the U.S. interagency community is a 
requirement for success, which is why those interagency representatives 
are not simply assigned to the headquarters; they are truly integrated 
members of the USNORTHCOM team. Whenever possible, they are invited to 
participate in command briefings and updates, and I rely on their 
subject matter expertise and professional judgment on a daily basis as 
we work hand in glove to address the challenges and threats facing the 
command.
    The commitment to cooperation shared by each of our interagency 
partners has contributed immeasurably to the broader USNORTHCOM 
mission. For example, during the 2018 hurricane season, DTRA provided 
around-the-clock modeling support that located all of the hazardous 
material production and storage facilities in the storms' paths and 
allowed our planners to develop well-researched plans to mitigate 
potential impacts if the sites were damaged.
    Our collective ability to meet threats head on and to provide a 
rapid, effective response in the wake of natural and manmade disasters 
is absolutely dependent on constant communication, routine interagency 
exercises, and close working relationships between each and every one 
of the civilian and military professionals who strive each day to keep 
our Nation and our citizens safe from harm.
    From USNORTHCOM's components and subordinates to NORAD, which has 
served as the absolute gold standard for international collaboration 
for over 60 years, and our locktight relationship with FEMA, we work 
every day to exercise the interagency and inter-DOD processes required 
to ensure that we are always ready to deliver the right assets in the 
right place at the right time to meet whatever mission we are assigned. 
To ensure USNORTHCOM and our interagency partners are ready at a 
moment's notice in the event of a crisis, we conduct regular command-
led exercises in each of our mission sets, such as Ardent Sentry for 
DSCA and Vigilant Shield for Homeland defense.
    Finally, I would like to make special note of USNORTHCOM's support 
to the state funeral of former President George H. W. Bush in December 
2018. The men and women of USNORTHCOM's Joint Task Force--National 
Capital Region, under the superb leadership of MG Mike Howard, 
demonstrated exemplary professionalism and decorum throughout a three-
day program in Texas and Washington, DC. The flawless execution of this 
mission was made possible by many months of rigorous planning, close 
communication with President Bush and his family, coordination with 
dozens of Federal, state, and local agencies, and multiple rehearsals 
to ensure no detail was overlooked. USNORTHCOM's support of this 
historic event was both a profound honor for all involved and a 
conspicuous example of the no-fail nature of all USNORTHCOM missions.
                               conclusion
    Today and every day, the men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are 
standing watch over our Homeland. These dedicated professionals work 
around the clock surveilling our skies, monitoring our oceans, and 
ensuring that we are always ready to counter a staggering range of 
threats to our Homeland, ranging from intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and long-range bombers to lethal opioids and cyberattacks. The 
strategic and technological innovation that will be required to defend 
our Nation in the coming years depends entirely on the quality and 
experience of our people.
    Today and always, our people are our strength, and I am proud to 
lead the outstanding airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and civilians 
of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. While the threats facing our Nation can be 
daunting, I have absolute confidence in our ability to meet any 
challenge and defeat any adversary because of the dedicated 
professionals I am honored to lead. We Have the Watch.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General O'Shaughnessy.
    You know, General Hyten, there are two areas of 
disagreement that we have heard among our colleagues in both 
the House and in the Senate, and you have heard some this 
morning in our opening statements. But one of them is the 
significance of nuclear modernization. Now, it is disturbing 
when we see some of our adversaries, peer adversaries, China 
and Russia, have actually gotten ahead of us in some areas of 
artificial intelligence and hypersonics. But in the area of 
nuclear modernization, I know that Jim Mattis, Heather Wilson, 
and others have said that is the most significant thing that we 
could be doing, and yet, some are saying that is an area where 
we could be making cuts at this time.
    I would like to have you start off by addressing that; do 
you agree with those who talk about the significance of that 
program and make your comments on that. Then I will get to the 
second one.
    General Hyten. It is the most important element of our 
national defense.
    Chairman Inhofe. It is the most important element of our 
national defense.
    General Hyten. We have to make sure that we are always 
ready to respond to any threat. I can do that today because I 
have the most powerful triad in the world. I have ICBMs, 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers that are 
ready to respond to any threat that comes. Because of the 
capabilities of each leg of the triad, I have the ability to 
respond to any threat. We did a Nuclear Posture Review. It was 
released last year. In it, it validated the need for a triad.
    Our adversaries have also recognized the need for a triad. 
They are beginning modernization of their programs as well. In 
fact, Russia started their modernization program in 2006. They 
are about 80 percent through completing the modernization of 
their triad. They will be pretty close to being through by 
about 2020, and in 2020, we will still be starting. That is not 
a good place to be from a national security perspective.
    Chairman Inhofe. That is right.
    You have actually jumped to the second area of 
disagreement: the triad. Several people have said that we do 
not need a triad, all three legs. It could adequately be 
handled without all three. Just specifically on the triad 
element of the necessity of the three legs.
    General Hyten. When you look at the threat we face, the 
threat from the Russian triad, soon the threat from the Chinese 
triad, threats from North Korea as well, you have to look at 
the three elements of the triad.
    The bombers are our most recallable element. They are the 
most flexible element of the triad. The bombers can be deployed 
and recalled by the President, deployed and recalled, before 
they employ their weapons. They are the most flexible element. 
We can do almost anything with a bomber.
    The submarine is the most survivable element. It allows us 
to hide from our adversaries and make sure we can respond to 
any surprise attack.
    The ICBM is the most ready element to respond to a quick 
surprise attack, and it also creates the most significant 
targeting problem for an adversary because there are 400 
separate targets across the United States. All would have to be 
independently targeted by an adversary. That targeting problem 
is hugely problematic and creates a significant advantage for 
us.
    When you put those three together, you get this great 
operational capability. But the other thing it provides for us 
is the ability to respond to a failure in any one of those 
legs. If you have a technical failure or intelligence failure, 
I can cover it with another leg, and that has happened during 
my tenure. I never have put this nation at risk because I have 
the flexibility in the triad.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes. General O'Shaughnessy, that is a big 
deal to you too.
    We look at what we have done with our aging system. We are 
talking about now getting into a modernized ICBM. I do not know 
how long that would take. Some people say all the way through 
the 20s. At the same time, you have our adversaries who may 
have been late in starting, but they are starting in a more 
modernized way. Do you agree with that? They become a threat 
even though right now today they may not be ahead of us in 
these areas.
    General O'Shaughnessy: Chairman, I would agree. I think as 
the NDS articulates, the security environment has fundamentally 
changed and part of it is because of what you alluded to. I 
think as we watch both Russia and China create success in some 
of their weapons programs and advancing the capabilities that 
they have, they are fundamentally changing not just on the 
ballistic missile side but, as you mentioned, the hypersonics 
and also in the cruise missiles. It is not just the cruise 
missiles themselves. It is also the platforms that deliver 
those cruise missiles. They have clearly invested very 
specifically with the ability to hold our Homeland at risk with 
things like submarines and bombers that they have modernized 
with the low RCS [Radar Cross Section] cruise missiles that 
they can then launch. Therefore, we have to also modernize. We 
have to stay ahead of that advancing threat. We cannot expect 
to have success with 20th Century technology against 21st 
century threats.
    Chairman Inhofe. Which is what we have had.
    Thank you very much.
    Senator Reed?
    Let me interrupt, Senator Reed, if I might, because we do 
have a quorum now.
    I will ask the Committee to consider a list of 1,818 
pending military nominations. All the nominations have been 
before the Committee the required length of time. Is there a 
motion?
    Senator Reed. So moved.
    Senator Fischer. Second.
    Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
    [Chorus of ayes.]
    Chairman Inhofe. No?
    [No response.]
    Chairman Inhofe. It carries.
    [The list of nominations considered and approved by the 
Committee follows:]

 Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee 
 Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on February 26, 
                                 2019.
     1.  LTG Michael X. Garrett, USA to be general and Commanding 
General, U.S. Army Forces Command (Reference No. 24)

     2.  Col. Timothy J. Donnellan, ANG to be brigadier general 
(Reference No. 266)

     3.  Col. Stephen J. Mallette, ANG to be brigadier general 
(Reference No. 267)

     4.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Jason D. Hoskins) (Reference No. 268)

     5.  In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Nancy E. Costa) (Reference No. 269)

     6.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Saiprasad M. Zemse) (Reference No. 270)

     7.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 125 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Jeffrey Wayne Akin) (Reference No. 
271)

     8.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with David C. Salisbury) (Reference No. 272)

     9.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Craig K. Abee) (Reference No. 273)

    10.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Michael J. Chung) (Reference No. 274)

    11.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Robert T. Hines, Jr.) (Reference No. 275)

    12.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Marc A. Banjak) (Reference No. 276)

    13.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Dennis M. Britten) (Reference No. 
277)

    14.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Jason G. Arnold) (Reference No. 278)

    15.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with David P. Bailey) (Reference No. 279)

    16.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Kimberly J. Kloeber) (Reference No. 280)

    17.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Joyce C. Beaty) (Reference No. 281)

    18.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Timothy S. McCarty) (Reference No. 282)

    19.  In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Jennifer J. Archer) (Reference No. 283)

    20.  In the Air Force there are 61 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Andrew T. Allen) (Reference No. 284)

    21.  In the Air Force there are 15 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Elham Barani) (Reference No. 285)

    22.  In the Air Force there are 121 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Homayoun R. Ahmadian) (Reference 
No. 286)

    23.  In the Air Force there are 25 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Francis E. Becker) (Reference No. 
287)

    24.  In the Air Force there are 45 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Margaret E. Abbott) (Reference No. 289)

    25.  In the Air Force there are 252 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Joseph L. Abrams) (Reference No. 290)

    26.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (James B. Flowers) (Reference No. 291)

    27.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel 
(Dylan T. Randazzo) (Reference No. 292)

    28.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Jerry D. Hallman) (Reference No. 293)

    29.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Christopher P. Moellering) (Reference No. 294)

    30.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Joubert N. Paulino) (Reference No. 295)

    31.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Saw 
K. San) (Reference No. 296)

    32.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Rebecca J. Quackenbush) (Reference No. 297)

    33.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Stacie L. Kervin) (Reference No. 298)

    34.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Brian R. Kossler) (Reference No. 299)

    35.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Katherine A. O'Brien) (Reference No. 300)

    36.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Jessica N. Peralesludemann) (Reference No. 301)

    37.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Julia C. Phillips) (Reference No. 302)

    38.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Alain M. Alexandre) (Reference No. 303)

    39.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Taliat A. Animashaun) (Reference No. 304)

    40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(G010349) (Reference No. 307)

    41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Jordanna M. Hostler) (Reference No. 308)

    42.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Elizabeth N. Strickland) (Reference No. 309)

    43.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Shawn M.T. May) (Reference No. 310)

    44.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Kyle 
A. Zahn) (Reference No. 311)

    45.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
commander (Jessica M.P. Miller) (Reference No. 312)

    46.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
commander (Rosemary M. Hardesty) (Reference No. 313)

    47.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
commander (Brett T. Thomas) (Reference No. 314)

    48.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there is 1 appointment to the 
grade of colonel (Matthew T. Coughlin) (Reference No. 317)

    49.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Bethanne Canero) (Reference No. 318)

    50.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Kevin T. Brownlee) (Reference No. 320)

    51.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Kevin F. Champaigne) (Reference No. 321)

    52.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Aaron J. Griffus) (Reference No. 322)

    53.  In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel H. Cusinato) (Reference No. 
325)

    54.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 5 appointments to the 
grade of colonel (list begins with Armando A. Freire) (Reference No. 
329)

    55.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Stephen R. Byrnes) (Reference No. 330)

    56.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Herman E. Holley) (Reference No. 
331)

    57.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Darren M. Gallagher) (Reference 
No. 332)

    58.  In the Marine Corps there are 799 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Alexander N. Abate) (Reference No. 333)

    59.  In the Marine Corps there are 14 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with German Alicealapuerta) (Reference No. 334)

    60.  In the Marine Corps there are 106 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Eric J. Adams) (Reference No. 335)

    61.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Joseph W. Crandall) (Reference No. 336)

    62.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Aaron S. Ellis) (Reference No. 338)

    63.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
major (Justin D. Mosley) (Reference No. 339)

    64.  In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Andres J. Agramonte) (Reference No. 341)

    65.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade 
of colonel (Katherine R. Morganti) (Reference No. 342)

    66.  In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of rear 
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Scott M. Brown) (Reference No. 
360)

    67.  In the Navy there are 18 appointments to the grade of rear 
admiral (lower half (list begins with Jeffrey T. Anderson) (Reference 
No. 361)

    68.  LTG VeraLinn Jamieson, USAF to be lieutenant general and 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, 
and Cyber Effects Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (Reference 
No. 376)

    69.  In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Patrick N. Westmoreland) 
(Reference No. 379)

    70.  In the Navy there are 46 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant commander (list begins with Scott A. Adams) (Reference No. 
385)

    71.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Bethany S. Peterson) (Reference No. 386)

    72.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Tolulope O.A. Aduroja) (Reference No. 394)

    73.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Erick L. Jackson) (Reference No. 395)

    74.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Joseph J. Fantony) (Reference No. 396)

    75.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Chariti D. Paden) (Reference No. 397)

    76.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Donald W. Rakes) (Reference No. 398)

    77.  In the Army Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Ronnie S. Barnes) (Reference No. 399)

    78.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Charles A. Riley) (Reference No. 401)

    79.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Richard S. McNutt) (Reference No. 402)

    80.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Lloyd V. Lozada) (Reference No. 403)

    81.  In the Army Reserve there are 18 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Julio Acosta) (Reference No. 404)

    82.  In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant commander (list begins with Peter D. Allen) (Reference No. 
405)

_______________________________________________________________________
                                                                    
TOTAL: 1,818

    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General O'Shaughnessy, as I have indicated in my opening 
statement, I have concerns about the use of American military 
forces along the southern border and a hard time understanding 
the nature of an emergency that would require military forces 
when nowhere in the National Defense Strategy, the worldwide 
threat statement from the intelligence community, nor the 
statement from the Commander of SOUTHCOM indicate that migrant 
caravans of civilians across the border are a military threat. 
In fact, in your opening statement, you say ``the threats to 
our Nation from our southern border are not military in 
nature.''
    Just to be clear, in your professional opinion, does the 
illegal crossing of the border by civilians represent a 
military threat?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, first, I would say that I 
do think a secure border does reduce threats to the Homeland.
    Now, specific to your question about is it a military 
threat that is coming towards us, it is not a military threat, 
but that is slightly [different] than answering whether the 
military should be responding to the situation.
    Senator Reed. Following up, in your professional opinion 
again, would a wall be effective in defending a military attack 
on the United States?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I would say that border 
security is national security. I do see that any barrier in 
place to secure our Nation does have some ramifications to our 
ability to defend against a military threat as well. Right now, 
there is not a specific military force from the south that we 
are trying to take action against.
    In this particular case, though, Senator, I would say over 
the last 5 months I have spent a tremendous amount of time on 
the border, as you would imagine, working with our CBP [United 
States Customs and Border Protection] partners. In all of those 
trips and discussions, it has been clear to me that the Customs 
and Border Protection personnel very much value the border 
protection and seeing it, having the awareness, having some 
impediments, whether that be a barrier or wall, et cetera, and 
then having the ability to respond to it. That has been fairly 
universal as I have been doing my trips to the border.
    Senator Reed. They are civilian law enforcement officials 
who have a law enforcement mission, and the context of their 
evaluation is based upon that law enforcement mission.
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    You have mentioned many real threats that have been 
articulated in the National Defense Strategy, Russia and China 
in particular. Many of them really are not focused on our 
southern border but our northern border, the opening of the 
Arctic, the operations by both China and Russia in the Arctic, 
and also I think maintaining the capabilities of NORAD. Those 
are multibillion dollar tasks. Do you think they are of more 
military significance than any operation along the southern 
border?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is those 
threats are very real. Those threats are what we are focused on 
within both NORTHCOM and NORAD because we do see that the 
evolving threat, as articulated within the NDS, very much is 
trying to take advantage of the northern approach. We have 
vulnerabilities there that we need to continue to close the gap 
on, and so that is a focus area for us at both NORTHCOM and 
NORAD.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir. Again, thank you 
for your service.
    General Hyten, I just have a few minutes. But the issue of 
hypersonic weapon systems are increasingly critical to us. It 
seems from our perspective that our adversaries are shifting 
more into the hypersonic realm for many reasons. One reason is 
that our defense systems were built for ballistic missiles, not 
hypersonic missiles.
    Do you feel that in the short run you can deter these 
hypersonic vehicles?
    General Hyten. Senator, the hypersonic activities in both 
China and Russia are not the majority of their activities right 
now. The majority are still the traditional ballistic missile, 
submarine, bomber threats that we can deter.
    I also believe that we have the ability to deter any 
adversary that would deploy nuclear weapons against us. My one 
concern in this area is that in order to effectively deter, you 
have to be able to see, characterize, and attribute where the 
threat is coming from. As our adversaries are moving into 
cruise missile technology and hypersonic technology, that 
challenges our ability to provide those attributes of detection 
and characterization. We need to move in that area to sense the 
threat so we can effectively deter it.
    Senator Reed. Let me ask a couple questions because my time 
is running out.
    Is your sense that they have, as we have, a legacy system 
of missiles, medium-range, long-range, intercontinental, but 
they seem to be moving with great energy into hypersonics. That 
could be the weapon of choice in the future.
    The second part of that is that, as I understand it--you 
can clarify it--hypersonics are not governed by the INF Treaty 
so that we could develop hypersonics and still remain within 
the treaty. Where are they going, and can we do that without 
leaving the INF?
    General Hyten. They are clearly moving aggressively in the 
area of hypersonics. Their testing is fully integrated systems, 
long-range and medium-range, as has been well documented, as 
opposed to--what was the second part of the question?
    Senator Reed. The second part was we can conduct hypersonic 
research without violating the INF.
    General Hyten. Right. That is correct. The INF Treaty says 
that it covers ballistic missiles, and ballistic is defined as 
the majority of the trajectory of the missile is ballistic. The 
hypersonic missiles that we are talking about, less than half 
of that trajectory is ballistic. Therefore, they are not 
covered in the INF Treaty.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Fischer?
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Hyten, in your prepared remarks, you said the only 
way to change our strategic deterrent is to convince our 
adversaries to reduce the threat and this is not occurring. 
China and Russia in particular are not only modernizing the 
traditional elements of their own triads, but they are also 
building a myriad of additional nuclear capabilities to 
threaten the United States.
    In your comments to Chairman Inhofe, you explained the 
desperate need that we have for modernization and to continue 
with our triad, the importance that has for our national 
security and for the security of this world.
    I would ask you, are you aware of any intelligence or 
threat assessment supporting the courses of action that are 
called for from some that we need to unilaterally cut our 
nuclear forces?
    General Hyten. I am not.
    Senator Fischer. Is it your view that taking such actions 
would make us more vulnerable and reduce our ability to deter 
threats?
    General Hyten. It would significantly reduce our deterrent.
    Senator Fischer. We are looking at a budget in the 
Department for nuclear forces and the plan for modernization. 
Some people consider it a wish list just to give the Department 
everything that they desire, and no effort has been made to 
sort through things to look at what we truly need to address 
the threats that we have. I am talking about need versus want 
here.
    That is not an accurate statement, is it, that it is a wish 
list?
    General Hyten. I look at our nuclear capabilities, our 
triad, our modernization program as the minimum essential 
capabilities required to defend this nation if we have to 
defend against the most existential threat--and Russia and 
China and their capabilities are the most existential threat. 
To me that is the most minimum essential capabilities that we 
have to build, and even at the highest rate, it will still be 
just roughly 6 percent of the overall defense budget. I think 
we can afford that security.
    Senator Fischer. Do you fully support the Nuclear Posture 
Review as it was put forward by the Department?
    General Hyten. I do, ma'am.
    Senator Fischer. Do you truly believe it is needed that we 
continue on a path forward to reach the goals of that Nuclear 
Posture Review?
    General Hyten. I think it is essential.
    If I could comment on the Nuclear Posture Review, I think 
it is very interesting to look at our approach defined in the 
Nuclear Posture Review and our adversaries' approach. The 
elements in the Nuclear Posture Review that we have put forth 
all stay within our treaty responsibilities. We do not 
recommend developing new nuclear-powered torpedoes, new 
nuclear-powered cruise missiles. We do not look at anything. We 
believe that we can secure this nation through the 
modernization of the triad and the addition of a couple of 
small elements to respond to specific threats. In that case, it 
is the low-yield nuclear weapon and the submarine-launched 
cruise missile. But that is a very measured response to what 
our adversaries are doing.
    Senator Fischer. I appreciated your very clear and concise 
explanation of the importance and really the mission of each 
leg of the triad, and I am very pleased that you made that 
clear and concise for the record today. Thank you.
    I would like to ask you a little bit about the New START 
treaty. In your opening statement, you note that Russia is also 
developing and intends to deploy novel strategic nuclear 
weapons like its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater, 
unmanned vehicle and intercontinental-range cruise missile, 
which Russia seeks to keep outside of existing arms control 
agreements.
    Do you believe that these new systems, if they are 
deployed, should be counted under a New START treaty 
limitation?
    General Hyten. The way the New START treaty is defined is 
that the New START treaty only covers existing weapons when it 
was put in place in 2011. That means it covers the ballistic 
missiles, both submarine- and ground-launched. It covers the 
bombers and the cruise missiles on the bombers, and the 
platforms that carry them.
    There is also a clause in the treaty that says if one of 
the parties of the treaty sees the development of new strategic 
arms, they can come to the bilateral consultative commission 
and bring those things forward. I have not seen that happen. 
But we see them developing capabilities outside of that treaty, 
which is concerning to me.
    Senator Fischer. Do you believe a decision to extend the 
treaty should be made on its national security merits and 
Russia's behavior figures heavily into that evaluation with 
just the example that I gave you, that we need to be looking at 
these not just to renew a treaty?
    General Hyten. I do, ma'am. I want Russia in every treaty. 
I want Russia in the INF Treaty. I want Russia in the New START 
treaty. I support those treaties. But they have to be parties 
to those treaties. It takes two to participate in a treaty at 
least.
    Senator Fischer. Russia has not been a party to the INF 
Treaty. Is that correct?
    General Hyten. Russia has violated the INF Treaty for 5 
years now, and despite our best efforts, we have not been able 
to bring them into compliance. I have talked about that to the 
President. I have talked about New START with the President. We 
all want Russia in that treaty. We want them to participate, 
but if they will not, we are tying our own hands to deal with 
the adversaries in the world, including China, who is not part 
of that treaty.
    Senator Fischer. It does not help when your partner in a 
treaty is not in compliance and we remain in compliance.
    General Hyten. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. General Hyten, General O'Shaughnessy, 
thank you both for your testimony this morning and for your 
service to the country.
    I want to begin my questions with you, General 
O'Shaughnessy, because I understand that part of your 
responsibilities as the leader of a combatant command is to 
look at counter-drug operations at our borders. Is that 
correct?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, what we do is support law 
enforcement agencies in a supporting role for some of the 
counternarcotics work.
    Senator Shaheen. Have you been made aware of any plans that 
would take money from what is being proposed already to fund 
the President's recent directive to reprogram DOD interdiction 
funding to pay for a border wall?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, as you know, with a 
declaration of a national emergency that is now being 
considered, the Secretary of Defense and I, actually together 
with the Chairman, went down to the border this weekend on 
Saturday in order to see firsthand both what our troops are 
doing now, as well as looking at the border and potential 
applications of DOD funding for the border, to inform his 
decisions. Those decisions--and that is ongoing this week. At 
this time, that is work in progress with the Acting Secretary 
of Defense.
    Senator Shaheen. But do I understand you to say then that 
plans are being drawn up that would take money from those drug 
interdiction efforts to use for funding a wall?
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is one of the options that is 
being looked at. It is premature at this time and that work is 
being done literally as we speak.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, as I am sure you are aware, the 
opioid crisis in the United States has taken tens of thousands 
of lives. In New Hampshire, we have the second highest opioid 
overdose death rate in the country. This is an issue that we 
care tremendously about. It is my understanding that most of 
the illicit drugs that come into this country come through 
ports of entry (POE) as opposed to coming across the border in 
other places. Is that what you have seen?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, I have seen a little bit of 
both. There has recently been a DEA [United States Drug 
Enforcement Agency] report that talks about the most common 
method of transportation through the borders is, in fact, 
through the POEs, but it is most common, not necessarily that 
all of it goes through there. It further delineates and talks.
    I will give you an example. Just this week, twice I have 
been to the border. In one of my trips down there, what they 
talked about was the TCOs [Transitional Criminal Organizations] 
that run the migrants coming are the same criminals that also 
run the narcotics. What we are seeing now is a coordinated 
effort, for example, where they will send a large number of 
migrants through over the border to take the Border Patrol 
agents off of the line, and then they will use that as an 
opportunity to bring drugs across the border while the Border 
Patrol agency are processing the migrants. It is a coordinated 
effort here that brings it all together that is very disturbing 
as we go forward.
    Senator Shaheen. Do you agree that it is helpful to have 
technology and more people at our ports of entry so we can 
better interdict drugs coming through there?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Absolutely, ma'am.
    Senator Shaheen. General Hyten, I want to follow up on 
Senator Reed's question about hypersonic weapons because I very 
much appreciated your strong statement that we are in a 
position to defend this country against all threats.
    Does that include hypersonic weapons? There have been 
public reports that we do not have a defense against those 
hypersonic weapons.
    General Hyten. Our defense against hypersonics is our 
nuclear deterrent. If somebody attacks us with a nuclear 
hypersonic capability, we have the ability to respond. Now, it 
is important for us to be able to track that to understand 
where it comes from.
    If you look at the way a hypersonic missile works, the 
first phase is ballistic, but it is a fairly short phase. That 
phase we will see. We will see the launch. We will be able to 
characterize it and understand it came from Russia, it came 
from China. But then from our sensor perspective, it basically 
disappears and we do not see it until the effect is delivered. 
We need to build sensors to be able to understand exactly where 
those things are going so we can better defend ourselves. You 
cannot defend yourself if you cannot see it.
    Senator Shaheen. I am sorry. I did not mean to interrupt. 
But do we have any sense about how much time we have from the 
point at which those weapons might be launched until when they 
might land in the United States?
    General Hyten. It is a shorter period of time. The 
ballistic missile is roughly 30 minutes. A hypersonic weapon, 
depending on the design, could be half of that, depending on 
where it is launched from, the platform. It could be even less 
than that. There are a lot of variables into that, but it is 
more challenging than a ballistic missile.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    The United States suspended its obligations under the INF 
Treaty. There has been some discussion about that. Can you talk 
about what our next steps might be to improve our position and 
to strengthen deterrence against Russia, China, and North 
Korea?
    General Hyten. I think the most important thing we can do 
is continue to modernize our nuclear triad. As long as we have 
nuclear capabilities that our adversaries cannot attack, they 
cannot take out, and they cannot eliminate, we will be able to 
prevent the use of nuclear weapons on our Nation. I remember 
when I interviewed for this job with President Obama and then I 
interviewed with Secretary Mattis after he took over, he asked 
me what is the reason we have nuclear weapons. I said the 
reason we have nuclear weapons is to prevent people from using 
nuclear weapons on us. That is exactly why we have them.
    If you do not have a robust capability and our adversaries 
do not believe that you are willing to respond, then you run 
the risk that somebody will take that step across the line that 
nobody ever wants to experience. That is why we have to make 
sure we modernize as we go forward.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Rounds?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
    I want to follow up a little bit with regard to the nuclear 
triad and what makes it as important to us as it does today. 
Part of it is the reliability, and when we start talking about 
the reliability of the nuclear triad, one of the areas that I 
think we have identified as being in need of updating is the 
nuclear command and control of the different portions of the 
triad.
    Could you share with us a little bit about, recognizing the 
setting that we are here, the weaknesses that we are trying to 
improve upon and include within that a discussion about the 
cyber threats that are shortcuts and that really do put our 
systems at risk today?
    General Hyten. One of the interesting things I have 
observed in my 27 months in command now--so that is a long 
period of time, 2 years and 3 months. Not one time in that 2 
years, 3 months have I lost connectivity with the nuclear 
force. Can you imagine any other electronic system in the world 
where that has happened? That shows you how resilient, 
reliable, and effective the current command and control system 
is.
    But what concerned me about it is I really cannot 
effectively explain that to you because it has been built 50 
years ago through different kind of pathways, different kind of 
structures. We look at it hard each and every day, and we know 
that those things are going to have to be replaced in about a 
decade. The big challenges that we have is how are we going to 
replace that old, ancient thing that works so well that we know 
works, but will not work after about another decade. How do we 
replace that with something that works just as well and with 
modern technology when we have the cyber threats we have to 
look at? One of the great things about being so old is the 
cyber threats are actually fairly minimal.
    Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that there is not 
an hour that goes by in which our system of protection of our 
communication system is not challenged someplace along the 
pathways?
    General Hyten. We see literally thousands, if not millions, 
of attacks against our systems every day. ``Attacks'' is 
defined as an unknown activity trying to get into a network. It 
may not be an attack, maybe just a curious person. But 
nonetheless, we look at all of those and make sure we defend 
those accordingly. We see that broadly on the network side. It 
is much more secure on the nuclear side because much of that is 
closed off to the world.
    Senator Rounds. With regard to both hypersonics and the 
item of discussion lately, the torpedo, which has been 
discussed in terms of the Russian advancements, in both cases 
there is a question as to the vector that we receive them from. 
Both are capable of movement, changes in direction, and so 
forth, which really changes the way that we defend North 
America because in many cases, our defenses have been built on 
the closest to the most direct route from our near-peer 
adversaries into the North American continent.
    Can you share with us a little bit about the needs, first 
of all, for the space-based capabilities that we are going to 
need in order to determine where hypersonics are at and so 
forth?
    Second of all, General O'Shaughnessy, I would just ask, can 
you share a little bit about the changes within the threats 
that a torpedo that could hit along our shorelines could do 
with regard to how we have to refocus our North American 
defenses as well?
    Really two questions, but if you could each.
    General Hyten. Real quickly, Senator, when I was a young 
officer and the Soviet threat existed, we had big radars on our 
southern border. We had a radar in Georgia and a radar in 
Texas, Robbins and El Dorado, that were looking south for 
threats that we had to worry about.
    When the wall came down and Russia became our friend, we 
dismantled those radars. We have no radars that look south.
    We have built radars and we are building a radar in Hawaii, 
built a radar in Alaska to defend against the Korean threat in 
particular to make sure we can enable General O'Shaughnessy's 
missile defense.
    But there are not enough islands in the world to build a 
radar to defend every avenue. Therefore, we have to go to 
space, and we can go to space now in an affordable way with 
distributed constellations that can look down and characterize 
that threat in a global perspective so we can see them wherever 
they come from. That is the direction we need to go.
    Senator Rounds. All at risk of cyber interference.
    General Hyten. All at risk of cyber interference, which is 
the big challenge of the day.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    General O'Shaughnessy?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. As we talked about earlier 
with respect to Arctic as the geography is no longer the buffer 
that it once was, I would say the same thing from the sea. It 
was a time where we for decades actually used the sea as a moat 
and really did not have to worry from the threats directly 
coming against the Homeland from the sea. That has 
fundamentally changed, as you were mentioning relative to the 
weapons that are being created.
    Therefore, we need to go and invest ourselves in our 
ability to have, first, the domain awareness. Just as General 
Hyten had mentioned, you have to see it if you are going to be 
able to react to it and ultimately defeat it. Right now, we 
need to invest in the IUSSS, which is our integrated undersea 
surveillance system, which has atrophied as it relates to the 
continental United States and our ability to defend there. We 
need to invest in that now to be able to defend against these 
advanced threats that are coming from the sea.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your service and for your very 
forthright and candid answers at this hearing.
    General O'Shaughnessy, is there a national emergency at the 
border?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, the President has declared 
a national emergency on the border.
    Senator Blumenthal. I am asking you in your military 
opinion does this nation face a national emergency at the 
border.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, Senator. As the President has 
declared that national emergency, he has given guidance and 
direction down to the Secretary of Defense and then the Acting 
Secretary of Defense. As that has happened, it has been 
parlayed to me in the form of an execution order, which makes 
it very clear to me of my actions that I need to take as a 
result of the guidance from our senior leadership.
    Senator Blumenthal. Did you recommend that he declare a 
national emergency?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, I did not directly recommend 
either way, although I will say----
    Senator Blumenthal. Were you consulted before he did it?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will say I have had 
multiple conversations, numerous conversations directly with 
the President with respect to the border. In addition, I have 
had multiple conversations as the Secretary of Defense and 
Acting Secretary of Defense has gone over to the White House 
for these conversations that have happened. I think I feel very 
comfortable that as the operational commander that our 
perspective was considered as those decisions were made.
    Senator Blumenthal. What is the threat to our national 
security that justifies declaring a national emergency, 
General?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, what I see from my perspective 
is that a secure border will reduce the threats to the 
Homeland.
    Senator Blumenthal. That is a general statement. But what 
is it specifically at this moment in time that justifies 
declaring a national emergency?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, again I would say that the 
President has made that declaration. We are responsible for 
that declaration----
    Senator Blumenthal. You are saying in fact--I do not mean 
to be disrespectful--that there is a national emergency because 
the President has said there is a national emergency.
    General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. What I am saying from my 
perspective I get my orders from the Secretary of Defense and 
the President. Those orders are very clear to me. Just like any 
other mission that I am given, when I get that legal order and 
I have the troops that are able to enforce that and take those 
actions, I do it with the same vigor and professionalism that I 
do for my ballistic missile defense, my operational, legal, et 
cetera. I take that same look to the----
    Senator Blumenthal. I understand that you follow orders and 
you do it well and you are proficient and expert in your 
duties. I commend you. But you did not recommend that the 
President of the United States declare a national emergency, 
and you have not given me as yet a specific fact at the border 
now that justifies declaring a national emergency.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I spent a lot of time at 
the border over the last 5 months, had very specific 
conversation with our lead federal agency, in this case the 
Customs and Border Protection, as well as with the Department 
of Homeland Security and directly with Secretary Nielsen on a 
regular, routine basis. I would defer to them with respect to 
the characterization of the threat. I will say we are trying to 
be a good partner to another lead federal agency as they take 
on this challenge.
    Senator Blumenthal. I am concerned, General, very frankly 
that this administration is politicizing our military and 
militarizing our immigration policy, in effect using the troops 
under your command as political props both in terms of 
declaring a fake emergency but also compromising our potential 
security by diverting them away from other assignments and 
missions that are absolutely necessary. My understanding is 
that these troops were engaged in various readiness and 
training exercises at the time they were deployed. Is that 
correct?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, there have been quite a few 
different deployments and units within that, but to your point, 
some of them would. I will also say that many of the units that 
have deployed, especially the initial salvo that went out, are 
actually doing exactly what their military skills are. Military 
police do a military police business. Engineers do an 
engineering business. In fact, many of them come back and 
talked about the readiness advantage they have for the way that 
they have been deployed.
    That said, readiness is a key concern of ours and mine in 
particular, and we will continue to look at the impacts to 
readiness as we go forward.
    Senator Blumenthal. General, recently--I think last week as 
a matter of fact--Under Secretary Rood and Vice Admiral Gilday 
testified that a minimum of $237 million has been spent so far 
on deploying both Active Duty troops and guard personnel at the 
border. They were unable to provide a total cost estimate for 
fiscal year 2019 even though those deployments have been 
extended--correct me if I am wrong--through September of 2019. 
Can you give us a cost estimate?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I will confirm that the 
deployments have been extended through September of 2019.
    The cost estimate--specifically on the title X side, which 
is the part that is under my command and control--was at $132 
million through the 31st of January of this year. We will 
continue to work with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] 
who is ultimately the one who is running the calculations with 
respect to the cost.
    Senator Blumenthal. In connection with the declaration of 
national emergency and the diversion of money that is necessary 
to build the wall, have you made a recommendation as to 
military construction projects within your command that would 
be stripped of funding to fund the wall?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, the actual funding is being 
worked by the Secretary of Defense as we speak. I did go down 
to the border to the El Paso area with the Secretary just this 
last weekend so he would have an understanding both of the 
military aspects of what our troops are doing right now, as 
well as be able to talk to the Customs and Border Protection 
that the folks actually doing the mission there and be able to 
take that into his calculations as this week he determines the 
funding that might be applied toward resourcing a wall or other 
efforts on the border.
    Senator Blumenthal. The money that will be taken from 
military construction projects under your command has not yet 
been determined as to what specifically and where it will come 
from.
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is a true statement, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We truly do 
appreciate it. I appreciate both of your extreme 
professionalism in a very difficult time. Thank you very much 
for stepping up. I do appreciate it.
    General O'Shaughnessy, let us go back and visit a little 
bit about the National Guard. You happened to mention it in 
your comments. This morning we had our National Guard breakfast 
caucus. A lot of our adjutant generals are here in town today 
and really excited to be here and speaking with all of their 
elected representation.
    Can you talk a little bit about how the National Guard fits 
into the overall force structure here in the United States and 
what type of missions are they engaging in?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the 
opportunity to highlight the great partnership we have with the 
National Guard. I will say certainly from the NORTHCOM and 
NORAD perspective, they are absolutely integral and core to 
every single mission that we do within our commands. It goes 
all the way from whether it is the aircraft that are sitting, 
as we speak right now, across both the CONUS [Continental 
United States] as well as in Alaska or whether it goes to the 
command and control that is part of that, whether it is the 
ballistic missile defense that we have in place. Every mission 
set that we have right now the National Guard is actively 
employed in doing that. Frankly, I can just tell you plain and 
simply we could not do our mission set without the National 
Guard and their contributions.
    Senator Ernst. We appreciate that very much. We want to 
utilize them as much as we can. We do know that there are a 
number of troops that have been activated or mobilized for work 
down on the southern border. We know that to be true.
    I would just state that having served in the National Guard 
and responding to a number of different mobilizations, whether 
it is hurricane relief, whether it is working in flood 
situations, or whether it is down on the border, that our 
troops are actively engaging in their MOS [Military 
Occupational Specialty] specific skill sets. If you are a heavy 
equipment operator, you are out there driving a dozer or you 
are operating. If you are a truck driver, you are driving. You 
are actually doing those skills that have been assigned to you. 
Thank you for highlighting that. I think it is great for our 
readiness to actually be able to engage in our MOSs. Thank you 
for that.
    I also want to go back. We have talked a lot with General 
Hyten about modernization and our nuclear capabilities, but let 
us focus a little more with you. What do you see the most 
pressing modernization requirements for NORTHCOM?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the 
opportunity to highlight this. It is actually fairly similar. 
The first thing is domain awareness. Over the years, we have 
just let atrophy our ability to understand and see what is 
happening in and around our Nation. It was done at the time for 
the right reasons because we had a sanctuary. We had the 
ability to not have more advanced sensors and more advanced 
capabilities. But now that it has fundamentally changed based 
on the security, based on our potential adversaries, our peer 
strategic competitors that now have the ability to reach out 
and hold us at risk, we need to fundamentally relook at the way 
that we are maintaining our domain awareness. That cannot be 
done with one single widget, one single particular program. It 
is going to have to be a family of systems. It is going to have 
to include both terrestrial based capability and a reassertion 
of technology in terrestrial based. It is going to have to 
include some air domain advances in technology and capability. 
But it is also absolutely going to have to include space. We 
really need to accelerate our work to put sensors in space that 
can help us understand the domain both on the sea and in the 
air of the threats that are coming towards our Homeland.
    In particular, the Arctic is an area that we really need to 
focus on and really look at investing. That is no longer a 
buffer zone. We need to be able to operate there. We need to be 
able to communicate there. We need to be able to have a 
presence there that we have not invested in in the same way 
that our adversaries have. They see that as a vulnerability 
from us, whereas it is becoming a strength for them and it is a 
weakness for us, and we need to flip that equation.
    Senator Ernst. Yes. You mentioned the Arctic, and I am sure 
that my colleague, Senator Sullivan, will have a lot of great 
questions there.
    But when we talk modernization, have we identified a system 
to replace the aging northern warning system?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Ma'am, we have a study that is going 
on right now. It is a bi-national study. It is being done by 
our Air Combat Command within the United States Air Force, as 
well as with Canada, that is going to help us. But I will tell 
you that north warning system right now--the last hardware 
insertion of technology was 1985. That needs to be invested in, 
and again, it needs to be part not just of advancing that but 
also doing the all-domain awareness in addition to the 
terrestrial based.
    Senator Ernst. Yes, I appreciate that.
    General Hyten, thank you so much for hosting me last year 
at STRATCOM. I really appreciated the tour and the time you 
took to educate me on your mission set there.
    Can you talk a little bit about the move that is ongoing at 
Offutt Air Force Base?
    General Hyten. Senator, I am glad to be able to sit here 
and say we are actually getting ready to move into the 
building. It has been a long time. It is a couple years late. 
The Guard did an amazing job. We brought in over 20 engineering 
and installation squadrons from the Guard to help us recapture 
some schedule. They saved over $70 million of the taxpayers' 
money, and they saved us probably more than that in schedule. 
We are getting ready to move in. I think we will be able to 
start next week, and I hope to have the opening ceremonies this 
October. That will be a big day because we will be able to do 
our mission even better. That will become the hub of nuclear 
command and control.
    Senator Ernst. Outstanding. Gentlemen, thank you both so 
much for your leadership.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. General O'Shaughnessy, forgive me for 
jumping back and forth between Intel and this Committee this 
morning. There is a little bit of something going on over there 
as well.
    I wanted to return to something that Senator Blumenthal 
came up and just make sure I have the correct information that 
you were not consulted by the White House before the decision 
to use military construction dollars to pay for the national 
emergency.
    General O'Shaughnessy. No, sir. That was not my response. 
Specifically, we have been in dialogue. I have been in dialogue 
with the President all the way down for multiple occasions, to 
include in coordination with the Secretary of Defense. The 
actual decision of how that funding will be placed is actually 
what the Secretary of Defense is actually working through 
literally right now.
    Senator Heinrich. Were you consulted before the 
announcement?
    General O'Shaughnessy. With multiple dialogues talking 
about the border, talking about the situation that we see.
    Senator Heinrich. Is that a yes?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our ability to have the operational 
perspective known was absolutely present.
    Senator Heinrich. My question is were you consulted as to 
using military construction dollars as the source of funding to 
pay for the national emergency efforts?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, in fact, with the Secretary of 
Defense.
    Senator Heinrich. That is a decision you support.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I gave my best military advice to 
the Secretary of Defense, to include going down, physically 
going down, with him to the border to make sure he understood 
the operational perspective.
    Senator Heinrich. If those dollars do flow to that priority 
rather than what they were appropriated for and authorized for, 
what impact of the cancellation of some of those construction 
projects have whether it is for military housing or air traffic 
control improvements or even runway upgrades? What impact would 
that have on military morale?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I think right now, Senator, that is 
premature. I think as we look at it, that is exactly the types 
of things that the Secretary is looking at. He is looking at it 
from what is the right balance, what is the right use of those 
funds, and in fact, what would the correct funds be, 
appropriate funds, to use given the direction that he has been 
given.
    Senator Heinrich. Given the Constitution, I would suggest 
that is a job for Congress.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir.
    Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, DOD's initial requirements 
for plutonium pits are to produce 30 pits per year at Los 
Alamos by 2026. Are you and NNSA [National Nuclear Security 
Administration] still laser-focused on making that happen?
    General Hyten. We are laser-focused on 30 by 2026 and 80 by 
2030, and my requirement is that. I never said where they had 
to be done, but if we do not get 30 in Los Alamos, we will 
never the 80.
    Senator Heinrich. If personnel and scientific expertise 
were shifted from one place to another during that effort, what 
would be the potential impact for the near-term goals?
    General Hyten. I have told the Secretary of Energy, as well 
as the Administrator of the NNSA, that we cannot move anything 
out of Los Alamos into Savannah River that would take our eyes 
off of the 30 in 2026. I am going down to Los Alamos and 
sending my people down to Los Alamos to make sure that that 
focus is always there because, again, if we cannot get to 30 by 
2026 at Los Al, we cannot get there at all.
    Senator Heinrich. Well, I appreciate your focus on this 
effort. It is very welcome, and you are always welcome at Los 
Alamos, as you know.
    I also understand that the administration, General Hyten, 
is currently reviewing whether it will seek to extend the New 
START agreement that limits United States and Russian strategic 
nuclear weapons to 1,550 treaty-accountable warheads with 
additional limits, obviously, on delivery vehicles. Is that 
information accurate? Is that correct?
    General Hyten. We are looking at that. The President asks 
me about that every time I see him. It is high on his mind. 
Again, the issue there is the efforts that Russia has going on 
right now that are not elements of the New START. The torpedo, 
the cruise missile, the hypersonics all are not part of that 
treaty. We believe that we would like to have all nuclear 
weapons as part of a future strategic arms treaty. That is my 
desire. I want Russia in that treaty. I want Russia in the INF 
Treaty, but if they will not participate----
    Senator Heinrich. I share that sentiment and certainly 
hopefully we can move to a world where there is control on more 
weapon systems rather than simply getting rid of the tools that 
we have to, in theory, get something that is perfect and more 
inclusive.
    Does New START provide significant benefits to U.S. 
national security interests? If so, what would those be?
    General Hyten. No treaty is perfect, and New START is 
certainly not perfect. But what it gives me at STRATCOM, it 
gives me two very important things. Number one, it puts a limit 
on the basics of their strategic force. I understand what the 
limits are and I can position my force accordingly so I can 
always be ready to respond. Maybe as important, it also gives 
me insight through the verification process of exactly what 
they are doing and what those pieces are. Having that insight 
through my forces and our partners is unbelievably important 
for me to understand what Russia is doing. But we do not have 
insight into all the other things that are going on right now. 
That will be the challenge.
    Senator Heinrich. If we were to lose that insight without 
gaining more global insight, would that be a step forward or a 
step back?
    General Hyten. That is the balance that will be in the 
decision that the country has to make as we go forward on the 
benefits of New START. I would like everything on the table.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, General.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thanks for your exceptional service of both of 
you and all the hard work you are doing.
    I want to talk about the Arctic and missile defense, but I 
actually wanted just to add a little bit to the exchange you 
had with my colleague, Senator Blumenthal, who I have a lot of 
respect for and work with on a lot of issues.
    But, General O'Shaughnessy, let me ask. How many Americans 
were killed by drug overdoses last year? Do you know?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, Senator, I do. 72,000 in the 
last year and 70,000 the year before.
    Senator Sullivan. More than all the men and women killed in 
the Vietnam War just last year, 72,000 Americans.
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. That is opioids, heroin, meth. How much 
of the heroin in America comes from Mexico?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, there is a significant portion 
that comes up through the southern approaches.
    Senator Sullivan. The number I have heard is over 90 
percent.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Okay. If that is not an emergency, 72,000 
dead Americans killed by opioids and heroin in 1 year, I have 
no freakin' idea what an emergency is. That is just my view on 
that. Do you have any comment on that? Is that an emergency, 
72,000 dead Americans?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, I would say that clearly this 
is a national issue that we have to take on with a whole-of-
government approach.
    Senator Sullivan. Yes, okay. Thank you.
    Let me talk about the Arctic. By the way, General 
O'Shaughnessy, I really want to commend you. You are by far and 
away the NORTHCOM Commander who has actually put this on the 
radar as a serious issue. Just today in your testimony about so 
many of the threats operating both in the Arctic and passing 
through I think is a wakeup call. This Committee has been doing 
a lot of work in that regard. Let me ask a couple issues with 
regard to capabilities.
    The Russians have a fleet of polar icebreakers. It is 40. 
They are building 14 more, including nuclear-powered 
icebreakers, weaponized icebreakers. We are finally getting our 
act together on that. Last year's NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] authorized six. This past appropriations 
bill recently signed by the President has about close to $700 
million on the first one.
    But do we have the required capabilities to answer the 
Russian and, by the way, Chinese challenge in the Arctic? If 
so, what more capabilities do we need?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, you started with 
icebreakers, and I will highlight that as well. On paper, we 
have four icebreakers. In reality we have one that is actually 
a polar level.
    Senator Sullivan. We have two and one is broken. Right?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Two. They are sister ships. We have 
one that is cannibalized and one that is----
    Senator Sullivan. They were commissioned in the early 
1970s.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. They are 43 years old.
    Senator Sullivan. Have you ever seen those icebreakers?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I have been on the Polar Star.
    Senator Sullivan. They are a disgrace to the men and women 
who wear the uniform of the United States. Are they not?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, sir. Just this year alone, for 
example, as the Polar Star was going down to Antarctica, she 
had multiple major casualties to include a propeller shaft seal 
that went out that ended up in flooding. Its incinerator 
actually caught on fire. There was a fire and flooding on that 
ship.
    Senator Sullivan. Yes. I commend the men and women of the 
Coast Guard who try to keep that ship afloat, but it is a 
disgrace. You put men and women wearing the uniform of our 
Nation on a ship that is that old and dangerous.
    But I interrupted you. Please go on.
    General O'Shaughnessy. In that regard, we are working 
closely with the Coast Guard and, of course, the U.S. Navy who 
is helping the Coast Guard get the six icebreakers, at least 
three that will be polar-capable icebreakers. Those are 
absolutely critical for us even within the Department of 
Defense even though it is ultimately for the Coast Guard to be 
able to clear the access for us to be able to have operations 
in the Arctic. So that is a high priority for us in U.S. 
Northern Command.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question. Again, this 
Committee has focused a lot on the Arctic, which I appreciate 
in a bipartisan way. We mandated this strategy that had to come 
out of DOD. Two years ago we mandated the concept of a 
strategic Arctic port. The Secretary of the Navy recently 
testified that we need a strategic Arctic port to protect our 
interests in the Arctic. Do you agree with him?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I had a conversation with the 
Secretary of the Navy just last week on this regard. Clearly 
what we need--I will use an example. We have a requirement for 
fuel north of Dutch Harbor. Right now we do not have access to 
that. Nome, if we were able to make Nome a deepwater port, 
would serve that requirement.
    Senator Sullivan. You think we need that the way he said 
that?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I think we need to ultimately have 
the ability to have the infrastructure to allow us to do the 
operations. A deepwater port would certainly be part of that 
going forward.
    Senator Sullivan. General Hyten, let me ask you. You have 
been a great advocate on missile defense. The Trump 
administration recently put out its Missile Defense Review. The 
President actually announced it at the Pentagon with the Vice 
President and SecDef, the Secretary of Defense.
    Again, this Committee has been doing a lot of work in 
regard to that.
    Do you agree with the priorities outlined in the Missile 
Defense Review? Can you just briefly talk about what other 
areas we need and how Alaska is the cornerstone of our Nation's 
missile defense in terms of LRDR [Long Range Discrimination 
Radar] radar, missile fields, and other areas that we need to 
continue to build on?
    General Hyten. I agree with the findings of the Missile 
Defense Review. The thing I liked most about the Missile 
Defense Review is that it was not just a ballistic missile 
defense review. It was a missile defense review looking at the 
entire spectrum of capabilities that we have to have not just 
against ballistic missiles but all the missile threats that we 
face. It talked about getting left of launch, as well as the 
response after the launch.
    When you look at Alaska, all you have to do is look at a 
globe and look at where Korea is and look at where the United 
States is and you understand the importantance of Alaska. That 
is why we are putting the long-range discrimination radar in 
Alaska. That is why that is going to be a critical portion.
    I continue to look at the radar architecture and be 
concerned about vulnerabilities in that architecture. That is 
why I think we need to augment the ground element, as General 
O'Shaughnessy talked about earlier with the space element, and 
then defend that space element as well. That will allow us to 
see, characterize, and hopefully discriminate the threat so we 
can make more efficient use of our interceptors in Alaska.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
    I want to pick up on a comment made by my colleague, 
Senator Sullivan, about the Coast Guard icebreakers, and I 
would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to mention 
we have a very aging fleet in the Great Lakes as well. In fact, 
I was on a Coast Guard ship earlier last week, and it was well 
over 50 years old. You can only keep those things running so 
long and you start running out of bubblegum and tape and you 
need to have it replaced. Hopefully we will be able to 
recapitalize that fleet in a much broader way.
    General O'Shaughnessy, you have a very big responsibility 
and an important one with a very large AOR [Area of 
Responsibility]. I am sure you have a lot of sleepless nights 
thinking about various threats. What do you believe is the most 
significant threat to your AOR? We have heard a number of 
different ones here today, but I am just curious as to the one 
that you think most about.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I think right now it in the 
near term is Russia. As we look at the advancement that Russia 
has made, it is not only the capability and the capacity that 
they have, but it is also the investments they made, the 
training they are doing, and the patterns of behavior that 
clearly show they intend to not only hold us at risk but in 
conflict, they would actually take action on the conventional 
side as well as on the nuclear side potentially. It is not just 
a cyber threat. This is a kinetic threat with the cruise 
missiles that we talked about. We need to invest in our ability 
to defend if we are going to be able to maintain our ability to 
defend. That is something that I think we need to have a sense 
of urgency on.
    Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that. That is our number 
one threat to the Homeland in your estimation.
    However, we just recently deployed troops to our southern 
border. As you know, as we have talked about here, we have a 
national emergency that was declared on February 15th.
    My question to you, General, is we sent troops to the 
border last October and into November. Could you tell us how 
the threat environment has changed from November to February? 
Have you seen an increased threat?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Well, first, I would say for the 
specific clarification of the threat we rely on our Customs and 
Border Protection personnel in close cooperation with them. I 
would defer the specifics of that actual threat to them.
    What I will say it is a dynamic that we are seeing where 
the response that we did in October was to a very large 
caravan, and we were tasked to do a request for assistance from 
the Department of Homeland Security to respond very rapidly. We 
did so. I am very proud of the response that was made with our 
military members taking the orders they were given, the mission 
that they were given, and executing it with the professionalism 
that you would expect of our military members.
    Senator Peters. I apologize, General. But just from that 
point forward, what has happened since then to now? What have 
you seen?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, we have seen the caravans are 
not as large, but they are still out there. I would use the 
example of a couple weeks ago where we had to respond to Eagle 
Pass where we had migrants show up there where the Customs and 
Border Protection asked for our assistance again to be able to 
harden the port of entry and provide them assistance in their 
ability to respond.
    Senator Peters. Well, I think we all agree that border 
security is incredibly important. I do not think you will find 
any disagreement with anybody on this Committee. I sit on the 
Homeland Security Committee as well. It is clearly a 
nonpartisan issue. We all believe that borders must be secure. 
It is a fundamental aspect of our government to keep the 
Homeland safe.
    The question is usually how do you do that in the most 
effective way and understand that we have to do it in a way 
that is respectful of taxpayer dollars as well. That I think is 
really the crux of what we are deciding right now.
    You mentioned that you were part of the consultation with 
the administration as to the need for a national emergency. I 
would assume, because of your repeated trips down to the 
border, you have seen significant gaps from Customs and Border 
Patrol. However, as you mentioned earlier in your testimony, 
the DEA has come up with a report that shows that most of the 
drugs, for example, that are coming across the border are 
coming through ports of entry. They are not folks walking 
across the open desert, and if they are, there are probably 
much more effective ways to track those folks down either with 
unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors, National Guard troops. I 
understand those National Guard troops use Department of 
Defense drug interdiction program money to go down there. Yet 
now I hear that that drug interdiction money may be diverted to 
something else.
    Could you explain why you think drug interdiction money is 
simply not an effective way of dealing with drugs coming across 
the border and we should look at other avenues?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, what I would say is that we 
have been in consultation with the Secretary of Defense on 
exactly these issues. With our role within USNORTHCOM, we have 
JTF-North [Joint Task Force North], for example, that is 
dedicated to the counternarcotics mission. That gets funding 
through the 284 money that you are alluding to. That is 
something that we are articulating up to the Secretary of 
Defense with the aspect of saying we want to preserve that 
ability for that particular program, as just an example of what 
inputs the Secretary of Defense is getting as he works through 
what is the appropriate way to work the funding and what is the 
report and response from the Department of Defense to this 
demand signal.
    Senator Peters. You are recommending that that money stay 
in place. That would not be diverted.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I am talking about very specifically 
the USNORTHCOM perspective of a very small sliver of the 
overall funding piece that needs to be considered within the 
broader context of the requirements that the Secretary of 
Defense has been given.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, 
thank you for being here. Thank you for your exemplary service, 
and thank you for the service of the men and women under your 
respective commands.
    General Hyten, I want to go back and talk about something 
you have touched on several times already this morning, the 
need for the modernization of our nuclear arsenal. I want to 
focus in on, in particular, one aspect of that as it relates to 
low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
    We know that Russia and China, our two peer or near-peer 
competitors, have been investing significantly in these types 
of weapons. Russia, for instance, in anti-ship cruise missiles, 
nuclear torpedoes, nuclear depth charges. China, other nuclear 
weapons designed for regional conflict like the DF-21, DF-26 
ballistic missiles. For these reasons, of course, the Nuclear 
Posture Review that was released last February called for us, 
the United States, to deploy new low-yield tactical warheads.
    Can you explain? Do you agree with that assessment by the 
Nuclear Posture Review? Can you explain why this type of weapon 
might be important given the strategic choices that we are now 
facing?
    General Hyten. Senator, I do agree with the Nuclear Posture 
Review. I had a lot of input into the creation of those 
recommendations. The thing I liked best about the Nuclear 
Posture Review and our National Defense Strategy is they are 
threat-based documents. When you have a threat specifically in 
Russia, which is my biggest concern, with low-yield nuclear 
weapons where they have deployed an order of magnitude more of 
those than we even have in our inventory, we need to be able to 
quickly respond to that and provide the President a spectrum of 
options in order to do that. Now, we have low-yield nuclear 
weapons in the air leg of our triad, but not in another leg of 
our triad. I talked about the attributes before about timely, 
responsive. We want to make sure the President always has a 
responsive option to respond.
    We are recommending that, but it is important to note that 
is inside the New START treaty. Russia is building those 
outside the New START treaty. We are going to take missiles off 
of the submarines, take big weapons off the submarines, put 
little weapons on the submarine, put it back on. We will still 
have 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons, but the total yield will 
be smaller. I do not think that is escalatory in any way. I 
think that will allow the President to have options to manage 
the threat effectively.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
    I wonder if you could go on, General Hyten, and just 
explain how it is that deploying new low-yield nuclear weapons 
can, if we do it effectively, if we do it right, actually 
reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.
    General Hyten. Because the adversary watches exactly what 
we have and then they look for gaps. If they think they can 
deploy a nuclear weapon and get away with it, they very well 
may do that. The Russian doctrine is escalate to win, and if 
they execute that doctrine as they have said--and I have to 
believe them at their word--if they execute that doctrine as 
they have said and they may consider if something is going bad 
on the battlefield somewhere to deploy a low-yield nuclear 
weapon and the United States will not respond because if we do 
that, we have to respond with a high-yield nuclear weapon, they 
might take that chance. But if they see we have a low-yield 
nuclear weapon, they will not go that direction. That is the 
whole theory of deterrence is if they see an effective response 
to that, they will not use that weapon.
    Senator Hawley. Given that, General, what place do you 
think that the use of these tactical low-yield nuclear weapons 
ought to have in our own strategic doctrine? I think you have 
touched on it, but explain a little bit more.
    General Hyten. The most important thing to realize is they 
are deterrent weapons. The first use of a deterrent weapon is 
to make sure the weapon is not used against you. Now, in order 
for that to happen, the adversary has to look at that and see a 
rational response. The second priority is to use that in 
response to that option. But the goal of that weapon is to make 
sure that weapon is not used on you.
    Senator Hawley. This is particularly important, is it not, 
General, as we face peer competitors, near-peer competitors who 
may well have significantly larger conventional military forces 
than we do so that we do not find ourselves in a position where 
a disadvantage that we may have with conventional forces tempts 
aggression. Is that fair to say?
    General Hyten. I never want to be at a disadvantage in any 
element of our architecture. I think it was Senator Inhofe, 
Senator Reed talked about disadvantages or places our 
adversaries are ahead of us. As far as I am concerned, that 
should never happen in the United States of America. But it is 
happening. I never want to be there.
    On the conventional side, we are still the most dominant 
conventional force on the planet. If we can move our 
capabilities into an operation, we will dominate the 
battlefield today. That is where the threat of a low-yield 
nuclear weapon becomes at risk because an adversary may see the 
opportunity to deploy conventional forces and have that short-
term advantage, but eventually that advantage will turn and 
that is where that escalation risk exists and we have to be 
able to respond.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you so much, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks to our witnesses.
    I am sorry that Senator Sullivan left. I want to return and 
say that 72,000 deaths, overdose deaths, is an emergency. 
40,000 people died in 2017 by gun violence in the United 
States, murders and suicides. That would seem to me to be an 
emergency.
    The question is not whether 72,000 drug deaths or 40,000 
gun deaths are an emergency. The question is should we allow a 
President to unilaterally declare an emergency and to take $6 
billion out of the Pentagon's budget to apply to a situation, 
General O'Shaughnessy, that you said the threats to our Nation 
from our southern border are not military in nature. The 
question that Congress and the Senate is going to grapple with 
in the next couple weeks is will we allow a President to 
declare that drug overdose deaths are an emergency, but the 
threat is not military and still will take $6 billion out of 
the defense budget to deal with it because if we set that 
precedent, I could certainly foresee a day when a President is 
going to say 40,000 gun deaths a year are an emergency, and why 
do we not take the money out of the Pentagon budget to deal 
with that? If we let the President take $6 billion out of the 
Pentagon's budget to deal with a non-military threat of drugs, 
then you guys are going to see money taken out of your budget 
for other emergencies as well. That is the vote that we are all 
going to be casting in the next couple of weeks.
    General O'Shaughnessy, I applaud the honesty of your 
written testimony. It is 23 pages of testimony. The first 
section of it is threats, five pages. You identify six threats, 
nothing to do with the southern border. The second section is 
defending the Homeland, eight pages of testimony, four 
different domains. The last is southern approaches, and you 
acknowledge that it is not a military threat. You focus in your 
three paragraphs of testimony on illegal narcotics.
    The question we are going to have to vote on is do we want 
the President to take Pentagon money for a threat that you 
acknowledge is non-military in nature.
    The President proposes $6 billion. The first chunk is $2.5 
billion of drug interdiction money. The Pentagon account on 
drug interdiction does not have $2.5 billion in it. Right now, 
an ABC news this morning article--one of the two Pentagon funds 
the Trump administration plans to tap to help secure the 
southern border after declaring a national emergency has 
nowhere near the $2.5 billion that is projected for use. It has 
$85 million, not $2.5 billion. It has $85 million that is 
available. The Pentagon is saying that they are going to have 
to reprogram or shift money from other accounts into the 
account to make the $2.5 billion.
    I gather, General O'Shaughnessy, from your testimony 
earlier you do not yet know where the Pentagon plans to find 
the money to shift into the drug interdiction account to then 
take to use for the President's emergency. Is that correct?
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct, Senator. That is 
beyond the purview of USNORTHCOM. That is something that OSD is 
working with the joint staff.
    Senator Kaine. Within the Pentagon but not NORTHCOM.
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is correct.
    Senator Kaine. Secondly, I want to make sure I understand 
your testimony. That is the $2.5 billion. The $2.5 billion to 
be taken is a fund that has $85 million in it. There is 
apparently an attempt to shift other Pentagon monies into it. 
We do not yet know where it will come from.
    The second chunk is $3.5 billion out of MILCON, military 
construction, projects. General O'Shaughnessy, in NORTHCOM I 
gather there are ongoing military construction projects as well 
as projects that you would like to do that either are further 
out or not yet funded. Correct?
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is a true statement, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. I gather from your testimony you have not 
yet been asked to provide a list of NORTHCOM MILCON projects 
that you would propose or you would recommend to be reduced, 
eliminated, or delayed. Is that correct?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We are actually working very closely 
with the Secretary of Defense's office with respect to the 
prioritization of that, not necessarily specifically related to 
this issue, but we have had communication with them with our 
prioritization of those MILCON dollars.
    Senator Kaine. I want to make sure I understand this. 
Obviously, NORTHCOM is always going to have a list of MILCON 
projects because we are working on the NDAA and that will be in 
it. You will always have a list. But have you been asked 
specifically in connection with this proposal to take $3.5 
billion out of MILCON, give us your recommendations as the 
NORTHCOM Commander about projects that should be reduced, 
eliminated, or delayed?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Again, Senator, I believe that is 
the process that is actually ongoing this very week, and that 
is why I was really pleased that the Acting Secretary of 
Defense took the time to go down, see firsthand, and then have 
a personal insight as he works through those very difficult 
challenges and decisions that he will make as he ultimately 
responds to the direction of the President.
    Senator Kaine. Have you made recommendations or not? Has 
NORTHCOM made recommendations about MILCON projects that should 
be reduced, eliminated, or delayed?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We have not specifically to this 
particular effort as of yet, but it is still premature and pre-
decisional at this point.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here.
    I know that the hypersonics have been discussed. General 
Hyten, I wanted to come back to that issue. It is important to 
us in Tennessee because of Arnold Air Force and the work that 
has been done there. They have been really a key contributor, 
if you will, to our Nation's aerospace program. They are very 
important to us in Tennessee, and we are pleased that they are 
there. You have discussed some of the program and the advances 
there, the operational capabilities.
    But I want to come back to one thing that they have 
mentioned a couple of times, and it is having both the talent 
and the numbers of individuals to really push forward into the 
hypersonics and into that capacity and, General O'Shaughnessy, 
as you said, 21st century warfare and having what is there. Let 
us take just a minute and focus on the talent and the numbers 
to deliver on that mission.
    General Hyten. Senator, Arnold Air Force Station is a 
treasure to this country. The wind tunnel capabilities that 
they have there are unique, and they allow us to do things that 
we really cannot do anywhere else.
    We have a challenge at Arnold and a challenge across our 
DOD labs and across our Department of Energy labs in 
attracting, recruiting, and retaining the kind of engineering 
talent that is required to move these kind of programs forward.
    What I have learned, though, is when you can explain to the 
youth of America the kind of work that you can do by coming to 
places like Arnold, they will come. They will come because they 
love to do that kind of fascinating work. That is the same with 
Los Alamos or Livermore or Sandia or Rome Labs or any of our 
national labs. The key is then to be able to retain them 
because they will be trained and they will learn unique skills 
and they can go out and do anything. We have to make sure that 
we have the compensation that matches their talent, that we 
compete with the civilian sector in doing that. But the most 
important thing is we can provide them fascinating work.
    The one challenge I would say that we have to work at 
together--and the Department of Defense is looking at this; 
Congress is looking at this--is the time it takes some of these 
employees to get their clearances has been very de-motivational 
for new employees and it is causing some of them to leave 
because it takes years in some cases for them to get the high 
level security clearances to work those issues. Now, the 
Secretary, Secretary Mattis, now Secretary Shanahan, have 
looked at this issue directly, and they are working it directly 
with the broader government. But that is an issue that we want 
to continue to take on.
    Senator Blackburn. Kind of in the same vein, let us talk 
about USSPACECOM and that capacity, that mission, the 
transition of that mission. How are you approaching this so 
that going from STRATCOM to SPACECOM that is a seamless 
transition, and that we keep our focus on those threats that 
are coming to us that we are going to need to--the adversary 
threats we will need to address?
    General Hyten. Two pieces of the answer to that question, 
Senator, is that, number one, I am still the senior military 
person in space still serving Active Duty. So I care 
desperately about space. But as the Commander of Strategic 
Command, space will never be my number one priority. In fact, 
right now it is about number three. The nuclear modernization 
and operations is number one. Nuclear command and control is 
number two. Space is my third priority. With the importance of 
space in today's day and age, that is not good to have that 
priority. We need a command that focuses on that and the 
commander of that command, whoever that person is, he or she 
must have a focus on space 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. That 
is why we are standing up a Space Command.
    One of the ways we are going to make sure we do that 
because I was around when we transitioned the old U.S. Space 
Command to U.S. Strategic Command in 2002--now we are kind of 
going back the other way. I watched us almost break the space 
mission when we did that because we just haphazardly slapped 
billets and said these 500-plus billets are going to move from 
Colorado to Omaha, and I will just say the people did not come 
with them automatically.
    We are going to continue to perform a lot of the mission 
for Space Command in the STRATCOM headquarters. It will be 
Space Command East. Omaha is east in this case if it is in 
Colorado. If it is in Florida, it will be Space Command West. 
If it is in Alabama, it will be Space Command West. Wherever it 
ends up, we are going to continue to support that because we do 
not know the final destination of where that is going to be. We 
cannot break the mission because we have threats to deal with 
today. So we will make sure we cover both of those issues in 
dealing with the standup of Space Command.
    Senator Blackburn. My time has expired. I am going to 
submit for the record a QFR [Questions for the Record] for you 
on supply chain integrity dealing with the space systems. I 
thank you each for your service and for being here today.
    General Hyten. Thank you, ma'am.
    Chairman Inhofe. Without objection, it will be part of the 
record. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Warren?
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here today.
    Senator Heinrich asked about New START, and I just want to 
go back and dig a little deeper, if I can, on that.
    General Hyten, in March 2017, you testified in front of the 
House Armed Services Committee, and you said ``I have stated 
for the record in the past and I will state again that I am a 
big supporter of the New START agreement.'' Is that still your 
view?
    General Hyten. It is still my view. I have said it multiple 
times. I am a big supporter of the New START agreement. I want 
ideally in my view all nuclear weapons to be part of the next 
phase of New START and not just the identified weapons that are 
in the New START treaty now.
    Senator Warren. I understand you would like to see an 
expanded New START. Can you just say a word about why you think 
New START is so important?
    General Hyten. It gives me two things at STRATCOM. Number 
one, it gives a cap on their strategic baseline nuclear weapons 
and their ballistic missiles, both submarine and ICBM, as well 
as their bombers so I understand what that is. Also, just as 
important, it gives me insight through the verification regime 
to their real capabilities. The INF Treaty, for example, does 
not have a verification regime anymore. The New START treaty 
does, which gives me insight into the Russian capabilities. 
Those are hugely beneficial to me. They just have to be 
balanced against all the other things Russia is doing outside 
of the treaty.
    Senator Warren. Right.
    Actually can you just say a word more about that, about the 
inspection process and what benefit that gives to the United 
States?
    General Hyten. Both Russia and the United States, as party 
to that treaty, have the ability to declare a New START 
inspection. The Russians can land in our country, and I get a 
notification that they landed at a port of entry somewhere. San 
Francisco is one that they land at frequently. Once they land 
there, they can declare wherever they want to go in this 
country to look at our nuclear force. We have the same ability 
in Russia to land at a port of entry in Russia and then go 
wherever we want to look at their capabilities. They open it up 
to verify that the right number of weapons are there, the right 
kind of weapons are there. That gives us insight into those 
capabilities, gives them insight into our capabilities and 
improves our overall strategic stability.
    Senator Warren. I presume, based on what you have said, 
that if we either lost that capacity or the capacity was 
greatly diminished, that you would like to try to find another 
way to be able to conduct that same kind of inspection and know 
what is going on.
    In this setting, how confident are you that we could 
replace those inspections, the data exchanges, and the 
notifications that are now in New START with other verification 
tools in a timely and cost effective manner?
    General Hyten. We have very good intelligence capabilities, 
but there is really nothing that can replace the eyes-on/hands-
on ability to look at something. We have to do that. But there 
are elements that they have that are not elements of the New 
START treaty that we do not have this insight into.
    Senator Warren. I understand that you want to see this 
expanded. I am just trying to hang onto what we have got and 
then talk a little bit about the expansion.
    Let me just ask, in your view would it be easier or harder 
to provide an effective deterrent without a verifiable arms 
control agreement such as New START in place?
    General Hyten. I believe in any situation I can foresee in 
the next 10 years I can provide an effective defense as long as 
I have a capable triad with the weapons that we have defined. I 
get concerned 10 years and beyond that with torpedoes, with 
cruise missiles, with hypersonics that they could go a 
completely other direction that we would have difficulty. But I 
do not have any problem standing here and saying I can defend 
this nation today and I think the commander after me can, but I 
worry about the commander after the commander after the next.
    Senator Warren. The question I am trying to ask, though, is 
it easier or harder when you have got the tools available to 
you in New START.
    General Hyten. Today it is absolutely easier.
    Senator Warren. That is the part I am going for. This is a 
part of what you are able to accomplish.
    Do you support the extension of New START?
    General Hyten. I have stated for the record in the past--I 
have not changed my opinion--I support New START, but you have 
to have a partner that wants to participate in New START.
    Senator Warren. I know.
    General Hyten. It is going to be like INF. We have to have 
a partner that can participate. It is a two-party treaty. If 
the Russians continued to build the capabilities outside the 
New START treaty that are not accountable and will not come to 
the table under the treaty--there is an element of the treaty 
that says if there is a new strategic arm that appears, they 
should bring that to the table and discuss it. If they will not 
do that, then that causes me to have concerns.
    Senator Warren. I appreciate that. I think you are exactly 
right when you identify who is going to come to the table. As 
you know, New START expires in just 2 years. The administration 
has already ripped up another nuclear arms treaty with Russia, 
the INF Treaty, and it appears to be running out the clock on 
the New START without any plans for a follow-up agreement. If 
this happens, this is going to be the first time since 1972 
that there are no arms control agreements between the United 
States and Russia.
    My view is we have a moral and strategic responsibility to 
do everything in our power to prevent a new nuclear arms race, 
and at a minimum I think that means working with Russia to try 
to get back to the negotiating table, try to get them back into 
compliance with the INF Treaty and working on a New START 
treaty. This just seems to me to be common sense arms control 
and to make America safe.
    General Hyten. I pay close attention to what the State 
Department is doing, and they are reaching out to the Russians 
and the Russians are not answering favorably.
    Senator Warren. Well, I hope we can get them to the table, 
and I am glad to hear that you are in favor of that. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Generals, both of you, for your service and for 
your testimony today.
    Since we talked a couple of weeks ago, General Hyten, I 
have completed my tour of bases in North Dakota. I went to all 
of them. I want you to know that while Minot and Grand Forks 
were grateful, the Cavalier was especially grateful that you 
asked specifically about them, and it was very encouraging I 
will tell you. I am new to this Committee, as you know, and I 
have sat through enough briefings that have made me adequately 
frightened, but I feel much better having gone to the bases, 
including our National Guard ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance] and Global Hawk bases. It is fantastic.
    With regard to modernization, General Hyten, I agree with 
you, that one of the things that concerns me is not so much a 
capability of modernizing, but the speed with which we are able 
to do it. When we think about the history of 60 years ago being 
able to build in 5 years, not just develop but create, produce 
hundreds of ICBMs, I do not even know if we could do that 
today. The timeline scares me.
    Do you have any specific thoughts on the bureaucracy itself 
and how we can improve the bureaucracy and then, as I always 
like to say, what we as policymakers can do to help either 
knock down the hurdles or send the right signals so that we can 
meet the timeline that is facing us?
    General Hyten. Senator, thanks for going to Minot, Cav, and 
Grand Forks. They are pretty special places. When you see the 
people, you should feel very, very good about this country. 
They are amazing people.
    But when you look at the challenges that we face in the 
future, I think Senator Peters asked General O'Shaughnessy what 
kept him awake at night, and General O'Shaughnessy answered 
Russia. What keeps me awake at night mostly is actually 
ourselves because somehow we have lost the ability to go fast. 
I do not know where we lost that, but somewhere we lost the 
ability to go fast, and we better regain that because right now 
we are dominant. I can guarantee you today that STRATCOM can 
keep this nation secure, but we have to make sure that is the 
case. We have to figure out how to go fast again. I can give 
you a lot of recommendations. I will be glad to do it offline, 
but I will give you one here.
    The one recommendation I have is that we have to, once 
again, empower the people that actually build stuff. We have to 
empower in the military the 06 program directors. That is 
colonels and Navy captains that actually build things. Over the 
last 25 years, we have taken all the authorities away from 
them, and in many cases, they are not even staying in the 
military anymore. They go out to do other things in industry. 
But those engineers that want to go build things--that is what 
built this amazing force that I get to command today. We have 
to go back again and do everything we can to empower the people 
down at that level to make the decisions, how to spend the 
money, how to deliver the capability, how to test the 
capability, all those kind of issues because they will do it 
more efficiently than when they have to go through 18 layers of 
bureaucracy above them.
    Oh, by the way, if they do fail, we will fire them and find 
somebody else. That is the other thing that is beneficial about 
having the authority in the right place. Now you know who is 
responsible. Right now, it is almost impossible to tell who is 
even responsible because there are so many layers of 
bureaucracy.
    Senator Cramer. Can Congress do something about that or is 
this----
    General Hyten. Congress has started down that path. Your 
Committee, as well as the House Armed Services Committee, in 
the last 2 years have made significant improvements in moving 
things from the Office of the Secretary of Defense back down to 
the services. I have now watched the services both on the Air 
Force and the Navy side, which are mostly in my command--I do 
not watch the Army as close--move things back out again to the 
2006's. Continuing that process, continuing to look at that 
through this Committee and to push those authorities back 
down--I think that is the biggest thing that would help.
    Senator Cramer. General O'Shaughnessy, could you comment 
on, I guess, the same basic principles within the context of 
your command because, again, having been in Grand Forks and 
Cavalier and even Fargo, frankly, with the Happy Hooligans and 
their ISR work, I find some of the greatest innovators in the 
world, and I just want them to be empowered.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I absolutely agree with everything 
General Hyten said. As you alluded to, I think we have to 
change the way that we are thinking about advancing our 
capabilities, and we cannot go about it the way that we have in 
the past if we are going to keep pace with our adversaries.
    Senator Cramer. Maybe in the remaining seconds, General 
O'Shaughnessy, I would ask for one clarification with regard to 
the debate about the southern border and your role in advising 
or in providing consultation to the President. Do you feel like 
you and the others, but you specifically, have been adequately 
listened to and that the information and intelligence and 
insights that you provided to the President and the others 
around him have been appropriately taken in and considered 
before making this whole-of-government decision?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Thank you for asking that, Senator. 
Yes, I do I believe for a variety of forums, whether it be 
directly with the President or whether it be through the 
Secretary of Defense with the Chairman, whether it be actually 
going hands-on and actually seeing what is going on there. I 
feel very comfortable that the best military advice from 
USNORTHCOM has been put forward and has been in the proper 
forums.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
    Senator Duckworth?
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you so much for your time today and your 
testimony and your willingness to answer extensive questions.
    General Hyten, in your testimony, you discuss the 
effectiveness of our legacy nuclear command, control, and 
communication systems and the need to pursue updates to meet 
evolving needs.
    Can you discuss the implications of building a new system 
in light of the rapidly changing technologies like AI, quantum 
computing, and machine learning? Could you elaborate, to the 
extent that you are able to in an open setting? Are we building 
an adaptable architecture with the workarounds necessary to 
adapt a future tech and modernization?
    General Hyten. Senator, over the last 6 months, I have dug 
into that very deeply, much deeper than I would ever expect a 
combatant commander to have to do that. That is because on the 
3rd of October, the Secretary of Defense put me in charge of 
the nuclear command and control enterprise. I am responsible 
for operations requirements and system engineering of that 
enterprise now. I felt the need to go out and look at how we 
are doing today, and I understand that pretty well. But then I 
have to define now how we are going to do it in the future in 
this very challenging cyber threat environment that we are 
walking into.
    I have some ideas. I have formed those ideas as I have gone 
through. Basically the broad-based structure of that idea is to 
develop a number of pathways for a message to get through that 
is nearly infinite that nobody can ever figure out exactly 
where it is or deny the ability for that message to get 
through. That is the way to do things in the future, and I 
think we will have the means to do that. We would have to talk 
about it on a much more classified level to get into the 
details.
    I have gone out to industry. I have gone out to the 
federally funded research and development corporations, and I 
have asked them to come in with ideas. Just last week, they 
delivered those ideas to me. We are going to now evaluate those 
ideas and come up with a broad-based set of mission needs that 
we need to explore, and then I will work back with industry to 
figure out how to do that. Then the services, the Army and the 
Navy in this case, will actually build them.
    Senator Duckworth. Have you thought about also going out to 
some of our national laboratories? I know they fall under the 
DOE, but in Illinois, we have both Fermi Lab and Argonne with 
quantum computing capabilities, currently pretty high up on the 
spectrum of quantum computing capabilities. But without major 
investments, we are going to fall behind in that.
    General Hyten. You bet, and I have gone to the national 
labs. I went to the national labs, the federally funded 
research and development corporations, the university 
affiliated research corporations, all those elements looking 
for best ideas. I did that individually because I found when I 
brought everybody together in a room, the answer ended up 
looking like it used to, and when I kept everybody separately 
everybody had very, very innovative answers. So now we are 
going to have to figure out how to capture this innovation and 
move forward effectively. But I had reached out to the DOE 
labs, as well as the UARCs [University Affiliated Research 
Centers] and FFRDCs [Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers].
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    I also want to delve a little deeper with both of you into 
something General O'Shaughnessy mentioned in his written 
testimony. General, when discussing the potential cumulative 
effects of Chinese and Russian advanced technologies such as 
hypersonics and cyber efforts--and you have mentioned them 
here--you said ``collectively these advanced technologies could 
be capable of creating strategic effects with non-nuclear 
weapons potentially affecting national decision-making and 
limiting response options in both peacetime and crisis.''
    Now, we are very focused and we have had quite a discussion 
today on nuclear strategic deterrence at the moment which, to 
be clear, I do not have a problem with that. I, in fact, do 
think we need to modernize our nuclear arsenal. But my concern 
and question for you both is around our own non-nuclear 
strategic deterrence.
    Would you increase investments on our end whether in 
hypersonics, cyber, conventional prop, global strike weapons, 
other new technologies in an effort to reach a level providing 
a credible deterrent against Chinese and Russian nuclear 
activities as we suggest they may be attempting with us? How do 
we balance that with the real need to continue our investments 
in the nuclear realm?
    General O'Shaughnessy. One, thanks for the opportunity to 
respond to that question because I think it is right in line 
with the NDS, and as the NDS has articulated, the changing 
security environment--one of the things that has really 
fundamentally changed is the strategic deterrence as it applies 
to the conventional aspect. As we look at that, as General 
Hyten mentioned, the cost imposition--in other words, we have 
to be able to impose a cost if we are going to be able to 
deter. But also especially on the conventional side, you have 
to be able to actually deny them their objectives. It is a 
combination of both of those together, imposing costs, denying 
their objectives, and then be able to credibly communicate that 
to them so they understand from a deterrence standpoint that it 
absolutely is not even worth going down that path.
    In order to do that, though, it is going to take an 
investment in just the areas that you mentioned. We have to 
have our own hypersonic capability and we also have to have the 
ability to defend against those advanced threats.
    Senator Duckworth. We are able to reach those capabilities 
if we make these investments?
    General O'Shaughnessy. If we make those investments is the 
key part of your statement. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Duckworth. General Hyten?
    General Hyten. I agree with General O'Shaughnessy.
    I think one of the most important things you said, though, 
is that you recognize that strategic deterrence in the 21st 
century is wholly different than it was in the 20th Century. It 
is not just about nuclear weapons. It is multi-polar now. It is 
not just the Soviet Union. It is Russia, China, North Korea. 
You have to worry about all the domains. You have to worry 
about nuclear, space, cyber, and conventional. You have to 
figure out how to integrate all those together.
    At STRATCOM, we formed an academic alliance with 35 
different universities to try to get them to start thinking 
about what is really needed in order to do this, not just on 
the technology side, but a policy and a strategy side as well.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Perdue?
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today.
    General Hyten, I love the way you summarize this. Every 
time you come before us, you just get right down--you do what 
my wife asked us to do when we were raising kids: major on the 
majors. Thank you for that. But recap triad, command and 
control, Space Command are your top three priorities. I want to 
focus on the first one.
    You are facing five threats across five domains. I could 
not agree more that it is an integrated effort now. It is not 
just about the nuclear capability. Given that, though, the most 
salient comment I have heard today is we have lost our ability 
to go fast. I lived in Asia. I worked in China a good bit in my 
career. I can tell you they can beat us to the core on every 
single development with our technology, with their technology. 
It does not matter.
    I want to focus on one part of our nuclear triad. I want to 
get to a second question very quickly. The Ohio-class has 
served us well for decades, 4 or 5 decades in many cases, but 
it is aging. I know we have got the Columbia-class coming. 
Secretary of Navy Spencer said recently the Columbia-class 
submarine is the most important acquisition program the Navy 
has today. Do you agree with that, sir?
    General Hyten. I do. I cannot tell you how thankful I am 
for Secretary Spencer and CNO [Chief Naval Officer] Richardson 
both making that statement and putting that as a priority.
    Senator Perdue. We are going to procure, as I understand 
the schedule, the first Columbia-class in fiscal year 2021, and 
it will take us to fiscal year 2031 before that first delivery 
will be taken in the first, I guess, trial will be done on that 
boat. Is that right?
    General Hyten. Operational capability by then.
    Senator Perdue. How long does it take China to do the same 
thing?
    General Hyten. Actually on the submarine side, it has been 
taking about just as long.
    Senator Perdue. But that is going to change between that 
and 2031.
    General Hyten. That will change because you understand that 
we are experienced in submarines and China is still fairly new 
in developing those capabilities.
    Senator Perdue. Can you give us an update on the 
development of that Columbia-class effort, and is 2031 still an 
appropriate date to expect on that?
    General Hyten. I have done a deep dive look into every 
element of the triad, again kind of an odd thing for a 
combatant commander to do, but it is because I am so concerned 
about it I wanted to look in depth into that issue. I have gone 
with Admiral Caldwell, the head of Navy nuclear reactors, up to 
the shipyard at Electric Boat and done a deep dive.
    When I went through that--I have to be honest, Senator--I 
was very concerned because there was so little margin in the 
overall schedule. Then over the last year, as the Navy has 
informed you guys, we have had some issues with welding----
    Senator Perdue. The missile silo in particular.
    General Hyten. It is the missile tubes, absolutely. Because 
of that, a lot of that margin that was not too much before is 
even less now. It is still on the positive side, but if you are 
10 years away and you are eating margin and not putting margin 
in, that causes me concern.
    Senator Perdue. Can you take a question away for the record 
to help us understand what we could do to shorten that 
gestation period?
    General Hyten. You bet. I would be glad to come and talk to 
you or take it for the record, either one.
    Senator Perdue. I would like an update on the Hong 20. This 
is the new long-range nuclear bomber which is effectively--we 
will go to China now--their first true triad capability, if I 
understand that correct.
    General Hyten. Absolutely. That discussion is better to 
have in a classified setting.
    Senator Perdue. I appreciate that and I look forward to 
that.
    General O'Shaughnessy, I was just at the southern border. I 
agree with everything you just said. I know you were just 
there. I personally believe that we have got a human tragedy 
going on on the border with people coming from all parts of the 
world, not just Central America. But the bigger crisis is the 
drug traffic that is coming through there.
    The first thing I want to get on the record, though, there 
have been three places where a wall has been built: California, 
Arizona, and Texas. In those areas, the numbers I see is that 
human traffic across those borders where that barrier is in 
place dropped 95 percent. Do you agree with that?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Senator, I do. I will just add again 
within the last week, I have been twice to El Paso meeting with 
the Secretary Chief, meeting with the individual Border Patrol 
agents, and they confirm exactly that. When a barrier is in 
place, as long as it has cover--in other words, you are 
actually having some sensing of it--and you have the ability to 
respond to it, it totally changes the flow and they can funnel 
it into the areas that they want to. CBP personnel to a person 
talked about the effectiveness that is part of their family of 
systems.
    Senator Perdue. Sir, thank you for your troops' help down 
there. I saw some of those troops and the support that they are 
giving CBP is really remarkable.
    I was in the McAllen sector in Texas. It is the most active 
sector we have now. What we are doing is put barriers up. We 
pushed the activity to other sectors. I went to what I think is 
the most active sector. They were telling me that an individual 
coming across--the two cartels in Mexico that are at war 
controlling that particular sector are very powerful. They pay 
$8,000 per person to the cartel to come through. The people 
that were arrested the night I was there--on patrol were the 
CBP--had no money in their pocket, not a dime. They each had a 
burner phone with one number in it, and it was for a support 
person in the United States that was part of the infrastructure 
here.
    My question for you is, can the U.S. military on the drug 
side of this--if it is a $2 billion business with regard to 
human traffic, it is more than $30 billion just in that sector 
for drugs coming through. There was more fentanyl coming 
through that sector last year, enough to kill every man, woman, 
and child in America.
    My question, sir, is what can the U.S. military do there 
that is within the realm of your responsibility as protectors 
of our country?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, thank you for the question and 
to allow us to highlight some of the efforts that are ongoing 
and will continue.
    Our JTF-North is actually about 190 individuals that are 
focused just exactly 100 percent on this. Some of the things we 
are able to provide are--especially important is the intel 
aspect, understanding the networks. We understand networks. We 
have been doing this for decades overseas. We understand how to 
get to the networks and then partner with our law enforcement 
agency partners to be able to actually get after those networks 
in ways that they may not have worked their way through. It has 
been very powerful having our intel folks as part of this.
    We also bring unique military capability that we are 
applying, whether it is the use of our Fort Huachuca unmanned 
aerial systems or whether it is our ground sensor platoons that 
deploy in there for training. Those are all additive to the 
capability to partner with our law enforcement agencies that 
have proven to be quite effective and really from the dollar 
perspective of what we spend and what we get out of them, a 
very effective use while getting training. Our ground sensor 
platoon that deploy there--they are doing exactly what they are 
going to be asked to do if they deploy over to the Middle East, 
et cetera, and they are doing it in an environment with a 
thinking adversary that really allows them to get ready and 
increase their readiness in the way that we are currently 
applying them.
    Senator Perdue. But with all of that activity, CBP and the 
military, all of our U.S. activity, with all our technology and 
everything else, we are only interdicting about 10 percent of 
the drugs coming in. Is that correct, sir?
    General O'Shaughnessy. That is roughly correct, and it 
obviously depends exactly what you are talking about. Broadly 
that is a correct number, sir.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for being here today and for your service and for 
all of those behind you for their service.
    I apologize for not being here as much, but we have several 
hearings going on today.
    General Hyten, I know there has been a lot of questions and 
answers about the INF Treaty and the pullout of the INF Treaty. 
I will not kind of rehash all of that.
    What I would ask, though, have we done everything that you 
would advise in order to bring Russia to the table on the INF 
Treaty?
    General Hyten. I think that is a very difficult question 
for me to ask because I do not have the whole picture. I do not 
know everything the State Department has done. I understand my 
discussions with the President. I understand that the State 
Department has worked that issue. As far as I know, we have 
done everything humanly possible to try to bring Russia back 
into that. Every time I talk to the President about it, I want 
Russia in that treaty, but if they will not comply, then you do 
not really have a treaty.
    From my perspective, I think we have done everything 
humanly possible, but I would say that there is still time that 
Russia could come to the table and still participate in that 
treaty. I would hope that that would happen, but I do not think 
that is very likely right now.
    Senator Jones. Do you have any specifics that you would 
recommend that have not been tried already?
    General Hyten. I was thinking about that as you went 
through the question, Senator, and I think you just have to ask 
again and again. I think we have shown the intelligence to our 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies. You have seen 
the NATO allies come out and understand that that system is in 
violation of the treaty. I think all our NATO allies agree with 
that. For whatever reason, Russia does not want to play in that 
situation, and if they do not want to come to the table, they 
are not going to come to the table.
    Senator Jones. Thank you for that.
    General O'Shaughnessy, obviously there has also been a lot 
of questions and answers about the border and the national 
emergency. I think you testified earlier that whenever there is 
something coming from the President--I think your testimony was 
when you get a legal order from the President, you act. My 
question is, with regard to the national emergency declaration, 
did you or anyone on the staff that you know of evaluate the 
legality of the order regarding the national emergency on the 
southern border?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Sir, that is beyond the purview of 
NORTHCOM I would say.
    Just for clarity, though, since the actual declaration of a 
national emergency, there has been no specific tasking that has 
come down to NORTHCOM post that declaration. What we have is we 
are actually executing those orders and direction that we were 
given prior to that declaration that those troops are now 
showing up on the border, but that order was given and the 
request for assistance was given from the Department of 
Homeland Security to the Department of Defense prior to that 
declaration.
    Senator Jones. All right. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I think that is all I have. Thank you very 
much.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
    Well, first of all, thank you very much, both of you, for 
the very concise way in which you answered some pretty 
difficult questions, and I appreciate that very much.
    Was there anything else that you would like to bring up 
that you did not have the opportunity to do for clarification? 
Either one of you.
    General Hyten. Senator, you mentioned a few things at the 
beginning that you wanted to make sure we address today. I went 
down the list just a minute ago. We have talked about 
everything on your list except the space force, and I would 
just like to make a few comments on that.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I do appreciate that. In fact, both 
of you may want to do that because my question was there is 
confusion out there when we are talking the space force, where 
that fits in all of this. The two of you would be the logical 
ones to ask. Thank you very much.
    General Hyten. Senator, the space force is structured to be 
the organize, train, and equip element for our space 
capabilities. Right now, the space capabilities are broadly in 
the Air Force, but they are also across the Army, the Navy, and 
other defense agencies as well. When we look at the problem, 
there are really two issues.
    After Goldwater-Nichols, the military services are now 
responsible for organizing, training, equipping forces but not 
fighting. The fighting is done in the combatant commands. 
General O'Shaughnessy and I represent the combatant commands. 
We are responsible for fighting. That is why, in response to 
the questions earlier, the need to stand up a U.S. Space 
Command focused on the warfighting problem in space is what 
that command is doing, which leads to the question, are we 
properly organized to do the organize, train, and equip mission 
for the space mission? The President has said because of the 
importance of that warfighting domain, we are not. We should 
consolidate all of those capabilities from across the 
Department into a single space force.
    I give the President and the Vice President big credit for 
not creating a department of the space force at this time, but 
putting that capability in the Air Force because I was very 
concerned about creating excess bureaucracy. So was the 
President. So was the Vice President. By creating a department 
of the space force, it is just not sized right now in order to 
do that. It will be some day, but it has just not reached that 
point right now.
    But the legislative proposal should come to you shortly. 
There will be some issues we will have to work out with you, 
and we will work those together. But I just want you to know 
that I support the concept of the space force inside the Air 
Force that the President is now pushing.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes, you are right. I had brought that up 
both in my opening statement, as well as initial questions. My 
concern was that we wanted two things answered before you 
actually get into a new bureaucracy. One is what the costs are 
going to be. One would it be more efficient. I think you have 
answered both of those. I appreciate that very much.
    Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    I apologize for my tardiness. It has been a fun-filled 
morning of committee hearings all across the Senate.
    General Hyten, each leg of our nuclear triad has its own 
value. Is it fair to say that our ballistic missiles have 
strength in numbers?
    General Hyten. That is one of the big values of our 
ballistic missiles. Four hundred ballistic missiles create a 
huge targeting problem for the adversary. The only way to get 
after 400 hardened nuclear missiles is with a whole bunch of 
incoming weapons, and if you decide to attack those, then you 
pretty much are guaranteeing that we will attack back. That is 
deterrent in a nutshell, and that creates a huge element of our 
deterrent process.
    Senator Cotton. Sometimes referred to as a missile sink for 
the enemy?
    General Hyten. It would be a missile sink. It would be a 
weapons sink. It would be a very, very difficult target to 
impact.
    Senator Cotton. I have heard proposals from some in 
Congress and Washington suggesting that we ought to eliminate 
our Minuteman 3 fleet and cancel the replacement for that 
fleet. If we were to take that step to unilaterally cut over 
400 ballistic missiles and command centers, would it not be 
like giving the Russians and the Chinese 400 free warheads to 
target something else in the United States or around the world?
    General Hyten. I do not understand how, with the threats 
that we face today, which are growing, not shrinking, we would 
make a decision today as a nation to lessen our overall 
strategic deterrent. That makes no sense to me, and my best 
military advice is that we do not do that.
    Senator Cotton. One common argument I hear in defense of 
that position is why do we spend so much money on weapons we 
never use. It is not that much money. It is only 3 to 6 percent 
of the defense budget, depending on where we are in the cycle. 
Would you not say, though, that we have been using our nuclear 
weapons every single day for 74 years?
    General Hyten. We use them every day. Senator, the people 
that say that--I actually find that a little bit insulting 
because the men and women who go to work every day underneath 
the water, underneath the ground, in the air that provide that 
strategic deterrent--they are doing the mission every day. It 
is the most active mission. Strategic deterrence is not a 
passive mission. Deterrence does not exist just because you 
have 1,550 deployable nuclear weapons under the New START 
treaty. You have to do that mission every day, and that is what 
the men and women of my command do. They are proud to do it. It 
is an active mission, one of the most active missions that we 
have. When you send a nuclear submarine out with 160 sailors on 
board, do you think they are thinking to themselves this is a 
passive functional mission? No. They are an active warfighting 
mission.
    Senator Cotton. The whole point of our nuclear deterrence, 
of the way we use that force is not to launch and detonate 
those missiles, but to stop our adversaries from launching and 
detonating theirs to begin with.
    General Hyten. Secretary Mattis asked me what is the use of 
nuclear weapons. Why do we have nuclear weapons? The answer is 
to prevent others from using nuclear weapons on us. But in 
order to do that, you have to be ready. It is the Washington 
analogy. The best way to avoid war is to be prepared for war. 
If you are not prepared, you run the risk of an attack.
    Senator Cotton. If Russia or China or perhaps Russia and 
China combined had clear, demonstrable nuclear overmatch 
against the United States, there is no doubt who would win if 
there were, in fact, a nuclear exchange. What impact would that 
have on the conventional forces and the strategic thinking of 
those nations as against the United States and our allies?
    General Hyten. You know, in my opening statement for the 
record, I said that nuclear war cannot be won. Therefore, it 
must never be fought. Therefore, we must be ready to fight it 
every day. That is the way I look at it. That is a complicated 
thing for some people to understand, but if you are not ready, 
somebody could take a step over the line. If there is an 
overmatch, somebody could think they could get away with it, 
and that could create the worst day in the history of the 
world, the worst day in the history of our country. We never 
want that to happen. In order to do that, I believe in peace 
through strength, not peace through unilateral disarmament.
    Senator Cotton. If you were sitting in your position or in 
the head of state position in a country like Japan or South 
Korea that depends on the extended deterrence of the United 
States and the United States weakened its nuclear triad or even 
eliminated one of their legs, what kind of influence would that 
have on your thinking?
    General Hyten. What I would be concerned about from a U.S. 
perspective is that would cause some of our allies to decide 
they need their own nuclear deterrent. One of the goals we have 
as a country is to eliminate the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, not just in our adversaries, but around the world. A 
world with fewer nuclear weapons is a better world. But we have 
to be able to defend ourselves. We want our allies to 
understand that we can defend them too. That is what extended 
deterrence is all about, and that means you have to be ready to 
support their contingencies as well.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
    I understand that some opponents of our nuclear force or 
critics of it say that we should not start a new arms race or 
be engaged in an arms race. I will simply observe, based on 
what you have said here today, that it is much cheaper to win 
an arms race than it is to lose a war.
    General Hyten. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    I thank both of you. I will repeat what I said earlier. 
This has been a really enlightening session, and you have been 
the right ones to be here. Thank you very much.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
  value of thaad [terminal high altitude area defense] for addressing 
                     threats from china and russia
    1. Senator Inhofe. General O'Shaughnessy, the National Defense 
Strategy [NDS] states, ``the central challenge to United States 
prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic 
competition by . . . revisionist powers,'' namely China and Russia. Can 
you please tell the Committee what you perceive as the most pressing 
threat and how NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] and 
NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] have adjusted their focus to 
counter China and Russia?
    General O'Shaughnessy. In the near term, Russia's development of a 
preemptive ``active defense'' strategy is the most pressing threat to 
the Homeland. This strategy relies on indirect action, cyber, and 
advanced, precision-guided conventional air- and sea-launched cruise 
missile strikes--each of which is currently capable of reaching targets 
in the United States and Canada. Russia's efforts pose significant 
detection, warning, intercept, and infrastructure defense challenges to 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
    Both Russia and China are actively developing and testing 
intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicles. Russian statements 
indicate the country's new AVANGARD HGV could begin deployment as early 
as this year. If either country successfully fields an ICBM with an HGV 
payload, it will pose unique challenges both to NORAD's Integrated 
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) mission as well as 
USNORTHCOM's ballistic missile defense mission.
    While China does not yet have a conventional capability to strike 
Alaska or the continental United States comparable to Russia's, China's 
leaders are determined to demonstrate capabilities that could dissuade 
or prevent the United States from intervening in any conflict along 
China's periphery. Currently, China could employ its world-class cyber 
forces to attack our critical infrastructure during a crisis. In the 
longer-term, China is likely to develop long-range conventional cruise 
missiles and associated platforms that will threaten the Homeland.
    In response, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have honed the focus of both 
commands to ensure Homeland defense is our absolute priority. Our 
mission to deter our adversaries and defend the Homeland in the current 
strategic environment requires the commands to maintain a strong 
warfighter mindset. Specifically, we are taking active measures to 
improve our missile defenses, expand our ability to operate in the 
Arctic, improve domain awareness and communications in the far north, 
and build a more comprehensive and globally integrated defense 
architecture with fellow combatant commands, allies, and interagency 
partners.
    To ensure our ability to defend the Homeland against threats in all 
domains, we continuously advocate for NORAD and USNORTHCOM requirements 
to the Services and Missile Defense Agency and push the Services, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff to reduce or 
eliminate capability gaps.

    2. Senator Inhofe. General O'Shaughnessy, would an additional THAAD 
benefit the Homeland defense mission?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) program has not been tested against an intercontinental 
ballistic missile threat, but could potentially add to our capacity and 
capability to defend the Homeland in the future. THAAD provides a 
significant capability, and we are working with the Missile Defense 
Agency to explore THAAD's utility for our Homeland defense mission.

                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                              no first use
    3. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you believe a ``no first 
use'' policy improves our ability to deter conflict and would it be 
your best military advice to adopt such a policy? If you believe it is 
important to maintain the current policy, please explain why.
    General Hyten. No, a no first use policy works against the basic 
tenets of deterrence, increases the risk of nuclear war by changing how 
adversaries and allies view the credibility of the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent and our resolve to use it when threatened.
    Adopting a no first use policy could undermine the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella we extend to our allies and signals to potential adversaries 
the U.S. may not defend our allies and vital interests with every means 
at our disposal. The current policy provides great strategic value by 
retaining ambiguity regarding the precise circumstance that might lead 
to a U.S. nuclear response. The lack of precision on exactly where the 
nuclear threshold is gives adversaries pause and strengthens our 
overall deterrent.

                  low yield ballistic missile warhead
    4. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what is your assessment of the 
consequences if the Navy is unable to deploy the low-yield submarine-
launched ballistic missile recommended by the NPR [Nuclear Posture 
Review]?
    General Hyten. There is no technical or operational barrier to 
deploying a low yield ballistic missile in our SSBN force. Therefore, 
any impediment imposed on the Navy to deploy a low yield warhead would 
lessen our ability to most effectively address the strategic threats 
identified in the NPR.

                         nuclear modernization
    5. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what is your assessment of the 
consequences if the Air Force is denied full funding for the 
replacement of the Minuteman III?
    General Hyten. Any funding reductions to the GBSD program will 
result in a schedule slip. GBSD is a just-in-time replacement for the 
Minuteman III, and it must begin deploying in 2028 to avoid a nuclear 
deterrence operational capability gap.

    6. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you believe the air-leg of 
the triad would continue to be viable without an air-launched cruise 
missile capability?
    General Hyten. No. The continued viability of the air-leg is 
dependent upon both a long range air-launched cruise missile and a 
penetrating bomber capability to cover operational requirements.

                                  nc3
    7. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, what will your relationship be 
with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, as relates to 
NC3 [Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications] programs, under the 
new governance structure for NC3 approved in October, 2018?
    General Hyten. USD(A&S) serves as the NC3 Capability Portfolio 
Manager with increased responsibilities for resources and acquisition. 
In this capacity USD(A&S) functions in a supporting role to the NC3 
Enterprise Lead (USSTRATCOM) by executing the day-to-day oversight of 
the NC3 Portfolio and advising on risk, mitigation options, and 
prioritization.

    8. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, do you currently have the 
funding and personnel necessary to effectively execute your 
responsibilities as the NC3 Enterprise Lead?
    General Hyten. The President's Budget request contains the 
resources necessary to carry out my responsibilities.
                        defense of the homeland
    9. Senator Fischer. General O'Shaughnessy, the Missile Defense 
Review [MDR] states that the United States will continue to rely on 
nuclear deterrence to protect the Homeland from large-scale or 
sophisticated ballistic missile attack. If the United States did not 
replace the aging Minuteman III force with a new ICBM [Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile], do you believe the U.S. Homeland would be as safe 
as it is today?
    General O'Shaughnessy. No, it would not be as safe as it is today. 
I absolutely support the nuclear triad as critical to Homeland defense 
and I support the findings in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. I defer 
to United States Strategic Command Commander, General Hyten, for 
specifics on nuclear deterrence capabilities.
                 substitution for nuclear capabilities
    10. Senator Fischer. General Hyten, those who favor reducing the 
size of our nuclear forces often argue that non-nuclear capabilities 
can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our ability 
to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries, and assure allies. 
A report released last September by the Global Zero group repeatedly 
argues that ``cyberweapons''--in particular--can be substituted for 
nuclear weapons. Do you think cyber capabilities, their effects, and 
their ability to deter hostile activity is comparable to nuclear 
capabilities to a sufficient degree that one can be directly 
substituted for the other?
    General Hyten. No other weapon system contains the capabilities or 
deterrence effect of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons are the 
foundation of strategic deterrence due to these unique characteristics. 
It is important to note that other countries are not only modernizing 
their existing stockpiles, but also increasing the numbers and 
diversity of nuclear weapons.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
   third gbi [ground-based interceptors] site and shoot-assess-shoot 
                               capability
    11. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what 
specific additional capability would a third GBI site provide against a 
future ICBM threat?
    General Hyten. A new continental United States Ground-Based 
Interceptor (GBI) site provides an option for added Homeland defense 
against potential future Iranian ICBM capability. In addition, a third 
interceptor site would increase our capacity to negate larger raids, 
expand engagement windows, and improve survivability of Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS) assets through dispersal. However, to be 
clear, my first priority is to develop a space-based sensor 
architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced 
missile threats.
    General O'Shaughnessy. A third ground-based interceptor site based 
in the continental United States, combined with future technologies, 
would increase available interceptor launch window ``battlespace'' for 
engagements. It could also provide the opportunity to utilize a shoot-
assess-shoot strategy for future intercontinental ballistic missile 
threats from both North Korea and Iran, which could provide us time to 
evaluate an engagement and reengage if a threat reentry vehicle 
survived our initial salvo.

    12. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, does 
the United States currently have a shoot-assess-shoot capability if an 
ICBM were to be launched from the Middle East toward our east coast?
    General Hyten. USSTRATCOM supports USNORTHCOM in the execution of 
the Homeland defense mission, but day-to-day operational decisions are 
within the purview of USNORTHCOM. As such I would defer to General 
O'Shaughnessy for operational details.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Currently we do not possess this capability.

    13. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, would 
a third GBI site in New York, Michigan, or Ohio provide that shoot-
assess-shoot capability?
    General Hyten. I defer to General O'Shaughnessy for discussion of 
operational issues.
    General O'Shaughnessy. A third ground-based interceptor site in New 
York, Michigan, or Ohio, combined with future technologies, could 
provide a shoot-assess-shoot capability.

    14. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, how long would it take 
to stand-up a third GBI site?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for 
specifics on timeline estimates to stand up an additional ground-based 
interceptor site.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
               norad missions limfacs [limiting factors]
    15. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, are our aerospace 
warning and missile defense radars along the Alaskan and Canadian 
coastlines sufficient for the current threats associated with great 
power competition against Russia and if so, in your personal opinion, 
if not already, when will these radars become severely limited and what 
are their primary limiting factors?
    General O'Shaughnessy. These radars represent 1985 technology and 
are no longer sufficient due to capability limitations. We need to 
modernize the systems that provide surveillance of our northern 
approaches in order to defend North America against Russian long-range 
bombers, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicle 
threats. In August 2018, NORAD conducted an operational assessment of 
the North Warning System, and the data collected in that test will 
inform the design for the air domain defense of the United States and 
Canada. In addition, the United States and Canada are evaluating 
alternative options to replace the North Warning System. This new 
system will be designed to enhance the capability to maintain effective 
air surveillance of threats approaching North America.

    16. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, given the rapidly 
evolved Russian threat, how critical is it that we upgrade NORAD 
terrestrial radars to address long-range missile threats and hypersonic 
threats?
    General O'Shaughnessy. One of our most urgent requirements is to 
upgrade these radars against advanced cruise missile and hypersonic 
threats. Simply put, we cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we 
cannot defeat what we cannot detect. Our ability to detect threats and 
defend North America is challenged by rapidly advancing adversary 
capabilities that present significant challenges to our current sensor 
architecture. To expand our early detection and identification 
capabilities against these threats, the best solution should include a 
combination of multi-domain sensors, including terrestrial radars and 
space-based assets. We also continue to support ongoing efforts within 
the Department of Defense, such as the bi-national Northern Approaches 
Surveillance Analysis of Alternatives, to evaluate potential
solutions for modernizing sensor coverage in the northernmost regions 
of North America.

    17. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, given the increased 
capability of Russian long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles--both 
nuclear and conventional--how have Russian Tactics Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs) evolved along with their technology? What risks does 
this pose for our forces in Alaska and in CONUS [Continental United 
States]?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Arctic provides the shortest path 
between Russia and the United States. Russia is developing and 
practicing the tactics needed to employ the variety of conventionally 
armed precision strike weapons they are currently deploying. These 
include a long-range ground-launched cruise missile and a very long-
range, stand-off air-launched cruise missile.
    Russian heavy bombers frequently conduct air patrols along the 
coastlines the United States and Canada, particularly in the Arctic, to 
underscore Russia's capabilities. According to their own words, these 
patrols are to demonstrate to the United States the continued viability 
of Russia's nuclear and more recently, their non-nuclear deterrent.
    Since 2015, Russia has employed its new generation of very long-
range, stand-off air-launched cruise missiles against anti-regime 
targets in Syria, providing real-world training for Russian crews and 
demonstrating its growing precision-strike capabilities to the West.
    Moscow continues to bolster its military defenses in the Arctic 
with the delivery of coastal defense cruise missiles, modern air 
defense sensors and weapons and by constructing airfields on Russian 
Islands deep in the Arctic. These weapons are intended to ensure 
Russian control of Arctic waters and air space from their northern 
coast to the Pole and thereby eliminate threats to egressing Russian 
bombers. Once safely away from Russian air space, these bombers are 
capable of launching their weapons and striking the Homeland well 
outside detection range of current NORAD sensors. We must advance our 
capability to detect these threats in order to defend the Homeland; if 
we do not, our forces in Alaska and the continental United States will 
be held at risk.

    18. Senator Sullivan. General O'Shaughnessy, can you clarify what 
exactly you mean when you state in your testimony: `` . . . air- and 
sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff 
ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike 
North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage'' and, 
specifically, how is this a risk to the U.S. Military in Alaska and in 
CONUS?
    General O'Shaughnessy. [Deleted.]
                          space-based sensors
    19. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, how 
critical is the rapid deployment of space-based sensors to addressing 
the long-range cruise and hypersonic missile threats from Russia and 
China?
    General Hyten. It is essential. We need to move sensors to a space-
based architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced 
missile threats, to include hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and cruise 
missiles.
    In addition, space-based sensors enjoy a measure of flexibility of 
movement unimpeded by the constraints geographic limitations impose on 
terrestrial sensors and can provide birth-to-death tracking that is 
extremely advantageous. Space sensors are also more survivable than 
individual, fixed ground sites that can be targeted.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Advanced space-based sensors are a critical 
step toward providing a more comprehensive capability to detect and 
track evolving complex threats, such as long-range cruise and 
hypersonic missile threats. Improving our network of missile defense 
and early warning terrestrial sensors, coupled with a space-based 
sensor layer, would allow us to keep pace with these advancing threats.

    20. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, in the 
best case scenario, what is a realistic timeline for MDA [Misssile 
Defense Agency] to begin deploying space-based sensors?
    General Hyten. My best understanding is we could have a capability 
by the mid-2020s, but funding is not yet defined or appropriated. 
However, the Space Development Agency (SDA) is charged with leading 
development of space-based sensors and I defer details on this question 
to them.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for 
specifics on timeline estimates for deploying space-based sensors; 
however, it is of the highest urgency to me that we gain space-based 
sensing capability as soon as possible to give us the ability to track 
advanced complex threats from `birth to defeat.'

    21. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what 
would be your preferred timeline and would this pose an acceptable 
level of risk given the threat?
    General Hyten. Deployment of a complete space-based sensor 
architecture is already late-to-need. We are increasingly disadvantaged 
to find, fix, and track missile threats that risk outpacing our sensor 
capabilities, diminishing our missile warning and sub-optimizing the 
effectiveness of our missile defense assets.
    General O'Shaughnessy. We need space-based sensors to provide a 
more comprehensive capability as soon as possible. Until that happens, 
we must also balance the move to space with more technologically mature 
solutions, such as improving our terrestrial-based radars.

    22. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, in 
your personal opinion, what type of space-based sensor system would you 
prefer 1. A smaller number of more capable and more expensive set of 
satellites in GEO; 2. A larger number of slightly less capable but less 
expensive satellites in LEO and MEO; 3. A combination of the two?
    General Hyten. As a combatant commander, I am orbit agnostic, but I 
see potential advantages in a mixed constellation.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I place high priority on fielding space-
based sensing capabilities. A combination of space-based platforms in 
multiple orbits would provide the most robust tracking capability.

    23. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, which 
of these space-based sensor solutions do you think we might be able to 
build and deploy sooner and how much of a priority factor should there 
be in acquiring them?
    General Hyten. I don't have enough information today to answer this 
question or related questions; which architecture meets my 
requirements, maximizes resiliency, does so at an affordable cost, and 
at the speed of relevance. Ongoing analysis is working towards 
answering these questions.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I defer to the Missile Defense Agency for 
specifics on timeline estimates. But to reinforce my thoughts on this 
issue, I support development of space-based sensors as soon as possible 
to provide a more comprehensive future capability. In the meantime, I 
prioritize addressing urgent operational risks with more mature 
technologies for ground-based capabilities that can be deployed in the 
near term.
                 missile defense priorities and the mdr
    24. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaugnessy, in your 
personal opinion, did the Missile Defense Review miss any key 
priorities and if so, what are they?
    General Hyten. No. USSTRATCOM fully participated in the Missile 
Defense Review, and I am pleased with the results.
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Missile Defense Review reflects my 
warfighter views and priorities across the spectrum of threats. I 
especially appreciate the much-needed addition of cruise missile 
defense (CMD) into the discussion, although I would have liked to see 
more emphasis on CMD due to significant advancements in cruise missile 
technology by Russia and China.

    25. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaugnessy, can you 
discuss the importance of continuing to invest so that we field the 
Redesigned Kill Vehicle?
    General Hyten. I fully support MDA's efforts to develop the 
Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV). The RKV is a key component to improving 
the effectiveness of the Ground Based Interceptor.
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) is our 
next-generation kill vehicle. It will increase capacity by adding to 
our overall interceptor count and also bring added capabilities that 
will significantly improve engagement performance and lethality. The 
RKV will eventually phase out the older, less capable, Exo-atmospheric 
Kill Vehicles, increasing overall reliability of the entire interceptor 
fleet. Fielding an additional 20 GBIs in Alaska with RKVs is critical 
to keeping pace with the threat.

    26. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, can 
you discuss the importance of new technologies like Multi-Object Kill 
Vehicle (MOKV), directed energy, new boosters, and space-based sensors?
    General Hyten. My first priority is to develop sensors in a space-
based architecture in order to detect, track and discriminate advanced 
missile threats.
    Providing a cost-effective missile defense with sufficient magazine 
depth also requires pursuit of next-generation capabilities such as 
directed energy, MOKV, boost phase intercept, and non-kinetic 
capabilities.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Future technologies are critical to 
outpacing the ever advancing threat. These technologies, while not yet 
mature, will potentially allow for updated tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for how we employ interceptors, resulting in greater 
capacity to defend the Homeland against advanced threats.

    27. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, why 
are terrestrial radars like the Long-Range Discriminating Radar (LRDR), 
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii, and Pacific Radar, important as a 
compliment to future space-based sensors?
    General Hyten. Terrestrial sensors remain the best viable near-term 
solution. Terrestrial sensors have higher power levels and multiple 
sophisticated waveforms can exploit different phenomenology enabling 
persistent, long-range mid-course tracking, discrimination, and hit 
assessment capability against current threats. Terrestrial sensors will 
complement future space-based sensors designed to globally detect, 
track, and discriminate ballistic missile threats and HGVs.
    General O'Shaughnessy. These terrestrial radars are an important 
complement to a future space-based sensor layer because they will 
provide resiliency and redundancy for in-depth sensor coverage and 
persistent discrimination capability against evolving missile threats. 
Terrestrial radars, coupled with a space-based sensor layer, will 
provide track and discrimination data from multiple phenomenologies to 
the Ballistic Missile Defense System, enhancing our ability to defend 
the Homeland.

    28. Senator Cotton. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, are 
United States missile defense testing timelines progressing fast enough 
to stay ahead of the threats from Russia, China and rogue nations?
    General Hyten. As stated in the Missile Defense Review, the United 
States relies on strategic deterrence to protect against large and 
technically sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental 
ballistic missile threats to the United States Homeland.
    Although I would like to go faster for many reasons, I am satisfied 
the speed of testing is sufficient to pace the threat from rogue 
nations such as North Korea and Iran.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
systems were designed and deployed against North Korea and potential 
Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic 
missile threats. I support the Missile Defense Agency's efforts to 
maintain a regular ground-based interceptor flight test cadence. Flight 
testing that is conducted at a regular cadence and combined with ground 
testing gives me confidence in the system and how we employ it.
                            polar silk road
    29. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, in your personal opinion 
given what China has done in the South China Sea, their Belt and Road 
Initiative, and their pressing need for resources, how would you 
characterize China's interest in the Arctic region?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I would characterize China's interest in the 
Arctic region as focused and committed. Chinese leaders believe the 
Arctic has great reserves of oil, natural gas, and precious metals and 
has extended part of their One Belt One Road initiative to Murmansk in 
northwestern Russia. China recently declared itself a ``near-Arctic 
nation'' which, while having no legal status, clearly indicates its 
intent to have Chinese national interests considered in discussions 
concerning the future of the Arctic. Last summer, China's icebreaking 
research vessel, Xue Long ("Snow Dragon") completed its ninth 
expedition to the Arctic, operating in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and 
the Canada Basin. Xue Long's expeditions are indicative of China's 
increasing interest in the Arctic, and they have enabled China to gain 
familiarity and experience operating in the Arctic environment. China 
is also building its first open ocean-class icebreaker, which will 
enable it to operate surface ships in the Arctic.

    30. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, in your personal 
opinion, what is China's long-term strategic objective in the Arctic 
and does that objective line up with United States/Western objectives?
    General O'Shaughnessy. China understands the vast economic value of 
the Arctic due to the potential for exploitation of natural resources 
and the shorter shipping distances to world markets. China's activities 
and objectives in the Arctic conflict with many United States 
objectives. For example, China's hydrographic research vessel, Xue 
Long, has made nine research expeditions to the Arctic in recent years, 
and several of these expeditions have focused primarily on mapping the 
ocean's bottom in and around the Bering Sea. The hydrographic surveys 
performed by Xue Long are more consistent with preparation for 
submarine operations in the high north than scientific monitoring and 
environmental research. To be clear, a Chinese military presence in the 
Bering Sea would be inconsistent with United States security needs.
    On the economic front, China has also extended its One Belt and One 
Road initiative into the Arctic, including investments in the Russian 
city of Murmansk as part of an ongoing effort to claim that China is 
now an interested power in the Arctic. China has also sent merchant 
ships from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean through the Arctic 
during the summer melt. China has made significant investment in 
Greenland's mining industry, and in 2016, China attempted to purchase a 
defunct Danish Naval Base at on the southwest tip of Greenland. 
Although the government of Denmark blocked the acquisition, China 
maintains significant influence as one of the top investors in 
Greenland.
    Based on recent Chinese behavior and coercive economic practices 
employed in other regions, I am concerned that China will continue to 
leverage influence and debt trap economic practices in an effort to 
gain a strategic presence in the Arctic as competition over resources 
increases in the coming years--an effort that risks destablizing a 
region long known for cooperation and adherence to international 
agreements.

    31. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, what is China 
specifically doing--in terms of building capability and using monetary 
soft power--to assert itself in the Arctic and does this concern you?
    General O'Shaughnessy. China has already conducted nine Arctic 
expeditions with its research vessel Xue Long and is starting to build 
its first open ocean-capable ice breaker. The Chinese are gaining 
experience with operating in the Arctic environment, and the 
construction of their new ice breaker certainly suggests they intend to 
operate there. China is also investing in various projects in most of 
the Arctic Council nations in an attempt to build goodwill and thus 
influence countries with the most impact over the future of the Arctic.
    While China is currently limiting its actions to peaceable economic 
competition, I am still concerned from a Homeland defense perspective. 
My job is to assume military intent, and therefore United States 
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command continue 
to remain extremely vigilant for any indications that China is engaging 
in military activities in the Arctic.
               great power rivalry with russia and china
    32. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, Russia poses a 
continually increasing threat to the United States from its operations 
in the Arctic, and China has expressed, in actions and writing, its 
interest in being a ``near-Arctic'' power. What specific capabilities 
are most critical for us to field in order to counter both of these 
threats from our near-peer competitors in terms of protecting the 
Homeland and are there any areas of overlap on which we should 
especially focus?
    General O'Shaughnessy. To outpace adversaries in the Arctic today 
and in the future, we need improved multi-spectrum sensor and domain 
awareness capabilities, the ability to effectively communicate in the 
northern latitudes, and a visible maritime presence capable of 
detecting and defeating multi-domain threats operating in and through 
the Arctic. Our ability to defend the Homeland against Russia or China 
will require our land, sea, and air components to operate routinely and 
effectively in the Arctic. It is essential that they are trained and 
equipped to do so.
                      u.s. arctic naval capability
    33. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, do you agree with 
Secretary Spencer that we need to execute a Freedom of Navigation 
Operation in the Arctic, or at least have the ability to?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. It is long-standing policy of the 
United States to challenge the excessive maritime claims of other 
nations.
                     arctic sar [search and rescue]
    34. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, does 11th Air Force have 
the Search and Rescue forces it requires to meet all of its missions 
today, including its NORAD alert responsibilities, the daily F-22 
training missions, and rescue triad's tactical training requirements?
    General O'Shaughnessy. No. As we expand our Arctic operations to 
meet our adversaries' increased Arctic capabilities and presence, the 
current search and rescue capabilities will no longer be able to match 
our enlarged Arctic footprint.

    35. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, what about once two 
combat-code squadrons of F-35s arrive beginning in 2020?
    General O'Shaughnessy. As the F-35 arrives in Alaska, the increased 
footprint will drive a requirement for additional search and rescue 
(SAR) capability to support both increased training and exercises. 
Additionally, as we start to push fighter aircraft further out in 
support of longer-range NORAD intercepts, we will require the ability 
to provide a rapid SAR response over a greater area than our current 
SAR forces can provide.
                         strategic arctic port
    36. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, Secretary of the Navy 
Richard Spencer has talked about the importance of strategic ports. 
Right now, the closest strategic port to the Arctic is in Anchorage. 
That's the equivalent of the closest port to Maine being in Florida. In 
your personal opinion, is it in U.S. strategic interest for the 
Arctic's closest strategic port to be essentially the length of the 
Eastern seaboard away from the Arctic and what is USNORTHCOM doing to 
rectify this gap?
    General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
has an articulated requirement for fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. 
A deep draft port in the Arctic would contribute to our maritime 
Homeland defense mission by providing all-weather, always-available 
fuel for naval vessels operating in the North American Arctic. I am 
aware that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently 
studying the feasibility of improving the Port of Nome and will publish 
their draft report in May 2019.
    As you know, the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 expanded 
the feasibility justification for a potential Arctic deep draft harbor 
to include benefits associated with national security and the 
protection of the Homeland. In April 2019, I wrote to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works to outline USNORTHCOM's 
operational requirements in the Arctic and the benefits to our Homeland 
defense mission that would result from the development of a deep-draft 
port north of Dutch Harbor. In addition, USNORTHCOM staff has been 
working closely with USACE to provide detailed information regarding 
our mission requirements in the region.
                                  f-35
    37. Senator Cotton. General O'Shaughnessy, last May, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, testified that `` . . . the 
F-35 and the Guard will contribute to Homeland security by flying what 
we call combat air patrols over the United States to preclude a threat 
in any kind of circumstance. So it is very important.'' What do you 
believe to be the best fighter to protect and defend the Homeland and, 
specifically, what role do you believe the F-35 should have in the 
protection of the Homeland?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I consider the F-35 critical to defend the 
Homeland against the most-advanced and emerging threats to North 
America. The F-35 offers unmatched fifth-generation advantages against 
the latest weapons fielded by our adversaries and includes improved 
detection capabilities and increased levels of situation awareness 
enabled by advanced data fusion. The F-35 will provide us with our most 
crucial capabilities and form the cornerstone of our ability to defend 
the Homeland well into the 21st century.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                             columbia-class
    38. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, as presented in hearing 
testimony, issues with the welding of missile tubes during the 
development of the Columbia-class program have led to very little 
margin for error remaining for on-time delivery. It is concerning to 
have margin for error originally built into this critical program 
reduced to such a small level at the front-end of a 10 year project. 
What actions can be taken, including by Congress, to ensure the 
Columbia-class program remains on schedule for delivery in 2028, and is 
operational by 2031?
    General Hyten. The Navy is actively pursuing means, to include 
advanced procurement, to increase schedule margin and ensure Columbia 
is ready for its first strategic deterrent patrol in fiscal year 2031. 
I defer to the Navy for any specifics on these measures.
    Continued Congressional support of the Columbia program is also 
essential, to include full funding and on-time appropriations.

    39. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, as discussed in the February 26, 
2019, Senate Armed Services Strategic Command hearing, the Chinese are 
speeding up their delivery time of submarine technology. Is there a way 
to speed up the delivery of the Columbia-class program and is it 
necessary?
    General Hyten. I defer to the Navy for specific Columbia-class 
program questions.

    40. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, developing and maintaining a 
skilled workforce is essential to submarine production. Would the 
potential addition of a new Virginia-class submarine in 2022 and/or 
2023 help develop the workforce needed for Columbia-class production or 
in some other way affect production?
    General Hyten. The shipyards are critical national assets to 
America. The skilled workforce is essential to building and overhauling 
all ships, particularly nuclear-powered ones like SSBNs, SSNs, and 
CVNs. It is all of our responsibility to ensure the workforce, a 
strategic asset, is supported across the board.
    Regarding the addition of the new Virginia-class submarine in 2022 
or 2023 and any effects on the workforce for Columbia, I respectfully 
refer you to the Navy for any program acquisition questions.

    41. Senator Perdue. General Hyten, because of shared submarine 
construction infrastructure, do other acquisition programs (Virginia-
class) affect the Columbia's on time delivery and if so, how?
    General Hyten. The Navy has stated that the Columbia-class SSBN 
program is their number one shipbuilding priority. I respectfully refer 
you to the Navy for any program acquisition questions.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                                 space
    42. Senator Blackburn. General Hyten, do you believe U.S. space 
assets are most vulnerable to adversary jamming, kinetic attacks, 
cyberattacks, or directed energy attacks?
    General Hyten. Focusing on one or two avenues of attack is not 
prudent. The effectiveness of any attack vector is situation dependent 
and it is likely that multiple attack vectors will be employed.
    The Administration and DOD are moving rapidly to address the 
significant adversary counter-space threat to our critical space assets 
through institutional changes (i.e., the standup of USSPACECOM, USSF) 
and significant PB space investment.

    43. Senator Blackburn. General Hyten, I have concerns regarding the 
supply chain integrity supporting space systems. Do you see a path to 
resolution among the space defense industry and industrial base?
    General Hyten. Yes, but resolution will require a diligent focus on 
security and risk-mitigation actions like those recommended in the EO 
13806 Report, ``Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and 
Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United 
States,'' and in other best-practices designed to guarantee supply 
chain integrity.
    This integrity is vital to establishment and preservation of a 
resilient space enterprise industrial base and will enable the 
increased capability development/fielding timelines necessary to 
outpace our adversaries.
                               __________
          Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
             inf [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty
    44. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, as you know, President Trump 
recently withdrew from the INF Treaty that Russia has been violating. I 
worry that the Trump administration is leaving this treaty in a 
reckless manner, gleefully inviting a costly and dangerous arms race 
while giving Putin the legal right to deploy an unlimited number of 
their previously banned missiles. I led a letter signed by 26 
Democratic Senators calling for the Trump administration to do the 
hard, if sometimes boring and monotonous work, of finding a diplomatic 
solution to this problem. I further co-led a bill that would require 
this administration to actually do its homework before proceeding with 
any withdrawal. To this end, can the United States counter Russian 
violations with INF-compliant missiles, allowing us to simultaneously 
counter Russia militarily and punish them diplomatically as violators 
of a treaty?
    General Hyten. The supplemental capabilities announced in the 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review would allow us to effectively respond to Russian 
violations of the INF Treaty. The Department is developing a small 
number of low-yield nuclear weapons and re-introducing a nuclear sea-
launched cruise missile capability, which are both INF Treaty 
compliant.
    In addition, the Department is pursuing treaty compliant R&D on a 
limited conventional Ground Launch Cruise Missile capability.
    The strategy is intended to incentivize Russia's return to INF 
Treaty objectives while simultaneously enhancing our deterrent posture.

    45. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, the basing of INF-type 
missiles will require buy-in from allies. I am worried that even if one 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] nation agrees to host these 
missiles, it will be over the objections of other allies. This could 
act as a wedge in the NATO alliance. Has NATO, as a whole, agreed to 
actually host INF-type missiles and has a Pacific ally?
    General Hyten. The United States has made no request to deploy 
intermediate range missiles on the territory of an ally or partner and 
no NATO nor Pacific ally has made this request.
    It is important to note the low-yield options the Department is 
pursuing are sea-based and do not require host-nation basing. Likewise, 
the Administration has not made any determination to move beyond the 
treaty-compliant Ground Launch Cruise Missile R&D activities.
                               new start
    46. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, now that the administration 
has announced its withdrawal from INF Treaty, the New START [Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty will soon be the only thing standing in 
the way of a world without limits on the United States and Russian 
nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972. New START is due to 
expire in 2021, but can be extended for five years. Russia has been in 
verified compliance with the treaty and is interested in beginning 
talks on an extension. Alarmingly, this administration has been 
unwilling to begin these talks to continue the decades-long bipartisan 
tradition of nuclear arms control. General Hyten, if we were to lose 
the New START Treaty and the ability to inspect Russia's nuclear 
arsenal, what would that mean for the long-term planning of our nuclear 
force structure and how would this affect our current nuclear weapons 
modernization program, which is already slated to cost a staggering 
$1.7 trillion over the next 30 years?
    General Hyten. The impacts from the failure to extend New START are 
unlikely to drive significant changes in U.S. Force structure, but are 
more geopolitical in nature. My overarching concerns are with the 
myriad of nuclear weapons and capabilities that Russia is already 
producing and deploying that are not accountable under New START.
    Hopefully, we can ultimately conclude an agreement with Russia that 
addresses all nuclear weapons. Those details are best addressed by the 
Department of State.
    However, the comprehensive deterrence strategy as defined in the 
NPR includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against 
prospective and unanticipated risks. A fully modernized nuclear Triad, 
including requisite NC3 capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons, 
provides the diversity and flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for 
effective deterrence as the geopolitical landscape evolves.
                              saudi arabia
    47. Senator Gillibrand. General Hyten, it has been revealed 
recently that actors in the Trump administration had attempted to 
circumvent established protocols to provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear 
technology, usurping Congressional authority and possibly risking a 
nuclear arms race in the Middle East. If the sale of nuclear technology 
were to enable Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons, how would that 
undermine international non-proliferation efforts?
    General Hyten. Saudi Arabia is a non-nuclear-weapon state-party to 
the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). As such they are 
legally prohibited from pursuing nuclear weapons development. 
Similarly, the NPT also prohibits nuclear weapon states from 
transferring nuclear technology that would lead to the development of a 
nuclear weapon. It is important to continue to preserve the tenets of 
NPT.
                           homeland security
    48. Senator Gillibrand. General O'Shaughnessy, the Eastern Air 
Defense Sector, based out of New York, is responsible for detecting, 
characterizing, and directing the alert forces that will respond to the 
next air attack on America east of the Mississippi. This includes 
critical sites like New York City and Washington D.C. However, higher 
Air National Guard priorities have prevented the resourcing of 41 full-
time Operations positions necessary to support a 24/7 Homeland defense 
mission. Can you commit that you will prioritize the full funding of 
the Eastern Air Defense Sector in order to assure our national 
security?
    General O'Shaughnessy. We have formally advocated for these 
positions, and I am committed to working with National Guard Bureau, 
U.S. Air Force, and Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS) leadership to 
ensure the National Guard provides EADS with the necessary resources 
and funding to perform their critical mission.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                          troops at the border
    49. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, do you believe that 
the deployment of troops to the southern border--both Active Duty and 
National Guard--laid the foundation for a national emergency 
declaration?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Defense has a long history 
of supporting the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) in their mission to secure the U.S. border, 
spanning multiple presidential administrations. I believe the recent 
deployment of troops to the southern border continues to enhance CBP's 
ability to execute its border security mission.

    50. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, I understand that 
many servicemembers were in the middle of important readiness and 
training exercises when they were deployed to the border. What 
exercises--and how many exercises--were interrupted and will these 
interruptions compromise readiness?
    General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. military personnel are supporting the 
Department of Homeland Security with the following missions: conducting 
contingency planning, assisting with the hardening or reinforcing ports 
of entry (POEs), operating Customs and Border Protection (CBP) mobile 
surveillance cameras, and placing wire obstacles between POEs. Military 
personnel are also providing force protection coverage to U.S. military 
and CBP personnel, as well as providing aviation support and medical 
assistance efforts to U.S. forces and CBP personnel.
    As the Service Chiefs have stated previously, the military units 
executing the DOD support to the southern border mission are conducting 
operations that enhance their overall military readiness when employed 
in line with their military skill sets. I defer to the Service Chiefs 
on specific training exercises that may have been impacted by units 
conducting operations along the southern border.

    51. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, engineering units 
have installed concertina wire along the southern border. How long will 
this c-wire remain installed?
    General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
taken custody of the wire. I defer to CBP regarding their plans for its 
disposal.

    52. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, when Active Duty 
troops eventually--hopefully--leave the border, what will become of the 
c-wire?
    General O'Shaughnessy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
taken custody of the wire. I defer to CBP regarding their plans for its 
disposal.

    53. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what are the 
environmental impacts of the troop deployments and base camps 
established along the border and how does DOD plan to assess the 
inevitable environmental degradation?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Potential environmental impacts of military 
operations are the same as for any human activity on the environment, 
including: soil disturbance, fuel spills, solid waste generation, human 
waste generation, wastewater generation, vehicle and generator 
emissions, increased storm water runoff, and light and noise pollution. 
Where operations are planned, the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts 
a baseline environmental survey to catalog existing conditions. During 
the operation, local commanders implement controls to prevent and 
mitigate environmental impacts. Upon completion, the DOD conducts an 
environmental survey to identify, document, and remediate any residual 
problems.

    54. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, are you concerned 
about a potentially indefinite, domestic deployment of troops within 
your command?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Department of Defense and United States 
Northern Command work to provide capability requested by the Department 
of Homeland Security that is approved by the Secretary of Defense. We 
will continue to do so as requested and approved by the Acting 
Secretary of Defense. We are fully prepared to do what is ordered in 
defense of the Homeland.

    55. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what is the basis 
for the extension of Active Duty deployments through September 2019?
    General O'Shaughnessy. In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Requests for Assistance to the Department of Defense, DHS states their 
extension requests are based on the current and evolving border 
security environment and lack of available support by other federal, 
state, and local partners, thereby projecting that the risk to Customs 
and Border Protection's ability to carry out its federal functions will 
exist through September 2019. The Acting Secretary of Defense has 
subsequently approved all requested extensions.

    56. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, given the evolving 
role of the Active Duty troops deployed at the southern border, what is 
your understanding of the limitations of their mission based on Posse 
Comitatus?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits title 10 
Armed Forces from providing direct support to civilian law enforcement, 
except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the 
U.S. Constitution or an Act of Congress.

    57. Senator Blumenthal. General O'Shaughnessy, what actions or law 
enforcement activities would constitute a violation of Posse Comitatus?
    General O'Shaughnessy. In accordance with Enclosure 3 of DOD 
Instruction 3025.21, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits title 10 DOD 
personnel from providing forms of direct civilian law enforcement 
assistance such as interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or 
other similar activity; search or seizure; arrest; evidence collection; 
and forensic investigations or other testing of evidence obtained from 
a suspect for use in a civilian law enforcement investigation.
                           nuclear deterrence
    58. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, in your testimony on the 
Nuclear Triad, you stated the need to ``support our industrial 
partners'' and prioritize funding for these partners throughout the 
life of the Columbia-class programs. Do you agree that workforce 
development is a vital component of this support?
    General Hyten. I defer to the Navy regarding specifics, however the 
shipyards, as well as the rest of the industrial base, are strategic 
assets, critical to the defense of the Nation. They are one of our 
strengths.
    It is clear continued and focused support is essential to build the 
workforce required to execute construction of the Columbia and Virginia 
programs.

    59. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, you state in your testimony 
that we must field the Columbia-class on time to avoid a deterrent 
capability gap in the nuclear triad. What are the strategic 
consequences to a gap in our nuclear triad capabilities--particularly 
given that nuclear powered submarines are the most survivable leg of 
the triad?
    General Hyten. Any gap in Triad capability reduces options to the 
President in time of need and weakens our overall deterrent posture.
    In the event a legacy system's availability is challenged due to 
unexpected age-related techinical issues or we experience delyas in 
replacement systems, we can intentionally leverage operational 
flexibility inherent in the Triad to mitigate short-term shortfalls.
    The best way to manage future risk is to ensure current systems are 
adequately sustained and replacements fielded on time.

    60. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, as you note in your 
testimony, we currently have no margin for error in our Columbia 
program timeline as the Ohio-class rapidly approach retirement. What 
funding streams for the industrial base should Congress prioritize in 
this funding cycle to ensure the timely production and delivery of the 
Columbia-class?
    General Hyten. I defer to the Navy with respect to specific funding 
streams. However, full funding and on-time appropriations are critical 
to delivering Columbia on schedule.
                intermediate range nuclear forces treaty
    61. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, if you believe that Russia's 
material breach of the INF Treaty is a significant concern, are you 
concerned that scrapping the INF entirely will lead to an escalation of 
Russian development of its intermediate-range nuclear stockpiles?
    General Hyten. Russia has been in material breach of the INF Treaty 
for many years and has already fielded multiple battalions of a system 
in direct violation of its obligations. The strategy in the NPR is 
intended to bring Russia back into the INF Treaty, but if that fails, 
make sure we are able to develop capabilities needed to deter and 
respond effectively.

    62. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, the United States can reach 
both Asia and Europe with sea-based and air-delivered missiles, neither 
of which violate the INF Treaty. Do you believe ground-based missile 
systems are necessary to deter Chinese aggression in the South China 
Sea when the United States is already investing in the construction of 
Virginia and Columbia-class submarines?
    General Hyten. Regarding specifics with respect to the South China 
Sea, I would defer to Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command.
    From a strategic perspective, the United States is prepared to 
respond decisively to Chinese non-nuclear or nuclear aggression. The 
United States conducts exercises in the Asia-Pacific region that, among 
other things, demonstrate our capabilities and resolve which 
contributes to assuring our allies.
    Likewise, being forward-deployable, survivable, penetrating, and 
responsive, Virginia and Columbia-class submarines will strengthen our 
posture and preparedness, and therefore our deterrence vis-a-vis China.
    Finally, I support the need for other basing options (including 
ground) that can increase our overall capabilities.

    63. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, why not continue this 
investment in order to maintain our asymmetric advantage in undersea 
warfare?
    General Hyten. I don't view this as an ``either/or'' proposition. 
Investment in the research and development of ground-based missiles 
does not detract from planned investments in undersea capabilities. 
Diversity in capability and basing is, in fact, key to our strategy.

    64. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, many of our allies--
including Japan--oppose withdrawal from the INF. Others, such as South 
Korea and Australia, do not want to host United States offensive 
missiles. NATO allies also oppose the treaty withdrawal. As STRATCOM 
[United States Strategic Command] Commander, how will you manage this 
opposition?
    General Hyten. In a February 1, 2019 statement, NATO Allies fully 
supported the U.S. suspension of its obligations under the INF Treaty 
and declaring United States intent to withdraw from the Treaty if 
Russian did not return to full and verifiable compliance. In the 
statement, the Allies agreed that Russia would bear sole responsibility 
for the end of the INF Treaty if Russia did not honor its obligations.
    The U.S. is in close dialogue with all our allies, but I defer to 
the State Department and the geographic combatant commanders in 
managing relations with specific allies and partners.
    From a USSTRATCOM perspective, we will continue holding at risk, 
under all conditions, any nation that can hold us at risk. This is the 
foundation of deterrence. Our strategy and posture will pose 
insurmountable difficulties to any Russian strategy of aggression 
against the United States, its allies, or partners.

    65. Senator Blumenthal. General Hyten, if regional allies will not 
support the deployment of ground-based missiles, how will the INF 
withdrawal impact strategic deterrence?
    General Hyten. NATO is continuing to assess the consequences of 
Russia's violation of the INF Treaty and fielding of multiple 
battalions of the SSC-8, and recognizes the need to provide a credible 
and effective deterrent.
    Per the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is modifying a 
small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
warheads to provide a low-yield option. Likewise, in the longer term, 
the U.S. will pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise 
missile.
    These supplements will enhance our ability to tailor deterrence and 
assurance as well as expand the range of flexible and credible U.S. 
options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                       missile defense of hawaii
    66. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, in your written 
statement you said that you are confident in the ability of the Ground-
Based Midcourse Intercept (GBI) defense system to defend the United 
States against ICBMs from North Korea. Does that assessment include 
ICBMs targeted at Hawaii?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes, I am confident we can defend Hawaii 
with our ground-based interceptors.
                     homeland defense radar-hawaii
    67. Senator Hirono. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, you 
both mentioned your support for the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii and 
the Pacific Radar in your written statements. What capability do these 
radars add to our current missile defense system?
    General Hyten. These sensors represent the near-term solution. 
These sensors have higher power levels and multiple sophisticated 
waveforms to exploit different phenomenology enabling persistent, long-
range mid-course tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment 
capability against current threats. Terrestrial sensors will complement 
future space-based sensors designed to globally detect, track, and 
discriminate critical missile threats.
    General O'Shaughnessy. These two radars, along with the Long Range 
Discrimination Radar, will provide much desired `birth-to-death' 
discrimination across the entire flight profile of threat missiles. The 
capabilities these radars will deliver when fully operational could 
potentially allow us to change our shot doctrine, which could increase 
capacity to engage threat missiles.

    68. Senator Hirono. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, do 
these two new radars increase our ability to defend against missile 
threats from China and Russia, in addition to North Korea?
    General Hyten. These radars support the characterization of all 
threats detected in their field of view, but are specifically designed 
to counter ballistic missile threats emanating from North Korea. We 
have other radars designed to meet the requirements of high-end 
competition.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential 
Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic 
missile threats.

    69. Senator Hirono. General O'Shaughnessy, once operational, will 
the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii improve the likelihood of 
successfully intercepting an ICBM targeting Hawaii?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Yes. The Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii will 
provide mid-to-late flight discrimination against intercontinental 
ballistic missile threats targeting Hawaii, allowing for more refined 
targeting of threat reentry vehicles and effective engagements.
                          future of deterrence
    70. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, you have repeatedly stated that 
strategic deterrence is your number one priority. In an era of cyber 
threats, misinformation campaigns, hypersonic weapons and space as a 
warfighting domain, how has the concept of deterrence evolved in the 
first part of the 21st century?
    General Hyten. The basic tenets of deterrence have not changed but 
the application is much more challenging today. What has changed is the 
threat. We face a more diverse threat and the challenge of a more 
uncertain, multipolar geopolitical environment. We must enhance our 
agility across the spectrum from strategy development to capability 
acquisition in order to address this ever more complex environment.
    USSTRATCOM, in partnership with the combatant commands, is working 
to utilize current capabilities to meet the evolving threat while 
shaping strategies and fielding new capabilities for the future. Our 
nuclear forces remain the backbone of our deterrence strategy. However, 
deterrence must span the entire spectrum of conflict and be supported 
by credible U.S. capabilities in all domains.

    71. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, what additional tools does the 
United States need to develop further to meet an evolving concept of 
strategic deterrence?
    General Hyten. The U.S. must rediscover the ability to move with 
speed and agility across multiple domains in operationally-relevant 
timelines. This includes assessing the threat environment, developing 
strategy and policy, fielding capabilities and producing plans to 
ensure our strategic deterrent remains robust, credible, and relevant. 
Our nuclear forces are the backbone of our strategic deterrent, and we 
must complete the planned modernization of the force on time, to 
include fielding the low-yield capabilities discussed in the Nuclear 
Posture Review.
    Additionally, we must continue the work of integrating our 
capabilities across the combatant commands, all domains, and every 
element of national power as well as with our allies and partners in 
order to deter potential adversaries.
    nuclear command, control and communications (nc3) modernization
    72. Senator Hirono. General Hyten, your written statement 
appropriately emphasizes the importance of modernizing our NC3 systems. 
It seems like there is some overlap between the mission requirements 
for nuclear operations and those for missile defense. Will a modernized 
NC3 system be equipped to support missile defense operations and 
decision making in addition to the nuclear mission?
    General Hyten. While both Nuclear and Missile Defense command and 
control systems leverage many of the same sensors, communication paths 
and data streams, the operational requirements and decision authority 
for each mission are different and distinct and drive mission-unique 
solutions.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                         missile defense review
    73. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, the 
2019 Missile Defense Review acknowledged emerging threats like cruise 
missiles and hypersonic weapons, but the report did not propose any new 
creative solutions or investment efforts to address them. Do you 
believe we are acting with the right sense of urgency to counter these 
threats?
    General Hyten. The MDR recognizes we are on the wrong side of the 
cost curve and directs a comprehensive approach to prevent and defeat 
emerging threats, including better integration of offensive and 
defensive capabilities.
    The President's Budget supports continued investment and 
development of game-changing technologies aimed at providing a more 
effective and affordable missile defense.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I view the cruise missile threat to the 
Homeland with an enormous sense of urgency. Simply put, we are behind 
and losing ground. Our ability to defend the Homeland against advanced 
cruise missiles is USNORTHCOM and NORAD's top capability gap, and I am 
equally concerned about the threat presented by our adversaries' 
emerging hypersonic capabilities. Our ability to track, defend, and 
defeat advanced missile threats is significantly challenged by these 
new weapons systems. We require significant, focused investment in 
cruise missile defense that incorporates existing and emergent 
technologies to counter both current and emerging threats, or we risk 
falling further behind.

    74. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten and General O'Shaughnessy, what 
technologies and systems should the Committee be investing in to 
address these threats?
    General Hyten. My first priority is to move missile warning/missile 
defense sensors to a space-based architecture in order to detect, track 
and discriminate advanced missile threats.
    Providing a cost-effective missile defense with sufficient magazine 
depth also requires pursuit of next-generation capabilities such as 
directed energy, Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV), boost phase 
intercept, and non-kinetic capabilities.
    General O'Shaughnessy. I believe we need to take a holistic 
approach and fundamentally change our defense against cruise missiles 
and hypersonic threats by expanding capabilities and capacity across a 
layered defense architecture. This requires building upon our current 
capabilities as well as developing new capabilities to address these 
complex threats. The solution may include a layered architecture 
consisting of capabilities such as sensors, communications, command and 
control, airborne early warning, active electronically scanned array 
radars, munitions, ground-based air defenses, information operations, 
increased research, development, test, and evaluation, Arctic 
operations, and logistical support. The bottom line is that our 
capability challenges cannot be solved by individual capabilities.
                  space r&d [research and development]
    75. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, the Space Rapid Capabilities 
Office is something I've focused on for a number of years. Today, it 
serves as the lynchpin of our responsive space strategy. I'm a firm 
believer that we have parts in place within the Space R&D enterprise 
that are working very well and they should be expanded upon. Moving 
pieces around is where we're going to run into trouble in terms of 
costs and inefficiencies. How important is it that we don't reinvent 
the wheel in areas like Space RCO [Rapid Capabilities Office] and other 
research and development entities during the current space 
reorganization?
    General Hyten. It is vitally important every effort be made to 
reduce costs and inefficiencies by linking Space RCO research and 
development activities with the Space Development Agency (SDA) and 
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to eliminate duplication of 
effort, maximize outcomes, and enable a focus on experimentation, rapid 
prototyping and accelerated fielding of specific next-generation 
capabilities.
              nuclear command, control, and communication
    76. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, you've mentioned that ``we're 
in good shape in the near term'' when it comes to defending our space 
assets, but that we need to look to how we will defend those assets in 
the future. Can you describe the necessary upgrade to the nuclear 
command, control, and communication program and why it is so important 
to the STRATCOM mission?
    General Hyten. Sustaining a reliable, endurable, and survivable NC3 
architecture is foundational to strategic deterrence.
    To that end, the Department is moving towards fielding more 
resilient satellite architectures for protected communications, missile 
warning and responsive counter-space effects.
    Understanding space is no longer a ``sanctuary,'' the Department is 
also pursuing expanded capabilities in the aerial and terrestrial 
domains to provide NC3 resilience and reliability in the event of 
degraded or denied space capabilities.

    77. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, are you still on track to 
produce a concept of operations for space by June?
    General Hyten. Yes. We produced a draft concept of operations and 
evaluated it during our Global Lightning 20 exercise. My space 
component is incorporating lessons learned and refining the document. 
We expect to finalize the document in June.
                    ground based strategic deterrent
    78. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, our adversaries are 
modernizing and advancing their nuclear weapon systems. Understanding 
that stable requirements are essential to the success of nuclear 
modernization programs, are you providing input to the Air Force on how 
requirements need to be shaped for programs like Ground Based Strategic 
Deterrent to stay relevant to a constantly changing threat?
    General Hyten. USSTRATCOM has been an active partner with the Air 
Force to shape the requirements for the GBSD program from inception. 
Our requirements are being met, and I am confident the GBSD weapon 
system will be relevant in the face of future threats.

    79. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, it is our understanding that 
the contract award for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program 
will occur in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020. Is it your 
understanding that is still the Air Force plan?
    General Hyten. I am confident the Air Force will complete Milestone 
B and contract award in the fourth quarter fiscal year 2020.
                               new start
    80. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, to the best of your knowledge, 
including information you might have provided by the U.S. intelligence 
community, are the United States and Russia complying with the treaty?
    General Hyten. Yes, but it is important to note the New Start 
Treaty does not cover all Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear 
weapons.

    81. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, does New START provide for 
intrusive inspections by both parties, including United States boots on 
the ground in Russia inspecting specific Russian nuclear sites, so that 
the United States military has a good degree of confidence in Russian 
compliance with the treaty?
    General Hyten. Yes. The New START Treaty's verification regime 
(i.e., on-site inspections, database exchanges, notifications) provides 
transparency into Russian strategic offensive capabilities, 
contributing to our understanding of their nuclear force structure and 
pace of modernization.
    The U.S. State Department is responsible for determining compliance 
with United States treaties, and I am confident in the State 
Department's and Intelligence Community's efforts to verify and monitor 
Russian compliance with the New START Treaty.

    82. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, does New START include 
notifications about changes and movements in Russian strategic nuclear 
weapons systems, notifications that provide valuable information to the 
United States intelligence community and the military?
    General Hyten. Yes--this is done via Treaty-specific processes 
managed by the Department of State's Nuclear Reduction Center. Part 
Four of the New START Treaty Protocol stipulates each party shall 
notify the other about changes in data (status) pertaining to ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and heavy bombers. These notifications are required to be 
submitted within five days after the change in status. Again, many 
other types of nuclear weapons are not covered by these protocols.

    83. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, are you aware of any estimate 
from the U.S. intelligence community or elsewhere that indicates what 
it would cost to attempt to replace the data provided under New START 
verification provisions, if the treaty did not provide them?
    General Hyten. I am not aware of any such estimate and would defer 
to the Director of National Intelligence for such information.

    84. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, would it not be a very 
significant undertaking to try to replace that information?
    General Hyten. I would defer to the State Department and Director 
of National Intelligence for the scale and scope of replacing 
information provided through New STRAT Treaty verification provisions 
through alternative means.
      microsystems, engineering, science, and applications (mesa)
    85. Senator Heinrich. Gen. Hyten, your testimony notes the need to 
upgrade key nuclear facilities and infrastructure, including for 
production of non-nuclear components. Do you agree that strategic rad-
hard microelectronics at the MESA [Microsystems Engineering, Science 
and Applications] Complex are among the key technologies needed to 
maintain the nuclear deterrent?
    General Hyten. Yes. The trustworthiness of the nuclear weapon 
supply chain providing specialized components must be sustained to 
protect against the potential for sabotage, malicious introduction of 
an unwanted function, or subversion of a function without detection.
    NNSA's MESA facility at Sandia National Laboratories is currently 5 
years beyond the intended 25-year design life and relies on tools and 
capabilities that are no longer supported by manufacturers. Ongoing 
investments in infrastructure and tools to support the MESA complex are 
required to provide key technologies to meet planned LEPs and evolving 
national security needs for strategic radiation-hardened microsystems 
beyond 2025. Without sustained investment and eventual large-scale 
recapitalization, the MESA complex will experience failures due to 
aging and will become obsolete.
             intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    86. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, this Committee, and our 
companion committee in the House, heard testimony from many of your 
colleagues about the gap between your needs for Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and what you receive from 
various sources of ISR. Are your needs being met; and if not, are there 
alternative sources that you can turn to, such as U.S. commercial 
sources or allied partners for the collection of ISR data?
    General Hyten. No operational Commander is fully satisfied with the 
level of ISR support available to them given the overwhelming 
requirements to understand the threat and gain decision advantage in 
today's contested global multi-domain environment. That said, I am 
pleased with the support I get and agnostic as to the sources of ISR 
information as long as they contribute to answering my information 
needs in a reliable, timely and secure manner.
                        artificial intelligence
    87. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, is the Department of Defense 
fully utilizing commercial artificial intelligence platforms and 
algorithms to refine and process the terabytes of ISR data being 
collected?
    General Hyten. Not fully. However, USSTRATCOM continues to 
implement various algorithm-based tools and programs in partnership 
with the IC and DOD. These tools use artificial intelligence and 
machine learning to help analysts triage large amounts of ISR data. For 
more details on DOD's utilization of these types of technologies I 
would defer to the USD (I).

    88. Senator Heinrich. General Hyten, what system or process does 
the Department of Defense have in place for commercial industry 
providers to pitch artificial intelligence products to military leaders 
to help them meet DOD requirements?
    General Hyten. Artificial Intelligence is one of DOD's 
modernization priorities, and the Department has created a Technical 
Director for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to 
consolidate the Service and CCMD AI requirements.
    In addition, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) website posts DOD 
hard problems that need industry involvement to solve, and the Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC) has the CCMD Priorities listed in 
the DTIC Classified reading room for industry to review and offer 
solutions to solve AI gaps.
    Finally, industry providers are encouraged to submit potential 
solutions and brief their products via regularly scheduled technical 
interchange meetings and conferences.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                             f-15c/d fleet
    89. Senator Warren. General O'Shaughnessy, the Air Force is 
reportedly considering buying new F-15s to refresh the F-15C fleet, 
which is nearing the end of its service life. How would a 
revitalization of the F-15C/D fleet with advanced F-15s affect your 
ability to defend the Homeland in terms of the capacity and 
capabilities available to you as NORTHCOM Commander?
    General O'Shaughnessy. For our Homeland aerospace defense mission, 
we advocate for required capabilities rather than specific platforms. 
The Air Force is on record with its requirement to buy 72 new fighter 
aircraft per year to implement the National Defense Strategy, and we 
understand the Air Force remains fully committed to advanced 5th 
generation capabilities and the F-35. However, the decision to refresh 
4th generation capability helps mitigate capacity risk while balancing 
near term readiness concerns, getting closer to the goal of 72 new 
fighter aircraft. Recapitalization of the Air Force fighter force, 
including the F-15 variant, will help give us the resources and 
flexibility necessary to defend the Homeland.
                            new start treaty
    90. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if New START expires in February 
2021 with nothing to replace it and there are no constraints on 
Russia's nuclear forces, would that increase or decrease the threat 
Russia poses to the United States?
    General Hyten. It's difficult to predict with any certainty, but I 
doubt Russia would realize any strategic value in increasing the size 
of its stockpile and following that course of action would 
significantly increase the burden on its economy and society. The more 
likely response would be to continue the path the Russians are already 
on, which is to increase the capability and diversity of their existing 
platforms and stockpile.

    91. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if we have less visibility into 
Russia's nuclear capabilities, their force structure, and their 
modernization plans, which would be the case without New START, what 
impact would that have on United States military planning and spending 
and what countermeasures would we need to consider and what would be 
the cost?
    General Hyten. The impacts from not extending the New START Treaty 
are unlikely to drive significant changes in United States force 
structure, but are more geopolitical in nature. My overarching concerns 
are with the myriad of nuclear weapons and capabilities that Russia is 
producing and deploying that are not accountable under New START--with 
or without an extension.
    Hopefully, we can ultimately conclude an agreement with Russia that 
addresses all nuclear weapons. Those details are best addressed by the 
Department of State.
    However, the comprehensive deterrence strategy as defined in the 
NPR includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against 
prospective and unanticipated risks. A fully modernized nuclear Triad, 
including requisite NC3 capabilities and low-yield nuclear weapons, 
provides the diversity and flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies for 
effective deterrence as the geopolitical landscape evolves.

    92. Senator Warren. General Hyten, if we lose the New START data 
exchanges and onsite inspection rights, would the Pentagon and the 
intelligence community have to spend more on national technical means 
of verification to make up for this loss?
    General Hyten. I would defer to the State Department and Director 
of National Intelligence for the scale and scope of replacing 
information provided through New STRAT Treaty verification provisions 
through alternative means.

    93. Senator Warren. General Hyten, given the extensive United 
States experience in negotiating and pursuing arms control agreements 
with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, how do you recommend the 
United States pursue arms control agreements with Russia and China in 
the years ahead?
    General Hyten. My ideas are stated in the answer to Question 91 
above. However I defer to the State Department as to the best means to 
approach arms control negotiations.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
           nuclear command, control and communications (nc3)
    94. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, the Nuclear Posture Review, 
your written testimony and your verbal testimony all highlight the 
critical requirement for Nuclear Command, Control and Communications 
modernization. Being given the sole responsibility for NC3 as commander 
of USSTRATCOM as well as the opening of the new USSTRATCOM headquarters 
this year mean a lot of modernization and change occurring rapidly 
within your command. Given the cyber warfare and cyber espionage 
challenges from adversaries like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, 
what measures are you and your team taking to guard against an 
aggressive and persistent cyber threat?
    General Hyten. USSTRATCOM is engaged with key experts from across 
the Department to develop a comprehensive cyber defense plan for the 
current NC3 enterprise.
    Teams regularly assess individual NC3 systems for vulnerabilities 
and build mitigations to address cyber threats to our aging systems.
    In addition, the Department is considering and incorporating 
information security best practices in all new modernization programs 
at the onset of development to ensure fielded systems are capable of 
defending against future cyber threats.

    95. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, you have two platforms in the 
E-4B and E-6B that are critical components of our ability to execute 
NC3 operations in both peacetime and war. The last major platform 
upgrades were 34 years ago (1985) for the E-4B model and 21 years ago 
(1998) for the E-6B model. We spend a lot of time discussing the aging 
B-52, ICBM inventory and submarine fleet, but little time discussing 
the E-4B and E-6B. Further, the Nuclear Posture Review cites these 
platforms as a strength while your written testimony highlights efforts 
to find replacements. How survivable and interoperable are these 
current platforms in a modern war and when do we need to seriously 
consider a replacement or major upgrade to these weapons systems?
    General Hyten. Both of these key command and control platforms are 
survivable in the most stressed environments and fully interoperable 
with all elements of the National Military Command System. The 
fundamental challenge facing these platforms is in fully meeting 
operational mission availability requirements.
    The E-4B is projected to reach end of life in 2032. Operational 
availability is negatively impacted by a continuous cycle of 
maintenance, major overhauls, and system upgrades that are necessary to 
keep the fleet operationally capable.
    Likewise the E-6B is challenged to meet operation mission 
availability requirements due to a combination of limited fleet size 
and increasing depot-level and routine field-level maintenance to 
address aging airframe issues.
    The Air Force is leading a joint analysis of alternatives to 
explore options to recapitalize the E-4B, E-6B, and the VC-32 and is 
expected to complete in late fiscal year 2019. We will take this 
information and integrate it into our broader NC3 architecture work in 
order to define the best way ahead.
                              space force
    96. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, in your testimony you praised 
the decision to keep the newly developing Space Force under the 
umbrella of the Department of the Air Force. With the development of 
the Space Force and a Unified Space Command, what steps are you taking 
to ensure USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM and the new U.S. Space Command are all 
resourced appropriately and have the appropriate authorities given the 
significant interests all three commands have in space capabilities?
    General Hyten. My staff is working with the Joint Staff, in concert 
with AFSPC and Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC) to identify 
the resources and authorities required to establish an effective 
USSPACECOM. In the interim, I am committed to ensuring there will be no 
operational degradation during the transition and have directed my 
staff to provide robust support until USSPACECOM reaches full operating 
capability.

    97. Senator Manchin. General Hyten, are you concerned about 
shortfalls as the Air Force tries to fully support all of the commands?
    General Hyten. I fully recognize the challenges the Air Force faces 
supporting another combatant command, but the Air Force has been 
responsive to the changes directed by the Department. My staff 
carefully monitors competing interests to ensure USSTRATCOM and future 
USSPACECOM support is properly prioritized.
                            missile defense
    98. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, a December GAO 
[Government Accountability Office] report reviewed the Air Force's 
position and analysis of the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya island. While 
the report did highlight an excellent mission capable rate, it also 
listed Air Force and Missile Defense Agency estimates of required 
investments of $200 million in operations and maintenance funds and 
almost $70 million in upgrade and sustainment costs over the next 5 
years to keep the system running. Given existing and future 
capabilities such as the Long Range Discriminating Radar, the Space 
Fence, the Pacific Radar, the sea based X-band radar and radars in 
Japan, is the Cobra Dane still providing such a critical function to 
our missile defense that we need to continue to invest large sums of 
money into sustaining this aging system?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The Cobra Dane radar contributes 
significantly to Homeland defense and continues to be the ``backbone'' 
of the ground-based midcourse defense system. Due to its unique 
geographic location, the radar provides engagement quality mid-course 
tracking data of missiles threatening CONUS and Alaska. I work closely 
with the Missile Defense Agency and the Air Force to ensure Cobra Dane 
remains a critical operational element of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System architecture until it can be replaced by assets that provide 
equal or better capabilities.

    99. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, we currently have 44 
ground based interceptors in our inventory between Fort Greely, Alaska, 
and Vandenberg AFB [Air Force Base], California. You have previously 
stated that you do not consider this to be adequate for defense of the 
United States and North America as a whole. How many additional GBI do 
we need to be adequately prepared for a North Korean or Chinese 
ballistic missile threat?
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our defensive Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
system was designed and deployed against North Korea and potential 
Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian or Chinese ballistic 
missile threats. I am confident in our ability to defend against the 
current North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile threats.
    I support the Department of Defense's initiative to field twenty 
additional interceptors at Ft Greely, AK that will carry the Redesigned 
Kill Vehicles. This effort will provide both capability and capacity 
improvements. We will continue to reassess the sufficiency of our 
interceptor fleet based on the estimated threat going forward.

    100. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you have testified 
extensively in writing and verbally that the arctic is quickly becoming 
a vulnerable spot in our defenses for North America. What are your 
requirements for defense of North America from a northern approach in 
the form of radars, interceptors, ships or investment in other 
infrastructure such as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System 
(IUSS)?
    General O'Shaughnessy. The defense of North America requires modern 
sensor systems for aerospace surveillance and warning capable of 
detecting advanced threats at long ranges. These sensor systems must be 
able to detect, characterize, and attribute potential threats from 
airborne, surface, and subsurface launch platforms operating in and 
through the Arctic and the northern approaches to the Homeland.
    United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) currently have nine Arctic-related 
items on the commands' Integrated Priority List that address air and 
cruise missile defense, communications, maritime undersea surveillance, 
indications and warning, and Homeland defense. The commands have also 
articulated a requirement for ice-strengthened surface vessels capable 
of exercising and deploying, positioning, and conducting deterrence and 
decisive operations in the ice-diminished waters of the Arctic. 
Additionally, USNORTHCOM has a requirement to support those vessels 
with fuel north of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Finally, USNORTHCOM and NORAD 
have stressed the urgency of Integrated Undersea Surveillance System 
recapitalization with the United States Navy, as Russia and China have 
fielded advanced submarines and missile systems that present 
significant threats to the Homeland.
          counter terrorism and violent extremist organization
    101. Senator Manchin. General O'Shaughnessy, you highlighted in 
your written testimony your significant concern over terrorist or 
violent extremist attacks on the United States to include another 9/11 
style attack on the Homeland. What steps are you taking at USNORTHCOM 
either militarily, through interagency or multi-nationally to gather 
intelligence and conduct operations to combat the persistent terrorist 
threat?
    General O'Shaughnessy. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 
takes a comprehensive approach to countering threats to the Homeland. 
We maintain constant awareness of terrorist threats through routine, 
daily coordination with the U.S. intelligence community and utilization 
of a vast network of liaison officers and interagency partners, 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of 
Homeland Security. We have also built strong relationships with other 
combatant commands through which we share information and participate 
in multi-national forums run by Special Operations Command that focus 
on countering violent extremist organizations. In addition, USNORTHCOM 
has developed robust counterterrorism plans which we exercise and 
rehearse frequently.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Doug Jones
                     space force and space command
    102. Senator Jones. General Hyten, at the hearing, you emphasized 
the importance of ``not breaking the mission'' in separating Space from 
SRATCOM and re-establishing it as a separate combatant command. Please 
be more specific about the steps STRATCOM is taking to ensure a smooth 
transition and to avoid overlap, duplication, and inefficiency among 
the Space Force, Space Command, the Space Development Agency, the NRO 
[National Reconnaissance Office], and the Services.
    General Hyten. My chief concern and focus is ensuring there is no 
disruption in space operations or support to other commanders, the 
Joint Force and DOD/USG agencies.
    To facilitate seamless transition, USSTRATCOM in association with 
the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and the NRO developed 
both a transition Divestiture Plan and Implementation Plan.
    These plans are continuously refined, socialized, and coordinated 
through exercises in advance of the transition. Additionally, a 
Memorandum of Agreement codifies how elements of the USSTRATCOM Staff 
will support Commander, USSPACECOM throughout the transfer.
    USSPACECOM, at establishment, will be postured to issue orders, as 
well as command and control assigned and attached forces, but will not 
be fully mission capable.
    To that end, I directed my staff to continue providing robust 
support to ensure mission success through USSPACECOM declaration of 
FOC.
                        homeland defense design
    103. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, your written testimony 
briefly references the three-phase Homeland Defense Design. Please 
provide an update on that effort and how it's progressing.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Our cruise missile defense efforts for the 
first two phases of the Homeland Defense Design initiative started in 
the National Capital Region (NCR) and are just part of our overall 
initial effort encompassing the whole aerospace domain. We are 
utilizing lessons learned from point defense against cruise missile 
threats in the NCR and broadening our understanding of what is required 
to defend critical infrastructure throughout North America.
    As we move to Phase III of Homeland Defense Design, it is clear 
there is much to be done. From a warfighter perspective, we need to be 
able to find, track, and defeat launch platforms and cruise missiles at 
greater ranges than we've previously planned for. This will require 
changes in our operational approach and investments in advanced 
sensors, and weapons, all of which we are addressing with the 
Department.
    Expanding cruise missile defense beyond the NCR is significantly 
more complex. The Northern Approaches Surveillance Analysis of 
Alternatives (NAS AoA) and my Commander's Estimate on Homeland cruise 
missile defense are both currently underway, and these two key, 
overarching efforts will be crucial to identifying the best way to 
defend our Homeland against cruise missile threats.
    These studies are critical to our efforts, but we must take action 
now to address the threat. As such, we have taken action to address 
immediate needs as we continue efforts to identify and implement short, 
mid-, and long-term solutions. The immediate includes achieving the 
best possible results with the capabilities and capacity available 
today. The short-term includes increasing capacity of the systems we 
already have and targeting investment in capabilities giving me the 
best flexible deterrent options for the available funding. Our mid-term 
and long-term efforts are heavily reliant on current and emergent 
science and technology and will require significant investment now to 
field solutions as soon as possible.
                  combatting illegal drug trafficking
    104. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, in your testimony, you 
acknowledged that the majority of illegal drugs are coming through the 
ports, not across uncontrolled sections of the border. Could you give 
us your best military advice on whether NORTHCOM's forces have an 
appropriate role in combatting illegal drug trafficking and if so, 
explain what the most appropriate and effective use of NORTHCOM's 
forces is in that effort?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I believe United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) has an appropriate role in combatting illegal drug 
trafficking. USNORTHCOM routinely provides military-unique capabilities 
in support of federal civilian law enforcement and participates in 
training with both U.S. civilian law enforcement and foreign partners. 
As authorized by 10 USC Sec.  124 and 10 USC Sec.  284, USNORTHCOM 
contributes to counterdrug efforts by providing maintenance and repair 
of equipment, transportation support, engineering, training of law 
enforcement agencies, employment of detection and monitoring sensors, 
intelligence analysis, and aerial and ground reconnaissance. This 
support enables our law enforcement partners to more effectively 
interdict drugs and other illicitly trafficked commodities.
                         emergency declaration
    105. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, you testified that you 
have not yet received any orders from the Commander in Chief pursuant 
to the Emergency Declaration of March 15, 2019. Please explain what 
process, if any, you undertake when you do receive an order from the 
Commander in Chief to determine the legality of that order and state 
whether that process will be followed if you receive an order pursuant 
to the March 15, 2019 Emergency Declaration.
    General O'Shaughnessy. Orders received by United States Northern 
Command (USNORTHCOM) from any source are reviewed by the our command 
staff judge advocate and legal staff to determine if there are any 
potential legal concerns associated with any given order. If there are 
legal concerns, in coordination with Chairman of the Joint Chief of 
Staff Legal Counsel and the Department of Defense Office of General 
Counsel, our legal team develops recommended courses of action that 
resolve or mitigate those concerns for my consideration. Based on this 
information, I select a course of action and issue appropriate orders 
to our headquarters staff and subordinate commanders. This is the 
process I have followed to date, and it is the same process I will 
continue to follow for future orders I receive as Commander of 
USNORTHCOM.
                             national guard
    106. Senator Jones. General O'Shaughnessy, you testified about the 
importance of the National Guard to NORAD's missions. We have an Air 
Guard unit in Alabama that is scheduled to receive the new F-35 fighter 
jets in a couple of years. How will that unit and those capabilities 
contribute to the defense of the Homeland?
    General O'Shaughnessy. I am absolutely confident the Alabama Air 
National Guard, equipped with the new F-35 Lightning II, will be 
ideally suited to defend the United States against the most advanced 
and emerging threats to North America. The F-35 is unmatched in its 
ability to counter and defeat the latest 21st century advanced threats 
to the Homeland. In short, the F-35 and the Air National Guard provide 
critical combat capability and will be integral to the defense of North 
America.


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, McSally, 
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono, 
Kaine, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
    The Senate Armed Services Committee today meets to continue 
receiving the posture statements from our combatant commands. 
Testifying today are General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of 
the United States European Command [EUCOM], and General Stephen 
Lyons, Commander of the United States Transportation Command 
[TRANSCOM]. I welcome both of you here and thank you for your 
service.
    The Senate Armed Services Committee's top priority is to 
ensure the effective implementation of the National Defense 
Strategy [NDS]. That is our blueprint. We pretty much agreed to 
that. It means that we need urgent change at a significant 
scale to address the challenges of strategic competition with 
Russia and China.
    I just got back from Munich, Kosovo, Djibouti, Algeria, and 
these areas, and that is where Russia and China are. We need to 
be aware of the strength and what the competition is. Putin has 
demonstrated both the capability and the intent to use force to 
achieve his objective, most notably in Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Syria. Putin will not hesitate to use other tools in his 
arsenal as well, whether it is cyber attacks, election 
meddling, or assassinations with chemical weapons. Perceived 
weakness will only provoke further aggression from Putin.
    That is why efforts such as full support for the European 
Deterrence Initiative that is made up of primarily the old 
Soviet Union countries provides the defensive lethal assistance 
to Ukraine and why they are so important.
    Likewise, we need a defense budget that is of sufficient 
size and invests in key capabilities we need in Europe, areas 
like long-range fires, cruise missile defense, anti-submarine 
warfare, and the supporting infrastructure.
    I was in Munich 2 weeks ago, and it was clear that we 
cannot be successful in the strategic competition with Russia 
without a strong, unified NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] alliance. America is safer and stronger because 
of our NATO alliance. General Scaparrotti, I look forward to 
your thoughts along these issues.
    General Lyons, you have had a long history with TRANSCOM 
serving as its Deputy Commander for 2 years before assuming 
your current role. I look forward to hearing your assessment of 
the services and the resources that you have there because I 
know that there is some discussion even of some privatization 
in that area. We will be anxious to hear your statements.
    Before I turn to Senator Reed, I would like to remind all 
of our members that we will have a classified, closed, informal 
briefing, at 2:30 in the Visitors Center with both of our 
witnesses.
    Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 
join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning.
    General Scaparrotti is returning to testify before the 
Committee for the third time on the United States military 
posture and programs in Europe. He is dual-hatted as Commander 
of United States European Command and NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander, or the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe]. 
Welcome, General Scaparrotti.
    General Lyons, I want to welcome you to your first posture 
hearing before this Committee.
    Let me thank both of you for your many decades of military 
service, and please extend our appreciation to the dedicated 
men and women serving under your commands. Thank them very much 
for us.
    Over the last several years, the security challenges in the 
United States European Command have grown increasingly complex. 
Russia has reemerged as an aggressive opponent of the rules-
based international order, which Russia views as a counter to 
its strategic interest in reclaiming great power status. The 
National Defense Strategy issued last year highlights the need 
to counter a revanchist Russia with a credible military 
deterrent that demonstrates that any military aggression 
against the sovereignty and integrity of NATO members or threat 
of such aggression will not succeed. General Scaparrotti, I am 
interested in your assessment of the progress of our force 
posture in Europe in meeting NDS requirements.
    In addition to its military modernization and aggressive 
military posturing, Russia is conducting a campaign of hybrid 
warfare, below the level of military conflict, using all tools 
of national power to advance its strategic interests. Our 
democracy was attacked in 2016, and we have been persistently 
under attack ever since, including during last year's midterm 
elections. I would be interested in hearing from General 
Scaparrotti whether EUCOM is getting the cyber resources and 
personnel it needs and whether we are investing in the right 
non-military tools of national power to counter this hybrid 
warfare.
    An additional challenge is the unprecedented strain on 
alliance cohesion within NATO. Former Secretary of Defense 
Mattis stressed that the United States' strength is 
inextricably linked to our systems of alliances and 
partnerships. Yet, a recent report from the Harvard Belfer 
Center by Ambassador Doug Lute and Ambassador Nicholas Burns 
describes a crisis within NATO, which they attribute in large 
part to the absence of strong U.S. leadership. The Senate and 
Congress as a whole have repeatedly gone on record to reaffirm 
our strong commitment to NATO and the transatlantic 
relationship as a core element of U.S. national security. There 
should be no doubt among our allies or our adversaries 
regarding the United States' resolve to meet its NATO 
commitments to collective defense.
    Turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of TRANSCOM perform 
duties that sustain the whole Department of Defense effort in 
protecting our Nation's security. With the competitive edge in 
its ability to deploy and sustain America's armed forces, 
TRANSCOM provides DOD [United States Department of Defense] 
with unique capabilities that we have come to expect and 
perhaps too frequently take for granted. TRANSCOM forces are 
busy supporting all of the combatant commanders every day, and 
without them, the United States would be at a significant 
disadvantage almost everywhere in the world.
    The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a group of cargo ships 
held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, but it is 
aging and will need to be modernized over the next decade. Two 
years ago, the Committee authorized the Department to start a 
program to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force by authorizing 
DOD to purchase up to two foreign-built vessels, while the Navy 
designed a family of auxiliary vessels for a number of uses, 
including recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force. Then last 
year, Congress authorized the Department to buy five more 
foreign-built vessels as soon as the Department put forward a 
funded plan to build new ships for the RRF in U.S. shipyards. 
General Lyons, I am interested in the status and the next steps 
for RRF recapitalization in fiscal year 2020.
    The Defense Department also needs to ensure that the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF, program, which provides as much as 
40 percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable after 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and will be able to provide 
needed surge capacity in the future. General Lyons, I am 
interested in your view on the state of this fleet and if 
anything needs to be done to ensure these capabilities and 
their readiness.
    Our global transportation capability, owned and managed by 
TRANSCOM, has been one of our asymmetric advantages for many 
years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries 
will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Last year, 
General McDew told the Committee that TRANSCOM has been 
conducting analyses to assess requirements for an environment 
where our mobility forces would be challenged, and his 
assessment was that additional investment in lift would be 
needed. However, when we received the report of that analysis 
in the Mobility Requirements Study earlier this year, the 
study's conclusions differed from General McDew's assessment. 
General Lyons, perhaps you could give us an update on why there 
was a change.
    Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats 
because of the command's extensive network with private sector 
entities in the transportation and shipping industries. General 
Lyons, I would like to get an update from you on progress in 
the cybersecurity efforts you have made since last year.
    Once again, let me thank the witnesses for their service 
and for their testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    You guys know the drill. First, you are going to have 5 
minutes. Try not to exceed 5 minutes, but your entire statement 
will be made a part of the record. We will start with you, 
General Scaparrotti.

  STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, 
     UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
          ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

    General Scaparrotti. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, good morning and thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you today as the 
Commander at United States European Command. I am honored to be 
here today this morning with General Steve Lyons as well.
    First and foremost, I want to thank you for Congress' 
support of the servicemembers, civilians, and families in 
Europe. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and 
dedication to Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is 
essential to our national security and to maintaining global 
peace and prosperity. We as a nation are blessed by their 
voluntary and exceptional service. Thank you again for your 
steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.
    The threats facing United States interests in the EUCOM 
area of responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and 
growing. They are complex, trans-regional, all-domain, and 
multi-functional. This remains one of the most dynamic periods 
in recent history in my view. Russia has continued its 
reemergence as a strategic competitor and remains the primary 
threat to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment.
    While the United States maintains a global military 
superiority over Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten 
to erode our competitive military advantage, challenge our 
ability to operate uncontested in all domains, and diminish our 
ability to deter Russian aggression.
    In light of Russia's modernizing and increasingly 
aggressive force posture, EUCOM recommends augmenting our 
assigned and rotational forces to enhance our deterrence 
posture. EUCOM also recommends further investments that enhance 
European logistical infrastructure and capacity to support 
rapid deployment of multi-domain United States Forces in 
Europe.
    In addition to the threat from Russia, the risk of 
terrorism in Europe remains high despite a decline in 
fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists 
present a clear and present threat to Europe's people and their 
infrastructure.
    Thankfully, the United States is not alone in facing these 
other challenges across the Euro-Atlantic theater. As our 
National Defense Strategy states, the NATO alliance deters 
Russian adventurism, contributes to the defeat of terrorism, 
and addresses instability along NATO's periphery. Our allies 
and partners play a vital role in our collective security, and 
they have made significant progress in increasing cash 
contributions and capabilities that provide our common defense. 
For almost 70 years, NATO has been the cornerstone of Euro-
Atlantic security. As NATO adapts to remain relevant and fit 
for purpose, we will find, as we always have, that every 
challenge is best addressed as an alliance.
    Let me close by, again, thanking Congress and this 
Committee for your continued support, especially the sustained 
funding of the European Deterrence Initiative, EDI. EUCOM's 
future success in implementing our National Defense Strategy 
and fulfilling our mission is only possible with Congress' 
support. Thank you.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti follows:]

          Prepared Statement by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti
                              introduction
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is my honor to testify today in 
what is likely my final year as Commander of the United States European 
Command (USEUCOM). I humbly represent over 68,000 brave and dedicated 
men and women who are forward-deployed or stationed in the European 
theater of operations. These warriors demonstrate selfless service and 
dedication to Euro-Atlantic defense, a mission that is essential to our 
national security and to maintaining global peace and prosperity. We as 
a Nation are blessed by their voluntary and exceptional service. Thank 
you for your steadfast support of these patriots and their mission.
    Europe and the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance remain crucial to our 
national security, as clearly stated in the President's 2017 National 
Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and 
the 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS). USEUCOM's operations, 
activities, and investments are aligned with the principles and 
guidance provided by these strategic documents. I cannot stress enough 
that USEUCOM's ongoing and future success in implementing and executing 
these strategies is only possible with Congress' support, especially 
the sustained funding of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).
A Dynamic Security Environment
    The threats facing United States interests in the USEUCOM area of 
responsibility, which includes Israel, are real and growing. They are 
complex, trans-regional, all-domain, and multi-functional. They require 
the United States, together with our European allies and partners, to 
constantly adapt with forces and concepts that are able to out-pace the 
evolution of these threats. A revisionist Russia is the primary threat 
to a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment. Russia has invaded 
Ukraine, occupied Crimea, launched cyber-attacks against the Baltic 
States and Ukraine, interfered in United States and other Western 
elections, and attacked Ukrainian navy vessels attempting to transit 
the Kerch Strait to Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. It is also 
overhauling its nuclear forces--including those that threaten European 
territory, such as the dual-capable, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF)-violating SSC-8/9M729 ground-launched cruise missile. Given 
Moscow's demonstrated willingness to violate international law and 
legally-binding treaties, and to exercise malign influence, Russia 
threatens the United States' vital national interests in preserving a 
Europe that is whole, free, and at peace.
    We have already made significant strides in adapting our European 
force posture to meet these threats. As we continue to adapt, USEUCOM 
remains steadfastly committed to fielding a lethal, agile, and 
resilient force and to strengthening the NATO Alliance. With continued 
investment, innovative use of resources, and the strength of our 
Nation's resolve, I am confident that we will continue to meet the 
challenges of the dynamic security environment. This includes ensuring 
the continued credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which 
backstops all U.S. military and diplomatic operations across the globe 
and helps ensure that tensions with Russia--no matter where or how they 
arise--do not escalate into large-scale war.
           risks and challenges in the strategic environment
Russia
    Russia is a long-term, strategic competitor that wants to advance 
its own objectives at the expense of U.S. prosperity and security and 
that sees the United States and the NATO Alliance as the principal 
threat to its geopolitical ambitions. In pursuit of its objectives, 
Moscow seeks to assert its influence over nations along its periphery, 
undermine NATO solidarity, and fracture the rules-based international 
order. Russia actively pursues an aggressive foreign policy in 
violation of other nations' sovereignty, carrying out subversive and 
destabilizing activities in Europe and the United States and exploiting 
opportunities to increase its influence and expand its presence in 
Afghanistan, Syria, and Asia.
    Russia employs a whole-of-society approach through a wide array of 
tools to include political provocateurs, information operations, 
economic intimidation, cyber operations, religious leverage, proxies, 
special operations, conventional military forces, and nuclear forces. 
Russia pursues its strategic objectives in Europe, while avoiding 
direct military conflict with the United States and NATO, by targeting 
countries through indirect action--backed up by the coercive threat of 
its conventional and nuclear forces. Such actions include questioning a 
government's legitimacy, threatening a country's economic interests, 
mobilizing fringe opposition groups, and utilizing proxies or armed 
civilians, such as private military contracting companies with opaque 
ties to the state.
    Russia's military capability improvements are significant. Russia 
continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to complete its 
broad-based upgrade of its nuclear forces and produce advanced weapons 
and capabilities specifically designed to counter United States 
military superiority. Russia's nuclear modernization program covers 
every leg of its strategic triad and includes advanced modern road-
mobile and silo-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), new 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Long Range Strategic 
Bombers. Russia is also developing and deploying new strategic nuclear 
delivery platforms, to include its nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered 
underwater unmanned vehicle, intercontinental-range cruise missile, and 
its air-launched ballistic missile, all of which Russia seeks to keep 
outside of existing arms control agreements. Additionally, they are 
pursuing nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons, which could provide them the 
capability to attack anywhere in the globe with little or no notice.
    Russia is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-
strategic, dual-capable weapons. It currently has an active stockpile 
of approximately 2,000 of these theater-range systems, which are not 
subject to the New START Treaty's limitations on deployed warheads. 
These systems include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic-
missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges, and Russia's INF-violating 
ground-launched cruise missile, among others.
    Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile is of concern 
because it facilitates Moscow's mistaken belief that limited nuclear 
first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia 
a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. The 
2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for adjustments to U.S. nuclear 
forces to close this perceived gap on the escalation ladder and 
reinforce deterrence against low-yield nuclear use.
    Outside of its nuclear forces, Russia is fielding advanced anti-
access/area denial (A2AD) integrated air defense systems (IADS), 
precision guided cruise and ballistic missiles, modern cyber and 
electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and counter-space weapons meant 
to impede United States power projection in Europe. They have improved 
readiness via investments in infrastructure, training, and 
compensation, and their exercise program demonstrates increasingly 
sophisticated command and control and integration across multiple 
warfare areas. In the Arctic, Russia continues to invest in their 
forces as environmental changes open up access to the High North.
    The Kremlin has also demonstrated the ability and political will to 
deploy its modernized military and expand its operational footprint. 
Last year we observed a historically high combat maritime presence in 
the East Mediterranean along with military deployments and 
demonstrations in Syria. Their most advanced and quietest guided 
missile submarine, the Severodvinsk, conducted extended deployments in 
the northern Atlantic.
    Russia seeks advantage over the United States and its European 
allies through its non-compliance with long-standing arms control 
treaties. Its violations of the INF Treaty allowed Moscow to develop 
capabilities that the United States continued to forego. Its 
``suspension'' of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty gave 
it greater flexibility to posture forces in regions of special interest 
to Moscow and to do so with significantly less transparency towards its 
neighbors in ways we do not because of our adherence to these treaties. 
Its violation of certain provisions of the Open Skies Treaty--as well 
as its selective implementation of Vienna Document transparency 
measures--poses challenges for ensuring full military transparency.
    Our NATO allies supported the U.S. announcement to begin withdrawal 
from the INF Treaty because they recognize that Russia's Treaty-banned 
systems hold much of Europe at risk and that despite significant 
diplomatic efforts--more than 30 engagements over nearly six years--
Russia refuses to return to compliance.
    While the United States maintains global military superiority over 
Russia, evolving Russian capabilities threaten to erode our competitive 
military advantage, challenge our ability to operate uncontested in all 
domains, and diminish our ability to deter Russian aggression.
Ukraine
    Moscow persists in its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine 
and block Ukraine's democratic choice to align with the West. Following 
Russia's purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia's aggressive 
activities, including those of Russia-led forces in the Donbas region 
in eastern Ukraine, target Ukraine's defense, economic, and political 
sectors. Russia has not implemented its commitments in the Minsk 
agreements, and Russia continues to arm, train, lean, and fight 
alongside antigovernment forces in eastern Ukraine. The conflict in 
eastern Ukraine remains hot, with numerous ceasefire violations 
reported weekly. The UN reports that approximately 13,000 people have 
been killed in the Donbas since Russia instigated the conflict in 2014. 
More than 100 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2018 as well as 55 
civilians. Due to Russian intransigence, no peacekeeping initiative has 
been implemented. Russia's unjustified use of force against Ukrainian 
vessels and naval personnel in the Black Sea near the Kerch Strait last 
November demonstrated Russia's disregard for Ukraine's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, denying Ukraine its right of free passage in 
accordance with international law. In addition, through its support of 
illegitimate elections in the so-called ``Donetsk and Luhansk People's 
Republics'', Russia has sought to undermine the government of Ukraine. 
Russia will likely attempt to interfere in Ukraine's upcoming 
presidential elections, as it did in 2014.
Georgia
    After the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia stationed 7,000 troops on 
sovereign Georgian territory. Russia now occupies approximately 20 
percent of Georgian territory and maintains a significant military and 
border presence in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has 
recognized the two territories as independent, entering into defense 
agreements with these territories and incorporating South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian ``national military forces'' into Russian Army command 
structures. Russia exacerbates tensions by fomenting discord between 
these territories and the rest of Georgia. While Georgia supports 
confidence building measures, such as granting the EU Monitoring 
Mission in Georgia (EUMM) access to the occupied territories in 
accordance with its mandate. Russia opposes them.
Balkans
    Security in the Balkans, a strategically significant region, is 
tenuous, and Balkan nations are a primary target of Russian malign 
influence. Negotiations between Kosovo and neighboring Serbia to 
normalize their relations and agree on a long-term solution that is 
viable for both countries have struggled to make progress for some time 
and are currently on hold. Russia fuels regional instability in an 
effort to prevent individual Balkan nations from progressing on a path 
toward greater Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. Seeking to 
maintain its influence in Serbia through political, military, and 
economic support, Russia also opposes the recognition of Kosovo as a 
sovereign country. NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes over 
3,500 troops from both NATO and non-NATO nations, plays an important 
role in maintaining security and stability in this region. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina also continues to work toward long-term peace and 
stability. Despite challenges from Republika Srpska, which is 
influenced by Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina partners with the United 
States and NATO, supporting the Resolute Support Mission in 
Afghanistan.
Baltics and Poland
    Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are a focal point of United 
States and NATO deterrence posture and activities as Russia attempts to 
intimidate these nations, both politically and militarily. Russia also 
tries to influence ethnic Russian populations, especially in Estonia 
and Latvia, and both countries remain mindful that in Crimea, Russia 
used these ethnic groups as a justification for intervention. Poland 
has offered at least $2 billion towards United States basing in Poland, 
and the form of such an increased United States troop posture in Poland 
is currently being discussed in Working Groups under the auspices of a 
DOD-led Executive Steering Group.
Turkey
    Turkey is a strategically important ally facing significant 
security challenges, the most pressing of which is the ongoing Syrian 
conflict. It must maintain security along its border with Syria, and 
within its borders, Turkey hosts over 3.5 million Syrian refugees. 
Turkey continues to view the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Syrian 
Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) as a single entity, one that 
constitutes a greater threat than ISIS. This has complicated United 
States-Turkey cooperation on Syria. USEUCOM works closely with Turkey 
to help secure its borders, and we have improved our efforts, in 
support of Turkey, to counter the PKK and the threats this terrorist 
organization poses to Turkish citizens. USEUCOM also supports United 
States interagency efforts to effect a deliberate withdrawal of United 
States forces from Syria that ensures the enduring defeat of ISIS, 
preserves Turkey's security, and keeps faith with United States 
partners on the ground. Finally, USEUCOM supported United States 
interagency efforts to provide an NATO-interoperable alternative to 
avert Turkey's planned purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense system, 
which risks triggering the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Such an opposition puts at risk NATO cohesion 
and our longstanding and mutually beneficial United States-Turkish 
defense industrial cooperation.
Violent Extremist Networks
    The risk of terrorism in Europe remains high, despite a decline in 
fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2018. Violent extremists present a 
clear and persistent threat to Europe's people and infrastructure. ISIS 
seeks to re-establish itself in Iraq and Syria, expand into new safe 
havens, and plan attacks against Western targets. We must remain 
vigilant to all jihadist groups trying to extend their operational 
networks and radicalize recruits in Europe.
Israel
    In the Levant, Israel faces a complex set of security challenges 
from numerous actors across multiple domains. Israel must constantly 
defend itself from threats posed by Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and 
Iran, which has expanded its network of proxies while also pursuing 
advancements in its missile program to assert its influence throughout 
the Middle East. Israel must also guard against Russia's increased 
presence in Syria, its facilitation of Iran's presence, and ISIS 
militants along its Syrian border.
Additional European Security Challenges
    Several other issues present ongoing challenges to European 
security. Though migrant flows slowed in 2018, Europe's migrant crisis 
has led to difficult political discussions about demographic 
integration and the allocation of resources. Transnational organized 
crime and the illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons, to 
include weapons of mass destruction and related materials, can be 
linked with terrorism and place an added burden on European security 
and police forces. USEUCOM is also monitoring China's activities in 
Europe as it seeks to expand its influence and grow its presence. For 
example, China is looking to secure access to strategic geographic 
locations and economic sectors through financial stakes in ports, 
airlines, hotels, and utility providers, while providing a source of 
capital for struggling European economies. Russia and China have 
increased their transactional collaboration based on some common 
objectives and opportunities to increase their power and influence at 
the expense of the United States and our allies.
      accomplishments and opportunities--``strength and balance''
Strategy Implementation
    USEUCOM is confronting the risks and challenges in its area of 
responsibility by aggressively adapting our thinking and posture in 
accordance with the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), the 
Secretary's National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Chairman's 
National Military Strategy (NMS). We are particularly focused on 
expanding the competitive space with Russia by increasing the lethality 
of our forces and strengthening alliances and partnerships. Our forces 
demonstrate commitment to the defense of our allies while our execution 
of the Dynamic Force Employment concept, along with our operations and 
exercises, introduce operational unpredictability to our adversaries. 
USEUCOM will help ensure that our Nation successfully competes with 
Russia, deters aggression, and if necessary, prevails in conflict.
Supporting NATO
    The NSS, NDS, and NMS all emphasize the central role of a 
revitalized NATO in securing our vital national interests. NATO allies 
help shoulder our common defense burden through cash (defense 
spending), contributions (such as troop deployments), and critical 
capabilities (e.g., advanced missile defense systems). Allies have made 
considerable progress in each of these areas.
    Since January 2017, allies have added more than $41 billion in 
increased defense spending over the 2016 level; and by the end of 2020, 
Allies--according to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg--are on track 
to add approximately $100 billion in increased defense spending. In 
2018, eight allies spent 2 percent of their GDP on defense and ten more 
have presented plans or made political commitments to do so by 2024. 
Fifteen allies are already allocating at least 20 percent of their 
defense budgets to major new equipment in 2018, and 11 more have 
presented plans or commitments to do so by 2024. In addition, all U.S. 
EDI-funded military construction is being submitted for consideration 
of future funding via recoupment through the NATO Security Investment 
Program (NSIP).
    At last year's Brussels Summit, NATO Heads of State agreed that 
ensuring alliance responsiveness, readiness, and reinforcement are 
strategic imperatives for implementing a credible deterrence and 
defense posture. There are several distinct elements to this 
commitment. Implementation of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) 
Adaptation will include a refined Initial State Peacetime Establishment 
(ISPE) manning increase, the stand-up of NATO Headquarters Joint Forces 
Command--Norfolk (JFCNF) to command and control (C2) operations in the 
Atlantic, and the establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling 
Command (JSEC) in Ulm, Germany.
    NATO allies are also making progress in developing a more capable, 
interoperable, and ready alliance force. NATO's Political Guidance for 
defense planning (PG19) provides direction for a variety of required 
cross-domain capabilities. PG19, discussed at the February 2019 NATO 
Defense Ministers conference, is the first step in the process NATO 
uses to influence allied nations, develop and deliver interoperable 
forces, and ensure the alliance has the required capabilities and 
readiness needed to strengthen deterrence and defense. Additionally, 
the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), which builds upon the 2014 
Readiness Action Plan's comprehensive package of Assurance and 
Adaptation Measures, will provide ``4-30s''--30 major naval combatants, 
30 medium or heavy maneuver battalions, and 30 air squadrons ready to 
fight within 30 days--by the year 2020.
    In terms of contributions, allies have stepped up their support for 
NATO-led missions. From 2014 to 2017, the number of NATO troops serving 
on deployment was up from 18,000 to just under 23,000 (with almost half 
of that number, 10,500, from outside the U.S.). In addition to the 
United States, Germany, Canada, and the UK serve as Framework Nations 
for the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups in the Baltics 
and Poland. The UK, Romania, and Croatia all contribute forces to the 
United States eFP mission. Germany serves as the Framework Nation for 
the 2019 NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) brigade. NATO 
allies and partners also contribute forces to NATO's Baltic Air 
Policing, enhanced Air Policing in the Black Sea region, Standing 
Maritime Group, Resolute Support Mission (RSM), and KFOR.
    As directed by the NDS, we will `fortify the Trans-Atlantic 
Alliance' in part by increasing our collaboration with our European 
allies and partners. With thanks to Congress for its support to our 
security cooperation and security assistance initiatives, USEUCOM 
continues to bolster our engagement in places like Ukraine, Georgia, 
the Balkans, and in other allied and partner nations along Russia's 
border. USEUCOM employs programs such as the Ukrainian Security 
Assistance Initiative, Section 333 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, and 
Title 22 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to build partner capabilities 
in key European nations, enhancing their abilities to defend their 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to operate in coalition with 
the United States. Additionally, USEUCOM works closely with NATO 
planners and forces to integrate our collective capabilities, and we 
will regularly test and improve these capabilities through title 10 
exercises, our Joint Exercise Program, and through NATO Response Force 
(NRF) certification exercises to ensure interoperability on the 
battlefield. We will continue to press allies to meet the important 2 
percent mark, advocate for individual nation capability targets that 
meet their most pressing force requirements, and align with their 
assigned NATO capability targets.
    NATO is also a key platform for engagement and displaying 
solidarity on issues such as Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. The 
Alliance unanimously supported our declaration of Russia's material 
breach of the INF Treaty in December and our announcement that we were 
suspending our legal obligations and initiating withdrawal from the 
Treaty in February. We remain engaged on this issue with our NATO 
Allies to ensure NATO is postured to defend against Russia's new 
intermediate-range capability and to deny Russia any military advantage 
from its unlawful conduct.
Working with Non-NATO Partners
    Georgia remains a committed partner, especially in Afghanistan, 
where it is the largest non-NATO contributor to Resolute Support with 
almost 900 troops currently deployed. The United States-Georgia 
security relationship has steadily expanded, and the establishment in 
2018 of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone 
in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a 
credible, ready force through training, education, and mentorship. The 
program is a centerpiece of Georgia's broad efforts to enhance its 
national defense and contribute to the security of the Black Sea 
region.
    Ukraine seeks to partner more closely with the United States, NATO, 
and the European Union (EU), and it has made progress in developing a 
capable, sustainable, and professional force. USEUCOM supports 
Ukraine's efforts through the Joint Multinational Training Group-
Ukraine (JMTG-U), combined exercises including the annual naval 
Exercise Sea Breeze, and other activities. The United States delivered 
the Javelin anti-armor capability to Ukraine in April 2018 to deter 
Russian aggression against Ukraine. Continued senior-level engagement 
and support for Ukrainian self-defense capabilities and institutional 
reform will help enhance regional security and demonstrate our 
continued commitment to Ukraine's security and territorial integrity, 
and a rules-based international order in Europe.
    Thanks to the historic agreement this past summer between Greece 
and North Macedonia, we are poised to welcome NATO's newest member once 
Allied ratifications are complete. North Macedonia is a consistent 
contributor to security, regularly deploying forces to Afghanistan and 
to other United States and NATO-led exercises, and the Alliance will be 
stronger with North Macedonia as a full member.
    The EU has moved to enact multiple defense reforms and initiatives 
in an attempt to create efficiencies and commonalities in European 
defense. These include the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, which 
serves as the basis for preparing the EU's long-term Capability 
Development Plan and identifying defense and investment capability 
shortfalls; the European Defense Fund, which will amplify research and 
development undertaken by multiple participants to achieve economies of 
scale and free up funds for additional capability development; and 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a legal framework to 
cooperate more intensively on defense issues and jointly develop 
defense capabilities for EU military operations. NATO continues to work 
with the EU to ensure these efforts complement rather than duplicate 
NATO initiatives or undermine NATO as the foundation of Euro-Atlantic 
security.
Strengthening U.S. Deterrence Posture
    A combat-credible United States deterrence posture in Europe means 
fielding a force that is lethal, agile, and able to maneuver across the 
continent, capable of delivering joint fires, flexible enough to 
operate inside a highly contested environment, integrated with multi-
domain capabilities, resilient through redundant systems, protected 
through integrated air and missile defense systems, and prepared to 
leverage the full power of our allies and partners. Establishing this 
force requires us to make resource-informed decisions about the 
appropriate combination of persistent forces (assigned, forward 
stationed, or persistent heel-to-toe 365 day rotations), and those that 
can quickly reach and operate in theater under the Dynamic Force 
Employment concept.
    Each of USEUCOM's Service Component Commands has strengthened our 
deterrence posture. The capability and lethality of United States Army 
Europe (USAREUR) forces stationed in Europe were enhanced by persistent 
armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) 
rotations. The forward stationing of long-range fires and air defense 
units will further improve the lethality and resilience of USAREUR 
forces. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) executed a no-notice deployment of 
the Harry S. Truman (HST) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the 
Mediterranean in the summer 2018 and to the North Atlantic in the fall 
2018. As part of its deployment, the CSG participated in Trident 
Juncture 18, which had not involved a CSG in over 20 years. In Eastern 
Europe, strategic bombers and fourth- and fifth-generation fighters 
deployed to support United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) 
deterrence missions. Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) sustained 
rotational elements in both the Black Sea region and Norway. Special 
Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provided rotational teams that 
helped build the resiliency of allies and partners exposed to Russian 
malign influence. In support of the Service components, our Nation's 
Reserve component forces continue to play a critical role in supporting 
our assurance and deterrence mission, especially through the National 
Guard State Partnership Program (SPP).
    Enhancing our logistical infrastructure and capacity is another key 
element to fielding a combat-credible force. EDI investments in 
resilient joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 
(JRSOI) have resulted in infrastructure improvements as well as the 
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and European Contingency Air Operation 
Sets (ECAOS). USEUCOM coordinates with USTRANSCOM in the Joint 
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to find integrated 
solutions and facilitate strategic movement and maneuver through our 
military and commercial partners. The EU is also addressing logistics 
through its PESCO project focused on military mobility, with the goal 
of partnering with NATO to better facilitate the movement of troops and 
equipment across European borders. Furthermore, we are working to 
enhance munition stocks and ensure interchangeability with NATO 
munitions to allow flexibility within the Alliance.
    We have also strengthened our deterrence and defense through the 
Joint Force Headquarters Exercise Program, which prepares USEUCOM to 
effectively carry out its wartime mission and trains our Component 
Commands to assume Joint Force Component Command and Joint Task Force 
(JTF) missions. Our exercises maintain and enhance our ability to 
jointly operate in a multi-domain and multi-functional environment. We 
execute four Tier 1 exercises--Austere Challenge, Juniper Cobra, 
Juniper Falcon, and Jackal Stone, along with numerous theater-specific 
and global integration exercises.
    Although we have increased our forces, improved our infrastructure, 
and successfully executed multiple rotations, deployments, and 
exercises, a theater not sufficiently set for full-spectrum contingency 
operations poses increased risk to our ability to compete, deter 
aggression, and prevail in conflict if necessary.
    As for our nuclear forces, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
validated the importance of maintaining the nuclear triad for strategic 
stability with Russia and China. Great power competition requires that 
we maintain a credible strategic deterrence, which includes modernizing 
its supporting infrastructure. This underwrites U.S. security, 
diplomacy, and our conventional military operations worldwide.
Countering Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
    USEUCOM works directly with our combatant command counterparts and 
our European partners to identify and counter terrorist threats. We are 
increasing our intelligence-sharing and strengthening a counter-VEO 
network that includes NATO, partner nations, and international 
organizations such as EUROPOL and INTERPOL. Our EU, NATO, and USEUCOM-
shared Tri-nodal Community of Action targets existing VEO networks and 
facilitates expanded intelligence-sharing with law enforcement. 
European allies provide the United States with critical strategic 
access for counter-terrorism operations in USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM 
theaters, and they also deploy their own forces to support U.S.-led 
operations, including Operation Inherent Resolve. Counter VEO efforts 
led to a significant decline in directed and enabled attacks across 
Europe in 2018.
Competing in Cyberspace
    USEUCOM's ongoing efforts to build operational-level cyberspace 
capabilities are critical to implementing the NDS. USEUCOM benefits 
from resources and authorities that enable us to partner more closely 
with USCYBERCOM. We are well-aligned in the planning and conduct of 
cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives that include deterring 
Russia, countering misinformation, and defending computer networks. Our 
Joint Cyber Center (JCC) continues to mature in manning, facilities, 
and authorities to actively counter cyber-attacks and help strengthen 
ally and partner nation cyber capabilities.
Building Intelligence Capacity
    USEUCOM is working alongside our allies and partners to grow our 
intelligence and analytical capability in order to meet both steady 
state and contingency planning requirements. We are leveraging language 
expertise resident in European nations and are utilizing non-
traditional ISR platforms to mitigate the global shortage of high-
demand, low-density assets. In addition, USEUCOM is leveraging the 
growing capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 
sourcing intelligence communication and dissemination platforms, such 
as the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository System (MARS), 
Publicly Available Information and Open Source Intelligence (PAI-
OSINT), and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
(JWICS).
Countering Russian Malign Influence
    As we expand the competitive space with Russia, USEUCOM is working 
with the interagency to effectively compete below the level of armed 
conflict. A leading effort in this domain of competition is the Russian 
Influence Group (RIG), jointly led by USEUCOM and our Statement 
Department counterparts in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. 
The RIG brings together the interagency to share information and 
collaborate in efforts to counter Russian malign activities in Europe. 
Separately, United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are also 
working with select European allies and partners to enhance their 
defense institutions, border security, and resilience to Russian malign 
influence. USEUCOM and USSOCOM work together to employ SOF in Europe, 
where their unique access and capabilities can be utilized to compete 
below the level of armed conflict.
Providing Assistance to Israel
    USEUCOM directly supports our Nation's unwavering commitment to the 
security of Israel. We meet regularly with senior Israeli military 
leaders, coordinate in planning, and regularly participate in combined 
exercises. USEUCOM also assists in the defense of Israel through a 
continuous missile defense presence in the Mediterranean under 
Operation Sharp Sentry. Israel continues to be the largest recipient of 
Foreign Military Finance (FMF) funds, and in September 2016, the United 
States and Israel signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that 
provides $3.8 billion per year in military assistance over the fiscal 
year 2019  fiscal year 2028 period, totaling $38 billion, enabling 
Israel to maintain a qualitative military edge over its adversaries.
Enabling Global Operations
    Strategic geographic access, forward basing, and overflight 
permissions within Europe support multiple combatant commands and 
enable allied, coalition, and United States operations. European basing 
and access remains our strategic military ``high-ground'' for the 
United States and a key enabler of our global power projection. The 
bilateral agreements that grant the U.S. these permissions are built on 
trust and sustained by maintaining relationships with our allies and 
partners. Last year's United States-led cruise missile strike in Syria 
is the latest in a number of examples in which European access, basing, 
and overflight were critical in executing short-notice, contingency 
operations.
Fiscal Year 2020 Requests
    The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) provides funding to 
improve our deterrence posture and execute our deterrent initiatives 
and activities. First, EDI ensures that we position the right 
capabilities and refine the necessary infrastructure to respond to 
adversaries in a timely manner. Second, it underwrites our commitment 
to article 5 and to the territorial integrity of all NATO nations. 
Third, EDI increases the capability and readiness of U.S. Forces, NATO 
allies, and regional partners so we can effectively deter adversary 
aggression and adventurism. USEUCOM has remained disciplined in 
nominating EDI projects that are consistent with Congressional guidance 
and follow five distinct lines of effort: increased presence, exercises 
and training, enhanced prepositioning, improved infrastructure, and 
building partnership capacity.
    In accordance with your Congressional guidance, we plan and execute 
EDI as if it were a Future Years Defense Program. This allows us to 
maintain fiscal and program discipline and prepares the command for 
when EDI transfers from overseas contingency operations (OCO) to base 
service budgets.
    Our fiscal year 2020 Budget request focuses on: (1) continued 
implementation of Enhancing Army Prepositioned Stocks to improve 
responsiveness of ground forces and provide rapidly deployable combat 
capability in the event of contingencies; (2) continued implementation 
of the Air Force Prepositioned Stocks and airfield facilities to 
improve flexibility and resilience of air forces and provide rapidly 
deployable combat capability in the event of contingencies; (3) 
continued enhancement to the Theater's Anti-Submarine Warfare through 
the procurement of additional equipment and the improvement to theater 
infrastructure; and (4) enhancing other key capabilities and 
requirements throughout the theater including, but not limited to: (a) 
Naval logistics hubs; (b) Integrated Air and Missile Defense: and (c) 
JRSOI.
Conclusion
    Given the transformation of the European security environment and 
its impact on United States national security, a strong commitment to 
the USEUCOM area of responsibility is more important than ever. I would 
like to thank Congress for their acknowledgement of these threats and 
their continued support of efforts within the USEUCOM theater. Russia 
continues to engage in armed aggression in eastern Ukraine, is yet to 
fulfill Minsk Agreement obligations, maintains an illegal occupation of 
Crimea with reinforced forces, openly violates International law, to 
include the Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, and Open Skies Treaties, and blocks Vienna Document revisions 
which are needed to address non-accountability of political-military 
realities. As witnessed last March with the Skripal poisoning, the 
Kremlin is willing to act boldly, employing banned military-grade nerve 
agents against civilian targets on the territory of our ally, contrary 
to all international norms, expectations of civilized society, and 
their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The 
growing capability of Iran and its proxies is challenging Israel's 
security. Violent extremists, though slightly abridged in activities 
last year, remain intent on destroying a rules-based system of 
government and will continue to target United States and European 
civilians and infrastructure.
    Fortunately, we are not alone in meeting these challenges. As 
stated in the NDS, the NATO Alliance will ``deter Russian adventurism, 
defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, and address the arc of 
instability building on NATO's periphery.'' NATO has been, and will 
remain, vital to our national security, and a central element in 
addressing the challenges of the 21st century. Our Trans-Atlantic bond 
is strengthened by a shared commitment of collective defense, 
democratic principles, and mutual respect of national sovereignty.
    The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and 
civilians at USEUCOM continue to display selfless service and 
dedication to meet the demands of the European theater. They are the 
lethal, agile, and resilient force that will protect and defend the 
Homeland and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Scaparrotti.
    General Lyons?

 STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                 STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

    General Lyons. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members, it is an honor to testify before you 
today and represent the men and women of United States 
Transportation Command.
    I am pleased to join General Scaparrotti. He is one of 
several but very important supported commands of the United 
States Transportation Command, and his more than 40 years of 
exceptional leadership remains a stellar example for all of us.
    I could not be more proud of the more than 120,000 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and coast guardsmen and 
civil servants that are assigned to United States 
Transportation Command. They project and sustain the joint 
force every day.
    The Department's global deployment networks, transportation 
capacity in air, on land, and over the sea and our global 
command and control capabilities combine to provide the United 
States with a strategic competitive advantage unmatched around 
the world. Somewhere on the globe a TRANSCOM aircraft is 
touching down every 3 minutes. TRANSCOM ships are under way. 
Aerial refueling missions are orbiting overhead, and planes 
converted to intensive care units are moving our Nation's ill 
and injured.
    I should remind everybody, though, that the key to our 
success is global access, and I would like to highlight that 
our allies and likeminded partners that provide access to key 
regions, support substantial basing, and reinforce DOD's global 
reach are critical to our mission.
    We know we must never take our success for granted. For 
decades, we could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, 
assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. With 
the rise of great power competition, we can no longer assume 
that we can operate with impunity.
    Before closing, I would like to acknowledge the letters 
that I received from more than a dozen members of Congress 
concerning the Defense Personal Property Program, which 
relocates the household goods for our servicemembers, 
civilians, and their families. Simply put, I agree. We lack the 
capacity during peak season, and we lack measures to hold 
industry accountable. Our most important resource is our people 
and we owe them better. In consultation with the service 
secretaries and the service chiefs and on behalf of the 
Department, TRANSCOM is leading an initiative to restructure 
our relationship with industry in an effort to improve quality, 
capacity, and accountability.
    In closing, I am proud to support DOD's enduring mission of 
providing a combat-credible military force to deter war and 
protect the security of our Nation. Our nation relies on United 
States Transportation Command to respond with immediate force 
on short notice and seamlessly transition to project a decisive 
force when needed. I am fully committed to retaining this 
strategic competitive advantage.
    Thank you for your support to the Department and your 
support to United States Transportation Command, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Stephen R. Lyons
               united states transportation command 2019
Delivering for our Nation
    United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is one of ten 
warfighting combatant commands (CCMD) in the Department of Defense 
(DOD). Our ability to deliver and sustain combat power anywhere in the 
world underpins the lethality of the Joint Force. USTRANSCOM's purpose 
is to project and sustain military power at a time and place of our 
choosing in support of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). In doing 
so, we advance American interests and provide our Nation's leaders with 
strategic flexibility to select from multiple options and create 
multiple dilemmas for adversaries. No other country in the world 
possesses the capability to deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces across 
strategic distances, providing an immediate force and a decisive force 
when needed.
    With global responsibilities and capabilities that transcend air, 
land, and sea, USTRANSCOM is uniquely postured to fulfill five specific 
responsibilities within the 2017 Unified Command Plan that include: 1) 
the DOD's Single Manager for Transportation, 2) the Mobility Joint 
Force Provider, 3) the DOD Single Manager for Global Patient Movement 
(GPM), 4) the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator (JDDC) for 
the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE), and 5) 
providing Joint Enabling Capabilities via the Joint Enabling 
Capabilities Command (JECC).
    USTRANSCOM responsibilities are operationalized and executed 
through three component commands; Military Surface Deployment and 
Distribution Command (SDDC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Air 
Mobility Command (AMC); and one subordinate command, the Joint Enabling 
Capabilities Command (JECC). In addition, the Joint Transportation 
Reserve Unit (JTRU) provides critical Reserve manpower augmentation to 
USTRANSCOM headquarters. USTRANSCOM also has a strong connection with 
commercial industry, sometimes referred to as the `4th Component,' 
because they provide important augmentation in day-to-day and surge 
operations.
    Our Total Force team is comprised of more than 122,000 Active Duty, 
National Guard, Reserve, and Civilians that conduct worldwide 
operations. In addition, industry partners under contract to the U.S. 
Government provide critical transportation capacity, access to global 
trade networks, and trained Merchant Mariners to crew U.S. Navy sealift 
vessels. On an average day in USTRANSCOM, 115 railcars are moving DOD 
equipment, 33 ships are underway, 1,500 trucks are delivering cargo, an 
aircraft is taking off or landing around the world every 2.8 minutes 
with 455 airlift sorties in motion, 47 tanker sorties are refueling 
receiver aircraft, and 13 airborne patients are under expert medical 
professionals' care. This activity, although significant, would be 
dwarfed by a wartime scenario that requires a fully-mobilized 
deployment enterprise.
  Strategic Environment
    The NDS describes the DOD's response to the most complex security 
environment we have experienced in recent memory, and we expect that 
power projection will be contested in all domains. For decades, the 
U.S. enjoyed dominance in every operating domain; we could generally 
deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and 
operate how we wanted. China, Russia, and to a lesser extent rogue 
regimes now challenge this ability through competition across all 
dimensions of power, resulting in long and potentially contested lines 
of communication for USTRANSCOM. In this operating environment, focused 
DOD effort, complemented by a whole-of-government effort, is necessary 
to enable sufficient comparative advantage in mobility and logistics 
for USTRANSCOM to project military power decisively when our Nation 
calls.
Projecting the Joint Force Globally
    USTRANSCOM and the broader JDDE are designed to project and sustain 
military forces around the world. We conduct globally integrated 
mobility operations through dynamic synchronization of (1) global 
deployment networks; (2) a global command & control and integration 
construct to dynamically allocate resources for our Nation's strategic 
priorities; and (3) transportation and mobility capacity operating 
across air, land, and sea.
  1. Global Deployment Networks
    USTRANSCOM's global networks of nodes and routes provide the Nation 
with multiple paths to connect the globe and deliver Joint Force 
capability for supported combatant commanders (CCDR). Power projection 
capabilities are enabled by en route infrastructure and are metered by 
a command's ability to receive the force. Power projection is 
underpinned by diplomatic alignment and geopolitical agreements with 
allies and partners to enable strategic maneuver of the force and 
deliver effects to the point of need.

  1a. CONUS Power Projection
    CONUS power projection relies upon DOD installations, seaports, 
railways, and highways that connect them. USTRANSCOM manages several 
programs on behalf of DOD, in coordination with other government 
agencies, to ensure our national infrastructure is sufficient to 
support military mobilization. The Strategic Seaport Program consists 
of 23 primary seaports and multiple alternate ports. The majority of 
these ports are active, commercial ports spread across the east, west, 
and gulf coasts. The Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET) program 
connects rail lines with over 120 defense installations and sites of 
military importance.
    The Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) includes over 62,000 miles 
of roadways connecting important military installations to each other 
and with strategic seaports to facilitate rapid movement of military 
cargo. DOD power projection requires close coordination with other 
federal agencies to create a Joint Force conduit from garrison 
locations to ports of embarkation.

  1b. Geopolitical Access
    Assured, international access across air, land, and sea is 
underpinned by close coordination with like-minded allies and partners 
to obtain and retain sufficient and resilient en route support networks 
providing durable comparative advantage that no competitor can match. 
Allies and partners provide access to key regions, supporting a 
substantial basing and logistics system that reinforces the DOD's 
global reach. Without that system, the DOD would lack options in many 
contingencies and our responses would require more time to execute at 
greater cost. For the past 75 years, our allies and partners have 
joined us in defending freedom, deterring war, and maintaining the 
rules which underwrite a free and open international order. Strategic 
investment in international agreements, defense partnerships, and 
infrastructure provide multiple power projection pathways supporting 
global deployment.
  2. Global Command & Control and Integration
    USTRANSCOM's mission transcends traditional geographic combatant 
command boundaries, and our ability to integrate global mobility 
operations enables the JDDE to dynamically redirect capacity and 
operate at the speed of relevance. Global Command and Control allows 
USTRANSCOM, in support of Joint Force global integration, to apply 
resources consistent with strategic priorities in time and space. 
Through global networks and the capability to prioritize across all 
missions and modes, USTRANSCOM has the ability to source the optimal 
method of transportation to maximize value and responsiveness for 
supported commanders.
    Ultimately, Global Command & Control and Integration is necessary 
for USTRANSCOM to achieve decisive warfighting effects. Our adversaries 
intend to disrupt or deny this capability through cyber attacks, which 
requires robust defense capabilities for mission assurance.
  3. Transportation and Mobility Capacity
    Transportation and mobility capacity provides the lift that 
operates within the global deployment network. USTRANSCOM's assigned 
mobility forces consist of sealift, aerial refueling, inter-theater 
airlift, and intra-theater airlift forces. The DOD mobility force mix 
is spread across the Total Force with approximately 60 percent of the 
capacity retained in the Guard and Reserve. They are integrated into 
our day-to-day operations--some as directed through mobilization and 
others obtained by volunteerism. Our wartime mission success is 
dependent on the mobilized output of our Guard and Reserve partners. 
When necessary or when fiscally advantageous, military mobility 
capacity is augmented by commercial industry, and during wartime, they 
contribute to Joint Force projection through emergency preparedness 
programs. The following paragraphs address mission profiles in the 
areas of sealift, aerial refueling, airlift, patient movement, and 
industry capacity.

  3a. Sealift
    The DOD's sealift transportation fleet is expected to transport 
approximately 90 percent of our military cargo during wartime surge 
(primarily for the U.S. Army), and it consists of Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/
RO) ships, prepositioned afloat vessels, specialty ships for heavy 
lift, over-the-shore petroleum distribution ships, and crane support 
ships. Because the majority of our sealift fleet support is dedicated 
to wartime requirements, a significant portion is maintained in a 
Reduced Operating Status that is available for tasking five days after 
activation. Due to the increased age of the sealift fleet, degraded 
fleet readiness, and wartime requirements, sealift is USTRANSCOM's 
number one readiness concern. USTRANSCOM needs continued Congressional 
support for DOD efforts to improve sealift.
    Due to the age of DOD vessels and the level of maintenance funding 
in prior years, the overall health of the Surge Sealift Fleet has 
deteriorated. The Ready Reserve Force vessels average nearly 44 years 
old with the oldest in the fleet being 55 years old. In contrast, the 
average age of U.S.-flag, militarily useful vessels in the commercial 
sector is approximately 19 years of age, which by international 
standards is approaching end of service life. The use of steam-
propulsion has become obsolete across the competitive global shipping 
market, however five steam-ships remain in the U.S.-flag commercial 
sector, and they are all scheduled to be phased out by 2021. When that 
occurs, USTRANSCOM will be the sole U.S. operator of steam-powered 
vessels, with 26 vessels, complicating readiness because of the near 
extinction of steam-propulsion engineers, parts obsolescence and 
unavailability, and increased maintenance costs.
    The DOD has not met ship availability goals in recent years, and 
the U.S. Navy is addressing this problem by pursuing a three-pronged, 
sealift recapitalization strategy through 1) service life extensions 
where cost effective, 2) acquiring used vessels with Congressional 
approval, and 3) procuring new sealift vessels in the out years. The 
fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization 
Acts (NDAA) authorized the purchase of seven used vessels, and we 
expect to procure the first two vessels in 2021 and 2022.
    Commercial industry plays a critical role for DOD sealift by 
augmenting capacity, providing access to global trade networks, and 
generating a supply of qualified private sector Merchant Mariners 
essential to crew every surge sealift ship. Although the U.S. Merchant 
Mariner pool is currently sufficient to crew the surge sealift fleet, 
long-term, sustained conflicts could overstress the commercial 
industry's supply of contract mariners needed for sustainment 
operations.
    USTRANSCOM utilizes commercial industry during day-to-day 
contracted operations, and if needed in contingencies, we can activate 
participating companies through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) to gain access to critical sealift and intermodal 
capacity. When required, DOD also leverages U.S. commercial industry 
and foreign-flag shipping for strategic transport of bulk petroleum.

  3b. Aerial Refueling (AR)
    The AR fleet provides the backbone of rapid U.S. global operations, 
and ``tankers'' are the lifeblood of our Joint Force's ability to 
deploy an immediate force supporting all NDS mission areas. AR is 
USTRANSCOM's number two readiness concern. Today's AR fleet consists of 
the new KC-46 currently being delivered, the 33 year-old KC-10 that is 
planned for divestment, and the KC-135 which is a 57-year old airframe 
programmed to continue flying through mid-2050. Currently, we must 
manage limited AR capacity and globally position/reposition tankers to 
meet the highest priority NDS requirements while taking risk in lower 
priority missions.
    Limited fleet capacity, an aging fleet with degraded readiness, and 
non-mobilized operational utilization challenges pose significant risks 
to meeting future demands. Approximately 60 percent of the AR force 
resides in the Air Reserve Component (ARC), requiring careful 
management to satisfy daily operations and enable the crew force to 
attain full spectrum readiness. During KC-46 unit conversions, we are 
working closely with the U.S. Air Force to retain sufficient AR 
capacity and potentially delay the retirement of KC-135 aircraft in 
order to maintain sufficient number of aircraft to meet operational 
requirements. We strongly advocate for continued Congressional support 
to enhance tanker readiness and balance new aircraft fielding with 
aging aircraft divestiture in order to retain the necessary number of 
accessible AR assets over the next decade to ensure USTRANSCOM can meet 
NDS demands.

  3c. Airlift
    Airlift forces enable rapid power projection and sustainment of 
forces around the world. Our strategic airlift force is comprised of C-
5s and C-17s that are designed to carry over-sized and out-sized cargo. 
In addition to strategic lift, C-130s provide intra-theater delivery 
under austere conditions. USTRANSCOM also enables theater rotary-wing 
and fixed-wing contract airlift support where there is a demand and 
security conditions permit. For example, USTRANSCOM routinely provides 
contracts which support passenger and cargo airlift services, air 
ambulance, medical evacuation, sling-load cargo operations, and 
delivery of supplies for USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, USSOCOM, and 
USINDOPACOM.
    Sixty percent of the military airlift fleet resides in the ARC 
underscoring our Nation's reliance on Reserve forces and the need to 
balance crew tempo in non-mobilized operations. We are at the lowest 
non-mobilized airlift capacity for daily activities since 2003. The 
military fleet of `gray tails' is reinforced by commercial augmentation 
accessed through day-to-day contracts or through the Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet (CRAF) emergency preparedness program in times of crisis. We are 
increasing the use of commercial augmentation to balance daily airlift 
workload with unit readiness and enhance high-end warfighting 
proficiency of the Mobility Air Force.

  3d. Global Patient Movement
    The USTRANSCOM patient movement mission is executed by the U.S. Air 
Force aeromedical evacuation (AE) system and is a unique and vital part 
of the military mobility enterprise for supported commanders. En route 
care is provided by aeromedical professionals across the Total Force 
that are specially trained to operate within the AE system and enabled 
by nodal staging facilities located at key locations around the globe. 
These professionals provide time sensitive, fixed-wing, mission 
critical in-flight care to patients in transit for varying levels of 
medical care. Highly specialized Critical Care Air Transport Teams 
(CCATTs) are capable of providing intensive care while airborne, which 
are growing to meet anticipated demands of operational plans. Global 
patient movement is a Total Force mission with nearly 90 percent of the 
total AE structure in the Reserve component to meet mission 
requirements.

  3e. Commercial Industry
    The JDDE is inextricably linked to commercial industry capacity, 
networks, and capabilities to support DOD requirements. From day-to-day 
operations through wartime mobilization, commercial nodes, rail 
infrastructure, trucks, aviation, and sealift capabilities are integral 
to USTRANSCOM's ability to respond and scale to need. In times of 
crisis DOD accesses strategic transportation capacity through 
designated emergency preparedness programs--VISA and CRAF.
    The Maritime Security Program (MSP), authorized by Congress and 
administered by MARAD, provides a stipend for 60 U.S.-flag ships that 
are contractually committed to be available for national contingencies. 
These MSP participants contribute to VISA which enables USTRANSCOM 
assured access to shipping services using U.S.-flag ships and their 
global transportation networks during contingencies through pre-
approved contingency contracts.
    Our CRAF contract providers are essential to meet global airlift 
mobility requirements for both cargo and passenger movements in times 
of need. This important relationship provides Long-Range International 
airlift for approximately 40 percent of DOD air cargo and over 90 
percent of passenger movements required in operational plans. To 
incentivize support for this essential program, CRAF enrollment is a 
prerequisite for U.S. General Services Administration's City Pair 
Program, which spends approximately $3 billion annually on government 
travel. The CRAF program is fully subscribed and provides DOD with 
aircraft from 25 safety certified airline companies to augment the U.S. 
Air Force mobility fleet during contingencies and national emergencies.
  Cyber Mission Assurance
    Cyberspace is a warfighting domain, without sanctuary, in which 
capable adversaries continuously attempt to degrade our Nation's 
ability to project the Joint Force globally. As in all warfighting 
domains, assuring mission capabilities requires resilience and 
simultaneous efforts across multiple functions and stakeholders, 
including defense, interagency, and industry partners. Our actions are 
underscored by the need to understand adversary intentions, 
capabilities, and actions targeting the JDDE. USTRANSCOM actively 
manages mission risk and advances our cyber domain capabilities by 
understanding our large and complex cyber terrain, which is an evolving 
endeavor. Defending cyberspace operations, providing for mission 
assurance through continuity of operations when degraded, and ensuring 
our ability to conduct uninterrupted Global Command & Control and 
Integration are paramount to our success.
    In addition to operations on Department of Defense Information 
Networks (DODIN), USTRANSCOM has special interest and equities in the 
mission assurance of industry partners relying on non-DODIN cyber 
networks. We are working closely with industry partners and have 
mandated contract language to improve cyber hygiene and mandate 
contractor compliance with National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-171 standards, which contains 
110 distinct cybersecurity controls, on commercial networks. Industry 
partners are required to conduct annual self-assessments and are 
encouraged to share information with associated timelines for 
improvement where necessary. NIST controls are just the first step in a 
longer journey toward commercial industry's cyber mission assurance. 
Industry partners have been responsive to DOD cyber initiatives and 
recognize the utility in resilient operations capability in the cyber 
domain.
  Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS)
    At the direction of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA, USTRANSCOM 
collaborated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to conduct an MCRS assessing 
the force sufficiency of airlift, AR, and sealift capacity to meet the 
NDS missions. The study concluded that current, programmed fleets are 
sufficiently sized in the near-term to meet combatant commander 
mobility requirements, as defined in previously approved war plans, 
with elevated risk. The study also highlighted readiness challenges 
with the reliability of existing sealift vessels and AR tankers that, 
if not addressed, will lead to increased risk in mobility support to 
the NDS wartime missions. Specifically, the study reaffirmed the 
requirement to recapitalize aging U.S. Navy sealift vessels and U.S. 
Air Force AR fleets. Key enablers for network resiliency and protection 
of mobility operations were also identified as beneficial to overcome 
contested environment challenges. As plans evolve, we will continue to 
assess the mobility enterprise's sufficiency against globally 
integrated plans to capture the simultaneous demands of future 
scenarios.
  Joint Enabling Capabilities
    The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command provides DOD's mission-
tailored joint communications, planning, and public affairs support 
packages for all CCMDs, accelerating the establishment, organization, 
and operation of Joint Force headquarters. In fiscal year 2018, the 
JECC played a critical role supporting DOD globally integrated 
operations through short notice, limited-duration deployments of over 
1,000 joint personnel (70 percent were Reserve and National Guard) to 
18 countries supporting 14 requests for forces, five Global Response 
Force deployments, two Defense Support to Civilian Authorities 
assignments, and tailored organic communications networks supporting 
simultaneous requirements to multiple CCMDs. The JECC is a key enabler, 
which has provided planning support for Joint Staff campaign plan 
development, Customs and Border Patrol, Northeast Asia force flow 
requirements, Hurricane Florence and Michael support, and multiple 
operations and exercises around the world. It would be expensive and 
inefficient to embed this level of highly qualified expertise in every 
CCMD, so this pool of experts is an economy of force that allows the 
CJCS to weight the joint effort to achieve desired mission outcomes.
  Keeping Pace: Leveraging the Cloud, Data, and Analytics to Meet 
        Evolving Requirements
    USTRANSCOM is on a path to leverage our Data and Analytics strategy 
to generate competitive global planning and decision-making advantage 
for the JDDE. Success in this area starts with access to data through 
an Enterprise Data Environment coupled with advanced analytics, machine 
learning, and artificial intelligence. Our primary goal in leveraging 
data and analytics is to enhance our operational insights and 
foresights to make better decisions in support of Joint Force power 
projection. Our cloud journey embraces a modern, digital infrastructure 
which is critical to defend against cyber-attacks as well as provide 
greater reliability, adaptability, and scalability of the systems that 
support USTRANSCOM and our components. Innovation and critical thinking 
are essential at every echelon, and USTRANSCOM will evolve and overcome 
emerging threats by being agile in our processes, willing to test, 
rapidly adopt or reject new technologies, and make wise investments to 
for the future. Leveraging the cloud, data, and analytics is essential 
to understand, think, and act at the speed of relevance to out-pace our 
adversaries in an increasingly complex and dynamic operating 
environment.
  The Defense Personal Property Program (DP3)
    USTRANSCOM is working with military services and is committed to 
improving relocation process for military members and families. We 
appreciate Congress's expressed interest in improving the DP3. Each 
year, the DOD relocates over 400,000 servicemembers, DOD civilians, and 
their families to assignments across the globe. Roughly 40 percent of 
these moves occur between May 15 and August 31, which is the period we 
refer to as `Peak Season' due to the strain the DOD's assignment cycle 
places on commercial capacity. Customer satisfaction survey respondents 
rate their personal property relocation as either satisfactory (9 
percent), good (18 percent), or excellent (63 percent). However, 10 
percent of respondents report unsatisfactory experiences, which usually 
correlate with peak seasons.
    In response, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment established a joint working group to identify ways in which 
DOD could improve moving experience during peak season. As a result, 
the Services are attempting to spread military moves to off-peak 
timeframes and are issuing PCS orders earlier to facilitate planning. 
These are important initiatives that will generate marginal progress to 
mitigate stress on the moving industry but will not fundamentally 
improve DP3, a program plagued by diffused responsibilities and 
accountability, lack of transparency, and insufficient quality capacity 
to meet peak requirements. In support of the DOD reform initiative, 
USTRANSCOM is exploring a centralized acquisition approach that would 
transition DP3 to a single move manager. This concept would improve 
capacity and curbside service by incentivizing long-term investment by 
industry, reduce barriers to entry into DOD markets, and establish 
clear accountability and transparency. If approved, this contract will 
be in place by 2021.
Executive Summary
    The Nation relies on USTRANSCOM to project an immediate force 
tonight and a decisive force when needed and continues to adapt to the 
most complex security environment in recent history. JDDE power 
projection utilizes the global deployment network; global command & 
control and integration; and transportation and mobility capacity, to 
include commercial industry, to move Joint Force capability in support 
of national priorities. This capability is underwritten by whole-of-
government coordination to secure and sustain access, basing, and 
diplomatic agreements. To maintain strategic comparative advantage, we 
have three top mobility concerns to fulfill NDS mission requirements: 
1) readiness of the U.S. Navy's aging sealift fleet, 2) readiness and 
capacity of the U.S. Air Force's air refueling platforms, and 3) cyber 
domain mission assurance. We appreciate the exceptional teamwork from 
the Services, combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and Congress. USTRANSCOM's ability to project the Joint Force 
globally at the time and place of our choosing provides our Nation's 
leaders with multiple options while presenting multiple dilemmas for 
potential adversaries. I am extremely proud of our soldiers, sailors, 
marines, airmen, and coast guardsmen who serve with pride and answer 
our Nation's call every day.
    Together, We Deliver.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Lyons.
    Senator Reed brought up in his opening statement the 
question as to whether or not, General Scaparrotti, we have the 
right posture and capabilities in EUCOM to handle the credible 
deterrence against Russian aggression in Europe. What is your 
feeling about that?
    General Scaparrotti. Chairman, thank you.
    We have clearly made progress in European Command, thanks 
to the support of Congress. We have added forces and 
capabilities. We have improved the readiness. But I would tell 
you in response to your question that I am not comfortable yet 
with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe in support of 
the National Defense Strategy.
    Chairman Inhofe. Where are the shortfalls, as you see them?
    General Scaparrotti. Sir, I have shortfalls in our land 
component and the depth of forces there--I would like to get 
into more detail in that in the closed hearing--and in our 
maritime component as well, both of those in particular when 
you look at both the building capability and the modernization 
of the Russian forces that we face there.
    Finally of concern is my intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capacity given that increasing and growing 
threat of Russia. I need more ISR. Again, in the closed 
hearing, I can go into detail.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. You will have that opportunity at 
2:30 today.
    General Scaparrotti, we keep hearing from sources that 
maybe we have some redundancy in our nuclear program. Now, we 
have been guilty I think for a long period of time in not 
addressing our nuclear modernization. We now are faced with a 
situation where we have both Russia and China with what we 
would call a triad system. I think that people with your 
background need to respond as to why a triad system is not 
redundant and is necessary.
    General Scaparrotti. Well, sir, first of all, our strategic 
nuclear force is critical to our deterrence and our security, 
and a triad as a part of that force is important as well. Each 
one of those legs of the component gives us specific qualities 
that are somewhat different, and we need those differing 
qualities just for a safeguard within the component itself, but 
also to make it complex for our adversaries to determine or 
believe that they have the opportunity to strike and gain 
dominance. I think with the triad I am certain that they 
cannot. I would note that they also have a triad as well.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes, and it needs to be repeated because 
the suggestions keep coming on.
    In Ukraine, Russia is now in their sixth year at war there. 
We have talked about and we have actually had language in our 
defense authorization bills to send lethal help to Ukraine, and 
to my knowledge, there has only been one case where we actually 
were using lethal assistance. That was in the Javelin.
    Can you tell us why we have not been able to successfully 
do that since the authorization is there?
    General Scaparrotti. Senator, I think as recommendations 
for Ukraine, particularly on the lethal side, work its way, it 
has to go through the policy deliberations that provide 
authority to deploy those kinds of weapon systems. As you 
stated, we got the authority with Javelin. The Ukrainians in my 
view have trained very well for the use of that. They have been 
responsible in the security and the deployment of it, and we 
watch that closely. They have handled that well.
    There are other systems, sniper systems, ammunition, and 
perhaps looking at the Kerch Straits, perhaps consideration for 
naval systems as well here in the future as we move forward.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, we have an authorization bill coming 
up. Is this something that you think that we might need some 
more language on?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, as you will see, I will have 
recommendations for that.
    Chairman Inhofe. Good.
    General Scaparrotti. I would like consideration of those 
recommendations.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate that.
    General Lyons, I know there is a problem in trying to get 
all the service materials transported out where they are 
needed, and recently there has been some suggestion that maybe 
some of that should be contracted out. Now, we have gone 
through some problems with the housing program recently on 
contracting out.
    Do you have any comments to make about that as being one of 
the solutions to the problem that we face getting this material 
out?
    General Lyons. Chairman, if you are referring to the joint 
deployment enterprise, we are heavily linked to industry on 
multiple levels. If we are referring specifically about the 
household good program--I think that is what you are referring 
to, sir?
    Chairman Inhofe. That is what I am referring to and that is 
where the suggestion has come out.
    General Lyons. Yes, sir. What I would say on that is that 
is 100 percent commercial industry. It is not an effort to 
privatize whatsoever, but it is an effort to restructure our 
relationship with industry in a way that delivers higher 
quality capacity and holds carriers and the government 
accountable.
    Chairman Inhofe. Good.
    Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service and for your 
testimony.
    Last March, General Scaparrotti, you testified before the 
Committee, I do not believe there is an effective unification 
across the interagency with the energy and the focus that we 
could attain. Is that still your view?
    General Scaparrotti. Yes, Senator, it is still my view. We 
have improved, and Congress, as you know, has committed funding 
to some of the entities in the interagency to help us with 
this. But it is still my view.
    Senator Reed. I presume, based on your response, that we 
need a synchronized campaign prosecuted in a unified manner 
across the interagency, which is multiple institutions, to 
counter Russian hybrid warfare and to deter anything greater 
than that. Is that accurate?
    General Scaparrotti. That is correct, Senator. We need a 
whole-of-government approach to this.
    Senator Reed. Where are the gaps right now? Where is it 
that we are not making the investments in your view?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, I think actually we need to 
probably get greater focus and energy into actually a strategy, 
a multifaceted strategy, to counter Russia. As you know, 
General Gerasimov just made another speech that underscored 
their view of indirect activity, the use of whole-of-government 
activities as a part of their spectrum of warfare. We have to 
approach this in a way that we can counter that and I think 
specifically within information operations, challenging their 
disinformation, and cyber areas that we need to continue to 
press.
    Senator Reed. That would presumably require State 
Department activity. Again, I am old enough to recall the Voice 
of America, which is something that was very pronounced in the 
1950s and the 1960s. Those types of very proactive information 
campaigns--they are not being conducted at this point. Are 
they?
    General Scaparrotti. Not in the way that you recall, when I 
recall, and I think we have the talent to pursue particularly 
when it goes to underscoring our values, which I think is 
important.
    Senator Reed. All of this is designed, obviously, to deter 
and to disrupt Putin's plans or aspirations, and without it, he 
has more of an open field. Is that correct?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, they have a good deal of 
agility, and they seem to have no constraints on what they are 
willing to say publicly.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    General Lyons, thank you for mentioning in your comments 
the defense personal property program, DP3. As the Chairman 
indicated, we are receiving some comments, and I am going to 
follow up with some specific questions for the record because I 
think this is an important issue. There is a proposal to move 
to a single mover manager. Again, this has some echoes of some 
of the discussions we are having currently about housing issues 
in the military. We want to be ahead of the game. We will send 
those questions to you for your response.
    Even before you took charge at TRANSCOM, the command was 
concerned about war planning. For many years, we assumed that 
we would be operating in a benign atmosphere. We could fly 
civilian aircraft unprotected. We could move ships in 
unprotected, et cetera.
    Last year, General McDew, your predecessor, hinted that, 
for example, the KC-46 tanker that we are buying might be too 
expensive to purchase because the number we would need in a 
challenge situation to replace and to overmatch the adversary 
would be significantly more than projected.
    As a result, we asked TRANSCOM to produce a mobility 
requirements study, and the report essentially came back and 
said there is no problem with our ability to support 
contingencies, we have got the right mix. It essentially was 
disconnected with the comments that I heard, at least my 
perception of what General McDew was talking about.
    What has changed? We all recognize this is going to be a 
much more hostile environment to move equipment in, and we do 
not seem to be responding in an appropriate way. Your comments, 
sir.
    General Lyons. Sir, thanks for the question.
    I think you are referring to the Mobility Capabilities 
Requirements Study that the NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] directed in 2018. That study was directed 
between the Department and TRANSCOM to look at force sizing and 
sufficiency of the mobility force against the program 
essentially out to 2023. We did that and we did that based on a 
demand signal from the existing plans that exist on the books 
today.
    But I would acknowledge to you today--and I think General 
McDew was alluding to this--as we emerge our defense planning 
scenarios to be more reflective of the defense strategy, as we 
emerge and develop globally integrated plans, which are 
happening right now in the Joint Staff, we do see the potential 
for an increased mobility requirement, particularly in the area 
of aerial refuel, which is the lifeblood of the joint force.
    Senator Reed. What you sent up to us has been overtaken by 
events, more or less.
    General Lyons. Sir, I would say we still have work to do on 
the plans on which it is based. The demand signal is emerging 
right in front of us. We will adapt the study to the plans as 
they evolve. Yes, sir.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Wicker?
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, thank you very much 
for your work, and I think it is clear that we have great 
leadership in your area of responsibility.
    General Scaparrotti, about 3 weeks ago, this Congress sent 
five delegations, House and Senate, to the Munich Security 
Conference. That show of force was followed on then by a 
delegation going to the NATO parliamentary assembly and another 
delegation going on a week later to the OSCE [Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe] parliamentary assembly.
    Does that volume of participation by House and Senate 
members send a positive statement? Is it helpful to you in 
dealing with your friends in Europe--with our friends in 
Europe?
    General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. First, it is very helpful, 
and it is helpful to us as a nation. You know, at Munich, that 
was the largest congressional delegation that they have ever 
had there. It was noted by everyone. That in and of itself is a 
strong message of commitment to our allies in Europe. Then I 
would tell you the congressional delegations that traveled 
during the year to different spots within European Command have 
a very positive influence, again another sign of commitment and 
actual discussion about the issues of the day. I routinely get 
feedback from the chiefs of defense, ministers of defense, and 
others when our congressional delegations visit. I know that it 
has an impact.
    Senator Wicker. Okay. Well, I could guess we could have a 
debate about whether there is a crisis in NATO. I hope there is 
not. But I do hope that the strong statement of wanting to be 
involved was heard. I appreciate your comments in that regard.
    General Scaparrotti, you are recommending augmenting our 
forces in Europe. Specifically with regard to sea power, what 
are your suggestions? For example, there are four destroyers in 
Rota, Spain now. Do we need six? What else needs to be done? 
What specifically can you tell us in an open hearing that would 
help with regard to our sea power aspect of helping you?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, as you know, specifically for 
the maritime component, what we are looking at is an evolving 
and modernizing Russian fleet, and in the closed hearing, I 
plan to go through just the changes I have seen in the 3 years 
that I have been in European Command. If we want to remain 
dominant in the maritime domain and particularly under sea, 
which we are today, we have got to continue to modernize, and I 
think we need to build our capacity.
    Specifically for destroyers, yes, I have asked for two more 
destroyers within EUCOM. I would like to go into a little more 
detail on that in the closed hearing rather than here. But 
again, we do need greater capacity, particularly given the 
modernization and the growth of the Russian fleets in Europe.
    Senator Wicker. In addition to the two destroyers, can you 
tell us publicly what else you are asking for in terms of 
ships?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, this primarily has to do with 
capabilities that deal with the numbers of Russian ships that 
we see within our theater today and also for anti-submarine 
warfare. I would like to go into the more detailed piece in the 
closed hearing.
    Senator Wicker. Are we going to need more ships or fewer 
ships?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, you know, that is a service 
question as to how they----
    Senator Wicker. In your area.
    General Scaparrotti. In my area, more. I would like to see 
at least the rotation of naval component, carrier strike 
groups, amphibious strike groups at a little better pace than I 
have seen in the 3 years that I have been in command.
    Senator Wicker. General, at the Halifax Security Conference 
and at the Munich Security Conference, a number of us met 
individually with the defense minister from Turkey. At the 
military level, are we doing better with Turkey than it would 
appear on the front pages of the newspapers? What is the news 
out of Turkey recently, and is there any good news?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, I would say, first of all, that 
we have a good, very strong mil-to-mil relationship with our 
counterparts in Turkey. I know very well their chief of defense 
and their minister of defense, who was the chief prior to this, 
prior to him becoming the minister. We do have some 
differences, as you know and you can see in the paper. But we 
have very candid and frank conversations, and we have been very 
successful at working through mutual interest to this point. 
Our mil-to-mil relationship, as it reflects in the deployment 
of our forces, in my view has improved over the past year. That 
is what I would hope that our work together will continue to do 
here as we look at the tough issues we have got to face within 
European Command.
    Senator Wicker. In terms of military-to-military, things 
are a little better than they were a year ago.
    General Scaparrotti. They are. They have improved, and I 
think we have a good candid relationship.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, General Lyons, I noted your concern about the 
movement of personal items and want to volunteer as a 
consultant. Fifty years ago, I worked for Allied Van Lines in 
this area moving military families. If you need technical 
assistance, it is a lot better, for example, to move a carton, 
to pick up a carton of lamp shades than it is books. I learned 
that the hard way. Anyway, I could not resist. You brought back 
a lot of memories when you talk about moving furniture for 
military families.
    General Scaparrotti, I know you touched on this, but game 
out for me what happens if little green men appear in Lithuania 
or Latvia? Have we war-gamed what happened in the Ukraine and 
Crimea? How do we respond? It seems to me this is a real 
challenge for our whole deterrent posture.
    General Scaparrotti. Yes. We have taken a close look at 
both what has happened in the past and what we think could 
potentially happen here in the future.
    The first thing I would say is that as a result of that, we 
have worked with our allies in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, 
Bulgaria along the eastern border on what we have learned and 
also on the capabilities that we think we need as an alliance, 
both them and us, in order to deter this. Our first perspective 
is what do we do today to ensure that Russia fully understands 
the commitment of article 5 for an alliance.
    Senator King. But the question is what is the definition of 
attack. It seems to me that is the gray area that we are in to 
know when and how to respond when it is not clear that tanks 
are not rolling across the border.
    General Scaparrotti. You have hit it on--I mean, the thing 
that I worry about most----
    Senator King. You can continue with that, you hit it on the 
head, Senator. I like that in the record.
    [Laughter.]
    General Scaparrotti. Well, you did.
    The thing that is difficult is not necessarily an actual 
attack that you can see coming. It is actually the kind of 
subversive undermining of both the nation's authority, one of 
the nations that they are undermining, which is what they do, 
and other elements of power that are not necessarily military. 
The military would be one of the last that they want to use. 
That is the most difficult.
    But we also work with our interagency to the point that 
Senator Reed made. That is the importance of all of our 
elements of power here. When you can combine 29 nations with 
their elements of power in response to Russia's, it is a slam 
dunk. There is no doubt that we can handle this, and they will 
be deterred. But we have got to work together.
    Senator King. A question about funding and budgets. We have 
not seen a budget yet, but there is talk that there will be a 
significant increase in the military budget but primarily in 
OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] as opposed to line items. 
Give me your thoughts about having money in OCO rather than 
allocations and authorizations that you can put to work in your 
AOR [Area of Responsibility].
    General Scaparrotti. Well, primarily those budgets that 
come in within the base budgets itself, laid out in a FYDP 
[Future Years Defense Program], give me greater stability and 
knowledge of what is coming in the future. Really what we need 
is predictability. OCO tends to fluctuate each year. I 
personally underscore the greater predictability we have and 
stability in our budget as we look forward. Obviously, the more 
efficient we can be with our funding and the more sure that 
what we need in terms of force capability, readiness, et 
cetera, can be planned and we can deliver it.
    Senator King. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    General Lyons, you mentioned in your testimony--and it is 
clear--that a large part of your responsibility is met through 
civilian enterprises, shipping, airplanes. I know you talked 
about this, but please outline for us your level of 
satisfaction and confidence in the cybersecurity of the private 
sector partners.
    General Lyons. Sir, we acknowledge this is a significant 
challenge. We work very closely with our industry partners. As 
a matter of fact, we have introduced language into our 
contracts. We require self-assessments. We do a level of 
analysis on that, and we work more closely to ensure that their 
resiliency is improving.
    However, I would admit to you that if an advanced, 
persistent threat actor were on their systems today, it would 
be problematic. There is no question about that.
    Senator King. Do you red team their systems? Self-analysis 
does not make me sleep a lot better at night. Do you have a red 
team capacity where you can mock attack them to show them their 
vulnerabilities?
    General Lyons. No, Senator, we do not.
    Senator King. I would urge you to consider that as an 
option. In other areas of the government, that has been very 
effective. It has a way of waking people up when a skull and 
crossbones appears on the CEO's [Chief Executive Officer]'s 
computer.
    General Lyons. Sir, I agree with that.
    Senator King. Thank you, General.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Fischer?
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Lyons, as you know, Nebraska is the home of the 
155th Air Refueling Wing, and that plays an important role 
especially during deployment with your command. I am proud of 
those airmen. I just met with them a couple of weeks ago back 
in Nebraska.
    But my question to you is when we are looking at the 
challenges and the risks that we are facing in order to meet 
the future demands--you kind of touched on that earlier--what 
is the biggest issue you see contributing to the limiting 
capacity of the fleet?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, specifically in the area of aerial 
refueling?
    Senator Fischer. Yes.
    General Lyons. I think you alluded to this. Aerial 
refueling is the lifeblood of the joint force's ability to 
project power immediately. There is nothing in the joint force 
we can do without that capability. I was very pleased to see 
the Air Force accept the KC-46 and begin that modernization 
process. I think that is a very important first step.
    The other initiatives that the services are working--the 
service in this case, the Air Force--is improved readiness 
against the KC-135 fleet and the potential deferment of 
divestiture of some of those weapon systems so that we do not 
have a dip in capability over time.
    Senator Fischer. I am happy to hear you say that. As you 
know, the KC-46--it is online, but it is going to take quite a 
while to make it an important part of the fleet. As we look at 
the 135, there are maintenance issues, and we are seeing delays 
in that.
    Are you confident that there is a good balance between 
Active, Reserve, and Guard when it comes to refueling?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, I am. I will defer to the service on 
the force mix specifically, but I think you know very well we 
have guardsmen on alert, 2 hours trip alert today. It is a 
total force effort in everything we are doing. Over 60 percent 
of our capability does exist in the Guard and Reserve.
    Senator Fischer. What would you offer us as suggestions so 
that we can mitigate some of the obstacles we are facing with 
that limited refueling fleet that we have with their capacity? 
Do you have any suggestions for us?
    General Lyons. Well, ma'am, in the near term, it is really 
about generating higher levels of readiness. In the KC-135 
fleet, for example, we are unable to meet that 85 percent goal. 
The Air Force is working very, very hard to improve that 
readiness. In the near term, that would generate more tails 
available for mission.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    General Scaparrotti, I would like to ask you about some 
logistic challenges that I think you face in EUCOM. There have 
been quotes in the past, in fact, from you when you said the 
expansion of the alliance to include former Eastern Bloc 
countries has exacerbated the lack of common transportation 
networks between the newer NATO members in the east and the 
more established allies in the west. For example, Germany just 
allows trucks loaded with tanks to be on their highways at 
night on weekdays. The rails on the Baltic railroads--the gauge 
is set wider apart than we have in the western standard. It is 
my understanding trains have to be unloaded and then reloaded 
near Poland's border with Lithuania.
    As we are looking at movement of troops and to be able to 
respond quickly, to some of the possible challenges that we are 
looking at in that area, how serious is this issue today? What 
steps have you taken in order to address that?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, thank you.
    It is true what you stated in terms of the status today in 
Europe. It is a serious issue because we need to be able to 
move 360 within Europe with our forces and the allies' as well.
    If there is good news, the good news is that, as you know, 
Congress has supported, particularly through EDI, some of the 
key infrastructure improvements that we need, particularly in 
the east, to support our movements, reception of our troops, 
support of the troops that we put in place there, but also it 
helps the allies. The allies, as well, are financing, along 
with many of those projects, things that they should do with 
regard to airfields, fuel lines, rail, et cetera.
    Senator Fischer. I apologize for interrupting you, but are 
we trying to facilitate some changes so that our NATO allies 
can make those changes? Are they working together as well?
    General Scaparrotti. They are. Within NATO and the EU 
[European Union] both, NATO had a study of the infrastructure 
and logistics support that needed to happen. EUCOM was very 
involved in that. We provided help to them, and we also 
provided to the EU who did a mobilization study. That has 
resulted in about $7 billion the EU is going to invest in 
logistics and infrastructure over the next 5 or 6 years. Much 
of what we recommended was, in fact, accepted. We now have a 
study. We know what our issues are. We have insight within both 
EU and NATO on that, and we have got to follow up and make sure 
that that investment goes to the right places and actually 
makes a difference in military mobility.
    Senator Fischer. To be able to have a rapid response.
    General Scaparrotti. That is correct.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Peters?
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony and your 
service over many years.
    General Scaparrotti, you are well aware that if there is 
ever a major conflict in Europe, the first shots are likely to 
be cyber. They are not going to be kinetic. We have to be 
prepared for that. I know since the Russian attack against 
Estonia in 2007, the Baltic countries have been really leaning 
into this in a pretty major way. Estonia created the Cyber 
Defense League, established NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Center of Excellence, and as you know, Latvia is home to NATO's 
Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.
    But I would like you to give us an update and share some of 
your thoughts on what you are seeing in the Baltic countries, 
lessons learned, things that we may want to be replicating in 
other places around the world.
    General Scaparrotti. Well, you noted the changes that have 
taken place. I would add as well that after NATO determined 
that cyber was in fact a domain, which needed to happen to give 
me as SACEUR authorities, we now have a cyber center that 
operates within NATO. It is connected with each of our nations. 
Most of them are building a cyber capability. You noted the 
Cyber Center of Excellence, for instance, that I think is a 
very good one. It is important because it is through that 
process--that is one of those nodes that we are able to advance 
lessons learned, do training, ensure that we can help with 
defense within NATO but also to specific nations.
    Like anything in cyber, though, it is a very dynamic world. 
We are facing Russia, who is very agile in this and good at it. 
We really cannot rest. We have got a lot to do yet in cyber, 
particularly capacity. We have to build the skills we need to 
man these centers.
    Senator Peters. You know, one idea that has come to me--and 
I would love to have your comments on it as we try to provide 
more resources into that and really leverage some of the State 
partnerships we have with the National Guard. For example, we 
have a cyber unit in Michigan, but those around the country as 
well. I know our partners in the Baltics would love to have 
more presence of United States Forces in country there as well.
    Talk to me a little bit about whether or not it makes sense 
to have rotations of particularly cyber National Guard units. I 
mean, this would be good for morale. It would be great for 
retention. It would be great for recruiting. It would allow 
them to be at the tip of the spear while exchanging great 
ideas. Is that something that makes sense to you?
    General Scaparrotti. It absolutely makes sense, and it is 
something we are already doing particularly where you have 
State partnership programs because they have a level of trust 
that has been built, some over 25 years, and they have that 
expertise. It helps me in EUCOM because otherwise I pull from 
my cyber center expertise, and I send that team out to a 
nation. Here we can rotate forces through from a State with the 
same expertise and ability to build that capacity. We are 
actually beginning to do more of that in Europe today.
    Senator Peters. I understand there might be some need for 
additional funding through the National Guard to do that. Are 
there adequate resources for you to conduct that program or 
will you need more?
    General Scaparrotti. You would have to ask the National 
Guard for the specific answer to that, but my general response 
is when you pick up an OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo] like that 
and you bring them in--generally, for the Guard there is a 
funding issue, and one of us has to pick that up.
    Senator Peters. We can explore that further because I think 
that is necessary for us to do that.
    General Lyons, I am a former supply corps officer in the 
U.S. Navy Reserve, and so I think there is a lot of truth in 
General Omar Bradley's maxim that amateurs talk tactics and 
professionals study logistics. It is good to have you here.
    I wanted you to comment a little bit about a recent Defense 
Science Board Task Force Survivability Logistics Publication 
that came out that talked about the decay in logistic readiness 
was perhaps a result of insufficient war-gaming that 
incorporated logistics. In a lot of war games, they are 
typically just wished away. We know professionals cannot wish 
away logistics or you are in a world of hurt pretty quickly.
    Could you comment on that report and give us an update on 
how you are integrating combatant commanders with exercises so 
the logistics is an integral part of war-gaming and a real part 
of war-gaming, not just wished away?
    General Lyons. Senator, thanks for the question.
    I am familiar with the report. There are efforts actually 
ongoing now, given the defense strategy and the security 
environment, that will operate in the future to better connect 
logistics outcomes, for example, in TRANSCOM's case, mobility 
outputs and our ability to generate the force with a campaign 
analysis, which is currently disconnected. We are working with 
the Department to move in that direction in the future.
    Senator Peters. General Scaparrotti, briefly. I know we are 
running out of time. But how is that being incorporated in your 
war-gaming?
    General Scaparrotti. We work very closely here in terms of 
our war-gaming and do a transportation feasibility in each one 
of those. Our planners in fact work with his, either coming 
back or they come when we do our war planning. That is just a 
standard part of what we do.
    Senator Peters. You do not think it is just being wished 
away--the logistics challenges and the war-gaming?
    General Scaparrotti. No, I do not. In fact, if anything, we 
have leaned into this trying to be very factual about what our 
problems will be, particularly with respect to those in Europe, 
as we mentioned earlier.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
    Senator Cotton?
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen. General Scaparrotti, welcome to your 
last hearing and, General Lyons, to your first hearing. I am 
sure there were no jokes made at General Lyons' expense before 
this hearing began by General Scaparrotti.
    General Lyons, with that smile on your face, I would like 
to address some issues I have heard from logistics companies, 
including some in Arkansas, dealing not just with your command 
but with the Federal Government as a whole, but obviously, your 
command is one of the largest if not the largest in the entire 
government when it comes to moving things and equipment. They 
express frustrations with the kind of inscrutability or 
perplexed at the bureaucratic challenges of dealing with the 
government. A lot of these companies are either run by veterans 
or they have a large veteran workforce, given the training that 
the military gives its personnel in logistics. They would like 
to work more with the government and with TRANSCOM in 
particular. They just sometimes find it to be a challenge.
    What kind of working groups, if any, does TRANSCOM have 
with private industry to try to make what you do more 
transparent to them so they can better serve our personnel 
through your command?
    General Lyons. Senator, it is a great question. We are 
inextricably linked in our relationship with industry and their 
ability to generate the force.
    We have a relationship with our industry partners at 
multiple echelons, all the way from action officer to executive 
working groups that my three-star deputy leads. I also meet at 
least two times a year with the senior executives from our 
industry partners.
    I acknowledge your point that from time to time, based on 
our federal acquisition regulations, it can be a bit of an 
obstacle to work with the government. We try to minimize that 
as much as possible, and in fact, that is really, Senator, what 
is driving some of our restructure initiatives on the household 
goods side of the house to open up the market to more capacity.
    Senator Cotton. Good. I would just like to encourage that 
kind of linkage to continue. As the logistics industry changes 
so rapidly through the use of information technology, the more 
connections you can have to private sector leaders and to the 
people who are out doing this on the front lines I think it 
will just be beneficial to the personnel that you are serving 
on the front lines, whether it is moving household goods in the 
summer months or getting material down range as well. I would 
like to have my office continue to work with your command to 
try to facilitate some of those conversations.
    General Lyons. Sir, that will be great. Thank you.
    Senator Cotton. General Scaparrotti, I noted with great 
interest that Vladimir Putin yesterday directed Russia to 
withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] 
Treaty, which I find somewhat ironic since they have been 
violating their commitments under the INF Treaty for the last 
10 years. Do you have any thoughts on that news?
    General Scaparrotti. It would only be to underscore what 
you just suggested and that was the fact that they left the INF 
Treaty some time ago, years ago, by very deliberately producing 
a weapon in violation, and they have been deploying that 
weapon.
    Senator Cotton. The United States Government has publicly 
recognized these violations under both the Obama 
administration, and the Trump administration. We recently 
announced our intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty.
    Was there any public opposition from a NATO partner or was 
it uniform NATO support for the United States' decision to 
withdraw from that treaty?
    General Scaparrotti. NATO both in December and February 
produced very strong statements in support of each step that we 
took in terms of our withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
    I would say that our NATO allies understand that the INF 
[Treaty] is a very important component to European security 
from their view. They will emphasize--I am sure you have heard 
them--with each step they would hope that we would continue to 
work to bring Russia back into compliance before we are fully 
out, the 6-month period, or that we would look forward from 
that then to perhaps a new treaty that would encompass the new 
weapon systems, et cetera. They very much understand the 
importance of this, but they did support us strongly--29 
nations strongly--in our decision.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    Obviously, one reason why it is in our national security 
interest to withdraw from the INF Treaty besides Russia's 
noncompliance with the treaty is that China has been free to 
build intermediate-range missiles at unlimited rates for 
decades now. As you know from your time at United States Forces 
Korea, that has a significant impact on our security interest 
in the Pacific region.
    But China is not just limited there. It wants to be a 
global player. I noted with interest last year that the 
government of Denmark agreed to build some airports at 
Greenland, which it controls, not exactly considered a 
traditional EUCOM area, but it is within your area of 
operations.
    What are the implications of Chinese presence if they were 
to get a foothold, which they were largely denied in that 
airport construction project last year in the high north?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, it could have an absolute 
impact. I mean, I am concerned personally about the strategic 
investments that we see by China throughout Europe in air and 
sea ports or vicinities of that in critical technologies and 
companies that hold that particularly in the high north where 
you note Greenland and Iceland both are important bodies in 
that line of communication. I think we need to watch carefully 
China's investment in these ports. As you know, many of their 
commercial companies are actually state-owned.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    General Scaparrotti, I want to thank you for your service 
to our Nation for over 40 years. I know you have been wearing 
that fourth star on your shoulder for longer than anyone else 
in the armed forces right now. You have well earned the 
retirement that you have ahead of you. But I think I speak for 
most members of this Committee when we say that we would like 
to see you back in the employ of Uncle Sam sometime in the 
future.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here and for your 
service to the country.
    General Lyons, I want to follow up on some of the concerns 
that have been raised by Senators Reed and Fischer about the 
phasing out of our KC-135's and when the KC-46's are going to 
arrive. It is my understanding that in New Hampshire where we 
have the 157th Air Refueling Wing that there will be a period 
of months between the time the 135 is phased out and the 46 is 
delivered, given that it is already behind schedule.
    Can you comment on what we should assume will happen during 
those months when there is no refueling capacity and whether 
the intent will be to try and keep the 135's around longer 
until the delivery of the 46's?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, from my perspective, the key issue is 
to maintain operational capability throughout the conversion. 
The Air Force is working that very issue. In fact, they are 
working currently to delay the divestiture of a select number 
of KC-135's so that we do not have this exorbitant dip in 
capability over time. The service is working that, ma'am.
    Senator Shaheen. Should we assume that that is going to 
happen? I appreciate that the service is working it, but does 
that mean that we are going to see that extension happen?
    General Lyons. Senator, it has been my request. It has been 
well received by both the air component and the chief. 
Obviously, it is going to cost some money, and when the money 
is put into the program, that is when we will know. But the 
intent is to retain 28 weapon systems beyond their currently 
scheduled retirement.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    In terms of Boeing's delivery of the 46's, I know that they 
have accepted or made a commitment to address some of the 
concerns that have been expressed about the tankers. Do we know 
whether that is going to speed up the further delivery, or 
should we assume that we are going to see further delays?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, the decision to deliver I think was a 
good one. Right now, we are on a pause, as you may know, based 
on some Boeing issues with a foreign object. I do not have a 
sense, until that is cleared up, for the impact on the program. 
But I will talk to the Air Force about that.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I am sure 
that all of us hope that Boeing will do everything they can to 
make sure those deliveries are done to address the concerns 
that have been raised.
    General Scaparrotti, you mentioned in your testimony the 
concern about Turkey acquiring the S-400 at the same time they 
are supposed to take delivery of the F-35's. I know that there 
has been an effort underway to try and encourage Turkey to look 
at other alternatives and that there was an offer made early in 
January for the sale of the Patriot system. They have until the 
end of March, it is my understanding, to decide whether they 
are going to take delivery of that or not.
    But the question I have is, if Turkey moves forward with 
the agreement with Russia on the S-400, do we assume that they 
should receive delivery of F-35's and what does that do to 
their accessing that technology?
    General Scaparrotti. Senator, I would say, first of all, if 
they accept the S-400 and to establish it within Turkey, there 
is, first of all, an issue that it is not interoperable with 
NATO systems nor is it interoperable inside of our integrated 
air missile defense system. That presents one problem.
    The second has to do with the F-35. It presents a problem 
to all of our aircraft, but specifically the F-35 I believe. My 
best military advice would be that we do not then follow 
through with the F-35 flying it or working with an ally that is 
working with Russian systems, particularly air defense systems, 
with one of our, what I would say, is probably one of our most 
advanced technological capabilities.
    Senator Shaheen. I am pleased to hear you say that, but the 
question I have is I understand that some of the parts for the 
F-35 are being made in Turkey and what happens to that assembly 
and who picks up that slack if Turkey cannot receive the F-35.
    General Scaparrotti. Well, that is one of the issues that 
is being considered and will be considered I am sure, as you 
know.
    But for them, I would just underscore the fact that this is 
a huge decision for Turkey. I have talked to them personally as 
all of our leadership has. It connects in many different ways 
to the employment and the integration that they have within the 
system itself, the F-35, but also the FMS [Foreign Military 
Sales] and other systems that we sell to Turkey as well. I 
would hope that they would reconsider this one decision on S-
400, one system, but potentially forfeit many of the other 
systems and one of the most important systems that we can 
provide them.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I share that view. I 
think Turkey is an important ally, but it is one that we hope 
to be able to depend on.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Let me inform you that some of the KC-46's have been 
delivered. In fact, I flew the right seat of a KC-46 from 
Seattle, Washington to Altus. It is running fine.
    Senator Sullivan?
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here and your service.
    General Scaparrotti, I want to talk about a few things. 
First, there is a narrative that I think has played out a lot 
in the media that the administration or what you are doing in 
your capacity is somehow being weak on Russia and Putin. I just 
want to talk about a few actions that under your leadership we 
have been taking because is it not true that the one thing that 
Putin understands more than anything is power. Right? Would you 
agree with that?
    General Scaparrotti. I would agree.
    Senator Sullivan. Power of military forces, energy 
production, not worth by actual power.
    Does it help that we have now our forces deployed in 
countries like Poland and the Baltics in the European 
Reassurance Initiative, which this Committee has supported in a 
bipartisan fashion?
    General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir, very important.
    Senator Sullivan. It does not get a lot of press, but my 
colleague, Senator Ernst, was recently in Ukraine. As you know, 
the previous administration was reluctant and never helped the 
Ukrainians with defensive weapon systems that they could use to 
protect themselves. Under Secretary Mattis' leadership when he 
got involved, we did provide the Ukrainians the Javelin anti-
tank missile system. How is that working out?
    General Scaparrotti. Senator, first of all, as I said 
earlier in testimony, they have received the system. I have 
been impressed with their training and their preparation to 
utilize it.
    Senator Sullivan. Do you think that makes Russian T-72 tank 
drivers in eastern Ukraine a little more nervous?
    General Scaparrotti. I think it does. I think the fact that 
they have a Javelin that they can employ and they know how to 
employ it is a deterrent.
    Senator Sullivan. Are we seeing any force posture 
indications that they are taking that into consideration when 
they are moving those kind of forces? I am talking about the 
Russian forces.
    General Scaparrotti. Not directly because we have not 
employed them right on the line. The Ukrainians have not. But I 
am sure that they are aware of them, and they take that in 
consideration in the employment of their forces and where they 
put them. They know it is a lethal weapon system.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    I do not know if you mentioned it--I am sorry. I had to 
step out prior to your testimony. But could you talk a little 
bit about the Vostok 2018 exercise? My understanding was it 
involved 300,000 Russian troops, 80 ships, notably 3,200 
Chinese troops, including up to as many as 900 Chinese tanks. 
Are those reports accurate and should we be concerned about 
that?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, the numbers that 
they published are higher than what was factually present. I 
can talk in more detail on this in a classified hearing this 
afternoon. It was not that large, but it was large. Yes, we 
should take notice primarily because it was designed for them 
at a very strategic operational level to be able to command and 
control large forces in a force-on-force type of exercise 
scenario. It connected them with multiple of their regional 
commands specifically in order to practice that. It covered 
both conventional long-range precision munitions training, as 
well as nuclear training offset toward the end. It included 
China, as you noted, which is the first time I can recall them 
providing forces in a partner training scenario, which is quite 
unusual. The size of it, the complexity of it, the 
communications that they demonstrated, the fact that it was a 
hybrid conventional and nuclear exercise I think is all 
important.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you for that.
    General Lyons, you and I had a discussion, and the Chairman 
I see was just talking about the KC-46 and the deployment of 
that. I know that is not ultimately your call, but certainly 
you are an advocate and you have a lot of knowledge. I am going 
to ask just a couple quick questions that I would just 
appreciate quick answers to.
    But when you look at the places where you would want to 
deploy that, either CONUS [Continental United States] or OCONUS 
[Outside Continental United States] decisions, you know, the 
National Defense Strategy prioritizes great power competition 
with China and Russia, decisive action against North Korea, 
would it make sense to place KC-46's in a part of an American 
territory, State, or otherwise as closely proximate to those 
places?
    General Lyons. Senator, just to be clear, Alaska is clearly 
a strategic location.
    Senator Sullivan. You are getting to my punch line already. 
I have not even gone through the list. Let me go through the 
list.
    We are close to all those places. We are the only State 
where you are actually right at the seams of EUCOM, PACOM 
[United States Pacific Command], NORTHCOM [United States 
Northern Command], STRATCOM. The State of Alaska is in the 
seams of every one of those. The OPLANs [Military Operation 
Plans] that support contingencies all focus on Alaska. It has 
the fourth largest fuel storage area of the Air Force in any 
place in the world. It is going to have over 100 fifth 
generation fighters in the next 2 years. One hundred. No other 
place on planet earth will have 100 combat-coded fifth gen 
fighters. It has the existing infrastructure to support aerial 
refueling operations. JPARC [Joint Pacific Alaska Range 
Complex] will be the best training place for fifth gen aircraft 
anywhere in the world.
    Is your advocating for the KC-46--I mean, of course, I am 
advocating for the State I represent, but I would not do it 
unless I thought it made 100 percent strategic sense. Just give 
me your thoughts on that very quickly.
    General Lyons. Sir, I know the Air Force is still 
developing the basing plan. It is not complete yet, 
particularly in the future years. I do have confidence that 
they will look completely at the operational range and 
capability to be able to swing and give us the flexibility in 
TRANSCOM to employ that important weapon system. I am sure that 
Alaska is part of that discussion. I just do not know the 
details, sir.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Duckworth?
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope on that 
right-seat ride, you did not try to get them to do a hammerhead 
or anything, did you, with any aerobatic maneuvers?
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Duckworth. Stay within the restrictions.
    Gentlemen, thank you so much for your participation today.
    General Scaparrotti, I want to return to the discussion 
about logistics challenges especially in the Eastern European 
area. Illinois National Guard has been the sponsor in the State 
Partnership for Peace program with the nation of Poland for 28 
years now I believe--27-plus years. Through my service, I am 
somewhat familiar with the challenges that we face there.
    Could you update us on how the establishment of the NATO 
Joint Support and Enabling Command [JSEC] is going? Let us 
remind us of why it was created and what it will better enable 
you to do in theater to respond to Russian aggression. When 
will this command be fully operational?
    General Scaparrotti. The establishment of JSEC, as you 
called it, is moving I think on timeline. It is actually ahead 
of pace in my view. The Germans who were the framework nation 
for this headquarters in Ulm, Germany have--in my view they 
have really leaned into this. They have already got their 
commander designated. They have a portion of the staff there. 
They have been present in my headquarters in SHAPE [Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] to do the further planning 
that needs to take place to ensure that it is right-sized, to 
make sure that the planning, the understandings, roles, and 
responsibilities are correct. That is really the piece that we 
are doing right now, but it is moving along very well.
    This fall is IOC [Initial Operational Capability], and it 
is another year before it would be fully operational. We have 
got some time here before it would be fully operational. But I 
would say to you that I think they will be ahead of that in 
terms of real output. They are already making a difference in 
terms of our logistics planning with other logistics commands 
within the headquarters and throughout the component. I think 
they will actually be leaning into that before they are 
actually fully established, so to speak.
    Why did we set that up? Primarily because in a European 
environment where we have got to be able to support and move 
360, not just to the eastern border, but north to the high 
north, south, and west with a threat that is actually 360 and 
then we needed to protect the central lines of communication, 
critical ports, seaports, and infrastructure in doing that 
because as has been testified to here by General Lyons, we are 
now in a contested environment. We needed a headquarters that 
both looked logistically, as well as protection of those key 
assets. That is really why we stood up that command, and it is 
well placed being in kind of the heartland of Europe, so to 
speak, in Germany.
    It is a very important step for NATO to take, and I think 
it demonstrates NATO's focus on making sure that it will be 
relevant for the environment that we are in today.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, General.
    General Lyons, how would TRANSCOM plug into the JSEC, and 
has this been tested yet? I mean, how would you plug in during 
conflict, for example, and have we tested it?
    General Lyons. Senator, first let me tell you thank you for 
your understanding of logistics and the importance of logistics 
to warfighting. I greatly appreciate that.
    I have actually been to Europe several times, and I met 
with the leadership that were developing the JSEC and I 
understand that concept very well. I think it is a great 
initiative that General Scaparrotti and his team are moving out 
on.
    I do not know that we plug in directly. We plug in directly 
to his EUCOM headquarters through a European deployment and 
distribution operations center and then across at echelon to 
include his headquarters, and we would take the signals that he 
would be sending on his priorities for mobility and then meter 
them accordingly. Then he would have the role then to integrate 
that from a coalition perspective.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    With that, I would like to return, General Scaparrotti to 
an understanding of sealift. We had a discussion earlier today. 
I understand that recently NATO reactivated its Atlantic 
Command to guard the sea lanes of approach into Europe in the 
event of war.
    Can you describe for me in general terms the amount of 
sealift that would be required to move significant United 
States Forces to Europe in the event of conflict? Are you 
comfortable with the amount of sealift at your disposal right 
now in the event of a conflict?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, Senator, when we go to the 
closed session, I can probably get into more detail on that. 
But I would say it is significant. Because of the types of 
forces I move--I think Steve would agree that we rely on 
sealift largely for a lot of that bulk and heavy movement.
    You know, I am aware of the challenges to particularly our 
Reserve Force for naval forces and our commercial support. That 
is all important if we had a full conflict in Europe. I would 
just underscore the importance of funding that and making sure 
that we have the readiness in the right place because we will 
rely on it heavily for any crisis in Europe.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. We will probably try to 
follow up in the session later today. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Let me just, since you brought up the KC-46, remind all of 
us here that is replacing eventually the KC-135. The first KC-
135 that was delivered to Altus Air Force Base was in 1959. It 
has been operating for 60 years. It gives you an idea of the 
significance of the KC-46 to the distant future of that 
capability.
    Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Scaparrotti, General Lyons, thank you both for 
being here. Thank you for your exemplary service, and thank you 
to the men and women under your command.
    General Scaparrotti, if I could just start with you, I want 
to talk a little bit about the NDS Strategy Commission. The NDS 
Commission, various RAND studies, and others have clearly 
indicated that we are not optimally postured to deal with a 
Russian assault into the Baltics in particular. The NDS clearly 
states that the joint force has got to be prepared to blunt 
this assault and to prevent a Russian fait accompli.
    My question is building on the positive work in the 
previous years, the European Defense Initiatives, and other 
activities, could you give us a progress report? I understand 
you may want to save some of this for the closed session, but 
can you give us a progress report on our force posturing 
developments to prevent that fait accompli? Where are we on 
this in your judgment?
    General Scaparrotti. We have made clear progress as I 
stated up front in this regard, and largely thankful to the 
support of Congress, particularly EDI, in funding the changes 
that we need to make. We made progress, I would tell you, in 
every domain that is important to that, including cyber in 
that, for instance. But we are not postured yet where we need 
to be, and as you cited, the studies that have come out 
recently have underscored that. In a closed session, I would 
like the opportunity to talk to you more specifically about 
where we are at and what we are short.
    But, for instance, you know, we now have rotational 
brigades, an armored brigade, a CAB [Combat Aviation Brigade] 
in the east, a battalion task force as a part of NATO. We have 
rotational air forces. We have rotational bomber forces. We 
have had twice now--well, three times actually--a carrier 
strike group once already in the high north for the first time 
in 20 years. At the beginning of my time here, 3 years ago, we 
were moving one brigade at a time and challenged. A month ago, 
I moved four brigades, two armored, two CABs, simultaneously in 
Europe. That is the progress. Thanks to TRANSCOM and others 
that help us do the work, provide the assets, increase the 
infrastructure to make that happen. Clearly progress, but we 
are not there yet.
    Senator Hawley. Again with the reservation I realize you 
wanted to save the specifics for the closed session, I think it 
is important to get some of this on the record as we are about 
to, as you know, go into the authorization season here and then 
the appropriations season where we will be needing to make the 
case for authorizing and then spending what is necessary in 
order to get you what you need.
    Can you give us an overview at least about what more you 
think we need, generally speaking, to get you to the posture 
that the NDS recommends?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, we will start with 
the cyber domain. There is a plan and an increase in my cyber 
capability, and I have been increased by CYBERCOM as a 
priority. That has happened. But I still have personnel and 
skills in the numbers of around 50 personnel yet. It would be 
very helpful to have them in place. That is one of those.
    If you go to the land component, I need greater land 
component capability not only in armored elements but with my 
enablers, and I will go into more detail on that in the other.
    I have mentioned maritime, greater capacity there, as well 
as specific capabilities to stay ahead of, frankly, the 
modernization that we see in Russia's maritime forces.
    The Air Force is presently on a rotational basis providing 
fifth gen aircraft to me, bomber aircraft, et cetera, which we 
need to employ for a deterrent factor and also to ensure our 
readiness and capability. I am looking forward to those being 
stationed permanently in some numbers within Europe as well.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you.
    Let me ask you about our European allies. Can you give us a 
report--you mentioned some of this in your written testimony. 
Can you give us a report on the work with our European allies 
especially Germany to ensure that they are meeting their NATO 
commitments and have a plan to do so going forward?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, as you know, we have been 
working with all of our allies, and I mentioned up front the 
cash contribution. Since 2016, our allies have put another $41 
billion into defense. By 2020, it will be $100 billion based on 
the plans that they had to provide here in December. Their 
contributions have stepped up. We asked for greater force 
structure to assist in Afghanistan. Our allies responded. I 
think when you look at that, they are clearly responding, but 
we have a ways to go yet.
    Germany in particular has responded as well. They plan to 
bring their defense investment up to 1.5 percent. That is not 2 
percent yet. That is where it needs to be, but they are clearly 
refocused on their contribution, as well as their readiness. As 
you know, they have got some readiness issues. That has been in 
the paper. I believe that is true from what I have seen.
    But they are providing the very high joint task force, for 
instance, for NATO, and they made sure that they produced a 
force that was ready and credible. I have seen it. We operated 
with that force in Trident Juncture, for instance. They 
understand the issue and they are working hard to get their 
readiness up to where it is going to be. But they spent a good 
deal of time, in particular, as many of the other--we did as 
well, but European nations where they rested and they did not 
invest in their defense, and now they are having to invest 
heavily to get back up on step.
    Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Warren?
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to discuss the national security threat that cannot 
be addressed by traditional military power at all, and that is 
climate change. The unclassified worldwide threat assessment by 
the Director of National Intelligence said--and I am going to 
quote here--global environmental and ecological degradation, as 
well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for 
resources, economic distress, and social discontent through 
2019 and beyond. End quote.
    That assessment also said, quote, damage to communication, 
energy, and transportation infrastructure could affect low-
lying military bases, inflict economic costs, and cause human 
displacement and loss of life.
    I have asked this question to other combatant commanders, 
so I want to make sure that I get this on the record. General 
Scaparrotti and General Lyons, do you agree with the 
intelligence community's assessment of the climate change 
threat?
    General Scaparrotti. I do, and I believe that, as you 
noted, much of this will be drivers for potential conflict or 
at least very difficult situations that nations have to deal 
with.
    The second, I would point you to the high north and that is 
the increasing opening of the northern sea route and the 
challenges that presents from a security perspective.
    Senator Warren. Yes. Thank you.
    General Lyons, do you also agree?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, I agree. These are sources of 
conflict, and we certainly have to be prepared to respond to 
them.
    Senator Warren. Good.
    Could I then ask each of you very briefly because we have 
very limited time just to describe how climate change impacts 
your operations in your commands and what you are doing to 
adapt to these changes? General Scaparrotti, would you like to 
start?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the most apparent to me 
is the one that I noted and that is in the Arctic. We already 
are seeing longer periods of time that the northern sea route 
is open. As a part of that, there is an increased interest in 
commercial and resource capabilities there. China, for 
instance, is pressing to get into the high north and have some 
presence there. That creates competition. Russia, because that 
northern sea route is the one that follows most closely to 
their borders, has increased--reopened 10 of their airports 
there. They now have radar systems up. They have begun to move, 
on periodic times, different weapon systems up there for 
control of the area. Those are all things----
    Senator Warren. That is serious.
    General Scaparrotti.--that I have to bring into my 
planning.
    Senator Warren. What has been your response to that, just 
briefly?
    General Scaparrotti. Briefly? We have updated our plans as 
a result of that. We have had to change the posture of some of 
our forces. We have changed our operational patterns so that 
we, in fact, deter and we send a signal of the importance of 
the Arctic to us. Those are just some of the ways day to day 
that we have made changes in our normal routine in order to 
demonstrate significance and capability in the Arctic.
    Senator Warren. Thank you.
    General Lyons?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, anything that degrades our ability to 
project and sustain power globally at our time and place of 
choosing is a concern. We know that we have to operate in any 
conditions whatsoever.
    Senator Warren. What are you doing by way of response?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, in other words, in our planning and 
so forth, we consider all environments. But more specific to 
General Scap's point about the more scientific piece of it is, 
that is a little bit out of my area of expertise.
    Senator Warren. Fair enough. I really was not looking for 
so much of a scientific answer, but as General Scaparrotti 
said, how you have to kind of readjust where you are and what 
you are doing.
    If I can, I just want to say adapting to climate change 
impacts our military readiness, and I am glad you both take 
this threat seriously. I appreciate that.
    In my remaining time, I just want to ask very briefly, if I 
can, about the INF Treaty. We all know this is a landmark arms 
control treaty with Russia negotiated in 1987 by President 
Ronald Reagan. The treaty prohibits both of our countries from 
testing and deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise 
missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Yes, we know 
that Russia is in violation of the treaty since 2014, but 
rather than use the mechanisms within the treaty or other tools 
available to us to try to get Russia back into compliance, the 
administration is abandoning the treaty entirely.
    I just want to ask what is our plan to prevent Russia from 
building more INF Treaty-prohibited missiles in the absence of 
the treaty? Do we have a plan here? General Lyons?
    General Lyons. Ma'am, I would have to defer on that. That 
is a little bit out of my area of expertise.
    Senator Warren. Okay.
    General Scaparrotti?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, Senator, I think that we are 
still in a 6-month period here where we are looking at what our 
options are. We, in fact, have told our allies in NATO that we 
will do the planning in collaboration with them. We have begun 
that. I do not know that we have a plan today. I know that we 
are working on what we think that plan might be. I personally 
think that it has to be multi-dimensional. It has to be across 
all of our domains, and it has to be whole-of-government in 
order to respond to that.
    I would finally say that from my point of view that when 
you have a peer competitor, particularly a modernizing one, 
that will be challenging us, such as Russia, that we should 
look toward treaty capabilities in order to provide some 
stability, to provide signals and communications and limits 
that we understand that we can work from.
    Senator Warren. Well, I am glad to hear that you are trying 
to work with our allies. I think the Polish, for example, have 
said that they are concerned about missiles on their land. I 
just urge you to think about, instead of withdrawing from the 
INF Treaty, whether or not we should be redoubling our efforts 
to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty. We know 
that Putin cannot be trusted, but we have a responsibility to 
prevent a dangerous and expensive arms race in Europe and 
without the treaty I am worried that is what we are doing.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. I apologize.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Tillis?
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both, gentlemen, for being here.
    General Lyons, I was down at Fort Bragg this past Friday 
with Secretary Esper, and we were talking with folks there who 
are in unacceptable housing conditions.
    We also talked a little bit--and I have had a number of 
discussions in the past with families about some of their 
household belongings being moved, some of the bottlenecks, and 
unsatisfactory service.
    I like the idea of taking the personal property program 
into what I would consider to be one throat to choke sort of 
model. But maybe if you could briefly describe where you think 
this is going to end up. I really want to make sure that we get 
this right in terms of accountability, predictability, and 
customer satisfaction so that any relationship we create with 
this confederation of movers--I get that you are going to have 
a consolidator, but you are still going to have a number of 
individual providers. We have got to get the compensation and 
accountability models right so that we do not end up here 
honestly trying to do a good thing and ending up where we are 
with the housing situation.
    Can you give me some assurances or briefly describe how 
that is going to work?
    General Lyons. Senator, I can. This is definitely not a 
privatization effort by any stretch of the imagination. As a 
matter of fact, what I have offered to the service secretaries 
and service chiefs is instead of this completely de-aggregated, 
diffuse value chain of very little centralized responsibility 
even inside the government, I would look at them and I would 
say hold me accountable. Allow me to develop an acquisition 
tool to hold industry accountable. We have a track record of 
being able to do that, as a matter, in other parts of the 
defense personal property program like personal-owned vehicles. 
We do this today.
    I do know, Senator, that there is some concern in industry. 
We get a lot of feedback from industry. Some are very, very 
supportive where we are headed. They see opportunities to enter 
the market. We want to grow the market. Others are concerned 
about potential change. What I tell them and what I have seen 
in our past acquisitions that have been similar is that below 
the level, we still need the same or greater number of movers 
out there who just need a level of quality and accountability 
in the system.
    Senator Tillis. And some peaking capability.
    I would be very interested in maybe having the right people 
in your organization meet with my staff to describe what that 
really looks like operationally. In a simplistic way, it would 
almost be this baseline guarantee of capacity with some peaking 
capability that is almost uber-like in terms of having the 
household know that they are going to get their things moved at 
the appropriate time hopefully to a house that is in much 
better condition than some of the ones that I saw down at Fort 
Bragg on Friday, a separate issue and not your problem.
    General Scaparrotti, I appreciate the time you spent in the 
office yesterday. I appreciate your years, decades of service, 
and I associate myself with Senator Cotton's comments that if 
you take your uniform off, we hope that does not mean that we 
will not see you back here serving in some other capacity.
    I am going to save a lot of my questions for the classified 
briefly, but I do want to highlight my concern with the Turkey 
situation, particularly with the S-400's. I know--and you gave 
a great briefing on where we are working together on a 
legitimate homeland security threat that they are dealing with 
with the PKK [Kurdistan Worker's Party]. On the one hand, we 
are trying to partner and continue to build on that 
relationship.
    Turkey is a vitally important NATO partner in the most 
complicated part of the world. I understand some of their 
behaviors, but I do not understand under any circumstances why 
on earth they would be considering purchasing a missile defense 
system that would not be interoperable, that would require the 
deployment of capabilities on the ground in Turkey that would 
threaten the presence of our Joint Strike Fighter, why on earth 
they would be considering a decision that would make us have to 
rethink whether or not they can actually even be in the supply 
chain for the Joint Strike Fighter, let alone deploying assets 
that are scheduled to be there in 2020, but even raising doubts 
about whether or not we can legitimately manufacture and 
distribute parts in the supply chain for the production of 
Joint Strike Fighters.
    The message that I want to send to the Turkish leadership 
is this is an area--Congress got educated quite a bit on the 
Joint Strike Fighter and on Turkey last year when we were 
dealing with a matter involving a pastor from my State. I think 
we are very well briefed on it now and some of the risks there. 
I would just encourage the Turkish Government and the 
leadership to recognize that they should not have this one 
decision put all the other great things that we are doing, that 
we will do in the future in the balance and have Congress 
potentially in a position where we would have to act.
    General Scaparrotti. Senator, thank you. As you know, we, 
the United States, have a team there today talking to the 
Turks, and I am sure a very candid conversation about the S-400 
and the potential consequences are a part of that conversation.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
    Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Lyons, let me first ask you a question about 
privatization. As you are familiar, as you know, Army veteran 
and military spouse Megan Harless recently wrote an op-ed that 
criticized TRANSCOM's plan to privatize the military move 
program. She stated that the military move advisory panel 
convened by TRANSCOM has not been consulted regarding 
privatization, and TRANSCOM also has not solicited feedback 
from military families or from the moving industry.
    Do military families support privatization? Does industry 
support it?
    General Lyons. Senator, there is no initiative whatsoever 
to privatize the household goods industry. This is a 100 
percent--every task inside that value chain is conducted by 
commercial industry today.
    What we are proposing, however, is a restructure of how the 
government approaches this with industry. To be honest with 
you, Senator, I have received more letters on this particular 
issue in the 6 months that I have been Commander than any other 
issue that TRANSCOM deals with. In fact, I agree with the 
criticisms of the program. I think we need to take action to 
remedy the program as it exists today. We have been studying 
this since 1996.
    Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to prioritizing the 
needs of those military families in any kinds of reforms that 
you may consider?
    General Lyons. Sir, there is no question about it. This is 
all about improving curbside service for military families. 
That is our north star. That is the only reason that we are 
doing this, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to consulting with the 
TRANSCOM advisory panel?
    General Lyons. Yes, sir. We consult regularly with 
industry. Some very much support where we are headed, and some 
are very, very concerned.
    I do know, Senator, that the moving associations, for 
example, are drafting language to insert in the NDAA that would 
delay any kind of progress in this area, perhaps to study it 
for 2 more years. I can just say I really think that would be a 
gut punch for our military families.
    Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, talking about the 
Ukraine, is there evidence of the Russians meddling in the 
Ukrainian elections that are planned?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, in terms of their influence, 
they certainly are supporting the parties where they believe 
they can have the most influence and those individuals. There 
is certainly disinformation as a part of that. They are playing 
in that way. I think, for instance, Russia's seizure of their 
ships and their 24 sailors and the fact that they have not been 
released is likely also another way that they have some 
leverage and influence on the outcome of that election.
    Senator Blumenthal. Has there been an increase in 
disinforma- tion or other Russian interference?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, just generally it has been 
targeted at undermining the present government and the 
president.
    Senator Blumenthal. What is your command or other American 
resources doing to counter it?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, both not only my command--I deal 
with the military aspects of this, but there are others 
diplomatically, for instance, in State that we are working with 
in this regard. But we do have personnel there that support in 
military means their defense of disinformation, appropriate 
information, and cyber defense as well. In the closed hearing, 
I can be more specific about precisely what we are doing.
    Senator Blumenthal. Just to reassure the American people--
and that is the purpose of an open hearing really to inform the 
American people--can you provide some description of what is 
being done in the cyber domain by your command to bolster the 
Ukrainian defenses?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, I guess I would underscore, 
first of all, what we do with the others is just to make sure 
that this is a free and fair election. Within the cyber domain, 
mine is to help them with their defense of their systems. It is 
not selected by any means at all. It is primarily defense and 
help them to understand how they ensure that they do, in fact, 
have a free and fair election.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I will tell you it has been such a pleasure for me to go 
through this series of hearings with our different commands in 
your area of responsibility and hear repeatedly from you all 
some of the needs and stepping up our game, if you will, 
dealing with Russia and China and especially with cyber.
    General Scaparrotti, I am from Tennessee, and I have got 
some National Guardsmen that are under your command at this 
point, folks in the Ukraine and Poland. We appreciate their 
service, and we appreciate you and the leadership that you have 
shown throughout your career to our men and women in uniform 
and to those that are currently under your command.
    Let me stay with looking at our enemies, Russia, China, the 
cyber component, and we will come back to that this afternoon 
in the briefing. But what I would like to know, General, as you 
look at Europe and as we talk about the rollout of 5G and you 
are looking at that European Deterrence Initiative, do you have 
what you need? Where do we need to be planning forward on that, 
and how are you approaching the integration and the utilization 
for really what some of our troops at Fort Campbell--when I 
talk to some of our special ops guys, 5th Division, 160th, this 
is very important to them, 5G and the utilization of that, 
knowing that that is going to help fuel artificial 
intelligence, et cetera, knowing they are going to use that 
with some of the ISR capabilities. If you will just touch on 
that briefly, and then we will explore it a little more this 
afternoon.
    General Scaparrotti. Well, first of all, I will just start 
with the 5G part of this. This is a considerably different 
capability than what we have today. It is not just a 
modernization or an upgrade.
    Senator Blackburn. It is a whole new world. It is like 
going from analog to digital.
    General Scaparrotti. That is right. It is a different 
world. What we have to know is that we have a secure 5G 
capability. That is one of the reasons that when you now go to 
our allies, that we have said they need to be very careful 
about Chinese investment----
    Senator Blackburn. Yes. No Huawei and no ZTE.
    General Scaparrotti.--in their telecommunications 
capabilities because we also want to know that we are secure 
with our allies that we can act with. There may be an outcome 
where we cannot connect with our allies unless they change the 
composition of their systems. We are trying to get ahead of 
that.
    Senator Blackburn. Is this an open discussion that you are 
having?
    General Scaparrotti. Yes, it is an open discussion.
    I would say to you that just to give you an idea of how 
this has come along, 2 years this would not have been a topic. 
A year ago, it was starting to come in, and now----
    Senator Blackburn. It is front and center.
    General Scaparrotti. Now it is front and center, and we are 
beginning to have the right conversations as a security issue.
    Senator Blackburn. Good. That is great.
    General Lyons, TRANSCOM has had some problems with some 
breaches, and I think it was a couple of years ago, Chinese 
hackers got into the network like 20 times. What you do and 
with logistics--and we have talked about different points. I 
think Chairman Wicker brought up Rota, Spain. As you look at 
the integration and all that comes under you, give me an update 
on the security of your systems and then how are you dealing 
with contractors that are a part of your system.
    General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am. As you indicated, this is 
an area of concern and it is a high priority for the command. I 
tell folks this is a warfighting domain. There is no one thing 
that is going to solve this. We have got multiple things going 
on, everything from just operator discipline, through cyber 
hygiene, through defense, through infrastructure, and a high 
level of collaboration with Cyber Command to create conditions 
to allow us to operate.
    As for our industry partners, we are also upping our game 
there through our contractual language and their compliance 
with NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology] 
standards, basically their assessments and collaboration and 
information sharing. But that is a much more complex area 
outside of the DODIN
[Department of Defense Information Network] where a level of 
protection is lower, and that does become a vulnerability in 
the enterprise.
    Senator Blackburn. We will talk a little more about that in 
this afternoon's hearing.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks to the witnesses for your service and your 
testimony.
    A House bill to overturn President Trump's emergency 
declaration is pending before this Committee and will likely be 
voted on on the floor of the Senate within the next 10 days or 
so.
    There are at least two issues that Senators are grappling 
with about the bill: one, the question of whether there is an 
emergency. General O'Shaughnessy of NORTHCOM testified before 
us last week and said in a very straightforward way there is no 
military emergency at the border.
    But a second issue we are grappling with is where will the 
money come from. The President has proposed to use $6 billion 
from the Pentagon to direct toward this non-military emergency: 
$3.5 million of MILCON [Military Construction] funding and $2.5 
billion of drug interdiction monies within the DOD budget.
    I want to ask you about these proposals because we are 
trying to get information about exactly how the moving of the 
$6 billion is doing to affect military operations.
    Have either of you in your commands been asked to provide 
lists of MILCON projects that should be either delayed or 
reduced or eliminated with respect to this particular $3.5 
billion proposal? General Scaparrotti?
    General Scaparrotti. Not with respect to this proposal, no, 
sir.
    Senator Kaine. General Lyons?
    General Lyons. No, sir. But it probably would not be 
appropriate. TRANSCOM relies on the services for their MILCON.
    Senator Kaine. Right, so that you do not have the big 
MILCON back list that the others do. I understand.
    General Lyons. That is correct.
    Senator Kaine. General Scaparrotti, you say not with 
respect to this proposal. I gather what you mean by that is you 
are often putting together MILCON lists. That would be one of 
the things you would do in EUCOM is looking at MILCON needs 
within that command. You have been doing that, but you have not 
been asked with respect to this proposal what MILCON projects 
could be reduced, delayed, or eliminated.
    General Scaparrotti. With respect to the budget as a whole, 
well prior to this question, we went through the normal process 
of our discussion within DOD as to what the priorities were 
across the Department with respect to my MILCON.
    Senator Kaine. Right.
    General Scaparrotti. We had to prioritize. We did delay 
some, but that was well before this conversation.
    Senator Kaine. Do you know if and when a decision is made 
about where the $3.5 billion of MILCON projects, which will be 
affected--do you know whether you will be in that decision loop 
or whether it will be made by others?
    General Scaparrotti. I expect I will be in the decision 
loop within the Department. We have a close relationship with 
them. We generally would have. No one has discussed it with me, 
and I am confident they would when and if that should----
    Senator Kaine. The ``they'' would probably be the service 
secretaries and the SecDef?
    General Scaparrotti. It would be the service secretary or 
the SecDef, probably the SecDef as well. I actually talked to 
the SecDef personally about the potential delay, et cetera that 
I just told you about as we were going through the budget.
    Senator Kaine. Let me ask the second half of the question. 
The other funding that is suggested could be used is the $2.5 
billion drug interdiction account at the Pentagon. Reporting 
suggests that there is not $2.5 billion in that account. There 
is about $750 million, of which only $85 million is available 
for use right now. There is a suggestion that what the Pentagon 
would do would be to take monies out of other accounts to fill 
up the drug interdiction account to $2.5 billion prior to using 
it for the emergency proposal that the President has suggested.
    Have either of you been involved in any discussions about 
funds within your bailiwick that might be used to pull into the 
drug interdiction account?
    General Scaparrotti. No, Senator, I have not.
    Senator Kaine. General Lyons?
    General Lyons. No, sir.
    Senator Kaine. General Scaparrotti, let me ask you about 
this. The 70th anniversary of NATO is in April, a really 
important one. NATO has a headquarters both in Brussels and 
also in Virginia in the Hampton Roads area. I have a proposal, 
a bill that is a bipartisan bill, that would stipulate that 
NATO, a treaty that the Senate ratified--the U.S. should not 
unilaterally withdraw from that without either a Senate vote or 
an act of Congress. The bill is a bipartisan one, and it is 
meant to send a strong signal of congressional support for the 
NATO alliance at the 70th anniversary.
    Would that message be positively received by our NATO 
allies?
    General Scaparrotti. Senator, I believe it would. The votes 
by Congress that you have taken in the past to reinforce our 
commitment to our allies have been helpful as well.
    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
    No further questions. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Ernst?
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being 
here today and willing to answer questions.
    Like so many of my colleagues, I do want to make sure that 
you have the tools and resources necessary to enable you in 
your missions and make you successful.
    As Senator Sullivan mentioned just a little bit earlier, I 
did recently return from a trip to Ukraine, and during that 
trip, I was able to see firsthand the Russian aggression that 
is being exhibited in that region against what is a very 
important strategic partner to us. Not only do we want to push 
back against Russia because of Ukraine and Europe but, of 
course, for many of our other allies around the world as well.
    General Scaparrotti, I would like to start with you, sir.
    Of course, while I was in Ukraine, the Ukrainians expressed 
a very strong desire for military assistance, defensive 
assistance and lethal assistance. Senator Sullivan mentioned 
that we have provided Javelins to the Ukrainian army.
    I met with members of the defense establishment there, as 
well as members of the Ukrainian parliament, and those that I 
had the opportunity to meet with in Kiev and also the joint 
forces headquarters near the eastern front--they really 
appreciated that assistance.
    What more can we do for the Ukrainians in that regard for 
lethal assistance? Is it just simply more Javelins, or is there 
additional assistance we can provide?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, I think personally--and you will 
see soon here a list. I think it has already been provided to 
Congress. But as you know, we provide that prior to it being 
authorized, the actual purchase from the funding that you have 
given.
    But from my point of view, the things that we need to 
continue is to continue their support for counter-battery, Q-
36/37, that they have the assets and the systems that they need 
to do that well. They have asked us for help in communication 
at an operational level, and they do have a distinct need for 
that because while we focus on the line of contact, their chief 
of defense is also focused on other areas of the country that 
are a threat, that Russia could present a threat as well. He is 
trying to determine--he is trying to establish a good 
communications system for his entire force, as well as just the 
front.
    They have asked us specifically for some assistance to help 
with sniper proficiency, the right kind of ammo and weapons, 
grenade launchers.
    Then finally the area that I would say is that we need to 
study how we help their maritime component, their navy, which 
as you know, is not large to begin with, given the portion of 
the fleet that Russia took when it annexed Crimea, and they 
just lost a couple of ships as well in the Kerch Strait. I 
think there are some areas there that we can help them get this 
navy back up and begin to supply it with what they believe they 
need to defend themselves and deter Russia's aggressive 
actions.
    Senator Ernst. I appreciate that very much, sir. Thank you 
for bringing up the Kerch Strait incident because they are 
still holding those 24 sailors, as you referenced earlier, and 
using those sailors as leverage with the elections coming up. I 
do appreciate that you think we need to do more on the maritime 
front, not only in assisting them with their navy, but is it 
possible that we as an American force need to have more of our 
naval forces in the Black Sea region?
    General Scaparrotti. Both the United States and NATO has 
stepped up its presence in the Black Sea. As you know, the 
Donald Cook just departed yesterday or the day before, and it 
is the second time that we have had a destroyer in the Black 
Sea here in the past 2 months. We believe there is a need for 
that. We have stepped up and our allies have as well. NATO has 
a fleet right now in the Black Sea.
    Senator Ernst. Do you think it is sending a clear message 
to President Vladimir Putin?
    General Scaparrotti. I think it is. I mean, they frankly do 
not like us in the Black Sea. It is international waters and we 
should sail and fly there.
    Senator Ernst. That is a great thing, and I love it. Thank 
you, sir.
    The presidential elections are coming up. I will just close 
with this. I think it was very important that I take this trip 
to Ukraine and spend time with the folks within their defense 
sector and also spent time with some of their brand new special 
operations forces that had just graduated from their Ukrainian 
Q Course, which is run by our American special operations 
forces. I appreciate what we are doing in that region, sir. I 
appreciate your leadership in that region.
    Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here today and for your service. 
General Scaparrotti, I appreciated you coming by the office the 
other day. I enjoyed that very much.
    I also appreciated your candid answers concerning climate 
change. I think we sometimes get caught up in the political 
discussions about climate and not really focus on the real 
world consequences that are affecting us today.
    Earlier today, you spoke with Senator Cotton about China's 
investments in your AOR. If you can, I would like to have you 
discuss what, if any, actions EUCOM may be taking to counter 
China's activities in Europe today.
    General Scaparrotti. Well, most of all, in terms of EUCOM, 
it is discussions with our counterparts and leaders about the 
concerns of China's what I would say is strategic investments. 
Most of this is diplomatic at this point, but we do try to 
ensure that we can point out to them not only economic benefits 
which China demonstrates and make sure they are aware of, but 
also the security aspects of their control of seaports, 
airports, critical key terrain, investment in infrastructure 
particularly with technology that is critical to security. We 
try to emphasize the security aspects of their investments.
    Senator Jones. Has the administration's tactics with regard 
to the tariffs and European tariffs--have you seen any effect 
on that with any of our allies--the economic impact?
    General Scaparrotti. Well, it is certainly a point of 
discussion among the allies and one of concern because our 
country and Europe has a very significant trade and economic 
linkage there. But in terms of the direct impact for me, the 
mil-to-mil relationships are strong. That essentially is dealt 
with on the diplomatic side.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, sir.
    General Lyons, I want to kind of go back to a conversation 
you had with Senator King on cybersecurity. If you can in this 
hearing as opposed to the closed hearing, could you please 
maybe describe the impact on operations of a nation state cyber 
attack on TRANSCOM's networks and how this could impact your 
discussions and your ability and interaction with COCOMs [U.S. 
Combatant Commands]?
    General Lyons. Senator, anything that would degrade our 
ability to project power is a concern. Cyber as a warfighting 
domain does create an area of vulnerability across what is 
largely an unclassified surface of employment. We are working 
very, very hard to prioritize and to ensure that we have the 
appropriate level of resiliency and to move to an 
infrastructure that is more secure. We are moving very, very 
rapidly in that area.
    Senator Jones. Right.
    Just staying with you, General Lyons, you mentioned earlier 
that there was a plan to improve the household goods shipment 
process using a single contractor to manage transportation 
service providers. How will that change improve the process? 
What will it cost, and will it increase accountability?
    General Lyons. Senator, it will definitely increase 
accountability, and I believe it will also increase capacity. 
Those are the two major issues. Those are the two major 
complaints. The way that enhances capacity is it is a longer-
term investment with our industry partners, and so they are 
willing to invest in capacity over time, as well as reducing 
barriers to entry into the market that we, unfortunately, 
create for ourselves.
    There is no question that it will improve accountability. 
Today, there are 950 various transportation service providers 
that compete for work on a transactional basis. Very, very 
difficult across the services and TRANSCOM to maintain 
accountability and all that. But the business folks know the 
business, and that is the right relationship to have with a 
single move manager.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you both for being here.
    Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the remainder of my time. 
Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
    Well, it looks like we have run out of members here so we 
will close it.
    Several people during the course of this hearing, General 
Scaparrotti, have speculated this may be your last time that 
you attend this hearing. It is also your birthday today. Is 
this a birthday present to you?
    General Scaparrotti. Yes, sir. It is Congress' birthday 
present, I assume. I have enjoyed it.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, we thank you so much for all of the 
service. Both of you, but particularly you because you have 
appeared so many times, and as has been pointed out by Senator 
Reed, you have held the fourth star longer than anybody else in 
existence here. You have served your country in a way that many 
others have not. Thank you so much for that service.
    Anything else?
    Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman. Just let me join in 
thanking both General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, 
particularly General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                          ready reserve force
    1. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act] provided authority to procure 
seven used vessels, sufficient to sustain sealift recapitalization 
requirements through fiscal year 2025. Based on the Navy's fiscal year 
2019 30-year shipbuilding plan, meeting the full sealift 
recapitalization requirement would entail procuring 26 used vessels 
through fiscal year 2031. Has the Navy developed and shared with you 
its acquisition plan to procure the vessels needed to recapitalize the 
ready Reserve force?
    General Lyons. Yes, the Navy coordinated with USTRANSCOM when it 
developed its plan titled, ``Sealift that the Nation Needs,'' which 
includes plans for new construction and used ship acquisitions to 
recapitalize the sealift fleets. The Navy continues to work with 
USTRANSCOM to enhance near-term readiness of strategic sealift 
capabilities through an accelerated buy-used acquisition timeline.
                          ready reserve force
    2. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, last year's NDAA authorized the 
procurement of seven used vessels to sustain sealift recapitalization 
requirements through fiscal year 2025. What is the status of procuring 
those new vessels and where are we getting them from?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM established requirements and is 
coordinating with the Navy and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to 
acquire used vessels and recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force. MARAD 
completed a Request For Information (RFI) that identified 78 viable 
ships owned by U.S. and international companies. While authority exists 
to purchase now, Navy budgeted funds to purchase two vessels in fiscal 
year 2021 and fiscal year 2022. USTRANSCOM has submitted an Unfunded 
Priority List requesting that funds be appropriated in fiscal year 2020 
to purchase the first two vessels. Once funding is available, MARAD 
will release a request for proposal (RFP) to initiate the acquisition 
process. The source of the ships will be determined through responses 
received from the RFP.
                            sea and air lift
    3. Senator Wicker. General Lyons, I read with interest the op-ed in 
the Wall Street Journal on March 4, 2019 by Mark Helprin. In 
particular, I was concerned with his statement regarding ``America's 
inadequate military sea and air lift'' abilities when it comes to 
resupplying our forces. As Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, I 
worry not only about our Navy fleet but also our commercial maritime 
industry, which is critical to our surge abilities during war. What is 
TRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] doing to work with the 
Navy and MARAD [United States Maritime Administration] to ensure both 
our military and commercial supply ships can maintain sea lines of 
communication to our bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam during a 
potential conflict in the Pacific?
    General Lyons. Within the DOD, geographic combatant commanders and 
fleet commanders are tasked with planning and establishing the 
necessary protection and security of USTRANSCOM's military and 
commercial assets to ensure their safe transit. To further aid in 
assurance, in coordination with Military Sealift Command, we are 
reevaluating the strategic posture of strategic sealift assets and how 
commercial assets are utilized in the Pacific when operating within a 
contested environment. Additionally, we partner with MARAD on improving 
civilian mariner manning, training, and the industrial base to support 
high-end conflict. Finally, in support of these efforts, we, along with 
combatant and fleet commanders, continue to plan and conduct wargames, 
multi-faceted experiments, tiered exercises, and innovative proofs of 
concept that address the challenges of operating within a contested 
environment.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                defense personal property program (dp3)
    4. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, broadly speaking, how will 
outsourcing the Defense Personal Property Program to a single source 
contract improve the current program?
    General Lyons. Rather than describing this as `outsourcing,' 
USTRANSCOM characterizes this effort as a fundamental restructuring of 
DOD's relationship with industry to enhance accountability, stability, 
and capacity. Currently 100 percent of servicemembers' movements are 
executed by commercial providers. Under a single commercial move 
manager construct, 100 percent of the movements will continue to be 
performed by commercial providers. Rather than relying on 42 DOD 
offices to coordinate the operations of 950+ Transportation Service 
Providers on a shipment-by-shipment basis, with no underlying formal 
contractual agreement, DOD seeks to award end-to-end transportation and 
storage processes to a single commercial move manager to drive 
integration and capitalize on the market intelligence of industry.
    We seek to evolve beyond the current transactional approach, which 
hinders industry's ability to conduct long-term planning and invest in 
sustainable relationships. Entering into a multi-year relationship 
provides industry with both the confidence and rationale to invest in 
capacity and strategic relationships with trusted suppliers to meet 
peak demand. DOD will have a single company to engage and hold 
accountable when necessary to better meet the needs of military 
families.

    5. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the 
transition to a single-move manager will affect the costs to the 
Defense Personal Property Program and what metrics are you using to 
measure this effect?
    General Lyons. The purpose of transitioning to a single move 
manager is to improve access to--and management of--quality capacity to 
meet peak demand and enable DOD to affix responsibility and 
accountability. DOD will withdraw this recommendation if the formal 
acquisition process identifies no viable candidates or if the Military 
Services deem the final product is unaffordable.

    6. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the 
transition to a single-move manager will increase moving capacity and 
what metrics are you using to measure this increase?
    General Lyons. The fractured nature of the current Defense Personal 
Property Program (DP3)--both in terms of the number of Transportation 
Service Providers (TSPs) and disparate government offices trying to 
manage them--is a root cause of the capacity and quality issues 
reported by servicemembers and DOD civilians.
    The DOD is the largest single consumer of moving and storage 
services, accounting for 20 percent of the domestic household goods 
market, yet we still compete with the broader population for assets. 
Under our current construct, each of the DOD's 42 regional shipping 
offices deals with a pool of TSPs and awards business on a shipment-by-
shipment basis. In day-to-day operations, the transactional nature of 
this approach results in inefficient crew and truck utilization. More 
broadly, this transactional approach hinders industry's ability to 
conduct long-term planning, and with no meaningful forecast of what 
they can expect to move--offers no basis to invest in relationships 
with agents or assets to respond to DOD's very predictable demand. 
Centralizing demand planning with a single entity improves utilization 
of available capacity. In addition to better utilizing existing 
capacity, I believe this construct will attract new providers. Industry 
representatives who are currently unaffiliated with DP3 state that the 
programs existing over- engineered rules make DOD an unattractive 
partner; while the DOD pays competitive rates, much of industry would 
rather serve the 80 percent of the non-DOD domestic moving and storage 
market.
    Regarding metrics, we will specifically measure on-time pickup and 
delivery, counseling, completion, claims settlement, and overall 
customer satisfaction.

    7. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, can you detail how the 
transition to a single-move manager will improve customer service for 
our military families and what metrics are you using to measure this 
improvement?
    General Lyons. The DOD encounters the same set of challenges--and 
results--each peak season: quality capacity is lacking, DOD has limited 
accountability measures to drive improvements, and DP3 customers do not 
know who to call when things go wrong. Restructuring DOD's relationship 
with industry promotes long-term stability and investment that 
ultimately eliminates unnecessary friction and opacity for DP3 users. 
Building relationships with trusted suppliers and increasing 
accountability should lead to increased customer satisfaction.
    Regarding metrics, we will specifically measure on-time pickup and 
delivery, counseling, completion, claims settlement, and overall 
customer satisfaction.

    8. Senator Sullivan. General Lyons, how are you working to include 
input from industry and servicemembers in your decision to outsource 
the DP3 program?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM interacts with industry and 
servicemembers in a number of venues. We conduct spring and fall 
Personal Property Forums with industry and personal property 
professionals representing the Military Services. We conduct monthly 
calls with those same professionals during the non-peak season and 
weekly during the peak season.
    USTRANSCOM conducted two `Industry Day' engagements as part of 
ongoing market research, which included the opportunity for industry 
personnel to conduct one-on-one meetings with DOD personnel to address 
their specific questions and concerns regarding the single move manager 
contract. My team has also released a DRAFT RFP to industry for their 
review and feedback to improve the final RFP. My Deputy and I have 
personally hosted group meetings with industry CEOs, leaders of the 
associations that represent them, and accepted numerous requests for 
one-on-one phone calls and office calls with CEOs.
    We have a monthly Open Discussion Group with industry leaders and 
we also conduct a monthly Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel 
with some leading spousal advocates from the military services. 
Additionally, I have personally engaged each Service Secretary and 
Service Chief on this effort.
    Each of these engagements leaves me more in tune with industry's 
concerns as we develop the path ahead. They have informed how we intend 
to structure the program and how we continue to solicit inputs for 
program improvement. They have also informed the development of the 
acquisition strategy and DRAFT RFP. After every engagement, I am more 
convinced that restructuring DOD's relationship with industry and 
implementing this single move-manager construct is the right answer for 
DOD personnel and their families.
                 russia/china great-power collaboration
    9. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what are the strategic, 
operational, and tactical implications of China's involvement in 
Russia's exercise Vostok 2018?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

    10. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, how does China's 
investment in the infrastructure of nations like Denmark and Belgium, 
especially ports, relate to China's intention to develop a ``blue 
economic passage'' connecting China to Europe through the Arctic Ocean?
    General Scaparrotti. China is leveraging their growing economic, 
diplomatic, and military clout to increase economic, trade, and transit 
links to Europe and in the Arctic through projects such as the ``One 
Belt, One Road'' Initiative (OBOR).
    Since 2013, China has elevated OBOR from a regional infrastructure 
project connecting western China with Eurasia to a global foreign 
engagement strategy that presents Belt-Road Initiative as a new 
platform of international cooperation and showcases China as an 
alternative model of economic and political development.
    China has increased activities and engagement the Arctic region 
since gaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. In January 
2018 China published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a Polar 
Silk China linked its OBOR initiatives. The strategy identifies China's 
interests as access to natural resources, Sea Lines of Communication, 
and promoting an image of a responsible major country in Arctic 
affairs.

    11. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, in your personal 
opinion, is there incentive for a resource-producing nation like Russia 
and a resource-consuming nation like China to work together?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
 eucom [united states european command] & nato [north atlantic treaty 
                    organization] arctic capability

    12. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, as Russia dramatically 
increases its Arctic capability and capacity, what is the strategic 
cost of not increasing United States and NATO activity in the Arctic?
    General Scaparrotti. The strategic risk is that we would cede the 
Arctic to the Russians. The intent of increasing U.S. and NATO activity 
in the Arctic should not be to militarize the Arctic but to ensure that 
the region continues to be an area of international cooperation. It 
will be important to continue the cooperation and governance that has 
historically made the Arctic a region of cooperation, not a zone of 
conflict. Having U.S. and NATO assets increase Arctic activity ensures 
that no single nation can unilaterally make decisions there that affect 
the world.

    13. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what specific 
capabilities are needed to improve our Arctic posture in EUCOM?
    General Scaparrotti. Across the USEUCOM AOR, including the Arctic, 
there is a need for domain awareness capabilities (such as 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment) in the 
undersea, surface, and air domains. Additional communication 
capabilities and infrastructure are also required to facilitate 
military activities as well as basic search and rescue operations.
                              vostok 2018
    14. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, what are the strategic 
implications and messaging of the scale and complexity of Russia's 
exercise Vostok 2018 and what should we be doing to respond?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

    15. Senator Sullivan. General Scaparrotti, in light of Vostok 2018, 
what does EUCOM need to do to maintain a credible deterrent to Russian 
activity?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                republic of georgia--ascension into nato
    16. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in your written testimony, 
you said, ``Georgia remains a committed partner, especially in 
Afghanistan, where it is the largest non-NATO contributor to Resolute 
Support with almost 900 troops currently deployed.'' How important are 
non-NATO partners like Georgia for NATO to fulfill its objectives?
    General Scaparrotti. The contributions of our non-NATO partners are 
critically important to our mission in Afghanistan. Our various 
partners, including Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, support 
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) objectives by providing critical 
functions, including trainers, advisors, planners, and security and 
force protection units. These contributions not only allow NATO to make 
progress in RSM, but also demonstrate commitment to shared values and 
closer relationships.

    17. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the United States-Georgia 
security relationship has steadily expanded, and the establishment in 
2018 of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) marked a milestone 
in our partnership. The GDRP helps Georgia field and sustain a 
credible, ready force through training, education, and mentorship. The 
program is a centerpiece of Georgia's broad efforts to enhance its 
national defense and contribute to the security of the Black Sea 
region.'' How important is engagement and security cooperation with 
Black Sea countries like Georgia to NATO's posture in the region?
    General Scaparrotti. Security cooperation and assistance efforts 
with Black Sea countries like Georgia are vitally important to United 
States and NATO interests. These efforts promote regional security, 
good governance, and democratic principles of civil-military relations, 
especially professional service, civilian control of the military, 
transparency, and accountability. Additionally, programs such as the 
GDRP improve Black Sea nations' ability to generate and sustain their 
own military forces, which further strengthens regional security.

    18. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, the fiscal year 2019 NDAA 
affirmed support for the Open Door policy of NATO, including the 
eventual membership of Georgia in NATO?
    General Scaparrotti. Yes. Section 1248 of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA 
states that in order to strengthen the defense of the United States and 
its allies and partners in Europe, the Department of Defense should 
affirm its support for the Open Door policy of NATO, including the 
eventual membership of Georgia in NATO. This statement is consistent 
with the 2008 Bucharest statement and does not dictate a time frame for 
Georgia's membership. USEUCOM provides assistance to Georgia that will 
help the country's defense establishment prepare for a future political 
decision among the NATO allies on Georgia's eventual membership.

    19. Senator Perdue. General Scaparroti, how would NATO 
strategically benefit from Georgia's ascension into NATO?
    General Scaparrotti. With Georgia's ascension to NATO, the Alliance 
would benefit from Georgia's geographic position and steadfast support 
for NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan. NATO would also 
benefit from Georgia's assistance to counter Russia's malign narratives 
along their periphery.
               joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
    20. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in the era of great power 
competition, electronic warfare has risen in strategic importance. For 
example, Russia demonstrated in its incursion into Ukraine a full range 
of capabilities, including communication jamming, message intercepting, 
and geolocating units based on the electromagnetic signatures they 
emit. Last year's NDAA required a report on the status of 
operationalizing the Joint Electromagnetic Operations Cells at the 
COCOMS and what resources were needed to do so. The United States Army 
fielded Raven Claw, a mobile variant of the their EW Planning and 
Management Tool (EWPMT), in Eastern Europe last year, as well. How 
important is it to provide our warfighters in the European theater with 
the right tools to plan and manage military operations in the face of 
sophisticated EW attacks in EUCOM?
    General Scaparrotti. It is vitally important that we provide our 
forces in Europe the right electromagnetic warfare (EW) equipment and 
training as the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a critical 
warfighting area that crosses all military domains. Russia is 
increasing its EW capabilities and already integrates EW into their 
military operations. Our ability to leverage the EMS requires tools 
that combine multiple intelligence and operational feeds to quantify EW 
threats and electromagnetic interference, while not interfering with 
host nation infrastructure. Additionally, effectiveness in this domain 
will require the continued coordination with host nation partners to 
manage and utilize the electromagnetic spectrum.

    21. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti, in your assessment, how 
would the availability of a joint version of EWPMT and the mobile 
version, Raven Claw, benefit EUCOM?
    General Scaparrotti. A joint version of an Electromagnetic Battle 
Management (EMBM) system, similar to EWPMT, would be highly beneficial 
as it helps reduce labor-intensive manual processes and enables greater 
freedom of action in the electromagnetic environment. Any EMBM system 
would require thorough evaluation to ensure it meets current and 
emerging needs for USEUCOM forces.
                         continuing resolutions
    22. Senator Perdue. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, in as 
much detail as possible, through specific examples, please describe the 
operational and financial impact continuing resolutions have on EUCOM/
TRANSCOM?
    General Scaparrotti. Continuing resolutions significantly impact 
the operations, training, and readiness of units in our European 
footprint and the Atlantic Resolve (AR) assurance and deterrence 
mission. Constrained distribution of fiscal resources causes execution 
impasses, decreases unit OPTEMPO, and impairs rotations (e.g., ABCT, 
CAB, MP/CSSB RFFs, 1ACB) to, from, and within Europe. Additionally, the 
investment of resources to improve infrastructure and facilities 
throughout the European theater provides our allies, partners, and 
potential adversaries a clear indication of the United States' long-
term commitment to Europe. Continuing resolutions limit the capacity to 
execute these improvements, compromising our ability to set the theater 
for assurance and deterrence. The specifics of these infrastructure and 
operational impact can be found in USEUCOM fiscal year 2020 J-book 
submission.
    General Lyons. As we have seen in the past, a Continuing Resolution 
impacts readiness, mission operations and modernization funding when 
the Services cannot project funding levels for manning, training, and 
equipping mobility forces. In order to maintain readiness, USTRANSCOM 
requires a balance between Services having adequately appropriated 
funding and workload levels in order to provide the enterprise a 
sufficient Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) cash balance. A 
Continuing Resolution has some direct, immediate impact to USTRANSCOM's 
appropriated workforce such as our Research and Development and new 
start projects including Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations; 
however, a Continuing Resolution will significantly impact readiness of 
our Service Components, who execute our missions, and ultimately 
reflect on our overall readiness to conduct global mobility operations.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
              european energy security (russian coercion)
    23. Senator Cramer. General Scaparrotti, Russia currently has 
significant leverage over many of our European and NATO allies due to 
their reliance on Russian natural gas exports to provide for their 
power needs. Last year, General Scaparrotti, you testified before the 
HASC [House Armed Services Committee] that ``we [and our allies] are 
working toward relieving some of the dependency on Russia . . . [and] 
there's facilities being built that will allow us to transport 
[liquefied natural gas]'' . You also said ``frankly, I think we should 
continue to do that, because, as you know, Russia uses energy to coerce 
and compel''. Nord Stream 2 is set to be completed later this year and 
would double the amount of gas Russia transports directly to Germany. 
Eventually Russia aims to eliminate the movement of Russia gas to the 
European Union through Ukraine. Such a development would eliminate 1.5 
percent of Ukraine's GDP outright and make Ukraine more vulnerable to 
gas cutoffs by Russia, making Ukraine more vulnerable to annexations. 
General Scaparrotti, is Russia continuing to use its natural gas 
exports to Europe as a weapon against our European allies and NATO 
partners?
    General Scaparrotti. Russia uses its status as a major energy 
exporter as a tool of coercion in Europe. Russia continues to 
demonstrate a willingness to use (or threaten to use) energy supply 
disruption as a tool of leverage to affect partner and Allied decision-
making, or as a punitive response to decisions viewed as counter to 
Russian interests.

    24. Senator Cramer. General Scaparrotti, what can we and our NATO 
partners do to clear the regulatory roadblocks and make the 
infrastructure investments to ensure the United States can prevent 
Russia from coercing our European allies by threatening to turn off the 
taps to their energy supply?
    General Scaparrotti. Since most of the infrastructure and energy 
markets in NATO nations are owned and operated by the private sector or 
by civilian-managed, government-owned entities, NATO governments are 
responsible for addressing any shortfalls and roadblocks to promote 
investment and energy supply diversification. USEUCOM, together with 
our military counterparts in NATO, are identifying fuel supply-chain 
vulnerabilities and providing civilian leadership our best military 
advice on energy security risks and infrastructure investments that can 
help mitigate Russian coercion. Civilian and military investments in 
enhanced energy efficiency, fuel supply diversification, and overall 
energy resilience programs and policies will help grow our shared 
capabilities to respond to future supply disruptions.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                   defense personal property program:
    25. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, I understand your command is 
considering getting out of the personal property moving business by 
privatizing the Defense Personal Property Program. But TRANSCOM is in 
fact in the business of moving stuff. Watching what has come to light 
over the last three weeks with the military's privatized housing 
initiative, I have grave concerns with the idea of TRANSCOM handing 
this off to the lowest bidder. Could you describe your Command's 
deliberations on privatizing the Defense Personal Property Program?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is not taking action to `get out of the 
Personal Property moving business,' nor is it `privatization.' In part, 
the current DP3 program is prone with problems similar to those 
identified with the privatized housing issue. Much like individual 
rental contracts for housing without adequate leader oversight each 
servicemember arranges household goods shipments one transaction at a 
time without accountability provided by leader oversight. Rather, 
USTRANSCOM--on behalf of DOD--is taking action to fundamentally 
restructure our relationship with industry to improve quality capacity, 
stability, and accountability. Ultimately, USTRANSCOM will be 
responsible for holding industry accountable. We will never relinquish 
this responsibility.
    Currently, 100 percent of servicemembers' movements are executed by 
commercial providers. Under a single commercial move manager construct, 
100 percent of the movements will continue to be done by commercial 
providers. Rather than relying on 42 DOD offices to coordinate the 
operations of 950+ Transportation Service Providers on a shipment-by-
shipment basis, with no underlying formal contractual agreement, DOD 
seeks to award end-to-end transportation and storage processes to a 
single commercial move manager to drive integration and capitalize on 
the market intelligence of industry.
    USTRANSCOM will award this contract based on a ``best value'' basis 
that meets the needs of the program. We will not award a contract, and 
will withdraw this recommendation if the acquisition process identifies 
no viable candidates or if the Services deem the final product 
unaffordable.
    Restructuring DOD's relationship with industry in this manner will 
promote stability and ultimately eliminate some of the most critical 
gaps and seams that generate unnecessary friction and opacity for 
military families.

    26. Senator Hawley. General Lyons, what can you do to assure me 
that TRANSCOM will maintain sufficient oversight of any contract that 
privatizes the DP3?
    General Lyons. Under the single move manager construct, USTRANSCOM 
will be the DOD's lead agency for maintaining rigorous centralized 
oversight--something today's DP3 lacks in the current construct. The 
DOD's 42 regional shipping offices (which are independently managed by 
the Military Services) award business on a shipment-by-shipment basis 
to a regional pool of Transportation Service Providers. This fractured 
nature of operations also stymies accountability. In 2018, the Services 
issued over 50,000 letters of warning detailing areas where TSPs were 
operating outside the bounds of program guidelines, and issued over 
2,000 suspensions when those issues were not addressed; however, 
because letters and suspensions are handled by 42 separate offices in 
an uncoordinated fashion, these well intended actions do not translate 
into meaningful outcomes. Restructuring our relationship with industry 
will enhance our ability to provide oversight of this program.
                           f-15x procurement
    27. Senator Hawley. General Scaparrotti, according to public 
remarks made by Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein at the Air 
Warfare Symposium, the Air Force will include new F-15s in this year's 
budget request as part of an effort to refresh the F-15C fleet. What 
impact would fielding new, advanced F-15s for the 48th Fighter Wing at 
RAF Lakenheath have on your ability to reassure United States allies 
and deter Russian aggression?
    General Scaparrotti. As the current fleet of F-15Cs continues to 
age, the Air Force's initiative to field new, advanced fighters will 
help ensure that USEUCOM has the necessary assets to maintain air 
superiority, deter Russia, and reassure United States allies and 
partners, in part through participation in the NATO Air Policing 
mission.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
          women, peace and security (wps) act and gender roles
    28. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, how has United States 
European Command (EUCOM) been satisfying the Women, Peace and Security 
Act?
    General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM's approach to institutionalizing the 
Women, Peace, and Security program focuses on formal change management, 
establishing internal structures and training, and external capacity 
building in partnership with the Department of State, USAID, and the 
Department of Justice. USEUCOM has implemented an ``Executive 
Coaching'' initiative focused on educating our senior leaders on the 
importance of participation by women in conflict prevention, peace 
processes, mitigation, and resolution. Additionally, with our Command 
Gender Advisor, we mandate training on international human rights law 
and protecting civilians from violence, exploitation, and trafficking 
in persons.

    29. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, how do you view EUCOM's 
approach to WPS and the progress that has been made?
    General Scaparrotti. In the past year and a half, USEUCOM has made 
good progress in operationalizing the WPS program by working with our 
Allies and partners to ensure a synchronized effort moving forward. 
USEUCOM's approach centers on values-based education and change 
management within the command. It nests with NATO's approach to WPS and 
reinforces the role of women in conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.

    30. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, what is EUCOM doing to 
get to a place where it can hand over a crisis situation to NATO with a 
seamlessly integrated gendered approach?
    General Scaparrotti. USEUCOM is mirroring NATO WPS structures as 
well as adopting their key terms of reference for WPS. During our last 
headquarters exercise, which focused on managing a crisis with NATO, 
our Gender Advisor was an active participant in several key decision-
making discussion forums. Additionally, during our everyday steady 
state operations, we are actively engaged with the NATO gender network.

    31. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, does EUCOM have a full-
time gender advisor?
    General Scaparrotti. Yes. USEUCOM has a full-time Gender Advisor 
(GENAD).

    32. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, if so, what are the 
responsibilities of the current gender advisor?
    General Scaparrotti. Internally, USEUCOM's Women, Peace, and 
Security Program Management and Gender Advisor (GENAD)is responsible 
for: strategic document and orders mainstreaming, internal instruction 
writing and implementation, education and training for all of USEUCOM 
and the component commands, training exercise gender advising, advising 
senior interagency representatives from State and USAID, and senior 
military leaders' preparation and advising for key leader engagement.
    Externally, the GENAD is responsible for capacity building 
throughout EUCOM's 51 country AOR to include mainstreaming of 
documents, strategy development of national action plan implementation 
as well as education and training support, and supporting and advising 
the NATO International Military Staff and Allied Command operations 
GENAD.

    33. Senator Shaheen. General Scaparrotti, is he/she exclusively 
focused on WPS and what else do they work on?
    General Scaparrotti. The USEUCOM Gender Advisor's primary task is 
to execute the WPS program. As a member of our Interagency Partnering 
Directorate (ECJ9), her additional performance elements are related to 
Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) and Interagency Coordination.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                          military move system
    34. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how would privatizing the 
military move process improve transparency and better serve military 
families?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM is not taking action to `privatize' DP3. 
Rather, USTRANSCOM--on behalf of DOD--is taking action to fundamentally 
restructure our relationship with industry to improve quality capacity, 
stability, and accountability. Currently, 100 percent of 
servicemembers' movements are executed by commercial providers. Under a 
single commercial move manager construct, 100 percent of the movements 
will continue to be done by commercial providers.
    The single move manager construct will not only improve 
accountability, but will also improve transparency in the program. 
Under the single move manager construct, USTRANSCOM will be the DOD's 
lead agency for maintaining rigorous centralized oversight--something 
today's DP3 lacks. Under the current DP3 construct, the DOD's 42 
regional shipping offices (which are independently managed by the 
Military Services) award business on a shipment-by-shipment basis to a 
regional pool of Transportation Service Providers. This fractured 
nature of our operations also stymies accountability. In 2018, the 
Services issued over 50,000 letters of warning detailing areas where 
TSPs were operating outside the bounds of program guidelines, and 
issued over 2,000 suspensions when those issues were not addressed; 
however, because letters and suspensions are handled by 42 separate 
offices in an uncoordinated fashion, these well intended actions do not 
translate into meaningful outcomes. Restructuring our relationship with 
industry will enhance our ability to provide oversight of this program.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what oversight and 
accountability measures would you implement to ensure we don't make the 
same mistakes made when the military housing system was privatized?
    General Lyons. The increase in accountability by transitioning to a 
single move manager cannot be overstated. In many respects, the 
fragmentation and diffused responsibility associated with our current 
program mirrors the shortfalls Congress highlighted with DOD's 
privatized housing model. As we restructure our relationship with 
industry, we will similarly restructure the DOD's management framework 
to provide the rigorous, centralized oversight required.
    The current lack of accountability in DP3 mirrors the lack of 
accountability in housing privatization, reinforcing the need to 
fundamentally change our relationship with industry with a single 
commercial move manager construct. USTRANSCOM, as DOD's lead agency for 
maintaining rigorous centralized oversight, will never relinquish 
responsibility for moving military families.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what cost-benefit analysis 
have you conducted on privatization?
    General Lyons. After conducting an internal program review and a 
survey of decades of studies on the topic, three consistent themes 
emerge: 1) that DOD's assignment cycle exerts considerable strain on 
capacity during the summer months; 2) that the transactional nature of 
our relationship with industry prevents us from capitalizing on the 
capacity that is available; and 3) that the program is fractured.
    The cost of delaying significant action and committing resources to 
extended study while preserving the status quo is clear; we will 
continue to subject our military families to substandard moves, 
something that has been brought to my attention through multiple 
discussions with servicemembers, industry, and Congress. In order to 
fundamentally improve the program, restructuring our relationship with 
industry is necessary to capitalize on the market intelligence and 
capability of industry to develop lasting relationships to increase 
accountability, stability, and capacity.

    37. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what other studies have you 
conducted on your proposal to transition to a fully privatized moving 
system?
    General Lyons. This program has been studied numerous times by OSD, 
the Military Services, GAO, DOD IG, and various think tank 
organizations. These studies, which are still relevant because they 
apply to the same system, reveal the same root causes and repeat the 
same recommendations which have led to our intended transition to a 
single move manager. Accountability and oversight will be enhanced in 
this system and remain under USTRANSCOM's scope of responsibility.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do military families support 
privatization?
    General Lyons. Military families have spoken out, loud and clear, 
that they want improvements in the relocation process. Improving the 
process for military families is our North Star and the reason we are 
taking action. Military families' concerns, along with surveying 
decades of studies on the topic highlighting recurring problems based 
on the fractured nature of the current system, have led me to the 
decision to restructure our relationship with industry to improve 
quality capacity, stability, and accountability.

    39. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, does industry support 
privatization?
    General Lyons. We have a monthly Open Discussion Group with 
industry leaders, and we have held multiple industry days to gather 
feedback. My Deputy and I have personally hosted group meetings with 
industry CEOs, leaders of the associations that represent them, and 
accepted numerous requests for one-on-one phone calls and office calls 
with CEOs.
    Many move managers and larger asset-based providers agree that 
DOD's business model is outdated, and recognize the business 
opportunities associated with this change. Some of these companies 
support the proposal knowing full well that they do not have the 
resources to serve as the prime contractor; yet, the opportunity to 
engage and invest in longer-term relationships and operate in an 
environment with other industry professionals free from DOD's 
artificially complex business rules is an attractive prospect.
    Each engagement with industry leaves me convinced that 
restructuring DOD's relationship with industry and implementing this 
single move-manager construct is the right answer for DOD personnel and 
their families.

    40. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, have you included military 
families' input in your plans for privatization?
    General Lyons. Yes, improving the relocation process for our 
servicemembers and their families is our North Star and the reason we 
are taking action. We have received feedback through our monthly 
Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel with leading spousal 
advocates from the military services.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, will you commit to 
prioritizing the needs of military families as you consider reforms to 
the personal property program, and reporting back to Congress on how 
their input is being implemented?
    General Lyons. Yes, I will.
                 increased military presence in europe
    42. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, with a returned focus to 
Europe, are you reestablishing routes and connections previously used 
during the Cold War?
    General Lyons. In coordination with USEUCOM, USTRANSCOM is 
consistently reviewing various means of providing efficient and 
effective distribution based on the geographic combatant command's 
analysis of their requirements. This may include previously used routes 
and nodes, as well as newly established locations to meet that 
commander's timeline across various OPLANS.
    USTRANSCOM is closely coordinating air and sea ports of debarkation 
with USEUCOM; some of those are the same as the Cold War and some may 
be different based on the nature of the planning as it evolves; the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS) mandates strategic predictability with 
operational unpredictability and the use of theater nodes will adapt to 
the USEUCOM planning.

    43. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, are these routes and 
connections adequate for the technology, interoperability, and capacity 
required by missions?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM continues to analyze the distribution 
network for the most effective and efficient means of meeting the 
geographic combatant command's requirements. There are identified risk 
areas, for which mitigation strategies are being developed. A key 
responsibility for USTRANSCOM is to meter the strategic flow of forces 
and sustainment in daily competition and under wartime conditions to 
ensure onward movement meshes with the capacities planned by USEUCOM. 
This is both an operational and information technology challenge that 
must be effective at multiple echelons to coordinate end-to-end 
movements.
    European seaports and airports, for the most part, are very modern 
and have robust infrastructure, capacity, and capability. Associated 
routes and connections to these entry points will adapt to the plan, 
specific USEUCOM concepts of operations, and implementations of Dynamic 
Force Employment in accordance with the NDS.

    44. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, NATO allies and EU member 
states may be moving troops, equipment, and cargo along the same routes 
and will use the same platforms, such as railroads, that we use to move 
assets. Is there a mutually agreed upon plan in determining which 
countries' assets have priority in the various European transportation 
modalities?
    General Lyons. There is a command and control structure designed to 
prioritize transportation movements. If NATO allies are moving assets 
during a contingency operation, the USEUCOM Commander will be dual 
hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and will make 
prioritization decisions.
    As far as the strategic network is concerned, there is sufficient 
capacity at European seaports which will receive the bulk of military 
equipment, and USEUCOM has done considerable coordination with industry 
on the availability of railcars and trucks for onward movement. While 
USEUCOM is responsible for intra-theater movement coordination with 
NATO allies and EU members, USTRANSCOM needs awareness of that movement 
in order to meter strategic flow. To that end, USTRANSCOM will be 
linked with USEUCOM through the Europe Deployment and Distribution 
Operations Center at USEUCOM headquarters.

    45. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, what 
capabilities does Russia have to interfere with our logistics pipeline 
in Europe?
    General Scaparrotti. Russia has numerous kinetic and non-kinetic 
means of interfering with the United States logistics chain in Europe. 
Kinetically, Russia can threaten ports, supply depots, and lines of 
communication throughout the European theater with land, sea, and air-
delivered precision-guided munitions, potentially assisted by special 
operations forces. In the non-kinetic domain, Russia can use cyber or 
electronic warfare attacks against a variety of targets throughout the 
supply chain, including factories, sea, rail, and highway 
transportation, key nodes such as airports and seaports, and space-
based navigation and communication systems. Russian actions against 
logistics nodes and distribution routes would delay and disrupt force 
closure and sustainment movements to include commercial commerce.
    General Lyons. [Deleted.]

    46. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti and General Lyons, 
should we be more concerned about physical obstructions, manipulation, 
and destruction, or meddling in the cyber realm?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
    General Lyons. [Deleted.]
                     upcoming elections in ukraine
    47. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, have you observed any 
instances of Russian meddling leading up to Ukraine's presidential 
election?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

    48. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what is EUCOM doing to 
deter and counter Russia's propaganda and misinformation campaigns in 
Ukraine's upcoming elections?
    General Scaparrotti. Our Military Information Support Team- Ukraine 
(MIST-UKR) has and will continue to conduct DOD Military Information 
Support Operations (MISO) activities in coordination with the United 
States Embassy Kyiv since May 2014 in accordance with a SECDEF approved 
EXORD. MIST-UKR focuses its enduring efforts providing alternative, 
truthful information, reinforcing the U.S. Commitment to NATO Allies 
and Partners, and expressing United States support for Ukraine 
sovereignty and self-determination.

    49. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, how are you working 
with other agency partners, such as the Department of State, to ensure 
Russia does not employ covert ways to influence the vote?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]
                      conflict in eastern ukraine
    50. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, in your testimony, you 
state that ``the conflict in eastern Ukraine remains hot, with numerous 
ceasefire violations reported weekly.'' What progress, if any, has been 
made in the last year to counter Russia's aggression and improve the 
capabilities of Ukraine's forces?
    General Scaparrotti. Through the Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative (USAI), over the past year the United States has provided 
counter-battery and counter-mortar radars, secure communication 
equipment, and night vision devices. This assistance has increased 
situational awareness, early warning, and survivability for Ukrainian 
units operating in the Joint Forces Operations (JFO) area. The first 
$125 million tranche of USAI 2019 is also being contracted to provide 
two additional counter-battery systems, sniper rifles, shoulder fired 
rocket launchers, and, in response to Russia's actions in the Sea of 
Azov, counter-sea-mine equipment, special operations inflatable boats, 
and dive equipment.

    51. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what more can the 
United States do to help Ukraine reestablish sovereignty and 
territorial integrity?
    General Scaparrotti. The United States must remain committed to the 
Multinational Joint Commission (MJC), which is the leading organization 
for eight partner nations to determine requirements, identify 
shortfalls, and coordinate international assistance efforts to support 
Ukraine's sovereignty. We must also continue to leverage the Joint 
Multinational Training Group--Ukraine (JMTG-U) mission to help Ukraine 
develop a modern and self-sustaining capacity to generate combat units. 
Finally, we must sustain funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative (USAI), which helps enable Ukraine to defend itself and 
deter further Russian aggression.

    52. Senator Blumenthal. General Scaparrotti, what do you see as the 
most impactful thing the United States can do to support Ukraine?
    General Scaparrotti. Unwavering United States political support to 
Ukraine, both bilaterally and through NATO, will have the most 
significant impact on Ukraine's efforts to secure its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.
                           sealift shortfalls
    53. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, you state in your testimony 
that sealift is TRANSCOM's number one readiness concern. Is DOD [United 
States Department of Defense] properly addressing TRANSCOM's readiness 
concerns--particularly Sealift--in their budget requests?
    General Lyons. Yes, the Navy is in close consultation with 
USTRANSCOM, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Military 
Sealift Command (MSC) who maintain the government-owned organic sealift 
fleets. Through current and future budget cycles, the Navy is reviewing 
all parts of the recapitalization strategy, including maintenance and 
repair of the current fleets, Service Life Extensions, funding used 
acquisitions, and the new construction program.
    USTRANSCOM's focus is on improving near-term sealift readiness 
which will benefit by accelerating the retirement of aging, difficult-
to-maintain vessels and acquiring more modern, used vessels.

    54. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, how can Congress assist 
TRANSCOM in addressing these concerns?
    General Lyons. Congress can assist through continued budget 
stability and execution in support of the DOD. Additionally, Congress's 
oversight and advocacy for sealift recapitalization requirements as 
outlined by the DOD and MARAD will assist greatly in mitigating 
USTRANSCOM's #1 readiness concern. Specifically, USTRANSCOM is focused 
on the immediate need to improve sealift readiness at an affordable 
level. This can be accomplished in part by accelerating the replacement 
of aging, difficult-to-maintain vessels and acquiring more modern, used 
vessels.
    USTRANSCOM, with the Navy, is working to fully employ the 
Congressional authorization to acquire seven used vessels with the 
understanding that 26 total used vessels are required as part of the 
sealift recapitalization effort.

    55. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, can the American shipping 
industry support recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force, the Maritime 
Security Program, and the 355 ship Navy?
    General Lyons. Although I cannot speak to the 355 ship Navy, the 
American shipping industry will play a significant role in providing 
new construction capacity to recapitalize a portion of the organic 
sealift fleet. Regarding the Maritime Security Program, the law 
requires participants to replace ships in the program upon reaching a 
maximum age of 25 years. MSP participants have provided ship 
replacements as needed since the program's inception, providing the DOD 
with significant capacity and capabilities, although not typically from 
U.S.-built sources. However, the refurbishment of these used ship 
replacements and the construction of new ships will both occur in U.S. 
shipyards.

    56. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what is your priority here?
    General Lyons. My top priority is maintaining sealift readiness to 
meet DOD force deployment and sustainment requirements. Given the 
advanced age of the organic sealift fleets, continued Service Life 
Extensions on existing ships will not provide readiness outcomes 
needed. The acceleration of the acquisition of more modern, used 
vessels is the most practical means to alleviate readiness concerns in 
the near-term.

    57. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, what does Congress need to 
do to support recapitalization?
    General Lyons. Congress can assist through continued oversight and 
advocacy for sealift recapitalization requirements as outlined by the 
DOD and MARAD. Specifically, USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate 
need to improve sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be 
accomplished in part by accelerating the replacement of aging, 
difficult-to-maintain vessels with more modern, used vessels. 
USTRANSCOM, with the Navy, is working to fully employ the congressional 
authorization to acquire seven used vessels with the understanding that 
26 total used vessels are required as part of the sealift 
recapitalization effort.

    58. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do you think the Navy has 
the capability to escort Sealift ships?
    General Lyons. Combatant and fleet commanders are tasked, in 
coordination with USTRANSCOM, with planning and establishing the 
necessary protection and security of USTRANSCOM's military and 
commercial assets to ensure their safe transit within the respective 
areas they operate. With any near peer competitor, all the Services 
will be challenged to maintain open lines of communication including 
from the sea. Defense of the sea lanes is a Navy mission that can be 
accomplished by a variety of means, to include escort; however, with an 
increased threat level, the Navy may have limited escort capacity 
available for sealift at a given time. In that scenario, the Navy may 
augment escort with additional measures such as aerial reconnaissance, 
patrol or the use of escort support from a coalition partner.

    59. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, in your testimony, you state 
that ``TRANSCOM will be the sole U.S. operators of steam-powered 
vessels.'' Can the American maritime labor force support the operation 
of steam vessels?
    General Lyons. The steam engineering skill set is eroding in the 
commercial maritime sector as commercial fleets rely less on steam 
engineering plants. However, mariners with steam credentials and 
experience are vital to the continued success of existing steam powered 
vessels in the MSC and MARAD Ready Reserve Force Fleets.
    This decline in steam ships and steam engineers paints a dire 
picture for manning and maintaining steam powered vessels. At the same 
time, the American labor force is increasingly unable to support the 
operation of steam vessels as the number of steam vessels in the 
American Fleet is decreasing. MSC and MARAD are working together on 
options to alleviate this potential shortfall in mariners with 
experience in steam engineering, to include leveraging military-to-
mariner transition of military personnel with steam experience that are 
departing the service and providing opportunities for cross-deck 
training of mariners to expand their skill sets. For this reason, 
USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve sealift 
readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in part by 
accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain vessels 
with more modern used vessels.

    60. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, do sailors require 
additional training?
    General Lyons. The mariners that crew the surge fleet are 
commercial contractor mariners who are trained to their respective 
commercial standards. There are some unique military training 
requirements, and those are generally handled during the activation 
period. Under certain conditions, augmentation with government 
personnel may be necessary to perform all the necessary tasks in 
contested environments. Our mariners and shore staff must be ready for 
the threats and complex problems they may encounter. Focusing on ship 
and crew readiness is a priority--be it the material condition of our 
platforms, training of our shipboard personnel, proper manning of our 
ships with qualified mariners, or the resilience of our people and 
their families.

    61. Senator Blumenthal. General Lyons, Last year, Department of 
Transportation chief Mark Buzby stated in an interview that the Navy 
may not have enough ships to escort the sealift fleet during a wartime 
surge. This is a vulnerability we must address to ensure our 
servicemembers have the resources to defend against an attack on our 
vital logistics network. Are you concerned that our logistics network 
is vulnerable to attack if we cannot defend our shipping lanes?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM recognized this growing problem a few 
years ago and has conducted analysis of operations in a contested 
environment and begun to take actions to negate anti-access/area- 
denial threats. To increase the resiliency organically within sealift 
fleet against potential threats and provide greater confidence in 
mission assurance in a contested maritime environment, we have renewed 
our focus on operational tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well 
as procuring secure communications, navigation, and force tracking 
equipment. Naval escort may be one of several means to enhance the 
protection of sealift operations. Other means may include maritime 
aviation patrols, routing away from engagement zones, and decoy or 
masking of vessels. All such protective measures will be considered in 
the risk calculus.
    The recent Mobility Capability and Requirements Study included 
contested environment injects, and we have some initial insights to 
build as our understanding of potential effects on force projection and 
delivery. We are in coordination with other combatant commands, the 
Services, and the Joint Staff on these issues through a variety of DOD 
and USTRANSCOM forums. We continue to conduct analysis to determine the 
vulnerabilities of greatest impact.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                       allocation of naval assets
    62. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, recent increases in 
Russian naval activity, particularly submarine activity, deserve the 
full attention of EUCOM. During the hearing, you mentioned that you 
need two additional Destroyers in EUCOM. How many more submarines and 
anti-submarine warfare aircraft do you need in EUCOM to maintain 
awareness of Russian submarine activities?
    General Scaparrotti. [Deleted.]

    63. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, the Navy recently 
announced its intent to eliminate the mid-life refueling and overhaul 
of the aircraft carrier, USS Harry Truman (CVN 75), effectively 
retiring the ship more than two decades before the end of its planned 
service life and reducing the inventory of aircraft carriers from 11 to 
10 in the near future. What is the impact to the combatant commanders 
in general and you specifically in EUCOM of having less aircraft 
carriers available?
    General Scaparrotti. Increased Carrier Strike Group presence is 
essential to expanding the competitive space, especially in the 
Northern Atlantic and Eastern Mediterranean, and achieving a combat-
credible posture for deterrence and defense as directed by the 2018 
National Defense Strategy. Achieving this increased carrier presence in 
the European theater depends not only on the Navy's capacity (in terms 
of the number of carriers in the fleet) but also upon how that capacity 
is allocated globally through the Department's Global Force Management 
process.
                     russia's goals in the pacific
    64. Senator Hirono. General Scaparrotti, Russia remains your 
primary threat in EUCOM, but Russia is a power in the increasingly 
competitive Pacific as well. What do you assess are Russia's strategy 
and goals in the Pacific?
    General Scaparrotti. In the Pacific, as in the Euro-Atlantic, 
Russia's strategy and goals are to undermine U.S. interests, ensure its 
territorial security, and achieve greater influence over its neighbors. 
Russia also maintains economic interests throughout the region and 
seeks to develop additional markets for military equipment, grain, and 
energy exports. Moscow aims to attract more direct investment from 
China, Japan, and South Korea for development of the underpopulated, 
resource rich Russian Far East.
                               jones act
    65. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, your written testimony describes 
the challenges in the Ready Reserve Fleet, both in terms of vessels and 
Merchant Marines. The Jones Act helps maintain a critical base of U.S. 
Merchant Mariners that the nation will depend on in a crisis. Quite 
simply, it is an investment in our national security that will pay huge 
dividends in the event of a crisis. Does TRANSCOM continue to affirm 
the importance of the Jones Act for our national security?
    General Lyons. The domestically trading fleet is a critical 
component to the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), 
providing assured access to wartime production capacity, global reach 
to intermodal networks, and a pool of trained merchant mariners to 
bring our government-owned, organic fleet from reduced to fully 
operational status. Additionally, the Jones Act contributes to a robust 
domestic maritime industry by helping maintain the U.S. industrial 
shipyard base and infrastructure to build, repair, and overhaul U.S. 
vessels.

    66. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, what would be the implications 
for the number of U.S. merchant mariners if the Jones Act were 
eliminated?
    General Lyons. The impact would be significant. Currently there are 
30 Jones Act eligible ships committed to VISA. At approximately 40 
mariner jobs per ship, the overall mariner pool could decline by 
approximately 1200. Recent studies indicate there is already a 
shortfall of approximately 1,800 mariners for sustained contingency 
operations.
                          ready reserve fleet
    67. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, your written testimony does a 
good job of laying out the readiness challenges regarding sealift. Does 
your current plan with the Navy to pursue service life extensions and 
buying a mix of new and used vessels fully address current readiness 
shortfalls?
    General Lyons. Service Life Extensions are part of the current plan 
as a short-term means to maintain capacity until either new or used 
replacement capacity can be acquired; however, extending the life of 
aging, difficult-to-maintain ships is not desired and will not fully 
address current readiness shortfalls without increasing cost and risk. 
For this reason, USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve 
sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in 
part by accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain 
vessels with more modern used vessels.

    68. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, based on your strategy with the 
Navy for the Ready Reserve Fleet, when will DOD meet its ship 
availability goals?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM will continue to have readiness and 
availability issues until a substantial portion of the fleet can be 
replaced with newer ships. Extending the life of aging ships will not 
fully address the current readiness shortfalls without increasing cost 
and risk. USTRANSCOM is focused on the immediate need to improve 
sealift readiness at an affordable level. This can be accomplished in 
part by accelerating the replacement of aging, difficult-to-maintain 
vessels with more modern used vessels. The authority to acquire used 
vessels will help to raise fleet readiness and availability as the 
newer ships are brought into the fleet.
                       maritime security program
    69. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Maritime Security Program 
(MSP) is a critical link in our ability to project military power. Are 
the 60 vessels currently contracted in the MSP enough to meet 
operational needs?
    General Lyons. Yes, MSP's 60 ships and associated 2,400 highly 
qualified U.S. Merchant Marines continues to meet USTRANSCOM's 
operational requirements. The MSP is an extremely valuable part of 
USTRANSCOM's overall sealift portfolio to meet operational needs. MSP 
carriers' global networks provide DOD not only with the vessel capacity 
committed by participants through VISA but also with access to their 
complete intermodal transportation systems and freight management 
capabilities around the world. Those intermodal systems--not just the 
ships but also the terminals, people, training, facilities, and 
information systems provide DOD the global reach it needs for mission 
accomplishment.
                    strategic importance of red hill
    70. Senator Hirono. General Lyons, the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage 
Facility at Joint Base Pearl Harbor/Hickam is a key component of the 
Defense Department's operations in the Indo-Pacific, as it provides the 
largest source of underground fuel storage in the region. What is the 
potential impact to operational plans and logistics if the Navy were no 
longer able to use the Red Hill facility?
    General Lyons. Defense Fuel Support Point (DFSP) Pearl Harbor 
includes war Reserve and day-to-day operational stock fuel storage at 
Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hickman Air Force Base, and the Red Hill 
storage facility. The fourteen operational tanks at Red Hill provide 
storage capacity for up to 175,000,000 gallons of fuel. The primary 
fuel products are jet fuel, naval jet fuel, and maritime fuel.
    In addition to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickman, DFSP Pearl Harbor 
supports Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Army Air Field, Marine Corps Air 
Station Kaneohe as well as Sand Island (Honolulu Harbor) and Barber's 
Point Coast Guard stations. Red Hill is the largest storage area in the 
Pacific and facilitates trans-load, forward deployment, and sustainment 
operations in support of various operational plans for the region. I 
defer to INDO-PACOM as to potential risks to operational plans and 
logistics.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
                defense personal property program (dp3)
    71. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, in 2017 TRANSCOM took over the 
Defense Personal Property Program (DP3). Your command has stated 
objectives that attempt to streamline the move process and reduce 
backlogs, ultimately aiming for a centralized, or single, move manager. 
Despite these actions, there are still numerous stories of damaged 
goods, late shipments and overall dissatisfaction with the companies 
that are executing the moves. As you prepare for the second ``peak 
season'' in charge of the DP3, what actions have you taken or are 
undertaking to ensure that this move season is an improvement over last 
year?
    General Lyons. Improving the overall relocation process requires a 
variety of initiatives and investments from the Military Services' 
Personnel and Logistics communities. OSD has established a Personnel 
and Logistics Cross Functional Team that has the Department properly 
aligned and focused on an action plan with near and long-term tasks to 
improve many aspects of the overall relocation experience.
    The Department of Defense has emphasized a number of improvements 
for the 2019 Peak Season. These improvements include: earlier delivery 
of permanent change of station orders for servicemembers and civilian 
employees, allowing earlier scheduling of transportation and personal 
property appointments; more in-person quality assurance inspections on 
moving days; and increased claims valuation. In addition USTRANSCOM has 
taken steps to add 68 new providers to the program, created new transit 
time standards in partnership with industry, and relaxed overly-
engineered and burdensome business rules to allow industry more 
flexibility to provide better service.
    USTRANSCOM is also fundamentally restructuring DOD's relationship 
with industry with a single move manager to achieve the accountability, 
stability, and quality capacity required for substantial progress. We 
expect to award a contract in January 2020 with performance beginning 
in October 2020.

    72. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, delays in the move process for 
military families have been attributed to the overall housing boom in 
the United States taking commercial capacity away as well as an overall 
lack of numbers of commercial moving company capacity. Can you describe 
what TRANSCOM is doing to incentivize or encourage the growth of 
private moving companies required to meet the demands of the Defense 
Personal Property Program?
    General Lyons. A single move manager contract will provide industry 
with both the confidence and rationale to invest in capacity and 
strategic relationships with trusted suppliers to meet peak demand. In 
turn, that single move manager will have the latitude to partner with 
the companies it believes will provide both capacity and quality on the 
terms and conditions those companies believe make sense (versus being 
bound by the DOD's overly-complicated rule set). In addition to better 
utilizing existing capacity, DOD assesses this construct will attract 
new providers. Industry representatives who are currently unaffiliated 
with DP3 state that the program's existing over- engineered rules make 
DOD an unattractive partner; while the DOD pays competitive rates, much 
of industry would rather serve the 80 percent of the non-DOD domestic 
moving and storage market.
                     transcom civilian partnerships
    73. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, in your testimony you 
extensively cover the numerical problems with and ageing of our 
mobility assets, especially in the sealift realm. The truth is in a 
major conflict we are going to be relying heavily on civilian support 
to move our military through both the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement (VISA) and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) programs. Do you 
assess that industry will be able to provide the promised and required 
mobility assets to meet our demand in the case of a major conflict in 
Europe or the Pacific?
    General Lyons. Yes, the Mobility Capability Requirements Study 
examined both organic and commercial capacity and concluded the 
combined capacities from organic and commercial providers were 
sufficient to meet NDS objectives based on current plans. Additionally, 
CRAF and VISA providers are committed under contract to provide their 
capacity when needed. We have close relationships with our industry 
counterparts through the National Defense Transportation Association 
and CRAF/VISA Executive Working Groups that meet twice a year and are 
chaired by my three-star deputy where we identify and resolve issues on 
these programs. One area of focus going forward is the impact of the 
contested environment on CRAF/VISA and what that will mean for when, 
where, and how we use this vital and required commercial capacity.
    However, a fundamental premise for use of commercial CRAF/VISA 
capabilities is the necessity to operate in an acceptable operating 
environment to minimize risk. This often requires setting conditions to 
mitigate threats or conducting trans-load operations at locations 
removed from the immediacy of the combat zone which complicates 
operations and potentially increases the burden on military 
capabilities for subsequent onward movement.

    74. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, what quality control mechanisms 
do you have in place or are working on to ensure that our industry 
capability has not atrophied and remains accountable and able to 
deliver on their agreements given the changing international 
environment and the concern over a conflict with a major power?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM closely tracks and reports capacity 
levels monthly and compares this data to our mobility requirements to 
ensure the Command's strategic sealift portfolio is adequately sized 
and ready to meet any contingency. VISA and MSP are joint programs 
between MARAD and USTRANSCOM in which vessel selections are managed to 
ensure they continue to meet national defense needs. Additionally, 
regular industry engagements such as the National Defense 
Transportation Association Fall Forums, CEO Meetings, and CRAF/VISA 
Executive Working Groups pay huge dividends by enhancing relationships 
with our commercial partners. These executive sessions, regular 
operational wargames, and planning sessions ensure we align the 
emerging threat environment with industry capabilities and 
expectations.
                          worldwide logistics
    75. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, the only reason we're able to 
offer a credible threat to our enemies at any time is TRANSCOM and the 
logistical support it provides in moving cargo, personnel and refueling 
operations. As the United States continues to expand operations in 
foreign countries as we see increased aggressiveness out of Russia and 
China, there is concern that logistical networks outside of our country 
will be unable to handle the burden if we do go to war. What is 
TRANSCOM doing to address the ability to quickly and efficiently move 
military equipment through Europe, Japan and Korea given significant 
challenges in access to highways, rail and other mass transportation 
mediums in these areas?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM participates in integrated planning with 
the Joint Staff, Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, and 
Combat Support Agencies to address contingency and crisis requirements 
for projecting and sustaining the Joint Force. As part of our everyday 
activities, USTRANSCOM works with geographic combatant commands' 
theater posture efforts to maintain and expand access, basing, and 
overflight across the globe. Additionally, we maintain close working 
relationships with our commercial partners and components through 
various forums to translate required capacity from planning into 
capability at the point of need.

    76. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, as we expand our operations in 
Africa, can you explain logistical issues with a lack of real road or 
rail infrastructure or even developed airfields in much of Northern 
Africa and the Sahel and what initiatives the command is executing or 
advocating for to ensure that we are able to project power or defend 
allies whenever and wherever we choose?
    General Lyons. With the significant size of the African land mass 
and the lack of robust infrastructure, deployment and distribution is 
challenging and often resolved via airlift, which is quite expensive. 
To mitigate gaps and optimize distribution in the West and Central 
regions, we have partnered with United States Africa Command to develop 
the West Africa Logistics Network (WALN) designed to reach forces in 
these far reaching locations. WALN is structured with a single, 
strategic, multi-modal hub with tactical lift to several West and 
Central Africa locations. We are considering a similar ``hub and 
spoke'' approach in East Africa where we also have regularly scheduled 
airlift missions. USTRANSCOM also provides regularly scheduled 
strategic airlift missions to Tunisia in North Africa. Russian and 
Chinese influence at various ports are growing concerns from an access 
perspective. In order to enhance our relationships with partners and 
allies, USTRANSCOM holds annual multinational logistics symposium and 
explores common avenues for multinational cooperation, 
interoperability, and innovation with logistics professionals.

    77. Senator Manchin. General Lyons, what are TRANSCOM's priorities 
to invest in regarding relationships with allies or infrastructure and 
capabilities for airfields or naval facilities to ensure constant 
access for our currently deployed forces in support of combat or 
security operations?
    General Lyons. USTRANSCOM's priorities for infrastructure 
investments and capabilities are aligned with the National Defense 
Strategy and the combatant commands' planning to conform to that 
strategy. USTRANSCOM's Posture Plan, which includes the En Route 
Infrastructure Master Plan, provides the basis for responding to a 
wide-range of global activities. We seek agreements to ensure constant 
access for deployed forces. The Command continually reviews 
requirements for infrastructure and agreements, coordinating closely 
with the various combatant commands and incorporating their operations 
planning mobility needs via various cross-organization collaborations.
                            eucom and israel
    78. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, Israel is the lone 
country in your area of responsibility that faces the constant threat 
and use of rockets and missiles against their nation. The United 
States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on Security Assistance 
approved by Congress provides $500 million in funding for annual 
missile defense cooperation. How do you asses the effectiveness of 
programs and systems that have resulted from this investment such as 
Iron Dome, Arrow and David's Sling?
    General Scaparrotti. The Iron Dome, Arrow, and David's Sling 
systems are highly capable and have demonstrated their effectiveness in 
testing and in defending against real-world threats. Nevertheless, 
large numbers of rockets and missiles with enhanced capabilities could 
overwhelm Israeli defenses.

    79. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, what benefit do you see 
to see to United States national interests through security cooperation 
with Israel and where do we need to increase this cooperation to ensure 
we are paying attention to the areas that require the most support?
    General Scaparrotti. Israel and the United States share many 
regional interests, and Israel supports United States interests in the 
Middle East by deterring Syrian aggression, countering Hamas and 
Lebanese Hezbollah, combatting the Iranian threat network, fighting 
radical Islamic extremist organizations in both Syria and the Egyptian 
Sinai, and enabling United States access and presence in the eastern 
Mediterranean and Levant. We must continue to strengthen cooperation in 
rocket and missile defense, air superiority, cyber capabilities, and 
intelligence sharing.

    80. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, last month EUCOM 
participated with the Israeli Air Force in exercise Juniper Falcon and 
with the Israeli defense forces in the Juniper Cobra ballistic missile 
defense exercise. What are the benefits to the United States and our 
allies of continued bilateral military exercises with the Israelis and 
EUCOM, and how are we going to continue to realize these benefits 
through future military exercises?
    General Scaparrotti. Bilateral exercises with our Israeli partners 
are an integral component to one of USEUCOM's core missions--assisting 
Israel in its inherent right to self-defense. The Juniper Cobra and 
Juniper Falcon exercises not only demonstrates United States commitment 
to the defense of Israel, but also enhances our ability to rapidly 
deploy, integrate, and conduct military operations with a critical ally 
who furthers our objectives and protects our interests in the Middle 
East.
    Through the Juniper exercise series, United States Forces are 
postured and ready to integrate military personnel and combat systems 
into a combined architecture for the defense of Israel. As the United 
States and Israel both bring new combat systems on line, such as the F-
35 and Israel's Arrow 3 missile defense system, and as we continue to 
upgrade existing systems such as the Patriot and Aegis missile defense 
systems, future bilateral exercises with Israel will allow the United 
States to hone weapons systems, tactics, techniques, procedures, 
bolster capabilities, and increase interoperability.
             relations and security assistance with turkey
    81. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, our relationship with 
Turkey has become increasingly strained due to actions taken by their 
government and policies regarding their relationship with Russia and 
the Kurds in northern Syria. Regarding Russia, Turkey has continue to 
pursue the purchase of the S-400 surface to air missile system despite 
the United States offering to sell them a Patriot missile system. 
Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan said a few days ago that we won't 
transfer any F-35's to Turkey if they complete their acquisition of the 
S-400. What actions or precautions are you taking in EUCOM to try and 
reinforce our alliance with Turkey given the apparent change in 
temperature regarding United States-Turkey relations?
    General Scaparrotti. Continued efforts to reinforce our bilateral 
relationship, in the face of current difficulties, is critical. EUCOM 
maintains strong Mil-Mil relations with Turkey through such lines of 
effort as intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, military 
training, cyber security, and other regional security issues. EUCOM 
also participates in land, air, and maritime exercises with the Turkish 
Armed Forces. We are also exploring ways we can provide forces to 
support Turkey as it leads the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force beginning in 2022.
    The United States's extensive security cooperation with Turkey 
includes 334 Active Foreign Military Sales cases worth $9.9 Billion and 
the participation of 112 Turkish Officers in various International 
Military Education and Training opportunities, including participation 
at United States War Colleges.

    82. Senator Manchin. General Scaparrotti, what actions are you 
taking with regard to Turkey and CENTCOM [United States Central 
Command] to ensure our Kurdish partners who have fought so hard 
alongside us against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] are 
protected even as we begin to draw down combat operations in Syria?
    General Scaparrotti. The USEUCOM staff has been closely integrated 
with the USCENTCOM staff as withdrawal planning is formulated and 
executed. Throughout this process, we have reinforced the message with 
our Turkish counterparts that the Kurds must be protected.


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                             BUDGET POSTURE

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, 
McSally, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, 
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. The meeting will come to order.
    It's nice to have the--Steve Turner, Northeastern State, in 
the audience today to advise us along our line.
    We're very pleased to have the--Patrick Shanahan, the 
Acting Secretary of Defense; General Joseph Dunford, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and David Norquist.
    I have to say, David, I enjoyed our breakfast together the 
other day. I think--some people think it's pretty outrageous 
that we can actually have an audit. I'm glad that you're in 
charge of it.
    Secretary Norquist. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank the panel for their distinguished 
service to the country.
    I'm pleased to see that--the Department of Defense budget 
request for $718.3 billion and the overall national defense 
request of $750 billion. This amount is an increase of less 
than 3 percent of real growth. You know, this manual represents 
the blueprint that we're following right now. We had a hearing 
on this. I think, in all the years I've been here, this is the 
most productive hearing that we've had, where we had Democrats 
and Republicans alike in agreement on what our needs are to try 
to perform this function. Well, one of the things that is in 
this book that we all agreed to, and all the uniforms that came 
to our hearings agreed with this, was to have an increase while 
pulling out of this period of time and rebuilding our military 
would be between 3 percent and a 5 percent increase over 
inflation. Well, this 750 is actually less than 3 percent over 
inflation. So, I just want to remind people of that. We didn't 
quite get to that point.
    The top line is only part of the story. We must ensure that 
we are effectively and efficiently spending the money. That's 
why I want to commend you, Secretary Norquist, for all of your 
hard work delivering an audit of the Defense Department this 
year. It's something we haven't seen. That audit should help us 
identify areas that need more attention and hold people 
accountable to spend the money more properly.
    Despite leadership changes at the Department of Defense, I 
believe the implementation of the National Defense Strategy 
should continue, without pause. This is the book that we're 
referring to, right here. When President Trump came to office, 
he inherited an American military in crisis. Meanwhile, China 
and Russia were rapidly modernizing their militaries and 
actually passing us up in many areas.
    America's military advantage has eroded in key warfighting 
areas, such as long-range ground-based fires, cyber, space, 
electronic warfare, as well as air and missile defense. The 
Commission on the National Defense Strategy, a bipartisan, 
independent commission, stated, quote, ``Put bluntly, the U.S. 
military could lose the next state-versus-state war that it 
fights,'' unquote. The conclusion of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy states that we--and I'm quoting again--``need urgent 
change, at significant scale, to address strategic competition 
with China and Russia.''
    I look forward to hearing what the urgent changes are and, 
our witnesses, what they recommend. Even the best-prepared 
budget request will be meaningless if we don't reach a budget 
agreement soon. The Commission on the National Defense Strategy 
also stated that there must be--another quote--``There must be 
greater urgency and seriousness in funding the national 
defense. Without sufficient, sustained, and predictable 
funding, we'll squander the progress the military has made over 
the past 2 years.'' Improved readiness, increased procurement, 
and critical capabilities and investment in future 
technologies, I see no bigger imperative than this, to reach a 
budget agreement immediately in order to fully fund defense and 
to fully implement the National Defense Strategy.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me join you in welcoming the witnesses, Secretary 
Shanahan and General Dunford and Secretary Norquist.
    Before we consider the details of the Defense Department's 
budget request, I'd like to address some of the broader fiscal 
challenges we face. Once again, we find ourselves in a 
situation all too familiar, debating how best to fund the 
government under the caps required by the Budget Control Act of 
2011, the BCA. There is bipartisan consensus that enforcing 
budget discipline through the BCA and sequestration is 
ineffective and shortsighted, and that the BCA caps for fiscal 
year 2020 will deprive us of the resources needed to 
sufficiently meet the needs of our Nation.
    Last year, because we had passed the Bipartisan Budget Act 
of 2018, and we knew the permitted spending parameters, and 
therefore, were able to mark up and pass the fiscal year 2019 
defense authorization and appropriations bills before September 
30th, this gave the military the funding certainty that it has 
lacked for many years. I believe Congress should pass another 
2-year budget agreement to provide further relief from the caps 
and provide stability for budget planning. Without such an 
agreement, we will face great difficulty in crafting a 
bipartisan authorization bill and will be hard-pressed to 
provide the Defense Department with another on-time 
appropriation. Delay will likely lead to recurring continuing 
resolutions that disrupt planning and, ironically, add cost and 
inhibit readiness and modernization, and, to the Chairman's 
point, undermine that sense of certainty that is probably worth 
billions of dollars in budget authority. So, I would urge that 
we do that.
    Today, we consider the fiscal year 2020 budget for the 
Department of Defense, which seeks $544.5 billion for the base 
budget and $164.6 billion in overseas contingency operations 
(OCO), of which $97.9 billion is designated to pay for base 
requirements. In addition, there is another $9.2 billion 
requested for emergency funding.
    In its base budget request, the Defense Department 
highlights resources intended to prioritize programs targeted 
for the high-end fight against near-peer competitors and to 
operationalize the National Defense Strategy, including 
investments in the space and cyber domains, larger purchases of 
aircraft, ships, and munitions, and increased research-and-
development dollars for unmanned systems, artificial 
intelligence, hypersonics, and directed energy. The base budget 
request also supports the quality of life of our servicemembers 
by sustaining family support initiatives and by authorizing a 
3.1 percent pay raise, the largest in 10 years. However, it is 
clear that the base budget request will not cover all the 
Defense Department's requirements, so we've been presented with 
a particularly egregious misuse of the OCO account. I 
acknowledge that both Congress and other administrations in the 
past have included elements of base funding in OCO accounts, 
but overloading the OCO request with $97.9 billion worth of 
activities that truly belong in the base budget just to avoid 
the threshold of the BCA cap far exceeds any President and 
cannot be justified.
    Ironically, last year, the President's Acting Chief of 
Staff, Nick Mulvaney, called for a, in his words, ``transition 
away from using OCO as a gimmick to avoid the sequestration 
caps,'' close quote, in his testimony before Congress. Yet, 
this defense budget is a prime example of such a use and 
undercuts the integrity of the entire request.
    I'd also highlight that section 1524 of the Fiscal Year 
2018 Defense Authorization Act directed the Defense Department 
to update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be 
covered by OCO. Neither OMB nor the Defense Department have 
updated these guidelines. I hope our witnesses shed some light 
on when this will be done and what the details are of this OCO-
for-base request.
    I also have serious concerns with the $9.2 billion 
requested in emergency funding for unspecified military 
construction projects, $3.6 billion of that total is intended 
to replenish funds that may be diverted from military 
construction projects that Congress already authorized and 
appropriated to build a wall on the southern border. Even if 
this funding is replenished, these projects could be delayed or 
even canceled. I would also like to note that Congress has not 
yet been given the list of projects whose funding may be 
diverted, and I'm interested if the witnesses can provide some 
information on that list.
    Moreover, we've learned that an additional $3.6 billion of 
emergency funding in Defense Department's budget will be used 
to build more of the wall, projects that have not been 
identified in any way and arguably have zero military utility. 
Much of our witnesses' testimony today describes the $750 
billion in investment needed to fulfill the National Defense 
Strategy, but the National Defense Strategy Commission, as the 
Chairman cites is authoritative in his comments, noted that 
comprehensive challenges will require whole-of-government and 
even whole-of-Nation cooperation, extending far beyond DOD. 
Diplomatic statecraft and other nonmilitary tools will be 
critical. So will adequate support for funding for those 
elements of American power. With the State Department and other 
agencies facing drastic cuts in this budget request, I'm 
interesting to know if the Defense Department will truly be 
able to realize the National Defense Strategy.
    It is a duty of this Committee to ensure the men and women 
we send into harm's way have the resources necessary to 
complete their mission and return home safely. But, I firmly 
believe, if the Senate decides to modify the budget caps for 
fiscal year 2020, we must do so in a manner that continues to 
provide sufficient funding for both defense and nondefense, as 
we have done every other time we've adjusted the caps.
    I'm proud that this Committee has always worked in a 
bipartisan fashion during this process. I look forward to 
working with all the Committees to come to a reasonable 
agreement again this year.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We'll now have opening statements by both the Secretary and 
General Dunford. Your entire statement will be made a part of 
the record, but, if you can hold it down to around 5 minutes--
we have a full house today, and we want to get to questions by 
all of our members on both sides.
    So, we'll start with you, Secretary Shanahan.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PATRICK M. SHANAHAN, ACTING 
  SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE DAVID L. 
       NORQUIST, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

    Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe and Ranking 
Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you 
for this opportunity to testify in support of the President's 
budget request for fiscal year 2020.
    I'm joined by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Joseph Dunford, and the Department's Comptroller and 
Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David Norquist.
    During my time at the Department of Defense, I've engaged 
in substantive discussions with many of you. In our 
conversations, there has been an enduring constant. That is, 
the bipartisan nature of defense, proved by the sustained 
funding increases Congress has provided, the last 2 years. On 
behalf of our military's selfless patriots, thank you.
    It has been a great privilege and honor to serve alongside 
the men and women of the Department of Defense, and it was a 
pleasure to work with Secretary Mattis to craft the 2018 
National Defense Strategy. Released in January of 2018, that 
strategy laid the foundation for restoring military readiness 
and modernizing our joint force for an era of great-power 
competition.
    I now oversee the continued execution of our strategy, 
which is the undisputed driver of today's budget request. It 
was extremely helpful for the Department to receive the 
authorization and appropriation bills on time and at the 
requested top line last year. That is equally important this 
year, as our competitors have not been complacent. China's 
defense spending approaches that of the United States when we 
take into account purchasing power and the portion of our 
budget going to military pay and benefits. That, coupled with 
China's organized approach to steal foreign technology, has 
allowed China to modernize its missile, space, and cyber 
capabilities, as well as project power far beyond its borders. 
Russia, for its part, continues to compete asymmetrically with 
the United States, modernizing and developing its own missile, 
space, and cyber capabilities. Simultaneously, North Korea's 
nuclear weapons and missiles remain a pressing concern. Iran's 
missile and cyber threats and malign aggression across the 
Middle East and beyond threaten United States national 
interests. We know violent extremist organizations like al 
Qaeda and ISIS continue to foment instability in vulnerable 
areas.
    We have seen marked progress in our current operations as 
we work by, with, and through an expansive network of allies 
and partners across the globe. In Syria, the 79-member Defeat 
ISIS Coalition has liberated virtually all of the territory 
ISIS once held. As the United States drawdown continues, we 
will maintain a presence to prevent ISIS resurgence.
    As part of a whole-of-government approach, we fully support 
Iraq's fight against terrorism, and we continue to enable the 
Iraqi Security Forces' progress in securing liberated areas and 
thwarting ISIS's attempts to mount a clandestine insurgency.
    In Afghanistan, United States and coalition forces are 
training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces to apply 
pressure on the Taliban. We support the ongoing negotiations, 
the best window for peace there in 40 years, and continue to 
stymie terrorist threats to our Homeland.
    Defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS 
remains the top United States national security interest in 
Yemen. At the same time, we fully support UN efforts to bring 
all relevant parties of the civil war to the negotiating table. 
The $750 billion top line for national defense enables DOD to 
maintain irregular warfare as a core competency, yet prioritize 
modernization and readiness to compete, deter, and win in any 
possible high-end fight of the future.
    The budget is critical for continued execution of our 
strategy, and reflects difficult but necessary choices that 
align finite resources with our strategic priorities. To 
highlight some of those choices, this is the largest research, 
development, training, and evaluation budget in 70 years. The 
budget includes double-digit increases to our investments in 
both space and cyber, modernization of our nuclear triad and 
missile defense capabilities, and our largest shipbuilding 
request in 20 years, when adjusted for inflation. It also 
increases our total end strength by roughly 7,700 
servicemembers and provides a 3.1 percent pay increase to our 
military, the largest in a decade.
    Now to the specifics. The top line slates $718 billion for 
the Department of Defense. Of that total, the budget includes 
$545 billion for base funding and $164 billion for the overseas 
contingency operations. Of the overseas contingency operation 
funds, $66 billion will go to direct war and enduring 
requirements, and $98 billion will fund base requirements. To 
round out the numbers, $9.2 billion will fund emergency 
construction. That includes an estimated $2 billion to rebuild 
facilities damaged by Hurricanes Florence and Michael; up to 
$3.6 billion to support military construction projects that 
will award in fiscal year 2020 instead of fiscal year 2019 so 
we can resource border barrier projects under emergency 
declaration this year; and $3.6 billion in case additional 
emergency funding is needed for the border. Military 
construction on the border will not come at the expense of our 
people, our readiness, or our modernization. I caution that no 
adversary can be as damaging to our military readiness as 
budget instability.
    We built this budget to implement the National Defense 
Strategy, and I look forward to working with you to ensure 
predictability, on-time funding at our requested top line so 
our military can remain the most lethal, adaptable, and 
resilient fighting force in the world.
    I close with the words of William Jennings Bryan etched 
into the walls of our Capitol so we may never forget their 
meaning, ``Our Government, conceived in freedom and purchased 
with blood, can be preserved only by constant vigilance.''
    Senators, I appreciate the critical role Congress plays to 
ensure our warfighters can succeed on the battlefields of both 
today and tomorrow. I thank our servicemembers, their families, 
and all those in the Department of Defense for maintaining the 
constant vigilance as they stand always ready to protect 
freedoms.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Shanahan follows:]

   Prepared Statement by Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan
                              introduction
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the 
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the 
President's budget request for fiscal year 2020. I am joined today by 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, and the 
Department's Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, Mr. David 
Norquist.
    The size, scale, and importance of collaboration between Congress 
and the Department of Defense (DOD) shows we are united in our purpose 
to protect and defend our Nation. During my time as Deputy Secretary of 
Defense and now as Acting Secretary of Defense, I have engaged in 
substantive discussions with many Members of this Committee. I look 
forward to continuing our engagements, in this hearing and beyond, with 
both long-serving and new members, as the Department drives results 
along our strategic priorities.
    We in DOD appreciate Congress's partnership in repeatedly 
demonstrating the bipartisan nature of defense. I thank Congress for 
voting to lift budgetary caps and providing sustained funding increases 
over the last two years, which have helped our military meet today's 
challenges while preparing for those of tomorrow. Members of this 
Committee, the entire Congress, and the American people can rest 
assured that DOD has efficiently and effectively invested your money. 
Thank you, in particular, for your support of the fiscal year 2019 2.6 
percent pay increase for our military personnel.
    Our responsibility is to remain responsible stewards of your trust 
and the American people's hard-earned tax dollars. DOD has accelerated 
necessary changes in how we develop, posture, and employ our Joint 
Force. We are taking a clear-eyed approach to the strategic environment 
in which we operate and marrying our past experiences to new ideas, 
driving progress and fostering innovation in the process.
    Our fiscal year 2020 budget reflects the President's vision for 
prioritizing the security, prosperity, and interests of the American 
people. It also reflects my vision for the future--one marked by a more 
lethal, results-oriented Department of Defense with the capabilities 
and capacity to ensure national security and implement our National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) at the speed of relevance. Today I look forward 
to discussing that vision and how it is reflected in DOD's posture and 
resourcing decisions.
                  the 2018 nds: an enduring framework
    To provide context for that discussion, I want to take us back in 
time: two years ago, our Department had brand new civilian leadership 
ready to drive results. With a military enduring the longest continuous 
duration of combat in American history, we contended with a host of 
challenges, including an increase in North Korean missile testing; an 
aggressive Iran; violent extremists in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan; 
and growing strategic competition with China and Russia. In addition, 
cyber and space emerged as contested, warfighting domains, further 
complicating an already complex security environment.
    Amidst these challenges, the release of our 2018 NDS last January 
provided the strategic unity DOD needed, with clear direction on 
restoring military readiness and modernizing the Joint Force to address 
great power competition.
    The 2018 NDS's unified framework enables a potent combination of 
teamwork, resources, and an unmatched network of allies and partners 
stepping up to shoulder their share of the burden for international 
security. The NDS also fosters alignment within the Department, the 
Interagency, industry, and Congress.
    Fourteen months after its release, I say with conviction: the NDS 
remains the most effective aligning mechanism for the Department. Its 
implementation is our most critical mission. Yet, strategy cannot be 
static; it must be constantly reevaluated. Last month, my staff 
concluded a clear-eyed assessment of our NDS priorities and our 
progress in meeting them, highlighting our successes and making clear 
we still have more work to do. Most significantly, it reaffirmed that 
erosion of our competitive edge against China and Russia continues to 
be DOD's most pressing ``central problem.'' Our three primary lines of 
effort--increasing our military's lethality, strengthening our network 
of alliances and partnerships, and reforming DOD's business practices--
remain the most effective avenues for addressing this challenge.
    I thank Congress for its own evaluation via the NDS Commission. 
Having reviewed the findings of both our internal DOD assessment and of 
the Commission's report, I am confident we are aligned on the most 
critical matters. The few areas where we did not agree reflect the 
reality that finite resources require tough choices. DOD stands by 
these choices as necessary components of our strategic approach.
    As our Department has aligned behind our Strategy, our competitors 
have not been complacent. They have accelerated their own military 
modernization efforts and vigorously pursued the development and 
fielding of advanced technologies with a clear intent: create an 
asymmetric military advantage against us, our allies, and our partners.
                  priority threats & policy objectives
The China Threat
    As this Committee recognizes, the Chinese Communist Party exports 
coercive influence far beyond its borders while internally wielding 
authoritarian governance over its own people. To achieve hegemony in 
the Indo-Pacific in the near term and shape a world consistent with its 
authoritarian model, China is: (1) aggressively modernizing its 
military, (2) systematically stealing science and technology and 
seeking military advantage through a strategy of Military-Civil fusion; 
(3) undermining the rules-based international order, which has 
benefited all countries, including China, and (4) building an 
international network of coercion to further its economic and security 
objectives.
  Military Modernization
    The trajectory of China's military spending is clear. In just 
twenty years, China's official defense budget soared from roughly $20 
billion in 1998 to $170 billion in 2018, with actual spending even 
higher. Just last week, China announced a projected 7.5 percent 
increase in defense spending in 2019. China devotes these funds to 
aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development, 
from nuclear and missile capabilities to space and cyber. Accounting 
for purchasing power and the significant portion of our military budget 
going to pay and benefits, today, China's defense spending approaches 
that of the United States.
    China has made investments specifically intended to offset United 
States advantages, including robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) 
networks, more lethal forces, and new strategic capabilities. If 
deployed to overwhelm United States or allied combat power at initial 
stages of a conflict, these capabilities could seek to achieve a ``fait 
accompli'' that would make reversing Chinese gains more difficult, 
militarily and politically. Implementation of our Strategy ensures we 
have the capabilities, posture, and employment of forces so this never 
comes to pass.
    On the nuclear front, China is developing long-range bomber 
capabilities that, if successful, would make it one of only three 
nations in the world to possess a nuclear triad. In addition, China is 
building up its inventory of missiles, focusing on those intended to 
circumvent U.S. and allied defenses and deny the United States critical 
military access to the Indo-Pacific. Within the past five years alone, 
China has successfully tested hypersonic cruise and boost glide weapons 
concepts for these purposes.
    In 2018, China conducted more space launches than any other nation. 
In choosing to develop counterspace and dual-use space capabilities and 
enhance space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
China has demonstrated its ability to weaponize space, if desired. We, 
in turn, cannot ignore China's ability to target United States and 
allied space capabilities. We also cannot ignore China's ambitions in 
the cyber domain, which it recognizes as the battlefield's ``nerve 
center.'' With all People's Liberation Army (PLA) cyber operations 
coordinated under one roof, China can operate in this contested domain 
without bureaucratic red tape to slow it down.
  Technology Theft
    The rate at which China is systematically stealing United States 
and allied technology for its own military gain is staggering. 
Reversing this dangerous trend--one which could impact our troops on 
the battlefield--means acknowledging reality: every Chinese company is 
at risk of being either a witting or unwitting accomplice in China's 
state-sponsored theft of other nations' military and civilian 
technology. To quote China's own cybersecurity law, private companies 
are required to ``provide technical support and assistance to public 
security organs and national security organs,'' whether they want to or 
not. Any United States or allied company that works with Chinese 
companies, without proper safeguards, thus opens itself to theft as 
well.
    To grasp the pervasiveness of the problem, look to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There are open Chinese economic 
espionage or technology theft cases in nearly all FBI field offices. 
For years, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) has indicted members of 
the Chinese state and military for stealing U.S. technology. In 
January, DoJ recognized China's escalating tactics and took a step 
further, indicting executives of Chinese telecommunications company 
Huawei for scheming to steal T-Mobile's trade secrets.
    Huawei exemplifies the Chinese Communist Party's systemic, 
organized, and state-driven approach to achieve global leadership in 
advanced technology. With initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, Made 
in China 2025, and Thousand Talents Program in play, which spur 
companies and individuals to carry out its bidding, China aims to steal 
its way to a China-controlled global technological infrastructure, 
including a 5G network. China pursues large-scale acquisition of 
foreign companies in sensitive sectors and pressures companies into 
transferring technology. Finally, China's Military-Civil Fusion 
strategy seeks to translate cutting-edge technology into advanced 
weapons.
    Here I must note: some United States companies have voiced ethical 
qualms about working with DOD to develop advanced technology, in some 
cases even terminating relationships--often while continuing to work 
with China. DOD takes ethical considerations extremely seriously when 
researching and developing emerging technologies, and our efforts 
improve performance and allow human beings to make better decisions. 
China, on the other hand, repeatedly demonstrates little regard for 
international ethical rules and norms.
    China's approach to technological advancement matters for our 
military advantage, and its ambitions threaten the security of critical 
United States capabilities and technological infrastructure, and thus 
our military operations, safety, and prosperity.
    Let me be perfectly clear: the United States does not oppose 
competition, as long as it takes place on a fair and level playing 
field. However, we cannot accept the unfair and illegal actions of 
others who intend to tilt the playing field through predatory economics 
and underhanded tactics.
  Undermining the Rules-based International Order
    We all know China's population is comparable to the Americas and 
Western Europe's combined. But China is also geographically situated 
within arm's reach of 2.4 billion people, roughly a third of the 
earth's population, across Southeast Asia, Japan, and India. Make no 
mistake--China is extending that reach by increasing its overt military 
and coercive activities vis-a-vis its neighbors.
    China's increasingly provocative behavior in the Indo-Pacific, 
particularly the South China Sea (SCS), should concern us all. Between 
2013 and 2018, China increased its air and sea incursions into the SCS 
twelvefold. Within those five years, it also increased deployments of 
offensive and defensive weapons systems to the SCS by the same order of 
magnitude.
    China's land reclamation and militarization far exceed that of 
other claimants combined in the South China Sea. Between 2013 and 2015 
alone, China created more than 3,200 acres in the SCS, building 
features within its self-proclaimed `nine dash line'--a claim the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 has no legal 
basis. These constructed features are almost four times the size of 
Central Park in New York City and roughly five times the size of this 
Capitol Hill neighborhood. Imagine walking from this hearing room to 
the Marine Barracks at 8th and I over what used to be part of the 
Pacific Ocean.
    Now also picture Chinese interference in freedom of navigation. Yet 
for this, we do not have to use our imaginations. China habitually 
threatens this freedom, using both conventional military force 
projection and ``gray zone'' or irregular warfare activities. For 
example, in September, Chinese military vessels came dangerously close 
to the USS Decatur off the coast of the Spratly Islands. China's force 
projection inside and outside the SCS disrespects and undermines our 
rules-based international order and threatens regional stability and 
security.
  International Network of Coercion
    Lastly, China is diligently building an international network of 
coercion through predatory economics to expand its sphere of influence. 
Sovereign nations around the globe are discovering the hard way that 
China's economic ``friendship'' via One Belt, One Road can come at a 
steep cost when promises of investment go unfulfilled and international 
standards and safeguards are ignored.
    Let us look at just a few examples. Saddled with predatory Chinese 
loans, Sri Lanka granted China a ninety-nine-year lease and seventy 
percent stake in its deep-water port. The Maldives owes China roughly 
$1.5 billion in debt--about thirty percent of its GDP--for construction 
costs. Pakistan owes China at least $10 billion in debt for the 
construction of Gwadar Port and other projects.
    In Africa, Djibouti owes China more than eighty percent of its GDP 
and, in 2017, became host to China's first overseas military base. In 
Latin America, Ecuador agreed to sell eighty to ninety percent of its 
exportable crude oil to China through 2024 in exchange for $6.5 billion 
in Chinese loans. After leasing land tax-free to China for fifty years, 
Argentina is denied access and oversight to a Chinese satellite 
tracking station on its sovereign territory, unwittingly allowing the 
facility's use for military purposes.
    The list of nations entrapped by China's predatory debt tactics 
runs long, and some have started to push back. Yet, under the guise of 
good-intentioned development, Beijing continues to leverage debt for 
economic or political concessions--a practice we expect will intensify 
as more nations prove unable to pay China back.
Policy Objectives to Meet the China Threat
    Left unaddressed, China's success in unfairly tilting the playing 
field in its favor has serious implications for our own military 
advantage. While we do not seek to contain China, we expect China to 
play by the rules, meeting the same standards to which the United 
States and all other nations are held. We will cooperate with China 
wherever and whenever possible, but we also stand ready to compete 
where we must to ensure our military's competitive advantage for 
decades to come.
    As German Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen said last month 
in Munich, ``our partnerships are not built on domination. They do not 
create political and economic dependencies.'' Our pursuit of many belts 
and many roads creates alternative options for nations unwilling to 
succumb to China's increasingly coercive methods.
    As such, DOD's priority policy objectives are to outpace Chinese 
military modernization to deter future conflict, or win decisively 
should conflict occur; protect United States and partner research and 
development of advanced technology from rampant Chinese theft, and; 
maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific built on strong alliances and 
growing partnerships.
The Russia Threat
    China is not the only nation attempting to undermine U.S. interests 
and security to alter the international order in its favor. Despite 
having an economy smaller than that of the state of Texas, Russia, 
against the economic odds, seeks a return to great power status. Though 
it has not reached that goal, Russia is playing a weak strategic hand 
well by: (1) aggressively modernizing its military; (2) projecting 
military might beyond its borders; (3) intimidating its neighbors, 
including exploiting their energy dependence for strategic gain, and; 
(4) undermining other nations' sovereign democratic processes.
  Military Modernization
    Russia is aggressively modernizing its military to gain an 
asymmetric advantage over the United States and NATO. Russia plans to 
spend $28 billion to upgrade and modernize each leg of its strategic 
nuclear triad by 2020, and has already spent more than ten percent of 
its total military budget every year since 2011 on nuclear 
modernization efforts. In March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
announced Russia's development of six new strategic weapons systems--
five of which are nuclear capable--including hypersonic systems able to 
maneuver at ten times the speed of sound and intended to circumvent 
U.S. missile defense capabilities. One of those hypersonic systems is 
expected to enter service this year.
    In addition to modernizing its strategic weapons systems and 
delivery platforms, including its submarine fleet, Russia is building a 
large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems, including the 
dual-capable SSC-8 cruise missile, which clearly violates the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Every NATO Ally agrees 
on this point and supports our decision to suspend United States Treaty 
obligations in response to Russia's material breach. A treaty not 
followed by all parties cannot be an example of effective arms control. 
For any who doubt United States efforts to bring Russia back into 
compliance with the Treaty, I would emphasize: we held over thirty 
meetings with the Russians at every level of government for more than 
five years--across two administrations, one Democrat and one 
Republican.
    Moving to space, Russian systems are intended to disrupt, degrade, 
and damage United States satellites in orbit. There is no question: 
Russia treats space as a warfighting domain to gain military advantage 
over the United States. Moscow has already fielded ground-based 
directed energy laser weapons and is developing air-based systems and 
additional novel counterspace capabilities to target our space-based 
missile defense sensors. Russia now has the third largest collection of 
operational satellites in the world, behind only us and China.
  Projecting Military Power
    On top of modernizing its military capabilities, Russia also 
projects its military might around the globe. In 2018, Russia conducted 
its largest strategic military exercise since 1981. Today Moscow 
deploys a variety of aviation and naval missions to the Pacific, the 
Arctic, the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the western 
hemisphere, including the Caribbean. In December, Russia conducted 
landing and overflight operations in our own front yard, sending 
bombers to Venezuela. In the Middle East, it has continued support for 
Syria's murderous regime with expeditionary operations and long-range 
strikes. These examples make clear Russia's ambitions for a more 
globally dominant military footprint.
  Strategy of Intimidation
    In addition to projecting military power far beyond its borders, 
over the last decade Russia has attempted to incrementally push 
geographic boundaries with its neighbors. From its 2008 invasion and 
continued occupation of twenty percent of Georgian territory to its 
2014 invasion and continued occupation of Crimea, Russia demonstrates 
blatant disregard for other nations' sovereignty. Lest we forget, 
Russia still holds twenty-four Ukrainian crewmembers it captured last 
November, when it attacked three Ukrainian ships near the Sea of Azov 
in violation of international law.
    Russia's escalating intimidation efforts are amplified by irregular 
warfare and ``gray zone'' tactics intended to sow confusion, conceal 
military movement, and limit accountability. By deploying mercenaries--
like those of the Wagner Group to places like Crimea, Syria, Libya, and 
now Venezuela--instead of uniformed soldiers, Russia hopes its use of 
proxies will further muddy the already murky waters of conflict and 
limit international response to its actions. Russia's attempts at 
deception are not fooling anyone.
  Undermining Sovereign Processes
    Russia's duplicity also extends to the cyber domain, where it 
propagates coordinated disinformation campaigns to undermine sovereign 
democratic processes. In April 2018, Facebook estimated that roughly 
one million users followed a page operated by Russia's Internet 
Research Agency (IRA). Last year, Twitter identified more than 3,800 
IRA accounts that had generated millions of tweets over a nine-year 
span. These accounts are intended to foster divisiveness in the West 
and undermine trust in democratic institutions.
    Russian efforts extend beyond their bots and internet trolls--they 
conduct deliberate cyber operations against the United States and other 
sovereign nations. To name a few examples of Russian handiwork: it has 
targeted United States Government and critical systems to allow damage 
or disruption of U.S. civilian or military infrastructure during a 
crisis; launched distributed denial of service attacks against NATO, 
Ukraine, and German Government websites, and; released a potent cyber 
virus that caused billions of dollars in damage around the world.
    In response, we are not complacent. DOD is getting after the 
problem, and we are achieving results, most notably in our recent 
successful efforts to stymie Russian disruption of our midterm 
elections. We are determining what other actions DOD and our 
Interagency partners must take to ensure the continued safety and 
integrity of our democratic institutions.
Policy Objectives to Meet the Russia Threat
    As these examples make clear, Russia is intent on undermining 
United States military advantage to alter the existing balance of power 
in its favor. In order to thwart Russia's efforts to regain peer 
competitor status, DOD is focused on modernizing our military to 
enhance deterrence and prevent future conflict, while bolstering burden 
sharing to ensure the NATO Alliance remains credible and capable 
against Russian aggression.
    We are also working diligently with the Interagency, our allies, 
and our partners to deter Russia's physical intimidation and contest 
its cyber aggression, information warfare, and ``gray zone'' tactics in 
Syria and beyond. That includes ensuring Russia does not control the 
international narrative, casting its malign intentions and actions 
under a cloak of subterfuge, disinformation, and malign propaganda. We 
are strengthening our ability to counter this deliberate deceit, both 
on our own and with our allies and partners.
Regional Threats: North Korea & Iran
    As DOD modernizes to win competition with China and Russia, we also 
remain alert to regional threats, like those posed by the Iranian and 
North Korean regimes.
    While President Trump and our diplomats negotiate for the 
denuclearization of North Korea, its collection of nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles continues to pose a threat to the United States 
Homeland, as well as our allies.
    Iran, for its part, relentlessly seeks to expand its malign 
influence across the Middle East and beyond. By providing conventional 
manpower and support to the Syrian regime and Houthi rebels in Yemen, 
and offering support and financing to terrorist groups like Lebanese 
Hizbullah, Iran is entrenching and proliferating its clout across the 
region. In addition, Iran demonstrates reckless behavior in the 
maritime domain. Iranian leaders repeatedly threaten to close the 
Strait of Hormuz--the gateway for almost a third of all global sea-
traded oil--to international shipping and allow Iranian-backed Houthis 
to conduct attacks on international shipping in the Bab al-Mandab.
    Iran has also increased funding for its cyber efforts twelvefold 
under President Rouhani, as well as increased espionage and targeting 
of United States Government and commercial entities since withdrawing 
from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. DOD also remains closely 
attuned to the threat of Iran pursuing nuclear weapon and advanced 
missile capabilities, including Iran's testing of space launch vehicles 
with technology virtually identical and interchangeable with that of 
ballistic missiles.
Policy Objectives to Meet Regional Threats
    In support of the ongoing negotiations for the denuclearization of 
North Korea, DOD aims to ensure our diplomats continue to speak from a 
position of strength. Our alliances in the region remain ironclad, 
including with the Republic of Korea and Japan. Together we deter North 
Korean aggression and maintain our ability to protect the Homeland and 
win decisively should conflict ever occur.
    To counter Iran's destabilizing influence across the Middle East, 
DOD seeks to deepen and expand alliances in the region and strengthen 
local partners' capabilities and capacity to manage and counteract 
threats. We also seek to ensure freedom of navigation for all, bolster 
resilience against destructive cyber-attacks, and prevent weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) from falling into the hands of irresponsible 
actors.
The Terrorism Threat
    Working by, with, and through an expansive network of international 
partners, we have made meaningful progress in thwarting terrorist 
designs against the U.S. Homeland and interests. Yet we do not discount 
the threats that continue to emanate from violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs), as they seek to conduct and inspire attacks, gain 
legitimacy by exerting control over territory, enjoy safe haven in 
under-governed countries, obtain access to WMD material, and 
proliferate their ideology to others across the globe.
    Taking a step back from our hard-won successes against the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), we also recognize the global fight 
against radical Islamist terrorists is not over. From the 1980s to now, 
the number of nations, either unwittingly or willingly, providing safe 
haven to VEOs has increased eleven-fold. Today, radical Islamist 
terrorist movements are organized in more than two dozen countries, and 
the globe must contend with more than one hundred VEO-directed, 
enabled, or inspired attacks every year. VEOs continue to take 
advantage of instability in places like Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq, the 
Maghreb, Lake Chad, Somalia, and Afghanistan, preying on the conflict-
ridden to grow their influence.
Policy Objectives to Meet the Terrorism Threat
    Recognizing terrorism as a global threat, we must pursue global 
solutions that utilize the unique capabilities and capacities of our 
allies and partners, in addition to our own. Military might alone will 
not eliminate terrorist ideology or the threat of future terrorist 
attacks.
    However, we can and are reducing the likelihood of an attack on our 
Homeland, our troops, and our interests by contributing to a whole-of-
government and coalition approach. Together, we are removing 
terrorists' ability to control and hold territory; bolstering the 
internal security and stable governance of vulnerable states; ensuring 
the proper safeguarding of WMD material from terrorist hands; checking 
their ability to exploit emerging technologies, including unmanned 
systems; targeting VEO financial networks and countering terrorist 
ideology online to limit its spread to the greatest extent possible; 
and sharing intelligence to limit the risk of attack around the world.
                       what dod is doing about it
    To meet our policy objectives, DOD cannot simply keep pace with our 
competitors as they increase their regional and global influence, grow 
their military capabilities, and develop and field advanced 
technologies. We must--and will--significantly outpace them.
    We have made tough choices that align finite resources with our 
strategic priorities, reducing some day-to-day operational requirements 
now so we are prepared to deter, compete, and win against strategic 
competitors in the future. Our work bringing the NDS to life is far 
from over, but we are demonstrating clear progress along our three 
lines of effort.
  Increasing Lethality
    In order to protect the Homeland and remain the most lethal 
military in the world, we have begun a paradigm shift towards a more 
balanced, distributed, survivable, and cost-imposing Joint Force. In 
2018, we closely linked our combatant commands' operations to policy 
objectives and our Service plans to capability and capacity, with a 
focus on execution and performance. We are adjusting our posture, 
increasing lethality, improving operational readiness, and beginning to 
modernize and innovate at scale. These efforts allow us to better 
exploit adversary weakness, project power in contested environments, 
and expand our combat credible forward presence.
    We have shifted our posture in key regions, taking initial steps to 
economize for sustainable missions in the Middle East and South Asia to 
prepare for the possible high-end fight of the future. In doing so, we 
maintain strategic predictability and implement operational 
unpredictability via the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model. This 
approach provides assurance to our allies and partners, while keeping 
our competitors and adversaries on their toes. We demonstrated DFE in 
action last year, when one of our carrier strike groups returned early 
from deployment unannounced and quickly redeployed to the North 
Atlantic--the first carrier strike group to conduct operations there 
since the 1990s.
    We encourage and welcome all individuals who can meet our exacting 
requirements to join our military's ranks. A key element of 
strengthening our military and increasing lethality is ensuring our 
warfighters achieve established physical, mental, and security vetting 
standards. War is unforgiving, and our mission demands we remain a 
standards-based organization. In upholding systematically applied 
standards, we ensure the readiness of our Joint Force and cohesion of 
our units. One of those standards is deployability. Since June, we have 
lowered the percentage of non-deployable servicemembers from 6.4 to 
5.4--that means roughly 21,000 fewer non-deployable servicemembers 
today than eight months ago.
    DOD has also worked diligently to ensure our personnel have the 
capacity, training, and capabilities they need to achieve results. Last 
year, we accelerated delivery of more than 14,000 munitions and 
precision guidance kits to our warfighters, turned the corner on 
replenishing critical munitions stockpiles, and made strides to rapidly 
deploy cutting edge equipment to the warfighter. Our Close Combat 
Lethality Task Force continues to strengthen our infantry's lethality, 
survivability, resiliency, and readiness for close combat. Four out of 
five U.S. combat deaths occur in our infantry. Therefore, it is a 
strategic imperative to ensure those who confront war's grimmest 
realities never enter into a fair fight.
    This work on personnel and munitions readiness feeds into 
complementary efforts to increase equipment readiness. In October 2018, 
we set an eighty percent readiness target for mission critical aviation 
platforms. In just a few months, almost every type, model, and series 
of aircraft targeted by that memorandum has demonstrated progress. This 
year, we will establish similarly ambitious readiness targets across 
the DOD enterprise. In addition, our Services have made impactful 
readiness gains. As one example, the Air Force's operational squadrons 
are twenty-three percent more ready today than in 2017, and we will 
have twenty-five percent more pilots able to carry out missions in 
fiscal year 2019 than in fiscal year 2016.
    On modernization, we remain committed to a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence has kept the peace over 
the last seventy years, and its importance has been reaffirmed by every 
Congress and every president since Harry Truman. Last year, DOD 
released our Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which details the need for 
modern and tailored nuclear capabilities and capacity that meet the 
realities of our times. We are moving out on those efforts. With fiscal 
year 2019 funding, we are recapitalizing and modernizing our aging 
legacy forces, including our nuclear command, control, and 
communications (NC3), while pursuing prudent, modest adjustments to our 
arsenal, which will increase the flexibility of our response options.
    Here it is worth re-stating--Russia is aggressively developing and 
modernizing a suite of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Not 
only does this add urgency to the modernization of our legacy forces, 
it underscores the importance of the supplemental capabilities called 
for in last year's NPR. Both the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM) and the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) close what we 
believe to be troubling gaps in regional deterrence. These are not 
redundant capabilities. The low-yield SLBM, deployed in small numbers, 
will provide a highly tailored response to specific developments in 
Russia's forces and doctrine that may lead Russia to mistakenly believe 
it could potentially use a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons 
without risking a United States military response. A nuclear SLCM will 
provide a similar capability in response to serious developments and 
trends in Russia's nonstrategic nuclear forces. These supplemental 
capabilities enhance deterrence and stability.
    Turning to emerging technology fields, DOD has identified ten key 
areas: hypersonics; fully networked C3; directed energy; cyber; space; 
quantum science; artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning; 
microelectronics; autonomy; and biotechnology.
    We have invested in basic research, rapid prototyping, and 
experimentation to mature technology that can be used at scale. We are 
also updating our warfighting doctrine as the character of warfare 
changes. Take AI for example--competitors are investing heavily in this 
field, redefining the future of warfare. Last year, DOD established the 
Joint AI Center (JAIC), and we released our AI Strategy just last 
month. These efforts accelerate DOD's delivery and adoption of AI at 
the speed of relevance, while attracting and cultivating the best 
global talent.
    In pursuit of stronger missile defense, DOD released our Missile 
Defense Review (MDR) in January, which recognizes the accelerating 
proliferation of advanced offensive missile capabilities around the 
world. The MDR articulates a comprehensive approach that combines 
deterrence, active and passive missile defense, and attack operations. 
We continue to maintain ground- and sea-based missile defenses while 
also developing new capabilities to counter new threats.
    As the MDR illustrates, our military is not constrained by earth's 
geography. We are taking steps to secure unfettered access to and 
freedom to operate in space, in accordance with our international 
agreements and obligations. Reforming the organization of the military 
space enterprise is fundamental for protecting our roughly $19 trillion 
economy and our position as the world's strongest military. Earlier 
this month, we submitted a legislative proposal to Congress, requesting 
authorization for a U.S. Space Force. If authorized, the Force would 
transform our approach to space, increasing our responsiveness in this 
warfighting domain. Establishing a sixth branch with dedicated military 
leadership will unify, focus, and accelerate the development of space 
doctrine, capabilities, and expertise to outpace future threats, 
institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further build space 
warfighting culture. I ask for your support of our proposal, so we can 
move out in this critical domain.
    We recognize restoring military readiness, modernizing our Joint 
Force, and increasing lethality will not happen overnight, but as the 
above examples demonstrate, we are making meaningful progress.
  Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships
    Beyond DOD's efforts to improve readiness and lethality, we are 
expanding collaboration and cooperation outside the Department. DOD's 
participation in combined military exercises has increased by seventeen 
percent in the last two years, and our Foreign Military Sales have 
increased by more than sixty-five percent in the last three years. 
Across the globe, DOD has leveraged opportunities to expand and deepen 
our already unmatched network of allies and partners, while making real 
progress on burden sharing for international security.
    Starting in the Indo-Pacific, our priority theater, we continue to 
pursue many belts and many roads by keeping our decades-old alliances 
strong and fostering growing partnerships. In all our actions, we 
demonstrate our commitment to a free and open region, marked by respect 
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, big and 
small.
    We are fortifying our bedrock alliances with Australia, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand while growing key 
partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. It is worth noting here that four 
out of the five nations in our Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network 
are also Pacific nations, further emphasizing the region's importance.
    In 2018, the United States took historic strides with two key 
partners in particular, Vietnam and India. Our Navy conducted the first 
United States aircraft carrier visit to Vietnam since the Vietnam War, 
and we participated in the inaugural United States-India 2+2 Strategic 
Dialogue in New Delhi, showing growing trust between the world's oldest 
and largest democracies.
    While our diplomats chart a path to the denuclearization of North 
Korea, DOD continues to enforce United Nations Security Council 
resolution sanctions against North Korean ship-to-ship transfers, 
alongside allies and partners. We have also improved integration of our 
missile defense assets on the Korean Peninsula to better protect United 
States Forces and allies.
    In July 2018, we conducted the largest naval exercise in the world, 
the Rim of the Pacific or RIMPAC, alongside twenty-five other nations. 
That and our Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative have boosted 
interoperability and increased our allies and partners' ability to 
conduct maritime security and awareness operations on their own. Our 
efforts across the region have enabled our allies and partners to take 
a tougher stand against Chinese aggression in international waters. For 
example, this past year France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand all increased their presence in the East and 
South China Seas, reiterating our collective stance to fly, sail, and 
operate wherever international law allows.
    In Europe, the United States is fortifying relationships, realizing 
burden sharing gains, and developing a more lethal, combined 
capability. This year, NATO--the most successful Alliance in history--
marks its seventieth anniversary as the bedrock of transatlantic 
security. NATO is poised to bolster deterrence through larger and more 
frequent exercises, mobility and infrastructure improvements, a 
revamped command structure, and increased force presence in territories 
most vulnerable to Russian aggression. We are rapidly pursuing our 
``Four Thirties Readiness Initiative'' by 2020: thirty mechanized 
battalions, thirty air squadrons, and thirty combat vessels ready to 
fight within thirty days or less.
    Over the last two years, NATO has made significant burden sharing 
progress, both financially and operationally. Since 2017, our NATO 
Allies have increased their defense spending by $41 billion. The nine 
percent increase from 2016-2018 represents the largest in a quarter 
century. By 2020, NATO projects Allies will increase defense spending 
by $100 billion. These are impressive numbers. Yet NATO contributions 
do not all boil down to simple dollar amounts. The Alliance continues 
to provide valuable manpower, specialized capabilities, and territory 
that no other partnership in the world can match.
    I now move to the impactful work we are doing by, with, and through 
our allies and partners across the Middle East and South Asia.
    In Syria and Iraq, the United States, as part of the seventy-nine-
member Defeat-ISIS Coalition, and our local partners have liberated 
more than thirty towns and cities from ISIS control since January 
2017--that's virtually all of the territory ISIS once held.
    As we look ahead in Syria, we will continue to stand with those who 
fought and continue to fight alongside our Coalition, address Turkey's 
security concerns along Syria's northeast border, maintain the global 
Defeat-ISIS Coalition, and set conditions for continuing United States 
counterterrorism operations in the region. We fully support the 
government of Iraq in its fight against terrorism and will continue to 
enable the Iraqi Security Forces' progress in securing liberated areas 
and thwarting ISIS attempts to mount a clandestine insurgency.
    In Afghanistan, we are executing President Trump's South Asia 
Strategy, R4+S (regionalize, realign, reinforce, reconcile, and 
sustain). In applying military pressure on the Taliban, we support 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Secretary Pompeo's ongoing 
negotiations, which are Afghanistan's first chance for real peace in 
forty years. We are also applying maximum pressure on ISIS-Khorasan 
(ISIS-K) and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, to stymie any 
threats to the United States Homeland.
    Since 2016, our allies and partners have stepped up to create 
necessary conditions for negotiations. Afghan forces now lead one 
hundred percent of missions, with United States and coalition personnel 
performing train, advise, and assist roles. In 2018, international 
partners agreed to extend their roughly $1 billion in annual financial 
sustainment of Afghan forces through 2024. NATO's fulfillment of 
requirements in Afghanistan has increased more than fourteen percent 
since the introduction of President Trump's South Asia Strategy, its 
highest level in the Mission's history. Since 2016, the number of non-
U.S. Coalition troops to NATO's Resolute Support Mission has increased 
by more than thirty-five percent, and two new countries, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates, are formalizing their status as operational 
partners.
    Defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS remains 
the United States' top national security interest in Yemen. At the same 
time, we fully support UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths's efforts to 
bring all relevant parties of the civil war to the negotiating table. I 
am encouraged by the ceasefire in the strategically-important city and 
port of Hudaydah. Though not easy, these are necessary first steps on 
the path to lasting peace.
    In Africa, we are helping partners build their security forces' 
capacity to counter terrorist and other transnational threats, 
bolstering relationships to ensure U.S. influence and access against 
great power competition, enhancing our ability to conduct crisis 
response, and supporting whole-of-government efforts to advance 
stability and prosperity.
    The last stop in our abbreviated walk around the world is closer to 
home--to our allies and partners in the western hemisphere and our 
efforts to protect our southern border. Over the last year, we have 
fostered strong military-to-military ties with our Canadian and Mexican 
neighbors, while bolstering relationships with Brazil, Argentina, 
Colombia, and Chile. We appreciate and applaud these nations' 
contributions to international security, demonstrated notably last year 
when Chile served as the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander 
at RIMPAC--the first time in the exercise's history a non-English 
speaking nation has done so.
    As we continue to monitor the situation in Venezuela, we are 
working closely with the Department of State, United States Agency for 
International Development, and regional partners to provide 
humanitarian assistance, while maintaining our posture to protect our 
national interests and citizens abroad.
    On the southern border--last month, I visited the El Paso area to 
assess the security situation and DOD's role in supporting our 
Department of Homeland Security partners.
    As these myriad examples illustrate, our thriving, global 
constellation of alliances and partnerships provides an asymmetric 
advantage no competitor or adversary can match. We take that advantage 
seriously, and we continue to foster its growth at every opportunity.
  Implementing Reform
    Let me now turn inward--to reform of our internal business 
practices. Over the last year, we have made marked improvements to our 
fiscal transparency, instituting a wide range of reform initiatives 
that bolster efficiency, effectiveness, and performance.
    We have focused reform in key areas, including healthcare, contract 
management, information technology (IT), acquisition, civilian resource 
management, and financial management. Let me provide a brief overview 
of our progress so far. Over the course of fiscal year 2017 and fiscal 
year 2018, we have saved $4.7 billion from reform across our 
headquarters' activities--a down payment on more to come.
    On healthcare, we realized savings of almost $519 million in 
TRICARE reform, with $3.4 billion in savings planned through fiscal 
year 2021. Our entire Fourth Estate has now participated in contract 
service requirement reviews to eliminate unnecessary contracts, 
resulting in $492 million in programmed savings.
    Within the IT field, we modernized our defense travel system, 
trimming our regulation by almost 1,000 pages. The reform allows for 
better industry competition and has saved nearly $160 million to date. 
Within acquisition reform, our Services saved more than $550 million in 
fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 by selling equipment to foreign 
partners and negotiating multi-year procurements over single year 
contracts.
    Within financial management, DOD completed our first-ever 
consolidated financial statement audit in 2018, covering roughly $2.7 
trillion in assets. As of February 1, DOD had developed corrective 
action plans to address more than thirty-three percent of the total 
audit findings and recommendations, with many more corrective actions 
to come.
    In addition to business reform, the Department has also made 
important structural reforms, including elevating U.S. Cyber Command to 
full combatant command status, standing up U.S. Army Futures Command, 
and finalizing our split of the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
office into two separate offices: Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) and 
Research and Engineering (R&E).
  The Way Ahead
    Our Department has been busy, but we are just getting started. I am 
encouraged by our initial progress. Focus and discipline are vital for 
our NDS's continued execution.
         our fiscal year 2020 request: a strategy-driven budget
    Our fiscal year 2018 funding stopped the erosion of our competitive 
edge by beginning to restore military readiness. Our fiscal year 2019 
funding continued readiness gains and made key down payments on a more 
lethal military. Now our Department needs adequate, sustainable, and 
predictable funding to maintain momentum and expand our modernization 
and readiness efforts. Every line of our fiscal year 2020 request is 
designed to implement our Strategy. Therefore, every dollar of it--both 
in baseline funding and overseas contingency operations--is critical. I 
ask for Congress's support for on-time funding of our $750 billion 
topline for National Defense, so we can continue to breathe life into 
the NDS.
    Our strategy-driven budget drives further progress along our three 
lines of effort and brings our military modernization efforts to life 
at the speed of relevance. It enables critical shifts to compete, 
deter, and win in any high-end fight of the future, while preserving 
capabilities to support current operations. With this funding, we 
ensure America maintains our asymmetric military advantage with a more 
lethal, agile, and innovative Joint Force.
    The fiscal year 2020 request includes the largest research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) budget in DOD's history, when 
adjusted for inflation. That is $104 billion in total requested funds 
for fiscal year 2020--$9 billion more than what we will spend this 
fiscal year. We have made strategic choices to prioritize lethality for 
the high-end fight.
    Across DOD, these choices move our capabilities from cost-accepting 
to cost-imposing, from the exquisite and purely survivable to the 
affordable and attritable. Through targeted investment, we will replace 
a federated approach with an enterprise one, enabling a more 
distributed, scaled path to innovation and modernization. This path 
prioritizes unmanned and machine capabilities, as well as the ability 
to ``fight in the dark'' without network dependency.
    With that broader context in mind, I will now focus on four 
priority areas: (1) Investing in the contested space and cyber domains; 
(2) modernizing in traditional air, maritime, and land domains, as well 
as multi-domain enterprises; (3) innovating in emerging technology 
fields to strengthen our competitive edge, and; (4) building on 
readiness gains to meet requirements for our current operational 
commitments and future challenges.
  Space and Cyber Investments
    Our request recognizes the critically important role space will 
play in maintaining military superiority in the future. The $14.1 
billion dedicated to space will counteract the erosion of our 
competitive advantage by enhancing our existing space-based 
capabilities, like GPS, satellite communications, and missile warning, 
as well as increasing launch capacities. We will also stand up the U.S. 
Space Force Headquarters, U.S. Space Command, and Space Development 
Agency to best prepare DOD to assure freedom of operation in space, 
deter attacks, and when necessary, defeat space and counter space 
threats to the United States, our allies, and our partners.
    We also note the cyber domain's crucial role, both now and in 
warfare's future. That is why we have requested $9.6 billion to support 
offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, shore up network 
resiliency against adversaries, and improve our cyber posture. These 
efforts help ensure DOD has the information and communications 
technology capabilities necessary for implementing our NDS and 
realizing our mission.
  Traditional and Multi-Domain Investments
    The fiscal year 2020 budget will ensure the U.S. military maintains 
long-term competitive advantage on land, in the air, and on the sea. 
Across these three traditional domains, we are investing a total of 
$107 billion for modernization.
    In the air domain, this includes $57.7 billion to increase the 
procurement and modernization of our fighter force. A balanced mix of 
fourth and fifth generation aircraft will effectively and affordably 
meet the entire spectrum of NDS missions, providing the stealth needed 
to gain air superiority, execute precision strikes, and conduct stand-
in electronic attack against peer competitors in highly-contested 
environments, while also providing counter-air and strike in more 
permissive environments. We will also purchase additional tankers, 
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air missiles, and Joint Air-Surface 
extended range missiles.
    On land, we will invest $14.6 billion to fund roughly 6,400 combat 
and tactical vehicles, including M-1 Abrams upgrades and Amphibious 
Combat Vehicles, as well as multiple combat systems that provide 
overmatch on the last two hundred meters of the battlefield.
    In the maritime domain, we will increase and diversify our strike 
options, including offensive-armed unmanned surface and underwater 
vessels and advanced long-range missiles. Fiscal year 2020 funds will 
also accelerate fleet growth, delivering more ships faster, including 
cutting edge unmanned variants.
    The fiscal year 2020 request also invests $14 billion in 
modernizing and recapitalizing all three legs of our nuclear 
capabilities, to include the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent system, 
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, Long-Range Standoff Weapon, 
B-21 bomber, life-extended Trident SLBM, and the F-35 dual-capable 
fighter aircraft; while also enhancing our missile warning and NC3 
capabilities.
    We also slate $13.6 billion for missile defeat and defense 
modernization, increasing the capability and capacity of our ground-
based defenses, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense systems; enhancing our space-based missile 
warning and other capabilities to address hypersonic threats; and 
developing boost-phase missile defense systems, including directed 
energy and air-launched kinetic interceptors.
    Also on the multi-domain front, we will invest $3.4 billion for our 
Special Operations Forces. The fiscal year 2020 request refocuses on 
strategic competition by increasing funding for research and 
development, modernization, and expanded capabilities for the high-end 
fight, while maintaining irregular warfare as a core competency.
  Innovation and Advanced Technology Investments
    With more than $7.4 billion directed toward DOD's development and 
fielding of technologies focused on the high-end fight, the fiscal year 
2020 budget prioritizes funding across four key emerging areas: 
autonomy, AI/machine learning, hypersonics, and directed energy.
    Let me expand on hypersonics for a moment as one example. Without 
the long-range, survivable, and fast strike capability of hypersonic 
weapons, it will be difficult for our military to maintain access to 
key regions or come to the defense of allies and partners in a crisis 
or war. Yet, with the $2.6 billion requested in fiscal year 2020, 
projected doubling of funding requests in coming years, and close 
inter-service cooperation, we are accelerating pursuit of options 
deliverable from land, sea, and air, with some capabilities expected to 
deploy to the warfighter three years earlier than previously planned.
  Sustainment and Readiness Investments
    This budget sustains our Joint Force and builds on critical 
readiness gains. We will invest almost $125 billion in operational 
readiness and sustainment, including $1.5 billion for advanced training 
facilities and ranges, $2.6 billion for improving and expanding cyber 
operations training, and $41.2 billion for further improving tactical 
aviation readiness.
    In addition, the fiscal year 2020 budget will allow an increase to 
our total end-strength by roughly 7,700 servicemembers over the 
projected fiscal year 2019 level, as well as give our men and women in 
uniform a much-deserved 3.1 percent pay raise, the largest in a decade.
    In concert with the funding priorities I have just outlined, we 
will continue to pursue opportunities that balance capacity and 
capability by realizing economies of scale in large equipment 
acquisitions, like aircraft carriers and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
As we do so, we will continue to assess the utility of our investments 
through a lifecycle lens.
                               conclusion
    With Congress's support and delivery of on-time funding at our 
requested topline, this budget ensures our military maintains the 
lethality, adaptability, and resiliency necessary to compete, deter, 
and win against any adversary in an increasingly dangerous world.
    It is a privilege and honor to lead the most lethal military in the 
world. I thank those in uniform and their families for all they do, 
today and every day, to keep us safe, and I appreciate the critical 
role Congress plays to ensure our warfighters are ready to succeed on 
the battlefields of today and tomorrow.
    The men and women of the Department of Defense stand ready, as 
always, to protect liberty and freedom.
    Thank you.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Shanahan.
    General Dunford.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN OF 
                   THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

    General Dunford. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for 
opportunity to join Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary 
Norquist here today. It remains my privilege to represent your 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
    While much of the discussion this morning is going to focus 
on the challenges we face, it's important I begin by assuring 
you that your Armed Forces can deter a nuclear attack, defend 
the Homeland, meet our alliance commitments, and effectively 
respond, should deterrence fail. I believe we have a 
competitive advantage against any potential adversary, defined 
as the ability to project power to fight and win at the time 
and place of our choosing.
    But, as Members of this Committee know, 17 years of 
continuous combat and fiscal instability have affected our 
readiness and eroded our competitive advantage. As the 
Secretary highlighted, China and Russia have capitalized on our 
distraction and restraints by investing in capabilities 
specifically designed to challenge our traditional sources of 
strength. After careful study, they deployed capabilities 
intended to contest our freedom of movement across all domains 
and disrupt our ability to project power. With the help of 
Congress, starting in 2017, we began to restore our competitive 
advantage. Recent budgets have allowed us to build readiness 
and invest in new capabilities while meeting our current 
operational commitments. But, I think we all know we can't 
reverse decades of erosion in just a few years. This year's 
budget submission would allow us to continue restoring our 
competitive advantage by improving readiness and developing 
capabilities to enhance the lethality. It proposes investments 
in advanced capabilities across all domains--sea, air, land, 
space, and cyberspace. This year's budget also sustains 
investments in our nuclear enterprise to ensure a safe, secure, 
and effective strategic deterrent, the highest priority of the 
Department of Defense. We've also taken steps to more 
effectively employ the force we have today and build the force 
we have tomorrow. We've implemented fundamental changes in our 
global force management processes to prioritize and allocate 
resources in accordance with the National Defense Strategy 
while building readiness and the flexibility to respond to 
unforeseen contingencies. We've also refined our processes for 
developing and designing our future force. A joint, concept-
driven, threat-informed approach, which leverages a wide body 
of analytic work, will allow us to deliberately evaluate and 
prioritize warfighting requirements. This also enables us to 
pair emerging technologies with innovative operating concepts.
    In closing, I'd like thank the Committee for all you've 
done to support our men and women in uniform and their 
families. Together, we've honored our solemn obligation to 
never send our sons and daughters into a fair fight. With your 
continued support, we never will.
    [The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]

       Prepared Statement by General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of this 
Committee, it is an honor to join Acting Secretary Shanahan and the 
Honorable David Norquist in testifying before you today. It remains my 
distinct privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines of the United States Armed Forces.
    Today, I can assure the Committee that the United States military 
can defend the Homeland, meet our Alliance commitments, deter nuclear 
attack from any state actor, and effectively respond should deterrence 
fail. We have a competitive advantage against any adversary across all 
domains--air, sea, land, space, and cyber--and we can project power to 
advance the interests of the United States anywhere around the globe.
    But that competitive advantage has eroded. This is the result of 
seventeen years of continuous combat against transregional violent 
extremism and the damaging effects of funding instability. China and 
Russia have capitalized on our distraction and our constraints. They 
have invested in capabilities specifically designed to challenge our 
traditional sources of strength and have sought to undermine the rules-
based international order that brought prosperity and relative peace 
for the last seven decades.
    With your help, starting in 2017, we arrested the erosion of our 
competitive advantage. Appropriations in fiscal years 2017-2019 allowed 
us to restore readiness and invest in new capabilities while meeting 
our ongoing commitments across the globe. However, we cannot undo 
decades of degradation in just a few years. This year's budget allows 
us to continue to restore our competitive advantage by enhancing our 
readiness and lethality.
                         strategic environment
    Today's strategic environment is extraordinarily complex and 
volatile. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) characterizes and 
prioritizes our strategic challenges with a ``2+3'' framework that 
names China and Russia as the primary challenges with which we must 
contend, along with North Korea, Iran, and violent extremism. This 
framework provides a benchmark against which we can measure our 
capabilities. It is not intended to be predictive of future crises or 
armed conflicts; rather, it is an important tool for planning, managing 
risk, and developing capabilities. Our assumption is that if we build a 
Joint Force with the capabilities and capacities to meet these 
challenges, either individually or in some combination, we will be 
well-positioned to respond to whatever threats the future holds.
    China. China has paired its rapid economic growth with substantial 
military investment as it strives for regional hegemony and global 
influence. By investing heavily in the space and cyber domains while 
expanding air and maritime capacity and militarizing disputed land 
formations, they are developing the ability to deny us access to the 
East and South China Seas. The intended effect is to weaken our 
alliance structure in the Pacific and allow Beijing to rewrite the 
norms, standards, and laws in the region. They are also advancing their 
interests globally through the One Belt One Road Initiative, creating 
exploitive economic relationships across Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. These relationships can be leveraged to reduce our influence 
and the access we need to project military power.
    Russia. Similarly, Russia has invested in asymmetrical capabilities 
where they perceive they have a competitive advantage. They are using 
information, cyber, and unconventional operations combined with 
economic and political influence to advance their interests while 
seeking to undermine the credibility of NATO. We have seen examples of 
their revanchist behavior in the invasion of Georgia and Crimea, their 
ongoing activity in the Donbas, and the recent seizure of Ukrainian 
vessels near the Sea of Azov. We also saw their efforts to undermine 
democracy in 2016, both in Europe and the United States.
    North Korea. While we remain hopeful for a peaceful 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, after two summits between 
President Trump and Kim Jong-Un, it is clear that we must remain ready 
for multiple contingencies. We are still dealing with a country that 
has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that threaten our Allies in 
the region and our Homeland. Regardless of the expressed intent of the 
North Korean leader, that capability exists and we must retain the 
force posture to deter and defend against the threat.
    Iran. Iran continues to project malign influence and present 
challenges with missile, cyber, proxy, and maritime capabilities. We 
also continue to monitor Iran's nuclear capability. The regime aims to 
establish itself as the dominant regional power; their military 
development is designed to restrict our access to their sphere of 
influence while their activities threaten freedom of navigation along 
important commercial routes, destabilize the government of Iraq, 
exacerbate civil wars in Yemen and Syria, and support proxies inside of 
Lebanon and Syria.
    Violent Extremist Organizations. While we have made significant 
progress against ISIS, al Qaeda, and affiliated groups, the threats to 
the United States and our Allies and partners remain. Violent extremism 
is a global, generational, society-level problem of which military 
operations can only manage the symptoms. In the meantime, we have 
implemented a fiscally, politically, and militarily sustainable 
counterterrorism campaign.
    Our security, our prosperity, and the international system that 
makes them possible are threatened today by actors ranging from 
advanced and ascending militaries backed by nuclear arsenals to lone 
fighters inspired by radical ideologies. The Joint Force must respond 
by balancing the capabilities we need for today's operations with the 
depth, flexibility, and advanced technologies required to respond to 
the challenges of the future. If approved, the President's Budget 2020 
(PB20) request will enable the Department to adapt the force we have 
today, while we design the force needed for tomorrow's challenges.
                        the force we need today
    The Joint Military Net Assessment--a rigorous tool we use to 
evaluate the Joint Force's ability to meet its strategic objectives--
identified challenges across all domains in the context of our near-
peer competitors. Other assessments and strategic reviews have also 
highlighted the sustained investment we need to improve readiness, 
capabilities, and capacities in the Joint Force. The fiscal year 2020 
budget provides funding for current operations and, building on budgets 
of recent years, continues to build readiness and improve lethality by 
modernizing existing capabilities and expanding capacity.
Readiness.
    We have realized readiness improvements through fundamental changes 
in our global force management processes. As directed in the NDS--and 
in support of its 2+3 strategy--we have implemented Dynamic Force 
Employment (DFE). This is a top-down process of prioritizing and 
allocating resources against our strategic priorities with bottom-up 
refinement from the geographic combatant commanders.
    DFE allows us to position resources globally to mitigate strategic 
risk and be operationally unpredictable while remaining strategically 
predictable. This improves our ability to respond to unforeseen 
crises--as well as opportunities--and provide strategic flexibility for 
senior decision makers while maintaining readiness across the Joint 
Force.
    Within this new framework for global force management, your men and 
women in uniform are operating across the globe every day to assure 
Allies and partners, deter adversaries, and assist local forces in 
combatting violent extremism at its sources. President's Budget 2020 
provides them the resources they need to accomplish their missions and 
return home safely.
Current Operations.
    China. United States Forces conduct freedom of navigation 
operations globally to challenge excessive maritime claims--including 
those made by China--and demonstrate our determination to operate 
wherever international law allows. In the South China Sea and elsewhere 
in the region, we also fly bomber missions, demonstrating a resilient 
global strike capability that checks Chinese ambition and assures our 
regional Allies and partners. Throughout the Pacific, our troops 
exercise and engage with partners to signal our commitment and 
counterbalance China's challenges to the rules-based order.
    Russia. In Europe, the European Defense Initiative and associated 
posture adjustments and combined exercise programs represent the 
largest reinforcement of NATO's collective defense posture--and the 
largest demonstration of its interoperability--since the Cold War. 
United States personnel also contribute to NATO's integrated ballistic 
missile air defense in Europe. In both the Atlantic and Pacific, we 
conduct sustained air and sea operations to monitor Russian activities 
and deter any aggression.
    North Korea. United States troops on the Korean Peninsula are 
postured and trained to deter North Korean aggression, provocation, and 
coercion. Their current priority is supporting the State Department-led 
maximum pressure campaign to achieve the full, final, and verifiable 
denuclearization of the Peninsula. In concert with like-minded nations, 
we have expanded our sea and air operations to deter and disrupt 
illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum and other materials 
restricted by UN Security Council Resolutions.
    Iran. United States forces conduct freedom of navigation operations 
in the Strait of Hormuz. We continue our commitment to the stability of 
the government of Iraq, and our efforts to build the capacity of our 
regional partners. In these and other ways, the Joint Force complements 
United States diplomatic and economic efforts to counter Iranian malign 
influence in the Middle East.
    VEOs. The United States has assembled a global coalition to counter 
violent extremist organizations--leveraging a relatively small 
footprint of U.S. Forces to enable local partners throughout the world. 
The immediate priority is achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS in Iraq 
and Syria through Operation Inherent Resolve. We are also working by, 
with, and through partners in every region to cut the ``connective 
tissue'' of foreign fighters, resources, and the ideological narrative 
that enable violent extremists to operate transregionally.
    Iraq and Syria. United States troops remain engaged in the D-ISIS 
campaign. As the campaign transitions from clearing ISIS-held territory 
to a focus on stabilizing the region, activities such as training local 
security forces, enabling local governance, and conducting 
counterterrorism operations will help prevent a power vacuum in 
Northeast Syria and a resurgence of ISIS. We are working with our 
Coalition partners to ensure we meet Turkish security concerns as well 
as protect those that fought with us against ISIS.
    Afghanistan. Along with our Allies and coalition partners, we are 
setting the military conditions to fully support an Afghan-led, Afghan-
owned peace process. Coalition forces train, advise, and assist 
Afghanistan National Security Forces, as well as provide critical 
aviation support, intelligence, and other capabilities to make them a 
more effective fighting force.
    In addition to readiness gains from improved force management, DOD 
budgets in recent years helped arrest the decline of unit readiness 
across the Joint Force. In fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019, we 
increased the quality and quantity of unit training, improved personnel 
deployment availability, increased stocks of key munitions, streamlined 
aviation depot processes, and added capacity to address shortfalls in 
maintenance and sustainment functions. President's Budget 2020 enables 
us to continue on this path, but a decade of neglect will require years 
to correct. A full restoration of our readiness will require sustained, 
sufficient, and predictable funding into the future.
              a modern and more lethal force for tomorrow
    The NDS calls for a more lethal force that expands the competitive 
space to meet critical challenges and key operational problems. The 
President's Budget 2020 request invests in a more lethal force by 
funding efforts to modernize current capabilities and expand 
warfighting capacity.
    A primary modernization priority is our aging nuclear enterprise. A 
large-scale nuclear attack poses an existential threat to the United 
States. U.S. nuclear forces are the indispensable means of addressing 
this threat, making nuclear deterrence the highest priority mission of 
the Joint Force. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review established the 
elements of the nuclear modernization program--a program that is 
necessary, prudent, and affordable given the nature and evolution of 
the threats we face. President's Budget 2020 fully funds that program.
    President's Budget 2020 also enhances joint warfighting capacity by 
fielding the capabilities we need to project power. In the air, 
continued procurement of 5th generation fighter aircraft allows us 
greater flexibility to respond globally today and in the future. At 
sea, recapitalizing the naval fleet with modern and lethal platforms 
sustains undersea, surface, naval aviation, and fleet logistic 
advantages while increasing investments in unmanned, autonomous 
maritime capabilities. On the ground, enhancement of long-range 
precision fires, development of the next generation combat vehicle, and 
investments in close combat systems ensure our soldiers and marines' 
overmatch on the battlefield.
    Space continues to be a priority area for modernization and 
innovation. In response to the evolution of threats to U.S. assets in 
space, we will establish the U.S. Space Force Headquarters, U.S. Space 
Command, and Space Development Agency. To deter our adversaries, we are 
pursuing organizational constructs, systems, and capabilities that will 
produce a more lethal, resilient, and agile Joint Force. Additionally, 
this budget request includes substantial investments in Missile 
Warning, launch platforms, Space Situational Awareness, Space Control, 
and enhancements to Position, Navigation, and Timing.
    In the cyber domain, President's Budget 2020 allows the Joint Force 
to further develop and employ the necessary tools to defend DOD 
infrastructure, compete below the level of armed conflict, and operate 
as part of broader joint operations. This budget request increases our 
investments in required capabilities to operate effectively in 
cyberspace and maintain our competitive advantage against near-peer 
adversaries.
    While improving lethality in the near term, we will continue to 
develop and design a future Joint Force that can fight and win against 
any adversary on any battlefield of tomorrow. A joint concept-driven, 
threat-informed approach to capability development--leveraging 
wargames, exercises, and experimentation--allows us to more 
deliberately evaluate needs of the current force and prioritize future 
requirements. Our refined approach to Force Development and Design 
allows senior leaders to pair emerging technologies with optimal 
organizational constructs and innovative operating concepts to plan and 
execute joint operations now and in the future.
    No investment is more important to the effectiveness of our future 
force than the development and education of our future leaders. The 
nation's ability to compete, deter, and win requires leaders who have 
the vision, intellect, and critical thinking skills to employ, develop, 
and design the future Joint Force. With a special emphasis on 
revitalization of the War Colleges, our leader development program is 
designed to fully support the development of these strategic thinkers 
and future senior leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces.
                               conclusion
    This is my fourth and final appearance before this Committee in 
support of the Department's annual budget request. I thank you for the 
great honor of representing your soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines.
    More importantly, I would like to thank the Committee for all you 
have done to support our troops, as well as their families. In visits 
to the Joint Force at bases and posts, stateside and around the world, 
I continue to be amazed by their spirit and dedication to the mission. 
Through the support of the Congress and the people you represent, our 
servicemembers in uniform will prevail in our current conflicts and be 
prepared to confront the threats the United States will surely face in 
the future.
    Together, we have honored our solemn obligation to never send our 
sons and daughters into a fair fight. With your continued support for 
sustained, sufficient, and predictable funding, we never will.

    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you, General.
    What we're going to do is have a round of 5-minute 
questions. We are very well attended this morning, so I ask 
people to try to keep within their time. I will do the same 
thing.
    To kick it off, we talked about the blueprint that we're 
using. I'd like to ask each witness a question about this.
    Secretary Shanahan, you said that the Department of Defense 
would realign the resources in the budget to implement this 
program. Now, in order to do that, can you quickly run over any 
of the programs or systems or missions that have been either 
reduced or accelerated to accommodate this?
    Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would 
highlight, in this year's budget, three major structural 
changes, in terms of being able to accelerate. The first is 
space. The Space Force, itself, is intended to accelerate, 
dramatically, our capabilities to defend. Second, missiles. 
Probably the best characterization of that is our efforts on 
hypersonics. Third, a significant investment in cyber 
capabilities. When we think about reductions, I think the Army 
is the best illustration of that in their modernization plans 
as they look to make reductions across their portfolio to, I'll 
say, about 100 different programs.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I appreciate that.
    General Dunford, similar question. The National Defense 
Strategy Commission listed several capability gaps, vis-a-vis 
China and Russia, such as long-range fires, additional air 
defense units, and others that I mentioned in my over 
statement. Which of these capability gaps do you think the 2020 
budget addresses?
    General Dunford. Chairman, thank you.
    The budget actually addresses all the challenges you 
identified. What I can assure is that the National Defense 
Strategy really has been the basis for our prioritization for 
capability development. We did careful analysis of China and 
Russia, in particular, the capabilities developed over the last 
few years to limit our ability to operate freely in space, 
cyberspace, land, sea, and air. The capabilities that we have 
identified in this year's budget are really designed to allow 
us to project power when and where necessary to advance our 
interests in that context of that emerging threat from China 
and Russia.
    Chairman Inhofe. All right. I appreciate that.
    Now, I am concerned about one other area. Neither one of 
you is personally responsible for this, but I'm a little 
disturbed by the idea that we're going to be taking the USS 
Truman out of the system and I wonder how this is going to work 
in just our sheer numbers. Now, we have a law that says we have 
to maintain 11 carriers. We would also look at this and realize 
that 10 would equal what's necessary to conduct a major war. 
How do we get to the number we're supposed to have if we don't 
follow through with the midlife of the Truman? Now, recognizing 
that would take up to, I think, 2024. But, nonetheless, it's 
going to take longer if we start--depending upon the multiple 
buy that we're talking about, particularly of a vehicle that 
still--the elevator still doesn't work and carry the ordinance.
    So, what's your thought about that? How are we going to, 
number one, comply with the law that we have--in fact, Mr. 
Norquist, this might be a good question for you, because you're 
into these issues, also--and still not follow through with our 
original plans with the Harry Truman?
    Anybody.
    Secretary Shanahan. Why don't I lead off?
    First of all, I think the Truman decision represents some 
of the strategic choices we've made in this year's budget. It 
was a very difficult decision for us. Carriers represent, now 
and in the future, critical force structure for the Navy. The 
Truman decision was made in concert--it was an integrated 
decision with our two-carrier buy. Let me walk through the 
benefits of the decision and then potential off-ramps so that 
we don't find ourselves in a difficult situation.
    So, the first is that, with this decision of the two-
carrier buy and to not refuel the Truman, our lethality of our 
carriers and capability increases with the new carriers. The 
second is, until mid-2020s, we maintain the level of 11 
carriers. The third is--and part of the calculus here--was to 
maintain employment. In fact, with this decision, we grow 
employment in the industrial base. We needed to make sure, not 
only that our shipyards maintained their employment--there's 
actually growth--but also the supply chain. The last is that 
the funds that we freed up from making these decisions are 
invested in the future force. The decision for two carriers 
saved $4 billion.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    Secretary Shanahan. Not refueling the Truman saves $3.4 
billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)----
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Yeah, we're going to run out of 
time, and I'm going to set the example of not allowing us to 
run out of time. But, I still am not happy with the results of 
that. My mental numbers don't agree with that. I think it's a 
very important thing. I personally brought this up before 
Wicker gets here.
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Chairman Inhofe. All right.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony.
    Mr. Secretary, on February 18th, you sent a letter to 
Secretary Nielsen stating that you had, in your words, ``not 
yet decided whether the use of Section 2808 is necessary.'' 
That would be the section under the emergency that would 
authorize access to military construction (MILCON) funds. 
You've asked for information from the Secretary, to include a 
list of proposed border construction projects that would 
improve the--again, your words--``effectiveness and efficiency 
of DOD personnel supporting these Customs and Border Patrol.'' 
Have you received a response yet from Secretary Nielsen?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not. I expect it this week.
    Senator Reed. Again, I--in the context of something that is 
supposed to be an emergency, this seems to be a pretty casual 
sort of approach to the issue. But, beside that, at this point, 
then, you don't know what projects Deputy Assistant Secretary 
(DAS) is requesting, and whether or not those projects would be 
appropriate under 2808.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, the projects we've received, or 
the updates from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to date, 
are on--with regards to their 2019 appropriations, they're for 
the expenditure of forfeiture of Treasury funds and then needs 
as they----
    Senator Reed. Those are all programs that are automatic. 
You've already put those--do--I'm talking about the 2808, which 
would require not only the emergency declaration, but also a 
judgment whether--of their military utility.
    Mr. Chairman--General Dunford, you have the obligation to 
advise the Secretary on the military utility of these projects 
with--if they're being incorporated. What criteria do you 
intend to use?
    General Dunford. Thanks, Senator Reed.
    The criteria I intend to use is, we'll look carefully at 
the mission that our soldiers, sailors, marines have been 
assigned, and some airmen, as well. We'll look at how these 
projects support, directly, the mission of those individuals.
    Senator Reed. Thank you. The Secretary will make the 
ultimate decision, but based upon your recommendation.
    General Dunford. Senator, I'll be one of the inputs, and 
I'll provide military advice to the Secretary on the 
relationship between the resources, the projects, and the 
mission.
    Senator Reed. If it comes to pass, then, you'll have to 
delay certain military construction projects we've authorized 
and appropriated. Do you have a list of those projects yet, Mr. 
Secretary?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I don't have a final list of 
those projects.
    Senator Reed. Well, obviously, I think it would be 
important to all of us to understand which projects would be 
sacrificed, even in the short run. So, I would encourage you to 
get that list.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Shanahan. See Appendix A, fact sheet for the list 
of projects.

    Senator Reed. In the emergency request, there's $3.6 
billion for, essentially, backfilling those projects which have 
already been authorized and appropriated, which is, I think, an 
unusual way to fund military construction projects. But, then 
there's an additional $3.6 billion that's just been set aside 
for ``the wall,'' competing with other potential military 
projects. That's emergency funding. Do you think that's 
appropriate?
    Secretary Shanahan. It was appropriate, given the planning, 
when we were putting together, to provision for the next year. 
I'll ask Secretary Norquist to comment about how we came up 
with the planning.
    Secretary Norquist. Sure. One of the things we wanted to be 
certain to do is to not disrupt future military construction 
projects. So, if 2808 extends, which it will, into fiscal year 
2020, it just gets--at least it's 12 months. If it's longer, we 
don't want that to disrupt other projects. So, we put in 
funding so that it would be available and not to be able to--in 
order to be able to protect the other military construction 
projects.
    Senator Reed. But, essentially, what you're doing is 
creating appropriations dedicated, at this point, to building a 
wall, which has not, I think, been authorized or appropriated 
by the Congress. That 3.6 extra funding, you know is going to 
the wall. It might be a backfill or a--or a circuitous way, but 
it's essentially for the wall. Is that correct?
    Secretary Norquist. Right. It's in the request. Therefore, 
would need to be both authorized and appropriated to----
    Senator Reed. Okay. So----
    Secretary Norquist.--take effect. Absolutely, sir.
    Senator Reed. So, that, in our process, we are 
authorizing--you're asking us literally to authorize funding 
for the wall.
    Secretary Norquist. Yeah.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Just a quick question, because I want to follow the 
Chairman's guidelines. You mentioned $2 billion in the 
emergency request for hurricane reconstruction. The Marine 
Corps has indicated to me, as late as yesterday, that it's 
about $3.7 billion. Tyndall Air Force Base is--$5 billion. So, 
it would seem to me, if you're trying to address the real needs 
of the Department of Defense, that, instead of using 3.6 or $7 
billion for the wall, that could be used immediately for 
repairs at Camp Lejeune and Tyndall Air Force Base.
    Secretary Norquist. So, what you have is--yes, there are 
significant requirements for both of those two bases. One of 
the things we're looking at is, particularly, the military 
construction projects. The planning and design lead means that 
some of them can be executed in 2020, so we have $2 billion in 
for that, some of them won't be able to be executed till 2021 
or later. We're trying to balance that and address those. But, 
we're happy to work with you on those requirements.
    Senator Reed. Respecting the Chairman, I----
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay, thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Fischer.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dunford, do you believe a ``no first use'' policy 
improves our ability to deter conflict? Would it be your best 
military advice to adopt such a policy?
    General Dunford. Well, thank you, Senator. I think the 
current policy is one that complicates an adversary's 
decisionmaking process, and I wouldn't recommend any change to 
simplify an adversary's decisionmaking calculus. I also can 
envision several circumstances where we would not want to 
remove that option from the President in the future. I could 
certainly talk about that in a classified venue. But, I 
absolutely believe the current policy is the right policy.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    As you know, those who favor reducing the size of our 
nuclear forces, they often argue that a non-nuclear capability 
can be substituted for nuclear weapons without diminishing our 
ability to credibly hold targets at risk, deter adversaries, 
and assure our allies. A report released last September by the 
Global Zero Group repeatedly makes this argument and claims 
that cyberweapons, in particular, can be substituted for 
nuclear weapons. Do you think cyber operations, their effects 
and their ability to deter hostile activity, is comparable to 
nuclear weapons, or are these extremely different capabilities? 
Is this idea of direct substitution unwise?
    General Dunford. Senator, I don't believe that cyber 
capabilities can be substituted for nuclear capabilities. I 
think we need to be very careful to maintain a safe, effective, 
and credible nuclear deterrent on its own.
    We, as you know, have looked at this through more than 
three or four administrations in a row. We've carefully looked 
at, What does the Nation need to do what I described in my 
opening statement as the most important mission in the 
Department of Defense, and that is to deter a nuclear war? 
We've concluded that the current construct of a triad with a 
robust nuclear command-and-control capability is the most 
effective way to deter a nuclear war. It is also the most 
effective way to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear 
weapons by any potential adversary.
    Senator Fischer. You mentioned that, in order to maintain 
that safe deterrent, we must follow the advice of all previous 
administrations, both Republican and Democrat, all previous 
military leaders, that we maintain that triad?
    General Dunford. Yes, Senator. I have participated in two 
Nuclear Posture Reviews since I've been in this assignment and 
been exposed to the wide body of analytic work that was behind 
those two Nuclear Posture Reviews that came to the very same 
conclusion in two different administrations. It's very 
consistent with the military advice that I provided on both 
occasions.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Moving to a different topic. Late last year, General, you 
characterized the situation in Afghanistan as a stalemate. In 
the time since, we've seen some indications that negotiations 
with the Taliban are showing signs of progress. Do you believe 
the South Asia Strategy is working? What is your view of the 
current security situation?
    General Dunford. Oh, thanks, Senator.
    First, I think we're all cautiously optimistic that there 
is, for the first time, serious inroads made into 
reconciliation. Ambassador Zal Khalilzad just completed a round 
of negotiations with the Taliban. He's back in Washington, DC. 
I'll have an opportunity to speak to him later today, and I 
think we'll see him tomorrow morning. We're encouraged. I can 
tell you, on behalf of Secretary Shanahan, everything that we 
are doing now in the military space, led by General Miller on 
the ground, is in support of Ambassador Khalilzad's efforts.
    I think, on the ground, by and large, the general strategic 
situation has not changed, but General Miller has incorporated 
elements of the strategy to increase the pressure on Taliban 
leadership. We do believe that some of that pressure has 
contributed to the fact that the Taliban are now at the peace 
table for the first time since the war began.
    Senator Fischer. What conditions on the ground do you 
believe are necessary if we're going to be able to see any kind 
of progress in discussions that we have with the Taliban? Can 
you be specific in this setting?
    General Dunford. You know, first, to put pressure on the 
Taliban, we need to continue to provide enabling capability to 
the Afghan forces. That's been in the form of train, advise, 
and assist. We have the right leaders at the right place to 
assist the Afghans. We're also providing combat-enabling 
capability--aviation, intelligence, logistics support--as well. 
Then, most importantly, though, Senator, on the ground is a 
counterterrorism capability, remembering that the reason why 
we're in Afghanistan is to prevent attacks against the American 
people in the Homeland. The combination of support for the 
Afghans to allow them to put pressure on the Taliban also 
creates the conditions for us to have an effective 
counterterrorism presence in South Asia to secure the American 
people.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you. I think it's important to 
always consider conditions on the ground and always keep in 
mind what our goal and mission is.
    Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Shanahan--I'm sorry----
    Senator Shaheen. Shaheen.
    Chairman Inhofe.--Shaheen.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. There we go.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been on 
this Committee for about 8 years now.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. That's right.
    Senator Reed. His Irish----
    Senator Shaheen. Yeah, actually--that's right. It's----
    Senator Reed. His Irish----
    Senator Shaheen.--St. Patrick's Day is coming up, so for 
that I'll be ``Shan.''
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
    Secretary Shanahan, I must say I was quite concerned this 
morning when I read The New York Times story that the 
Department of Defense is pushing back against the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which is trying to set tougher 
standards for Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) 
chemicals. I will just show you. The article was in the Times, 
and the headline here says, ``Pentagon Pushes for Weaker 
Standards on Chemicals Contaminating Drinking Water.'' You and 
I first had a chance to talk about PFAS chemicals and how 
they're affecting the former Pease Air Force Base in 2017. I 
told you about the hundreds of people, children, who had been 
drinking water, and those chemicals now have shown up. No one 
knows what the long-term health impacts of drinking that water 
is.
    There are 401 known military facilities in the United 
States that the Pentagon has admitted have PFAS contamination. 
This Committee worked, 2 years ago, to authorize the first-ever 
health study on PFAS chemicals. I'm just--I'm very concerned 
about the fact that the Department of Defense would be trying 
to reduce the standard that the EPA is setting to try and 
ensure that drinking water is safe, not just for the civilians 
around our military installations, but also for our members of 
the military. I must say, the Air Force has been very 
responsive at Pease and Portsmouth. Under the previous 
Secretary, Deborah James, and the current Secretary, Heather 
Wilson, they have come up, they have put in remediation 
efforts. I think this health study that has been started is 
going to be critical in answering questions for people. But, I 
don't understand how you and the Department of Defense could be 
trying to reduce the standards that affect drinking water for 
literally millions of people around the country.
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I'm not familiar with the 
article this morning. You have my assurance that I'll take a 
look at what the actual situation is, in terms of the 
standards.
    What I am accountable and responsible for is the safety and 
security of our men and women. You have my assurance that we 
will continue to do that. I will look into this matter. I take 
these matters personally, very, very seriously, just as we had 
talked before. I am the advocate to take care of those matters, 
so let me take that for the record, and I will follow up with 
you directly to explain the situation and what we're doing to 
take responsibility.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD) 
supports the use of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act's (CERCLA) long-established, 
risk-based approach to determine when groundwater cleanup is 
needed. The Department is not seeking a different or weaker 
cleanup standard. Using the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) risk assessment process supporting this statute, the 
unacceptable risk to human health for cleanup of groundwater 
with perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic 
acid (PFOA) is approximately 380 parts per trillion (ppt). DOD 
uses EPA's risk assessment guidance to determine whether to add 
the concentrations of PFOS and PFOA together to determine 
CERCLA responsibilities. Additionally, there is a Lifetime 
Health Advisory (LHA) of 70 ppt for PFOS and PFOA. The LHA 
applies to drinking water, but also considers all PFOS/PFOA 
exposures over a lifetime. Therefore, the LHA is not a cleanup 
level.

    Senator Shaheen. Well, I appreciate that. Can you confirm 
or deny whether DOD has urged a lowering of the standard that 
the EPA is trying to put in place?
    Secretary Shanahan. I can't speak to that specific. I will, 
very quickly, find--get an answer back to you.
    Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. I think that's 
something that is important for the entire Committee to know, 
because, as you know, installations across the country are 
affected, and a lot of people's--and we don't yet really know 
what the long-term health impacts are. So, getting those 
answers is very important.
    Can I ask--and I'm not sure who, quite, to direct this 
question to, but, General Dunford, you said that you were going 
to be weighing in on any projects that were put on a list--any 
MILCON projects put on the list to consider delaying because of 
the President's effort to put more money into a border wall. 
Can you tell me what objective criteria that you're looking at 
in trying to come up with those projects?
    General Dunford. Senator, the Secretary will get inputs on 
the impact of the projects from the service secretaries and the 
service chiefs. What I will do is talk about the 
appropriateness of those projects and how they relate to the 
performance of our mission along the border so the Secretary 
will get a wide variety of inputs. Each of the service 
secretaries, I know, will share their assessment of those 
impact of those projects to the Secretary.
    Senator Shaheen. But, a number of those projects would not 
affect the border, would they?
    General Dunford. No----
    Senator Shaheen. I mean, we have a--MILCON projects at the 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard that are very important, I think, to 
our national security, that don't affect the border directly.
    General Dunford. Yeah, sorry, Senator, if I conflated two 
issues. There is the list of projects, and then the service--
that may be used to free money up for projects along the 
border--the service secretaries and the service chiefs will 
provide input to the Secretary on the impact of those projects 
to the services and, as you point out, bases and installations, 
maybe, where those projects would have been executed. What I 
will do, when the decision is made to support the border with 
infrastructure, is assess the relationship of that 
infrastructure to the DOD mission. There are two separate 
processes that affect----
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    General Dunford.--infrastructure and projects.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. General Dunford, how many troops, roughly, 
do we have on the border today?
    General Dunford. Senator, we have approximately 4,000 in a 
title 10 status, and we have approximately 2,000 in a title 32 
status.
    Senator Cotton. How many do we have in the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula?
    General Dunford. We have a total of 28,500 in Korea.
    Senator Cotton. They're all pretty close to the DMZ, but we 
have a lot that are right up on the DMZ, too, correct?
    General Dunford. We do, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. How many do we have today in the Baltics 
and Poland nations that border Russia?
    General Dunford. We have several hundred. Then, of course, 
in Poland we have a constant rotational presence that can be up 
in the thousands. We have brigade combat teams that rotate into 
Poland for training. I was there visiting them in December, 
and, at that point, we had probably about 3,000 forces inside 
of Poland at that time.
    Senator Cotton. Okay. So, we have lots of troops around the 
world on other countries' borders. Does it cause you any 
disquiet that we have troops on our own border?
    General Dunford. It does not cause me disquiet that we have 
troops on the border, Senator.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    Let's turn to the budget. The budget has a very large 
request for the overseas contingency fund, $174 billion. I 
think that's probably about a hundred-billion more now than 
what we've spent this year. That, obviously, is a big patch to 
try to get around the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. There's 
a lot of people on Capitol Hill who are not going to like that. 
But, let's think about it, first, from a military standpoint.
    General Dunford, what does it mean for modernization if the 
opposition to such a large overseas contingency fund results in 
a 1-year continuing resolution?
    General Dunford. Well, Senator, my understanding this year 
would be that we would not have a continuing resolution, that 
we would go back to BCA levels. I'm not given to hyperbole----
    Senator Cotton. So, let's say it's a continuing resolution 
that suspends the BCA levels. So, because of the dispute over 
the overseas contingencies fund, the Congress can't reach a 
budget-cap agreement, and therefore, we have to have a 1-year 
continuing resolution that suspends the caps.
    General Dunford. Yeah, one of the challenges that we've 
had, Senator, over the last few years is, the fact that we have 
not had a budget--last year, we did, but the fact that we have 
routinely not had a budget at the beginning of the year has 
delayed new-starts, and it's been incredibly inefficient in how 
we prioritize and allocate resources throughout the year. The 
three adjectives I use--and I think they're all important--is, 
predictable, sustained, and adequate levels of funding. If we 
had the entire fiscal year, we can be the good stewards that 
you should hold us accountable for being.
    Senator Cotton. Secretary Shanahan, is a dollar of spending 
in the overseas contingency fund equal to a dollar of spending 
in the base budget?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, yes, it is.
    Senator Cotton. Could you elaborate on that a little bit 
more?
    Secretary Shanahan. When I think about the top line and how 
we built the top line, it was a requirements-built budget. So, 
every dollar in the budget is based off a derived requirement. 
So, how we package the money doesn't change how we built the 
budget. So, the color is indifferent to what it is we would put 
the money towards.
    Senator Cotton. If the Congress could reach a budget-cap 
deal, though, and have that money in the base budget, would 
that be better off for the Department of Defense?
    Secretary Shanahan. Be much better off.
    Senator Cotton. Can you explain why that would be better 
off?
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, for a number of reasons. I think 
and I'll ask David to comment on this, but it's in the out 
years. When the base budget gives us the predictability and the 
stability the Chairman just spoke to, that not only gives us, 
internally, the stability to do our planning, but also our 
partners in the industrial base, their investment and their 
planning and their sizing, they have confidence that that 
continuity of money will continue. It----
    Senator Cotton. Yeah, if we could--that's probably a good 
question for the Comptroller. Could you just explain the 
efficiency of spending a dollar in the base budget versus a 
dollar in the OCO budget, especially in the out years?
    Secretary Norquist. So, in the regular year, they follow 
the same congressional oversight; they get spent the same way. 
It's a presentation difference. To be clear to the members, we 
have presented the budget so that that which has historically 
been OCO is distinctly presented from the OCO for base, because 
we want to understand--to be able to do analysis, you need to 
be able to compare. But, when you go to the out years, what 
people look at is, What numbers can we expect in the out years? 
It is easier to project, and we have done that in the past. 
You'll see, in some of our presentations, a different base-and-
OCO mix in the out years when you get to the point where all 
that is OCO is the contingency versus the OCO for base and 
others. But, it helps with planning.
    Senator Cotton. Yeah. I say the reason we're in this bind 
is a law against which I have inveighed for many years, the 
2011 Budget Control Act. I hope that we can get another, and 
final, 2-year cap deal. I do worry, though, that we may be 
heading in the direction of a full-year continuing resolution. 
I would hate to see that for all our men and women in uniform 
out on the front lines.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. I thought Senator Blumenthal was here 
before me, so I'll----
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator----
    Senator Hirono.--defer to him first.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed. Take the ball and run.
    Chairman Inhofe. Go.
    Senator Blumenthal. Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you very 
much for your service. Appreciate your being here, and your 
candid and forthright answers.
    President Trump's budget has been criticized in many ways. 
In my view, it gets a lot wrong, but it got very right the 
commitment to undersea warfare and building three submarines, 
Virginia-class attack submarines, a year in fiscal year 2020. I 
want to thank you and your entire team for their commitment to 
that issue of paramount importance to our future Navy and our 
national defense. It is an area where we have an asymmetric 
advantage that must be preserved. There are others that are 
also important, cyber and air superiority and space, for all 
the reasons that you know. But, I just want to highlight that 
area.
    I want to ask a question that is unrelated to the defense 
budget, but is very much on the minds of many of us, relating 
to the Boeing 737 MAX 8. I know it's not a topic of interest 
today before this proceeding, but it is a topic of interest to 
work that you've done in the past. I'd like to know whether you 
have spoken about the Boeing 737 MAX 8 to anyone in the 
administration, in the Department of Transportation, or in the 
White House.
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I've not spoken to anyone 
regarding the 737 MAX.
    Senator Blumenthal. Have you been briefed at all on any of 
the problems relating to it?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, sir, I have not.
    Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, Are you in favor of an 
investigation that would look into why these defects that 
caused crashes were not known earlier or were not acted upon 
earlier?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I firmly believe we should let 
the regulators investigate the incidents. I would just say, my 
heart goes out, and my condolences, to the families and the 
employees involved in the Lion Air incident and the Ethiopian 
Airline incident.
    Senator Blumenthal. The independent watchdog, Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, recently asked the 
Department of Defense Inspector General to investigate whether 
you have broken any ethics rules by promoting Boeing while you 
served as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Do you support such an 
investigation?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yes, I do.
    Senator Blumenthal. I welcome your support for that 
investigation.
    Other government watchdog groups have looked at records 
indicating that the Department of Defense spent almost $140,000 
at Trump-branded properties in the first 8 months of the Trump 
presidency. More than a third of those payments were made at 
Mar-a-Lago. Some of the payments overlapped with presidential 
trips, but others do not. All the payments--you may be familiar 
with the emoluments lawsuit that I and other members of 
Congress have brought--would violate that domestic emoluments 
clause, potentially, which prevents the President from 
receiving money from the Federal Government, or any other 
payments and benefits, without consent of Congress. Are you 
aware of those expenditures by the Department of Defense?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, I'm not, but I'll ask Secretary 
Norquist.
    Secretary Norquist. I'm not aware of those.
    Senator Blumenthal. Could you give us, in writing, a--an 
accounting of those expenditures by the Department of Defense 
at Trump-branded properties?
    Secretary Norquist. I'll take that for the record, Senator.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense has spent a 
total of $147,607.38 at Trump-branded properties since the 
inauguration. These were all government travel credit card 
purchases by individual employees and members of the military. 
It is not Department of Defense policy to recommend that its 
personnel patronize any particular hotel or restaurant. 
Individual travelers are largely free market players in 
choosing these services. Individual travelers are personally 
responsible for paying the amounts due on their government 
travel credit cards and are provided a per diem lodging 
allotment and a meals and incidentals expense allotment with 
which to make these payments.

    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    As the Acting Secretary of the Department of Defense, I 
have been alarmed by reports that indicate a pattern of 
retaliation against some of the Pentagon reporters, and 
restricted press access to some of the top DOD officials. Are 
you aware of those restrictions? Do you think they're 
appropriate?
    Secretary Shanahan. I'm not aware of any restrictions. In 
fact, I think there's probably, since I've assumed these 
responsibilities, much more interaction and engagement with the 
press.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, if you could--since my time is 
expired, if you could let me know of any restrictions that have 
been imposed?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Blumenthal. For the record, if you would take that 
question.
    Thank you.
    Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Shanahan. There have been no press restrictions 
put in place at the Pentagon and that will not change under my 
leadership. My team and I are committed to upholding this 
promise.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. President--or, thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Sullivan. A lot of Irish mistakes going on here 
this morning.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Sullivan. Maybe we're getting close to St. 
Patrick's Day or something.
    I want to thank you, all you gentlemen, for your service.
    Under Secretary Norquist, I know Senator Perdue's going to 
ask a lot about the audit, but I think that was really good 
work that you were doing.
    General Dunford, I just want to thank you. You know, I know 
that there has been an announcement of a new Chairman, but 
certainly we view you as the Chairman who's done an exceptional 
job, not just as Chairman, but in your entire career. I know 
you've got a lot of work to do left, but I do want to do a 
shout-out to your exceptional service to our Nation.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to ask a couple of questions that 
relate to the President's recent visit to Alaska. He was there, 
coming back from North Korea. Billy Mitchell, who's the father 
of the U.S. Air Force, in a congressional hearing similar to 
this right before World War II, called Alaska ``the most 
strategic place in the world.'' The President kind of echoed 
Billy Mitchell's comments when he was in Alaska visiting with 
our troops. He said, ``Since the second World War, our intrepid 
servicemembers in Alaska have proudly stood as the top cover 
for North America. You are a powerful warning to the world to 
never strike American soil. You are a warning that everybody 
knows about and nobody wants to mess with.'' He went on to 
say--he was at Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson (JBER)--``Next 
year, the 11th Air Force, headquartered right here at JBER, 
will receive the first of 54 brand-new F-35 fighters. You are 
getting very special planes, and you're getting a lot of them. 
That'll make Alaska the home to very 100 fifth-gen fighters. No 
place on the planet Earth will have that much combat fighter 
power. It's because of our strategic location.''
    The President then went on to talk about Alaska's critical 
role in missile defense, ``We are also deploying more than 20 
ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, which will further 
strengthen our missile defense system. So important. Our 
missile defense system is being rebuilt very substantially, and 
we're going to have the latest and greatest here very soon.'' 
So, that was the President, 2 weeks ago, in Alaska.
    Do you agree with these statements by the President, Mr. 
Secretary?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, I do.
    Senator Sullivan. You called North Korea a pressing 
concern. Like the President indicated by his remarks, do you 
believe that the rapid deployment of advanced missile defense 
for America is critical to our readiness, defending from North 
Korea missile attacks?
    Secretary Shanahan. Extremely critical.
    Senator Sullivan. How about the rapid deployment of 100 
fifth-gen fighters that can be defending our troops in Korea, 
because of Alaska's strategic location, within 5 hours?
    Secretary Shanahan. Deployment and sustainment of them is 
vital.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Let me ask, on the issue of allies, Do you agree that China 
and Russia have been trying for years to split us from our 
traditional allies? NATO, Japan, Korea. Hasn't that been a 
strategic goal of them--of those countries?
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, China, in particular, but we see 
this constantly with Russia and NATO, particularly in the 
Balkans. I'd ask the Chairman, maybe, to comment on the recent 
activity in the Balkans.
    Senator Sullivan. Well, let me just----
    General Dunford, do you see that as a strategic goal of the 
Chinese and the Russians, to split us from our allies?
    General Dunford. It's been a very consistent pattern of 
behavior to split us from our allies. More specifically, to 
create doubt, in the minds of our allies, that we can meet our 
alliance commitments.
    Senator Sullivan. So, I appreciate what the President's 
been trying to do, particularly to get our NATO allies to 2 
percent, but there have been press reports about a cost-plus-
50-percent approach. Mr. Secretary, do you know how much the 
Koreans paid for the new Camp Humphreys on the Korean 
Peninsula?
    Secretary Shanahan. I do. Slightly less than a billion 
dollars.
    Senator Sullivan. So, they paid $9.8 billion out of a new 
facility cost, $10.8 billion. Isn't that correct?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
    Senator Sullivan. Ninety-three percent of a U.S. Army base.
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Sullivan. Have you been to Camp Humphreys?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, I haven't.
    Senator Sullivan. You should go there. It's an outstanding 
facility.
    I'm sure you've been, General.
    General Dunford. I have, Senator.
    Senator Sullivan. So, 93 percent, United States Army base 
on Korean soil, paid for by the Koreans. Do we really think--
and maybe those statements--maybe the press reports aren't 
true--cost-plus-50--are we driving our allies away from us in 
the way that Putin and Xi Jinping are probably cheering right 
now?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, Senator, we don't do cost-plus-50 
percent.
    Senator Sullivan. So, those reports in the press, all over 
the press----
    Secretary Shanahan. They're----
    Senator Sullivan.--are incorrect?
    Secretary Shanahan. They're erroneous. We're not going to 
run a business and we're not going to run a charity. The 
important part is that people pay their fair share. Payment 
comes in lots of different forms. Could be contributions, like 
in Afghanistan. But, at the end of the day, people need to 
carry their fair share. Not everyone can contribute. But, it is 
not about cost-plus-50 percent.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Shanahan, the recently released Missile Defense 
Review (MDR) directed a study on operationalizing the Aegis 
Ashore site of the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF), on 
Kauai. You and I discussed this. I have some significant 
concerns about what operationalizing the site would do to PMR's 
ability to meet its testing mission, which I assume you agree 
is important. You can----
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. No, absolutely, Senator, and----
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Secretary Shanahan. The----
    Senator Hirono. I'll get to the question.
    Secretary Shanahan. All right.
    Senator Hirono.--as well as the impact of removing that 
testing capacity from PMRF. So, briefly, could you tell us how 
operationalizing the Aegis Ashore site in Kauai would add to 
our ability to defend Hawaii from missile threats, especially 
as the major missile threat to Hawaii would be an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Aegis Ashore 
is not set up to counter ICBMs?
    Secretary Shanahan. My understanding of the request in the 
MDR is that it's a study to assess taking the test assets and 
operationalizing them. As you well point out, the ground-based 
midcourse defense system that is resident in Alaska defends 
Hawaii. I believe that the study will look at what are other 
threats that may be posed to Hawaii, and how there might be a 
layered defense. But, as you pointed out, the test range there 
is vital capability and capacity for developing our missile 
defense systems.
    Senator Hirono. So, I want to make sure that my concerns 
are in the record. For Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, 
2 weeks ago before this Committee, General O'Shaughnessy, the 
Northern Command Commander, testified that the current 
situation at our southern border is, to quote him, ``not a 
military threat.'' Do you agree, Secretary Shanahan, that the 
situation on the southern border is not a military threat?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, you're referring to General 
O'Shaughnessy's testimony?
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. What I recall from his testimony 
is, he said that it is not a military threat. He said border 
security is national security.
    Senator Hirono. I understand that. But, he said 
specifically that it's not a military threat. I'm asking you 
whether you agree with him that----
    Secretary Shanahan. I----
    Senator Hirono.--it's not a military threat.
    Secretary Shanahan. I agree with him.
    Senator Hirono. General Dunford?
    General Dunford. I agree. It's a security challenge, not a 
military threat.
    Senator Hirono. So, you testified, Secretary--Mr. 
Secretary, that there are 6,000 troops currently deployed at 
our southern border. Can you tell us how long they're going to 
be there?
    Secretary Shanahan. I'd say 30 or 40 percent of them will 
be departing in the next month or so when they complete some of 
their work. I believe we'll probably draw down to between 3,000 
and 4,000.
    Senator Hirono. Is this something that the President is 
indicating to you, or can he say that, ``I want you all to 
remain at the border''?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, this was part of the tasking from 
the Department of Homeland Security. Based on their request to 
us----
    Senator Hirono. From the President.
    Secretary Shanahan. From the Department.
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Let me get on to a matter that is of great concern to 
some--to a lot of us, actually. Secretary Shanahan, in your 
response to Senator Inhofe's question about refueling the 
Truman, you stated that growing the workforce in the shipyard 
is a priority, and the move to not refuel the Truman would save 
$3.4 billion over 5 years. How does canceling 3 years of 
shipyard work grow the workforce there?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. The workforce--when we look at 
what is in the shipyard, so the combination of submarines, new 
carriers, and then maintenance, all that is done in the same 
shipyards, and that workforce moves from project to project. 
So, when we look at the total employment, the actual total 
employment goes up over the period of time in which we're 
building the two carriers.
    Senator Hirono. Frankly, as I talk with some of the people 
from the shipyards, I'm not so sure that that is the case. 
It'll cost about $3.4 billion to refuel the Truman, which, by 
the way, by not refueling, we're only getting about 50 percent 
of the Truman's service life. At the same time, there's $3.6 
billion in the emergency fund which you acknowledge is going to 
be set aside--you want us to authorize setting that aside for 
the wall. So, doesn't it make sense--maybe I should ask this of 
General Dunford--that we should use the money from the 
emergency funding that you're requesting us to set aside for 
the wall for something--i.e., the refueling of the Truman--that 
actually fits with the NDS and that your combatant commanders 
want?
    General Dunford, would you like to respond?
    General Dunford. Senator, I would. I'm not trying to be 
evasive, but I think my responsibility is to identify for the 
Secretary the priorities within our top line, not to identify 
what the top line is, and not to identify how the money within 
the total top line ought to be allocated.
    Senator Hirono. Well, I would say probably if you all had 
your druthers, if you could get some money to refuel the 
Truman, you would do so, wouldn't you?
    General Dunford. Again, if I look at it through the 
military dimension alone, that would be true, but I have to 
acknowledge that the Secretary and the President have broader 
responsibilities than I do.
    Senator Hirono. Yes, like building a vanity wall.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Senator Perdue.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today.
    Mr. Secretary Shanahan, in 1990, Congress passed a law that 
required the administration to produce an audit of the 
Department of Defense. I want to give you guys kudos for 
producing the first-ever audit of the Department of Defense 
last year, in November. Thank you for that. Can you give us an 
update on that? Give us a little idea of what the Department is 
learning from that audit. I know we don't have a clean audit 
yet. Secretary Norquist may want to comment on that. But, I'd 
like to get a brief update about what we're learning, what kind 
of opportunities we have for efficiencies and a better use of 
capital in the military.
    Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Senator.
    First of all, the audit was to look at $2.7 trillion worth 
of assets. So, this was the largest audit ever conducted, 
probably in the history of mankind. We were asked, Would we 
ever do this? Because it had never been done. We made the 
commitment to this Committee that it would be accomplished. We 
always knew that there would be discoveries. But, audits really 
aren't about doing the audits, it's finding the problems, as 
you've pointed out. We specifically focused on identifying 
certain problems that are vital to operating the Department. 
Some of them are financial in benefit, as you described, 
efficiencies, but others are identifying cyber shortfalls. So, 
we used the audit to find efficiencies, vulnerabilities from 
cyber, as well as where there is noncompliance.
    The best part of the audit is, we've identified those 
items, and now we're incorporating all the corrective actions, 
we're building the muscle movement and the habits to 
continuously address those findings and make ourselves better.
    Dave, would you like to talk about the efficiencies?
    Secretary Norquist. Sure. So, I think one of the things you 
point is, before we started the audit, there was sort of two 
potential misconceptions. One is, it was going to be a 
paperwork exercise, and we'd learn nothing. Or the other is, 
we'd open the floors and discover pots of gold hidden 
underneath. Of course, part of the value of getting through is, 
you move past those to discover the tangible value. Let me just 
give a couple of specific examples:
    The first is inventory. We discovered there are certain 
facilities where what they thought they had in inventory did 
not match what they had in inventory. If your responsibility is 
spare parts for airplanes, the accuracy of that inventory 
matters. So, for example, at Hill Air Force Base, uninstalled 
missile motors, they don't just check the quantity, they check 
the condition. They were labeled as unserviceable. When you 
visit them and look at them, they're actually usable. So, you 
wouldn't have needed to order more. That saved us $53 million.
    Other places, you go to Osan and Kadina, 14,000 munitions, 
$2.2 billion, 100 percent accounted for, not a single 
exception.
    What we learned is, there are some places that are doing 
this quite well, and there are others where we need to either 
help them fix their process or give them better attention. But, 
the commanders in the field recognize the direct correct--
connection to mission and readiness. So, I had expected a lot 
of pushback once the audit findings came in, that this was just 
paperwork, but they saw the tangible value. I think, as we move 
forward, the accuracy of the data, adopting more businesslike 
practices, will be tremendously helpful for the Department.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you. How long will it take us to get 
a clean audit, in your estimate?
    Secretary Norquist. I don't know how long the Department, 
because the Department's opinion will be the last of the 
organizations. But, I think, over the next couple of years, 
you'll see either the working capital fund of the Army or the 
Marine Corps start to get to clean opinions, and then you'll be 
able to differentiate between which of the organizations 
missing progress and who needs an extra hearing.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you.
    Chairman Dunford, today we have about 5,000 troops, I 
think, directly in Iraq. Is that correct?
    General Dunford. That's correct, Senator.
    Senator Perdue. So, General Thomas recently before this 
Committee--the combatant commander of SOCOM--said, and I quote, 
``Our Iraqi partners have embraced their sovereign 
responsibility in terms of defending their terrain.'' What are 
we doing--and also, we hear about this potential vote in the 
Parliament in Iraq about asking United States Forces to leave 
Iraq. Then, just this week, we had President Rouhani visiting 
Prime Minister Modi. Can you talk to us a little bit about what 
assumptions we have in this budget with regard to our presence 
in Iraq? How do you see our continuing role there in Iraq?
    General Dunford. Senator, this budget includes an enduring 
presence in Iraq, slightly less than the forces that are on the 
ground right now. What's important is that we do that in 
partnership with the Iraqi Government. So, as the Iraqi 
Government settles, and they're prepared to enter into a 
conversation about what our reliable partnership will be moved 
forward, then our Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense 
will work out the exact numbers to meet the requirements that 
the Iraqi Security Forces will still have to ensure the lasting 
defeat of ISIS, which is--of course, our collective focus.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'm somewhat saddened to have so much of this hearing taken 
up with issues about the wall, because I and all Members of 
this Committee have been very bipartisan. We've always been 
very supportive of the military. But, there are some questions 
I feel that I have to ask.
    Secretary Shanahan, you testified earlier, in answer to 
Senator Reed's question, that you don't know which military 
construction expenditures are going to be canceled in favor of 
this $3.6 billion. Is that correct?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, that's correct.
    Senator King. Why is that correct? You've had a month. I 
find it very hard to believe that there's not a list.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator King. Are you testifying there's no list, there's 
no information you can give us about which construction 
projects are on the chopping block?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. So, what I can tell you are what 
projects aren't on the chopping block. So, for example----
    Senator King. Have you assured Members of the Senate--
individual members, that there are not projects in their States 
that are under consideration?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not.
    Senator King. You have not made any assurances to any 
member of the Senate.
    Secretary Shanahan. I have had questions as to whether 
projects--this has been a blanket statement that's been made. 
There are no projects in this fiscal year that will be 
canceled. That has been a--and anything associated with family 
housing or barracks.
    Senator King. But, wasn't the appropriations, the $3.6 
billion--I mean, that's part of a larger appropriation for 
military construction that's been through this Congress, been 
through the Appropriation Committee--didn't it list projects?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, it doesn't.
    David?
    Secretary Norquist. So, what he's talking about is--the 
projects, when we go to prioritize, when we have the guidance 
from DHS's request, and the Secretary makes a decision--we'll 
look at those that are unobligated, meaning the contracts 
haven't been awarded. If you look at the----
    Senator King. But, those are projects that have been 
identified. This is----
    Secretary Norquist. Absolutely.
    Senator King. You weren't just say, ``We'll give you $50 
billion for military construction.''
    Secretary Norquist. Correct. The projects individually 
identified by the Congress and the committees, correct.
    Senator King. But, you're telling me that the Department 
has not identified which of those projects are going to be 
canceled in--or deferred in order to spend this $3.6 billion on 
a wall.
    Secretary Norquist. We don't know which projects will be 
deferred. I don't know if the Secretary's decision will be $3.6 
billion. He has to determine that it's relevant----
    Senator King. It's your testimony, Mr. Secretary, that you 
have not had conversations with Members of the Senate to assure 
them about the safety of projects in their States.
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, let me be clear on this so it's--
I have told members there are projects and this is writ large--
there are no projects scheduled to be obligated in this fiscal 
year that will be canceled. That's the only information I've 
shared.
    Senator King. Well, I'm confused. I mean, either projects 
are going to be canceled to find $3.6 billion, or they're not. 
Please explain, Mr. Norquist.
    Secretary Norquist. Sure. The projects in military 
construction have up to 5 years to be awarded. So, if you 
receive funding for a project in 2018 or 2019, it might not get 
awarded till 2020 or 2021.
    Senator King. So, you're focusing on the word ``awarded,'' 
but I'm focusing on the fact that these are identified projects 
in the appropriation. Are they not?
    Secretary Norquist. Correct. But, if----
    Senator King. Mr. Chair--Secretary, are you saying that 
there are no identified projects in the appropriation for this 
year that are going to be defunded or deferred because of this 
3.6? I mean, this 3.6 is coming from somewhere.
    Secretary Norquist. So, okay--so, I think you're talking 
past each other. There's a difference between the 2019 
appropriations bill versus projects that are scheduled to be 
awarded, meaning the contract is going to be funded and the 
construction would begin in 2019. Those projects have up until 
the year 2023 or so to be awarded. The reason we put the $3.6 
billion in the request is so that money would be available and 
allow those projects to continue. In many cases----
    Senator King. All right. Let me put it another way. I know 
of projects in New England that were funded in this bill. Can I 
be assured that they're safe, they're not going to be deferred 
or canceled to find this 3.6? I mean, it sounds--something's 
not computing here. The 3.6 is coming from somewhere. It's 
coming from projects that were authorized and appropriated by 
this Congress. You won't tell me what they are.
    Secretary Norquist. The 3.6 will come from projects--well, 
assuming the Secretary signs off--I don't know the number of 
the requirement yet--but, assuming the Secretary signs off, the 
3.6 would, in fact, come from projects previously authorized 
and appropriated by Congress. We would look to not--we would 
not touch those that dealt with family housing or military 
construction. We would prioritize----
    Senator King. I'm going to ask my question once, Mr.----
    Secretary Norquist. Sure.
    Senator King.--Secretary. Have you spoken to any Members of 
the Senate to assure them that projects in their State are not 
going to be affected by this policy?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, I have not, Senator.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I'm very concerned about this. I don't think 
we're getting full information. I intend to follow up.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator McSally.
    Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I do want to follow up on that, as we did have a 
conversation, and there are four projects in Arizona that are 
appropriated in fiscal year 2019, and you broadly said those 
fiscal year 2019 projects, across all the country, will not be 
impacted by this, just to be clear. Correct, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Shanahan. That is correct.
    Senator McSally. Thank you.
    Senator King. How----
    Senator McSally. I just wanted to clear that up.
    Senator King. How does that square with what he just told 
me?
    Senator McSally. Well, you rebound if you get more time, 
sir, but I've got some other questions to ask. I just wanted to 
clear that up, since it seemed that may cause some confusion 
about some conversations that we had.
    I want to get to a different topic. In 2017, there were 
6,769 sexual assaults reported across our entire military, 
likely thousands of others that were not reported. These blue-
on-blue crimes are unacceptable. They're harming our warriors, 
and they're degrading good order and discipline and military 
readiness. Many steps have been taken by the military over the 
last years, and this body. Over 100 legislative actions. But, 
it's not enough. There are thousands of our warriors in 
military readiness that's been harmed by these crimes. I 
believe commanders must be educated, equipped, and held 
accountable, and still be responsible for the decisions, the 
culture, and the discipline regarding sexual assault. However, 
something needs to change. ``Insanity'' is doing the same thing 
over and over again, expecting a different result. Perhaps we 
need to take a fresh look at this issue.
    I've spent a lot of time thinking about this, and more so 
over the last week. We have weeks, now, before the NDAA will be 
marked up before this Committee. I am fully locked on, like a 
missile, on this target. I want to be working with you and the 
military services to take a fresh look at this. I've asked the 
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff to start with 
a summit with the Air Force. But, it's not just the Air Force, 
it's across our military services.
    So, can I get your commitment that we are going to partner 
on this, and we're going to take a fresh look and tackle this 
over the next 45 days together, which includes being responsive 
to my questions, maybe forming a team of experts and resources 
to be able to really dial in as to what's working, what's not 
working, across the spectrum of prevention and response and 
prosecution? We can tackle this together, come up with some 
ideas, impact on the NDAA, culminating with a tank meeting with 
all the leaders there, with myself, and solve this thing 
together. Can I get your commitment you'll work me--with me on 
that?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, you have my commitment.
    Senator McSally. Thank you.
    Chairman Dunford?
    General Dunford. Absolutely, Senator.
    Senator McSally. Okay, great. Let's follow up immediately 
on that. I appreciate it.
    I want to shift to a different topic. I was over on the 
Korean Peninsula, less than a year ago, visiting the troops, 
and I will tell you, I am so proud of them and their ability to 
fight tonight, and everything that's been done by our military 
and the services to make sure that we were using all elements 
of national power to crank up the pressure with a deterrent 
capability to keep the pressure on North Korea for the 
negotiations and to thwart the threat that they are.
    I want to get some clarity, Secretary Shanahan, on 
exercises. As we know, military exercises, every single day. I 
mean, every day, you--you're going out with your squadron, your 
unit, and you are making sure that you're ready to fight 
tonight. But, people rotate in and out over there every year. 
So, large-scale crisis-response exercises are critical for us 
to have that decisionmaking process for key leaders at the 
highest level. So, can you just clarify where we are with 
military exercises on the Peninsula, and what the 
decisionmaking process was on that?
    Secretary Shanahan. Right. So, Senator, the exercises that 
we have on the Peninsula, which are ongoing as we speak, and 
the Minister of Defense for South Korea, ROKs [the Republic of 
Korea], will come see me at the end of this month, and we'll 
discuss progress and the findings of those exercises. They were 
redesigned this year for three things: support the peace 
process, the expanded responsibilities of the South Koreans, in 
terms of operational control, and to----
    Senator McSally. Okay.
    Secretary Shanahan.--maintain foundational readiness. 
Underlying all of this is maintaining the readiness we need if 
we're called to fight tonight.
    Senator McSally. Right.
    Secretary Shanahan. We've sustained that readiness.
    Senator McSally. Okay. So, are you--can you say that, with 
the adjustment--I understand turning the volume down so it's 
not being so provocative, but those higher-level operational 
crisis exercises, the command-post level and beyond, 
decisionmaking for new leaders, is really important----
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator McSally.--especially as they rotate so quickly over 
there. Are--can you assure us that there will be no degradation 
in the readiness----
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator McSally.--to fight tonight, based on adjustments to 
the exercises?
    Secretary Shanahan. I have had personal conversations with 
General Abrams, and I can assure you there will not be 
degradation. We will have the capability we need.
    Senator McSally. Okay. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Peters.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to our witnesses today.
    Before--Assistant--or Secretary Shanahan, before I ask you 
a few questions, I just want to go back and get a little bit 
more clarification from some of the answers that I've heard to 
Senator King and Senator Hirono.
    I noticed, in the budget, there is a line for $9.2 billion 
for emergency----
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Peters.--for fiscal year 2020. Is that $9.2 billion 
that you're asking Congress to appropriate related to the 
emergency declaration that the President has made?
    Secretary Shanahan. $7.2 billion of it is, and $2 billion 
is for hurricane.
    Senator Peters. So, you're asking Congress to appoint--or 
to appropriate $7 billion to deal with what the President has 
declared an emergency. I want to be clear about that.
    Secretary Shanahan. Correct.
    Senator Peters. So, the Senate, as you know, will be voting 
later today on a resolution of disapproval relating to this 
emergency declaration. Is it safe to say you would revise the 
request for national emergency funding if a majority of the 
House and the Senate disapproves of the emergency declaration?
    Secretary Shanahan. I will stick to the budget that we've 
submitted.
    Senator Peters. But, if we don't approve an emergency 
declaration, why would you come and ask us for money for an 
emergency declaration?
    Secretary Shanahan. I will work with this Congress to get 
the right top line.
    Senator Peters. So, you will look at that and revise it, if 
necessary, if we disapprove it.
    Secretary Shanahan. I'll work with the Committee and I'll 
work with the Congress to get the right top line.
    Senator Peters. Could you describe the Department's 
response to the request for assistance that DHS sent a few 
weeks ago, and perhaps provide some characterization of the 
specifics in that request for us? I also serve on the Homeland 
Security Committee. I think it would be helpful to know.
    Secretary Shanahan. Right. Which request for assistance is 
this?
    Senator Peters. On the southern border.
    Secretary Shanahan. It's just--is this--yeah, there's been 
a number of them.
    Senator Peters. Could you give me--could you characterize 
what the--what they have been asking for and what--your 
response?
    Secretary Shanahan. Right. I'll--do you want to----
    General Dunford. Sure.
    Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
    General Dunford. Senator, I'll take that, if you don't 
mind. The----
    Senator Peters. Yes.
    General Dunford.--the most recent request requested our 
engineers to reinforce some of the infrastructure along the 
border. We also have some soldiers that are supporting the 
detect-and-monitor mission by manning cameras that allow 
Customs and Border Protection to see what activity is ongoing 
around the border. Those are the two primary tasks. That's, of 
course, in addition to the National Guard sustain mission, 
which provides rotary-wing aircraft for surveillance, some 
logistics support, some planning support, and some intelligence 
along the border.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Secretary Shanahan, at your confirmation hearing for the 
position of Deputy Secretary, I asked you about what was 
previously known as the ``third offset'' that essentially was 
using technology to improve military tactics and strategy. We 
had a further conversation about that in my office, and I 
appreciate that. Your predecessor as Deputy Secretary, Bob 
Work, championed the initiative and sought out ways to use 
technology to create and maintain an advantage over our 
competitors, very similar to what was envisioned in the 
National Defense Strategy.
    Well, now that you've been inside the Department, I'm going 
to ask this question again. Now, as an insider--before, I asked 
that, prior to your appointment--what is your view on how 
technology's going to impact warfare? In particular, give me a 
sense of how you view the most disruptive technologies to some 
of our legacy weapon systems that are pretty much ingrained in 
DOD culture, also tend to be incredibly expensive. But, as 
we're thinking about this budget going forward, that could 
change very dramatically. Give me your sense and how that is 
reflected in this budget.
    Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely. To Bob Work's credit on the 
third offset, that was the underpinning for many of the 
concepts that we're requesting funding for this year. So, in 
terms of the four major disruptive capabilities, they are 
space, missiles, cyber, and autonomy. So, take, for example, 
missiles on--in answering your question: low cost, cost-
imposing, and attritable versus very expensive, manned assets. 
Same can be said for cyber, all the effects that you can create 
with cyber. When we think about the trade in cost, terms of 
being able to deploy forces, versus effects--significant cost 
imposition. Space, you know, when we think about having 
unfettered access to the world, outer space provides us that 
environment.
    Senator Peters. So, when you're talking about some--I--my 
time is running low, but you're talking about some of this 
disruptive and autonomy. So, when you think about legacy 
systems of pilots and airplanes and aircraft carriers, things 
of that nature, all of those things we should be looking at----
    Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely. I mean, when we think about 
the challenge to find pilots, that challenge goes away. When we 
think about surface/subsurface and the capability to build for 
lower cost, hide and suspend for longer periods of time, these 
are real enablers. The cost to support them is significantly 
less.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
    Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being with us today.
    Mr. Shanahan, I want to move a little bit of a different 
direction as we talk about budget and priorities. I'm from 
Tennessee. I spent 16 years in the House and represented a 
district that was home to Fort Campbell and many of the 
enlisted men and women that are there, the 101st, 160th, 5th 
Division, and have really developed a good working relationship 
with those families and the enlisted, and also with command 
teams that have been there that have done such a terrific job. 
We have some of those that have served at Fort Campbell that 
are members of our team. So, we hear a good bit from them, and 
hear about their concerns. I join Senator Cotton in being 
tremendously concerned about the Budget Control Act from 2011, 
with the sequester that was placed on our military. That has 
not served us well. My hope is that we're going to be able to 
solve that situation and address some of the problems that it 
has brought forward.
    But, one of the things I hear from, especially, our Special 
Operations guys is their desire to make certain that 5G 
technologies are available to them, and that those networks are 
secure. I appreciate that in your testimony you mentioned three 
of your priorities as cyber, hypersonics, and space. We have 
had our COCOM [combatant command] hearings and have talked some 
about the placement of these technologies so that we're 
fighting 21st-century warfare and that we're not just focused 
on today.
    I'll tell you, one of the things that I've heard a little 
bit of scuttlebutt about that causes me some concern is that 
maybe some of the fighter pilots from Air Force are not that 
excited about having a Space Force that would function there as 
Air Force. So, I want to give you a couple of minutes to talk 
about Space Force, how you see it standing up, how you expect 
to deploy it, how you intend to protect the funding for that so 
that we are looking forward as well as tending to today.
    Secretary Shanahan. Thank you, Senator.
    The--with 2 minutes, I'll go as quickly as I can.
    Senator Blackburn. Good.
    Secretary Shanahan. I'll summarize it this way. Our Nation, 
our $19 trillion economy, and our military, we're carrying too 
much risk, given the vulnerability we have in space now that 
space is a contested domain. The Space Force represents a 
chance to accelerate our ability to respond to that threat 
environment. The Space Force really gets after three items in 
order for us to reduce that risk:
    The first is, the assets that are in space were never 
designed to be resilient and deal with the threats that exist 
today. It's a bit like, ``You can't pick your parents.'' We 
need to design new capability and put it up on orbit as quickly 
as possible. Space Force recommends a Space Development Agency 
(SDA), which really gets at cutting the redtape to do 
development and tapping into commercial space technology, save 
costs, save time.
    The second is, stand up the Space Command, much like we've 
done Cyber Command, so that we can focus, have dedicated focus 
to provide the rules of engagement, authorities, and the tools 
to defend our assets.
    The third is, bring together and train. Make space a 
dedicated profession, where we can provide this cadre of 
professionals the right training so that they have the ability 
to have a career that leads to----
    Senator Blackburn. Well done in a summary. Now give me 15 
seconds on great-power competitiveness with China in this 
arena.
    Secretary Shanahan. I think we've been ignoring the problem 
too long.
    Senator Blackburn. Well done.
    Yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blackburn.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, to our witnesses, for being here.
    So, the administration has submitted a national defense 
budget request for $750 billion for next year. That is a pretty 
big number even by the Department's own standards. In fact, the 
budget rules govern how much money is available for defense 
spending, is set at $576 billion, which is still a huge sum. 
But, you're requesting $174 billion more than the amount that 
is allowed by law; $165 billion for the overseas contingency 
operations, OCO, and another $9 billion for emergency funds for 
the wall. Now, some of the things in the DOD budget request 
seem to me to point in the right direction--more investments in 
research, for example. We need to have a much larger 
conversation about whether these budget caps make sense, and 
how defense and nondefense priorities should stack up. But, 
right now, I just want to dig into how you got your numbers so 
all of the nondefense budget experts out there can understand 
the tricks the administration is using to justify skyrocketing 
defense spending.
    Secretary Shanahan, the Department proposes to get around 
the budget rules by requesting that 165 billion extra dollars 
in the OCO account. The amount in the OCO account is not 
counted toward statutory budget caps. Is that correct?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yes.
    Senator Warren. Okay. So, let's dig in a bit, then, on OCO. 
As the cost to fight the war in Iraq and Afghanistan began to 
increase in the early 2000s, Congress had to pass emergency 
supplemental appropriations every year. So, in 2009, President 
Obama established OCO so that they can set aside funds for this 
and other related operations. Because those funds are for 
emergencies, they don't count toward the overall limits in 
defense spending, as you just said. This year's OCO request is 
a 140 percent increase from the $69 billion you requested for 
OCO in last year's budget. So, tell me, did the cost of 
supporting our overseas operations suddenly increase by 140 
percent last year?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, they did not.
    Senator Warren. They did not. Okay. In fact, the last time 
OCO account was even close to the amount you've proposed for 
next year was in 2010, when we had approximately 100,000 troops 
deployed in Afghanistan and another 50 to 100,000 troops in 
Iraq. Today, we have about 21,000 troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Syria, combined, a number that's largely unchanged from 
last year. So, let me ask another question. Since last year, 
has the Department deployed a large number of troops to fight a 
war someplace other than Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan?
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, no, we have not.
    Senator Warren. Okay. So, the actual cost of supporting 
operations overseas did not increase by 140 percent, and we 
haven't launched a war someplace else, triggering that kind of 
emergency. Yet, you're asking for $165 billion for, quote, 
``overseas contingency operations.'' I just want to be 
absolutely clear so the taxpayer understands. You're requesting 
funding in OCO to fund activities that have nothing to do with 
the reason that OCO was established. Is that correct?
    Secretary Shanahan. What we've done this year is, we've 
taken our base budget from last year, per the Chairman's 
blueprint, grown our budget 3 percent in real growth.
    Senator Warren. Okay. I appreciate it. But, you can just 
answer my question.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Warren. That is----
    Secretary Shanahan. The----
    Senator Warren. You're requesting funding in OCO to fund 
activities that have nothing to do with the reason that OCO was 
established. Is that right?
    Secretary Norquist. So, Senator, to make it transparent, if 
you go through the budget material, we've got it in two groups. 
One is what you think of as traditional OCO, and the other is 
clearly labeled ``OCO for base.'' That's the distinction 
you're----
    Senator Warren. So, I----
    Secretary Norquist.--looking for.
    Senator Warren. You can call it whatever you want. We know 
why OCO was established. My question is, Are you asking for 
this increase for the reasons that OCO was originally 
established? It's an easy question.
    Secretary Shanahan. No----
    Senator Warren. Secretary Shanahan?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, we're asking for a $750 billion top 
line, and we want to work with this Committee to get the 
appropriation and authorizations proper.
    Senator Warren. You're asking for an increase in OCO for 
purposes that OCO was not established. In fact, your own staff 
said so yesterday. They said you're asking at least for $98 
billion for things that have nothing to do with contingency 
operations. I'm not quite sure why you can't say that.
    What we're really talking about here is the establishment 
of a slush fund to hide what's happening with defense spending 
and get it out from underneath the statutory caps. I think it's 
time to stop this business of more, more, more----
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Warren.--for the military.
    Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
    Senator Warren. Establishing a slush fund like this, and 
saying, ``Oh, because we put it in two different accounts''----
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Warren.--somehow changes the fact is just not true. 
We just need to be honest with the American people about how 
much we're spending here.
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, we have provided, in our 
justification books, 100-percent transparency. There is no 
slush fund. We can take the money and tie it back to the 
National Defense Strategy and what we need to defend America.
    Senator Warren. I have----
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator----
    Senator Warren.--no doubt that you see this----
    Chairman Inhofe.--Warren.
    Senator Warren.--is more, more, more.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
    Let me start by saying that--first, a note just about Fort 
Leonard Wood. I'm looking forward to seeing the budget 
justification books next week so we can see the details here 
about the budget, itself. I'm anticipating it will include an 
increase for the Army's Chemical School at Fort Leonard Wood, 
in Missouri, my home State. These are professional soldiers, of 
course, who train and respond to an adversary's use of chemical 
weapons on the battlefield. Four of the five threats, I'm 
struck, called out in the National Defense Strategy have a 
chemical weapons capability. By investing in places like Fort 
Leonard Wood, we ultimately, of course, save lives on the 
battlefield. So, I'm very proud of the work that they do, and 
look forward the Department's continuing support for their 
important mission.
    Let me just shift and ask about our challenge in emerging 
technologies, cyber, and space; in particular, China's 
investment in those areas, and our eroding advantage. I was 
struck, Mr. Secretary, by a comment that you make in your 
written testimony. You say, ``Some U.S. companies have voiced 
ethical qualms about working with DOD to develop advanced 
technology. In some cases, even terminating relationships, 
often while continuing to work with China.'' What are we 
talking about, here?
    Secretary Shanahan. I think we're talking about Google and 
their support to China, and their lack of support to the 
Department of Defense.
    Senator Hawley. So, Google has refused to work with the 
Department of Defense, actually was under contract, weren't 
they, with the Department of Defense? Tell us about that.
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, they haven't refused, they just 
have said they're not going to continue to do business with the 
Department of Defense on certain contracts.
    Senator Hawley. But, they are doing business in China in a 
way that benefits, you're saying, our Chinese competitors.
    Secretary Shanahan. Correct.
    Senator Hawley. Say more about that.
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, the interesting thing--and this 
is why China is--this is such an important issue for our 
country. You have this--the fusion of commercial business with 
military is significant, $5 trillion of their economy is state-
owned enterprises, so the technology that is developed in the 
civil world transfers to the military world. It's a direct 
pipeline. Not only is there a transfer, there's also systemic 
theft of U.S. technology that also facilitates even faster 
development of emerging technology.
    Senator Hawley. So, I just want to make sure that I 
understand exactly what you're saying. You're telling me that 
Google, an American company, supposedly, is refusing to work 
with the Department of Defense, but is doing work with China, 
in China, in a way that at least indirectly benefits the 
Chinese Government. Is that correct?
    Secretary Shanahan. I haven't heard the word ``refuse,'' 
but there's a lack of willingness to support DOD programs.
    Senator Hawley. General, you're nodding your head. Do you 
want to weigh in on this?
    General Dunford. No, Senator. I'm nodding a head on exactly 
the point that you made, that the work that Google is doing in 
China is indirectly benefiting the Chinese military. I've been 
very public on this issue, as well. In fact, the way I 
described it to our industry partners is, ``Look, we're the 
good guys, and the values that we represent, in the system that 
we represent, is the one that will allow, and has allowed, you 
to thrive.'' That's the way I've characterized it. So, I was 
just nodding that what the Secretary was articulating is the 
general sense of all of us as leaders. We watch with great 
concern when industry partners work in China, knowing that 
there is that indirect benefit. Frankly, indirect may be not a 
full characterization of the way it really is. It's more of a 
direct benefit to the Chinese military.
    Senator Hawley. I just want to underscore this for the 
record so that we are absolutely, perfectly, 100-percent clear, 
here, that Google, an American company based in this country--
again, supposedly an American company--is doing work in China 
that directly or indirectly benefits the Chinese Government at 
a time of increased peer competition with this country. We are 
in a struggle with the Chinese Government over whether or not 
they're going to become a regional, and maybe global, hegemon 
with values very different from ours, certainly values that do 
not favor freedom in the world, and we have an American company 
that does not want to do work with our Defense Department, 
which is, you know, one thing, but they are happy to help the 
Chinese, at least--the Chinese Government, that is--the Chinese 
military--at least indirectly. I think that's just 
extraordinary.
    In my time remaining, Mr. Secretary, tell us what, from 
your perspective, we need to do to maintain our competitive 
advantage on AI and these emerging technologies. What do we 
need to see, going forward?
    Secretary Shanahan. We need to--well, two things. One, we 
need to continue to invest. This year's budget doubles our 
investment in artificial intelligence. Then the string that 
you're really pulling on, the talent is in this country. We 
need to use the talent in this country. The talent in this 
country needs to support our great-power competition.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Shanahan, I'd like to follow up with the line of 
questioning from my colleague from Arizona, Senator McSally. 
You know, I think there's no doubt we'll continue to see 
tensions in North Korea, on the Korean Peninsula, after the 
latest breakdown in talks between the President and Chairman 
Kim. How do you plan to use your position as Acting Secretary 
of Defense to reassure our allies in the region? We know our 
great friends, the Republic of Korea and Japan, have a much 
more tense and complicated relationship with each other. For 
example, there were questions about them sharing non-combatant 
evacuation plans (NEO) plans with one another. What do you plan 
to do to work on bridging that gap?
    Secretary Shanahan. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    That gap could be bridged at--well, I'll say, at three 
different levels. There's a relationship level. I have 
relationships with the Defense Minister for Japan as well as 
the Republic of Korea. So, it's important that I play a role in 
keeping the two countries together there. Exercises that we'll 
do together. Technology that we'll develop together, 
particularly in the area of missile defense. As you well know, 
a sizable investment by the government of Japan is to put Aegis 
Ashore as well as develop other, I'll say, defensive 
capabilities in the event of an escalating situation on the 
Peninsula.
    Senator Duckworth. So, you had answered Senator McSally, 
saying that there would be--not be any degradation of our 
relationship and readiness as it pertains to military 
exercises. But, are you changing the nature of those exercises 
to, for example, simply being tabletop exercises or just 
computer exercises, as opposed to how they've been conducted in 
the past?
    General Dunford. Senator, if you don't mind me taking that 
question.
    Senator Duckworth. Yes, of course.
    General Dunford. The way I would describe it--and you're 
quite familiar with this--what we have changed--and I want to 
be clear--is, we've changed the method of training to focus on 
the mission-essential tasks that each of the levels of command 
needs to be proficient in. What we haven't changed is the 
outcome and the readiness to fight tonight. So, the way you 
characterize it is, in part, true, that some of our large-scale 
exercises are done, now, with simulation Command Post Exercise 
(CPX) and so forth. What's really important to highlight is 
that, at the battalion and the squadron level and below, 
there's been no changes to training and the ability of our men 
and women on the Peninsula to train in the integration of 
combined arms. We've made adjustments to our large-scale 
exercises. What we've done is--very quickly, I'll just try to 
highlight--we've shifted from certifying our readiness, based 
on the conduct of an exercise, to a much more complex system, 
that General Abrams and Admiral Davidson have developed, which 
identified all the mission-essential tasks for every level of 
command in making sure that we have a proven method of 
developing proficiency.
    Another thing I can assure you is that, as soon as General 
Abrams and Admiral Davidson have any concerns about their 
ability to maintain readiness--and right now we're executing 
their plan--they know that they come right back to the 
Secretary and I, and we will work with the Koreans to make 
adjustments. But, I can assure you, from a military perspective 
right now, I am quite confident in our 2019 training plan, and 
confident that that will deliver the level of readiness that we 
have historically done--accomplished in large-scale exercises.
    Senator Duckworth. So, you're saying that, for brigade and 
below, or battalion and below, there's no change as far as the 
leaders that see what's happening?
    General Dunford. That is correct. That's an important 
point, Senator. That is correct.
    Senator Duckworth. So, above brigade, that's where the 
changes----
    General Dunford. That's where the----
    Senator Duckworth.--have taken place.
    General Dunford.--changes are. In some cases, it's dialing 
down the volume of the exercises. As you know well, those 
exercises had two purposes; one was deterrence, one was 
proficiency. I'm confident right now that our exercise program 
does deliver the latter, proficiency in our mission-essential 
tasks.
    Senator Duckworth. Have those exercises taken into account 
the role of logistics in sustaining any type of a fight that we 
would have to engage in? I do think that we focus on what's 
happening on the Peninsula, but sustaining that fight long-term 
and then getting whatever we need, resources, there is a real 
challenge. The Pacific--I don't think people realize how vast 
the Pacific Ocean is.
    General Dunford. Right.
    Senator Duckworth. Can you speak a little bit to the 
logistical challenges?
    General Dunford. Senator, I can. In fact, this past year, 
we did what we call a Korea Readiness Review, and we played out 
the first 60 days of a Korean conflict, to include the detailed 
logistics planning that was necessary to support operations for 
the first 60 days. We, needless to say, learned a lot during 
that exercise, but our exercises absolutely include the 
logistics factors associated with our ability to conduct 
operations.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    Our National Defense Strategy outlines a shift in primary 
focus from countering violent extremism to great-power 
competition. As Acting Secretary, Mr. Shanahan, what's, 
specifically, do you plan to do in areas perhaps less obviously 
impacted by either of these priorities? For example, SOUTHCOM 
or AFRICOM.
    Secretary Shanahan. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM are critical, in 
terms of defeating ISIS, dealing with regional threats. The 
Chairman, in his role as the integrated global campaign 
planner, we make sure that the risk in those areas, and the 
resources required to manage, are properly delivered, both to 
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Cramer.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks, to all of you, for your service and for your candor 
today.
    Now, as I listened to Senator Fischer talk about and ask 
about nuclear modernization, I wanted to follow up on that. 
Then I heard Senator Blackburn talk about Space Force, and I 
wanted to follow up on that. So, I'm going to try to combine 
the two as quickly as I can, because I think there are some 
similarities.
    I'll start with you, Secretary Shanahan. You know, many of 
the critics of nuclear modernization imply or state 
emphatically that we can't afford that, that it's unaffordable, 
that, in fact, we have to choose, in essence, between nuclear 
or conventional modernization. Yet, as I look at the budget, 
historically, and as I look at the budget, going forward, I 
see, for the most part, a peaking of modernization costs for 
the nuclear force at under 6 and a half percent in year 2029. 
Can we afford not to do it? I mean, it seems to me that that's 
a pretty efficient use of deterrence dollars, and I would just 
like to hear you elaborate a little bit on whether we can 
afford it.
    Secretary Shanahan. I'll ask David to talk about the 
affordability, but, as our competitors are building up their 
nuclear capabilities--this is setting aside budget--as our 
competitors are building up their nuclear capability, or 
modernizing, we should not unilaterally disarm. I think we have 
to start there.
    Terms of timing of the budget, David, maybe you could speak 
to that.
    Secretary Norquist. Sir, the--Senator, the numbers you used 
are correct. The peak is about 6 and a half percent. When you 
realize that in--normal maintenance runs 3 percent. Right? 
That's--that increase, for the amount of peace and stability 
that that deterrent provides us against what is probably the 
most catastrophic threat we can face, I think is a reasonable 
and sound approach, and something that you'd want to be very 
careful about changing, because of the stability that it 
provides globally and for the safety of the American people.
    Senator Cramer. Okay. So, then let's move to space, because 
I think I have a similar line of questioning as it relates to 
the affordability of it. I understand concerns. I could--it's 
easy to see why somebody that has a particular system within 
the Air Force might feel threatened by a competing--you know, 
competing for limited dollars. Secretary Shanahan, I think 
you've referenced it, at least to some degree, and I'd like to 
have you elaborate even a little more on the efficiencies that 
can be found. Clearly, space is a realm that we're competing 
in. Clearly, you're--we need to probably ramp up some of our 
capabilities there. As you pointed out earlier, you know, we 
need--we don't--we can't pick our parents. The resiliency isn't 
what it needs to be. Yet, maybe you could speak to--and maybe 
this would be a good one for the Comptroller, as well--to the 
efficiencies that will be found in the process of creating a 
Space Force as a sixth branch.
    Secretary Shanahan. I think, on the efficiency side--and 
I've had conversations with Senator Reed on this subject, and 
many in Congress are experts in this area--we can't build a 
bureaucracy. In standing up the Space Force, we have a chance 
to build it from the bottom up. I think we'll build a 
bureaucracy if we build it from the top down. So, it's an 
opportunity to build it correctly.
    The biggest effort needs to be at retiring the risk. We're 
too vulnerable, and, you know, it's a little bit like the 
nuclear conversation. I actually think it's going to cost us 
less. I mean, we've--I've had lots of arguments about whether 
that's true or not. I think, in--at the end of the day--I mean, 
what we hear quite a bit is, ``This is change versus the status 
quo.'' This is a fundamental structural change. But, in that 
structural change, we'll get after reducing our vulnerability, 
and I really believe, the end of the day, have more capability 
and more money, terms of, we won't have spent as much.
    Senator Cramer. Well, and maybe speak a little bit to the 
realigning of existing space programs as part of that 
efficiency, if that makes sense.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. No, absolutely.
    The--you know, when we talk about standing up a new 
service--this is a very small service. You know, you think 
about 15,000 to, you know, 18,000 people, so it's really not 
about a large group being consolidated. This is really talking 
about, How do you consolidate development efforts within the 
Department? So, how do we take what's being done--you know, the 
Army's going to undertake a brand-new modernization program. 
How do we combine that with work going on in the Air Force, 
with what's going on in the Navy, and then integrate it into 
all the combatant commands? This is really about doing it at a 
DOD level. These are, like, once-in-a-generation opportunities. 
Since we must address the contested environment, and we're 
going to make significant changes, why not do it at an 
integrated level for the Department instead of, you know, in 
each service?
    Senator Cramer. Well, your answers were as efficient as I 
expect the Space Force to be. Thank you very much.
    Secretary Shanahan. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    The Minority Leader had a question, and has a scheduling 
problem, so let's go ahead and recognize him----
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe.--and then we'll get to the rest of them, 
if that's acceptable.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're very 
gracious. I appreciate it.
    I'm trying to clarify the debate that Senator King 
initiated about projects at risk. I'm going to take the really, 
really dangerous path for a social scientist to try to break it 
down into simple numbers, particularly dealing with an engineer 
and a numbers person. Bear with me.
    Let's say X equals the authorized MILCON for the last 5 
years. That's the universe. Y equals the unobligated MILCON 
projects after September 30th of this year. X minus Y, or Z, 
equals those projects that are at risk of being captured for 
the wall, with some limited exceptions. No public housing, et 
cetera. You know what that Z is right now. You have the list. 
Is that correct, Mr. Shanahan? You have the ability to create 
the list.
    Secretary Shanahan. Let me make sure I understand what Z 
is. I'm going to look at my friend, here.
    Senator Reed. Okay.
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary Shanahan. So, Z is----
    Senator Reed. Z----
    Secretary Shanahan. We know what that universe of projects 
is.
    Secretary Norquist. The--if the question is, What is the 
universe of either unobligated projects or unobligated projects 
after a certain date? Those are things that can be generated, 
yes.
    Senator Reed. Exactly. Those projects, with the exceptions 
you've mentioned--family housing and some others--are all 
subject to being taken away to fund this wall. They might not 
all be taken, but they are the projects at risk, correct?
    Secretary Shanahan. That's the pool.
    Senator Reed. I would like that list today, Mr. Secretary.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    See Appendix A on page 560.

    Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
    Secretary Shanahan. Absolutely.
    Senator Reed. So, we'll be waiting. I'll be--my fingers----
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Reed.--and we'll have that list. So we'll--everyone 
will know is at--what project they have to worry about----
    Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
    Senator Reed.--going forward.
    Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
    Senator Reed. Is that it?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Thank you for the clarification.
    Senator Reed. That's a deal?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. That's a deal.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Can I assume that there are 
congressionally appropriated fiscal year 2019 projects that 
received military construction funding that are going to be in 
that list?
    Secretary Norquist. Because of 5-year monies, yes.
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah. I can't tell you, Mr. Chairman, how 
inappropriate I think that is. Congress has the power of the 
purse. This is wrong. This is abusive. We should do something 
about it, all of us, because I guarantee you, if you let this 
happen, it will happen under the next President and the next 
President, and you won't always like how this money gets spent.
    Acting Secretary, how much do you know about PFAS?
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, I understand the nature of the 
chemical. So, when we talk about it being a fire retardant and 
being used over--extensively and militarily and commercially, 
and the issue of it being in the water supply.
    Senator Heinrich. So, have you had a chance to read the 
article in The New York Times this morning with the headline, 
``Pentagon Pushes for Weaker Standards on Chemicals 
Contaminating Drinking Water''?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, I haven't had a----
    Senator Heinrich. Okay.
    Secretary Shanahan.--chance to read the paper.
    Senator Heinrich. I would ask that you read that.
    Secretary Shanahan. Sure.
    Senator Heinrich. I hope it's highly inaccurate.
    Secretary Shanahan. Okay.
    Senator Heinrich. The second clause in the first sentence 
says that the Pentagon is pushing the Trump administration to 
adopt a weaker standard for groundwater pollution.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Heinrich. Are you aware of any conversations going 
on in the Pentagon that would push for a standard that was not 
set by the best-available science?
    Secretary Shanahan. Right. I--I'm not aware of any 
conversation. I shared with Senator Shaheen that I would follow 
up with her, also, on this matter after I have a chance to 
investigate. I'll do the same with you.
    Senator Heinrich. I would deeply appreciate that.
    The right way to do this is to follow the science.
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Heinrich. The right way to do this is not to set a 
standard based on trying to limit liability.
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Heinrich. I know that there is--we're going to have 
a big pricetag attached to this. There is no question about 
that. But, we're also going to have a very big human cost 
associated with this. I'll just give you one example.
    Highland Dairy Farm was forced to close its doors in New 
Mexico after 25 years. That's a local business. For months, 
because of this contamination, they had to dump 12,000 to 
15,000 gallons of milk per day. That's enough to give a carton 
at lunch to 240,000 kids. That is one example of how this is 
impacting the communities that have been enthusiastic about 
hosting our Air Force and other military establishments.
    We are going to need to get in front of this. I don't think 
it has received adequate attention from the Pentagon. So, I 
look forward to working with you on that. But, we're at the 
front end of this, and there's going to be a lot of work that's 
going to have to go into trying to make this right for these 
communities.
    I very much agree that our competitors are rapidly fielding 
new capabilities in the space domain, and that we need to move 
with a greater sense of urgency. I welcome the increased 
prioritization the Department has put on this area, and your 
focus on that. In terms of R&D as we stand up a Space 
Development Agency, one of the things I want to make sure we're 
not doing is reorganizing the existing pieces or reinventing 
the wheel. Things like the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the 
Space Vehicles Directorate, the Advanced Systems Directorate, 
and many others, all are--play a critical role in researching, 
developing, and fielding our Nation's space systems. So, I 
would just urge you, as you look at that, and urge Secretary 
Wilson, Dr. Fred Kennedy, Dr. Mike Griffin, all to fully 
utilize the existing R&D assets as you stand up SDA so that 
we're not losing a few years of reorganization to make the 
whole system work better.
    If you have any thoughts on that, I'd love to hear them.
    Secretary Shanahan. No, I--when I think of the Space 
Development Agency, what I don't want it to be is a 
reorganization. The number-one element of the Space Development 
Agency that we need to take advantage of is large-scale systems 
engineering. How do we put together a national team so that we 
can do this at scale? There is incredible technology in the Air 
Force. We don't lack for talent. That is not our issue. We 
don't lack for money. The architecture that's required to be 
able to do this quickly so that we don't have to do it three or 
four times is really the problem we have to get after.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today, and for the service 
provided to this country, and, to all those behind you, for 
their service, as well.
    You know, as we approach these hearings, we hear a lot 
about the threat assessments and our nuclear capabilities and 
our hardware. Often, we overlook, sometimes, the very human 
element of this. As you probably are aware, this Committee's 
had a couple of hearings about some serious--I think, very 
serious ongoing health and safety problems with privatized 
housing on our military bases. Some of those have occurred in 
my State, at Maxwell Air Force Base and at Fort Rucker. I did 
not notice any language in either of your statements on this 
particular topic. Not surprising. I'm not criticizing that. 
But, I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on these 
issues and whether or not any of these issues are going to be 
resolved through the budget that you're proposing this year. 
I'll ask the--Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford----
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. So, maybe I'll just start out 
with--it's an embarrassment where we are, so I'm not going to 
defend anything. It's a leadership failure. Once we get past 
that, it's, What are we going to do about it? I've had 
considerable interactions with the service secretaries, and 
they've assured me, for the time being, they'd like to run with 
the lead to address the problem. But, the conversations I've 
had with them are like this, ``It's okay if we identify the 
problem. Let's make sure we put the resources that are required 
to be responsive in place.'' That's what I intend to follow up 
on. The second piece is, we can't fall into this hole again. 
What is the enduring issue? But, for the families that are in 
these--the servicemembers and their families, we need to 
rapidly address the problem. Let's make sure the resources are 
put in place.
    Senator Jones. General?
    General Dunford. Senator, first, I agree with the 
characterization of the problem, the Secretary's comments about 
the sense of embarrassment about the conditions that we found 
recently in family housing. The Secretary talked about it from 
a resource perspective. I can assure you that the leadership in 
the Department has gripped this issue, and the services have 
done things, like make sure that a leader goes and visits each 
and every individual's home so that we have a personal hands-on 
view of the conditions under which our men and women are 
living.
    When the Secretary talks about a leadership challenge, it's 
very simple what happened. We contracted out for family 
housing, some years ago, and a gap grew between leadership and 
the contractor. That should not be the case. Leadership should 
be decisively engaged in the overseeing of those contracts, 
and, more importantly, should be decisively engaged in the 
challenges that our men and women have in family housing.
    So, there is a resource issue that you spoke about, there 
is a human element to it, which is the men and women in those 
houses, but there's also the important leadership point that 
the Secretary mentioned, and that is, making sure that our 
leaders are, in fact, decisively engaged in all aspects of our 
men and women's lives; in particular, the housing.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you both.
    The resources--I'm assuming you're talking about our 
military and the various leaders on the bases getting to the 
bottom of this and trying to correct it. But, I'm hoping that 
the resources to actually correct these problems are going to 
be borne by these companies who are making the profits.
    Secretary Shanahan. That's my concern, is--we'll identify 
the issues, and then we'll say we'll fix them, and it'll take 
too long. We need to fix them quickly. If it means getting 
extra resources, these companies, they need to find a way to do 
that.
    Senator Jones. All right. Thank you. There's nothing in the 
budget, though, that we--that we're looking at to budget to 
actually fix the resources, as opposed to first looking to the 
contractors. Is that--would that be fair?
    Secretary Norquist. We are, first, looking to the 
contractors to do it. We have resources in the budget, should 
the Committee want to address additional things, but the 
contractors are the one responsible for delivering the service 
at the rate they were funded.
    Senator Jones. All right, great.
    Secretary Shanahan, I'm really interested in additional 
funding in the budget for hypersonics and directed-energy 
programs. A lot of that work is going on in my State, up in 
Huntsville. Are you anticipating any new programs or more 
funding for existing programs in those areas?
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, this budget has a sizable 
increase in hypersonics, and then we continue to double down on 
directed energy. Most of the focus in directed energy is to get 
a form factor so we can operationally deploy these concepts. 
But, you'll continue to see more and more funding going towards 
these technologies.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the time.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
    Senator Wicker.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
    General Dunford, thank you so much for being here, and 
thanks for dropping by and chatting with us the other day at my 
office.
    Let me ask you about LHAs and LPDs. There's pressure to 
build a fleet better able to face Chinese and Russian precision 
missiles. The Navy, therefore, appears to be reducing its 
investment in warships, like LPDs, big-deck amphibs, and 
aircraft carriers, to free up money for more offensive weaponry 
on smaller surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. 
Additionally, moving the build of the new amphibious ships into 
the future would likely delay the Navy's ability to reach its 
goal of 38 amphibious ships from the current level of 32.
    General, does the Marine Corps still have a stated need for 
38 amphibious ships, as indicated in the Navy's force-structure 
assessment? How many amphibs do we have in the inventory today? 
Do you foresee eliminating Marine Corps core mission of 
amphibious operations at any point in the near future?
    General Dunford. Senator, the requirement you identified, 
of 38, is still the requirement. I went back, after our 
conversation, to just check to make sure what the facts were. 
The requirement is 38. The 355-ship program of record that was 
submitted last year, I think they're working minor adjustments, 
but there's still a cardinal direction of the Navy. The issue 
with the amphib ships inside of this program was an issue of 
sequencing. They--the Navy put a higher priority on other 
platforms during this period of time, but did not walk away 
from the requirement or the long-term plan to have those ships 
in place.
    Senator Wicker. Now, in terms of facing the Chinese and 
Russian threat, just inform the public, through the mechanism 
of this hearing, how the amphibs fit into that.
    General Dunford. Senator, it's critical for us to be able 
to project power in the context of China, and to seize--one of 
the traditional missions of the Marine Corps is seizing 
advanced naval bases. If you look at the island chains and so 
forth in the Pacific as platforms from which we can project 
power, that would be a--an historical mission the Marine Corps 
has, and one that is very relevant in the China scenario.
    Senator Wicker. Projecting power with marines being 
transported by these amphibs.
    General Dunford. That is correct, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. Right.
    Secretary Shanahan, last year Congress appropriated 
considerable funds toward both LHA-9 and LPD-31, yet those two 
ships were not funded in this year's budget request. We just 
heard General Dunford's answer. So, why did the Department 
withhold funding for LHA-9 and LPD-31 in this year's budget? If 
both these ships are going to be built at some point, wouldn't 
you agree that we should fund them in the most cost-effective 
manner? Were both the Navy and Marine Corps in agreement with 
this decision to delay funding of the LHA-9 and LPD-31?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah. Senator, what I recall, in the 
development of the plan, there was a--it was a sequencing, not 
a requirement, issue, in terms of--General, you know the--in 
terms of the--providing the availability. Yeah.
    General Dunford. You know, Senator, the issue--when they 
looked at all the money that was available to the Navy, and 
they looked at the shipbuilding plan, they prioritized other 
platforms within this program over those two amphibious ships, 
and they moved those two amphibious ships outside the program 
without adjusting the requirement.
    Senator Wicker. Okay. So, the requirement's there, but the 
sub-part of my question about the efficiency of building them 
in the most cost-effective and efficient manner, would you--
either of you care to comment on that? Wouldn't it make sense 
to do it in the most efficient manner?
    Secretary Shanahan. It would.
    Senator Wicker. What has been proposed is not necessarily 
that, is it?
    Secretary Shanahan. I can't speak to the specific----
    Senator Wicker. Could you, General Dunford?
    General Dunford. Not with regard to what the difference 
would be in the cost of the ship or the efficiency within the 
program, as opposed to outside the program. I can't talk to 
that, Senator. But, we can get back to you on that specific 
question.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Dunford. This was answered directly with Senator 
Wicker's MLA on 18 March via phone call with CDR Hagerty, 
OCJCS/LA.

    Senator Wicker. Okay.
    Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator--yeah, Senator Manchin. I believe--yeah, he was 
here first. Yeah. Senator Manchin.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank all of you. I'm so sorry. We get--sometimes we get 
shortchanged here and we have to go to different meetings. I'm 
handling an Energy meeting now. But, I just wanted to thank you 
all so much.
    So, Secretary Shanahan, as you know, State-owned National 
Guard facilities that cause PFAS contamination do not have 
access to defense environmental restoration dollars like Active 
Duty bases do. Senator Gillibrand had a situation similar to 
what I had in Martinsburg. I think you're familiar with both of 
those. So, I think my question would be--National Guard units 
use the same firefighting foam that the Active components use. 
The training is often the same. It makes no sense for the 
National Guard to not have access to these dollars. So, would 
you be supportive of a similar amendment this year if we could 
get access to them?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yes, I would.
    Senator Manchin. Okay. You've been brought up to speed on 
that.
    Secretary Shanahan. I'm not totally up to speed on that 
particular----
    Senator Manchin. We'd love to--if we could--you tell us who 
to designate in your--on your staff, and we'd love to bring you 
up to speed, because it would be very helpful, because it's 
really been detrimental to the community.
    The President's budget request is something I wanted to go 
over. A combination of emergency funds as well as other budget 
shell games. You gave us an $8.6 billion--I think you all might 
have touched on this. What we're looking at is a holistic 
approach of how we're able to secure our border and, really, 
the immigration challenges we have. Do you all know how many of 
the--maybe you have this--as far as the DACA--some DACA 
children that are involved in military, do you have any idea? 
It would be helpful to us if we could find out how many of 
these young people are participating in defending our country 
that are asking to be considered as being available to be a 
citizen of our country. I think it would be quite appropriate 
for us to be able to know that.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Shanahan. Based on security concerns, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) discontinued the MAVNI Pilot 
Program in 2016. However, DOD has continued to access existing 
MAVNI recruits already in the pipeline determined to be ``vital 
to the national interest'' for military service. Under MAVNI 
there were approximately 834 Deferred Action Childhood Arrival 
(DACA) recipients recruited.

    Senator Manchin. Again, a big thing with me, when Senator--
God rest his soul--Senator McCain was here, is the audit. You 
might have touched on this, and my question might have been 
asked. If there's something on the audit that you can give me 
an update on where we are and what your intentions are and how 
we can get a complete audit of the Department of Defense, would 
be very, very, very helpful.
    Secretary Norquist. Senator, I'm always happy to give an 
update on the audit for you.
    Senator Manchin. Okay.
    Secretary Norquist. So, we've started the second. We've 
completed the first-year audit. We received over 2,300 
findings. We have corrective action plans that each of the 
services are developing to address those. The major areas of 
focus this year are, particularly, inventory, information 
technology, and real property. Those services will be executing 
those. The auditors have already started the second audit. They 
don't wait. They come right back and begin the next year. 
They'll be testing the progress on those and we'll--I think we 
do twice-a-year updates to the Committee staff, and we expect 
the reports to be completed and delivered to us, on the second-
year audit, on November 15th.
    Senator Manchin. The other thing I need to know and have 
more information, whoever would be responsible for, is the 
procurement, how we are--the procurements we handle, the 
changes that have been made in procuring, you know, all the 
different types of anecdotes and jokes have been made about how 
we buy things and what we pay for things, and things of that 
sort. I'd like to be able to go back to the citizens of West 
Virginia and say that we are investing the money properly. They 
have total support--they have given total support for the 
military. They want to make sure that we're using the resources 
in the most prudent way.
    Secretary Shanahan. Senator, we'd be happy to put together 
for you to be able to share: here's how we've been saving 
money, here's where we've been saving money, here are our plans 
to save even more.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Shanahan. The Department has identified $7.7 billion 
within five areas of business operations to include: contract 
management, healthcare management, acquisition, information technology 
and business systems, and logistics and supply chain management. Reform 
efforts within the Department's five areas of business operations are 
focused on delivering optimized enterprise business operations to 
assure the success of the National Defense Strategy. Reform results 
(savings and investments) have been aligned to six reform levers and 
discretely accounted for within the budget. These levers are: better 
alignment of resources, business process improvements, business system 
improvements, divestments, policy reforms, and weapons system 
acquisition. The attached table is a summary of the $7.7 billion 
savings accounted for in fiscal year 2020, by reform lever.



    Senator Manchin. The other thing, Secretary Shanahan, is on 
the F-15X, if you could explain to me a little bit about that. 
If the experts in air combat in the Air Force identify a need 
for the F-15X, then what does OSD know that the Air Force 
doesn't about the future threat environment?
    Secretary Shanahan. Oh, yeah, let me address that. So, my 
responsibility in pulling together the budget is to make sure 
we identify what are the threats and campaigns that we need to 
structure, develop, do force design and force development. The 
services, the joint staff, and the cost assessment and 
performance evaluation organizations then do the analysis. So, 
I can ask the Chairman on what the recommendation, in terms of 
mix of tactical aircraft.
    General Dunford. Senator, I spoke at length with the Chief 
of Staff of the Air Force and others on this issue. So, I can 
give you the framework for making the decision.
    Senator Manchin. Sure.
    General Dunford. First, the primary aircraft of the future 
for the Air Force is the F-35. They're not walking back off 
that program or the importance of the F-35 program. But, as 
they looked over the next several years, they had two problems. 
They had, one, capability represented by the fifth-generation 
aircraft, the F-35, and then they had capacity issue, both 
numbers of aircraft plus the amount of ordnance that could be 
carried by those aircraft. Then they had the F-15C, which was 
aging out in the 2027-2028 period. So, within the next 5 or 10 
years, the best solution was to go to the F-15--it's called 
EX--platform to backfill the F-15. Eventually, we'll get to an 
all-F-35 program. But, from both a cost perspective and a 
capacity perspective, this particular mix of aircraft, for the 
near term, was determined to be the right mix of aircraft. So, 
again, not walking off the fifth generation, but the near term, 
need that combination of a fourth generation and a fifth 
generation to generate capacity. I would add that the F-15X is 
slightly less expensive from--for procurement than the F-35, 
but it's more than 50 percent cheaper to operate over time, and 
it has twice as many hours, in terms of how long it lasts.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, to the witnesses, for your testimony and 
service.
    I was late to the hearing today because Secretary Esper 
asked me to accompany him to Fort Belvoir to visit with 
military families about the housing issues. I've got to tell 
you, I did a visit on Norfolk Naval Base last Friday, so my 
expectations were pretty darn low, but I'm just stunned after 
talking to these families. The physical condition of their 
units--mold, water damage; poor, shoddy construction; poor, 
shoddy repairs--the lack of responsiveness, that they can't get 
response from the housing companies, that they're told, when 
they go to chain of command, ``We don't do this anymore. We 
don't have any responsibility,'' that, when they do get a 
response, the quality of the repair work done both by the 
maintenance connected with the companies or contractors they 
come up with is atrocious.
    But, then what I really heard about today was the number of 
people who are getting sick. Hospitalizations, families being 
forced to move out of units for significant amount of time as 
their units are being repaired so that they can be habitable, 
carbon monoxide, CO2 monitors going off, and people being told, 
``It's fine, you can move back in,'' but not being told what 
was wrong that was causing there to be CO2. A 10-year-old girl, 
mother just told me this at--within the last hour, missed 45 
days of school last year--that's one-quarter of the school 
year--because of respiratory problems caused by mold in the 
unit.
    I know that you're focused on this, but I just got to say, 
as the father of a marine, as somebody who is in a State that's 
heavily military, it was just absolutely depressing, the 
physical conditions. We've got to have both housing companies 
that will improve and a military that will fix. I have been 
pointing out, nobody enlisted to be a tenant of Lincoln 
housing. They enlisted to be a marine or an airman or -woman, 
or a solider or a sailor. So, it's the military that's got to 
fix it.
    I want to focus on the emergency issue. Secretary Shanahan, 
my reading of title 10, section 2808, is that the President can 
continue to use unobligated MILCON dollars for the duration of 
the emergency. So, having declared an emergency, unless 
Congress rebuts that, as long as the President says they're in 
an emergency, we basically are put--tapping the spigot into the 
MILCON budget for this budget year and future budget years 
until the emergency is declared over. Is that your 
understanding of the section?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah, my understanding is, as long a 
there's a declaration of emergency, that is an authority that 
goes along with the declaration.
    Senator Kaine. So, I just want to make plain to everybody 
what we're voting on this afternoon. We're voting on an 
emergency declaration that, until this President says there's 
not an emergency, it is a spigot tapped into the MILCON budget 
that can allow not only 2019 funds, but 2020 funds, 2021, 
future funds, to be pulled out of the MILCON budget, at the 
President's discretion--in my view, counter to the 
appropriations powers of Congress.
    Secretary Shanahan, I wrote you a letter on February 15 
asking you for information about MILCON projects--unobligated 
MILCON projects that could be affected by the President's 
emergency declaration. My understanding is, the Committee staff 
has been repeatedly in contact with your office on the same 
thing. I was not here, but I understand that you committed to 
Senator Reed that you will get him that list today. Is that 
correct?
    Secretary Shanahan. That is correct.
    Senator Kaine. Okay. I got to tell you, I feel completely 
sandbagged.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Kaine. The service secretaries have had that list. 
They've had the list. The service secretaries have been willing 
to share the list of their unobligated MILCON projects. So, 
you're going to send it to us today, after the vote on the 
emergency declaration?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Kaine. Members of the Senate are entitled to know 
from where these MILCON monies will be pulled.
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Kaine. The fact that you come here today and say 
you'll now give it to us, right after the vote this afternoon? 
Your service secretaries and chiefs have had these lists, and, 
when we've asked them to send them to the Committee, they've 
said, ``We can't, without the permission of the SECDEF.'' So, 
were they only available in the last half-hour?
    Secretary Shanahan. No, the--well, first of all, Senator, I 
think the situation is being misrepresented. There has not been 
a deliberate attempt to withhold any information to this 
Committee.
    Senator Kaine. Let me state this to you. The staff has been 
reaching out to the service secretaries and saying, ``Send us 
the list of unobligated MILCON projects.''
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Kaine. They have been told that they cannot do 
that----
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Kaine.--it has to come through the OSD.
    Secretary Shanahan. Right. Right.
    Senator Kaine. You're now going to produce that list today, 
after we have a vote at 1:45? This information is highly 
relevant to the Senators who are voting on this emergency 
declaration, because the question is, Should a President be 
able to declare a nonmilitary emergency--that's the what the 
military has testified--and then ransack the Pentagon budget 
for $6.1 billion? I think we're entitled to know where the 
money might come from, especially since you've just said this 
is a multiyear declaration that opens up a spigot into the 
MILCON budget. I don't think you giving us that list today, 
after the vote----
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Kaine.--when we've been asking for it for a month, 
is a good-faith response to the requests of this Committee.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yeah.
    Senator Kaine. Now, tell me if I'm misrepresenting what's 
going on.
    Secretary Shanahan. Throughout this process of the 
emergency declaration--and I just have to say, this is not 
something we do every day--from the very start, we have worked 
to be 100-percent transparent with Congress. 100 percent.
    Senator Kaine. I agree you don't do an emergency 
declaration every day, but, every day, you have a list of 
unobligated MILCON projects, don't you?
    Secretary Shanahan. Well, I think the list--we've always 
had a list of--that's how we keep book--I mean, it's not like 
we don't have a list of projects.
    Senator Kaine. But, why wouldn't you--why wouldn't you--why 
wouldn't your services share those with the Committee----
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator Kaine.--after continuing requests from the 
Committee?
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Kaine, your time is long expired. 
I know the passion that you feel right now, but we are 
adjourned.
    Senator King. Chairman, I had a couple of follow up 
questions.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, I know you did.
    Senator King. Are we adjourned?
    Chairman Inhofe. You know, I have to say this about Senator 
King. I say this in front of all my--well, they're gone now. Of 
all the members, Democrat and Republican, you are the one who 
has been the most responsible, you've been to every single 
meeting. No one else can say that. I--even though it would be a 
violation of what we're going to do, if you want to have--I'll 
withdraw that just long enough for you to do one question. Only 
because it's you. Got it?
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. All right. One comment and one question.
    The comment is, I want to complement Mr. Norquist for the 
work that he's done. I failed to do that before. Doing--working 
through the audit process for the Defense Department is a 
herculean task, and you were--embarked on it well and truly, 
and I compliment you on that. I qualify that a little bit by 
the invention of the phrase today ``OCO for base.'' That's like 
``rabbit for bicycle.'' I mean, those two things aren't really 
consistent.
    My followup question, Mr. Secretary. Based upon all this 
discussion--and I'm honestly confused. My father used to say, 
``You--the Pentagon is the only building in America you can 
drive straight toward and it keeps getting further away.''
    [Laughter.]
    Senator King. I feel a little bit like that today.
    Is it your testimony that 2019 military construction 
projects that were authorized and appropriated for are off the 
table, or are they only off the table if they're obligated 
before September 30th?
    Secretary Shanahan. Right.
    Senator King. Fairly straightforward question.
    Mr. Norquist, perhaps you can answer.
    Secretary Norquist. Senator, it's the award day. What we 
are looking at in prioritizing is contracts that award later. 
So, if you----
    Senator King. So, if a--there's a project in the 2019 bill 
that hasn't been awarded, it's on the--it's potentially on the 
chopping block. Is that correct?
    Secretary Norquist. That is correct.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

              Questions Submitted by Senator James Inhofe
               cybercom and nsa ``dual hat'' relationship
    1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Shanahan, what are your views about 
maintaining or ending the ``dual hat'' relationship whereby the 
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command also serves as the director of the 
National Security Agency?
    Secretary Shanahan. The Department is not at a decision point. 
Because of recent election-related operations and the publication of 
the new DOD Cyber Strategy, I deferred making a recommendation to the 
President in order to ensure operational lessons learned are accounted 
for and incorporated into the decision calculus.
                               __________
                               
               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                        space development agency
    2. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, how will the Space 
Development Agency perform better than other currently established 
organizations?
    Secretary Shanahan. Our adversaries are developing and deploying 
threats against our legacy space systems faster than we can field new 
capabilities. I established the Space Development Agency (SDA) as an 
expressly threat-driven organization, intended to define and create the 
Department's comprehensive next-generation space architecture. SDA will 
not wait for a validated requirement; instead, the agency will work 
closely with the warfighter and intelligence communities to quickly 
identify and evaluate existing and emerging threats, then proceed to 
design, build, and launch an ensemble of space-based capabilities to 
address those threats in less than 24 months. To meet such a compressed 
development schedule, the SDA will heavily leverage commercial space 
technologies and systems (i.e., satellites, payloads, ground control 
hardware and software, and user equipment). Additional tranches of 
capability will follow on 24-month upgrade cycles. This approach to 
rapid, agile acquisition has not been attempted on an architectural 
scale and will only be achievable by partnering with, and drawing from, 
the burgeoning commercial space sector.

    3. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, what special authorities or 
exemptions will the Space Development Agency use that other space 
acquisition organizations cannot also be provided?
    Secretary Shanahan. The Director, Space Development Agency (SDA) 
has the delegated authority to act the SDA's Senior Procurement 
Executive; is designated the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) 
including exercise of Middle Tier Acquisition authority; has the 
authority to enter into transactions other than contracts, cooperative 
agreements, and grants carrying out basic, applied, and advanced 
research projects as well as certain prototype projects; will exercise 
available special hiring authorities including direct hire via limited-
term appointments for highly qualified experts (HQE) and non-
competitive short-term hires; will exercise approval authority over 
assignment of military personnel selected for duty at SDA, rate such 
personnel, and approve their rating chains; and will exercise original 
classification authority. While these authorities can and should be 
provided to other agencies (to enhance their operational tempo), the 
SDA is unique in that it was established explicitly to build out the 
next-generation national security space architecture, rapidly and 
efficiently. SDA will work to leverage commercially-derived 
capabilities (e.g., launch services, user radios and antennas, mass-
produced satellites and payloads) to disincentive risk aversion and 
incorporate innovative upgrades in every generation of new capability. 
Legacy organizations have operated in a risk-averse environment for 
decades, and their policies reflect this. Starting a new organization, 
with a culture dedicated to speed, will drive the development of new 
tools on far shorter timelines than would otherwise be possible.

    4. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, how does the Space 
Development Agency prevent duplication of effort amongst organizations?
    Secretary Shanahan. Space Development Agency (SDA) will work with 
its partner organizations to ensure that its development efforts are 
complementary to their work and not duplicative. SDA will be laser-
focused on building a comprehensive, next-generation space architecture 
that addresses the DOD's Space Vision, comprised of eight essential 
capabilities described in the Department's August 2018 Report on 
Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space 
Components of the Department of Defense. These capabilities include:

      1.  Persistent global surveillance for advanced missile 
targeting,
      2.  Indications, warning, targeting, and tracking for defense 
against advanced missile threats,
      3.  Alternate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) for a 
GPS-denied environment,
      4.  Global and near-real time space situational awareness,
      5.  Development of deterrent capability,
      6.  Responsive, resilient, common ground-based space support 
infrastructure (e.g., ground stations and launch capability),
      7.  Cross-domain, networked, node-independent battle management 
command, control, and communications (BMC3), including nuclear command, 
control, and communications (NC3), and
      8.  Highly-scaled, low-latency, persistent, artificial-
intelligence-enabled global surveillance.

    These are critical, unmet capabilities. Were we to apply historical 
practices and procedures, acquiring and fielding space systems to 
address these capabilities might require a decade or more, during which 
time our adversaries will have developed and deployed new 
countermeasures against those systems. We no longer have the luxury to 
respond on timelines of this length. SDA will work to develop a unified 
architecture comprised of legacy capabilities (servicing primarily 
validated requirements) as well as an agile, responsive, next-
generation architecture intended to pivot as necessary to meet new 
threats as they arise. This will greatly facilitate our ability to 
conduct future military operations against peer competitors at campaign 
scale.

    5. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, has the DOD Cost Analysis 
and Program Evaluation office completed their analyses on whether 
projected Space Development Agency projects will be better than current 
plans?
    Secretary Shanahan. Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has 
completed its analysis of Space Development Agency (SDA) projects 
funded in Fiscal Year 2020 President's Budget Request. CAPE is 
analyzing SDA's proposed further projects as part of its broader review 
of the Department's portfolio of future space capabilities. This review 
will complete this summer, and the results will inform the fiscal year 
2021 President's Budget Request.

    6. Senator Rounds. Secretary Shanahan, who will establish the 
priorities of the Space Development Agency?
    Secretary Shanahan. Currently, priorities for the Space Development 
Agency (SDA) will be established and executed by Director, SDA. These 
priorities will be informed by the Space Development Executive Board 
(SDEB) for SDA-related strategic policy, plans, program priorities, and 
investment areas and by the SDA Warfighter Council (WFC) on current and 
assessed multi-domain threats to national security for which next-
generation space capabilities that would support the joint fight and on 
architectural vulnerabilities and potential adversarial attack 
surfaces.
                               __________
                               
               Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
                         camp lejeune recovery
    7. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how much risk are we 
assuming by delaying and under resourcing recovery at Camp Lejeune and 
Cherry Point?
    Secretary Shanahan. The operational and training impacts from the 
initial hurricane damage remain. Projects to repair or replace damaged 
headquarters facilities, railroad tracks, beach erosion, and roadways 
have been planned and designed. Since there is limited funding, most 
facilities scheduled for repair have been dried out, cleaned, and 
temporarily re-roofed. Trailers have been provided to house personnel 
that were displaced from the severely damaged buildings that could no 
longer be occupied. With the 2019 hurricane season starting June 1, the 
current conditions of many of the buildings on both bases creates high 
risk. Temporary repairs--such as tarps and plastic sheathing--will not 
withstand hurricane force winds and rains created throughout the 
upcoming seasonal change. Similarly, the temporary trailers are also 
not fabricated for these conditions.

    8. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how long is it going to take 
to rebuild those bases?
    Secretary Shanahan. If funded, repair and replacement construction 
projects will take approximately three years to fully complete.

    9. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, at the start of this 
hurricane season on June 1st, will our facilities and assets there be 
particularly vulnerable due to the state of reconstruction?
    Secretary Shanahan. The buildings that were damaged during 
Hurricane Florence and were temporarily repaired (e.g. those that 
received a tarp roof) will be the most vulnerable to further damage. 
Additionally, Camp Lejeune's Onslow Beach and the roadways and railroad 
trestles could be further degraded.

    10. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how long are we going to 
have to wait until Camp Lejeune regains baseline functionality?
    Secretary Shanahan. In order to regain full functionality, all 
buildings and infrastructure will need to be either repaired or 
replaced. Once funding is provided, it will take approximately three 
years to fully complete.
                        camp lejeune resiliency
    11. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, how vulnerable are our 
Marine Corps facilities and assets in North Carolina to another 
disaster such as Hurricane Florence of Hurricane Matthew?
    Secretary Shanahan. Most of the newer buildings were not 
significantly damaged during Hurricane Florence. Where possible, we are 
designing the repair projects to include these new standards and 
building materials in order to maximize resilience. Removing and 
replacing asphalt shingle roofs with standing seam metal roofs will be 
a main design change. The more durable metal roofs last longer and are 
able to withstand hurricane force winds and rain.

    12. Senator Tillis. Secretary Shanahan, what needs to be done to 
ensure that those installations are survivable and resilient in the 
future?
    Secretary Shanahan. In addition to improving design standards and 
selecting the most durable building materials, as noted above, it is 
also important to fund preventive maintenance and select the best site 
to prevent flooding and seismic damage. These important factors are 
combined with the Commandant's Infrastructure Reset strategy, which 
reduces the facilities footprint and optimizes the resources necessary 
to ensure our installations remain a key enabler to generating and 
sustaining combat readiness.
    As a matter of course, the Department's resilience initiatives 
address risks from its ``all hazards'' approach, allowing our 
installations to support critical missions regardless of the threat, 
including weather, climate, natural events, or direct attack (either 
physical or cyber). While climate is often the focus, the reality is 
our installations must be resilient in the face of a variety of threats 
and conditions. The Department views these threats to installations 
holistically and responds with a balanced approach. The Department 
considers resilience throughout the installation planning and basing 
processes. This includes consideration of resilience risks in 
installation master planning, training and exercises, management of 
natural resources, design and construction standards, utility systems/
service, emergency management operations, and supporting analytical 
tools. DOD is including the forecasts for rising sea levels in planning 
future flood zones and elevations along coastal installations, as well 
as developing a tool for forecasting changes to major precipitation for 
inland areas.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                vulnerable installations--climate change
    13. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, the Department ignored a 
requirement in law for each service to submit their top ten list of 
most vulnerable installations to climate-related events, required by 
section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA. Despite the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps testifying to this Committee that Camp Lejeune will need 
billions of dollars to rebuild in the wake of Hurricane Florence, the 
section 335 report that was submitted failed to even mention the Marine 
Corps once. It also ignored the billions of dollars likely required to 
rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base. Do you commit to sending us the top ten 
lists that were required by section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA 
within a week?
    Secretary Shanahan. The top ten list of most vulnerable mission 
assurance priority installations per Military Department is attached. 
The Marine Corps has no installations on the Mission Assurance Priority 
Installation list for reasons that we can share with Congress on a 
classified basis.
    General Dunford. I defer to OUSD (A-S) to provide the appropriate 
response to this question.
                           osd personnel caps
    Section 143 of title 10, United States Code, limits the number of 
military, civilian, and detailed personnel supporting the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to 3,767. According to the report produced 
by the National Defense Strategy Commission, ``Civilian voices have 
been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and 
national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian 
control.''

    14. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, in your assessment, has the 
personnel cap on OSD constrained the ability of your office to execute 
its required responsibilities, including those mandated by Congress?
    Secretary Shanahan. Secretary Shanahan, the Department is executing 
its required responsibilities within the personnel caps set forth in 10 
USC 143. The manpower limit does constrain the ability to address new 
missions and emerging / expanding requirements in the future.

    15. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, would a revision of this 
personnel cap facilitate more effective management and oversight of the 
Department of Defense?
    Secretary Shanahan. The elimination of headquarters manpower caps 
in lieu of a more appropriate single constraint (e.g., cost limit) 
would greatly improve the flexibility of the Department to manage the 
total workforce. The policy of the Department, in line with 10 USC 129 
and 129a, is to manage our workforce to requirement and cost. The 
constraints imposed by military and civilian limits inadvertently 
drives solutions toward contract support which may not be appropriate 
or the most cost effective solution. Additionally, any constraining 
provision would need to be adjusted periodically to account for 
emerging statutory or high priority requirements. However, the most 
pressing constraints for Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) 
manpower are the cost limits imposed by section 346(b) of the fiscal 
year 2016 NDAA (for fiscal year 2020) and section 931 of the fiscal 
year 2019 NDAA (for fiscal year 2021) and the contract support limit 
imposed by section 865 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA (for all fiscal 
years through fiscal year 2023). These cost limits on OSD are impacting 
our ability to address new missions and emerging/expanding 
requirements.''

    16. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, are there specific OSD 
responsibilities that would benefit from an upward adjustment of the 
OSD personnel cap? If so, please provide some examples.
    Secretary Shanahan. Yes, there are several emerging requirements 
that could benefit from an upward adjustment. The Department recently 
added resources to the Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) for 
establishment of the Secretariat for Special Operations (SSO) 
(supporting the Assistant Secreary of Defense (Special Operations & 
Low-Intensity Conflict)'s oversight of United States Special Operations 
Command), realignment of the Defense Innovation Unit to the USD(R&E), 
Military Health System Transformation, establishment of the Personnel 
Vetting Transformation Office (PVTO), and establishment of the Joint 
Artificial Intelligence Center (among other increases). While these 
additions are being managed under the statutory caps (both manpower and 
cost), it is coming at a cost to other high priority areas in OSD 
because of the need to direct cuts to keep under the limits.

    17. Senator Reed. Secretary Shanahan, what other civilian personnel 
constraints would you recommend Congress reevaluate so to allow the 
Department greater flexibility to recruit, retain, and manage its 
civilian workforce more effectively?
    Secretary Shanahan. I appreciate Congress' recognition of the 
Department of Defense's need for increased flexibilities to attract, 
hire, and retain its civilian workforce. The multitude of stand-alone 
civilian hiring and pay authorities granted by Congress has been 
effective; however, the Department seeks to implement a civilian 
personnel system that is simple and streamlined to improve our ability 
to focus on strategic workforce needs and efficiently acquire and 
retain the right talent. I recommend Congress consider streamlining 
existing authorities to reduce complexity and grant additional 
flexibility to enable the Department to respond rapidly to meet 
emerging mission needs with proven hiring and pay methodologies.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                     russian election interference
    18. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, is the 
Department of Defense looking at potential Russian interference in the 
upcoming election in Ukraine and the European Union as a sign of new 
innovative techniques they may use toward the United States elections?
    Secretary Shanahan. As part of the ``defend forward'' concept 
elaborated in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy, the Department of Defense is 
paying close attention to democratic elections overseas to monitor for 
new techniques that adversaries might utilize in future U.S. elections. 
The Department is also working closely with a number of partners and 
allies to learn lessons from recent elections, to improve partner's 
abilities to defend their own networks, and to conduct combined 
Defensive Cyber Operations on partner networks.
    General Dunford. [Deleted.]
                                 kc-46
    19. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan, General Dunford and 
Secretary Norquist, earlier this month, I asked General Lyons, 
commander of TRANSCOM, about the delivery delays of the KC-46 and he 
expressed concerns about the additional costs to maintain at least 28 
KC-135's beyond their currently scheduled retirement. Do you share 
General Lyons' concerns about the additional cost these delays will 
have on the Air Force?
    General Dunford. Any additional cost incurred to maintain legacy 
tanker aircraft beyond their planned retirement dates is concerning. 
The KC-46A delivery schedule and the Air Force's planned legacy tanker 
aircraft retirement dates are coordinated to provide the joint force 
with sufficient tanker aircraft capability and capacity throughout the 
transition time.
    Secretary Shanahan. and Secretary Norquist. Yes. The Department is 
concerned about any additional costs that may be incurred to maintain 
the legacy tanker aircraft beyond their planned retirement dates. This 
includes both the KC-10 aircraft as well as the KC-135 aircraft. The 
KC-46A remains a key Departmental acquisition program and delivery of 
these aircraft is critical to ensure timely retirements of the legacy 
fleet. The Department plans to retire KC-10 aircraft beginning in 2020 
with the KC-135 aircraft beginning in 2022 and we will continue to 
review the transition from legacy aircraft to KC-46 in order to 
minimize the need to sustain legacy platforms.
                           pfas contamination
    20. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Shanahan, has is the Department of 
Defense advocated for interim actively pursuing groundwater clean-up 
recommendations for perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) or 
perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) standards substantially higher than 
those suggested by the Environmental Protection Agency as suggested by 
The New York Times article published on March 14? Does the Department 
of Defense support groundwater cleanup recommendations for PFOA and 
PFOS higher than EPA's lifetime health advisory levels for these two 
chemicals? What is the contamination concentration the Department of 
Defense believes to be appropriate to trigger groundwater cleanup and 
remediation of PFOA and PFOS? Is it the position of the Department of 
Defense that concentration levels of PFOA and PFOS should be counted 
separately when determining whether cleanup of these two chemicals 
should begin?
    Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD) supports the 
use of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act's (CERCLA) long-established, risk-based approach to 
determine when groundwater cleanup is needed. Using the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) risk assessment process supporting this 
statute, the unacceptable risk to human health for cleanup of 
groundwater with perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and 
perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) is approximately 380 parts per trillion 
(ppt). DOD uses EPA's risk assessment guidance to determine whether to 
add the concentrations of PFOS and PFOA together to determine CERCLA 
responsibilities. Additionally, there is a Lifetime Health Advisory 
(LHA) of 70 ppt for PFOS and PFOA. The LHA applies to drinking water, 
but also considers all PFOS/PFOA exposures over a lifetime. Therefore, 
the LHA is not a cleanup level.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                 ethics
    21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, have you ever discussed 
any Boeing matters while serving as Deputy Secretary, or Acting 
Secretary of Defense?
    Secretary Shanahan. I have recused myself for the duration of my 
service in the Department of Defense from participating personally and 
substantially in matters in which the Boeing Company is a party. I have 
provided written guidance to my staff, which is posted on a public 
website (https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID/Proactive-Disclosures/), to 
ensure my staff identifies matters involving Boeing. My staff and I 
consult with and follow the advice of ethics counsel. I remain 
committed to abiding by the letter and spirit of my ethics agreement, 
and my previous promises to this Committee.

    22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, have you ever discussed 
the advantages of Boeing products, or disparage Boeing competitors 
during your time at the Pentagon?
    Secretary Shanahan. I have recused myself for the duration of my 
service in the Department of Defense from participating personally and 
substantially in matters in which the Boeing Company is a party. I have 
provided written guidance to my staff, which is posted on a public 
website (https://www.esd.whs.mil/FOID/Proactive-Disclosures/), to 
ensure my staff identifies matters involving Boeing. My staff and I 
consult with and follow the advice of ethics counsel. I remain 
committed to abiding by the letter and spirit of my ethics agreement, 
and my previous promises to this Committee.
                       president trump properties
    23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how much money has DOD 
spent at Trump properties since the inauguration?
    Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense has spent a total of 
$147,607.38 at Trump-branded properties since the inauguration. These 
were all government travel credit card purchases by individual 
employees and members of the military. It is not Department of Defense 
policy to recommend that its personnel patronize any particular hotel 
or restaurant. Individual travelers are largely free market players in 
choosing these services. Individual travelers are personally 
responsible for paying the amounts due on their government travel 
credit cards and are provided a per diem lodging allotment and a meals 
and incidentals expense allotment with which to make these payments.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how much money has DOD 
spent on military aircraft flights for the President to travel to Mar-
a-Lago and other Trump properties?
    Secretary Shanahan. The costs, flying hours and sorties associated 
with operating the presidential airplane for President Trump are 
comparable to what the program has spent every year for the past 5 
years. Air Force financial management does not track the cost of each 
trip the President makes and cannot break out trips to Trump properties 
versus other presidential trips. The attached spreadsheet details costs 
per flying hour and sorties associated with the presidential aircraft 
for each calendar year since 2014.

   Costs, Flying Hours, and Sorties for Presidential Aircraft



    25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, since 2016, have you 
personally spent any money at any Trump properties? Have any of your 
family members stayed at any Trump hotels?
    Secretary Shanahan. I am not immediately aware of any family 
business transactions at Trump hotels, but I am confident my financial 
disclosures are all in accordance with Office of Government Ethics' 
regulations and standards of ethical conduct.
                      answering to president trump
    26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as Acting Secretary of 
Defense, do you feel that you are accountable to the President of the 
United States, or to the American people?
    Secretary Shanahan. As Acting Secretary of Defense, I serve the 
American people as the principal assistant to the President in all 
matters relating to the Department of Defense and am subject to the 
direction of the President in accordance with the law.

    27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, Attorney General 
Sessions and Secretary of State Tillerson were both fired for not 
following the wishes of the President when doing so would run counter 
to departmental policy or law. Do you commit to following the law, and 
upholding the Constitution, even if doing so would result in your 
dismissal?
    Secretary Shanahan. Yes.

    28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as you are well aware, 
Secretary Mattis resigned in a letter to Trump that expressed his 
personal disagreement with President Trump's policies. How would you 
respond if you are given an order that you felt was not in the best 
interests of American national security or military personnel?
    Secretary Shanahan. I will endeavor to provide the President the 
best advice I can on all matters pertaining to the Department in 
accordance with the law.
             press access and retaliation against reporters
    29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, how often do you think 
is appropriate for the Pentagon to host a press conference? How often 
should the Secretary of Defense address the media?
    Secretary Shanahan. I believe it is our duty to provide timely and 
accurate information to the American people, and I am committed to 
ensuring the Department regularly engages with the press. In addition 
to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who 
speaks with members of the press daily in both formal and informal 
settings, the Department of Defense has a team of public affairs 
professionals who are subject matter experts on their portfolios. The 
media have direct access to this team and they are available to the 
media on a daily basis, including nights, weekends, and holidays. As 
issues arrive, I address the media with timely information, and I 
frequently engage with the press during my regular activities as well 
as on official trips.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, do you commit to 
ensuring that media outlets will have full access to the Pentagon?
    Secretary Shanahan. In keeping with the First Amendment, I am 
committed to ensuring that media outlets have and will continue to be 
granted full access to the Pentagon. Unlike many government agencies, 
the Department of Defense provides media representatives with 
unescorted access to our headquarters. We continue to issue Pentagon 
press badges that authorize such access, and our press corps has 24-
hour access to our team of public affairs professionals. We respond to 
queries posed by members of the press from around the world on a daily 
basis. In addition, we continue to develop and publish transcripts for 
all public events such as briefings, honor cordons, and other open-
press events involving our senior leaders. Media representatives are 
invited to travel with our leadership, including myself, within 
logistical limits. This includes my recent trip to the U.S. Central 
Command Area of Responsibility. Procedures for media access to the 
Pentagon remain the same as previous years. More information can be 
found on defense.gov via this direct link: https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/For-the-Media/

    31. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, do you commit to 
preventing any retaliation against reporters who publish unfavorable 
stories?
    Secretary Shanahan. My team and I am committed to preventing any 
forms of retaliation against reporters.

    32. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, if you do discover that 
press access is being restricted, and reporters are facing retaliation, 
what steps will you take to remedy this activity?
    Secretary Shanahan. There have been no press restrictions put in 
place at the Pentagon and that will not change under my leadership. My 
team and I are committed to upholding this promise.
                                  f-35
    33. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, why does this budget 
request cut the Marine Corps F-35Bs?
    Secretary Shanahan. In its President's Budget (PB) for Fiscal Year 
2020 submission, the Marine Corps chose to rebalance its aviation 
portfolio, deferring several F-35B aircraft into future Low Rate 
Initial Production contracts in order to balance concurrency management 
while taking advantage of emerging future technologies. The Marine 
Corps increased its procurement of F-35Cs over the Future Years Defense 
Program to 28 F-35Cs (up from 19 F-35s in PB19) to ensure the service 
would be able to transition its F-35C squadrons on schedule. This 
decision provides the Marine Corps flexibility as it continues to 
determine the best mix of tactical aircraft as operational requirements 
develop and change.

    34. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, I understand the budget 
request also includes 8 fourth generation F-15X aircraft in fiscal year 
2020, and a total of 80 F-15X jets in the Future Years Defense Plan 
(FYDP) over the next 5 years. Who directed the investment in F-15X, and 
when was this decision made? Please elaborate on the reasoning for this 
decision.
    Secretary Shanahan. The decision to include investment in F-15EX 
was the result of deliberations between the Air Force, Joints Chiefs, 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the annual Program 
and Budget Review. Several studies and analysis dating from 2017 and 
2018 have identified an enduring need for the capability and capacity 
that fourth generation aircraft provide across the range of military 
operations. Similar to the Department of the Navy's continued 
investment in the F/A-18E Super Hornet, the United States Air Force has 
an enduring need for the improved capability of the F-15EX above the 
baseline F-15's. One added factor in the decision was that for the F-
15EX, the Operations and Sustainment costs are significantly less than 
that of a fifth generation aircraft.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, does your current plan 
to purchase F-15EX's effect DOD's previous validate requirement for 
2,456 F-35s? If the validate requirement remains unchanged, please 
explain how purchasing additional F-15EX's could result in a cost 
savings?
    Secretary Shanahan. Procuring F-15EX does not affect the F-35 
program requirement. Even with the full F-35 program, we have an 
emerging capacity shortfall due to an aging 4th Gen fleet. The F-35 
will replace aging F-16 and A-10 aircraft as planned. The F-15EX is the 
most cost-effective way to replace aging F-15C/D and close the capacity 
shortfall because 4th Gen aircraft are cheaper to operate in missions 
that do not require 5th Gen aircraft.
             uss harry truman retirement and navy interests
    36. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, what are the risks of 
retiring the USS Truman early and reducing our naval carrier fleet from 
11 to 10?
    Secretary Shanahan. Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) 
increased the requirement from 11 CVNs to 12 CVNs to meet the increased 
warfighting response requirements of the Defense Planning Guidance 
Defeat/Deny force sizing direction. CVN 75 is planned for retirement to 
pursue a more lethal balance of high-end, survivable platforms (e.g. 
CVNs) and complementary capabilities from emerging technologies. 
Operationally, CVN 75's accelerated retirement is projected to be 
balanced with these accelerated portfolio options of distributed 
effects.
    Persistent threat analysis and ongoing warfighting studies will 
continue to inform the requirements for specific battle force ships in 
the context of an evolving capability force mix, and the Navy is 
postured to respond to these studies. Reducing the naval carrier fleet 
without the complementary capabilities could result in reduced 
presence, a delayed warfighting response, and/or inability to deter a 
second opportunistic aggressor if engaged in a major combat operation.

    37. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, are you concerned that 
our near peer competitors--most notably China--may attempt to exploit 
our near-term carrier capability gap?
    Secretary Shanahan. I do not foresee a gap in carrier capability or 
capacity. CVN 75 is currently scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 
(FY) 2024 and the Navy will maintain its capacity of 11 carriers until 
then. The $3.4 billion in savings from the decision to cancel the CVN 
75 refueling and comprehensive overhaul (RCOH) will be invested to 
pursue a more lethal balance of high-end, survivable platforms 
(including CVNs) and complementary capabilities leveraging emerging 
technologies. Operationally, CVN 75's accelerated retirement is 
projected to be offset by this portfolio of accelerated capability 
options. If these future force capabilities cannot be developed at a 
pace to mitigate the retirement of a carrier in fiscal year 2024, then 
we will revisit the decision and adjust accordingly.

    38. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, if this decision was 
made to increase investment, why does this year's budget request for 
Science & Technology (S&T) remain stagnant?
    Secretary Shanahan. While Navy Science & Technology account 
increased only by 1.2 percent from fiscal year 2019, most of the 
cutting-edge investments to improve naval lethality are part of either 
the Navy RDT&E account, which increased by 9.4 percent, or Procurement 
which increased by 7.8 percent. Within that context, the Truman 
decision, along with a two-carrier buy, provided funds to heavily 
invest in future diversified strike options. Those National Defense 
Strategy-driven decisions represent a conscious paradigm shift in naval 
force structure procurement for more advanced and distributed naval 
strike options to increase lethality and maneuver. To reach that goal, 
the Department increased investments in advanced strike options, 
including $3.6 billion in large, offensively-armed unmanned surface 
vessels; $1 billion in extra-large and large unmanned underwater 
vehicles; and $3.5 billion in advanced long range offensive and 
defensive munitions.

    39. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, does the President's 
budget require any additional resources to effectively address the 
submarine maintenance backlog? What additional funding or authorities 
may be necessary to get this timeline back on track? Will the Navy 
continue to award submarine maintenance availabilities to the private 
sector in order to alleviate these delays?
    Secretary Shanahan. As described in the Chief of Naval Operations' 
Fiscal Year 2020 Unfunded Priorities List, a number of requirements 
have emerged since the President's Budget was formulated. First among 
these is $653 million needed for submarine maintenance ($290 million 
for USS Boise, $306 million for USS Hartford, and $57 million for USS 
Columbus).
    The Navy will continue to consider both the public and private 
industrial base when scheduling the maintenance and modernization of 
its ships and submarines, however no further authorities are needed at 
this time to address the submarine maintenance backlog. The Navy is 
committed to working with the private shipbuilders to improve private 
sector cost and schedule as these are key to the Navy's ability to 
outsource future work. The Navy is reviewing contracting strategies, 
scheduling tools and better ways to share lessons learned from the 
public shipyards with private industry to improve private shipyard 
performance. The current plan is to award two SSN 688 class Engineered 
Overhauls in the next two fiscal years to the private sector to help 
reach the goal of eliminating submarine idle time by 2023.
                        civilian control of dod
    40. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, as Acting Secretary, 
what actions have you taken to ensure DOD is upholding the principle of 
civilian control? In your view, has DOD fully addressed the 
Commission's concerns regarding the erosion of civilian control?
    Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have 
exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight 
responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and 
planning. Civilian oversight of the military will continue to be 
vigorously exercised throughout the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
as long as I am the Acting Secretary of Defense.

    41. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, the Commission's report 
highlights the importance of civilian participation in discussions 
regarding force management and the prioritization of global challenges. 
What efforts have you made to identify and address instances where 
civilian voices were absent from critical discussions pertaining to 
national security strategy development and implementation--particularly 
in regards to global force management?
    Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have 
exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight 
responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and 
planning. In particular, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Joint Staff work closely together to implement National Defense 
Strategy priorities; civilian voices are a key component of this 
implementation in global force management.

    42. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, what has DOD leadership 
done to ensure civilian employees feel empowered to fulfill their 
responsibilities?
    Secretary Shanahan. Civilian leaders within the Department have 
exercised, and will continue to exercise, their appropriate oversight 
responsibilities in the development of defense strategy, policy, and 
planning. I expect all Department of Defense civilian leaders to 
exercise these responsibilities on a daily basis.

    43. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, in November, the 
Commission testified that civilian personnel vacancies were a 
contributing factor to the imbalance of civilian control. What are you 
doing to recruit and retain civilian personnel? What is the current 
vacancy rate?
    Secretary Shanahan. I am confident in the civilian leaders we have 
in the Department of Defense and am proud to serve with them. The White 
House Personnel Office handles civilian nominations for the Department 
of Defense. My office provides recommendations to the White House to 
fill vacancies, but ultimately, key leader personnel decisions reside 
in the White House.

    44. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Shanahan, in your view, what are 
the long-term consequences of eroding civilian control of the military? 
How does an imbalance of civilian and military perspectives impact 
national security policy, and frame defense advice provided to the 
President?
    Secretary Shanahan. If civilian control of the military was eroding 
it would have my full attention, but I do not share the perception of 
this erosion. The Department has been and is civilian-led and under 
that statutory organizational model, I enjoy a close working 
relationship with all levels of military command.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                indo-pacific alliances and partnerships
    45. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, in your written testimony you 
stated that the intended effect of China's efforts to deny access to 
the East and South China Seas is to weaken our alliance structure in 
the Indo-Pacific. Based on that, what is the current state of our 
alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, specifically the 
military-to-military relationships?
    General Dunford. Senator, in an update to the last 12 months, 
overall I assess China's behavior in the East and South China Seas has 
actually strengthened alliances and partnerships in the region. For 
some of the littoral states, China's militarization of the South China 
Sea and its challenges in the East China Sea have actually produced the 
opposite of China's intended effect--bringing the threat ``closer to 
home'' and hence the stronger mil-mil ties with the United States as a 
counterweight. However, those countries which have significant 
political and economic ties with China still have to tread carefully to 
maintain those interests.

    46. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, how resilient are our allies 
and partners in the face of China's economic and military growth?
    General Dunford. Senator, each of our allies and partners has their 
own sovereign decision and interest vis-a-vis China, and each has 
varying levels of economic and military capability and capacity to 
resist Chinese coercive influence. While some are better positioned 
economically and militarily, we cannot take their resilience for 
granted because China is actively pulling economic and military levers 
to negatively tip the scale towards their favor--interfering in allies 
and partners' domestic national choices. One-Belt One-Road is but one 
example of this economic-security fusion. We must offer stronger 
incentives across all elements of national power, but especially in the 
economic realm, to effectively bolster and complement the security 
support we provide to allies and partners to resist China's increased 
influence. We have to help allies and partners resist this infringement 
on their sovereignty and the abuse of the global norms. One example is 
strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Defense 
Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Over the last 
year, we have seen that countries across the region are becoming more 
aware of the threat Beijing's economic policies pose. Malaysia 
announced the cancellation of three projects worth $22 billion in 
August 2018, declaring that it could not afford Beijing's projects, 
decrying the corrupt practices associated with the projects, and 
criticizing the loans as a ``new version of colonialism.''

    47. Senator Hirono. General Dunford, what is the U.S. doing to 
support our allies and partners in the region to bolster our alliance 
structure?
    General Dunford. Senator, we have been, and will continue to resist 
coercive behavior and publically condemn maligned activities by all 
actors. Our allies and partners are encouraged by U.S. willingness to 
``have skin in the game''--that is by sharing mutual risks, our 
commitment to support international laws and norms, and our willingness 
to speak out against destabilizing behavior. At the strategic level, 
the most effective action we can do to support allies and partners is 
to let them know that the United States military is combat credible and 
is here to stay in the Indo-Pacific. These efforts have provided our 
allies and partners the space to push back against this oppressive 
influence. At the operational level it is to enhance our 
interoperability throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Expanding our 
interoperability will ensure our respective defense enterprises can 
work together effectively during day-to-day competition, crisis, and 
conflict--if it is imposed upon us. Increasing interoperability also 
includes ensuring our military hardware and software is able to more 
easily integrate with those of our closest allies and partners, 
offering financing and sales of cutting-edge U.S. defense equipment to 
security partners, and opening up the aperture of United States 
professional military education to more Indo-Pacific military officers. 
As such, we have strengthened our alliances with Australia, Japan, the 
ROK, and the Philippines, while maintaining our long-standing alliance 
with Thailand. These alliances are indispensable to peace and security 
in the region and our investments in them will continue to pay 
dividends far into the future.
                    military housing and child care
    48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Shanahan, as you are aware, there was 
recently a tragedy in Hawaii where a 7-month old child passed away at 
what appears to be an unlicensed home day care in military family 
housing. While there are several investigations ongoing in that 
particular case, it raises a broader policy issue. Most enlisted 
servicemembers are under the age of 35 and many have families with 
young children. Nothing is more nerve-wracking for a parent than having 
to find safe, affordable child care for their children, especially when 
moving to a new duty station. Yet as the Committee has learned during 
the hearings on the privatized housing initiative and the tragedy in 
Hawaii, there are far too few child care slots available in military 
Child Development Centers (CDCs) for the families who need them. Many 
common-sense measures such as constructing new CDCs, streamlining 
hiring processes for child care workers, and increasing the 
transparency of wait lists have been proposed to address this issue. 
Will you commit to working with the Committee to address access to 
safe, affordable child care for military families as a readiness and 
retention issue?
    Secretary Shanahan. We are a young force with young families and we 
know that our servicemembers need to rely on safe, quality child care 
in order to focus on the mission. The Department of Defense has long 
been recognized as a model for child care in the United States; our 
programs provide care to more than 160,000 children on a daily basis. 
We fully understand that even with these numbers, many military 
families are challenged in finding access to child care. Unfortunately, 
there is no ``one size fits all solution'' for what is a national 
challenge, not just a military challenge. My office and each of the 
Military Departments are exploring a number of solutions.

    49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Shanahan, does the fiscal year 2020 
budget request of over $700 billion for the Defense Department include 
appropriate resources to address the lack of sufficient access to this 
critical service for our military families?
    Secretary Shanahan. The Military Services indicate that they have 
reviewed their budgets and adjusted where needed to ensure sufficient 
funding for children, youth, and family programs.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                            military housing
    50. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the 
service chiefs agreed last week that there is value in having a uniform 
building code for military housing. Do you agree?
    Secretary Shanahan. To the maximum extent practicable, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has required uniform building codes in the 
housing privatization agreements. When the Military Departments 
developed their agreements with the housing privatization partners, 
they required that the privatized housing adhere to DOD Unified 
Facilities Criteria (UFC) for fire protection and housing space 
standards, as well as state and local building codes (unless overridden 
by DOD UFCs), in addition to installation or Military Department 
specific requirements such as installation architectural standards.
    General Dunford. Nothing is more important than taking care of our 
members and their families and as such, I agree with the service 
chiefs, there is definite value in having a uniform building code for 
military housing. My staff and I will continue to work with the 
services to ensure our military families receive the housing they 
deserve.
                              hypersonics
    51. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, I am 
pleased to see $2.6 billion budgeted for hypersonics. Sandia National 
Laboratories has played a critical role in developing this technology 
over decades. I've heard from our national labs how valuable it is to 
co-locate the R&D and manufacturing of these systems. Do you agree?
    Secretary Shanahan. The National Labs, Government Labs, Federally-
Funded Research & Development Centers and University Associated 
Research Centers have played a critical role in the development and 
demonstration of foundational hypersonic concepts and technologies. 
Much of the intellectual capital for the vehicle designs, and even some 
of the more advanced manufacturing techniques, resides within this 
government research and development ecosystem. We need to make sure 
that this core intellectual horsepower continues to focus on rapidly 
evolving our technology to address our most difficult challenges moving 
forward. We must accelerate the rate at which we transition from 
technology development and prototype demonstration to production of 
weapon systems. We are creating a highly collaborative environment 
between industry and government to accomplish this acceleration. 
Industry is essential to being able to produce weapon systems with the 
complexity and scale necessary to field warfighting capability. We must 
capture essential knowledge and transfer it to industry for production 
of the first generation of weapons while enabling the Labs to work on 
the next generation of capability.
    General Dunford. Co-location of research and development with 
manufacturing could result in efficiencies when it comes to getting new 
technologies into the manufacturing process. This is by no means a 
requirement, with today's world of technology and data transfer 
capabilities, information can be readily available in just about any 
location with Internet access. Contract selection should be based on 
considerations for how to develop the most effective systems, while 
being good stewards of our budget. It is possible that person to person 
contact can provide synergy and efficiencies that are difficult to 
quantify. However, it is also possible that a location-centric approach 
could increase costs over prioritizing allocation of available funding 
towards R&D.

    52. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, do 
you think it is worth encouraging an ecosystem where the manufacturing 
and the core expertise for these systems exist together?
    Secretary Shanahan. I do not think that colocation of core 
hypersonic technical expertise with manufacturing is necessarily the 
most effective or efficient model for accelerating and sustaining the 
fielding of warfighting capability enabled by hypersonics. The 
expertise associated with some of the more advanced technologies may 
reside within our government research and development ecosystem, but 
that ecosystem is not as well suited as industry for production of 
large quantities of complex weapons systems. As such I think we need to 
work across our national infrastructure to optimize our path forward.
    General Dunford. I am an advocate of co-locating R&D and 
manufacturing facilities when it provides the warfighter an advanced 
capability fielded in the shortest amount of time and is also cost 
effective. There are potential areas where a geographically co-located 
ecosystem could play an important role in the cost, ease of 
communications and quality of the manufactured product; however, in 
today's highly-connected internet-of-things world geographic 
differences within the ecosystem could have less impact than they have 
had in the past on collaborations between design, manufacture and 
fielding activities, and are best determined on a case by case basis.

    53. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the 
2019 Missile Defense Review acknowledged emerging threats like cruise 
missiles and hypersonic weapons, but the report did not propose any new 
creative solutions or acceleration of efforts to address them 
defensively. Do you believe we are acting with the right sense of 
urgency to counter those threats on the defensive side?
    Secretary Shanahan. In fiscal year 2020, the Department is 
continuing investments in Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defensive 
concepts. MDA is identifying the architecture requirements necessary to 
design an effective hypersonic missile defense system that can be 
integrated into the current ballistic missile defense system. 
Attributes of this architecture will be sensors for detection and 
track, battle management, command and control systems, and weapons for 
hypersonic missile intercept. The department is investing in 
technologies to mature promising space and ground sensor concepts and 
kinetic and non-kinetic intercept concepts through industry 
engagements.
    General Dunford. Yes--President's Budget 2020 is consistent with 
the National Defense Strategy and the 2019 Missile Defense Review 
(MDR). The Missile Defense Defeat Enhancement (MDDE) in 2018 provided 
significant investment and the Department is sustaining critical near-
term layered capabilities and initial investment in studies. The MDR 
directs researching improvements for timely warnings on hypersonic and 
advanced cruise missiles launched at the U.S. Homeland. Future 
investment recommendations will be balanced by additional insights 
drawn from an MDA Defense Against Hypersonic Threats (DAHT) Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) and an MDR directed follow-on analysis. MDA's DAHT 
AoA investigated a wide range of options.

    54. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, does 
the budget invest in those specific defensive capabilities to counter 
these threats? If so, please identify them for the Committee.
    Secretary Shanahan. The Missile Defense Agency Budget request for 
fiscal year 2020 includes $157.4 million for Hypersonic Defense to 
continue to assess architecture alternatives and provide 
recommendations for future Ballistic Missile Defense System 
configurations to keep pace with this threat. The budget request also 
invests $38 million for advanced targets to begin testing against this 
threat. The Agency is investing $116 million for Directed Energy to 
include a laser scaling effort that will develop scalable, efficient 
and compact high energy laser components for integration into high 
power systems; and $132 million for Discrimination Sensor Demonstrator 
Development to provide an airborne sensor to detect and discriminate 
advanced threats. The Space Development Agency (SDA) budget includes 
$20 million to foster development of a Department-wide Space Sensor 
Layer effort (referred to as Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space 
Sensor (HBTSS)) and $30 million to do an assessment of architectures 
for a discriminating space sensor and a Space Based Interceptor.
    General Dunford. The Department is requesting $157.4 million in 
fiscal year 2020 for hypersonic defense to move from concept 
development to technology risk reduction. The fiscal year 2020 plan 
includes software modifications to current BMDS assets and further 
defines the architecture for future capability demonstrations. In 
addition, the Department is requesting $49.8 million in fiscal year 
2020 for the Space Development Agency to pursue a proliferated Low 
Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellation. One goal of this constellation is to 
provide the space sensor capabilities for missile warning and missile 
defense.

    55. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, what 
specific defensive technologies and systems should the Committee be 
investing in to help counter cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons?
    Secretary Shanahan. Investments in space based sensor technologies; 
kinetic interceptor technologies to include advanced sensor, 
propulsion, material science and guidance and control technologies; 
non-kinetic directed energy defeat concepts to include cyber, high 
powered microwave systems, and high energy lasers; artificial 
intelligence for advanced command and control in conditions of high 
uncertainty, and electronic warfare will be essential technologies for 
defeat of advanced cruise and hypersonic missile threats.
    General Dunford. The fiscal year 2020 budget submission requests 
accelerated funding ($428 million) for the Army's new Patriot radar 
(Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS); rapid acquisition 
Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) for near-term air and 
cruise missile defense, and the restructuring of the Indirect Fire 
Capability (IFC). The Navy PB2020 budget invests in SM-6 and Air and 
Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). The SM-6 RDT&E of $116 million budget 
includes initial funding for rapidly developing a new Block 1B 
interceptor to extend the range of the current system. This would 
increase the SM-6 capabilities to air defense, ballistic missile 
defense, and anti-ship strike. In addition, the Department is 
requesting $149.8 million in fiscal year 2020 for the Space Development 
Agency to pursue a proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellation. 
Finally, the Department is developing a Low-Power Laser Demonstrator to 
evaluate the technologies necessary for mounting a laser on an unmanned 
airborne platform to track and destroy missiles in their boost phase.
                        artificial intelligence
    56. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, part 
of the challenge we are going to experience with integrating Artificial 
Intelligence into mission sets is that we need a deeper foundation of 
people who understand the technology and the importance of good, 
useable data. Do you believe DOD recruitment efforts are doing enough 
to target individuals with that kind of skill set?
    Secretary Shanahan. In both our enlisted and officer corps, the 
Services select and train individuals to meet future and current 
manning requirements. This includes specialized programs like 
Artificial Intelligence and Cyber. Officers are educated from a variety 
of outstanding colleges and universities around the country through the 
Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps, while others will attend the 
Military Service Academies. This education provides new officers with a 
solid foundation and the latest information available in these 
specialized areas. The Military Services also collaborate with industry 
to further develop the required skills of these officers. Our enlisted 
force is selected from among the best and the brightest of today's 
youth. The Military Services' selection and classification process uses 
a number of tools to further identify individuals with the greatest 
potential and aptitude to do well in these specialized areas. These 
servicemembers are selected and trained to meet the needs of their 
respective Military Service. Our civilian workforce also helps to round 
out and fill the needs of the Department for such skill sets.
    General Dunford. Yes. The Department is not complacent and across 
the government we need to synch efforts to attract the right people. 
The Services are recruiting skills sets that have the greatest 
potential for understanding the Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
technology. The military personnel policy changes within the 2019 NDAA 
and the service academies commitment to producing future leaders with 
computer science and technical education are among the many efforts the 
Services are implementing to produce the right skill sets. In addition 
to recruiting efforts, Services internally train enlisted personnel who 
have demonstrated aptitude in cyber and other technical fields and 
endeavor to retain this talent by increasing bonuses in those highly 
technical areas. The Services have routinely collaborated with industry 
leaders in many technical fields to build critical skills within our 
current force. The civilian workforce also helps to meet Department 
needs, and I defer to Civilian Personnel leaders to address how the 
civilian workforce is employed.

    57. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, is 
there value in the services assigning someone specifically for 
recruiting individuals in this area?
    Secretary Shanahan. I believe each Service is best positioned to 
make that determination based on its own needs and requirements. The 
Military Services currently have the authority and resources to pursue 
that effort.
    General Dunford. Yes. There is value in assigning specific 
individuals to recruit in AI. Services have seen success in using those 
already in a particular field to recruit additional talent in that same 
field and the Services are best positioned to determine those needs. 
For example, the Navy uses nuclear trained sailors and officers to 
recruit others into the field of this high demand/low density area. 
Special Operations, Cyber, and Linguists have all been used to recruit 
personnel within their respective areas of expertise. In this 
increasingly challenging recruiting environment, we appreciate the 
additional authorities granted in the NDAA as we consider initiatives 
to attract and retain the right talent.
                       breakout of dod ai funding
    58. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Norquist, the fiscal year 2020 
budget request includes a $927 million investment in Artificial 
Intelligence, with money directed toward the Joint Artificial 
Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Advanced Image Recognition (Project 
Maven). Can you please provide the breakdown on how the $927 million 
will be allocated?
    Secretary Norquist. The Department's total Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) request is classified and can be provided under separate cover 
upon request. The $927 million request highlights three major AI 
efforts. The funding allocation is detailed in the table below:



    59. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Norquist, one impediment to 
accurately evaluating funding levels for AI is the lack of a stand-
alone AI Program Element (PE) in DOD funding tables. As a result, AI 
R&D appropriations are spread throughout generally titled PEs and 
incorporated into funding for larger systems with AI components. As the 
lead coordinating entity for AI, do you have visibility on the 
Department of Defense's total investment in AI, including Services and 
components, and can you provide that breakdown to the Committee by PE 
and amounts?
    Secretary Norquist. The Department is working to more rigorously 
identify AI funding in its databases for future budget requests. For 
fiscal year 2020, the Department's data call likely captured most of 
the ongoing AI efforts, but a complete report of funding by program 
element is not available. While some AI efforts are large, stand-alone 
projects, such as JAIC and Project MAVEN, the vast majority are 
embedded in weapons and business systems. Identifying the cost of these 
efforts within larger systems will always have an element of 
uncertainty.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                            defense funding
    60. Senator Warren. General Dunford, in the course of your 
testimony, you said the following with regard to defense funding: ``We 
have routinely not had a budget at the beginning of the year has 
delayed new starts and it's been incredibly inefficient in how we 
prioritize and allocate resources throughout the year and the three 
adjectives I use and I think they are all important is predictable, 
sustained and adequate levels of funding and if we had the entire 
fiscal year we could be the good stewards that you should hold us 
accountable for being.'' With the understanding that predictability, 
sustainment, and adequacy are all important, please prioritize among 
those. Which one is the most important and why?
    General Dunford. Predictable, sustained, and adequate funding are 
interdependent variables and are equally necessary to meet NDS 
priorities. All three attributes translate to budget stability, which 
the Department requires to build a more lethal, resilient, agile, and 
ready Joint Force. Predictable funding builds readiness and supports 
effective planning--both for the military and the Industrial base. 
Sustained funding ensures we can modernize and invest for the future. 
Adequate funding ensures the Joint Force can balance building capacity 
to ``fight tonight'' while also ensuring the ability to deter, defend, 
and, if necessary, defeat future threats posed by near-peer 
adversaries.
                             climate change
    61. Senator Warren. General Dunford, the unclassified worldwide 
threat assessment by the Director of National Intelligence said: 
``Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate 
change, are likely to fuel competition for resources, economic 
distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond.'' That 
assessment also said: ``Damage to communication, energy, and 
transportation infrastructure could affect low-lying military bases, 
inflict economic costs, and cause human displacement and loss of 
life.'' Do you agree with the Intelligence Community's assessment?
    General Dunford. Yes.

    62. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that climate 
change is a national security threat to the United States?
    General Dunford. Climate change is a national security issue. The 
effects of climate change such as shortages of water, food, or 
migration can be sources of conflict.

    63. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that the 
Department of Defense can and should be doing more to address the 
threat of climate change? Please explain.
    General Dunford. The U.S. military is routinely tasked to assist 
with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

    64. Senator Warren. General Dunford, do you believe that the 
combatant commands should incorporate climate change into their 
operational plans and planning processes?
    General Dunford. The joint staff and combatant commands already 
take the effects of climate change into account when planning. Climate 
change is one of many factors the Joint Force considers when planning 
for future military operations.

    65. Senator Warren. General Dunford, does adapting to climate 
change have any negative impact on the readiness of our military to 
address the five challenges (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and 
violent extremism)?
    General Dunford. Responding to any conflict or unanticipated 
requirement impacts readiness and affects our ability to respond to 
other challenges.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                 pfoa/pfos clean up for national guard
    66. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, as you know state-owned 
National Guard facilities that are associated with PFAS contamination 
of drinking water in their communities do not currently have access to 
Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) dollars like their 
Active Duty counterparts do. Last year Senator Gillibrand, who had 
similar problems with National Guard facilities in her state, proposed 
an amendment in the NDAA to change this and allow National Guard 
facilities to utilize DERP funds instead of being forced to take from 
their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. This amendment was 
stripped prior to the final version of the NDAA. Obviously, 
environmental cleanup is not the purpose of O&M dollars. Our national 
guards units use the same firefighting foam and train the same way as 
their Active Duty counterparts for ease of integration and to maximize 
the effects of the total force. Would you support the passage of an 
amendment proposed again this year to allow National Guard facilities 
to access DERP dollars for PFAS and any associated contamination 
cleanup?
    Secretary Shanahan. We reviewed the authorities for use of Defense 
Environmental Restoration Program funds at State Air National Guard 
(ANG) facilities for remediating PFOS/PFOA. While these funds are not 
available for use at State owned or operated ANG facilities for cleanup 
activities, Operation & Maintenance ANG funds are being used, making a 
change unnecessary. The Air Force has programmed funds in the Air 
National Guard Operation & Maintenance account for the ANG to meet 
their Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act responsibility.
                            f-15ex and f-35
    67. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, in February the Secretary 
of the Air Force Heather Wilson admitted that the Air Force's 2020 
budget submission to the Department of Defense did not include any F-
15EX aircraft procurement. Further, she stated that the F-15EX 
procurement was added by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
for the final department budget. Further, recent OSD budget briefs to 
Congress have referenced results of a comprehensive study that explains 
the requirement for a fourth generation fighter to fill capacity and 
operational cost gaps, but they can't share much of the details due to 
claims of classification. If the experts in combat aircraft and 
associated force presentation, the Air Force, didn't identify a need 
for the F-15EX, then what does OSD know that the Air Force doesn't 
about the future threat environment or operational needs requiring the 
addition of fourth generation aircraft?
    Secretary Shanahan. The decision to include investment in F-15EX 
was the result of deliberations between the Air Force, Joints Chiefs, 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the annual Program 
and Budget Review. Several studies and analysis dating from 2017 and 
2018 have identified an enduring need for the capability and capacity 
that fourth generation aircraft provide across the range of military 
operations. Similar to the Department of the Navy's continued 
investment in the F/A-18E Super Hornet, the United States Air Force has 
an enduring need for the improved capability of the F-15EX. The savings 
of F-15EX are not realized in the initial procurement but instead in 
the Operations and Sustainment costs that are significantly less than 
that of a fifth generation aircraft.

    68. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the F-
15EX is a platform that is already largely un-survivable against many 
near peer weapon systems. This problem will only get worse over the 
expected lifespan of the F-15EX of 15-20 years. What is the long term 
intent of acquiring up to 80 F-15EX aircraft that clearly do not align 
with the priorities set forth in the National Defense Strategy of 
competing with ever advancing technology from our biggest competitors?
    Secretary Shanahan. The F-15EX aligns with many portions of the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS). Specifically, the capability and 
capacity that a modernized and capable 4th generation platform brings 
to bear against both state and non-state actors. The NDS highlights 
that even non-state actors now have access to increasingly 
sophisticated weapons systems. The F-15EX has been continuously 
modernized both for the United States fleet as well as over $5 billion 
worth of investment by foreign partner nations that continue to procure 
the aircraft today. At the opposite end of the spectrum of conflict, 
there is still a requirement for fourth generation aircraft even 
against a near pear competitor if it is part of an appropriate balance 
of capabilities. Not all missions will require the low observability 
and advanced systems of 5th generation aircraft. The decision to 
procure F-15EX is directed at replacing existing legacy F-15s that are 
approaching the end of their lifecycle. The age of legacy F-15s 
contributes to increased O&S costs.
    General Dunford. The gaps identified in the 2018 Joint Military Net 
Assessment led to the Air Superiority Competitive Area Study which 
outlined capability, capacity, and readiness issues. The Competitive 
Area Study identified materiel and non-materiel recommendations and 
investment opportunities that could increase capability and/or 
capacity. One of the recommendations was F-15EX. F-15EX supports the 
priorities identified in the National Defense Strategy by providing 
modernized capacity, teamed with 5th gen capabilities, to contribute to 
and enhance lethality and survivability in contested environments. 
Short term recapitalization of the aging F-15C with F-15EX provides 
increased munitions capacity, advanced sensors, and weapons 
capabilities, and improved operational readiness capacity. The F-15EX 
replaces the aging F-15C/D fleet which will be retired by the late 
2020's.
               cybersecurity and defense industrial base
    69. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, West 
Virginia is home to a number of companies that are a part of the 
defense industrial base and we're proud of the work that they do to 
ensure that our servicemen and women have the resources it needs. Our 
industry partners are just as big of targets, if not more, as the DOD 
for cyber theft and espionage. I'm particularly worried about our 
smaller subcontractors who do not always have the capital to invest in 
robust cybersecurity protection for their networks. What industry best 
practices or internally developed actions are you undertaking to better 
protect our industry partners who are developing defense capabilities 
from being attacked?
    Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) are true partners in addressing the needs of 
cybersecurity because every aspect of software and information 
technology pervades all aspects of DOD's mission (from business systems 
to weapons systems, supporting infrastructure to cybersecurity to 
space). Our collective responsibility is to ensure that DOD goods and 
services are delivered in conjunction with a strong, unified 
cybersecurity standard. We in the department see the need to create a 
unified cybersecurity standard, as currently there are several. The 
unified standard needs to take all of the controls called out in 
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) SP 800-171.1 and 
53, as well as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
27001 and other various standards across the DOD Supply Chain. With our 
industry partners we are currently evaluating how to strengthen and 
unify these cybersecurity standards in the DOD Supply Chain. We believe 
a comprehensive standard, as well as certification, will reduce risk 
across the entire DIB. Small businesses are critical to our National 
Defense Strategy (NDS) especially for innovation and specialization 
within the DIB. We aim to support the unified standard with a third-
party certification process. The certification must be cost effective 
enough that small businesses can achieve certification with 
commercially available solution sets for those who might not have the 
capital to invest to meet certification. This unified standard effort 
is supportive of our efforts in regard to the SECURE Technologies Act 
of 2018. That Act, among other things, establishes the Federal 
Acquisition Security Council. The Department will actively participate 
in that Council, which is chaired by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), to develop security standards and metrics for the entire 
Federal Acquisition Supply Chain. We are doing this in an open dialogue 
with all elements of the industrial base, as we need to be cognizant 
that we are just partners in our DIB. This effort is currently 
underway, and we will be conducting listening sessions with industry 
over the next few months to chart our path forward.
    General Dunford. Senator, the Department is gravely concerned over 
the illicit transfer of advanced capabilities. As we continue to invest 
in next generation technologies, it is critical that we protect each in 
the R&D phase and beyond. Just last November, the Department stood up 
the Protecting Critical Technologies Task Force which reports directly 
to the Vice Chairman and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This group is 
tasked with integrating, accelerating, scaling and institutionalizing 
the Department's efforts to protect critical capabilities. That said, 
this issue extends beyond contractors, subcontractors, and 
cybersecurity. Our adversaries are acquiring U.S. critical technology 
through a variety of licit and illicit means to include cyber theft, 
nefarious engagement in our R&D base, investments in acquisitions, and 
talent recruitment efforts. Specific to attacks on the defense 
industrial base, we are raising cybersecurity standards for new and 
existing contracts, moving away from a self-assessment evaluations to a 
model where the Department is actually enforcing cybersecurity 
compliance, and making cybersecurity part of our source selection and 
program evaluation criteria Furthermore, the President's Budget 
submission for fiscal year 2020 contains a request for $15 million in 
fiscal year 2020 and $10 million in fiscal year 2021 for a ``DIB Cloud 
Pilot''. The Department anticipates using these funds to develop a 
Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) effort and to conduct 
a range of other supporting Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cybersecurity 
pilots. The objective of the CMMC activity is to accelerate and 
validate the adoption of a cybersecurity maturity model for the DIB and 
further develop a framework for implementing an independent third party 
certification process to assess the commercial sector against the CMMC 
standards. The maturity model standards will be tiered and provide a 
more cost effective approach for smaller companies by requiring them to 
implement the appropriate set of controls based on the information they 
need to protect. The additional DIB pilot efforts will assess the 
feasibility of smaller DIB companies migrating to more cost effective 
secure environments. These combined activities are intended to increase 
the overall cyber hygiene of the DIB and help smaller companies better 
secure their data. Finally, we are also looking at measures to increase 
the integrity of the supply chain so that increased levels of 
cybersecurity extend beyond the prime contractors typically associated 
with DOD contracts to those subprime contractors as well.
                     dod budget and border security
    70. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, as we have started to dig 
into the President's budget request this week, there's a lot of 
questions over the DOD portion being requested for border wall funding. 
A combination of an emergency fund as well as other budget shell games 
give us $8.6 billion in border wall funding for fiscal year 2020. Given 
the briefs we've already heard from your office this week, it seems 
like a lot of energy is being spent by your department to figure out 
how to fund this primarily non-military requirement from the President. 
This appears to be taking a large portion of both your time and staff 
time to discuss and calculate. Is our attention in the Department of 
Defense budget discussion adequately covering the required defense 
items given the time and energy senior officials and staff have spent 
on figuring out how to carve out pieces of the military budget for a 
border wall?
    Secretary Shanahan. Preparation of the Department's Fiscal Year 
2020 President's Budget request is a comprehensive, deliberative 
process involving the Department's senior leadership. The Department of 
Defense fiscal year 2020 budget request provides a foundation for 
transformational change and implementation of the National Defense 
Strategy. Through the strategic reprioritization of resources during 
the development of the budget, the Department increased investments in 
specific key areas such as cyber and space warfighting domains, 
capability modernization, and acceleration of emerging technologies. 
The deliberate investment of time in developing this budget will better 
enable us to deter and win against adversaries.
               critical infrastructure and cyber security
    71. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the 
budget we've been presented lays out $9.6 billion for DOD cyber domain 
efforts to include network, infrastructure and offensive and defensive 
cyber capabilities. As the Ranking Member of the Cyber Security 
Subcommittee and with my work on Energy and Natural Resources I have 
become deeply concerned with the vulnerabilities faced by our Nation's 
critical infrastructure. How much of the Department's efforts with 
these cyber security funds are directed at making sure our critical 
infrastructure that is vital to the defense of this country is 
protected from cyber-attacks by countries like China, North Korea, 
Russia and Iran?
    Secretary Shanahan. Defense of national critical infrastructure is 
a key area of emphasis for the Department. This emphasis reflects the 
fact that competitors are targeting these assets, and that any large-
scale disruption or degradation of national critical infrastructure, 
not just Department of Defense (DOD) infrastructure, would be a 
national security concern. We seek to preempt, defeat, or deter 
significant malicious cyber activity targeting national critical 
infrastructure by 1) defending forward to stop threats before they 
reach their targets and 2) supporting the Department of Homeland 
Security in fulfilling its responsibility to coordinate the overall 
Federal effort to promote the security and resilience of the Nation's 
critical infrastructure.
    Last year, Secretary Mattis and Secretary Nielsen signed a joint 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) detailing how our two departments can 
cooperate in order to secure and defend the Homeland from cyber 
threats. The MOU reiterates Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) 
primary role as the U.S. Government lead for protection of national 
critical infrastructure, and emphasizes DOD's unique mission of 
defending forward. These roles are mutually reinforcing; DHS's efforts 
at home enable DOD to project power both in cyberspace and in the 
physical domains, even as our efforts outside the Homeland help to 
secure U.S. infrastructure. As part of the efforts to implement this 
MOU fully, DOD and DHS senior leaders recently signed a charter 
creating a Cyber Protection and Defense Steering Group. This steering 
group provides us with visibility into existing areas of DOD-DHS cyber 
cooperation, enabling us to synchronize our efforts more effectively. 
By bringing leaders from both departments into the same working group, 
we are able to collaborate better, and to ensure that our two 
departments are able to address cyber threats synergistically, rather 
than work at cross-purposes.
    General Dunford. The Department is also deeply concerned about 
protecting our Nation's critical infrastructure. Congruent with the 
2017 NDAA Section 1650, we have been addressing this issue. The Joint 
Staff provided a tiered list of DOD installations based on strategic 
importance to global missions and OSD is actively working to conduct 
evaluations of cyber vulnerabilities at these locations. We are 
currently in a pilot phase of cyber assessments and hope to use these 
pilots as a model to conduct full evaluations of all DOD installations 
in the near future. Our budget request includes $8 million and 8 
manpower positions for this purpose. Once our vulnerabilities are 
identified, we will work with Congress to fund mitigations strategies 
to maximize security of our infrastructure. DOD keenly understands that 
we rely heavily on commercial infrastructure, and particularly, our 
Nation's energy grid. To that end, we are actively working with 
industry and the Army Cyber Institute to increase DOD participation in 
the Jack Voltaic series of research projects, which is an innovative 
bottom-up approach to critical infrastructure resilience. This analysis 
of strengths and weaknesses, tailored specifically to stress aspects of 
the incident response and disaster recovery plans, identifies gaps in 
critical infrastructure cybersecurity that directly and indirectly 
supports the DOD mission.
                        state department budget
    72. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, the State Department is 
seeing a 23 percent decrease in its budget at the same time the 
Department of Defense is seeing an increase of approximately 5 percent. 
Secretary Mattis famously said that if we cut the State Department we 
were going to have to buy him more bullets. The State Department 
already traditionally operates on a fraction of the amount that the 
Department of Defense receives. I understand that you are not 
responsible for them, but do you consider such a drastic cut to the 
State Department budget as an overall negative for the Department of 
Defense given the additional duties your department will be forced to 
execute alongside a weaker State Department?
    Secretary Shanahan. The Department of Defense supports the State 
Department's role in U.S. foreign policy. Along with the National 
Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security, we have 
generated remarkable alignment across the U.S. Government on a range of 
defense issues. I am in constant dialogue with Secretary Pompeo, and 
will let him address the appropriate level for the State Department 
budget. That said, achieving the objectives of the National Defense 
Strategy requires a strong, well-resourced interagency partner in the 
State Department.
                           gao high risk list
    73. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan, this week GAO released its 
2019 High Risk List report. There were several DOD items on the list--
for right now, I'd like to focus on Weapons System Acquisition. In 
April 2018, GAO reported that the DOD expects to invest $1.66 trillion 
in total to develop and procure its portfolio of 86 major defense 
acquisition programs. For years, DOD has struggled with cost, schedule, 
and performance goals. In fact, this weapons system acquisition was 
added to the GAO High Risk List in 1990. While GAO notes there has been 
some partial progress, there are still things that need to be done such 
as:

    Tracking the costs to correct defects after ship delivery to help 
determine cases in which warranties could contribute to improvements in 
the cost and quality of Navy ships.

    Requiring the Missile Defense Agency to make its cost estimates 
more comprehensive, to stabilize its element and program baselines by 
better understanding requirements before setting a baseline, and--once 
a baseline is set--to track revisions to enable meaningful comparisons 
over time.

    Can you tell me how you and the Department of Defense are 
addressing these issues by discussing any meaningful steps being taken 
and when we will see or be briefed on the results?
    Secretary Shanahan. With regard to cost, schedule, and performance 
goals generally, section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by 
section 831 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), 
requires the designated milestone decision authority to establish cost, 
fielding, and performance goals (also called targets) before funds are 
obligated for technology development, systems development, or 
production of a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). Further, 
Department of Defense Instructions stipulate that MDAPs are to report 
program data including unit cost estimates and Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summaries (DAES) on a quarterly basis after submission of the 
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). USD(A&S) offices provide analysis of 
reported data to USD(A&S), Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) and 
Program Offices.
    With regard to tracking the costs to correct defects after ship 
delivery, the Department of Defense stated in our response to the GAO 
recommendation 3 in GAO-16-71 Navy and Coast Guard Shipbuilding: Navy 
Should Reconsider Approach to Warranties for Correcting Construction 
Defects, the GAO assertion that the Navy is not tracking the costs to 
correct defects after ship delivery to help determine cases in which 
warranties could contribute to improvements in the cost and quality of 
Navy ships is inaccurate. The Navy has been differentiating the 
Government's and shipbuilder's responsibility for defects and tracking 
the costs to correct all defects after delivery on shipbuilding 
contracts. The costs for any shipbuilder responsible corrections are 
tracked by the SUPSHIP and the shipbuilding program office.
    With regards to the Missile Defense Agency, the Department 
partially concurred with the GAO recommendation regarding the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) life cycle costs, agreeing that decision makers 
should have insight into the full life cycle costs of programs. The 
Department concurred with the recommendation regarding the 
stabilization of the MDA acquisition baselines. However, it is 
necessary to recognize that Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 
baselines change to respond to evolving requirements provided by other 
organizations and leaders, from the Warfighter to the President, to 
counter changing threats. We also noted that the MDA Director has 
authority to make these adjustments within departmental guidelines. The 
MDA has enhanced the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 
Accountability Report (BAR) format to be able to track revisions.
                           duty status reform
    74. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, Duty 
Status reform is a significant concern of mine given the large National 
Guard presence in West Virginia. I hope that your proposals are based 
on extensive consultation with the states regarding title 32 and other 
significant National Guard issues. Can you please share your 
discussions with state leadership and the results of those discussions 
as far as support or disagreement with your Duty Status Reform 
suggestions?
    Secretary Shanahan. From the very beginning in developing a Duty 
Status Reform proposal, the Department has been open and transparent, 
collaborating freely across the entire Department of Defense and 
throughout government. Our team has worked tirelessly with leadership 
from each Reserve Component and the National Guard Bureau, as well as 
with major stakeholders such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs and 
Labor, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional 
Budget Office, and others. Throughout the entire process, the 
Department engaged and solicited feedback from the governors and 
adjutants generals of the states through various outreach efforts, to 
include briefing the Council of Governors on several occasions. At 
numerous points, we received feedback and suggestions and have worked 
collaboratively to ensure our proposal addressed the identified issues, 
while retaining the integrity and purpose of the reform effort. If the 
proposal is cleared by OMB and enacted, we anticipate a significant 
period of time will be required to fully implement. The Department will 
continue to work with the Congress to make any additional changes that 
are required prior to implementation. I commit to continuing to work 
with States and other stakeholders as we move forward on this critical 
reform effort.
    General Dunford. From the very beginning in developing a Duty 
Status Reform proposal, the Department has been fully open and 
transparent, collaborating freely across the entire Department of 
Defense and throughout government. Our team has worked tirelessly with 
leadership from each Reserve Component and the National Guard Bureau, 
as well as with major stakeholders such as the Departments of Veterans 
Affairs and Labor, the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Congressional Budget Office, and more. Throughout the entire process, 
the Department engaged and solicited feedback from the governors and 
adjutants generals of the states through various outreach efforts, to 
include briefing the Council of Governors on several occasions. At 
numerous points, we received feedback and suggestions and have worked 
collaboratively to ensure our proposal addressed these issues, while 
retaining the integrity and purpose of the reform effort. If the 
proposal is enacted, we anticipate a significant period of time will be 
required to implement. We request the support of Congress to support 
any legislative adjustments that need to be made to address unforeseen 
issues and concerns that may arise post-enactment. We are committed to 
continuing to work with the Congress, the states, and others as we move 
forward to implement the comprehensive, fundamental reform needed to 
support our National Guardsmen and reservists.

    75. Senator Manchin. Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford, the 
Governors have been very clear that they do not accept that changes to 
the Insurrection Act in title 10, chapter 13 are necessary to complete 
the Duty Status Reform. Have any of your Duty Status reforms made 
changes to title 10, chapter 13, and if so, what are the impacts and 
cost of Duty Status reform?
    Secretary Shanahan. Throughout the development of our Duty Status 
Reform initiative, the Department has zealously guarded the 
prerogatives, responsibilities, and authorities of the governors and 
states, including their authorities under the Insurrection Act in 
chapter 13 of title 10, United States Code. Today's ``patchwork quilt'' 
of laws, policies and procedures that govern how leaders utilize and 
manage our Reservist components, and how Reservists and National 
Guardsmen earn their pay and benefits, is a complex system fraught with 
inequities, disparity, and complexity. I recognize some concern has 
been expressed that Duty Status Reforms would fundamentally alter the 
role of governors as it pertains to the Insurrection Act. I can assure 
the Congress that is not our intent.
    General Dunford. Throughout the development of our Duty Status 
Reform initiative, DOD has zealously guarded the prerogatives, 
responsibilities, and authorities of the governors and states, 
including their authorities under the Insurrection Act in chapter 13 of 
title 10, United States Code. Duty status reform, however, is long 
overdue. Today's ``patchwork quilt'' of laws, policies and procedures 
that govern how our leaders utilize and manage our Reserve components, 
and how Reservists and National Guardsmen earn their pay and benefits, 
is a complex system fraught with inequities, disparity, and complexity. 
Through adoption of a new Reserve Component duty status structure, our 
comprehensive draft legislative proposal simplifies and streamlines the 
more than 27 existing Reserve Component duty statuses, improves the 
utilization of the Reserve Components, and most importantly, aligns pay 
and benefits according to the nature of the work Reserve and National 
Guard members perform in service to their country. I recognize some 
concern has been expressed that the Department's duty status reform 
concept would fundamentally alter the role of governors as it pertains 
to the Insurrection Act. I can assure the Congress that was never our 
intent, and while it is absolutely necessary to reorganize the 
provisions of the Insurrection Act in order to effect the simplified, 
streamlined, duty status structure we are proposing, our current 
legislative draft proposal does preserve the governor's role and 
authority as specified in the Act. To the extent, however, that 
specific concerns with the Department's proposal as currently drafted, 
have been identified, OSD staff has worked closely with their National 
Guard Bureau colleagues and state Adjutants General representatives to 
address these concerns. Further, the Department will continue to work 
openly and transparently with all stakeholders to ensure any future 
concerns are also responsibly and fairly addressed. In terms of the 
part of your question that pertains to costs, at this time our proposal 
is pending release by the Office of Management and Budget, so the 
Department is unable to address the specifics of the budgetary 
implications of this proposal. However, throughout the development of 
the Duty Status Reform initiative, the Department considered the 
potential budgetary implications of this comprehensive, fundamental 
reform.

                           Appendix A
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                              ARMY POSTURE

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
Cramer, McSally, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, 
Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin, 
Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
    We--as soon as we have a quorum here, we do have some 
nominations that have to break into the regular order.
    The Committee meets to receive testimony on the posture of 
the U.S. Army in fiscal year 2020 budget request.
    We welcome Dr. Mark Esper, the Secretary of the Army, and 
General Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army. We thank both 
of you for your years of distinguished service. Look forward to 
the upcoming months.
    The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military 
to prepare for the return of great-power competition. This 
means that we've got to be prepared to deter--if necessary, 
decisively defeat--potential near-peer adversaries, obviously 
referring to China and Russia.
    In order for the Army to achieve that goal, our Army must 
be manned, trained, and equipped appropriately. The Army has 
made significant progress in rebuilding readiness across the 
force, but there's still a lot to be done. A high state of 
readiness is crucial for our Nation to demonstrate peace 
through strength.
    With their alarming speed of modernization of both 
conventional and nuclear forces, China and Russia now present a 
credible threat to America and our allies in their regions, and 
an increasing threat around the world. In fact, in some areas 
they--they've actually surpassed us. It's a hard thing to 
explain to American people. They always assume that we have the 
very best of everything. That has been true in the past. It's 
not true today.
    It's past time for action. You have testified that the Army 
is outranged and outgunned, as currently organized and 
equipped. The future of our Army readiness and the relevance 
requires modernization now. Any successful modernization 
strategy must focus on results. Rapid prototyping and realistic 
experimentation will be vital to getting modern, reliable, 
lethal weapons into the hands of our soldiers, and doing so on 
time within allotted budgets. We cannot allow the past 
acquisition failures to continue any longer.
    The Army undertook a detailed and exhaustive look at every 
single program to ensure that each supports the National 
Defense Strategy. This National Defense Strategy, which, of 
course, we've had two hearings on this, it's a strategy that 
was agreed to by both Democrats and Republicans, and we're 
trying to use that as our blueprint. These choices will require 
an open and transparent dialogue with Congress along the way. 
We look forward to working with you to make our shared 
modernization vision a reality as the Army reinvests itself to 
become a 21st century fighting force prepared for the more 
lethal and dynamic battlefields of the future.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Esper and General 
Milley to this morning's hearing. This will likely be the last 
time that General Milley testifies before the Committee in the 
capacity as Chief of Staff of the Army. So, let me thank you, 
General, for the leadership of our soldiers, very, very much.
    The President's budget request for fiscal year 2020 
includes $182.3 billion in funding for the Army. Of that 
amount, 150.7 billion is for the base budget requirements, and 
31.6 billion for overseas contingency operations activities. 
This request should be evaluated in the context of the National 
Defense Strategy and the national security challenges facing 
our country. The renewed focus on strategic competition with 
China and Russia will require the Army to train for full-
spectrum operations and to field equipment necessary for a 
high-end fight. I commend the Army for recognizing that, while 
there is a change in strategy, budgets remain constrained. I 
understand that, as this budget was developed, senior Army 
leadership scrutinized existing programs to determine which 
ones supported the Army's modernization priorities and which 
programs should be reduced or canceled so that savings could be 
reinvested. While the Committee may not agree with every budget 
decision made by the Army, they did make tough decisions to 
prioritize funding for the future fight.
    In support of the focus on near-peer competition, the Army 
has also made major structural changes to expedite 
modernization across the force. The Army has established eight 
cross-functional teams to demonstrate capabilities through 
prototyping and experimentation for major modernization 
priorities. The Army is also exercising new acquisition 
authorities provided by Congress, while Army Futures Command 
was established as the single command for all modernization 
efforts. Delivering cutting-edge capabilities to the warfighter 
under an expedited acquisition timeline is always a challenge. 
To do so while undergoing a major structural and cultural 
change with the establishment of the Army Futures Command makes 
this process even more complex.
    While I applaud the Army for taking a hard look at their 
acquisition processes, we do not have a wide margin for 
mistakes, given the threats from our adversaries. I asked our 
witnesses this morning to share what the Army has learned to 
date from these efforts.
    While modernizing military platforms and upgraded equipment 
are critical for the battlefield, ensuring our soldiers are 
ready for the fight remains our highest priority. I commend 
Army leadership for their focus on unit readiness and for 
submitting a budget proposal that supports 25 Combat Training 
Center rotations for brigade combat teams. This budget request 
seeks an increase of 2,000 Active Duty soldiers as well as a 
slight end-strength increase for the Army National Guard and 
Reserve. It is imperative that, as the Army grows, it remains 
focused on the quality of our soldiers rather than the 
quantity. The Army has acknowledged that they were unable to 
meet the recruitment goals last year, and I would like to know 
from our witnesses how the Army plans to address this 
challenge.
    The President's budget also requests an across-the-board 
pay raise of 3.1 percent for all military personnel, equal to 
the annual increase in the employment cost index. However, once 
again, the President has decided not to include in this budget 
the funding necessary to support a pay raise for civilian 
employees. This budget request also makes reduction to Federal 
employee pensions affecting current and future employees. 
Civilians working in the Department of the Army are force 
multipliers and part of the total force. Unfortunately, by 
denying a corresponding pay increase for our civilians and 
cutting their pensions, the President's budget request sends 
the message that their work and contributions to our national 
defense are not as highly valued as they should be, and it 
hinders the Army's ability to recruit the very best civilian 
workforce we need. I hope to hear from our witnesses their 
views on the morale of the Army civilian workforce and their 
ability to effectively manage the total force, including 
civilian employees.
    Finally, I wanted to close on two important issues. First, 
this Committee has received the list of military construction 
projects that will be targeted in order to resource the 
President's proposed wall. Many of these projects are Army 
military construction priorities, and they will be at risk for 
delay or cancellation. Also, there are concerns that troop 
deployments to the southern border may undermine Army readiness 
goals. Given the efforts by the Army over the past several 
years to rebuild readiness, I would like to hear from our 
witnesses today whether moving funds from military construction 
projects or deploying soldiers to the border will have a 
detrimental impact on readiness.
    Second, I want to emphasize the urgency of fixing the 
substandard living conditions that are pervasive in privatized 
military housing. I appreciate the Army has acknowledged the 
enormity of the issue and that they are working to address this 
crisis. In the meantime, this Committee will continue our 
stringent oversight until every servicemember and their family 
has access to the high-quality housing that they have earned 
and deserve.
    Again, thank you. I look forward to hearing from the 
witnesses.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Now Carl Doms and your group understand why you're here 
today.
    Since a quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to 
consider a list of 2,743 pending military nominations. All the 
nominations have been before the Committee the required length 
of time.
    Is there a motion to favorably report these----
    Senator Reed. So moved.
    Chairman Inhofe.--2,743----
    Senator Wicker. Second.
    Chairman Inhofe.--pending----
    There's a motion. There's a second.
    All in favor, say aye.
    [A chorus of ayes.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
    [No response.]

    [The list of nominations considered and approved by the 
Committee follows:]

 Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on March 26, 2019.
     1.  In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the 
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Leonard F. Anderson IV) 
(Reference No. 32)

     2.  In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel M. Anderson) (Reference No. 
288)

     3.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Matthew D. Colsia) (Reference No. 305)

     4.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Deven R. Gaston) (Reference No. 306)

     5.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Steven M. Angeline) (Reference No. 319)

     6.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with David F. Hunley) (Reference No. 
326)

     7.  In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
major (John C. Jarvis) (Reference No. 328)

     8.  In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Nathaneal J. Hart, Jr.) (Reference No. 337)

     9.  In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of 
major (list begins with Matthew J. Anderson) (Reference No. 340)

    10.  RADM(lh) Peter G. Stamatopoulos, USN to be rear admiral 
(Reference No. 346)

    11.  RADM(lh) Gayle D. Shaffer, USN to be rear admiral (Reference 
No. 347)

    12.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear 
admiral (list begins with Kelly A. Aeschbach) (Reference No. 348)

    13.  In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of rear 
admiral (list begins with Blake L. Converse) (Reference No. 349)

    14.  Capt. Dean A. Vanderley, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) 
(Reference No. 354)

    15.  Capt. Kenneth W. Epps, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) 
(Reference No. 355)

    16.  Capt. Timothy H. Weber, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) 
(Reference No. 356)

    17.  Capt. James L. Hancock, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) 
(Reference No. 357)

    18.  In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear 
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Nicholas M. Homan) (Reference 
No. 358)

    19.  Capt. Charles W. Brown, USN to be rear admiral (lower half) 
(Reference No. 359)

    20.  In the Army there are 949 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Adrian Acevedo) (Reference No. 380)

    21.  In the Army there are 556 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Benjamin T. Abel) (Reference No. 381)

    22.  In the Army there are 555 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Kwansah E. Ackah) (Reference No. 382)

    23.  In the Army there are 51 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Alan Adame) (Reference No. 383)

    24.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Elizabeth A. Fields) (Reference No. 384)

    25.  RADM John B. Nowell, Jr., USN to be vice admiral and Chief of 
Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, 
Personnel, Training, and Education, N1 (Reference No. 393)

    26.  MG Steven L. Basham, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy 
Commander, US Air Forces Europe and Deputy Commander, US Air Forces 
Africa (Reference No. 419)

    27.  Col. Steven J. Butow, ANG to be brigadier general (Reference 
No. 420)

    28.  MG Karen H. Gibson, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence for National Security Partnerships, 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Reference No. 421)

    29.  In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of rear 
admiral (list begins with James P. Downey) (Reference No. 422)

    30.  RADM Ronald A. Boxall, USN to be vice admiral and Director, 
Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J-8, Joint Staff (Reference 
No. 423)

    31.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade 
of colonel (Thomas D. Crimmins) (Reference No. 425)

    32.  In the Air Force there are 16 appointments to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Shawn C. Bishop) (Reference No. 
427)

    33.  In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Michell A. Archebelle) (Reference No. 428)

    34.  In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Peter N. Fischer) (Reference No. 429)

    35.  In the Air Force there are 425 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Brian M. Alexander) (Reference No. 430)

    36.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (P.J. Fox) (Reference No. 433)

    37.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Nathan M. Clayton) (Reference No. 434)

    38.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Adam 
P. James) (Reference No. 435)

    39.  In the Army Reserve there are 33 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Jason S. Baker) (Reference No. 436)

    40.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Shelia R. Day) (Reference No. 437)

    41.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Robert D. Cope) (Reference No. 438)

    42.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (William C. Mitchell) (Reference No. 439)

    43.  BG Thomas L. Solhjem, USA to be major general and Chief of 
Chaplains, US Army (Reference No. 457)

    44.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major 
general (list begins with Telita Crosland) (Reference No. 458)

    45.  LTG Daniel R. Hokanson, ARNG to be lieutenant general and 
Director, Army National Guard (Reference No. 459)

    46.  MG Leon N. Thurgood, USA to be lieutenant general and Director 
of Hypersonics, Directed Energy, Space and Rapid Acquisition, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology (Reference No. 461)

    47.  MG Walter E. Piatt, USA to be lieutenant general and Director 
of the Army Staff (Reference No. 463)

    48.  In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
lieutenant colonel (Latoya D. Smith) (Reference No. 472)

    49.  In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade 
of colonel (Lisa Marie Ahaesy) (Reference No. 473)

    50.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Rubirosa B. Bago) (Reference No. 474)

    51.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Meghan C. Gerrity) (Reference No. 475)

    52.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Daniel M. Jansen) (Reference No. 476)

    53.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Randolph Powell) (Reference No. 477)

    54.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Michael J. Prokos) (Reference No. 478)

    55.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Anthony Bellofigueroa) (Reference No. 481)

    56.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Sean 
R. Richardson) (Reference No. 482)

    57.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Kahtonna C. Allen) (Reference No. 483)

    58.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Angelo N. Catalano) (Reference No. 484)

    59.  In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Charles J. Calais) (Reference No. 485)

    60.  In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Robert T. Evans) (Reference No. 486)

    61.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
commander (Edward M. Prendergast) (Reference No. 487)

    62.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander 
(Thomas L. Hinnant III) (Reference No. 489)

    63.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
commander (Sanjay Sharma) (Reference No. 490)

    64.  LTG James C. Slife, USAF to be lieutenant general and 
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (Reference No. 493)

    65.  LTG Paul E. Funk II, USA to be general and Commanding General, 
US Army Training and Doctrine Command (Reference No. 494)

    66.  RADM Dee L. Mewbourne, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy 
Commander, US Transportation Command (Reference No. 497)

    67.  RADM Jon A. Hill, USN to be vice admiral and Director, Missile 
Defense Agency (Reference No. 498)

    68.  RADM Stuart B. Munsch, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5 
(Reference No. 499)

    69.  In the Air Force there are 3 appointments to the grade of 
colonel (list begins with Julie Huygen) (Reference No. 500)

    70.  In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel 
(list begins with Paula I. Schasberger) (Reference No. 501)

    71.  In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander 
(Angela Tang) (Reference No. 502)

_______________________________________________________________________
                                                                    
TOTAL: 2,743

    Chairman Inhofe. The motion carries.
    We'll now hear from our two witnesses. It's a pleasure 
having both of you here.
    We'll start with you, Secretary Esper. Try to keep your 
remarks somewhere in the neighborhood of 5 minutes. You're 
recognized.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir, I'll watch the clock, here.
    So, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished 
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today.
    I want to, first, thank Congress for helping us reverse the 
readiness decline that developed following several years of 
budget uncertainty. Because of the strong support provided in 
the fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 budgets, we have 
increased the number of fully ready brigade combat teams by 55 
percent over the past 2 years. However, while I am confident we 
would prevail against any foe today, our adversaries are 
working hard to contest the outcome of future conflicts. As a 
result, the Army stands at a strategic inflection point. If we 
fail to modernize the Army now, we risk losing the first 
battles of the next war.
    For the past 17 years, the Army bore the brunt of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. For over a decade, we postponed 
modernization to procure equipment tailored to 
counterinsurgency operations. Our legacy combat systems, 
designed for high-intensity conflict, entered service when I 
joined the Army in the early 1980s. While they dominated in 
past conflicts, incremental upgrades for many of them are no 
longer adequate for the demands of future battlefield, as 
described in the National Defense Strategy. We must build the 
next generation of combat systems now, before Russia and China 
outpace us with their modernization programs.
    Despite Russia's looming economic difficulties, they are 
steadily upgrading their military capabilities. In addition to 
field testing their next-generation T-14 Armada tank, they 
continue to advance the development of their air defense and 
artillery systems. When combined with new technologies, such as 
drones, cyber, and electronic warfare, Russia has proven its 
battlefield prowess.
    We have no reason to believe that Moscow's aggressive 
behavior will cease in the short term. Russia's blatant 
disregard for their neighbors' sovereignty, as demonstrated in 
Ukraine and Georgia, is a deliberate strategy meant to 
intimidate weaker states and undermine the NATO alliance.
    In the long run, China presents an even greater challenge. 
They continue to focus their military investments in cutting-
edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence, directed 
energy, and hypersonics. Beijing's systematic theft of 
intellectual property is also allowing them to develop 
capabilities cheaper and faster than ever before. Additionally, 
China's coercive economic practices are expanding its sphere of 
influence in ways contrary to our Nation's interests.
    To deter the growing threat posed by great-power 
competitors, and to defeat them in battle if necessary, we must 
leap ahead to the next generation of combat systems, and we 
must do so now. Over the past year, the Army took a major step 
forward in reorganizing its entire modernization enterprise 
with the establishment of Futures Command. In doing so, we 
stripped away layers of bureaucracy and streamlined our 
acquisition process while achieving unity of command and 
greater accountability. Guided by our six modernization 
priorities, Army Futures Command is hard at work developing the 
systems needed to maintain battlefield overmatch in future 
conflicts.
    When we received our budget this time last year, we felt 
that it was unreasonable to ask Congress for the additional 4 
to 5 billion dollars needed annually to fund our modernization 
without first looking internally to find the necessary 
resources. As a result, the Army's senior leaders took an 
unprecedented initiative to review every Army program. Our goal 
was simple: Find those programs that least contribute to the 
Army's lethality, and reallocate those resources into higher-
priority activities. After over 50 hours of painstaking 
deliberations, we eliminated, reduced, or delayed nearly 200 
programs, freeing up over $30 billion over the next 5 years. We 
then reinvested this money into our top priorities, those 
systems and initiatives we need to prevail in future wars. The 
Army will continue to ruthlessly prioritize our budgets to 
provide a clear, predictable path forward that will achieve our 
strategic goals. That process is underway now as we develop 
next year's budget.
    Support for the Army's fiscal year 2020 budget is critical 
to building the Army the Nation needs and demands. Those who 
are invested in legacy systems will fight to hold on to the 
past, while ignoring the billions of dollars in opportunity 
created by our investments in new technologies and what it 
means for the Army's future readiness. While change will be 
hard for some, we can no longer afford to delay the Army's 
modernization. We believe we are following the sound guidance 
conveyed to us by many of you.
    In this era of great-power competition, we cannot risk 
falling behind. If left unchecked, Russia and China will 
continue to erode the competitive military advantage we have 
held for years.
    The Army has clear vision--a clear vision, which I ask be 
entered into the record--and a sound strategy to maintain 
battlefield overmatch. We are making the tough choices. We now 
need the support of Congress to modernize the force, and it 
starts with the fiscal year 2020 budget. The bottom line is 
this: We owe it to our soldiers to provide them the weapons and 
equipment they need to win decisively in the future.
    Thank you again for your continued support. I look forward 
to your questions and appreciate the opportunity to discuss 
these important matters with you today.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Excellent 
statement. Without objection, the report made part of the 
record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                            the army vision
    The United States Army is the most lethal and capable ground combat 
force in history. It has proven this in multiple conflicts, across a 
broad spectrum of operations, in various locations around the world, 
defending the Nation and serving the American people well for over 240 
years. The key to this success has been the skill and grit of the 
American soldier, the quality of its Leaders, the superiority of its 
equipment, and the ability of the Army--Regular, National Guard, and 
Reserve to adapt to and dominate a complex and continuously changing 
environment as a member of the Joint Force.
    As we look ahead, near-peer competitors such as China and Russia 
will increasingly challenge the United States and our allies in Europe, 
the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, we 
should expect these countries' arms, equipment, and tactics to be used 
against us by others, including threats such as North Korea and Iran, 
failed states, and terrorist groups. Our adversaries' ambitions and the 
accelerating pace of technological change will create challenges and 
opportunities for the Army's battlefield superiority.
    Meanwhile, the many demands on the Nation's resources will put 
downward pressure on the defense budget in the future, forcing the Army 
to continue making difficult choices about how it spends scarce dollars 
to meet national objectives and compelling us to become ever more 
efficient. A continued commitment to strengthening our alliances and 
building partnerships will help offset these challenges.
    The Army Mission--our purpose--remains constant: To deploy, fight, 
and win our Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained 
land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as 
part of the Joint Force. The Army mission is vital to the Nation 
because we are a Service capable of defeating enemy ground forces and 
indefinitely seizing and controlling those things an adversary prizes 
most--its land, its resources, and its population.
    Given the threats and challenges ahead, it is imperative the Army 
have a clear and coherent vision of where we want to be in the coming 
years so that we retain our overmatch against all potential adversaries 
and remain capable of accomplishing our Mission in the future. As such, 
the Army Vision--our future end state--is as follows:

        The Army of 2028 will be ready to deploy, fight, and win 
        decisively against any adversary, anytime and anywhere, in a 
        joint, multi-domain, high-intensity conflict, while 
        simultaneously deterring others and maintaining its ability to 
        conduct irregular warfare. The Army will do this through the 
        employment of modem manned and unmanned ground combat vehicles, 
        aircraft, sustainment systems, and weapons, coupled with robust 
        combined arms formations and tactics based on a modem 
        warfighting doctrine and centered on exceptional leaders and 
        soldiers of unmatched lethality.

    To achieve our Vision, the Army must meet the following objectives 
in the coming years:

      Man. Grow the Regular Army above 500,000 soldiers, with 
associated growth in the National Guard and Army Reserve, by recruiting 
and retaining high quality, physically fit, mentally tough soldiers who 
can deploy, fight, and win decisively on any future battlefield.

      Organize. Ensure war-fighting formations have sufficient 
infantry, armor, engineer, artillery, and air defense assets. Units 
from brigade through corps must also have the ability to conduct 
sustained ground and air Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance; Electronic Warfare; and cyber operations to shape the 
battlefield across all domains. Aviation, additional combat support, 
and robust logistical support must be readily available to units.

      Train. Focus training on high-intensity conflict, with 
emphasis on operating in dense urban terrain, electronically degraded 
environments, and under constant surveillance. Training must be tough, 
realistic, iterative, and dynamic. Continuous movement, battlefield 
innovation, and leverage of combined arms maneuver with the Joint F , 
allies, and partners must be its hallmarks. This training will require 
rapid expansion of our training environments and deeper distribution of 
simulations capabilities down to the company level to significantly 
enhance soldier and team lethality.

      Equip. Modernize the force by first reforming the current 
acquisition system and unifying the modernization enterprise under a 
single command to focus the Amy's efforts on delivering the weapons, 
combat vehicles, sustainment systems, and equipment that Solders need 
when they need it. This includes experimenting with and developing 
autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, and robotics to make our 
soldiers more effective and our units less logistically dependent.

      Lead. Develop smart, thoughtful, and innovative leaders 
of character who are comfortable with complexity and capable of 
operating from the to the strategic level. We will build a new talent 
management-based personnel system that leverages the Knowledge, skills, 
behaviors, and preferences of its officers and noncommissioned 
officers. This system, when coupled with more flexible career models, 
will enable the Army to better attract, identify, develop, and place 
these leaders to optimize outcomes for all.

    To achieve and sustain these objectives given the uncertainty of 
future budgets, the Army must continually assess everything we do, 
identifying lower value activities to discontinue and ways to improve 
what we must do, in order to free up time, money, and manpower for our 
top priorities. Trusting and empowering subordinate leaders will 
facilitate both reform and greater performance.
    In all these efforts, we will ensure that our soldiers, civilian 
workforce, and their families enjoy the professional opportunities and 
quality of life they deserve. From the top down we must also remain 
committed to the Army Values. The Army is at its best when we wort and 
fight as one team, and our Army Values, coupled with our Warrior Ethos, 
will guide and serve us well as we face the challenges ahead.
    Since 1775, the United States Army has proven itself absolutely 
vital to protecting the American people, safeguarding the Nation, and 
advancing our Interests abroad. This fact remains true today. Our 
ability to do so will be even more in the future as threats continue to 
emerge and evolve, becoming ever more dangerous and more complex. To 
remain ready to accomplish our Mission of fighting and winning the 
Nation's wars, the Army must fulfill the future Army Vision outlined 
herein. We are confident that with the right leadership, the proper 
focus, sufficient resources, and sustained effort the U.S. Amy will 
achieve our Vision, remain the world's premier fighting force, and 
serve the Nation welt for decades to come.

Mark A. Milley
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Mark T. Esper
Secretary of the Army

    Chairman Inhofe. General Milley.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 
                              ARMY

    General Milley. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and 
distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you again for 
the opportunity to join Secretary Esper here today.
    It remains an incredible privilege and honor to represent 
the million soldiers in uniform in the regular Army, the 
National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve, arrayed in 18 
divisions, 58 brigade combat teams, with 180,000 of them 
tonight deployed on freedom's frontier in 140 countries around 
the world.
    While much of our testimony today is going to focus on our 
challenges and how to make us stronger and more lethal, it's 
important to note up front, to you, the Committee, and to the 
Congress, to the American people, our allies, and, perhaps most 
importantly, to our adversaries, the United States Army is 
highly capable, globally deployable on very short notice to 
anywhere in the world, and we have the training, equipment, 
people, and leaders to prevail in ground combat against anyone, 
anywhere, anytime.
    I concur with Secretary Esper's comments on the threats 
posed by China and Russia. The international order, and, by 
extension, United States interests, are under increasingly 
dangerous pressure. China is a significant threat to the United 
States and our allies in the mid and long terms. They're a 
revisionist power seeking to diminish our influence in the 
Pacific and establish themselves as the controlling regional 
power in Asia, and they are setting conditions to challenge the 
United States on a global scale.
    Russia seeks to return to global great-power status, and 
will continue to challenge the United States, not only in 
Europe but also in the Middle East, Asia, the Arctic, Africa, 
and the western hemisphere. Russia continues to undermine NATO 
as an alliance and to sow dissent throughout the European 
continent and in our own Homeland through a variety of means. 
Russia remains the only current existential threat to the 
United States, and will likely become increasingly 
opportunistic in the near term, in my view.
    In the last 17 years, our strategic competitors have eroded 
our military advantages, as outlined by Secretary Esper. With 
your help, starting 2 years ago, we began to restore our 
competitive advantage, and our recent budgets have helped 
improve readiness and lay the groundwork for future 
modernization. We ask, with this budget, that you sustain these 
efforts. Our goal remains 66 percent, two-thirds, of the Active 
Duty Army brigades at the highest levels of readiness, and 33 
percent of the Guard and Reserve also at the highest levels. 
Those numbers, those levels of readiness, are what we need to 
be able to align with the strategy, as laid out in the National 
Defense Strategy. With continued, consistent, predictable 
congressional support, we can reach those levels of readiness 
sometime in 2022.
    Specifically, this budget will fund, in terms of readiness, 
58 brigade combat teams, six security force assistance brigades 
for the total Army, 32 combat training rotations, to include 
four for the National Guard, increase pre-positioned stocks in 
both EUCOM [European Command] and INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific 
Command]. In terms of modernization, which is really just 
another term for future readiness, this budget will improved 
capabilities across our six modernization priority areas and 
the 31 specific programs that are embedded within that. In 
addition to that, it funds 51 other programs that are of 
significant importance to the Army. It'll increase the 
lethality of munitions across the globe, and it will fill 
specific solutions that we have identified, 17 critical gaps 
relative to our near-peer competitors that I can brief in 
detail in a classified hearing, if you so choose.
    Lastly, I want to highlight that this Committee and 
Congress as a whole has provided us tremendous support over the 
last several years. We recognize that, and we are committed to 
applying our resources deliberately and responsibly, 
understanding that they've been entrusted to us by Congress and 
the American people. We will continue to do that, going 
forward, to ensure that our solemn obligation to never send our 
sons and daughters into harm's way unless they are properly 
trained, fully manned, have the best equipment money can buy, 
and are extraordinarily well led.
    Thank you again for your continued support to our soldiers 
and their families. I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Dr. Esper and General 
Milley follows:]

          Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Mark T. Esper
                                  and
                         General Mark A. Milley
                              introduction
    America's Army stands ready today to deploy, fight, and win our 
Nation's wars. The Army has made great progress in recent years, 
recovering from depleted levels of readiness following extended periods 
of sustained conflict and reduced defense spending. Our near-peer 
competitors, however, capitalized on this period to advance their own 
positions by modernizing their militaries and reducing the overmatch we 
held for decades. Aligned with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the 
Army is pursuing a path to ensure we stay ahead of our competitors and 
remain ready and lethal into the future.
    The Army's Vision and Strategy outline the force needed to prevail 
over the threats of the future, along with the plan for building that 
Army. To accomplish this, the Army's efforts are focused on three 
priority areas: building readiness for high-intensity conflict against 
strategic competitors; modernizing our doctrine, equipment, and 
formations to conduct multi-domain operations; and reforming our 
personnel system, business processes, and fiscal management to ensure 
our resources are put towards the highest priority activities. 
Additionally, the Army will continue to take care of its people, live 
the Army Values, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships to 
sustain long-term success in wartime and peace.
    We are grateful to Congress for the strong and timely support 
provided to the Army in the fiscal year 2019 (FY19) appropriations. 
Receiving this funding on time reduced risk to short term readiness and 
allowed us to make significant investments towards our six 
modernization priorities. In order to achieve the defense objectives in 
the NDS and meet our goals as outlined in the Army Vision, we must 
receive predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding in the 
future. The Army's total fiscal year 2020 budget request is $182.3 
billion, consisting of $150.7 billion for base requirements and $31.6 
billion for Overseas Contingency Operations requirements. This request 
provides the resources the Army needs to build readiness, while 
modernizing for the future.
                         strategic environment
    The Army faces a global security environment that continually grows 
more competitive and volatile. The challenges are many: the reemergence 
of great power competition; a resilient but weakening post-World War II 
order; accelerating technological advancements empowering state and 
non-state actors; and persistent threats to the Homeland. The Army must 
be ready now, and in the future, to confront this challenging strategic 
environment. We must have an Army prepared for high-intensity conflict, 
modernized to extend overmatch against near-peer adversaries, and 
trained to fight as part of the Joint Force alongside our allies and 
partners, all while sustaining our ability to conduct irregular 
warfare.
    The modern battlefield encompasses all domains--air, land, sea, 
space, and cyber-space--and is increasing in geographic scale. Near-
peer competitors, like China and Russia, are aggressively pursuing 
modernization programs to erode American overmatch. They have developed 
sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems, fires, 
cyber, electronic warfare, and space-based capabilities that generate 
layers of stand-off to disrupt the deployment of military forces, deny 
the build-up of combat power, and separate Joint Force capabilities in 
time and space. These capabilities may embolden more aggressive 
behavior in the conventional realm. China's military modernization 
program aims to transform the People's Liberation Army into a modern, 
mechanized, Information Age force in the next one to two decades and a 
world-class military capable of strategic force projection and 
warfighting by mid-century. Their military strategy seeks to protect 
Chinese interests outside of Asia and into Europe, the Middle East, and 
Africa. Furthermore, Russia is likely to threaten our interests for the 
next 20 years as they attempt to regain control of historic spheres of 
influence and shape European economic and security structures in their 
favor. Although we may not face China and Russia directly, we are 
likely to face their systems and methods of warfare as they proliferate 
military capabilities to others.
    Regional state adversaries, namely North Korea and Iran, also 
present significant challenges as they pursue advanced capabilities and 
weapons of mass destruction to gain regional influence and ensure 
regime survival. Additionally, transnational terrorist organizations 
continue to pose a threat to our Homeland and our interests, as well as 
our allies and partners. The Army must be prepared to defeat and deter 
highly capable adversaries while disrupting violent extremists and 
simultaneously defending the Homeland.
    Today, the Army contributes to our Nation's efforts to counter 
these challenges by providing combatant commanders over 179,000 
soldiers in more than 140 countries, including 110,000 soldiers 
deployed on a rotational basis. This includes over 30,000 soldiers 
supporting operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan; 8,000 
soldiers supporting NATO operations and the European Deterrence 
Initiative; and over 17,000 soldiers providing a forward American 
presence on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, Army forces remain 
prepared to respond to other contingency requirements, both abroad and 
at home. Concurrently, the Army is investing in the research and 
development of the next generation of weapons and equipment needed to 
stay ahead of our adversaries. Through a disciplined prioritization of 
resources, the Army will remain postured to defend the Nation in an 
increasingly dangerous world.
                               readiness
    America's Army stands ready today to defeat any adversary that 
threatens our Nation and our national interests. We have made great 
progress in rebuilding warfighting readiness, which remains the Army's 
number one priority as we increase lethality to prepare for the future. 
Ready forces must be organized, trained, and equipped for prompt and 
sustained ground combat. This ensures the Army can deploy, fight, and 
win decisively in high-intensity conflict against any adversary, 
anytime, and anywhere. Over the past year, the Army balanced our force 
structure, increased manning in combat units, filled equipment 
shortfalls, and improved deployability to build readiness across the 
force. From September 2016 to December 2018, we increased the number of 
ready Brigade Combat Teams from 18 to 28, and more broadly, increased 
readiness across all Army units by nearly 11 percent. We achieved these 
readiness gains despite sustained operational demand for Army units. 
Our fiscal year 2020 budget request sustains this momentum, so the Army 
can achieve our readiness objectives by 2022.
    The Army has implemented several readiness initiatives to 
reorganize for high-intensity conflict against near-peer competitors. 
We are increasing combat readiness by working to fill our operational 
units to 100 percent of authorized strength this year and 105 percent 
of strength by the end of 2020. Furthermore, we reduced the non-
deployable rates of soldiers from 15 percent in 2015 to six percent 
today. We anticipate achieving our goal of five percent non-deployable 
soldiers by the end of this year. This equates to thousands more 
soldiers ready to deploy in support of global contingency operations. 
We also rebalanced our force structure to increase lethality by 
initiating the conversion of two Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to 
Armored Brigade Combat Teams, our most potent battlefield formation. 
Furthermore, we plan to modestly grow the Regular Army to 480,000 with 
associated growth in the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in 
2020. This growth will allow the Army to fill critical gaps in the near 
term in cyber, air and missile defense, and fires while we develop the 
necessary force structure and end strength needed to execute Multi-
Domain Operations.
    Another critical element of readiness is training. We overhauled 
Army basic training to develop more lethal, disciplined, and resilient 
soldiers. This includes extending Infantry One Station Unit Training 
from 14 weeks to 22 weeks. Initial reports show a significant reduction 
in attrition and injuries with significant improvements in physical 
fitness, land navigation, and marksmanship skills based on the 
additional training time and a reduced Drill Sergeant to trainee ratio. 
Other branches may see similar adjustments through fiscal year 2024.
    Army collective training focuses on high-intensity conflict, with 
an emphasis on operating in complex terrain, electronically degraded 
environments, and under constant surveillance. Training is tough, 
realistic, iterative, and task focused. We eliminated or reduced over 
85 individual training requirements to unburden commanders and allow 
them to focus on training their units. In the Army National Guard and 
the Army Reserve, we increased the training days for select units to 
increase the pool of Reserve component units available to support 
operational requirements. Additionally, we maximized capacity at our 
combat training centers to meet Army force readiness requirements. The 
Army will execute 26 Decisive Action Training Environment rotations for 
Brigade Combat Teams and six other mission specific rotations for a 
total of 32 combat training center rotations in fiscal year 2019. 
Moreover, we continue to develop a Synthetic Training Environment which 
will integrate live, virtual, constructive, and game-based training 
environments into a single platform to increase home station training 
repetitions and enhance training realism in a variety of scenarios and 
locations.
    We also approved the new Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT) to 
fundamentally improve our fitness culture, reduce injuries, increase 
deployability, and increase the probability that a soldier survives on 
the battlefield of the future. We have focused our fitness standards on 
the skills needed to fight in sustained close combat where physical 
toughness and endurance will be pushed to the extremes of human 
capacity. We began field-testing the ACFT in 2018 with 63 units across 
the Total Army and will begin full implementation this year. By the end 
of fiscal year 2020, the ACFT will be the fitness test of record for 
all soldiers.
    Increasing readiness is also about improving our equipment. To this 
end, Army Materiel Command increased the spare parts inventory and 
ammunition stockpiles. The Army also redistributed equipment to Focused 
Readiness Units, which remain at higher readiness levels to support 
global response. Furthermore, we are making progress towards achieving 
ground and aviation equipment readiness goals Army-wide.
    To further improve equipment readiness and enhance our power 
projection capabilities, the Army uses prepositioned stocks to quickly 
execute operational plans and conduct contingency operations. We 
budgeted $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 to 
improve the readiness of Army Prepositioned Stocks. Additionally, we 
initiated a Configured-for-Combat effort to equip Army Prepositioned 
Stocks with combat enablers such as communications, modernized weapons, 
and counter-measure systems in order to speed our ability to build 
combat power. This reduces the time it takes to build combat power by 
weeks and significantly reduces the amount of strategic airlift 
previously required to deploy early entry Army forces. Follow-on forces 
will continue to rely on modern and ready strategic lift assets, 
especially sealift, to deliver ready and lethal ground forces in 
support of the Joint Force. We must continue to invest in robust power 
projection platforms and strategic lift capabilities to ensure we can 
rapidly deploy and operate anywhere in the world.
    Through these readiness initiatives, the Army is getting stronger 
by the month in manning, training, and equipping the force. With 
Congressional support, our fiscal year 2020 budget will allow us to 
continue to increase readiness and build lethality.
                             modernization
    While we continue to build readiness, the Army must also prepare 
for the future. This includes modernizing our doctrine, equipment, 
processes, and organizational structures to extend our overmatch 
against any competitor on any battlefield. Guiding our modernization 
effort is our Multi-Domain Operations concept, which identifies the 
threats and challenges we will face in the future. Great power 
competitors like China are developing capabilities to create standoff 
intended to frustrate our ability to build combat power and maneuver at 
will. To counter this, the Army will need to integrate our capabilities 
with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines even more in the future. The 
Army's new Multi-Domain Operations concept describes how we will 
synchronize our capabilities across all domains in support of the Joint 
Force.
    The Army is using the Multi-Domain Operations concept to inform 
future force development through numerous iterations of experimentation 
and analysis, including field experimentation with Multi-Domain Task 
Force pilots in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. Our future success 
depends on modernized equipment, evolving doctrine, and the 
organizations essential to ensure overmatch against our competitors. 
These elements will work in concert to increase our combat capabilities 
across all domains.
    As a major step towards developing the capabilities needed for 
Multi-Domain Operations, we reorganized our entire modernization 
enterprise for greater speed and efficiency. Last year, the Army made 
its most significant organizational change in over 40 years by 
establishing the Army Futures Command (AFC). We stood up AFC in the 
innovation hub of Austin, Texas with a focus on providing unity of 
command and unity of effort for the modernization enterprise. For the 
first time, one commander is driving concept development, requirements 
determination, organizational design, science and technology research, 
and solution development. We located AFC outside of a traditional Army 
installation to increase their accessibility and ability to collaborate 
with industry and academia. Through these partnerships, AFC will 
identify and deliver new capabilities with greater speed and more 
efficient use of our resources.
    To guide AFC, the Army established a clear set of modernization 
priorities that emphasize rapid maneuver, overwhelming fires, tactical 
innovation, and mission command. Our six modernization priorities will 
not change, and they underscore the Army's commitment to innovate for 
the future. We have one simple focus--to make soldiers and units more 
capable and lethal. Over the last year, we identified $16.1 billion in 
legacy equipment programs that we could reinvest towards 31 signature 
systems that are critical to realizing Multi-Domain Operations and are 
aligned with these priorities. The six Army modernization priorities 
are:

      Long Range Precision Fires--We will improve the range and 
lethality of cannon artillery and increase missile capabilities to 
ensure overmatch at each echelon. Army artillery weapons, including 
Extended Range Cannon Artillery and the Precision Strike Missile, will 
neutralize and dis-integrate adversary A2/AD networks, from extended 
ranges, to create windows of opportunity for the Joint Force to 
exploit. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery is on schedule for 
delivery in fiscal year 2023. It will protect and support maneuver 
forces in the close and deep operational maneuver areas with an 
extended range out to 70km and increased 6-10 rounds/minute volume of 
fire. The Army has requested $1.31 billion for Long Range Precision 
Fires in the fiscal year 2020 President's Budget to accelerate 
prototyping and initial fielding.

      Next Generation of Combat Vehicles--The Army will 
modernize the next generation of combat vehicles through technology 
development, experimentation, and prototyping to ensure overmatch 
against near-peer competitors. These vehicles will employ greater 
firepower, mobility, and protection to successfully maneuver on more 
lethal battlefields. They will have manned and unmanned variants for 
combined arms maneuver, and be built with future growth in mind. The 
first prototype will arrive in fiscal year 2021 to accelerate 
experimentation and initial fielding. We requested $2.0 billion in the 
fiscal year 2020 President's Budget to deliver an initial capability.

      Future Vertical Lift--We will increase our competitive 
aviation advantage with next generation aircraft to penetrate contested 
airspace and support independent maneuver from greater distances 
through extended range, endurance, and lifting capacity. The most 
important FVL investments at the moment are the Army's development of 
the Future Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft, designed to address the gap 
left by retirement of the Kiowa, and the Future Long Range Assault 
Aircraft. An additional investment includes integrating unmanned aerial 
systems, which we will prototype in fiscal year 2024, for manned/
unmanned teaming and improved lethality, situational awareness, and 
survivability. Over $797.2 million is included in the fiscal year 2020 
President's Budget to develop initial designs and unmanned 
demonstration systems.

      Army Network--The Army Network supports mission command 
and the continuous integration of combined arms and Joint capabilities. 
We will deliver a resilient and secure tactical communications network 
effective in the most challenging contested and congested 
electromagnetic spectrum and cyber environments. This network includes 
advanced information technology, hardware and software, and a reduced 
electromagnetic signature. We have allocated $2.28 billion in the 
fiscal year 2020 budget to build our integrated tactical network as 
part of our network restructuring.

      Air and Missile Defense--Advanced air and missile defense 
will protect our forces from adversary aircraft, missiles, and drones 
to enable joint operations. This includes both theater systems and 
short-range air defense, like the Mobile Short-Range Air Defense with 
directed energy technologies. The fiscal year 2020 budget includes $1.4 
billion to rapidly deliver an initial capability by fiscal year 2022.

      Soldier Lethality--We will equip and train soldiers to 
extend overmatch through increased lethality, mobility, and 
survivability against emerging threats. This includes improved weapons, 
sensors, body armor, and training. The fiscal year 2020 budget includes 
$1.18 billion for prototyping, development, and procurement of the Next 
Generation Squad Automatic Weapon and Squad Rifle, Enhanced Night 
Vision Goggles, Integrated Visual Augmentation System (HUD 3.0), and 
Synthetic Training Environment.

    Eight Cross Functional Teams (CFTs), aligned under AFC, lead the 
development of these modernization priorities. The CFTs streamline Army 
acquisition processes to reduce the requirements process, shorten 
acquisition time, and, by engaging soldiers early in development, 
ensure fielded systems are affordable and meet warfighter needs. This 
approach demonstrates our commitment to good stewardship of taxpayer 
dollars. In addition to this organizational realignment, we updated 
acquisition policies. Our new intellectual property policy will 
encourage private industry to work with our CFTs to develop innovative 
solutions to maintain technological overmatch.
    The Army is taking a holistic approach to modernization so we can 
achieve multi-domain dominance by 2028. Next generation equipment, 
combined with modern doctrine and formations, will allow the Army to 
maintain overmatch on future battlefields.
                                 reform
    Over the past year, the Army aggressively pursued reforms to free 
up time, money, and manpower for our highest priorities and to empower 
subordinate commanders to make more effective and timely decisions. In 
addition to our detailed program review process, we are executing the 
Army Reform Initiative, instituting fiscal discipline, scrutinizing 
contract management and contract services, and working towards 
financial auditability. Through these reform efforts, we realigned over 
$30 billion across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for higher 
priority programs to build readiness and increase lethality.
    In our most significant reform effort, Army Senior Leaders 
conducted a detailed review of Army equipping programs for the fiscal 
year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 budgets. Through this in-depth, time 
intensive process, we eliminated, reduced, or consolidated nearly 200 
legacy programs to reallocate funding towards our modernization 
priorities. While each of these programs had value, we must continue to 
make hard choices to ensure we spend each dollar wisely and remain 
aligned with Army priorities.
    Through the Army Reform Initiative, we garnered over 700 ideas to 
eliminate, delegate, consolidate, or streamline Army policies, programs 
and practices. Inputs included work efficiencies, business process 
improvements, and structural realignments. For example, through our 
installation management reform effort, we are realigning Installation 
Management Command under Army Materiel Command and consolidating staff 
functions to garner personnel savings and improve efficiency. This 
integration of sustainment and installation functions provides the 
ability to prioritize resources on key requirements for both combat 
readiness and soldier and family support. Additionally we have an 
ongoing headquarters reduction effort across multiple levels of 
command. The goal of the Army Reform Initiative is to eliminate 
redundancy and delegate authorities and resources to the lowest 
appropriate level of command. This allows for rapid actions and 
decisions while simultaneously saving resources for higher priorities.
    To improve fiscal discipline, we implemented the Command 
Accountability & Execution Review (CAER) to optimize the purchasing 
power of the Army's operating budget. This Army-wide program educates 
Army leaders on fiscal stewardship, updates policies to increase 
purchasing power, and creates a scorecard of key performance indicators 
to measure progress. While still early, CAER has generated a marked 
improvement in the efficient execution of the Army's budget for fiscal 
year 2018 and we anticipate greater success in fiscal year 2019.
    In 2018, contract management and contract services reform saved the 
Army $1.6 billion across the FYDP by eliminating contract redundancies, 
improving contract competition processes, and using data analytics for 
contracting decisions. We continue to implement category management and 
increased emphasis on the use of strategic sourcing contracts to 
improve management of services acquisitions. This year, we found 
service acquisition efficiencies in Army rotary-wing aircraft and 
ground system maintenance programs, food services, and the use of 
advanced data analytics. We saved over $400 million and are on pace to 
reach over $1 billion in budget savings from improved contract 
management in fiscal year 2019. These savings and their reinvestment 
into modernization are crucial to the Army and our progress towards the 
force of the future.
    The Army completed its first full financial statements audit in 
fiscal year 2018, and the audit findings are an important part of our 
larger reform effort. We fully support these audits, which help the 
Army identify ways to improve resource management and business 
practices. We are aggressively implementing corrective action plans and 
are on track to achieve auditable financial statements across all 
accounts by fiscal year 2022.
    Another major area of reform is the directed reorganization of our 
medical capabilities across the Army. Readiness is the primary focus 
throughout this effort because the Army will continue to be responsible 
for a ready medical force trained in clinical skills that are critical 
to wartime missions. As we transition medical treatment facilities to 
the Defense Health Agency, we are working to ensure we retain the 
necessary combat medical support at each echelon to maintain readiness 
and deliver premier military health care on the battlefield and in 
garrison. This reorganization provides us an opportunity to optimize 
the Army medical structure and plan for future medical capabilities.
    The Army will continue to pursue savings in time, money, and 
manpower that we can reinvest into our top priorities. These aggressive 
reform efforts, will sustain our momentum as we build readiness and 
increase lethality to prepare for high-intensity conflict against great 
power competitors.
                           allies & partners
    America's network of allies and partners is an unrivaled strategic 
advantage the Army is actively working to enhance. Every day, the Army 
works to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships through 
security cooperation and security assistance. A continued commitment to 
our allies and partners helps us compete against great power 
competitors and bolster deterrence. In support of our allies and 
partners we established Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC), which 
will consist of six subordinate Security Force Assistance Brigades 
(SFABs)--five Regular Army and one Army National Guard. The SFABs are 
specialized units whose core mission is to train, advise, assist, 
enable and accompany allied and partner nations. SFABs reduce the 
demand on conventional Brigade Combat Teams enabling them to focus on 
high-intensity conflict against near-peer threats. The Army deployed 
its first SFAB to Afghanistan in support of the Afghan National Army to 
validate the proof of concept, and we will apply what we learned to the 
second SFAB deployment this year.
    The Army works with Combatant Commanders to ensure our security 
cooperation efforts support their priorities as we work to increase 
interoperability and build partner capability. Interoperability ensures 
we can train and fight alongside our allies and partners more 
effectively and efficiently so we are ready to face any threat 
together. In fiscal year 2018, the Army executed $115 million on 58 
multinational exercises with 95 allies and partners. In fiscal year 
2019, we programmed $165 million for multinational training exercises 
to increase interoperability.
    In Europe, we are leading a multinational battlegroup in Poland as 
part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission to deter Russian 
aggression. Last summer, our soldiers participated in Exercise Trident 
Juncture alongside forces from every other NATO ally and two of our 
closest partners, Sweden and Finland. This was the largest NATO 
exercise conducted in recent years, and it demonstrated both the 
Alliance's commitment and collective defense capability. We will 
continue these efforts as we prepare for the division-level Defender 
exercise in 2020, which will exercise the Army's force projection 
capabilities. We also maintain close training and exercise 
relationships with Ukraine and Georgia, key partners in the region for 
promoting peace and security.
    Likewise, in the Indo-Pacific region we are deepening cooperation 
with our allies to protect our national and shared interests. The 
United States Army presence in the Republic of Korea and Japan deters 
North Korean aggression and protects United States interests. Assigned 
and rotational forces participate in combined training exercises, such 
as Yama Sakura in Japan and Yudh Abhyas with the Indian Army. These 
exercises strengthen our relationships and build interoperability. 
Furthermore, we are testing the Multi-Domain Task Force in exercises 
through our Pacific Pathways program to determine the right capability 
mix to counter Chinese A2AD capabilities. We will continue to use 
regional training and exercises to work with new partners and leverage 
multi-component and inter-service integration. This helps us to expand 
the competitive space and counter Chinese influence throughout the 
region.
    We are assisting our partners around the world in building military 
capabilities to enhance security. The Army, through its security 
assistance enterprise, supports combatant command theater security 
cooperation plans. We will continue to prioritize security assistance 
programs to counter key threats and achieve shared defense objectives 
with our allies and partners.
                            people & values
    The Army's greatest strength is our people--the intelligent, 
adaptable, and professional soldiers, civilians, and families who 
sacrifice for our Nation. We take care of our people by ensuring our 
soldiers are ready for combat with modern doctrine, equipment, and 
realistic training while simultaneously providing their families with 
the resources they need to thrive at home. Furthermore, our continued 
commitment to the Army Values ensures we foster strong and resilient 
units built on a foundation of trust.
    Comprehensive reform of the Army's personnel management system is a 
top initiative for 2019. To remain the most lethal ground combat force 
in the world, we must continue to attract, develop, and retain the best 
people our Nation has to offer. A competitive labor market for 
America's most highly skilled talent complicates this effort. We thank 
Congress for the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) 
reforms and additional authorities in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA, and we 
will incorporate these into our new Talent Management Strategy. We are 
moving the Army towards a market-based assignment process with more 
flexible career models along with updates to our promotion system and 
retention incentives.
    The Army faced significant challenges in meeting our fiscal year 
2018 recruiting goals, however, we remain committed to quality over 
quantity. Despite these challenges, we recruited over 70,000 new 
soldiers into our ranks, the most in any single year since 2010. To 
meet our fiscal year 2019 recruiting goals, we changed our approach to 
increase the pool of qualified applicants so we can attract the best 
talent and improve diversity in our ranks. We restructured our 
accessions enterprise to ensure unity of effort across the Army, manned 
our recruiter positions at 100 percent, realigned resources to increase 
our recruiting capacity, and improved our use of technology. 
Additionally, we centered this recruiting initiative in 22 major 
metropolitan areas across the Nation to expand our reach using micro-
targeted web advertising and local marketing. This revised strategy 
expands recruiting across the Total Army to increase awareness of the 
opportunities for service and to better connect the Army to the 
American people.
    Taking care of Army families remains a top priority, and we are 
taking steps to improve quality of life programs across our 
installations. This year we increased staffing rates at Army child care 
centers, and we are implementing new policies to improve spouse 
employment opportunities. Given recent reports of deficient conditions 
in some of our family housing, the Army has taken immediate action to 
ensure we are providing safe, high quality family housing. We are 
visiting all Army housing and inspecting all barracks to identify 
health, life, and safety issues that exist. We will work with the 
Residential Communities Initiatives (RCI) companies to remediate these 
issues immediately, and over the long term, to improve work order 
resolution, customer satisfaction, and communication with residents. We 
are also reviewing and standardizing partnership agreements and 
incentive structures to ensure we hold the RCI companies accountable 
for providing quality housing. The Army is fully committed to providing 
a safe and secure environment on all of our installations where our 
soldiers and families can thrive.
    The Army Values form the bedrock of our profession and guide us in 
all that we do. The Army's Senior Leaders have asked everyone to 
recommit themselves to these Values, and we demand that every member of 
our Army team treat each other with dignity and respect. Across the 
Total Army, we continue to focus on eradicating sexual harassment and 
sexual assault from our ranks. Over the past several years, we have 
placed a high priority on our prevention efforts, and the Army will 
continue to improve the effectiveness of our prevention efforts moving 
forward. This starts by ensuring that the perpetrators of sexual 
assaults are held accountable and that the victims are protected 
without fear of retribution. Additionally, we are reinforcing leader 
responsibility for building a climate of trust and professionalism that 
emphasizes the Army Values. We are taking a similar approach with other 
essential programs including Equal Opportunity, Suicide Prevention, 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, and Resilience.
                               conclusion
    The Army mission remains constant: to deploy, fight, and win our 
Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance 
by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the 
Joint Force. Our Army is ready today to win in the unforgiving crucible 
of combat. We are supporting the National Defense Strategy and 
expanding the competitive space by increasing our lethality through our 
modernization effort, strengthening American alliances through combined 
operations and training, and reforming our business practices to be the 
best stewards of the resources Congress has provided. The Army thanks 
Congress and the American people for their continued strong support, 
which enables our ability to accomplish our mission. By providing 
predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding, Congress will 
ensure America's Army remains the most capable and lethal ground combat 
force in the world.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Milley.
    Both statements were excellent, and I appreciate--and we 
appreciate, up here, the time you're devoting to making us 
aware, and America aware, of the threats that are out there in 
our peer competitors of China and Russia.
    Unfortunately, the Army missed our recruiting goals in both 
fiscal year 2018 and 2019, coming up short about 9,500 of what 
this Committee authorized in fiscal year 2019. So, let's 
start--General Milley, what's your assessment of the most 
critical manning shortfalls facing the Army as we begin to try 
to meet our blueprint, here, with the--what would come to your 
mind as the most critical?
    General Milley. We did miss the shortfall. I would add that 
we did recruit and assess 70,000 soldiers into the United 
States Army, which was a 10-year high, which, in combination, 
is more soldiers than are in the British and Canadian armies, 
combined. So, that's significant, I think. In terms of the 
shortages, going forward, what we're asking for this budget is 
modest growth of an increase of 2,000, which I think Senator 
Reed mentioned in his opening statement. We knew we had a very 
significant and high objective on the last years' recruiting, 
and we've made a variety of changes inside Recruiting Command, 
to include the commander. We're focusing on 22 significant 
cities throughout the United States. We're looking at where the 
storefronts are. We're looking at redoing the advertising 
campaign. There's a variety of other initiatives. We are very 
confident--we're on glidepath right now, and we're very 
confident that we'll meet the recruiting and accessions 
missions for this year.
    Chairman Inhofe. What do you think, Secretary?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I agree. Last summer, we actually 
turned up the standards. We raised the quality standards, 
because quality is more important than quantity. We need to do 
that. We need to raise the quality, and we need to continue to 
bring more in each year, because we need to fully man the units 
exist, we need to put capabilities back into----
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    Secretary Esper.--the units that we lost over the years, 
such as EW--electronic warfare--and we need to add new 
capabilities to our units, such as cyber. So, this is all 
consistent with the vision of where we want to go. The vision 
that we outlined says we definitely need to be above 500,000 
soldiers by 2028.
    Chairman Inhofe. That's good. What we don't want to do, 
we've emphasized and you have emphasized in the past, that we 
don't want to lower standards in order to increase.
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Reed. That's not happening now, and it's not going 
to happen.
    You addressed this, this goal, General Milley, of 66 
percent. It's probably--you don't want to get into any detail 
on that, but would you repeat what you did--what you said in 
your opening statement? I think you said, in year 2022--what's 
going to happen?
    General Milley. We think, by our projections, if things in 
the international environment remain at a constant and we 
continue to get steady budgets at the rates we're getting, we 
assess that we'll be at the highest levels of readiness, with 
two-thirds, 66 percent, in the regular Army and 33 percent in 
the Guard and Reserve, sometime in 2022, which is significant. 
When I became the Chief of Staff, 3 years ago--3 and a half 
years ago--we had three brigades at the highest level of 
readiness. Today, we have--roughly speaking, as of December's 
reports, you're looking at about 28. So, that's a significant 
increase. But, we have yet to achieve that 66 percent. We are, 
essentially, right now, somewhere around the high-water marks 
of pre-9/11, but we need--if we're serious about Russia, China, 
and what's in the NDS, with North Korea, Iran, and the violent 
extremists and terrorist organizations, our assessment is, of 
those 58 brigades, 66 percent in the--or 66 percent in the 
regular Army, 33 percent in the Guard and Reserve. We'll----
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
    General Milley.---- achieve that in 2022.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Before I run out of time, I do want 
to get a comment from each one of you on the budget. You know, 
we went through a period of starvation, the last 5 years, of--
between 2010 and 2015--of actually reducing, in constant 
dollars, the amount of money that came into our military. We 
are now paying for that. Even with the budget increases that we 
saw in 2018, 2019, what we're proposing for 2020, it still 
doesn't put us where we need to be. When you go back to this 
book, you're talking about an increase in--for that 5-year 
period, of somewhere between 3 and 5 percent above inflation. 
Even the 750 doesn't reach that. It would have to be somewhere 
around 757, I think it would be. So, I'd like to have each one 
of you comment as to where we are. Do you think that's a figure 
that's going to be adequate to take care of the needs that we 
have in our assessment?
    Secretary Esper. Mr. Chairman, you summed it up well. I 
mean, the needs will always exceed the means, but we think, if 
Congress passes this budget, we will continue on a good 
trajectory with regard to restoring readiness and modernizing 
the Army. That's really the key thing right now.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    General Milley. I concur with the Secretary. As you well 
know, Chairman, it's all related to the amount of risk we are 
willing to take relative----
    Chairman Inhofe. Exactly.
    General Milley.--to the tasks.
    Chairman Inhofe. Exactly.
    General Milley. So, it's all about risk.
    Chairman Inhofe. We understand that.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, General Milley, last night we received 
notice that the Department of Defense was reprogramming $1 
billion from the Army to support border wall construction. This 
is being done without approval by Congress, which is a custom 
that both sides have relied upon for many, many, many years to 
ensure that our constitutional authority over spending is 
maintained. The Army also has a $2.3 billion unfunded 
requirements for fiscal year 2020. Does this $1 billion 
reprogramming support Army requirements, or could the funds be 
spent better elsewhere to improve readiness and maintain the 
Army?
    Secretary Esper. The funds do not affect our fiscal year 
2020 budget, Senator Reed. With regard to fiscal year 2019, 
it--those funds came out of our Military Personnel (MILPERS) 
wedge, if you will--military personnel--that we could not fill 
that end strength. So, that's where those came from. The--
otherwise, the fiscal year 2019 budget approved by this 
Congress on time meets our readiness needs.
    Senator Reed. You still do have $2.5 billion of unfunded 
readiness, including things like aviation readiness----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Reed.--whole host of issues that the money could 
have been used for.
    Secretary Esper. That's true.
    Senator Reed. In a sense, you are foregoing at least the 
immediate use of those funds for military purposes, like 
aviation readiness. Is that correct?
    Secretary Esper. Like I said, the fiscal year 2019 budget 
was more than adequate for our needs, but, you know, clearly, 
with--there--as I said, to--in response to the Chairman, the 
needs always exceed the means. So, yes, we could have used that 
money for--as the other services, for--to continue to improve 
our readiness.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    The Army's unfunded requirements list included $564 million 
for key infrastructure projects. As I mentioned in my opening 
statement, the Committee has received the list of military 
construction projects that will be--or could be included in 
order to resource the proposed wall along the southern border. 
These will obviously include Army construction projects. Given 
the Army has identified more than half a billion in unfunded 
infrastructure requirements for the fiscal year 2020 budget, 
how detrimental will it be to the Army readiness if we cancel 
or delay these projects?
    Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, we have to see what 
projects will be teed up for repurposing. I think, once we see 
those initial requests, we can make a better estimate of what 
the impact will be.
    Senator Reed. One of the areas, too, that's been identified 
are projects overseas, the European Defense Initiative and 
other areas. We often rely upon host and partner contributions 
to facilitate those constructions. They schedule sometimes on 
calendar years or fiscal years. So, what impact would we have 
on delaying those projects?
    Secretary Esper. Again, I'm familiar with some of those 
projects. It includes everything from schools, I think, to 
warehouses. We'll have to, again, assess, based on--once DHS, 
Department of Homeland Security, makes the request to DOD, and 
then, from there, DOD, I assume, will prioritize the projects, 
and we will do our own reprioritizing within the Army 
submission and assess the impacts at that time.
    Senator Reed. Section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA 
asked for each military service to submit the top 10 list of 
most vulnerable installations to climate change, extreme 
weather, or whatever appropriate terminology that you want to 
use. Unfortunately, to date, we have not received that letter. 
Could you commit to sending us the top 10 list of Army 
facilities that are vulnerable to weather effects?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. Pursuant to NDAA 2018 Section 335, the 
Army has been evaluating the effect of the six specified 
climate impacts: recurrent flooding, drought, desertification, 
wildfires, thawing permafrost, and rising sea tides.
    The Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory 
(CRREL), home of the United States Army Corp of Engineers' 
Climate Preparedness and Resilience Community of Practice, 
created a model to assess the risk to individual Army 
installations. While the work in ongoing, the table below lists 
the top ten most at-risk installations in the 50 United States. 
Assessment of installations overseas and in U.S. territories is 
forthcoming. The analysis is based on climate science only and 
is not influenced by strategic or mission considerations.
    The Army will continue to work closely with other leaders 
throughout the Department of Defense and with Congress to 
identify corrective actions and implement steps to enhance our 
readiness and capability in the face of climate related 
threats. Thank you for your interest in this matter, as well as 
your continued support of the Army.

 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Primary driver of   Secondary driver
                       Installation                             State       climate effects   of climate effects
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yuma Proving Ground.......................................           AZ     Desertification             Drought
Fort Irwin................................................             CA   Desertification             Drought
Fort Huachuca.............................................           AZ     Desertification             Drought
Fort Bliss................................................           TX     Desertification             Drought
White Sands Missile Range.................................           NM     Desertification             Drought
Camp Roberts..............................................             CA   Desertification             Drought
Hawthorne Army Depot......................................           NV     Desertification             Drought
Tooele Army Depot.........................................           UT     Desertification             Drought
Military Ocean Terminal Concord...........................             CA Riverine Flooding             Drought
Pueblo Chemical Depot.....................................             CO   Desertification             Drought
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note: All of the top ten are subject to riverine flooding 
and wildfires. Military Ocean Terminal Concord is also subject 
to coastal flooding.

    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Wicker.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you.
    Gentlemen, appreciate your service.
    General Milley, let's talk about Poland. The Army's there 
on a rotational basis now. The Government of Poland has asked 
us to look seriously at a permanent station there. Section 1280 
of the fiscal year 2019 NDAA required a DOD report on the 
feasibility and advisability of permanently stationing United 
States forces in the Republic of Poland. Do you know the status 
of that report? It was due March 1st. What can you tell us 
about your opinion as to how that would work, sir?
    General Milley. Thank you, Senator. I do not know the 
status of the actual report, and I'll have to get back to you 
with that. I'm not sure where that's at in the pipeline sort of 
thing.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Milley. Given that discussions with the Polish on 
the $2 billion offer are still ongoing, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Policy) sent an interim letter to 
Congress offering to provide periodic classified updates in 
person until discussions have concluded. A physical report will 
be provided once discussions are complete.

    Senator Wicker. All right. Just----
    General Milley. But, as far as personal----
    Senator Wicker.--just give us your assessment.
    General Milley. Yeah. My assessment, I am in the camp of 
recommending rotational forces to Europe, in general, and 
Poland, in specific. There are some forces that should and 
could be forward-stationed, some enabling-type things, some 
infrastructure. But, for the most part, I recommend, and have 
recommended, rotational forces, for a couple of reasons. From 
the analysis I've seen, rotational forces are more cost-
efficient, cheaper, than permanently-based. Secondly is, you 
don't have to build schools and post exchange's (PX's) and all 
the infrastructure that goes with permanent-based forces. Third 
is, I think you get much more operational flexibility for 
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, because he can move 
forces around much easier than he can if they're tied down to 
bases--permanent bases, with families, et cetera. Fourth is, 
you get a strategic benefit from rotating forces, because we 
exercise the strategic muscle memory of TRANSCOM 
[Transportation Command] to move large-scale forces back and 
forth to Europe. There are some other reasons, but bottom line 
is, I recommend rotational forces, with some exceptions for 
infrastructure and enablers, command and control, some other 
things that would be necessary at the higher end. But, for the 
most part, most forces, I recommend rotational.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
    Some of the things we're mindful of with regard to Russia 
are Russia rapidly seizing NATO territory, reinforcing it and 
presenting it as a fait accompli scenario to the West. Do you 
think the rotational idea that you've enunciated is sufficient 
to meet those challenges?
    General Milley. I do, for a couple of reasons. One is, 
depending on how you structure the rotations--in the National 
Defense Strategy, we talk about dynamic force employment, so 
you want to keep an adversary guessing as to where you're going 
to position forces around the globe at a moment in time. By 
rotating forces, you can pick and choose your own schedule, you 
can do heel-to-toe, so you have the same strategic effect, 
operational effect, as permanent-based, or you can have 
episodic, where the adversary doesn't necessarily know when and 
where you're going to introduce forces of different sizes. I 
think, depending on the size of the force, the disposition, and 
the rotational schedule, it would be sufficient to enhance the 
deterrent effect of United States forces in Europe.
    Senator Wicker. Did DOD ask for your input in formulating 
the report that is now due?
    General Milley. I'll have to go back and check to see if 
they specifically asked for Army input. I've given my input on 
numerous meetings, numerous occasions, to both DOD, EUCOM, and 
the Army. I'm at a loss, Senator, as to the specific report 
that you're referring to, whether I inputted that.
    Senator Wicker. All right.
    General Milley. I input a lot of things, and I'll have to 
go back and doublecheck----
    Senator Wicker. Thank you.
    General Milley.--and see if that specific----
    Senator Wicker. Appreciate that. If you'd get back to us.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Milley. The report has not yet been written. When 
discussions with the Polish Government have concluded, the Army 
will provide input to the report.

    Senator Wicker. Let me just ask, then, General, about the 
idea of a new rotary wing program called the Future Attack 
Reconnaissance aircraft. It is meant to fill the capability gap 
in the role of armed reconnaissance and attack in complex, 
degraded operation environments. Can you describe, in an 
unclassified setting, what type of capabilities we're talking 
about there, and how such an aircraft would fare against 
Russian and Chinese threats?
    General Milley. As Secretary Esper mentioned, in terms of 
these six priority areas, one of which is future vertical lift, 
and the FAR [future attack reconnaissance] aircraft, which is 
the one you're referring to is one of those programs underneath 
the future vertical lift. The Apache helicopter is one of the 
big five that came in in the 1980s, so it's been in now for 40 
years or so. That particular aircraft, although it's deadly--
it's a great weapon system, the Apache--it's going to need to 
be replaced in the out years. So, we're looking for an aircraft 
that, without going into specific requirements and 
classifications, essentially goes further, can see further, can 
acquire targets further, and can engage at greater ranges than 
currently exists, and has greater legs, can fly further with a 
greater payload of weapon systems. A significant improvement 
over that which exists today.
    Senator Wicker. Can you tell the Committee how soon you 
envision moving in that direction?
    General Milley. We're already moving in that direction, in 
terms of research, development, and the development of the 
prototypes. In terms of actually fielding the weapon, or 
fielding the helicopter, that, I think, is still a moving 
target with industry, because we want to see the prototypes and 
we want to do proof of principle on some of the technologies.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Secretary Esper and General Milley, for your 
testimony this morning.
    Secretary Esper, I was pleased to see a story in--a report 
this morning that said that the Army had backed down on the 
Freedom of Information request relative to contamination from 
PFAS components. I just wanted to applaud the fact that you had 
decided to waive those fees. We have a significant 
contamination from PFOS and PFOA at the former Pease Air Force 
Base, and the Air Force has been very responsive to the 
community of Portsmouth and New Hampshire on that. I hope the 
Army will be as responsive.
    I want to go back to pick up on Senator Reed's question 
about the $1 billion that is coming for the President's border 
wall, because the reports--the news reports have suggested that 
that $1 billion is counterdrug money. Can you--you mentioned 
that it was coming from a different fund, in your testimony--
can you clarify where, exactly, that billion dollars is coming 
from?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. My understanding--and I 
would obviously defer to OSD [Office of the Secretary of 
Defense], because it's their decision, of course--is, that is 
money that was in the fiscal year 2019 budget for the Army for 
military personnel. When we adjusted our end-strength number 
down, it freed up the 1 billion or so military personnel money, 
and that money is now being reprogrammed into what's called the 
284 counterdrug account. Then that is the means by which it is 
leveraged to build the necessary barriers that were outlined, I 
think, in the notification sent to Congress.
    Senator Shaheen. So, it's actually being programmed into 
the counterdrug account----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. I'm----
    Senator Shaheen.--is what you're saying?
    Secretary Esper. I'm not familiar with all the movements. 
Again, it's not my decision or action, but, my understanding, 
it gets reprogrammed from the DOD account into the 284 account, 
and eventually ends up with the Corps of Engineers.
    Senator Shaheen. Can you or General Milley speak to the 
reports that have suggested that a number of the dollars that 
are being talked about to be taken from military construction 
are coming from projects in Europe that are going to be needed 
for our various activities in defense of Europe and the West?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. As you know, as you've read, 
there are things that, as I understand it, will not be 
included, will not be eligible, if you will, that would be--and 
it was our recommendation, ``Do not include barracks or 
dormitories or housing.'' Then the decision was also made to 
not include any fiscal year 2019 projects that aren't awarded, 
I think, before the end of this fiscal year. That leaves a 
numbers of projects. We would need to take a look at the final 
list. Those projects are all over the world and the United 
States, of course. Then I'd have to look at the eaches to kind 
of--and we--and the Army staff will now have to look at, How do 
we prioritize those, based on MILCON thrust typically being--
begins with readiness and power projection.
    Senator Shaheen. So, are any of those funds coming from the 
European Deterrence Initiative?
    Secretary Esper. I don't know, Senator, because I don't 
think any decisions have been made yet on how much money needs 
to be drawn and, therefore, which projects, because I think OSD 
has available to them Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps 
projects to choose from in order to fund what they want to do 
next.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly hope that none of those 
dollars are going to be taken from funds that are needed to 
protect the national security of this country.
    I understand that there has been a proposal to downsize or 
eliminate the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 
that's at the Army War College in Carlisle. I wonder if you can 
give us the status of that. I'm particularly interested because 
they're the entity that's charged with implementing the Women, 
Peace, and Security legislation. If that's going to be 
downsized or eliminated, what's going to happen to that 
initiative?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. In the context of National 
Defense Strategy, we were told that, while we shift to higher-
intensity conflict, we need to maintain proficiency in 
irregular warfare. So, the Army decided to stand up what we 
don't have, which is an irregular warfare office. In the 
context of reform, what we've done is, we looked at a number of 
programs throughout TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] and 
everywhere else to make sure we moved money and people 
internally. The assessment was that we had nearly 50 people at 
the Peacekeeping Institute, that we could accomplish the same 
mission with fewer people. That's what was done, at the 
recommendation of Training and Doctrine Command, is to 
reallocate people while preserving the functions, including the 
one you mentioned. Further reform also included aligning that 
Institute, because peacekeeping is a part of the mission set--
aligning it much more closely with Fort Leavenworth, which is 
the home of Army doctrine, so we have a greater connectivity. 
We think we've got a more manageable set, more focused and 
better connected, both to Army doctrine and while retaining the 
connections at Carlisle, if you will, and with the joint 
community. We don't see that as degrading their mission, but we 
felt 50 people was more than enough, that we could reduce that 
some in order to help build the irregular warfare office that 
we need for the Army.
    Senator Shaheen. So, what's going to happen to the Women, 
Peace, and Security Initiative?
    Secretary Esper. My understanding is, that is--that 
function is being preserved.
    Senator Shaheen. Where?
    Secretary Esper. At Carlisle, is my understanding. I'll 
get--I'll confirm and get back to you, though.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Institute (PKSOI) will be reorganized and will remain at 
Carlisle Barracks, with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, taking command of both PKSOI and the newly 
established Army Irregular Warfare Proponent Office. The Army 
established the Irregular Warfare Proponent Office at Fort 
Leavenworth, KS in order to implement the National Defense 
Strategy; it will work alongside PKSOI to support Joint 
peacekeeping and stability operations issues. No military 
members or civilian employees currently at PKSOI will be 
directed to move to Fort Leavenworth as part of the 
reorganization. Regarding the Army's role and responsibility to 
the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) mission, the CAC will 
assume all related tasks to WPS at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
With the ongoing transition, CAC and PKSOI are making efforts 
to ensure there is minimal reduction in capability to support 
WPS during the transition. Both organizational transitions will 
take place no later than October 2019.

    Senator Shaheen. Okay. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper. There's nothing--my understanding is, 
nothing is moving out of Carlisle, but there is a 
reorganization of the reporting chain to improve the 
connectivity, again, back with Army doctrine at Leavenworth.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you----
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Fischer.
    Senator Shaheen.--very much. That makes sense, Secretary.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary and General, I have the honor of representing 
the men and women of the Nebraska National Guard, and I want to 
take a moment to recognize their work. For the past week to 10 
days, they've been active across our State, responding to the 
catastrophic flooding that Nebraska has experienced. They're 
working around the clock to save lives and protect property. 
They are truly the best representation of what it means to be a 
soldier in the United States Army National Guard, and all of us 
in Nebraska are deeply thankful for their efforts.
    My question for you is, With the additional funding for 
modernization and rebuilding readiness gaps projected for 
fiscal year-2020, how will you be working to ensure that 
adequate investments are made across the Active, Reserve, and 
the Guard components?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. First of all, our hearts go 
out the people of Nebraska for what they're going through right 
now. I'm sure it's going to take some time, so we really feel 
for them, and, you're right, a lot of kudos to the Nebraska 
Guard for what they're doing. It's a tremendous use of our 
Guard. I remember my days in the Guard, the same thing. It's a 
mission we're very proud of.
    Our commitment is to man the total Army and to field the 
total Army with the equipment needed to do all the missions. 
So, we've made that commitment, particularly with aviation 
assets, which are being in heavy--heavily used right now in 
Nebraska. That's our commitment.
    The Guard is no longer a strategic Reserve. It is an 
operational force, and it's proved itself very well over the 
past many years, along with the United States Army Reserve.
    Senator Fischer. General?
    General Milley. If I could just add one comment. The United 
States Army's tasked, within the broader national security 
establishment, to conduct large-scale ground combat operations, 
campaign quality over extended periods of time. The United 
States Army cannot execute that mission, that wartime mission, 
defense of the United States--cannot do it without the National 
Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. We're the only one of the four 
services with over 50 percent of the force in the Reserve 
component. We have 53 percent in the Guard and U.S. Army 
Reserve. Navy has very tiny Reserve. Marines have a tiny 
Reserve. The Air Force, about 25 percent are in the National--
Air National Guard. So, the Army is dependent upon the National 
Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve to execute our wartime mission. 
It cannot be done without it. So, we take that into 
consideration, and we ensure that, through the budgeting 
process and the prioritization, that the Guard and the U.S. 
Army Reserve are carefully considered and they're in all the 
meetings. We want to ensure that they are properly manned, 
trained, and equipped.
    Senator Fischer. Do you see the role of the Guard changing 
in any way as we transition to the goals of the National 
Defense Strategy? Do you see that component having to change in 
any way?
    General Milley. Yes.
    Senator Fischer. How so?
    General Milley. The--I think the OPTEMPO [Operational 
Tempo] of the Guard will increase for selected units within the 
Guard on our annual basis. We're already designating them with 
the head of the Army Guard, Tim--General Kadavy. Those units, 
the amount of training time they do per year will increase. We 
increased the Combat Training Center rotations from two to 
four. We intend to use those National Guard units on rotations 
to either Europe, Korea, Kosovo, the Middle East, wherever. So, 
fully incorporate the National Guard into the operational 
rotations.
    Senator Fischer. With that increase in tempo, do you see an 
increase needed for personnel, or is recruitment going to have 
to increase for the Guard?
    General Milley. Yes, for both. Within this budget, as 
mentioned, a 2,000 modest increase, rise over run, a few 
thousand a year, for the regular Army, 500 a year for the Army 
Guard, and 250 for the Army Reserve. So, slight increases over 
time until we achieve our end-state objectives sometime in the 
2028 period.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I think the other challenge for 
the Guard and the Reserve will be in future conflict with 
Russia and China, is the ability to mobilize and deploy 
quickly, much more quickly than they have, because I don't 
believe Russia and China will give us the time to build combat 
power in the future.
    Senator Fischer. I would assume you have plans on how to 
help the Guard do that.
    Secretary Esper. We have to work on that. That's--yes, 
ma'am.
    Senator Fischer. Are you working with General Kadavy? Does 
he then work with our local Guard?
    Secretary Esper. We----
    Senator Fischer. Our State people?
    Secretary Esper.--see General Kadavy every day, and----
    Senator Fischer. Who is also a Nebraskan.
    Secretary Esper. General Kadavy and his counterpart, 
General Luckey, of the United States Army Reserve. Again, we 
meet as one team, one Army, and they are fully involved in all 
of our considerations.
    Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    General Milley, in your opening statement, you mentioned 
that the Army is focusing on using directed energy for its 
mobile short-range air defense, or MSHORAD, capability. Is the 
Army still on track to field battalions of air-defense Strykers 
with directed-energy technology?
    General Milley. We're on track, in terms of establishing 
prototype systems and in the overall program, yes. So, we're on 
track, on budget, and we still intend to do that.
    Senator Heinrich. What's the timeline look, moving into the 
future? How important is continued investment in directed 
energy----
    Secretary Esper. We're----
    Senator Heinrich.--to this project?
    Secretary Esper. We're looking at a couple of batteries 
deployed to Europe----
    Senator Heinrich. Secretary?
    Secretary Esper.--in fiscal year 2021, Senator.
    Senator Heinrich. Great.
    Secretary Esper. I think it's--so, it's very exciting. It 
reflects--directed energy is one of our big-five, if you will, 
technologies, along with hypersonics and artificial 
intelligence and robotics. We're--the Army's doing a lot of 
good work, and working with sister services, on directed 
energy.
    Senator Heinrich. I look forward to continued progress in 
that area.
    Secretary, I also want to ask you--the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps recently warned Pentagon leaders that deployments 
to the southwest border and funding transfers under the 
President's emergency declaration have posed, quote, 
``unacceptable risk to the Marine Corps combat readiness and 
solvency,'' end quote. Specifically, he stated that marines 
will not participate in planned training and exercises in 
Indonesia, in Scotland, in Mongolia, and will reduce their 
participation in joint exercises with Australia and South 
Korea. Have there been similar impacts to the Army when it 
comes to training exercises?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I may defer to the Chief on 
this----
    Senator Heinrich. Okay.
    Secretary Esper.--because he's much more involved, in terms 
of watching training and readiness. But, we have spoken with 
commanders and with the 2800-or-so title 10 soldiers and 1900-
or-so title 32 soldiers. In the scale of a 1.1-million-man 
Army, the impacts on readiness, if there are any, are 
negligible, if you will. It's not unlike when we deploy to 
tackle Ebola in western Africa or flooding in Puerto Rico. So, 
it's part of our mission set that we accept.
    But, in terms of specifics, Chief, I don't know if you want 
to----
    Senator Heinrich. General Milley. Maybe you can speak to 
whether any Army units canceled either home-station training 
events or overseas participation.
    General Milley. Anytime an Army unit goes on an unplanned 
contingency operation, whether it's Hurricane Katrina or Puerto 
Rico or Ebola or goes to Afghanistan or wherever--doesn't 
matter where it is--they're going to cancel whatever they were 
doing prior. So, the short answer would be yes, for the 
specific units. The larger answer, though--Does it impact the 
readiness of the Army? The answer is no, it doesn't have a 
significant impact at all. It's a very modest, negligible 
impact on the Army as a whole, because of--primarily because of 
scale, which is slightly different scale than what the Marines 
are talking about in that letter.
    So, our assessment is that the units that are going down 
there, primarily engineers, MPs, some aviation, transportation, 
medical units, they're within their mission profile, in terms 
of what the tasks that they're actually doing, so we don't see 
a significant degradation in readiness at this time for the 
Army.
    Senator Heinrich. Can you provide us with just a list of 
what exercises may have been impacted, either at home or 
abroad?
    General Milley. Absolutely. Sure.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Milley. The Army did not cancel any training 
exercises in fiscal year 2019 because of unplanned or 
unbudgeted factors.

    Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper, I know last year you and I worked quite 
hard to accelerate a Military Construction (MILCON) project at 
White Sands Missile Range, and Congress actually appropriated 
$40 million to replace the 57-year-old information facility 
that actually recently caught fire; it's so old. That facility 
is used in the development and testing of our most advanced 
weapon systems, things like the Standard Missile-2, the Patriot 
missile systems, and others. In the era of big data, this kind 
of technological facility is critical for transmitting the vast 
amounts of data generated during military testing. I am raising 
this simply because this is just one of the projects we've seen 
as potentially on the list for the chopping block to transfer 
those funds to the border wall. Do you believe that this is the 
kind of project that's at risk?
    Secretary Esper. Well, first of all, Senator, thank you. I 
did enjoy my visit to White Sands last year, and it was very 
helpful, instructive to me. I--thank you for that.
    I'd have to look into the details of what you're referring. 
I'm sorry to hear about the fire. I was not tracking that. But, 
I'd have to get back to you.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. I will work to preserve as many Army 
projects as possible, with a prioritization on projects that 
directly impact Army readiness, our ability to project power, 
military housing, and barracks, but ultimately the Army will 
follow direction and guidance provided from OSD.

    Secretary Esper. As I said up front, once we see the list 
of MILCON projects that may be put up for consideration, 
that'll be an OSD call. We'll have to assess that, based on the 
prioritization we put to them, and then get back with you.
    I know one of the things that--in the OSD budget--in the 
DOD budget that OSD put in there was a--this $3.6 billion, if 
you will, to backfill any type of MILCON that might be used to 
mitigate any type of thing--projects like that.
    Senator Heinrich. I think the sooner we can get our hands 
on what is really on the list, versus off the list, then we can 
have a much more informed conversation.
    Secretary Esper. Agreed.
    Senator Heinrich. I've got one more question on AI, which I 
will just submit for the record. But, I look forward to hearing 
the Army's plans on that front, as well.
    Secretary Esper. I'll just say one thing on Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), if I can have 30 seconds. I think the Chief 
and I would agree that AI has the promise of maybe 
fundamentally changing the character of warfare. Whoever gets 
there first will have overmatch for years to come. So, we are 
putting significant investments into AI. In fact, I was in 
Pittsburgh about 2 months ago, doing both recruiting for the 
Army and then also opening up our AI Task Force at Carnegie-
Mellon University, which is pulling in industry and schools 
from all across the country. So, AI is very, very important.
    Senator Heinrich. I'm glad to hear that.
    Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
    I particularly want to compliment both of you, as well as 
Under Secretary McCarthy, for the very painstaking effort you 
put in, in going through the Army budget, line by line, to find 
the savings to fund so many of these critical modernization 
projects. One doesn't have to agree with every single decision 
you made, and I suspect there'll be some Members of this 
Committee that won't agree with every single decision, to 
realize it was a long overdue project and that it's responding 
to Congress's long-stated desire to see that we have that kind 
of effort. So, thank you very much for doing that for the Army. 
General Milley, maybe you'll have a chance to do that for the 
entire Armed Forces a few months from now.
    General Milley, I want to return to something that you said 
to Senator Wicker. He was asking you about the presence of our 
troops in Poland--and, presumably, Baltics, as well--and the 
concept of permanent basing versus rotational forces. You made 
a pretty strong case for the advantages of rotational forces 
over permanent basing. Would that not apply to Germany as well 
as Poland?
    General Milley. It could. In fact, we are rotating. We're 
rotating a brigade right now. There's two brigades in Europe, 
as you know, the 173rd, down in Italy, and then the Stryker 
Brigade, up in Germany, and we rotate an armored brigade combat 
team through Germany right now. What is permanent, the two 
brigades plus some infrastructure--artillery, some aviation, 
some command and control. That's what's in Germany today. 
Compared to, say, the Cold War, where we had 300,000 troops, or 
something like that, in Germany. We're sort of doing a 
combination of both, rotational for the combat units, and 
permanent for the infrastructure. That's something similar to 
what I would recommend for any other part of Europe, for that 
matter.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    General Milley. We're doing it----
    Senator Cotton. Yeah.
    General Milley.--in Korea, as well, by the way.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    Just listening to your response to Senator Wicker, 
juxtaposed to the announcements in the last few days that 
Germany is going to slash its defense budget, I thought was 
pretty telling. In the end, I don't think we can expect 
Americans and American soldiers to care more about Germany's 
security than Germans do. It's troubling that they're going the 
opposite direction of so many other of our NATO allies.
    Secretary Esper, I want to talk about the THAAD missile 
defense system. Is the Army going to take full ownership of 
that from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I know that's under 
consideration. It's being discussed in great detail. I think we 
could, but what's important is that the budget would come with 
that if that happens. So, we just can't accept the program 
without all the budget authority, to include the research 
aspects of it, as well. So, I think that's still being worked. 
But, we don't want to get stuck with a bill.
    Senator Cotton. Yeah, sure. What's the timeline in which 
you think you might make that decision?
    Secretary Esper. I don't know, Senator. I think that's--
it's really an OSD decision, if you will. But, we can get back 
to you on that.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. Recent high-level discussions between the 
MDA and the Army have led to a unified position that no 
transfer of the THAAD and AN/TPY-2 programs occur. THAAD and 
AN/TPY-2 are BMD-purpose built systems that are fully 
integrated into the MDA Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS). Transfer would risk disruption to this tightly coupled 
integration into the BMDS architecture and MDA-managed 
configuration control of THAAD and AN/TPY-2. The THAAD and AN/
TPY-2 programs are jointly managed with the Army and fully 
integrated as Army capabilities as demonstrated by multiple 
THAAD forward deployments and stationed batteries. MDA has 
initiated a modernization program for the AN/TPY-2 radar to 
increase the THAAD weapon system capability. If a transfer is 
directed, the Army has previously stated that all the upgrades 
must be completed prior to transfer and all associated funding 
for THAAD would need to be transferred as well. Additionally, 
any separation of funds between the MDA RDT&E and Army for 
Procurement would result in budgetary and programmatic 
inefficiencies for both MDA and the Army putting THAAD 
development and the force at risk. Finally, a transfer could 
also have adverse effects on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) such 
as delays and resultant higher costs which could jeopardize 
current and future agreements.

    Senator Cotton. Okay.
    I'm pleased to see that one of the big modernization 
prospectus--or lines of effort is long-range precision fires, 
what many just call ``artillery,'' expanding the range and 
lethality of artillery. Could you please explain the concept 
for the so-called extended-range cannon, what it would mean to 
have a gun that has that kind of range, that--those kind of 
fire power to it?
    Secretary Esper. I'll take the first shot, and then----
    Senator Cotton. Sure.
    Secretary Esper.--no pun intended--and then let the Chief 
talk to it.
    But, clearly, as the Chairman said up front, when it comes 
to artillery systems--the system, we are outmatched by the 
Russians. The extended-range cannon artillery--and I was able 
to go to Yuma, Arizona, and see it shoot--provides us 
incredible reach. When we talk about deploying to the Baltics 
or Poland, when you think about a gun that can shoot around 70-
plus kilometers--and we think we can get further--it can be a 
game changer for us, in terms of reach, and, more importantly, 
in terms of deterrence, from the get-go. So, this is one of 
the--long-range precision fires is the top priority of the six, 
and we're moving out at both the tactical, the operational, and 
the strategic level.
    General Milley. Yeah, I mean, we made it the number-one 
priority because fires are fundamental to the American way of 
war, which is all about maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is--
fires with movement, in combination, equals maneuver. We have 
lost a little bit, relative to some near-peer adversaries--
China, Russia, example--with respect to cannon and rocket 
artillery. So, we intend to regain the comparative advantage 
that we've had, at least in modern history, in that weapon 
system. That's really, really important to us. Extended Range 
Cannon Artillery (ERCA) is one of multiple programs in the 
entire concept of long-range precision fires that go everywhere 
from the tactical, the 30-to-40-kilometer range, the 70 for the 
ERCA, and beyond, up to 499, for the limits of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and beyond that for 
some other systems. So, it's an entire suite of capabilities to 
regain American dominance in the area of long-range fires.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    One final question. Going to have a lot of vehicles, a lot 
of aircraft, a lot of guns coming online in the coming years. 
General Milley, you and I have discussed this before. No 
soldier wants to ride in or shoot an acronym. I hope there's a 
plan to come up with good names for all these things, like the 
Bradley and the Abrams.
    General Milley. We were thinking the Inhofe and the Reed.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cotton. We'll have the----
    General Milley. Or maybe the Cotton.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cotton. Have to stick with the Inhofe and the Reed, 
but I do hope that there are going to be cool names for our 
soldiers to ride in and shoot for many years to come, as 
they've had for so long. Not an acronym.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Peters.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.
    I want to follow up on some of the questions related to the 
reprogramming of a billion dollars from the personnel accounts. 
You know, this is--certainly it was the decision made without 
the approval of Congress. As you know, a majority of Congress 
has actually voted against the President's national emergency 
declaration. So, basically, this is an end-around Congress, 
which I think is unacceptable. But, I think it was also 
interesting that, as you're moving a billion dollars from 
personnel funds to the DHS, the Army, just yesterday, sent the 
Congress a list of 2.3 billion in unfunded priorities, included 
more than 1 billion for readiness requirements and 247 million 
for modernization. So, given you're reprogramming a billion 
from personnel and Reserve personnel accounts to DHS 
counternarcotics account, just curious, from both of you 
gentlemen, how is the southern border a greater priority than 
Army readiness and modernization?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, on the first part, the billion 
dollars from the military personnel was that--again, that delta 
of 6500 soldiers that we were unable to fill, along with others 
from the end-strength number. That was an amount of money that 
we----
    Senator Peters. I understand that.
    Secretary Esper. Okay.
    Senator Peters. I understand where it came from. But, 
still, you've reprogrammed that for the southern border. You 
haven't come to Congress to ask for it. So, that's an end-
around.
    Secretary Esper. We returned it to OSD, and OSD is using it 
to meet the requirements set out in the--I think, the national 
emergency declaration established by the Commander in Chief.
    Senator Peters. That has been rejected by Congress. 
Correct?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Peters. You sent a list for 2.3 billion in unfunded 
priorities that could have been met with this 1 billion that 
originated for the--as you described. So, my question is--you 
made that a priority, as opposed to readiness and 
modernization, and yet you're here, telling us readiness and 
modernization is a priority, and yet it seems as if you've 
prioritized the southern border over Army readiness and 
modernization. Tell me why.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, the fiscal year 2019 budget, even 
with--because the money was for the military personnel that we 
cannot fill, the fiscal year 2019 budget meets our readiness 
and modernization goals. As I said up front, the needs of the 
services will always exceed the means. So, that's just a state 
of--the state of things. It's always been that way. So, I don't 
see it the way you've characterized it, if you will.
    Senator Peters. Well, you had a billion dollars you could 
have transferred to your list of unfunded priorities that you 
submitted to us just yesterday.
    Secretary Esper. Yes. Well, that was for fiscal year 2020. 
This is fiscal year 2019 money we're talking about. But, you're 
correct, that's--as I said----
    Senator Peters. I mean, that's your----
    Secretary Esper.--as I said to Senator Reed up front, we 
could have used that money to continue to improve readiness. 
That's fair.
    Senator Peters. But, you're saying the southern border is 
more important than readiness.
    Secretary Esper. I'm not--I'm not saying that. I'm saying 
that we--the Department of Defense made decisions based on what 
the President set out as priorities, and we are following 
through, we are executing.
    Senator Peters. General Milley, is readiness and 
modernization a priority over the southern border?
    General Milley. Readiness is the Army's number-one 
priority; and modernization is future readiness, and that's our 
number-two priority. But, I--you know, Senator, I'm a soldier. 
Priorities and national security priorities are established by 
civilian control of the military. We're given those as matters 
of policy. When they're given to us, we execute. So, it is not 
for me to say one is more important than the other, relative to 
the entire national security of the United States. But, within 
the Army, we've said priority one is readiness, priority two is 
modernization. But, within the Nation, that's not our call.
    That's the call of the United States Congress and the 
President of the United States. We were told to move that 
money. We gave it back to DOD. DOD's applying it in accordance 
with presidential priorities.
    Senator Peters. Of course, the Congress has spoken on this 
issue. We know that.
    But, a question in the remaining time, for both the 
Secretary and General Milley, deals with the Army's Future 
Command. I just want to get a sense--a better sense of how you 
see that fitting in with existing Army activities. 
Particularly, how does the Future Command work with the Army 
science and technology (S&T) community? What do you expect to 
see happening, in terms of that Future Command, with what we 
have now?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, first of all, the acquisition 
enterprise, if you will, under Dr. Jette, Army Acquisition, 
works hand-in-glove with Army Futures Command. In the Army 
Futures Command, what he's given us is unit--what we say, unity 
of effort, unity of command. So, in the past, where the 
acquisition enterprise was spread out across the Army, with no 
clear one person in charge, there were multiple people in 
charge, what we've done with Futures Command, by standing it up 
last summer, was really unify it under General Murray, in 
Austin, and that--what that also did was, we moved out of--we 
moved, organizationally, our S&T enterprise under him, as well. 
So, now his responsibility is to think about the future, 
Futures Command. How will the Russians and Chinese, say, fight 
in the year 2035, 20---2045, if you will, and then, how does he 
start looking at the capabilities we will need to deter and 
defeat them at that point in time? Then he can think--he has 
the ability now to direct the S&T side of the house. In this 
budget, we shifted 80 percent--we continue to shift of 80 
percent of our S&T dollars to those modernization priorities. 
That's his call, to make sure that we're all lined up, aligned, 
focusing on what the future threats are. That's his--that's a 
big part of his job. That eventually turns into requirements.
    Senator Peters. Right.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Ernst.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Gentlemen, thank you so much for your leadership for our 
men and women in the Army. We certainly do appreciate that.
    Increasing our warfighting readiness does remain the Army's 
number-one priority. Thank you for emphasizing that over and 
over again. However, we do understand that sexual assault 
within our Army formation is not only a serious criminal 
offense, but it also degrades our readiness. It also degrades 
discipline, morale, unit cohesiveness, and going back again to 
the combat readiness. So, to both of you, please. We'll start 
with you, Secretary. What is the Army doing to continue to 
combat the problem of sexual assault in the military? Are you 
seeing an increase in the leadership in our culture, where we 
are addressing the issue of sexual assault?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, thank you for that question. 
You've hit a number of good points.
    Let me say up front, there is no room in the United States 
Army for sexual assault and sexual harassment, period. We will 
not tolerate it. It's not just a readiness issue. It's contrary 
to our values as an institution. We are working very hard to 
continue to get the--and we see it, statistically. Prevalence 
over the years is coming down, and reporting is going up. Those 
are good trend lines. We have another report coming out in a 
month or so. We'll see what that looks like. But, what we've 
done in the last year is, rather than focus on soldiers doing 
online training and sending them off to an auditorium to get a 
speech or whatever, we are putting the chain of command back 
involved in teaching the importance of dignity and respect for 
everybody, and not tolerating sexual assault and harassment. 
So, what we want to do is leverage the culture of the Army and 
the chain of command to get at this. My experience, my view, 
the commanders' view, as well, is, that's the way you get at 
this. I think we've set it aside for too long. It's much like 
housing. We--the chain of command stepped aside a little bit. 
We need to get back in the game. That, on top of all the 
education we're doing, the training, the stand-downs, I think 
will continue to move the needle on sexual assault and 
harassment until we get it down to zero.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you. I do think that's important. We 
do need to focus on those issues. But, active engagement by our 
leadership is very, very important. Thank you, Secretary.
    General Milley, would you like to make some comments?
    General Milley. I would echo the comments of the Secretary, 
that it's not tolerated. We are deeply, deeply committed to 
that. From a soldier's standpoint, from a commander's 
standpoint, this is blue-on-blue. This is a friendly force 
inflicting a casualty on a friendly force. There's no room for 
that. There's no room for it with bullets on a live-fire range, 
there's no room for it with bullets in combat, and there's no 
room for it with sexual assault in a barracks or at a party or 
wherever.
    There are some key things that we are doing. The chain of 
command here is absolutely critical. The ownership of the 
small-unit leader all the way up to the senior-most leaders of 
the Army, chain of command engagement is critical to resolving 
this. I know there are people who think the chain of command 
should not be involved in this, from a legal standpoint, UCMJ 
[Uniform Code of Military Justice]. I disagree 100 percent with 
that. The chain of command has got to own it, wrap its arms 
around it, and prevent it. Alcohol, we know, is a contributing 
factor in almost 50 percent of the cases. We know that almost 
all of the cases occur on weekends, Fridays and Saturday 
nights, between midnight and 0300. We know that a lot of the 
victims, or most of the victims, are young women. There are 
male victims, but most of them are young women between 19 and 
24 years old, newly assigned to a unit, in the first 60 days. 
We know that it normally involves a party and there's alcohol 
involvement.
    So, there are things that we know we can do. We can control 
the barracks, we can control the night, we can ensure the chain 
of command are present at various functions--unit functions, et 
cetera. We can beat this. It is a cancer within the ranks. It 
destroys cohesion and discipline. It must be stamped out in the 
military, writ large--not just the Army; military, writ large. 
There are TTPs--tactics, techniques, and procedures--to do it, 
and we intend to do it.
    Senator Ernst. Absolutely. Going back to something that you 
said, General--Secretary Esper, I'd like you to comment on it--
you mentioned the chain of command. Very important. I would 
like to discuss section 541 of our fiscal year 2015 NDAA. This 
provision required relevant service secretaries to review 
sexual assault cases where the staff judge advocate has 
recommended referral of charges to a court-martial but where 
the commander who serves as the convening authority has refused 
to refer the case. To the best of your knowledge, Secretary, 
how many cases has the Secretary of the Army reviewed under 
this provision between its enactment in 2015 to the present?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I can't speak for my 
predecessors. I'd have to go find that information. But, I 
don't believe I've reviewed any. I need to dig into this and 
come back to you.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. Neither I, nor my predecessors, have been 
asked to review any cases under the provisions of section 541 
of Fiscal Year 2015 NDAA or section 1744(c) of the Fiscal Year 
2014 NDAA.

    Senator Ernst. Okay. I believe that you are correct, sir, 
that there have been zero. Based on this, is it your assessment 
that commanders are following the legal advice provided by 
their staff judge advocates with respect to sexual assault 
cases?
    Secretary Esper. I'd have to check. The expectation is 
that, in most cases, they would. I can't speak to them all. 
There's--but, I'd have to come back to you with the numbers.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. Yes, it is my assessment that Commanders 
are following the legal advice provided by their judge 
advocates with respect to all cases, including sexual assault. 
Commanders value the advice and counsel of their legal 
advisors. It is the Commander, however, who bears ultimate 
responsibility for making decisions about the proper 
disposition of a case. Legal advisors will often provide a 
range of options for the Commander to consider, and the 
Commander combines that advice with his or her training and 
experience to make a decision in the best interests of justice, 
good order, and discipline.

    Senator Ernst. Yes. If they are not following, they would 
go----
    General Milley. Let me----
    Senator Ernst.--to you, Secretary Esper.
    General Milley. As a commander who's been a general court-
martial convening authority on multiple occasions, I think the 
percentage is extremely high, like 99.9 percent, where 
commanders are following----
    Senator Ernst. Follow----
    General Milley.--the advice of their SJA [Staff Judge 
Advocate]. It would be a very stupid commander not to do that, 
in most cases. That's not--he has the authority not to follow 
it, but he--that wouldn't be a very smart commander.
    The other thing, in terms of way ahead, we are partnering 
with Senator McSally and her initiative with the Department of 
Defense. We want to partner closely with that. We think there's 
a lot of promise in that initiative that we intend to fully 
participate in it over the next 90 to 120 days.
    Senator Ernst. Very good. That would be a stupid commander 
that does not----
    General Milley. It would be a stupid commander.
    Senator Ernst.--follow his JAG's advice--his or her JAG's 
[Judge Advocate General] advice.
    So, thank you. I appreciate that, gentlemen. Thank you very 
much for your service.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
    Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here today. I really appreciate 
it. Thanks for your service, to both of you.
    General Milley, I'd like to just kind of follow up on a 
question that Senator Cotton asked. Earlier, he asked about the 
Army taking THAAD over from the MDA, which came as a little bit 
of a surprise to me. Can you kind of explain that a little bit 
more to us, and what's going on there?
    General Milley. I think what he's talking about is the 
money and the procurement, acquisition, and the way ahead for 
the prototyping, and the force structure of THAAD. I believe 
that's what Senator Cotton was talking about.
    Senator Jones. All right, sir.
    I guess this would be to both of you. I notice, in the--the 
requested $63 billion in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) 
funding, which is a pretty big increase--89.8-percent increase 
from the amount that we enacted in fiscal year 2019. Going into 
that a little bit, I've noticed that a lot of line items in the 
budget request is kind of a mix of base and OCO funding, which 
really kind of makes it hard to tell what might be affected if 
Congress doesn't provide that level of OCO funding. So, how can 
we tell anything about your priorities by just digging into the 
OCO percentage for a particular item? How can we look and see 
what your priorities are and what you might be doing with that 
money?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, two things. I think the OSD 
Comptroller would say that there are two buckets of OCO, one 
that he would describe as ``OCO for base,'' which is about 31 
billion, and then one is the pure base, which is about 31 
billion. So, I think, for us, if you look at the 150 billion or 
so that is the base plus the OCO-for-base, in there you will 
see the prioritization the Army has placed on, number one, 
readiness. It's reflected in the maximization of our CTC 
[combat training center] rotations, the flying-hour program for 
aviation, et cetera. Then, with regard to modernization, which 
is future readiness, you see the early stages of this big shift 
from legacy systems into future systems. In fiscal year 2020, I 
think it's over $4 billion gets shifted, but, over the FYDP, 
over the 5-year period, you will see a 30-plus-billion-dollar 
shift, because most of that money is needed in the 2022, 2023, 
2024 timeframe, when we start procuring things, as our S&T 
ripens into projects ready to harvest.
    Senator Jones. All right.
    General Milley, you have anything to add to that, or is----
    General Milley. For me, as a Chief--and I've said this the 
last 3 and a half years, or three--previous three testimonies--
the color of the money, whether it's OCO or base, I know that's 
important from a budgeting standpoint, it's important to 
Congress, but, as a recipient of the money, what we need is the 
money in order to train, man, and equip this Army, in order to 
defend the United States of America. However that is 
categorized and the color of the money, I won't say it's not 
important to me, but it's less important than getting the 
money. That is important.
    The reason it's being done is because of BCA [Budget 
Control Act] and the continuing resolutions (CR) that have been 
done over the years. I would caution this Congress that, if we 
were to go to BCA levels of funding, we will place the United 
States of America at great risk. So, that's why it's being done 
the way it is.
    Senator Jones. All right. Thank you, sir.
    I also want to talk a little bit about the budget that 
calls for declines in support for AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM as well 
as USFK [United States Forces Korea], but a pretty big 
increase, about 35 percent, for EUCOM. I have two questions 
about that. One, I'm still a little bit--I am concerned as--
about North Korea. Maybe not as much as Russia and China, but 
I'm still pretty concerned about North Korea, which remains 
pretty volatile. We've got decreased funding there. I'm 
wondering if we should take this as an indication that our 
troop levels on the Peninsula are going to be reduced. Also, as 
a different part of that question, the operational changes, 
what will we see as operational changes at EUCOM with a 35 
percent increase?
    General Milley. A couple of points. Over the previous, I 
guess, it was 18 months or so, the United States military--and 
the Army, specifically, as part of a broader effort--did many 
things, some in a classified setting, and others were open 
knowledge, that shored up military capabilities on the 
Peninsula of Korea and in the general western Pacific region. 
We think that today the United States Army capabilities that 
are forward-deployed in the Pacific are in pretty good shape to 
handle whatever might come.
    Secondly is, the military's clearly in support of a 
diplomatic effort in the Pacific. Although there's various 
reporting about North Korean nuclear capabilities, et cetera, 
one thing we can say with certainty is, there has not, at least 
to date--over the last year, year and a half or so, that there 
has not been another nuclear test. There has not been another 
missile test. The rhetoric has died down considerably. The 
North Koreans are doing various things, along with the South 
Koreans, in engaging and interacting with each other. There 
have been LPOPs [Listening Post/Observation Post] in towers 
that have been brought down along the DMZ [Korean Demiliterized 
Zone]. So, the situation today is different. There's been two 
meetings, of course, between the President of the United States 
and the leader of North Korea.
    All of that diplomatic engagement, is pointing in a good 
direction. We are not done yet. There's a lot of--a lot yet to 
be done on North Korea. But, we're in a different place today 
than we were--we think we are in a different place today than 
we were, say, 18 months or more before.
    The increase in Europe, we think--at least my estimation is 
that, as I said in my opening statement, Russia is still the 
only country on Earth that is actually an existential threat to 
the United States of America, they're the only ones who have 
the capability to bring that level of destruction to our 
country. They have been very aggressive in the last, call it, 
decade or so, in--with Georgia and Ukraine and Middle East and 
various other places. They are intentionally, with malfeasance 
and forethought, trying to undermine NATO on a daily, weekly, 
monthly basis, and with a variety of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that are just below the level of war. They have 
clearly done various nefarious activities in the United States, 
as well. So, beefing up our capabilities in Europe is important 
to the defense of the United States.
    Alliances still do matter. NATO is important to the United 
States. Our President has said NATO's important to the United 
States. We want NATO to belly up to the bar and pay their 2 
percent. Clearly, we want that. But, at the same time, we know 
that we need to forward-defend in order to defend the United 
States, as well. So, there is some additional monies going into 
Europe just for the purpose of deterring further aggression by 
Russia.
    Senator Jones. All right. Thank you General Milley. I 
really appreciate those responses.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator McSally.
    Senator McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for your leadership for the 
men and women in our Army.
    You talked, in your testimony on page 7, about the need to 
increase unmanned aerial system (UAS) integration was related 
to future vertical lift. As you look at modernization, 
obviously unmanned aerial systems are going to be more and more 
important as to how we fight and integrate both manned and 
unmanned. Fort Huachuca houses the unmanned aerial system 
training right now, the only solely dedicated UAS training 
airspace. Unlike other places in the country, we're actually 
increasing that airspace, our 2303; whereas, other places, 
airspace is being encroached.
    As you know, General Milley--you were down there when I 
hosted you--there's over 300 days of sunshine for the training 
there. It really is a unique location for this capability for 
our Army, never mind all the joint base and airspace and 
opportunities for joint training around it in the future, and 
it is along the border, so, in defense support to civil 
authorities, if they do see something, they can pass that on. 
So, I really see this is a national security asset for us.
    Do you agree that, as we grow our UAS training 
opportunities or grow UAS missions, that Fort Huachuca is a 
national asset that needs to have its training protected and 
potentially increased?
    Secretary Esper, I'd love to host you down there so you can 
see that, firsthand.
    General Milley. Senator, I--you know, Fort Huachuca is a 
great base. Arizona has 300 days of sunshine, as you noted. The 
airspace is mostly always clear. So, yes, Fort Huachuca and 
other capabilities and bases within Arizona are--and other 
States--are national assets. As far as UAS-specific, it's a 
great place to fly UAS. There are some other bases around the 
U.S. that do that. But, clearly, UAS has a role to play, and it 
is an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance asset. You've 
got the Intelligence School there. That's why it was there. 
Now, we have taken UAS and realigned it with the aviation 
community of the United States Army. But, in terms of where it 
bases, where it trains, we're taking a look at all of that. 
There's a variety of options. Arizona's clearly right on the 
top of the list.
    Senator McSally. Okay. I appreciate it. Again, if we're 
going to expand the capability that, you know, we continue to 
preserve that national treasure that we have there.
    Secretary Esper, can I host you down at Fort Huachuca 
before any decisions might be made in the future?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator. I think we're planning a 
trip for the fall. So, I'd love to----
    Senator McSally. Okay.
    Secretary Esper.--meet up with you down there and do 
soldier meetings and watching training and all those great----
    Senator McSally. Outstanding. Thank you.
    I know you mentioned, in talking to Senator Cotton, that 
you were down at Yuma Proving Group, you know, watching some 
fires there. One of the challenges we have with long-range 
precision fires being your top priority is the range space that 
we have, and the need to modernize it and lengthen it. They 
actually have to shut down the road when they do longer-range 
fires. So, is part of your budget taking a look at--I know 
there's some initiatives in Yuma for land swaps and other 
things, but trying to modernize the ranges so that we can 
actually test these long-range fires for future?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. You hit on an important point. 
We're looking at all of our training ranges to make sure that 
they can accommodate the future systems that we have under--
that we're designing or developing. It's not just the range, 
itself, but it's the sensors, it's all the----
    Senator McSally. Exactly.
    Secretary Esper.--all the stuff you need. So, we're looking 
at that for Yuma, I think, White Sands, a number of locations, 
for all of these six priorities, as we need them.
    Senator McSally. Okay, fantastic. Is there any resources in 
this budget related to expansion of those training ranges?
    Secretary Esper. I'd have to get back to you and--with a 
note and tell you what is or is not. I just--I don't have that 
level of detail, Senator.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. The Army is currently reviewing whether 
expansion is needed at both Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) and White 
Sands Missile Range (WSMR) to meet the needs of future weapon 
systems. The Army has funds for proposed YPG land expansion in 
the fiscal year 2020 budget to safely allow for air drop at 
higher altitudes. The Army is continuing to research the 
necessity of expansion at WSMR, and won't be in a position to 
seek funding for another 1 to 2 years.

    Senator McSally. Okay, great.
    Another question on the precision-strike missile. Right 
now, it's being developed in accordance with the INF Treaty. 
We've made a notification to be withdrawing from the INF 
Treaty. I think that will happen in August, with a 6-month 
notification. Are there any plans to release--remove the 
previously imposed range restrictions in the development of 
that capability, based on us pulling out of INF?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I've talked with our acquisition 
folks, and they've talked with industry. I think there are two 
competitors. I think, if and when we exit the treaty, they're 
prepared to adjust the ranges above 499 kilometers.
    Senator McSally. Great.
    Secretary Esper. We've got to see how far. But, that--
clearly, again, long-range precision fires is something that's 
important to us, and the ability to do that with conventional 
means gives us that reach.
    Senator McSally. Great, thanks.
    Oh, go ahead, General Milley.
    General Milley. Nope.
    Senator McSally. Okay.
    One last quick question. Nearly 75 percent of young 
Americans age 17 to 24 are not fit for military service, for a 
variety of reasons. I know you've had some recruiting 
challenges. This was already touched on. This is obviously 
concerning, if we're coming from such a small pool. Is there 
anything else that we can do innovatively to address this issue 
to make sure that we've got the best and brightest joining our 
military in the Army?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, you're right, it's--you know, 29 
percent are not qualified, for mental, physical, behavioral 
reasons. For--on the physical side, it's mostly obesity. Then 
you take a look at that same population of--less than 4 percent 
have a proclivity to serve. So, we're trying to go out, by--we 
reorganized and overhauled our recruiting organization. One of 
the initiatives we have is the Focus 22 cities, where we go 
back to America's biggest cities, and we try and talk to kids, 
young men and women, where they are, and speak to the 
opportunities that the Army provides them. It's different in 
each part of the country. I was--I've been in Cleveland and in 
Boston and L.A., and I've been all over. But, you have to 
appeal to them where they are, and talk to them about what the 
Army brings.
    The bigger challenge that we face--this is a national 
issue--is, fewer and fewer Americans--young Americans 
understand the military.
    Senator McSally. Right.
    Secretary Esper. There's no relationship, whether it's the 
Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force. That's--in our own little way, 
we're trying to reverse that by getting out and telling our 
story.
    Senator McSally. Great. Thank you.
    I'm out of time. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank Senator Ernst for focusing on the 
continuing scourge of sexual harassment and assault in the 
military. In addition, we need to focus on retaliation that 
continues. I know that we need to change the culture, which 
doesn't happen overnight. It's an ongoing, continuous effort. I 
certainly share Senator Ernst's perspective and concerns.
    Mr. Chairman, we spend a lot of time on this Committee 
talking about China as a near-peer competitor. But, of course, 
Russia is also a significant rival, and of--General Milley just 
talked about Russia as posing the only existential threat to 
the United States, undermining NATO, what they're doing in the 
Ukraine, Syria, their nefarious activities in the United 
States. So, we learned, Mr. Chairman, that the--President Trump 
has invited Putin to the White House. We don't know what they 
talked about during their Helsinki meeting. We have no idea 
what they will talk about this time. It should concern us that 
the Commander in Chief is talking to a near-peer adversary, and 
we won't know what they will talk about or what kind of 
understanding they may come to. So, I think this Committee 
should be seriously concerned.
    I have a question for both of you regarding the Army's role 
in the Pacific. It is important that the United States projects 
strength, reassure our allies, and build partnerships in the 
Indo-Pacific, particularly in light of the actions of China and 
North Korea. Your fiscal year 2020 budget request specifically 
noted the goal of strengthening alliances and partnerships by 
funding multilateral exercises. How much money was added for 
those exercises in the 2020 budget?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I'll have to get with--back to 
you on the exact numbers, but clearly we do want to strengthen 
our relationships and exercises. Pacific Pathways has been very 
successful. We were actually looking at----
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. In the fiscal year 2020 budget, the Army 
allocated approximately $156 million in additional funding for 
Defender Pacific and a number of other, smaller, exercises.

    Senator Hirono. Thank you, because one of my subquestions 
was whether Pacific Pathways will be included in your budget--
--
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Hirono.--request.
    Secretary Esper. It is, and it's a very robust series of 
exercises. But, we're also looking at doing our own type of 
dynamic force employment as part of multidomain operations, 
where we do even bigger exercises out in the Pacific to reflect 
the shift to the National Defense Strategy.
    Senator Hirono. Can you tell me, Mr. Secretary, how many of 
these targeted multilateral exercises are in the Pacific?
    Secretary Esper. I can't, off the top of my head, Senator. 
We can give that to you. But, we've had soldiers, from National 
Guard to regular Army, training anywhere from Singapore and 
Indonesia to Thailand, all over.
    Senator Hirono. So, you'll get back to me.
    Secretary Esper. Absolutely.
    [The information referred to follows:]
    Senator Hirono. I want to know how many of the--how much of 
the Army's funding for the exercises goes toward exercises on 
the Korean Peninsula, as a subpart.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. There are five multilateral exercises and 
23 bilateral exercises regularly conducted with partners and 
allies in the Pacific. Approximately $8 million was budgeted in 
fiscal year 2020 for exercises on the Korean Peninsula.

    Senator Hirono. Has there been a change in the Army's 
funding for exercises in Korea, since larger joint and combined 
exercises have been canceled or modified, starting last year?
    General Milley. Let me----
    Senator Hirono. General Milley?
    General Milley.--help out a little bit here, Senator, if I 
could.
    There are dozens of exercises in the Pacific. We'll get you 
the exact list. You're familiar with the big ones----
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    General Milley.--Corporate Gold, Yama Sakura, Keen Sword, 
and so on, so forth.
    Senator Hirono. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).
    General Milley. Pacific Pathways. We are funding those. We, 
years ago--I guess it was 4 or 5 years ago now--made a 
commitment to pivot to the Pacific. We, the United States Army, 
have about 87-88,000 U.S. soldiers in the Pacific. We've got 
the--most of the 28,500 that are on the Korean Peninsula are 
Army soldiers. We've got United States Army, Japan. So, as you 
are well aware, we're--we, the Army, are very deeply engaged 
and very committed to the Pacific. It's not just all about 
Russia and Europe. We'll get you the exact number of exercises, 
and the money.
    General Milley. With respect to the Korean Peninsula, there 
was, as you know--I guess it was within the last 30 days, there 
was a commitment to go ahead and reduce some of the major 
overall exercises, in terms of large-scale CPXs [command post 
exercise] and stuff like that. Our estimate is, is that, from 
an Army perspective--and I've talked to General Abrams, as 
well--that the degree of readiness is modest--the degree of 
declining in readiness is modest. We don't think it's going to 
have a huge detrimental effect. Anything brigade and below, 
where the rubber meets the road, in terms of combat actions, 
those guys are still training every single day, and they're 
still capable of fighting tonight. So, we're comfortable with 
where we are, in terms of our training schedules and our 
training plans, on the Korean Peninsula.
    Senator Hirono. So, with our training in the Korean 
Peninsula, we are doing these in conjunction with the South 
Korean military----
    General Milley. Absolutely.
    Senator Hirono.--are we not? Because we need to----
    General Milley. Yeah.
    Senator Hirono.--coordinate, if anything----
    General Milley. Yes.
    Senator Hirono.--happens there.
    General Milley. Yes.
    Senator Hirono. I want to get to the need for childcare 
facilities and capacity, Mr. Secretary. When we met, there was 
a 7-month-old infant who passed away, what appears to be an 
unlicensed home daycare. I think that we have to pay a lot more 
attention to the need for childcare, as we have families now, 
more and more, in the military. Is access to safe, affordable 
childcare for military families an important readiness issue 
for you?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. I've traveled the Army now for 
18 months or so, talking about this. I was at Schofield 
Barracks lat year. It's--the challenge is particularly acute in 
Hawaii, where we have probably an unmet demand--I'm trying to 
recall--anywhere between 20 and 40 percent. So, there are a 
number of things we're doing to tackle that. A big part of it 
is civilian hiring, spousal hiring----
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Secretary Esper.--to fill----
    Senator Hirono. We need to make sure that we decrease the 
delay in hiring appropriately trained people.
    Secretary Esper. So, we've taken about a dozen-plus 
initiatives, everything from allowing, after the background 
check by the FBI, within 72 hours, line-of-sight access. We see 
our numbers going up, which is very good. I can come brief you 
on a number of other things. But, we--it's trending in the 
right direction. We do need to actually expand authorized in-
home childcare. That's another route. The other thing that I'm 
hearing lately that I want to go after is providing hourly 
childcare for folks, outside of the daycare centers, because 
it's a need for spouses, for moms and dads who need to--you 
know, maybe the spouse is on deployment, to be able to do that.
    Senator Hirono. So, we'll continue to work with you on 
these, thank you for recognizing our reality for many military 
families.
    Secretary Esper. Very important.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Secretary, I'd like to begin with a comment about 
something that is a little bit outside the jurisdiction of this 
Committee but is not outside your jurisdiction. I'm talking 
about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As you know, large 
portions of my State is currently--are currently under water, 
which is true for other Members of this Committee. I was just 
in the State in recent days, surveying the damage from this 
historic flooding. It is quite significant. I have to say, I've 
heard from my constituents in the State over and over again 
that they have had significant trouble in working with the Army 
Corps, both in terms of responsiveness, but also in terms of 
significant concerns about, perhaps, misplaced priorities by 
the Corps and their management of the river systems. So, I look 
forward to working with you on this. Like to visit about it 
and--whether that's taking a look at the master manual or other 
reforms that we need to pursue to make sure, as we face a year 
of historic flooding, that this sort of thing does not keep 
happening, and that we're able to meet the needs of folks who 
live in and make their living along the river.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, if I may, first of all----
    Senator Hawley. Please.
    Secretary Esper. Well, again, our hearts go out for the 
folks affected by the flooding, your constituents. What I'd 
like to do is get the Corps of Engineers up here today to your 
office and find out----
    Senator Hawley. Great.
    Secretary Esper.--what's going on.
    Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much. I appreciate--
--
    Secretary Esper. Then we can----
    Senator Hawley.--that.
    Secretary Esper.--we can tackle it, and then we'll take it 
back down to the district level and make sure we get it--get 
working on it ASAP.
    Senator Hawley. Fantastic. Thank you very much.
    I just want to offer a word of praise, Mr. Secretary, both 
to you and to you, General, for your leadership in reform, 
modernization, pursuit of the NDS priorities, I think, and 
really making the Army, perhaps, the leading service, in terms 
of pursuing reform and modernization. It's really impressive 
what you have done in this most recent budget and your 
leadership overall. So, thank you for that.
    Let me ask you an NDS-related question. I'm wondering 
about--thinking about the Indo-Pacific, does the Army have 
plans--what are the Army's plans to contribute with INF-range 
conventional missile systems in that theater to restoring our 
conventional edge against China?
    General, go ahead.
    General Milley. The--I don't want to go into classified 
briefings, but we've got a variety of capabilities that--
emerging capabilities that we're going to deploy to the Pacific 
theater that we think will have significant impact on any 
potential conflict that could emerge in that area. We are 
experimenting that with what we're calling multidomain task 
forces. We're establishing two of those. One of them is in the 
Pacific. They are experimenting with the doctrine or the new 
concepts of multidomain operations. That task force will be 
equipped with a variety of capabilities that'll be able to 
establish dominance from the land, in space, cyber, perhaps 
maritime, as well--not subsurface, but surface, to be sure--as 
well as air. So, there's a variety of capabilities that we're 
going to deploy and a variety of cannon, rocket, and missile 
capabilities from the land that will have a significant impact. 
Just did a secure video tele-conference (SVTC) with--Admiral 
Davidson and Under Secretary McCarthy and Vice Chief of Staff 
McConville were out there just last week, and we were talking 
about that very issue, and we'll be introducing some of that 
stuff in exercises over the course of the next 24 months.
    Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you very much.
    Let me switch theaters, but a similar set of questions 
about the NDS, thinking about, now, the Army in the context of 
the Joint Force in the Baltics and this Baltic scenario that 
the NDS talks about. How have you made progress on that? Where 
do you--what do you still need? What are your plans to get 
there?
    General Milley. Again, most of those exercises that we've 
done, and then the analysis we've done, is classified. We are 
keenly aware of Russian capability with respect to the Baltics. 
We are shoulder to shoulder with the Baltic nations--Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia--as well as Poland. The rotation of forces, 
the European Defense Initiative (EDI), the exercises we're 
doing and the capabilities that we're deploying, we think will 
be sufficient to cause pause for any further Russian 
aggression.
    Senator Hawley. Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Esper. Senator, you made a very important point. 
You said, ``What do you need?'' What we need is this budget. 
Because the Russians are building new tanks, the Russians are 
modernizing their fighting vehicles, they are modernizing their 
air defense systems. Across the board, they are doing things 
that we need to get on with doing. This budget, and the 
billions of dollars we shift, will get us there so we're 
prepared to deter them and, if necessary, defeat them, should 
war come.
    Senator Hawley. Fantastic. Thank you, again, Mr. Secretary, 
General, for your leadership.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, to the witnesses.
    I want to start with Secretary Esper, a thank you. Two 
Thursdays ago, you hosted Senator Warner and I at Fort Belvoir. 
I just want to commend you and the Army in the way that you're 
going after this very, very tough challenge on military 
housing. Secretary Esper escorted us around to a couple of 
homes, where we were able to visit with folks who live there, 
but then a roundtable session with many other families. I was 
very impressed, because, when problems came up and it seemed 
like there was a little bit of, ``Well, that's the housing 
company's problem,'' or, ``That's the garrison commander's 
problem,'' Secretary Esper was in a ``Well, no, we're going not 
fix it'' mode, and you just had a really good assuring demeanor 
to the families that were there that I know gave Senator Warner 
and I assurance, as well. The Army has also played the lead 
role in, I think, doing the initial draft of a Tenant's Bill of 
Rights that might be used more systemwide to protect folks who 
are living in military housing. So, I'm going to just begin 
with that. I know, Secretary Esper, you have a sense of urgency 
about this.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Kaine. General Milley, as well. We'll all be after 
it, focusing on it during the NDAA.
    Secretary Esper. Thank you for going down with me. Having 
the support of this Committee makes a big difference. We will 
fix it, because there's nothing more important than our 
soldiers and their families.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you so much for that.
    You--your last answer to Senator Hawley was, ``What we need 
is this budget.'' I'm going to ask budget questions. So, does 
your--does the fiscal year 2020 budget request include any 
funding for sustaining support activities on the southern 
border past September 30?
    Secretary Esper. I don't believe, Senator, but I'd have to 
get back with you on that.
    Senator Kaine. I think that's an important one, just to--
for my colleagues. So, can you explain what you mean by 
``sustaining''----
    Secretary Esper. Yeah.
    Senator Kaine.--just the current deployment of any, you 
know, Army units. General Neller was talking about this 
recently with respect to the Marines. The current deployment of 
Army units to the border is something that is important, but I 
wonder if the budget that we are talking about here assumes 
that that will continue past September 30. My sense is, it 
doesn't, from looking at it.
    Secretary Esper. I don't believe so, but let me come back 
to you with a definitive response.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. No, support to Customs and Border Patrol 
(CBP) began on October 26, 2018, was first extended through 
January 31, 2019, and has since been extended to September 30, 
2019. The CBP has not requested and the Army has not been 
directed to deploy troops at the border past September 30, 
2019. Therefore no funds were requested for the mission in this 
budget request.

    Senator Kaine. So, I think that's an important one, because 
if you're here testifying about the budget, and you say, ``What 
we need is this budget,'' but the budget includes nothing for 
continued sustainment of these troops at the border, that also 
tells us something about what priorities are.
    It's more than just priorities. My understanding of the 
President's authority under 10 U.S.C. 2808 to reprogram MILCON 
monies is that MILCON monies can be reprogrammed, but they have 
to be in support of military personnel. So, if we're going to 
reprogram $3.6 billion of fiscal year 2019 MILCON monies, 
they're not going to be immediately put up. I mean, that's 
going to take some time to put things under contract and do 
them. If we're not assuming that we're going to be having a 
sustained presence of military personnel at the southern 
border, sort of raises a question about, ``If we need this 
budget, but those who put this budget together did not 
determine that that was a priority, then why use U.S.--10 
U.S.C. 2808 to reprogram MILCON monies if we're not going to 
have a sustained presence of military personnel there?'' You 
can understand the question that I'm asking. I think it's 
relevant to the vote that the House is going to undertake 
today. But, I'm sort of curious and may ask, for the record, Do 
you know why there was not a request, as part of this budget 
submission, to have sustained activities of the Army at the 
border?
    Secretary Esper. One of the challenges with the budget 
process, Senator--and it involves any number of things, which 
is--and it's inevitably why we ask for reprogramming--is, the 
budget that you see before you today was developed this time 
last year and submitted in June of last year. That's one 
explanation, if you will. And----
    Senator Kaine. But, it was submitted, but it wasn't like 
unamended and unedited and unrevised----
    Secretary Esper. That's true. I'm--that's correct. Yes, 
sir. I mean, it's--but, pretty much it leaves our hands in June 
or July, and then it goes through its various iterations, and 
we have a chance every now to make some movements. But, 
that's--that is a factor I just wanted to point out. It 
involves weapon systems and what we--you know, we gain new 
knowledge on things, and that's inevitably why we come back to 
you--we, the Army and, I'm sure, the other services--come back 
to the Congress to ask for reprogramming----
    Senator Kaine. Well, just--at the end of the day, the 
budget that gets submitted to us, the final signoff, is by the 
President and the Office of Management & Budget (OMB) and the 
White House. It's just interesting that they would not have 
included funding for sustainment of activities at the border at 
the same time as they want to put in MILCON that is supposed to 
be in support of that personnel that, apparently, will not be 
at the border.
    Let me ask you this. The fiscal year 2020 budget asks for 
9.2 billion under the Department of Army account for emergency 
funding. My understanding is, that's 2 billion for hurricane 
relief, 3.6 billion to repay accounts from 2019. I'm assuming 
that's the MILCON monies that are being changed. Is that right? 
To refill those accounts?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I believe so, but that was an OSD 
insert, if you will, on the Army budget for those purposes, as 
you outlined.
    Senator Kaine. Then, I'll ask that one for the record, just 
to confirm that----
    Secretary Esper. Sure.
    Senator Kaine.--our understanding about that is correct.
    Secretary Esper. We'll get back to you on that.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Esper. The Department requested $9.2 billion in 
emergency funding in the Army's Military Construction, Army 
(Oversees Contingency Operations account of the 2020 
President's Budget request for the following: Reconstruction 
from natural disasters ($2.0 billion), restoration of funding 
from military construction projects used to support the 
declaration of national emergency ($3.6 billion), and emerging 
fiscal year 2020 requirements in support of the declaration of 
national emergency ($3.6 billion).

    Senator Kaine. Thank you much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator--Senator Kaine.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, General Milley, I haven't seen you since the 
Patriots won the Super Bowl. As a New Englander, I'm sure you 
share my delight that we had to suffer through a 3-month 
drought between world championships between the Red Sox and the 
Patriots.
    Secretary Esper. Don't get--please, Senator, don't get him 
going.
    General Milley. I'm sitting here next to a guy from 
Pittsburgh, but, I agree, it's been 60 days since the world----
    Senator King. It was a very tough period----
    General Milley. Yes.
    Senator King.--for us all.
    General Milley. Agonizing.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    First, I want to commend both of you. Both of you addressed 
the sexual assault question several times, and also, General 
Milley, your addressing of the--Russia's threat. Those were 
excellent statements, the most forthright, succinct, and 
powerful statements on those two subjects that I've heard in 
this Committee in a long time, and I want to commend you for 
making those statements.
    Looking at the budget, as I understand it, we're talking 
about a total Army budget of 182 billion, of which 33--31 is 
what I call traditional OCO, and 31 and a half is OCO-for-base, 
a wonderful new phrase. I said, a week ago, that's like 
``rabbits-for-bicycles.'' I mean, these are two things that 
aren't really related. Wouldn't it be better if we just stepped 
up and had an honest budget, and said, ``This is what the base 
budget needs to be, and OCO is for OCO, not for ongoing 
needs''? Isn't that a more honest way to present this? I'm not 
suggesting you're dishonest, but this is a sort of charade that 
we do around here instead of saying, ``We need 182 billion for 
the Army.''
    Secretary?
    Secretary Esper. Well, Senator, I've, you know, spent my 
share of time on the Hill, as well, on the other side of the 
dais, and this is not new, if you will, in many ways, with 
regard to OCO and how you fund the base and all that. I think 
what's underlying this, too, is--the Chief said it very well 
earlier--is, certainly on the defense committees, nobody likes 
the Budget Control Act, and it's put us in a bind, where it 
impacts the readiness of the services, our modernization 
ability, et cetera. Frankly, if it were implemented, it would 
severely undermine----
    Senator King. Then maybe we ought to admit that----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator King.--change those caps to reflect the current 
reality. Those caps were established, 2011, 8 years ago. The 
world has changed dramatically since that----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator King.--time.
    Secretary Esper. Changed, and nobody thought that was ever 
going to happen. I remember the time. But, it is what it is. 
But, the--as the Chief said so well, all I look at is $182 
billion, because I know I have to organize, man, and train, 
equip an Army to defend the Nation.
    Senator King. I--and I agree with that, but I--but it does 
trouble me that 34 percent of that under an 82 billion is 
supposedly contingency money, and it really is, and everybody 
knows that. I just--truth in budgeting, I think, would be 
helpful.
    Now, as I understand it--and I think you just testified to 
this--the 9.2 billion emergency is storms plus the funding 
going out of military construction for the southern border. Is 
that correct?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir, that's my understanding. It's--I 
think a share of it was for the--what happened at Tyndall and 
with the Marine Corps, some damage down there, and then the 
MILCON replenishment, if needed.
    Senator King. Well, what's troubling is--to us, is that we 
go through this process of budgeting and appropriating, and 
looking at priorities and everything, and then 3.6 gets pulled 
out, and then it gets put back in, the next year. In effect, 
the Congress is funding something it refused to fund. I realize 
that wasn't your decision or your call, and you've got to abide 
by this, but it's a kind of shell game. I mean, we're--we said 
we're not going to fund this, the appropriations process didn't 
fund it. So, it's coming out as an emergency, and now we're 
being asked to, in effect, fund it, in retrospect. I think 
that's troubling.
    One other question or--before I leave you, on--not on the 
budget. I'm concerned about recruitment, and concerned about 
not only recruitment in general, but the geography of 
recruitment. I'm worried about the military becoming isolated 
from the rest of the society and--for example, there are no 
significant military bases in the--in New England. We don't--
and I think that's a loss for the country. We don't want the 
military to be a separate caste system over--and separate from 
the rest of the society. Could you speak to that?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I'm concerned, as well. I think 
you heard me say it a few minutes ago. I spoke to this 
particular issue, that we risk having a society that's 
increasingly--or a military increasingly isolated from the 
people it serves. That concerns me. The Army's trying to do its 
part. We have, maybe, two dozen initiatives to improve our 
recruiting, make sure we can meet our numbers. One of them 
includes what we call the Focus 22 cities, so it's 22 of our 
biggest cities, many of them in the Northwest and Northeast, 
where maybe upper--under-representative--under-represented. 
It's our efforts to kind of go to there, go to those cities and 
talk to those kids. So, I was in Boston 2 weeks ago, met with 
the mayor, met with the Governor. I was in Cleveland last week. 
I've been to L.A. I'm going to be going back up to Seattle, 
here, soon. But, it's our effort to go out to these cities and 
really speak to America's youth and appeal to them in whatever 
way resonates most. For many, it's jobs, it's skills, it's 
opportunity. For others, it's college money. For others, it's 
adventure. It's different, depending on where you go. So, in 
Cleveland, for example, it's about learning the trades, getting 
skills that you could use elsewhere. If you go to Seattle, it's 
about STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering and Math]. They 
want to see how it applies. So, I think this is our effort to 
go to America's cities where the young men and women are, and 
reengage in those places where--like you said, are, maybe, 
under-represented.
    Senator King. Well, I think part of that is that we also 
have to work with the States on credentialing to accept----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Senator King.--the credentials so a person that has all the 
skills in the world coming out of the Army doesn't have to go 
back through an apprenticeship program, or whatever is 
required. That's a separate issue.
    Secretary Esper. As I said, in both Boston and Cleveland, 
if you don't want to go regular Army, the Army Reserve and the 
Army Guard are great opportunities well--as well, where you can 
learn those skills and still stay home, in your local area, and 
be with your friends and family, or whatnot. Those are all 
great options. If you don't want to go Army, you can go another 
service. But, I think reengaging in these areas is very 
important to the future of the country.
    Senator King. You may want to go back and revise your 
testimony, ``If you don't want to go Army, you want to go one 
of the other''--I'm--you may not want that on the record.
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary Esper. Well, they should go--if they want to go 
to the best branch, they should go Army, but I think--you 
know--and this generation, there is appeal to serving something 
bigger than themselves----
    Senator King. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper.--their communities. I think we should tap 
into that.
    Senator King. Thank you for that work. It's very important.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So, I know that you're aware of the crisis in the 
military's privatized housing program. The private companies 
that were put in charge of managing military housing failed to 
provide safe and clean homes to military families. Nonetheless, 
they managed to rake in millions of dollars in profits. The 
services have fallen short in their oversight responsibilities 
by allowing military families to live in hazardous and 
unhealthy conditions.
    I want to focus, this morning, on just one part of that 
problem. When repairs to military housing are either poorly 
made or not made at all, it can threaten the health of 
servicemembers and their families. We now know that many of 
them have developed chronic medical conditions from exposure to 
mold, lead paint, and other hazards. So, I want to ask both of 
you, as a matter of principle, do you think the United States 
Government has the responsibility to cover the lifetime costs 
of treating servicemembers and their families for health 
problems that are connected to unsafe military housing?
    General Milley, maybe I should start with you.
    General Milley. Absolutely yes.
    Senator Warren. Thank you.
    Secretary Esper?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. But, frankly, I'd like to see 
the companies pay, first.
    Senator Warren. Well, I'm fine with that. But, I want to 
know whether or not the military should be on the hook, whether 
or not the Federal Government should be on the hook, for its 
failure to having supervised those----
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, I agree. For that reason, I 
agree.
    Senator Warren. Good.
    General Milley. To that extent, Senator, we have 
established--we are establishing a housing registry to make 
sure that, (a) we know all the houses that have had any life, 
health, or safety issues--lead, asbestos, or whatever, to 
include mold; and we want to make sure that we backtrack, as 
many years as it takes----
    Senator Warren. Good.
    General Milley.--to go back and make sure that we know the 
names of all of those inhabitants of those houses, both adults 
and children. We want to track them throughout their life. If, 
at any point in time in the future, they have a serious health 
issue that can be directly related, cause and effect, to having 
lived in that house, it is our belief that the Federal 
Government and the RCI [Residential Communities Initiative] 
partner should be on the hook for the payment of that.
    Senator Warren. Good. I'm very glad to hear this. This is 
very reassuring. I also want to make sure that we memorialize 
this in law. I am introducing a broader military housing reform 
bill that will ensure that no member of the military or 
military family will have to pay for medical care as a result 
of unsafe housing. When a servicemember or that servicemember's 
child or spouse gets sick because the military failed to hold 
these companies accountable, then it is time for the military 
to step up and fix the problem. That means making sure this 
never happens again and paying the ongoing medical bills. So, 
thank you.
    I want to take my remaining time and ask a critical 
question about readiness facing the Army. Climate change. The 
Defense Department's most recent report on climate change 
discussed the impact of this human-caused problem on our 
military operations in bases. This report included a statement 
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford, 
who said--and I'm going to quote, here--``When I look at 
climate change, it's in the category of sources of conflict 
around the world and things we'd have to respond to.''
    General Milley, just a simple yes or no is fine, 'cause 
I'll have some followup questions. Do you agree with General 
Dunford?
    General Milley. I do, Senator.
    Senator Warren. Good.
    General Milley. If I could just make an additional----
    Senator Warren. Sure.
    General Milley.--comment. I think what we're talking about 
here are the effects--the potential effects of climate change. 
Clearly, there'll be military implications as well as other 
implications down the road.
    Senator Warren. Good. So, is adapting to climate change 
necessary for Army readiness?
    General Milley. I'm not sure exactly what you mean by 
``adapting to climate change.''
    Senator Warren. Well, taking this into account, if you're 
thinking about----
    General Milley. Of course. It's a----
    Senator Warren.--readiness.
    General Milley.--consideration.
    Senator Warren. Good.
    General Milley. For example, there could be resource 
shortfalls in various parts of the world, which will increase 
stress on the society, which could increase insurgency, 
revolution, terrorism, or a wide variety of other factors. So--
--
    Senator Warren. Well----
    General Milley.--there's a variety of effects that we'd 
have to take into consideration.
    Senator Warren. So, do you think it would be prudent for 
the Army to incorporate climate change into operational and 
strategic planning?
    General Milley. We already do.
    Senator Warren. Good. How would you rate Army 
installations, as a whole, in terms of their climate-change 
resiliency?
    General Milley. That is a work in progress. So, we're 
evaluating those and coming up with a list. There's some--the 
Army is--by its nature, is more inland than on the coast, so 
the climate change, as it affects some of the Army 
installations, varies. The coastal ones tend to, probably, have 
greater impact. But, that doesn't mean the ones on the interior 
of the country don't. So, we're evaluating all the variety of 
bases we have. We do have a list--that was mentioned earlier by 
one of the Senators, but we do have a list, and we'll get that 
list promptly to the----
    Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that. You know, it's 
clear that climate change is a threat to our military's 
infrastructure and operations. It's critically important for 
the Army and other military services to incorporate climate 
change into their operational plans. It's a readiness issue, 
and I'm very glad to see that the Army takes this seriously.
    Thank you, General.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Senator Tillis.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here, for your service.
    General Milley, thank you for rearranging your calendar and 
participating in the sensing session we had done at Fort Bragg 
on Friday. I think it was illuminating. What I paid particular 
attention to is just how many notes you've taken, so I have no 
doubt that, in those particular cases, then we're going to make 
progress. I think that we still have to take a look at the 
broader issue. We've got a footprint out there we haven't yet 
figured out.
    Secretary Esper, thank you and your wife for coming down 
and being a part of a sensing session, about a month ago. 
Because I think we're making progress there. The command's 
taking it seriously. They've got a good strategy for putting 
resources on the ground. We need to make sure we do everything 
we can, as members of Congress, to support that.
    But, maybe very briefly, could you guys give me an idea of 
how the housing issue and--could actually affect--have an 
impact on readiness?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I think--if you submit to our 
foundational principle that there's--the importance of the 
soldier and their family--I think if a soldier is deployed--and 
I--you--when we--you and I, I think, have spoken to families--
the last thing you want is a soldier, particularly facing a 
lethal situation, to be distracted, worrying about his or her 
wife and children being impacted by mold in the house, or 
having to--dealing--deal with a broken tub, or whatever the 
case may be. So, in that regard, it becomes very acute. Having 
done my share of deployments during my Army days, you do worry 
about your families. That's--at that point in time, you want 
them focused on the mission, focused on being successful and 
coming home safe. For that matter, you don't want the 
distraction.
    Senator Tillis. I--one of the two houses that I visited 
last week down on Fort Bragg, the husband's deployed, the 
mother is there with two--he's an officer--the mother is there 
with two kids. You walk down a fairly narrow hallway, and there 
is about a foot reserved for you to walk through, because the 
other 2 feet are taken up by an industrial-sized dehumidifier 
that is sucking so much moisture out of this particular unit 
that they had to run a hose into the tub. I just saw it dump I 
don't know how many quarts of water while I was sitting there 
talking to them. That's a distraction, when you get on the 
phone with a spouse and you're talking about that kind of 
environment that they're living in.
    So, we're going to continue to focus on it. I'd tell any 
military families who may be watching these hearings that we're 
not going away until it's fixed. I know that I have you-all's 
commitment to be there every step of the way. So, thank you for 
that.
    Mr. Secretary, when you and I had breakfast several months 
ago, you were talking about your top-to-bottom review of 
programs that would--you know, that are either critical, nice 
to have, or not necessary. Can you give me an idea where you 
are on that review now, and what specific actions you've taken?
    Secretary Esper. So, the second round of that review--
it's--in layman's terms, it's being called ``Night Court''--is 
underway right now for the fiscal year 2021 budget build. The 
fiscal year 2020, which was the one that the Chief and I 
initiated this time last year, again, has resulted in this 
budget. What we did was, we ended up canceling, reducing, or 
delaying nearly 200 programs. It began with--we began on the 
opposite end of the table. That is, What do we need to 
modernize the Army? That began with our 31 cross-functional 
team programs that show our six modernization priorities. Then 
we knew we had another 50 or 60 programs that were also 
critical to readiness. We filled those buckets first. Then, 
when you get to the end of the list, there were programs that 
we knew--not that they didn't have value, but, relative to 
everything else, they just either didn't cut the--didn't make 
the cut.
    Senator Tillis. General Milley, I was here earlier in the 
Committee. I'm sorry I couldn't be here longer. I've got four 
committees meeting concurrently. But, you were talking about 
the dramatic increase in readiness. I think you said, at one 
point, we had three BCTs [Basic Combat Training], and then you 
said in the upper 2020s that are at a ready state. You said, 
``Provided that we get the resources, we'll continue to build 
on that.'' You know, when you get them to the state, though, 
there's a certain cost associated with keeping them there. So, 
as we move into future budgets, what worries you most about 
being able to sustain that level and not see a downward trend 
over the near-to-intermediate term?
    General Milley. Well, you just said it, Senator. It's the 
ability to sustain that. Once we get to the level we want to 
get to in--sometime in 2022, which is 66 percent of the regular 
Army and 33 percent of the Guard and Reserve, we have to 
sustain that. We recognize--we, in the Army, but, more broadly, 
in the military--we recognize that we are a very, very 
expensive endeavor. We appreciate the support of Congress and 
the American people. But, there is one thing that's a lot more 
expensive than what we do on a day-to-day basis, and that's 
having a war. By funding us, we deter war. By making sure that 
we have large, capable, competent, excellent military that is 
dominant on any field of battle, that goes a long way towards 
telling any potential adversary, ``Don't mess with the United 
States.'' If we underfund that in the future years, or if we do 
two steps forward, one step back constantly, then that, I 
think, provides opportunity and encourages aggression on the 
part of any potential adversary.
    Senator Tillis. Well, thank you. I'll submit some questions 
for the record regarding end strength and some of the great 
work I think you're doing on modernizing, recruiting. Like to 
know how you're doing on hitting the goals this year.
    But, thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you----
    General Milley. We'll make it----
    Chairman Inhofe.--Senator Tillis.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'd like to ask about the units in--or the military 
construction projects that may be defunded in Puerto Rico. I 
think there are ten Army National Guard projects and two Army 
Reserve projects in Puerto Rico. The total value of the 
projects potentially in jeopardy is about $550 million. I'm 
concerned that defunding these projects will detract from the 
effort of the island to recover. In this panel, at the time of 
the hurricane, we heard very unmistakable commitment to the 
recovery efforts. I would like your commitment that these 
projects will not be cut and that there will be a continued 
commitment to the recovery efforts on the island.
    Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Esper. Senator, I cannot make that commitment, 
because it's not my decision to make. It's going to be made, I 
think, by at least the Acting Secretary of Defense.
    Senator Blumenthal. Can you commit to encouraging Acting 
Secretary Shanahan to avoid selecting any projects in Puerto 
Rico to be defunded and diverted to the border wall, given the 
natural disaster that happened there and the continuing 
disarray on the island?
    Secretary Esper. I think what will happen, here, next is, 
the Army will look at all that those--all those projects that 
are up for consideration, and then I'd--we need to assess each 
one of them. Candidly, our prioritization will be readiness and 
the ability to project force, going forward. Then we'll 
certainly consider other factors, as well, as we build a 
prioritization list.
    Senator Blumenthal. But, you're aware of the continuing 
needs and challenges of recovery on the island, and the very 
important role of the National Guard.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. Puerto Rico National Guard does 
a great job, and there are a lot of needs out there. I 
recognize that. It was--you know, the hurricanes that hit 
there, it was tragic what it did to the island.
    Senator Blumenthal. I saw firsthand, perhaps you have, the 
critical role that the National Guard has played there.
    Secretary Esper. They do.
    Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Secretary, I know that Senator 
Kaine has asked about the budget item for deployment of troops 
at the border if their deployment there is extended. Can you 
explain why the budget request does not include funding for 
those border deployments?
    Secretary Esper. My best explanation, as I said to him, was 
that, at the time this budget was built--was last summer. This 
was not on anybody's radar screen, so that would be the first 
thing I would say. Even going into the fall, where we had a 
chance to amend, it just was not on our radar screen.
    I don't know if you have anything to add.
    Senator Blumenthal. Would you want to amend it now? If so, 
for what period of time would you contemplate----
    Secretary Esper. I don't think----
    Senator Blumenthal.--that deployment?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I think much more needs to--we 
under--we need to understand that--and it's going to be driven 
largely by Department of Homeland Security (DHS), because DOD 
is in support of Department of Homeland Security, of what they 
will need, how long they will need it, and in what numbers. I 
think time will tell what that mission looks like.
    Senator Blumenthal. How much time will tell?
    Secretary Esper. I don't know. That's--we're all waiting, I 
think, to understand what DHS will need in the coming weeks and 
months.
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you have a timeframe for that 
decision being made?
    Secretary Esper. No, sir, I don't. I'd have to ask the 
Acting Secretary of Defense.
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you know the factors that will go 
into that decision?
    Secretary Esper. I don't. I think that they--you know, 
they're considering what it takes in order to secure the 
border. And----
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you know who will make that 
decision?
    Secretary Esper. I think it's Secretary Nielsen. I think it 
begins with her.
    Senator Blumenthal. But, the troops are your 
responsibility, are they not?
    Secretary Esper. So, DHS would make the request of DOD, and 
then DOD would have to assess whether it can--can or cannot 
meet that request, depending on the law and resources, et 
cetera, et cetera. At that point in time--and this works 
through Northern Command--eventually, it gets tasked down to 
the military to see if we can fill that need. Right now, I 
think, on the border, all the services are--it's more than just 
the Army on the border, and it--that's the process by which 
these taskings happen.
    Senator Blumenthal. I know it's more than just the Army, 
but right now the Army's budget and its plan for the future is 
before us----
    Secretary Esper. That's correct.
    Senator Blumenthal.--for oversight. We have no idea, as we 
sit here----
    Secretary Esper. Right.
    Senator Blumenthal.--when and how and whether that review 
will occur.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir. I can't tell you 
authoritatively, either, whether or not we would need funding 
to sustain forces on the border beyond September 30th, 2019.
    Senator Blumenthal. My time is expired. Thank you very 
much.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Go Army, hooah.
    Gentlemen, an interesting find as I examined your budget 
request was a $24 million decrease in logistics operations. I--
in my conversations with both of you, I have discussed what I 
view as the important role of logistics in any type of future 
operations with our Army as well as when it comes to our 
positioning for great-power competition. I--my sense was that 
you both agreed with me on the role, the importance of 
logistics. Yet, I'm left assuming that your analysis now is 
that logistics operations from infrastructure to delivery are 
resilient against threats posed by great-power competitors and 
violent nonstate actors because you think that you can cut 24 
million from that budget. Otherwise, you would either request 
the same amount as enacted in fiscal year 2019 or you would 
increase it. This is in light of the fact that you had the NDS 
that came out and you're talking about, you know, we have 
increased great-power competitions, we need to spend more money 
on these things, and yet, you're cutting logistics. So, that 
doesn't seem to make sense to me. I would love for both of you 
to respond. You can choose who goes first.
    Secretary Esper. So, Senator, in the--we talk a lot about 
``Night Court'' and Army's reform efforts with regard to 
equipping. But, frankly, this process went through everything. 
It went--it included training, it included our manning budgets, 
it included our installations. Part and parcel, this was 
logistics. We have a great commander at Army Materiel Command, 
in General Perna. He proposed a number of things, where he 
thought he can accomplish his mission and, in some cases, do it 
better, by making adjustments. We've--for example, we've 
consolidated all classes of supply underneath him at Army 
Materiel Command. We've looked at logistics readiness centers, 
how we can improve them.
    So, I'm fully confident that we can meet the needs. I 
wouldn't infer, necessarily, that, just because we made cuts 
here and there, that we lost capability. Like I said, there are 
a lot of efficiencies gained. We've reduced headquarters, we've 
reduced--we've pushed people out of headquarters, both military 
and civilian. We've really devolved operations down to the 
brigade and division level and corps level. So, there's a lot 
that's going on, where we save money, but yet we're still able 
to accomplish the mission. I--again, I think this is what 
Congress has asked us to do.
    Senator Duckworth. Is it the current mission, or are you 
talking about positioning yourself for great-power competition, 
though?
    Secretary Esper. It's both. So, we have the current 
mission. We have to sustain, obviously, operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and we have any number of brigade combat teams 
deployed presently, but we're also thinking ahead. So, he's 
doing some very innovative things down there as we build our 
ammunition stocks, as we think about, in the future, for 
example, How do we do additive manufacturing on the 
battlefield, behind the forward line of troops, to reduce the 
amount of time it takes to reequip heavy vehicles, for example, 
or helicopters? So, a lot of innovative things as he looks 
forward into the future.
    Senator Duckworth. General?
    General Milley. I would echo what the Secretary said, 
Senator. I don't think the 24 million is--as we look to the 
future and the great-power competition, is going to have any 
kind of significant negative effect on our logistical 
capability to sustain the force. We, through this ``Night 
Court'' process, went through a huge amount of due diligence. 
Based on the recommendations of General Perna--and that's not 
all one type of logistics, that's a wide variety of nickels and 
pennies that we've cut in various programs across the Army in 
the logistics world. I think it's an acceptable degree of risk, 
and I don't think it's going to have any detrimental effect 
with respect to great-power competition.
    Senator Duckworth. Okay. I tend not to agree with you, but 
I would love to take a closer look at how you got to this 
number, because I am deeply concerned that we are cutting, 
here, and then you're going to be back and saying, ``Now we 
need to increase it, and now we're falling behind.'' That's a 
real concern.
    I want to touch on something that one of my colleagues 
talked about a little bit, which was the Army Corps of 
Engineers. It now has a 31-percent cut in its budget, as you've 
presented. The President says that he is committed to improving 
the aging domestic infrastructure, which some say is a national 
security risk. As a representative of this administration, can 
you explain the discrepancy, Mr. Secretary, between the policy 
and statements in this issue, and especially, you know, as--
look at the problems along the locks and dams on the 
Mississippi River, as a great example of where we actually 
should be putting in more money in order to help the Corps of 
Engineers do its job.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, Senator, I can. I think there was 
some confusion that came out of a press story a few weeks ago 
about this, about a 31-percent decrease. I think what it was 
is, the story spoke to what was enacted in fiscal year 2019 
versus what was requested. So, in fiscal year 2019, the Army, 
for civil works, the request was actually 4.785 billion. The 
request for 2020 is 4.827 billion. So, you see an increase. 
What happened is, last year, in fiscal year 2019, Congress 
enacted a $6.9 billion budget. That's not unusual, to see 
Congress put more money in for MILCON or civil works--I'm 
sorry, for civil works. So, I think what you have to compare 
is, not enacted, but you have to compare requested versus 
requested. You'll see, frankly, we have a--we have an increase 
there.
    Senator Duckworth. Barely an increase.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am, barely an increase, but, 
again, within a budget constraint, but it doesn't reflect a 31 
percent decrease. It's just a difference between what Congress 
enacted in 2019 and what we requested in 2019.
    Senator Duckworth. Can you explain why, then, there's not 
much--barely an increase, then? Let's go with that number. 
Because from everything that I've heard from the Corps of 
Engineers, what I've heard from the White House is that there's 
actually a need for great increase in the Army Corps of 
Engineers budget so that they can meet the infrastructure needs 
of this Nation.
    Secretary Esper. Yes, ma'am. There's a long list of civil 
works projects out there. In the billions, for sure. But, it's 
a matter of--as I said, in any number of programs, the needs 
and wants seem to always exceed the means. Where do you draw 
the line? This is another case.
    Senator Duckworth. I think my farmers would disagree with 
you. But, thank you.
    I'm out of time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Thank both of our witnesses for your tolerance and your 
patience today.
    We are adjourned, before someone else shows up.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
              future attack reconnaissance aircraft (fara)
    1. Senator Wicker. Secretary Esper, we know that the Army is 
exploring new rotary wing programs to modernize its aging airframe 
fleet. One of those programs, FARA, is meant to fill a capability gap 
that the Army has in the role of armed reconnaissance and attack in 
complex degraded operation environments. Can you describe what type of 
capabilities that FARA will bring to the Army and how such an aircraft 
will fare against Russian and Chinese threats?
    Secretary Esper. Optimal manning with revolutionary increases in 
reach (speed and range), protection, lethality, and agility at the 
objective will allow Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) to 
fly and fight in any environment leveraging multi-function sensors and 
payloads as well as extended range munitions that are affordable and 
rapidly tailorable via aircraft agnostic, open mission systems 
architectures.
    Advanced teaming FARA with next generation unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) delivering lethal and non-lethal air launched effects enables 
cross-domain fires to penetrate and dis-integrate enemy A2AD systems 
and exploit expanded maneuver to overmatch peer adversaries.
    Based on High-Fidelity modeling against peer adversaries in highly 
contested environments, FARA will enable the joint force to operate 
dispersed over wide areas with the ability to rapidly converge to 
penetrate the multiple layers of stand-off employed by the threat, 
disintegrate A2/AD systems, and exploit this advantage to achieve 
strategic objectives to return to competition.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
                 improved turbine engine program (itep)
    2. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, the Improved Turbine Engine 
Program (ITEP) remains the Army's #1 Aviation Modernization priority 
program that will save a combined $1 billion per year in reduced fuel, 
maintenance and operating costs while increasing the capability of 
today's Black Hawk and Apache helicopters and provide engines for the 
Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program. On February 1st, the United States 
Army awarded an Engineering and Manufacturing Design (EMD) contract for 
the ITEP program to the General Electric Company. On February 19th the 
Advanced Turbine Engine Company (ATEC) a 50/50 joint venture between 
Honeywell and Pratt & Whitney, filed a protest with the General 
Accountability Office (GAO) on the award. I understand DOD cannot 
comment on the award due to the protest, but I request clarification on 
ITEP specifically. What is the purpose of this program?
    Secretary Esper. The purpose of the ITEP is to deliver the next 
generation turbo-shaft engine for the Black Hawk (H-60), Apache (AH-
64E), and for the future the Army's Future Vertical Lift Future Attack 
Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA). Compared to the current H-60 and AH-64 
engine, the Improved Turbine Engine will increase operational reach and 
lethality and provide increased power, fuel efficiency, and reliability 
while fitting in the current engine bays of the Black Hawk and Apache 
aircraft.

    3. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, will ITEP improve the overall 
performance of the Army's Apache and Black Hawk fleets?
    Secretary Esper. Yes, the ITEP is expected to improve the overall 
performance of the Army's Apache and Black Hawk fleets by regaining 
lost capability due to aircraft weight growth, significantly increase 
aircraft range, payload, and endurance over the current engine.

    4. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how does ITEP impact the Army's 
Future Vertical Lift program?
    Secretary Esper. The requirement is for Future Attack 
Reconnaissance Aircraft to include the ITEP Engine as program efforts 
mature.

    5. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, were engine power, fuel 
consumption, reliability, and maintenance key elements for ITEP?
    Secretary Esper. Engine power, engine growth, specific fuel 
consumption, reliability, and maintenance were all considered for ITEP. 
All technical requirements/key elements were thoroughly evaluated by 
the Army and they were included in the System Requirements Document 
(SRD) which was attached to the ITEP EMD Request for Proposal (RFP).

    6. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, were there any other key 
elements?
    Secretary Esper. All technical requirements/key elements were 
included in the System Requirements Document (SRD).

    7. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how were these factors 
prioritized?
    Secretary Esper. The EMD contract award is currently under a 
protest with GAO. Until this is resolved, specifics regarding 
evaluation criteria cannot be provided. Engine power, future engine 
improvements, fuel consumption, reliability, and maintenance, however, 
were all considered for ITEP. The Army evaluated all technical 
requirements/key elements and they were included in the System 
Requirements Document which was attached to the ITEP EMD Request for 
Proposal.

    8. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the 
Army's turbine engine-manufacturing industrial base, and specifically, 
for combat helicopters?
    Secretary Esper. The commercial and military rotorcraft turboshaft 
engine industrial bases are healthy with no identified lower tier 
supply chain risks that are of significant substance to program 
execution risk. All identified supply chain risks are being managed 
and/or mitigated through normal industrial base surveillance and risk 
mitigation techniques. The Army's turbine engine industrial base 
consists of turbo shaft engines and does not include turbine fan 
engines. For turbo shaft engines, the industrial base includes several 
diverse companies.

    9. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how does the industrial base 
impact innovation and cost?
    Secretary Esper. A healthy industrial base, which exists for 
turbine shaft engines, will increase competition and drive down costs. 
Combat helicopter turboshaft engine innovation and cost are driven by 
DOD requirements (e.g., better fuel efficiency, power, etc.) and the 
industrial base's ability to meet those requirements. The commercial 
sector continuously utilizes advanced manufacturing techniques and 
processes, such as additive manufactured parts, ceramic matrix 
composites, and other advance materials, to achieve key performance 
requirements. While many factors impact cost, key innovation items 
mentioned above will reduce piece part count, streamline manufacturing, 
and improve performance and reliability, which will have direct impacts 
on production and operations and sustainment costs.

    10. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, do we have a sufficiently 
robust industrial base to meet future turbine engine requirements?
    Secretary Esper. The combat helicopter turbine engine industrial 
base was examined in-depth in 2012, 2016, and twice in 2018 with focus 
on support of the ITEP program and the Future Vertical Lift. Commercial 
and military engines are usually very similar in configuration, which 
leads to a stronger industrial base as a manufacturer will be 
supporting both users at the same time. These examinations consistently 
determined that this industrial base segment is healthy and prepared to 
support upcoming and emerging Army aircraft programs.
                       sigint, ew, cyber and ems
    11. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what strategy is the Army 
implementing to integrate SIGINT, EW, and Cyber and what does that 
strategy mean for the development of the EMS?
    Secretary Esper. The Army is developing a framework for an 
implementation plan that guides the integration and harmonization of 
the approved strategies for SIGINT, EW and Cyber Operations 
capabilities in support of multi-domain operations. The resulting plan 
will describe the actions to accomplish the major objectives from each 
strategy. Coordination with the cross-functional teams will ensure the 
development of a comprehensive integration plan. The governance plan 
for this framework will include (a) assessment during the Army 
Cyberspace Council; (b) updates during the intelligence senior 
initiatives group, and; (c) updates at the Intelligence Center of 
Excellence, Cyber Center of Excellence Home-on-Home series. Employing 
cyberspace and EW capabilities under a single planning, integration, 
and synchronization methodology increases the operational commander's 
ability to understand the environment, project power, and synchronize 
multiple operations using the same domain and environment. 
Synchronizing offensive and defensive activities allows a faster 
response to enemy and adversary actions. The EMS is the common 
denominator for both cyberspace and EW operations, and also impacts 
every operation in the Army.

    12. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what does the Army's new 
SIGINT strategy mean for the development of future systems/
capabilities?
    Secretary Esper. The SIGINT strategy provides ends, ways, and means 
required for U.S. Army SIGINT capabilities to be flexible, agile, and 
rapidly adaptable to keep pace with the threat in a multi-domain 
operational environment. The strategy describes agile processes 
required to acquire and adapt SIGINT equipment to address new threats 
leveraging conventional acquisitions processes as well as Army rapid 
acquisition approaches (Information Technology Box, Quick Reaction 
Capability, Army Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, Rapid 
Capability Office.)
    The Army's new SIGINT strategy incorporates capabilities pertaining 
to the cyberspace domain. This new strategy also improves the rapid 
acquisition process to keep better pace with the changes happening with 
computing.
    The inclusion of the entire electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as part 
of SIGINT ensures that Electronic Warfare is integrated into SIGINT 
capability design.

    13. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, in complex EMS environments, 
the legal partition between title 10 and title 50 can generate 
inefficiencies in acquisition with respect to combined tactical EW and 
SIGINT systems. How are Army acquisition officials managing this divide 
and what steps is the Army taking to bridge it?
    Secretary Esper. Titles 10 and 50 each have their respective 
authorities with regard to command and control of EW and SIGINT 
systems. This includes how each system is used, whether it is employed 
in support of tactical military operations (title 10) or in support of 
national intelligence/covert operations (title 50). The Army builds 
materiel solutions to approved requirements. Any issues are worked out 
as the Army develops the requirements for each system. Army SIGINT / EW 
Program Managers work closely with various intelligence and security 
organizations to ensure materiel solutions are accredited by cognizant 
authority prior to their employment.

    14. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, how are the Army's EMS-related 
activities (Cyber operations, EW, Spectrum Management, and SIGINT) 
aligned?
    Secretary Esper. The Army has aligned SIGINT, EW, and CO 
capabilities to produce fully integrated staff processes to improve 
mission execution at every echelon. This alignment is consistent with 
the Joint Cyberspace Concept and the Army Concept Framework. Alignment 
concepts are continuously being developed in partnership between the 
Intelligence and Cyberspace Centers of Excellence to coordinate and, 
where applicable, consolidate force and capability development efforts 
with an integrated approach. This will ensure that SIGINT, EW and CO 
capabilities are interoperable, deliver more versatility, and are 
mutually supporting.

    15. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, what changes across DOTMLPF-P 
is the service pursing to ``Man, Train, and Equip'' our combatant 
commanders for modern operations in complex EMS environments?
    Secretary Esper. The Army must fight and win in a contested 
electromagnetic operational environment. Cyberspace and the EMS will 
grow increasingly congested, increasingly contested, and will be 
critical to successful multi-domain operations. Success will be 
measured by the ability to execute operations freely in cyberspace. On 
May 17, 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) directed U.S. Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop a framework focused 
on providing increased cyberspace support to corps level and below 
commanders titled, ``Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Support to 
Corps and Below'' to address specific electronic warfare concerns and 
issues. In April 2017, CSA directed Cyber and Intelligence Centers of 
Excellence to conduct an assessment to identify gaps and solutions 
associated with the integration of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), 
Electronic Warfare (EW), and Cyber capabilities, the findings of which 
will be incorporated into a mission strategy.
                         emergency preparedness
    16. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, you previously testified 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee (May 5, 2018) that the 
Department would place increased emphasis on a range of business 
reforms, specifically addressing acquisition reform, contract 
management, and budget execution. Private sector solutions have 
historically played a critical role in ensuring that the Department has 
access to top quality, cost effective products and services. It has 
been brought to my attention that the Department is using funds to 
research, build and deploy an emergency preparedness and response 
technology (the Protection Services Infrastructure Framework (PSIF) 
produced by the United States Army Combat Capability Development 
Center). This emergency preparedness and response technology already 
exists in the market today, and has proven effective in other state, 
local and federal agencies that have acquired it. What factors are 
considered when the Department evaluates whether to expend these 
resources versus deploying a Commercial Off the Shelves (COTS) 
technology?
    Secretary Esper. Between 2002 and 2010, the Combat Capability 
Development Center Armament Center (CCDC AC) adapted its combat 
decision aids technologies for dual-use applications to address 
situational awareness and emergency management to bridge the 
information gap between Defense and Civil agencies. Combat decision 
aids allow commanders to identify decisions and solutions to reduce 
decision timelines as situations develop in the operational 
environment. Following the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, Joint Project 
Manager Guardian (JPM GUARDIAN) received a directed requirement from 
the working group organized to study what happened during the shooting 
to provide an installation common operating picture, mass warning and 
notification, and enhanced 911 system. A standalone commercial product 
capable of bridging the aforementioned gap in a ``plug-and-play'' open-
architecture framework did not exist at that time. Given this 
requirement and knowledge of a separate CCDC AC effort to enable 
interagency information sharing at the Port Authority NY/NJ, JPM 
Guardian selected CCDC AC in 2010 as the lead system integrator for the 
Physical Security Integration Framework--Interconnection Capability 
Suite (PSIF ICS).
    In accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Title 10 
USC Sec.  2377, when the Army evaluates whether to pursue a 
developmental program in lieu of a COTS technology, the Army must first 
determine if a COTS or non-developmental product exists capable of 
satisfying the requirements, or whether the COTS/NDI product could be 
modified to meet the requirements, or determine if the COTS/NDI product 
could meet the requirements if the requirements were modified to a 
reasonable extent. Numerous factors are considered, including: 
threshold and objective capability performance specifications, breadth 
of capability to meet unique U.S. Army requirements, potential 
reasonable modifications to the requirements, open vice closed/
proprietary architectures (to enable interface with multiple COTS/ 
Government off the Shelf Solutions [GOTS] solutions), performance, and 
schedule as well as overall lifecycle sustainment costs. Lifecycle 
sustainment costs consist of maintenance, licensing fees, replacement 
costs, and technological refresh rates. In addition to the economic and 
specification measures noted above, potential COTS/GOTS capabilities 
undergo operational and developmental testing and evaluation to 
determine optimal functionality, durability, and the ability to meet 
operational mission requirements, and possible COTS/NDI modifications 
to meet the requirements.

    17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Esper, current policies in place 
require all federal agencies, including DOD, to comply with the 
Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act. The Mutual 
Obligations in Statute were specifically designed to allow government 
entities to communicate with one another during times of crisis. 
Emergency response and preparedness is crucial to our national 
security. It's my understanding that most Federal installations, 
including the United States Army, are connected to each statewide 
system--but there are several that are not. Has the Department made 
efforts to close this gap, and ensure that the Army has a technology in 
place that allows for the sharing of information and personnel during 
times of crisis?
    Secretary Esper. The Army has fielded mass warning and 
notifications (MWN) systems that are Emergency Planning & Community 
Right-to-Know Act compliant at 100 of 144 installations. The Army plans 
to field MWN at all installations in early 2020.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martha McSally
                     waats/apache pilot throughput
    18. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper and General Milley, I 
understand Ft. Rucker is having a hard time processing Apache pilots on 
schedule. Is the Army is still experiencing a pilot shortage? How is 
throughput at Ft. Rucker for attack pilots progressing? For AH-64 
pilots specifically? Has the Army considered locating a Mobile Training 
Team (MTT) at the Western Army Aviation Training Site as a way to speed 
up throughput in the short-term? As part of the replacement for the 24 
AH-64 helicopters/Attack Reconnaissance Force Structure lost due to 
ARI, Arizona is on track to receive 13 replacement UH-60A/L for an 
Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) by the end of the month. Arizona now 
has two AHBs in the state (w/ 10 UH-60A/Ls each) and two Med Evac 
detachments (w/ 3 UH-60A/Ls each). Arizona has also been identified to 
receive an accelerated upgrade of the AHB's UH-60A/Ls to the UH-60M by 
August 2020. Is that plan still on track? I also understand these the 
Med Evac detachments are scheduled to be upgraded to UH-60V models--
what is the timeframe for delivery of these variants?
    Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army is short 647 Aviation 
Warrant Officers (AWO) across all components. The Army under-produced 
pilots between the years 2010-2017 due to reduced budgets and 
subsequent reductions to force structure. As a result, a shortfall 
developed among junior AWOs in those year groups. The Army is 
mitigating the shortfall by retaining a surplus of senior-level AWOs. 
The Army's strategy to address the shortage is two-fold: incentive 
programs to retain pilots beyond their initial Active Duty or Reserve 
Service Obligation, and increasing throughput capacity at Fort Rucker.
    The Army is not yet meeting its AH-64 pilot training requirements 
at Fort Rucker for all components, but AH-64 pilot throughput is 
progressing in a positive direction. We have both improved the 
maintenance readiness levels of the AH-64s and increased the number of 
AH-64s at Fort Rucker, both of which were limiting factors. 
Additionally, we are increasing the number of Instructor Pilots and the 
amount of funding at Fort Rucker to meet pilot training requirements. 
The overall shortage of AH-64 aircraft across the Army will continue to 
challenge the training of pilots.
    Historical analysis shows that the U.S. Army Aviation Center of 
Excellence (USAACE) at Fort Rucker is the most efficient training 
location due to economy of scale. USAACE can train over twice as many 
pilots per aircraft as compared to the Western Army Aviation Training 
Site (WAATS), which has not conducted AH-64 training since 2013.
    The current timeline for the Arizona National Guard to receive UH-
60Ms is by 2020. The timeline for UH-60V fielding is being developed.
         yuma proving ground (ypg) long range firing expansion:
    19. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper, I appreciated our discussion 
during the hearing regarding the need to update and expanding our 
testing ranges, like the Yuma Proving Ground, to be able to accommodate 
Army's top modernization priority of long range precision fires 
testing? In your answer, you mentioned there are some specific 
resources in the Army's fiscal year 2020 budget regarding these 
updates. Are resources to update our testing and training ranges 
reflected in Army's fiscal year 2020 budget? If so, how specifically? 
Army's Electronic Proving Ground (EPG) @ Ft. Huachuca is looking into 
expanding electromagnetic spectrum access in order to allow for 
additional military training within channels where adversaries may try 
to target government and civilian communications. With modernization a 
top priority, is the Army also prioritizing updating and investing in 
its electronic testing facilities, like the EPG at Ft. Huachuca? In the 
face of growing grey-zone threats, is expanding electromagnetic 
spectrum access for more testing and training is a priority for the 
Army? If so, how? If not, why not?
    Secretary Esper. The Army annually plans and programs investments 
in test capability modernization and sustainment for its test ranges 
that support the testing required for legacy and modernization 
priorities. The fiscal year 2020 budget has targeted investments in 
infrastructure and instrumentation at Army test ranges which will 
support modernization efforts including Long Range Precision Fires 
systems. The Army is investing in test capabilities such as range fiber 
optics, radars, telemetry, and support vehicles to support all Yuma 
Test Center (YTC) testing efforts including Long Range Precision Fires 
at the YTC on U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. In addition, the 
Army is leveraging Office of the Secretary of Defense funding to 
develop optical instrumentation and autonomous flight safety systems 
for future YTC testing needs.
    The Army is specifically investing at the U.S. Army Electronic 
Proving Ground on Fort Huachuca, Arizona in electronic test 
capabilities for Network, Radio, and GPS systems as well as threat 
emulation capabilities which include threats typically found in grey 
zone conflict.
    Department of Defense (DOD) ranges, including those on Fort 
Huachuca, are faced with challenges in spectrum access, airspace 
restrictions, and land use. For example, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and the Federal Communications Commission have 
curtailed DOD's access to the spectrum while the global wireless 
broadband industry is seeking to reallocate spectrum from Defense use 
to commercial use. The Army is working with the following to address 
some of the challenges:

    1)  DOD to establish provisions for assured and dynamic access to 
the spectrum including spectrum that is already in use.

    2)  Fort Huachuca, other Services, and FAA to convert the Tombstone 
Military Operations Airspace into restricted airspace that would better 
support DOD training and provide the airspace necessary to test sensing 
technologies.

    3)  Fort Huachuca and its Sentinel Landscapes partners to expand 
its Electronic Warfare Test Range to enable electronic testing and 
training operations with a brigade size element.
                          future vertical lift
    20. Senator McSally. Secretary Esper and General Milley, I 
appreciate the Army's fiscal responsibility in trying to cut less 
promising programs in order to pay for its modernization priorities, 
including Future Vertical Lift (FVL). However, how you chose pay for 
those programs is critically important. I'm concerned that some Army 
National Guard (ANG) aviation programs may be seen as a pay-for for 
some of these priorities and, as a result, ANG's modernization budget 
may be disproportionately affected. When is the Army planning to begin 
receiving new rotary-wing aircraft based on your Future Vertical Lift 
initiative? Is the Army expecting a top-line budget increase to fund 
FVL, or are you planning to cut existing programs to fund FVL 
development and procurement? Which programs does the Army plan to cut, 
when, and which units (or components) will be affected? (For example, 
we understand that UH-60M production from fiscal year 2024-2028 is 
planned as one offset for modernization programs, and this 
modernization will primarily affect primarily the Guard because if the 
Active component is modernized first, UH-60V production/delivery for 
the ANG may never occur).
    Secretary Esper and General Milley. Regarding whether we expect a 
topline budget increase to fund FVL, at this time we do not. We are 
planning for defense budgets to stay relatively flat or potentially 
decline so we are choosing to reprioritize resources within our 
expected topline to pay for near term readiness and future 
modernization requirements.
    The Army is at an inflection point as procurement of its AH-64 and 
UH-60 fleets wind down while developing the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) 
acquisition programs: Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft and the 
Future Long Range Assault Aircraft. The Army must balance continued 
modernization of the current fleets with the requirement to field new, 
more advanced aircraft capable of operating effectively on the Multi-
Domain Battlefield against near-peer adversaries to maintain overmatch 
in this domain. The Army will not turn to Army National Guard (ANG) 
aviation programs to pay for FVL. Additionally, the Army will not 
impact ARNG and USAR rotary wing modernization. UH-60M, AH-64E, and UH-
60V programs are currently funded and on schedule.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
        peacekeeping and stability operations institute (pksoi)
    21. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper, I understand that the Army 
plans to downsize or eliminate the Peacekeeping and Stability 
Operations Institute (PKSOI) located at the Army War College in 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania as part of an effort to restructure your over 
Irregular Warfare enterprise. I also understand that Assistant 
Secretary Owen West has requested that the Army delay any decision 
regarding PKSOI until the Irregular Warfare review is complete, but the 
Army has not agreed to honor that request. I am particularly concerned 
about these changes because PKSOI is currently the Army's lead on 
Women, Peace and Security. Can you provide an update as to the Army's 
plan for PKSOI and specifically, what does that mean for the Army's 
implementation of Women, Peace and Security if it is transferred to the 
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas?
    Secretary Esper. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Institute (PKSOI) will be reorganized and will remain at Carlisle 
Barracks, with the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 
taking command of both PKSOI and the newly established Army Irregular 
Warfare Proponent Office. The Army established the Irregular Warfare 
Proponent Office at Fort Leavenworth, KS in order to implement the 
National Defense Strategy; it will work alongside PKSOI to support 
Joint peacekeeping and stability operations issues. No military members 
or civilian employees currently at PKSOI will be directed to move to 
Fort Leavenworth as part of the reorganization. Regarding the Army's 
role and responsibility to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) 
mission, the CAC will assume all related tasks to WPS at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. With the ongoing transition, CAC and PKSOI are 
making efforts to ensure there is minimal reduction in capability to 
support WPS during the transition. Both organizational transitions will 
take place no later than October 2019.
           precision guidance kit--anti jam (pgk-aj) program
    22. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the 
threat posed to our armed services in GPS denied environments, the Army 
is funding the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the 
Precision Guidance Kit--Anti Jam (PGK-AJ) program. The goal of this 
program is to bring affordable, degradation resistant precision to our 
artillery forces. The funding planned in the latest budget drops 
sharply after fiscal year 2020. What is the Army's plan to continue to 
fund this critical capability improvement to complete its full 
qualification and reach an Initial Operational Capability by 2025 or 
sooner?
    Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Precision Guidance Kit--
Anti Jam program is fully funded in fiscal year 2020, and the Army is 
committed to funding PGK-Anti Jam development and delivering the 
Initial Operational Capability to our Warfighters by fiscal year 2025.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                          southern border wall
    23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, have you made any 
recommendations regarding any Army construction projects that could be 
diverted to build the wall?
    Secretary Esper. On March 19, 2018, the Department identified a 
complete pool of unawarded military construction projects from which 
funding could be reallocated to support the construction of a border 
barrier should the Secretary of Defense decide to use 10 USC 2808 
authority. To support his determination on utilizing this authority, 
the Army and the Department are reviewing the pool of unawarded 
projects with award dates in fiscal year 2020 or later to minimize 
potential impacts of delays of resourcing. No military housing, 
barracks, or dormitory projects will be impacted. No definitive date 
has been set for the Acting Secretary of Defense's determination on the 
use of section 2808 authority or for identifying a final list of 
military construction projects that could be deferred.

    24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, what is your criteria for 
evaluating and prioritizing Army construction projects? How will you 
formulate recommendations for projects to be defunded?
    Secretary Esper. The Secretary of Defense has not yet decided to 
undertake or authorize any barrier construction projects under section 
2808. We are carefully considering whether and which MILCON projects 
could be deferred, applying these criteria:

      No MILCON projects that have already been awarded, and no 
MILCON projects with fiscal year 2019 award dates will be impacted;

      Only MILCON projects with award dates after September 30, 
2019 will be considered;

      No military housing, barracks, and dormitory projects 
will be impacted; and

      MILCON projects would be selected to minimize the impact 
on readiness and take into account the National Defense Strategy.
                              puerto rico
    25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will you commit to 
encouraging Secretary Shanahan to not select any Army projects in 
Puerto Rico to be defunded and diverted to the border wall given the 
recent natural disasters and economic disarray?
    Secretary Esper. No definitive date has been set for the Acting 
Secretary of Defense's determination on the use of section 2808 
authority or for identifying a final list of military construction 
projects that could be deferred. MILCON projects would be selected to 
minimize the impact on readiness
                     troops at southern border wall
    26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, will troops be deployed to 
the border for as long as it takes to build the wall?
    Secretary Esper. The U.S. Army will provide support to U.S. 
Northern Command as directed by the Secretary of Defense in response to 
requests made by the Department of Homeland Security.

    27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, is construction of a 
border wall under section 2808 contingent on extending the deployments 
of troops at the border, even beyond the current extension through 
September 2019?
    Secretary Esper. The Secretary of Defense has not yet decided to 
undertake or authorize any barrier construction projects under section 
2808.

    28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Esper, if you anticipate that 
deployment orders for troops at the border will be extended, why does 
the President's budget request fail to include funding for border 
deployments?
    Secretary Esper. To date, the Army does not anticipate troop 
deployments extending past 30 September 2019. Further, the Acting 
Secretary of Defense has not ordered the Army to deploy troops to the 
Southwest Border beyond 30 September 2019.
                 general neller concerns with readiness
    29. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you share the concerns 
that General Neller articulated? Do you agree that the border 
deployments, among other factors, are compromising Army readiness and 
solvency?
    General Milley. The Army has managed several unplanned and 
unbudgeted events, to include support to the Department of Homeland 
Security along the Southwest Border, support to hurricane relief 
efforts in the Southeast, and support to flooding relief efforts in the 
Midwest. From an Army-wide perspective, the readiness impact of these 
unplanned and unbudgeted factors has been negligible.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, have you communicated any 
concerns to Acting Secretary Shanahan?
    General Milley. No.

    31. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, in the memos made public, 
GEN Neller lists 4 Marine Corps exercises that have been decisively 
cancelled or reduced, and 7 potential cancellations. General Milley, 
has the Army also been forced to cancel readiness exercises? How many?
    General Milley. The Army did not cancel any training exercises in 
fiscal year 2019 because of unplanned or unbudgeted factors. There have 
been some planned training events, not exercises, disrupted by support 
to the border, but all are recoverable after units return to home 
station and Commanders reschedule that training. The border commitment 
has represented no more than 5,000 soldiers, or 0.5 percent of the 
total Army. Additionally, we took mitigating steps to reduce any risk 
to readiness such as rotating forces frequently to prevent disruption 
in training.

    32. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, are you concerned that 
these troop deployments will continue indefinitely? If that is the 
case, can you estimate the impact on readiness?
    General Milley. No. Given the Army's large size in proportion to 
the support mission, and our ability to rotate units for the mission, 
continuation of deployments at the current level would have a 
negligible impact on readiness of the Army.
                          future vertical lift
    33. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, the Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1 
Defiant conducted its first flight last week. Can you please provide an 
update on how the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program is 
progressing?
    General Milley. The flight of the Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1 Defiant is 
another step in the Joint Multi Role Tech Demonstrator (JMR-TD) process 
that is helping us reduce risk. The Future Vertical Lift Cross 
Functional Team is on schedule to field both Future Attack 
Reconnaissance Aircraft and Future Long Range Assault Aircraft to units 
in the 2030 timeframe. We will accomplish fielding by capitalizing on 
existing, mature technology and through a modular open systems 
architecture (MOSA) enabling Future Vertical Lift to integrate the most 
reliable and capable technical solutions available from government 
efforts and commercial industry. No later than June 2019, the Army will 
award four to six initial Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft design 
contracts. No later than March 2020, the Army will select two vendors 
for final design and competitive prototypes. November 2022 is the 
target date for the prototypes to first take flight followed by a year-
long ``Fly-Off'' competition in 2023. The Army will decide whether or 
not to buy one of the prototype designs by 2024.

    34. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you believe--as your 
Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Team leader BGEN Rugen does--that 
the Army is at an inflection point in aviation modernization and should 
now pursue a new design or concept for power lift?
    General Milley. Yes, I agree with BG Rugen. We had to make a 
decision as to whether we keep incrementally upgrading our current 
rotary wing fleet that were designed in the 1970s or go with a ``clean 
sheet'' design. The current rotary wing fleet is as capable as ever and 
now is the time to build an Army aviation force that is optimized for 
large-scale combat operations against a peer or near-peer competitor.

    35. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, are you satisfied with the 
progress Future Vertical Lift Program? How can Congress best support 
your aviation modernization efforts?
    General Milley. While I am satisfied with where we are with Future 
Vertical Lift, we are always looking for opportunities to accelerate 
the programs to deliver advanced capabilities to our Army sooner. We've 
enjoyed recent successes under the Other Transaction Authorities that 
Congress has provided the Services and look to continue to leverage 
those authorities to deliver advanced capabilities to our Army.

    36. Senator Blumenthal. General Milley, do you believe the Cross 
Functional Team organization is effective in leading modernization 
efforts in powered lift for the Army? What are the challenges and how 
are you addressing them?
    General Milley. Yes. The Cross Functional Team construct allows us 
to consolidate warfighter, technical, programmatic, and acquisition 
communities to fuse time and investment of readiness priorities. The 
Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Teams (FVL CFT) are designed to 
rapidly integrate and synchronize critical solutions across the 
modernization enterprise and deliver timely solutions to the 
warfighter. As we have demonstrated in Future Long Range Assault 
Aircraft (FLRAA) and Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) 
schedules, the FVL CFT has literally cut years off the normal 
procurement schedule by working with the acquisition and contracting 
community to maximize the use of Other Transaction Authorities; worked 
with the Science and Technology community to capitalize on existing, 
mature technology as well as the Joint Multi Role Tech Demonstrator 
(JMR-TD) program to reduce risk in the accelerated timeline. The FVL 
CFT is working hand in hand with the Program Manager--Unmanned Aerial 
Systems and applied the ``Buy, Try, Decide'' method to accelerate the 
replacement for the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Systems. Overall, we are 
very happy with all of our Cross Functional Teams' performance but we 
are always looking for ways to improve and, in turn, accelerate the 
process to get the next generation of equipment into our soldiers' 
hands as soon as possible.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                  department of the army budget review
    37. Senator Kaine. Secretary Esper, does your fiscal year 2020 
budget request include any funding for sustaining support activities 
along the Southern Border?
    Secretary Esper. No, support to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
began on October 26, 2018 , was first extended through January 31, 
2019, and has since been extended to September 30, 2019. The CBP has 
not requested and the Army has not been directed to deploy troops at 
the border past September 30th. Therefore, no funds were requested for 
the mission in this budget request.

    38. Senator Kaine. Secretary Esper, have you been informed that you 
will need to sustain your deployment of forces to the southern border 
past September 2019?
    Secretary Esper. No. the Army has not been informed to sustain 
troop deployments to the Southwest Border past September 2019.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                            white supremacy
    39. Senator Warren. General Milley, white supremacy is rising in 
the United States. The Anti-Defamation League found a 182 percent 
increase in propaganda efforts by white supremacist groups in the U.S. 
in 2018, compared to the previous year. That same group found that 
white supremacist murders in the U.S. more than doubled in 2017, with 
white supremacists responsible for 53 percent of extremist-related 
murders in the United States. A recent Huffington Post investigation 
found that two marines, two Army ROTC cadets, an Army physician, a 
member of the Texas National Guard and one member of the Air Force 
belong to a white supremacist group called Identity Europa. This group 
reportedly helped organize the white supremacist rally in 2017 in 
Charlottesville, Virginia and spews racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-
immigrant views. I believe that Army values are American values, and 
that the vast majority of our soldiers live those values every day and 
represent the best of America. I do not blame the Army for every 
offensive thought or act by every soldier. How does the Army ensure a 
command climate of zero tolerance for white supremacist or white 
nationalist views and acts, including how soldiers are disciplined for 
such behavior?
    General Milley. All soldiers are prohibited from supporting 
extremist organizations or extremist activities, and participation in 
extremist organizations and activities by Army personnel is 
inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Enforcement 
of this policy is a responsibility of commanders at all levels, is 
vitally important to unit cohesion and morale, and is essential to the 
Army's ability to accomplish its mission. Further, Commanders have the 
authority to prohibit military personnel from engaging in or 
participating in other activities that the commander determines will 
adversely affect good order and discipline or morale within the 
command.
    Commanders have several options for dealing with violations of the 
prohibitions, which include punishment under the UCMJ or administrative 
actions such as separation for unsatisfactory misconduct, or for 
conduct deemed prejudicial to good order and discipline or morale; 
reclassification actions; bar to reenlistment; or other administrative 
or disciplinary action deemed appropriate by the commander based on the 
specific facts and circumstances of the particular case.

    40. Senator Warren. General Milley, in recruiting quality soldiers, 
how does the Army ensure that recruits do not have an association or 
participation with white supremacist or white nationalist groups or 
causes of any kind?
    General Milley. The Army uses a comprehensive set of policies and 
procedures to identify extremism during the accessions process. These 
checks include screening with the National Crime Information Center 
which checks the Gang File and the Known or Appropriately Suspected 
Terrorist File which provide the Army identifying information about 
violent criminal gang and terrorist organization members.
    Army accessioning agencies complete, for each applicant, tattoo 
screening for tattoos or brands that are extremist, indecent, sexist, 
or racist; they also require applicants to complete numerous 
questionnaires and be subject to interviews with Army leaders in the 
accession process, credit checks, and also be subject to a Personnel 
Security Investigation (Tier 3 PSI).
    Many applicants are also subject to an even more in depth Single 
Scope Background Investigation comprised of additional screening 
including interviews by security screeners with persons who know the 
applicant (neighbors, coworkers or former supervisors or teachers). A 
particular area of emphasis in the screening process is to detect and 
deter those with a history of gang or extremist activity, which is 
often found to be an indicator of racist behavior.

    41. Senator Warren. General Milley, Military Times ``conducted a 
voluntary, confidential online survey'' of Active Duty U.S. 
servicemembers in September 2017, in which ``[t]he questions focused on 
President Trump's time in the White House and national security issues 
facing American leaders.'' That survey found: ``Nearly one in four 
troops polled say they have seen examples of white nationalism among 
their fellow servicemembers.'' Furthermore, according the survey, 
``When asked whether white nationalists pose a threat to national 
security, 30 percent of respondents labeled it a significant danger.'' 
Has the Army conducted a voluntary, confidential survey of soldiers 
regarding the presence of white supremacy or white nationalism in the 
ranks, or the threat of white supremacy or white nationalism to the 
United States?
    General Milley. The U.S. Army has not surveyed soldiers regarding 
the presence of white supremacy or white nationalism in the ranks, or 
the threat of white supremacy or white nationalism to the United 
States. During the 1997 to 2011 timeframe, the U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducted a 
biannual survey that contained items asking soldiers about their 
experiences with extremist organizations/activities. The survey also 
asked soldiers for their perceptions of the seriousness or the extent 
of extremist/hate group activities within their unit. In 2013, the 
Department of Defense's Office of People Analytics (OPA) also asked 
soldiers to what extent racist/extremist organizations or individuals 
were a problem at their installation.
    Overall, the vast majority of Active Duty soldiers said extremist 
activities were not a problem at all or only a slight problem.

    42. Senator Warren. General Milley, how many soldiers were 
discharged each year for the last 10 years for association or 
participation with white supremacist or white nationalist groups or 
causes?
    General Milley. The Army doesn't track discharges for association 
or participation with white supremacy or white nationalist groups or 
causes. The Army tracks the overall basis for which a servicemember is 
separated (e.g., civil conviction, court-martial conviction, 
misconduct, unsatisfactory performance). Army policy prohibits 
participation in extremist, terrorist, and criminal gang organizations 
and activities.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                           apache helicopters
    43. Senator Manchin. General Milley, after the Aviation Restructure 
Initiative the Army National Guard was left with four Apache helicopter 
battalions. Each of these battalions is manned by only 18 aircraft 
instead of the traditional 24 required aircraft per battalion. This 
means that the National Guard units must constantly share aircraft to 
ensure adequate training for combat operations or are forced to borrow 
aircraft from Active Duty or accept reduced readiness. Is this plan 
sustainable for long term readiness of our National Guard Apache fleet 
or do we need another restructuring of assets?
    General Milley. The four ARNG Attack Reconnaissance Battalions are 
scheduled to reach full authorization of 96 total aircraft by the end 
of fiscal year 2026. The first battalion will be fielded with 24 AH-
64Es in fiscal year 2022, the second in fiscal year 2023, the third in 
fiscal year 2025, and the fourth in fiscal year 2026. All 96 aircraft 
are scheduled to be the Version 6, which is the most advanced, capable, 
and lethal version of the AH-64E. Regular Army units are also short of 
AH-64 aircraft, and must also cross-level them for deployments. Given 
the aforementioned plans to field more Apache aircraft in the future to 
the National Guard (and the Regular Army), this plan is sustainable and 
does not require another restructuring of assets.

    44. Senator Manchin. General Milley, after a limited procurement of 
new build AH-64E Apache block IIIB helicopters over the last few years, 
the service has elected to shift this year's budget for Apaches 
entirely into remanufacture of airframes for the Apache block IIIA. 
Given the already significant service of some of these Apache 
airframes, if we ignore cost numbers which are not significant in the 
long term are we making the correct investment now to facilitate long 
term reliability of our attack helicopter assets?
    General Milley. Yes, we are making the correct investment. The 
remanufactured Apache has a new airframe, comes off the production line 
as a zero-hour new aircraft, and it costs less than procuring a new 
build aircraft. There is no difference between the life or capability 
of a REMAN and new build Apache. Both will serve the Army through 2050.
                           budget priorities
    45. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, we are 
currently in a period of the highest defense budgets we have ever seen. 
Last year's enacted Department of Defense budget was the largest in 
history, only beat by this year's request in the President's budget. 
This trend of increasingly massive defense budgets is unsustainable. Do 
your budget priorities laid out in the request adequately take 
advantage of the large budgets now to prepare the force for a likely 
time in the future where we will see decreasing budgets and the 
inability to fund every project you want?
    Secretary Esper and General Milley. The fiscal year 2020 budget 
resources the Army's essential support of the National Defense 
Strategy. It furthers the Army's total readiness recovery goal by 2022 
and puts the Army on a path to achieve our modernization objectives by 
2028. The Army needs timely, adequate, predictable, and sustained 
funding now and in the future to ensure we meet these goals. Any 
reduction now or to future budget requests would likely impact the 
Army's fiscal year 2022 readiness goals and the fiscal year 2028 
modernization goals. The Army has/is taking a holistic approach to 
modernization for the future which is demonstrated by the establishment 
of AFC and the six modernization priorities--which drive our future 
objective of achieving multi-domain dominance by 2028. The Army's six 
modernization priorities will not change and they demonstrates the 
Army's commitment to innovate for the future.
                 proportional and concurrent equipment
    46. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, a top 
priority of the National Guard year in and year out is the acquisitions 
of proportional and concurrent equipment. Having the same equipment on 
the same timelines as Active Duty massively enhances the total force's 
ability to train and fight alongside the Active Duty and overall 
enhances our national security. Do your current and future budgets 
support National Guard acquisition of items such as Bradley and Abrams 
mods, and Joint Lightweight Tactical vehicle in the short term as well 
as projects like Future Vertical Lift in the long term?
    Secretary Esper and General Milley. The Army National Guard's 
equipping focus is on deployability, sustainability, and 
interoperability. The Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle is fully 
funded through fiscal year 2025 to support Army National Guard 
requirements. The Abrams modifications are fully funded through fiscal 
year 2025, which supports all Army National Guard requirements. The 
potential reduction in Bradley modifications to COMPO 1 would result in 
delaying the cascade of the A3 variants to COMPO2. Future Vertical Lift 
fielding plans are not developed; however, the Army has an obligation 
to ensure soldiers going into harm's way, regardless of component, have 
the best equipment available.
            weapons of mass destruction civil support teams
    47. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper, National Guard Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) are a critical component 
of domestic ability to respond to acts of violence here at home. 
Congress has made this a priority and our Governors and Adjutant 
Generals in the states depend on the funding of these assets to ensure 
we maintain this capability. Does the fiscal year 2020 budget request 
and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) include the necessary 
funding levels and resources to ensure that this capability is fully 
sustained?
    Secretary Esper. The Department of the Army recognizes the 
importance of the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 
Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) in supporting civil authorities' efforts to 
counter weapons of mass destruction. The Army decided not to pursue 
certain upgrades in order to fund more urgent and important 
modernization priorities. In coordination with the NGB, the Army is 
currently reviewing funding levels for the WMD-CST program in the 
fiscal year 2021-2025 POM build.
                      mq-1c gray eagle procurement
    48. Senator Manchin. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in May 
2017 the Army updated its MQ-1C procurement requirement to 204 aircraft 
based on the decision to man your brigades with 12 MQ-1C aircraft 
versus 9. However, your budget request allots for only six War 
Replacement Aircraft in fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, with no 
procurements listed In fiscal year 2022, fiscal year 2023 or fiscal 
year 2024. This action leaves your force short of the overall 204 
aircraft. What is the plan for future requests and utilization of MQ-1C 
Gray Eagle aircraft?
    Secretary Esper and General Milley. The entire MQ-1C Gray Eagle 
Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 204 is procured with the fiscal 
year 2019 appropriation. The fiscal year 2020 request is for pre-
planned battle losses which shortens the timeline to acquire 
replacement aircraft to reduce risk to the Gray Eagle fleet.


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 28, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

       THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAMS

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Cramer, Scott, 
Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, 
Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. We will come to order. Consistent with our 
policy of starting on time, it is now time.
    I appreciate your being here. I want to say one thing to 
Secretary Perry. You have a lot of fans here that you did not 
know you would have because just 28 and a half miles north of 
Texas is Fort Sill, and Fort Sill is in Washington this week, 
and so we were talking about the fact many of them are going to 
come and see. A lot of people are not aware of what the Senate 
Armed Services Committee (SASC) has to do with this whole issue 
that we are going to be talking about today. This will be an 
opportunity to do that. We thank you for being here and for 
your service.
    The Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 
2020 budget request of the Department of Energy's (DOE) atomic 
energy defense activities.
    I would like to welcome our witnesses, Rick Perry, former 
Governor of Texas, and Lisa Gordon-Hagerty. Both of you 
distinguish yourselves in your fields, and we are very 
fortunate to have your service.
    The Committee's top priority is to support an effective 
implementation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS, 
which is this manual right here--the commission that put this 
together--just as a reminder, this is equally two Democrat and 
Republicans. It is something that is the blueprint for 
everything that we are doing in the military right now. That 
commission made it clear that maintaining a nuclear deterrence 
is required. In recent years, since the Cold War ended, Russia 
and China have increasingly prioritized nuclear programs, while 
our lack of focus on these programs--we are paying for it now 
because they have caught us in many areas.
    We heard a few weeks ago from General Hyten at STRATCOM 
[U.S. Strategic Command] about the need to modernize our 
nuclear triad, and as he mentioned, it includes the Department 
of Energy's warheads and infrastructure.
    Secretary Perry, about three-quarters of your Department's 
fiscal year 2020 budget request is in this Committee's purview 
and will help us continue this vital work.
    I was pleased to hear that NNSA [National Nuclear Security 
Administration] recently assembled the first W76-2 low-yield 
warhead, which was recommended by the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) and authorized by Congress last year. This is an 
excellent example of how responsive the nuclear enterprise 
should be. From a requirement to production, it happened in 
just 1 year. You do not see that very often.
    But we cannot be responsive when half of our facilities are 
more than 40 years old and a quarter of them date back before 
World War II. We need to modernize infrastructure across the 
complex. I was disappointed to learn that we have workers in 
buildings with chunks of concrete falling off the ceiling and 
flooding damage--rooms and expensive equipment that cannot be 
quickly repaired.
    We have some pictures at each of the desks up here and also 
with the two of you, who have seen this many times, just to 
kind of get a visual of how bad things are.
    [The information referred to follows:] 
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	
    
    Chairman Inhofe. We are going to have to correct that. We 
owe it to the men and women who work across the nuclear 
enterprise to provide state-of-the-art 21st century facilities 
to work in. I am glad to see that the Department is requesting 
substantial funding for infrastructure modernization. I hope 
that we are going to be able to maintain the bipartisan 
consensus to fund this work in the future.
    I look forward to your testimony, and thank you for being 
here. Senator Reed?

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Perry back to the 
Committee, and I also want to welcome Administrator Gordon-
Hagerty who is appearing for the first time. Thank you both for 
your service.
    The President's fiscal year 2020 budget request for 
defense-related activities at the Department of Energy is $23 
billion. This is a 4.3 percent increase over last year's 
enacted level, and it is approximately 73 percent of the entire 
$31 billion request for the Department of Energy. The specific 
request for the National Nuclear Security Administration, or 
NNSA, is $16.5 billion, an increase of $1.2 billion, or an 8.3 
percent increase, over last year. Given that defense-related 
activities comprise such a large percentage of the Department's 
budget and the large proposed increases to the NNSA budget, I 
want to particularly thank the Chairman for asking these 
witnesses to testify before our Committee today.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, the requested $1.2 billion 
increase to the NNSA budget is intended to help meet the 
requirements of both the 2010 and 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 
The NNSA's workload is at its highest peak since the 1980s with 
plans to overhaul five weapons systems over the next 15 years. 
These projects include a cruise missile warhead first built in 
1980; the B61 gravity bomb, which first entered production in 
1961; and an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] warhead, 
which entered service in 1978. All of these programs will 
require nuclear and non-nuclear parts from your complex at the 
same time. The NNSA is also preparing to product 30 pits per 
year at Los Alamos which will require extensive new equipment 
while, at the same time, NNSA is building a $6.5 billion 
building at Oak Ridge to handle uranium. I am interested in 
your approach to ensuring all these projects can be 
accomplished on time and on schedule and on budget. It is quite 
a challenging list.
    Also, in anticipation of this increased workload, the 
fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
authorized a cost estimating and program evaluation office to 
provide an independent review on programs and their cost 
estimates. I am interested in hearing if this office is being 
funded and staffed appropriately.
    Secretary Perry, your Department recently revised the 
environmental cleanup liability of former atomic weapons 
production sites from an estimated $163 billion to $377 
billion, a jump of $244 billion over the next 30 years. I would 
note, for example, at the Hanford Washington Reservation, there 
are approximately 55 million gallons of radioactive liquid 
sludge in 177 underground storage tanks, some of which are 
leaking. I would like to know why the cost of cleanup has grown 
so much. In addition, I would like to understand why it is 
taking so long to clean out the Hanford underground tanks while 
the Savannah River site cleanup of underground storage tanks is 
well on its way.
    On a final point, Secretary Perry, proposals to sell United 
States nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have generated 
significant interest and could have broader repercussions for 
the Middle East and global nonproliferation efforts.
    In May of last year, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 
stated that if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow 
suit as soon as possible. That statement, combined with 
apparent Saudi insistence on the right to produce fissile 
material, whether it be enriched uranium or plutonium, requires 
that we carefully evaluate whether we could unintentionally 
encourage a nuclear arms race in the Middle East by selling 
Saudi Arabia nuclear reactors and associated technology.
    Since the passage of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the 
United States has promoted the peaceful use of atomic energy. 
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires the United States 
and any country seeking a transfer of nuclear technology to 
sign a nonproliferation agreement that is reviewed by Congress. 
Part 57b of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) requires that you, Mr. 
Secretary, review any transfer of technology that could lead to 
the production of special nuclear material outside the United 
States. Clearly the intent of Congress for over 70 years has 
been to balance the peaceful use of atomic energy against the 
possibility it might be used to make a nuclear weapon. We have 
serious questions in this regard, Mr. Secretary, and I hope you 
will respond to them. We would appreciate your update on this 
issue and many more.
    Again, let me thank both of you for appearing here today. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Both of you know what is going on here, what we want to get 
to. What we are going to do is start with your opening 
statements, and we would like to have you confine that to 
around 5 minutes because we have a good attendance up here. We 
are going to get all of our questions asked. We will start with 
you, Secretary Perry.

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE J. RICHARD PERRY, SECRETARY OF 
                             ENERGY

    Secretary Perry. Chairman Inhofe, thank you very much for 
the invitation, and to Ranking Member Reed, it is good to be in 
your presence, and thanks for allowing us to come earlier in 
the year to sit down with you and your staffs to discuss before 
we came here. The other members, it is a privilege to be with 
each of you, and a number of you who have served as governors, 
it has been a great privilege to share that executive spirit 
with each of you.
    So my work today and discussing the President's fiscal year 
2020 budget for the Department of Energy--and I just want to 
say it continues to be a great privilege for me. Many of you 
have this before, particularly those governors in the audience 
there, that this is the coolest job I have ever had before. It 
is not the best job I ever had before, but it is the coolest 
job.
    I am pleased to be joined with the Under Secretary of the 
Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty. 
Each of you have had the opportunity to work with her, and you 
know the incredibly high quality intellect and experienced 
individual that we have running that side of the shop.
    I am blessed to get to have a front row seat, if you will, 
and some of the most remarkable innovations that are bringing 
us energy independence, greater prosperity, a more robust 
national security position.
    The Department's overall budget request of $31.7 billion is 
designed to further our progress by providing funding for the 
National Nuclear Security Administration. It directly supports 
our national security. By funding our Office of Environmental 
Management (EM), it helps us clean up the environmental legacy 
of the effort dating to the Manhattan Project, and this budget 
request seeks to build upon the progress we made in both of 
those areas, both NNSA and the EM, over the last year.
    Thanks to NNSA's diligent efforts, along with congressional 
support, I, along with the Secretary of Defense, was able to 
certify to the President once again the reliability of our 
nuclear weapons stockpile as we extended the service life of a 
key warhead by 30-plus years by completing the W76-1 life 
extension program in December of last year.
    We continue our regular safe and reliable nuclear 
propulsion and naval fleet support, while contributing 
expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program, 
ensuring sea-based deterrent capabilities for decades to come.
    We are also seeking to replace our aging nuclear security 
infrastructure. You made mention of that, both Senator Reed and 
you, Mr. Chairman, much of it that is older than I am, and so 
that is getting a little age on it since even before the 1950s.
    Behind all of this is a bedrock belief that we continue to 
embrace at DOE. Given the rising threats to our Nation and the 
world from both state and non-state actors, we must maintain 
our nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, we would like to eliminate 
nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, but until that 
becomes feasible, we must continue to pursue through strength 
that peace that we all desire by keeping nuclear weapons out of 
the wrong hands, supporting nonproliferation efforts. Through 
NNSA, we seek to minimize the number of states that possess 
nuclear weapons; deny nuclear access to terrorists; control 
weapons usable material; related technology, and expertise; and 
help ensure arms control agreements can be verified and 
enforced. As I have said many times, we have a moral obligation 
to defend our country by strengthening our nuclear deterrent.
    But we have an equal duty to address the environmental 
legacy left at the sites that produced the materials that 
helped defeat tyranny and secure peace. That is exactly why the 
EM program, which marks its 30th anniversary this year, exists. 
To date, EM has completed cleanup activities at 91 sites in 30 
States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The 16 EM sites in 
11 States that remain are home to some of the Nation's toughest 
and most complex cleanup challenges. Recently we made 
significant progress from coast to coast from the Hanford site, 
Jack, that you mentioned, in Washington to the separations 
process research unit in New York. We are working to ensure 
that EM is prepared to safely and effectively tackle these 
challenges in a sustainable manner going forward.
    In conclusion, this budget represents a commitment from all 
of us at the Department of Energy to serve the American people 
with stewardship, accountability, and service. In partnership 
with our national labs, we will continue to support the world 
class scientists and engineers who ignite America's ingenuity 
and drive our competitiveness.
    I look forward to working with each of you, your 
colleagues, and your excellent staff in the weeks and months 
ahead on these important funding details.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with that I will attempt to 
answer any questions you have.
    [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Perry and 
Secretary Gordon-Hagerty follows:]

 Joint Prepared Statement by Secretary Rick Perry and Under Secretary 
                         Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, 
it is an honor to appear before you on behalf of the Administration and 
the Department of Energy (``the Department'' or ``DOE''). We appreciate 
the Committee's strong support for DOE's environmental management 
program and enduring national security missions and the opportunity to 
testify in support of the President's budget request for fiscal year 
(FY) 2020.
    The Department's budget request supports America's continued rise 
as an energy independent Nation, and advances U.S. national security by 
modernizing our indispensable, yet aging, nuclear deterrent, and 
promotes economic growth by making investments in transformative 
science and technology innovation to promote affordable and reliable 
energy. It also includes funding to meet our national security and 
environmental cleanup challenges.
                   accomplishments in the past year:
    Thanks to strong support from the Administration and Congress, over 
the past year, DOE has made significant progress in advancing America's 
security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental and 
nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology 
solutions.

      Last year, the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) continued to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of 
nuclear weapons through the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), 
enabling the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to 
certify to the President once again the reliability of the nuclear 
weapons stockpile. While we are confident in the state and 
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent today, we must--as General Hyten 
of STRATCOM recently testified--provide sustained and reliable funding 
for nuclear modernization so that future Secretaries and commanders can 
brief future Congresses with the same confidence. In addition to its 
critical role in sustaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear stockpile 
and its supporting enterprise, NNSA also continued its important work 
to advance U.S. nonproliferation, nuclear security, counterterrorism, 
arms control objectives, and naval nuclear propulsion.

      In December 2018, NNSA completed the W76-1 Life Extension 
Program (LEP), extending the warhead's service life another 30+ years. 
The B61-12 LEP, W80-4 LEP, W88 Alteration (Alt) 370, W87-1 
Modification, and the W76-2 Modification continue to remain on budget 
and on schedule. These achievements are a testament to NNSA's ability 
to deliver on commitments we have made to the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and Congress.

      The highest NNSA infrastructure priority is re-
establishing a robust plutonium pit production capability to meet 
military requirements, supported by numerous studies and analyses, of 
no fewer than 80 war reserve pits per year by 2030. Last May, the 
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) endorsed NNSA's recommended alternative 
calling for plutonium pit production at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). This two-site approach 
bolsters the nuclear security enterprise's responsiveness and 
resiliency.

      The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project continues 
to make timely progress with the recent commencement of the 
construction of the main buildings at the Y-12 National Security 
Complex (Y-12). UPF will be delivered by the end of 2025 for no more 
than $6.5 billion. This project is on budget and on schedule. NNSA also 
broke ground on the new Albuquerque Complex in New Mexico, which will 
house 1,200 employees when complete.

      Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), China, and Nigeria, NNSA was instrumental in the conversion of 
a Nigerian research reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This 
marks NNSA's 74th research reactor or isotope production facility 
conversion, which was followed by the repatriation of the highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to China, making Nigeria the 33rd country, 
plus Taiwan, to become HEU free.

      NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors continued its record of 
safe and reliable nuclear propulsion and nuclear fleet support, while 
contributing expertise to the U.S. Navy's new Columbia-class program. 
This next generation nuclear-powered submarine will ensure required 
sea-based deterrence capabilities for decades to come.

      The Office of Environmental Management (EM) broke ground 
on a new ventilation system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 
facility in New Mexico. WIPP is the lynchpin to the final disposition 
of transuranic waste across the cleanup complex and the new ventilation 
system will increase airflow in the WIPP underground for simultaneous 
mining and waste emplacement operations.

      The EM program successfully completed safe demolition of 
the 10,000-square-foot vitrification plant at the West Valley 
Demonstration Project in New York.

      In June 2018, DOE's Office of Science (SC) Oak Ridge 
Leadership Computing Facility's Summit system reclaimed the top spot 
for the United States in the global ``Top 500'' list of high 
performance computing systems and held the top spot in the November 
list, which included five DOE systems among the top 10.

      The Summit system is also launching the Exascale 
computing era by enabling researchers to break the Exascale barrier, 
achieving a peak throughput of more than two exaops--faster than any 
previously reported science application.

      Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) unveiled 
the Sierra supercomputer, ranked the second-fastest in the world 
according to the Top 500 list.

      In May 2018, the White House's National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC) established an interagency committee on 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) to advise the White House on Government-
wide AI research and development priorities and will work to establish 
partnerships among government, private sector, and independent 
researchers. The DOE serves a leading role on this Committee.

      On February 11, 2019, the President signed Executive 
Order 13859, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial 
Intelligence. The Initiative focuses Federal Government and Department 
resources toward developing AI technology, while ensuring that the next 
great AI inventions are made in the United States.

      In support of the Executive Order and building on our 
core competencies in science and technology, DOE is developing a 
coherent, long-term strategy to maximize the capabilities and 
scientific benefits of transformative AI technologies to all of our 
mission, business and operational areas.

      Our approach includes development of innovative AI 
technologies, aggregation of DOE mission-related data that together can 
foster innovative advancement of next generation hardware and software 
technologies.
                    building a strategic capability
    The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of our national 
strategy to keep the American people safe and secure for more than 70 
years and its credibility backstops all U.S. diplomatic and military 
activities around the globe.
    While the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons has been an 
aspiration for many for generations, we must recognize the reality that 
foreign nuclear threats are growing. Russia and China are investing 
massive resources into upgrading and expanding their nuclear arsenals, 
all at a time when they seek to challenge United States interests and 
unravel U.S. alliances around the world. It is imperative that we 
undertake prudent efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear stockpile and 
enterprise--ensuring that the United States can continue to speak from 
a position of strength and that tensions--regardless of where or how 
they arise--do not escalate into all-out war.
    DOE is building on the previous year's achievements with new 
activities tailored to 21st century threats. In fiscal year 2020 and 
beyond, the Department will pursue initiatives to ensure the necessary 
capability, capacity, and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons 
infrastructure and the needed skills of the nuclear enterprise 
workforce. This includes the ability to produce strategic materials 
(uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium) associated with nuclear 
weapons, as well as refurbish and manufacture components made from 
these materials.
    Consistent, robust, and predictable funding and authority from 
Congress are essential for the Department's nuclear weapon and 
infrastructure modernization efforts. These modernization efforts are 
aligned with the needs outlined in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) and approved by the NWC.
                    modernizing our nuclear forces:
    The Department is modernizing our nuclear enterprise to ensure that 
we have the scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities 
necessary to maintain an effective and safe nuclear triad and respond 
to future national security threats.
    Unique, state-of-the-art capabilities for research, development, 
testing, evaluation, and production enable this critical effort. In 
coordination with DOD, we have fully integrated the scope, budgets, and 
schedules of the LEPs, infrastructure modernization, and nuclear 
delivery systems.
    We are making significant progress in the full set of LEPs, 
modifications, and alterations while remaining aligned with DOD through 
the NWC.

      W76-1 LEP: The W76-1 LEP, which directly supports the 
sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, completed its last production unit 
in December 2018. Close-out activities in fiscal year 2020 include 
archiving production tooling and program records, and completing 
component overbuilds to support hardware provisioning for the life of 
the warhead system.

      W76-2 Modification Program: The W76-2 modification is 
currently on schedule, on budget, and the program achieved First 
Production Unit (FPU) in February 2019. This low-yield option is a 
measured way to reinforce deterrence in the face of Russia's large, 
diverse, and modern stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which 
facilitate Moscow's mistaken belief that limited nuclear first use, 
potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide Russia a coercive 
advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict.

      B61-12 LEP: The oldest weapon system in the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal, the B61-12 LEP will consolidate four variants of the B61 
gravity bomb and improve the safety and security of that vital weapon 
system. Currently in Phase 6.4, Production Engineering, this LEP has 
demonstrated system performance in over 60 integrated ground and flight 
tests, including eight joint flight test drops with the U.S. Air Force. 
The B61-12 LEP will enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2019, following completion of system 
qualification and Pantex Plant production readiness activities.

      W88 Alt 370: The W88 Alteration 370 is on track for FPU 
in fiscal year 2020. This program, which also supports the sea-based 
leg of the nuclear triad, is currently in Phase 6.4, Production 
Engineering, and will enter Phase 6.5, First Production, in September 
2019.
      W80-4 LEP: In February 2019, the NWC approved the W80-4 
LEP to transition into Phase 6.3, Development Engineering. The fiscal 
year 2020 request for $898.6 million will allow the W80-4 LEP to remain 
on track to achieve FPU in fiscal year 2025 in support of the Air 
Force's Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile.
      W87-1 Modification Program: The W87-1 program will 
replace the aging W78 warhead, with planned first production in 2030 to 
support fielding on the Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent 
(GBSD) missile system. In September 2018, the NWC authorized restart of 
Phase 6.2, Program Feasibility Study, activities on the W78 replacement 
warhead and renamed it the W87-1. The W87-1 program will improve safety 
and security, addressing antiquated design, material obsolescence, 
evolving performance expectations, and emerging survivability threats.
            recapitalizing our cold war era infrastructure:
    As stated in the 2018 NPR, ``an effective, responsive, and 
resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure is essential to the U.S. 
capacity to adapt flexibly to shifting requirements. Such an 
infrastructure offers tangible evidence to both allies and potential 
adversaries of U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and can help to deter, 
assure, hedge against adverse developments, and discourage adversary 
interest in arms competition.''
    More than a third of NNSA's facilities are over 60 years old. It 
will take sustained investments to modernize NNSA's nuclear weapons 
infrastructure.
    With Congress' support, NNSA is making these investments, 
including:

      An enduring capability and capacity to produce plutonium 
pits at a rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year by 2030. The time to 
move forward is now. Repurposing the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication 
Facility (MFFF) at SRS to produce 50 war reserve pits per year and 
continuing to invest in LANL to produce 30 war reserve pits per year is 
the optimal path forward to meet pit production requirements while 
managing the risks and costs associated with increasing production 
rates and maintaining existing plutonium missions at LANL.

      Investing at LANL to provide all the tools necessary for 
the enterprise to successfully support an enduring plutonium pit 
production mission to produce 30 pits per year by 2026. NNSA 
anticipates $3 billion in total funding over the next five years, and 
LANL is actively installing pit production equipment and has begun 
hiring to meet future work scope. As the nation's plutonium center of 
excellence for research and development, LANL plays a critical role in 
early design efforts for pit production.

      Investing $774 million at SRS in fiscal year 2020, a 75.8 
percent increase over fiscal year 2019. NNSA will continue termination 
activities of the MFFF project at SRS, continue to pursue a dilute and 
dispose strategy to fulfill U.S. commitment to dispose of 34 metric 
tons (MT) of plutonium, and modernize SRS infrastructure to support the 
tritium supply chain.

      Fully funding the Uranium Processing Facility.

      Ensuring availability of sufficient unobligated low-
enriched uranium and the necessary reactor capacity to produce an 
adequate supply of tritium.

      Investing over $900 million in fiscal year 2020 to 
sustain and recapitalize NNSA's mission-enabling infrastructure to 
support mission needs and improve facility reliability, sustainability, 
productivity, and efficiency.

      Disposing of several high-risk process-contaminated 
excess facilities. Many of NNSA's excess process-contaminated 
facilities will ultimately be transferred to the Environmental 
Management (EM) program for disposition. In the interim, NNSA is 
focusing on reducing risks where possible. For example, NNSA has made 
critical investments to stabilize high-risk process-contaminated 
facilities until ultimate disposition, including at Y-12's Alpha 5 and 
Beta 4 facilities.

      Commencing an effort by the EM program to remove Building 
280 Pool Type Reactor and ancillary facilities at Lawrence vLivermore 
National Laboratory. The Department identified five (including Building 
280) of the top ten list of the highest risk excess facilities at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

      Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL) EM program has 
been able to remove risks and stabilize a portion of the 220 excess, 
contaminated, and deteriorating facilities at the Y-12 National 
Security Complex (Y-12) and ORNL. While Oak Ridge has more high-risk 
excess contaminated facilities than any other site, crews continued 
addressing this issue in 2018 by tearing down two high-risk buildings, 
preventing more than 6,000 pounds of mercury from entering the 
environment, completed characterization for future demolition projects, 
and immobilizing contamination in hot cell facilities.
                   preventing global nuclear threats:
    Effective nuclear nonproliferation and arms control measures 
support U.S., allied, and partner security by controlling the spread of 
nuclear materials and technology; placing limits on the production, 
stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; reducing misperception 
and miscalculation; and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 
competition. The 2018 NPR reiterates the U.S. commitment to effective 
nonproliferation and arms control measures, both of which are vital to 
our Nation's ability to have a credible deterrent.
    In 2018, the U.S. Government interagency coordination on nuclear 
nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism programs and strategy 
enabled NNSA to:

      Remove or confirm the disposition of nearly 352.4 
kilograms of excess highly enriched uranium (HEU).

      Partner with the U.S. healthcare industry, which resulted 
in the first domestic production of molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) in 30 years. 
Mo-99 is a vital medical radioisotope used in approximately 40,000 
patient procedures daily in the United States.

      Downblend or ship for downblending, 2.5 MT of surplus 
HEU, for a cumulative total of 160.4 MT, which after downblending 
cannot be used in a nuclear weapon.

      Deploy a total of 48 radiation detection systems to 
prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials worldwide.

      Secure 87 domestic and international civilian buildings 
containing high-priority radioactive material.

      Provide technical reviews of 5,973 U.S. export license 
applications and 3,053 interdiction cases to facilitate legitimate 
nuclear cooperation and prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear and 
dual use goods.

      Hold over 40 international nuclear safeguards engagements 
including training, and technical meetings with foreign partners.

      Conduct 84 export control trainings for U.S. enforcement 
agencies and foreign partners.
    All of the aforementioned work was completed by NNSA's Office of 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). DNN is committed to continuing 
its efforts to: (1) minimize the number of nuclear weapons states; (2) 
deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials; 
(3) strictly control weapons-useable material, related technology, and 
expertise; and (4) support the Department of State to make sure arms 
control agreements enhance security, and are verifiable and 
enforceable.
                   countering global nuclear threats:
    The Office of Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP) 
provides effective capabilities to respond to any nuclear or 
radiological incident in the United States or abroad by applying the 
unique technical expertise found in NNSA's nuclear security enterprise. 
Highly trained personnel with specialized technical equipment maintain 
readiness to support lead federal agencies to find and render safe 
potential nuclear and radiological threat devices, to effectively 
manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, and to 
support enhanced security operations at large national public events.
    CTCP also maintains operational nuclear forensics capabilities to 
enable the attribution of a nuclear attack against the United States. 
These capabilities allow the U.S. Government the ability to collect 
evidence if a device is rendered safe prior to detonating, or to 
characterize and identify the material used if the device detonates, 
allowing policymakers to hold those accountable for the attack. CTCP 
will also implement the National Nuclear Material Archive program 
within NNSA to identify, consolidate, and analyze historical nuclear 
material samples of value to the technical nuclear forensics program.
    NNSA, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), supports render safe teams at FBI field offices in 11 major 
American cities that are specially trained and equipped to identify and 
mitigate the function of a nuclear or radiological device. Over the 
next few years, CTCP will continue to provide training and conduct 
operations in support of these FBI teams and begin transitioning to the 
Capability Forward initiative, under which life-saving responses to a 
nuclear threat device will be accelerated. As part of this initiative, 
NNSA will provide additional training, equipment, and technical support 
to the current 11 U.S. cities--eventually growing to 14 cities by 
fiscal year 2022--to allow FBI teams to execute render safe operations 
more rapidly. CTCP will also improve and expand NNSA training 
facilities to accommodate the increased training requirements 
associated with regional render safe capabilities.
               responsible stewardship of the environment
    The government's nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research 
programs made significant contributions to our Nation's defense for 
decades. The EM program is tasked with the safe disposition of 
radioactive wastes; the management of spent nuclear fuel and special 
nuclear material; the cleanup of contaminated soil and water; and the 
decontamination and decommissioning of thousands of excess facilities. 
As DOE continues to open new horizons in innovation, national security 
and American energy production, we also remain focused on addressing 
the environmental liabilities accrued while ending World War II and 
keeping the peace in the Cold War.
    This year marks the 30th anniversary of the EM program. DOE is 
making great progress toward reducing and eliminating legacy waste in a 
safe, efficient and cost-effective manner that is protective of human 
health and the environment.
    With a track record of demonstrated results, EM has reduced the 
footprint of the cleanup program from 107 sites comprising a total of 
3,100 square miles to just 16 sites, with an active cleanup footprint 
of less than 300 square miles.
    Over the past year, EM has made significant progress, including the 
following:

      At the Hanford site in Washington State, workers are 
making real progress towards Direct Feed Low Activity Waste 
vitrification of tank waste with a milestone to complete hot 
commissioning of the Low Activity Waste facility by December 31, 2023.

      Work performed by Oak Ridge's EM program brought the site 
closer to its ambitious goal to complete major cleanup at the East 
Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in 2020.

      EM published the Final Environmental Impact Statement at 
Energy Technology Engineering Center (ETEC).

      Workers in South Carolina consolidated more than 400,000 
cubic yards of coal ash and ash-contaminated soil at the SRS. They 
completed it safely and 14 months ahead of schedule, saving $9 million.

      The EM Los Alamos (LA) Field Office safely ramped up 
operations during the initial months of the new legacy cleanup 
contract, and successfully completed 13 milestones under the Consent 
Order with the State of New Mexico.

      And, project crews at EM's Separations Process Research 
Unit (SPRU) in New York completed the last phase of building demolition 
with the removal of Building H2. The SPRU facilities were built in the 
late 1940s and operated through the early 1950s to conduct pilot tests 
for recovery of uranium and plutonium.

    The EM sites that remain are home to some of the Nation's toughest 
and most complex cleanup challenges. The Department is working to 
ensure that EM is prepared to safely and effectively tackle these 
challenges in a sustainable manner going forward. To that end, the 
Department has reinvigorated the completion mindset that has been the 
foundation of EM's greatest successes.
    EM is taking lessons learned from three decades of cleanup and 
institutionalizing a strengthened and robust results-driven approach 
that protects our Nation, continues risk-based cleanup progress and 
drives down liabilities to the American people through close 
collaboration with regulators and stakeholders.
    EM is now managing capital projects and procurements with a greater 
degree of rigor and consistency. With billions of dollars in 
procurements coming up over the next few years, the Department has the 
opportunity to implement improved contracting approaches that ensure 
that safety remains paramount, while incentivizing results and allowing 
for great flexibility.
    As the Department looks to best position EM to meet long-term 
challenges, innovative ideas and approaches are necessary. The greatest 
incubators of innovation are the DOE National Labs. The Department is 
focused on fully utilizing the capabilities of our National Labs to get 
cleanup to completion safer, sooner and more efficiently.
          recruitment and retention of highly qualified people
    Across the Department, our greatest asset will always be our 
workforce. DOE's challenging national security missions require it to 
recruit, train, and retain highly skilled and dedicated federal 
employees and Management and Operating (M&O) contract workforce. DOE 
and Congress must continue to provide these highly-talented men and 
women with the tools necessary to support their work as they carry out 
complex and challenging responsibilities. Funding alone is not the only 
thing needed. The Department will also need to have the necessary human 
resource authorities to attract and retain the best and brightest 
people from around the country. These positions are not just in 
science, technology, and engineering but also manufacturing, 
maintenance, project and program management, and construction.
    A skilled federal workforce is required for appropriate program and 
project oversight as the nuclear security enterprise is busier than it 
has been since the end of the Cold War. Over the past nine years, 
NNSA's program funding has increased 50 percent, while staffing has 
decreased 10 percent. Last year the Office of Personnel Management and 
NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation both 
independently determined the need to significantly increase NNSA 
federal staffing. Therefore, for NNSA to meet its growing nuclear 
security mission requirements, as described in the 2018 NPR, it will 
need the funding to hire aggressively for the next two years.
                    fiscal year 2020 budget request
    The President's Budget for fiscal year 2020 requests $31.7 billion 
for DOE to advance U.S. national security and economic growth through 
transformative science and technology innovation that promotes 
affordable and reliable energy through market solutions and meets our 
nuclear security and environmental cleanup challenges. The fiscal year 
2020 budget request provides: $16.5 billion to modernize and restore 
the nuclear security enterprise and to maintain the safety and 
effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile, a $1.3 billion increase over 
fiscal year 2019 enacted levels; $6.5 billion to continue our 
commitment to cleaning up the Cold War nuclear legacy; $5.5 billion to 
conduct cutting-edge, early-stage scientific research and development 
(R&D) and build state-of-the-art scientific tools and facilities to 
keep U.S. researchers at the forefront of scientific innovation, 
including achieving exascale computing in 2021.
    This budget request demonstrates the Administration's strong 
support for NNSA, EM, and SC. For the Nation to retain a credible 
deterrent and prevent, counter, and respond to global nuclear security 
threats, NNSA will require significant and sustained investments in its 
nuclear security mission.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA's Weapons Activities 
account is $12.4 billion, an increase of $1.3 billion or 11.8 percent 
over fiscal year 2019 request levels. The programs funded in this 
account support the Nation's current and future nuclear defense posture 
and the associated nationwide infrastructure of science, technology, 
engineering, cybersecurity, and production capabilities.
    The majority of weapons in today's stockpile have surpassed their 
intended design life, thereby accumulating increasing risk. The United 
States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent since 2010, while 
potential adversaries have increased their numbers of nuclear weapons 
and significantly modernized their nuclear capabilities.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget request for NNSA's DNN account is $2 
billion, an increase of $63.3 million, or 3.3 percent above the fiscal 
year 2019 request. DNN account activities address the entire nuclear 
threat spectrum by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to 
nuclear and radiological incidents around the world.
    NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2020 budget request is 
$1.65 billion, a decrease of $140.2 million or approximately 7.8 
percent below the fiscal year 2019 enacted level.1 The funding supports 
Naval Reactors' mission to provide militarily effective nuclear 
propulsion plants for Navy vessels and to ensure their safe, reliable 
and long-lived operation.
    1 Amounts do not reflect the transfer of funds to the Office of 
Nuclear Energy for maintenance and operation of the Advanced Test 
Reactor in fiscal year 2019.
    The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Request includes $71 million in 
combined AI funding for SC's Advanced Scientific Computing Research 
(ASCR), Basic Energy Sciences (BES), Biological and Environmental 
Research (BER), Fusion Energy Sciences (FES), and High Energy Physics 
(HEP) programs, and $48 million for NNSA.
    The EM program represents one of the top financial liabilities to 
the American taxpayer. As EM is put on a sustainable path forward, the 
fiscal year 2020 budget request provides the resources necessary to 
build upon recent successes, bring a renewed sense of urgency to the 
program and enable meaningful, measurable progress to projects and 
sites throughout the cleanup complex. Resources provided for in the 
fiscal year 2020 budget request will:

      Advance construction on the Outfall 200 Mercury Treatment 
Facility, progress deactivation and demolition of remaining facilities 
at the East Tennessee Technology Park, and continue preparation of 
Building 2026 to support processing of the remaining uranium-233 
material at ORNL in Tennessee.

      Initiate two transuranic waste processing lines, complete 
characterization of the high explosives plume in Canon de Valle and 
implement the full interim measure for the chromium plume at Los Alamos 
in New Mexico.

      Complete verification of cleanup, site restoration, and 
closeout activities at SPRU in New York.

      Ramp up efforts to address radioactive tank waste at the 
SRS in South Carolina through start-up of the Salt Waste Processing 
Facility and continued construction activities for necessary Saltstone 
Disposal Units.

    Together, these investments for environmental management will make 
significant progress in fulfilling our cleanup responsibilities while 
also starting to address our high-risk excess facilities at NNSA sites.
   project management execution--safe quality construction on budget:
    NNSA is driving continued improvement in contract and project 
management practices. Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $2 
billion in projects under budget--a significant portion of NNSA's total 
project portfolio. Some of NNSA's acquisition and project management 
achievements include:

      Over $500 million in cost savings via M&O contract 
competitions.

      Small Business Administration score revised from ``F'' to 
``A.''

      Government Accountability Office narrowed the focus of 
its High Risk List to projects greater than $750 million.

      Delivered $2 billion project portfolio eight percent 
under budget.

      U.S. Strategic Command requested NNSA's best practices 
for project management.

    NNSA is continuing to encourage competition and increase the 
universe of qualified contractors by streamlining its major acquisition 
processes. NNSA will continue to focus on delivering timely, best-value 
acquisition solutions for all programs and projects, by using a 
tailored approach to contract structures and incentives that are 
appropriate for the special missions and risks at each site.
                               conclusion
    This budget request represents a commitment from all of us at the 
Department of Energy to serve the American people with stewardship, 
accountability and service. We commit to ensure that DOE performs 
efficiently and effectively as we pursue our mission-driven goals.
    We are at an extraordinary moment in American energy. In 
partnership with our National Laboratories, we will continue to support 
the world-class scientists and engineers who ignite American ingenuity 
and drive our competitiveness. The President's fiscal year 2020 budget 
request for the Department of Energy positions us to seize 
opportunities and prioritize investments. We look forward to working 
with you and your colleagues in Congress in the coming weeks and months 
on these important funding details. Thank you, and we look forward to 
answering your questions.

    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you very much. Excellent 
statement.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, we are very pleased to have you 
here, and please proceed with your opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LISA E. GORDON-HAGERTY, UNDER 
  SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, 
            NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe and 
Ranking Member Reed. I have no opening statement this morning. 
I defer to Secretary Perry. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. What I want to do is get into a 
couple of the things just to kind of set them out because I 
know they are going to be covered by questions, general 
questions.
    Last year, the NNSA proposed to repurpose the half-built 
MOX [mixed oxide] building. Of course, that has been the main 
discussion for a long period of time and an area of confusion. 
That is the one that is located in South Carolina to produce 
plutonium pits. Los Alamos National Lab would still operate the 
current facility in New Mexico producing 30 pits a year while 
South Carolina I think would be in the neighborhood of some 50 
more to meet the STRATCOM requirement which is for 80 by what 
year, 2030?
    Secretary Perry, explain why the Department chose last year 
to construct a plutonium pit production facility in South 
Carolina and what advantages would this option bring in 
addition to the current smaller capability in Los Alamos.
    Secretary Perry. Mr. Chairman, I think for so many years, 
as you know as well as anyone in this room, the challenge that 
we have had with the mixed oxide facility in South Carolina--I 
do not want to relitigate that at all. What I would like to do 
is say thank you to the Members who agreed that this was not a 
program that needed to go forward, and you had the courage to 
work with us and others to terminate that and then to 
transition that facility.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yes, because you are talking about a very 
large investment that we have had in the past. We are 
interested in seeing what is the most we can get out of it now.
    Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. I think we are on a track that 
will take us to a reasonable development there. Los Alamos is 
and, as Senator Heinrich knows, will always be the center for 
pit production, the center of excellence in the world for 
plutonium pit production. Pits 0 through 30 will be done there. 
There is an additional $5 billion that is headed towards that 
facility in Los Alamos. It will be a substantial buildup. They 
are going to continue to play, I will suggest, the lead role in 
the immediate out-years. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, by 
2030, there will be the requirement to do 50 pits. The decision 
was investigated, decision made that you could bifurcate that 
effort with the continual focus on Los Alamos and have pits 31 
through 80 be done at the Savannah River site. We can discuss 
further about that decision-making, but both the DOD, those in 
the nuclear weapons world agree that that is a legitimate, 
thoughtful way to go forward with the pit production.
    There are some other potentials at Savannah River, but the 
main legacy program that would come out of the repurposing of 
the MOX facility will be the development of those pits 31 
through 80 at Savannah River.
    Chairman Inhofe. I understand that, and I appreciate that 
very much.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, there are a lot of people 
speculating that we may not be able to reach those goals. In 
fact, in NNSA's own analysis, it suggests that reaching the 80 
by 2030 is going to be a problem. No matter what the location 
of the production, how do you plan to mitigate in the event we 
do not make it?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As the Secretary said, this is going to be a challenging 
undertaking for the NNSA and for our entire nuclear security 
enterprise. When the Nuclear Weapons Council determined that 
based on STRATCOM requirements, that we needed to produce not 
less than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030, it was a 
challenge. I need not remind Members of this Committee that the 
United States has not had a plutonium pit production capability 
since the early 1990s, and it is well past time that we provide 
a resilient infrastructure for our nuclear weapon deterrent. 
The focus of that is on plutonium pit production now and in the 
future. In order to do that, we believed that a two-pronged 
strategy is the most affordable and optimal way to get to the 
80 pits per year by 2030. Again, it is not less than 80 pits.
    We have a lot of challenges ahead of us. We believe that 
our two-pronged approach where we are undertaking the 
investments, the significant investments, as the Secretary 
stated, at Los Alamos which will provide several hundred 
million dollars over several years in order to increase the 
production capacity, as well as the infrastructure necessary at 
Los Alamos, and the facility at South Carolina. We are making 
significant investments in that to undertake the preconceptual 
design, and we are seeking $410 million to continue that 
repurposing of the facility at South Carolina.
    Chairman Inhofe. My time has expired, and I want to make 
sure that we get everyone here.
    But let us do this for the record. When we see a staggering 
figure like $677 billion, referring to the Hanford site, that 
does not seem achievable to me. Right now, we are in the middle 
of a budget, and that is overwhelming.
    I would like for the record for each one of you to spend 
some time to analyze how that can be diminished. I am talking 
about using grout instead of glass or any number of things. For 
the record, not at this time. Thank you very much.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The Department of Energy continues to thoughtfully and 
deliberately work toward determining the best path forward to 
safely and successfully treat all of Hanford's tank waste. We 
continue to make progress towards commissioning of the direct 
feed low-activity waste facility and we recently initiated an 
Analysis of Alternatives to evaluate options for the high level 
waste fraction of the tank waste. We fully recognize the 
challenges we face and we are addressing these challenges head-
on with an eye toward getting waste out of tanks and disposed 
of sooner, safely and at a reasonable cost.

    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Reed?
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator Gordon-Hagerty, as I mentioned in my opening 
remarks, you have undertaken the overhaul of at least five 
weapons systems. You are building two multibillion nuclear 
facilities, uranium and plutonium. You are employing and 
performing inspections of the deployed stockpile with a federal 
workforce of about 1,700 people. Are you at all concerned about 
too much work and too little capacity?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    As I mentioned previously, this is a challenge ahead of us, 
but we are taking on this challenge throughout our entire 
44,000-person workforce and throughout our entire nuclear 
security enterprise. We recognize the challenges ahead of us. 
When we talk about pit production, that is only 11 years away. 
This a major challenge. We have five modernization programs, as 
you stated today.
    We also have challenges with hiring workforce. Right now, 
in the next 5 years, we are expecting 40 percent of our 
workforce to be retirement eligible.
    So we have got a number of challenges ahead of us, but I 
believe we can--with the robust staffing plan and robust 
funding that we are seeking from Congress, I believe we can get 
through the systems and continue to be on time and on budget, 
which we are finding we are in right now, in alignment with the 
Department of Defense (DOD).
    Senator Reed. Can I ask very quickly, what is the biggest 
risk? Is it the pit production at Los Alamos?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The biggest risk right now is 
sustained and supported funding to recapitalize and modernize 
our infrastructure. In terms of programs, yes, it is plutonium 
pit production, but we have our eye on that, and we are focused 
specifically on plutonium pit production.
    Senator Reed. The first critical point is 30 pits by 2026.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Correct.
    Senator Reed. One of the concerns I will put on the table 
is that as we start to build up the facility in South Carolina, 
there will be at least a temptation to pull resources out of 
Los Alamos at a time when that is a critical--the first 
critical action will be made there. If we cannot get those 30 
pits by 2026, then we have a serious nuclear security problem.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I absolutely agree with you, 
Senator Reed. One of our challenges, however, is to put 
together what we call integrated product teams in an 
implementation strategy across our entire enterprise. So this 
does not just involve South Carolina and the facility we are 
repurposing there, as well as Los Alamos, but it also affects 
all of our other parts of our enterprise whether it is Y-12 for 
sub assemblies or the actual production complex at Pantex in 
Amarillo, Texas. We are working across our entire enterprise as 
an integrated approach.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, I mentioned in my opening comments the 
ongoing negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a non-
nuclear weapons state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
That is correct. Is it not?
    Secretary Perry. That is correct.
    Senator Reed. Does it concern you that the Crown Prince has 
made statements that they are prepared to obtain an atomic 
weapon if Iran particularly gets one? That would violate their 
standing under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    Secretary Perry. I share your concern with any world leader 
that we are doing or we are not doing business with, for that 
matter, that would say that their intention was to do that.
    Senator Reed. Part of the negotiation involves ensuring 
that they are not able to enrich fissile material or keep 
fissile material. That seems to be a non-waiverable condition 
in any arrangement. Is that correct?
    Secretary Perry. That is correct.
    Senator Reed. For further depth, we have an arrangement 
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They have, indeed, agreed 
not to enrich nuclear materials. Is that accurate?
    Secretary Perry. That is correct.
    Senator Reed. There is a fear that if we did not have the 
same arrangement with the Saudis, that the UAE might feel that 
they are unconstrained. Is that a concern that you have?
    Secretary Perry. I think you would be correct in that 
analysis.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
    Quickly following up, the Chairman made comments about the 
significant increase in cost, as I mentioned, at Hanford 
particularly. We have a problem and we have a huge increase in 
resources we have to devote to it. I would concur with the 
Chairman's request that you provide us more information and 
more details as we go forward.
    Secretary Perry. Coming your way.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Fischer?
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator, I am trying to take stock of the progress 
that we have made in achieving the goals that were laid out in 
the New START's ratification, and the Nuclear Posture Review 
makes the point that despite a longstanding goal and one that 
was particularly reinforced during the debate on the New START, 
quote, the United States has fallen short in sustaining the 
modern infrastructure that is resilient and has the capacity to 
respond to unforeseen developments.
    That treaty was signed in 2010, and since that time, we 
expected a pit production facility to be completed by 2023 and 
work is just now beginning with the optimistic target, I 
believe, of reaching full capacity at 2030.
    After years of delay, the uranium production facility is 
moving forward, but its scope is reduced to one-third of its 
original capacity, and several warhead life extension 16 
programs were delayed. Revised schedules appear to be holding, 
but the stockpile is older than anticipated.
    In my view, we have a lot of work ahead of us if we are 
going to achieve the vision that was articulated in 2010 and 
really be able to attain a responsive nuclear complex. Would 
you agree with that?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Absolutely.
    Senator Fischer. Do you see us moving in that direction, a 
more positive direction, at this point?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. I do, Senator Fischer. I believe 
that our entire complex has our eye on our goal, and the goal 
is to continue to modernize our five nuclear weapon systems 
that we are currently undertaking. I am happy to say that they 
are all on schedule and all on budget. However, a minor slip in 
any of those could cause a rippling effect across all of the 
different modernization programs.
    With regard to UPF [Uranium Processing Facility], the 
facility to which you alluded, our uranium processing facility, 
to date we have spent $2.5 billion in construction activities. 
This year, we have undertaken the actual construction of the 
main processing building. That building will cost $6.5 billion 
and be completed by 2025. Again, I am glad to say that we are 
on schedule and on cost for that.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    You and I--we talked a lot about pit production, and the 
two questions previous to mine dealt with some pit production 
issues as well. NNSA's goal has been to be able to produce 
those plutonium pits per year 2030. I know that you do have a 
strategy to accomplish this and you are pursuing it.
    But it is my understanding that as a result of the years of 
delay that this effort has faced, I guess you could say plans 
are extremely fragile at this point, and achieving this goal is 
going to be challenging for you. I am pleased you are focused 
on it.
    But my question is, to what extent has NNSA thought about 
any contingencies or any supplemental plans should it face 
delays or any kind of disruption to your current strategy that 
you hold?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We have a number of different 
options available to us. We are, obviously, focused on the most 
optimal, which is to go with the two-pronged strategy for pit 
production, which will be, as the Secretary said, Los Alamos 
producing pits 1 through 30, and as we repurpose the former MOX 
facility in South Carolina, that we will look to have an 
aggressive plan for that.
    One of the historical notes about NNSA is that I like to 
say we used to do things in serial. Well, now we are doing 
things in parallel. We have a lot of work on our plate, but I 
am absolutely confident in the men and women of the NNSA 
enterprise that we can get this done. We have no further time 
to delay.
    In addition to everything else we are doing, we have a 
massive infrastructure and recapitalization program. As the 
Chairman mentioned, more than 30 percent of our facilities were 
built during the Manhattan Project, and it is long time past 
that we do something to modernize our infrastructure and give 
the tools to our workforce that are necessary to maintain our 
nuclear deterrent.
    Senator Fischer. I know you are trying to do things in 
parallel and not step by step, but as you view your next major 
strategic materials challenge, what comes after the plutonium 
pit production for you?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. High explosives.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks to the witnesses for your service and testimony.
    Secretary Perry, Reuters broke a story last night, ``United 
States Approves Secret Nuclear Power Work for Saudi Arabia.'' 
Just to read the opening paragraph, United States Energy 
Secretary Rick Perry has approved six secret authorizations by 
companies to sell nuclear power technology and assistance to 
Saudi Arabia, according to a copy of a document seen by Reuters 
on Wednesday.
    Is the story accurate?
    Secretary Perry. Senator, as you probably know, as well as 
any of us, from time to time, the media may get a story wrong.
    Senator Kaine. That is why I asked.
    Secretary Perry. It is always good to hear in the public, 
and I hope that there is some good reporting going to be going 
on about this conversation you and I are about to have relative 
to that because it is important to have a little understanding 
of the history of the part 810.
    Senator Kaine. Part 810. These are part 810 authorizations 
that we are talking about. Correct?
    Secretary Perry. That is correct. These go all the way back 
to the 1970s, about the same time that the Department of Energy 
was created in 1977.
    Frankly, I think the word ``secret'' is what gets everybody 
spun up when they see the word ``secret'' in there. What we are 
talking about here is something that goes on every day in this 
town and across the country.
    Senator Kaine. If I can lead the witness a little bit, I do 
understand these part 810 authorizations are common. They have 
happened for a long time. The Reuters story suggests, though, 
that in the past, part 810 authorizations have been publicly 
available to be reviewed at the Department of Energy office, 
but in this case, these six authorizations have not been 
subject to any review by the public.
    Secretary Perry. Here is what I will suggest to you, is 
that the proprietary information that these companies, these 
U.S. companies, that are going to be doing this work want to 
keep that proprietary information from being out in the public 
domain. I totally understand that. When we were governors, our 
business model from time to time--well, not from time to time, 
generally speaking, they were not interested in putting out and 
having their competitors look at it.
    Senator Kaine. Let me not ask anything about any 
proprietary information. I do not want to do that.
    Is it accurate, though, that six part 810 authorizations 
have been issued to American companies to do this prep work for 
a potential nuclear power deal with Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary Perry. Well, since January of 2017, here is what 
I think is really pretty important from my perspective.
    Senator Kaine. How about just really quick. Is it true that 
six part 810 authorizations have been issued to companies----
    Secretary Perry. Here is what is true. Since 2017, there 
have been 65 applications for part 810's, and we have issued 37 
of them, with nine of them to the Middle East.
    Senator Kaine. Okay, and six to Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary Perry. That is correct, and two to Jordan.
    Senator Kaine. When was the last one issued? Give me the 
date. You said since 2017. When was the last one done to Saudi 
Arabia?
    Secretary Perry. Let me get back with you on that.
    Senator Kaine. Do you know whether or not it was done 
before or after October 2, 2018?
    Secretary Perry. I do not. I do not want to give you a date 
specific.
    Senator Kaine. That was a date that a constituent of mine, 
a Virginia resident, was murdered, Jamal Khashoggi, by the 
Saudi Government in a Saudi consulate in Istanbul. I would be 
very interested to see whether the United States was signing 
deals, part 810 authorizations, to enable nuclear work for 
Saudi Arabia after that date.
    Secretary Perry. We will get you that specific date.
    Senator Kaine. We will ask that for the record, the record 
of all six of the authorizations.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The international commercial nuclear power industry is a 
highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low 
number of competitors, even the name of a company and the 
market they are competing in can be harmful to an American 
company seeking to market their products. Certain companies can 
be easily identified by the technology associated with them, 
thus revealing the name or technology associated with such a 
company would reveal that they were competing in a certain 
market.
    Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the 
information in question, the Department has been working with 
Congress to provide access to this information in the 
appropriate setting and manner.

    Senator Kaine. Let me switch topics quickly.
    The Department of the Navy is recommending that the USS 
Harry S. Truman be decommissioned rather than overhauled in the 
next few years. I serve on the Seapower Subcommittee of this 
Committee. We had a hearing about this yesterday. Has the 
Department of Energy been given any direction to fund or plan 
for the decommissioning of the Truman?
    Secretary Perry. Let me let the Administrator have a bite 
at that.
    Senator Kaine. Indeed.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. What I could say, Senator Kaine, 
is that obviously part of that comes under the Office of Naval 
Reactors, which falls under NNSA. I can get back to you on that 
information to let you know specifically what we are providing.
    Senator Kaine. That would be helpful. It would not be 
surprising I think. There is just a little bit of an effect in 
the SASC budget this year on it, and it may be that the DOE 
portion of it would be downstream from fiscal year 2020. I am 
just curious to see whether there has been any instruction 
given to DOE about potential decommissioning. If so, what 
effect would that have on the budget? I will ask that question 
for the record.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    Senator Scott?
    Senator Scott. Secretary Perry and Under Secretary Gordon-
Hagerty, thank you for being here and thank you for your hard 
work. I know it is a lot of work to get done, what everyone 
expects you to do.
    I want to thank Secretary Perry for not running for 
reelection in 2014. I was never able to beat you in job 
creation in my first 4 years as Governor, but your departure 
was welcomed and we were able to beat you for quite a bit. I 
hope you appreciated those phone calls every month when I let 
you know how we were doing.
    Secretary Perry, the National Defense Strategy focused on 
our national security efforts, more on the threats of China and 
Russia. How does the National Nuclear Security 
Administration's--how do you address these threats through your 
mission and programs?
    Secretary Perry. Senator, thank you.
    The NNSA, as I said in my opening remarks, keeping our 
nuclear deterrent at a position that clearly modernizes it, 
clearly sends the message that the United States is going to 
defend itself against any threats. That is one aspect of what 
the Department is involved with.
    I will suggest to you an equally important part of this is 
through some of the work that goes on at our national labs in 
the super computing side of things. The ability to protect the 
grid against any attacks that could come from a cyber 
standpoint--statutorily the Department of Energy is the sector-
specific agency that deals with that. The Idaho National Lab 
and the grid, the test grid, that they have there is a great 
example of that. Our super computing en route to exoscale 
computing, the first exoscale machine will be at the Argonne 
Laboratory, up and running by 2021. Then we have the number 
one, number two fastest computers in the world, most powerful 
computers in the world today at Oak Ridge in Tennessee and at 
Lawrence Livermore. When that Argonne facility in Chicago comes 
up--its name is Aurora--then we will be at the exoscale level. 
Senator Cotton, you know the importance from a cryptology 
standpoint, the ability for us to use our super computing 
capacity and abilities.
    I will suggest to you those are two of the things, Senator 
Scott, that DOE is directly involved with. What Lisa has over 
on her side of the house is the single most important part of 
our deterrent, but also our ability to serve multiple agencies 
of government, whether it is the DOD, whether it is the 
Secretary of State, whether it is the other three letter 
agencies of government, with our cryptology, with our ability 
of using the super computers that the Department operate in 
that National Security Council (NSC) environment, DOE plays a 
monumental role in the acquisition, interpretation, and other 
engagements that are very important to sending the message to 
those who would not necessarily have America's best interests 
in mind, that we are prepared, we are substantially engaged, 
and we have both offensive and defensive capabilities to keep 
this country free and secure.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    The budget that you propose--is that sufficient for you to 
meet your needs?
    Secretary Perry. Yes.
    Senator Scott. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Scott.
    Senator Heinrich?
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    Secretary, I would like to ask you about the role of the 
Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB). I have to say 
that I am hearing from communities in New Mexico that DOE's 
unilateral revision of Order 140.1 will significantly affect 
the board's ability to meet its statutory oversight 
responsibilities at NNSA and the EM facilities, including 
obviously the three in New Mexico.
    In light of this new order, talk to me about how you can 
assure me of your commitment to preserving both the board's 
oversight responsibility but, more importantly, to ensure 
public health and safety for workers and for local communities 
around the complex.
    Secretary Perry. Senator Heinrich, thank you.
    I do not think there is a more important relationship 
between the Department of Energy than through the labs, through 
the contractors with the local communities. I will say having 
the great privilege over the last year, I think last fall I 
visited the 17th of the 17 labs and to be in those communities 
to see the great support that comes from the communities to the 
labs--and it is one of our goals to make sure that that is the 
case, recognizing the highly technical work and sometimes the 
contentious public issues that come out of whether it is on the 
weapons side or what have you--
     Senator Heinrich. Why change the order when you had built 
up all that credibility with the local communities?
    Secretary Perry. I do not think we have. You know, there 
may be certain individuals who think that we like to do it the 
way that we have always done it. What I have always found was 
that anytime you kind of make a change in the way things have 
historically run, somebody is going to go, wait a minute, I am 
losing some of my authority, I am losing some of my what have 
you.
    But what I would like to do is I would like to get Lisa to 
weigh in here as well and share with you her aspect of it.
    I think it is very healthy to have conversations about here 
is why we are going to change this and have that public input, 
and I think we are having that. I think we are having some good 
back and forth on this and find a reasonable solution.
    But if I may, Senator, can I ask Lisa to----
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Senator.
    Senator Heinrich. Good morning.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. First of all, let me say that the 
DOE order is just updating a 17-year-old order that is, quite 
frankly, antiquated. What it does is it more clearly defines 
the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Energy 
where it is related to the independent oversight of the Defense 
Nuclear Facility Safety Board. We enjoy a very strong and solid 
relationship and continue to have one with the DNFSB, and we 
continue to interact with them.
    However, we do need to clearly define and redefine the 
responsibilities of Department of Energy because if in fact 
health and safety situations do occur, the roles and 
responsibilities and the accountability rests solely with the 
Department of Energy and NNSA and not with the Defense Board. 
So that is what we are looking at.
    Senator Heinrich. Administrator, I do not want to cut you 
off, but I am really getting short on time here. So I do want 
to pivot real quickly and ask the Secretary one more quick 
question, which is, Secretary, you mentioned the Manhattan 
Project, which is something we are incredibly proud of in New 
Mexico and the role that we played in it. But 75 years later, 
we still have not cleaned up all the waste. Once again this 
year, in the proposed budget, there is a $25 million cut to 
that cleanup. Why cut cleanup at Los Alamos?
    Secretary Perry. Senator, I will share with you that some 
of the reductions on the EM side is because we have 
successfully been able to make some cleanups and finish those 
and transitioning over to some others.
    Senator Heinrich. That is not the case here, though, 
because the more we stretch this out, I mean, we could be there 
for another 20 years or we could be there for a much shorter 
period of time. So I just want you to know that I will work 
with Senator Udall to, once again, restore that funding like we 
did last year. But we are making good progress. We have a new 
contractor on board. This is an opportunity to show to the 
State, to whom commitments have been made, that we are going to 
keep those commitments. So I would just urge you to look at 
that.
    Secretary Perry. We will, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Cramer?
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, 
for being with us today and, of course, for your ongoing 
access. It is really very helpful.
    If there is time at the end, I will maybe get into some 
plutonium pit production questions, but it sounds like we have 
covered it pretty effectively.
    So let me focus, first of all, on something that is very 
important specifically to my home State of North Dakota, and 
that is warhead modernization efforts. Obviously, it is 
important to us in Minot. Our B-52's, of course, carry the 
long-range standoff weapons, and then of course, the ICBMs and 
whatever might replace them. They are both hosted at Minot. 
They really are depending on getting the new warheads on 
schedule so that we can continue to provide the strategic 
deterrence that our country and our allies need and depend on.
    Let me just put it real straightforward. I am going to 
maybe ask three questions in one, Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, and 
then you can answer all of them probably in one breath.
    If you were forced to delay, for example, the W84, what 
would the impact of the program be--on the program be? Would it 
introduce challenges to integration with the LRSO [Long Range 
Stand Off]? Likewise, would there be similar concerns with a 
delay in the W87-1 as it relates to our Minuteman III's and 
future ground-based systems? I will just open the door for you 
to walk through that and answer.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Certainly. Thank you, Senator 
Cramer.
    Yes, obviously, our programs are all--all five of our 
modernization programs are currently on cost and on schedule, 
and they are completely aligned with our customer, the 
Department of Defense. If we see any slippage whatsoever in any 
of our programs, that could obviously affect or impact and will 
impact the LRSO or the GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent] 
programs--excuse me--the W80-4 or the 78 replacement programs. 
Again, we are thoroughly aligned with the Air Force right now 
and with the Department of Defense. So we need the additional 
funding, the resources necessary to continue those programs so 
they are on schedule, on budget so we can deliver them on time 
to the Department of Defense.
    Senator Cramer. Any chance of doing it faster than that?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We have our challenges, and of 
course, as Senator Reed had said, we are busier than we have 
been the 1980s. We are working every possible way to slim up 
the margins to do whatever we can to move faster, quicker, and 
speedier, as General Hyten often likes to say. We are 
thoroughly aligned with the Air Force, and where we can make 
commitments to improve those processes and those timelines, we 
will do so. But we are working as closely as we can with the 
Air Force to make sure that we can deliver on our commitments.
    Senator Cramer. Secretary Perry, anything you would want to 
add to that?
    Secretary Perry. Well, I will just say that they restarted 
phase 6, which activates the W87-1 modification program. That 
obviously supports the ground-based strategic deterrent.
    Again, I am comfortable that the funding stream is 
appropriate.
    Here is my concern, is if the Department gets tasked with 
some other areas--and I will make reference to what is going on 
in North Korea. Knock on wood, if that goes forward and we get 
tasked with verification issues and what have you, DOE would 
play a very, very leading role in a verification of the weapons 
that are there and then the obvious next steps past that. Were 
that to be the case, then I would remind this Committee that 
the funding that would be required for DOE to take those 
additional duties on would be substantial, and at that 
particular point in time, Administrator Gordon-Hagerty's job 
becomes incredibly challenging. I have total faith that she can 
keep a lot of balls in the air at one time, but just looking 
out over the horizon, sir, and saying here is what you need to 
be prepared for, something coming out of left field that you 
may not have had in your line item that was not funded for, 
that is one that I think, Mr. Chairman, we need to kind of just 
keep in the back of our mind. If this goes forward, the DOE's 
requirement will be substantial, incredibly important, and it 
could affect our other programs as we are trying to get those 
addressed as well.
    Senator Cramer. Secretary Perry, thank you for that 
observation and for that warning because would we not all love 
to be able to have too much to do with regard to the Korean 
Peninsula?
    Secretary Perry. It would be a good problem to have.
    Senator Cramer. It sure would. But I, like you, am 
confident that Secretary Gordon-Hagerty is capable of a lot of 
multi-tasking. That has been my observation. I thank you both 
for keeping the main thing the main thing. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
    Senator Blumenthal?
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome to you both and thank you for your service.
    I want to ask a question about fuel cells. As you know, 
they are highly efficient and clean technology that use 
domestically available resources to advance our security goals 
and efforts to create a more resilient and reliant source of 
electricity generation.
    In Connecticut, the United States Navy has agreed to 
install a 7.5 megawatt fuel cell park on the United States 
submarine base in New London, which is home to about 16 fast 
attack submarines. This move is going to provide a very cost 
effective source of power to the base that will advance long-
term grid independence and power resiliency. As you know, the 
solid oxide fuel cell program within the Office of Fossil 
Energy at the Department of Energy supports the advancement and 
eventual full scale deployment of fuel cell technologies. The 
Navy has been a leader in this effort, so has the military in 
general, using fuel cells as sources of energy in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere.
    Could you tell me, Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the 
solid oxide fuel cell program at the Department of Energy?
    Secretary Perry. Senator, we have got a lot of different 
alternative energy programs that we are working on. That is 
obviously one of them, and both at PNNL [Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory] and at some of our other labs, we are 
doing work on the fuel cell side of things.
    Our advanced--I will shift gears on you just a little bit, 
but micro-reactors, another area that held some extraordinary 
potential for the future. I think it is one of the reasons that 
both basic research and applied research----
    One of the things that we have done over at the Department 
is we have created a chief commercialization officer to be able 
to take some of these technologies like you speak about here, 
be able to take them from their inception and commercialize 
them. It is one of the things that I am proud of although we 
have had discussions in this Committee and other committees 
about budgetary items over at the Department and what the 
priorities are, but from my historic perspective, one of the 
great gifts that we have at the Department of Energy is being 
able to take the research in many areas and commercialize that 
and make it available to the general public and in many cases, 
obviously, for our military as well.
    Senator Blumenthal. Will you commit to spending the full 
$30 million that the fiscal year 2019 budget appropriated to 
fuel cell development, the solid oxide program, for fuel cell 
development?
    Secretary Perry. That is our intention, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Coming back to the transfer potentially 
of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, I think Senator Kaine 
asked you whether any part of the 810 authorizations were 
signed after October 2, 2018. Would you not know that sitting 
here now?
    Secretary Perry. No, sir, I would not. We sign a lot of 
papers, and I have got a pretty good memory but to remember 
every date that I sign a piece of paper might be above my 
ability to recall, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Although that is a pretty significant 
piece of paper.
    Secretary Perry. I understand that. But, again, asking me 
to recall when I signed a particular piece of paper, when I 
sign literally thousands of pieces of paper, might be just 
above my ability to recall, sir.
    Here is what I can share with you--I will get it to you and 
you will have it post haste, and we can see whether or not it 
meets the timeline of what you asked.
    Senator Blumenthal. But you are concerned about the 
transfer of that technology in light of the Crown Prince's 
refusal to agree to any prohibitions on enriching uranium or 
reprocessing of spent fuel.
    Secretary Perry. What I am concerned about is any country 
that is going to not go forward with nonproliferation. Here is 
what I am really concerned about, Senator, is that if the 
United States is not the partner with Saudi Arabia, for that 
matter, Jordan, which is the other country that we have signed 
810's with, and they go to Russia and China for their civil 
nuclear technology, their civil nuclear partners, I can assure 
you that those two countries do not give a tinker's damn about 
nonproliferation. That is why we continue to work very, very 
diligently to try to bring those countries that want to develop 
civil nuclear programs into the sphere of the United States 
because we are committed to nonproliferation. We got a history 
of nonproliferation, and nobody in the world will do it better 
than us. It is very, very important for the world, for the 
Middle East, for the United States to be the partner in as many 
of these development of civil nuclear energy programs as we can 
be.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator King?
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, we have been promising the American people 
for 70 years a solution to the storage problem of high-level 
nuclear waste. We have not managed it yet. Governor, perhaps 
you want to take this one. But where are we? This is one of the 
reservations that people have about the future development of 
nuclear power is how do we responsibly tell people that we can 
manage this issue without having what amounts to 100 or more 
high-level nuclear waste sites scattered all over the country 
because that is what we have now.
    Secretary Perry. Senator King, thank you.
    It does seem to be the issue that has vexed this country 
for a long time. There are two different issues here, two 
different problems I guess. There is a technical issue with 
where are you going to put this high-level waste, and there is 
a political challenge.
    Senator King. Which is also radioactive.
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary Perry. My role is to find a solution, and we had 
a conversation yesterday with the Senate appropriators in a 
public forum about getting together over the course of the next 
2 weeks and talk about what some of those options are. If Yucca 
is not going to be one of the sites, if WIPP [Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant], which Senator Heinrich represents, is going to 
limit, where are the other options? Well, there is a site in 
far west Texas that has historically been open and supportive 
of waste coming into that part of the State of Texas. That is 
an option.
    Here is what is important. If we are going to find a 
solution for storage, Congress must act. You are going to have 
to change the statute. Today the only entity that can take 
possession of high-level waste is the Department of Energy. If 
you are going to have an option to that, you are going to have 
to change the statute. The statute is going to have to allow 
for private sector entities to be able to take possession of 
that. For instance, if it were to go to a place like Andrews, 
Texas waste control specialist, you have to change the law. You 
have to continue to fund the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) to be able to get those licensings processes forward. You 
have a real challenge on your hand.
    But let me leave you with this. If you do not act, by not 
acting, you are saying that we have permanent high-level waste 
repositories in the United States and they are in 39 of your 
States.
    Senator King. Including one in my State of Maine.
    Secretary Perry. Yes, sir. It is a pretty stunning map to 
look at, Senator King, when you look at the 39 States that have 
high-level waste in them. I will suggest to you we have a moral 
responsibility to get that waste out of these States, to get it 
to secure, appropriate sites. That is the map. Every one of 
those red States has high-level waste. I do not think that is 
what the American people want. I do not think what the men and 
women sitting around your dais today want. But we have some 
hard decisions to make as a country about are we going to go 
forward with a high-level waste repository, or are we going to 
have interim storage? Hopefully the men and women of Congress 
can deal with this and deal with it in a short period of time.
    Senator King. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your 
commitment to continue working on this problem because it not 
only is a commitment based upon existing sites, as you talked 
about, but it is impairing the ability to even think about 
future nuclear development if we cannot tell our citizens that 
the waste problem has been dealt with.
    I am running out of time. Madam Secretary, maybe for the 
record, you could supply for us some thinking about how we 
deter a nuclear attack by a non-state actor. My concern is that 
traditional concepts of deterrence work on a nation state, but 
they do not necessarily work on a group of 30 people who are 
ready to die anyway. Deterrence has been at the core of our 
nuclear strategy. How do we cope with the idea of a non-state 
group getting the technology from a rogue regime that has it? I 
understand we have got to talk about intelligence. We have got 
to talk about interdiction. So for the record, my time has 
expired. If you would supply a page or so on that, that would 
be helpful.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The U.S. Government's approach to countering nuclear 
terrorism recognizes the difficulty of deterring non-state 
actors through the means that have traditionally been used to 
deter hostile states, that is, threatening overwhelming 
reprisal in response to a nuclear attack. The National Strategy 
for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, released 
by the White House in December 2018, captures this conundrum, 
noting that threats of retaliation do not resonate among 
fanatics who do not value human life, including their own, who 
may lack sanctuary to occupy or destroy, and who may even 
welcome retaliation as a means of galvanizing popular support. 
Consequently, the U.S. strategy for deterring nuclear terrorism 
is comprised of two central elements: (1) attempting to 
convince terrorists that a nuclear attack against the United 
States would be unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, and (2) 
deterring foreign governments from providing support to would-
be nuclear terrorists.
    The United States undertakes multiple efforts to persuade 
non-state actors that a nuclear attack would be prohibitively 
difficult. First, the U.S. Government expends significant 
resources around the world consolidating, securing, and when 
possible eliminating the nuclear materials necessary to 
construct an improvised nuclear device, with priority given to 
materials that are at highest risk of acquisition and use by 
non-state actors. Similar efforts are undertaken to eliminate 
disused radioactive materials or better secure materials still 
needed for medical and other applications. In addition to the 
intrinsic value of these programs, which have dramatically 
improved global nuclear security, a secondary benefit is to 
nurture the perception that these materials are simply too 
difficult to acquire. This perception may in turn persuade 
terrorists to pursue less lethal attack modes.
    Second, the United States fields a variety of domestic and 
international defenses against nuclear terrorism and actively 
messages these capabilities in various media. For example, the 
U.S. Government has installed hundreds of radiation portal 
monitors at foreign seaports and border crossings around the 
world, complicating the ability of illicit smugglers and 
terrorists to move nuclear material from its point of origin to 
the United States. At home, the U.S. Government also vigorously 
scans for radiation at airports, seaports, and other ports of 
entry. Additionally, specialized capabilities are maintained to 
search for, interdict, characterize, and disable terrorist 
nuclear devices. The fact that these assets are strategically 
pre-positioned throughout the country to respond to nuclear 
incidents is consistently advertised as part of a conscious 
strategy to deter non-state actors from attempting a nuclear 
attack.
    The second pillar of the United States' deterrence strategy 
is to dissuade hostile foreign states from providing nuclear 
material, equipment, and expertise to would-be nuclear 
terrorists. This objective requires advanced nuclear forensics 
capabilities to identify the source of material used in a 
nuclear device and thereby help attribute state support for an 
act of nuclear terrorism. These capabilities may also induce 
states to augment their nuclear security practices, lest an 
inadvertent loss of material be perceived as an act of willful 
assistance to terrorists. Like U.S. defenses, the existence of 
nuclear forensics capabilities are actively messaged using a 
variety of media platforms.
    In tandem with forensics tools, the United States has 
consistently issued declaratory policy to identify the severe 
consequences that would result if a hostile state facilitated a 
terrorist nuclear attack against U.S. interests. To wit, the 
2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) pointedly states that the 
United States will hold fully accountable any state, terrorist 
group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables 
terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices. Further 
amplifying this message, the NPR notes that our adversaries 
must understand that a terrorist nuclear attack against the 
United States or its allies and partners would qualify as an 
extreme circumstance' under which the United States could 
consider the ultimate form of retaliation an unambiguous 
reference to the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation 
against such states.
    Although deterrence of non-state actors and potential 
foreign patrons is merely one dimension of the United States' 
strategy to counter nuclear terrorism, these efforts represent 
an important element of the Nation's defense-in-depth against 
this grave threat.
    Additional information on the U.S. Government's approach to 
deterring nuclear terrorism can be provided in a classified 
setting.

    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Blackburn?
    Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Perry, I will begin by saying thank you so much 
for the attention you have given to Oak Ridge and to Y-12 and 
being on the ground there. It is noted and it is appreciated. 
We hope that you will come back often. Good things are 
happening there that are important to both our energy and our 
military, our complex.
    When we were looking at the Nuclear Posture Review, it was 
talking about the age of the infrastructure. Forty years old is 
primarily the age of the infrastructure, a quarter of which 
dates back to the Manhattan Project, and at Y-12 at that 
national security complex, in 2014--and I know you have visited 
there--chunks of concrete weighing up to 20 pounds fell from 
the ceiling of building 9024. Fortunately, no one was injured. 
It was good timing, if you will, that left workers not being 
injured, which is fortunate. But that is a building that was 
built in 1944, still operational today.
    Then we had noticed in the annual site environment report a 
statement on this building, building 9024, and I am quoting, 
that it has degraded to the point that repair is no longer an 
option. Other deferred maintenance such as inoperable air 
conditioning equipment causing recurrent lost work days and 
critical fire and emergency operations crowded into too small 
facilities that would be rendered inaccessible in critical 
security events are unacceptable.
    So you look at this. Should site report on some of our most 
critical infrastructure and the national security enterprise 
contain the term ``World War II vintage buildings''? I wish 
that you would spend a couple of minutes for the benefit of our 
Tennessee constituents there working at Oak Ridge and at Y-12. 
Talk a little bit about what is needed with the backlog of 
maintenance. Have you arrested the growth of deferred 
maintenance? Kind of give a little bit of perspective on this. 
Then if you will refer to what will be your implementation plan 
and how do you intend to ensure that all of these projects are 
attended to.
    Secretary Perry. Senator, thank you very much. Just for the 
record, I will be out at Oak Ridge the first week of May for an 
ex-lab.
    Senator Blackburn. You are going to be welcomed.
    Secretary Perry. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Blackburn. They will look forward to having you 
there.
    Secretary Perry. It is a great facility. I hope everyone 
has the opportunity to go. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I 
am remiss in not having tendered an invitation to every Member 
of the Committee to come to one of the national labs of their 
choice, or if we could pick one for them, it would be an 
extraordinary event for them. It is the most enlightening, 
exciting thing I have done to go be engaged in these national 
labs and none more intriguing, interesting, nor has a greater 
history than Oak Ridge National Lab, ``The Girls of Atomic 
City,'' the ladies who helped with the Manhattan Project, a 
really fascinating book that I know you have.
    But let me address directly your question about--in fiscal 
year 2016 and 2017, NNSA--they stopped the growth of the 
deferred maintenance for the first time in nearly a decade. For 
fiscal year 2019 funding and certainly in this budget, 2020 
requested, will help NNSA to begin decreasing the deferred 
maintenance that you very vividly laid out here. We are 
committed to implementing the infrastructure modernization 
initiative as directed in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act to reduce NNSA's deferred maintenance backlog 
by no less than 30 percent by 2025. So I hope there is some----
    Senator Blackburn. So what I am hearing you say is that 
NNSA turns the corner on this in 2020.
    Secretary Perry. Correct.
    Senator Blackburn. Correct, okay. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Warren?
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to pick up on a point that Senator Reed raised. Last 
month, the House Oversight Committee issued a report detailing 
attempts by the Trump Administration officials to fast track 
the transfer of sensitive American nuclear technology to Saudi 
Arabia. Now, career ethics officials advised against this 
transfer, and they said such a transaction would be illegal 
without review by Congress. We know this happened because 
whistleblowers came forward to sound the alarm.
    Secretary Perry, you are referenced nine times in the House 
Oversight Committee's report, which describes how you and other 
administration officials pushed the Saudi Government to buy 
nuclear reactors from American companies, including 
Westinghouse by name.
    This is a serious matter, and Congress is right to demand 
answers here. You lead the Energy Department. So let me ask, 
how many documents has your Department provided to the House 
Oversight Committee in response to its investigation into this 
matter?
    Secretary Perry. Senator, let me get back with you on the 
information.
    Senator Warren. Well, it is a matter actually of public 
record. The answer is zero. Your Department has produced zero 
documents to the House Oversight Committee and its 
investigation.
    I think the Energy Department should cooperate fully in 
this investigation. So I have a few more questions about it.
    Secretary Perry, do you agree that any agreement to 
transfer our nuclear materials, facilities, or sensitive 
technology to Saudi Arabia requires congressional review?
    Secretary Perry. I am going to follow the law, whatever the 
law may be.
    Senator Warren. Well, I would like to know that you know 
what the law is here.
    Secretary Perry. I am going to follow the law, Senator.
    Senator Warren. The law is it requires congressional 
review. Are we clear on that?
    Secretary Perry. Then I think you and I both agree.
    Senator Warren. Are you just now learning that that is the 
law?
    Secretary Perry. No, ma'am. I am just agreeing with you, 
Senator.
    Senator Warren. Okay. So you understand that is the law, 
that Congress has to approve before the Saudis can get nuclear 
material.
    Secretary Perry. Senator, if you have any evidence that the 
Department of Energy has not followed that, I would be----
    Senator Warren. I just want to make sure that we are clear 
going forward here while you are out there pushing this. Under 
U.S. law, any civilian nuclear cooperation or 123 agreement 
with a foreign country must meet nine specific requirements to 
ensure that nuclear material cannot be reprocessed or enriched 
to build a bomb. You seem more focused on pushing the Saudi 
Government to hire companies like Westinghouse to build 
reactors than you do on working with Congress to nail down an 
agreement that will prevent the Saudis from developing a 
nuclear weapon.
    At a committee hearing in the House last May, you said that 
you told the Saudi Crown Prince that if he wants the world's 
best nuclear reactors, then, quote, you have to use 
Westinghouse.
    So let me just make sure we are clear on this. Secretary 
Perry, do you agree that any agreement to transfer our 
sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia should ensure that 
they cannot use that technology to develop a nuclear weapon no 
matter which company makes the reactors or how high their 
profits might be?
    Secretary Perry. I agree.
    Senator Warren. Okay, good, because at a minimum, I expect 
the Trump Administration to follow the law when it comes to any 
potential civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi 
Arabia. Any agreement must ensure that there can be no 
reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear material without our 
prior approval.
    Frankly, I think it is a bad idea to even consider 
transferring our sensitive nuclear technology to the Saudi 
Government. This is a government that continues to fuel a 
humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The Saudi Crown Prince ordered 
the brutal murder of journalist Khashoggi. The last thing we 
should be doing is giving the Saudi Government the tools to 
produce nuclear weapons.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Senator Hawley?
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Thank you, Secretary Perry and Under Secretary, for being 
here.
    I want to first start off by saying that, of course, we are 
very proud that in my home State we are proud of the 
partnership we have with the NNSA, Under Secretary, dating 
back, of course, to the Second World War, but on display now 
with the new Kansas City National Security Campus, which we are 
very, very proud of. It employs over 4,000 people in the State 
of Missouri, manufactures, assembles, and procures 85 percent 
of the non-nuclear parts of the U.S. nuclear weapons. We are 
very proud of that. Of course, that is just the tip of the 
iceberg in terms of the service that that facility renders to 
the United States.
    I thank you for your leadership, both of you, on this and 
look forward to working together to ensure that that Kansas 
City campus continues to have what it needs to advance its 
important mission. So thank you for that.
    Let me ask you, Under Secretary, talking about research 
here for a moment. Given the prior administration, the Obama 
Administration's efforts to reduce the nuclear stockpile, 
constrain research and development for nuclear weapons, do you 
feel that--and nuclear components--do you feel that you have 
the resources and the authorities that you need in order to 
carry out the research and development that is important as we 
make the shifts outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Good morning, Senator Hawley. It 
is nice to hear such complementary words of Kansas City and we 
do. KCNSC [Kansas City National Security Campus] is one of the 
proud eight locations in the NNSA. So your words resonate with 
us and with our entire workforce. So thank you.
    With regard to the nuclear stockpile, our research and 
development testing, all the programs that we need to underpin 
our weapons activities, to modernize our nuclear weapons 
stockpile, I believe that the request that we are making in the 
fiscal year 2020 budget will certainly support our initiatives 
going forward. However, we have more priorities than there are 
resources.
    We have done considerable work in racking and stacking, if 
you will, what the near-term priorities are and also putting us 
in a place where we do not find ourselves in the position we 
are today where we are focusing strategically on what the tools 
are that are necessary to maintain our nuclear deterrent, as 
well as plan for the future.
    Senator Hawley. Yes. Thank you.
    I mentioned the Nuclear Posture Review and let me just stay 
with that for a moment. The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes 
low-yield capabilities, particularly modifying the small number 
of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles and other 
low-yield options to ensure that potential adversaries perceive 
no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation. That is a 
quote.
    Do you agree with this assessment on the utility of low-
yield capabilities and the absolutely invaluable deterrent 
potential that they provide?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes, I do.
    Senator Hawley. Would you agree that having the flexibility 
of these weapons that they provide is essential to keeping this 
country safe and strong?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes.
    Senator Hawley. Tell us about what more you need in order 
to ensure that, again, the priorities outlined in the NPR go 
forward here and that we continue to develop and modernize the 
triad to continue to keep this country safe.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We continue to need stable and 
predictable funding. That is first and foremost our biggest 
requirement.
    With that, that does not only just modernize our stockpile. 
What it does is it modernizes the infrastructure and do the 
recapitalization that has been long necessary. As many people 
have noted, more than 30 percent of our entire enterprise is 
more than 60 years old. That is clearly unacceptable that we 
put our workforce, our very dedicated workforce of 44,000 men 
and women across our nuclear security enterprise in a situation 
where we might be working eventually in untenable conditions. 
We tried to minimize that situation, but with a broad, robust, 
and continued support in funding from the Congress, which we 
have seen for the last year or 2, that predictable and stable 
funding is what we need to continue to ensure that our nuclear 
deterrent remains second to none.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you for that.
    Secretary Perry, let me just ask you. As we think about the 
priorities outlined in the NPR, we know that Russia, who the 
National Defense Strategy identifies as a peer competitor--they 
have been investing in lower-yield nuclear weapons and, of 
course, their famous escalate to deescalate strategy. Can you 
talk a little bit about our cooperation with our NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and how that is going in 
aligning our nuclear priorities to ensure that NATO is 
resilient and ready to address Russia's advances?
    Secretary Perry. Senator, our relationship with our NATO 
allies from my perspective as I travel in Europe and I am 
generally talking to them about buying American liquefied 
natural gas, talking to them about how to have multiple 
options, a diversity of fuels, a diversity of suppliers, a 
diversity of routes, and as those conversations take place, 
what I have observed is that we have a very, very strong 
relationship with our NATO allies. They recognize our very 
important role, particularly on being able to deliver our 
energy to them. There has never been a time in history, or 
certainly in my history, that the United States has been in a 
stronger position to be able to support our allies with a 
source of energy that will give them the option of whether or 
not they are required to buy that energy from Russia. That is a 
very, very powerful tool and I will suggest to you one of the 
most powerful geopolitical tools that we have in our toolbox 
today.
    So our NATO allies--not only they respect us for whatwe 
have done over the last 75 years, but also what we are doing 
today. I can assure you that Poland and the work that is being 
done in Poland building LNG [liquefied natural gas] import 
facilities, buying United States LNG is a powerful deterrent to 
Russia, and it is a very comforting work that is being done 
that our allies in Europe see and recognize that we are more 
than willing to continue to deliver this diversified energy 
source to them.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Jones?
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary and our witnesses today. I really 
appreciate you being here.
    Secretary Perry, just a quick question about a GAO 
[Government Accountability Office] report that was released in 
December of 2018. It laid out some criticism for how the 
Department of Energy and NNSA handles recording and sharing of 
lessons learned from mainly capital asset projects, claiming 
that not all the lessons are documented consistently or shared 
in a timely manner, which has led to cost and schedule 
inefficiencies. Additionally, the report found that these 
lessons were not accessible to other relevant staff.
    Have you had a chance to look at that? Do you agree with 
that, or can you address whether or not the Department has 
taken steps to address those concerns?
    Secretary Perry. With your permission, could I ask the 
Administrator to address that? That is really more over her 
specific shop.
    Senator Jones. Absolutely. Wherever we can get the best, 
that is fine with me. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Yes, ma'am.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Thank you.
    We are constantly trying to improve our processes and 
procedures. We have come off of a number of different places, 
off our high-risk list that GAO has put together. We are 
undertaking best practices. We are taking that particular issue 
about how we can categorize and also codify, if you will, so 
that we can share best practices and lessons learned throughout 
our entire NNSA, and we are sharing those capabilities with the 
rest of the Department. So, yes, we are taking all of those 
recommendations under consideration by GAO, and we are finding 
ways of putting together and improving our best practices 
program so we can share those lessons learned.
    There is nothing worse than finding ourselves in a 
situation where we are repeating the problems that we have had 
in the past. We have got a robust program through our Office of 
Acquisition and Project Management that are undertaking those 
efforts, and across our entire enterprise, we are undertaking 
that effort.
    We also have a closer effort at home that we have 
undertaken in the last 6 months to capture lessons learned on 
very specific projects and see how we can affect the rest of 
the complex with those types of improvements that we are making 
from the lessons learned of the past.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much for 
that.
    Either of you can answer this as well. In October, the NNSA 
collaborated I think with British, Norwegian, and Chinese 
experts to remove highly enriched uranium from a research 
reactor in Nigeria that proliferation experts have long warned 
could be a target for terrorists.
    Can you talk about the impact a little bit about that 
operation and if there is potential to do similar type 
operations even with folks like China and Russia where we are 
not always on the same side?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The example that you cite, 
Senator Jones, is a great news story. We have worked with the 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], with Nigeria, and 
China to repatriate Chinese origin material. So what we did was 
we actually refueled the reactor in Nigeria with low-enriched 
uranium, a proliferation-resistant fuel, and repatriated the 
material to China. It is a huge success story, and it happened 
over a number of years.
    I am heartened to say that we have done that and we had 
those commitments and have done 33 type of reactors, plus 
Taiwan. Thirty-three countries now have low-enriched uranium 
fuel reactors where we have repatriated or sent the material to 
the origin of the highly enriched uranium. These are great 
nonproliferation success stories, and we continue to pursue 
opportunities like that throughout the world.
    Secretary Perry. Great. Thank you, Senator. If I could just 
add, you really make a great point of recognizing that the 
United States from time to time work with countries that are 
not necessarily our friends or in areas that are in the world's 
interest.
    The questions that I have been asked today about the work 
that we have done with countries who may have historically not 
been in our sphere but we would like to have them in our 
sphere--I have been asked a number of times about Saudi Arabia 
and why you would do business with Saudi Arabia. I think you 
make the absolute great point that if it is not the United 
States that is trying to create civil nuclear programs in 
countries, particularly in the Middle East and in Africa, that 
the potential for nonproliferation--it could be expanded by X 
factor if it is not the United States. From time to time, these 
are countries that do some things that we really are offended 
by, but the potential of proliferation of nuclear materials, if 
the United States is not involved, will be substantially moved 
forward. I think it is our moral responsibility as a country to 
be engaged with this every place we can so that that does not 
happen, the United States and our ability to make sure that 
nonproliferation is being conducted. So thank you.
    Senator Jones. Well, thank you. I know my time is out. I am 
going to follow up and maybe get some information close to 
home. The Bellafont nuclear plant is up for sale, and we have 
got an issue. That is a really important issue to the people in 
my State, and I would like to maybe get an update from you at 
some point----
    Secretary Perry. Consider it done.
    Senator Jones.--about whatever we can do to help to move 
that along. So thank you for that. We will follow up.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. We are going to deviate from a policy I do 
not like to deviate from, and that is one of our Members has 
come back and wanted to ask one more question. We going to make 
an exception. Senator Heinrich, you are recognized.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I wanted to ask the Administrator actually, because we ran 
short on time, about the Mesa facility at Sandia National Labs, 
how we are addressing the long-term need for rad hard 
electronics, how we are going to address that in the short 
term, but also what the plans are to make sure that sort of 
capability is with us in the out-years in or 15 or 20 years as 
well.
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. With regard to the Mesa facility 
at Sandia, we know that we will be able to provide radiation 
hardened electronics for our nuclear weapons stockpile, a 
critical component to our stockpile, through 2040. We are now 
undertaking a robust plan to consider what, if any, challenges 
we will undertake as we look to refurbish, if you will, 
recapitalize or actually modernize our Mesa facility. We are 
making investments into it to make sure that we can maintain 
that facility through 2040, but the time is now to start 
thinking about recapitalizing that capability, a critical 
component, as we have discussed previously. We are also 
speaking with our counterparts in the IC and in the Department 
of Defense about what their needs are. Perhaps there are some 
common themes there, but certainly this is a critical component 
to our stockpile.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Administrator.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    Thank you to our witnesses.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                         energy infrastructure
    1. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, it has been brought to the 
Committee's attention that New England communities are having to import 
natural gas from Russia due to constraints in the northeast. Have 
natural gas shortages effected New England?
    Secretary Perry. For decades, some of New England's natural gas 
demand has been met by liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. Most of 
these imports have been into Exelon's Everett LNG receiving terminal 
near Boston, Massachusetts, but Repsol's Canaport LNG facility (in New 
Brunswick, Canada) and Excelerate's Northeast Gateway Deepwater Port 
LNG import terminal (located offshore of Boston) also provide some of 
the LNG imports that serve the New England market. The vast majority of 
these LNG imports comes from Trinidad and Tobago. In 2018, over 44 
billion cubic feet of natural gas was imported from Trinidad. Also in 
2018, New England received LNG shipments from the United Kingdom and 
France that consisted mostly of re-exported LNG that was produced at 
the Yamal LNG export facility in arctic Russia; the total volume of 
these shipments was 6 billion cubic feet. Similarly, early in 2019, re-
exports of LNG from France that were initially produced at the Yamal 
LNG export facility were imported into the Northeast. The United States 
has never received a direct shipment of LNG from Russia.
    Domestic natural gas production is at record high levels, and the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration projects production to continue 
to increase over the coming decades. U.S. natural gas supplies are 
ample to meet domestic demand, but there are pipeline constraints in 
the Northeast and New England that limit natural gas delivery in the 
region. The impacts of these constraints are felt most acutely during 
very cold weather events during the winter when natural gas demand 
peaks.
    The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) examined the 
impacts on energy markets of the cold weather event known as the ``Bomb 
Cyclone'' that occurred between December 27, 2017, and January 8, 2018. 
\1\ The NETL analysis found a lack of sufficient natural gas pipeline 
infrastructure and the surge in natural gas demand for heating led to 
sharp increases in natural gas spot prices exceeding 300 percent across 
the Northeast. The largest price spike occurred in New York with 
Transco Zone 6 NY spot prices increasing nearly 700 percent during the 
Bomb Cyclone event. \2\ Natural gas spot prices in the independent 
system operator New England (ISO-NE) footprint increased 400 percent 
during the weather event, peaking at over $80 per million British 
thermal units. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ National Energy Technology Laboratory, ``Reliability, 
Resilience and the Oncoming Wave of Retiring Baseload Units,'' March 
13, 2018, available at https://www.netl.doe.gov/ projects/ files/
ReliabilityandtheOncomingWaveofRetiringBaseloadUnitsVolumeITheCriticalRo
leof Thermal Units--031318.pdf
    \2\ Ibid, page 1.
    \3\ Ibid, page 7.

    2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, do you believe this a threat to 
energy security?
    Secretary Perry. Any time we have to rely on imports of energy, it 
can be argued our energy security is diminished. The United States is 
blessed with plentiful energy resources, including abundant supplies of 
coal, oil, and natural gas. Producers in America have demonstrated a 
remarkable ability to harness innovation and to cost-effectively unlock 
new energy supplies, making our country a dominant energy force. Last 
year the United States surpassed production records set nearly 5 
decades ago and is in all likelihood now the largest producer of crude 
oil in the world. The United States is also the world's leading 
producer of natural gas, becoming a net exporter in 2017 for the first 
time since 1957. The United States will continue to be the undisputed 
global leader in crude oil and natural gas production for the 
foreseeable future.
    These robust energy supplies present the United States with 
tremendous economic opportunities. To fully realize this economic 
potential, however, the United States needs infrastructure capable of 
safely and efficiently transporting these plentiful resources to end 
users. Without it, energy costs will rise and the national energy 
market will be stifled, job growth will be hampered, and the 
manufacturing and geopolitical advantages of the United States will 
erode. As described in the previous answer, natural gas prices spike in 
New England during very cold weather events because of the lack of 
sufficient infrastructure to deliver natural gas to the region as 
demand increases. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ National Energy Technology Laboratory, ``Reliability, 
Resilience and the Oncoming Wave of Retiring Baseload Units,'' March 
13, 2018, available at https://www.netl.doe.gov/ projects/files/
ReliabilityandtheOncomingWaveofRetiringBaseloadUnitsVolumeITheCriticalRo
leofThermalUnits --031318.pdf

    3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Perry, would more natural gas 
infrastructure, like pipelines, help get our abundant domestic supply 
to New England so they don't turn to Russia?
    Secretary Perry. Yes. A number of pipelines have been proposed over 
the past several years to deliver natural gas from the prolific 
Marcellus and Utica shale plays to the Northeast and New England. These 
pipelines have faced challenges in securing state regulatory approvals, 
notably the required state certification of water quality under Section 
401 of the Clean Water Act.
    In his executive order ``Promoting Energy Infrastructure and 
Economic Growth,'' President Trump directed the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review Section 401 of the 
Clean Water Act and EPA's related regulations and guidance to determine 
whether any provisions thereof should be clarified to promote private 
investment in the Nation's energy infrastructure. This review will 
focus on:
      The need to promote timely Federal-State cooperation and 
collaboration;
      The appropriate scope of water quality reviews;
      Types of conditions that may be appropriate to include in 
a certification;
      Expectations for reasonable review times for various 
types of certification requests; and
      The nature and scope of information States and authorized 
tribes may need in order to substantively act on a certification 
request within a prescribed period of time.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
            office of cost evaluation and program execution
    4. Senator Reed. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, in the Fiscal Year 2016 
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] we created an Office of Cost 
Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) much like the DOD [Department 
of Defense] has with the Office of Cost Analysis and Program Management 
(CAPE). This was after years of having programs at the NNSA [National 
Nuclear Security Administration] exceed their estimates. Their job is 
to be the counter-balance directly to you on the program managers who 
might be too optimistic. Are you ensuring they have the proper staff 
and resources to carry out their mission?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Yes. A number of pipelines have been 
proposed over the past several years to deliver natural gas from the 
prolific Marcellus and Utica shale plays to the Northeast and New 
England. These pipelines have faced challenges in securing state 
regulatory approvals, notably the required state certification of water 
quality under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.
    In his executive order ``Promoting Energy Infrastructure and 
Economic Growth,'' President Trump directed the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review Section 401 of the 
Clean Water Act and EPA's related regulations and guidance to determine 
whether any provisions thereof should be clarified to promote private 
investment in the Nation's energy infrastructure. This review will 
focus on:
      The need to promote timely Federal-State cooperation and 
collaboration;
      The appropriate scope of water quality reviews;
      Types of conditions that may be appropriate to include in 
a certification;
      Expectations for reasonable review times for various 
types of certification requests; and
      The nature and scope of information States and authorized 
tribes may need in order to substantively act on a certification 
request within a prescribed period of time.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                     nuclear sales to saudi arabia
    5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, are you concerned about the 
potential transfer of sensitive United States nuclear technology to 
Saudi Arabia? Do you believe this transfer should continue?
    Secretary Perry. The regulations governing the transfer of 
unclassified civil nuclear technology abroad are found at 10 CFR Part 
810. These regulations define the term sensitive nuclear technology as 
any information which is not available to the public and which is 
important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or 
maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing 
facility or a facility for the production of heavy water. I have not 
issued any authorizations to U.S. companies to export sensitive nuclear 
technology as defined by regulation.
    I have issued authorizations, however, for the export of 
unclassified civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia that is not 
sensitive nuclear technology. The authorizations issued for the export 
of unclassified civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have been done 
in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810. The 
Department of State secured assurances from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
that the transferred technology will be used only for peaceful 
purposes, will not be retransferred for any military use, and will not 
be retransferred to a third destination without prior United States 
consent.

    6. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, could the transfer of 
sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia contribute to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East and 
exacerbate existing regional tensions?
    Secretary Perry. I have not authorized any United States company to 
transfer ``sensitive nuclear technology'' to Saudi Arabia, nor do I 
intend to do so.
    Longstanding U.S. policy seeks to prevent the further proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to any country and region. For this reason, the 
United States seeks to ensure that all countries comply with strict 
U.S. nonproliferation requirements, which are the strongest in the 
world. One way the United States achieves this goal is by placing 
legally binding nonproliferation conditions on U.S. civil nuclear 
exports.

    7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, should government officials 
involved in the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology concurrently advise 
private industry interests?
    Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy (DOE) has statutory 
responsibility for authorizing the transfer of unclassified nuclear 
technology and assistance under 10 CFR Part 810. This regulatory 
function is performed by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
(DNN) within the National Nuclear Security Administration. DNN 
interacts with private interests in the context of its regulatory 
function.
    Separately, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy works with the U.S. 
civil nuclear industry to help develop new and innovative technologies 
that will help return the United States to a position of global 
leadership in civil nuclear energy.

    8. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin 
Salman has reportedly refused any prohibitions on enriching uranium or 
reprocessing of spent fuel. Can Saudi Arabia can be trusted with this 
sensitive technology and what restrictions and safeguards should the 
United States require if the transfer continues?
    Secretary Perry. All authorizations for the export of unclassified 
civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia have been issued in accordance 
with the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810.
    As Under Secretary of State Thompson recently stated, the United 
States seeks the highest nonproliferation commitments in all peaceful 
nuclear cooperation negotiations, including legally binding commitments 
over enrichment and reprocessing. By law, every 123 agreement must 
contain all of the security and non-proliferation requirements 
specified in section 123(a) of the Atomic Energy Act.
    Additionally, the United States has long-promoted the universal 
adherence by all non-nuclear weapon states to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, regardless of the nature of 
that State's fuel cycle aspirations. In this context, the United States 
encourages Saudi Arabia at every appropriate opportunity to conclude an 
Additional Protocol with the IAEA as soon as possible.

    9. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, Section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA) stipulates that the U.S. may not transfer nuclear 
technology to a foreign country without congressional approval. Do you 
agree that the Trump Administration must seek congressional review of 
any transfer of United States nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary Perry. 10 CFR Part 810 implements AEA section 57 b. (2), 
which provides the Department of Energy with statutory responsibility 
for authorizing the transfer of unclassified civil nuclear technology 
and assistance. The part 810 regulations apply to technology transfers 
and assistance related to certain nuclear fuel-cycle activities, 
commercial nuclear power plants, and research and test reactors. 
Covered transfers include the transfer of physical documents or 
electronic media, electronic transfers or the transfer of knowledge and 
expertise. A 123 Agreement is not required for the export of the above-
described technology and assistance, and there is no legal requirement 
for Congressional approval. The negotiation of a 123 agreement is a 
separate and distinct procedure from the part 810 application 
authorization review process.

    10. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, did you sign any of the 
six ``part 810'' authorizations for companies sharing nuclear 
technology with Saudi Arabia after the October 2, 2018, murder of Jamal 
Khashoggi?
    Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy has issued seven part 810 
authorizations for the transfer of unclassified civil nuclear 
technology to Saudi Arabia to date. There have been two part 810 
authorizations issued since October 2, 2018. A part 810 authorization 
simply provides United States companies the ability to compete in the 
international civil nuclear market.
    A part 810 authorization does not authorize the transfer of nuclear 
material, equipment or components. The process involves a thorough 
interagency review that requires the Department of Energy to secure the 
concurrence of the Department of State, and consult with the 
Departments of Defense and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission.
                        artificial intelligence
    11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, do you have any concerns 
that private sector partners in Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems 
developed with support and funding from your department will sell these 
technologies to foreign adversaries or otherwise make such systems 
broadly available?
    Secretary Perry. No, as the Office of Science (SC) works on basic 
research which funds open source proposals.

    12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, when you contract on 
project with private sector partners like on Project Maven, what 
contractual mechanisms do you have in place to ensure that the highly-
accurate and efficient systems that were developed based on sensitive 
government datasets and collaboration are not provided to foreign 
actors?
    Secretary Perry. Technology is a critical part of the DOE's mission 
and requires special consideration in identifying and protecting 
sensitive technologies and ensuring appropriate protection of DOE 
funded intellectual property.
    DOE contractors are subject to applicable U.S. export control laws, 
regulations and policies when exporting materials and technical 
information resulting from the performance of their contracts. Within 
the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) there are 
contractual requirements related to the protection of the Department 
funded technology and information. These contractual requirements put 
in place controls requiring: differing levels of review based on the 
technology and information; review and approval of all foreign national 
visits and assignments; review of all Scientific and Technical 
Information generated under the contract to determine appropriate 
release and handling; and many additional controls.

    13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Perry, what controls do you 
recommend the United States put in place on private sector 
collaboration to protect U.S. developed AI technologies from getting 
into the hands of our strategic competitors?
    Secretary Perry. This is an area the United States will need to 
continue to monitor. However, at this time we believe the present 
controls are adequate.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
                  u.s. nuclear part 810 authorizations
    14. Senator Kaine. Secretary Perry, in your testimony you mentioned 
over 37 part 810 authorizations approved since your tenure as Secretary 
of Energy, 9 of which were to the Middle East. Provide a list formatted 
by Date Issued / Company / Country for every part 810 authorization 
made since you were confirmed as Secretary of Energy, to include those 
which are not publically available.
    Secretary Perry. The international commercial nuclear power 
industry is a highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low 
number of competitors, even the name of a company and the market they 
are competing in can be harmful to an American company seeking to 
market their products. Certain companies can be easily identified by 
the technology associated with them, thus revealing the name or 
technology associated with such a company would reveal that they were 
competing in a certain market.
    Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the 
information in question, the Department has been working with Congress 
to provide access to this information in the appropriate setting and 
manner.
                 decommissioning of uss harry s. truman
    15. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, have you been given 
any direction from the Department of Defense to commence planning or 
provide funding for the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier USS 
Harry S. Truman?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. No, NNSA has not been given direction by 
the Department of Defense related to the decommissioning of the USS 
Harry S. Truman. The Department of the Navy is responsible for the 
planning and budgeting to support a nuclear ship's refueling complex 
overhaul or its inactivation.

    16. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what would be the 
impact to future DOE [Department of Energy] budgets if the Navy were to 
go through with the early decommissioning of the Truman?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. There will be no impact to NNSA's budget 
if the USS Harry S. Truman is retired early. The Department of the Navy 
is responsible for the planning and budgeting to support a ship's 
refueling complex overhaul or its inactivation.

    17. Senator Kaine. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, when would planning 
and funding need to commence if the decommissioning were to start in 
fiscal year 2024?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The Department of the Navy is responsible 
for the planning and budgeting to support a ship's refueling complex 
overhaul or its inactivation. The Deputy Administrator for the Office 
of Naval Reactors is responsible for ensuring safe and effective 
nuclear propulsion plants for the Navy's fleet of submarines and 
aircraft carriers, to include the USS Harry S. Truman. Naval Reactors 
remains engaged in discussions with the Navy on retaining this aircraft 
carrier through its remaining service life based on recent 
announcements by the Administration.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
              implementation of plutonium strategy at lanl
    18. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, I appreciate your 
reconfirming Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) continuing role as 
the Nation's center of excellence for plutonium research and 
development. You also stated there is an additional $5 billion that is 
headed to Los Alamos to provide the capacity in PF-4 to produce at 
least 30 plutonium pits per year by 2026.
    Secretary Perry. We are investing approximately $3 billion over 
five years in support of pit production at LANL to produce 30 pits per 
year beginning in 2026. Funding in fiscal year (FY) 2020 for LANL will 
be provided to hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production 
personnel; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility 
(PF)-4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024; 
install pit production equipment in PF-4 to reach 30 war reserve pits 
per year beginning in 2026; and support analytical chemistry and 
materials characterization equipment scope.

    19. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, can you please confirm the 
$5 billion in additional funding for LANL and provide the full budget 
justification for it and a breakout of how the additional $5 billion 
will be used at LANL?
    Secretary Perry. We are investing approximately $3 billion over 
five years in support of pit production at LANL to produce 30 pits per 
year beginning in 2026. Funding in fiscal year 2020 for LANL will be 
provided to hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production 
personnel; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility 
(PF)-4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024; 
install pit production equipment in PF-4 to reach 30 war reserve pits 
per year beginning in 2026; and support analytical chemistry and 
materials characterization equipment scope.

    20. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, what portion of the $5 
billion in additional funding for LANL will be used to provide 
technical support to SRS (Savannah River Site) to establish the 
capacity to produce plutonium pits in the repurposed MFFF [MOX Fuel 
Fabrication Facility]?
    Secretary Perry. The funding for Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) includes provision of technical support to the Savannah River 
Site (SRS), as the two-site approach allows for complementary training 
plans at both sites. NNSA is developing plans for workforce 
recruitment, training and sustainment, and pit production knowledge 
transfer to the future workforce. NNSA is also evaluating options for 
cross training personnel at SRS and LANL. Additionally, a portion of 
the funding is provided for and will continue to be provided for LANL 
efforts supporting equipment design for the proposed Savannah River 
Plutonium Production Facility.
       fiscal year 2020 budget request for plutonium sustainment
    21. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you please 
provide a breakout of proposed scope of work for fiscal year 2020 at 
LANL under NNSA's budget request for plutonium sustainment, including 
LANL's support for establishing the capacity to produce plutonium pits 
at Savannah River Site?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. In the fiscal year (FY) 2020 budget 
request for LANL, Plutonium Sustainment Operations provides funding to 
hire, train, qualify, and retain required pit production personnel at 
LANL; recapitalize equipment needed to restore Plutonium Facility (PF)-
4's ability to produce 10 war reserve pits per year by 2024; and 
support production activities. The Savannah River Plutonium Processing 
Facility Project element of Plutonium Sustainment Operations in the 
fiscal year 2020 budget request invests in completing conceptual design 
to repurpose the facility for pit production and supports developing 
other project documentation required for Critical Decision-1. LANL is 
providing expertise and design support for conceptual design of special 
facility equipment for this project.
              savannah river plutonium processing facility
    22. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, can you please 
provide your current best estimate of the schedule and timeline of the 
major milestones, including NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act] 
review, to establish the capacity to produce 50 plutonium pits per year 
in the re-purposed MFFF?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is currently executing conceptual 
design activities for the proposed Savannah River Plutonium Processing 
Facility (SRPPF) to produce 50 pits per year. An independent cost 
estimate for refurbishment of the proposed SRPPF will be done prior to 
Critical Decision-1. Consistent with the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) and pursuant to 10 CFR 1021.311, NNSA is preparing an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) for the proposed action to 
repurpose the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to produce a 
minimum of 50 pits per year at the Savannah River Site (SRS). On June 
10, 2019, the Office of the Federal Register published a Notice of 
Intent to prepare an EIS on plutonium pit production at SRS. NNSA 
expects the draft EIS to be available in 2020.
                         pit production at lanl
    23. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, I understand Los 
Alamos has been making steady progress in restoring the capacity to 
produce plutonium pits in PF-4. What is the current status of the 
effort to produce development W87-like pits are you satisfied with the 
progress being made to begin pit production in PF-4?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA remains committed to achieving pit 
production requirements established by the Nuclear Weapons Council 
(NWC) to produce the first war reserve (or W87-like) pit in 2023, 10 
war reserve pits per year in 2024, 20 war reserve pits per year in 
2025, and 30 war reserve pits per year beginning in 2026 at LANL. LANL 
has demonstrated progress in meeting these goals and fabricated four 
development pits in fiscal year 2018, is fabricating five development 
pits in fiscal year 2019, and plans to produce five process prove-in 
pits in fiscal year 2020.
                doe's order 140.1, interface with dnfsb
    24. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Perry, as you know, DOE issued 
Order 140.1 without any consultation with either the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) or with the local communities most 
impacted by DOE's nuclear facilities. The Chairman and Members of the 
DNFSB have been unanimous in their opposition to DOE's unilateral 
implementation of order 140.1. In particular, the board takes strong 
exception to the order's exemption of some facilities from the board's 
oversight, the adoption of a new definition of public health and safety 
that exempts onsite individuals and workers from oversight, new 
limitations on access to facilities, personnel and information, and 
denial of the board's requests related to deliberative and pre-
decisional documents. The board has clearly and repeatedly conveyed to 
you its position that DOE's new Order 140.1 is both inconsistent with 
the board's statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act and with 
DOE's own policy of continuing a strong and productive relationship 
with DNFSB as a valued external and independent reviewer. Community 
leaders in my state echoed these concerns at the board's recent public 
hearing on Order 140.1 in Albuquerque.
    To restore credibility with the local communities, will you agree 
to collaborate with the DNFSB to try to address the board's specific 
concerns with Order 140.1, and to demonstrate again a shared focus on 
adequate protection of public health and safety?
    Secretary Perry. The Department of Energy (DOE) values the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (DNFSB) advice on our two agencies' 
shared focus on protecting public health and safety.
    DOE issued Order 140.1, Interface with the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board, on May 14, 2018, to update and streamline a 
17-year old, out-of-date DOE Manual (Manual 140.1-1B), to make the 
Manual compliant with changes made to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as 
amended, as well as to clarify DOE personnel roles and responsibilities 
in our interface with DNFSB.
    Since the issuance of Order 140.1, DOE leadership and senior 
managers at Headquarters and Field Offices have participated in three 
DNFSB public hearings to discuss compliance with the Atomic Energy Act, 
as amended, including a public hearing held in Albuquerque, NM, on 
February 21, 2019.
    DOE federal and contractor employees are particularly trained to 
execute their work in and around the hazards posed by our activities; 
their safety is the focus of our training programs and multiple 
requirements established by our governing directives, standards, and 
procedures. The adequate protection of the public health and safety is 
our primary point of interface with the DNFSB, and should be the focus 
of our interactions.
                     upgrade of mesa at sandia labs
    25. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, for over 30 years 
the MESA [Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications] facility 
at Sandia Labs in Albuquerque has been a real workhorse for meeting 
NNSA's unique requirements for strategic rad-hard microelectronics. The 
aging facility is outdated and unable to support adequately life-
extension programs in the post-2025 timeframe. Upgrading MESA will 
require a major infrastructure investment. What is the current strategy 
and plan to sustain the unique capabilities of Sandia's MESA Complex to 
produce strategic rad-hard microelectronics beyond 2025?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA is committed to sustain the MESA 
Complex through 2040. Sandia National Laboratories' (SNL) Microsystems 
Engineering, Science, and Applications (MESA) Complex currently is the 
only U.S. foundry with the capability to deliver custom strategically 
radiation-hardened microelectronic components required to sustain the 
Nation's nuclear deterrent. NNSA recognizes the distinguished 
capability provided by SNL and, over the last several years, NNSA has 
worked to assess the long-term viability of the MESA Complex to provide 
war Reserve components that meet system requirements. As the Silicon 
Fabrication (SiFab) foundry surpassed its 30-year intended life, NNSA 
and SNL contracted Aerospace Corporation and Longenecker Associates to 
conduct independent risk assessments. Both concluded that the foundry 
can be extended until 2040 with modest upgrades to infrastructure and 
equipment.
    NNSA and SNL have partnered in the development of an Extended Life 
Program (ELP) to understand investments required to sustain the 
existing capabilities of the MESA Complex. The ELP plan will provide a 
20-year forecast of tools and equipment recapitalization, and 
facilities and infrastructure projects.
    NNSA and SNL are also partnering in the development of the MESA 
Integrated Program Plan, which will provide a 5-year view of 
operations, weapons program commitments, and operational costs, to 
include the budgeting information for maintenance of capability, R&D 
programs, production programs, and technology maturation activities.

    26. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what are the 
specific milestones you are planning for the upgrade this year and for 
fiscal year 2020?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has worked closely with Sandia 
National Laboratories to generate a facility project schedule that 
poses minimal risk to the Life Extension Programs (LEP) production 
schedule. Based on the complexity and age of MESA, facility projects 
must be prioritized and executed based on areas of highest need to 
avoid extended shutdowns of production fabrication, and with 
consideration for the quality of the systems supporting production, 
e.g., cleanliness of deionized water, air quality, and regulation of 
airflow. fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 maintenance projects and 
associated improvements to the MESA facility include enhancements to 
the bulk chemical distribution system; Silicon Fabrication Facility 
(SiFab) Uninterruptible Power Supply system upgrades; commencing a 3-
year SiFab HEPA filter and bay ceiling replacement project; and 
structural upgrades to support packaging equipment for the W80-4 LEP.
                  lep workload at nnsa labs and plants
    27. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the ongoing Life-
Extension Programs (LEP) are essential to assuring the stockpile is 
safe, secure and reliable. I believe the LEPs are a top priority. You 
currently have four major LEPs underway: B61, W88, W80-4 and W87-1 with 
about $2 billion in required work per year. Are you confident that the 
NNSA's labs and sites have sufficient capacity needed to perform this 
critical work, and stay on the schedule and budget for each LEP?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. We are confident that we have sufficient 
capacity to execute these modernization activities. However, 
significant technical issues can arise that have the potential to 
affect LEP schedules and budget. For example, NNSA is assessing the 
impacts of a technical component that did not pass qualification 
testing and is common to several components on the B61-12 LEP and W88 
Alt 370.
  future of pulsed power and z machine at sandia national laboratories
    28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the Z Machine at 
Sandia Labs continues to provide one of the critical pieces of our 
stockpile stewardship program by simulating pressures and radiation 
environments that previously required underground testing. Do you agree 
that pulsed power science is important to NNSA's mission, and what do 
you see is the future role of pulsed-power science for mainting the 
strategic deterrent?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. Pulsed power capabilities are key to 
supporting weapon survivability and radiation effects, materials 
science, and thermonuclear burn. Given the promise demonstrated by 
pulsed power and magnetic drive in recent years, the work at the Z 
Pulsed Power Facility has been prioritized within the Inertial 
Confinement Fusion Program. NNSA plans continued increases in its 
investment in pulsed-power science to capitalize on recent advances in 
fusion concepts, which may provide high neutron yields and meet 
national security needs without requiring fusion ignition.

    29. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, in light of the 
recent article in the South China Morning Post concerning China's 
future plans for pulsed power, what are your thoughts on the need to 
extend the laboratories' capabilities in pulsed power science to 
support stockpile stewardship?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The priority for the next fiscal year is 
the completion of the Inertial Confinement Fusion 2020 goal, which 
includes the development of credible physics scaling to multi-megajoule 
fusion yields for each of the ignition approaches. The conclusions of 
this study will be used to guide future research and facility 
investments. The 5-year experimental plan initiated in fiscal year 2019 
includes activities that will explore the mission need for next-
generation facilities and identify the best approaches.

    30. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, are there risks to 
the U.S. deterrent if adversaries advance major scientific capabilities 
in pulsed power beyond what the national labs currently have today?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA continuously assesses and manages 
the full breadth of risks to the deterrent, including the impact of new 
technical capabilities of our adversaries. As we monitor global 
scientific advances, we will continue to use our full suite of tools to 
ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal, 
including possible investments in new capabilities as appropriate.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                   saudi civilian nuclear cooperation
    31. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, my understanding is that the 
Department of Energy has not produced a single document or made a 
single agency official available to respond to the House Oversight 
Committee's February 19, 2019, request for documents related to its 
ongoing investigation into ``efforts inside the White House to rush the 
transfer of highly sensitive U.S. nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia in 
potential violation of the Atomic Energy Act and without review by 
Congress as required by law.'' Will the Department of Energy commit to 
speedily producing documents and any other relevant information and 
making Energy Department officials available to the House Oversight 
Committee? If not, please explain why your Department is not 
cooperating with this investigation.
    Secretary Perry. The Department has produced several hundred pages 
of documents to the House Oversight Committee. The Department is 
continuing to search for and review responsive documents.

    32. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, is the Trump Administration 
continuing to engage with the government of Saudi Arabia about a 
potential civilian nuclear cooperation agreement? If yes, what is the 
status of that engagement?
    Secretary Perry. Negotiations began in 2012 under the previous 
Administration and remain on-going. The United States continues to seek 
the strongest possible nonproliferation and security commitments from 
Saudi Arabia.

    33. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, what other agencies, if any, 
is the Department of Energy consulting with regarding a potential 
civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with government of Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary Perry. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act mandates that 
the negotiation of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement be led by the 
Department of State, with the technical assistance of the Department of 
Energy and in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    34. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, you reportedly expressed 
interest in the plan to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, 
known as part of a ``Middle East Marshall Plan,'' in a March 2017 
National Security Council (NSC) meeting, just two months after 
President Trump's inauguration. Why are you interested in transferring 
American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary Perry. In 2017, Saudi Arabia announced that it is 
proceeding with a nuclear power program and requested bids to construct 
two large light water reactors. As U.S. companies have requested the 
Department's authorization to compete in that tender process, I have 
imposed nonproliferation obligations on such exports that comply with 
the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR Part 810. 
Moreover, the Department of Energy has provided technical assistance to 
the Department of State in the negotiation of a 123 agreement. If we 
are able to conclude such an agreement, it will help ensure that Saudi 
Arabia will develop its civil nuclear program in accordance with the 
highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation.

    35. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, have you received direction 
from anyone in the White House to pursue the transfer of American 
nuclear technology to government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please list 
the names of those White House officials.
    Secretary Perry. Private companies apply directly to the Department 
for authorization to transfer part 810-covered unclassified civil 
nuclear technology and assistance abroad.

    36. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation 
with Jared Kushner about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer 
American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, 
please explain the date, location, and outcome of those conversations.
    Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely 
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on 
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear 
technology issues.

    37. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation 
with Tom Barrack about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer 
American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, 
please explain the date, location, and outcome of those conversations.
    Secretary Perry. I do not recall any conversations with Tom Barrack 
during my time as Secretary.

    38. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation 
with then-National Security Advisor Lieutenant General (ret.) Michael 
Flynn about the Trump Administration's efforts to transfer American 
nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please 
explain the date, location, and outcome of any conversation.
    Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely 
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on 
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear 
technology issues.

    39. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation 
with then-Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland about the 
Trump Administration's efforts to transfer American nuclear technology 
to the government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please explain the date, 
location, and outcome of any conversation.
    Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely 
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on 
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear 
technology issues.

    40. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation 
with Derek Harvey, the Senior Director for Middle East and North 
African Affairs at the National Security Council about the Trump 
Administration's efforts to transfer American nuclear technology to the 
government of Saudi Arabia? If yes, please explain the date, location, 
and outcome of any conversation.
    Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely 
interact with senior Administration officials and advise them on 
matters within the jurisdiction of the Department, including nuclear 
technology issues.

    41. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation 
with any employee of IP3 International about the Trump Administration's 
efforts to transfer American nuclear technology to the government of 
Saudi Arabia? If yes, please identify every individual employee with 
whom you had a conversation, as well as the date, location, and outcome 
of any conversation with that employee.
    Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I routinely 
interact with industry representatives and other energy stakeholders.

    42. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, did you have a conversation 
with President Trump about the Trump Administration's efforts to 
transfer American nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? 
If yes, please explain the date, location, and outcome of any 
conversation.
    Secretary Perry. In my role as Secretary of Energy, I regularly 
advise the President on matters within the jurisdiction of the 
Department, including nuclear technology issues.

    43. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, does the Administration intend 
to authorize any licenses for the export of nuclear material or 
equipment to the government of Saudi Arabia without a nuclear 
cooperation agreement (commonly known as a 123 agreement) in force? 
Please explain in details.
    Secretary Perry. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible 
for licensing exports of nuclear material or equipment.
    The Department of Energy (DOE) has statutory responsibility for 
authorizing the export of unclassified civil nuclear technology and 
assistance under 10 CFR Part 810. A 123 agreement is not required for 
the export of unclassified civil nuclear technology and assistance. 10 
CFR Part 810 authorizations are often the first step in U.S. nuclear 
industry engagement with a new foreign partner and often serve as an 
indication that the partner is committed to beginning a civil nuclear 
program that includes the strongest possible nonproliferation 
requirements. The negotiation of a 123 agreement is a separate and 
distinct procedure from the part 810 application authorization review 
process.

    44. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, does the 123 agreement under 
negotiation with the government of Saudi Arabia meet all of the 
security and non-proliferation requirements specified in Section 123(a) 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954? Please explain in details.
    Secretary Perry. By law, the Department of State leads in the 
negotiations of all 123 agreements. I would refer you to the Department 
of State for further information on the status of these negotiations.

    45. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, according to a recent Daily 
Beast report, the Department of Energy ``has approved six 
authorizations for United States companies seeking to conduct nuclear 
related work in Saudi Arabia.'' If this is accurate, please list--
without divulging any trade secrets or proprietary information--the 
names of the United States companies to which the Department has issued 
a Saudi Arabia-related part 810 authorization, which allows for limited 
cooperation related to the ``development or production of any special 
nuclear material outside of the United States'' if that activity has 
been determined by the Secretary that it ``will not be inimical to the 
interest of the United States.'' If you will not list the names of 
these companies, please explain how refusing to disclose this 
information is consistent with the Department's obligation to ``keep 
the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives which, 
under the rules of the Senate and the House, have jurisdiction over the 
functions of the Secretary or the Commission, fully and currently 
informed with respect to the activities of the Secretary and the 
Commission'' as provided under the Sec. 303 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (emphasis added).
    Secretary Perry. The international commercial nuclear power 
industry is a highly competitive market. Due to the high stakes and low 
number of competitors, even the name of a company and the market they 
are competing in can be harmful to an American company seeking to 
market their products. Certain companies can be easily identified by 
the technology associated with them, thus revealing the name or 
technology associated with such a company would reveal that they were 
competing in a certain market.
    Due to the sensitive, business proprietary nature of the 
information in question, the Department has been working with Congress 
to provide access to this information in the appropriate setting and 
manner.

    46. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, without divulging any trade 
secrets or proprietary information, please list the names of any United 
States companies that are seeking, but have not yet been issued or 
denied, a part 810 authorization to conduct nuclear related work in 
Saudi Arabia. If you will not list the names of these companies, please 
explain how denying access to this information is consistent with the 
Department's obligation to ``keep the committees of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives which, under the rules of the Senate and the 
House, have jurisdiction over the functions of the Secretary or the 
Commission, fully and currently informed with respect to the activities 
of the Secretary and the Commission'' as provided under the Sec. 303 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (emphasis added).
    Secretary Perry. The Department does not comment on applications 
that may be in process.

    47. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, please provide a brief update, 
without divulging any trade secrets or propriety information, on the 
status of the part 810 authorizations for the category of United States 
companies described in the previous question (i.e., United States 
companies that are seeking, but have not yet been issued or denied, a 
part 810 authorization to conduct nuclear related work in Saudi 
Arabia).
    Secretary Perry. The Department does not comment on applications 
that may be in process.

    48. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, please list any federal 
agencies and the names of any White House officials that were involved 
in the Department of Energy issuing any current part 810 authorizations 
to United States companies seeking to conduct nuclear related work in 
Saudi Arabia since January 20, 2017. If you refuse to list such 
agencies and officials, please explain how refusing to provide this 
information is consistent with the Department's obligation to ``keep 
the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives which, 
under the rules of the Senate and the House, have jurisdiction over the 
functions of the Secretary or the Commission, fully and currently 
informed with respect to the activities of the Secretary and the 
Commission'' as provided under the Section 303 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (emphasis added).
    Secretary Perry. Part 810 authorizations involve a robust intra-
and-interagency review. As required by Section 57 b. (2) of the Atomic 
Energy Act, the Department of Energy must obtain the concurrence of the 
Department of State and consult with the Departments of Defense and 
Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For each of the seven 
authorizations for Saudi Arabia, the Department of State concurrence 
was obtained following their receipt of government-to-government 
nonproliferation assurances from the government of Saudi Arabia. The 
Departments of Commerce and Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission were consulted and provided no objection to the approval.
    Typically there is no review of part 810 applications by White 
House officials.

    49. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, do you currently have any 
financial interest, or did you formerly have any financial interest, in 
any of the following companies: General Electric, Exelon, Nuscale, 
TerraPower, Lightbridge, AECOM, BWXT, Centrus Energy Corp., and X-
energy? Please explain in details.
    Secretary Perry. No, I do not have any current financial interests 
in those companies. I have not had any reportable financial interests 
in those companies since December of 2016.
    Q50. Secretary Perry, since you assumed your duties as the 
Secretary of Energy, have you or your subordinates taken any meetings 
with registered lobbyists working on behalf of the Saudi Government to 
lobby the Trump Administration to approve a sale of nuclear reactors or 
any other nuclear technology to the government of Saudi Arabia? Please 
explain in details.

    50. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, since you assumed your duties 
as the Secretary of Energy, have you or your subordinates taken any 
meetings with registered lobbyists working on behalf of the Saudi 
Government to lobby the Trump Administration to approve a sale of 
nuclear reactors or any other nuclear technology to the government of 
Saudi Arabia? Please explain in details.
    Secretary Perry. As Secretary, I routinely engage with my foreign 
counterparts, including at the Saudi Ministry of Energy, Industry and 
Mineral Resources.

    51. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in a Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (SFRC) hearing on May 24, 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo 
said in reference to a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with 
Saudi Arabia: ``[W]e have told them we want a gold standard section 123 
agreement from them which would not permit them to enrich.'' Do you 
agree with Secretary Pompeo? If not, please explain why it is in the 
national security interest of the United States to conclude a 123 
agreement that would allow the Saudi Government to enrich or reprocess 
nuclear material for the development of a nuclear weapon.
    Secretary Perry. Yes. The United States seeks to conclude 123 
agreements with foreign partners that legally restrict their ability to 
engage in any enrichment and reprocessing activities.

    52. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, on May 16, 2008, the United 
States and Saudi Arabia reached a ``United States-Saudi Arabia 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Nuclear Energy Cooperation,'' 
which states: ``Saudi Arabia has stated its intent to rely on 
international markets for nuclear fuel and to not pursue sensitive 
nuclear technologies, which stands in direct contrast to the actions of 
Iran.'' While not legally binding, is this MOU still valid, and if so, 
is the Energy Department working to ensure that the Saudi Government 
adheres to the commitment it made in this document?
    Secretary Perry. The United States-Saudi Arabia Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on Nuclear Energy Cooperation signed in 2008 
supported the United States Government's initial engagement with Saudi 
Arabia. This engagement was during the height of the nuclear 
renaissance when Saudi Arabia, similar to other newcomer countries, 
expressed an initial interest in pursuing civil nuclear development. 
The MOU provided a framework for cooperation, but none materialized. 
Saudi Arabia elected not to conduct any cooperation under the 2008 MOU. 
In 2015, the United States and Saudi Arabia concluded a new MOU that is 
currently active and covers cooperation in renewable and nuclear 
energy. Under the 2015 MOU, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a 
civil nuclear energy action plan in February 2018, but no substantive 
cooperation under the action plan has occurred to date.

    53. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, what steps are being taken by 
the Energy Department to ensure that the government of Saudi Arabia is 
adhering to its current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)?
    Secretary Perry. The Department regularly invites officials from 
Saudi Arabia to attend DOE-sponsored international and regional 
safeguards and safeguards-related workshops and training events. 
Additionally, DOE is prepared to engage with Saudi officials on a 
bilateral basis to address any safeguards technical or implementation 
questions they may have.

    54. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in the opinion of the Energy 
Department, is the government of Saudi Arabia adhering to its IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)?
    Secretary Perry. The Department believes that Saudi Arabia is 
adhering to the safeguards agreement that currently is in force between 
the IAEA and the Government of Saudi Arabia.
                         iran nuclear agreement
    55. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, in an Armed Services Committee 
hearing on March 22, 2018, I asked if you agreed with the opinion of 
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that the Iran nuclear 
agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) ``extended the 
amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a 
nuclear weapon from a few months to about 1 year'' and ``has enhanced 
the transparency of Iran's nuclear activities.'' You replied, ``I 
cannot tell that I do or I do not.'' In a January 29, 2019 Senate 
Intelligence Committee hearing, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 
Director said in reference to Iran: ``at the moment, technically they 
are in compliance.'' Do you agree with the CIA Director that Iran is 
currently complying with the nuclear agreement? If you do not agree, 
please provide your evidence of an incurable material breach of the 
nuclear agreement by the Government of Iran.
    Secretary Perry. We work closely with our colleagues at the U.S. 
Department of State and the United States Mission to the United Nations 
organizations in Vienna to monitor developments related to Iranian 
compliance with commitments made under the JCPOA. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization in charge of verification 
and monitoring of these commitments, releases quarterly reports on 
Iranian compliance and we would direct your attention to those reports. 
DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical expertise, equipment, and 
training to support the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran. DOE will 
support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities and work closely with 
our interagency partners as needed.we would direct your attention to 
those reports. DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical expertise, 
equipment, and training to support the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran. 
DOE will support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities and work 
closely with our interagency partners as needed.we would direct your 
attention to those reports. DOE/NNSA provides extensive technical 
expertise, equipment, and training to support the IAEA's ability to 
monitor Iran. DOE will support all efforts to monitor Iran's activities 
and work closely with our interagency partners as needed.A\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Since the date of the hearing, the IAEA has reported to its 
Board of Governors that Iran has exceeded its JCPOA commitments with 
respect to its uranium enrichment levels, low-enriched uranium 
stockpile and research and development on advanced centrifuges.

    56. Senator Warren. Secretary Perry, is the Department of Energy 
currently involved in working to negotiate an alternative to the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? If yes, please explain the 
objectives of that work. If not, please explain why not.
    Secretary Perry. DOE would refer you to the Department of State, 
which has the lead on the administration's efforts to secure a 
comprehensive agreement with Iran based on the 12 points described by 
Secretary Pompeo in May 2018. DOE/NNSA continues to monitor Iran's 
nuclear activities and provides critical support to the interagency's 
efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If called 
upon, we will support interagency discussions to negotiate a new, 
comprehensive agreement.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
        nuclear material security and theft prevention programs
    57. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, under the previous 
and current administration's budget requests for NNSA led nuclear theft 
prevention programs have been declining over the years as well as 
actual funds being appropriated. Current funding levels are at their 
lowest since the early 1990s and even after the most recent Nuclear 
Posture Review noted that nuclear terrorism is one of ``the most 
significant threats to the security of the United States.'' The fiscal 
year 2019 and current budget requests have suggested cuts to domestic 
and international radiological security, nuclear smuggling and 
deterrence, security at nuclear facilities, and efforts to consolidate 
and remove nuclear weapons usable materials. Can we count on the NNSA 
to partner with the Senate Armed Services Committee and other relevant 
committees to identify the risks we face domestically and 
internationally so we can correctly allocate resources to the 
applicable programs responsible for preventing radiological materials 
theft and preventing terrorism incidents?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA values its partnership with the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and other committees on nuclear 
security. NNSA will continue to work diligently with Congress to ensure 
that any and all risks domestically and internationally are identified 
and appropriate resources allocated to support our nuclear security 
priorities.

    58. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, what efforts are the 
NNSA undertaking with international partners to consolidate nuclear 
weapons usable materials to the minimum practical number of locations 
to maximize security and effectiveness of resources?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA has worked with 48 countries and 
Taiwan to minimize the amount of weapons-usable nuclear material at 
civilian sites by consolidating these materials at fewer sites and 
where possible eliminating them, for example by downblending highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium. Recent and near-term 
activities include making Ghana and Nigeria HEU-free by returning 
Chinese-origin HEU from these countries to China; eliminating all HEU 
from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Alatau, Kazakhstan; and 
working with Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and other partners to 
eliminate excess HEU from a number of other facilities.

    59. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the Department of 
Energy's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request suggests cutting the Global 
Material Security budget by $65 million. As you are aware, the Global 
Material Security plays an important role in permanent threat reduction 
and working closely with international partners to interdict illicit 
nuclear materials that could be used in a non-state actor attack. Do 
you agree that this program is critical for maintaining U.S. nuclear 
security leadership and preventing potential theft and illicit use of 
such materials?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget 
Request supports the Global Material Security mission of preventing 
terrorists and other actors from obtaining nuclear and radioactive 
material that could be used in an improvised nuclear device or a 
radiological dispersal device. This work, which is critical to our 
national security and to NNSA's efforts to reduce global nuclear 
security threats, is fully supported by the fiscal year 2020 budget.
    Fiscal year 2019 appropriations included an increase above the 
budget request for Global Material Security. This allowed NNSA to 
accelerate a number of activities that had been planned for fiscal year 
2020, including procurements to support the replacement of cesium-based 
irradiators, the development of transportation containers to remove 
disused cesium-based irradiators, and activities to secure buildings 
with radioactive material. The increase also allowed for the 
acceleration of counter nuclear smuggling efforts near unofficial 
border crossings, targeted operations along air traffic and unregulated 
maritime pathways, and with interior security services. All of these 
important efforts will continue in fiscal year 2020.
                      nuclear enterprise security
    60. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, many U.S. partner 
countries have limited experience with vulnerability assessments that 
test for areas that an adversary may be able to exploit security 
systems and/or testing ``force on force'' exercises at borders or at 
facilities that house sensitive materials. What activities or 
partnerships is the NNSA leading to ensure our international partners 
have the training to properly asses and build awareness around their 
security practices?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA works on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis with partner countries across the globe to prevent 
the theft, sabotage, and diversion of nuclear material. NNSA pursues 
this mission in concert with technical experts from the National 
Laboratories.
    NNSA has extensive experience working with partner countries in 
developing vulnerability assessments to ensure the effectiveness of 
physical protection systems for nuclear material. Additionally, NNSA 
conducts force-on-force trainings for foreign response teams at 
domestic and international training facilities and transport security 
trainings for foreign police organizations. NNSA also provides physical 
protection upgrades on a case-by-case basis, and assists partner 
countries in building capacity in critical areas such as cybersecurity 
and insider threat mitigation.

    61. Senator Manchin. Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency maintains an Incident and Trafficking Database, 
which compiles information from participating member states on 
incidents such as loss or theft of radioactive materials. Does the NNSA 
maintain any a similar database and is it accessible by other agencies 
and by international partners?
    Secretary Gordon-Hagerty. NNSA maintains an internal list of 
detections of nuclear and radioactive material gathered both from open 
source reports, including the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), 
and from our bilateral partnerships with foreign governments. 
Information reported to NNSA by international partners is used for 
internal project assessment, planning, and prioritization. NNSA also 
encourages its partner countries to report incidents to the ITDB. In 
addition, NNSA closely collaborates with other appropriate U.S. 
interagency partners on detections of concern to ensure a consistent 
whole-of-government effort in counter nuclear smuggling.
                    nuclear enterprise cybersecurity
    62. Senator Manchin. Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, 
the budget request you presented shows a 39.9-percent increase in 
Information Technology and Cybersecurity funding for the National 
Nuclear Security Administration. USSTRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] is 
also in the process of modernizing cybersecurity as a part of an 
overall effort to modernize nuclear command, control and 
communications. Are DOE and DOD engaging in any cooperative efforts 
regarding nuclear cybersecurity in order to avoid duplication of 
efforts or systems that lack interoperability?
    Secretary Perry and Secretary Gordon-Hagerty, NNSA and DOD are 
strategic partners and continuously engage in various activities. 
NNSA's Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) currently works 
with NNSA's Office of Defense Programs and the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy on cybersecurity, information 
technology, and operational technology for weapons activities. The 
Nuclear Enterprise Assurance Steering Group (NEASG) is the senior DOE/
DOD management body that oversees, coordinates, and shares lessons 
learned that will improve the country's ability to prevent adversarial 
threats against nuclear weapon systems. This collaboration allows us to 
maintain communication and engage in any cooperative efforts regarding 
nuclear cybersecurity, where opportunities exist.


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                           AIR FORCE POSTURE

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, 
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, 
Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. The Committee meets today to receive 
testimonies on the posture of the U.S. Air Force and its fiscal 
year (FY) 2020 budget request.
    We welcome Dr. Heather Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force, 
and General David Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
and thank both of you for your service and all that.
    We're all saddened by the decision that's been made by 
Secretary Wilson. Your work has just been great, and maybe 
there's still--it's still time to change your mind. All right?
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
directs our Nation's military to prepare for the return to 
great-power competition. This means that we must be prepared to 
deter and, if necessary, defeat potential near-peer 
adversaries. Obviously, China and Russia. In order for the Air 
Force to achieve that goal, it must properly be manned and 
trained and equipped. Unfortunately, as pointed out by the 
National Defense Strategy Commission, we are still in a 
readiness and modernization crisis. At the end of the Obama 
administration, the Air Force was at a historic low in 
readiness. Less than 10 percent of combat squadrons were ready 
and--to deploy, and even less were prepared for the peer fight. 
We have made progress in rebuilding the readiness, but more 
needs to be done. A high state of readiness is crucial for our 
Nation to demonstrate peace through strength.
    While our forces suffered from being ill-prepared, our 
adversaries moved out and recapitalized both their conventional 
and nuclear forces. So, all the time that we were resting and 
we were coasting, China and Russia were not. In spite of the 
previous neglect of our military, our men and women have done 
outstanding work for our Nation, but it's past time for action. 
You have testified that, quote, ``Our Air Force is too small 
and too old to do what the Nation asks,'' unquote, and that the 
Air Force needs to grow to the 386 squadrons. I agree that it 
needs to grow and modernize. The future of our Air Force 
readiness and relevance requires both growth and modernization 
now.
    Any successful modernization strategy must focus on results 
and meeting the needs of tomorrow's fight. Fielding relevant 
technology fast requires discipline in acquisition strategies. 
It also requires rapid prototyping and experimentation in order 
to get modern, reliable, and lethal systems into the hands of 
our warfighters, and doing so on time and within allotted 
budget. So, executing the strategy will require an open and 
transparent dialogue with Congress all the way. We look forward 
to working with you to make our shared modernization visions a 
reality and to ensure the Air Force is a fighting force 
prepared for the more lethal and dynamic battlefields of the 
future.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Wilson and 
General Goldfein to the Committee this morning to testify on 
the plans and programs of the Department of the Air Force in 
review of the fiscal year 2020 presidential budget. We are 
grateful to all the men and women of the Air Force for their 
professional service, and to their families for their continued 
support.
    In preparing this budget request, the Air Force faced 
difficult decisions in balancing the need to modernizing and 
keep the technological advantage over near-peer competitors and 
the need to support ongoing operations and sustain today's 
readiness. This budget request proposes funding increases to 
address readiness concerns, munitions shortfalls, preparing for 
the future fight, and modernizing our strategic deterrent 
capability. While each of these issues is important, I'm 
concerned that the Air Force may not have taken as thorough a 
review of what programs could be cut, delayed, or made more 
efficient in order to pay for the proposed increases, so I am 
interested in the witnesses' view on what efforts could be 
taken to offset current and future costs.
    In the near term, the Air Force has money in the disaster 
emergency relief supplemental they need by May 1st. If the Air 
Force has not received the $1.2 billion funds by this date, 
they will be forced to stop all work at Tyndall Air Force Base, 
which will, in turn, delay the return of full base operations. 
If these funds are delayed past that date, other dire 
consequences may result, such as halting recovery operations at 
Offutt Air Force Base, stopping maintenance on some aircraft, 
and grounding others. I hope we can focus on the potential 
consequences and move the disaster emergency relief 
supplemental forward very, very quickly.
    In addition, because significant levels of funding are 
being transferred to build a wall on the southern border, the 
amount of reprogramming authority will be limited. Our main 
concern is that the Air Force and other services may run short 
of head room and reprogram authority, which could lead to 
delays in other shortage areas as we approach the end of the 
fiscal year.
    One of the major issues that will be considered in this 
year's NDAA is the Air Force proposal to buy more F-15 
aircraft. For years, the Air Force has adamantly opposed buying 
any more fourth-generation aircraft. I believe the Committee 
needs to understand this reversal. Any Air Force proposal 
deserves our careful consideration, but we must consider it 
against the recent history of abrupt Air Force changes of 
direction on such programs as A-10, U-2, Global Hawk, Compass 
Call, C-27 airlift aircraft, and JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and 
Target Attack Radar System]. Another area of change is light 
attack experimentation program--light attack aircraft 
experimentation program. For the past several years, the Air 
Force has been conducting experiments with small trainer 
aircraft that have been modified to include a modest ground 
attack capability. Some expected these experiments would result 
in a program that would produce one or two wings of aircraft 
for the Air Force. In the fiscal year 2020 budget request, the 
Air Force has changed the nature and timing of that effort. The 
budget request would defer funding for any light attack 
aircraft until fiscal year 2022, at which point the Air Force 
would buy roughly 24 aircraft. The aim of this revised program 
would be to encourage coalition partners to contribute to the 
air campaign effort with such aircraft, and to provide training 
support for our partners who wanted to participate in such a 
program. I ask that the witnesses explain this change in focus 
and clarify the role of proposed light attack aircraft.
    In last year's budget request, the Air Force proposed to 
truncate the program to modernize the JSTARS, and to replace it 
with a combination of other systems, including unmanned systems 
and overhead sensors. The Committee supported the Air Force 
proposal, and the plan was ultimately adopted in the fiscal 
year 2019 NDAA. I understand that the Air Force has continued 
this program in the fiscal year 2020 budget, and I look forward 
to receiving an update on the progress.
    I'm also interested in hearing updates of your continuing 
efforts to improve the state of Air Force personnel, including 
progress on improving the shortfalls within the remotely-
piloted aircraft operator community, and how the Air Force has 
addressed shortfalls within the larger pilot community and 
maintenance personnel.
    The one major issue I have not mentioned is the proposal 
for Space Force. I--discussion of Space Force this morning 
because Chairman Inhofe intends, and I heartily concur, to 
convene a hearing next Thursday dedicated solely to this issue 
with Acting Secretary Shanahan, Chairman Dunford, Secretary 
Wilson, and General Hyten as witnesses. With that in mind, 
rather, I plan to use the hearing to focus on the issues I've 
already discussed.
    Once again, Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, thank you 
very much.
    Secretary Wilson, thank you for your distinguished service 
to the Nation. You did an extraordinary job. I wish you well at 
University of Texas--El Paso, Madam President.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. It does get pretty hot down there.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, it's--anyway, you two have been here 
before. You know the drill, and I look forward to hearing your 
opening statement. Your entire statement will be made a part of 
the record.
    We'll start with Secretary Wilson.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HEATHER A. WILSON, SECRETARY OF THE 
                           AIR FORCE

    Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With my full 
statement in the record, I'll just summarize a few points, and 
then ask the Chief to add in.
    The budget proposal that we've put forward for fiscal year 
2020 is driven by the National Defense Strategy and the five 
priority missions in that strategy. There are three things that 
I think I'd like to highlight from our testimony in what we're 
trying to do.
    The first is, we're building a more lethal and ready Air 
Force. The Air Force is more ready for major combat operations 
today than we were 2 years ago because of the support and the 
consistent budgets that have been approved by the United States 
Congress. In the first place, that means more people, and 
getting the right people, and getting them trained. Two years 
ago, we were 4,000 maintainers short in the United States Air 
Force. As of December, we are no maintainers short in the 
Active Force. Now, that means that our maintainers are young, 
and now we have to season them and make sure that they are 
fully capable to do the jobs we're asking them to do. Last 
year, we stopped the decline in pilots, and we are increasing 
pilot training in order to close that gap, as well.
    We are building that more lethal and ready force, but we 
are also building tomorrow's Air Force faster and smarter. The 
United States Congress gave us new authorities in order to buy 
equipment in new ways to meet a rapidly innovating adversary. 
We cannot win this contest with an acquisition system from the 
Cold War. We are taking advantage of the authorities that the 
Congress has given us. Delegation works when you do it to 
competent people and then monitor results. We are using the 
authorities for prototyping and experimentation that you have 
given us to start bending metal earlier, finding out what 
really works, and then setting requirements. We are also doing 
so in a way that is as transparent, or more transparent, than 
the traditional acquisition system, by giving reports to the 
Congress on our prototyping and experimentation programs three 
times a year and setting clear guardrails for when we need to 
report to you even more frequently.
    The third thing I would say is that we are changing the way 
in which we engage small business. Many of you were involved 
and helped us get the word out on our first Pitch Day, where we 
took in proposals on some of our hardest problems from over 400 
companies, narrowed that down to about 60, whom we invited to a 
1-day Pitch Day with our program managers in New York City. 
Fifty-one companies earned awards on that day. The average time 
to complete a contract was 15 minutes, and the contract is one 
page long. We have to change the way we engage America's most 
innovative businesses in order to have them work with us, the 
United States Government. We're showing the way--or leading the 
way on how we can do that.
    The third thing I would say is that the Air Force we need 
is larger and different from the Air Force that we have. This 
Committee asked General Goldfein and I, last year at this 
time--we have a new National Defense Strategy, and one of you 
asked us, ``Well, you know, you always come up here and defend 
the budget amount that you've proposed, but what is the Air 
Force you need to execute the National Defense Strategy?'' We 
didn't know the answer. We should know the answer. So, you 
directed us to do a study, which we turned in to you, in 
classified form, on the 1st of March, that sets out, after 
almost 8 months of study, what is the Air Force we need to 
execute the National Defense Strategy. We have 321 squadrons 
today. As the Chairman pointed out, our analysis shows that, 
for the 2025-2030 timeframe, we need 386 operational squadrons 
to accomplish the missions of the National Defense Strategy at 
a moderate level of risk.
    Finally, I would say this. On-time budgets and certainty 
matters a lot. This Congress gave us that certainty this year. 
In the first quarter of this year, when we looked at our first-
quarter results, we were able to execute about the first 
quarter of our program. We were able to do new-starts and set 
priorities and manage appropriately. So, thank you for that 
certainty and that on-time budget.
    I would also say that one of the most difficult things that 
we are facing as a service right now is the results of two 
catastrophic storms that hit two of our Air Force bases: 
Tyndall Air Force Base, in October; and, most recently, Offutt 
Air Force Base, in Nebraska, with flooding. We need the 
supplemental to recover from those terrible storms at Tyndall 
and Offutt. I look forward to working with you all to achieve 
that end.
    Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    General Goldfein.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF 
                         THE AIR FORCE

    General Goldfein. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking 
Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee. It's 
really an honor once again to represent your Air Force, Active, 
Guard, Reserve, civilian airmen who stand the watch and provide 
top cover for the Nation and our joint and allied teammates.
    This hearing is among the first official forums since 
Secretary Wilson announced her pending departure from the Air 
Force. I want to say publicly, on behalf of all airmen and 
their families, what an honor it's been to work with her every 
day to make our Air Force more ready and more lethal. This 
budget represents the culmination of our work together to build 
the Air Force we need to compete, deter, and, if deterrence 
fails, to fight and win. I want to state for the record that 
we're a better Air Force because of the leadership and the 
vision of our Secretary, Dr. Heather Wilson.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    Chairman, I went to the war--I went to war for the first 
time as a young captain, flying F-16s out of Shaw Air Force 
Base in South Carolina just days after Saddam Hussein invaded 
his neighbor in Kuwait. At the time, we had 401 operational 
squadrons consisting of 945,000 Active, Guard, Reserve, and 
civilian airmen, and 8,629 aircraft, with an average age of 17 
years, in an Air Force that landed our Nation's initial punch, 
401 operational squadrons to defeat a middleweight, non-nuclear 
power who threatened his neighbor and the region, but posed 
little threat to our Homeland and our way of life. Today, we 
have just 312 operational squadrons, down from 401. We have 
685,000 airmen, down from 945,000. We have 5,314 aircraft, down 
from over 8,600. The average age of our aircraft is 28 years.
    Chairman, we are not the Air Force of Desert Storm. When 
General McPeak was the Chief of Staff in 1991, he and his 
fellow Joint Chiefs were focused on supporting a single 
combatant commander, General Norm Schwarzkopf, the Commander of 
U.S. Central Command. Today, should deterrence fail and we find 
ourselves defending a Nation--our Nation against a major 
nuclear power, I expect to get three phone calls simultaneously 
on my Red Switch phone. First the geographic combatant 
commander will request forces to support his operational plan, 
which will include backfill for any fighters, tankers, and 
command-and-control (C2) forces he must place on nuclear alert. 
The next call will be from the U.S. Strategic Command 
Commander, who will tell me how many bombers, tankers, and 
command-and-control forces he needs to execute his nuclear 
deterrence mission, protecting not only our Homeland, but also 
our allies and partners. The third call will come from the 
Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), who will tell me how many fighters, 
tankers, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR), and C2 
aircraft he will need to execute his operational plan to defend 
the United States and Canada. The Air Force will be required to 
support these missions simultaneously, not sequentially, while 
at the same time, shoulder-to-shoulder with our joint 
teammates, maintaining a global presence to deter any rogue 
nation while simultaneously maintaining campaign pressure 
against violent extremism.
    This is the stark difference between fighting a 
middleweight rogue nation without nuclear weapons versus 
competing, deterring, and, if deterrence fails, fighting and 
winning a peer fight. It's why Secretary Wilson and I continue 
to articulate in every forum, ``The Air Force is too small for 
what the Nation is asking it to do.'' It's why we reported to 
this Committee, as the Secretary said in March, that the Air 
Force we need to execute the National Defense Strategy requires 
386 operational squadrons. It's why the National Defense 
Strategy Commission, after their research, stated, ``Regardless 
of where the next conflict occurs or which adversary it 
features, the Air Force will be at the foresight--at the 
forefront.'' With your support of this budget request, we'll 
continue to rebuild the readiness and lethality of this force, 
which you supported last year with an on-time appropriation 
following a damaging sequester and years of budget uncertainty. 
For that, we thank you.
    Chairman, history doesn't always repeat, but it does rhyme 
now and then. My father fought as a young F-4 pilot in Vietnam, 
and he and many of his peers stayed in and rebuilt the Air 
Force his son needed to fight and win in Desert Storm, which 
was followed by 28 years of continual combat operations, 
including 10 years of operations Northern and Southern Watch, 
air campaigns in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia, and continuing 
through the past 17 years fighting violent extremism in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and North Africa. Today, my daughter 
and my nephews are young airmen. With your continued support, 
with on-time appropriations, we'll build the Air Force they're 
going to need to fight and win in this era of great-power 
competition.
    So, on behalf of every airmen serving today, and their 
families, I want to thank this Committee for your unwavering 
support. Secretary Wilson and I look forward to your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared combined statement of Secretary Wilson and 
General Goldfein follows:]
      
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	
    
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank both of you.
    We'll have a round of--a 5-minute round.
    That was a great historic perspective. I appreciate that 
very much. It's one that a lot of people have forgotten.
    Now, I know that we're all locked into the NDS and the 
Commission. They've done a great job. We had two good hearings 
here. Everyone believes that we should be following that 
blueprint that we've established. While, yeah, we--this is--
we're on the way to recovery right now, we still have problems 
out there. I mean, if we were to follow the NDS, that would be 
an increase for this 5-year--for the Future Years Defense 
Program of between 3 and 5 percent increase over inflation. 
This 750 doesn't do that. We're not quite there. So, I think, 
when--your discussion, starting with that as something we kind 
of agreed on, you had to give in some areas that probably could 
have very well produced some risk.
    General, during that process, what things did you kind of 
either slight or change from what we had thought was going to 
be a good model and a blueprint to follow?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I'm aligned with the Chairman, 
who's testified, as well, to say that 3 percent allows us to 
keep--stay even; 5 percent allows us to improve and modernize 
in both capability, capacity, readiness. The trades that we 
made----
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, but we didn't do the 3 percent, 
even.
    General Goldfein. That's right. So, the challenges that we 
had--one of the places we didn't take risk was readiness 
recovery. What the Secretary talked about, in terms of getting 
our maintainer shortage to zero and ensuring that we're 
investing in people, we did not take risk. Where we had to take 
risk was in areas of--some areas of modernization, some areas 
of procurement, and some areas where we'd like to have bought 
more to get at that shortfall we have of the aircraft we need--
--
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    General Goldfein.--to go forward.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    Secretary Wilson, someone's got to say this. We're right in 
the middle of a budget thing. If something should happen that 
we're not able to do this, and we had to go back--keeping in 
mind that we went through fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019 
as recovery years, and--but if fiscal year 2020 comes up and we 
don't do the--if we have to fall back to Budget Control Act 
(BCA) and to the--or a CR [continuing resolution], describe to 
us what the result of that would be and how this would have 
impacted what we've already done in fiscal year 2018 and 2019.
    Secretary Wilson. Well, let me give you--with respect to 
the Budget Control Act and sequester, for the Air Force that 
would be about a $29 billion cut. To put that in context, that 
would be four times as large as what happened in sequester the 
last time. So, let me give you what that would look like.
    Now, a sequester is kind of across the board, but what 
would the--what would the magnitude of those choices look like 
under the Budget Control Act? Twenty-nine billion dollars. That 
would be no F-35s. Cut all of the KC-46s, all--stop the B-21 
program. No ground-based strategic deterrent. No research, 
development, test, and evaluation for any space system, most of 
the fourth- and fifth-generation modifications and all of 
science and technology. Or $29 billion means all of weapon 
system sustainment, all flying hours, all base operations and 
airfield support, and all munitions, together to make $29 
billion. I think you can see that that would be absolutely 
devastating in scope and scale.
    With respect to a continuing resolution, what that would 
mean is, we've got 16 new military construction projects that 
wouldn't start, and 18, for current missions, military 
construction that wouldn't start, and we would also--we've got 
89 research, development, test, and evaluation new-starts in 
this budget that wouldn't start.
    So, either of those would set us back significantly. 
Sequester, at this point, would be four times as bad as it was 
in the previous time that the Air Force went through it, and we 
are still recovering from a sequester that would be just one-
quarter of the impact if we had to go through it again.
    Chairman Inhofe. That's a frightening scenario. But, I 
would agree with that. You think about the progress that we 
made during that period of time, the two fiscal years. You had 
mentioned the Tyndall and the Offutt. We do know that there are 
some problems. One thing has--that has been discussed is 
cutting the 18,000 flight hours. You know, we went through that 
once before, and that turned out to be a disaster, and we 
changed our situation there. Does that look like one of the 
things that you think we might have to do in order to come up 
with the results that we're looking for?
    Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman, with respect to Tyndall, 
last week I had to hold back money for 61 facility 
modernization projects in 18 States because we still--we're 
cash-flowing the damage to Tyndall. Just this year, the impact 
will be about $750 million. As we get further into this year, 
my options narrow further and further. If we get into May, 
we're probably going to have to stop the recovery at Tyndall, 
and that means an impact to flight operations there, as well as 
to people who are going to continue to live in--and work in 
degraded facilities. We're going to have to, in May sometime, 
stop a lot of aircraft repairs. We're going to have to ground 
some of our bombers if we don't get the supplemental to 
recover----
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    Secretary Wilson.--from Tyndall. If we get towards the end 
of the year and we've only got a month or so left, there's very 
few options that we have. So, I'm trying to minimize the impact 
and give the Congress enough time to pass a supplemental. But, 
if I get into that last month and I still haven't balanced, 
because of the impact of the storm, and we don't have a 
supplemental, yes, it will impact flying hours.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Well, my time's expired, but for the 
record, I'm going to ask you a question as to where we are 
right now when we're talking about 48 F-35s and eight F-15s. I 
mean, it seems to me we're getting back into the fourth 
generation that we're hoping to be out of. Then, we remember so 
much. Sometimes in history, we forget about the fact that--what 
happened to our F-22s. You know, it started out that was going 
to be 750, ended up being, what, 187, and we've paid dearly for 
that ever since then. That was a huge mistake, should not have 
happened. So, I'll be asking those questions for the record.

    Secretary Wilson. Mr. Chairman, an all fifth generation 
fleet would be ideal; however it simply isn't a realistic 
option given the current budgetary situation. Our analysis 
shows in the 2030 timeframe, sufficient fighter capacity is 
critical in a fight with a near-peer. A mix of F-15EX with F-35 
is our best option given present resources. Additionally, we 
will continue to rely heavily on our fourth generation aircraft 
for the next 20 years. Unfortunately, some of those aircraft--
most specifically the F-15C/Ds--are rapidly reaching the end of 
their service lives. Replacing the F-15C with a modernized 
successor such as the F-15EX allows us to benefit from foreign 
partner investments and enhance capacity without transition 
costs to another platform in the near term.

    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    So, I'm interested in those topics, too, Mr. Chairman, 
since I raised it in my opening statement.
    Chairman Inhofe. You did.
    Senator Reed. So, General Goldfein, for years the Air Force 
has declined to request funding for F-15s or F-16s, and it was 
a pretty strong declination. This year, there are eight F-15s 
in the budget, 1.1 billion over the FYDP, 7.9 billion for about 
80 F-15s. Can you just give us an idea--and I think it touches 
upon the Chairman's question, too--based on your personal and 
professional judgment, is this a wise acquisition?
    General Goldfein. Sir, this is what went into the decision. 
It starts with, Chairman Inhofe, your point. If you go back to 
the decision when we cut the F-22, a part of that decision was 
the program of record. We should have 1100 F-35s today. We have 
less than 300. The F-15Cs were supposed to be long gone. So, 
first and foremost, as we went into looking at the capacity 
challenges we're facing right now, we're absolutely adamant 
that the F-35 program, the program of record that we have, 
stays absolutely on track, and that we don't take a dime out of 
the F-35, because it's not only a game changer for us, it's the 
quarterback of the penetrating joint team. So, what you'll see 
in our budget is not only maintaining the F-35 program, but 
we're actually adding $1.8 billion to the F-35 program to make 
sure we stayed on track.
    Here's the challenge we faced. We have the capacity--those 
missions--those phone calls that I'm going to get, that I laid 
out in my opening statement, that are simultaneous--our mission 
assessments of the Air Force we need says that we need all of 
the capacity of both fifth- and fourth-generation. We've got 
four fourth-generation aircraft that have got to fly into the 
2030, the F-15C, the F-15E, the F-16, and the A-10. One of them 
is not going to make it, and that's the F-15C. So, knowing 
that, we had to find a way to refresh the F-15C line only by 
keeping the F-35 program on track. We only looked at one 
option, which was a F-15 variant to replace an F-15. Because 
what that does was, it allows you to use the same hangars, same 
construction, same base, same operating equipment, which is 90-
percent common, same maintainers, same operators, and no time 
and minimal costs to make a transition. The Saudis and the 
Qataris have kept that line open and have invested in making it 
a much better airplane. So, we can capture all that, the 
business case for being able to refresh that F-15C line only, 
on top of the F-15, with the other fourth-generation airplanes, 
make--made the most sense to us, and using the CAPE [cost 
assessment and program evaluation] estimates.
    We are now an Air Force of about 20 percent fifth-
generation, 80 percent fourth-generation. By 2040, our target 
is to reverse those numbers: 80 percent fifth-generation, 20 
percent fourth-generation. That target has not changed, and we 
have not changed our position on the F-35. We've just got a 
capacity near-term issue we've got to solve.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Just a quick, almost, footnote on the F-35. One of the 
issues you're still dealing with is sustainment costs, which 
are much higher than you can manage, frankly, going forward. I 
presume both you and the Secretary are committed to getting 
those sustainment costs down dramatically. That fair?
    General Goldfein. Sir, we are committed to that. We've made 
that very clear to the contractor, as the largest customer, I 
believe we speak not only on behalf of the Air Force, but also 
on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps teammates and all of the 
international air chiefs and the international partners who are 
in the F-35. The target that we've put out is to get a 
procurement cost below 80 million and an average cost per 
flying hour of less than 30,000 per flying hour, which puts it 
comparable to the high end of a fourth-generation.
    Senator Reed. Right.
    General Goldfein. If we can hit those targets, then we've 
got an affordable airplane that is already a game changer.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, last year's NDAA, 
section 335, asked for the list of 10 most vulnerable 
installations to weather challenges. We have not yet received 
that list from the Air Force. We had the Army here last week. 
They committed their leadership to send us this list. Would you 
do that? Because, you know, looking at Tyndall, looking at some 
of these other bases, it's not a one-off experience. We're 
going to have more storm damages and if we don't know where to 
start putting our mitigation funding and our sustainability 
funding, we'll misspend resources. Can you send us those lists?
    Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir, we will.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    This list was sent to the professional staff members of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on April 30, 2019.


    Notes:

     LThe list is organized alphabetically by state; it 
is not a ranked 1 to 10 list.
     LThis list differs from the Office of Secretary 
Defense (OSD) list submitted in March 2019 pursuant to Section 
335 of the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act.
     LThe OSD Report on Effects of a Changing Climate 
to the Department of Defense submitted in fulfillment of 
Section 335 included Air Force input. The Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD 
(A&S)) provided each Service the same list of bases, and the 
Air Force noted the presence or not of current and potential 
vulnerabilities to each Air Force site to five climate-related 
events: recurrent flooding, drought, desertification, wildfires 
and thawing permafrost over the next 20 years.
     LThe Air Force list is different because we took a 
broader look at the full inventory of primary Air Force bases 
in the continental United States to determine our exposure to 
current and potential severe weather and climate effects. It 
also evaluated coastal and inland flooding vulnerabilities 
separately, and appropriately weighted flooding, wildfire and 
drought vulnerabilities. These factors led to results that were 
different from OSD results. Additional similarities and 
differences between OSD and Air Force approaches are below.
     LThe OUSD (A&S) mission assurance list included 34 
active Air Force sites and 2 National Guard sites. The Air 
Force list is derived from 74 Active sites, 10 Reserve sites, 
and 2 National Guard sites.
     LWe analyzed our expanded list of bases with the 
same authoritative data used for the OUSD (A&S)-provided list.
     LWe separated the OUSD (A&S) `recurrent flooding' 
category into coastal and inland flooding to capture those 
sites that are, or could be, impacted by multiple flooding 
effects.
     LWe applied the same weighting methodology used by 
OUSD (A&S), which ranked current effects higher than potential 
effects, and weighted recurrent flooding (in our case, two 
categories of flooding--coastal and inland) and wildfire 
vulnerabilities higher than drought, desertification, and 
thawing permafrost.
    The Air Force analysis that underpins both Air Force-
specific list, and our input to OSD's list, is subject to some 
caveats:
     LIt reflects an installation's susceptibility to 
the consequences of severe weather events, not necessarily 50 
to 100 year climatic changes
     LIt does not consider any specific critical 
mission implications. For example, even if the base is subject 
to flooding because a portion is within a 100 year flood plain, 
the mission critical facility may not be impacted because of 
its location on the base (e.g. STRATCOM HQ Building on high 
ground at Offutt)

    Moving forward, we plan to conduct a more robust analysis 
of Air Force installation vulnerabilities related to mission 
criticality and specific locational aspects within the 
installation, to include accessibility concerns. Once we have a 
better understanding of the linkage to mission, then we can 
begin to assess where best to apply resources to improve either 
resiliency or adaptability.

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, ma'am. Thank you, Madam 
Secretary.
    One of the other issues that came up last week when we were 
speaking to the Army is, they did a deep dive. They looked at 
where they could save money to pay for--which we understand are 
significant challenges. We're trying to help, but, as the 
Chairman and the dialogue here is presented, you know, we're 
not up at that 5-percent level. We're probably hovering close 
to the 3. So, some of these savings have to be found 
internally. Can you give us just a quick sense of what you've 
done and what you propose to do?
    Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Senator. The Air Force also 
conducted what we call the ``zero base review'' of our 1,072 
programs in the Air Force. We will do that again for fiscal 
year 2021. Our approach was to come up with a balanced budget 
that made us as lethal as we possibly could be. We restructured 
our next-generation air-dominance program. Of course, last 
year, we had proposed, and you all approved, the restructuring, 
cancellation of JSTARS and moving to advanced battle 
management. We terminated the B-2 high-frequency program. We 
put money into readiness and tried to focus that on the 
squadrons where it made the most difference, what we call our 
``pacing units.'' So, we also--and when we try to do 
acquisition faster and smarter, we're trying to bring more 
competition into our procurements, because that drives down 
cost. In fact, with the four major procurements that we've 
announced in the last 7 months, we came in $15 billion below 
the independent cost estimate, and were able to take that $15 
billion and roll it back into greater readiness and lethality.
    So, our approaches have been slightly different than the 
way the Army has approached the problem set, but the intent is 
the same, to get the most value we can out of every dollar that 
we spend.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Fischer.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary and General, I'd like to thank you both for 
making visits to Offutt Air Force Base after the flooding that 
we saw hit Nebraska a couple of weeks ago. Madam Secretary, it 
was a pleasure to be able to have you at office when we were 
able to survey the damage together there. I thank you for your 
commitment to rebuild Offutt, and I look forward to working 
with you on that task.
    I have no doubt that this Committee appreciates the 
essential value of that installation. I do think it's important 
that this Committee also understands the full impact to Offutt 
and what will happen if we do not provide supplemental funding. 
You mentioned the effects of sequester, a CR, if we do not get 
the supplemental funding to Tyndall, with looking at the 61 
projects that are out there in 18 states, and the effect that 
has, not just on repairs, but on readiness. But, now you add 
Offutt into that mix, as well. Can you explain the effect that 
that will have if we do not get this supplemental funding done?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me talk a little bit about 
that. We have a rough estimate now of what it's going to do--
what we're going to need to just recover from the damage done 
at Offutt. So, it wasn't just that a third of the runway was 
covered by water, it is that the water came up into a number of 
our facilities and buildings there, including some satellite 
facilities and other things.
    I would say two things first. One is a real thank you to 
the people in Nebraska. When the base put the call out for 
needing people to help with sandbags to protect the base, the 
city of Bellevue showed up with dump trucks' worth of sand. It 
was a wonderful partnership, even when they were also 
threatened.
    The second thing that I would say is that STRATCOM 
headquarters was in the middle of an exercise when that flood 
hit, and they didn't miss a beat, because there was redundancy 
in power, and we worked with the commercial power provider to 
make sure that power was shut off in an orderly way and shifted 
to the backup systems. Resilience does matter.
    The reality is, though, that we're going to probably have 
$350 million worth of damages there at Offutt just this year, 
and that's not including MILCON [military construction], which 
will be further out, to recover and rebuild some of those 
facilities. If we don't get the supplemental to recover from 
the storm damage, in July we're going to have to start 
deferring Offutt recovery other than for matters related to 
health and safety. That means the risk of mold and continued 
damage to buildings that then cost more to recover will 
increase.
    Senator Fischer. Thank you.
    As you both know, the 55th Wing is also at Offutt. It's the 
home of the RC-135, which is Air Force's largest manned ISR 
platform. Secretary Wilson, last October, you responded to a 
question that I submitted for the record on the future of the 
RC-135, and you stated, ``The RC-135 family of aircraft will 
continue to operate through at least 2040 to 2050''.
    General, yesterday, you were at the HASC hearing, and, in 
testimony, when discussing the RC-135, you mentioned that the 
Air Force is looking at fusing capabilities that are platform-
centric. Can you explain--or can you expand on this and what it 
really means for the C-135 family of aircraft? I think there 
might have been a little confusion yesterday on that.
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
    First of all, let me reinforce Secretary's testimony that, 
in fact, the RC-135, which is not only a U.S. platform, but one 
that we also do with our U.K. partners. We're partners in that 
program. So, our ability to fly that airplane into the 2040s is 
going to be absolutely essential.
    The Advanced Battle Management System, the debate that we 
had last year that this Committee supported, is bigger than 
Joint STARS. This is about the future of joint warfighting and 
how we move from a platform-centric approach to a network-
centric approach. The visual I would offer you--you know, 
sometimes we, I think, are guilty of putting forth PowerPoint 
slides that have big, red domes over countries that--as though 
we cannot penetrate or get in. A better visual actually is a 
block of Swiss cheese, because that's about what any country 
can put over the top of them to defend themselves. It's our job 
to actually know where the holes are and get in. Once we get 
in, then we do the--what I call the ``five Ps'' of air 
superiority, right? We've got to penetrate, we've got to 
persist when we're inside there, we've got to protect what's in 
there, not only on the ground, in the air, at sea, we've got to 
proliferate, and we've got to be able to punish by holding 
targets at risk.
    So, if an adversary actually ever sees an F-35, which is 
unlikely, I would like to also send them a message on their 
screensavers that says, ``We're here.'' Not ``I'm here,'' but 
``We're here.'' Because the visual I would offer you is that, 
if the F-35 is inside, it is the quarterback of a penetrating 
joint team, and that joint team consists of an F-35, a B-21, an 
RQ-170, an X-37 in space, low-Earth orbiting satellites, a 
penetrating attack submarine, a small team on the ground. The 
key for that penetrating team to operate is to connect every 
sensor to every shooter. That's advanced battle management.
    This is bigger than the Joint STARS. This is about the 
future of joint warfighting and how the entire Department is 
shifting to networked warfare of the future.
    Senator Fischer. As we move to that future, though, the 
135s definitely have a role to play, as the Secretary said, 
through 2040 to 2050, because that future is not where we are 
at the present. Is that a correct statement?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Where I would give you in the 
visual is, every sensor to every shooter, and the RC-135 is a 
critical sensor.
    Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here.
    Let me add my voice, Madam Secretary, for your service. I 
want to particularly thank you for the time that you've spent 
with me over the last 15 months as I joined this body. It's 
been very, very helpful.
    In one of our meetings, in particular, we talked about Air 
Force's Junior ROTC program. That program really came to my 
attention through a similar program that the Air Guard in 
Alabama has. Colonel Sparrow--"Swapper Sparrow'' has a program 
to give some scholarships for kids. I notice that, for the Air 
Force to grow from, like, 312 operational squadrons to 386, 
we're going to need, like, 1,480 pilots for fiscal year 2020. I 
am hopeful that, in doing that, we can also increase the number 
of female and minority pilots, which I think is really--that 
Junior ROTC program is directed to. I'd like for you to just 
talk about that program for a minute, and talk about the 
success for that program. We have introduced a bill recently to 
kind of expand that across the other branches of the services. 
So, I think it's a good opportunity for you to talk about the 
Air Force's success in that program.
    Secretary Wilson. Well, thank you, sir. Thanks for the 
opportunity.
    We are facing a national shortage of aircrew and pilots. 
While we are having plenty of people volunteer to go through 
training with us and we don't think we'll have trouble getting 
to the 1,480, we need to inspire the next generation of 
aviators and cause people to choose to fly. When we look at who 
we don't have volunteering in the Air Force and who's not 
stepping up in civil aviation, as well, there is a 
disproportionately low number of women and minorities who 
choose to fly. When we looked at the data, one of the things 
that was interesting was that, if you ask an Anglo boy, ``When 
did you decide to learn to fly?''--they usually say, ``Fourth, 
fifth grade,'' somewhere around there. If you ask girls, women, 
or minorities, it's much more common for them to say, ``In high 
school'' or ``In college.''
    One of the things we looked at was the Junior ROTC program. 
Here's an interesting factoid that I didn't know before I 
became Secretary. But, our Junior ROTC programs, which we have 
in high schools across America, are 58 percent minority. Last 
summer, with some of our excess funds, we decided to sponsor 
170 high school kids to get their private pilot's license. We 
partnered with seven universities around the country. They had 
to be in Junior ROTC, which gave us a--you know, we--so, we're 
going after the population we were interested in. So, they 
showed some interest in the military. There was no requirement 
to join the military. But, a full-ride scholarship on a college 
campus for 7 weeks in the summer to get their private pilot's 
license. So, we're trying to inspire the next generation of 
aviators. About 90 percent of them were successful in getting 
that private pilot's license, and we hope that we have sparked 
a dream.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you very much for that. I 
hope we can get that going across the other agencies.
    Following up on that a little bit, just, General, about 
recruiting, we've heard the challenges, sometimes, of 
recruiting, but I notice, you know, in the budget the Air Force 
has increased its recruiting goal without really talking about 
challenges. Have you experienced challenges? It seems that, to 
meet the budget, you are trying to recruit 4,400 new airmen. 
What experience have you with challenges? But, more 
importantly, what are some of the Air Force's successful 
recruiting strategies?
    General Goldfein. Thanks, Senator.
    We have met our recruiting goals, but, I'll tell you, 
what's been interesting is--you know, there's a tradition at 
the Recruiting Squadron; when they meet their quota, they ring 
a bell. Normally, through most of the year, they ring the bell 
about the middle of the month. What we're seeing is that 
they're often ringing the bell in the last day or 2 days, 
because it's becoming harder and harder. This is a challenge 
across--this is--this has to do with, 29 percent of America's 
youth that's physically capable of serving and we're all 
fishing in that same pool. So, it's a challenge for all 
services. We're happy to report that, to date, we've been able 
to meet our recruiting goals.
    When we looked at the growth and the glide slope that we 
could sustain, in terms of increasing our numbers, 4,400 a 
year, plus then about 3,000 or so after that, allows us to have 
a very steady growth path that allows us to not only go out and 
recruit what we need, but also bring them in. We have the right 
numbers in basic military training, the right numbers in tech 
schools. So, the entire pipeline now has been built to be able 
to sustain that growth over time.
    Probably the biggest success story, I will tell you, is in 
our special warfare business. We stood up a new recruiting 
squadron to go after our Special Operators, our young men and 
women who are capable of probably the most intense training 
pipeline of any of the services, certainly in our--2 years' 
pipeline. We're seeing a lot of success with mentors, a 
preparatory program, and getting out to high schools and 
talking about what an Air Force does on the ground.
    Senator Jones. Great. Well, thank you all very much. I 
appreciate that. I'm looking forward to talking about SPACECOM 
next week.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Secretary Wilson, General 
Goldfein, for your testimony today.
    I know you spoke a little bit earlier about what would 
happen if the Air Force returned to sequester-level budgets. 
Let's hope that doesn't happen. It usually hasn't happened 
since 2013. But, General Goldfein, I'd like for you to address 
what would happen under an alternative scenario that some 
people in Congress are talking about. Let's suppose you got a 
full-year continuing resolution. So, Congress couldn't reach an 
agreement to lift the budget caps and pass the normal annual 
spending bills, the way we have the last l2 years, so Congress 
throws up its hands sometimes later this summer or early fall, 
and says, ``You know what? We're just going to have a full-year 
continuing resolution for all of fiscal year 2020. You'll get 
exactly what you got last year.'' What would that impact be?
    General Goldfein. Thanks, sir.
    I'll just give you a few examples of what that'll mean for 
us, because, of course, a year-long CR, we would assume, would 
be to execute, with no new-starts, at the 2019 levels. So, new 
mission MILCON, KC-46, F-35, TX would all stop. That would 
affect about 16 projects that would stop and, therefore, stop 
our ability to bed down, because you have to have the 
infrastructure to bed down the weapon systems. We have about 18 
current mission MILCON projects that would cease and stop that 
would affect our readiness. You know, any procurement, 
research, development, training, and evaluation (RDT&E), new-
starts would stop. That would affect over 89 programs, the 
United States Air Force, for an Air Force that's working hard 
to modernize, that this Committee has supported. If it goes 
anything more than 6 months, it would put our end-strength 
growth at risk, because we will not be able to bring on the 
additional airmen we need, not to have mission growth, but 
actually to fill our formations to do the missions that we're 
already doing. So, it would have a significantly negative 
impact.
    Senator Cotton. So, almost the worst thing imaginable.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cotton. Sequester would be the worst thing, but 
it's hard to----
    General Goldfein. Yes.
    Senator Cotton.--imagine we would go back to the actual 
sequester levels. But, a proposal that's being batted around to 
have a full-year continuing resolution, almost the worst thing 
imaginable.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cotton. All right, thank you for that.
    Couple of NDAAs ago, the Congress directed the Air Force to 
begin to transition a significant number of UAV [unmanned 
aerial vehicles] pilots to enlisted ranks, an issue on which 
I've worked. Senator King and Senator Jones and I are working 
together on this pilot issue. Could you tell us how that's 
going, what we've learned about--learned from it?
    General Goldfein. Sir, no surprises. As you might imagine, 
what we learned is, our enlisted force can do anything we ask 
them to do. The enlisted members who have been in the--we put 
them in the RQ-4, the Global Hawk program, and they've 
performed brilliantly.
    We've now expanded the discussion, though, because, as we 
work through in space and look at the--building the force we 
need to fight and win in a contested environment, today all 
constellations are being flown by our young enlisted force. You 
know, we have seven members right now who are on duty, who are 
running GPS for the globe right now at Schriever Air Force 
Base. So, the question we're asking is, What is the future of 
the enlisted operator when you look at space transitioning to a 
contested domain and high-altitude ISR, going forward? Is there 
a broader discussion that we're having about that enlisted 
operator in high-altitude ISR when it's above the atmosphere 
and below the atmosphere? Is there a career path where someone 
can now go into the business of ISR as an enlisted operator and 
transition between the two? So, we're taking the lessons we 
learned from where we are today, and now expanding that 
discussion. That's where I think we're going to land.
    Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you.
    I'd like to talk about the B-21 budget request. I have 
occasional hearings on the B-21 and its progress in a closed 
setting so we can ensure that, 20 years from now, people don't 
look back on some of the decisions made now, as we do look back 
on the F-35. Last year, the budget request was 2.3 billion. 
This year, it's 3 billion. Secretary Wilson, in this setting, 
could you tell us a little bit more about why we've seen that 
increase and what the Department plans to do with it?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, we've got--we're moving forward 
with the research, development, test, and evaluation of this 
new aircraft. We had the critical design review late last year, 
fourth quarter last year. The program is on track and on 
schedule.
    Senator Cotton. Okay.
    General Goldfein, anything to add?
    General Goldfein. No, sir. Same.
    Senator Cotton. I know we're projected at 100, minimum, 
aircraft. Given the threat environment we face and the posture 
review that you've undertaken, can you envision a scenario in--
where we need to have more than 100 B-21s?
    General Goldfein. I can, sir. Not surprisingly, when we did 
our analysis of the Air Force we need, which was over 2,000 
computer iterations of different force elements against the 
latest combatant commander OPLANs, operational plans, and the 
projection of the threat in the 2025 to 2030 timeframe. No 
surprise that long-range aviation was in the shortest supply 
and in the greatest demand. So, tankers, bombers, long-range 
ISR and command and control, those are where you're seeing the 
largest amount of growth required for the Air Force we need. 
So, I do see an environment where the bombers would be a larger 
number required.
    Senator Cotton. Over the long run, that would produce a 
lower average unit cost, I would assume, right?
    General Goldfein. It would.
    Senator Cotton. Okay.
    Thank you both for your testimony.
    Secretary Wilson, thank you for your service. We're sorry 
to see you leave. I guess, though, congratulations is in order 
to see you leave Washington?
    [Laughter.]
    Secretary Wilson. I was released early for good behavior.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Cotton. Very well.
    Thank you all.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here, and also, thank you for your 
service.
    General Goldfein, you stated that F-35 is the quarterback 
of our fighters--fighter aircraft. You also said that, by 2040, 
you want a 80-20 percent dominance of the Air Wing by the 
fifth-generation fighters, like the F-35. In all my time on 
House Armed Services Committee, we had a lot of discussion 
about the need to invest in more fifth-generation into our 
current fleet, but then also to start investing in sixth-
generation aircraft, certainly because our competitors, on the 
global scale, the Chinese, are pushing into the sixth-
generation, themselves. So, I'm a little bit confused. How will 
funding the F-15X--EX--affect your goal of this dominance, 
given that a sustained defense budget is not guaranteed, moving 
into the future?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
    First, I'll just--I'll say that the F-35, as I describe it, 
is the quarterback of more than the fighter force. It's the 
quarterback of the penetrating joint team. When you look at the 
investment in--that we are making, in this budget, in 
penetrating capability, you'll see $135 billion of investment. 
But, the--but, that is F-35, plus B-21, plus other capabilities 
that we're--plus space capabilities--that are all required to 
penetrate enemy airspace and be able to watch the enemy. So, 
first and foremost, the F-35, which is why we are not backing 
an inch off of our program of record, and maintaining the F-35, 
because it is the quarterback of the joint team that we need.
    The challenge we face is a near-term challenge. Our 
analysis indicated that, to be able to drive aircraft aged to a 
manageable level and to be able to do the missions that we 
require, we have to procure 72 aircraft a year to do that. 
There's four aircraft that we have to fly in the fourth 
generation, capacity-wise, into the 2030s, and that's the F-
15C, the A-10, the F-15E, and the F-16. Three are going to be 
capable of flying into the 2030s. One is not going to make it. 
So, the F-15 refresh is only to give us the capacity we need as 
we make that transition from 20-80 to 80-20. We find ourselves 
in this position again, because, as the Chairman mentioned, 
when the decision to cancel the F-22 occurred--we're supposed 
to have 1100 F-35s right now. We have less than 300. So, we're 
faced with the situation we have right now. As the Secretary 
and I looked at the cost estimates, an F-15 refresh, using the 
investments that the Saudis and the Qataris have put in that 
line, to replace the F-15C, as long as we don't impact the F-35 
line, was a reasonable choice.
    Senator Duckworth. So, you're refreshing the Charlie-model 
F-15s, and they're going into the EX. Then you-- what's the 
projected lifespan for the refresh model into the future? 
You're saying into 2030?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Actually, longer. The model 
of--the EX model has got a 20,000-hour service-life expectancy.
    Senator Duckworth. Will that affect what your future 
requests are going to be for the number F-35s?
    General Goldfein. Ma'am, if we ever get to a point where we 
are trading F-35s for F-15s, let me tell you, that's a bad 
choice. The F-15 is not an F-35. It will never be an F-35. We 
are just--you know, in the flying business, we--you know, we 
describe things as ``runway behind us and runway ahead of us.'' 
The run--the decision that was made on the F-22 to put us in 
the place we're in is ``runway behind us.'' I can't affect 
that. The Secretary and I can only affect ``runway ahead of 
us.'' What we need is, we need the capacity, and we've got to 
get to 72 aircraft a year. We've got to look at the cost 
projections to be able to make an affordable decision, going 
forward.
    Senator Duckworth. Understood. Also, ``airspace above--
altitude above you and gas on the ground, behind you,'' right?
    Last year, it was reported that more than 126 military 
installations or sites and their surrounding communities rely 
on wells or groundwater sources that contain dangerous levels 
of two chemical compounds that are tied to birth defects and 
certain cancers, known as PFOS and PFOAs. Secretary Wilson, how 
many Air Force military installations may be threatened by 
dangerous levels of PFOS and PFOAs? Do you know?
    Secretary Wilson. Ma'am, we have done 110 detailed site 
inspections. We have looked at 297 total locations. So, we've 
done the detail of those. Of the ones we did--so, we did an 
initial look, and then--and, in that initial look, we 
identified 21 installations where we need to do alternative 
water supplies. So, there is, immediately, alternative water 
supplies to make sure that people have safe drinking water.
    We then go back and do a more detailed site inspection. We 
have done 110 detailed site inspections of a total of 189, I 
think, active facilities. We also do some on locations that 
were BRAC'd [Base Realignment and Closure].
    Senator Duckworth. What about the ones that are on Air 
Guard locations?
    Secretary Wilson. That includes Active, Guard, and Reserve.
    Senator Duckworth. Okay. Thank you.
    Yield back.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Goldfein, Secretary Wilson, first of all, thank you 
both for your service to our country.
    Secretary Wilson, we're going to miss you up here, but it 
sounds as though you've got an opportunity that--it's clearly 
something in your future, and you'll do great.
    I do have a question with regard--for Secretary Wilson--
with regard to the DOD's submitted budget of $750 billion this 
year. Why is the Air Force unfunded priority list (UPL) over a 
billion dollars--a billion dollars greater than your fiscal 
year 2019 request, despite the top-line growth in the overall 
DOD budget?
    General Goldfein. Senator, I'll----
    Secretary Wilson. I'll go----
    General Goldfein.--answer, if that's----
    Secretary Wilson. Sure.
    General Goldfein.--okay, just because the----
    Secretary Wilson. Sure.
    General Goldfein.--the unfunded priority lists normally 
comes from the service chiefs.
    What you'll see in the unfunded priority list--first of 
all, it's always those things that didn't make the cut line 
when we were building our budget, and it--the intent is always 
to tell you where we would place money if additional money were 
available. It's important to note that, in the first--and we 
listed ours in priority order, as well, in the UPL--the first 
thing we listed was money for MILCON, and those--and if we were 
not--to not get a supplemental, we placed in the UPL, in 2020, 
money that we would need to recover from the damage done in 
2019 if we didn't get a supplemental. Important to note that, 
in that money is also adding three to five additional 
professionals at 63 bases where we have privatized housing and 
identified privatized housing issues, because of that--of 
course, that issue came up after we had completed our POM.
    What you'll also see there is in money for defendable 
space, because we are--we're transitioning from a noncontested 
domain to a contested domain. This accelerates things that 
we're already doing in the program, but moves them to the left, 
and you see that. Then you see money in there for aircraft 
procurement so that, again, if there was additional money left, 
it gets us to this--to 60 F-35s, which is what we are told, 
from the company, they can produce in 2019, and it also adds 
KC-46s, which our Air Force We Need Assessment told us long-
range aviation is a high priority.
    Senator Rounds. All right. Well, as you both know, we're 
very pleased with the bed-down determination, where Ellsworth 
Air Force Base will be the first bed-down for the B-21. 
Community of Rapid City is very pleased, and I can assure you 
that they are prepared and willing to assist any way possible 
to make that as workable as possible. But, we're very happy 
with that decision, and we look forward to seeing the B-21 
being deployed on time and on target with regard to budget.
    Based upon the study that you've provided us, which is 
``The Air Force We Need,'' the number of required bomber needs 
to be increased, according to your assessment. I think 
Secretary--or Senator Cotton talked a little bit about it. But, 
I want to go into this a little bit. We'd originally talked 
about the 100 B-21s as--first it was, that's what we were 
looking at, in terms of the budgeted items, but, really, that's 
a minimum number. But, there really is no scenario laid out in 
which you could get by with just 100.
    What I'd like to do is to talk about two items. First of 
all, what is that real number? What is the number that we're 
really going to need to make this thing work? Second of all, 
you've got the F-35s coming in. I agree with you, you've got to 
get to the right number of F-35s. But, that's not an air-
dominance system. It's not designed to be the F-22. The F-22 is 
now, what, closing in on 40 years in age? So, you're going to 
have to be looking at that next-generation air-dominance 
system, that platform. What's the plan? How do you fit in 
maintaining and moving forward with the required numbers of B-
21s that you're going to need and still allow for us to 
maintain the air dominance necessary with that next new 
platform or system? How does it fit together?
    Secretary Wilson. Sir, I may let the Chief talk a little 
bit about the numbers of bombers, but let me talk a little bit 
about next-generation. Probably within the next couple of 
weeks, we will be releasing the Science and Technology Strategy 
for the Air Force. The Air Force does that every 7 to 10 years. 
But, one of the things that we are going to do is go back to 
what we call vanguard programs, where we use the authorities 
you've given us to prototype, to experiment, and to rapidly 
innovate. I think there's--if you look back, there's probably a 
legitimate criticism of some of our major defense programs, 
where, you know, there are multiple miracles required in a 
program. That's probably not the way to set yourself up for 
success. Rather than looking at a particular platform, our 
next-generation air-dominance will identify the technologies 
that we need to develop and test, and then make decisions along 
the way on how we will deploy those technologies. Beyond that, 
I think, probably we should go into--I'll talk to you in a 
classified setting, on what we're thinking about.
    General Goldfein. Sir, with respect to bombers, the minimum 
number we need to be able to meet the current operational plans 
of the combatant commanders is 175. That's 100 B-21s and 75 B-
52s. To be able to keep the B-52 flying in the period of time--
and we did a business-case analysis to look at the cost of a 
brand-new bomber versus, you know, taking the B-52 and 
reengining it and putting new radars in it. What we found is 
that the cost alone for a, you know, EMP-hardened new bomber, 
to be able to bring that level of payload in a standoff 
capacity, is far more significant than the cost of just 
upgrading it, because it has good bones and can last for 
awhile.
    So, it's 175 that is the minimum number in the Air Force we 
need. We have--you'll see that that pluses up from a current 
squadron number of 9 to 14, with an additional 5 squadrons. 
Those 5 squadrons are based on the simultaneous missions and 
the simultaneous plans that we're going to have to support, be 
that STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, EUCOM, or PACOM.
    Senator Rounds. But, the key was, the B-52 was a standoff--
--
    General Goldfein. Yes.
    Senator Rounds.--weapon system----
    General Goldfein. Absolutely.
    Senator Rounds.--not a penetrating.
    General Goldfein. Not a penetrator.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for being here today.
    Let me add my voice to the others on the Committee who have 
said how much we will--have appreciated your service, Secretary 
Wilson, and how much we will miss you.
    General Goldfein, we're glad you're staying.
    A couple of weeks ago, I had the opportunity to be at the 
``Last Plane Out'' ceremony for the KC-135 that left the 157th 
Air Refueling Wing at the former Pease Air Force Base. I just 
want to share with you one of the things that commander of that 
unit, Colonel John Pogorek, said as he was saying goodbye to 
the plane. He pointed out that for the third year running, the 
157th has flown more sorties, and more sorties per KC-135, than 
any other Guard unit, Reserve unit, or Active Duty unit in the 
world. So, as you can appreciate, we--and I should point out 
that the plane that left was the oldest plane in our inventory. 
It wasn't through yet. It was built in 1957, and it was going 
to Arizona. So, obviously, we're waiting, with great angst, for 
the new tankers to come to Pease. I know there have been some 
reports in the news lately indicating that there has been 
another discovery of foreign debris found in the aircraft, and 
that there has, again, been a halt to delivery of the tankers. 
So, I wonder, Secretary Wilson, if you can give us an update on 
where we are with this and what you expect to happen with 
Boeing and the production of the tankers.
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, the production is going forward. 
I had the joy of being on the first KC-46 to fly in to 
McConnell. Senator Inhofe brought the first one in to Oklahoma, 
I believe. We have found some debris on the line. The 
inspectors found some debris that shouldn't have been there, 
should have been wiped out of some of the compartments on the 
KC-46, on the manufacturing line. We have worked with Boeing on 
a corrective action plan. It will also require greater 
inspection and attention for quality assurance by both the Air 
Force and Boeing. But, we expect that they will be able to 
implement those quality improvement plans this month so that we 
can restart acceptance of the aircraft and the arrival of the 
aircraft at Pease will not be affected.
    Senator Shaheen. I'm delighted to hear that. Are the issues 
that were found with the--as I understood, it was the 
electronics that also had some issues with the plane. Has that 
been resolved, as well?
    Secretary Wilson. There were two issues that we accepted 
the plane with, where we had some deficiencies that we had to 
work through. One of them is going to be fixed at Boeing's 
expense, and that has to do with the remote vision system. So, 
in the KC-135, as you know, you kind of look out--you lie down 
and look out the back window.
    Senator Shaheen. Right.
    Secretary Wilson. In the KC-46, you look at a video screen 
that has cameras on the back, and there's some distortion of 
that screen because of the way the cameras are located and so 
forth. We have reached agreement with Boeing on how that needs 
to be fixed, and that that will be retrofitted into aircraft--
all of the aircraft, and added in on the line, going forward. 
That will be done at their expense.
    There was one other deficiency that we identified. That had 
to do with the stiffness of the boom when refueling an A-10, 
which is a very light aircraft. They met the international 
standard, so that actually will be a change that the Air Force 
will pay for. It's the change of an actuator to affect the 
stiffness of the boom.
    Senator Shaheen. Great. Thank you for the update.
    I also should thank you for the responsiveness of the Air 
Force to the PFAS issues that we've had at Pease, and your 
support for the study that the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry is doing, the first long-term health impact of 
PFOA and PFOS that will have been done. So, that should provide 
a lot of information that we can use, going forward.
    Unfortunately, we've also heard from a number of military 
retirees and their families who believe that exposure to a 
dozen other known carcinogens at the air base has caused them 
health impacts, including a number of cancers, ranging from 
prostate to bladder cancer. The National Guard has requested 
that the Air Force Medical Support Agency conduct a public 
health study for military personnel and civilian individuals 
that lived and worked on Pease to determine if there is a 
higher-than-expected rate of morbidity and mortality. Can you 
tell me if that is a possibility and what would need to happen 
in order for us to be able to get that done?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, I don't--the answer--the quick 
answer is, I don't know what would have to happen in order to 
do that kind of a study. But, of course, we'd have no 
objections to that kind of a study being done.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, if there's anything that I can do, 
and anything that we need, in terms of the upcoming defense 
bill, I'm happy to work on that.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Perdue.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you both for your service and outstanding performance 
in the last 2 years.
    Two years ago, when you sat before us, you inherited the 
smallest and oldest Air Force ever. You reminded us of that. 
You also called out, Secretary, that your three priorities were 
readiness, recap, and rationalization. I want to thank you both 
for what you accomplished in the last year and a half on 
readiness. It's remarkable to see what you've done to bring our 
force to the current level of readiness. I know we have a lot 
of work yet to do, but I want to thank you for that.
    Chief, can you just give us an update--you mentioned it 
earlier--on ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System]? I have 
two questions for both of you, so I'd appreciate some brevity, 
here. But, in June of last year, in 2018, the Air Force 
announced that Robbins would actually host some of the initial 
elements of ABMS. That statement actually said it is a service 
transition--and I quote, ``transition to ABMS, the Air Force 
will fly the E-8C JSTARS fleet in the mid to late 2020s. The 
air and space systems that make up the ABMS network will 
include a fusion center and associated supporting activities.'' 
Can you give us an update on what's happened in the last year, 
how that's progressing, and how it's developing, and how you're 
managing the gaps from current technology into this model that 
you're talking about, in this environment?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Thank you.
    You know, the decision that was made to place Air Battle--
Advanced Battle Management System at Robbins was based 
primarily on the fact that that's where our Ph.D.'s of battle 
management exist. We looked, first and foremost, at that 
community, who understands this business better than any other 
community. They're the doctors of battle management that we 
need to lead us into the future.
    There's three increments to this transition. Increment one 
is focused on taking the current sensors that we have and 
advancing them and connecting them in ways that they're not 
currently connected. So, one of the first things we did with 
the money that you authorized us to put, is, we bought back E-3 
AWACS as they were currently--we were planning to retire, and 
we put money into them to be able to bring in feeds that didn't 
currently exist. Because this is about current--increment one 
is current sensors, and connecting them together. That is on 
track.
    Increment two is about bringing new sensor capability--many 
of those are going to be in space--and bringing that new 
capability on, and connecting them together.
    The final increment is to connect it all together. We've 
just brought on, this year, an architect, Mr. Preston Dunlap, 
to lead us through that. His first stop was to meet the doctors 
of battle management at Robbins. Matter of fact, I believe he's 
still there today. We're on track, and I'm really excited that 
Robbins is going to lead the way.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
    Madam Secretary, in your first testimony here, you talked 
about China. We've just received this RAND report. It's an 
update on their views of what's going on. My concern about 
China was that they were moving out from a defensive posture, 
evidenced by publishing the Made in China 2025, along with what 
they've known they've been doing with the BRI, Belt-Road 
Initiative, along with their port loans in Africa and South 
America. The one that really concerns me is that their air 
force investments and what they're doing right now looks like 
they've been moving more to a strategic posture, certainly over 
the next 10 years. So, as you talk about what we need, in terms 
of the 386 squadrons and so forth, does that reflect this 
change in strategy that you see China moving to right now?
    Secretary Wilson. We do see rapid innovation in China, and 
a change to their strategic approach to the world from being a 
largely--the old PLA was largely internally focused and focused 
on internal control. They made a decision to be more of a 
regional power and a--they have words for it. I can't remember 
them, like, off the top of my head, but there was a very good 
Defensive Intelligence Agency unclassified study recently on 
this subject, as well, looking outward and developing a 
military commensurate with their place in the world, I think is 
kind of the way it was. The J-20, which is a--is in service now 
in the Chinese air force, and they've just flight-tested the J-
31, so they are moving forward with advanced aircraft, but also 
advances across the board in other kinds of capability as air 
defense, of course, their surface navy and so forth. So, we're 
seeing modernization across the board and in all domains.
    Senator Perdue. I'd like to say one last thing, Mr. 
Chairman. The greatest threat that these two people have, 
certainly General Goldfein as he faces this next year, is, I 
think we're staring down the barrel of a CR, September 30th. We 
have 39 working days left between now and July 31. If we don't 
move this up as a priority, there is no way we're going to get 
defense authorization done--HHS, if we have to combine them, 
whatever we have to do. This needs to be our Committee's top 
priority right now to make sure that, in the remaining few days 
we have before that, quote, ``August work period'' comes up 
again, that we get this defense budget authorized and 
appropriated. Because we're staring down the barrel of another 
CR. After 2 years of not having--the number-one thing I've 
heard from these guys and others that we've met over the last 2 
years is that this is the number-one threat to getting 
readiness back and beginning this long haul toward recap. I'll 
just close.
    Madam Secretary, thank you for your service. You guys have 
accomplished great things in the last 2 years under your 
leadership, and as ``off you go into the wild blue yonder,'' I 
wish you all the best.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, thank you, Senator Perdue. Let me 
assure you, that is our intent, and that's our commitment. I'm 
fully aware of the time remaining. I'm also fully aware of the 
fact that we've never had to face a China like this before, or, 
for that reason, a--also a Russia.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, thank you.
    The private companies that were put in charge of managing 
military housing failed to provide safe and clean homes to 
military families, but they still managed to make millions of 
dollars in profits. The services have fallen short in their 
oversight responsibilities. Now, many of these families have 
developed chronic medical conditions from exposure to mold, 
lead paint, and other hazards. Last week, I asked the Army 
Chief of Staff, General Milley, whether he believes, as a 
matter of principle, that the U.S. Government has the 
responsibility to cover the lifetime costs of treating 
servicemembers and their families for health problems connected 
to unsafe military housing. He said, ``Absolutely yes,''.
    General Goldfein, do you agree with him?
    General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Warren. Secretary Wilson, do you agree?
    Secretary Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Warren. Good.
    One other quick question. I'm concerned that the southern 
border deployment is having some negative effects on readiness. 
General Neller recently wrote a memoir to the Secretary of the 
Navy that listed border deployment among the factors 
contributing to readiness challenges. General Goldfein, have 
any training exercises or overseas deployments been canceled or 
delayed due to units supporting border developments?
    General Goldfein. No, ma'am.
    Senator Warren. Not----
    General Goldfein. Not in the Air Force.
    Senator Warren. Not--okay.
    I also want to ask another readiness issue facing the Air 
Force: climate change. The Defense Department's most recent 
report on climate change discussed the impact of this human-
caused problem on our military operations and bases. This 
report included a statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Dunford, who said, quote, ``When I look at 
climate change, it's in the category of sources of conflicts 
around the world and things we have to respond to.''
    General Goldfein, just a simple yes or no on this one is 
fine, and then I have some followups. Do you agree with General 
Dunford?
    General Goldfein. I do, ma'am. I do think--if there's time 
at the end, I'd like to sort of qualify where I think he was 
going with that.
    Senator Warren. Sure. But, let me ask, Does adapting 
military bases and other infrastructure to climate change 
contribute to Air Force readiness?
    General Goldfein. It does, ma'am. I think what General 
Dunford was referring to, though, is that--I mean, if you go 
back--if you take a look at Syria as an example, most don't 
remember what caused the Syria conflict to start. It started 
because of a 10-year drought----
    Senator Warren. Yes. Water.
    General Goldfein.--and folks having to move from their 
family farms into cities, where they then were not getting any 
support and, therefore, a civil war began. I think what 
Chairman Dunford was talking about is that we have to respond 
militarily, very often, to the effects globally, of climate 
change.
    Senator Warren. Good.
    So, let me ask, Do you think it is prudent for the Air 
Force to incorporate climate change when making strategic 
decisions, like strategic basing decisions, for example?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me take that one.
    Senator Warren. Sure.
    Secretary Wilson. We just published an Infrastructure 
Investment Strategy, and we also just finished a major piece of 
work on weather. Maybe the Air Force looks at these things more 
because weather is such a big impact on us for all of our 
flying operations every day, and we're the ones responsible for 
weather forecasting around the globe. The infrastructure 
strategy looks at resilience and, How do we get more out of 
every dollar that we spend? So, there's a number of pieces of 
that strategy. But, the resilience of our bases is very 
important because we fight from our bases. We don't leave our 
bases to fight. We fight from our bases. Their resilience is 
very important to----
    Senator Warren. How would you rate Air Force installations 
as a whole, in terms of their climate resilience?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, it probably varies a lot. I 
couldn't give you a red, yellow, or green chart on that at this 
point, but I know that, overall, we've got significant 
infrastructure challenges overall, but from a number of 
factors.
    Senator Warren. Well, I see that the Air Force is 
requesting nearly $5 billion in emergency funds to rebuild Air 
Force bases in Florida and Nebraska, alone, that were damaged 
by natural disasters. So, I think it's very important that the 
Air Force and the other military services continue to 
incorporate climate change in their planning so that when 
disaster strikes, the impact on operations is minimal. This 
clearly is a readiness issue.
    So, thank you for your work on this.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Tillis.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you both for being here, and, Secretary Wilson, for 
your service. I was also sad when I heard you were moving on, 
but I can certainly thank you for everything you've done and 
share the Chair's advice to you that it's still not too late to 
change your mind.
    I think I'll start with General Goldfein. It's on the KC-
46. Specifically, I know that--I believe that Senator Shaheen 
asked a question earlier. I'm more interested in our current 
plans in the basing in Seymour Johnson, whether or not that's 
shifting to the right, or what the current status is.
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, we're--I think we're--we are 
going to be fine on the basing. We're not seeing an impact 
there. We just needed to have Boeing stop, put a corrective 
action plan in place, get up to the standards that we expect on 
the manufacturing line, and then get the line moving again. You 
actually can't fix a manufacturing line while it's stopped. It 
has to be flowing. But, they have to put the corrective actions 
in place for quality assurance.
    Senator Tillis. I also had a question on the talent 
marketplace. I think, right now, the--almost all the officer 
assignments are in there. Give me an idea of how that's working 
and what progress has been made.
    General Goldfein. Sir, it's working well. As a matter of 
fact, you know, when I travel and talk to, especially, young 
officers, you know, what I hear over and over again is the fact 
that they want to have a little bit more control over their 
future, and they want to have a better visibility on what's out 
there. Not only them, but also hiring officials want to know--
get a--have a better sense of who they can look at for hiring 
purposes. The fact that we're now connecting them for dialogue 
is pretty powerful. Initial rollout's been very--very 
successful, and--but, we're not going to slow down. We're going 
to continue to listen to the force, screen with our ears, and 
modify it to make it better.
    Senator Tillis. On a related note, how well are we doing, 
or what kind of changes have we put in place to address the 
pilot shortage?
    General Goldfein. So, this year we were successful at 
stopping the reduction. So, it's the first year where we 
actually haven't had increasing numbers leave. So, we see that 
as----
    Senator Tillis. What do you think that could be attributed 
to?
    General Goldfein. I think it's a combination of things, 
sir. I think, you know, what I hear over and over, it's a 
combination of quality of service, quality of life. The 
financial incentives that Congress has approved, I think, have 
been very helpful. But, it's as much quality of service as it 
is quality of life. I think the combination--we have, like, 69 
different initiatives that we're working on. I don't think 
there's one silver bullet. A combination of reducing overseas 
deployments, I think, has helped. Putting more white space on 
the calendar, we've looked at every one of our exercises and 
reduced those that aren't value-added. I think that making 
flying in the United States Air Force as rich an experience as 
we can make it is going to have the most lasting effect. That's 
going to start with inspirational and courageous commanders and 
senior NCOs [non commissioned officers], and so, where the 
Secretary and I have focused is on where--when we select and 
how we develop these young officers to make sure that, when 
they are in command, they can build a culture that thrives.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you.
    I share Senator Perdue's concern about where we're headed 
with respect to a CR. I see your budget request. I tend to 
agree and would support and advocate for it. But, I believe 
it's more or less going to be a paper exercise, and that we're 
going to be looking at a CR. So, I think one thing that we need 
from you, Madam Secretary or General Goldfein, is an 
understanding of the consequences of that, because here is a 
trajectory to increase readiness capabilities and things that I 
think are important. I think we also have to understand the 
consequences of our inaction, to go through regular order 
appropriations. We'd like to see that so that, when those who 
would resist moving through regular-order appropriations 
understand the consequences of their actions, we need that. You 
can infer it, but I'd like, very specifically, to look at 
things that are going to be affected by that.
    Secretary Wilson--I mean, we can talk about that now, but I 
think I'd--what I'd prefer to do is go, if you don't get this 
and you have to deal with the consequences of a CR, what does 
that look like in the near term, and how it could potentially 
be disruptive to progress that you've made?
    Secretary Wilson, you have a comment on that?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, there will be 16 new MILCON 
projects for new missions that wouldn't start. That means that 
we can't put those aircraft at those bases. There were the 18 
MILCON projects for existing missions that would not go 
forward, and 89 new-starts for programs where we're trying to 
modernize this force and trying to stay--our adversaries don't 
have to deal with continuing resolutions or sequester. They 
keep going, and so, there is risk in deciding that we're just 
going to do a CR.
    Senator Tillis. We need to look at that in terms of the 
effect that it has on MILCON and then the effect that it has on 
what we would flesh out after those MILCON projects are 
complete. People really need to understand that, because I 
think we're doing you all a disservice. We need to make sure 
that those who oppose going through that process understand the 
direct consequences of their actions, both in terms of the 
opportunities in the communities for these projects to move 
forward, but, more important to me, the capabilities and 
readiness that we're leaving on the table when we talk, in 
every committee, about our great-power competition and the need 
to really move forward with these projects. People need to 
start taking responsibility for holding up what I think is an 
important regular-order process.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
    Senator Manchin.
    Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks, both of you, for your service. I appreciate it very 
much.
    We're sorry to see you going, Secretary Wilson, but thank 
you for what you've done. I've got one last request before you 
leave, too. I met with Secretary Shanahan on Tuesday, and he 
mentioned, in the city of Martinsburg, that has still not 
received their money for PFAS. He agreed we're going to get on 
that. So, only thing I'm asking--it's less than $5 million, and 
this little city really needs that. It means a lot to them, and 
they've put the money out already, and they just don't have the 
resources. So, before you depart, if you would check into that. 
The city of Martinsburg. It's the National Guard base. Our Air 
Base National Guard there in Martinsburg does a great job, and 
it would be very much appreciated.
    The other thing I want to ask for is, you know right now 
statute only allows us to tap operations and maintenance, O&M, 
dollars from the Air National Guard. That's what I consider to 
be unfair, considering that they are using the same 
firefighting foam as the Active component uses. So, my question 
would be, Do you agree--or will you agree that we should be 
able to use defense environmental restoration dollars for the 
National Guard facilities, the same as military does?
    Secretary Wilson. I--Senator, whenever I get involved in 
the Guard issues, there are different colors of money there, 
and I'm going to have to take that question for the record. Our 
commitment is to do the cleanup on all of our bases where we've 
been responsible for this. I'll have to get back to you on that 
specific question about which funds can be used for which kinds 
of----
    Senator Manchin. Yeah. I don't know why they would be 
objectionable, because----
    Secretary Wilson. I don't----
    Senator Manchin.--in NDAA, we've tried to do this, and got 
stripped out. I think every Senator has a Guard component that, 
basically, needs to be able to use their money the same as the 
branches use theirs. Okay?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, you may well be right. I just 
don't know.
    Senator Manchin. Okay. I appreciate your--again, that's one 
other question before you leave, because I know you will be 
diligent about that.
    Secretary Wilson. Yes, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Secretary Wilson. Defense Environmental Restoration Account 
(DERP) funds cannot be used to fund environmental restoration 
actions at State-owned and operated facilities where DOD was 
not the ``owner'' or ``operator'' at the time of the release of 
PFOS/PFOA into the environment. DERP funding is allowed for 
initial investigations in order to resolve DERP eligibility or 
ineligibility, and for cleanup where the release occurred when 
DOD was the ``owner or operator.'' The Air National Guard (ANG) 
is in the process of determining DERP eligibility for all its 
sites and is now programming for both DERP funding and 
Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funding to address its required 
environmental restoration activities.

    Senator Manchin. I think this is probably--General 
Goldfein, maybe you can help me on this one. The F-15EX--and I 
understand the arguments for--procuring capabilities. I 
understand all of that. Where I'm unclear about is the plan how 
you're going to integrate that. Because I think it's a 4-year 
phase-in, and, during that 4-year phase-in, even though it's 
the same aircraft, the components are different. So, I'm 
understanding that we don't have the ability to train or--or 
the simulators that it will take to train them, and won't be 
ready in 4 years. How are we going to have our pilots ready and 
prepared for the--for that to come onboard in 4 years, and them 
not have the proper training?
    General Goldfein. Sir, because the F-15EX is only intended 
to help us with a short-term capacity shortfall and replace 
only the F-15Cs, the----
    Senator Manchin. How many aircrafts, General, are we 
speaking about?
    General Goldfein. Right now, we're looking at 80----
    Senator Manchin. Eighty.
    General Goldfein.--is what we have laid----
    Senator Manchin. That's because the F-35 is not going to be 
able to meet the demand.
    General Goldfein. It's to supplement the F-35 program to 
make sure--and I said before----
    Senator Manchin. I understand that, and I'm okay with all 
that. I'm----
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
    Senator Manchin.--just understanding--as a pilot, myself, 
and you as--having many hours, as you have--there's still some 
simulation time it takes to integrate into that.
    General Goldfein. It does. The 90 percent of the 
architecture--the support equipment for the F-15C is common to 
the F-15EX. That's one of the reasons--so, we're not looking 
at----
    Senator Manchin. You're not concerned about the transition.
    General Goldfein. No, sir. Matter of fact, that's one of 
the reasons that we only looked at an F-15----
    Senator Manchin. Okay.
    General Goldfein.--as a replacement.
    Senator Manchin. I trust you on that.
    Next, my final question is this. This picture here. This 
shows the J-31 and the F-35. They kind of look similar, I 
think, if you look at it. They're fairly similar, here. I'll 
pass just around to my colleagues. I'm not an expert on jet 
fighters, but they sure do look like that someone had some 
plans. My concern is this. I understand we have the prime 
contract, and then it goes from the prime to sub to sub to sub 
to sub to sub to sub. This didn't happen by accident. They're 
able to--and I'm understanding they're actually able--the 
Chinese and Russians, and whoever else, has been able to get up 
to speed quicker by being able to access--and maybe it might 
not be high priorities or high profiles--they were able to get 
into things that weren't classified, and reverse engineer. 
We're not holding our subs accountable, and we're not holding 
the prime accountable to the subs. Do you all see that as a 
tremendous concern? How do we change it? Will you work with us 
to change the procurement process, holding the primes--holding 
your prime subcontractors totally responsible for the food 
chain, if you will, and bringing some of these platforms to 
reality?
    Madam Secretary?
    Secretary Wilson. Sir, very happy to work with you on that. 
The intelligence threat, particularly from China, is 
significant, and it's----
    Senator Manchin. But, I'm saying it's continued. For them 
to have the rapid acceleration--and everybody here is concerned 
about that--that has to be stopped. We're not doing anything to 
stop it. I'm on Cyber Command, I'm concerned about this. So, 
I'm just hoping that you all are in total agreement with this. 
It needs to be changed. Do you all agree it needs to be 
changed?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I'll tell you that we've stood 
up a Cybersecurity Task Force, under the leadership of General 
Pawlikowski, when she was Air Force Materiel Command. That 
Cybersecurity Task Force is designed to do just what you're 
talking about, look at every system and subsystem to----
    Senator Manchin. Who's heading that up?
    General Goldfein. Now it's Colonel--the Commander of Air 
Force Materiel Command. If----
    Secretary Wilson. McMurray.
    General Goldfein. Yeah, thanks. General McMurray.
    Senator Manchin. General McMurray, okay. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you.
    Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Madam Secretary, General, for being here. Thank 
you, as always, for your exemplary service.
    To Secretary Wilson, I was delighted, last week, to get the 
news that Whiteman Air Force Base is slated to be the second 
location for the B-21 Raider. Of course, I think we ought to be 
the first location, but we're delighted to be hosting the B-21. 
I just want to say for the record how proud I am of the 509th 
Bomb Wing and the work they've done with the B-2 Spirit over 
many a year. We stand ready at Whiteman to receive the B-21 
when the time comes.
    I know Senator Cotton asked you about the schedule and 
whether we were on schedule, in terms of production. Let me 
ask--and you testified that we are--let me ask you just about 
the budget. I know the target price is about 500 million a 
piece. Are you confident that we're going to come close to that 
number? What's it looking like?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, we don't discuss publicly the B-
21 program costs, and we're--actually would be very happy to 
come and talk to you in detail about where we are. But, we are 
pleased with the management of the program, thus far, by both 
the contractor--and we're doing this one a little bit 
differently. We do this through our Rapid Capabilities Office. 
It's a small high-performing team, and they're doing a very 
good job.
    Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you.
    Let me shift gears just slightly and ask you about a number 
that appears a number of times in your written testimony, the 
386 number. Let me ask you about the relative importance of 
this. The NDS states very clearly that the Joint Force and the 
Air Force need to focus on improving in our key warfighting 
scenarios against China and Russia while carrying out 
operations in the greater Middle East more economically. I'm 
wondering, why is purchasing more platforms now better, 
relatively speaking, than investing in R&D [research and 
development], munitions, base resilience? I mean, can you give 
me some sense of why 386 is important, and how you got there?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, the 386 is a size construct, but 
the work that we did in this evaluation looked also at 
different ways of fighting. It is not just more of the same. 
It's not just about capacity. It also looks at, What do we have 
as a stand-in force, what do we have as a standoff force, how 
do we integrate things so that we get more bang for the buck, 
if you will? If you think about this, you know, to--and the 
Chief talked about Desert Storm and having 401 operational 
squadrons. If we're talking about meeting a near--defeating a--
deterring and defeating a near-peer adversary, a safe, secure 
nuclear deterrent, Homeland defense, countering violent 
extremism, and deterring rogue states, all at the same time, 
with 386 squadrons. They're obviously more capable squadrons 
and a different way of fighting. So, it's both.
    Senator Hawley. You're satisfied, then, that this budget 
advances the NDS priorities, and particularly those on, not 
just capacity, but also capability, lethality, resilience.
    Secretary Wilson. I am. You know, there are always more 
things that we can do, and we're always making tradeoffs. But, 
even things like multidomain operations and the need to connect 
everything as part of a network, and driving those things 
forward. Our science and technology--early-stage science and 
technology budget is--you know, combined with research, 
development, test, and evaluation, is fairly healthy.
    Senator Hawley. General, do you want to comment on any of 
this?
    General Goldfein. Sir, I'll just tell you that, by the time 
Secretary Mattis rolled out the National Defense Strategy, the 
last version I saw was version 67. I said that because it was 
very inclusive--typical Secretary Mattis--very inclusive. We 
had folks that were there, and it allowed us--it allowed 
Secretary Wilson and I, actually, to align the 2019 budget, 
because we were part of the writing of the National Defense 
Strategy, and then 2020, our guidance to the team, and our 
scoring of our budget inside was alignment with the National 
Defense Strategy. So, that's what this budget submission is all 
about.
    Senator Hawley. Thanks very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    General Goldfein, I want to ask you a little bit about 
artificial intelligence. It is going to be critical, both on 
and off the battlefield in the future. As you know, AI is just 
not possible without good, high-quality data. AI is only 
effective if we have a workforce that really understands how to 
take care of that data. Do you think that the Air Force is, at 
this point, adequately able to recruit a workforce that is 
literate and understands that future?
    General Goldfein. Sir, I think we're in the beginning 
stages, really----
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
    General Goldfein.--of--and the Secretary and I have--maybe 
turn it over to the Secretary, because, you know, having a 
Secretary that was formerly a president of a STEM [Science, 
Technology, Engineering & Math] university, and understanding 
how the universities work, and how you bring in young people, 
and how you motivate them, and you bring them in as interns. I 
think we've done a lot to make sure that we are a--we're an 
easy place----
    Senator Heinrich. Are you extending her work assignment?
    General Goldfein. Would love to.
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
    One other thing, and then I do want to get to you, 
Secretary. It--is it--is there value to thinking about whether 
there should be someone within the services that just has that 
responsibility--and maybe this is a good time to pivot to you, 
Secretary--for making sure that we're recruiting coders and 
data scientists and the folks that we're going to need as we 
make this transition into AI? Specifically, I'm curious whether 
it might be even worth considering a mission occupational 
specialty for that area, to make sure that we do make that 
transition quickly.
    Secretary Wilson. That's actually an interesting idea. In 
the Air Force--you know, the Navy has been talking, I know, to 
the Committee about a Chief Information Officer position. In 
some ways, the Air Force already has--we've got our Chief 
Information Officer, our Chief Data Officer, and our Chief 
Management Officer all in the same--all combined and reporting 
directly to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. So, we've 
got--organizationally, got that. I would say that we've got--AI 
is not just about the data, it's about gathering and directing 
that data, and analyzing it, at speed. In many cases, it's 
about the analysis happening right at the sensor edge and not 
as you bring it in. So, for all of us, in the military and in 
the wider society, we are probably going to see a significant 
shortage of data scientists and analysts over the next couple 
of decades. It's a very high priority.
    Senator Heinrich. Secretary, I want thank you for your 
service, and specifically, as--you know a great deal about what 
we now call the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO) and how 
much that has contributed to our national security with its 
infrastructure and personnel and acquisition authorities. I 
just want to thank both of you, really, for your work in 
building secure facilities at Kirtland for Space RCO and 
enabling that office to really quickly deliver solutions to the 
military. I look forward, General, in continuing that progress 
with you.
    Secretary, one other thing I want to ask you about is--I'm 
starting to hear from another of--a number of folks, both in 
and outside the services, who have said that if the U.S. 
doesn't start to buy the emerging commercial offerings that 
we're seeing, in terms of small satellites, small launch 
providers, that we could see those things migrate overseas. Is 
the Air Force being assertive enough in procuring or even just 
experimenting with some of these smaller commercial 
capabilities?
    Secretary Wilson. I think there's going to be a huge demand 
for small commercial capabilities, globally. The Air Force has 
funded, through DARPA, an experiment. It's called Black Jack, 
and it's looking at a small satellite constellation using 
commercial satellites. But, I will say this. We've done a lot 
of modeling and simulation. Many of you have participated in a 
tabletop exercise that we've done about the shift from an 
uncontested environment to a contested environment. What is the 
strategy that makes sense in that environment? Then, how do we 
develop programs to support that strategy? One of the 
challenges with a proliferated low-Earth-orbit satellite system 
that's where commercial satellites usually live and operate is, 
it's very close to the Earth. That's great to be able to see 
things, but it also means that they are vulnerable. The 
commercial systems, without any defenses on them, are also 
quite vulnerable. So, we need to think about not just how 
expensive they are, but, Do they survive in a contested domain? 
The way I like to put it is, you know, I drive a Subaru. It's a 
great--I love it. It's less expensive than a tank. But, I 
wouldn't take it into combat. So, we need to think about it 
from a warfighting point of view.
    Senator Heinrich. Well, Secretary, I want to thank you 
again for your service. I'm out of time, here, but, before you 
begin your transition, I would just urge you, on the PFAS issue 
that Senator Manchin brought up, whatever we can do to make 
these folks, who have been so severely impacted by that, whole, 
really through no fault of their own, in all of these cases, I 
would just urge you to give that all the attention you can 
before you make your transition to El Paso.
    Secretary Wilson. Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich. Thanks.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Cramer.
    Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thanks, both of you, for appearing again.
    Let me add my congratulations and just tell you I agree 
with all the accolades you've received today, Secretary Wilson. 
I don't think any of them are even a little bit exaggerated. 
But, thank you for your service.
    To both of you, thank you for your candor. You have spoken 
with great clarity, and particularly in differentiating the Air 
Force we need from the Air Force that we can afford. More 
importantly, thank you for your candor in answering the what-if 
questions, the ``What if the worst? What if we don't get our 
jobs done as it relates to appropriate appropriations?'' So, we 
need that clarity, our constituents need to hear that clarity, 
and I thank you for that.
    I'm tempted, of course, to ask about plans to modernize two 
very important aircraft to me, the Global Hawk in Grand Forks 
and the B-52s. I think we've talked a lot about that. But, 
before we get to that, I've not heard a lot today about, and 
I'm very intrigued with, and interested in, Space Force. I'd 
like the--the message that is coming out, I think you have 72 
million in this budget for the headquarters. But, I would ask 
each of you to, maybe, elaborate a bit, first of all, on the 
importance of it--as we look at scarcity of resources, and 
we're talking about a sixth branch, there--you know, lots of 
people have lots of opinions, and yet this domain seems--well, 
I think it seems critically important, and I haven't heard 
anybody--any of the combatant commanders or anybody else, 
whether related to Space Force or not, say that it's not a good 
idea. But, I just would open the floor to let you explain to us 
one more time why it's so important, maybe starting with the 
Secretary.
    Secretary Wilson. You know, Senator, we are the best in the 
world at space. Our adversaries know it, and they are seeking 
to develop the capability to deny us the use of space in crisis 
or in war. In private conversations, as we've received 
briefings and so on from combatant commanders--not from the Air 
Force, but from combatant commanders and other services--they 
understand the importance of space as an enabling capability 
for everything they're trying to do. We have made significant 
changes in programs, based on threat analysis and strategy, in 
fiscal year 2019, which this Committee and others in the 
Congress supported, and we propose, in fiscal year 2020, 
another boost, a 17-percent increase in our space portfolio in 
the fiscal year 2020 budget. So, we're making the financial 
investments. We are also buying those capabilities faster and 
smarter. In fact, in the space realm, we--you know, we set 
ourselves a goal 10 months ago. In some ways, it was a gimmick, 
but it got people focused. We wanted to strip 100 years out of 
Air Force procurement in 12 months. So, look at every program, 
see if we could optimize these in a--you know, not--we're not 
skimping on any requirements. We're going to buy a tailored 
suit rather than a suit off the rack. We're currently at 78.5 
years taken out of Air Force procurement programs. Of that, 21 
came from space, alone. So, we are moving forward to buy things 
in space faster and smarter. Our policy is to maintain American 
dominance in space so that space capabilities are available to 
the Joint Force, and so that we deter any attack on the United 
States or our allies.
    So, the organizational change that was put forward in 
parallel with this budget is actually--you know, it's a change 
that elevates, that enhances the influence of space and leaders 
in the Pentagon. That's in it for the long haul. So, I think 
one of the things that--taken all together, the combatant 
command, which is being stood up, plus the increases in 
spending that all of you have supported, and the shift to a 
strategy for a--strategy and the programs to support it for a 
contested domain, will keep us dominant in space. That is our 
job.
    Chief?
    General Goldfein. Thanks, ma'am.
    You know, I look at it from a warfighter perspective. 
Having been the space coordinating authority and component lead 
for Central Command for--deployed for 2 years, I've employed 
space capabilities against an enemy. I look at it from a 
warfighting perspective. I see, given the situation we're in, 
and obviously aligned with the Secretary's statement--the 
problem statement, that we are the best in the world, we've got 
to do three things simultaneously. First, we have to defend 
what we have, because it's going to be there for awhile, and we 
all rely on it. From the blue dot on our phone to the 
indications and warnings of missile launch, I mean, we rely on 
space capabilities. So, we have to defend what we have.
    But, it's not good enough just to step in the ring and 
defend and take punches. At some point, you've got to be able 
to punch back. Our adversaries need to know that we can punch 
back. It needs to be part of their calculus. So, we have to 
develop offensive capabilities.
    the third piece we have to do is develop the force that can 
fight and win, because this transition from an uncontested 
domain to a contested domain requires that force to be 
developed for the future.
    So, I believe that, as we were in a robust debate about how 
to get at the President's guidance, we were debating between a 
separate service, separate department, separate Secretary, 
separate Chief, to a Med Corps, JAG Corps. Where we landed, 
which is a separate service within the Department of the Air 
Force, to me, is the most recognizable model from a business of 
warfighting. Of all the things that we're doing, going forward, 
I would offer, the most important act that I would ask this 
Committee to take on this year is to stand up U.S. Space 
Command with a commander. Because, in the business of joint 
warfighting, that aligns how this entire Department does 
business, going forward.
    Senator Cramer. Well said. Thank you both.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to pursue this question of the Space Force, but I 
understand we're having a full hearing next week, so I'll 
defer. Put me down as skeptical that an organizational change 
costing half a billion dollars a year is going to change our 
capacity. So, be prepared to help me through that question. I 
look forward to that discussion next week.
    Secretary Wilson, everybody's praised you today. I plan to 
do something about it. You'd better watch the National Defense 
bill. I'm thinking of an amendment prohibiting your retirement. 
So, you'd better have that--have your legislative staff scour 
that document as it goes forward.
    You have done a sensational job. I think a perfect example 
is the comment you made a few minutes ago about the amount of 
time you've cut out of the procurement process. That's a big 
deal. Procurement has two problems, historically, in the 
Defense Department. One is money, cost, and the other is time. 
You have done something that had needed doing a long time, and 
I really want to thank you for that.
    A second general comment. I understand neither of you had 
anything to do with this, but I just don't like this OCO-for-
base business. Twenty-five percent of your budget is OCO, and 
three-quarters of the OCO is OCO-for-base, which is a non 
sequitur. If it's base, it's base. If it's OCO, it's OCO. 
Again, I realize that you're--this is something that was handed 
down from other parts of the government, but it's not honest 
government, it's not honest to the Congress or the people of 
America. This isn't OCO. Let's get real about what these 
numbers are.
    General, the light-attack experiment, which is to use 
existing platforms, try to develop a new counter-violent-
extremist--I understand the A-10 is--I heard, yesterday, from 
people in the maintenance business, that they are hard to 
maintain now. They're just wearing out. How's this experiment 
going? Where does it stand?
    General Goldfein. Sir, let me tell you, first, that light 
attack, A-10, two completely separate----
    Senator King. Okay.
    General Goldfein.--issues, here. Light attack is not 
designed to, nor will it ever, replace the A-10. Our intent is 
to fly the A-10 as one of the four weapon systems----
    Senator King. You can----
    General Goldfein.--that we need through the 2030s.
    Senator King. Because we've been hearing, for the last 3 or 
4 years, about getting rid of the A-10. Are we now back to 
maintaining the A-10?
    General Goldfein. We are, and--through the 2030s, for the
A-10.
    Senator King. So, let's move now to the light attack.
    General Goldfein. Light attack. Sir, to understand light 
attack and where we're going--and I will tell you that I can't 
think of a better example of how we used the authorities you 
gave us to accelerate our understanding about a particular 
weapon system. You go back to the National Defense Strategy, 
the second line of effort is about building allies and 
partners. That's what the light attack is all about. The 
question--the strategy in the National Defense Strategy is to 
drive violent extremism down to the point where it can be 
handled inside the borders of governed nations. This is a 
global challenge, from the Philippines to Nigeria. So, the 
question we asked to ourselves was, How do we build a platform 
sensor/weapon combination and an intelligence-gathering and a 
network that will allow more allies and partners to join us in 
the fight against violent extremism? So, we went out----
    Senator King. So, this would be a--an aircraft that could 
be utilized by our allies.
    General Goldfein. Absolutely. That's been the primary 
focus. It remains our focus. So, again, we went out, 5 months 
after I signed an initial declaration of an experiment, when it 
went out, companies came in, we did an experiment at Holloman 
Air Force Base. We went on to a second experiment. What you'll 
see in our budget is money to procure three of each kind of 
airplane that we've been experimenting with. We're going to put 
a detachment at Nellis, where we do our task-level training. 
We're going to put a detachment at Hurlburt, where we do 
Special Ops. We're going to invite allies and partners. The 
most exciting part of this experiment, that we would not have 
been able to do without your authorities, is, we have built a 
coalition-friendly intelligence-gathering and information-
sharing network that we don't have to tell anybody, ``No, you 
can't have this information.'' It's platform-agnostic. By 
owning these airplanes, now, as prototypes, we can modify. 
We're going to bring industry in, we're going to bring allies 
and partners in, and we're trying to solve the math equation 
that currently exists in North Africa. One-thousand Americans 
plus 4,000 French enables 35,000 fighters that are taking on 
violent extremism across North Africa. This is the air-
component contribution to the National Defense Strategy, to do 
just that.
    Senator King. I take it from your comments that you feel 
like this has been a worthwhile experiment, and that we're 
making some real progress.
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Not only has it been 
worthwhile, but I will tell you that the companies that have 
been with us from the beginning have been spectacular. I think 
there is no better example I can give you of how we used your 
intent for these authorities to advance. We're not even 2 
years----
    Senator King. You mean you're saying, for the record, that 
we did something right?
    General Goldfein. Yes, sir. We jumped on it.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    I'm out of time, but a question for the record. I'm very 
interested in maintenance levels and readiness levels of 
aircraft, and increasing those levels to, if not duplicate, but 
approach commercial availabilities. For the record, if you 
could give me some thoughts on where we are, progress made, 
perhaps graph where we are. You understand the nature of the 
question.
    [The information referred to follows:]
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    Senator King. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks, to the witnesses. Secretary Wilson, I'll add my 
congratulations. I'll tell you who I'd be--who is really 
nervous right now. The individual running Air Force ROTC at 
UTEP [University of Texas El Paso], because if that program 
isn't the best-performing one in the country, with the former 
Secretary of the Air Force as president of the university, that 
person's going to have some 'splaining to do, I think. So----
    Secretary Wilson. Sadly, there's only Army ROTC at UTEP, 
so----
    Senator Kaine. Okay, good. All right. They ducked that 
bullet. Congratulations to you.
    I just want to pick up, first, on comments--a number of 
folks on the other side of the dais here have raised the 
specter of CR. Folks on this side of the dais aren't talking 
about CR. The notion that we're heading toward a CR, I hear 
that from one side. I don't know where that's coming from. We 
don't want a CR. We want an appropriations bill, and we'll get 
one. We got a great appropriations deal at the end of 2018, 
with two Republican houses, that Republican colleagues here 
voted for. But, then, after the President said he didn't like 
it, folks switched their votes, they voted against it, and we 
shut the Government down for 35 days. That hurt the military. 
Didn't hurt the Air Force directly, but the Coast Guard's part 
of the military, even though it's not part of the DOD. They 
weren't getting paid for 35 days. So, let's be clear who's 
talking about CR, who's expressing worry about CR, who's saying 
we might run into a CR. It's not Democrats. We don't want a CR. 
We want a budget.
    Let me just ask, If there is a CR and sequester kicks back 
in, my understanding is, it's not steady-state funding. Am I 
correct that funding would start to ratchet down under a CR if 
sequester kicks back in?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, if you move to a sequester, the 
cut for the Air Force would be about $29 billion. I think you 
were at another hearing when I was talking about this, but 
that's four times the size of the sequester we had last----
    Senator Kaine. Yeah.
    Secretary Wilson.--time the Air Force went through this, 
and just to--so, the choices--I mean, sequester would be across 
the side----
    Senator Kaine. Right.
    Secretary Wilson.--of all program elements. But, if it were 
concentrated, the scope of this is--it would be all F-35s, all 
KC-46s, all B-21s stopped, ground-based strategic deterrent, 
all research, development, test, and procurement of space, and 
most fourth- and fifth-generation modifications, all science 
and technology. You add all of that together, and you get $29 
billion in a single year.
    Senator Kaine. Sequester would be foolish. CR would be 
foolish. There's nobody on this side of the dais who is talking 
about either. We can do an appropriations bill.
    Let me move to hurricane relief. I have a publication from 
the OSD Comptroller, and I just want to make sure this is 
right. The Air Force hurricane recovery estimate--just the Air 
Force--is 5 billion--that's my understanding--for Tyndall, 
Eglin, Warner Robbins, Goldsboro, Sumter, and Hampton, VA. Is 
that 5-billion number accurate, Madam Secretary?
    Secretary Wilson. It's 3.7 plus 1.2.
    Senator Kaine. Okay. So, 4.9--$4.9 billion. Now, that's the 
Air Force number. The--DOD-wide, the hurricane recovery request 
is $8.9 billion. That's for Hurricanes Michael and Florence. 
Here's the way that we're proposing to deal with that. The DOD 
has--they're trying to cobble together 2.4 billion out of the 
fiscal year 2019 budget, and they're flexing cash around to be 
able to do it. They may need a supplemental of 1.8. They may 
not be able to find enough, but they're trying to find 2.4 
billion in fiscal year 2019. The Department has, in the 
budget--the budget before us--3 billion for fiscal year 2020. 
So, that gets to 5.4 out of the 8.9. That leaves 3.5, 3.6 
billion unfunded for hurricane relief. Now, I'm struck, when I 
saw that the unfunded requirement for hurricane relief is $3.6 
billion, that that is exactly the amount that the President is 
taking out of the fiscal year 2019 MILCON budget: $3.6 billion. 
It's 3.6 billion out of MILCON. It's 2.5 out of the drug 
interdiction account.
    So, if we were not taking the 3.6 out of MILCON to deal 
with what your colleagues have testified here is a nonmilitary 
emergency, that $3.6 billion could be used to fill the unfunded 
requirements for hurricane relief for the entire DOD. I'm just 
putting that on the record, because many of us voted against 
the declaration, a few weeks back, because we don't think a 
nonmilitary emergency should give the President a license to 
ransack the military's budget. The numbers, dollar for dollar, 
are the same. That $3.6 billion is the amount of the unfunded 
requirement to do the hurricane relief on Tyndall and on other 
installations--Lejeune, et cetera--that are outside the Air 
Force. That's important.
    General Goldfein, the last thing I want to say is this. 
Military housing folks have asked you about it. Your statement 
in that hearing, where you said, ``I've lived in military 
housing most of my life, as a child, as a member in the 
military, and my wife and my kids have lived in military 
housing.'' I think you said 50 years, plus, in military 
housing, or something like that. You said that you have never 
worried for your own health, you've never worried for the 
health of your spouse, you've never worried for the health of 
your kids in military housing. You said that in a very powerful 
way to point out that people who are in military housing right 
now shouldn't have to, either. That comment gave me a feeling 
that there is a command presence here that's going to take this 
very, very seriously until we get it right. We'll make sure 
that you do. But, I'm given confidence by the way you expressed 
that.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator.
    You know, let me just make one comment, here, and we can 
discuss this in a different setting, perhaps. Just keep in mind 
that the problem that many on this side of the aisle see is 
parity. This is the first time in my memory that we've been in 
a situation--and I'm older than you are, I've been around 
longer than you have, and I've observed, certainly since World 
War II, that we have not been in a situation where defending 
America wasn't the number-one priority. It is no longer, as a 
result of the last administration.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    I know there have been questions about the F-35 and the F-
15. As you well know, prior to the release of the President's 
budget request, my Connecticut colleagues and I sent a letter 
to Acting Secretary Shanahan expressing concern about the then-
rumored cuts to the F-35 program. I am deeply disappointed, 
more so now than then, that these reports proved to be true. 
Instead of the robust investment in the fifth-generation F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter, this budget request proposes a mix of 
fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. This step seems to be a 
shift in strategic planning. This shift appears to have been 
directed by the Secretary--or, I should say, the Acting 
Secretary of Defense, not the Air Force. Is that true?
    Secretary Wilson. No, sir. The Secretary of--Acting 
Secretary of Defense did not direct us to do that--or did not 
direct me to do that.
    Senator Blumenthal. Was it your initiative?
    Secretary Wilson. I'm sorry, sir, I didn't hear you.
    Senator Blumenthal. Was it your initiative?
    Secretary Wilson. Sir, when we put together a budget and 
make sausage, there's--we put forward ideas, they then go 
forward to the OSD level and cost analysis and program 
evaluation, and the Comptroller then look at various programs 
and how all of this works. In the process of that, we did a 
deep dive particularly looking at tactical air and how are we 
going to get to where we need to be without our airframes--
we've got some airframes, particularly the F-15C, that's not 
going to make it there. You look at the various sand charts and 
pieces of analysis and what the combatant commander 
requirements are, and we cannot meet their requirements in 
capacity, because that F-15C--it's just not going to live long 
enough. What should we do about that within the money that we 
have? The solution that we came up with, in concert with CAPE 
and the Comptroller, was to buy--we're committed to the F-35--
was to buy 48 F-35s and then, instead of trying to extend the 
life of those F-15Cs, replace them with an F-15E.
    Senator Blumenthal. What was the initial recommendation, 
though, that you made before all of the grinders----
    Secretary Wilson. Well----
    Senator Blumenthal.--then took over?
    Secretary Wilson. I can tell you that, when we--what the--
what we could do within the money that we were--the way this 
works--and I didn't know it when I was up here on the Hill, but 
you--we, basically, are given a top line internal to the Air 
Force and try to build the best program we can to achieve the 
National Defense Strategy objectives within that top line. That 
included a proposal for 48 F-35s. With that, we would see a 
decline in the number of fighter squadrons we would have in the 
out years, because those F-15Cs weren't going to make it. When 
we went forward and said, what does this mean for our ability 
to meet combatant commander requirements? The answer was good. 
We can't keep declining in the number of fighter squadrons we 
have. In cooperation with CAPE and the Comptroller, one of the 
ideas was to replace those dying F-15Cs with an F-15EX off the 
line. By doing that, the Qataris and the Saudis have kept the 
line open, and have invested in modernization there. We 
wouldn't have any MILCON cost. We could do local training to 
shift from an F-15C to an F-15E. Most of the ground equipment 
is the same. Many of the parts are the same. We wouldn't have 
to retrain the maintainers. So, when it's a balance of capacity 
and capability, given the budget that we have available, that 
was what made, we thought, the most sense.
    Senator Blumenthal. So--I hate to be simplistic about it--
your initial recommendation, as I understand it, your initial 
budget that you submitted to the Secretary of Defense did not 
include the F-15s, and then all of these factors were made 
aware to you?
    Secretary Wilson. Senator, we do the best we can with the 
top line we're given internally, and that included 48 F-35s and 
a declining size of the number of fighter squadrons. The 
question then was, What is the impact of that? When we went 
forward with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
CAPE and the Comptroller--and, you know, they never allocate 
all the money out when we go through this process, and it was, 
``Well, if there were more money available, can we stem that 
decline in the number of fighter squadrons we have available?'' 
The first thing was to keep 48 F-35s. We're committed to that 
platform. It's a game changer. How can we reduce the impact of 
the loss of the F-15C? This was the answer we came up with.
    General Goldfein. Sir, I would just offer that, as part of 
the dialogue, one of the things that the Secretary and I made 
very clear was that we were not going to take money from the F-
35 and put it into an F-15. This is additive, F-15. We 
absolutely have to keep the F-35 program on track, because, as 
the largest customer, we speak not only for the United States 
Air Force, but also for our teammates in the Navy and the 
Marine Corps that are buying the F-35, and all of our 
international teammates, because we need our international 
allies and partners in the fifth generation with us. To give 
you an example, we need Canada, who's going through their 
process right now. We need them. They're part of an alliance 
that we've worked together in NORAD for 60 years. To defend our 
Homeland together, we need them in the fifth-generation. So, 
we're not backing an inch off the F-35 as we go forward.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, I take it at word, because my 
time is expired, that there will be no diminishing of 
commitment to the F-35. I think that is certainly the right 
goal.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you very much.
    Let me make one comment about the F-35 that I don't think 
was--has been made. Yeah, we have the figure of 1,763--1,763 
that's supposed in this timeframe. We are now at 182. We should 
be at 1,100. I think you would agree with that figure. So, 
that's one of the problems that we have not had a chance to 
explore, but it's a problem, certainly not of your doing.
    Appreciate very much the great responses that you made to 
all these questions.
    We're adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                                bombers
    1. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how many 
combat coded bombers does the Air Force We Need require?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force We Need 
requires a total of 14 bomber squadrons, an increase of 5 bomber 
squadrons. The exact number of combat coded bombers is classified but 
remains available in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA Section 1064 Report.

    2. Senator Rounds. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how many 
penetrating (non-standoff) bombers does the Air Force We Need require?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force We Need 
requires a total of 14 bomber squadrons, an increase of 5 bomber 
squadrons. To achieve this capacity while reducing overall bomber 
operations and sustainment costs, the Air Force plans to keep the 
current four B-52 squadrons and transition the rest of the bombers to 
B-21 long-term. Therefore, the remaining 10 bomber squadrons would 
eventually consist of penetrating bombers. The exact number of 
penetrating combat coded bombers is classified but remains available in 
the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA Section 1064 Report.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joni Ernst
                        manned-unmanned teaming
    3. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, as we continue to build 
readiness and modernize our forces to potentially fight a great power 
war, we must contend with issues such as the ongoing pilot shortage. 
Part of this can be addressed through recruitment and retention, 
however, emerging capabilities provide additional avenues to overcome 
this challenge, as well as many others. What initiatives has the Air 
Force undertaken in the realm of manned-unmanned teaming to increase 
the number of combat aircraft without necessarily requiring as many 
pilots?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force is continuing to develop, 
demonstrate and assess advanced control automation techniques, a key 
initiative to make manned-unmanned teaming work. In our budget we are 
funding research to continue the development in three areas: 1) mixed 
initiative control techniques for teams of remotely piloted aircraft 
and/or manned-unmanned teams in contested, dynamic mission 
environments; 2) integration of unmanned systems into controlled 
airspace and airbase operations; and 3) autonomous behaviors for safe, 
loyal wingman that maintain appropriate human control over weapons 
employment.

    4. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, do you foresee a future in 
which a single pilot or pilot-pair could fly while simultaneously 
directing autonomous aircraft in combat?
    General Goldfein. This is exactly the type of game-changing 
capability we envision for future autonomous combat air vehicles. 
Manned and unmanned teaming in future operations will require unmanned 
platforms to autonomously fly in complex and fluid formations. Manned 
and unmanned teaming will also be dependent upon on how well our 
systems seamlessly share information.

    5. Senator Ernst. General Goldfein, what hurdles would need to be 
overcome to field these types of formations, and how would emerging 
technologies such as artificial intelligence be leveraged to field them 
effectively?
    General Goldfein. A variety of technologies, including advanced 
sensors, flight control systems, artificial intelligence, flight safety 
systems, communications capability and others will have to be leveraged 
to field these types of formations. As the technology evolves, we will 
iteratively hone our thinking on human control, develop employment 
concepts, and then the detailed tactics, techniques and procedures 
needed to employ these new capabilities.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                              f-35 beddown
    6. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, is the 
Air Force's beddown of F-35 aircraft proceeding on schedule?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The beddown of 54 F-35As in 
2 Squadrons at Eielson AFB, AK remains on track. The first squadron has 
already started receiving F-35 personnel, and is currently planned to 
receive F-35s from the spring of 2020 to the spring of 2021. The second 
squadron's F-35s are planned to arrive from the spring of 2021 to the 
winter 2021/2022.

    7. Senator Sullivan. General Goldfein, please describe the 
strategic importance of bedding two squadrons of F-35s down at Eielson 
AFB.
    General Goldfein. F-35 beddown at Eielson AFB adds the newest fifth 
generation fighters to our major Air Force command within the Pacific, 
adding significant capacity to provide Air Superiority to United States 
Indo-Pacific Command's area of responsibility. In accordance with the 
National Defense Strategy, they are strategically located there to 
deter Russia and China and aid the United States in a time of great 
power competition.

    8. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, are 
there any ongoing military construction projects at Eielson AFB that 
would affect the F-35 beddown, if the project were to be delayed?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are no ongoing 
Military Construction projects at Eielson AFB, AK that, if delayed, 
would affect the F-35 beddown.

    9. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what 
are the programmed but not yet awarded military construction projects 
at Eielson AFB that would affect the F-35 beddown, if the project were 
to be delayed or cancelled?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are no programmed, but 
not yet awarded Military Construction projects at Eielson AFB, AK that, 
if delayed or cancelled, would affect the F-35 beddown.
                             kc-46 progress
    10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson, what problems and concerns 
with KC-46 production and quality control prompted you to halt delivery 
of KC-46 aircraft from Boeing twice? What was the timeline for those 
problems, concerns, and the Air Force's decision-making process?
    Secretary Wilson. On February 28, 2019, the Air Force halted KC-46A 
aircraft acceptance after discovering excessive Foreign Object Debris 
(FOD) during aircraft acceptance inspections. Deliveries resumed on 
March 11, 2019, following Boeing's Corrective Action Plan brief to the 
Air Force and successful FOD sweeps of delivering aircraft. Deliveries 
were halted a second time on March 23, 2019, after inspections to 
selected sealed areas uncovered additional FOD as well as workmanship 
and quality issues. On April 5, 2019, the Air Force resumed deliveries 
after determining additional corrective actions proposed by Boeing were 
sufficient. Delivered aircraft can continue to fly as there is no 
immediate safety of flight issue. Inspections to select sealed areas of 
delivered aircraft are required and will be accomplished via a Time 
Compliance Technical Order in the coming months, at Boeing's expense.

    11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Wilson, when will you release the 
outcome of the Air Force's Strategic Basing Decision for KC-46 OCONUS 
basing?
    Secretary Wilson. The Air Force will make future final basing 
decisions approximately three years prior to projected first aircraft 
delivery. Future KC-46A basing strategies will be made in light of the 
National Defense Strategy and combatant commander requirements to 
maintain optimum combat capacity during recapitalization. The National 
Defense Strategy informs the optimal sequencing of Active Duty, 
Reserve, and guard locations for future KC-46A squadrons.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator David Perdue
         new air national guard aeromedical evacuation squadron
    12. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, this year, the Air Force will 
continue with its strategic basing process to establish a new 
Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (AES) within the Air National Guard, 
including site surveys this spring. Savannah Hilton Head Air Guard 
Station is one of fourteen locations being considered. The September 
18, 2018, approval of the enterprise definition and criteria emphasizes 
the operational, manpower, and capacity requirements of the AES 
mission. Within the manpower criteria is an emphasis on recruiting, and 
in particular, registered nurses. Georgia Southern University has a top 
tier School of Nursing located in Savannah and is uniquely positioned 
to offer support in the way of nursing professionals, as well as other 
health professional programs. How important is a local, academic 
recruiting pipeline to the success of this new AES?
    Secretary Wilson. As shown in the basing criteria released to 
Congress, registered nurses and the ability to recruit form 70 percent 
of the Recruiting score listed under Manpower, which is a Mission 
criterion. Recruiting and retention, combined, form over half the 
Mission score. Recruiting and retention are primary considerations for 
this Air National Guard basing action.

    13. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, how important is support from 
local academic institutions to ensure there is the required, trained 
workforce available to this mission?
    Secretary Wilson. The recruiting measure in part includes assessing 
the registered nurse population proximate to the installation, 
therefore although not directly measured as a part of this basing 
action, local academic support may positively impact recruiting pool 
and retention levels, which are measured.

    14. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, how can academic and 
workforce development partners tailor their programs to prepare to 
support the Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron?
    Secretary Wilson. Academic institutions offering Bachelors of 
Science in Nursing programs benefit the Air Force by providing the 
basic qualifications needed by flight nurses. Also any partnerships 
related to physician training would also apply. Workforce development 
partners, with critical care capabilities, should allow Air Force 
medics to practice within their facilities through memorandums of 
agreements or training affiliation agreements with our Active Duty 
medical treatment facilities so our Aeromedical Evacuation medics can 
keep their skills up.
                              jstars/abms
    15. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, in February 2019, the Air 
Force submitted a report to Congress on the ``Joint Surveillance Target 
and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Sustainment and Viability Plan''. The 
report states that the E-8C fleet service life projection has been 
updated and extended as a result of the wing and fuselage widespread 
fatigue damage analyses conducted by Boeing. The report states that 
these analyses indicate the ability to operate ``into the 2030s''. 
However, the platform's service life may be much greater, with the 
potential to operate well into the 2040s. What is the most current 
service life projection for the E-8C JSTARS fleet?
    Secretary Wilson. The current airframe service life projection is 
past 2070, but other critical components begin to limit the E-8C's 
service life in the 2030s. The next major limitation is engine 
availability, driven by engine depot throughput, a lack of replacement 
parts to maintain aging engines. In parallel, multiple communication 
and datalink mandates, and aging/Diminishing Manufacturing Sources 
(DMS) components all limit the service life.

    16. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, the February 2019 JSTARS 
Sustainment and Viability Plan states that the System Program Office is 
currently executing multiple initiatives to address declining fleet 
aircraft availability rates, to include addressing negative non-mission 
capable (NMC) drivers. However, the report does not identify which 
elements of the aircraft are most responsible for driving NMC rates, 
nor does it describe how exactly the Air Force intends to address these 
issues. The propulsion system has repeatedly been identified as the 
number one non-mission capable driver for the platform, and that it is 
also one of the largest time and cost drivers during depot maintenance. 
Of the multiple initiatives currently being executed by the System 
Program Office, are there any related to the propulsion system, and 
what is the Air Force's plan going forward to address issues related to 
the propulsion system?
    Secretary Wilson. The program office is actively pursuing efforts 
to address key non-mission critical drivers such as engine 
availability. Efforts include: locking out the engine thrust reversers; 
working with Tinker engine depot to improve engine replacement 
throughput; and sub-contracting engine maintenance to augment the 
Tinker depot. Each will increase engine availability, but not eliminate 
all issues completely.
    The thrust reversers are the biggest non-mission capable driver for 
the JSTARS engines. The thrust reverser lock out project is expected to 
begin this summer and last six months. During the six months, engineers 
will design a permanent hardware solution, which locks the thrust 
reverse in place preventing any movement of the reverse eliminating the 
issue. The project is funded.
    To address parts limitations, the Air Force will ask for additional 
money in fiscal year 2021 to increase depot part throughput and 
availability. Right now, the program office is working with Northrop 
Grumman to sub-contract an alternative engine depot to augment the 
current depot throughput.

    17. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, the progression of the ABMS 
program is now being measured by ``phases'', rather than 
``increments.'' What is the rationale for this shift, as well the 
impact it will have on formal milestone designations, decision 
authority, and progress measurement?
    Secretary Wilson. The objective is to field ABMS capabilities as 
they are ready and not wait for a specific preconceived date in the 
future.

    18. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, does the Air Force have an 
estimate on when they expect ABMS to deliver a BMC2 and GMTI capability 
that is at least comparable to that of the current JSTARS fleet? Please 
provide both the timing (fiscal year) and acquisition stage (both phase 
and increment).
    Secretary Wilson. We are committed to doing ABMS thoughtfully, 
prior to the retirement of any legacy systems, to ensure that we have 
the right warfighter capabilities. This will enable us to project power 
in contested environment, not simply a permissive environment.

    19. Senator Perdue. Secretary Wilson, on June 4, 2018, the Air 
Force announced that Robins would host the initial elements of ABMS. 
The press release specifically said, ``Selecting Robins enables the Air 
Force to leverage existing infrastructure and the more than 40 years of 
experience resident in the Robins' workforce. There is no intent to 
reduce manpower at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS.'' Is 
it still the case that the Air Force expects no reduction of manpower 
at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS?
    Secretary Wilson. Yes. The Air Force still expects no reduction of 
manpower at Robins AFB as the service transitions to ABMS.
                               __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                 support to southern border operations
    20. Senator Reed. General Goldfein, in a response to a question 
from Sen. Warren, you said there were no training exercises or impacted 
deployments based on the Air Force's support of troop deployments to 
the southern border with Mexico. Given the news and readiness impacts 
General Neller outlined in his memoranda to Secretary Spencer, I wanted 
to give you an opportunity to clarify. Have there been any adverse 
impacts to unit readiness, any training exercises deferred or missed, 
or otherwise any impacts on unit deployments based on Air Force support 
to southern border operations?
    General Goldfein. General Goldfein's memo dated May 2, 2019 
provided amplifying details to answer Senator Warren's questions on the 
readiness challenges posed by the deployment of troops to the southern 
border. No exercises or deployments were cancelled or delayed due to a 
unit supporting a southern border deployment. However, an HH-60G Rescue 
Squadron missed an opportunity to attend the Navy's TRIDENT Exercise 
from January 14-26, 2019. The exercise would have provided an opportune 
platform for deck landings. The Rescue Squadron's inability to attend 
the Navy exercise due to southern border deployment had a limited 
impact on a training opportunity. There was no impact to long-term 
readiness of the squadron due to other training opportunities 
throughout the year and deck landings are not required for current 
deployments. The HH-60G Rescue Squadron is no longer supporting 
southern border operations as of January 31, 2019.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                                  f-35
    21. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, with the recent shift in 
National Defense Strategy toward great power competition against near 
peer threats like Russia and China, isn't having a robust generation 5 
tactical fighter aircraft like the F-35 now more important than ever? 
What is the value of having stealth fighter in a non-permissive 
environment?
    Secretary Wilson. The capabilities of the F-35 are crucial for 
deterring and prevailing in combat against a peer adversary. The F-35's 
stealth capabilities allow it to penetrate enemy advanced air defense 
to hold key targets at risk. Additionally, the F-35s Battle Management 
Command and Control (BMC2) capabilities are essential for Joint Team 
success. The F-35 increases the value of other assets against a peer 
threat--it is the centerpiece of achieving air superiority in future 
contested environments.

    22. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, the Air Force unfunded 
priority list includes 12 F-35A's. How would the Air Force's benefit 
from receiving those additional 12 F-35's in this year's budget 
authorization and appropriation from Congress?
    Secretary Wilson. The F-35 brings game-changing capabilities to the 
fight--it has increased survivability through a number of technologies 
including stealth. Its advanced integrated sensors will provide 
battlespace awareness to the Joint Team through the resilient network. 
The F-35's situational awareness and targeting abilities allow it to 
effectively employ our most advanced weapons in a highly contested 
environment. Analysis shows that we must procure 72 fighter aircraft a 
year to account for aging aircraft retirements and to meet National 
Defense Strategy and Operations Plans assigned missions. Appropriating 
funding for an additional 12 F-35A's would bring the Air Force closer 
to that number.

    23. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, you have said recently 
that F-15s were not in the initial Air Force budget you submitted to 
the Secretary of Defense. Why did you decide to reverse course and add 
8 F-15EX's to your budget this year? Were you directed to do so?
    Secretary Wilson. No. It is true that our initial fiscal year 2020 
POM submission did not include the F-15EX; however, several key pieces 
of analysis and information became available during Program and Budget 
Review (PBR) to support the fiscal year 2020 PB position to procure the 
aircraft. We must procure 72 fighter aircraft a year to account for 
aging aircraft retirements and to meet the National Defense Strategy. 
This requirement, combined with current budget realities and the global 
missions of the Air Force demand a mix of 4th and 5th generation force 
structure to balance near and mid-term readiness with future needs.
                            dod resignations
    24. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, did the abrupt departure 
of Secretary Mattis influence your decision to resign? Why did you 
decide now is the right time to leave the Air Force?
    Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about 
SecAF resignation.

    25. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, are you concerned that 
your position--like many other administration positions--may remain 
unfilled for an extended period of time? What are the potential 
negative effects of this void?
    Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about 
SecAF resignation

    26. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, what qualifications and 
experience should this Committee seek in your successor as we vet the 
next Air Force Secretary?
    Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about 
SecAF resignation

    27. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, as you know, Acting 
Secretary Shanahan has been serving in a temporary status since January 
1st. This is the only time in the last 70 years the Secretary of 
Defense position has been vacant for more than two months. How has this 
vacancy impacted the Department, and specifically the Air Force? Are 
you concerned that Acting Secretary Shanahan appears to be serving 
indefinitely, without a confirmation to serve as Secretary of Defense?
    Secretary Wilson. Questions not answered; Personal questions about 
SecAF resignation
                          c-130h modernization
    28. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, can you provide any 
updates to the approval process since I wrote to you on this issue?
    Secretary Wilson. The NP2000 8-bladed propeller is a performance 
enhancing modification approved and currently funded for 44 total C-
130H aircraft. Currently, 11 aircraft have had been modified with 
NP2000 propellers. The remaining 33 aircraft will begin NP2000 
installations in June 2020. Since your letter, we have continued flight 
testing of the NP2000 propeller with other C-130H propulsion 
modifications all scheduled for completion fall 2019. Data from this 
test and the accompanying analysis of performance information will 
inform Air Force leadership of composite propeller capabilities as a 
baseline for future decisions for the C-130H fleet.

    29. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, in light of the recent 
tragic events and the subsequent revelation of the serious risk to our 
Air Force C-130H aircrews while flying the legacy propeller, what is 
the proposed timeline for installation of the NP-2000 propeller on the 
C-130H's like the ones we have in Connecticut?
    Secretary Wilson. The Air Force continues flight tests of the 
NP2000 propeller with other C-130H propulsion modifications scheduled 
to complete fall 2019. Data from this test and the accompanying 
analysis of performance information will inform Air Force leadership of 
composite propeller capabilities as a baseline for future decisions for 
the C-130H fleet.

    30. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Wilson, I understand that Collins 
Aerospace is currently producing enough propellers for two aircraft per 
month. Due to the risk associated with the legacy propeller, would you 
support an increase to 3-4 aircraft per month if Congress appropriated 
additional funding to support the increased production costs?
    Secretary Wilson. Our budget request includes a plan for propeller 
modifications. Should congress appropriate additional funds, it is 
possible the Air Force could accelerate the modification.
                               __________
              Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie Hirono
                        indo-pacific importance
    31. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, the U.S. National Security 
planning has for several years centered its policies in relation to the 
five major threats it faces, four of which are in the Indo-Pacific AOR. 
What concerns you most with regard to the Indo-Pacific region as the 
Secretary of the Air Force?
    Secretary Wilson. There are four main areas of concern, basically 
stemming from China's threatening regional posture: 1) Rapid growth of 
Chinese ability to attack United States and allied forces throughout 
the region and hinder United States entry, 2) Chinese competitive 
actions aimed at pushing the United States out of the Western Pacific, 
3) Lack of resilient and hardened basing to execute Agile Combat 
Employment, and 4) Increasing ops-tempo on USAF and allied air forces 
in responding to aggressive Chinese intrusions.
    Iran, North Korea, and other violent extremist groups are opponents 
we are equipped to manage, but China's large economy has enabled its 
huge and often hidden military expenditures. Ironically, we enabled 
China's economic growth by welcoming them into the international system 
with open arms. Over the last few years, however, it has become 
abundantly clear that China fundamentally rejects the equitable 
system--the system which has prospered more than any other--and aims to 
dominate its own sphere of influence by force, while threatening us in 
our own region.

    32. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, are additional assets and 
investments needed for the Air Force to maintain its competitive 
advantage against our adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region? If so, in 
what areas?
    Secretary Wilson. There are several material steps we can take such 
as base hardening/base resiliency, more munitions, more cyber 
capability, hypersonics, and resilience in space. But we are only 
beginning to invest. Just as important is the time and effort our 
leaders put into engaging with our allies and partners, explaining our 
commitment to a free and open Indo Pacific, and our willingness to work 
cooperatively with all nations who wish to keep it that way.
                        indo-pacific operations
    33. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, last month, B-52H 
Stratofortress bombers deployed in support of U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command's Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP). The CBP has been 
operational for more than a decade in support of a free and open Indo-
Pacific. The bombers conduct training with NATO allies and partners to 
enhance interoperability and readiness. During this operation, one of 
the bombers flew over contested islands in the South China Sea for the 
first time since November. United States officials recently criticized 
China for setting up the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over 
the East China Sea in 2013, which does not conform to international law 
and overlaps similar zones operated by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
How important are operations such as to show support to United States 
partnerships abroad and to communicate our commitment to ensuring the 
South China Sea remains open?
    Secretary Wilson. Our Air Force's presence, along with our sister 
services and civilian counterparts, is critical to maintaining a free 
and open Indo-Pacific.
    To ensure we balance this critical mission with readiness needs, we 
continually evaluate the specific measures we take, such as CBP, for 
their effectiveness and efficiency. That means our specific actions can 
and will change, but our commitment remains firm.

    34. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, how important are these types 
of missions in support of Air Force readiness?
    Secretary Wilson. Real world missions require a ready and able 
force. In some cases, employing that force in critical missions 
improves readiness. However, there are some aspects of readiness that 
are best done or can only be done, within the United States. There may 
come a point when best supporting a particular mission means bringing 
forces home, and possibly changing the configuration of forces abroad.
                        artificial intelligence
    35. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, I see that your unfunded 
priority list calls for $18 million for further development and 
demonstration of cutting-edge technologies like hypersonics and 
autonomy. What is the importance of these technologies for the 
capabilities of the Air Force to meet our near-peer and peer 
adversaries?
    Secretary Wilson. In the dynamic battlespace, the Air Force must 
gather decision-quality information and act on it faster than our 
adversaries can react. Technologies such as autonomy and hypersonics 
will give the Air Force advantages over near-peer and peer adversaries 
in regards to acquiring information and acting upon it with speed. 
Artificial intelligence, aided by machine learning, will play a 
critical role in enhancing human-machine teaming, allowing for 
collaborative platforms and sensors, predictive analysis, and rapid 
decision making. Current autonomy research efforts have demonstrated a 
long-range, high subsonic unmanned air vehicle, as well as live mission 
exploitation techniques to accelerate analysis of full motion video, 
computer assisted detection, characterization, and tracking of humans 
in operational surveillance imagery. Current hypersonics research 
efforts have demonstrated hypersonic engine performance in ground 
testing and physics based simulations for the utilization of hypersonic 
weapons. These technology efforts will improve decision-making 
processes and advance weaponry that outpaces our adversaries. The 
additional funding would accelerate the completion of these technology 
efforts.
                        capability and readiness
    36. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the 
National Defense Strategy clearly articulates a focus on near-peer and 
peer competitors such as China and Russia. How does the budget reflect 
the requirements of the Air Force to meet the challenges of the Great 
Power Competition?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The National Defense 
Strategy directs the Air Force to increase lethality, restore 
readiness, and prepare for high-end conflict against a near-peer 
adversary. We are getting after the challenges of the NDS in our budget 
by funding programs that are vital to win in the high-end fight, such 
as: hypersonics, F-35, Next Generation Air Dominance, B-21 Raider, KC-
46, T-X, Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, ABMS, and preferred 
munitions. However, as our Air Force We Need analysis shows the Air 
Force at 312 operational squadrons is too small to meet the demands of 
the NDS.

    37. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, your 
budget calls for increasing the Air Force by 4,400 airmen and 5,143 
civilians. What are you doing to ensure that you can get the proper 
talent to fill these vital positions?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. In an environment with a 
fast growing competition for talent spurred by a robust economy, we are 
committed to improving how we recruit and prepare airmen to succeed, 
even as we have found success in attracting top talent from across our 
Nation. The increased airmen will go to support maintenance of our new 
weapon systems as well as increasing requirements in cyber, 
intelligence, rated and pilot production, career enlisted aviators and 
battlefield airmen. We have found success in recruiting most of these 
areas, and to ensure continued success we've adopted a total force 
recruiting approach which allows all recruiters to fill positions in 
the Active, Guard, Reserve and civil service. This ensures we maximize 
the productivity of each recruiter. We've added new recruiters to 
markets where we need additional support and focused our advertising 
and marketing program. Moreover, we've seen an increase in the number 
of leads through online career interest survey, Air Force Work Interest 
Navigator (AF-WIN). To date this survey has generated over 141,000 
leads--an average of over 400 surveys per day. We also stood up a 
squadron that is solely responsible for recruiting battlefield airmen, 
as well as a recruiting detachment to focus on engaging the pre-
accessions demographic as part of the Air Force's efforts to improve 
outreach to youth, specifically increasing opportunities and awareness 
to diverse populations. Using these multiple approaches and tools, we 
are confident highly talented and skilled Americans will continue to 
find quality of service and quality of life while serving their country 
as airmen.
    The Air Force instituted numerous improvements to our civilian 
hiring and recruitment processes and developed a Comprehensive 
Recruiting Strategy in order to increase our applicant pools. We 
established a Talent Acquisition Team dedicated to recruiting civilian 
talent for mission critical and highly skilled fields. The Talent 
Acquisition Team combines workforce planning, forecasting, and analysis 
with innovative marketing, acquisition tools, and sourcing strategies 
to address both short and long-term hiring needs. The talent 
acquisition strategy includes leveraging social media and civilian 
sector recruiting sources and technology to improve the speed and 
quality of hiring. As one example, from January through March 2019, the 
AF conducted 23 outreach and hiring events across the nation at 22 
colleges/universities. These efforts increased recruiting by 63 percent 
and generated 93,000 primary leads. There are numerous other more 
localized programs at our Major Commands and installations throughout 
the country. The Air Force also implemented changes to our hiring 
processes to reduce time-to-hire in order to ensure we do not lose top 
talent through lengthy delays in hiring. We continue to make steady 
progress in reducing hiring timelines and are continuing to press for 
greater reform to civilian hiring.
                     military construction funding
    38. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, in your 
recent MILCON fiscal year 2020 budget request, the Air Force continues 
to prioritize critical infrastructure requirements to meet mission 
needs and operational timeliness. The request states that its MILCON 
investments support the combatant commanders' highest construction 
priorities, new weapons system beddowns, and modernization of research, 
development and testing. What is the importance of MILCON investments 
to improve your capabilities to deter our adversaries in the Indo-
Pacific region?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Military Construction 
investments are critical to supporting the operational beddown, 
training and employment of our future force. At the same time, Military 
Construction is vital to supporting our people and their families. 
While we are exploring a variety of different approaches to future 
military operations within the Indo-Pacific region, Military 
Construction will continue to be a vital part of all approaches.
    Air Force Military Construction supports combatant commanders, 
beddown of new weapons systems such as the F-35, and recapitalization 
of our existing infrastructure. Military Construction investments are 
powerful tools in the Indo-Pacific region, as they provide us with 
alternative airfields, fuels resiliency, modernized facilities, and 
surveillance capabilities in remote and isolated areas. Each completed 
project reminds our partners and adversaries of the United States' 
commitment to the Indo-Pacific Region.
                   sexual harassment and retaliation
    39. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, annual 
reports on sexual assault in the military and annual reports on sexual 
harassment and violence at the military service academies consistently 
document the direct correlation between incidents of sexual harassment 
and incidents of sexual assault. Many past witnesses in Senate Armed 
Services Hearings have testified to the seriousness of addressing 
sexual harassment and sexual assault in the military. Please provide an 
update on what the Air Force is doing on the issue of sexual harassment 
and retaliation.
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Training: Sexual Harassment 
is a topic highlighted during the curriculum for all initial training. 
We also reinforce sexual harassment policy at different stages 
throughout an Airman's career. Additionally, Sexual Harassment 
Awareness Education (SHAE) Training is a tool we provide to Key Leaders 
to reiterate sexual harassment policy. SHAE training includes the 
following:
      Define sexual harassment
      Identify behaviors that may constitute sexual harassment 
using DOD definition
      Identify the effects and describe the impact of sexual 
harassment
      Prevention strategies
      Individual roles and responsibilities when addressing 
sexual harassment
      Sexual harassment scenarios
    Prevention: In addition to training, we utilize organizational 
climate assessment tools as a preventive measure for Commanders to 
identify and track problematic behavior trends (to include sexual 
harassment), and develop action plans to address and counter those 
behaviors within their unit.
    Complaint Processing Options/Policy: Military sexual harassment 
complainants have the option to file informal and formal complaints 
through the military equal opportunity process. Civilian complainants 
have the option of filing a sexual harassment complaint through the 
equal employment opportunity process.
    Retaliation: We advise all complainants of their rights in regards 
to reprisal and retaliation by equal opportunity practitioners during 
initial discussions, and upon any inquiries by customers who contact 
the equal opportunity office. Any allegations of reprisal presented to 
the EO office by military personnel, including cadets, are referred to 
the Inspector General. We are aligning the AF Equal Opportunity 
Retaliation Program with DOD's Retaliation Prevention Response Strategy 
(RPRS), which is designed to operationalize the following:
      Develop and employ a common definition of retaliation to 
describe the full spectrum of retaliatory behavior;
      Initiate a data-driven approach to inform retaliation 
prevention and response mechanisms through a case tracking system;
      Hold offenders appropriately accountable;
      Facilitate a variety of support resources for sexual 
assault victims, sexual harassment complainants, witnesses, bystanders, 
and first responders;
      Provide leadership with additional education and tools to 
promote unit climates intolerant of retaliatory behavior.
                           space capabilities
    40. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, the Maui Space Surveillance 
Site provides a space capability combining operational satellite 
tracking facilities with a research and development facility. What are 
some areas in which we could make greater space investments (e.g., 
cyber)?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force is making a number of key 
investments in space, consistent with the National Defense Strategy. 
First, we are recapitalizing current generation systems with resilient, 
defendable capabilities along with the means to defend them. Second, we 
are developing capabilities to fight back, if necessary, at a time, 
place, and domain of our choosing. Third, we are investing in the 
people that will develop, field, operate and support these new 
capabilities.

    41. Senator Hirono. General Goldfein, what is the importance of a 
whole-of-government approach when working with our allies in this 
integrated and interdependent domain?
    General Goldfein. A whole-of-government approach when working with 
our allies in an integrated and interdependent space domain is 
critically important for ensuring the dominance and lethality to deter, 
defend and if necessary fight and win a future war. We are threatened 
by economic, military and political aggression, and we need to preserve 
the peace through strength. Our strength as a nation, however, is 
greatly magnified by embracing allies and partners who share our values 
and contribute to our common defense. As part of this approach, the Air 
Force is strengthening alliances, establishing new partnerships, 
leveraging industry and non-governmental organizations and increasing 
information sharing. A prime venue for this was the April 2019 Space 
Symposium, which brought together Air Force, other Government entities, 
industry, international and commercial leaders in a week-long 
conference to collaborate and share best practices across the space 
enterprise. Other activities being pursued by the Air Force in support 
of a whole-of-government approach include increased international space 
training where we consistently review course material for increased 
inclusion of allied nations and the participation of allies and 
partners in U.S. wargames. The Air Force is also appropriately sharing 
more classified information with our allies, and it is integrating more 
allies into operations centers such as the Combined Space Operations 
Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. This center was 
established last year to coordinate space intelligence sharing among 
allies and commercial space companies. Current participants include 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
                              eagle vision
    42. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, the fiscal year 2020 Air 
Force Budget briefing documentation includes a claim that through the 
identification of redundant capabilities, the AF was able to divest all 
funding for the Eagle Vision program through an agreement between the 
Air Force and a National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. A claim is 
also made that the Air Force receives a higher resolution of service at 
no cost to the Air Force saving $21 million per year.
    Please submit a copy of the referenced agreement between the Air 
Force and NGA.
    Secretary Wilson. While there is no formal memorandum of agreement 
between NGA and the Air Force, NGA's NextView License allows release of 
Digital Globe imagery to the Air Force. NGA's NextView License provides 
similar services of which some are identical in nature to Eagle Vision. 
Please see Appendix A, page 776, ``NextView License Sharing and Release 
Guidance.''

    43. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does the 
agreement take into consideration the fact that Eagle Vision, in 
addition to support for domestic operations, also provides support for 
natural disasters, humanitarian relief operations, Theater Security 
Cooperation, and military missions in partner nations where NGA does 
not fully release commercial imagery?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The current NextView License 
allows imagery support for domestic operations, support for natural 
disasters, humanitarian relief operations, Theater Security 
Cooperation, and military missions in partner nations. Imagery released 
to combatant commanders can be shared directly with third party users 
where the mission is of U.S. interest.

    44. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, can 
NGA's commercial imagery be released to all coalition and partner 
nations? If not, please provide any restrictions to the share-ability 
of this imagery.
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. NGA may share imagery with 
organizations beyond the USG, such as coalition and partners nations, 
provided that it supports a USG purpose with a direct benefit to the 
USG. The NextView License allows NGA to disseminate and share 
commercial data imagery, imagery services, and imagery derived products 
with members of the USG including all branches, departments, agencies, 
and offices for U.S. Government purposes. Imagery released to combatant 
commanders can be shared directly with third party users where the 
mission is of U.S. interest. In addition, NGA may share commercial 
imagery directly with the following organizations: State & Local 
Governments, Foreign Governments and Intergovernmental agencies, USG 
contractors and university researchers supporting USG contracts, and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Non-profit Organizations. 
NGA's corporate dissemination systems limit accesses to commercial 
imagery in accordance with intelligence oversight policies. NGA also 
provides commercial data to foreign partners in 42 countries across the 
globe and now can provide imagery to foreign government in support of 
combatant command requests.

    45. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson, please provide a copy of the 
analysis used to determine that the NGA could meet the requirements of 
the Eagle Vision system to include the need for timely imagery.
    Secretary Wilson. It was through a body of evidence that the Air 
Force determined NGA could meet the requirements of the Eagle Vision 
system. Please see attached Air Force Audit Agency report and Air Force 
Requirement Office memorandum.

    46. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, without 
a Federally declared emergency, does the National Guard have access to 
NGA commercial imagery for all domestic response situations, both 
archived and new collections?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, as a result of updates 
to NGB processes, NGB confirms access to all NGA commercial imagery for 
both state declared and federally declared emergencies via the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS).
    As a result of the NextView license in 2018, NGA approved ``Limited 
Public Release'' of imagery. For example, all commercial imagery 
related to Hurricane Matthew was released prior to the storm making 
landfall. This approval, along with expedited delivery of commercial 
imagery directly to FEMA servers, allowed the widest distribution of 
imagery to Federal, State, and Local authorities. Imagery was also 
publicly released to assist with storm preparations as well as post-
storm rescues and damage assessments.

    47. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does NGA 
currently have an unclassified SAR capability or contracts with 
commercial vendors to obtain unclassified SAR imagery?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, NGA has a bilateral 
agreement with the Canadian government, called the NorthernView 
Agreement, which enables NGA and its customers to have access to 
unclassified SAR collections world-wide. This capability is comparable 
to that of Eagle Vision's TerraSAR-X access.

    48. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, does NGA 
have a mobile, direct downlink capability from commercial imaging 
satellites?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. [Deleted.]

    49. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, one of 
Eagle Visions' strengths is a robust capability to process and produce 
unclassified and sharable imagery products from remote deployed 
locations. Does NGA have this mobile capability?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Yes, as mentioned in 
question 52, the Domestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial Intelligence 
System (DMIGS) units can support domestic remote delivery and 
dissemination requirements. NGA does have some small tactical unmanned 
imaging systems used to support limited operations.

    50. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the Air 
Force has other alternative imaging capabilities. What are the costs 
associated with utilizing alternative imaging capabilities? For 
example, what are the costs for utilizing such platforms as Global Hawk 
and U2 for imagery?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There is no cost additive to 
the Air Force for utilizing alternative imaging capabilities. As with 
Eagle Vision, programs are federally funded for their sharable imaging 
capabilities as a part of their missions. However, in situations that 
drive addition flying hours or conflicts between title 32 or title 50, 
additional cost could be assessed above Air Force programed dollars.

    51. Senator Hirono. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what is 
the process the Air Force customer uses to order domestic response 
commercial unclassified imagery from NGA? What is process for Eagle 
Vision imagery requests? What is the difference in the timeline?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. There are multiple facets 
with respect to the process Air Force customer(s) use to order domestic 
response commercial unclassified imagery from NGA and Eagle Vision. 
These are broken down into the following:
    1)  Access to data,
    2)  When Satellite is Overhead,
    3)  Customer Order,
    4)  Satellite Tasking, and
    5)  Product Delivery.
    1) Access to Data--Both NGA and EV users have the ability to 
generally quickly access commercial unclassified imagery from their 
respective data repositories through web based access.
    2) When Satellite is Overhead--When the satellite is overhead of 
the target area, both NGA and EV can gain collection of the image and 
it can be accessed by users generally on the same timeline.
    3) Customer order--NGA can direct and update collection plans up 
until 20 minutes prior to satellite uplink and collection over target 
area. EV can request collection as late as the satellite rising over 
the horizon.
    4) Satellite Tasking--NGA customers request their collection needs 
through an NGA Source Strategy. Analysts build collection plans that 
optimize sensor capabilities and maximize efficiency and effectiveness 
of the satellite time while satisfying requirements from across the IC, 
DOD, and Fed/Civ communities. These tasking(s) requests are fulfilled 
as the next available satellite collects the image request when over 
the target site. EV direct tasking can be accomplished by calling the 
EV Program Manager to request a collection, who then makes the request 
for the user which is met when the next available satellite passes the 
target area, including direct tasking as the satellite rises over the 
horizon.
    5) Product delivery--NGA NextView license is contractually 
obligated to deliver 90 percent of their satellite data in under 100 
minutes or less. Historically, to date 98 percent of that commercial 
data has been delivered in under 50 minutes, as the average delivery 
time. EV historically downlinks, processes and is available for 
delivery as the satellite sets over the horizon.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                              hypersonics
    52. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, I am 
pleased to see the Air Force budget $576 million for hypersonics. As 
you know, Sandia National Laboratories has played a critical role in 
developing this technology over decades and is the core reason for why 
we have a capability ready to prototype. I have spoken to lab directors 
who are eager to transition this technology to industry and believe it 
is important to co-locate the R&D and the manufacturing of these 
systems. Do you agree there is value in ensuring the core talent and 
expertise of the technology is nearby production efforts?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Sandia National Laboratories 
(SNL) has been instrumental in the technical and design development of 
hypersonic system concepts. SNL expertise and technical data continues 
to be leveraged by the Air Force as it pursues its hypersonic strike 
capability, and in particular its Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon 
(HCSW) prototype effort. For specific HCSW milestones, SNL is working 
with the Air Force to deliver the first several sets of hypersonic 
glide body hardware to Lockheed Martin Space (LMS) for integrated 
flight test and technical expertise. SNL will continue to be engaged 
for expertise in transitioning this technology to industry.

    53. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what 
are we doing to co-locate the R&D and manufacturing of these systems?
    Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force acquisition 
framework recognizes there are many ways to combine technical 
expertise, manufacturing capability, and testing infrastructure. The 
Air Force acquisition process does not prescribe to industry how they 
organize to deliver weapon system capability.
                     new mexico air national guard
    54. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, the Air National Guard 
enterprise is based on established Capstone Principles that set the 
foundational framework for aircraft in the 54 states and territories. 
Specifically, one of those Capstone Principles is to allocate at least 
one unit-equipped wing and flying squadron to each state. Yet, the New 
Mexico Air National Guard is the only one in the country without an 
operational flying mission and one of three states--New Mexico, 
Virginia, and Washington--that lack ownership of aircraft. Are states 
that are currently unable to align with these core principles due to 
divestiture of aircraft in the past given priority for new mission 
opportunities?
    General Goldfein. While we recognize the value and intent of the 
ANG's Capstone Principles, our Strategic Basing Process does not give 
specific priority to states based on their alignment with them. We do, 
however, work hard to ensure the enterprise we define for each basing 
action is as inclusive as possible. The Strategic Basing Process 
evaluates candidates through a number of important factors (e.g., 
suitability of existing facilities, capacity to absorb additional 
mission, location demographics and environmental factors) and all three 
components are fully represented. As mission demands evolve and 
resource constraints remain, the Air Force continues to ensure it 
leverages the collective talent and experience of the Regular, Guard 
and Reserve Forces to compete, deter and win.

    55. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, will you commit to working 
with the National Guard Bureau to address the lack of a unit-equipped 
wing and flying squadron in the New Mexico Air National Guard and to 
address aircraft ownership in New Mexico, Virginia, and Washington?
    General Goldfein. I look forward to continuing our collaborative 
efforts with the National Guard Bureau on building a more lethal and 
ready Total Force. The New Mexico Air National Guard represents one of 
the many opportunities that can help us accelerate towards the Air 
Force We Need and the additional unit-equipped air, space and 
cyberspace squadrons that are required. That strategic design effort is 
led by the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC), and 
the Air National Guard's integration into that office underscores our 
commitment to capitalize on the strengths and opportunity in the 
Reserve Component.

    56. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, considering the mission 
growth suggested by the Air Force We Need imperative, will a 
substantial proportion of that growth be realized in the Air National 
Guard?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force will need to grow across all 
components--Active, Reserve and Air National Guard. The assumption in 
the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA 1064 Study was to maintain the current force 
mix ratios across all the mission sets. If the Air Force were to 
increase by 25 percent, more analysis would need to be conducted to 
determine the optimal growth across components based on operational, 
strategic, and cost factors associated with meeting NDS demand across 
many mission sets.

    57. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, if the Air National Guard 
will likely take on additional mission sets in line with the Air Force 
We Need guidelines, is it reasonable to expect that locations with 
available ramp space, infrastructure, and manpower will be given 
priority to maximize budgetary limitations?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force strategic basing process considers 
existing excess capacity first. Using existing excess capacity results 
in judicious use of taxpayer dollars and potentially reduces overall 
bed down costs.

    58. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, given the recognized 
performance enhancements of the CV-22 aircraft for both federal and 
state roles, will the airframe be purchased in larger numbers to meet 
the increased demands on Special Operations mission sets? If so, will 
they be considered for equipping Air National Guard units?
    General Goldfein. The Air Force Program of Record for the CV-22 is 
54 aircraft; the Air Force has no plans to procure additional aircraft. 
Once the 54 aircraft are procured, the Air Force Special Operations 
Command's four Attrition Reserve CV-22s will be located where they are 
most needed based on CV-22 enterprise requirements. AFSOC has two 
associate ANG units.

    59. Senator Heinrich. General Goldfein, the proposed light attack 
program for the United States Air Force has gone through multiple 
iterations of aircraft competitions, testing issues, extended timelines 
and program de-prioritization. What is your current posture to realize 
an affordable option that has clear potential to fulfill a niche role 
in support of the National Defense Strategy?
    General Goldfein. Our current posture is to procure a small number 
of aircraft from two vendors for ACC and AFSOC to support continued 
experimentation. Beyond just airframe capability, our exploration 
efforts include an exportable tactical data network to enhance partner 
nation support to this NDS role. If the results of the experimentation 
are positive, the budget includes procurement funds in fiscal year 
2022-24 to buy aircraft.
                       kirtland military housing
    60. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, Kirtland was one of the 
bases affected by issues associated with privatized military housing. 
Specifically, the Maxwell development at Kirtland is in disrepair; so 
much so that very few military personnel live there. However, the 
privatized-housing contractor is leasing the space to civilians. Can 
your team report back to me on the current status of this housing 
development and when did military personnel stop living there?
    Secretary Wilson. The housing units on the Maxwell parcel are 
smaller units with older floorplans located off base. As these are 
older units, they do require more maintenance than newer housing units. 
While this housing neighborhood has more non-military residents than 
the main housing area on Kirtland Air Force Base, 37 percent of 
residents in the Maxwell neighborhood are military, including military 
families and unaccompanied military members.

    61. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, it is my understanding 
Maxwell Housing is slated for demolition, but that the homes are 
currently under a 5-year extension. Why, and under what terms, was the 
extension granted; and when can we expect demolition to take place?
    Secretary Wilson. The Maxwell homes were extended through April 
2024 in order to generate additional revenue for the Kirtland Family 
Housing Project and strengthen cash flow available for mid-term 
reinvestment. Even with this additional revenue, the project may still 
have significant long-term shortages in sustainment and 
recapitalization funding, which may drive another extension unless 
market conditions change. Currently, the units are slated for 
demolition upon the termination of the extension in April 2024.

    62. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, are the Maxwell homes still 
generating revenue? If so, where does that revenue go?
    Secretary Wilson. The 5-year extension of the Maxwell homes is 
projected to generate a total of approximately $5.3 million in 
additional funding for the Reinvestment Account after debt obligations 
and operating expenses are paid. The Air Force has approval authority 
for how Reinvestment Account funds are spent, and can direct the 
funding to be used for sustainment and reinvestment in any housing 
units within the Kirtland Family Housing Project (including homes in 
the main housing area on base).
    Directed Energy Programs Designated as ``Section 804'' Accelerated 
Acquisition Programs
  directed energy programs designated as ``section 804'' accelerated 
                          acquisition programs
    63. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, to my knowledge there are 
no Directed Energy programs currently designated as ``Section 804'' 
Rapid Prototyping or Rapid Fielding activities, which is different than 
many other Air Force acquisition efforts, especially in space and 
hypersonics. Why have you not designated any Directed Energy programs 
as 804 activities?
    Secretary Wilson. We have used similar rapid prototyping activities 
for our Directed Energy Experimentation Campaign. In addition, two 
prototype High Power Microwave Systems were funded using OSD-level 
Rapid Prototyping Funds. We have not specifically designated programs 
for 804, because airborne applications are still in the technology 
demonstration phase and ground-based applications are undergoing 
operational experimentation to assess military utility, concepts of 
operations, and policy issues. Once airborne Advanced Technology 
Demonstrators are built, current estimate in 2021, we will conduct a 
round of experimentation and consider airborne Directed Energy as a 
candidate for rapid prototyping. Once our ground-based prototypes 
conclude operational experiments later this year, we will consider them 
a candidate for 804 activities.

    64. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, would the 804 designation 
speed the prototyping and fielding of these much needed capabilities?
    Secretary Wilson. Once the airborne technology demonstrators are 
built and ground-based prototypes complete operational experiments, the 
804 designation would absolutely speed the fielding of these 
capabilities.
                 laboratory and test range bureaucracy
    65. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, please provide an update on 
the use of the streamlining authorities that this Committee authorized 
under Section 233 of the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA. These authorities 
allows lab directors and range commanders to cut red tape and move 
their organizations to embrace the agile and innovative activities that 
we all think will be necessary to enhance Air Force research, testing, 
and innovation and lead to more efficient deployment of new 
capabilities. They will also help make these Air Force institutions 
behave more like their private sector counterparts, and make them a 
more attractive employer for world class technical and innovative 
talent. The Navy, in particular, has aggressively and successfully used 
these authorities for its labs and warfare centers.
    Secretary Wilson. The AF greatly appreciates the section 233 
authority. The Air Force Flight Test Center, which oversees the 
developmental test ranges, and the Nevada Test and Training Range have 
used the authority resulting in three innovative activities. To date, 
the Air Force laboratories have not utilized the authority but plan to 
do so in the near future.

    66. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what successes has the Air 
Force seen from using these authorities?
    Secretary Wilson. The Air Force Flight Test Center (AFTC) has 
utilized the section 233 authority to update the Center Scheduling 
Enterprise software allowing communication between Edwards AFB and 
Eglin AFB scheduling centers, improving distributed test operations 
efforts. AFTC has also standardized instrumentation tasks for greater 
sharing of test instrumentation resources across the 412th Test Wing 
and the 96th Test Wing instrumentation groups. Lastly, the Nevada Test 
and Training Range (NTTR) has developed a threat simulation capability 
that cuts required development time for new or upgraded threats at 
reduced cost. The NTTR effort will begin production in June 2019.

    67. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what are the plans for the 
use of these authorities in the near future?
    Secretary Wilson. The Air Force Major Range Test Facility Base 
plans to continue to utilize Section 233 authority when and where 
applicable while the Air Force Research Laboratory is looking forward 
to take full advantage of the authority in the coming year.

    68. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, what has been the major 
challenge in using these authorities to date?
    Secretary Wilson. There have not been difficulties in utilizing the 
233 authorities.
                     internal afrl research funding
    69. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson, I note that the Air Force 
has struggled to develop a mechanism to fully use the authorities of 10 
USC 2363--which would allow AFRL lab directors the ability to use funds 
available to them to fund internal R&D and fund other activities, 
including lab construction and workforce development programs. The GAO 
noted that the Air Force has not yet developed a mechanism to charge 
research laboratory customers a fixed fee for costs that would fund 
these activities. Please provide an update and timeline for 
implementation relating to Air Force to respond the GAO finding on the 
inability to develop this charging mechanism.
    Secretary Wilson. The Air Force is continuing to work towards 
establishing a special account within the Treasury to properly receive 
and expend these fixed percentage fees. Air Force has taken the 
necessary steps to request the creation of a Special Fund account 
through OUSD(C). Once OMB and Treasury approves and establishes the 
account the Air Force will begin collecting fees from Air Force 
Research Laboratory's customers. Special Fund account is the existing/
optimal solution where collections can immediately be made available 
for execution. Air Force is optimistic a Special Fund account will be 
created sometime in fiscal year 2020 and collections will start shortly 
after that, but timeline is driven by OUSD(C), OMB, and Treasury as 
they control the Special Fund approval process.
                               __________
            Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                                 f-15ex
    70. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, how does the Air Force intend 
to field the new F-15EXs? Will they be fielded across both the Active 
and Guard components? Which do you expect to receive aircraft first?
    General Goldfein. The F-15EX is intended to replace the Air Force's 
oldest F-15C/D aircraft. The decision on fielding locations and 
timelines will be made using the Air Force Strategic Basing Process.

    71. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, the F-15EX aircraft in this 
year's budget are intended to replace legacy F-15C and D Eagles. The F-
15C fleet is flown by Air National Guard units around the country. In 
your testimony this week to Congress, you've noted that transitioning 
units across ``like-type'' aircraft--in other words, from one model of 
F-15 to another--takes advantage of common infrastructure, parts and 
equipment. Can you elaborate on this? How do unit readiness and mission 
conversion costs and schedules factor into this F-15EX decision?
    General Goldfein. The F-15C/D begins to age out between 2023 and 
the last aircraft in 2028. The current buy profile is for 80 aircraft 
through 2024 and we anticipate replacing F-15Cs one for one with 
procured F-15EXs in the FYDP. We estimate that the transition time, to 
return to acceptable readiness levels, from F-15s to the F-35 
(dissimilar aircraft) will take approximately 18 months for an Active 
Duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron. The 
transition time is due to aircrew and maintenance personnel training. 
Our estimate is it will take 6 months or less to transition from the F-
15C to the F-15EX. The Air Force is still evaluating specific spare 
inventory requirements and equipment compatibilities. In terms of 
operating costs, we estimate that F-15EX will cost less to operate than 
the F-15C fleet; however, the exact operating costs are unknown at this 
time.

    72. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what is your estimate of the 
cost and time required to convert an F-15C unit to F-15EX?
    General Goldfein. Our estimate is it will take 6 months or less to 
transition from the F-15C to the F-15X.

    73. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what is your estimate of the 
cost and time required to convert an F-15C unit to an F-35 mission?
    General Goldfein. It will take approximately 18 months for an 
Active Duty squadron and 36 months for an Air National Guard squadron. 
The transition time is due to aircrew and maintenance personnel 
training. Based on previous conversion efforts, we estimate cost to be 
upwards of $60-$70 million.

    74. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, under our current national 
defense strategy, it's important that we understand the Air Force's 
decision to procure new F-15s from an operational perspective. Can you 
clarify how a fifth generation fighter like the F-35 and a fourth-
generation plus platform like the F-15EX would complement each other in 
a near peer fight?
    General Goldfein. The F-35 and F-15EX bring complementary 
capabilities to a peer fight. The F-35 design allows for penetrating 
adversary air defense systems to prosecute targets while passing 
targeting information back to other assets for additional target 
prosecution. F-15EX is an improved model from Boeing, teaming a new 
airframe with an improved radar, cockpit, electronic warfare suite and 
the ability to carry more missiles than previous F-15 model aircraft in 
service. Individually, both are good for what they are designed to do. 
The future fight requires more than just individual platforms which are 
good. It requires weapon systems working together for the enhanced 
capability required to deter and defeat peer adversaries. The F-35 and 
F-15EX complement each other and provide that greater capability to the 
U.S. in a peer fight environment.

    75. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, what unique capabilities, if 
any, does the F-15EX bring into your tactical fighter inventory, 
whether in terms of range or payload or stand-off?
    General Goldfein. F-15EX will be able to carry more air-to-air 
missiles than any other 4th generation aircraft in the USAF inventory. 
Additionally, the F-15EX will be able to employ large munitions in the 
above 2,000 pound weapons class. A more detailed discussion of the F-
15EX's unique capabilities is best provided in a classified setting, 
which we are ready to provide at your request.

    76. Senator Warren. General Goldfein, earlier this year you stated 
the following regarding your plan to buy new F-15EX aircraft in fiscal 
year 2020: ``We've got to refresh the F-15C fleet because I can't 
afford not to have that capacity to do the job and the missions. That's 
what this is all about. If we're refreshing the F-15C fleet, as we're 
building up the F-35 fleet, this is not about any kind of a trade.'' Is 
that still your position?
    General Goldfein. Yes.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                           rc-26b retirement
    77. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wilson, I see in the budget the Air 
Force is planning on retiring the entire RC-26B fleet. The RC-26B is an 
important part of not only the West Virginia National Guard 
contribution but also to the security of the United States in its 
domestic border surveillance and counterdrug missions. I am concerned 
that the Nation will lose a valuable asset and capability if we retire 
this aircraft. How is the Air Force going to mitigate the loss of the 
RC-26B if you follow through with the plan to retire it?
    Secretary Wilson. The Air Force divested the RC-26 program in the 
fiscal year 2020 budget because there is no longer a DOD/AF/Title-10 
requirement for this platform. There are other existing DOD (MQ-9 
remotely-piloted aircraft, MC-12, Satellite imagery, Army Lakota 
helicopters) and other Federal agency (NOAA, NASA, DHS, CBP) assets 
that provide equivalent or better capability than the RC-26 to support 
border security and/or counterdrug missions. Over the past four years, 
898 percent of National Guard support to the Counter-Drug missions was 
accomplished by assets other than the RC-26 (analysts, linguists, 
rotary wing, etc.)
         national guard c-130h modernization / recapitalization
    78. Senator Manchin. Secretary Wilson, the Air Force still operates 
a large number of C-130H aircraft across both the Active Duty and 
National Guard. This aircraft, which was first delivered in 1965, is 
aging rapidly. This was highlighted by the propeller issues that led to 
the grounding of 60 C-130H aircraft in February of this year. I see no 
procurement of baseline C-130J aircraft in this year's budget, only the 
MC-130J specialized variant. Does the Air Force have a long term plan 
for replacing the aging C-130H fleet with C-130J or at a minimum 
modernizing all C-130--H aircraft to ensure consistent operations and 
readiness across the Total Force?
    Secretary Wilson. Given limited Air Force funding and a focus on 
the National Defense Strategy priorities, at this time there is no plan 
to purchase additional combat delivery C-130Js beyond the current 
program.
    However, the Air Force continues to program the Avionics 
Modernization Program Increment 1 and 2, as well as operational 
upgrades for C-130H aircraft to ensure that safety/obsolescence, 
airspace compliance, and fleet modernization are priorities.
    Additionally, several C-130H aircraft have received a Center Wing 
Box upgrade, which extends the service life and equivalent flying hours 
of those aircraft.
    The Air Force is conducting an Operational Utility Evaluation on 
the combination of the NP2000 (eight blade propeller), Electronic 
Propeller Control System, and 3.5 engine modifications, all on the C-
130H aircraft.

                           Appendix A
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]	


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
               2020 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2019

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                              NAVY POSTURE

    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, 
Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, 
Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, 
Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

    Chairman Inhofe. Our meeting will come to order.
    We have a number of nominees to confirm, here. Since we now 
have a quorum, I would like to move to that.
    It is present, and I ask the Committee to consider a list 
of 82 pending military nominations. All of these nominations 
have been before the Committee the required length of time.
    Is there a motion to favorably report these----
    Senator Reed. So move.
    Chairman Inhofe.--82 pending military nominations to the 
Senate? There's a motion.
    A second?
    Senator Wicker. Second.
    Chairman Inhofe. All in favor, say aye.
    [A chorus of ayes.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Opposed, no.
    [No response.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Ayes have it. That's done.

    [The list of nominations considered and approved by the 
Committee follows:]

 Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee 
 Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on April 9, 2019.
    1. In the Marine Corps there are 12 appointments to the grade of 
major general (list begins with Julian D. Alford) (Reference No. 33)

    2. General Stephen J. Townsend, USA to be general and Commander, US 
Africa Command (Reference No. 378)

    3. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jason 
A. Anthes) (Reference No. 400)

    4. In the Air Force there are 13 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Jeremiah L. Blackburn) (Reference No. 424)

    5. LTG Timothy J. Kadavy, ARNG to be lieutenant general and Vice 
Chief of the National Guard Bureau (Reference No. 460)

    6. RADM James W. Kilby, USN to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of 
Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, N9 
(Reference No. 495)

    7. LTG Jeffrey L. Harrigian, USAF to be general and Commander, US 
Air Forces Europe; Commander, US Air Forces Africa; Commander, Allied 
Air Command; and Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (Reference 
No. 517)

    8. Gen. Tod D. Wolters, USAF to be general and Commander, US 
European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Reference No. 
527)

    9. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with La Tanya D. Austin) (Reference No. 529)

    10. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade 
of colonel (list begins with Michael T. Charlton) (Reference No. 530)

    11. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to the grade of major 
(list begins with Elissa R. Ballas) (Reference No. 531)

    12. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Brian C. Bane) (Reference No. 532)

    13. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Robin N. Scott) (Reference No. 535)

    14. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Matthew R. Thom) (Reference No. 536)

    15. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (David 
M. Powell) (Reference No. 537)

    16. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Ford 
M. Lannan) (Reference No. 538)

    17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Luke 
A. Randall) (Reference No. 539)

    18. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of 
colonel (Mark M. Kuba) (Reference No. 540)

    19. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Rhana S. Kurdi) (Reference No. 541)

    20. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Michael D. Norton) (Reference No. 542)

    21. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jason 
A. Byers) (Reference No. 543)

    22. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Nathaniel C. Curley) (Reference No. 544)

    23. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Sewhan Kim) (Reference No. 545)

    24. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Early Howard, Jr.) (Reference No. 546)

    25. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant 
colonel (Isaac L. Henderson) (Reference No. 547)

    26. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of commander 
and below (list begins with Shawn D. Trulove) (Reference No. 548)

    27. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander 
(Charles E. Jenkins IV) (Reference No. 551)

    28. In the Air Force there are 23 appointments to the grade of 
major general (list begins with Christopher P. Azzano) (Reference No. 
553)

    29. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Benjamin D. Ramos) (Reference No. 554)

    30. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Christopher D. Black) (Reference No. 555)

    31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (James 
A. Broadie) (Reference No. 556)

    32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major 
(Brandon E. Resor) (Reference No. 557)

_______________________________________________________________________
                                                                    
TOTAL: 82

    All right, we have a--let's go ahead on this. I'm going to 
just go ahead with opening statements, then we'll have a round 
after we hear from our witnesses.
    The Committee meets today to receive testimonies on the 
posture of the Department of Navy in its fiscal year 2020. We 
welcome our witnesses: Richard Spencer, the Secretary of the 
Navy; Admiral John Richardson, Chief of the Naval Operations 
(CNO); and General Robert Neller, Commandant of the Marine 
Corps. We thank you, all three, for your service.
    The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation's military 
to prepare for the return of great-power competition. This 
means we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, 
decisively defeat, our near-peer adversaries. I think we all 
know who we're talking about. It's China and Russia.
    In order for the Department of the Navy to achieve that 
goal, our Navy and Marine Corps must be manned, trained, 
equipped appropriately. Significant progress has been made in 
rebuilding the readiness, but, still, there's a lot of work to 
be done.
    With the alarming speed of modernization that we've 
witnessed, both conventional and nuclear forces, China and 
Russia now present a credible threat to the United States and 
our allies. It's past time for action. However, we must be 
smart, not hasty, as we modernize our military. Recently--
recent history should be our guide, because, without better 
acquisition performance, we could fall behind, or further 
behind, our competitors. For example, the last eight combatant 
lead ships cost $8 billion more than their initial budget, 
delivery the last 6 months late, with dozens of deficiencies. 
Another example is our--the 9 to 11 advanced weapons elevators 
on the USS Gerald R. Ford still have not been accepted by the 
Navy, nearly 2 years after the ship's delivery, and some other 
areas, also, the problems with that.
    While the promise of new technology may be alluring, it's 
no substitute for demonstrated performance. I'm highly 
skeptical of claims by the Department of Defense officials that 
early retirement of the USS Harry Truman will result in a more 
modern and lethal force as well as increased industrial-base 
workload. The reality is, the Ford lacks functional weapons 
elevators and has significant reliability problems. No 
combination of unmanned systems has been shown to match and 
reach the lethality of the aircraft carrier and its Air Wing. 
The Truman proposal will result in reductions, not increases, 
of highly skilled employees. We'll have some questions and 
discussion on the USS Truman during the course of this hearing.
    Senator Reed.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Spencer, Admiral 
Richardson, and General Neller to the Committee this morning to 
testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the Navy 
in our review of the fiscal year 2020 authorization request. We 
are grateful to each of you for your service and for the 
service of the men and women under your command, and for the 
support of all Navy and Marine families. Thank them for us, 
please.
    I particularly want to thank Admiral Richardson and General 
Neller, as this is likely to be their last posture hearing 
before the Committee. We thank you for your dedicated years of 
service to our Nation. As the leaders of the Navy and the 
Marine Corps, you face huge challenges as you strive to balance 
the need to support ongoing operations and sustained readiness 
with the need to modernize and keep the technological edge so 
critical to military success.
    In the near term, the Marine Corps has $315 million in the 
disaster emergency relief supplemental that they need 
relatively quickly. I hope we can focus on the potential 
consequences of delaying recovery activities and move the 
disaster emergency relief supplemental forward.
    In addition, because significant levels of funding are 
being transferred to build the wall on the southern border, the 
amount of reprogramming authority will be limited this year. I 
remain concerned that the Navy, Marine Corps, and other 
services may run short of headroom in reprogramming authority, 
which could lead to other delays and shortages. In addition, 
I'm concerned about the opportunity cost of deployments to the 
border.
    The Department of the Navy faces serious readiness problems 
caused by deferred maintenance, reduced steaming and flying 
hours, and canceled training and deployments. We are all keenly 
aware of the collisions of the McCain and the Fitzgerald, and 
the loss of life that resulted. I'm interested in hearing about 
the progress the Navy is making in implementing changes that 
will ensure such incidents will not happen in the future.
    All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely 
high operational tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack 
submarines, air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and 
strike fighter inventories. In addition, the Navy is now in its 
seventh year of operating with fewer than the legally required 
11 aircraft carriers. The Ford is listed in the Navy inventory, 
but that ship, which is more than 4 years behind schedule, will 
not be ready to deploy for many more months. In addition, 
during the next decade, the Navy will need to buy the new 
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines to replace the 
Ohio-class submarines. This is an extremely expensive 
undertaking that is on a very, very tight schedule.
    The Marine Corps continues to make modernization of ground 
vehicles a priority, which requires balancing the procurement 
of new systems while upgrading existing platforms to meet 
current operational needs. The amphibious combat vehicle will 
replace the aging inventory of assault amphibious vehicles in 
order to provide the Marines with increased force protection 
and enhanced lethality. The Marine Corps is also partnering 
with the Army to develop the joint light tactical vehicle, or 
the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), to replace the Humvee. 
I will welcome an update from our witnesses on the status of 
these programs, particularly in view of Army plans to cut back 
on the JLTV program.
    Two years ago, Admiral Richardson, you released the Force 
Structure Assessment that identified a new force-structure 
goal. The Navy's current high level of operations contributed, 
in part, to your conclusions in this assessment that the goal 
for the Navy fleet needs to increase from 308 ships to 355 
ships. I'd like to hear what progress the Navy is making in 
filling these needs. I'm also interested in learning how the 
plan to retire the USS Harry Truman, rather than refuel her, is 
consistent with achieving the 355-ship goal.
    I, again, thank the witnesses for their service and their 
sacrifice. I look forward to their testimony.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    We'll now have our opening remarks by our witnesses. Your 
entire statement will be made a part of the record, and so, be 
brief, if you'd like.
    Senator--or Secretary Spencer.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD V. SPENCER, SECRETARY OF THE 
                              NAVY

    Secretary Spencer. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Committee Members, on behalf of our sailors, 
marines, and civilian teammates, thank you for your bipartisan 
efforts to restore funding stability.
    I would like to take a moment right now, though, and have 
everyone pause for a minute. Yesterday, as you read, we lost 
three marines and one civilian in an attack. It is still a very 
risk-full world out there.
    I would be remiss----
    Chairman Inhofe. I would ask, right now, though, that we 
bow our heads in silence for the lives of these, and the 
families, of these individuals.
    [A moment of silence was observed.]
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Spencer.
    Secretary Spencer. I'd be remiss, Chairman, if I wasn't to 
take a moment right now, since this might be my last time in 
front of you all testifying on a budget, to say that, wearing a 
businessman's hat, I could not have asked for two better 
business partners than in the CNO and the Commandant. I came 
into a situation that we are working our way out of. If I, 
again, carry the corporate term, it was a turnaround. We've 
done some herculean work, and these two gentlemen were side by 
side, no light between us as we went forward. I'd like to just 
acknowledge that.
    The concept of a strategy is the application of limited 
resources to attain a goal. Aligned to the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS), the Navy strategy for restoring readiness, 
strengthening relationships, and reforming our processes has 
been set, and we will build on that with a disciplined focus on 
our people, capabilities, and processes. This budget 
prioritizes a strategy-driven, balanced approach to investment. 
It builds on prior investments, sustains the industrial base, 
and maintains our competitive advantage, if not expands the 
perimeters as we move to a more cost-imposing, survivable, and 
affordable future of the--future--force of the future.
    Restoration of readiness is underway, and we're seeing 
progress, ladies and gentlemen, every day. My analogy is that 
the wind vanes are all pointed in the right direction. Although 
we might be a little frustrated with the velocity of the wind, 
we are moving it continually, day by day. We're building the 
strength of our team through hiring in areas of critical need, 
such as cybersecurity specialists, aviation technicians, 
scientists and engineers, human resource specialists, shipyard 
workers, and digital warfare officers. We're aligning and 
enhancing our educational institutions' distributed-learning 
venues through the Education for Seapower Review. We're taking 
aggressive actions to return private military housing to a 
premium product, mindful that we recruit the individual, but we 
retain the family. All of these actions have one common thread 
through them: the goal of increased readiness.
    We're building our capabilities through investments in 
hypersonics, machine learning, additive manufacturing, quantum 
computing, and directed energy. We're building the fleet in 
pursuit of a 355-ship Navy, manned and unmanned, to include the 
Columbia-class submarine, next-generation frigate, and 
remotely-piloted platforms, such as Sea Hunter and Orca. These 
efforts are increasing lethality through increased distributed 
maritime operations.
    To reach the Secretary's goal of 80-percent mission-capable 
tactical aircraft, we've realigned investments to spares, 
aviation engineering, and logistical support through our newly-
created Navy Sustainment System, which is based upon best 
practices from outside the wire, as I say, commercial best 
practices. As a pilot program, these activities have moved us 
to review our processes in all maintenance areas within the 
naval enterprise, to include ship, weapon, and vehicle 
maintenance and sustainment. Driven by the Marine Corps Force 
2025 Capability Investment Strategy, we're investing in the 
amphibious combat vehicle, loitering munitions, and unmanned 
logistics systems in order to maintain our competitive 
advantage. Exercising the Marine Corps operating concept is 
moving us to rapidly progress as a continuous learning 
organization as we adapt and experiment in our new competitive 
environment.
    Yet, while we effect the aforementioned, the Marine Corps 
is also contending with unprecedented double impact of 
Hurricanes Florence and Matthew, which together damaged or 
destroyed more than $3.7 billion of infrastructure across many 
of our East Coast installations. Camp Lejeune is a primary 
force-generator for the naval services, directly contributing 
to the capacity and readiness of our force. That area took the 
majority of the blunt impact of those storms.
    Over the past year, we have meaningfully increased our 
interaction with our allies and friends. Exercises and 
education have strengthened our ability to operate; therefore, 
increasing the depth of our collective ability to deliver the 
resources requested. Compared to a year ago, the increase and 
depth of our relationship with our allies and friends has been 
the prime contributor to this good outcome.
    Our Navy has implemented 91 of the 111 readiness reform and 
oversight council recommendations, transforming a culture of 
accepting risk to one of understanding and managing risk. We've 
reviewed and are in the process of remediating our business 
processes following our first top-to-bottom audit. The audit is 
now proving to be a tool where we find we can leverage 
lethality. We're using this information to streamline 
operations and reimagine how support functions can be 
modernized in order to drive continued learning and, therefore, 
produce ever-increasing efficiencies for the American taxpayer. 
We owe it to them to ensure every dollar that we invest--every 
dollar--is invested in the most effective manner possible. I am 
proud to work with this Committee to keep that promise.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]

         Prepared Statement by the Honorable Richard V. Spencer
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee 
Members. On behalf of our sailors, marines and civilian teammates, 
thank you for your bipartisan efforts to restore funding stability to 
the Department of the Navy. The foundation for restoring readiness and 
increasing lethality has been set. Now we must build on that foundation 
with a sense of urgency. While we have much to do, we are well 
underway, and I will highlight some of our progress.
                             where we were
    At my confirmation hearing in July 2017, I stated my intent to 
expeditiously assess the current situation, develop the tools needed to 
enhance its ability to fight, and to deliver on the title 10 
responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary the Navy. My priorities 
for accomplishing these goals centered on three key areas: people, 
capabilities, and processes.
    I expressed my determination to recruit, train and retain the best 
of our Nation for our military and civilian ranks, and to create a 
flat, lean and agile organization where those who manage critical 
situations have the ability to make decisions to solve the problems in 
front of them.
    I committed to rebuild the readiness and lethality of our 
capabilities, citing cumulative effects of 16 years of wartime 
operational tempo, unpredictable funding, and challenges to our 
warfighting advantage as we return to a geostrategic environment 
dominated by great power competition.
    As a businessman, I expressed my determination to improve our 
processes across the portfolio, analyzing all systems and platforms to 
extract additional efficiencies, incorporating private sector best 
practices, and migrating to a true continual learning enterprise.
                              where we are
    Over the past year and a half, Admiral Richardson, General Neller 
and I have attacked these goals with a sense of urgency by investing in 
our people, capabilities and processes.
    To build the strength of our people, we've invested in a ready, 
relevant and responsive force: A Marine Corps force with 186,200 active 
personnel and 38,500 reservists; the Targeted Reentry Program to enable 
key former personnel a streamlined return into Active Duty; quality of 
life and retention efforts like the MyNavy Career Center, which 
provides sailors with human resource services around the clock; and the 
military parental leave program. We've used the increased Defense 
Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) flexibility from the fiscal 
year 2019 NDAA to support dynamic changes and requirements in technical 
expertise, agility and innovation in our officers. We've invested in 
our civilian workforce, including enhanced hiring and training at our 
public shipyards to reach our FY20 goal of 36,100 personnel one year 
earlier than originally planned.
    We've enhanced our capabilities, through targeted investments in 
the lethality and readiness of our weapons platforms and munitions. We 
have accomplished this through strengthening our partnerships with the 
private sector. We've gleaned commercial best practices to increase 
efficiency and flow in our ship, ground and aviation maintenance 
facilities. The Navy has added 22 Battle Force Ships over fiscal year 
2017 and fiscal year 2018, while decommissioning nine, for a net 
addition of 13 ships. The Marine Corps has reset 99 percent of ground 
equipment and returned 72 percent of our equipment to the operating 
forces. We have also enabled personnel to ``fix it forward'' through 
technologies such as additive manufacturing, including the procurement 
of 160 3D printers capable of producing over 125 ground and 83 NAVAIR-
approved parts on demand.
    We've also significantly improved our operational processes, 
through the Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Review 
(SRR). Over the past year, the Readiness Reform and Oversight Council 
has examined 111 recommendations from the review process. 91 have been 
adjudicated and 83 have now been implemented. Business processes were 
also reviewed and remediated after our first ever top-to-bottom audit 
of the Department of the Navy, and we're using this information to 
streamline our operations and reimagine how support functions can be 
modernized in real time to drive greater readiness, lethality and 
efficiency. Through the development and implementation of the Navy 
Business Operations Plan and our Performance to Plan tool, we are 
beginning to accurately track the output impacts of our efforts.
    It must also be noted that the Marine Corps is contending with the 
unprecedented double impact of Hurricanes Florence and Matthew, which 
together damaged or destroyed more than $3.7B in infrastructure across 
many of our east coast installations. Camp Lejeune is a primary force 
generator for the Naval Services, directly contributing to the capacity 
and readiness of our force. The Marine Corps continues to feel the 
immediate impacts of these storms through lost and delayed training 
time; delayed deployments and redeployments; and daily quality of life 
challenges including the displacement of thousands of personnel and 
their families. Recovering from these disasters will require sustained 
investment and the ongoing support of this Committee.
                           where we are going
    Now that the foundation for readiness and lethality has been set, 
we continue to move forward with a sense of urgency, continually 
thinking of how to deliver the people, capabilities and processes 
needed by the Navy-Marine Corps Team. The Naval Services have developed 
plans informed by the National Defense Strategy, which mandates 
increased lethality, strengthened alliances and partnerships, and 
improved business processes. Now we are aligning those plans with the 
right leaders, tools, budget and technology advancements.
    This budget request invests in our people with the education and 
resources necessary to develop and retain the human capital we need to 
confront a changing world. We'll expand hiring for areas of critical 
need, such as cyber security specialists, aviation technicians, 
scientists and engineers, human resource specialists, and digital 
warfare officers. We'll add end strength to the Marine Corps Special 
Operations Command. We'll complete the rollout of Sailor 2025, updating 
policies, procedures and systems to improve retention and readiness.
    Education is a key component to developing the warfighter the Navy 
and Marine Corps Team needs. We will be effecting the blueprint 
developed by the recently released Education for Seapower Review, 
aligning and enhancing our educational institutions and distributed 
learning venues. And earlier this month, along with Secretary Esper and 
Secretary Wilson, I hosted University and College Presidents and other 
education leaders from across the country for a summit at the United 
States Naval Academy dedicated to eliminating the scourge of campus 
sexual assault and sexual harassment.
    We are constantly mindful that we recruit the individual, but we 
retain the family. And without the family, we are not operating at full 
capacity. As I stated before this Committee last month, upon reviewing 
the issues surrounding Public-Private Venture (PPV) military housing, 
it is clear that in some cases we have fallen woefully short of our 
obligations, and there is culpability around the table. We have 
identified the problems, and are focusing resources on the solutions. 
We will correct bad practices and return private military housing to a 
premium product. This budget supports these efforts, with a request of 
$21.975 million for the oversight of the Department's PPV housing 
worldwide.
    As we move from rebuilding readiness to owning the next fight, this 
budget prioritizes a balanced and strategy-driven approach, to provide 
for a bigger, better trained, and more ready force. It invests in our 
Force 2.0 capabilities in emerging areas such as applied artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, additive 
manufacturing, directed energy and more. We will continue to build the 
fleet in pursuit of the 355 ship Navy, manned and unmanned, to include 
the Columbia-class submarine, Next Generation Frigate, and remotely 
piloted platforms such as Sea Hunter and Orca, as well as one Ford-
class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class submarines and three 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
    Driven by the Marine Corps Force 2025 capability investment 
strategy, we will continue to modernize the Marine Corps with a 21st 
century Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) by focusing on six key 
priorities:
      C2 in a degraded environment;
      Long range and precision fires;
      Operations in the Information Environment (OIE);
      Air defense;
      Protected mobility and enhanced maneuver; and
      Logistics.
    This budget invests in Networking on the Move (NOTM) capabilities, 
close combat equipment, loitering munitions, unmanned logistic systems, 
ground-based anti-ship missiles, Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/
ATOR), the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the Amphibious Combat 
Vehicle to ensure the Marine Corps continues to adapt to meet the 
demands of the future operating environment and maintain our 
competitive advantage.
    We will operate with data-informed end to end processes and 
incorporate leading practices to inform how we fight. To achieve the 
goal of 80 percent mission capable aircraft in our Fleet Strike Fighter 
squadrons, this budget funds the Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) to the 
maximum executable levels, realigns investments to spares, aviation 
engineering and logistics support, while pursuing reforms such as the 
Navy Sustainment System, which incorporates best practices from 
commercial airline maintenance leaders. We will also incorporate the 
lessons of private industry as we invest in shipyard infrastructure and 
training to improve performance and throughput.
    These are just a few examples of how General Neller, Admiral 
Richardson, the entire Navy Marine Corps Team and I are building on the 
foundation of restored readiness and increasing lethality. We will 
continue to promote a culture of problem solving at every level, 
transform from a culture of risk removal to one of understanding and 
managing risk, and hold ourselves accountable for how and where we 
invest. Every day, we work with a sense of urgency driven by the 
knowledge that the American taxpayers provide us with their hard-earned 
treasure, and trust us to protect them from a dangerous world. We owe 
it to them to ensure that every dollar is invested in the most 
effective manner possible to fulfill our sacred oath. I'm proud to work 
with this Committee to ensure that we keep that promise. Thank you.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Spencer.
    Admiral Richardson.

 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking 
Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to appear here alongside Secretary 
Spencer and General Neller to discuss the Navy's fiscal year 
2020 budget.
    You know, President Thomas Jefferson wrote that, 
``Industry, commerce, and security are the surest roads to the 
happiness and prosperity of our people.'' And the causal link 
between prosperity, order, and security is why he deployed the 
United States Navy to combat piracy off the Barbary Coast at 
the dawn of the 19th century. And it's why, for over two 
centuries, we have helped keep the seas open for all and 
opposed those who seek to control the seas at the expense of 
America and our allies.
    Today, as outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 
nations like China and Russia are attempting to do just that, 
to stem the tide that has steadily lifted all boats by 
unilaterally redefining international norms on terms more 
favorable only to themselves. Chairman, you mentioned that in 
your opening statement. The Navy and the Nation are responding 
with more than 60,000 sailors deployed aboard nearly 100 ships 
and submarines at this very moment by sustainably operating 
around the globe, advocating for our principles, and protecting 
our national interests.
    To maintain this worldwide posture, the President's FY20 
budget offers a strategy-driven, future-leaning, balanced 
approach to deliver a naval force up to the task in this era of 
great-power competition. The single most effective way to 
maintain our strategic momentum is to provide adequate, stable, 
and predictable funding. This makes everything possible. It 
solidifies strategic planning, incentivizes our commercial 
partners, and mitigates operational risk by maximizing our 
planning and execution time.
    The foundation of naval power is our force of talented and 
well-trained sailors. Important to our success, we remain 
committed to recruiting and retaining diverse shipmates whose 
intelligence, curiosity, energy, different backgrounds, and 
varied viewpoints will catalyze the speed and quality of 
decisions we need to outperform our adversaries. As well, 
working with Congress, we continue to transform our pay and 
personnel system to 21st century standards.
    This budget also builds a bigger fleet, 54 battle-force 
ships over 5 years, preserving our industrial base, 
strengthening our ability to prevail in any warfighting 
contingency. The budget fully funds the Columbia-class 
ballistic missile submarine program, fulfilling our existential 
imperative to deter nuclear attack on our Homeland.
    The budget builds a better fleet, fielding state-of-the-art 
systems that are more agile, networked, resilient, and lethal. 
This budget recognizes that aircraft carriers will be central 
to winning the future fight, which is why it invests in the 
Gerald R. Ford-class, delivering far more combat power for less 
cost over their lifetime than their Nimitz-class predecessors.
    This budget also builds a ready fleet, steaming days to 
exercise at sea, flying hours to train in the air, sufficient 
quantities of ammunition and spares, and the resources to 
conduct maintenance, today and in the future, as the fleet size 
grows.
    Meeting the Nation's and the Navy's responsibility is not 
easy. It requires us all to work together. But, this is what 
great nations, and only great nations, can and must do. At the 
dawn of the Cold War, as this Nation took on the challenge to 
go to the Moon, President Kennedy, a naval officer, said, ``We 
do these things, not because they are easy, but because they 
are hard, because that challenge is one that we are willing to 
accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to 
win.''
    I am grateful to this Committee and to your colleagues in 
the Congress for continuing this important work. We look 
forward to sailing alongside you to build and deliver the 
safest navy for our sailors, the strongest partner navy for our 
friends and allies, and a navy that is the worst nightmare for 
our enemies.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Admiral John M. Richardson
    Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the 
Navy's fiscal year 2020 budget.
    To place this budget in its appropriate tactical, operational, and 
strategic context, we must understand what America stands for in the 
world so we don't forget it or, worse, take it for granted; the United 
States Navy's unique and historic connection to those core tenets; the 
challenges to those principles and our national interests by 
competitors like China and Russia--and our Navy's response; and the 
investments made in the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget to deliver, 
operate, sustain, and maintain a Navy that is bigger, better, and more 
ready to sail anywhere and do anything in defense of our country.
        we are a maritime nation--we rely on freedom of the seas
    Our first President, George Washington, best captured the value a 
Navy provides to the American people when he said: ``It follows then as 
certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval 
force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable 
and glorious.''
    Over 600,000 Active and Reserve sailors and Navy civilians--
alongside our partners in the Congress, academia, industry, and around 
the world--devote much of their lives to designing, producing, and 
operating a ``decisive'' naval force. Our decisive naval force operates 
around the world, defends our national interests, stands ready to fight 
if called upon, and de-escalates tensions on our terms. The President's 
Fiscal Year 2020 Budget delivers and sustains this decisive force and 
the investments contained therein will keep our Navy on a true course 
and making best speed to, as our oath declares, ``support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States and the country whose course it 
directs.''
    Our founding values, as well as our livelihoods and collective 
national security, are tied to the world's oceans. The seas are a prime 
facilitator of our prosperity as a people. But prosperity does not and 
cannot exist in a vacuum. It is the result of secure and orderly 
conditions that enable the flow of goods and services, access to 
markets via open oceans and critical waterways, and the ability to move 
unimpeded across the seas.
      
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    The seas present both challenges and opportunities--and the rapid 
changes in the maritime environment are stark and profound. More than 
90 percent of all international trade travels by sea--60 percent of 
that by value sails in containerized vessels. In recent years, 
approximately 735 million containers were shipped worldwide annually. 
If placed end-to-end, those containers would encircle the globe at the 
Equator more than 11 times. Beyond the numbers on trade, the global 
economy's reliance on the seas for resources--rare earth minerals for 
advanced technology, energy, or aquaculture--increase their economic 
and strategic importance. The seabed also plays host to 287 undersea 
fiber-optic cables through which 99 percent of global internet traffic 
passes, fueling the modern economy.
    Each of these developments serve to make the seas even more 
congested--and more vital.
      challenges to the united states and the international order
    Despite the United States' persistent work over two centuries to 
keep the seas open to every nation and every mariner, there are those 
who seek to upend this free and open order and stem the tide that has 
steadily lifted all boats. As discussed in the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy (NDS), China and Russia are deploying all elements of their 
national power to achieve their global ambitions. China and Russia seek 
to accumulate power at America's expense and may imperil the 
diplomatic, economic, and military bonds that link the United States to 
its allies and partners. And these actions are not only directed at the 
United States: China and Russia are working to redefine the norms of 
the entire international system on terms more favorable to themselves.
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    China and Russia are determined to replace the current free and 
open world order with an insular system. They are attempting to impose 
unilateral rules, re-draw territorial boundaries, and redefine 
exclusive economic zones so they can regulate who comes and who goes, 
who sails through and who sails around. These countries' actions are 
undermining international security. This behavior breeds distrust and 
harms our most vital national interests.
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    China's Belt and Road Initiative in particular is blending 
diplomatic, economic, military, and social elements of its national 
power in an attempt to create its own globally decisive naval force. 
China's modus operandi preys off nations' financial vulnerabilities. 
They contract to build commercial ports, promise to upgrade domestic 
facilities, and invest in national infrastructure projects. Slowly, as 
the belt tightens, these commercial ports transition to dual uses, 
doubling as military bases that dot strategic waterways. Then, the belt 
is cinched as China leverages debt to gain control and access. In the 
final analysis, these unfavorable deals strangle a nation's 
sovereignty--like an anaconda enwrapping its next meal. Scenes like 
this are expanding westward from China through Sri Lanka, Pakistan, 
Djibouti and now to our NATO treaty allies, Greece and Italy.
        the u.s. navy responding to challenges around the world
    The U.S. Navy is responding to this changing security dynamic by 
playing to our strengths: deploying all around the globe, regularly 
enforcing common principles, strengthening the conditions that have 
enabled mutual prosperity, and protecting our national interests. As 
you read these words, more than 60,000 sailors are deployed on board 
nearly 100 ships and
    submarines to enforce a free and open order that enables this 
unprecedented flow of goods and services.
    As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, the U.S. Navy will 
compete aggressively to shape our modern maritime environment, ensuring 
that order and security continue to underpin our prosperity. We do so 
by harnessing the myriad forces at play--the increasing use of the 
maritime domain; the rise of global information systems and the role of 
data-driven decision-making; and the increasing rate of technological 
creation and adoption. We remain committed to challenging excessive 
maritime claims, strengthening relationships with allies and partners, 
and upholding time-tested values.
      
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    How can we maintain this worldwide posture and compete given these 
strategic realities? How must we invest in order to build, sustain, 
organize, and strengthen ourselves so that we can continue harnessing 
the global maneuver power inherent in naval forces? The answers lie in 
the President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget (PB-20), a submission firmly 
rooted in addressing Great Power Competition and moving boldly and 
swiftly into the future.
    Importantly, the single most effective way to maintain the 
strategic momentum started in fiscal year 2017 is to enact the 
President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget prior to the start of the fiscal 
year. This funding will help us fulfill our responsibilities in the 
National Defense Strategy by building the Navy the Nation Needs: a 
balanced force that will increase America's naval power and safeguard 
our economic, diplomatic, and military interests around the world.
                   a bigger, better, more ready navy
    President's Budget 2020 seeks $160 billion for the U.S. Navy. For 
perspective, this request represents approximately three percent of the 
federal budget. According to the Congressional Budget Office, this 
investment represents approximately half of the amount currently 
expended on servicing the national debt and one-third of current 
expenditures on Medicaid.
    This budget request preserves our industrial base and establishes 
an aggressive, forward-looking, competitive posture. Our industrial 
partners are counting on us for consistent and continuous commitments. 
Absent this behavior, we may perpetuate, rather than end, the ``boom-
and-bust'' cycles we have experienced in the past. Coincident with this 
aim to steadily grow the force and preserve our industrial base is the 
responsibility to ``own'' the additional inventory when it arrives. 
President's Budget 2020 embraces future capabilities while judiciously 
stewarding our current force.
    The guiding principle of our budget request is to balance naval 
power across its many dimensions. Naval power is not a choice between 
increased capacity or better capability--it is a combination of both. 
Naval power is not a choice between readiness and modernization--it 
requires a balance of both. Naval power is not a choice between more 
complex stand-alone technologies or networked systems--it is achieved 
through both. The talent to operate and sustain a larger and more 
lethal force is not a choice between more people or better training--it 
must draw from both.
Bigger
    An ongoing force structure assessment will conclude by the end of 
2019. While data-driven analysis may ultimately change the details of 
our long-term fleet architecture, all force structure analyses agree in 
one respect: we must build a bigger Navy.
      
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    To increase America's naval power, we will build more platforms 
like ships, submarines, and aircraft, and expand our special operations 
forces. In 2018, Congress made a 355-ship Navy the law of the land, and 
this increased capacity will strengthen our ability to prevail in any 
warfighting contingencies, meet demand signals from combatant 
commanders, expand global influence, and support American prosperity by 
safeguarding access to critical markets, waterways, and chokepoints.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget requests nearly $24 billion in ship 
construction accounts to fund one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, 
three fast attack submarines, three large surface combatants, one small 
surface combatant, two combat logistics force ships, and two auxiliary 
support ships. Expanded across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), 
President's Budget 2020 funds construction of 55 battle force ships to 
achieve a 301-ship Navy in fiscal year 2020 and a 314-ship Navy in 
fiscal year 2024. Along with class-wide service life extensions, this 
puts us on pace to reach a 355-ship Navy in fiscal year 2034 
(approximately 20 years sooner than President's Budget 2019). The 
Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels (also referred 
to as the ``Thirty Year Shipbuilding Plan'') accompanies this budget 
request.
    There is no more existential imperative than deterring a nuclear 
attack on the Homeland. President's Budget 2020 fully funds the 
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program to do just that. 
Fully funding this request now will ensure that the lead ship's 
construction commences on time in fiscal year 2021, delivers in 2028, 
and conducts its first alert patrol in CY 2030. The Columbia-class will 
guarantee continuity of the most survivable leg of the strategic 
deterrent triad into the 2080s. This budget also procures 373 fixed and 
rotary wing aircraft (including 84 Block 3 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets), 
226 unmanned systems, and over 17,000 weapons and munitions across the 
FYDP.
    The recently approved block buy of two Gerald R. Ford-class 
aircraft carriers (CVNs 80 and 81) saves American taxpayers 
approximately $4 billion. It also maintains our trajectory towards the 
requirement of 12 more survivable and powerful aircraft carriers, and 
it gives our industrial partners much-needed predictability. It also 
represents an investment in future technologies that solidifies the 
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier as a centerpiece of national defense 
through the rest of the century.
    Finally, President's Budget 2020 funds an additional 5,100 sailors 
in fiscal year 2020 (and 18,600 over the FYDP) on top of fiscal year 
2019 end strength levels to recruit, man, maintain, operate, and fight 
these added ships, submarines, and aircraft. Filling gapped billets at 
sea remains our top manning priority, and we are committed to operating 
safely, effectively, and sustainably over time as the battle force 
grows.
Better
    To increase America's naval power, we will build a better fleet--
one that is more capable, agile, networked, and resilient across all of 
our naval platforms. This means fielding state-of-the-art systems and 
continually modernizing legacy equipment. In addition to other 
modernization efforts, the fiscal year 2020 budget includes $18 billion 
for research and development--an increase of $1.4 billion over fiscal 
year 2019 enacted levels.
    For example, President's Budget 2020 includes $4 billion across the 
FYDP to modernize 19 guided missile destroyers. This includes critical 
upgrades to AEGIS Baseline 9, enabling them to simultaneously perform 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) operations. As well, improvements to Naval Integrated Fire 
Control Counter Air (NIFC-CA) will allow networked ships to share 
identification, targeting, and fire control data. President's Budget 
2020 funds 160 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Service Life Modifications (SLM) 
across the FYDP, equipping these aircraft with more lethality at 
greater ranges, improved signatures, and advanced networks.
    The budget also increases investments in long-range offensive ship-
, sub-, and air-launched weapon systems, including: Tomahawk Land 
Attack and Maritime Strike missile, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile 
(LRASM), Standard Missile (SM) 6, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended Range 
(JSOW-ER), Harpoon Block II+, as well as investments in Conventional 
Prompt Strike hypersonics. The budget augments investments for acoustic 
superiority modernization by requesting $93 million in fiscal year 2020 
($633 million across the FYDP) to improve submarine quieting and sensor 
performance. To deliver capability faster, we are also leveraging 
accelerated acquisition and rapid prototyping by investing $1.3 billion 
in fiscal year 2020 ($4 billion across the FYDP) for the Navy Laser 
family of systems, SM-2/6 weapons, MQ-25 Stingray carrier-based 
unmanned aerial system, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles.
      
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    The fiscal year 2020 budget builds on the progress made in fiscal 
year 2019 by pursuing near-term Naval Tactical Grid development and 
investing $50 million in fiscal year 2020 ($236 million across the 
FYDP) for the newly-established Digital Warfare Office to design and 
implement a comprehensive operational architecture to support emerging 
Distributed Maritime Operations concepts. The Navy will also invest 
$440 million in fiscal year 2020 (and more than $2 billion across the 
FYDP) to fund Fleet and industrial base cyber security, and hardening 
of ship hull, mechanical, and electrical systems among others.
    As these investments indicate, the Navy is focused on controlling 
the high-end fight. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are, and will 
continue to be, central to this effort. Ford was designed to deliver 
more capability for today's airwing and to provide growth opportunity 
for tomorrow's airwing--more lethal systems, and increased power 
generation. Ford is also proving more cost effective with a 30 percent 
higher sortie rate with a 20 percent smaller crew than her Nimitz-class 
predecessors. This translates into $4 billion savings over the life of 
the Ford-class when compared to Nimitz-class: in other words, more 
naval power for less cost.
    Ford is innovation on a grand scale, offering a host of new 
technologies that will greatly improve the combat power of strike 
groups. As with naval innovations of the past, we didn't get everything 
right on the first try. We have learned with each test and most of the 
new systems are now operating. And we will continue to learn, iterate, 
and improve: the second Ford-class ship is being built with 18 percent 
fewer man hours. Despite this aggressive approach to adopt new 
technologies, Ford was delivered with less lead-ship cost growth than 
several other ship classes. Ford and her successors will set a new 
standard for afloat performance and combat power projection well into 
the second half of the century.
    We are also making tough calls about the capabilities we need to 
tackle future challenges. President's Budget 2020 removes funding for 
USS Harry S. Truman's (CVN 75) Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH)--
$3.4 billion over the FYDP. We are applying the funds from the RCOH 
decision to field cost-imposing advanced technologies faster. In 
parallel, we continue to validate this decision through a rigorous 
program of studies, wargames and experimentation to analytically 
validate the best way forward. We remain postured to respond to what 
our studies show us and to adjust pace in-stride, including reversing 
the CVN 75 decision, if needed.
Ready
    To increase America's naval power, we will build a ready fleet. 
This means steaming days to exercise at sea, flying hours to train in 
the air, sufficient quantities of ammunition and spares, and the 
resources to conduct emergent and planned maintenance--not only for 
today but also for the future as the fleet grows in size. And it's not 
just about buying more parts: President's Budget 2020 includes $23 
million in fiscal year 2020 ($66 million across the FYDP) to research 
and develop additive manufacturing (AM) capabilities. Among other AM 
goals--such as expanding this capability at sea to additional ships and 
beginning to network AM across the enterprise--we intend to produce 
1,000 unique end-use components for fleet installation and operation by 
the end of 2019. Readiness--both materiel and training proficiency--
transforms our Navy's potential power into actual power. The knowledge 
and efficiency gained from the Department of Defense-wide audit will 
ensure that we do so as effectively as possible.
    The fiscal year 2020 budget continues the readiness and wholeness 
commitments we made in fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2018, and fiscal 
year 2019 by funding ship and aviation readiness and enabler accounts. 
The fiscal year 2020 budget increases maritime and aviation spares 
funding compared to fiscal year 2019. Additionally, the fiscal year 
2020 budget stabilizes and incentivizes the industrial base by funding 
62 ship availabilities in public and private shipyards, shifting two 
attack submarine availabilities to private yards, and infusing $546 
million in fiscal year 2020 for naval shipyard infrastructure 
optimization. Finally, the budget includes capital investments of 12 
percent in public shipyard depot facilities and 10 percent in Fleet 
Readiness Centers, exceeding the six percent legislative requirement 
and underscoring our commitment to increase our capacity to maintain 
and modernize our fleet.
      
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    These investments will help on-time maintenance execution--aircraft 
and ship availabilities--which in turn gives our sailors the time they 
need at sea to build proficiency and confidence; not simply to operate 
safely but to prevail at the high-end of maritime conflict.
    Recognizing the inherent link between readiness and lethality, we 
continue to modernize our logistics capabilities to better refuel, 
rearm, resupply, revive, and repair operational forces. At sea, we are 
prioritizing the recapitalization of auxiliaries and sealift 
capabilities to sustain the Fleet's enduring global posture and support 
mobility of the Joint Force. President's Budget 2020 includes an 
initial $8 million research and development investment in the Common 
Hull Auxiliary Multi-mission Platform (CHAMP) for concept design. 
Ashore, we recognize that readiness is an enabler for force projection; 
in addition to investing in our shipyards, President's Budget 2020 
increases investment in facilities sustainment, restoration, and 
modernization (FSRM) to $3.1 billion (from 80 to 87 percent of the 
sustainment requirement).
    Of course, ships, aircraft, and weapons are not, by themselves, 
sufficient to respond to today's complex challenges. The readiness of 
these platforms and systems depends on talented and well-trained 
sailors, led by commanders of competence and character. Our sailors are 
the glue that binds our Navy team together. This is our Polaris. It is 
also why we established the College of Leadership and Ethics at the 
U.S. Naval War College in April 2018. Just as we have done throughout 
our history, we will continue to develop and empower leaders who are 
driven to build winning teams.
      
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    The fiscal year 2020 budget continues our generational 
transformation of the Navy's manpower and personnel systems. We are 
investing $235 million in a modern cloud-based personnel and pay 
system, while creating an expanded assignment marketplace and 
increasing career flexibility. For example, we are exercising the 
authorities granted to us in the reform of the Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) to make better use of investments in 
training and increase career opportunities and flexibility for our 
officer corps. These initiatives leverage state-of-the art practices to 
put more control into the hands of our sailors. This includes more 
transparency regarding their career options. The sailor 2025 suite of 
programs will make today's burdensome and time-consuming process for 
executing orders--from updating pay and benefits to finding new housing 
and moving household goods--as easy as scanning a Quick Response (QR) 
code on a smartphone. Not only will this make the frequent relocations 
associated with military service easier for sailors and their families, 
it will minimize distractions so they can focus on warfighting.
    And we continue to tackle the recommendations listed in the 
Comprehensive Review (CR) and Strategic Readiness Review (SRR). 
President's Budget 2020 assigns the highest funding priority to CR/SRR-
related investments--$346 million in fiscal year 2020 and $1.1 billion 
over the FYDP--including construction of new Mariner Skills Training 
Program centers and simulators and programmatic commitments for the 
Next Generation Surface Search Radar. Additionally, we remain committed 
to assessing our ships and crews, understanding the impact of fatigue 
and other human factors, filling personnel gaps for ships on deployment 
or in sustainment, and dedicating time to maintain our forward-deployed 
Fleet. As of February 2019, 20 of the 111 recommendations remain to be 
adjudicated. While we are on track to begin implementation of these 
remaining items by the end of the fiscal year, we will continue to 
analyze the effectiveness of our new programs and iteratively improve 
them over the FYDP.
      
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    Finally, we remain committed to recruiting and retaining diverse 
shipmates. In a time when evolving artificial intelligence and machine 
learning are factoring into future military capabilities, our sailors 
must bring creativity, innovation, and context to tactical and 
strategic decisions. This potent combination will make us more 
competitive and operationally effective. And it is the diversity of 
their backgrounds and viewpoints that will catalyze the speed and 
quality of decisions we need to outperform our adversaries.
                   continuing our budgetary momentum
    These realities highlight the importance of partnerships and a 
recognition that together we can do so much more. This past year's on-
time budget put our Navy on a steady course making best speed. Prior to 
last year, when the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) was enacted on August 13, a defense authorization bill had not 
been enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year since fiscal year 
1997; the last time a defense appropriation was enacted by October 1 
was fiscal year 2009. This meant nine years of continuing resolutions 
that averaged one-third of the fiscal year. This uncertain financial 
footing resulted in fluctuating toplines and interruptions to 
government operations and services.
    The Navy looks forward to working with the 116th Congress to 
continue the momentum developed in fiscal year 2019. Stable and 
predictable funding solidifies strategic planning, incentivizes our 
commercial partners, strengthens our industrial base, safeguards our 
sailors, and bolsters the interests of your constituents. And most 
importantly, stable and predictable funding mitigates operational risk 
by maximizing our planning and execution time.
    With timely, stable, and predictable investments, the U.S. Navy 
will be bigger, better, and more ready to work every day--in every 
ocean--to set the conditions that allow Americans and all the citizens 
of the world to flourish and prosper.
         the navy's connection to american principles and power
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    The Navy has always maintained a strong connection to the 
flourishing and prosperity of the American people. President 
Washington's phrase--``everything honorable and glorious''--hearkens to 
American values that are derived from the inalienable rights outlined 
in the Declaration of Independence: ``That among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.''
    This last value has commonly been understood as the right to 
materially improve our circumstances. The Navy also maintains a deep 
and historic connection to America's economic strength, the engine that 
makes our country a global power. The Navy was founded to protect vital 
sea lanes like Gibraltar and combat piracy off the North African 
coast--a mission to safeguard free movement of trade and free access to 
markets that continues in earnest today.
    ``Honorable and glorious'' also characterizes the mission of the 
United States Navy and the selfless service of more than 600,000 
sailors and civilians, and their families. The U.S. Navy is a 
definitive military force in world events but the Navy also connects 
with every other element of our national power. The Navy is the face of 
the Nation and often the first point of contact between the United 
States and other peoples. U.S. Navy ships have shuttled American 
diplomats across all seven seas: think of the paddle-wheeled steam 
frigate USS Mississippi transporting Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan 
in the early 1850s; the Great White Fleet circumnavigating the globe at 
the turn of the Twentieth Century; and the USS Quincy (CA 71) carrying 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Malta in 1945. And our ships have 
hosted international events of the highest consequence that have shaped 
the global security environment, such as the Japanese surrender aboard 
the USS Missouri (BB 63), anchored in Tokyo Bay, which formally ended 
the Second World War. The Navy brings sovereign United States territory 
to the shores of other nations, fostering connections to extend 
American assistance to those who would be our friends and demonstrating 
resolve to those who may oppose us.
    And ingrained in every mariner is the notion that we will never 
sail past another mariner in distress. We will continue to provide 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to our fellow citizens and 
neighbors wherever and whenever they are in need.
                               conclusion
    This hearing comes at a critical time to both our Navy and our 
Nation. The challenges we face are varied and are growing more dynamic 
by the day. Let there be no doubt: America is a maritime nation and a 
maritime power. Our way of life and our economic prosperity have always 
been linked to the sea. For 243 years--through war and peace, 
uncertainty and stability, turmoil and prosperity--the United States 
Navy has validated founding father Thomas Paine's maxim that ``a Navy 
when finished is worth more than it cost.''
    In the competitive environment we face now and in the future, we 
must increase naval power in a balanced approach to meet our national 
strategic goals. The President's Fiscal Year 2020 Budget ensures that 
the Navy and the Nation can continue to do everything honorable and 
glorious, as Washington intended.
    I am grateful to this Committee and to your colleagues in the 
Congress for starting this important work, and we look forward to 
sailing alongside you to build and deliver the Navy the Nation Needs.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Admiral Richardson.
    General Neller.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT B. NELLER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE 
                          MARINE CORPS

    General Neller. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished Members of the Committee, I'm here today to 
testify on the posture of your Marine Corps, and I appreciate 
the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    I know this Committee, the Congress, and the American 
people have high expectations for our marines. As our Nation's 
expeditionary force in readiness, you expect your marines to be 
ready to operate forward with our Navy in the contact and blunt 
layers of a global operating model, to assure our partners, 
deter our rivals, and respond to crisis across the range of 
military operations. And, if deterrence should fail and we are 
called to fight, you expect us to fight and win.
    As we hold this hearing, approximately 41,000 marines are 
forward-deployed or postured in more than 60 countries around 
the world, some in harm's way, as we found out all too well 
yesterday, all engaged, doing exactly what you expect of them, 
throughout our history, if you have called upon your marines to 
respond immediately to crisis around the globe, either from the 
sea, from forward bases, or from home station. To meet your 
intent to be ready to suppress or contain international 
disturbances, short of large-scale war, we strive to prevent 
war by assuring our allies and deterring rivals with ready, 
capable, and persistently present naval expeditionary forces. 
Forward-postured naval forces remain critical to that end, 
providing the Nation a significant operational advantage 
through maneuver access and our presence.
    Now, supporting day-to-day operations through theater 
security cooperation, building partner capacity, humanitarian 
assistance, and disaster relief, or supporting current global 
contingencies requires your expeditionary force in readiness to 
be present. We recognize the strategic environment is 
constantly changing, requiring adaptations to our organization, 
training, equipment, and warfighting concepts in order to 
provide our Nation the lethal naval expeditionary force it 
demands. Your Marine Corps is committed to building the most 
ready, capable, and adaptable force the Nation can afford. This 
requires hard choices as we balance commitments to our current 
operations, work to rebuild our readiness, and pursue 
modernization efforts designed to increase our competitive 
advantage over our adversaries. Thanks to your efforts in 
Congress to provide increased and on-time funding, you have 
made some of our choices far less difficult.
    Still, we remain challenged by the lasting effects of 
Hurricanes Florence and Michael, both mentioned by Ranking 
Member Reed and the Secretary, that hit the East Coast last 
fall. The financial cost of these two storms totals around $3.7 
billion, but their impacts go deeper. And I look forward to 
answering any questions on this issue that you may have.
    I do want to thank the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Congress, and the administration for their work and support 
in approving $400 million of reprogrammed resources so we can 
immediately begin addressing some of the most pressing needs at 
Camp Lejeune. The Marine Corps continues to work to address the 
remaining shortfall within this fiscal year.
    Despite these challenges, the Marine Corps remains on the 
right path as we implement the National Defense Strategy. We 
continue to develop effective warfighting concepts through 
experimentation and invest in the right capabilities while 
experimenting ruthlessly to validate our choices in order to 
prepare for the future.
    Most importantly to the success of your Corps, we continue 
to recruit and train the most qualified men and women our 
Nation has to offer, men and women who raise their right hand, 
yearn to earn the eagle, globe, and anchor, and serve something 
greater than themselves, and represent the best our Nation has 
to offer around the world.
    The Navy/Marine Corps team remains our Nation's naval 
expeditionary force in readiness, forward-deployed, forward-
postured, competing every day. And with the Congress's 
continued support and commitment, we will ensure that we must 
send our sons and daughters--if we must send our sons and 
daughters into harm's way, they will have every advantage our 
Nation can provide.
    Lastly, as mentioned by Ranking Member Reed, this was 
likely to be my last appearance in front of this Committee as I 
close out 44 years as a marine, the last 4 as the Commandant. 
And I want to personally thank this Committee for your support 
that you show every day to your marines.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Neller follows:]

             Prepared Statement by General Robert B. Neller
               marines--ready, expeditionary, and lethal
    The purpose of your Marine Corps remains unchanged since mandated 
by the 82nd Congress--to be ready. Not just ready to go--but ready to 
go now, ready to respond and compete wherever sent, and if necessary--
ready to fight and win. This idea of a ``force-in-readiness,'' 
reaffirmed by the 114th Congress, requires a Marine Corps that is 
``most ready, when the Nation is least ready.'' As a naval service, 
marines are soldiers of the sea ready to secure or protect national 
policy objectives by military force when peaceful means alone cannot. 
And if we must engage in the violence of battle to secure our 
interests, we stand ready for the violent struggle, and prepared to 
impose our will on our enemies. It is this idea of total readiness--a 
constant preparedness, expeditionary mindset, and aggressive 
warfighting philosophy--that remains the driving force behind your 
marines today. Yet we recognize the strategic environment is changing, 
requiring adaptations to our organization, training, equipment, and 
warfighting concepts in order to rebuild our competitive advantage and 
provide our Nation the lethal, expeditionary naval force it demands.
    The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready, lethal 
force the Nation can afford. Unfortunately, the testimony that follows 
is presently a conditional statement as the Marine Corps confronts the 
impacts of recent Hurricanes Florence and Michael in the fall of last 
year. Hurricane Florence was the wettest tropical storm ever recorded 
in the Carolinas, dropping 39 inches of water in less than one week. 
Just a few short weeks later we felt the impacts of Hurricane Michael, 
the strongest storm in terms of maximum sustained wind speed to hit the 
United States since Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The impact of these two 
disasters in terms of cost to the Marine Corps is estimated to be $3.7 
billion, but their impacts go much deeper and the gravity of these 
unforeseen disasters may not be fully known to this Committee:
      3,000 military personnel displaced including 1,000 family 
members living on base.
      North Carolina installations are home to II Marine 
Expeditionary Force which comprises 1/3 of the combat power of the 
Marine Corps.
      North Carolina installations are also home to Marine 
Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Fleet Readiness 
Center-East, and the Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training.
      800 buildings across Marine Corps Base (MCB) Lejeune, 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, and MCAS Cherry Point were 
damaged or compromised.
      100 structures were damaged at Marine Corps Logistics 
Base Albany.
      Almost 4,000 of the 6,200 homes across these 
installations sustained damage.
    Your Marine Corps is feeling the immediate impacts of these storms 
through lost and delayed training time; delayed deployments and 
redeployments; and daily quality of life challenges. Many of our ranges 
and training areas remain degraded. Damaged infrastructure to include 
roads, railroad trestles, and beaches have degraded our strategic 
capacity to deploy. All of these present an unacceptable challenge to 
the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness who must remain ready at 
a moment's notice. From a force posture ``risk to force'' and ``risk to 
mission'' perspective, we assess our current risk to both as 
``moderate.'' Effective 1 June of this year however, we assess our risk 
to both moving to ``high'' as we enter the next hurricane season.
    Thanks to the hard work and support of the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, Congress, and the Administration, the Marine Corps recently 
received $400 million of reprogrammed resources to immediately begin 
addressing our most pressing infrastructure needs. We continue to work 
tirelessly to address our remaining $449 million shortfall within 
fiscal year 2019, and $2.8 billion required over fiscal year 2020, 
fiscal year 2021, and future plans to fully recover. We continue to 
make the decisions necessary in the short term to return our personnel, 
repair our facilities, and restore our readiness. Funding the remainder 
of this requirement internally, however, may jeopardize the readiness 
gains made over that last few years through the efforts of Congress and 
your Marine Corps. We must continue the hard work described in the 
remainder of this testimony to rebuild our readiness and modernize our 
Corps to maintain our competitive advantage against rising competitors.
Expeditionary
    Throughout our history, marines have been called upon to respond 
immediately to crises around the globe either from the sea, forward 
bases, or home station. To meet Congress' mandate to be `` . . . ready 
to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale 
war,'' we strive to prevent war by assuring our allies and deterring 
rivals with ready, capable, and persistently present expeditionary 
forces. Forward postured naval forces remain critical to that end, 
providing the Nation a significant operational advantage through 
maneuver and access. Supporting steady state operations through theater 
security cooperation (TSC); building partner capacity; supporting 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR); and noncombatant 
evacuation operations (NEO); or supporting current global 
contingencies, requires your expeditionary force-in-readiness to be 
present.
    The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) clearly requires forward-
deployed naval expeditionary forces that can compete, deter, and 
provide ``inside'' forces capable of denying adversary freedom of 
maneuver as part of our integrated naval defense-in-depth. 
``Expeditionary,'' however, is more than a simple definition contained 
within joint publications. Marines view the term expeditionary as a 
pervasive mindset that is fundamental to our character, and an idea 
that shapes all aspects of our organization, training, education, 
equipment, and employment. Marines must be able to deploy rapidly, 
leverage the sea as maneuver space, enter the objective area, 
accomplish a broad range of operations, sustain itself, withdraw 
quickly, and rapidly reconstitute while forward deployed to execute 
follow-on missions. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)--by design 
a tailorable, self-sustaining, and scalable expeditionary unit--
provides our Nation a combined arms force capable of exploiting 
advantages over an adversary. Equally important, the MAGTF provides a 
forward deployed dynamic force available now. Marines approach this 
expeditionary mindset holistically--from our training, capability 
development, employment in austere conditions, and Service culture. 
Although our warfighting concepts must be continually revised and our 
capabilities modernized to sustain our ability to respond when called, 
it is our expeditionary nature, forward presence as a naval force, and 
preparedness for the violence of combat that define our unique role in 
the Nation's defense.
Competition, Lethality, and Deterrence
    The strategic environment is complex, informationally and 
technologically charged, volatile, and dangerous. The proliferation of 
modern conventional weapons and social media capabilities to a broader 
range of state and non-state actors, along with the erosion of our 
competitive technological advantage in areas where we have long enjoyed 
relative superiority, is likely to continue as peer competitors attempt 
to contest our influence globally. Competition below the traditional 
level of armed conflict and global campaigns such as China's One Belt 
One Road initiative, create a wide range of strategic and operational 
challenges that underscore the need for a globally responsive naval 
force capable of providing an asymmetric maritime advantage.
    Threats posed by revisionist powers and rogue states require a 
change to how your Marine Corps is organized, trained, equipped, 
employed, and integrated with the Navy. We must become a more lethal, 
resilient, and capable competitor and deterrent. The Navy-Marine Corps 
team no longer relies on concepts and capabilities premised on 
uncontested sea control. We must establish a forward deployed defense-
in-depth, anchored on naval ``inside'' forces, capable of Expeditionary 
Advance Base Operations (EABO) in support of the naval campaign. Modern 
sensors and precision weapons with expanding ranges and lethality are 
redefining how we assess our posture and relative combat power. 
Advanced adversary defensive networks are forcing us to reconsider 
methods of assured access required to compete against rising peers 
within a contested maritime space. As naval ``inside'' forces, the 
Navy-Marine Corps team must develop complementary capabilities to 
compete, deter, and win in all domains and facilitate the maneuver and 
projection of Joint Force capabilities. Our warfighting contributions 
must help shape the strategic environment to prevent conflict--one of 
the original mandates of the 82nd Congress for a ``force-in-
readiness.''
    The Marine Corps assures allies and partners and competes globally 
every day within the Contact and Blunt Layers articulated in the NDS, 
in support of respective Fleet Commanders and Geographic Combatant 
Commands (GCC). Your Marine Corps maintains approximately one third of 
its operating forces, or roughly 39,500 Active and Reserve component 
marines, forward deployed and forward stationed. Amphibious Readiness 
Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs), Special Purpose Marine 
Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTFs), MARSOC, Marine Expeditionary Force 
Information Groups (MIGs), Task Force South West, and allocated forces 
are forward-deployed and forward-stationed to contest the malign 
behavior of our foes, improve interoperability with our allies and 
partners, and prepare to delay, degrade, and deny adversary aggression 
should deterrence fail and competition turn to armed conflict. And if 
our adversaries mistakenly choose to test our will, we must be capable 
of providing a combat credible force ready to absorb the initial blow; 
hold the line; contest their advance; facilitate sea control/denial; 
win the information operations fight; attrit adversary naval, land, and 
air forces; and fight until our allies, partners, and the Joint Force 
reinforces.
    At home, your Corps is preparing to contribute to the war-winning 
Joint Force should deterrence fail. We are preparing to respond to 
global contingencies against peer rivals in contested environments; to 
rapidly aggregate forces from across the globe to deliver capable mass 
to the fight; and prepared and ready to wage violence in all domains--
from degrading and penetrating anti-access area denial (A2/AD) 
networks--to assuring access and projecting power with command and 
control (C2), fires, maneuver, and logistics. Every Marine throughout 
the MAGTF is constantly preparing through training and exercises that 
approximate the conditions of war as much as possible, and conducting 
training that introduces friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, 
disorder, and opposing wills. At the institutional level, we are 
testing our concepts and developing new tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. At the unit level, we are focusing on our foundational core 
competencies, individual discipline, and continuing actions in order to 
develop the mindset and skills necessary to prevail in any future 
fight. Only through hard, demanding, and realistic preparation can we 
achieve total readiness.
    We must increase the lethality of our integrated naval forces in 
order to deter our adversaries; and if deterrence fails, to win. 
Deterrence requires a combat credible force that possesses lethal 
capabilities, at sufficient capacities, paired with innovative 
operational concepts in order to alter the decision making choices of 
our adversaries. Lethality spans the Corps from the tactical to the 
operational levels of war, and from small unit formations to scalable 
MAGTFs. Ground formations must still locate, close with, and destroy 
the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel the enemy's assault by fire 
and close combat. The Marine Corps is committed to providing every 
lethal advantage available to our tactical warfighting formations to 
ensure overmatch against peer threats and improve the lethality of our 
close combat squads. No Marine should ever enter into a fair fight.
    At the MAGTF level, lethality provides the means by which we alter 
the decision making choices of our adversaries. A lethal, integrated 
naval force that can deny adversary freedom of maneuver is paramount to 
this idea. That said, sea control is more challenging now than in past 
decades. Long-range detection and targeting methods possessed by 
adversaries, combined with extended ranges of their land-based anti-
ship missiles, is increasing the interaction between land and naval 
forces in the littorals, requiring the Marine Corps to further develop 
and integrate force capabilities in support of the Navy--``Green in 
support of Blue.'' While power projection and forward presence remain 
foundational to our naval force, we are developing new concepts and 
capabilities for assured access, sea control, and sea denial that 
include long-range precision strike, raids, Distributed Maritime 
Operations (DMO), Operations in the Information Environment (OIE), and 
EABO. The product of those efforts, through speed, lethality, and an 
asymmetric competitive advantage, is deterrence. Ships and aircraft 
acting within a networked fleet must contribute to the lethality of the 
fleet with the ability to protect themselves from air, surface, and 
sub-surface attack, while possessing organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-
shore strike weapons required by future naval campaigns. Current 
amphibious ships lack these capabilities, and therefore, must rely on 
support from other combatants to perform sea control and assured access 
missions.
    To increase the lethality and deterrent effect of our existing 
amphibious fleet, the naval force must upgrade C2 suites; introduce 
organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore precision strike weapons; 
integrate organic air defense; decrease ship signatures; and launch/
recover the MAGTF's growing fleet of unmanned aerial systems--together, 
a more cost-effective approach than seeking a replacement of existing 
platforms. An amphibious fleet so equipped is a force multiplier to the 
larger naval force. The Marine Corps, in support of the Navy, must 
shift from a focus on a near symmetric land-based enemy to an 
asymmetric view in which Marine forces, operating from expeditionary 
advanced bases, threaten enemy naval, land, air, and unmanned forces. 
Marines must be prepared to task organize in support of fleet 
operations in highly contested maritime environments; employing mobile, 
low-signature, operationally relevant, and survivable expeditionary 
forces to mitigate challenges created by adversary advantages in 
geographic location, weapons system range, and precision. These are the 
capabilities and concepts possessed by an integrated naval force that 
offer our adversaries a choice--a choice to de-escalate to a state of 
manageable competition, or a choice to escalate and face a lethal naval 
force at a time and place of our choosing.
Concepts and Experimentation
    Marines continue to innovate to build the 21st century MAGTF--a 
lethal, adaptive, and resilient Corps that executes combined arms as a 
means to conduct maneuver warfare across all domains. This 
transformation began in 2016 with the implementation of the Marine 
Corps Operating Concept (MOC). The MOC represents our institutional 
vision for how the Marine Corps will operate, fight, and win despite 
the challenges of the strategic environment, and like the larger 
institution, will continue to be revised as the character of naval 
warfare changes. The MOC provides the foundation and context for 
subordinate operating and functional concepts--like Littoral Operations 
in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and EABO--and it guides our analysis, 
wargaming, and experimentation. These concepts, and our associated 
thinking on warfighting, are naval concepts which complement broader 
visions and conclusions articulated in the Navy's DMO concept.
    Whereas the MOC, DMO, and EABO provide the concepts for how marines 
will fight and prevail, it is through extensive experimentation and 
wargaming that we validate our force development choices, and inform 
our resourcing and programming strategies. Our experimentation and 
wargaming efforts focus on designing a lethal, agile, and resilient 
MAGTF optimized for the future that incorporates marines capable of 
integrating cyber, OIE, artificial intelligence, and long range 
precision fires capabilities in support of the Navy. As a driver of 
innovation, our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab completed the first phase 
of our long-range experimentation plan called Sea Dragon, and over the 
next five years will focus on MAGTF hybrid logistics, OIE, EABO, DMO, 
maritime fires, and maritime C2. Through these efforts, the Marine 
Corps continues to adapt and refine our capability development, force 
structure, and resourcing decisions that modernize the force.
                            our 2020 budget
    ``Competing with a Peer Threat'' is the theme of our President's 
Budget 2020 submission, and directly aligns with the Secretary of 
Defense's guidance to increase lethality, improve warfighting 
readiness, and achieve program balance. This year's budget of $45.9 
billion builds on the momentum gained over the previous year and seeks 
to further adapt and modernize our Corps by focusing on three key 
budget priorities--modernization, readiness, and manpower. Through 
programmatic reforms, divestiture of legacy systems, and key 
investments in manned / unmanned teaming and autonomous systems, we are 
transforming today's Marine Corps into the future force required by our 
Nation and building the most ready force our Nation can afford. To 
accomplish this goal, we require adequate, sustained, and predictable 
funding to properly plan for and resource a ready, capable, lethal 
force.
    The Marine Corps remains committed to fiscal transparency and 
responsible stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars. The results of Full 
Financial Statement Audits for fiscal years 2017 and 2018 generated 
efficiencies through improvements to financial processes, systems, 
internal controls, and accountability of equipment. The Marine Corps 
continues to remediate audit findings and remains focused on achieving 
a modified opinion by fiscal year 2020. Continued emphasis on executing 
corrective action plans, improving information systems, and better 
managing funds provided to us by the taxpayer demonstrates our 
commitment to achieve and sustain favorable audit opinions.
    Marine Corps business reforms identified more than $389 million in 
savings and cost avoidance in fiscal year 2020 to reinvest in 
modernization and warfighting readiness. When combined with reform 
efforts in fiscal year 2019, the cumulative reforms and divestitures 
over the past two years total $956 million. Examples of vetted and 
approved reform initiatives include:
      Multi-Year Procurement for Aircraft
      H-1 (Aviation) Program Procurement Savings
      Infrastructure Reset
      Enterprise Lifecycle Maintenance Program
      Legacy Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive 
Device (CREW) System Divestment
      DoN Under-Execution Review
    Marine Corps business reforms enable us to make strategic choices 
in the divestiture of certain programs to reinvest our limited 
resources toward building a more modern, lethal, expeditionary force. 
We are focused on continuing business reforms in fiscal year 2020 that 
foster effective resource management, support audit readiness, and 
streamline the requirements and acquisition process.
Modernization
    Modernization remains critical to meeting the demands of a 
strategic environment marked by revisionist and revanchist powers, 
long-term strategic competition, and rogue regimes that have immediate 
access to advanced, lethal, and disruptive technologies. As part of a 
naval expeditionary force, what we desire to achieve is a Corps capable 
of denying freedom of maneuver to deter our adversaries, or when 
necessary, capable of exploiting, penetrating, and degrading advanced 
adversary defenses in all domains in support of Naval and Joint Force 
operations. Deterrence is no longer measured solely by the threat of 
violence. We require a force capable of operating and winning in the 
information environment before the physical fight ever begins. Should 
deterrence fail, we require a future force that can deny adversary 
freedom of action, impose costs, control key maritime terrain, shape 
the operational environment in support of integrated sea control and 
maritime power projection operations, and impose our will in all 
domains while under attack.
    In order to achieve the modern, lethal force required, we must 
experiment with new technologies available on the market, determining 
what will work best in the future operating environment, and then 
deliver those capabilities to the force quickly to mitigate the rapid 
rate of technological change. The Marine Corps Rapid Capabilities 
Office (MCRCO) makes this possible, seeking emergent and disruptive 
technologies to increase our lethality and resiliency. The MCRCO 
leverages fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 NDAA provisions and 
partnerships to accelerate the requirements development and definition 
process--with the consistent and steadfast support of Congress--we will 
continue to fund this office. We also embrace the idea of alternative 
acquisition pathways. We are using and seeing value in other 
transactions authority and intend to apply middle tier rapid fielding 
authority at the first appropriate opportunity as a solution to 
expedite modernization, where production is achievable within five 
years or less. Accelerated modernization is an essential part of the 
remedy to our long-term readiness problems and we must not allow 
ourselves to bury modernization efforts under cumbersome acquisition 
processes.
    Modernization investments represent roughly 30 percent, or $13.9 
billion of the total President's Budget 2020 budget submission, and are 
synchronized with Marine Corps Force 2025 (MCF 2025), the capability 
investment strategy which modernizes the force toward implementing MCF 
2025, MOC, EABO, and the NDS. The following capability areas support 
building a 21st century MAGTF across the Active and Reserve components 
of the force, and are prioritized in the following manner:
     Command and Control (C2) in a Degraded Environment: The 
Marine Corps requires a sustainable, defendable, and resilient C2 
network, integrated with Navy and Joint Force networks, which allows 
for timely and persistent information exchange while enhancing 
battlefield awareness to dispersed tactical units across the MAGTF. 
Investments in Networking-on-the-Move (NOTM), Fused Integrated Naval 
Network (FINN), Terrestrial Wideband Transmission System (TWTS), MAGTF 
Integrated Command and Control (MIC2), and MAGTF Digital 
Interoperability upgrades provide significantly increased capabilities 
associated with maneuver and fires across the battlespace. 
Additionally, in a contested information environment, artificial 
boundaries between a ``tactical'' network and a ``garrison'' network 
erode; the marines at the tactical edge will need seamless connections 
to the marines supporting them further back from the front line. We 
have to modernize our enterprise network and move our data stores to 
the cloud so that marines can access the information they need any 
time, in any place. The Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) 
program and future programs like it are critical to supporting the 
warfighter.
     Long Range and Precision Fires: The modern day battlefield 
requires forces capable of conducting lethal strikes at range, in 
depth, and with precision from air, land, and sea. Marine Corps 
investments include 5th Generation F-35B/C aircraft, maritime Group 5 
MAGTF Expeditionary UAS (MUX) with precision weapons, Guided Multiple 
Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternate Warhead (AW), Ground-Based Anti-
Ship Missiles (GB-ASM) as well as ground vehicles and Long Range 
Unmanned Surface Vessels (LRUSV) armed with loitering munitions enabled 
by Low Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST).
     Operations in the Information Environment (OIE): Adversary 
use of ``information'' to manipulate facts, mobilize mass perceptions, 
and contest our ability to C2 forces undermines our traditional 
military advantages. We cannot count on uncontested access to the 
electromagnetic spectrum any more than we can count on uncontested 
freedom of maneuver on the sea. Establishment of the Deputy Commandant 
for Information (DC I) provides headquarters advocacy while the 
development of the MEF Information Group (MIG) enables the planning and 
integrating of OIE with traditional military activities to enhance 
lethality and our competitive advantage.
     Air Defense: Forward deployed/stationed marines are 
vulnerable to attacks in ways we have not considered for decades. Most 
lack protection and sufficient resilience from long-range kinetic 
attacks that jeopardize our ability to prepare, project, and sustain 
combat power. Expeditionary forces operating away from bases in a 
distributed/dispersed manner provide some degree of resilience through 
distributed mass and reduced signatures. Investments in Medium-Range 
Air Defense Systems, Counter-Cruise Missile, squad-level Counter-UAS, 
swarming technologies operating in a networked manner, and the Ground/
Air Task Oriented Radar improve the resilience of our posture and our 
air defense capabilities.
     Protected Mobility / Enhanced Maneuver: To distribute and 
concentrate forces and effects, we must be able to maneuver to 
positions of advantage, and engage and defeat threat forces in all 
geographic, topographic, and climatic environments from littoral 
waterways to urban areas. The Corps prioritizes modernization and 
investments in three key vehicle replacement programs required to 
improve mobility and increase force protection: Amphibious Combat 
Vehicle (ACV), Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and the Armored 
Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV). To improve dismounted mobility, we are 
investing in lighter, better fitting body armor. Aviation investment 
priorities include procurement and Block 4 capability upgrades for F-
35B/C; and the CH-53K which will provide an exponential leap in 
vertical heavy lift capability.
     Logistics: In a distributed and contested environment, 
logistics takes on greater significance as a key enabling function 
requiring global logistics awareness, diversifying distribution, 
improving sustainment, and optimizing installations to support 
sustained operations. This requires innovative methods, the ability to 
leverage new technologies, and integration with Navy, Joint, and 
Coalition forces. Science and Technology (S&T) efforts in Additive 
Manufacturing (AM) drove the procurement of 160 3D printers, with more 
than 125 ground and 83 NAVAIR-approved aviation parts; immediately 
improving readiness and lethality. Additional investments in developing 
enhanced logistics C2 systems, bulk fuel transportation and storage, 
unmanned logistics systems--to include quadrotor cargo delivery systems 
and littoral connectors--are paving the way in Next Generation 
Logistics (NexLog) capabilities.
    It is equally important that the Marine Corps provide every lethal, 
modern advantage available to our tactical warfighting formations to 
make sure our infantry is deadly and protected to the maximum extent 
possible. Aligned with the Secretary of Defense's Close Combat 
Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) initiative, the Marine Corps continues to 
invest heavily in its close combat formation capabilities, including--
enhanced combat helmet; binocular night vision devices; M-27 Infantry 
Automatic Rifle; M320 grenade launcher; M38 Squad Designated Marksman 
Rifle; and Javelin anti-tank missile. Additional investments include 
Squad unmanned aerial systems; MAGTF electronic warfare; Joint Battle 
Command Platform; Handheld C2; target hand-off system; adaptive threat 
force augmentation; future integration training environment; pattern of 
life automated behavior development, and warfighter augmented reality. 
These capability investments, combined with demanding unit training and 
Service-level force-on-force exercises, provide the path forward to 
ensuring close combat superiority against peer competitors.
Readiness
    The Marine Corps is committed to building the most ready force the 
Nation can afford. Readiness, however, is the product of two metrics. 
The first is the ability of the force to execute its mission with ready 
people, ready equipment, and the right training. The second compares 
the force against potential adversaries, the importance of which grows 
dramatically in an environment of rising peers and global competition. 
If our near-term readiness levels are high and our units are ready, 
then by the first metric we are ready. If, however, that force is 
outranged or outpaced by potential adversary capabilities, then by the 
second metric we are not. This requires an additional long-term view of 
readiness through capability modernization, as discussed in the 
preceding section of this statement. As a Service, we will take a 
deliberate approach to continue the positive trends in our overall 
readiness while simultaneously balancing the need to modernize our 
current force, satisfying existing GCC demands, and building the force 
required by the strategic environment to remain relevant in the future. 
Thanks to your efforts in Congress to provide increased funding, you 
have made the choices the Marine Corps has to make less difficult. Our 
President's Budget 2020 budget provides $14.3 billion, or approximately 
31 percent of our total submission towards near-term readiness.
  Aviation
    While readiness concerns exist across the MAGTF, our most acute 
readiness issues are found in aviation units. Recent increases in 
funding enabled the Marine Corps to simultaneously invest in both 
readiness and modernization, adding capacity to the flight lines by 
fully funding readiness enabler accounts, depot and Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA), spares, training, and people. The Marine Corps has been 
able to accelerate aviation readiness recovery efforts along four lines 
of effort:
    1.  Depot Readiness Initiative: resources to accomplish certain 
unit level maintenance while an aircraft is being re-worked at the 
depot, which means aircraft that return from the depot to a squadron 
are ready to fly almost immediately.
    2.  Non-Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM): the qualified 
maintenance marines and needed supporting resources (engineers, support 
equipment, etc.) are available to fix aircraft without delay.
    3.  Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS): all parts are available when 
needed to prevent extended aircraft down times awaiting parts.
    4.  In-Service Repair: higher-level maintenance needed at the 
squadron is properly resourced to perform these repairs without delay, 
avoiding excessive aircraft down time.
    Although much work remains to achieve our aviation readiness 
recovery goals, we continue to see significant gains realized along 
these lines of effort: depot throughput met Service goals, NMCM rates 
have decreased, NMCS rates have dropped, and in-service repairs have 
reached our Service goal. In short, these gains mean that marines are 
able to keep existing aircraft in a mission capable (MC) status for 
longer periods, affording aircrew more flying hours and training time. 
In addition to our dedication to fully funding aviation readiness 
accounts, other readiness recovery initiatives include the CH-53E Reset 
program, Depot Readiness Initiative, MV-22 Readiness Program, and 
talent retention efforts aimed at retaining experienced maintainers in 
operational squadrons. Leading indicators of readiness improvements 
resulting from these efforts include: an increase in overall flight 
hours, an increase in average monthly flight time for our aircrew, an 
increase in MC rates of our aircraft, and an improvement of our 
aggregate aviation T-Rating. These gains are a direct result of funding 
provided in the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018 defense 
appropriations bills, which allowed investments in readiness enabler 
accounts at maximum executable levels. These investments are now 
realizing significant results. Should funding decrease in fiscal year 
2020 or beyond--aviation readiness will also likely decrease.
    The Secretary of Defense released guidance to the Services 
directing accelerated readiness recovery of tactical aviation (TACAIR) 
to achieve 80 percent mission capable rates by the end of fiscal year 
2019. The Marine Corps is taking action to achieve this goal along five 
lines of effort. The Marine Corps is working towards this goal by 
increasing the number of aircraft available and operating within 
aircraft and maintenance capacity levels. Our investments in fiscal 
year 2017, fiscal year 2018, and fiscal year 2019 will produce ready 
aircraft from our depots, $1.6 billion in spares from Navy Supply, and 
$16 million in additional consumables from DLA. Additional goals from 
industry partners include accelerated completion of aircraft 
modifications and retrofits, accelerated depot repair capability, and 
shifting maintenance to the appropriate levels. Successful 
implementation of these efforts will ensure we meet the 80 percent goal 
and sustain it in the future.
  Ground Equipment
    Ground equipment readiness rates continue to show significant gains 
after years of focused effort to reset our equipment. As of 1 October 
2018, the Marine Corps completed reset of 99 percent of our ground 
equipment programs and returned 72 percent of our ground equipment to 
the operating forces. The operational readiness of key Principal End 
Items (PEI) remains high, and we project to complete our ground 
equipment reset efforts in third quarter fiscal year 2019. High 
operational readiness rates of key PEIs, however, mask certain 
underlying readiness issues. Units preparing to deploy are still 
experiencing shortfalls in equipment to train for core mission tasks as 
we support global equipment sourcing for forward deployed units such as 
Special Purpose MAGTFs. Equipping requirements for these rotational 
forces are disproportionally high due to their unique mission sets, 
placing high demand on low density equipment that approaches or exceeds 
availability. The result is risk in equipment availability to respond 
to contingencies and training for non-deployed units. We are addressing 
these issues through aggressive acquisition and redistribution actions.
  Amphibious Fleet
    Use of the sea as maneuver space remains as vital today as any time 
in our history. The Joint Force must maintain access to, and the 
ability to maneuver through the global commons, assure access, compete 
in the maritime domain, and defeat any competitor attempting to deny 
our freedom of action. To adequately accomplish these tasks, the naval 
force must be distributable, resilient, and tailorable while being 
employed in sufficient scale and for ample duration. The amphibious 
fleet allows the naval force to do three basic things:
      Conduct steady state operations around the world, 
including TSC, building partner capacity, HA/DR, and NEO.
      Execute a global cost imposition strategy if we have to 
fight.
      Project and sustain the force in a contested environment.
    Due to existing shortfalls and maintenance issues within our 
amphibious ship capacity, the naval force currently struggles to 
satisfy these basic requirements--an issue that will only grow worse 
over time if not properly addressed. The operational availability of 
the existing amphibious fleet is insufficient to meet global demands 
and negatively impacts the unit training necessary to recover readiness 
for major combat operations. Consequently, the strategic risk to the 
mission and the larger Joint Force is increased.
    The Navy and Marine Corps are currently operating below the minimum 
amphibious shipping requirement detailed in the 2016 Force Structure 
Assessment and 30-year shipbuilding plan. The stated requirement of 38 
amphibious warships is the minimum number required to fulfill our title 
10 obligation. Resourcing to a lower number puts contingency response 
timelines and the Joint Force at risk. Yet, amphibious readiness is 
more than the simple product of capacity and availability; it requires 
an amphibious fleet with the right capabilities to remain survivable, 
resilient, and lethal in a contested environment. Today's naval 
campaigns still demand an amphibious fleet capable of conducting raids, 
demonstrations, assaults, withdrawals, and support to other operations 
(TSC, HA/DR, NEO, etc.) in both permissive and non-permissive 
environments. The naval force must be able to maneuver; gain temporary 
lodgments to establish expeditionary advanced bases from which marines 
hold adversary naval, land, and air forces at risk; and then withdrawal 
quickly as the naval campaign advances. Our amphibious fleet lacks the 
ability to protect itself from air, surface, sub-surface, cyber, and 
information attack; and absent organic ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore 
strike weapons, must rely on support from other combatants to perform 
sea control and assured access missions. To increase the lethality and 
readiness of our amphibious fleet, the naval force must:
     Upgrade C2 suites, introduce organic ship-to-ship and 
ship-to-shore precision strike weapons, organic air defense, and 
decrease ship signatures to become less targetable.
     Modernize the manned and unmanned surface connector fleet 
that, when combined with our aerial connectors, enable the naval force 
to establish a web of sensor, strike, decoy, and sustainment locations 
based on land and sea that will complicate the strategic and 
operational decision making of our most advanced rivals.
     Address modernization in our prepositioning program to 
ensure persistent forward positioning of our critical equipment and 
sustainment supplies in a manner that is scalable, flexible, 
expeditionary, and survivable in a contested environment; and that will 
further enable our naval expeditionary inside forces to persist inside 
the enemy's weapons engagement zone (WEZ).
     Continue to explore innovative ways to employ alternative 
platforms for amphibious and maritime operations in more permissive 
environments in order to compensate for the shortfall of amphibious 
warships and provide more global coverage in the most resource-
appropriate manner.
     Continue to develop and employ Naval Task Force elements 
consisting of multiple ship types for optimal lethality and force 
protection; including possible development of more functional and 
operationally suitable naval vessels and craft to expand the 
competitive space and create an asymmetric maritime advantage globally.
  Deployment-to-Dwell
    The rate by which marines deploy largely depends upon what unit 
they are assigned to and the operational demand for those units. The 
majority of Marine units experience a deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio 
that is challenging; we confront this daily. While these demands are 
clear and unmistakable evidence of the continued relevance of marines, 
this tempo is difficult to sustain as it limits our time to train to 
our full naval mission sets. Our goal is to return to a 1:3 D2D force, 
which would allow us time to train for the high-end fight and achieve 
balance for our marines and their families at home.
    There are three types of marines in our Corps: those who are 
deployed, those getting ready to deploy, and those who just returned 
from deployment. President's Budget 2020 supports an 186,200 Active and 
38,500 Reserve component end-strength force, maintaining an overall 1:2 
D2D ratio. Operating at a 1:2 D2D ratio, although challenging, is a 
conscious, short-term decision to balance modernization, meet current 
demand, and simultaneously recover our readiness. We owe our marines 
and their families the necessary time to reset and train for the next 
deployment or contingency. For many decades prior to the attacks of 
September 2001, Marines in the operating forces benefited from a 1:3 
D2D ratio. The marines that were not deployed had time to prepare, time 
to train, and were ready to reinforce their fellow marines if a major 
contingency happened. A return to a 1:3 D2D would require a substantive 
increase in manpower, or decrease in operational requirements--we do 
not seek a significant increase in end-strength in this year's budget 
and we continue to experience high operational requirements. Although 
we manage the risks associated with a 1:2 D2D in the short-term, our 
long-term goal is to return to a 1:3 D2D force.
  Infrastructure
    The Marine Corps previously accepted risk in facilities funding to 
protect near-term readiness and service-level training. Taking risk in 
the facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization, and military 
construction programs resulted in the degradation of our 
infrastructure, which in turn increases lifecycle costs. We must ensure 
our infrastructure, both home and abroad, is resilient against attacks, 
and long-range precision strikes while modernizing to support future 
capability integration and training facilities needed to hone our 
warfighting skills. Our Infrastructure Reset Strategy must be a 
priority--we must improve infrastructure lifecycle management and 
ensure investments are aligned with Marine Corps capability-based 
requirements to support our warfighting mission and contribute directly 
to current and future force readiness. The state of our facilities is 
the single most important investment to support four critical force 
enabling functions our installations provide:
      Housing for our marines and their families
      Deployment platforms from which our expeditionary forces 
fight and win our Nation's battles
      Training facilities required for our MAGTFs to train and 
hone their combat readiness
      An organic industrial base for depot-level maintenance, 
storage, and prepositioning of war reserve equipment to maximize 
readiness and sustain combat operations
    As leaders we have fallen short of our full obligation to our 
marines and their families with respect to privatized military housing; 
we are correcting this shortfall. The Marine Corps has instituted a 
voluntary Marine Housing Outreach program aimed at every marine and 
sailor residing in government quarters, privatized military housing, or 
an off-base civilian rental property. This outreach program is designed 
to raise our awareness of the marines' living conditions to ensure it 
is safe, secure, and environmentally healthy; identify maintenance or 
safety issues affecting the residence, determine any actions taken to 
date to remedy them, and determine how the chain of command can assist 
in the resolution process; and ensure our marines and their families 
are aware of and understand the support processes and programs 
available. In concert with the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps 
is also reviewing the reporting mechanisms and oversight procedures 
that govern the way privatized military housing discrepancies are 
reported, remediated, and verified through our Public-Private Venture 
partners. The Marine Corps is committed to our marines and families, to 
improving the military housing offered aboard our installations, and to 
ensuring unit commanders are personally involved in advocating for the 
wellbeing of the marines they serve.
    The Marine Corps' Infrastructure Reset Strategy ensures every 
dollar is targeted and spent on the highest priorities at the lowest 
total lifecycle costs, optimizing investment over the long-term to 
support our warfighting mission and align investment with our strategic 
priorities. These prioritized investments align with NDS guidance to 
increase lethality by supporting new capabilities and platforms; 
modernizing inadequate and obsolete facilities; relocating and 
consolidating forces; and improving quality of life. fiscal year 2020 
Military Construction (MILCON) and Facilities Sustainment, Restoration 
and Modernization (FSRM) accounts support:
      Guam relocation investments: Barracks, central fuel 
station, and central issue facility
      MCF 2025 initiatives: Consolidated Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) for I MEF MIG and 10th 
Marines HIMARs complex
      New platform investment: F-35B/C hangar, apron, landing 
pads, and training simulator; ACV maintenance facility; and CH-53K 
cargo loading trainer
      Training: Wargaming Center at MCB Quantico
      Quality of Life: Barracks replacement at MCB Hawaii and 
mess hall replacement at MCB Camp Pendleton
      Recapitalization and replacement of inadequate facilities
Manpower
    Our people--marines, civilian marines, and families--are our 
institutional center of gravity, and remain fundamental to our ability 
to Make Marines and Win Battles. Maintaining the most ready, lethal 
Marine Corps possible requires talented and dedicated people. Our 
President's Budget 2020 provides $16.1 billion towards manpower 
accounts, approximately 35 percent of our total submission, to continue 
implementing MCF 2025. The strategic environment our Nation faces 
requires a more experienced, better trained, and more capable Corps. It 
requires more than just new equipment and technologies, it requires the 
right force structure and marines with the right skills to effectively 
operate. Modernization priorities require a complementary element of 
force structure changes to ensure we have the right people, with the 
right skills, for the deployment and employment of new capabilities and 
to ensure the future force is compatible and mutually supportive. Our 
goal is to provide a more mature, experienced force to leverage 
individual skill and professional talent with emerging technology 
through select force structure changes that recruits, trains, educates, 
and sustains the most lethal force possible.
    To achieve our goals, our actions focus personnel growth in the 
right areas. Our President's Budget 2020 end strength plans for an 
186,200 Active and 38,500 Reserve component force. This limited growth 
of 100 marines is targeted in specialized fields such as MARSOC and 
several specialties encompassed by OIE: intelligence, electronic 
warfare, and cyberspace operations. Equally important, our manpower 
efforts are addressing the need for more experienced and better trained 
leaders within our infantry formations to ensure the superiority of our 
close combat formations. In order to optimize selection of the most 
talented infantry squad leaders, we have increased the pool of infantry 
Sergeants by 330 marines through realignment efforts within our 
internal structure. Everything we do must focus on making marines 
better, more resilient, lethal, and capable of outpacing our 
adversaries.
    Central to our role in providing a lethal force is recruiting the 
most qualified men and women within our Nation who are willing to raise 
their hand, affirm an oath, and earn the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor. We 
must ensure that we recruit the right people, devoted to upholding the 
values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. Our new marines must be 
provided the highest level of training that not only prepares them for 
the rigors of combat, but also successfully transforms and sustains 
them in their career paths. As such, a fourth phase has been added to 
Recruit Training. This fourth phase focuses on mentorship and leader-
led instruction to better prepare new marines for transition to the 
operating forces.
    Education and training is continuous for marines. We must ensure we 
train to fight, and educate to win. New technologies require smarter, 
more mentally agile marines capable of exercising sound judgment and 
decision making in uncertain and challenging situations. Professional 
Military Education remains essential in developing leaders with the 
analytical and critical thinking skills required to adapt in ever 
changing environments. To increase the capabilities of our leaders, the 
Marine Corps has developed the College of Enlisted Military Education 
(CEME), creating a pathway for enlisted leaders to increase skill and 
proficiency through continuing education. We have revamped our PME 
process, adding new PME courses, and enhancing academic rigor to grow 
our force with the intellectual skills and capabilities necessary for 
the future.
    As a marines, we must hold ourselves to the highest standards of 
personal conduct and ensure all marines and family members are treated 
with dignity and respect. This requires us to take an introspective 
look at our culture to ensure the long-term success of our efforts. To 
demonstrate our commitment to strengthening our culture, we created the 
Talent Management Oversight Directorate (TMOD). This office supports 
the Assistant Commandant in his role as the Talent Management Officer 
of the Marine Corps, and addresses all personnel and cultural issues 
impacting the Corps' ability to invest in and leverage a diversely 
skilled and talented force. The TMOD's mission is to ensure compliance 
with all objectives, policies, and directives that supports the Corps' 
efforts to recruit, promote, and retain the best talent the Nation has 
to offer. Focused on mission readiness, the TMOD helps ensure we 
maintain an organization where all members are valued based on their 
individual excellence and commitment to warfighting. Treating all 
marines and their families with dignity and respect, as well as 
fostering a culture of inclusion throughout the service, is central to 
our core values.
    Taking care of marines and their families is a key element of 
overall readiness and combat effectiveness. The adage ``we recruit 
marines, we retain families'' remains as true today as ever. Our 
comprehensive system of services, to include Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Response; Suicide Prevention; Personal and Professional 
Development; Drug and Alcohol Abuse Counseling/Prevention; Business and 
Recreation Services; and Spouse Employment; seeks to create the 
holistic fitness and readiness of our marines and families--body, mind, 
spirit, and social. In addition, our Wounded Warrior Regiment continues 
to execute our Recovery Coordination Program to ``keep faith'' with 
those who have incurred life changing impairments in service to our 
Nation.
    Our civilian workforce has the leanest civilian-to-military ratio 
of all the military services, at a current ratio of one civilian 
employee to every ten marines. Approximately 95 percent of our 
appropriated funded civilians work outside the Washington, DC beltway 
at 57 bases, stations, depots, and installations around the world. 
Sixty-nine percent are veterans who have chosen to continue to serve 
our Nation; of those, 18 percent are disabled veterans. Civilian 
marines perform vital functions at our bases and stations, and are 
integral to the daily operations and overall capability of the Marine 
Corps. Challenges with recruitment and retention--notably burdens like 
the threat of sequestration, possible furloughs, antiquated hiring 
processes, and limited pay increases--inhibit our ability to retain top 
talent. Thanks to the hard work of Congress in passing a civilian pay 
raise this year, we continue to fund these critical members of our 
team.
                               conclusion
    The Marine Corps serves as a naval expeditionary ``inside'' force 
that is most ready, when the Nation is least ready. We seek a constant 
state of readiness--lethal, forward postured, assuring allies, 
deterring adversaries, capable of absorbing the initial blow, and 
holding the line--and if required, prepared to fight and impose our 
will on the enemy. We are an integrated naval force--transiting the 
oceans, aggregating at sea, fighting at sea, and coming from the sea. 
We are organized, trained, and equipped to operate across the range of 
military operations, in every domain, and thrive in uncertainty--
facilitating assured access operations, sea control operations, or 
maritime security in support of the fleets. We are self-sustaining for 
pre-determined lengths of time, and capable of quickly reconstituting 
for follow-on tasking globally to support dynamic force employment. We 
continuously live ``with our sea-bags packed'' and remain the most 
lethal, credible combat forces available.
    However, despite notable improvement in readiness during the past 
two year years, the preceding seventeen years of war have perilously 
degraded our overall capability and capacity, as those of our 
adversaries have increased. We must increase the lethality of our 
``inside'' combat credible forces in order to compete with our threats, 
deter our adversaries, assure our allies, and if necessary--prevail in 
any fight. As the force at the forward edge, the force first to make 
contact and hold--we require the most modern, technologically advanced, 
capable Marine Corps our resourcing will allow. To achieve this end, 
the Marine Corps must evolve from today's ``1.0'' force capable of 
addressing our current warfighting needs; to a near-term ``1.1'' 
modernized force that leverages select, existing platforms to achieve 
new warfighting concepts; to a ``2.0'' future force with revolutionized 
capabilities and the ability to execute new warfighting concepts.
    The Marine Corps is increasing lethality and evolving our force 
through prioritized investment in modernization, readiness, and 
manpower. This evolution is necessary to ensure we maintain current 
operational readiness and address whatever contingencies may arise 
today, and anticipate what our force of tomorrow must look like to be 
capable of addressing unforeseen threats. But we need Congress' 
continued support. To accomplish this goal, adequate, sustained, and 
predictable funding is required to properly plan for and resource a 
ready, capable force. Our Marine Corps will ensure there will never be 
a fair fight . . . our Nation is not afforded that luxury. We will 
continue to innovate and build a 21st Century Marine Corps--a lethal, 
adaptive, and resilient Corps that can dominate all domains, that is 
ready to fight tonight--and win.

    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, General Neller.
    I've had a couple of systems I've talked about, and we--
that I think are worthy of bringing up in this hearing. First 
of all, Admiral Richardson, what is your current requirement 
for aircraft carriers?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, the 2016 Force Structure 
Assessment lists 12 aircraft.
    Chairman Inhofe. I understand that you're now talking 
about--giving consideration to taking out the USS Harry Truman. 
Now, my question--my first question to you is, Why would you--
it's my understanding that, over the last--for 22 days last 
summer, there was not a single aircraft carrier strike group 
deployed. Right now, we know that we have a need. And to take 
out, I guess, the Truman, you'd--you could characterize that as 
being in midlife at this time--to take that out of the system, 
will you have something, then, that can actually change our 
deficiency from two to one? In other words, come up with 11, as 
opposed to 10. So, what would motivate that decision?
    Admiral Richardson. Chairman, thanks for that question.
    I like to think of the budget submission as a--particularly 
with respect to the Truman, as a bit of a discussion centering 
around three elements of the budget. One is that we have, 
indeed, proposed not refueling the Harry S. Truman at her 
midlife so that we can take those funds and invest them into 
advanced technologies, all with the idea of increasing naval 
power into the future. Our budget, as I said in my opening 
statement, is forward-leaning into those technologies.
    Chairman Inhofe. But, that would have the result of 
bringing our numbers down----
    Admiral Richardson. It would, indeed.
    Chairman Inhofe.--to buy one additional carrier.
    Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. And so, the third leg of that 
stool, Chairman, is really important, which is that we've got a 
Force Structure Assessment currently underway, and we've--the 
combatant commanders are also studying their requirements or 
OPLANs [Operational Plans].
    Chairman Inhofe. Now, when is that due?
    Admiral Richardson. This is due later on this year. And so, 
if we need to, it's early enough in the program that we can 
reverse this decision. I think it's about $16 million, $17 
million in the budget year. We are ready to readdress that. If 
these studies show----
    Chairman Inhofe. Well, I think that may happen, because 
we're going to be--of course, we're going into our 
reauthorization, and that would be one thing that's--I've 
heard--I'm not the only one who questions that decision, but--
and you'll have a chance to respond more, because I know others 
are interested in that.
    Let me--I know, Secretary Spencer, the question that--
obviously, our favorite subject is, When do you project that 
all 11 weapons elevators on the Ford would be ready to be 
accepted by the Navy?
    Secretary Spencer. Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is a 
subject of great interest to me. What we're looking at right 
now is, when she sails from her post-shakedown availability, 
right now scheduled to be October. We've taken two deliveries 
since we last talked. We're making progress. We're working with 
contractors, application and resources are being applied, and, 
rest assured, attention is focusing down on it.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. Well, let me just be sure that we're 
clear, here. There are other areas of underperformance, as you 
are fully aware, such as the catapults, the resting gear, 
radar, and the propulsion plan. They're going to have to 
demonstrate reliability at the same point that we'd be looking 
at the weapons elevators, isn't that correct?
    Secretary Spencer. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. And that was going to be July the--July of 
this year, of 2019.
    Secretary Spencer. That is correct. There are other items 
that are pushing the availability out, such as the main thrust 
bearings, propulsion, and just the whole general PSA [post 
shakedown availability] schedule.
    Chairman Inhofe. And that now is going out to October? Is 
that correct?
    Secretary Spencer. That is correct.
    Chairman Inhofe. All right. How confident are you that this 
is going to take place by October?
    Secretary Spencer. I----
    Chairman Inhofe. Now's a good time to express that----
    Secretary Spencer. It----
    Chairman Inhofe.--since----
    Secretary Spencer.--certainly is, Chairman. I am fairly 
confident. This is new technologies. I don't want to use that 
as an excuse, but I will tell you that we're confident, working 
with the contractor, that this is the goal that we will get the 
Ford out the door----
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah.
    Secretary Spencer.--in October.
    Chairman Inhofe. That's a good idea, because we've 
scheduled a meeting for October, so we'll have a chance to----
    Secretary Spencer. I will----
    Chairman Inhofe.--to look at that.
    Secretary Spencer. I will call up the CO [commanding 
officer], and we'll have lunch----
    Chairman Inhofe. All right.
    Secretary Spencer.--on the ship.
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay.
    Now--and one other system, here, because I know there's 
some discussion on the CH-53K replacing the CH-53E, and I'd 
like to get, kind of, an update on that. It could be from you 
or from any of the other witnesses.
    Secretary Spencer. Let me start, and I'm more than happy to 
have the Commandant weigh in if he has other comments.
    I think that you remember this has always been a program, 
since I've been onboard, that we've kept an eye on. As of this 
winter, it was not progressing to the speed that I thought was 
appropriate, nor our acquisition folks. We are having some 
negotiations with the prime supplier, Lockheed Martin Sikorsky. 
I just most recently, Mr. Chairman, sat down with the 
leadership of Lockheed Martin, and we have, ``aligned our 
priorities as partners.''
    Chairman Inhofe. Okay. I think that's a good idea. You have 
new leadership there, you have a different corporate setting 
than we did before, and that has to be taken in consideration.
    Yeah, we're going to stay with our time--timing on this, 
this round.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, we mentioned, several of us, the damage by 
Hurricane--several hurricanes to Navy installations. And 
Section 335 of the fiscal year 2018 NDAA required the services 
to send up the top ten installations that are vulnerable to 
weather, extreme weather. We have not received that yet. Your 
colleagues in the Air Force and Army have committed to do so. 
Can we get a commitment for promptly sending up to us the list 
of the ten most vulnerable installations?
    Secretary Spencer. At 12:01, I will make sure that is 
underway, Senator, and I apologize for the delay.
    Senator Reed. It's--thank you. It's--you're in good company 
with Secretary Wilson and Secretary Esper. So, thank you very 
much.
    One of the things that we've noticed through the course of 
these hearings is that--particularly when talking, again, with 
Secretary Esper and his colleagues in the Army--they did a deep 
dive into their budget to try to find savings before they asked 
for additional resources. Has the Navy, Mr. Secretary and 
Admiral Richardson and General Neller, Navy and Marine Corps 
made such a deep dive and made proposed cuts?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. A way to look at--I think 
you're talking about the Army's Night Court that they were 
having, et cetera.
    Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Spencer. Navy goes through a similar process 
every single budget cycle, although this next cycle that we're 
doing, we're actually calling it zero-base budgeting, where we 
are zeroing everybody out, and everyone has to come in and sing 
for their dinner as to their requirements. But, if you look at 
our savings--I was talking to Senator Perdue about this--if you 
look at our savings from authorities you've given us, whether 
it be block buy, multiyear buys, process improvements, from 
fiscal year 2017 on, we have about $30 billion worth of 
savings, compared to business as usual.
    Senator Reed. Your comments, Admiral Richardson?
    Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'd just echo what the 
Secretary said. We do this pretty much every year, but we've 
really turned up the heat, under the Secretary's leadership, 
and those tens of billions of savings are exactly what I'm 
tracking, as well.
    Senator Reed. And Commandant?
    General Neller. Sir, there are specific programs that we 
have dropped from the budget that we felt we could accept risk. 
There was risk to dropping them, but we did it, because we 
wanted to generate resources for other more important things. 
And we continue to look at what we call core/non-core actions 
that we do and things where we could possibly, maybe, outsource 
that or not do it at all in order to generate additional 
resources based on the fact that we--as generous as the 
Congress has been, we have to be prepared to be able to do with 
whatever we receive in the future.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, there is a significant amount of MILCON 
[military construction] that has been designated by the White 
House to be shifted to the wall. And I presume, simply by the 
fact of asking for the MILCON, that these are serious 
investments, and that, from a military standpoint, your 
position would be, they should be--they should take priority, 
perhaps, over other funding, including the wall?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. The process that I've been 
made aware of is that the list was going up, then we will be 
asked to prioritize, at some point. I will make sure that my 
prioritization expressions are given.
    Senator Reed. I--the sheer size of the request will limit, 
to a significant degree, what you can protect. And I would 
presume that there will be projects there that are critical to 
the Navy and the Marine Corps that, for the demands of the 
southern wall, will be taken away. And from, again, a military 
standpoint--there are other factors, I'm sure, but from the 
military standpoint, do you think that's a wise diversion?
    Secretary Spencer. When asked, Senator, I will give my best 
advice to the Secretary.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    General Neller, I mentioned the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicle]. Can you give us an idea how you and the Army are 
going to work together if they try to scale this program down, 
in terms of putting it in the field?
    General Neller. Senator, we have a stated requirement right 
now in the acquisition objective. I think it's about 8800. And 
we're starting to field, actually, this year, for the first 
time. So, I have not heard specifically from the Army that they 
are definitely going to reduce their acquisition objective, 
because that may have some effect on the unit cost, which will 
be passed on to us. So, overall, we have--we've been looking at 
ground vehicles, and we're trying to get no more ground 
vehicles than we need. And so, I'll have to engage with the 
Chief of Staff of the Army on this. But, right now, we're 
fielding the vehicle and trying to get rid of our old Humvees 
and--the oldest Humvees first, and replace them with JLTVs to 
give marines the newest piece of gear that they can get their 
hands on.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    And just a final comment, in just seconds left. Admiral 
Richardson, again, you mentioned the Columbia-class. It's going 
to require a lot of scrutiny, a lot of oversight, and a lot of 
collaboration. It's a great challenge, but necessary. We have 
to replace the Ohio-class. So, thank you for your work, and I 
encourage you to keep a close and sharp eye.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Wicker [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Reed.
    Senator Inhofe has stepped out for a few moments and asked 
me to preside for a few moments.
    General Neller, let me begin with you and, certainly, thank 
you for your four decades-plus of service.
    Let's talk about amphibious ship procurement and the 
current budget proposal. I was heartened to hear Admiral 
Richardson say that the budget submission is an opportunity for 
a bit of discussion about some of these issues. The Navy 
deferred LPD procurement to 2021 and LHA procurement to 2024, 
saying that, in pursuing the National Defense Strategy 
priorities, it was unable to take advantage of last year's 
addition of advanced procurement funding for either fiscal year 
2020 LPD or an adjustment to the LHA. Does the Marine Corps 
still have a stated need for 38 amphibious ships, as indicated 
in the Force Structure Assessment?
    General Neller. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. And do we have those 38 ships today?
    General Neller. No, we do not.
    Senator Wicker. Do you foresee eliminating the Marine 
Corps' core mission of amphibious operations at any point in 
the future? For example, in a potential conflict with China or 
Russia, would our amphibious Marine Corps likely play a key 
role?
    General Neller. Based on the plans I've seen, I would say 
yes, but it's more than that. It--I think we have to look at 
the ability to come from the sea with the Navy as part of a 
maritime strategy. And I think the CNO and I are aligned with 
that. So, yes, they would be part of that planning and in those 
operations.
    Senator Wicker. Okay. Let me just ask you, then, how the F-
35 exercise went, recently. The Essex Amphibious Ready Group 
and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) recently completed 
the first combat deployment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
During this deployment, the F-35 saw action in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Syria. How does the F-35 expand the 
effectiveness of U.S. amphibious forces? And what did we learn 
about the F-35's logistical and material footprint aboard the 
USS Essex that can be applied to future iterations of large-
deck amphibious ships, sir?
    General Neller. Senator, I have not received the After 
Action from the 13th MEU. I expect to get that within the next 
week. I can tell you that the material readiness of the 
airplane while they were deployed was--exceeded what I 
expected. They averaged above 70-percent readiness at some 
point. Actually, in 1 month, they were close to 80. They had 
six jets aboard the aircraft. They did operate in the airspace 
above Afghanistan and Syria. So, their material readiness was 
good. There actually--there are lessons learned, as far as the 
aviation maintenance onboard ship and the things you have to 
do, but they set themselves for success. They had us--they did 
a good job on the parts block, and they did a good job bringing 
experienced maintainers. This is a bigger jet than we're used 
to, so there are some deck-handling things that have to go. So, 
all that stuff will come out. As far as the capability, as far 
as information and the passage of information and what they 
were able to do or not do, that's what I'm looking forward to 
hearing in the After Action Brief.
    Senator Wicker. And when do you think----
    General Neller. Overall, it was--in the next week. I 
believe they will be up on the Hill to brief, also, Senator.
    Senator Wicker. But, overall, it's a positive----
    General Neller. It was--material readiness was the thing we 
were concerned with, being away from a home base. And the 
material readiness was excellent.
    Senator Wicker. Great.
    I think Senator Reed, in his opening statement, mentioned 
that he'd like to have a comment, at some point, about how not 
refueling the Truman is consistent with our goal of 355 ships. 
But, let me ask this question instead, Secretary Spencer. And 
it's with regard to the amphibs. Last month, during the 
Seapower Subcommittee hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs, I 
asked Secretary Geurts if, instead of deferring procurement to 
2021 and 2024, could the Navy apply incremental funding to the 
LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020? He said the Navy could apply 
incremental funding to the LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020, if 
authorized to do so by Congress.
    I'll ask you the same question. Could the Navy apply 
incremental funding to the LPD and LHA in fiscal year 2020, 
as--if authorized by Congress? And, if Congress approves 
incremental funding in the fiscal year 2020 NDAA for the LHA 
and LPD, would that allow the Navy to accelerate how it spends 
the 350 million that was appropriated in fiscal year 2019?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. If, in fact, you authorize 
and appropriate our authorities or--to go forward with the 
funding, yes, the answer is, indubitably.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very, very much. Well, we're 
certainly going to pursue that. I appreciate the candor of our 
witnesses today.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning.
    Admiral Richardson and General Neller, thank you both very 
much for all of your years of service and the excellent job 
that you provided to this country and to the Committee. I'm 
sure that the Committee is going to miss you a lot more than 
you're going to miss the Committee.
    Secretary Spencer, you and I have had the opportunity to 
talk about the importance of the Shipyard Infrastructure 
Optimization Plan and the commitment that you have to make 
progress on that. It calls for $21 billion in investment over 
the next 20 years, and a number of needs, one of which is 
drydock capitalization--recapitalization. I just wanted to pick 
up on Senator Reed's concerns that he expressed about money 
being taken from military construction projects, like those 
that are laid out in the Shipyard Optimization Plan, because of 
their need to address our military needs, going forward. Four 
of the projects that are on that list of military construction 
projects are at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. At least three 
of those are critical to the continued expansion of the drydock 
and the ability of the shipyard to continue to work on our 
attack submarines that are so critical to maintaining the 
defense of this country. So, can you talk about the importance 
of these projects to maintain our submarine fleet, and how 
delaying or taking money from these projects would impact our 
national security?
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, you and I have talked before, 
and I'm more than happy to present to the whole Committee the 
importance of our ability to, not only purchase, but, equally 
important, maintain the ships that we have, to get them back 
out to the fight. When we score our MILCON projects, there is a 
prioritization. This is obviously a very serious 
prioritization. As I said earlier, my job, in this case, is to 
provide the best advice that I can to the decision process. I 
will represent exactly that.
    Senator Shaheen. Have you been asked to do that yet? And is 
there any new criteria that has been laid out by Secretary 
Shanahan in the Department of Defense about how they're going 
to determine which projects to take money from?
    Secretary Spencer. None of that already has been discussed, 
and the timing has not been presented to me as to when he'd 
like my opinions.
    Senator Shaheen. So, you haven't been told of any 
reprioritization that is being done by DOD.
    Secretary Spencer. Not as of this date, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    General Neller, there's been recent reports, that I know 
you're aware of, where you've expressed concern about the 
readiness challenges that are presented by taking funding and 
troops to address the southwest border. Can you talk a little 
bit more about what your concerns are there?
    General Neller. Senator, I wrote a memo to the Secretary of 
the Navy laying out eight fiscal shortfalls that the Marine 
Corps had, one of which was the cost of putting marines on the 
border. So, the marines on the border, their readiness, I've 
checked--personally checked the readiness of every unit down 
there. And, with only one exception, there was no impact to 
their actual readiness. In fact, a couple of units improved 
their readiness. So, to say that going to the border was 
degrading our readiness is not an accurate statement.
    That said, there is a cost there, a small cost compared to 
the others. And we have a shortfall of just under $300 million, 
of which the border mission is less than 2 percent.
    So, what I was looking for was some assistance in trying to 
get money to reprogram, because we have to pay our bills. And 
short of that, we would have to look at other places to get the 
resources. So, that was the intent of the memo. But, there are 
a number of things out there that we don't have funding for, 
some due to other mandates put on us by this body, some by the 
Department of Defense. So, my intent was to just simply lay out 
for my boss what these were and ask for his support in trying 
to figure out how we might fund them.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that 
clarification.
    One of the concerns, Secretary Spencer, that has been 
expressed about our current state of readiness in terms of--is 
the industrial base that we have, that we're going to need as 
we ramp up our shipbuilding. Can you talk about the efforts 
that the Navy's taking to rebuild this industrial base and to 
focus on research and development to support shipbuilding 
efforts?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes, Senator. It goes across the board. 
Whether it's shipbuilding, aircraft building, weapons building, 
we are tremendously focused on the supply chain, because, 
beyond the prime, who we interface with directly, is this 
underlying matrix of organizations providing parts into the 
platforms. It's critical, on many fronts, whether it goes to 
the cyber protection of the data that they're holding to 
produce the parts to us, all the way to the actual parts. 
You're finding that, in the Navy/Marine Corps enterprise, the 
acquisition side is going deep, personally, themselves, 
alongside contractors to ensure the health and the warning 
signs and friction points that we have in the supply chain, and 
how we can rectify them. As an example, in certain areas we're 
sitting there, going, ``Okay, if, in fact, supplier A is 
industrial-capacity-limited, why don't we go to our allies, if, 
in fact, it's not a critical, confidential part, and actually 
rely more on our allies?'' As you know, we're legally allowed 
to, in many cases, include up to 50 percent foreign parts. 
We're now flexing that muscle again to make sure that we are 
exhausting the whole field of availability.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you.
    I'm out of time, but I'll submit a question for the record 
to try and learn a little bit more about exactly what we're 
doing.
    Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I want to 
return--it was touched upon briefly, the collisions of the 
Fitzgerald and the McCain. In 2017, after those collisions, you 
both initiated a review of the root causes, and arrived at a 
number of corrective actions. Our National Defense 
Authorization Act last year also included 11 provisions related 
to those reviews to improve the readiness of our naval surface 
forces. Could you please update the Committee on the current 
state of readiness, in light of those corrective actions, and 
also tell us what corrective actions have not yet been fully 
implemented?
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, I'll start and then be more 
than happy to turn it over to the CNO.
    Out of the 111, 91 we discussed and arbitrated, we have 
underway corrective actions, some that were immediate, such as 
turning on AIS, which is the identification system, when 
transiting busy passages, through our longer-term remediation, 
which is the education process, four ships for watch-standing, 
and also the equipment and systems that we are putting in place 
to enhance the education process.
    CNO?
    Admiral Richardson. Senator, I'll just pick up from there. 
Every one of the measures that we committed to do, both to 
ourselves and with the Congress, are on track or complete. And 
we have really moved the discussion from, certainly, regaining 
a safe-to-operate perspective to moving through a climate of 
compliance into a culture of excellence, which is where your 
Navy should always be operating. This included a number of 
different measures across a very wide spectrum, including, 
first and probably foremost, the return of schedule and 
training and certification discipline in the 7th Fleet. And so, 
now we are ensuring that we certify all ships to go out and do 
the missions that they are assigned, and they have the 
requisite maintenance and training time to do those.
    We also addressed the surface warfare officer career path. 
And so, as I alluded--illuminated in my written statement, the 
amount of training throughout that career path, and the amount 
of sea time that an officer accrues before he goes to command, 
has almost doubled, across the board. And so, there's a lot 
more experience being gained.
    Finally, in addition to the amount of training, the quality 
of that training has increased considerably through the use of 
high-fidelity simulators, which are being installed in our 
schoolhouses and in our fleet concentration areas. So, to put 
it broadly, we're making progress across this entire broad 
front to get to that culture of excellence.
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, we can send you a little 
followup that I know Senator King had asked for. And being a 
data-centric person, it's the numbers behind what we just 
presented you.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you.
    Just to tie a bow on this line of questioning, how 
confident are you that we have no more ships in our Navy that 
have some of the deficiencies that those After Action Reviews 
cited, and that the leaders and sailors on our ships now have 
been fully trained and have the skills that they need to avoid 
such a terrible tragedy in the future?
    Admiral Richardson. I'm confident we're on the right track, 
sir.
    Secretary Spencer. Ditto.
    Senator Cotton. Okay.
    Secretary Spencer, let's turn back to the Truman now. 
There's always been a few lines of questions here. Could you 
tell us, very simply, was the decision about the Truman a 
decision driven by budget considerations or by strategic 
considerations?
    Secretary Spencer. It was a hybrid, Senator. Then-Deputy 
Secretary Shanahan, when we were planning budget rollout, the 
thinking amongst the Navy that we worked on was, we have three 
buckets. We have legacy systems, we modernize legacy systems, 
and the third bucket was what we call Funding Force 2.0, which 
is what we've referred to as our future warfare systems, 
whether that be quantum computing, AI, machine learning, et 
cetera. Couple that with the fact that--I want to make sure 
everyone understands this--the Ford will work. The Ford is not 
a Nimitz. The Ford has 30-percent higher launch capability for 
sorties than the Nimitz. It takes 25-percent less people. It is 
a more efficient machine. So, as I look at modernizing a fleet, 
much like in the commercial world, when organizations modernize 
aircraft, modernize trucks, modernize cars, modernize ships, 
they will move for 20-percent efficiencies and abandon the 
assets that they have. This is not an easy decision whatsoever, 
Senator, but, in light of the technologies that we have coming 
forward--and I defer to the Chairman that there's still work to 
be done, here--the thought process was, we have a much more 
capable, much more lethal, much more projecting platform. Three 
of those in the fleet will make up on a capacity argument. That 
was the primary decision. So, we can take those dollars and 
then deploy those into Force 2.0 as the competitive--changes.
    Senator Cotton. So, my time's almost expired, but just to--
one final question here. Surely, though, if this Congress 
provided you the money necessary for both the Truman refueling 
and also the rest of your shipbuilding plan, you wouldn't turn 
that money down and say, ``No, we don't need the Truman.''
    Secretary Spencer. I would not turn that money down.
    Senator Cotton. I didn't think so.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So, thousands of Active Duty troops and National Guardsmen 
are currently deployed on the southern border. This operation 
is going to cost at least a half a billion dollars. So, I've 
repeatedly written to the Department of Defense, asking whether 
the deployment impacts military readiness. Each time, the 
answer has been no. General Neller, last month you wrote a memo 
to the Navy Secretary identifying nine factors, ``imposing 
unacceptable risk to Marine Corps combat readiness and 
solvency,''. One was the border deployment, and a second was 
the President's plan to take funding away from military 
construction for a border wall.
    Now, General Neller, I know you did not expect this memo to 
become public, you did not release it, you were just doing your 
job by assessing risks. Ranking Member Reed and I, along with 
several other Committee members, sent another letter to the 
Department yesterday, because that's our job as Members of this 
Committee, to ask questions about the impact of these risks. 
So, let me ask. Have any exercises been canceled, or were any 
units sent to the border instead of going to scheduled training 
exercises? Just factual questions. General?
    General Neller. No exercises, to my knowledge, have been 
canceled. There have been some, due to funding.
    So, Senator, if I could just embellish for a second. You're 
correct, I had a list of eight unresourced requirements, of 
which one was the mission to go to the border. And what I tried 
to articulate was, if we did not get funding for these, the 
total cost of these, about $300 million, of which the border 
mission, right now, to date, costing about 6.2--if we didn't 
get additional money, then we would have to look at other 
sources for money, which could potentially include other 
exercises, which would eventually affect the readiness of the 
force.
    Senator Warren. So, I understand that, but I'm not quite 
sure I heard the answer to the question. Are you saying no 
exercises were canceled?
    General Neller. There was an exercise that we reduced the 
number of people that were going there, but we have relooked at 
our finances, and we're going to cashflow, at least for this 
quarter, those exercises, and we're going to continue to do the 
exercises.
    Senator Warren. Were any exercises delayed because people 
were sent to the border?
    General Neller. No.
    Senator Warren. Okay. Were any units sent to the border 
instead of going to scheduled training exercises?
    General Neller. There were some units that went to the 
border that were scheduled to participate in exercises, and 
they were not able to do so because they were in that mission.
    Senator Warren. So, they were diverted to the border 
instead of doing their----
    General Neller. A small number, yes----
    Senator Warren.--their exercises. Okay. Can you just say a 
word about what are the opportunity costs of the border 
deployment?
    General Neller. It depends on the unit. Some of the units 
have gone down there, and they have done tasks that are more in 
line with their core mission, like engineer units or MP units. 
Aviation units that were assigned to that early on have 
actually improved their readiness, because they are able to fly 
certain profiles. Other units, one particular unit is doing a 
mission today that's not part of their core competency, so it--
but, for 60 days, they can handle that, but it will affect 
their readiness.
    Senator Warren. Okay. So, when I have raised these issues 
with DOD officials, they seem to deny disruptions to readiness. 
I'm seeing something of a disconnect here.
    Secretary Spencer, maybe you can shed some light on this. 
DOD officials assured me, in writing, that the President's 
southern border deployment and the transfer of military 
construction funds for a wall do not present significant 
readiness risks. But, we now know that concerns about readiness 
have been raised internally. Same question to you. What are the 
opportunity costs of the border deployment?
    Secretary Spencer. I answered the same as the Commandant, 
Senator. There are some that actually benefit from the 
deployment, because they can actually do their job that their 
core competency is, some not. But, let's bring it up--and the 
whole reason that I asked both the CNO and the Commandant for a 
memo such as this is, I feel I have to know, being the chief 
executive of the service, to know where the stresses are. This 
was item G on the whole list. The main stress that we were 
dealing with at the time, Senator, was the hurricane, which was 
imposing the greatest cost on the Marine Corps. Five-hundred 
men for a month at the southern border is $1.25 million. In my 
mind, is that affecting my readiness stress? No, it's not.
    Senator Warren. All right. I understand that it's in a 
context. But, as I said before, part of our job is to explore 
where we have valid concerns to military readiness. You're 
doing your job when you raise those concerns. We're doing our 
job when we ask about them.
    The Commandant of the Marine Corps has said that border 
deployment and the transfer of military construction funds for 
a wall contribute to an unacceptable risk to the Marine Corps' 
combat readiness and solvency. I think it's time for the 
President and Congress to listen to him, and we should keep 
asking these questions.
    Thank you.
    Thank you, both.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service to our 
country.
    Secretary Spencer, you recently commissioned a report to 
review your cyber operations within the Department of Navy. In 
it the report was very critical of current naval operations 
with regard to cyber operations, and it went to great lengths 
to point out some of the failings within the system today. But, 
I also found it very refreshing, in that it laid out, for 
everyone to see, the challenges that you face, and it clearly 
puts a focus on the need to make significant changes. I find 
that, if you would have taken out the Department of Navy and 
you would have put in any one of our other branches, I suspect, 
other than the anecdotal examples, you would have found a 
consistency across the entire Department of Defense. So, number 
one, I want to thank you for laying this out for everyone to be 
able to see and to review, but also for laying out, not just 
the challenges, but some solutions that I think are moving in 
the right direction.
    I'd like you to talk a little bit about one part, in 
particular. And that is, as we move to a 355-ship Navy, and as 
we talk about the security of every one of those ships and all 
of the work that we do to protect each one of those ships, 
compare that with what our near-peer and peer competitors are 
doing. They're not stealing our ships. They're stealing our 
information. And we need to take a change, in terms of the 
culture, about how we protect our information, just like we 
protect our other assets.
    Would you care to comment a little bit about, number one, 
where you're going with that? And I've got one other question 
I'm going to--I want to ask you about. So, if you could, a 
little bit, share where you're going with this, and just how 
deep in this went to not just cybersecurity, but to all other 
aspects, whether it be acquisitions, logistics, and so forth, 
modernization.
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, thank you for the question, 
because it is timely. This was driven primarily out of some 
exfiltrations that happens in our supply system. And that's 
where the concern for the study started. Rest assured, when it 
comes to classified information within the Navy itself, we are 
good at that. Where we're concerned about is out in our 
contractor--cleared-contractor relationship base. That's where 
it started.
    Now, where did it progress from there? One, we need to take 
immediate remedial actions, which we are underway right now, 
with our supplier base, when it comes to our cyber protection. 
You will hear the Navy and ourselves talk about--it's not how 
quickly we can get to the fight. One of our battles is going to 
be getting off the pier, because cyber is around us 
continually, 100 times a minute, a second, whatever analogy you 
want to use. It's there, it's present, it's not going away. We 
need to up our game, not only on cyber defense, because you 
can't have one side of this equation, you have to be 
offensively agile as you do defensively agile. They both 
complement each other. We have to move into that realm. We're 
going to be asking for probably more authorities, in general, 
the DOD, when it comes to this, because it's a balanced 
equation.
    Immediately, in the Navy, we are in the process, right now, 
of--underneath Ron Moultrie, who was a primary member of the 
team, he is helping us coalesce our business plan to go forward 
with our cyber remediation process. That goes from data hygiene 
all the way to organizing what the organization would look 
like. We're sending a leg prop up to you all to entertain 
adding a fifth Assistant Secretary. One of the reasons here is 
that we need to get the people of gravitas, who have the 
education, who have the experience to deal in cyber, to get 
them into a position like that and give them the authority to 
organize and effect the solutions that we need.
    Senator Rounds. I found one other part of this to be 
interesting, in that I think this could be transferred--this 
concept of using the outside resources to not only look at the 
cyber side, but also on your acquisition side and on your 
maintenance side, as well. Last fall, I asked specific 
questions about your attack submarines, the numbers that you've 
got. You've still got a number of them sitting at dock, because 
you're not getting them in to drydock, which means we've got 
nuclear attack submarines taxpayers have paid for that can't be 
used today. In fact, a number of them, including the USS Boise, 
can't dive. You've also got legacy and Super Hornets, of which, 
2 years ago, I believe, we were estimating the operational 
capability at 40 percent. My understanding is, it's pretty 
close to that same level today. Can you share with us a little 
bit about the direction that you're going with regard to those, 
and whether or not you're making progress on those legacies, 
both the Navy and the Marines?
    Secretary Spencer. The good news that I'm very happy to 
bring to you right now is, our F-18, both Navy and Marine 
Corps, the Es and Fs and the legacies are not boasting 
somewhere up around 67 percent availability. And this is part 
of our Navy sustainment effort that we're focusing in right 
now. We have a ways to go when it comes to surface ship and 
subsurface ship maintenance. That is apparent. Senator Shaheen 
brought it up. We need to do our shipyard modernization. This 
is all about flow. We have the fundamental understanding now. 
Now we need to apply the resources to get those out into----
    Senator Rounds. You need to be at 80 percent, correct, on 
the Hornets, to make your mission?
    Secretary Spencer. By end of fiscal year, yes, Senator.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you. That's good news. I was not 
aware that that's where we were right now. Because we were down 
as low as 40 percent.
    Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Jones.
    Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you each for your service.
    But, Secretary Spencer, I want to particularly thank you 
for the time and--that you've shown me in my first 15 months 
here. It's been a really enjoyable and informative experience, 
what I've had. So, thank you for that.
    You have stated--I guess this would be mainly to Admiral 
Richardson and General Neller--that we have increased rates--
we're looking at 5100 sailors and trying to increase the rates. 
I'm particularly interested in the pilot ranks. How diverse are 
our pilot ranks in the Navy? And what is the Navy doing to kind 
of increase the diversity for men, for minorities, as well as 
females? Senator Cotton and I have a bill that we introduced to 
try to increase Junior ROTC and some other things to try to 
increase that diversity. Could you talk about those programs a 
little bit, and what you're doing?
    Admiral Richardson. So, I'll tell you, in the Navy, and 
then I'll turn it over to the Commandant.
    Just like you, Senator, we're doing everything we can to 
make sure, as I said in my opening statement, that we bring in 
a diverse workforce across the entire Navy, not only in our 
pilots, but everywhere, in that regard. We've opened up all of 
our jobs to women. Certainly, we encourage, you know, a diverse 
population across the board, not only in terms of assessing 
them, but also--you know, look at that population 25 years 
down. Is the leadership retaining that diversity as it gets 
more senior? And so, we've got a number of efforts that I'd be 
happy to come and brief your--you and your staff on in detail 
to get after that. But, suffice it to say that this is the 
competitive edge of the future, is diversity, and we take it 
very seriously.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
    General?
    General Neller. Senator, if I look at the gross numbers, 
particularly in aviation right now, for pilots, the stats are 
not really good. So, it's going to take a concerted long-term 
effort to create a better statistical look at--so that we have 
more men of color and ethnicity and women across the whole 
force, let alone in aviation. But, I can tell you, for the last 
4 years, the number of accessions for officers in the Marine 
Corps has been 24, 25, 26, and, last year, over 30 percent of 
those that accept a commission into the Marine Corps were men 
of color and ethnicity and women. A lot of that comes from the 
Naval Academy, because we have been able to increase the number 
of midshipmen that can join the Marine Corps. Used to be 
limited to 16.6 percent. In the last couple of years, it's been 
around 25. That's been a great source of us for men and women.
    So, it's going to take--it's not going to get fixed in 4 
years, because it takes 22 years to make a colonel, to be an 
air group commander or be a MEU commander. It takes 15 years to 
make a squadron commander. So, we'll continue to track this and 
pay attention to it, but anything you or any other of the 
Committee Members can do to encourage people to serve in the 
military, to be involved in science, technology, and math, 
whether it be high school JROTC, although that is, by itself, 
not supposed to be a recruiting place; that's just a place to 
develop leadership in our high school students. But, anything 
you can do in any area to encourage young men and women to join 
the military--Army, Air Force, Navy, or the Marine Corps--it 
would be appreciated.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you, General.
    Secretary Spencer, Admiral Richardson, as you know, 
Alabama's had an important role on building of the LCS, and 
we're kind of looking forward to the transition to the fast 
frigate. Can you tell us, just briefly, about the importance of 
the frigate's role in the NDS? And do you see the Navy holding 
to the procurement schedule for the frigate?
    Admiral Richardson. Senator, we do. It's extremely 
important that we make this transition to a--frankly, a more 
lethal, small surface combatant as we look at--forward and do 
the Force Structure Assessment, as we look at employing the 
Navy in a distributed way, using this distributed maritime 
operations concept. These fast frigates are going to be an 
important part of that. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Spencer. Just to add to that, Senator, putting my 
business hat on and my title 10 hat on, this is going to be one 
of the most robust competitions that we'll have, having five 
potential forms being submitted into the competition. It's 
quite exciting.
    Senator Jones. Great. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jones.
    Senator Perdue.
    Senator Perdue. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank the three of you and all your teams for a 
couple of things. One is, last November, we received our first 
ever in U.S. history DOD audit. I'm not a beancounter. I don't 
think that's what we should be about, but I do think we need to 
look at being the most efficient we can be so our men and women 
get everything they need. I also want to thank you for the $30 
billion of what looked like to me real savings, Mr. Secretary 
and the team, in the--just in the last 2 years. So, this is, 
directionally, very encouraging.
    Admiral Richardson. Billion, sir.
    Senator Perdue. I'm sorry. Billion.
    Admiral Richardson. Yeah.
    Senator Perdue. Thirty billion. Let's put a B in front of 
that. Apologize. Thank you.
    I have two questions. Mr. Secretary, I'd love for you to 
talk to us--you made a quote, 2 years ago now, or in December 
of 2017. I'm going to quote you, if that's okay. I think you 
won't mind this. ``Continuing Resolutions (CRs) have cost the 
Department of the Navy--continuing resolutions have cost the 
Department of the Navy roughly $4 billion. Between 2011 we've 
put 4--since 2011, we've put 4 billion in a trash can, put 
lighter fluid on it, and burned it.'' Do you still stand by 
that?
    Secretary Spencer. Most definitely, Senator.
    Senator Perdue. So, would you also acknowledge that $4 
billion--compared to the deployment at the border, $4 billion 
would have really materially impacted our readiness, would it 
not?
    Secretary Spencer. It would, Senator.
    Senator Perdue. Sir, would you talk to us just a little bit 
about the specific impacts of continuing resolutions? We've 
had--in the last 44 or 45 years since the 1974 Budget Act, 
we've had 187 continuing resolutions. In the last 10 years 
alone, one-third of our time has been, basically, under a CR. 
So, I'm very concerned. We're halfway through our fiscal year 
right now. We're looking at September 30th this year. Would you 
talk to us about what momentum damage that would do to what 
we've done in the last 2 years? And then I have one more 
question about maintenance, if we can get to it at the end.
    Secretary Spencer. I'll be very quick with this, Senator. 
The work that you all have done in both this chamber, across 
the way at the House, both in authorizations and appropriations 
over the last 3 years with the 2017 Regulatory Accountability 
Act (RAA), the 2018/2019 budget, is absolutely spectacular. 
You've heard me say that it's the foundation of readiness, and 
we're building upon it. We are. A CR will knock us off our 
game. It'll be the most painful thing we've had. And what's 
more bizarre to me is that it would self-induced.
    Admiral Richardson. Senator, if I could pile onto that----
    Senator Perdue. Yes, sir.
    Admiral Richardson.--just a little bit. I'll tell you, I 
completely agree with the Secretary. This would be like a punch 
in the gut. Just some specifics. It would--it looks like it 
would be almost 16 billion less than the budget request. Of 
course, it's not just the amount, but also the inability to 
start new things. And so, there would be no start to the 
aircraft carrier refueling, the fast frigate program that we 
just discussed, the advanced helo training system, and a number 
of others. There would be no quantity increases to the 
Virginia-class SSN, the carriers, the oilers, and many other 
programs. And so, the list goes on. And we would not be able to 
assess the people that we need to fill gaps at sea. And so, it 
would be devastating.
    Senator Perdue. General Neller, you have a helicopter I 
also believe is due for delivery this year that would be 
delayed until at least 1 full year. Is that correct?
    General Neller. As the CNO and the Secretary said, Senator, 
I mean, everything is impacted. You know, we come up with a 
program and a plan based on what an anticipated budget number's 
going to be. And, although it would be better than the BCA 
[Budget Control Act] number, it still would have impact and 
cause us to have to go back, and would stall our progress on 
readiness and modernization.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you.
    Admiral, supply chain. We've--other people have talked 
about it. You guys have talked about it repeatedly here. After 
sequestration years and cutting the military by 25 percent, the 
supply chain is totally devastated. I've seen that. I've lived 
in the supply chain most of my career, and I've seen that just 
in the last week. I was--I visited--you guys were gracious 
enough to let me visit the Truman yesterday. I want to thank 
you for that.
    One of the things I'm concerned about is, at procurement 
now, you do have some flexibility over a multiyear facet. I 
think it's 3 years. Under maintenance, though, if you don't 
spend money in one year, it rolls to the--it doesn't roll to 
the next, it basically has to be reappropriated. Would you be 
comfortable--or do you see value in a pilot program to test 
providing multiyear flexibility in ship--in depot maintenance 
appropriations?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, thanks for that question. Thanks 
for coming out to Truman yesterday. It was an honor to have you 
onboard.
    Sir, absolutely is the answer to your question. A pilot 
program, I think, would be terrific, because it would match the 
funding window to, really, the job at hand. And so, this would 
give us flexibility throughout the--before, during, and after a 
maintenance. Before, we could get the supply chain, the 
material purchased, the planning done, all of that, in order 
and in place. During, as adjustments always occur, it would 
give us more flexibility to move funds from one project to 
another. And then after, it would allow us to recoup funds that 
we didn't spend efficiencies and apply them to other projects. 
So, across the board, that type of flexibility would be very 
helpful. And I'd be happy to participate in a pilot program of 
that type.
    Senator Perdue. Thank you, sir.
    Secretary Spencer. It only makes business sense, Senator. 
It would be a great pilot to try.
    Senator Perdue. Well, that would be a shame, to try 
something commonsense that might help you guys, wouldn't it?
    In closing, Mr.--General Neller, I just want to thank you. 
Forty-four years is a long time to be doing anything, and 
America is better off because you were at the--on the wall. 
Thank you, sir.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
    Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to join in thanking you, General Neller, for your 
service. Forty-four years is a long time, but you have an 
extraordinary and distinguished career, and it will be a model 
for many of our marines for a long time.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for your service, as 
well.
    I was encouraged to see, Admiral Richardson, your remarks 
about the Virginia-class submarine. I was encouraged that you 
agree that we should seize this moment of opportunity to build 
at the rate of three per year. I would assume that you also 
believe that we need to strengthen our workforce with training 
and the capability to build those submarines, correct?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, I had the chance to go up to 
Groton and visit Electric Boat. And one of my main topics was 
exactly that. I'll tell you, this is something that is really 
good for the Nation. Electric Boat and Newport News 
Shipbuilding, together, the two shipyards that build our 
submarines, have reached deep into the community colleges and 
high schools to start building skilled workforce at that level, 
at that age. All of those folks who would, historically, maybe 
go to low-paying service jobs or those sorts of things are now 
doing really high-level work--pipefitters, welders, 
electricians, et cetera--to meet this workforce demand that's 
going to allow us to build these amazing ships.
    Senator Blumenthal. They have begun expanded apprenticeship 
programs and skill training, on-the-job training that is 
building that kind of dedicated workforce in southeastern 
Connecticut. Not only there, but throughout the supply chain, 
which is critical to the future of our national defense. The 
construction of three Virginia-class submarines in fiscal year 
2020 is good news for our national security as well as for that 
workforce and for Connecticut. I'm going to do everything I can 
to support and bolster this effort. I hope it will be a smooth 
process in this year's budget cycle. But, I appreciate your 
commitment to this effort.
    Let me ask you about another area that I think is 
tremendously important to our national security. I know that, 
Secretary Spencer, you've been asked about the report, which I 
think you said is due at noon today.
    Secretary Spencer. I said I'd get it underway, sir, at noon 
today. I don't know if I can deliver it today.
    Senator Blumenthal. Well, we'll anticipate it whenever it's 
delivered.
    Secretary Spencer. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. But, you would agree that climate 
change is a national security issue, correct?
    Secretary Spencer. Rising waters are a threat to me at all 
times, yes, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. The prospect of famine, of flooding, 
drought, wildfires, the disruption that climate change causes 
around the world is a national security threat, correct?
    Secretary Spencer. I would agree with you, sir.
    Senator Blumenthal. Do you believe that opinion is shared 
throughout the Department of Defense among your fellow service 
Secretaries?
    Secretary Spencer. I loathe to comment on something I 
haven't asked them about, but I know that, in discussions, we 
share concerns about the events that you just discussed.
    Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that our Department 
of Defense is, not only acting, but also planning adequately 
into the future for this national security threat?
    Secretary Spencer. I do, Senator. And the reason I'm 
pausing, I'm thinking about three reports I just read 
internally, primarily on how the Navy is hipping into direction 
from the Department of Defense and what we're doing in that 
regard. So, the answer would be yes.
    Senator Blumenthal. Climate change is really a threat 
multiplier, because it inflames the global instability, it 
exacerbates those floods and food shortages and droughts and 
all of the humanitarian crises, which increasingly breed 
terrorist threats to this Nation. We live in that world now. I 
thank you and your fellow members of the Department of Defense 
for your awareness of this issue, no matter what the climate of 
opinion is elsewhere in this administration.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
    Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service.
    I think--Admiral Richardson and General Neller, I think 
this is your last posture hearing. So, thanks for your 
wonderful service. Forty-four years, General. I'm sure the one 
thing you probably won't miss, in terms of your Marine Corps, 
is these kind of hearings. So--you don't have to answer that.
    I'm also glad to see our colleagues, like Senator Warren, 
are raising their concerns about combat readiness for the 
military. I think we all share that. What did the 2010 to 2016 
25 percent cuts in the DOD budget do to combat--to readiness 
for our combat forces? Twenty-five-percent cuts----
    Admiral Richardson. I'll----
    Senator Sullivan.--from 2010 to 2016. A lot of people don't 
remember that, but----
    Admiral Richardson. I think that--Senator, I'll just take 
the first stab at this, then I'll just--I think it's been said 
before, that budget instability and insufficiency has done more 
damage to the military than any enemy.
    Senator Sullivan. General?
    General Neller. Sir, as much as we don't want to admit it, 
we need resources to be able to buy gear, train, and maintain 
the force. So, when we were in the period of time--the forward-
deployed forces, I believe, we're as ready as we could make 
them, but the difference between that and today is that the 
folks that were back home and on the bench, their overall 
readiness was--is not what it is today.
    Senator Sullivan. Just want to talk about an issue--
probably won't surprise you--I want to talk about the Arctic. 
You know, China and Russia are making big moves into that part 
of the world, because of resources, transportation routes. 
We're an Arctic nation because of my State, Alaska. The Russian 
buildup has been dramatic. Four new Arctic brigades, a new 
Arctic command, 50 airfields by 2020, 30-percent increase in 
Russian special forces in the Arctic, 40 icebreakers, 13 more 
being built, huge snap exercises, in the tens of thousands. 
This Committee, in a bipartisan way--I see Senator King is 
here--has been very focused on this issue--new Arctic strategy, 
strategic Arctic ports, icebreakers. I want to commend you, the 
three of you, on your focus on this issue, as well.
    Mr. Secretary, can you talk about some of the Navy's plans, 
in terms of freedom of navigation operations, training on Adak, 
that you and I have gone out to see that very strategic naval 
base that kind of breaks your heart to see that it's been 
shuttered, but the opportunities there. Then, General, cold-
weather training and other opportunities in Alaska and other 
places. You know, when you look at our military and our 
threats, North Korea, Russia, China all present cold-weather, 
mountainous threats, in terms of terrain. I think we need to do 
more in training in that area.
    Can you three gentlemen talk about some of our interests 
and what you're doing in that important strategic space for 
America?
    Secretary Spencer. More than happy to, Senator. Let me lead 
off, and I'll be more than happy to hand it over to both the 
CNO and the Commandant.
    As you and I have discussed and we've presented to this 
Committee before, the Arctic is a focus of ours, and we've 
never taken our eyes off of it. We've been up there since 1964, 
if I'm not mistaken, under sea, making sure our presence was 
known under sea, and in the air. But, now we're taking a more 
proactive step. We have up to three exercises that you've been 
made aware of in Alaska. We have one on Adak that we hope to 
have funded. NORTHCOM is the COCOM that is coordinating that.
    Senator Sullivan. And that's amphibious operations and----
    Secretary Spencer. That is amphibious operations.
    Senator Sullivan.--other P-8 sub-hunter ops?
    Secretary Spencer. Correct. Exactly. Take the airfield, 
then bring in the P-8s, fundamentally.
    We have been, in concert with the Coast Guard and you, 
looking at the needs and the possibility of a strategic port up 
in Alaska. I think this summer----
    Senator Sullivan. At this Committee's behest, correct?
    Secretary Spencer. That is correct, Senator.
    We--the CNO and I have been talking about the possibility 
of bringing some ships up, maybe up to Valdez--again, training 
north of the Arctic Circle. We learned this in the most recent 
Trident Juncture, where we had ships above the Circle. We need 
to learn again what we have done in the past, exercise those 
muscle movements, get the sets and reps so we're ready to fight 
up there, if need be, and/or just to do our freedom of 
navigation and/or diligent maneuvers up there.
    CNO?
    Admiral Richardson. So, I'll just pile on to that, if I 
could. Since the last time we testified before this Committee, 
I've signed out the Strategy Outlook for the Arctic--I'm happy 
to share that with you immediately--which talks about our 
strategic objectives to defend United States sovereignty up in 
the Arctic--as you said, we are an Arctic nation--to ensure the 
Arctic remains stable and conflict-free, protect the freedom of 
the seas, and promote partnerships with United States 
Government and other Arctic nations.
    Since that time, we've been putting our money where our 
mouth is, too. You know, we're not just talking about this, 
we've done four major exercises up in the Arctic. Arctic Edge, 
where more than 1500 military personnel were up in Alaska to 
test our ability to operate up there. As the Secretary 
mentioned, we did the Ice Ex, with two United States submarines 
and one British submarine up there. Trident Juncture, where we 
brought a carrier strike group north of the Arctic Circle for 
the first time since 1991, in November. I can tell you, much 
has changed since 1991, but it's still extremely cold and hard 
to operate, up north of the Arctic Circle. We regained some of 
those muscles. And then, in February, Arctic Exercise. Then, as 
the Secretary mentioned, looking forward to September of this 
year, if we can get the environmental clearances and everything 
to do a exercise up in the Arctic, amphibious with our Marine 
Corps partners, as well, which will include not only a takedown 
and a P-8--in Adak, but also the important part of logistics 
and refueling ashore, and all of those things.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, General, I can get your details from you later on 
this.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    General Neller. The Marine Corps consistent position 
regarding the Arctic is that ``the Marine Corps must be 
prepared to deploy wherever the Navy (and Coast Guard) deploy. 
The Marine Corps maintains capability to support Naval 
operations in ``any clime and place,'' including the Arctic. 
Depending on seaborne lift, the Service plans for a baseline of 
two MEBs that can conduct offensive operations in extreme cold 
weather environments. To develop and maintain this capability, 
the Marine Corps routinely deploys Marine Air-Ground Task 
Forces (MAGTF) of varying sizes to conduct cold weather 
training. The units train both in CONUS at the Marine Corps 
Mountain Warfare Training Center, and other venues including 
Camp Ripley, Minnesota and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The Service 
also trains in Alaska, in Exercise ARCTIC EDGE and in Norway, 
in exercises such as TRIDENT JUNCTURE as well as winter 
training rotations above the Arctic Circle. These training 
exercise feature interoperability training with NATO allies 
such as the Norwegian Army and the British Royal Marines. 
Additionally, the Marine Corps conducts cold weather training 
in the Pacific, alongside our Korean allies in the Korea Marine 
Exercise Program (KMEP), and in northern Japan, in winter 
exercises such as FOREST LIGHT. The Marine Corps has recently 
upgraded its Infantry Combat Clothing and Equipment (ICCE) cold 
weather inventory. The Service maintains sufficient cold 
weather ICCE for the entire Active and Reserve population and 
Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECCWCS) ICCE (sufficient 
for temperatures to minus 25 degrees F) for 35,000 marines, 
with plans to acquire sufficient sets for an additional 4,000 
marines when funding becomes available. The resulting ability 
to outfit 39,000 marines for extreme cold weather supports the 
Arctic-capable two MEB objective. The Service is currently 
(May, 2019) undertaking a study to review and update the 
requirement to provide increased numbers and capabilities of 
cold weather/Arctic-capable units, given the emerging 
requirements of potential operations in northwest Europe and 
northeast Asia, particularly above the Arctic Circle and north 
of the permafrost line.

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
    Gentlemen, I was very pleased----
    Chairman Inhofe. Yeah, let me interrupt for just a moment.
    We do have a vote coming up. And so, Senator Reed is going 
to go down and vote early, and come up, relieve me, and I'll 
vote late, and we'll keep on working through.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Chairman.
    Gentlemen, I was very pleased to see the focus that the DOD 
is now putting on hypersonics, and, in particular, the $2.6 
billion request for prototyping across the services. As you 
probably know, Sandia National Labs has long played a critical 
role in developing this technology, and is the core reason why 
we have--we actually have a capability now that's ready to 
prototype.
    One of the things I've discussed with lab directors, who 
are really eager to transition this technology to industry, and 
believe it may actually be important to co-locate the R&D and 
the manufacturing of these systems. What will the role of the 
lab community and industry partners be as we seek rapid 
development of this capability? And is there some value in 
making sure that the feedback loop between R&D, engineering, 
and manufacturing is as tight as possible?
    Secretary.
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, from day one coming here, one 
of my comments was that I have to be able to work, and so does 
Navy enterprise, as a partner with our--with industry. This is 
a prime example of it. But, what's really exciting about this 
project is, not only are we partners with industry, the Navy, 
Air Force, and Army are partners, as we signed out a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) to work together across our traditional 
stovepipes. So, we're applying combined resources together to 
get the goal forward, which is why you're seeing hypersonics 
dragged to the earlier dates. It's going to be critical, as we 
transition from R&D to manufacturing, that there not be a 
stutter-step, there's no light between R&D and the transfer to 
actual production. I believe everybody's onboard with that. The 
proof will be in the pudding, but you can guarantee that the--
--
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
    Secretary Spencer.--three service Secretaries and their 
acquisition arms are looking at it this way.
    Senator Heinrich. Well, I really appreciate the joint 
approach on this, because we're behind the eight ball, we're a 
little late to the party, and we need to speed things up. And I 
think making sure that all of those capabilities, the center of 
excellence in manufacturing, are as tight as possible. It's 
going to be really important.
    Admiral Richardson, I was very encouraged by the Navy's 
rapid demonstration of laser weapon systems on surface ships. 
In a short period of time, the Navy has successfully deployed a 
30-kilowatt laser on the USS Ponce, the 150-kilowatt laser on 
the USS Portland. You have an $80 million unfunded requirement 
in this area. If that were funded, what would it allow the Navy 
to do?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, first, let me thank the Committee 
and the entire Congress for all the support in this part of our 
business. It's really been terrific.
    What the--including that on the unfunded priority list does 
is allow us to accelerate it even further, right? The budget 
moves very aggressively in this area already--the submitted 
budget. But, if we got a little bit more money, we could move 
even more aggressively, still. And so, I've been, you know, 
privileged to kind of visit the direct-energy corridor. I was 
just recently out at our labs in California. They're working at 
every possible part of this, from the weapon itself, getting 
higher and higher powers, and then the integration with the 
combat system, shore-based test facilities. We're taking this 
very seriously across a full range of powers.
    Senator Heinrich. Is the Navy looking at high-powered 
microwaves, as well, for----
    Admiral Richardson. We are.
    Senator Heinrich.--high-velocity threats, like cruise 
missiles or hypersonics?
    Admiral Richardson. Indeed, we are, sir. And so, we--when 
we talk about directed energy or electric weapons, a lot of 
times we go right to the lasers, because----
    Senator Heinrich. Right.
    Admiral Richardson.--that's so exciting, but there's also a 
tremendous amount of work being done in high-power microwave.
    Senator Heinrich. Secretary Spencer, I want to sort of 
finish up here with a workforce question on artificial 
intelligence, and really the need to make sure that we're 
building the workforce for these coming changes now. I had a 
conversation last week with Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, 
on the idea of potentially--whether it would be beneficial to 
create a mission occupational specialty for this type of 
workforce. I'd just love to get your input on what you think we 
need to be doing now to make sure that we're developing a 
workforce that can handle and care for the kind of data that is 
going to be required, and whether it would be helpful to 
consider a mission occupational speciality for that type of 
workforce.
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, a very timely question, because 
this obviously does feed to Force 2.0, as I just was describing 
earlier. When I look at it through Navy lenses, the way that I 
view artificial intelligence is, that is the development of an 
algorithm that I can take and then apply to my machines so they 
can learn. I think, in the clearest path, what I would like to 
see is possibly, at the DOD level, have your AI development, 
and Navy be able to go up and check that algorithm out of the 
locker, out of the development field, and then apply it to the 
needs that they have, or amend it to the needs that they have. 
That would be the most efficient, I believe, way to go forward.
    That being said, we need to ring the bell right now, say, 
``Doors are open,'' and bring as many of the great minds to 
interact with AI right now.
    Senator Heinrich. Great. Thank you, Secretary.
    Thank you, Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Peters.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here today.
    Secretary Spencer, this budget does not request funding for 
additional littoral combat ship procurement. I understand that 
the Navy plans to shift from buying LCS to the next-generation 
frigate, called the FFGX. I know you plan to purchase nine 
hulls by fiscal year 2024, with the first purchase coming 
fairly quickly, in fiscal year 2020. But, recently, Vice 
Admiral Merz, the Deputy Chief, testified to the House that the 
Navy will be reevaluating its force structure plan, citing 
specifically--and I'm going to quote him right now, ``We know 
we are heavy on large surface combatants, and we'd like to 
adjust that to a more appropriate mix, especially with the 
lethality we're seeing coming along with the frigate.''
    My question to you is, How are you approaching the 
industrial base, given the potential to increase the Force 
Structure Assessment requirement above the current requirement 
for 52 small surface combatants?
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, you've hit a nail on the head. 
The supply chain is absolutely critical in this regard, no 
matter which way we move, with what provider. As I said 
earlier, the excitement about this program is--as you know, 
there are five forms that we're considering, so it's going to 
be a very competitive competition. But, we're not just looking 
at the ship, per se. One of the things that we have really 
moved forward on is, when we look at the acquisition of a 
platform, equally important is the sustainment of that 
platform. You might have heard us say that, traditionally, if 
you look back, 70 cents on the dollar was spent on acquisition, 
and 30 on sustainment. We're shifting that model completely 
because of what we've, obviously, learned. It's going to be 
critical that, in this competition, we understand where the 
supply base is, the health of that supply base, and the ability 
of that supply base's resiliency.
    Senator Peters. Well, do you believe the current budget 
request, then, bridges the gap? Because we're going to have a 
gap there in funding to make sure the industrial base can 
continue to operate.
    Secretary Spencer. I believe it does. We're going to listen 
to industry. Right now, that has not become an issue, but we 
will listen to industry when it comes to that point.
    Senator Peters. Very good.
    The Navy's budget also--request--includes a request for ten 
large unmanned surface vessels across the future years defense 
plan, and planned at about two per year, beginning in fiscal 
year '20. So, it's clear the Navy is continuing to embrace the 
benefits of unmanned platforms, particularly given the 
opportunities for low-cost, high-endurance platforms that can 
be reconfigured with a variety of payloads and can often serve 
as a force multiplier to the manned force out there.
    So, my question is to both Secretary Spencer and Admiral 
Richardson. Can you provide more detail on how you expect the 
Navy's unmanned surface vehicle family of systems to develop? 
What are the specific benefits that you hope that these 
platforms are going to offer the fleet?
    Secretary Spencer. Let me just provide, again, from a title 
10 point, buying of these platforms. You all have told us, in 
no mixed terms, that we are to move with urgency. That message 
is being transferred all the way down throughout the whole 
naval enterprise. This is a prime example of where we're going 
to acquire these platforms, and we're going to build, you know, 
use, break, learn, cycle, continually. This is a prime example 
of a platform that we'll do this on.
    CNO?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, the benefits of unmanned in this 
area almost speak for themselves. We can send a ship out there 
for a lot longer. Oftentimes, in terms of endurance, the people 
are the limiting factor there. We can send them into higher-
risk areas, you know, so all sorts of benefits. I agree with 
you that this large vessel will allow us a diversity of 
payloads, from weapons payloads to logistics payloads. The 
Commandant and I have been talking about some terrific 
opportunities for naval integration using these. The first 
couple, we'll be working very closely with the Strategic 
Capabilities Office to get those two going, and then we'll 
partner very closely with industry. We'll probably use mature 
designs for the hull form and those sorts of things. The real 
R&D part in this is, you know, what about the unmanned, what 
are the autonomy, how do we get into that, particularly when 
it--I mean, there's all sorts of dimensions, not only from a 
safety dimension, a security dimension, an ethical dimension, 
when you start to think about weapons employment. That's why we 
have them in the account--the R&D account, where they are right 
now.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
    General Neller, you--the Marine Corps has been conducting 
advanced naval technology exercises with the Navy to leverage 
both the industrial and academic intellectual base with 
prototypes and get it into the hands of marines as quickly as 
possible so that we can be on the cutting edge of new 
technologies but learn from our marines in the field. Could you 
briefly just tell us and inform us, What lessons did the 
marines learn during the technology exercise in 2018, and are 
we going to be continuing those kinds of exercises?
    General Neller. Well, first, Senator, yes, we will. We just 
did another one down at Camp Lejeune, as far as mine 
countermeasures, where we have--basically, we invite vendors to 
show up for certain technologies. The one in 2018--they're all 
kind of running together. We've been doing about one big one a 
year, give a certain theme with these surface-to-surface 
movement, and they show up with their capabilities, and then--
they talk to the marines, they learn what the marine 
requirements are, they make a change to their thing, and the 
marines kind of say, ``Hey, we think this has got value, and 
this one does not.'' And so, we can narrow it down.
    So, we'll continue to do that. We just recently did a big 
exercise with the Navy on the West Coast, called Pacific Blitz, 
where we had a number of technologies and ideas being 
demonstrated, where we looked at expeditionary-based operations 
where we would employ a marine force to, as part of the naval 
force, control maritime seaspace. So, we'll continue to do 
that, and we'll--the ships that you were just talking about 
with the CNO and the Secretary are of great interest to us. 
They could be platforms, as the CNO said, to carry weapons, 
they could carry logistics. We're seeing now that we need to 
have some sort of a connector that allows us to move from place 
to place. If it's unmanned and it can still do the job, that 
just makes it safer and easier, and it reduces our costs and 
our risk.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Peters.
    Senator Tillis.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
    Secretary Spencer, thank you for the work out at Annapolis 
last week on sexual assault. I think that it was a great 
discussion, great coming together of expertise. And so, it was 
a good meeting. A great outcome will be specific proposals that 
we can work together on to make sure that we make progress in 
this Congress. But, I thank you for being here.
    I want to go quickly with limited time, to General Neller. 
General Neller, you don't strike me as the sort of person that 
gets rattled very easily, but I've seen and had a number of 
discussions with you on the MILCON challenges that we have down 
at Camp Lejeune. I don't know if it's been covered in any of 
the other meetings--I've got two competing meetings going--or 
discussions, here--but, can you outline for this Committee your 
chief concerns over the billions of dollars of MILCON backlog 
that we have at Camp Lejeune, how it affects capabilities, 
readiness, and the operations of the base?
    General Neller. Senator, it's really not a backlog, it's an 
emerging requirement. As you know, Hurricane Florence struck 
the Carolina coast in September of last year. Fortunately, the 
storm went from a category 4 to a 2, but then, when it did come 
ashore, it sat on top of the--that part of North Carolina, 
rained for 3 straight days, rained over 30 inches of rain. And 
so, when the roofs came off some of these 40-, 50-, 60-, 70-
year-old buildings, and the water went in, we had a lot of 
damage. And it's not visible. It's not like down in the 
Panhandle, when Michael came across with category-4 winds and 
actually leveled buildings. So, it--when you drive around, you 
don't see it. It's more inside.
    And so, we've gone through. The PPV vendor is working to 
fix the housing that was damaged aboard the base. And they're 
about a 50-percent improve in their process. That was a painful 
thing, to get that going. But, they're working that. But, we've 
gone through and looked at all the buildings, and we've 
prioritized about 30 buildings we think the costs of repair is 
not worth it, that we think they need to be replaced. And the 
total bill's about $3.5 billion. The 400 million that we got in 
reprogramming last week will be helpful, but--so, we still have 
this remaining bill. A lot of this money, the Department says 
they're going to put it in fiscal year 2020. And so, we're 
hopeful that that will be part of the program. But, we still 
have about $450 million we could legitimately apply this fiscal 
year if we were to get the money.
    Senator Tillis. You tell me what the impact is on--what are 
you doing to make do? Some of these buildings, I would assume, 
are inhabitable, and you're having to figure out how to 
continue to operate. Can you give me an idea of how it's 
disrupting the day-to-day operations at Lejeune?
    General Neller. We've had to move people around to 
different places and spaces. We've had to make adjustments on 
some of the communications. And, in some cases, the marines are 
just continuing to operate in the building, making the best of 
what they have. The buildings are not unsafe, but their ability 
to have heating or air-conditioning is limited. And so, it's a 
pretty expeditionary environment, which is something we're used 
to, but--and you can do that for a limited period of time, but 
it would be nice to be able to work in a more normal 
environment, in a garrison environment.
    So, we're confident that we'll get these things fixed. Some 
of the buildings that they're in eventually would be razed and 
a new building would be built, because that's what we think 
it's going to take. We know for a fact from the storm that all 
the new buildings--and the Congress has been very generous with 
all the MILCON down at Camp Lejeune and many of our other 
bases--all the new buildings suffered very little to no damage. 
So, we've got a lot of old buildings down there that we think 
we need to replace if we're going to continue to be able to 
survive what's likely to be continued storms in the future.
    Senator Tillis. Secretary Spencer, I appreciate, also, your 
prompt action after a committee where I was a little bit 
animated on housing, a month or so ago, and want to continue to 
work with the--with all of DOD on what I think are unacceptable 
housing conditions. I've gone down to Fort Bragg. I'm going to 
be visiting Camp Lejeune, going to spend some time. And you've 
got to separate the storm damage from some of the problems that 
existed before that. We'll have to sort that out. But, do you 
also--and, Admiral Richardson, do you share the Commandant's 
view that this military construction recovery down at Camp 
Lejeune is a top priority?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes.
    Senator Tillis. Thank you all.
    Last thing I'll leave you with--I left it with Secretary 
Wilson in the hearing last week--is that--I understand the 
funding request. I tend to support what your priorities are, 
and hope to provide the funding. I think that you need to look 
ahead and game out what the likelihood is of getting that 
funding, versus something less than that, and, you know, worst 
case, a sequester, and need to communicate, in very specific 
terms, what your Department will have to do to react to that, 
not here in the Committee, but there needs to be a very clearly 
delineated list of everything that shifts to the right as a 
result of Congress's failure to give you all the resources that 
I think you need and you deserve.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
    Senator King.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Gentlemen, I'd like to start my questioning with a plea. 
We've had testimony from the SOUTHCOM commanders, over the last 
2 or 3 years, that we have intelligence about drug shipments 
coming to the United States by sea. Of the 100 percent that we 
have intelligence on, we're only able to interdict 25 percent 
because of lack of maritime assets. Since this hearing started, 
12 Americans have died of overdoses. Our country is under 
attack. People are dying. People are dying in my State, one a 
day. Please, see if you can find a way to allocate LCS or other 
maritime assets to work with the Coast Guard to interdict those 
drug shipments. It is inexcusable that we know of a drug 
shipment and can't do anything about it because of a lack of 
maritime assets. If you want to respond, Mr. Secretary, I'd be 
delighted, but, basically, this is a heartfelt request to try 
to use--to do something that's within our power to do.
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, could not agree more. The CNO 
and I have been talking, along with Admiral Faller, down in 
SOUTHCOM, exactly about this. This is a mission that fits the 
LCS, and I think, this coming quarter or so, you'll see our 
response in that regard.
    Senator King. Thank you. I'd deeply appreciate that, and 
I'll look forward to continue to work with you on that.
    To just a somewhat lighter question, a major change is--
you're talking, now, about a large surface combatant. You're in 
the early stages. Can we assume that that's going to follow a 
similar path of the new frigate program of existing hulls, 
working with partners, and that kind of approach to this 
project?
    Admiral?
    Admiral Richardson. If I could, just--the short answer is 
yes, we're going to try and really shorten the acquisition 
cycle, and we do so by leveraging more advanced and mature 
technologies, hull forms all the way up to combat system 
sensors, weapons----
    Senator King. Good.
    Admiral Richardson. And then we take more rapid, shorter 
acquisition steps, if you will, to follow that Moore's Law 
curve, or that exponential curve, a little bit more closely, 
with smaller steps.
    Senator King. Appreciate it. Thank you.
    And I should have, at the beginning--I've had some 
exchanges with naval officers here over the last month or so 
about the accidents with the McCain and the Fitzgerald. I've 
sought data. I've met with you at the Pentagon. I want to 
express my appreciation for the forward-leaning approach that 
you've taken, the data you have supplied. That doesn't mean I'm 
always going to be happy. So, keep at it. I want to see the 
data, on a quarterly basis, specific, ship-by-ship, in terms of 
training levels and all of the issues that were identified in 
the reviews of those two crashes. I think it's very important. 
But--trust, but verify, I guess is what I'm saying. And I 
intend to continue to verify. And I--but, I do appreciate what 
the Navy has done and the responsiveness that you've shown.
    Secretary Spencer, last year we talked about the audit, 
what you expected to find. You said you saw 4 to 7 years, I 
think, as a ramp-up to get to a clean audit. Now that we've had 
a year, any modification of your estimate? And are you 
satisfied with the process, thus far?
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, no update on the date. I will 
say that we've come in a year. I'm not kicking it out one more 
year, keeping 4-to-7 being a constant. We learned a tremendous 
amount, and we are underway right now, remediating the findings 
from the audit itself. But, the remediation is only one of the 
steps we're taking. It's what we're learning from the 
remediation. As an example, in the way that we monitor our real 
estate, in the way that we keep tabs on armaments. We're 
finding many different ways to improve the way we do it. Best 
practices from both other services, other forms of government, 
and outside the----
    Senator King. So, your conclusion is that the audit has 
certainly performed a useful function.
    Secretary Spencer. Its ROI [return on investment] is a 
multiple, sir.
    Senator King. That's excellent. I appreciate that and look 
forward to future progress.
    One, just, short comment at the end. You had an exchange--I 
believe it was with Senator Rounds--about the cyberthreat. I 
deal with cyber in two other committees, and one of the things 
that's come out in recent hearings is the threat via subs, that 
the major contractors are pretty secure and strong, and our 
adversaries are now going through a little six-person 
engineering firm that supplies one screw to a major contractor, 
and that's how they get into the system. I commend to you that 
as a risk factor that I think needs real attention. I also 
commend to you the Red Team approach to get their attention.
    Secretary Spencer. Senator, you've hit the nail on the 
head, and that came out in the review that we just had, our 
cybersecurity review. But, I'd like to turn around and say 
hat's off to you and Congressman Gallagher for setting up the 
Solarium. We look forward to seeing what's going to come out of 
your organization in that regard. There is not enough time and 
there's not enough resources to be put against this issue right 
now. We've got to get the gray matter starting it, and then 
we're going to start effecting the remediation.
    Senator King. We had our first meeting yesterday. We're on 
our way.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair--Secretary.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Inhofe. Thank you, Senator King.
    Senator Reed has returned. We're under--a vote is underway. 
I'm going to go vote, come back. We're going to work through 
it.
    Senator Hawley.
    Senator Hawley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you, as always, 
for your exemplary service.
    I have heard much praise for your work, as reflected in 
this budget in a lot of areas, but particularly in an area I 
want to ask you about, in the investments in unmanned, 
undersea, and surface platforms. I want to ask you about an 
unmanned aerial system, the MQ-25 Stingray. I understand this 
is the first of its kind unmanned aerial system that will serve 
as a refueling station for other carrier-based aircraft. And 
many proud Missourians are working on this program in St. 
Louis. Of course, they have my firm support.
    Secretary Spencer, can you update the Committee on the 
Stingray's progress and when you expect it to enter service?
    Secretary Spencer. I'm going to defer to the CNO, here, on 
exacts. This is a fast-track acquisition, and it's a large-
platform fast-track acquisition. We are tremendously impressed 
with what we've heard coming out of St. Louis on the different 
manufacturing style that they're going to use on the MQ-25, 
which is--without going into the weeds, is going to actually 
speed time dramatically for our receipt of this.
    CNO?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, first, let me tell--talk to the 
military benefit of this tanker--unmanned tanker, which will be 
able to stay in flight for so much longer that a manned tanker 
would be. And then, it liberates five F-18 strike fighter 
aircraft to do strike fighter missions instead of tanking 
missions. So, military utility couldn't be stronger.
    As well, the approach to acquisition, as the Secretary 
said, has been unique, in that we partnered with industry very, 
very early on to define the requirements appropriately, going 
back to Senator King's discussion regarding technical maturity, 
so that we can get this out into the fleet as quickly as 
possible. And so, for a sophisticated aircraft program, we let 
the contract for this program in 2018, and we expect this to be 
on deck in 2024, 6 years, which is pretty good, by recent 
metrics.
    Senator Hawley. Yeah, that's outstanding. Thank you.
    Admiral, can I just ask you about the--how the Stingray's 
deployment will change how air carrier--or carrier air wings 
operate? I think you started to gesture towards that just now, 
but we'd--if you would say some more about this.
    Admiral Richardson. Well, it'll extend the range of the 
Strike Fighter Air Wing, right, because we'll be able to go 
out--tank those aircraft, and allow them to go out to do their 
mission even further. But, I'll tell you what, sir. This is 
just the beginning for unmanned for us with the Air Wing. I 
think that one of the most exciting parts of this will be to 
integrate unmanned with the aircraft carrier crew, in terms of 
launching and recovery, and then, of course, integrating it 
with the other manned parts of the Air Wing. Lots of lessons 
learned as we continue to advanced unmanned aircraft.
    Senator Hawley. Yeah. Thank you very much.
    Let me just shift to a broader set of questions in the 
Indo-Pacific theater. The NDS focuses our attention on the fait 
accompli scenarios. Of course, in the Pacific, arguably, the 
decisive theater from the NDS standpoint, when it comes to a 
fait accompli scenario involving Taiwan, which is one that is 
featured prominently, much the focus of our attention and 
planning, how are we doing with our current capabilities on our 
capacity to prevent a fait accompli scenario in that specific 
instance?
    Go ahead, Admiral.
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, I'll just echo Admiral Davidson's 
thoughts. He's the Indo-Pacific commander primarily responsible 
for making sure that we are ready, in all respects across the 
entire Joint Force and the interagency, for that contingency.
    Senator Hawley. Do you feel that we are making progress, 
here, from the Navy's point of view, with the capacities, the 
capabilities that are required--I mean, are we making progress, 
here, in getting to where we need to be to prevent a fait 
accompli?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, I think that one of the major 
strategic messages of the budget submission that we're 
discussing today is that it looks exactly at that problem. If 
you integrate across the size of the force, the capability of 
the force, and the readiness of the force, it's focused on our 
pacing threat, which is the Indo-Pacific.
    Senator Hawley. Can you tell me, there have been--there's 
been some discussion, of course, about aircraft carriers today. 
But, from a broader point of view, can you tell me how you see 
the carriers contributing to our toughest fights in that 
theater, with China? I mean, what is it--as we think about 
their major investments, obviously----
    Admiral Richardson. Right.
    Senator Hawley.--what is that, strategically, the carrier--
how does the carrier contribute--how will it contribute in that 
theater, in the decisive theater, to that fight with China?
    Admiral Richardson. Right. There's been a lot of discussion 
about aircraft carriers and their role in the future. So, I 
appreciate the question. Once, again, going back to our budget, 
the acquisition of another Ford-class aircraft carrier, and the 
purchase of two of them at the same time, capturing a $4 
billion savings, but is a firm a statement as we can make that 
aircraft carriers are a lethal, survivable part of that future. 
With respect to the theater that you just described, in a very 
high-end fight, the carrier is the most survivable airfield in 
the theater, able to move 700 miles a day and really confound 
any kind of a targeting problem.
    Beyond that, sir, it gets very classified, very quickly, 
but suffice it to say that a competently run aircraft carrier, 
using distributed maritime operations concepts, can inflict a 
tremendous amount of damage against an enemy in that theater.
    Senator Hawley. Okay, I'll look forward to an opportunity 
to take that up further with you in a classified setting. I do 
think you allude to the very significant investment that these 
carriers require, and I think it's incumbent upon us to make 
sure that it's an investment that meets our strategic 
priorities.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you.
    On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thanks, to all the witnesses.
    I especially just want to offer my congratulations, Admiral 
Richardson, General Neller, for your wonderful service. You 
guys each have Virginia ties. Admiral Richardson, a Petersburg 
native.
    General Neller, congratulations on the UVA [University of 
VA] Cavaliers. That was an exciting evening. There are four 
Senators who have degrees from the University of Virginia. 
Neither of the Virginia Senators had either the talent or 
judgment to be in that number. It's King, Whitehouse, Capito, 
and Cornyn. But, it was exciting. But, again, I just want to 
offer my thanks.
    I have two questions that are sort of a followup, not to 
repeat other questions that have been asked about the refueling 
of the Truman. I associate myself with others' questions on 
these. But, one of the references was to this future-force 
study that's being done. And I want to ask two questions about 
it.
    The first one is a broad one. Do you think we're going to 
see other surprises when that is done--ship classes that are 
being considered for early retirement, or other things like 
that? What would you let us know that we ought to be watching 
for as that study is being done?
    Admiral Richardson. So, I'll tell you that, one, as we've 
talked about many times, the security environment has only 
become more complex. And so, we would see that the Force 
Structure Assessment would address that increasing demand 
signal for maritime security. I think that the next 25, 50 
years, easy, are going to put a lot of responsibilities on 
maritime security, and the U.S. Navy in particular.
    There are, additionally, new technologies. And so, we'll 
have to see where those new technologies take us. I'm of a mind 
that we need to move into that new technology space on an 
evidenced-based approach. We can't just take a leap of faith 
when our Nation's security is--you know, with the stakes that 
we're claiming. And so, we'll look for a lot of experimentation 
and evidence on which to base those decisions.
    And then there are those sorts of enduring qualities of 
payload volume and energy, and those things will allow a 
platform from which that innovation can take place. And so, 
certainly, as soon as we get any kind of inklings, I would say 
that that would be the area that we're moving. If there are 
places where legacy types of approaches fail to yield a return 
on investment, then we'll be informing you of those, as well.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you. We've had a number of classified 
briefs about both the Navy and Marine Corps' operating concepts 
as we talk about future needs. And one concern I always have is 
whether both the Navy and the Marine Corps' operating concepts 
are being represented in any future analysis of shipbuilding, 
aircraft procurement, force structure. Will both the Navy and 
the Marine Corps be signing off on the next iteration of Force 
Structure Assessment, shipbuilding plan, aircraft procurement 
strategy?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, the Commandant and I share just 
about everything. And so, something of this impact, we would 
absolutely habitually share them and address every concern that 
they would have.
    Senator Kaine. General Neller, anything you want to add on 
that?
    General Neller. On the previous comment you made, Senator, 
I think, you know, amphibious capabilities have a--an image in 
people's mind that we're going to storm the beach. That's just 
one thing that they do, and, quite frankly, 97 percent of the 
stuff they do every day is to do the second line of effort in 
the National Defense Strategy, which is maintain alliances and 
build partnerships, and also create presence out in the contact 
zone. We do need to look at the capability of those platforms 
to make sure they're more increasingly survivable and 
increasingly networked. Those are things that--the CNO and I 
sit on a Navy/Marine Corps Board. Our staffs bring us these 
issues. We try to stay as linked as we can through naval 
integration and make sure that the programmatics are in line 
with where we think we need to go. And I think you're going to 
see--in training and experimentations, just like we did at 
Pacific Blitz, you're going to see more and more U.S. Marine, 
U.S. Navy operations, where the two commanders are together. In 
fact, at that operation, probably the most unique thing is, 
they took their staffs and put them together as one staff. So, 
you had a blue-green staff, and so--to try to get rid of any of 
the seams or areas where there wasn't complete interoperability 
between the two forces. And I think it worked out well.
    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
    Admiral?
    Admiral Richardson. Sir, if I could come back just very 
quickly, with respect to the shipbuilding program that was 
discussed earlier, the enduring need for 38 amphib ships, our 
current shipbuilding plan gets us to 36 by fiscal year 2024, 
the 5 years.
    Senator Kaine. Right.
    Admiral Richardson. With this incremental funding authority 
that we've been discussing, we might be able to accelerate and 
get even closer to 37. And so, we're paying a great deal of 
attention to meeting that requirement.
    Senator Kaine. Excellent.
    Mr. Chair, thank you. Appreciate it.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    On behalf of Chairman Inhofe, Senator Gillibrand, please.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
    Admiral Richardson, statements from both the President and 
the Secretary of State seem to call into question this 
administration's commitment to defend our NATO allies. At the 
same time, we're building a new, low-yield nuclear missile so 
that we can more easily threaten nuclear war against Russia in 
order to protect the very allies that it is clear to me this 
administration does not care about. So, what do you think would 
make NATO feel safer? Having the United States build a new 
nuclear weapon that dangerously lowers the threshold for 
nuclear war, or have the United States commit to defending our 
allies, which has successfully kept the peace in Europe for 
almost 70 years?
    Admiral Richardson. Senator, if--ma'am, I'm sorry--if I 
could answer that, I would say both----
    Senator Gillibrand. Yeah.
    Admiral Richardson.--that the Nuclear Posture Review makes 
clear that we would enhance our deterrent effect, including 
extending that to our allies with the development of these low-
yield nuclear weapons, and that would also help defend our NATO 
allies.
    Senator Gillibrand. I understand it's the Department of 
Defense's position that the low-yield nuclear weapons program 
is focused on deterrence. But, does not it also make it more 
possible that it could be used?
    Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, I think that the logic would be 
that, if there's an asymmetry in the nuclear arsenal, if you 
will, if our opponents have options that they could use that we 
have no real deterrent symmetric approach, that this imbalance 
is, in fact, the thing that might lower the threshold to use. 
And so, that is the theory behind advocating for these new 
capabilities.
    Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Spencer, we continue to see 
significant cyberattacks on the defense industrial base. More 
specifically, reports continue to show China's interest and 
success in the illicit collection of critical maritime 
technology and information through both defense contractors and 
universities directly supporting Navy research and development. 
I'm alarmed by the persistent vulnerability. What can happen if 
China continues to collect maritime information and technology 
at this rate?
    Secretary Spencer. It's disastrous, Senator.
    Senator Gillibrand. What concrete steps has the Navy taken 
to mitigate and counter these threats?
    Secretary Spencer. That was the reason, Senator, for 
setting up the Cybersecurity Review, which was just delivered 
to me 3 weeks ago, and we're now rolling out the plan.
    Senator Gillibrand. And how is the Navy collaborating with 
the intelligence community, academia, and industry to improve 
the defense of Navy-affiliated contractors and universities?
    Secretary Spencer. That is actually in the plan, Senator, 
which--I'm more than happy to brief you and/or this Committee 
at any time. That is the key. It's not simply one avenue. It's 
the whole universe of players.
    Senator Gillibrand. Can you expand a little bit on 
potential fixes that can help the Navy more effectively protect 
maritime information?
    Secretary Spencer. CNO will weigh in, here, for a second.
    Admiral Richardson. Ma'am, if I could, just to support the 
Secretary, a lot of this has to do with just ensuring that our 
contractual arrangements with academia, industry, includes 
measures to secure their, you know, cyberspace, if you will, 
right? And so, a lot of this is making sure that there's 
increasing accountability by prime contractors for their 
subcontractors' performance. As Senator King illuminated, a lot 
of that vulnerability comes through the subs. Strengthening the 
security and oversight by making sure that data is encrypted, 
both at rest on those servers and in transit, dual-factor 
authentication. Some of this is pretty low-hanging fruit----
    Secretary Spencer. Web.
    Admiral Richardson.--and well-known things. But, ensuring 
that they are contractually required, and that there is a 
response mechanism and allowance for oversight there, are some 
of the measures we've already taken.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Admiral. And will you please 
submit that report to the Committee, and to me particularly, so 
I can read it? Thank you.
    Admiral Richardson. Most definitely, Senator.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Admiral Richardson. On May 28, 2019, a copy of the 
Secretary of the Navy's Cybersecurity Readiness Review of March 
2019 was delivered to your office. The classified addendum has 
been provided to the Committee and can be accesses via the 
Security Manager.

    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
    General Neller, for a variety of reasons, including current 
civilian-sector employment numbers, the military's having a 
tough time meeting its own recruiting goals. We've heard, too, 
about the portion of young Americans who do not meet medical 
fitness and education standards to join the Armed Forces, 
shrinking the pool of potential recruits. At the same time, the 
President's proposed budget would slash money from domestic 
agencies that directly address these challenges, programs to 
support childhood nutrition, public education, healthcare for 
low-income families, and others. Do you agree it's possible for 
cuts to domestic spending to further limit the number of 
Americans qualified for military service?
    General Neller. Senator, I'd have to speculate on that, but 
you know as well as I do that less than 30 percent of the 
American youth that are qualified--are qualified to join our 
military. Now, you take the propensity of those in that 30 
percent, and you get a smaller number. That said, I can only 
speak for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has been 
successful in making our recruiting goals and maintaining our 
quality of those applicants to become marines, since 2006. Our 
recruiters work very, very hard, and it's not easy to do. But, 
clearly, anything that we can do within the Nation to increase 
the health, the educational level of our youth, of our 
citizenry, would make it easier and better for us to find more 
and more people that were qualified to serve in the military.
    Senator Gillibrand. We had hearings--just to close the 
loop, Mr. Chairman--in the Ag Committee specifically on this 
issue, because obesity just continues to rise. And so, the 
importance of Food Stamps became obvious, because if you are a 
family on Food Stamps and you cut your nutrition amount, the 
last week of every month, they can't get fresh fruits and 
vegetables at an affordable price, so they eat high-carb, high-
fat foods that tend to be very inexpensive. And the actual 
consequence of hunger is obesity.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you for--all for your service.
    Chairman Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
    And thank all three witnesses. It's been good. I think 
we've accomplished a lot, a lot of interest. And we thank you 
for your time and your effort and your service.
    [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
                      attack submarine maintenance
    1. Senator Rounds. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, at the 
Seapower Hearing in November, I asked a series of questions about 
submarine maintenance, but received no answers then nor when my staff 
followed up with your staff. I asked about subs in dry dock and the 
queue--and the wait to get into the queue--but the bottom line is that 
the Navy has a tremendous submarine maintenance throughput problem. As 
a result, you have ``out-sourced'' three and they are over a year late 
for completion, with approximately $400 million in cost overruns. 
Consequently, a fourth--the Boise - will be delayed another year, which 
means it probably won't come out of maintenance until fiscal year 
2022--6 to 7 years since its last deployment. With only half of the 
INDOPACOM submarine requirement for attack submarines being met and 
submarines retiring faster than they can be built through the 2020s, I 
view this as an extremely grave matter. What has the Navy planned to 
address this situation--and what help do you need from Congress to 
solve it?
    Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. Thank you for the 
questions Senator and for your continued interest in our attack 
submarines. In our public yards, overall performance on aircraft 
carrier (CVN) and submarine maintenance is improving, with the days of 
maintenance delay and the amount of work carried over from year-to-year 
dropping each of the past three years from historic highs in 2016. For 
example, with the recent early delivery of USS Nimitz (CVN 68) from 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) we have now delivered eight of nine 
CVN maintenance availabilities on time including the last seven in a 
row at PSNS. In addition, four of nine current attack submarine 
availabilities in the Naval Shipyards are tracking to on-time delivery. 
One contributing factor for our success includes growing the organic 
workforce at the four Naval Shipyards to a total of 36,100. To account 
for the less-experienced workforce (i.e., 56 percent of the production 
workforce has less than five years of experience), the Naval Shipyards 
implemented new training approaches. These approaches included 
streamlining training curriculums, adding/improving learning centers to 
accelerate proficiency development through modern training techniques 
such as virtual reality trainers, and increasing the amount of hands-on 
learning. Additional contributing factors include setting more 
realistic and achievable resource/overtime strategies, increasing the 
discipline and fidelity of our planning processes, and improving our 
learning centers and sharing of lessons learned across shipyards. 
Despite these recent successes, the Navy shares your concern for 
submarine maintenance throughput. We continue working through Naval 
Shipyard availabilities with already-incurred maintenance delays, 
little margin to accommodate new work, and avoidable performance 
issues. Current challenges include: USS Jefferson City (Pearl Harbor)--
283 days late--projected completion date 12/1/19 USS Springfield 
(Portsmouth)--217 days late--projected completion date 7/22/19 USS New 
Hampshire (Portsmouth)--164 days late--projected completion date 7/15/
19 USS New Mexico (Portsmouth)--92 days late--projected completion date 
11/1/19 USS Virginia (Portsmouth)--59 days late--projected completion 
date 3/3/21 Further, as you note the two qualified private shipyards 
are challenged to execute attack submarine maintenance on time and on 
budget. The Navy has taken several actions to improve the situation. 
These actions include partnering with Huntington Ingalls Industries and 
Electric Boat to learn from these challenges and share lessons learned; 
driving USS Helena's (SSN 725) availability to completion by providing 
more direct government oversight; and conducting a bottom-up review of 
the USS Boise (SSN 764) work package. The Boise work package needs 
reassessment given the significant growth experienced on USS Montpelier 
(SSN 765), Helena, and USS Columbus (SSN 762) as well as the 
anticipated growth due to the extended idle time. Going forward, the 
Navy expects improved performance across all of our public shipyard 
availabilities based on the actions described above, use of improved 
and predictive data analytics, and implementation of the Navy Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP). In February 2018, the Navy 
delivered the SIOP to Congress. Since then, we have been executing the 
groundwork needed to redesign our Naval Shipyards to improve 
productivity by upgrading and repairing dry-docks, replacing obsolete 
capital equipment, and improving workflow within the shipyards. This 
summer we will receive the first digital twin of a shipyard that will 
serve as the springboard to evaluating what we can change to improve 
workflow and productivity. Finally, you asked what help Congress could 
provide. To start, the Navy has identified additional funding required 
for submarine maintenance in the Chief of Naval Operations Unfunded 
Priorities List (UPL) submitted with the President's fiscal year 2020 
budget. This funding supports three attack submarine maintenance 
availabilities; Boise, USS Hartford (SSN 768), and Columbus. As the 
Navy completes the Boise work package reassessment, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the initial budget estimate was too low. The 
Navy will keep Congress informed if/how the Boise reassessment affects 
the UPL topline. Additionally, passing the fiscal year 2020 budget on 
time, coupled with Congress' continued support for the SIOP and the 
Navy's efforts to balance the workload between public and private 
sector will help to improve the situation. An on-time budget is very 
beneficial as a delay in funding could affect not only maintenance 
availabilities, but also a number of SIOP efforts planned for next 
year.
                               __________
             Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                            industrial base
    2. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Spencer, the recently released annual 
report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of 
Naval Vessels states that ``over the last 60 years, 14 defense-related 
new construction shipyards have closed, 3 have left the defense 
industry and one new shipyard has opened.'' Can you elaborate on the 
efforts the Navy is taking on to rebuild this industrial base? What is 
the timeline for these efforts? What help does the Navy need to 
increase the industrial supplier base?
    Secretary Spencer. The Navy's current and future approach 
recognizes the importance of maintaining stability within the 
industrial and supplier base. Historical boom and bust cycles of Navy 
ship construction contributed to the 14 shipyard closures over the last 
60 years. The Navy is working to preserve our current shipbuilding 
capacity through stable shipbuilding procurement profiles that will 
foster a healthy and stable industrial base and will allow for 
additional growth as required. The current shipbuilders are sufficient 
to meet the Navy's demand. The Navy is focused on understanding the 
capacity and capability shortfalls at the lower levels of the supply 
chain. Consistent annual funding in the shipbuilding account is 
foundational to sustaining predictable workload and capacity. Long-term 
contracting arrangements, such as Multi Year Procurements, Block Buys, 
and serial production support the industrial and supplier base, as 
exemplified in Virginia, DDG-51, LCS, CVN, and AOs. The Navy is 
partnering with industry to define and establish workable requirements 
and is working with Congress to sustain predictable profiles. These 
supportive relationships will continue to promote efficiency through 
capital improvement and expansion, research and development, and 
sustainment of a world-class workforce. We appreciate the congressional 
support for industrial base initiatives. Funds appropriated in fiscal 
year 2018, $225 million for Virginia-class, and in fiscal year 2019, 
$225 million for Columbia-class, will further strengthen the industrial 
base.

    3. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Spencer, the President's Fiscal Year 
2020 Budget update to report to Congress on Submarine Depot Maintenance 
released in March 2019 stated that ``Lack of material availability . . 
. has contributed to an increased reliance on cannibalization of 
material from operational platforms in support of maintenance 
schedules. In a typical Virginia-class depot maintenance availability, 
over 100 items are acquired through this cannibalization process. This 
is unplanned work that adds to the maintenance requirements and 
generates a rolling requirement for the follow-on availability.'' The 
report goes on to mention a material forecasting tool to be developed 
and deployed at all public shipyards that will enable earlier 
identification of material, to provide early procurement options and 
reduce risk of unavailable material. This tool partially addresses the 
problem by providing early procurement options--however, this does not 
address the supplier base; what else is the Navy doing to address 
limited availability of Virginia-class submarine parts?
    Secretary Spencer. In addition to material forecasting, the in-
service Strategic and Attack Submarine Program Office is evaluating 
opportunities to leverage material management efforts implemented by 
new construction programs for improving original equipment manufacturer 
material support to follow-on submarine planned maintenance 
availabilities. This evaluation is in an early stage but can 
potentially result in better notification to industry of planned 
material purchases and address material shortfalls for submarines in 
repair.
                               __________
           Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                       virginia-class submarines
    4. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, as you know, we have only 
a few years until our excess submarine production capacity is primarily 
devoted to Columbia-class. Do you agree that it is important to seize 
this window of opportunity to boost our fast-attack Submarine inventory 
by adding a third submarine in fiscal year 2020?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes, attack submarines are critical to the 
National Defense Strategy, and adding a third submarine in fiscal year 
2020 helps in achieving the 66 submarine requirement sooner. Adding a 
third submarine in this fiscal year also demonstrates our commitment to 
the industrial base, to expand production, and better balances the 
total shipbuilding procurement funding over the next five years as the 
Navy begins to build Columbia-class submarines.

    5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, does adding this 
additional submarine help reduce the risk of an upcoming fast-attack 
submarine capability gap as Los Angeles-class submarines reach 
retirement?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes, it does. The Navy is relying on a steady 
state production of at least two attack submarines (SSNs) per year with 
Virginia-class submarines (VCS) being delivered within contractual 
requirements to reach the force structure requirement of 66 SSNs. The 
addition of a third VCS in fiscal year (FY) 2020 takes advantage of the 
available labor resources in the industrial base prior to the start of 
Columbia-class construction in fiscal year 2021 and gets us to our 
inventory requirement of 66 attack submarines sooner.

    6. Senator Blumenthal. Admiral Richardson, I was encouraged by your 
statement in written testimony that all force structure analyses agree 
we must build a bigger Navy. Is the 3rd Virginia-class submarine in 
this year's budget a result of the Navy taking action on this 
consensus?
    Admiral Richardson. Yes, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and 
the Navy Strategy provide the overarching high-level requirements for 
all our shipbuilding budget decisions to build the Navy the Nation 
Needs, the Navy's enduring plan for building and sustaining a lethal, 
resilient force through balanced investments across readiness, 
capability, and capacity. Attack submarines are critical enablers of 
the NDS and represent one of the Nation's most lethal asymmetric 
advantages. Numerically, attack submarines remain the furthest from the 
inventory objective. Adding a third submarine in fiscal year 2020 shows 
our commitment to the industrial base to expand production, better 
balances the total shipbuilding procurement funding over the next five 
years as the Navy also begins to build Columbia-class submarines, and 
gets us to our inventory requirement of 66 attack submarines sooner.

    7. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, Do you believe that 
industrial base workforce development initiatives are important to meet 
the increased demand for submarines over the coming years?
    Secretary Spencer. Yes, it is vitally important to develop and 
maintain the submarine workforce to meet the demands for the Virginia-
class and the Columbia-class partners. The Navy is collaborating with 
our industry partners to ensure we meet the needs of the programs.
                                 ch-53
    8. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, given your urgent need 
for this aircraft--and the known reality that the industrial base does 
not react well to declines in production ramps for new programs--would 
you support 2 additional CH-53K's this year to maintain a consistent 
annual production rate?
    Secretary Spencer. Thank you for your interest. I support the 
President's Budget of six aircraft in fiscal year 2020. This budget 
provides the best balance of delivering needed capability to the Marine 
Corps while ensuring we have an achievable production profile.

    9. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is there any heavy lift 
helicopter that has the capabilities of the CH-53K King Stallion? Are 
you confident that this program will deliver the capabilities the 
Marine Corps needs for the heavy lift mission?
    General Neller. The CH-53K King Stallion will be capable of 
delivering the vertical Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at a range of 
110NM from ship to objective. This 110NM metric has been established as 
the optimal range of our modern aviation platforms, such as the MV-22, 
the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z. Today's legacy CH-53E is limited in its 
ability to perform at this range. The enhancement in lift and range 
delivered by the CH-53K fully leverages the capability of the Aviation 
Combat Element (ACE) and thereby the entire Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF).

    10. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, I understand that the King 
Stallion has roughly 3 times the lift capability of the legacy CH-
53E's. How will this game-changing upgrade transform the Marine Corp's 
operational capability on the battlefield?
    General Neller. The CH-53K King Stallion will be capable of 
delivering the vertical Battalion Landing Team (BLT) at a range of 
110NM from ship to objective. This 110NM metric has been established as 
the optimal range of our modern aviation platforms, such as the MV-22, 
the UH-1Y and the AH-1Z. Today's legacy CH-53E is limited in its 
ability to perform at this range. The enhancement in lift and range 
delivered by the CH-53K fully leverages the capability of the Aviation 
Combat Element (ACE) and thereby the entire Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF).
                             climate change
    11. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, I am concerned that top 
U.S. military officials have stated publicly that climate change is a 
significant security threat, but that President Trump's White House 
continues to challenge the scientific consensus that human activity is 
the primary driver of climate change. Are you concerned that the Trump 
Administration is undermining the military's efforts to address and 
respond to the threats of climate change?
    Secretary Spencer. The Department of Navy has always considered a 
wide-range of risks, including climate change, and has a proven record 
of planning and preparing for such threats.

    12. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, recently, Pentagon 
spokesman Johnny Michael said in an email that the Pentagon will 
``focus on ensuring it remains ready and able to adapt to a wide 
variety of threats--regardless of the source.'' How is the Navy 
planning to address the impact of climate change in its worldwide 
missions?
    Secretary Spencer. Naval missions under the authority of the 
geographic combatant commands consider risk assessment and mitigation, 
diversity, connectivfity, reserves, and adequate redundancy in all 
plans and operations. In support of Arctic operations, the Office of 
Naval Research, Arctic and Global Prediction Program, is working to 
extend the capability to predict environmental conditions and 
disruptive weather events to several weeks and months in advance. The 
ability to provide useful forecasts of the operational environment, 
such as the location of the sea ice edge, the characteristics and 
evolution of sea ice, and the wind and wave conditions will be critical 
to reduce operational risk in the Arctic. The Department of the Navy 
launches its worldwide missions from installations, where resiliency is 
addressed through the integration of weather and climate considerations 
into existing plans and processes, using partnerships with other 
federal agencies, state governments, local governments, non-
governmental organizations, and local communities to increase 
preparedness.

    13. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, does the Navy's budget 
request this year adequately request resources to ensure climate 
resilience? Do you require additional resources to effectively combat 
the effects of climate change?
    Secretary Spencer. Climate and environmental resilience efforts 
span all levels and lines of effort, and are not framed as a separate 
program. Resources for assessing and responding to climate impacts are 
provided within existing Department of the Navy missions, funds, and 
capabilities.

    14. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Spencer, as you are aware, 
climate change is a ``threat multiplier'' that inflames global 
political instability and exacerbates floods, food shortages, and 
droughts--all of which exacerbate humanitarian crises and increase the 
likelihood of armed conflict. How will Navy strategy evolve to 
incorporate these realities as the impacts of climate change become 
more severe?
    Secretary Spencer. Climate and environmental resilience efforts 
span all levels and lines of effort, and are not framed as a separate 
program. Resources for assessing and responding to climate impacts are 
provided within existing Department of the Navy (DON) missions, funds, 
and capabilities and subsumed under existing risk management processes 
consistent with the 2018 National Defense Strategy priorities to build 
a more lethal force, strengthen alliances and attract new partners, and 
reform the Department's processes. To achieve these goals, DON must be 
able to adapt current and future operations to address the impacts of a 
variety of threats and conditions, including those from weather and 
natural events. To that end, DON factors in the effects of the 
environment into its mission planning and execution to build 
resilience.
                troop deployments to the southern border
    15. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, has Acting Secretary 
Shanahan provided the assistance you requested to repair structures 
compromised by Hurricane Florence?
    General Neller. The Marine Corps currently faces unfunded 
requirements of $778 million to fully recover from Hurricanes Florence 
and Michael. We have worked closely with the Department of the Navy, 
Secretary of Defense and Congressional committees to successfully 
identify funding solutions that address approximately $3 billion of the 
damages. The Marine Corps will continue working with the key 
stakeholders to identify additional solutions that address the 
remaining unfunded need.

    16. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is it fair to say that the 
troop deployments to the border are coming at the expense of Marine 
Corps training or necessary hurricane repairs at Camp Lejeune?
    General Neller. In order to maintain overall readiness, Marine 
Corps units require a combination of training exercises and actual 
operations. The troop deployments to the border have contributed a 
critical portion of this equation, and in some respects have enhanced 
the readiness of the participating units by allowing them to perform 
their core missions under real-world conditions. Even with the troop 
deployments to the border, the Marine Corps has not been forced to 
cancel any training exercises. The Commandant personally checked the 
readiness of every unit on the border, and with one exception, the 
deployment had no impact on their readiness.

    17. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, are you concerned that 
these troop deployments will continue indefinitely? If that is the 
case, can you estimate the impact on readiness if the border 
deployments become the status quo?
    General Neller. No, although South West Border (SWB) operations 
have impacted some of the units providing support to the border, in the 
aggregate, the readiness impacts have been manageable. The Service has 
been able to mitigate readiness impacts through unit and personnel 
rotations. If the requirements to support the mission continue into the 
foreseeable future, the Marine Corps will continue to mitigate impacts 
to readiness through similar measures. To date, the SWB mission has not 
significantly impacted our ability to meet our global commitments.
                      future marine corps mission
    18. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, is the Marine Corps 
committed to MARSOC longterm?
    General Neller. MARSOC is a highly valued capability by both the 
Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command. Our investment in 
MARSOC, as with all of our supporting capabilities, is limited by the 
need to sustain the readiness of our statutorily mandated Marine Air 
Ground Task Forces, commensurate with modernizing those MAGTFs for 
future conflicts and relative to timely appropriated funding.

    19. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, some recently have shared 
the view that the Marine Corps needs to focus on coastal operations in 
the Indo-Pacific region? What role can MARSOC play in supporting this 
mission?
    General Neller. MARSOC is already playing a significant role in the 
Indo-Pacific region, specifically in the Philippines, while enabling 
the partner force to exert their sovereignty. These forces are 
supported by capabilities provided from MARFORPAC and III MEF in a 
greater joint force effort there. We see the daily access and placement 
MARSOC, and SOF writ large, have in the region as a forces in 
``contact,'' as greatly assisting in pre-conflict competition short of 
armed conflict shaping operations. These forces contribute to the 
intelligence picture, cultural understanding, partner force 
integration, and bring other specialized skills that can support the 
Marine Corps mission in this region. We are also working closely with 
MARSOC as we work through concepts like Expeditionary Advance Base 
Operations, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Joint 
Forcible Entry Operations. SOF, MARSOC in particular, can help prepare 
these environments now, hoping to mitigate conflict, but preparing for 
larger operations if that becomes necessary.

    20. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, what strategic advantage 
does MARSOC provide to the geographic combatant commanders that we 
would be lost if the Raiders (MARSOC) were disbanded?
    General Neller. MARSOC remains a priority effort for the Marine 
Corps. The command has played a critical role for both the Marine Corps 
and SOCOM. MARSOC is an organization that has come extremely far, in a 
relatively short amount of time, regarding the evolution of its 
warfighting capabilities. From battlefield small unit tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, to the exploration of more effective 
equipment for unmanned aerial systems, precision strike capabilities, 
advanced communications, small arms capabilities, and intelligence 
integration at the lowest levels, MARSOC consistently provides forces 
that possess unity of effort driven largely by a coherent picture of 
the battlespace. As one would expect because it has a foot in both 
camps, MARSOC is a critical enabler of the relationship between the 
Marine Corps and SOCOM and has helped bridge capability development 
efforts between our two organizations. MARSOC plays a significant role 
in migrating capability between SOF and the general purpose forces. 
Raiders have consistently demonstrated an adaptability in the face of 
changing or ambiguous situations; their ability to leverage emerging 
technologies and integrate them has created opportunities for the 
larger Service as well. Operationally, I would defer to SOCOM and the 
geographic combatant commands to answer with details on this issue, but 
would note that Raiders fill approximately 10 percent of their assigned 
missions. From a man, train and equip perspective, MARSOC forward 
deployed forces bring an organic and fully integrated capability for 
operations and all-source intelligence fusion at the lowest levels that 
allows a comprehensive and holistic approach to problem solving in all 
environments to effectively conduct the whole spectrum of special 
operations. These capabilities are extremely effective operating 
against both VEO networks, as well as near peer competitors. These 
capabilities can be tailored based on the anticipated missions, but the 
force can be rapidly altered and specifically organized and trained as 
situations and mission sets evolve. Inherent in all MARSOC deployable 
formations are an ability to conduct unilateral special operations that 
feature special insertion capabilities, precision direct action 
operations, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism missions; but 
are also well-adept and prefer to work through partner nation forces, 
other governmental agencies, and the larger joint force in counter-
insurgency and foreign internal defense conducting advise, assist, 
accompany and enable missions in order to build resilient partners in 
key areas around the globe. Bringing with them their base culture as 
marines, Raiders find a way to be highly successful and effective in 
what are often ambiguous environments. Demand for their integrated 
capabilities and expertise in these strategic impact operations 
continues to increase. From an operational perspective, Raiders have 
invariably gravitated toward the highest priority campaign activities 
within INDO PACOM, CENTCOM, and AFRICOM - the three regions comprising 
MARSOC's current regional orientation. Efforts in these three regions 
have helped shape and support larger Joint Force efforts and advance 
Service-level opportunities for integration and interoperability in 
support of both the Counter VEO mission as well as contributing to 
great power competition. One of the best examples of MARSOC's 
collaboration with the Service along the lines of Interoperability, 
Integration, and Interdependence have been its ongoing efforts in the 
Philippines, where Raiders working for SOCPAC are heavily augmented by 
MARFORPAC marines to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the 
defense of their sovereignty. We can address further specific 
operational details of MARSOC's current missions via classified medium 
if desired.

    21. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, how do you see MARSOC's 
role in great power competition and the National Defense Strategy?
    General Neller. MARSOC Proposed Answer: Understanding that SOF is 
not designed to go toe-to-toe with large Armies, there are many ways 
MARSOC can support, before and during, potential conflict with near 
peer competitors. Just recognizing that we are in constant competition, 
albeit short of open warfare, with certain countries, makes us realize 
that there are many areas we could be shaping now, with our partners 
and the rest of our own government that can have a tremendous effect. 
Similar to the greater Marine Corps role in the context of the NDS, 
MARSOC is a ``contact force.'' As such, we will be among the first 
forces to influence the initial stages in this of this competition, 
whether it goes to open conflict or not. MARSOC forward deployed forces 
bring an organic and fully integrated capability for operations and 
all-source intelligence fusion at the lowest levels that allows a 
comprehensive and holistic approach to problem solving in all 
environments to effectively conduct the whole spectrum of special 
operations. These capabilities are extremely effective operating 
against both VEO networks, as well as near peer competitors. These 
capabilities can be tailored based on the anticipated missions, but the 
force can be rapidly altered and specifically organized and trained as 
situations and mission sets evolve. In the future, MARSOC will continue 
to develop into a more versatile force that brings highly adaptable, 
intelligent, and cognitively gifted individuals to any mission set with 
seamlessly integrated capabilities to rapidly understand and impact the 
surrounding system. Leveraging small size as a strength, MARSOC can 
give a high degree of flexibility to the SOCOM Commander for the 
employment against specific mission sets, including in the great power 
competition cited in the NDS. 1. MARSOC, along with the greater SOF 
enterprise, bridges the gap between covert capabilities from the 
interagency and the larger conventional forces. 2. MARSOC enables a 
deep understanding of the operational environment across the 
interconnected network of transregional threats at all levels of 
warfare against global, regional, and local competitors. 3. Raiders are 
specifically educated and trained to work with indigenous partners. The 
history of great power competition during World War II and the Cold war 
indicate that SOF is strategically useful in leveraging these local 
partners to strengthen the effort to deter, counter, and defeat malign 
influence. 4. MARSOC, and SOF writ large, provides specialized 
unilateral capabilities not easily replicable by conventional or other 
agencies to deter, counter, and defeat global or regional powers. 5. 
MARSOC provide a creative and adaptable perspective and culture to the 
joint force to understand and resolve complex, dynamic, and uncertain 
challenges.

    22. Senator Blumenthal. General Neller, you recently stated that 
much of what your service does will not be against a near-peer 
adversary. Can you explain what you mean by this, and expound on what 
you see the Marine Corps' operational role in the next 10-20 years?
    General Neller. The Marine Corps will continue to adhere to the 
strategic guidance of the National Defense Strategy, National Military 
Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance and will orient to the pacing 
threats presented by China and Russia. The Corps will not, however, 
ignore the various roles and responsibilities espoused by title 10 and 
will continue to be America's force-in-readiness that is able to 
respond to crises, inside and outside the scope of great power 
competition, when the rest of the country is least ready to do so. In 
10-20 years, the Marine Corps will be modernized against the pacing 
threats and further integrated with the Navy and the other services to 
compete in the full spectrum of conflict.
                               __________
               Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin
                   refueling the uss harry s. truman
    23. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson, I've 
seen estimates from the Department of the Navy that refueling the 
Truman will cost between three and four billion dollars. It has been 
suggested that if Congress were to add that money on top of the 
requested budget that the navy could continue to operate the Truman. 
But recently I've seen estimates of the rest of the overhaul on the 
Truman taking $6.5 billion. With the combined operating costs of around 
$1 billion per year this puts the additional cost of operating the 
Truman for the second half of its life at over $30 billion. I'm 
assuming that these cost not been factored into the long term plans of 
the Navy due to the plan to retire the Truman. So, if Congress were to 
authorize and appropriate the $3-4 billion and push the Navy to refuel 
and continue to operate the Truman, what does this do to your long term 
procurement plans and force structure decisions?
    Secretary Spencer and Admiral Richardson. The Navy is implementing 
the President's recent decision to restore the Refueling and Complex 
Overhaul (RCOH) for USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), and is updating our 
long-term procurement plans and force structure accordingly. With the 
President's restoral decision, the Navy is reviewing the required CVN 
75 RCOH and airwing funding profile.
                columbia-class submarine cost estimates
    24. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, on 8 April, 2019, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on the 
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program detailing how it 
believes the Navy has significantly underestimated the costs of the 
Columbia program. Specifically GAO highlighted a questionable 
assumption of labor hours required for construction as well as no 
allowance for cost overruns, which are expected and typically planned 
for. GAO assesses that these and other errors could lead to billions 
more needing to be invested in the program. Can you address the 
concerns raised by this report and detail how the Navy is either 
mitigating the concerns of GAO or updating the budget accordingly?
    Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy does not agree with 
GAO's assessment. Labor hours required to construct the submarines and 
allowance for cost overruns were considered by the Navy's Cost Review 
Board on September 7, 2016. Neither factor was considered overly 
optimistic or unreliable during this assessment. Navy does concur with 
GAO's three recommendations to do the following:
      Incorporate current cost and program data and an updated 
cost risk analysis in its planned update of the Columbia-class lead 
submarine cost estimate.
      Develop a realistic and well documented estimate of 
savings from use of authorities associated with the Fund and 
incorporate the savings associated with the lead submarine into the 
Columbia lead submarine cost estimate.
      Update the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk 
analysis prior to requesting funds for lead submarine construction. The 
Navy continues to actively manage all Columbia program cost, schedule, 
and performance goals including engineering and integration risks and 
routinely briefs Navy / DOD leadership, and Congress to ensure risks 
are transparent and fully understood.
      virginia and columbia-class submarine construction timeline
    25. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, the fiscal year 2020 budget 
adds another Virginia-class submarine, and subsequently alters the 
production timeline for the Virginia-class. Specifically, I am noticing 
the addition of a third submarine in 2020. This third Virginia-class, 
according to the justification books, will be constructed in 2023, 
meaning three Virginia-class submarines will be being built that year. 
That is the year before the Navy's second Columbia-class submarine buy. 
This, coupled with troubling news reports of a Virginia program that is 
4-7 months behind schedule have me concerned that any small slips in 
the Virginia-class submarine program will have more significant second 
and third order effects in delaying the much needed Columbia-class 
submarines. How is the Navy addressing this shift in the current 
dynamic schedule environment to ensure that both programs stay on track 
despite utilizing many of the same facilities and suppliers?
    Secretary Spencer. The Navy continues to work closely with the 
nuclear shipbuilding industrial base to simultaneously support the 
Columbia-class submarine (CLB) program, and Virginia-class submarines 
(VCS). The focus remains on ensuring the nuclear shipbuilding 
enterprise's facilities, resources, and supplier base are right-sized 
through the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP) efforts to ensure a stable 
production cadence for both CLB and VCS submarines and on time 
deliveries to the Fleet. Additionally, the CLB program is utilizing 
additional authorities to execute advance construction to efficiently 
manage transition to submarine production lines for two classes. In 
preparation for CLB and VCS, the shipbuilders have invested and will 
increase their facilities to accommodate both programs. In April 2018, 
the Navy investigated options for increasing VCS production to three 
per year during the CLB gap years in response to the Department's 2016 
Force Structure Assessment requirement for 66 attack submarines. The 
assessment determined the earliest viable option to increase VCS 
production to three per year is in fiscal year (FY) 2022, and only by 
providing advance procurement funding three years in advance to allow 
for an efficient ramp up at both the shipbuilders and their suppliers. 
For the third VCS built in any year without a CLB build, manufacturing 
of critical long lead time material (LLTM) is required three years in 
advance of the third submarine construction start to support normal 
construction spans. Therefore, adding the third submarine in FY 2020 
enables purchase of LLTM to support a fiscal year 2023 construction 
start. Through the addition of a third VCS submarine to the budget in 
fiscal year 2020, the Navy is sending a predictable signal of 
forecasted workload, allowing the shipbuilders and supplier base to 
prepare and invest for the increased production of submarines 
highlighted in the FYDP. The third ship would start fabrication of LLTM 
and critical shipyard manufactured components in fiscal year 2020 and 
the entire module production cadence would be incorporated over a 
three-year period to support the added ship entering the module 
sequence cadence in fiscal year 2023. This strategy and an additional 
year of LLTM ordering will enable the industrial base to better prepare 
for the increased workload and continue improvements in capacity, 
resources and quality.
                        defense industrial base
    26. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, recent fluctuations in 
Virginia-class submarine timelines as well as aircraft carrier 
refurbishment and upgrades have raised concerns of consistency from 
these valuable defense industrial base partners. Is the Navy 
considering the defense industrial base and their need for consistency 
and forecasting when adjusting or making changes to your programs?
    Secretary Spencer. The Navy continues to work closely with the 
industrial base. Congress has been supportive of the Navy's Integrated 
Enterprise Plan across the nuclear industrial base, particularly with 
components that are common across the submarines and aircraft carriers 
with advance procurement and economic order quantity funds. This allows 
investment in those suppliers to meet the demand signal. This strategy 
is not only critical for today's shipbuilding operations, but also the 
Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP) which adds the Columbia-class on top 
of attack submarine and aircraft carrier production. The Navy's 
objective is to ensure the industrial base is ready to support this 
capacity increase, not only to produce more, but to sustain what is in 
the fleet. The Navy believes that if the industrial base is provided 
with a clear demand signal, they will invest in the planned increased 
production of submarines and aircraft carriers highlighted in the FYDP. 
By adding a third Virginia-class submarine along with other Navy 
shipbuilding to the budget in fiscal year 2020, the Navy is sending a 
predictable signal of forecasted workload, allowing vendors to prepare 
and level load their workforce.
                     cybersecurity readiness review
    27. Senator Manchin. Secretary Spencer, thank you for the 
comprehensive look at Navy Cybersecurity Readiness and the accompanying 
report. The report made a number of excellent observations and 
recommendations. What is the current plan of attack and timeline for 
the Navy to address these recommendations for significantly improving 
the cybersecurity readiness of the service and the defense industrial 
base?
    Secretary Spencer. The Department of the Navy (DON) is fully 
committed to addressing the issues raised in the Navy Cybersecurity 
Readiness Review (CRR). The DON is working in parallel across the five 
areas highlighted in the CRR (Culture, People, Structure, Process, and 
Resources), assigning a priority and accountable organization for each 
of the recommendations. The DON is working to strengthen the existing 
partnership between the DON and the defense industrial base to mitigate 
evolving cyber threats, increase communications, establish processes to 
improve information sharing of threat data and cybersecurity best 
practices, and encourage efforts to anticipate and develop protective 
measures. I am looking forward to finalizing the business plan for the 
creation and operation of the DON Cyber Special Assistant to SECNAV.

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